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Full text of "Department of State bulletin"

BOSTON 
PUBLIC 
LIBRARY 




Department 
of State 



W of State ~1W ~iW j & 

bulletin 



Oviobvr 1978 



ie Official Monthly Record of United States Foreign Policy / Volume 78 / Number 2019 



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nppartmvnt of State 

bulletin 

Volume 78 / Number 2019 / October 1978 



Cover Photo: 

President Sadat 
President Carter 
Prime Minister Begin 



The Department of State Bulletin, 
published by the Office of Public Com- 
munication in the Bureau of Public 
Affairs, is the official record of U.S. 
foreign policy. Its purpose is to provide 
the public, the Congress, and govern- 
ment agencies with information on 
developments in U.S. foreign relations 
and the work of the Department of 
State and the Foreign Service. 

The Bulletin's contents include 
major addresses and news conferences 
of the President and the Secretary of 
State; statements made before congres- 
sional committees by the Secretary 
and other senior State Department of- 
ficials; special features and articles on 
international affairs; selected press re- 
leases issued by the White House, the 
Department, and the U.S. Mission to 
the United Nations; and treaties and 
other agreements to which the United 
States is or may become a party. 

The Secretary of State has deter- 
mined that the publication of this peri- 
odical is necessary in the transaction of 
the public business required by law of 
this Department. Use of funds for 
printing this periodical has been ap- 
proved by the Director of the Office 
of Management and Budget through 
January 31, 1981. 

NOTE: Contents of this publication 
are not copyrighted and items con- 
tained herein may be reprinted. Cita- 
tion of the Department oe State 
Bulletin as the source will be appre- 
ciated. The Bulletin is indexed in the 
Readers' Guide to Periodical Litera- 
ture. 

For sale by the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Print- 
ing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402 

Price: 

12 issues plus annual index — 

$18.00 (domestic) $22.50 (foreign) 

Single copy— 

$1.40 (domestic) $1.80 (foreign) 



CYRUS R VANCE 
Secretary of State 

HODDING CARTER III 

Assistant Secretary for Public Affai 

JOHN CLARK KIMBALL 

Consulting Editor 

PHYLLIS A YOUNG 

Editor 

COLLEEN SUSSMAN 

Assistant Editor 



CONTENTS 



A FRAMEWORK FOR MIDDLE EAST PEACE 

President Carter's Address to the Congress 

Remarks by President Carter, Viee President Mandate, President Sadat, and Prime 

Minister Begin 
Joint Statement 
Texts of Documents and Accompanying Letters 



THE PRESIDENT 

12 News Conference of August 17 

AFRICA 

15 Peaceful Solutions to Conflicts in 
Namibia and Southern Rhodesia 
f Warren Christopher) 

ARMS CONTROL 

17 SALT II— The Home Stretch (Paul C. 
Warnke) 

24 U.S. and Soviet Strategic Capability 
Through the Mid- 1 980 's (ACDA 
Report) 

ECONOMICS 

26 Prospects for International Action on 
Natural Rubber (Julius L. Katz) 

28 GPO Sales Publications 

EUROPE 

29 The Potential of the Helsinki 

Dialogue (Matthew Nimetz) 
34 Most-Favored-Nation Tariff Status for 
Hungary and Romania (George S. 
Vest) 

NARCOTICS 

37 Narcotics Control Efforts in Central 
America and the Caribbean (Joseph 
Linneman) 



NUCLEAR POLICY 

38 Balancing Nonproliferation and 
Energy Security (Joseph S. Nve, 
Jr.) 

PACIFIC 

43 U.S. Relations With the Pacific Is- 
lands (Richard C. Holbrooke) 

POPULATION 

45 World Population: The Silent 
Explosion — Part 1 (Marshall 
Green, Robert A. Fearer. Lydia K 
Giffler) 

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 

54 Science and Technology — Their In- 
teraction With Foreign Policy 
(Lucy Wilson Benson) 

UNITED NATIONS 

56 The Role of ECOSOC in International 
Economic Dialogue (Andrew 

Young) 

TREATIES 

60 Current Actions 

62 PRESS RELEASES 
INDEX 



Boston Publi: Library 
Superintendent of Documents 

OCT o 1 1973 



DEPOSITORY 





Clockwise from top: 

President Curler holds a pi e summit foreign policy luncheon with (from left to 

right) Secretary Vance, Viee President Mondale, Secretary Brown. Presidential 

aide Jordan, U.S. Ambassador to Egypt tilts, and U.S. Ambassador to Israel 

Lewis ( National Set urity Adviser Brzezinski is seated between Mr Jordan and 

Mr. Eilts.). 

President Carter and Israeli Defense Minister Weizman. 

Secretary Vance and National Security Adviser Brzezinski 

Prime Minister Begin and President Sadat (in the bah om on the right) receive a 

standing ovation during the President's address to the joint session oj the 

Congress. 

President Carter and President Sadat . 



A FRAMEWORK FOR MIDDLE EAST PEACE 



In August 8. 1978, President Carter announced that Egyptian President 
\ar al-Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menahem Begin had accepted an 
tation to meet at Camp David, Maryland, to seek a framework for peace in 
I Middle East. The meetings were held September 5-17. 

following are President Carter's address before a joint session of the Con- 
Uss. his remarks upon departing for Camp David, the exchange of remarks 
wteen Vice President Mondale and President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin 
j'fl the latters' separate arrivals at Andrews Air Force Base, a joint statement, 
I remarks by the three leaders at the ceremony when they signed the two 
%uments, and the texts of those documents and accompanying letters. 



RESIDENT'S ADDRESS 
IFORE THE CONGRESS, 
}PT. 18' 

/ice President Mondale. Speaker 
Weill, distinguished Members of the 
I ted States Congress. Justices of the 
fireme Court, other leaders of our 
jat nation, ladies and gentlemen: It's 
\n more than 2,000 years since there 
|; peace between Egypt and a free 
I ish nation. If our present expecta- 
i is are realized, this year we shall 
I such peace again. 
! "he first thing I would like to do is 
tgive tribute to the two men who 
lie this impossible dream now be- 
lie a real possibility — the two great 
Hers with whom I have met for the 
I 2 weeks at Camp David — first, 
Ssident Anwar Sadat of Egypt and 
I other, of course, is Prime Minister 
il nahem Begin of the nation of 
lei. 
know that all of you would agree 
t these are two men of great per- 
al courage, representing nations of 
>ples who are deeply grateful to 
m for the achievement which they 
7 e realized. And I am personally 
jteful to them for what they have 
lie. 

1 \t Camp David we sought a peace 
It is not only of vital importance to 
|ir own two nations but to all the 
|>ple of the Middle East, to all the 
J>ple of the United States, and, in- 
l:d, to all the world as well, 
rhe world prayed for the success of 
I" efforts, and I am glad to announce 
t you that these prayers have been 
iiwered. 

I've come to discuss with you to- 
>;ht what these two leaders have ac- 
mplished, and what this means to all 
us. 

The United States has had no choice 
Jt to be deeply concerned about the 
Sddle East and to try to use our influ- 
ce and our efforts to advance the 



cause of peace. For the last 30 years, 
through four wars, the people of this 
troubled region have paid a terrible 
price in suffering and division and 
hatred and bloodshed. No two nations 
have suffered more than Egypt and Is- 
rael. But the dangers and the costs of 
conflicts in this region for our own 
nation have been great as well. We 
have longstanding friendships among 
the nations there and the peoples of the 
region, and we have profound moral 
commitments which are deeply rooted 
in our values as a people. 

The strategic location of these coun- 
tries and the resources that they possess 
mean that events in the Middle East 
directly affect people everywhere. We 
and our friends could not be indifferent 
if a hostile power were to establish 
domination there. In few areas of the 
world is there a greater risk that a local 
conflict could spread among other na- 
tions adjacent to them and then perhaps 



erupt into a tragic confrontation be- 
tween us superpowers ourselves. 

Our people have come to understand 
that unfamiliar names — like Sinai, 
Aqaba, Sharm el Sheikh. Ras en Naqb. 
Gaza, the West Bank of Jordan — can 
have a direct and immediate bearing on 
our own well-being as a nation and our 
hope for a peaceful world. 

That is why we in the United States 
cannot afford to be idle bystanders and 
why we have been full partners in the 
search for peace and why it is so vital 
to our nation that these meetings at 
Camp David have been a success. 

Through the long years of conflict, 
four main issues have divided the par- 
ties involved. 

• One is the nature of peace — 
whether peace will simply mean that 
the guns are silenced, that the bombs 
no longer fall, that the tanks cease to 
roll, or whether it will mean that the 
nations of the Middle East can deal 
with each other as neighbors and as 
equals and as friends, with a full range 
of diplomatic and cultural and eco- 
nomic and human relations between 
them. That's been the basic question. 
The Camp David agreement has de- 
fined such relationships, I'm glad to 
announce to you, between Israel and 
Egypt. 

• The second main issue is providing 
for the security of all parties involved, 
including, of course, our friends the 



President Carter addresses the Congress; behind him Vice President Mondale and Speaker of rhe 
House Thomas P. O' Neitl applaud. 




Israelis, so that none of them need fear 
attack or military threats from one 
another. When implemented, the Camp 
David agreement, I'm glad to announce 
to you, will provide for such mutual 
security. 

• The third is the question of agree- 
ment on secure and recognized bound- 
aries, the end of military occupation, 
and the granting of self-government or 
else the return to other nations of ter- 
ritories which have been occupied by 
Israel since the 1967 conflict. The 
Camp David agreement, I'm glad to 
announce to you, provides for the 
realization of all these goals. 

• And finally, there is the painful 
human question of the fate of the 
Palestinians who live or who have lived 
in these disputed regions. The Camp 
David agreement guarantees that the 
Palestinian people may participate in 
the resolution of the Palestinian prob- 
lem in all its aspects, a commitment 
that Israel has made in writing and 
which is supported and appreciated, 
I'm sure, by all the world. 

Over the last 18 months, there has 
been, of course, some progress on 
these issues. Egypt and Israel came 
close to agreeing about the first 
issue — the nature of peace. They then 
saw that the second and third 
issues — that is, withdrawal and 
security — were intimately connected, 
closely entwined. But fundamental di- 
visions still remained in other areas — 
about the fate of the Palestinians, the 
future of the West Bank and Gaza, and 
the future of Israeli settlements in oc- 
cupied Arab territories. 

We all remember the hopes for peace 



that were inspired by President Sadat's 
initiative — that great and historic 
visit to Jerusalem last November that 
thrilled the world and by the warm and 
genuine personal response of Prime 
Minister Begin and the Israeli people 
and by the mutual promise between 
them, publicly made, that there would 
be no more war. These hopes were 
sustained when Prime Minister Begin 
reciprocated by visiting Ismailia on 
Christmas Day. 

That progress continued but at a 
slower and slower pace through the 
early part of the year. And by early 
summer, the negotiations had come to a 
standstill once again. 

It was this stalemate and the prospect 
for an even worse future that prompted 
me to invite both President Sadat and 
Prime Minister Begin to join me at 
Camp David. 

They accepted, as you know, in- 
stantly, without delay, without precon- 
ditions, without consultation even be- 
tween them. It's impossible to over- 
state the courage of these two men or 
the foresight they have shown. Only 
through high ideals, through com- 
promises of words and not principle, 
and through a willingness to look deep 
into the human heart and to understand 
the problems and hopes and dreams of 
one another can progress in a difficult 
situation like this ever be made. 

That's what these men and their wise 
and diligent advisers who are here with 
us tonight have done during the last 13 
days. 

When this conference began, I said 
that the prospects for success were re- 
mote. Enormous barriers of ancient 



Prime Minister Begin, President Carter, and President Sadat. 




Department of State Bulhp 

history and nationalism and suspic 
would have to be overcome if we w 
to meet our objectives. 

But President Sadat and Pri 
Minister Begin have overcome th 
barriers, exceeded our fondest exp 
tations, and have signed two agr 
ments that hold out the possibility 
resolving issues that history had tau 
us could not be resolved. 

The first of these documents is ei 
tied "A Framework for Peace in 
Middle East Agreed at Camp Davit 
It deals with a comprehensive set! 
ment, comprehensive settlement 
tween Israel and all her neighbors, 
well as the difficult question of 
Palestinian people and the future of 
West Bank and the Gaza area. 

The Israeli military government o 
these areas will be withdrawn and \ 
be replaced with a self-government 
the Palestinians who live there. A 
Israel has committed that this gove 
ment will have full autonomy. Pit 
Minister Begin said to me seve 
times, not partial autonomy, but 1 
autonomy. 

Israeli forces will be withdrawn : 
redeployed into specified locations 
protect Israel's security. The Pales 
ians will further participate in de I 
mining their own future through M s 
in which their own elected represei 9 
tives, the inhabitants of the West B I 
and Gaza, will negotiate with Eg I 
and Israel and Jordan to determine j 
final status of the West Bank and Ga ! 
Israel has agreed, has commit n 
themselves, that the legitimate right; V 
the Palestinian people will be rec I 
nized. After the signing of t s 
framework last night, and during 
negotiations concerning the establi 
ment of the Palestinian se 
government, no new Israeli settleme 
will be established in this area. T 
future settlements issue will be decic 
among the negotiating parties. 

The final status of the West Be 
and Gaza will be decided before I 
end of the 5-year transitional peri 
during which the Palestinian Arabs vj( 
have their own government, as part o ' 
negotiation which will produce a pe* 
treaty between Israel and Jorda, 
specifying borders, withdrawal, I 
those very crucial issues. 

These negotiations will be based I 
all the provisions and the principles f 
Security Council Resolution 242, wl 
which you all are so familiar. Tj 
agreement on the final status of tht5 
areas will then be submitted to a v<| 
by the representatives of the inhabitaii 
of the West Bank and Gaza, and th/ 
will have the right for the first tiif 
in their history — the Palestinii 



"I tober 1978 

jple — to decide how they will gov- 
i themselves permanently. 
We also believe, of course, all of us. 
it there should be a just settlement of 
i problems of displaced persons and 
ugees, which takes into account ap- 
>priate U.N. resolutions. 
Finally, this document also outlines 
variety of security arrangements to 
mnforce peace between Israel and her 
Highbors . 

iThis is, indeed, a comprehensive and 

f r framework for peace in the Middle 

1st. and I'm glad to report this to you. 

iThe second agreement is entitled a 

| ; ramework for the Conclusion of a 

lace Treaty Between Egypt and Is- 

ll." It returns to Egypt its full exer- 

|;e of sovereignty over the Sinai 

Ininsula and establishes several secu- 

1/ zones, recognizing carefully that 

J/ereignty right for the protection of 

I parties. It also provides that Egypt 

ill extend full diplomatic recognition 

| Israel at the time the Israelis com- 

:te an interim withdrawal from most 

the Sinai, which will take place be- 

sen 3 months and 9 months after the 

^elusion of the peace treaty. And the 

ace treaty is to be fully negotiated 

J signed no later than 3 months from 

t night. 

I think I should also report that 

ime Minister Begin and President 

i dat have already challenged each 

Iter to conclude the treaty even ear- 

kr. This final conclusion of a peace 

aty will be completed late in De- 

imber. And it would be a wonderful 

i iristmas present for the world. 

Final and complete withdrawal of all 

iaeli forces will take place between 2 

id 3 years following the conclusion of 

I j peace treaty. 

■ While both parties are in total 
(reement on all the goals that I have 
st described to you, there is one issue 
I which agreement has not yet been 
i ached. Egypt states that agreement to 
[move the Israeli settlements from 
^yptian territory is a prerequisite to a 
, ace treaty. Israel says that the issue 
I the Israeli settlements should be re- 
ived during the peace negotiations 
emselves. 

Now. within 2 weeks with each 
ember of the Knesset, or the Israeli 
irliament acting as individuals, not 
>nstrained by party loyalty, the Knes- 
t will decide on the issue of the set- 
:ments. Our own government's posi- 
on, my own personal position, is 
ell-known on this issue and has been 
)nsistent. It is my strong hope, my 
rayer, that the question of Israeli set- 
ements on Egyptian territory will not 
b the final obstacle to peace. 
None of us should underestimate the 
istoric importance of what has already 



been done. This is the first time that an 
Arab and an Israeli leader have signed 
a comprehensive framework for peace. 
It contains the seeds of a time when the 
Middle East, with all its vast potential, 
may be a land of human richness and 
fulfillment, rather than a land of bitter- 
ness and continued conflict. No region 
in the world has greater natural and 
human resources than this one. And 
nowhere have they been more heavily 
weighed down by intense hatred and 
frequent war. These agreements hold 
out the real possibility that this burden 
might finally be lifted. 



On September 28. 1978. the Israeli 
Knesset approved the Camp David 
agreements by a vote of 85 to 19, with 16 
abstentions. 



But we must also not forget the 
magnitude of the obstacles that still 
remain. The summit exceeded our 
highest expectations — but we know 
that it left many difficult issues which 
are still to be resolved. These issues 
will require careful negotiation in the 
months to come. The Egyptian and Is- 
raeli people must recognize the tangi- 
ble benefits that peace will bring and 
support the decisions their leaders have 
made so that a secure and a peaceful 
future can be achieved for them. The 
American public, you and I, must also 
offer our full support to those who have 
made decisions that are difficult and 
those who have very difficult decisions 
still to make. 

What lies ahead for all of us is to 
recognize the statesmanship that Presi- 
dent Sadat and Prime Minister Begin 
have shown and to invite others in that 
region to follow their example. I have 
already last night invited the other 
leaders of the Arab world to help sus- 
tain progress toward a comprehensive 
peace. We must also join in an effort to 
bring an end to the conflict and the 
terrible suffering in Lebanon. 

This is a subject that President Sadat 
discussed with me many times while I 
was in Camp David with him. And the 
first time that the three of us met to- 
gether, this was a subject of heated 
discussion. On the way to Washington 
last night in the helicopter, we mutu- 
ally committed ourselves to join with 
other nations, with the Lebanese people 
themselves, all factions, with President 
Sarkis, with Syria and Saudi Arabia, 
perhaps the European countries like 
France, to try to move toward a solu- 
tion of the problem in Lebanon which 
is so vital to us and to the poor people 
in Lebanon who have suffered so 
much. 



We will want to consult on this mat- 
ter and on these documents and their 
meaning with all of the leaders, par- 
ticularly the Arab leaders. And I'm 
pleased to say to you tonight that just a 
few minutes ago, King Hussein of Jor- 
dan and King Khalid of Saudi 
Arabia — perhaps other leaders 
later — but these two have already 
agreed to receive Secretary Vance, 
who will be leaving tomorrow to ex- 
plain to them the terms of the Camp 
David agreement. 

And we hope to secure their support 
for the realization of the new hopes and 
dreams of the people of the Middle 
East. 

This is an important mission, and 
this responsibility I can tell you, based 
on my last 2 weeks with him, could not 
possibly rest on the shoulders of a more 
able and dedicated and competent man 
than Secretary Cyrus Vance. 

Finally, let me say that for many 
years the Middle East has been a 
textbook for pessimism, a demonstra- 
tion that diplomatic ingenuity was no 
match for intractable human conflicts. 
Today we are privileged to see the 
chance for one of the sometimes rare 
bright moments in human history — a 
chance that may offer the way to peace. 
We have a chance for peace because 
these two brave leaders found within 
themselves the willingness to work to- 
gether to seek these lasting prospects 
for peace, which we all want so badly. 
And for that, I hope that you will share 
my prayer of thanks and my hope that 
the promise of this moment shall be 
fully realized. 

The prayers at Camp David were the 
same as those of the shepherd King 
David who prayed in the 85th Psalm: 
"Wilt thou not revive us again: that thy 
people may rejoice in thee? ... I will 
hear that God the Lord will speak: for 
he will speak peace unto his people, 
and to his saints: but let them not return 
again to folly." 

And I would like to say, as a Chris- 
tian, to these two friends of mine, the 
words of Jesus: "Blessed are the 
peacemakers: for they shall be the chil- 
dren of God." 



PRESIDENT'S REMARKS, 
DEPARTURE FOR CAMP DAVID, 
SEPT. 4 2 

I'm leaving now for Camp David to 
prepare for a very important meeting 
between myself. President Sadat of 
Egypt, and Prime Minister Begin of 
Israel. During the next few days, very 
important decisions will be made by 
us, working with our advisers repre- 
senting three great nations, searching 



4 



Department of State Bulk 



for peace in the Middle East which 
can help greatly to insure peace in the 
future throughout the world; by the 
Congress while I'm gone, in dealing 
with many very important issues, in- 
cluding the evolution of an energy 
policy for our nation. 

As we meet at Camp David, no one 
can insure the degree of success 
which we might enjoy. The issues are 
very complicated. The disagreements 
are deep. Four wars have not led to 
peace in that troubled region of the 
world. There is no cause for exces- 
sive optimism, but there is also no 
cause for despair. 

The greatest single factor which 
causes me to be encouraged is my 
sure knowledge that Prime Minister 
Begin and President Sadat genuinely 
want peace. They are determined to 
make progress, and so am I. 

We will need the encouragement 
and the prayers of everyone in our 
nation, in all three nations, through- 
out the world, who want success to 
come from our deliberations. Com- 
promises will be mandatory. Without 
them, no progress can be expected. 
Flexibility will be the essence of our 
hopes. And my own role will be that 
of a full partner, not trying to impose 
the will of the United States on others 
but searching for common ground on 
which agreements can be reached and 
searching for exchanges of com- 
promise that are mutually advantage- 
ous to all nations involved. 

I know the seriousness with which 
President Sadat and Prime Minister 
Begin come to our country, and I 
have tried to prepare myself as well 



as I possibly could to bring success to 
these efforts. 

It will have to be a mutual thing, 
and all of us will enter these discus- 
sions without prejudice toward one 
another, with a spirit of good will and 
with the realization of the sober re- 
sponsibilities that fall on us. 

Lastly, I would say that we will be 
almost uniquely isolated from the 
press and from the outside world. My 
hope is that this degree of personal 
interchange, without the necessity for 
political posturing or defense of a 
transient stand or belief, will be 
constructive. 

There will be a great deal of effort 
made to insure and enhance mutual 
trust in one another and to recognize 
accurately that we all want the same 
ultimate goal. There is no doubt in 
my mind about this. 

I want to express, in closing, my 
thanks to these two great leaders for 
their willingness to come when the 
political consequences of failure 
might be very severe and when the 
prospects of complete success are 
very remote. We'll do the best we 
can, and I fervently ask the support 
and prayers of all those who share 
with us a hope that we might bring a 
new prospect for peace to the Middle 
East. 



PRESIDENT SADAT'S ARRIVAL, 
ANDREWS AIR FORCE BASE, 
SEPT. 5 3 

Vice President Mondale: Mr. 

President, on behalf of President 
Carter and the people of the United 



President Carter with (from left to right) Defense Minister Ezet Weizman, Mrs Begin, press 
sit retary Dun Pattir, Yehiel Kadashi of the Prime Minister's offit e. and Prime Minister Begin 




States, we welcome you again to 
United States with a warm heart. 1 
people of our country admire grea 
your wisdom, your courage, and y( 
statesmanship. Welcome to t 
United States. 

President Sadat: Mr. Vice Pre 
dent. Mr. Vance, thank you for yi 
thoughtful words and the genui 
sentiments you express toward i 
and the Egyptian people. 

As you well know, these feelir 
are mutual. The Egyptian peop 
value very highly the ever-growi 
friendship and cooperation with t 
people and leadership of the Unit 
States. We are also gratified by t 
keen interest you are maintaining 
the establishment of a comprehensh 
just, and lasting peace in the Mid( 
East. 

All along, we have held the vii 
that this nation is the most qualifi 
to be a full partner in the peace pre 
ess. Your heritage is unique and so 
your global responsibility. When y 
demonstrated your determination 
assume such responsibility fully, y 
reaffirmed the faith of my people 
the United States and its dedication 
the cause of peace. 

We come here at the crucial cro 
roads. The challenge is tremendoi 
but we have no choice except to 
cept the challenge. We cannot affc 
to fail the hopes of nations all o\ 
the world. No one has the right 
block the road to peace. This is 
time for maneuvers and worn o 
ideas; it is time for magnanimity a 
reason. 

I pray to God Almighty to guide 
in this great endeavor and to enat 
us to achieve the noble goal whi 
inspired President Carter to call f 
this conference. This inspiration 
and shall remain a brave and galla 
act of statesmanship. Together 
shall proceed to build a viable str 
ture for peace on the solid foundatii 
of law and legitimacy. Together, v 
shall realize the hopes of those wl 
believe in the supremacy of right at 
justice, and together we sha 
overcome. 



PRIME MINISTER BEGIN'S 
ARRIVAL, ANDREWS AIR 
FORCE BASE, SEPT. 5 4 

Vice President Mondale: M 

Prime Minister, on behalf of Mi 
Carter and the American people, 
welcome you warmly to the Unite 
States. The American people deepl 
admire your leadership--its geniu; 
its strength, its compassion. Abov 



Rtober 1978 



11. we admire your profound com- 
ptment to peace, so appropriate at 
his historic moment. Mr. Prime 
Minister, we welcome you with a 
l/arm heart. 

Prime Minister Begin: Mr. Vice 
President. Mr. Secretary of State, 
udies and gentlemen, dear friends: 
lour times I visited the President of 
iie United States in the interests of 
leace. since we were elected by our 
eoples to conduct their affairs, to 
lare for the future, and for the pres- 
ervation of liberty and democracy in 
|ur countries and elsewhere. Twice I 
net the President of Egypt in a spirit 
f understanding, in good will and a 
ommon striving for peace in 
erusalem and in Ismailia. However, 
nere is no doubt that this fifth meet- 
ng with President Carter, and the 
lird with President Sadat, is the most 
nportant. the most momentous of 
lem all. 

My friends and colleagues, the 
oreign Minister, the Defense Minis- 
;r. and I and our friends and advisers 
/ill make all endeavors possible to 
•jach an agreement so that the peace 
irocess can continue and ultimately 
<e crowned with peace treaties. This 
> the peace mission on behalf of 
/hich we come now to you, Mr. Vice 
•resident, to the United States and to 
mr dear friend, the President of the 
Inited States. 

We are grateful to the President for 
ne hospitality he bestowed upon us 
n his retreat at Camp David and let 
|S all hope that out of that unique 

Kolitical conclave a day will come 
'hen the nations of the world will 
ay: "Habemus pacem" — "We have 
eace." 



OINT STATEMENT, 
EPT. 6 s 

After four wars, despite vast human 
fforts, the Holy Land does not yet 
njoy the blessings of peace. 

Conscious of the grave issues 
/hich face us, we place our trust in 
he God of our fathers, from whom 
/e seek wisdom and guidance. 

As we meet here at Camp David we 
sk people of all faiths to pray with 
is that peace and justice may result 
rom these deliberations. 



EXCHANGE OF REMARKS, 
SEPT. 17 6 



President Carter 

When we first arrived at Camp 
David, the first thing upon which we 




President Carter with (from left to right) President Sadat, Secretary Vance, and Under Secretary 
Osama el-Baz of the Egyptian Foreign Ministry. 



agreed was to ask the people of the 
world to pray that our negotiations 
would be successful. Those prayers 
have been answered far beyond any 
expectations. We are privileged to 
witness tonight a significant achieve- 
ment in the cause of peace, an 
achievement none thought possible a 
year ago. or even a month ago. an 
achievement that reflects the courage 
and wisdom of these two leaders. 

Through 13 long days at Camp 
David, we have seen them display 
determination and vision and flexibil- 
ity which was needed to make this 
agreement come to pass. All of us 
owe them our gratitude and respect. 
They know that they will always have 
my personal admiration. 

There are still great difficulties that 
remain and many hard issues to be 
settled. The questions that have 
brought warfare and bitterness to the 
Middle East for the last 30 years will 
not be settled overnight. But we 
should all recognize the substantial 
achievements that have been made. 

One of the agreements that Presi- 
dent Sadat and Prime Minister Begin 
are signing tonight is entitled, "A 
Framework for Peace in the Middle 
East [Agreed at Camp David]." 
[Applause] 

This framework concerns the prin- 
ciples and some specifics in the most 
substantive way which will govern a 
comprehensive peace settlement. It 
deals specifically with the future of 
the West Bank and Gaza and the need 
to resolve the Palestinian problem in 
all its aspects. The framework docu- 
ment proposes a 5-year transitional 
period in the West Bank and Gaza 
during which the Israeli military gov- 



ernment will be withdrawn and a 
self-governing authority will be 
elected with full autonomy. 

It also provides for Israeli forces to 
remain in specified locations during 
this period to protect Israel's security. 

The Palestinians will have the right 
to participate in the determination of 
their own future, in negotiations 
which will resolve the final status of 
the West Bank and Gaza, and then to 
produce an Israeli-Jordanian peace 
treaty. 

These negotiations will be based on 
all the provisions and all the princi- 
ples of U.N. Security Council Res- 
olution 242. And it provides that Is- 
rael may live in peace within secure 
and recognized borders. 

And this great aspiration of Israel 
has been certified without constraint 
with the greatest degree of enthusiasm 
by President Sadat, the leader of one 
of the greatest nations on Earth. 
[Applause] 

The other document is entitled. 
"Framework for the Conclusion of a 
Peace Treaty Between Egypt and 
Israel." 

It provides for the full exercise of 
Egyptian sovereignty over the Sinai. 
It calls for the full withdrawal of Is- 
raeli forces from the Sinai; and after 
an interim withdrawal which will be 
accomplished very quickly, the es- 
tablishment of normal, peaceful rela- 
tions between the two countries, in- 
cluding diplomatic relations. 
[Applause] 

Together with accompanying let- 
ters, which we will make public to- 
morrow, these two Camp David 
agreements provide the basis for 



Department of State Bulleti.J 



progress and peace throughout the 
Middle East. 

There is one issue on which agree- 
ment has not been reached. Egypt 
states that the agreement to remove 
Israeli settlements from Egyptian ter- 
ritory is a prerequisite to a peace 
treaty. Israel states that the issue of 
the Israeli settlements should be re- 
solved during the peace negotiations. 
That's a substantial difference. 

Within the next 2 weeks, the Knes- 
set will decide on the issue of these 
settlements. 

Tomorrow night, I will go before 
the Congress to explain these agree- 
ments more fully and to talk about 
their implications for the United States 
and for the world. For the moment, 
and in closing, I want to speak more 
personally about my admiration for all 
of those who have taken part in this 
process, and my hope that the promise 
of this moment will be fulfilled. 

During the last 2 weeks, the mem- 
bers of all three delegations have spent 
endless hours, day and night, talking, 
negotiating, grappling with problems 
that have divided their people for 30 
years. Whenever there was a danger 
that human energy would fail or pa- 
tience would be exhausted or good will 
would run out — and there were many 
such moments — these two leaders and 
the able advisers in all delegations 
found the resources within them to 
keep the chances for peace alive. 

The long days at Camp David are 
over. But many months of difficult 
negotiations still lie ahead. 

I hope that the foresight and the 
wisdom that have made this session a 
success will guide these leaders and 
the leaders of all nations as they con- 
tinue the progress toward peace. 
[Applause] 

President Sadat 

Dear President Carter, in this his- 
toric moment. I would like to express 
to you my heartfelt congratulations 
and appreciation. For long days and 
nights, you devoted your time and 
energy to the pursuit of peace. You 
have been most courageous when you 
took the gigantic step of convening 
this meeting. The challenge was great. 
and the risks were high, but so was 
your determination. 

You made a commitment to be a 
full partner in the peace process. I'm 
happy to say that you have honored 
your commitment. 

The signing of the framework for 
the comprehensive peace settlement 
has a significance far beyond the 
event. It signals the emergence of a 
new peace initiative with the American 



nation in the heart of the entire proc- 
ess. 

In the weeks ahead, important deci- 
sions have to be made if we are to 
proceed on the road to peace. We have 
to reaffirm the faith of the Palestinian 
people in the ideal of peace. 

The continuation of your active role 
is indispensable. We need your help 
and the support of the American 
people. Let me seize this opportunity 
to thank each and every American for 
his genuine interest in the cause of 
people in the Middle East. 

Dear friend, we came to Camp 
David with all the good will and faith 
we possessed, and we left Camp 
David a few minutes ago with a re- 
newed sense of hope and inspiration. 
We are looking forward to the days 
ahead with an added determination to 
pursue the noble goal of peace. 

Your able assistants spared no effort 
to bring out this happy conclusion. We 
appreciate their spirit and dedication. 
Our hosts at Camp David and the State 
of Maryland were most generous and 
hospitable. To each one of them and 
to all those who are watching this 
great event, I say thank you. 

Let us join in a prayer to God Al- 
mighty to guide our path. Let us 
pledge to make the spirit of Camp 
David a new chapter in the history of 
our nations. [Applause] 

Prime Minister Begin 

Mr. President of the United States, 
Mr. President of the Arab Republic of 
Egypt, ladies and gentlemen: The 
Camp David conference should be re- 
named. It was the "Jimmy Carter 
conference." [Laughter, applause] 

The President undertook an initia- 
tive most imaginative in our time and 
brought President Sadat and myself 
and our colleagues and friends and ad- 
visers together under one roof. In it- 
self it was a great achievement. 

But the President took a great risk 
for himself and did it with great civil 
courage. And it was a famous French 
field commander who said that it is 
much more difficult to show civil 
courage than military courage. And 
the President worked. As far as my 
historic experience is concerned, I 
think that he worked harder than our 
forefathers did in Egypt, building the 
pyramids. [Laughter, applause] 

Yes, indeed, he worked day and 
night, and so did we — [laughter] day 
and night. We used to go to bed at 
Camp David between 3:00 and 4:00 
o'clock in the morning, arise, as we 
are used to since our boyhood, be- 
tween 5:00 and 6:00, and continue 
working. 




From left to right. Deputy Prime Ministe 
Hassan Touhamy, Foreign Minister Mohamet 
Ibrahim Kamel, and Chef cle Cabinet of th 
Foreign Minister's office Ahmad Maher c 
Egypt with President Carter. 



The President showed interest i 
every section, every paragraph, ever 
sentence, every word, every lette 
[laughter] of the framework agree 
ments. 

We had some difficult moments, i 
usually, there are some crises ii< 
negotiations; as usually, somebod 
gives a hint that perhaps he would lik 
to pick up and go home. [Laughtei 
It's all usual. But ultimately, ladie 
and gentlemen, the President of th 
United States won the day. And peac 
now celebrates a great victory for th 
nations of Egypt and Israel and for a 
mankind. 

Mr. President, we, the Israelii 
thank you from the bottom of oi 
hearts for all you have done for th 
sake of peace, for which we praye 
and yearned more than 30 years. Th 
Jewish people suffered much, to 
much. And, therefore, peace to us is 
striving, coming innermost from oil 
heart and soul. 

Now when I came here to the Cam 
David conference, I said perhaps as 
result of our work, one day peopl 
will, in every corner of the world, b 
able to say "Habemus pacem" in th 
spirit of these days. Can we say s<| 
tonight? Not yet. We still have to go 
road until my friend President Sada 
and I sign the peace treaties. W 
promised each other that we shall di 
so within 3 months. 

Mr. President [President Sadat], to 
night at this celebration of the grea 
historic event, let us promise eacl] 



October 1978 



jbther that we shall do it earlier than 
■within 3 months. [Laughter, applause] 

Mr. President, you inscribed your 
■name forever in the history of two an- 
tbient civilized peoples, the people of 
■Egypt and the people of Israel. Thank 
Eyou. Mr. President. 

I would like to say a few words 
■about my friend. President Sadat. We 
ftnet for the first time in our lives last 
JjNovember in Jerusalem. He came to 
jus as a guest, a former enemy, and 
'during our first meeting, we became 
H friends. 

In the Jewish teachings, there is a 
■tradition that the greatest achievement 
■of a human being is to turn his enemy 
linto a friend, and this we do in rec- 
iprocity. Since then, we had some 
(difficult days. [Laughter] I'm not 
Igoing now to tell you the saga of those 
Kays. Everything belongs to the past. 
■Today, I visited President Sadat in his 
lcabin because in Camp David you 
Idon't have houses, you only have cab- 
fins. [Laughter] And he then came to 
•visit me. We shook hands. And, thank 
JGod, we again could have said to 
leach other, "You are my friend." 
[Applause] 

And, indeed, we shall go on work- 
ing in understanding and in friendship 
and with good will. We will still have 
[problems to solve. Camp David 
proved that any problem can be 
solved, if there is good will and un- 
derstanding and some, some wisdom. 
May I thank my own colleagues and 
friends, the Foreign Minister, the De- 
i fense Minister; Professor Barak who 
I was the Attorney General and now 
: he's going to be His Honor, the Jus- 
j tice of the Supreme Court — the Israeli 
i Brandeis — and Dr. Rosenne [legal 
' adviser to the Foreign Minister] and 
' our wonderful Ambassador to the 
United States, Mr. Simcha Dinitz. and 
\ all our friends, because without them, 
that achievement wouldn't have been 
possible. 

I express my thanks to all the mem- 
bers of the American delegation, 
headed by the Secretary of State, a 
man whom we love and respect. And 
so I express my thanks to all the 
members of the Egyptian delegation 
who worked so hard together with us, 
headed by Deputy Prime Minister Mr. 
Touhamy, for all they have done to 
achieve this moment. It is a great 
moment in the history of our nations 
and. indeed, of mankind. 

I looked for a precedent; I didn't 

i find it. It was a unique conference. 

perhaps one of the most important 

since the Vienna conference in the 

19th century; perhaps. 

And now, ladies and gentlemen, 
allow me to turn to my own people 



from the White House in my own na- 
tive tongue. 

[Brief remarks in Hebrew.] 

President Carter 

The first document that we will sign 
is entitled, "A Framework for Peace 
in the Middle East Agreed at Camp 
David," and the texts of these two 
documents will be released tomorrow. 
The documents will be signed by 
President Sadat and Prime Minister 
Begin. And it will be witnessed by 
me. 

We have to exchange three docu- 
ments, so we'll all sign three times for 
this one. 

[The three leaders signed the first 
document.] 

I might say that the first document 
is quite comprehensive in nature, en- 
compassing a framework by which Is- 
rael can later negotiate peace treaties 
between herself and Lebanon, Syria, 
Jordan, as well as the outline of this 
document that we will now sign. 

And as you will later see, in study- 
ing the documents, it also provides for 
the realization of the hopes and 
dreams of the people who live in the 
West Bank and Gaza Strip and will 
assure Israel peace in the generations 
ahead. 

This second document is the one 
relating to a framework for a peace 
treaty between Egypt and Israel. And 
this is the document that calls for the 
completion of the peace treaty negoti- 
ations within 3 months. And I have 
noticed the challenge extended by 
these two gentlemen to each other. 
They will complete within 3 
months — I might say that this docu- 
ment encompasses almost all of the 
issues between the two countries and 
resolves those issues. A few lines re- 
main to be drawn on maps, and the 
question of the settlements is to be 
resolved. Other than that, most of the 
major issues are resolved already in 
this document. We will now sign this 
document as well. 

[The three leaders signed the second 
document.] 



TEXTS OF DOCUMENTS, 
SIGNED SEPT. 17 7 



A FRAMEWORK FOR PEACE 
IN THE MIDDLE EAST 
AGREED AT CAMP DAVID 

Muhammad Anwar al-Sadat, President of 
the Arab Republic of Egypt, and Menachem 



Begin, Prime Minister of Israel, met with 
Jimmy Carter. President of the United States 
of America, at Camp David from September 5 
to September 17. 1978, and have agreed on 
the following framework for peace in the Mid- 
dle East. They invite other parties to the 
Arab-Israeli conflict to adhere to it 



Preamble 

The search for peace in the Middle East 
must be guided by the following: 

• The agreed basis for a peaceful settlement 
of the conflict between Israel and its neighbors 
is United Nations Security Council Resolution 
242. in all its parts. 8 

• After four wars during thirty years, de- 
spite intensive human efforts, the Middle East, 
which is the cradle of civilization and the 
birthplace of three great religions, does not yet 
enjoy the blessings of peace. The people of 
the Middle East yearn for peace so that the 
vast human and natural resources of the region 
can be turned to the pursuits of peace and so 
that this area can become a model for coexist- 
ence and cooperation among nations. 

• The historic initiative of President Sadat 
in visiting Jerusalem and the reception ac- 
corded to him by the Parliament, government 
and people of Israel, and the reciprocal visit of 
Prime Minister Begin to Ismailia, the peace 
proposals made by both leaders, as well as the 
warm reception of these missions by the 
peoples of both countries, have created an un- 
precedented opportunity for peace which must 
not be lost if this generation and future gener- 
ations are to be spared the tragedies of war. 

• The provisions of the Charter of the 
United Nations and the other accepted norms 
of international law and legitimacy now pro- 
vide accepted standards for the conduct of re- 
lations among all states. 

• To achieve a relationship of peace, in the 
spirit of Article 2 of the United Nations Char- 
ter, future negotiations between Israel and any 
neighbor prepared to negotiate peace and se- 
curity with it. are necessary for the purpose of 
carrying out all the provisions and principles 
of Resolutions 242 and 338. 

• Peace requires respect for the sovereignty, 
territorial integrity and political independence 
of every state in the area and their right to live 
in peace within secure and recognized bound- 
aries free from threats or acts of force. Prog- 
ress toward that goal can accelerate movement 
toward a new era of reconciliation in the Mid- 
dle East marked by cooperation in promoting 
economic development, in maintaining stabil- 
ity, and in assuring security. 

• Security is enhanced by a relationship of 
peace and by cooperation between nations 
which enjoy normal relations. In addition, 
under the terms of peace treaties, the parties 
can, on the basis of reciprocity, agree to spe- 
cial security arrangements such as de- 
militarized zones, limited armaments areas, 
early warning stations, the presence of inter- 
national forces, liaison, agreed measures for 




President Sadat. President Carter, and Prime Minister Begin sign the documents in the East 
Room of the White House. Secretary Vance stands behind President Sadat. 



monitoring, and other arrangements that they 
agree are useful. 

Framework 

Taking these factors into account, the par- 
ties are determined to reach a just, com- 
prehensive, and durable settlement of the 
Middle East conflict through the conclusion of 
peace treaties based on Security Council Res- 
olutions 242 and 338 in all their parts. Their 
purpose is to achieve peace and good 
neighborly relations. They recognize that, for 
peace to endure, it must involve all those who 
have been most deeply affected by the con- 
flict. They therefore agree that this framework 
as appropriate is intended by them to consti- 
tute a basis for peace not only between Egypt 
and Israel, but also between Israel and each of 
its other neighbors which is prepared to 
negotiate peace with Israel on this basis. With 
that objective in mind, they have agreed to 
proceed as follows: 

A West Bank and Gaza 

I. Egypt. Israel. Jordan and the representa- 
tives of the Palestinian people should partici- 
pate in negotiations on the resolution of the 
Palestinian problem in all its aspects. To 
achieve that objective, negotiations relating to 
the West Bank and Gaza should proceed in 
three stages: 

(a) Egypt and Israel agree that, in order to 
ensure a peaceful and orderly transfer of au- 
thority, and taking into account the security 
concerns of all the parties, there should be 
transitional arrangements for the West Bank 
and Gaza for a period not exceeding live 
years. In order to provide full autonomy to the 
inhabitants, under these arrangements the Is- 
raeli military government and its civilian ad- 
ministration will be withdrawn as soon as a 



self-governing authority has been freely 
elected by the inhabitants of these areas to 
replace the existing military government. To 
negotiate the details of a transitional arrange- 
ment, the Government of Jordan will be in- 
vited to join the negotiations on the basis of 
this framework These new arrangements 
should give due consideration both to the prin- 
ciple of self-government by the inhabitants of 
these territories and to the legitimate security 
concerns of the parties involved. 

(b) Egypt. Israel, and Jordan will agree on 
the modalities for establishing the elected 
self-governing authority in the West Bank and 
Gaza. The delegations of Egypt and Jordan 
may include Palestinians from the West Bank 
and Gaza or other Palestinians as mutually 
agreed. The parties will negotiate an agree- 
ment which will define the powers and re- 
sponsibilities of the self-governing authority to 
be exercised in the West Bank and Gaza. A 
withdrawal of Israeli armed forces will take 
place and there will be a redeployment of the 
remaining Israeli forces into specified security 
locations. The agreement will also include ar- 
rangements for assuring internal and external 
security and public order. A strong local 
police force will be established, which may 
include Jordanian citizens. In addition. Israeli 
and Jordanian forces will participate in joint 
patrols and in the manning of control posts to 
assure the security of the borders. 

(c) When the self-governing authority (ad- 
ministrative council) in the West Bank and 
Gaza is established and inaugurated, the tran- 
sitional period of five \cars will begin. As 
soon as possible, but not later than the third 
year alter the beginning of the transitional 
period, negotiations will take place to deter- 
mine the final status of the West Bank and 
Gaza and its relationship with its neighbors, 
and to conclude a peace treat) between Israel 



Department of State Bulleti> 

and Jordan by the end of the transitiona 
period. These negotiations will be conducte< 
among Egypt. Israel. Jordan, and the electei 
representatives of the inhabitants of the Wes 
Bank and Gaza. Two separate but relatet 
committees will be convened, one committee 
consisting of repfesentatives of the four partie; 
which will negotiate and agree on the fina 
status of the West Bank and Gaza, and it; 
relationship with its neighbors, and the seconc 
committee, consisting of representatives o 
Israel and representatives of Jordan to bt 
joined by the elected representatives of tht 
inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza, tc 
negotiate the peace treaty between Israel anc 
Jordan, taking into account the agreemen 
reached on the final status of the West BanV 
and Gaza. The negotiations shall be based ot 
all the provisions and principles of UN Secu 
rity Council Resolution 242. The negotiation; 
will resolve, among other matters, the locatior 
of the boundaries and the nature of the secu- 
rity arrangements. The solution from the 
negotiations must also recognize the legitimatf 
rights of the Palestinian people and their jus 
requirements. In this way. the Palestinian; 
will participate in the determination of theii 
own future through: 

1) The negotiations among Egypt. Israel 
Jordan and the representatives of the inhabi 
tants of the West Bank and Gaza to agree oi 
the final status of the West Bank and Gaza am 
other outstanding issues by the end of thi 
transitional period. 

2) Submitting their agreement to a vote h\ 
the elected representatives of the inhabitant; 
of the West Bank and Gaza. 

3) Providing for the elected representa 
tives of the inhabitants of the West Bank anc 
Gaza to decide how they shall govern them 
selves consistent with the provisions of their 
agreement. 

4 1 Participating as stated above in tht 
work of the committee negotiating the peace 
treaty between Israel and Jordan. 

2. All necessary measures will be taken and 
provisions made to assure the security of Israel 
and its neighbors during the transitional period 
and beyond. To assist in providing such secu- 
rity, a strong local police force will be con- 
stituted by the self-governing authority. It will 
be composed of inhabitants of the West Bank 
and Gaza. The police will maintain continuing 
liaison on internal security matters with the 
designated Israeli. Jordanian, and Egyptian 
officers 

3. During the transitional period, represent- 
atives of Egypt. Israel, Jordan, and the self- 
governing authority will constitute a continu- 
ing committee to decide by agreement on the 
modalities of admission of persons displaced 
from the West Bank and Gaza in 1967. to- 
gether with necessary measures to prevent 
disruption and disorder. Other matters of 
common concern may also be dealt with by 
this committee. 

4. Egypt and Israel will work with each 
other and with other interested parties to es- 



'October 1978 

Htablish agreed procedures for a prompt, just 
land permanent implementation of the resolu- 
tion of the refugee problem. 

MB. Egypt-Israel 

1. Egypt and Israel undertake not to resort 
llto the threat or the use of force to settle dis- 
putes Any disputes shall be settled by peace- 
ful means in accordance with the provisions of 

ikrticle 33 of the Charter of the United Na- 
i tions. 

2. In order to achieve peace between them. 
» the parties agree to negotiate in good faith 

with a goal of concluding within three months 
from the signing of this Framework a peace 
Jfreaty between them, while inviting the other 
loarties to the conflict to proceed simultane- 
JlDUsly to negotiate and conclude similar peace 
reaties with a view to achieving a comprehen- 
sive peace in the area. The Framework for the 
^Conclusion of a Peace Treaty Between Egypt 
ind Israel will govern the peace negotiations 
Aretween them. The parties will agree on the 
Inodalities and the timetable for the im- 
plementation of their obligations under the 
reaty 



C. Associated Principles 

1. Egypt and Israel state that the principles 
snd provisions described below should apply 
o peace treaties between Israel and each of its 
leighbors — Egypt. Jordan. Syria and Lebanon. 

2. Signatories shall establish among them- 
selves relationships normal to states at peace 
a ith one another. To this end, they should 
undertake to abide by all the provisions of the 
Charter of the United Nations. Steps to be 
aken in this respect include: 

(a) full recognition; 

(b) abolishing economic boycotts; 

(c) guaranteeing that under their jurisdiction 
he citizens of the other parties shall enjoy the 
protection of the due process of law. 

3. Signatories should explore possibilities 
for economic development in the context of 
final peace treaties, with the objective of con- 
tributing to the atmosphere of peace, coopera- 
tion and friendship which is their common 
goal. 

4. Claims Commissions may be established 
for the mutual settlement of all financial 
claims. 

5. The United States shall be invited to par- 
ticipate in the talks on matters related to the 
modalities of the implementation of the 
agreements and working out the timetable 
for the carrying out of the obligations of the 
parties. 

6. The United Nations Security Council 
shall be requested to endorse the peace treaties 
and ensure that their provisions shall not be 
violated. The permanent members of the Se- 
curity Council shall be requested to underwrite 
the peace treaties and ensure respect for their 
provisions. They shall also be requested to 
conform their policies and actions with the 



undertakings contained in this Framework. 

For the Government of the 
Arab Republic of Egypt: 

A. Sadat 

For the Government 
of Israel: 
M Begin 

Witnessed by: 

Jimmy Carter. President 

of the United States of America 



FRAMEWORK FOR THE CONCLUSION 
OF A PEACE TREATY BETWEEN 
EGYPT AND ISRAEL 

In order to achieve peace between them. 
Israel and Egypt agree to negotiate in good 
faith with a goal of concluding within three 
months of the signing of this framework a 
peace treaty between them. 

It is agreed that: 

The site of the negotiations will be under a 
United Nations flag at a location or locations 
to be mutually agreed. 

All of the principles of U.N. Resolution 242 
will apply in this resolution of the dispute 
between Israel and Egypt. 

Unless otherwise mutually agreed, terms of 
the peace treaty will be implemented between 
two and three years after the peace treaty is 
signed. 



The following matters are agreed between 
the parties: 

(a) the full exercise of Egyptian sovereignty 
up to the internationally recognized border 
between Egypt and mandated Palestine; 

(b) the withdrawal of Israeli armed forces 
from the Sinai; 

(c) the use of airfields left by the Israelis 
near El Arish. Rafah. Ras en Naqb. and Sharm 
el Sheikh for civilian purposes only, including 
possible commercial use by all nations; 

(d) the right of free passage by ships of 
Israel through the Gulf of Suez and the Suez 
Canal on the basis of the Constantinople Con- 
vention of 1888 applying to all nations; the 
Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba are in- 
ternational waterways to be open to all nations 
for unimpeded and nonsuspendable freedom of 
navigation and overflight; 

(e) the construction of a highway between 
the Sinai and Jordan near Elat with guaranteed 
free and peaceful passage by Egypt and Jor- 
dan: and 

(f) the stationing of military forces listed 
below . 

Stationing of Forces 

A. No more than one division (mechanized 
or infantry) of Egyptian armed forces will be 
stationed within an area lying approximately 
50 kilometers (km) east of the Gulf of Suez 
and the Suez Canal. 

B. Only United Nations forces and civil 



U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL 
RESOLUTION 242* 

The Security Council. 

Expressing its continuing concern 
with the grave situation in the Middle 
East, 

Emphasizing the inadmissibility of 
the acquisition of territory by war and 
the need to work for a just and lasting 
peace in which every State in the area 
can live in security. 

Emphasizing further that all Member 
States in their acceptance of the Charter 
of the United Nations have undertaken a 
commitment to act in accordance with 
Article 2 of the Charter, 

1 . Affirms that the fulfillment of 
Charter principles requires the estab- 
lishment of a just and lasting peace in 
the Middle East which should include 
the application of both the following 
principles: 

(i) Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces 
from territories occupied in the recent 
conflict; 

(ii) Termination of all claims or 
states of belligerency and respect for 
and acknowledgement of the 
sovereignty, territorial integrity and 
political independence of every State in 



the area and their right to live in peace 
within secure and recognized bound- 
aries free from threats or acts of force; 

2. Affirms further the necessity 

(a) For guaranteeing freedom of navi- 
gation through international waterways 
in the area; 

(b) For achieving a just settlement of 
the refugee problem; 

(c) For guaranteeing the territorial 
inviolability and political independence 
of every State in the area, through 
measures including the establishment of 
demilitarized zones; 

3. Requests the Secretary-General to 
designate a Special Representative to 
proceed to the Middle East to establish 
and maintain contacts with the States 
concerned in order to promote agree- 
ment and assist efforts to achieve a 
peaceful and accepted settlement in ac- 
cordance with the provisions and prin- 
ciples in this resolution; 

4. Requests the Secretary-General to 
report to the Security Council on the 
progress of the efforts of the Special 
Representative as soon as possible. 



♦Adopted unanimously on Nov. 22. 
1967. 



10 



Department of State Bullet 



police equipped with light weapons to perform 
normal police functions will be stationed 
within an area lying west of the international 
border and the Gulf of Aqaba, varying in 
width from 20 km to 40 km. 

C. In the area within 3 km east of the inter- 
national border there will be Israeli limited 
military forces not to exceed four infantry 
battalions and United Nations observers. 

D. Border patrol units, not to exceed three 
battalions, will supplement the civil police in 
maintaining order in the area not included 
above. 

The exact demarcation of the above areas 
will be as decided during the peace negotia- 
tions. 

Early warning stations may exist to insure 
compliance with the terms of the agreement. 

United Nations forces will be stationed: (a) 
in part of the area in the Sinai lying within 
about 20 km of the Mediterranean Sea and 
adjacent to the international border, and (b) in 
the Sharm el Sheikh area to ensure freedom of 
passage through the Strait of Tiran; and these 
forces will not be removed unless such re- 
moval is approved by the Security Council of 
the United Nations with a unanimous vote of 
the five permanent members. 

After a peace treaty is signed, and after the 
interim withdrawal is complete, normal rela- 
tions will be established between Egypt and 
Israel, including: full recognition, including 
diplomatic, economic and cultural relations; 
termination of economic boycotts and barriers 
to the free movement of goods and people; and 
mutual protection of citizens by the due proc- 
ess of law. 

Interim Withdrawal 

Between three months and nine months after 
the signing of the peace treaty, all Israeli 



U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL 
RESOLUTION 338* 

The Security Council 

1 . Culls upon all parties to the pres- 
ent fighting to cease all firing and ter- 
minate all military activity immediately, 
no later than 12 hours after the moment 
of the adoption of this decision, in the 
positions they now occupy; 

2. Calls upon the parties concerned to 
start immediately after the cease-fire the 
implementation of Security Council res- 
olution 242 (1967) in all of its parts; 

3. Decides that, immediately and 
concurrently with the cease-fire, negoti- 
ations start between the parties con- 
cerned under appropriate auspices 
aimed at establishing a just and durable 
peace in the Middle East. 



'Adopted on Oct 22. 1973, by a vote 
of 14 to (P.R.C. did not participate in 
the voting). 



forces will withdraw east of a line extending 
from a point east of El Arish to Ras Muham- 
mad, the exact location of this line to be de- 
termined by mutual agreement. 

For the Government of the 
Arab Republic of Egypt: 

A Sadat 

For the Government 
of Israel: 

M Begin 

Witnessed by: 

Jimmy Carter. President 

of the United States of America 



ACCOMPANYING LETTERS 



uisite to any negotiations on 
between Egypt and Israel. 
Sincerely. 



peace tre; 



Sinai Settlements 9 



September 17, 1978 



Dear Mr. President: 

I have the honor to inform you that during 
two weeks after my return home I will submit a 
motion before Israel's Parliament (the Knesset) 
to decide on the following question: 

If during the negotiations to conclude a 
peace treaty between Israel and Egypt all out- 
standing issues are agreed upon, "are you in 
favor of the removal of the Israeli settlers from 
the northern and southern Sinai areas or are you 
in favor of keeping the aforementioned settlers 
in those areas?" 

The vote, Mr. President, on this issue will be 
completely free from the usual Parliamentary 
Party discipline to the effect that although the 
coalition is being now supported by 70 mem- 
bers out of 120, every member of the Knesset, 
as I believe, both on the Government and the 
Opposition benches will be enabled to vote in 
accordance with his own conscience. 
Sincerely yours. 

(signed) 

Menachem Begin 

The President 
Camp David 
Thurmont. Maryland 



September 22, 1978 

Dear Mr. President: 

I transmit herewith a copy of a letter to me 
from Prime Minister Begin setting forth how he 
proposes to present the issue of the Sinai set- 
tlements to the Knesset for the latter's deci- 
sion 

In this connection. 1 understand from your 
letter that Knesset approval to withdraw all 
Israeli settlers from Sinai according to a time- 
table within the period specified for the im- 
plementation of the peace treaty is a prereq- 



(signed) 
Jimmy Carter 



Enclosure: 

Letter from Prime Minister Begin 

His Excellency 
Anwar Al-Sadat 
President of the Arab 
Republic of Egypt 
Cairo 



September 17, 19 

Dear Mr President: 

In connection with the "Framework for 
Settlement in Sinai" to be signed tonight, 
would like to reaffirm the position of the Ar 
Republic of Egypt with respect to the sett 
ments: 

1 All Israeli settlers must be withdra' 
from Sinai according to a timetable within t 
period specified for the implementation of t 
peace treaty 

2 Agreement by the Israeli Government a 
its constitutional institutions to this basic pr; 
ciple is therefore a prerequisite to starti 
peace negotiations for concluding a pea 
treaty. 

3. If Israel fails to meet this commitme 
the "Framework" shall be void and invalid. 
Sincerely, 

(signed) 

Mohamed Anwar El Sadat 

His Excellency Jimmy Carter 
President of the United States 



September 22. 19' 

Dear Mr. Prime Minister: 

I have received your letter of September 1 
1978, describing how you intend to place t 
question of the future of Israeli settlements 
Sinai before the Knesset for its decision. 

Enclosed is a copy of President Sadat's leti 
to me on this subject. 
Sincerely, 

(signed) 

Jimmy Carter 

Enclosure: 

Letter from President Sadat 

His Excellency 
Menachem Begin 
Prime Minister of Israel 



Jerusalem" 1 



September 17, 19 



Dear Mr President, 

I am writing you to reaffirm the position 
the Arab Republic of Egypt with respect 
Jerusalem: 

1. Arab Jerusalem is an integral part of t 



Jctober 1M78 



11 



West Bank. Legal and historical Arab rights in 
He City must be respected and restored, 
i 2. Arab Jerusalem should be under Arab 
uvereignty. 

] 3. The Palestinian inhabitants of Arab 
'Jerusalem are entitled to exercise their legiti- 
mate national rights, being part of the Palesti- 
ian People in the West Bank. 
,\ 4. Relevant Security Council Resolutions, 
narticularly Resolutions 242 and 267, must be 
pplied with regard to Jerusalem. All the meas- 
res taken by Israel to alter the status of the 
ity are null and void and should be rescinded. 
5. All peoples must have free access to the 
'lity and enjoy the free exercise of worship and 
le right to visit and transit to the holy places 
ithout distinction or discrimination 
. 6. The holy places of each faith may be 
i laced under the administration and control of 
flieir representatives. 

f 7. Essential functions in the City should be 
ndivided and a joint municipal council com- 
posed of an equal number of Arab and Israeli 
members can supervise the carrying out of 
-Jiese functions. In this way, the City shall be 
ndivided. 
Sincerely, 

(signed) 

Mohamed Anwar El Sadat 

is Excellency Jimmy Carter 
resident of the United States 



17 September 1978 

•ear Mr President. 

I have the honor to inform you, Mr. Presi- 
ent, that on 28 June 1967 — Israel's Parliament 
The Knesset) promulgated and adopted a law 
) the effect: "the Government is empowered 
y a decree to apply the law, the jurisdiction 
nd administration of the State to any part of 
iretz Israel (land of Israel — Palestine), as 
tated in that decree. " 

On the basis of this law, the Government of 
srael decreed in July 1967 that Jerusalem is 
me city indivisible, the Capital of the State of 
srael. 

Sincerely, 

(signed) 

Menachem Begin 

'he President 
Tamp David 
Tiurmont, Maryland 



September 22, 1978 

)ear Mr President: 

I have received your letter of September 17, 

:978, setting forth the Egyptian position on 

erusalem. I am transmitting a copy of that 

Better to Prime Minister Begin for his informa- 

ion. 

The position of the United States on 
lerusalem remains as stated by Ambassador 
3oldberg in the United Nations General As- 
sembly on July 14, 1967." and subsequently 



by Ambassador Yost in the United Nations 
Security Council on July 1 , 1 969. ' ' 
Sincerely, 

(signed) 

Jimmy Carter 

His Excellency 
Anwar al-Sadat 
President of the Arab 
Republic of Egypt 
Cairo 

Implementation of Comprehensive 
Settlement ' 3 

September 17, 1978 

Dear Mr. President: 

In connection with the "Framework for 
Peace in the Middle East", I am writing you 
this letter to inform you of the position of the 
Arab Republic of Egypt, with respect to the 
implementation of the comprehensive settle- 
ment. 

To ensure the implementation of the provi- 
sions related to the West Bank and Gaza and in 
order to safeguard the legitimate rights of the 
Palestinian people, Egypt will be prepared to 
assume the Arab role emanating from these 
provisions, following consultations with Jordan 
and the representatives of the Palestinian 
people. 

Sincerely, 

(signed) 
Mohamed Anwar El Sadat 

His Excellency 

Jimmy Carter 

President of the United States 

The White House 

Washington, D.C. 



Airbases 15 



September 28, 1978 



Definition of Terms" 



September 22. 1978 



Dear Mr. Prime Minister: 

I hereby acknowledge that you have in- 
formed me as follows: 

A) In each paragraph of the Agreed 
Framework Document the expressions "Pales- 
tinians" or "Palestinian People" are being and 
will be construed and understood by you as 
"Palestinian Arabs." 

B) In each paragraph in which the expression 
"West Bank" appears, it is being, and will be, 
understood by the Government of Israel as 
Judea and Samaria. 

Sincerely, 

(signed) 
Jimmy Carter 

His Excellency 
Menachem Begin 
Prime Minister of Israel 





Editor's Note 






Any 


additional correspondence 


wi 


11 be 


printed 


in the Bulletin when 


it 


has 


been publicly released. 







Dear Mr. Minister: 

The U.S. understands that, in connection 
with carrying out the agreements reached at 
Camp David, Israel intends to build two mili- 
tary airbases at appropriate sites in the Negev 
to replace the airbases at Eitam and Etzion 
which will be evacuated by Israel in accordance 
with the peace treaty to be concluded between 
Egypt and Israel. We also understand the spe- 
cial urgency and priority which Israel attaches 
to preparing the new bases in light of its con- 
viction that it cannot safely leave the Sinai 
airbases until the new ones are operational. 

I suggest that our two governments consult 
on the scope and costs of the two new airbases 
as well as on related forms of assistance which 
the United States might appropriately provide 
in light of the special problems which may be 
presented by carrying out such a project on an 
urgent basis. The President is prepared to seek 
the necessary Congressional approvals for such 
assistance as may be agreed upon by the U.S. 
side as a result of such consultations. 

(signed) 

Harold Brown 
Secretary of Defense 

The Honorable 

Ezer Weizman 

Minister of Defense 

Government of Israel □ 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of Presi- 
dential Documents of Sept. 25, 1978. 

2 Made to reporters assembled on the South 
Lawn of the White House (text from Weekly 
Compilation of Sept. II). 

J Text from White House press release of 
Sept. 5. 

4 Text from White House press release of 
Sept. 5. 

Mssued by President Carter, President 
Sadat, and Prime Minister Begin at Camp 
David (text from Weekly Compilation of Sept. 
11). 

6 Made in the East Room of the White House 
at the signing ceremony (text from Weekly 
Compilation of Sept. 25). 

'Texts from Weekly Compilation of Sept. 
25. 

8 The texts of Resolutions 242 and 338 are 
annexed to this document [original in agree- 
ment], 

'Released by the White House on Sept. 22 
(text from Weekly Compilation of Sept. 25). 

'"Released by the White House on Sept. 22 
(text from Weekly Compilation of Sept. 25). 

"For text of Ambassador Goldberg's state- 
ment, see Bulletin of July 31 , 1967, p. 148. 

12 For text of Ambassador Yost's statement, 
see Bulletin of July 28, 1969, p. 76. 

"Released by the White House on Sept. 22 
(text from Weekly Compilation of Sept. 25). 

"Released by the White House on Sept. 22 
(text from Weekly Compilation of Sept. 25). 

15 Released by the Department of Defense on 
Sept. 29. 



12 



THE PRESIDENT: 

News Conference 
of August 1 7 (Excerpts) 



As President of the United States, 
my ultimate responsibility is to the 
protection of our nation's security, and 
as Commander in Chief of our Armed 
Forces, it's my obligation to see that 
those forces are operationally ready, 
fully equipped, and prepared for any 
contingency. Because I take these re- 
sponsibilities seriously, I submitted 
this spring a defense budget designed 
to improve our military preparedness 
and calling for increased spending in 
real terms, above and beyond the cost 
of inflation, especially for enhanced 
readiness and for the urgent re- 
quirements of strengthening our NATO 
forces. 

Because of these same obligations, 
and with the concurrence of the Sec- 
retary of Defense, I have decided to 
veto the defense authorization bill 
which the Congress passed last week. 1 

This is not a question of money. 
The Congress has reduced only 
slightly the amount of money that I 
recommended for our nation's defense. 
It's a question of how that money is 
going to be spent — whether it will be 
concentrated in the most vital areas 
of need or diverted to less crucial 
projects. 

We must have the strongest possible 
defense within the budget limits set by 
Congress. We cannot afford to waste 
our national defense dollars. We need 
better maintenance and logistical sup- 
port, more research and development, 
a more flexible Navy. And we need 
these improvements now. not 8 or 10 
years in the future. The defense au- 
thorization bill does not meet any of 
these requirements. 

There are four particularly disturb- 
ing areas in which this bill, by cutting 
into the muscle of our military re- 
quest, could weaken our defenses and 
erode our contributions to NATO. 

This bill, for instance, cuts $800 
million for weapons and equipment for 
our Army forces, undermining our 
commitment to NATO at the very time 
when our allies recognize the urgent 
need to improve the power and the 
readiness of our forces in Europe. 

This bill would also cut $200 mil- 
lion for Air Force weapons and 
equipment which would add flexibility 
and strength to our military forces, not 
only in NATO and this country but 
throughout the world. 



This bill would also cause a cut of 
half a billion dollars — $500 
million — from readiness funds. This is 
an unglamorous part, but it's neces- 
sary for expenditures for ship over- 
hauls, weapon repairs, spare parts, 
personnel training, and the logistical 
support which guarantees that we can 
move our forces and have them act 
immediately when they're needed. 

And this bill also cuts very heavily 
from military research and develop- 
ment funds. I had requested a sub- 
stantial increase in these funds to 
sustain our position of technical ex- 
cellence in a world where circum- 
stances change rapidly and where 
weapons are increasingly dependent on 
advanced technology. The bill that has 
passed the Congress could lead to an 
actual decrease in these funds for next 
year. 

The ultimate effect of this bill 
would also weaken our Navy by ag- 
gravating the dangerous trend away 
from a larger number of different 
kinds of ships, which can maintain our 
military presence on the high seas, and 
toward a disturbingly small number of 
ships which are increasingly costly. 

What the Congress has done with 
the money being cut from these vital 
areas is to authorize a fifth nuclear- 
powered aircraft carrier, which we do 
not need. This would be the most ex- 
pensive ship ever built. Its purchase 
price, even estimated now, would be 
at least $2 billion, and the aircraft it 
would carry and the extra ships re- 
quired to escort and defend it would 
cost billions more in years to come. 

In order to use our dollars for their 
maximum effect, we must choose the 
armor, artillery, aircraft, and support 
that will immediately bolster our 
strength, especially in NATO. By di- 
verting funds away from more impor- 
tant defense needs in order to build a 
very expensive nuclear aircraft carrier. 
this bill would reduce our commitment 
to NATO, waste the resources avail- 
able for defense, and weaken our 
nation's military capabilities in the 
future. 

I will be glad to cooperate with 
Congress in passing a more responsi- 
ble bill, and I urge the Members of 
Congress to face that duty as soon as 
they return from their recess. The na- 
tion's interest and my oath of office 



■• 



Department of State Bulleti| 

require me to veto this bill and to see 
a stronger defense for our country. 

Q. Your direct involvement in th< 
Middle East summit conference nex 
month is seeming to be a high-risl 
gamble. Could you say what led yoi 
to take this step and what are thi 
risks? What happens if this effor 

fails? 

: 

A. Let me say, first of all, that w 
don't act just as a nonintereste> 
mediator or message carrier in th 
Mideast negotiations. Our own na 
tional security is vitally involved, no 
only in maintaining peace around th' 
world but especially in the Middl 
East, and we have devoted our utmos 
effort to bringing about a peaceful res 
olution of the longstanding Middl 
Eastern disputes. 

I have met in small groups and pri 
vately with Prime Minister Begin am 
with President Sadat on many occa 
sions. I think I know them both quiti 
well, and I am absolutely convincei 
that both men want peace, and thi 
people in both nations genuinely warn 
peace. 

All of us were pleased las 
November [and December] when th* 
exchange of visits took place — Sada 
going to Jerusalem, Begin going t< 
Ismailia. It was one of the happies 
few weeks of my career as Presiden 
not to be involved in those negotia 
tions and to see them face-to-face 
trying to work out the differences be 
tween them. 

Since then, the interrelationship 
which brought us such high hopes las 
winter have deteriorated rapidly. Ir 
spite of our best efforts, recently 
those peace talks broke down com 
pletely, not only at the high level ol 
the Prime Minister and President bui 
even at a lower level involving cabinet 
officers themselves. Even when Sec- 
retary Vance had scheduled a trip tc 
the Mideast, we could not get the 
leaders to agree to meet. 

It is a very high risk thing for me 
politically, because now I think if we 
are unsuccessful at Camp David, I will 
certainly have to share part of the 
blame for that failure. But I don't see 
that I could do anything differently, 
because I'm afraid that if the leaders 
do not meet and do not permit their 
subordinates to meet in a continuing 
series of tough negotiations that the 
situation in the Middle East might be 
much more serious in the future even 
than it is now. 

So, I decided on my own, and later 
got the concurrence of my top 
advisers — including Secretary of State 
Vance and the Vice President and 
others — to invite both those men to 



ctober 1978 

neet with me at Camp David. We do 
lot have any assurance of success. I 
lo not anticipate being completely 
uccessful there and having a peace 
reaty signed in that brief period of 
ime. But if we can get them to sit 
own and discuss honestly and sin- 
erely their desires for peace, to 
xplore the compatibilities between 
■hem, to identify very clearly the dif- 
ferences, try to resolve those differ- 
ences, then I think we can set a 
iramework for peace in the future. 
| It may result only in a redetermina- 
tion or recommitment to continue sub- 
. equent negotiations. We might make 
Jiiore progress than that. But we will 
o there as a full partner in the discus- 
lions, depending primarily, however, 
>|n the two national leaders themselves 
I) work out the differences between 
Item. 

I I pray and I hope the whole nation, 
lie whole world will pray that we do 
Jot fail, because failure could result in 
I new conflict in the Middle East 
hich could severely damage the se- 
JJurity of our own country. 

Q. You're said to be very deeply 

I mcerned about the dollar. Is there 

dollar crisis? What are you going 

: p do about it? And why haven't you 

i 9ne something yet? And I have a 

'Uowup. [Laughter] 

. A. I am deeply concerned about the 
I )llar. And I have asked Secretary of 
treasury Mike Blumenthal and the 
i hairman of the Federal Reserve, Bill 
■ tiller, and others to consult with one 
t tother and to give me advice on steps 
i: at can be taken by them and by me. 
"I There are some factors that are en- 
luraging in the long run. Recent 
onthly data have shown that our 
ilance-of-trade deficit is going down, 
believe that we've made good prog- 
ss in seeing an increase in the eco- 
)mic growth of other nations over- 
as so that they are better able now 
id in the future to buy our goods 
an they have been in the past, when 
e were growing fast and we could 
ford to buy their goods. 
The Congress can contribute. The 
ngle most important thing that Con- 
fess can do to control inflation and 
so to ease the pressures on the dollar 
id to reduce our severe adverse trade 
ilance is to pass an energy bill. I've 
one everything in the world that I 
iuld do and so have my Cabinet 
embers and all my staff members 
id many hundreds of people around 
e country to induce Congress to go 
lead and act on a comprehensive 
lergy bill. They have not yet done 
). They've been working on it since 
pril of 1977. We still have hopes 



that the Congress will act successfully. 

Another underlying problem, of 
course, is inflation, and we are dealing 
with that on many levels. One, of 
course, is to hold down the size of the 
Federal deficit. We've made good 
progress there. I know that when I ran 
for President in 1976, the Federal 
deficit was in the sixties of billions of 
dollars. By 1978, it was down to the 
fifties of billions of dollars; '79, the 
forties of billions of dollars, low for- 
ties; and by the 1980 fiscal year, I am 
determined to have it down in the 
thirties of billions of dollars. 

We are eliminating excessive 
spending and demonstrating to our 
country and the rest of the world that 
we are determined to hold down infla- 
tion. But it's a tenacious thing. It 
would be erroneous for me to insinuate 
to the American people that it's easy 
and that we're going to solve it over- 
night. Everybody has got to help. But 
if we can top it out — the inflationary 
curve — this year, I think that will send 
a good signal to the world monetary 
markets. 

We have a combination of prob- 
lems, some of which we are address- 
ing successfully, some of which are 
very difficult, but we are all working 
in concert. And I believe that the un- 
derlying economic strength of our na- 
tion will prevent a further deterioration 
in the status of our nation and a fur- 
ther deterioration in the dollar, par- 
ticularly if the Congress will act and if 
we can act in this Administration to 
address those questions that I've just 
described. 

Q. Back to the summit and what- 
ever preparations may have been 
made. I want to push one step fur- 
ther, if I may. Is there an agreement 
or an arrangement or even a slight 
arrangement already in place before 
you go into this big meeting? 

A. In my letter to both Prime 
Minister Begin and Sadat, I outlined 
some of the principles on which we 
should meet, not negotiating principles 
but the need, for instance, to lessen 
the vituperation that had been sweep- 
ing back and forth between govern- 
ment leaders, to express in a positive 
fashion their determination to come to 
Camp David with flexibility and with 
an ability on the part of those govern- 
ment leaders to act. 

The immediacy of their response — 
they did not delay at all, when they 
read my letter, to say "I will come to 
Camp David" — is indicative of good 
faith on their part. But I do not have 
any commitment from them to change 
their previously expressed positions as 



13 

a prerequisite or prelude to coming to 
Camp David. 

Q. Your Agriculture Secretary 
was quoted as saying earlier this 
week that you intended to retaliate 
against the cheapshot artists in Con- 
gress who oppose some of your pro- 
grams. What is your attitude toward 
Congress as you come up to the 
Labor Day recess? 

A. I would say that in general, the 
Congress has been very cooperative 
and very constructive. I think any 
analysis of the accomplishments of 
Congress last year in the domestic 
field would be favorable. We ad- 
dressed the most difficult questions of 
all successfully. The energy question 
was put off until this year and still has 
not yet been addressed. 

In foreign affairs this year, I think 
the Congress has acted with great 
judgment and also with great courage 
to deal with some longstanding ques- 
tions involving sales of weapons to the 
moderate Arab nations, approval of 
the Panama Canal treaties, removal of 
the embargo against Turkey, and so 
forth. 

I have never discussed this subject 
with the Secretary of Agriculture, and 
he's never discussed it with me. But I 
certainly don't have any animosity 
against any Member of Congress. I do 
not have a list of Congress Members 
who are worthy of punishment. I have 
no inclination to do that; it's not part 
of my nature. And I think it would be 
counterproductive if I attempted it. 

Q. Earlier this year, you 
suggested that the time might come 
when you would have to move ad- 
ministratively to impose import fees 
or quotas on foreign oil. My ques- 
tion is, are we near that time, and if 
Congress should adjourn this year 
without passing what you consider 
to be a substantial energy bill, will 
you do it? 

A. That's an option that I will 
maintain open for myself. Obviously 
there are several options that can be 
exercised, the most advantageous of 
which to consumers, to oil producers, 
to our own country, and, I think, to 
the rest of the world, is to pass the 
energy proposal as I presented it to the 
Congress — to impose a tax on oil, to 
reduce its waste, and to encourage 
more use of American oil in the first 
place, and to distribute the revenues 
from that tax back immediately to the 
American people. This would be a 
very constructive attitude. 

The second one would be, in the 
absence of congressional action, for 
me to impose, through Executive order 



14 

under the present law, either import 
quotas, limiting the amount of oil that 
could come in, or import fees, which 
would charge extra for oil coming into 
the nation. And, of course, the other 
option, which is one that I think would 
be at the bottom of the list, would be 
to permit the oil companies to unilat- 
erally increase the price of their oil 
very high and to let the consumers pay 
for it to the enrichment of the oil 
companies themselves. 

That's a list of the options that I can 
think of at this moment that exist for 
me. And my preference, of course, is 
for the Congress to act. But I cannot 
foreclose the option that I have to act 
unilaterally through Executive order if 
the Congress does not act. 



Q. Do you plan to continue selec- 
tive trade sanctions against the 
Soviet Union since some allied na- 
tions, such as France, are unwilling 
to cooperate in technological 
boycotts? 

A. We obviously don't have any in- 
clination to declare a trade embargo 
against the Soviet Union to stop all 
trade. It's to the advantage of our 
country to have trade with the Soviet 
Union. I think embargoes that have 
been imposed in the past by previous 
Administrations — for instance, an un- 
announced and unilateral stopping of 
shipments of feed grains and food 
grains and soybeans overseas — has 
been very detrimental to our country. I 
do not intend to do that. But we'll 
assess each individual sale on the basis 
of several criteria, one of the most 
important ones of which is, does this 
sale contribute to an enhancement of 
the Soviet's military capability and is 
this country the only reasonable source 
of a supply for that particular item? 

And we have a very well established 
procedure in the government for car- 
rying out that analysis. And I believe 
that my own cancellation of the sale of 
a very large computer a month or so 
ago was well-advised, but we'll have 
to consider each one of those addi- 
tional items as they are proposed on 
its own merits. 

It takes a long time for a decision 
like that to get to my desk. Most of 
them are simply canceled before they 
ever arrive — even come in to my at- 
tention. The Commerce Department 
and others assess it; the State Depart- 
ment has to approve it before it comes 
to me. But we'll have to assess them 
on an individual basis. 

Q. Getting back to energy and the 
veto today, Senator Jackson was 
suggesting today that this is going to 



be a big problem for the energy bill, 
now that you've vetoed the defense 
bill, because he says the aircraft 
carrier was kind of the glue that 
held that thing together, and it took 
them 6 months to get the bill. And 
he says now it's going to be a prob- 
lem, and he says we've got so many 
headaches and this is another one. It 
seems rather significant to me, in 
that he's the man that is carrying 
that energy bill for you. 

A. I met this morning with Senator 
Jackson and others to go over the rea- 
sons for my veto. He did not disagree 
with the reasons that I expressed. I 
have not had a single adviser who told 
me that we ought to go ahead with the 
nuclear aircraft carrier. 

The only concerns that anyone has 
expressed to me is that it might create 
additional work for Congress in cor- 
recting an error that I think they made, 
or that it might cause me political 
problems in having vetoed a bill and 
had a confrontation with Congress. 

I don't desire to do anything with 
Congress but to cooperate with them. 
We are working now in the House, 
which will first take up the veto since 
the bill originated in the House, to 
make sure that we can sustain my veto 
on the basis of its own merits. I don't 
see any reason to link the building of a 
nuclear aircraft carrier, which will be 
completed maybe in 1987, with the 
approval of a conference committee 
report on natural gas that's been 
negotiated now for almost 16 months. 

Q. Yes, sir, but are you confident 
someone up there might not see it? 

A. I cannot guarantee that nobody 
considers it, but I can tell you this: It 
won't be the first problem we've had 
with the natural gas bill. [Laughter] 



Department of State Bullet 

one that's mutually set. We have 
very good representative in Chin; 
Leonard Woodcock. They have a vei 
fine representative here, a new repn 
sentative not known as an ambassado 
in Washington whom I've not yet met 

But we are constantly exploring 
ways to have better relationships wil 
China. First of all, no matter what ot 
relationship is with them on a bilater, 
basis, we want China to be a peacefi 
nation, to be secure, and to have the 
beneficial effects felt around the worh 
Secondly, we want our bilateral n 
lationships with them to be better, t 
enhance trade, communications, stu 
dent exchange, and so forth, whethi 
or not we have diplomatic relations i 
such. And then, of course, the fin; 
thing is to hope for diplomatic rel; 
tions when we're both willing to pre, 
ceed expeditiously and when we'i 
both willing to accommodate on 
another's wishes. 

I can't tell you what the pace of th. 
might be. It's not something that 
could unilaterally impose upon then 
and I have to judge by what their Fi 
sponse might be. 

I think there's a new impression- 
certainly that I have of the leadershi 
in China — that they are more ou 
reaching now, they're more outgoing. 

The present visit of Chairman Hu; 
for instance, to Romania, is a goc| 
indication and an almost unpn 
cedented thing for them to go out im 
the Eastern European world, an 
perhaps even other countries as we 
later on. to make visits. I think th. 
they are reaching out in a spirit ( 
friendship. If they do, I will respon 
in good faith. I just cannot give you 
time schedule. 

[ 



Q. During a recent interview you 
made the point that both we and the 
Chinese are patient on the subject of 
establishing full diplomatic rela- 
tions. My question concerns the ex- 
tent of that patience on your part, 
whether now it might be something 
indefinitely on the back burner or 
something you would like to see ac- 
complished between now and, let's 
say, the end of 1980. 

A. The normalization of relations 
with the People's Republic of China 
has always been a goal of my Admin- 
istration. It was a goal of my prede- 
cessors under the general provisions of 
the Shanghai communique that was 
signed by President Nixon on his his- 
toric visit to China. 

The pace of negotiations must be 



For full text, see Weekh Compilation of Presl 
dential Documents of Aug. 21, 1978, p. 1438 

'For the text of President Carter's message t 
the House of Representatives returning H RJ 
10929 without approval on Aug. 17, 1978, se 
Weekly Compilation of Aug. 21, p. 1447. 



Ictober 1978 



15 



AFRICA: Peaceful Solutions to Conflicts 
in Namibia and Southern Rhodesia 



y Warren Christopher 



Based on an address before the liti- 
ation section of the American Bar 
ssociation in New York on August 9, 
$78. Mr. Christopher is Deputy Sec- 
tary of State. 



I want to talk briefly at the outset 
Dout our efforts to find peaceful so- 
itions to serious regional conflicts 

1 tat threaten peace. Our participation 
l the peacemaking process is 
■itical — in Namibia, in Rhodesia, in 
ebanon and elsewhere in the Middle 
ast, in Cyprus, and in other serious 
ouble spots of the world. These re- 
onal disputes contain the seeds of 
ider conflict. Each poses a grave risk 
world peace in a nuclear age. 
The heaviest toll falls on those who 

"re caught in the conflict. Resources 
id energy are drained from the work 
building better lives and stronger 
icieties. And as the weaponry of re- 
onal conflict becomes more sophisti- 
ited, the potential cost in human 
v>es grows more dear. 
We must all recognize that there are 
) instant solutions or quick remedies 
ir disputes with such deep roots, 
ecades — sometimes centuries — of 
utual suspicion and distrust are not 
usily overcome. And basic differ- 
tces of race, religion, ethnic back- 
ound, and national identity often 
el the discord. But it is equally im- 
)rtant to recognize that progress can 

[J: made, that seemingly irreconcilable 

fferences can be overcome. And the 

nited States has a unique role to play 

working for this progress. 

There has been, in recent years, an 

l warranted pessimism about the pos- 

< bilities for American diplomacy. It 

' ay stem in part from the fact that we 
e dealing with an increasingly com- 
icated world scene in which there 
e many more nations than a genera- 
Dn ago and the relative influence of 
ty one country is diminished. 
Professor Stanley Hoffmann recently 
ascribed our past diplomatic experi- 

•tce as having been premised either 
i isolation or on supremacy. Now, in 
more pluralistic world, our challenge 
to lead even when we do not domi- 
ite; to use our immense and un- 
oubted strength to inspire other 
ations — strong and weak — to work 
ith us toward goals we share and 
innot reach alone. 



I have no doubt that the United 
States can effectively play this role. 
For our power — while perhaps di- 
minished in relative terms — has never 
been greater in absolute terms. Our 
military strength is immense; our eco- 
nomic influence unparalleled. The re- 
cent reassertion of our concern for 
human rights, the breadth of our rela- 
tions throughout the world, and our 
evident commitment to peacemaking in 
troubled regions make us valued as a 
mediator. And our democratic domes- 
tic traditions, which emphasize build- 
ing coalitions around shared interests, 
serve us well when we are working to 
build inclusive and cooperative diplo- 
matic efforts abroad. 

U.S. Role in Namibia 

We have recently had an example of 
this kind of new American leadership 
in Namibia. Let me briefly describe 
what has happened. 

In the late 1800's a colony twice the 
size of California was established by 
Germany on the southwest coast of 
Africa. In the geography books of our 
youth, it was called Southwest Africa. 
Now it is called Namibia. 

After World War I, administration 
of this area was transferred to 
neighboring South Africa under a 
League of Nations mandate. After 
World War II, South Africa declined 
to allow self-determination for the ter- 
ritory and extended apartheid to 
Namibia. 

In 1966 South Africa's international 
mandate was revoked by the United 
Nations with U.S. support. South Af- 
rica refused to accept this decision. 
The conflict over independence for the 
people of Namibia, and transition to 
majority rule, has become more in- 
tense in recent years, with increasing 
clashes between South African forces 
and those of Namibian nationalists. 

Sixteen months ago, the five West- 
ern members of the U.N. Security 
Council — the United States, Britain, 
West Germany, France, and 
Canada — launched an unprecedented 
joint effort to resolve the Namibia 
problem peacefully. From the start, 
the five made clear that they favored 
no particular Namibian political group. 
At the same time, they realized that it 
was essential to gain the agreement of 
the two parties engaged in armed con- 
flict in Namibia — South Africa and the 



South West Africa People's Organiza- 
tion known as SWAPO. 

In the spring of 1977, discussions 
began among representatives of the 
five Western countries — what became 
known as the "contact group" — and 
South Africa and SWAPO. Through- 
out, the Western five kept all Nami- 
bian political groups informed of sig- 
nificant developments in the talks. The 
neighboring African states of Zambia. 
Mozambique, Angola, Tanzania, and 
Botswana — the so-called front-line 
states — as well as others in Africa, 
were deeply engaged at each stage of 
the negotiating process. 

Because the parties would not en- 
gage in direct negotiations, the contact 
group used a variety of diplomatic 
techniques. At times, it engaged in a 
form of "shuttle diplomacy," moving 
back and forth among the parties and 
the various African states that were 
playing an indispensable role. At one 
critical point in February of this year, 
representatives of South Africa and 
SWAPO were invited to New York for 
several days of intensive "proximity 
talks." Although the parties were not 
in the same room together, they were 
able to exchange views through 
negotiating intermediaries. 

One of the extraordinary aspects of 
these negotiations was the ability of 
the five-nation contact group to func- 
tion together as a unit. Many individu- 
als, from each of the countries in- 
volved, played critical roles. I think 
all who were involved would agree 
that the vision and persistence of Am- 
bassadors Andrew Young [U.S. Per- 
manent Representative to the United 
Nations] and Donald McHenry 
[Deputy Representative to the U.N. 
Security Council] of our delegation to 
the United Nations have been vital. 
President Carter and Secretary Vance 
provided constant leadership and pol- 
icy guidance. 

There were many times when the 
mistrust built up over the years set 
back the chances for a settlement. 
Now, however, at long last, the 
negotiations have produced an agree- 
ment between South Africa and 
SWAPO to cease hostilities and to 
proceed with a prompt transition to 
independence and majority rule 
through U.N. -supervised elections. 
Two weeks ago, the U.N. Security 
Council endorsed this agreement and 
launched the process for establishing 



16 

international peacekeeping and super- 
vision during the critical transition 
period. On August 6, the U.N. Sec- 
retary General's special representative 
[Marti Ahtisaari of Finland] arrived in 
Namibia to begin the process of es- 
tablishing a U.N. presence in that 
country. 

A great deal of hard work remains 
to assure that the agreement is suc- 
cessfully implemented. It is likely 
that both parties will attempt, during 
the coming period, to reopen various 
issues on which they were unable to 
obtain full satisfaction during the 
lengthy negotiations which led up to 
the final agreement. Such pressures 
will have to be resisted. For our part, 
the United States will lend its full 
support to the implementation effort. 

Approach Toward Negotiations 
on Namibia 

It may be useful, I think, to take a 
moment to identify the major ele- 
ments of the Namibia effort and to 
consider their relevance to achieving 
a peaceful resolution of other regional 
conflicts. No two regional conflicts 
are likely to yield to precisely the 
same approaches, but nevertheless 
there are important lessons to be 
found in the principles which guided 
the Namibian endeavor. 

• A settlement must reflect the will 
of the parties themselves. A solution 
cannot be imposed from the outside. 
It must be perceived by all of the 
interested parties as meeting their 
vital interests. 

• To endure, a settlement must not 
only have the support of the 
negotiating parties, it must gain the 
acceptance and support of the people 
directly affected by it. The future of 
Namibia will be determined by open 
elections, whose fairness will be 
guaranteed by U.N. supervision. 

• The mediation of impartial na- 
tions whose negotiators are respected 
by both sides is indispensable. An- 
tagonism and distrust between the two 
sides in Namibia made negotiations 
all but impossible in the absence of 
outside mediators such as the contact 
group. They provided a channel for 
communicating ideas and com- 
promises and, ultimately, for reaching 
agreement. 

• Encouragement and cooperative 
diplomacy from other key countries in 
the region can play a vital role. The 
neighboring African states were of 
crucial importance in gaining the trust 
and support of SWAPO. Their experi- 
ence in gaining their own independ- 
ence gave them an understanding of 



what was needed to achieve a solu- 
tion. Their interest in peace and sta- 
bility in the area led them to work 
closely with the contact group to 
achieve a peaceful solution. 

• The continued commitment of the 
international community to making 
the settlement work is critical. With 
its historic connection to Namibia, 
the United Nations has provided the 
framework for reaching an agreement. 
It will now provide the machinery for 
implementing that agreement and as- 
suring the new Namibian Government 
international support and acceptance. 
In addition to supervising the election 
process, the United Nations will pro- 
vide a substantial civil and military 
presence to assure fair elections. And 
ultimately, the United Nations and its 
specialized agencies will help the new 
government strengthen its political 
institutions and develop its economy. 

Major Elements of 
Negotiations on Rhodesia 

The approach I have described — 
based on democratic principles and 
cooperative diplomacy — worked well 
in Namibia. These are also the fun- 
damental elements of our negotiations 
on Rhodesia. 

As in Namibia, an end to the 
fighting in Rhodesia, and a peaceful 
transition to majority rule, can only 
come from an agreement that is ac- 
ceptable to all the parties and that 
protects the rights of all citizens of 
Rhodesia — black and white. In the 
absence of such an agreement, the 
prospect is for increased bloodshed. 

In Rhodesia, we are acting in sup- 
port of Great Britain, which has pri- 
mary responsibility as the colonial 
power and has worked over the years 
to secure a peaceful settlement. We 
have been engaged in this effort with 
the African states of the region. They 
share our commitment to a just and 
peaceful settlement of a growing war 
that would have tragic consequences 
for the entire region. And we are 
working in the context of a 
longstanding U.N. concern for the 
future of Rhodesia. 

The proposals we have put forward 
with the British would provide for 
fair nationwide elections open to all 
parties on an equal basis and under 
impartial outside supervision. A U.N. 
force would maintain the peace and 
help prevent intimidation during this 
crucial period. U.N. observers would 
help guarantee that elections are fair 
and that their results are recognized 
by the world community. We believe 
that these proposals provide the best 
means of achieving a negotiated set- 



Department of State Bullet 

tlement, but we would support at 
alternative arrangement which tl 
parties themselves can accept. 

There has been progress. Each sit 
has agreed to the principle of majori 
rule through elections. But both all 
seek to dominate the transition pro 
ess. We are working to bring the 
together in an "all parties" meetii 
to agree to a process that all will si 
as fair and that can therefore bring ; 
end to the conflict. 

To keep open this door to 
negotiated settlement among all tl 
parties, it is essential that the Unitt 
States not choose sides. Some ha' 
argued that we should now suppc 
the agreement between Ian Smith at 
some of the black leaders — and cea: 
our participation in the U.N. sani 
tions against Rhodesia — before tru 
free elections are held. We ai 
pleased that recent efforts in the Se 
ate and House to lift sanctions ir 
mediately were rejected. 

There are several reasons why 
strongly believe that siding wi' 
either the internal or the external pa 
ties would be a dangerous course, 
would not help to end the fighting 
Rhodesia. Whatever one may thir 
about the two sides to the conflict, 
seems clear that the fighting will n 
stop until both sides come together 
negotiate a transition process all a 
cept as fair. And only such a rest, 
will eliminate the opportunity fl 
growing involvement in the confli 
by other nations less committed to tl 
processes of peace. 

The only realistic channel no 
open for bringing the parties togeth' 
is the U.S. -U.K. negotiating effor 
That effort will remain alive only ; 
long as we remain impartial an 
retain the confidence of all partit 
involved. 

The wiser course, in my judgmen 
is to persist in our efforts, as we di 
in Namibia, to bring the parties tc 
gether to resolve their difference 
through negotiations and to work fc 
a peaceful transition to a stable an 
internationally accepted nation whet 
both blacks and whites can prosper. 

As I conclude, let me emphasiz 
that the United States will maintai 
its unyielding commitment to th 
processes of peace. We want never t 
be in the position, years hence, c 
asking whether, had we worke 
harder to keep open those processes 
a war could have been avoided. C 



n 



i 






October 1978 



17 



ARMS CONTROL: SALT Ml-The Home Stretch 



My Paul C. Warnke 

Following are an address and 
mestion-and-answer session before 
he Foreign Policy Association in 
few York on August 23, 1978. Mr. 
Varnke is Director of the Arms Con- 
rol and Disarmament Agency and 
hairman of the delegation to the 
trategic Arms Limitation Talks 
SALT) with the personal rank of 
Imbassador. ' 

As you can see from my title, 
SALT II— The Home Stretch, " I am 
uite optimistic that we are, in fact, 
earing the completion of what has 
een a very long race. SALT II, as I 
m sure you know, has been in 
egotiation for almost 6 years. In that 
eriod, most of the major problems 
ave been solved. 

We are close to the full develop- 
lent of a detailed, comprehensive 
greement that will break new ground 
l arms control. Agreement has been 
;ached on verification measures, on 
ew ceilings, and on subceilings for 
articular categories of strategic nu- 
lear delivery vehicles. 

Agreement is now emerging on re- 
xaints on new types of missiles and 
n improvement of existing missiles, 
nd the new SALT agreement will 
lean both quantitative and qualitative 
mitations on the Soviet nuclear 
eapons that are aimed at American 
ities and our military targets. 

But I would have to say that the 
:latively few problems that remain 
J re very tough ones. That, I think, is 
i) be expected, because they are the 
ist problems. They are the ones that 
ave proven to be the least tractable, 
am, however, convinced that we can 
Dmplete the home stretch and that 
le result will be an agreement which 
rotects and advances the security of 
le United States. 

background 

I would like to ask you to step back 
nd take a long view of SALT, as a 
rocess, to consider how and why we 
ecame involved in it, what we have 
ccomplished to date, and what we 
ave come to learn of the implica- 
10ns of SALT — first and foremost for 
ur national security but also for our 
stations with the Soviet Union — 
ecause SALT deals with the core of 



the power balance between the United 
States and the Soviet Union, specif- 
ically with the most important and 
most dangerous component of that 
balance — those nuclear weapons 
which, if ever used, would mean the 
devastation of both societies. 

So SALT thus involves fundamen- 
tal and vital security interests of both 
countries. Because this is so, you 
might ask why the SALT talks didn't 
begin until the late 1960's? Why was 
it that they didn't start sooner — 
perhaps in the early 1950's? 

I think the answer to this question 
can be found in the history of U.S.- 
Soviet relations and the evolution of 
the military balance between these 
countries since the end of World War 
II and the beginning of the nuclear 
age. Out of the wartime alliance, and 
with Europe and Japan in ruins, the 
United States and the Soviet Union 
emerged as the two dominant and 
rival powers. 



to allow this lead to persist as long as 
they possessed the resources to close 
the gap. Even if our strategic nuclear 
edge did not allow us consistently to 
thwart Soviet foreign policy objec- 
tives and its ability to project its 
military power, a combination of 
historic Russian sensitivity to the ac- 
tivities of the West and Soviet ideol- 
ogy drove the U.S.S.R., at no small 
cost, to try and catch up with the 
United States in strategic nuclear 
forces. 

By the mid-1960's, programs for 
this Soviet effort were firmly estab- 
lished and underway, and thus the 
two superpowers were forced to face 
the implications of the new military 
reality. For the United States, it 
meant that no longer could we rely — 
either in practice or even in 
rhetoric — on the doctrine of massive 
nuclear retaliation, a doctrine that 
actually had been eroding for nearly a 
decade. 



Agreement is now emerging on restraints on new types of mis- 
siles and on improvement of existing missiles. [It] will mean both 
quantitative and qualitative limitations on the Soviet nuclear 
weapons that are aimed at American cities and our military 
targets. 



Fundamental differences in goals, 
values, and political systems led in- 
evitably to this rivalry and to a bipo- 
lar world. And for many years any 
kind of useful relations or productive 
negotiations between our two coun- 
tries appeared almost impossible. 
Many questioned whether we could 
even live together, and the term 
"coexistence" acquired a pejorative 
connotation. So that arms control in 
these circumstances seemed a very 
unpromising prospect. 

Moreover, you have to remember 
that for about two decades we had, 
first, a nuclear monopoly and then a 
clear nuclear superiority. For the 
Soviet Union, arms control 
negotiations— in the light of this great 
American lead — seemed to offer 
nothing but permanent second-class 
status. And for the United States, be- 
cause of our immensely greater 
strategic capability, arms control was 
a topic of no particular urgency. 

The Soviets could not be expected 



Since the late 1950's, it has be- 
come increasingly clear that Soviet 
possession of a nuclear retaliatory ca- 
pability meant instead that our mili- 
tary forces must be capable of flexi- 
ble response, commensurate with the 
military challenge; because otherwise 
the Soviet Union would be left with 
wide freedom of action to use, or 
threaten to use. its conventional 
military power. 

Now there have been some who 
have argued that we never should 
have allowed the Russians to over- 
come our nuclear superiority. A 
group recently formed insists that we 
should now regain that strategic nu- 
clear superiority. They do not, how- 
ever, tell us how that can be done. 
Nor do they say how the effort to do 
so can be kept from creating an un- 
bridled competition and the accumu- 
lation of further and more deadly nu- 
clear weapons that would mean 
superiority for neither side and di- 
minished security for both. 



18 

The fact is that in a nuclear race 
between countries with the resources 
of the United States and the Soviet 
Union, one side can gain and main- 
tain strategic superiority only if the 
other side defaults. Now we know 
that we would never be willing to 
concede nuclear superiority to the 
Soviets, and I think we have no basis 
for hoping that they may be more in- 
dulgent and give us that advantage. 

So it is the inescapable logic of 
strategic nuclear weapons and the 
terrible consequences of their wide- 
scale use, if strategic stability should 
disappear and deterrence should fail, 
that even bitter competitors have to 
give serious thought to the benefits of 
limited cooperation in the form of 
arms control. This is the case for us, 
whatever our distaste for Soviet am- 
bitions abroad and repression at 
home. 

You will remember that the first 
manifestation of this dawning 
realism about nuclear arms came in 
the consideration of the deployment 
of antiballistic missile systems. In the 
mid-1960's, the Soviets were ex- 
panding their air defense and begin- 
ning to deploy some ballistic missile 
defenses, and the question we had to 
face was whether we should move our 
research and development program on 
antiballistic missiles beyond that de- 
velopment stage into actual deploy- 
ment. There were those within gov- 
ernment who consistently urged that 
course. 

What I regard as the seminal state- 
ment in the new strategic arms debate 
was a speech delivered by the then 
Secretary of Defense, Robert 
McNamara, in 1967. 2 This was an 
historic contribution to public under- 
standing of strategic policy. 

In his speech. Secretary McNamara 
outlined the basic concepts of nuclear 
strategy and explained the new 
realities of deterrence and the mutual 
vulnerability of the United States and 
the Soviet Union to the ballistic mis- 
siles of the other side. He emphasized 
that the problem with ABM's, with 
antiballistic missile defenses, was not 
the problem of cost but the fact that 
the system itself was vulnerable to 
countermeasures which the other side 
could take. No matter how many an- 
tiballistic missiles one side might as- 
semble, the other side could match 
that, and more than match that, with 
offensive nuclear warheads and also 
with dummy warheads. 

So that even if the ABM were 
technically feasible, U.S. deployment 
of a massive anti-Soviet ABM system 
would, as Secretary McNamara put it, 
have ". . . strongly motivated [the 
Soviets] to so increase their offensive 



Department of State Bulleti 



capability as to cancel out our defen- 
sive advantage.*' 

We could, as the Secretary of De- 
fense pointed out, guess at Soviet in- 
tentions, match their ABM deploy- 
ments, respond to internal pressures 
for new offensive systems to over- 
come the antiballistic missile de- 
fenses, and try to preserve our secu- 
rity interests in a new round of the 
nuclear arms race. "But," he con- 
tinued, "what we would much prefer 
to do is to come to a realistic and 
reasonably riskless agreement with 
the Soviet Union which would effec- 
tively prevent such an arms race. " 

And with that speech, Mr. 
McNamara placed negotiated arms 
control explicitly where it belongs — in 
the context of national security. It 
was really out of this new perception 
of the strategic realities that SALT 
was born. It was the relative parity of 
the strategic nuclear forces of both 
sides that made SALT possible, and it 
was the stability of that balance that 
made SALT desirable. 

When the United States was still 
strategically superior, the Soviet 
Union didn't dare to negotiate, and 
we felt no need to do so. But once 
parity was achieved, another round of 
the arms race with the rich, strong- 
willed, and technologically powerful 
United States would provide the 



With our highly sophisticated 
national technical means of 
verification, we don't have to 
rely on Soviet assurances. 



Soviet Union with neither greater se- 
curity nor greater status; because with 
the forces in relative balance, neither 
side could rationally be tempted to 
launch a preemptive first strike. 

President Johnson, in tying his ac- 
tions on ABM's to Soviet willingness 
to negotiate limitations on ABM's, 
was really the one who committed the 
United States to the SALT process. 
And every President since then. Re- 
publican and Democratic, has con- 
tinued that commitment to arms con- 
trol. 

Their consistent belief is expressed 
in President Carter's introduction to 
my agency's 1977 annual report. He 
noted that: "When necessary, we will 
maintain our security and protect our 
interests by strengthening our military 
capabilities. Whenever possible, 
however, we seek to enhance our se- 
curity through arms control. Our se- 
curity and the security of all nations 
can be better served through equitable 



fc' 



■' 



\ 



IS 

\ 



and verifiable limits on arms tha 
through unbridled competition. Th 
United States has chosen arms contro 
as an essential means of promoting it 

security." 

ft 

flli 
Accomplishments 

In SALT there already have beei 
significant accomplishments. Th 
SALT I agreements in 1972 includei 
a treaty which drastically limited an 
tiballistic missile defenses, and tha ' 
treaty was so successful that it wa ■ 
later amended to cut back the per 
mitted deployment of ABM system s > 
from two to one. The ABM treat; 
logically removed a major incentiv 
to build up offensive systems; be 
cause of the fact that the ABM's wer 
essentially banned, it meant that yo> 
did not have to engage in a furthe 
accumulation of offensive warhead 
in order to penetrate what would be 
come a nonexistent defense. 

In addition, in SALT I there was a: 
Interim Agreement on control o 
strategic offensive arms. This essen 
tially froze the number of strategi 
missile launchers at the levels alread; 51 
deployed or under construction. 

Taken together, these SALT 
agreements constituted recognitio 
that the key to strategic stability an- 
to a lower risk of nuclear war was t 
preserve the retaliatory capability o 
each side; and that, accordingly 
building of more and more offensiv 
weapons was unnecessary, dangerous 
and inconsistent with our goal of 
secure world. 

Since May of 1972, when SALT 
was signed in Moscow, the carefu 
and at times. I would say, painfu 
development of a SALT II agreemen 
has been proceeding. In late 1974 
there was a major breakthrough 
President Ford and the then Genera 
Secretary Brezhnev agreed in Vlad 
ivostok that the SALT II agreemen 
would provide for equal aggregates it 
intercontinental nuclear delivery sys 
terns. 

Moreover, the Soviet side agreec 
that these equal numbers could bt 
part of the new treaty, without an) 
compensation to them for the fact tha 
the United States maintains — in base; 
in Europe — the so-called ''for- 
ward-based systems" that enable us tc 
target additional thousands of nucleai 
weapons against the Soviet Union. 

It is important that we now embody 
this principle of equal aggregates in a 
formal treaty, because even if it were 
limited to this feature alone, SALT II 
would be very much in the interests 
of the United States. And from this 
starting point of equal ceilings on the 
number of total launchers and launch- 



October 1978 

rs of missiles with multiple, 
ndependently-targetable reentry ve- 
licles that we refer to as MIR Vs. we 
an go on to parallel reductions in 
hese ceilings. It has already been 
greed at Geneva that Vladivostok 
eilings of 2,400 strategic nuclear- 
lelivery vehicles, of which 1,320 can 
ie MIRV'ed, will be cut back early 
m in the course of SALT II. And it 
ias also been agreed that there will 
>e a separate subceiling on the land- 
iased intercontinental ballistic mis- 
iles (ICBM's) with MIRVs. 

We want that separate subceiling 
ecause these are the most dangerous, 
tie most destabilizing of the nuclear 
/eapons. They are the ones that pose 
ie greater threat of a counterforce 
apability against the missile forces 
f the other side, and hence a threat 
) the assured retaliatory capability. 

.essons From SALT 

As we have moved in the last dec- 

de of SALT from unrestricted ac- 

amulation of nuclear weapons to the 

eginning of control and now to the 

rospect of effective quantitative as 

ell as qualitative restrictions, we 

lave learned a good deal about the 

lirocess. We have learned a good deal 

jfpout how it works and what it means 

>r the U.S. -Soviet relationship. 

The first lesson that we have 

' arnod is that we can negotiate 

bout strategic arms and that the 

.'suiting agreements will work. The 

itiballistic missile limitation treaty 
iid, in fact, limit the deployment of 

allistic missile defenses. I pointed 
1 at that we have cut back from two 
lites in each country to one; and, as a 
l»atter of fact, we have deactivated 
'|| ur own one site, because we don't 

:ed it to protect our deterrent. 

The second lesson is that strategic 
rms control agreements can be de- 
eloped which are, in fact, verifi- 
ble by our national technical 
leans. Unless we can have adequate 
insurance that the other side is com- 
plying with arms control provisions, 
ny arms control agreement will be- 
rame a source of suspicion and fric- 
lon, rather than a source of comfort 
Ind confidence. With our highly 
IjDphisticated national technical means 
jlf verification, we don't have to rely 
JJn Soviet assurances. We have been 
fible to determine under the SALT I 
Agreements, and we will be able to 
ijetermine under a SALT II agree- 
ment, that the limits — both quantita- 
tive and qualitative — are, in fact, 
eing met by the Soviet Union. 
i The provisions on verification that 
jlave already been agreed upon pro- 



hibit any measures of deliberate con- 
cealment which would impede our 
ability to verify compliance, and they 
specifically prohibit any interference 
with our national technical means. 
Moreover, after long negotiation, and 
in the face of the traditional Soviet 
reluctance to disclose facts on mili- 
tary forces, the Soviet negotiators 
agreed earlier this year to an ex- 
change of data that will establish an 



19 



MIRVs, SALT I left MIRVs to run 
free. 

Now, today, in the course of the 
development of SALT II, a frequent 
criticism that I hear is that SALT II 
won't prevent the Soviets from ac- 
quiring the theoretical potential to 
threaten land-based forces in a coun- 
terforce first strike. 

I have mentioned that interconti- 
nental ballistic missiles (ICBM's) 



. . . the common recognition that we share an interest in survival 
has enabled SALT to continue despite the intermittent strains in 
the U.S. -Soviet relationship. 



agreed data base against which we 
can measure the reductions to the new 
agreed-upon lower ceilings. 

And because of the impossibility of 
determining by national technical 
means what kind of a missile is in 
any particular missile launcher, we 
have now agreed that a launcher will 
be counted as a launcher of a MIRV 
missile if it is of a type which has 
ever contained or launched a missile 
which is of a type which has ever 
been tested with MIRVs. That sup- 
plements our national technical means 
of verification and gives us an identi- 
fiable feature against which we can 
measure compliance with the SALT 
ceilings. 

There is a third, and I think a 
very important, lesson that we have 
learned in the SALT process, and 
that's the fact that arms control 
agreements only limit those things 
that are specifically covered by the 
agreement. We can't rely on com- 
pliance with the spirit of an agree- 
ment; you have to have the letter. 
You have to have something to which 
you can point and say that this is an 
agreed-upon provision which limits 
the activity in which each side can 
engage. And we have to recognize 
that any new weapon, or any new de- 
velopment, that is excluded from the 
coverage of the agreement is per- 
mitted for both sides — that to the ex- 
tent that we preserve options, we pre- 
serve them also for the Soviet Union. 

For example, the SALT I agree- 
ment limited antiballistic missiles, 
and it limited launchers of offensive 
missiles of intercontinental range. It 
didn't limit warheads, and it didn't 
limit MIRV testing and MIRV de- 
ployment. So it is somewhat ironical 
that although SALT I banned any 
major deployment of antiballistic mis- 
siles because these would lead to of- 
fensive countermeasures such as 



with MIRVs are the most dangerous, 
the most destabilizing of nuclear- 
weapons systems because they pos- 
sess the combination of accuracy and 
yield that enables them to strike hard 
targets, such as our hardened Min- 
uteman silos. Now, without SALT, 
this possible vulnerability would ob- 
viously become greater, but the 
threat, at least in theory, does exist. 
It exists because of the fact that the 
Soviets have been able to multiply 
their warheads, because SALT I did 
not prevent the development of 
MIRVs. 

So the MIRV option that we chose 
to keep open for ourselves has thus 
come back to haunt us. Now, in 
SALT II, the reductions in MIRV 
ballistic missile launchers — and par- 
ticularly the subceiling that I have 
mentioned on MIRV'ed interconti- 
nental ballistic missiles — will make a 
beginning toward meeting this prob- 
lem; but it won't be until SALT III, 
at the earliest, that we will be able 
fully to undo that which SALT I al- 
lowed to be done in proliferating 
reentry vehicles. 

I would say then that the third les- 
son we have learned from SALT is 
that in the SALT process we should 
protect only those military options we 
genuinely need and those in which the 
net balance, if both sides go ahead, 
will at least be equal and preferably 
will give us some benefits. We should 
avoid those things which mean only 
an unnecessary and futile intensifica- 
tion of the nuclear arms competition. 
And it is with this thought in mind 
that we arrived at a three-piece 
framework for SALT II. 

SALT II will consist of three parts. 
One is the basic agreement, which, as 
it now stands in the joint draft text, 
places specific limits through 1985 on 
total launchers, on launchers of 
MIRV missiles, and on launchers of 
MIRV'ed ICBM's. 



20 

The second part is a short-term 
protocol, which puts short-term limits 
on certain types of systems on which 
we are not yet ready to make a final 
program decision. For the period of 
the protocol, deployment of mobile 
launchers of ICBM's is banned. For 
that same protocol period, there is a 
ban on the actual deployment of long- 
range ground and sea-launched cruise 
missiles. The testing of these systems 
can continue; and while the protocol 
continues, we can determine whether 
longer term restrictions should be 
negotiated as part of SALT III or 
whether our interests warrant the ac- 
tual production and deployment of 
these new systems. 

We will, of course, have to keep in 
mind the experience of the matching 
Soviet development of MIRV's and 
be alert to the fact that if we elect to 
have the freedom to go ahead with 
these new systems after the period of 
the protocol, we must anticipate that 
the Soviets will do the same. The de- 
sirability of preserving the options 
must be balanced against the possibly 
adverse effects of the introduction of 
a new nuclear-weapons system into 
the strategic arms competition. 

There is a fourth lesson that has 
been taught us during a decade of 
SALT and that is that in the con- 
text of overall U.S. -Soviet relations, 
SALT has developed a value and a 
momentum of its own. Since 1969 
the common recognition that we share 
an interest in survival has enabled 
SALT to continue despite the inter- 
mittent strains in the U.S. -Soviet re- 
lationship. 

I mentioned earlier the many dif- 
ferences between the United States 
and the Soviet Union. With or with- 
out SALT, I think we have to antici- 
pate that we will continue to be com- 
petitors who share unmatched military 
power but very little else; that we will 
continue to have very different views 
of a desirable world order and of a 
domestic system which promotes the 
well-being of its citizens. We have to 
expect that there will be times of ten- 
sion, times when the international 
dialogue will be bitter and abrasive. 
Our disagreement with many Soviet 
policies and many of its actions, both 
within and outside the Soviet Union, 
will necessarily affect our attitude 
toward that government. 

But we pursue SALT to lessen the 
risk of nuclear war and to insure our 
own survival as a modern, function- 
ing society. I therefore — and I am 
sure this will come as no surprise to 
you — find myself in total disagree- 
ment with those who have suggested 



that we should cancel or suspend the 
SALT talks because of Soviet and 
Cuban intervention in Africa or 
Soviet suppression of independent 
voices within that country. As I see 
it, SALT is not just a byproduct of 
detente nor can it be used as a bribe 
to make the Soviets behave in a 
fashion of which we approve. 

SALT, of course, doesn't exist in 
total isolation. The Soviet invasion of 
Czechoslovakia, almost exactly a 
decade ago, had the further tragic 
consequence of postponing for more 
than a year the initiation of talks on 
limiting strategic nuclear arms. As 
indicated in President Johnson's 
memoirs, he was prepared to an- 
nounce on August 21, 1968, that he 
and Premier Kosygin would meet on 
September 30 to begin strategic arms 
limitation talks. But it was on August 
20 that Soviet, Bulgarian. East Ger- 
man, Hungarian, and Polish army 
units moved into Czechoslovakia. 

Neither American nor international 
public opinion would have understood 
the initiation of arms control discus- 
sions in the unhealthy climate of the 
summer that followed the Prague 
spring. And by that fall, when talks 
might have been started, the Johnson 
Administration had run out of time. 
So, it was not until November 17, 
1969 — in a new U.S. Administra- 
tion — that American and Soviet dele- 
gations met in Helsinki and ex- 
changed the opening statements on 
the limitation of strategic arms. 

But since then SALT has gone 
ahead despite many U.S. -Soviet fric- 
tions. SALT I — we have to 
remember — was signed in May of 
1972, just about a month after the 
United States had mined Haiphong 
harbor and trapped Soviet ships. 

We have pursued, and we will 
continue to pursue, our aims in the 
field of human rights; but Soviet re- 
sentment about this has never caused 
any ripples in our negotiations in 
Geneva. The issue has never been 
raised with me by any Soviet 
negotiator. 

We can't be sure that continued 
progress in the SALT process will 
improve detente, but I believe we can 
be certain if SALT fails, the chances 
of improved relations and of chan- 
neling the U.S. -Soviet rivalry into 
less dangerous areas of competition 
would be immeasurably damaged. 

To me, the relationship between 
SALT and detente is much like the 
relationship between SALT and the 
goal of halting the proliferation of 
nuclear weapons. Success in SALT 
won't automatically bring either de- 
tente or nonproliferation, but the fail- 



Department of State Bulletin, 

ure of SALT would leave us with a 
very dismal prospect of achieving 
either objective. 

There is a fifth lesson that I think 
is to be learned from our experience 
with SALT, and that is that we can 
pursue it without risk and, indeed, 
with major benefit to our national 
security. SALT, in fact, complements; 
our assured retaliatory capability with 
less cost and at less risk. 

To begin with, we can proceed 
with SALT because of the fact that 
we have the technology, the re-[ 
sources, and the forces to meet our 
strategic military needs. We are not 
negotiating from fear, but we are 
negotiating with confidence. We are j 
negotiating from strength and not 
from weakness. 

To illustrate my point, a study re- 
cently completed by the Arms Control | 
and Disarmament Agency (see p. 24) 
vividly shows that while pursuing 
SALT, we have maintained the re- 
taliatory capability that protects us 
against the use, or threatened use. of 
Soviet nuclear forces. Today, our re- 
taliatory capability could do more 
damage to the Soviet Union after a 
Soviet first-strike than that first-strike 
could to the United States. Our 
second-strike, destructive capability 
exceeds the Soviet Union's first-strike 
capability. 

And our study also shows that 
while the United States and Soviet 
forces will both become substantially 
more capable and, really, essentially 
equal in capability by the mid- 1 980 's, 
our retaliatory capability after a 
Soviet first-strike will at that time ex- 
ceed our current ability to retaliate 
against Soviet targets. 

In a speech that was delivered yes- 
terday. Secretary of Defense Harold 
Brown confirmed this increase in our 
second-strike capability, despite any 
improvements in the Soviet offensive 
or defensive forces. This, I would 
submit, doesn't square with the 
image, which is suggested by some, 
that the United States has been 
hamstrung by SALT while the Soviets 
race ahead. 

SALT has left us free to make 
those changes in each part of our de- 
terrent nuclear triad — the interconti- 
nental ballistic missiles, the subma- 
rine launched ballistic missiles, and 
our heavy bombers — which will in- 
sure their viability in the light of 
Soviet military improvements. 

SALT II will enable us to go ahead 
with the military options which our 
military planners tell us are neces- 
sary. Under the limits of SALT II. 
our heavy bomber force will be mod- 



)ctober 1978 

rnized by being equipped with 
ong-range cruise missiles, missiles 
vith a range that enables them to stay 
mtside of Soviet air defenses and still 
strike the lucrative Soviet targets. 

We are free to go ahead with the 
~rident ballistic missile submarine 
nd the longer range ballistic missiles 
•hat can be launched from ocean areas 
(lose to the United States and still 
naintain complete target coverage of 
he Soviet Union. 

Sixth, SALT II will impose 
leaningful limits on Soviet 
trategic forces. To comply with the 
greement, the Soviets will have to 
ismantle or destroy up to several 
undred strategic systems. The new 
igreement, furthermore, will hold the 
leployment of Soviet strategic forces 
(ell below what they would deploy in 

le absence of an agreement. Our in- 

lligence sources indicate that the net 
Uing in the number of Soviet 
i rategic nuclear delivery systems 
i rgeted against the United States is 
omething in the order of 900 — that 

eans 900 less systems as a result of 
KLT. And that, by any definition, is 

plus for American security. 

I have suggested that SALT is a 

| ocess. I don't think that SALT II is 

ning to be the ultimate word in 

rategic arms control. It will mean a 

eaningful step forward, but we 

lould regard this as a continuing 

1 ocess in which we move deliber- 

|ely, cautiously, but confidently to- 

ard the effective control of strategic 

; iclear weapons and the elimination 

the greatest threat to the survival 

the United States and of the world. 

Q. The first general set of ques- 
i sns is: How near are you to an 

•reement? What is in the way? Is 
> politics? Will it be before or after 

e election? How important is this, 
i ; against other problems of negoti- 
I ion with the Soviet Union? 

A. As far as timing is concerned, I 
in not rash enough to make any kind 
I a prediction. If you look at it in 
t rms of where we were, say, 3 
* onths ago, and where we are 
•■ day — if we make that same amount 

progress, we would certainly have 
i(i agreement well before the end of 
|\e year. 

S As far as the timing of it is con- 
hrned, my instructions from the 
'resident are to complete a negotia- 
Ipn when we can get an agreement 
iiat we want, that other consid- 

ations are not to be taken into ac- 

>unt, that we will get an agreement 
li soon as we have one that serves 
'e interests of the United States. 



I think that this is the only way in 
which we can negotiate. You 
shouldn't set for yourself any sort of 
arbitrary deadlines, which will just 
mean that you are not going to 
negotiate effectively. And you 
shouldn't postpone the opportunity to 
grasp an agreement which does meet 
your criteria. 

Q. The largest set of questions we 
have put here could be put in under 
a single heading, I think: Can you 
trust — should you trust — the Rus- 
sians? What about their activities, 
which you touched on, in Africa? 
What about the danger that they 
may have a significant — perhaps a 
compelling — civil defense program? 
What about their killer satellites? 
What about — can you really be sure 
on verification? And on what 
ground do we think that there is 
truly a common interest in SALT? 
And why do you negotiate from 
weakness? 

A. You have given me the material 
for an additional 40-minute speech. I 
would say that the short answer is 
that you can trust the Soviet Union to 
behave in its own interests. And I 
think that is the only trust you can 
place in any sovereign country. 

We don't trust the Soviet Union. It 
is why we have been very careful to 
work out the verification provisions 
that I have outlined. Those will en- 
able us, by our national technical 



21 



I don't think that anybody can en- 
visage the destructive capability of 
that number of warheads — -each one 
of which is many times the size of the 
primitive weapon that devastated 
Hiroshima. The idea that somehow 
the Soviet Union can protect itself by 
having every Muscovite shoulder his 
spade, take the subway out to the 
suburbs, and walk into the tundra 
until he can finally dig a hole — 
provided it was not frozen — I think it 
is an illusion. Again, I quote Secre- 
tary Brown. In his speech yesterday 
he indicated that whatever the Soviet 
Union tried to do, in the way of 
either offensive improvements or de- 
fensive improvements, would not im- 
pair our retaliatory capability. 

With regard to antisatellite sys- 
tems, we obviously view with alarm 
the possibility that both sides may 
engage in a race in space that could 
give both sides the ability to destroy 
the satellites of the other side. That 
would not only interfere with verifi- 
cation, it would also interfere with a 
number of developments that have 
proven to be of great civilian impor- 
tance. SALT cannot control the de- 
velopment of the capability. It does 
prohibit any use, so that whatever the 
capability might be, it could not be 
used without completely destroying 
the SALT agreement. 

In order to deal with the question 
of capability, we recently initiated 
talks on a prohibition of the develop- 



. . . my instructions from the President are to complete a negoti- 
ation when we can get an agreement that we want. . . we will get 
an agreement as soon as we have one that serves the interests of 
the United States. 



means, to determine whether or not 
the limits of SALT II are being met. 

I am confident that those verifica- 
tion provisions are adequate for the 
purpose. They are the verification 
provisions that we proposed and that 
eventually, after long and very skill- 
ful negotiations, we managed to get 
the Soviet Union to accept. 

As far as their other activities are 
concerned, mention has been made of 
civil defense. I say the real risk of 
civil defense is that the country that 
put money in it may convince itself 
that the money has not been wasted 
and, therefore, may bask in the illu- 
sion of invulnerability. The fact of 
the matter is that our more than 9,000 
nuclear warheads could totally satu- 
rate any civil defense effort and 
wreak totally unacceptable havoc on 
the Soviet Union. 



ment of antisatellite weapons. I par- 
ticipated in those talks in Helsinki at 
the beginning of June. We have a 
further round of talks coming up. We 
have to realize that either there is 
going to be a ban on antisatellite 
systems for both countries or else 
both sides will, in fact, go ahead. 

The short answer, in the course of 
a long answer, is that we do not trust 
the Soviet Union. It is why we have 
developed a SALT agreement that 
doesn't rely on trust but relies on our 
own ability to verify compliance. 

Q. I have a set of questions about 
the vulnerability of Minuteman and 
the role of multiple aiming point 
systems. When do we think that 
Minuteman will really be 
vulnerable— 1980? 1982? Later? 
And how do we think that we would 



22 

verify a Soviet multiple aiming- 
point system, if they, also, took this 
choice? 

A. As far as Minuteman vulnera- 
bility is concerned, as I mentioned, 
there will be at least a theoretical 
vulnerability at the point at which the 
Soviet Union has the number of 
warheads and the degree of accuracy 
that would enable them, with some 
degree of confidence, to deposit two 
reentry vehicles on each Minuteman 
site. 

There are some who say that will 
occur by the mid- 1 980 's. Some say 
earlier than that. Some say never. 
There are formidable problems in 
planning the kind of attack which that 
scenario would envisage. You would 
have to be able to send over enough 
missiles so that you had enough 
warheads so that you had two for 
each Minuteman silo. You would 
have to time your attack with the ex- 
quisite precision that would enable 
you to reach that point at which the 



Department of State Bullet 



missiles launched from submarines. 
The Soviet Union has something like 
70% in intercontinental ballistic mis- 
siles. So, if intercontinental ballistic 
missiles are vulnerable, then 70% of 
their force is at risk; something like 
30% of our force is at risk. 

As far as mobile launchers are con- 
cerned, that option is preserved after 
the protocol period. We can test any 
type of mobile ICBM launcher im- 
mediately. And if we decide that this 
is something we have to do to protect 
even the 30% of our deterrent force, 
we would be free to go ahead with it 
at the end of the protocol period. 

As far as verification is concerned, 
you have to recognize that SALT 
limits launchers, not missiles. You 
can't verify how many missiles there 
are. You can verify the number of 
launchers. So the verification problem 
requires that you have a system in 
which you can tell what the launcher 
is and how many of them there are. 
And any system that we utilized 
would meet that criterion, because we 



[The United States and the Soviet Union] have to recognize that if we 
continue to go ahead with an unchecked competition in strategic arms, 
we can't expect the rest of the world to stand by and indefinitely 
eschew the acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability of their own. 



oncoming missiles were not destroyed 
by the explosion of their predeces- 
sors, the so-called fratricide problem. 
You would have to assume virtually 
flawless performance of a system that 
has never been tested in anger. And 
you would also have to assume that 
the President of the United States 
would stand calmly by, while Soviet 
missiles — with something like 20-, 
25-, 30-minutes warning — thundered 
overhead to attack our missiles. Now. 
I don't think the President of the 
United States would do that, and I am 
quite sure that no Soviet planner in 
his right mind would assume that the 
United States would leave its missiles 
to be destroyed once we had assured 
proof of a Soviet attack. 

So I tend to be with those that say 
that the vulnerability is largely 
theoretical. But, if I am wrong, we 
are taking, and have taken, the steps 
to make sure that our retaliatory ca- 
pability is preserved. The fact that 
you could predict a point at which 
fixed targets could be vulnerable was 
what compelled us in decades past to 
develop the ballistic missile subma- 
rine, and it put a substantial part of 
our total resources into our ballistic 



would insist on that criterion being 
met by the Soviet Union. 

Q. Moving on to a cluster of 
questions on related issues, what is 
the relation between SALT and the 
concern of our allies? You have 
touched on the issue of nonprolifer- 
ation; how about mutual and bal- 
anced force reductions (MBFR)? 
And what is the relation, also, be- 
tween SALT and a comprehensive 
test ban? 

A. There is no direct relationship 
between SALT and these other arms 
control negotiations. You could have 
success in SALT and still not assure 
that you would have a comprehensive 
test ban. However, the two are, in a 
sense, complementary. For example. 
I have mentioned that what we are 
trying to negotiate is some sort of a 
prohibition on development of new 
strategic arms. Obviously, if you had 
a comprehensive test ban, that would 
give you additional assurance that 
new strategic arms weren't being de- 
veloped, because you could not de- 
velop a new warhead without exten- 
sive testing. But the two of them do 
proceed independently of one another. 



It is quite interesting that when 
am in Geneva dealing with both negol 
ations, there is almost no social ii 
terrelationship between the two Sovii 
delegations, and they never discu; 
the problems of the other negotiatioi 
They maintain an almost complete! 
isolated approach to the separal 
negotiations. 

As far as mutual and balanced fore 
reduction talks are concernec 
again, there is no direct relationshi| 
Obviously, it would improve th 
overall degree of confidence betwee 
the two sides if we were able to pr< 
ceed with reasonable parallelism c 
the two. 

But MBFR. you have to remembe 
is geographically limited. It involvi 
only the central European situatioi 
and therefore you could not negotia 
in MBFR any restrictions on Sovic 
theater nuclear forces that were n< 
located within the central Europe^ 
area themselves. Systems that wei 
located in the Soviet Union, directe 
at Western European targets, woui 
be entirely outside the coverage ( 
MBFR. 

It seems to me that at some poin 
in order to complete the arms contn 
agenda, what we will have to do is 
develop some sort of a forum i 
which we can negotiate meaningfi 
restrictions on the theater nucle; 
forces, the intermediate range balli 
tic missile systems of the Sovi. 
Union, and, of course, then sorr 
matching restraints on our longi 
range forward-based systems. But th 
forum does not exist as yet. 

Q. We have a cluster of questioi 
that relate to what will happen 
you do get an agreement: Have yo 
let the opponents of the agreemen 
or the critics, get the jump in th 
national debate? Are you plannin 
an effort at persuasion? When wi 
it begin? Have you considered ; 
given the difficulty of a two-thiro 
vote, the possibility of an executiv 
agreement? What would be the ac 
vantages and disadvantages of that 
And how optimistic are you aboi ■■ 
the country's agreement to wha 
you may agree to? 

A. First of all, we have to depei 
sonalize it. It won't be what I agre 
to; it will be what the U.S. Govern 
ment agrees to. I think it has to b 
understood that the entire process o 
developing positions in SALT is a 
interagency process. It is done by 
subcommittee of the National Securit 
Council, on which sit the Secretary o 
State, the Secretary of Defense, th' 
President's National Security Adviser 
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, th 



).' 



October 1978 

Director of the Central Intelligence 
Agency, and I am entitled to one 
small vote in that committee. That is 
where the positions are developed. 
That is where we determine what 
moves we are prepared to make. 

As far as letting the opposition get 

a jump on us, I think you have to 

recognize that it is awfully difficult to 

defend a treaty which doesn't yet 

exist against somebody else's dream. 

I can dream up a better treaty than we 

are going to be able to present. It 

would be a very one-sided treaty, and 

I have no realistic hope that the 

Soviet Union — or anybody else in 

their right mind — would accept it. We 

Whave to recognize that in order to get 

■restrictions on Soviet systems that we 

■don't like, we have to forego certain 

■ military options of our own. There 
jare those who will oppose any SALT 

■ treaty, because they oppose any re- 
Bstrictions on American total military 
jl freedom. I think they are wrong, but 
Ithey are entitled to their own opinion. 

I think that the only way that SALT 

lean be sold is on its merits. I believe 

that the agreement will commend it- 

j self to anybody who approaches arms 

| :ontrol with an objective frame of 

nind. Those who think that you 

should not be doing business with the 

■'Soviet Union, obviously, aren't going 

«to be satisfied. 

But, to me, it is going to be a 
question of whether or not the agree- 

■ ment improves the security of the 
United States. I think an agreement 

• which limits Soviet systems, which 
, requires them to reduce, which pre- 
sents them from going ahead with a 
■whole new fifth generation of inter- 
j Continental ballistic missiles — that 
I means a net reduction, as compared 
1 with where they would be by 1985, of 
^something in excess of 900 nuclear 
| delivery systems — is not going to be 
livery hard to sell. And I look forward 
lto the debate with a good deal of 

expectation. 

Q. I guess I should draw your 

attention to the question of an 

executive agreement versus a 

treaty. 

A. That, of course, is a possible 

option. I think that in terms of the 



ratification problem that it wouldn't 
make an awful lot of difference; be- 
cause, of course, in order to invoke 
cloture, you would need 60 votes in 
the Senate in any event. So it is a 
question of seven less votes, as com- 
pared to the problems of getting 
ratification through both houses of the 
Congress. It's a decision that, I think, 
will be made on the basis of congres- 
sional sentiment, as much as on any 
other consideration. We have consid- 
ered that SALT would be a treaty. 
Now, of course, as 1985 comes 
closer, it begins to look more like a 
short-term executive agreement. But, 
as I say, that decision remains open. 
It will be made, obviously, in close 
consultation with the Congress. 

Q. I think I will just sum up with 
one more question, if I may, Am- 
bassador Warnke, and that is if you 
would summarize for us your own 
sense of how near we are, actually 
on the clauses. And if you have — if 
there is one or another point that 
you would like to single out, is 
there a difference of substance that 
you find particularly troubling, or 
are you basically optimistic because 
you have called your speech "SALT 
II— the Home Stretch?" 

A. I would say that we are, in fact, 
very close at this point, that we have 
solved much more difficult problems 
than any of those that remain. The 
remaining problems have to do, for 
the most part, with the degree and 
coverage of the restrictions on new 
types of missile systems. 

The Soviet Union would like to 
impose tighter constraints on our 
cruise missiles. We would like to 
have tight constraints on the Soviet 
ballistic missiles. One of the prob- 
lems that exists is the fact that the 
Soviets do have bigger missiles than 
we have. We opted, back in the 
1960's, to go for the solid-fueled, 
smaller, but more reliable, systems. 
They have continued with the larger, 
liquid-fueled systems, so, as a result, 
they have larger throw-weight. One 
obvious improvement in the strategic 
situation would be to limit the way in 
which they could modify these exist- 
ing systems. If we can ban most of 



23 



the new systems, if we can prevent 
modifications, modernization, in- 
creased reentry vehicles on the exist- 
ing systems, then we have lessened 
the prospects of Minuteman vulnera- 
bility, and we have created a more 
stable strategic situation. 

I think that we are getting there. I 
think that the Soviet Union recognizes 
that they, too, have an interest in a 
SALT treaty. I have speculated 
sometimes on the reasons why they 
would be interested — I mean, if they 
want it, is it because they think it is 
good for them and bad for us? There 
is always that chance. But I think it is 
probably more realistic to consider 
why it is that we would have a com- 
mon interest, and there are a variety 
of reasons. I have mentioned the 
common interest in survival. There is 
also the common interest in stopping 
the proliferation of nuclear weapons. 
Both of us have to recognize that if 
we continue to go ahead with an un- 
checked competition in strategic 
arms, we can't expect the rest of the 
world to stand by and indefinitely es- 
chew the acquisition of a nuclear 
weapons capability of their own. 

I think, also, that the Soviet Union 
recognizes that the alternative to 
SALT is, for them, not a very ap- 
petizing one. I don't agree with those 
who say that we need SALT, because 
it is the best we can do in preventing 
the Soviet Union from massively 
overcoming us. I think that we have 
the resources, we have the will, we 
have the technology so that we could 
keep up in any kind of an unbridled 
competition. I know that the Soviet 
Union knows that, too. And, there- 
fore, the alternative to SALT is 
merely the indefinite perpetuation of 
a strategic arms competition, which 
we won't allow them to win. Under 
these circumstances, I think that we 
both have incentives to overcome the 
remaining differences. I think that 
can be done and in the not-too-distant 
future. d 



1 ACDA press release. 

2 For text of address, see Bulletin of Oct. 
9, 1967. p. 443. 



24 



I/.S. and Soviet Strategy? 
Capabilitg Through the md-1980 9 s 



Report of the Arms Control and 
Disarmament Agency, August 1978.* 

Many of the static measures used to 
compare U.S. and Soviet strategic 
forces deal only with factors such as 
numbers of bombers, missiles, 
weapons, throw-weight, and megatons. 
Other factors not considered can far 
outweigh these simple static measures. 
These factors include, but are not lim- 
ited to, the readiness of the forces, 
their survivability, their ability to 
penetrate defenses, their accuracy and 
reliability, and what it is they have to 
attack. 

The "capability index" used in this 
study attempts to place in perspective 
the relative capabilities of the U.S. 
and Soviet strategic forces according 
to a common measure of effectiveness. 
This measure is one which focuses on 
what the forces "can do" as opposed 
to what the two forces "look like." 

Basis for Analysis 

The first step in the process is to 
determine what it is that the forces 
will be used against in the event of a 
nuclear exchange. It is generally ac- 
cepted that the various categories of 
targets will include industrial and eco- 
nomic facilities, civilian and military 
command and control facilities, and 
military targets such as missile launch- 
ers, submarine ports, airfields, and 
troop installations. In terms of vul- 
nerability it is more appropriate to 
categorize the targets according to 
their susceptibility to destruction. The 
majority of potential targets are very 
soft. That is, any nuclear weapon 
which detonates within a few thousand 
feet will probably destroy the target. 
Other targets such as missile silos, 
weapons storage, and command and 
control facilities are built to withstand 
all but direct hits and near misses. 

In this analysis a basic target set is 
assumed against which the capabilities 
of the two forces are measured. While 
there are asymmetries within the U.S. 
and Soviet target systems on a func- 
tional basis, it is not unreasonable to 
assume an equal number of hard and 
soft targets for purposes of comparing 
overall capability. In this analysis it is 
assumed that each country has 1 ,500 
hard targets (2,000 psi) 2 and 5,000 
soft targets (10 psi). Excursions to this 
base case have been made. They show 



that the results are not particularly 
sensitive to the variations in the total 
number of targets, the hardness of the 
targets, or the ratio of hard to soft 
targets. 

This means of measuring force ca- 
pability cannot be used to evaluate the 
full impact of the current and pro- 
jected Soviet strategic forces. Nor 
should this study be the sole basis for 
accepting or rejecting proposed 
changes in the U.S. force posture. 
However, the overall capability of nu- 
clear forces to accomplish their de- 
signed objectives — destruction of 
targets — has to play a major role in 
any comparative assessment of relative 
strength. 

The analysis which follows com- 
pares the capability of U.S. and Soviet 
strategic forces for the present and for 
the mid-1980's against a common 
target set. 

Relative Strategic Capability of 
U.S. and Soviet Forces in 1978 

While the Soviets lead the United 
States in some of the static indices of 
strategic force comparison, the United 
States is clearly ahead today in terms 
of target destruction capability. 

Chart 1 shows the current Soviet 
capability to destroy a target system 
consisting of 1,500 hard targets and 
5,000 soft targets. The curve which 
originates at the lower left corner of 
the graph shows the damage expect- 
ancy for a sequentially higher alloca- 
tion of weapons to hard targets. The 
dotted curve which begins in the lower 
right corner of the graph indicates the 
percentage of soft targets destroyed by 
the weapons not allocated to hard 
targets. For example, if no weapons 
are allocated to hard targets then all 
weapons are used against soft targets 
and 75 c /c of the soft targets are de- 
stroyed. At the other extreme, if all 
weapons are used against hard targets 
and none against soft then the Soviets 
could destroy 56 % of the 1,500 hard 
targets. 

To illustrate the use of these curves 
consider the case where the Soviets 
might desire a damage expectancy of 
70% against the soft targets. With 
1978 forces this is achievable but in 
order to destroy 70% of the soft 
targets only 6% of the force would be 
available to strike the hard targets. 
Therefore, from the curves of chart I . 



;lft 



s 

■:. • 

; 
K 



Department of State Bulletir 

if 709c of the soft targets are de- 
stroyed then only 14 % of the hard 
targets would be destroyed. An in- 
teresting way of comparing forces is 
shown in the appendix. 

Chart 2 contains the Soviet 1978 
capability curves from chart 1 as well 
as the curves which show how capa- 
ble the current U.S. strategic forces 
would be against the same target 
system after riding out the Soviet 
first-strike. In these curves both 
forces are in a generated alert pos- 
ture. All force characteristics such as 
alert readiness, accuracy, weapon 
yield, and reliability have been taken 
into account as well as estimates of 
U.S. bomber force capability to 
penetrate Soviet air defenses. 

It can be observed from the com- 
puter plot of chart 2 that the retalia- 
tory capability of U.S. forces in 1978 
exceeds the first-strike capability of 
the Soviets against both hard and soft 
targets. It can be seen in this chart 
that for any weapon allocation U.S. 
forces in a retaliatory attack create a 
larger destruction than Soviet forces 
in a first-strike. For example, an allo- 
cation in which 80% of the force was 
used against soft targets while the 
other 20% was used against hard 
targets would yield the following 
results. 



Hard Targets Soft Targets 
Destroyed Destroyed 

Soviet first-strike 28% 61% 

U.S. retaliation 43% 77% 



One of the major contributors to 
U.S. hard target kill capability is the 
U.S. manned bomber force. This 
force is not provocative from a first- 
strike viewpoint because of its rela- 
tively slow response time (as com- 
pared to intercontinental ballistic 
missiles — ICBM's); however, in re- 
taliation it has the capability to de- 
stroy a wide spectrum of targets. 



Relative Strategic Capability of 
U.S. and Soviet Forces in the 
Mid-1980's 

Both forces are projected to 
undergo extensive modernization be- 
tween now and the mid-1980's. For 
the United States the changes which 
will take place include improved ac- 
curacy and higher yield warheads for 
the Minuteman III ICBM; the de- 
ployment of the new and larger Tri- 
dent submarines equipped with the 
new Trident C-4 missile; the backfit- 
ting of the Trident C-4 missile into 
many of the Poseidon submarines; 






ctober 1978 

nd the introduction into the U.S. 
omber force of the air-launched 
ruise missile (ALCM). 

Chart 3 shows a comparison of the 
US. retaliatory capability in 1978 to 
lat of the mid-1980s. It can clearly 
e seen in this chart that the U.S. 

taliatory capability in the mid- 
980's is substantially larger than our 
urrent capability. 

Soviet strategic force improvements 
re even more dramatic. The MIRV - 
!ig which is currently underway will 
ave been completed; better missile 
.-curacy is forecast; and several new 
eapon systems are projected to be 



Chart 1 

Current First Strike Capability of Soviet 
Strategic Forces 



Percent 
Destruction 

100 



Legend 



Percent 
Destruction 
100 




20 40 60 80 100 

Percent of Weapons Allocated to Hard Targets 
(Remaining Weapons Allocated to Soft Targets) 



deployed. In chart 4 the first-strike 
capabilities of the current and pro- 
jected Soviet strategic forces are 
shown. As can be seen in the chart 
Soviet first-strike capability in the 
mid- 1 980 's has increased sharply over 
the current Soviet first-strike capabil- 
ity. It can be noted that the most sig- 
nificant increase in capability is in 
hard target destruction. 

The analysis takes into account the 
SALT II agreement now being 
negotiated. Although it is not possible 
to predict Soviet force improvements 
in the absence of a SALT II agree- 
ment, it is apparent that the overall 



Chart 2 

A Comparison of Current Soviet First 

Strike Capability and U.S. Retaliatory 

Capability 



Percent 
Destruction 

100 



Percent 

Destruction 

100 



Legend 




40 60 80 100 

Percent ol Weapons Allocated to Hard Targets 
(Remaining Weapons Allocated to Soft Targets) 



25 

capability could be greater since it 
would be unrestrained by the SALT 
limitations. 

In chart 5 the U.S. retaliatory ca- 
pability is compared to the Soviet 
first-strike potential. Both forces are 
roughly in balance; however, the 
overall capability of the United States 
to attack hard targets is about 10 per- 
centage points lower than the Soviet 
first-strike capability primarily be- 
cause of the losses incurred by the 
U.S. Minuteman force. 

Observations 

On the basis of the capability index 
used in this study the following ob- 
servations can be made. 

• The United States is ahead of the 
Soviet Union today in target destruc- 
tion capability. 

• Both the United States and Soviet 
forces will become substantially more 
capable by the mid-1980's. 

• U.S. retaliatory capability after a 
Soviet first-strike in the mid-1980's 
exceeds the current retaliatory capa- 
bility. 

• The capability of U.S. and Soviet 
strategic forces in the mid- 1 980 's is 
essentially equal. 

APPENDIX— Equal Damage Point 

An interesting way to examine the 
curves presented in this report is at 
the point where the hard and soft 
targets curves cross. At this point the 
damage to both hard and soft targets 
is equal. This point will be referred to 
as the equal damage point (EDP). 



Chart 3 

A Comparison of Current and Future 
(mid-1980's) U.S. Capability to 
Retaliate 

Percent Percent 

Destruction Destruction 



100 



U.S. (mid-1980s) 




100 



20 40 60 80 100 

Percent of Weapons Allocated to Hard Targets 
(Remaining Weapons Allocated to Soft Targets) 



Chart 4 

A Comparison of Current and Future 
(mid-1980's) Soviet First Strike Capa- 
bility 




20 40 60 80 100 

Percent of Weapons Allocated to Hard Targets 
(Remaining Weapons Allocated to Soft Targets) 



Chart 5 

A Comparison of Soviet First Strike 
Capability and U.S. Retaliatory Capabil- 
ity in the mid-1980's 




Legend 

Hard Target Damage 

Soft Target Damage . . , 



20 40 60 80 100 

Percent of Weapons Allocated to Hard Targets 
(Remaining Weapons Allocated to Soft Targets) 



26 



Department of State Bulleti 



. 



ECONOMICS: Prospects for 

international Action on 

Natural Rubber 



by Julius L. Katz 



Address before the 25th assembly of 
the International Rubber Study Group 
on June 19, 1978. Mr. Katz is Assist- 
ant Secretary for Economic and Busi- 
ness Affairs. 

We are honored to serve as host to 
the 25th assembly of the International 
Rubber Study Group. The United 
States was a charter member of the 
International Rubber Study Group at 
its formation in 1944 and the new 
group's first assembly was held the 
next year in Washington. The group is 
one of the oldest, and indeed one of 
the most useful, international com- 
modity organizations representing both 
producers and consumers. Its statisti- 
cal information on natural rubber and 
synthetic rubber production, consump- 
tion, and trade has benefitted industry 
and government alike. The studies it 
has undertaken on problems of the 
rubber industry and its supply-demand 
projections have been very useful. 
And its annual meetings have provided 
an opportunity for representatives of 
some 30 countries to meet regularly to 
discuss common problems and de- 
velopments in world rubber markets. 

My own experience in the com- 
modities field does not date back quite 
as far as the International Rubber 
Study Group's, but international com- 
modity issues have been a major 
preoccupation of mine over many 



years. While my current respon- 
sibilities cover the spectrum of inter- 
national economic problems, I find 
myself frequently engaged — by per- 
sonal choice as well as circum- 
stance — in our government's efforts to 
address specific commodity issues. So 
it is a personal pleasure to welcome 
this important commodity group to 
meet with us in Washington. 

Since early 1977, a series of discus- 
sions on natural rubber have taken 
place under the auspices of the U.N. 
Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD). At the latest preparatory 
meeting, held 4 months ago, produc- 
ing and consuming countries agreed to 
participate in formal negotiations for 
an international price stabilization 
agreement. Those negotiations will 
begin in November. In light of these 
developments, I would like first to re- 
view briefly the outlook for natural 
rubber and then focus on the prospects 
of achieving agreement at the forth- 
coming negotiations in Geneva. 



The Role of Natural Rubber 

Over the last century, the natural 
rubber industry has changed dramat- 
ically. Natural rubber was initially 
obtained wild from several species in 
the Amazon basin, but today is pro- 
duced primarily in Southeast Asia 
from organized plantings of a single 
specie. In the interim, agricultural, 
physiological, and biochemical re- 



f Strategic Capability — cont'd) 

In chart 2 which compares the cur- 
rent Soviet first-strike capability to 
U.S. retaliatory capability, the 
Soviets could achieve a 48% damage 
expectancy on the 6,500 targets by al- 
locating 36% of their weapons to hard 
targets and the remaining 64% to the 
soft targets. The U.S. retaliatory capa- 
bility at the EDP is to destroy 58'; ol 
the 6,500 targets. A U.S. retaliation, 
therefore, has 10 percentage points 
more capability against this target set 
than a Soviet first-strike. 

Examining charts 3 and 4 one can 
see that the EDP and U.S. retaliatory 
forces grows by 24 percentage points 
between now and the mid-1980's. 



while that of the Soviet first-strike 
grows by 35 percentage points over 
that same period. 

The net effect of the current U.S. 
lead and the more rapid Soviet growth 
between now and the mid- 1 980 's is 
that the equal damage points of a 
Soviet first-strike and a U.S. retalia- 
tion are equal in the mid- 1980 time 
period. C 



1 ACDA press release. 

2 The stated level of hardness is the over- 
pressure in pounds of pressure per square inch 
which the target can withstand [footnote in 
original]. 






search have transformed the origina 
tree into a more efficient producer. I: 
1977 the world trade in natural rubbe 
had climbed to 3.2 million tons am 
was valued at $2.2 billion. Excludin; 
oil, natural rubber ranks sixth in valu 
among the primary products traded o 
world markets. 

Natural rubber is of majo 
socioeconomic importance to the de 
veloping countries of Southeast Asiai 
which supply over 90% of world pro 
duction; it is also of growing impoi 
tance to a number of countries in Al 
rica and Latin America. Nearly 2. 
million workers are directly employe 
in natural rubber cultivation. Ove 
three-quarters of world production i 
by smallholders — subsistence farmer 
who typically own fewer than 1 
acres. Moreover, natural rubber is 
significant earner of much-neede 
foreign exchange. In 1976 Malaysi 
generated 23% of its foreign exchang 
receipts from natural rubber and In 
donesia 21% of non-oil receipts. Tin 
figures for Sri Lanka and Thailan as 
were 18% and 9%, respectively. 

Natural rubber is also important t i 
the industrialized countries, which ac 
count collectively for over 80% o> 
world consumption. The transportatio 
industry, particularly commercial an 
passenger tire production, has tradi 
tionally accounted for the bulk of de 
mand. In recent years, though, othe 
sectors such as latex products, belting 
footwear, and cable insulation hav 
been rapidly increasing their con 
sumption. Natural rubber is particu 
lady important to the United States, a 
the world's largest single consumer c 
this product. In 1977 our imports tc 
taled nearly 800,000 tons. Thi 
equates to almost 8 pounds of nature 
rubber per capita and amounts to ove 
20% of world production. Given ou 
growing demand for radial tires, th< 
U.S. market for natural rubber appear 
certain to continue to expand rapidly. 



.: 



« 



Trends 

There are currently several trend 
underway which individually and col 
lectively promise significant futurt 
changes in the natural rubber market. 

First, the traditional demand struc 
ture is changing. Higher oil price: 
have slowed down growth in tota 
world elastomer (natural and synthetic 
rubber) demand. As a result, it ap 
pears likely in the next 15 years thai 
annual growth in world elastomer corv 
sumption will decline from the recen 
historical average of 6.5% to abou 
5%. The automotive industry of th« 
developed countries will remain the 



tjtetober 1978 

n, eading consumer, but its growth in 
|i tatural rubber use should taper off in 
^ he 1980's. Other industrial uses in the 
jj leveloped countries, coupled with the 
ij tutomotive sectors of the developing 
ill md nonmarket countries, should help 
( >ffset those slowdowns. On balance, 

lowever, we see the overall outlook as 
j| avorable, with total elastomer con- 
j, umption growing at a rate leaving 

ioth natural and synthetic rubber 

imple scope for expansion. 

Second, the energy situation has 
iltered the competitive relationship 
>etween natural and synthetic rubber, 
'rior to 1973 synthetic rubber, based 
>n monomers produced from inexpen- 
ive petrochemical products, enjoyed a 
listinct price advantage. The fourfold 
ncrease in oil prices changed this re- 
ationship by doubling the cost of most 
nonomers. Although the international 
>il market currently is slack, future 
etroleutn price levels and supplies 
smain highly uncertain. Meanwhile, 
he cost of natural rubber — whose 
ftrgest component is labor — has not 
teen as strongly or directly influ- 
mced. The result has been a substan- 
al improvement in its ability to com- 
ete in elastomer markets. 

Third, new technologies and pro- 
uction techniques continue to be de- 
eloped in the field of synthetic rub- 
ers. Cis-Polyisoprene, a synthetic 
lbber that is a virtual chemical dupli- 
ate of natural rubber, is already 
vailable but presently more costly 
J tan its natural counterpart. In addi- 
| on, new "convenience" rubbers — 
jhich would facilitate processing — 
nd "specialty" rubbers — which are 
resigned to perform well under ex- 
treme conditions — may soon be avail- 
able. There also has been renewed 
Interest in guayule, the latex- 
]iroducing shrub indigenous to Mexico 
Ind the southwestern United States. 
I'hese developments — and the apparent 
jlDmmitment of nonmarket economies 
K) increasing their synthetic rubber 
[I reduction — could offset natural rub- 
ler's increased competitiveness. 

Fourth, most projections indicate 
liat a supply shortfall in natural rub- 
j'er appears likely in the late 1980's. 
lis I have already mentioned, world 
lemand for elastomers is likely to 
Irow at 5% annually over the next 15 
Bears or so. Replanting and technical 
linovations will allow natural rubber 

reduction to climb from its historic 
Iverage growth of 3% annually to 

erhaps 4% per year. But even with 

lis effort, a gap between production 
llnd consumption seems likely to de- 

jelop in the latter part of the next 

iecade. 



Production Investment and Price 
Instability 

To reduce that anticipated future 
shortage of natural rubber, expanded 
production and increased investment 
are needed. An international workshop 
held last month in Southeast Asia pro- 
vided an opportunity to view firsthand 
the production situation of the natural 
rubber industry. Particularly impres- 
sive were technological innovations 
which would provide increased 
supplies of natural rubber if effectively 
and energetically implemented. These 
innovations encompass: 

• Higher yielding trees which could 
raise current annual yields by two or 
three times; 

• New planting materials and tech- 
niques which can reduce the immatu- 
rity period of rubber trees from the 
traditional 6 to 7 years down to 3 to 4 
years, thus reducing investment costs 
substantially; 

• Chemical stimulants capable of 
cutting production costs and enhancing 
yields of relatively mature trees; and 

• Methods of stemming losses from 
endemic tree diseases. 

Programs to implement these inno- 
vations are underway in all of the pro- 
ducing countries, but the levels of ef- 
fort and effectiveness vary consid- 
erably among the producing countries. 
As a result, in the near future there 
will have to be sizable new invest- • 
ments if the opportunity facing natural 
rubber producers is to be seized and 
natural rubber shortfalls avoided in the 
late 1980's. 

Natural rubber prices, however, 
have traditionally displayed a consid- 
erable degree of instability, with 
strong rises — notably in 1951, 1955, 
1960, and 1973-74— followed by 
sharp and sudden declines. This be- 
havior has tended to destabilize small- 
holders' incomes, complicate planning 
for national development, and impact 
adversely on foreign exchange earn- 
ings. It has also tended to contribute 
to unjustified investment during 
periods of high prices and underin- 
vestment during periods of low prices. 
As such, short-term price instability 
has clearly been among the factors 
generating resistance to needed long- 
term investments. 



Prospects for an International 
Agreement 

Our own analyses and the UNCTAD 
discussions have shown that a properly 
designed and implemented price 
stabilization agreement on natural rub- 
ber could provide benefits to both con- 



27 



suming and producing countries. From 
the standpoint of producer countries, 
an agreement could: 

• Offer greater predictability of 
smallholder incomes and foreign ex- 
change earnings; 

• Encourage investments that would 
steadily and substantially increase nat- 
ural rubber production and stimulate 
rural development; and 

• Boost consumption of natural rub- 
ber, thus making it possible for small- 
holder incomes and foreign exchange 
earnings to rise. 

The U.S. interest in such an agree- 
ment, and I assume that of most con- 
suming countries, would be to: 

• Moderate the extent to which vol- 
atile raw material prices trigger in- 
flationary pressures and 

• Create an atmosphere that would 
help to assure future needed supplies 
of natural rubber at reasonable prices. 

Looking to the Negotiations 

In theory, it is not difficult to ap- 
preciate that an international buffer 
stock agreement could offset imper- 
fections in the competitive rubber 
market, while avoiding interference 
with basic supply/demand factors or 
underlying price signals in the market. 
In doing so, an agreement should 
confer some of the benefits just listed. 
In practice, though, establishing a 
buffer stock agreement is not a simple 
matter. Commodity markets are com- 
plex, and the political realities of the 
multilateral negotiation process com- 
pound the problem. Each government 
brings to the bargaining table its own 
set of economic and political objec- 
tives, as well as its peculiar perspec- 
tive on the problem. 

The negotiations beginning in 
Geneva next November will need to 
resolve an array of closely linked is- 
sues before a satisfactory agreement 
can emerge. These issues include the 
proper buffer stock size and location; 
the width of the price band to be de- 
fended and the rules for adjusting the 
band; the procedures for market inter- 
vention by the buffer stock manager; 
the scale of government contributions 
to financing the buffer stock; and the 
decisionmaking rules. 

Two of these issues — export con- 
trols and pricing provisions — are likely 
to be troublesome. Given their signifi- 
cance, I would like to elaborate in 
some detail our views on each of 
them. 

Export controls are advanced in 
most negotiations for commodity 
agreements as a means of supple- 



28 

meriting buffer stocks to insure de- 
fense of floor prices. Part of their ap- 
peal lies in the notion that they will 
decrease the required buffer stock 
size, thus reducing the participants' fi- 
nancial obligations in comparison with 
a pure buffer stock agreement. Our 
experiences with other commodities 
and our analysis of the rubber market, 
however, suggest that export controls 
have serious disadvantages. In par- 
ticular, export controls: 

• Are cumbersome devices, difficult 
to negotiate and implement; 

• Freeze export patterns to the dis- 
advantage of more active and efficient 
producers, especially when the con- 
trols are based upon past export per- 
formances; 

• Impair the agreement's ability to 
defend a price ceiling once demand 
picks up. particularly if production re- 
strictions are also imposed; 

• Are particularly difficult to design 
and could be destabilizing; and 

• Inefficiently idle factors of pro- 
duction which could be devoted more 
advantageously to buffer stock size. 

In regard to pricing provisions gen- 
erally, our preference is for measures 
that enhance the operation of the free 
market rather than replace it. We op- 
pose arrangements that introduce arti- 
fically rigid restrictions on the market 
or try to peg prices at levels above 
those which supply and demand can 
sustain. In our view, the aim should 
be to stabilize the market price around 
its long-term trend as determined by 
market prices, rather than by institu- 
tional fiat. We seek an approach which 
would enable producers, consumers, 
and investors to respond to clearer 
market signals while erratic pressures 
on price movements would be damp- 
ened. Market distortions and misallo- 
cation of resources could thus be 
minimized. 

In the specific case of rubber, we 
believe that in determining the width 
of the price band, it will be necessary 
to take into account the size of the 
buffer stock and its ability to contrib- 
ute to price stabilization within that 
range. The design — and operation — of 
the mechanism for adjusting that price- 
band should be based primarily upon 
long-term trends. 

Conclusion 

As the negotiations approach, we 
are working with other countries to 
develop a proposal that will incorpo- 
rate recommendations for the major 
economic provisions of an agreement. 
In so doing we are giving careful con- 
sideration to the proposals of both 



producer and consumer countries. If 
the constructive atmosphere which has 
characterized the preparatory discus- 
sions carries over to the formal negoti- 
ations, the prospects are good for an 
agreement that will serve the interests 
of both producers and consumers. 

Looking beyond the November 
negotiations, we will inevitably face 
the question of the International Rub- 
ber Study Group's future role and its 
relationship to a secretariat created by 
a new international agreement. One 
possibility might be for the group to 
retain all its present functions and the 
traditional London headquarters but at 
the same time to acquire a close 
working relationship with the sec- 
retariat of the newly created interna- 
tional body. Such an agreement would 
maintain the valuable expertise already 
developed by the International Rubber 
Study Group, lower operating costs of 
the newly created body's secretariat, 
and reduce overlapping of efforts. 
Those of us here today, though, have 
not been tasked — nor are we now 
equipped — to reach a decision on this 
important question. 

In the meantime, I am certain 
that — in the tradition of the group — 
the discussion at this week's as- 
semblage will make a substantial con- 
tribution to the preparatory process for 
the negotiation by deepening our 
mutual understanding of the key issues 
facing the rubber industry. 

On behalf of the U.S. Government. 
I extend our warmest welcome and 
best wishes for a fruitful meeting. □ 



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k 
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101 



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It NO. |j 

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it with | 



October 1978 



29 



EUROPE: The Potential 
of the Helsinki Dialogue 



by Matthew Nimetz 

Address before the annual meeting 
of the American Bar Association in 
New York on August 3, 1978. Mr. 
Nimetz is Counselor of the Depart- 
ment of State . 

Perhaps at no time since the Hel- 
sinki Final Act was signed by the 
leaders of the 35 European and North 
American states at the summit in 
1975 has it been so much in the news 
as in the wake of the trials of Orlov, 
Shcharanskiy , Petkus, and other 
Soviet dissidents this spring and 
iummer. 1 I welcome this opportunity 
:o discuss the potential of the Hel- 
sinki dialogue. 

The behavior of the Soviet Union 
ooth internally and externally, espe- 
cially over the past 6 months or so, 
las been a matter of grave concern 
or the American public and for the 
\dministration. We entertain no illu- 
ions about the totalitarian nature of 
ooviet society. We recognize that our 
elationship is essentially an adver- 
;ary one, defined by challenges both 
deological and overt, though tem- 
pered by cooperative activities in 
ome areas. 

We believe it is in our fundamental 
lational interest to moderate the tone 
ind character of this adversary re- 
ationship and to expand the areas in 
■vhich cooperative ventures are mutu- 
ally advantageous. Equally, we owe it 
o ourselves, our children, and the 
oeople of other nations to seek every 
leasonable opportunity for reaching 
igreements with the Soviet Union that 
vill help control dangerous military 
ompetition and lessen the risk of nu- 
lear war. These efforts to seek out 
ireas of agreement, particularly in 
irms control, do not in any way sig- 
ify our acquiescence in Soviet mis- 
reatment of American diplomats, 
jusinessmen, and journalists or their 
>wn courageous citizens who are 
nerely trying to act on the rights 
>romised to them under the Helsinki 
•■inal Act and other international 
greements. 

The events of the past year have 
emonstrated how difficult it is for a 
Communist state to put into practice, 
ven to a limited extent, certain ele- 
nental rights, such as those contained 
n the Helsinki Final Act. However, 
he fact that the Soviet leadership has 



not implemented important elements 
of their Helsinki commitments in no 
way diminishes the potential of the 
Final Act to the citizens of East and 
West alike, or the advantages of the 
Helsinki process to long-term Western 
interests. 

I believe that the Final Act, and the 
process of which it is the most tangi- 
ble product, can contribute to a more 
stable and more beneficial East-West 
relationship. This potential can be 
realized only over a considerable 
period of time and then only if cool 
and informed judgment is exercised 
by all concerned — by governments 
and by the citizenry of the par- 
ticipating states. 

The Final Act in Context 

The document signed at Helsinki in 
the summer of 1975 marked the con- 
clusion of the Conference on Security 
and Cooperation in Europe, which is 
commonly referred to as CSCE. Such 
a conference was first proposed by 
the Soviets in the mid-1950's and 
then picked up again by President 
Brezhnev with renewed enthusiasm 
shortly after his ascent to power. 

The West had no interest in such a 
conference, considering it to be a 
ploy to legitimize Soviet claims on 
Eastern Europe while weakening the 
bonds between Western Europe and 
the United States. In fact, the Soviets 
had originally hoped to restrict the 
conference to European states so that 
their security situation could be dis- 
cussed without the presence of the 
United States. 

At the end of the 1960's the NATO 
alliance began to express cautious 
interest in some kind of pan-European 
conference, provided that the United 
States and Canada took part and pro- 
vided practical steps were taken to 
deal with several of Europe's most 
pressing security problems, especially 
regarding Berlin and conventional 
forces in central Europe. 

During this period the Federal Re- 
public of Germany launched its 
Ostpolitik in an attempt to defuse 
some of the major postwar European 
problems revolving around the Ger- 
man question. At the same time the 
United States and the Soviet Union 
were also reaching agreement on a 
range of subjects, including SALT I 
and cultural and scientific exchanges. 



It was in this context of substantial 
movement to relax political tensions 
across a broad front that agreement 
was reached to open preparatory 
CSCE talks in Helsinki late in 1972. 
Between the first Soviet suggestion 
and the actual convocation of a con- 
ference, more than a decade had 
passed and the entire nature of the 
conference had changed. 

While the word "security" was 
retained in its title, the concept of 
"cooperation" was added. Potentially 
explosive political issues such as the 
German problem and the hardcore se- 
curity issues, including strategic arms 
limitation and reduction of troop 
levels in central Europe, were being 
dealt with in more limited special 
forums (the Quadripartite Agreement 
on Berlin and the start of talks in 
Vienna on mutual and balanced force 
reductions in central Europe). CSCE 
concentrated therefore upon security 
in a more general sense — the security 
that would come from an expansion 
of cooperation between East and West 
in a wide range of areas including 
economic, humanitarian, educational, 
and cultural. 

The Final Act was divided into 
three basic areas, or baskets. A Dec- 
laration on Principles [Guiding Rela- 
tions between Participating States], 
contained in basket 1 , was not the 
quasipeace treaty originally suggested 
by the Soviet Union. During the 2 
years of negotiations, it evolved into 
a general restatement of long- 
accepted principles of interstate be- 
havior such as sovereign equality and 
non-threat or non-use of force. These 
principles were drawn from and are con- 
sistent with earlier statements of inter- 
national law such as the U.N. Charter, 
the U.N. Declaration on Friendly Re- 
lations, and the U.N. Definition of 
Aggression. 

A most important accomplishment 
was to include a strongly worded af- 
firmation of respect for human rights 
and fundamental freedoms in the 
Declaration on Principles as one of 10 
principles governing the participating 
states in their mutual relations. That 
principle was carefully drafted to be 
consistent with earlier statements in 
such documents as the U.N. Charter, 
the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, and the U.N. covenants on 
civil, political, economic, and social 
rights. In so doing it gave added 



30 

force to those documents and promi- 
nence to the commitment of the 35 
governments to pay heed to them. 

Another important part of basket 1 
was a set of military confidence- 
building measures which, in an in- 
novative way, seek to promote secu- 
rity by providing for notifications of 
military exercises, the presence of 
observers at such exercises, and other 
constructive steps. 

The most interesting and innovative 
accomplishment at Helsinki was the 
inclusion of a series of concrete, 
practical commitments in basket 3 
designed to improve the flow of 
people and ideas between East and 
West. 

These provisions were not written 
in tight treaty language but rather in a 
somewhat more flexible form of ex- 
pression favored by diplomats who 
are seeking to reach agreement in 
controversial areas. To some extent 
they did not go as far as the classical 
international legal statements sum- 
marized in the basket 1 principle of 
respect for human rights and funda- 
mental freedoms. For example, article 
13 of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, incorporated by refer- 
ence in the basket 1 principle, states 
that: "Everyone has the right to leave 
any country, including his own, and 
to return to his country." Basket 3 of 
the Final Act says that: "The par- 
ticipating States will deal in a posi- 
tive and humanitarian spirit with the 
applications of persons who wish to 
be reunited with members of their 
family. . . ." It pledges the par- 
ticipating states to ". . . deal with 
applications in this field as expedi- 
tiously as possible." It says that: 
"Applications for the purpose of 
family reunification which are not 
granted may be renewed at the appro- 
priate level and will be reconsidered 
at reasonably short intervals by the 
authorities of the country of residence 
or destination, whichever is con- 
cerned .... ' These provisions are 
not all-encompassing, but they pro- 
vide concrete commitments from 
which diplomats can discuss and 
often solve particular emigration 
cases. 

The Helsinki achievement thus was 
to fold human rights concerns into the 
developing fabric of East-West de- 
tente. It established the point that 
detente would have to deal not only 
with arms and armies, with balance of 
payments and benefits for govern- 
ments, but also with the practical, 
day-to-day concerns of people — 
businessmen, family members, jour- 
nalists, clergymen, and others. 

There were two reasons for the 



West's insistence upon this. It was 
believed that by encouraging the 
Soviet Union and other Communist 
states toward a more open and toler- 
ant treatment of people and ideas, 
much of the suspicion that fueled 
postwar hostility could be replaced, 
in an evolutionary process, by an in- 
creasing sense of mutual confidence. 
It was also recognized that a policy of 
active cooperation with the East could 
only be sustained in the long run for 
the democracies of the West if our 
publics could perceive and experience 
direct benefits. 

This, I would point out, was by no 
means merely or even primarily an 
American policy. It was carefully de- 
veloped and coordinated policy of the 
nations of the NATO alliance and of 
the major Western European neutrals. 

It was always recognized, of 
course, that the Final Act's ultimate 
value would have to be judged not on 
the day it was signed but at some 
point rather far in the future. It is 
important to emphasize that the Final 
Act is not a treaty but a political 
document signed by heads of state or 
government with the solemn intention 
of giving meaning to the words of the 
agreement. President Ford and 
President Carter have both em- 
phasized that the test would not be 
the aspirations expressed but rather the 
goals fulfilled. 

There were many who believed that 
the words to which the heads of 35 
nations subscribed at Helsinki would, 
in fact, be forgotten rather quickly. 
Clearly this has not happened. In- 
deed, few documents are quoted or 
referred to more often today than the 
Helsinki Final Act. It is important to 
understand why this agreement has 
such vitality. There have been, I be- 
lieve, three mutually supporting 
reasons. 

• The Final Act achieved a reso- 
nance among the citizenry of the 
Soviet Union and the countries of 
Eastern Europe that was unforeseen 
during the long years of negotiation. 
The formation of monitoring groups 
calling for the full implementation by 
their governments of the pledges they 
had made and the attempt by other 
courageous individuals to exercise the 
civil and political rights delineated in 
the Final Act or to apply for emigra- 
tion visas also focused new public 
attention in the West upon the CSCE 
process. The harsh response, particu- 
larly in the Soviet Union and Czecho- 
slovakia, greatly increased interest in 
the content of the Helsinki agreement 
in both the East and the West. 

• The election of an Administration 



Department of State Bulletin 

in the United States pledged to make 
human rights one of the major pillars 
of its foreign policy gave particular 
prominence to the Final Act and the 
CSCE process. The President showed 
that he took those commitments seri- 
ously. The support he received from 
the Congress — in particular the CSCE 
Commission under Congressman 
Dante Fascell — demonstrated legisla- 
tive support. And the sympathetic 
reaction to the goals of Helsinki from 
a broad spectrum of public 
opinion — religious, ethnic, human- 
itarian, legal, and business — gave 
strength to the U.S. position. The at- 
titude in Western Europe was also 
supportive, bolstering the united ef- 
forts of Western governments in 
promoting compliance. 

• The Helsinki Final Act, almost 
without parallel for a major interna- 
tional document, neither assumed its 
automatic implementation nor left that 
process to the traditional modes of 
bilateral or multilateral diplomacy. 
Instead, it contained explicit provi- 
sion for followup, most notably for a 
series of review meetings that would 
be charged with the primary task of 
assessing the state of implementation 
and determining, if possible, what 
additional measures might be under- 
taken to improve implementation. 

This type of built-in diplomatic re- 
view procedure is perhaps particularly 
useful for a political document like 
the Final Act which the signatories 
explicitly declared not be legally 
binding. It is a device that the inter- 
national community should also con- 
sider using in the future for legally 
binding multilateral agreements. Such 
mandated followup meetings offer a 
number of advantages over traditional 
procedures for effecting compliance, 
since parties are provided regular op- 
portunities to raise matters of concern 
without broaching the always serious 
questions of renegotiation or renunci- 
ation. At the same time, it provides a 
framework for making further ad- 
vances and for overcoming stumbling 
blocks by negotiating additional, 
functionally related agreements if the 
circumstances permit. 



The Belgrade Followup 

The first CSCE review meeting, 
held in Belgrade from October 4, 
1977, to March 8, 1978, has a long- 
range significance that transcends the 
innocuous phrases of its short, dry 
communique or the contentious and 
almost indeterminate nature of its 
semipublic debates. The meeting 
served as a catalyst for focusing pub- 



October 1978 



31 



lie attention on the content of the 
Helsinki Final Act. This public 
notice, more widespread in Europe 
than in the United States, made it 
certain that Western delegations 
would conduct a thorough and candid 
review of the implementation record 
and that the review would necessarily 
focus on the generally negative East- 
ern record. The fact that the U.S. 
delegation was led by a former Su- 
preme Court Justice and U.S. Ambas- 
sador to the United Nations, Arthur J. 
Goldberg, further served to direct 
public attention to the meeting. 2 

At the same time, it turned out, 
after the review was accomplished, 
that there was no practical possibility 
for the meeting to agree either on 
further measures to improve im- 
plementation or on a document that 
described the conclusions of the con- 
ference in detail. Under the rules by 
which CSCE proceeds, all decisions 
must be taken by consensus, which is 
defined as the absence of objection by 
any participant. Agreements reached 
carry great weight because they have 
been freely accepted by 35 states, 
each of which possesses an absolute 
veto. However, agreement can be re- 
duced to the lowest common de- 
nominator when one state, as in the 
case of the Soviet Union at Belgrade, 
chooses to insist on its blocking 
power. 

The first 3 months of the Belgrade 
meeting were devoted to the review 
of implementation and consideration 
of proposed new measures designed 
to improve implementation. The re- 
maining period was devoted to 
negotiation of the concluding docu- 
ment. 3 The Soviets made it plain 
from the first days of January 1978 
that despite repeated efforts by the 
West, and especially by the neutral 
and nonaligned delegations, to pro- 
duce substantive compromises, they 
would accept nothing in the conclud- 
ing document that referred directly to 
human rights. Most other delegations 
were unable to accept a Soviet- 
supported document that would have 
referred selectively to their proposals 
in the security field and to a few in- 
nocuous matters while ignoring major 
issues that had played so prominent a 
part in the meeting and were integral 
aspects of the Final Act itself. 

The result was a short document 
which nonetheless did contain a 
number of significant points. The 
concluding document reaffirmed the 
commitment of all the participating 
states to implement the Final Act. It 
provided for the process to continue 
by establishing that a second 
Belgrade-style review meeting would 



be held in Madrid in the fall of 1980. 
It also provided for the convening of 
three expert meetings which, between 
Belgrade and Madrid, would consider 
specialized topics and help give vital- 
ity and added depth to the CSCE 
process. 

Perhaps the central question of the 
Belgrade meeting, however, revolves 
around the specially creative aspect of 
the Final Act — the insertion of the 
human element into East-West rela- 
tions. Throughout the Belgrade 
meeting the Soviet Union insisted that 
Western criticism of Soviet or Eastern 
European human rights practices with 
respect to principle VII and basket 3 



that the participating states "held a 
thorough exchange of views" and 
that: "It was recognized that the ex- 
change of views constitutes in itself a 
valuable contribution towards the 
achievement of the aims set by the 
CSCE, although different views were 
expressed as to the degree of im- 
plementation of the Final Act reached 
so far." Through the diplomatic ver- 
biage one can perceive an implicit ac- 
ceptance of the responsible and 
detailed manner in which the West 
conducted the review of implementa- 
tion. Moreover, it was agreed that the 
Madrid meeting would be patterned 
on the Belgrade precedent. 



. . . the fact that the Soviet leadership has not implemented important 
elements of their Helsinki commitments in no way diminishes the 
potential of the Final Act to the citizens of East and West alike .... 



of the Final Act was itself a violation 
of the Final Act. The Soviets cited 
the sixth principle, "Non-intervention 
in internal affairs," as the basis for 
their position. 

Western delegations, and notably 
the American representatives, insisted 
that the Soviet position was untenable 
legally and politically. We noted that 
parties to the Final Act had the ob- 
vious right to make observations 
about the degree of implementation 
by another party of commitments 
mutually undertaken. We emphasized 
that such verbal comment and analy- 
sis, particularly in a meeting con- 
vened to assess the record of im- 
plementation, could not be construed 
as the sort of forceful intervention 
which the sixth principle was de- 
signed to cover. We also pointed out 
that expressions of international con- 
cern for matters affecting the funda- 
mental rights of individuals were a 
basic political element of the Final 
Act and that unless this aspect was 
retained. Western popular support for 
CSCE and for other areas of East- 
West cooperation would be 
endangered. 

In our judgment the course of the 
Belgrade meeting substantially con- 
firmed the Western position. The 
Soviet Union occasionally dropped its 
own theoretical defenses by attacking 
in some detail Western, particularly 
American, human rights practices. 
We welcomed this interchange, not 
because we considered that the Soviet 
comments were accurate but because 
we wish to be able in CSCE to en- 
gage in a candid debate. 

Most significantly, the Belgrade 
concluding document acknowledges 



Current Status of CSCE 

Where then do we stand with CSCE 
after more than 3 years of experience 
with the Final Act? How is the CSCE 
process affecting the lives of indi- 
viduals throughout the 35 signatory 
states'? What is the role of CSCE in 
the present state of East-West rela- 
tions and over the next several years? 
The answer to these questions must 
be both tentative and complex. 

To begin with, there certainly has 
not been adequate progress toward 
full implementation. The U.S. as- 
sessment of the implementation rec- 
ord, essentially as it was expressed at 
Belgrade, can be found in the series 
of semiannual reports which the State 
Department prepares and the Presi- 
dent transmits as required by law to 
the CSCE Commission. The most re- 
cent report is dated June 3, 1978. 4 The 
congressional CSCE Commission, 
which works in close, effective coop- 
eration with the executive, has also 
compiled its own quite similar public 
assessments. We consider that the 
Final Act reflects basic accepted 
worldwide standards, with which the 
United States and the other Western 
countries have largely been in com- 
pliance from the time the document 
was signed. Still, we recognize the 
need to improve our performance in 
certain areas. 

The 1977 McGovern amendment in 
visa waivers was a useful step to im- 
prove U.S. compliance. Based upon 
basket 3 provisions, it liberalized 
entry procedures with respect to indi- 
viduals who might otherwise be pre- 
vented from visiting the United States 
because of their political affiliations. 



32 



Department of State Bulletin 



There is an unfortunate attempt 
underway in the Congress to undo 
this progress as a riposte to recent 
Soviet actions. In our view such a 
backward step would complicate the 
East-West debate in an unhelpful 
manner, for it would permit the 
Soviet Union to point to a concrete 
example of U.S. backsliding when- 
ever we mention recent Soviet 
actions. 

Although we consider that com- 
pliance by the Soviet Union, and in 
varying degrees by Eastern European 
countries, to be generally insufficient, 
the picture is not uniformly bad. 
There has been a record of good-faith 
compliance, for example, by all 
CSCE nations with the military 
confidence-building measures. Com- 
pliance with basket 2 economic provi- 
sions and many of the less controver- 
sial provisions for cooperation in 
cultural and educational matters has 
continued in a generally positive pat- 
tern, although even in these areas 
considerable improvement would be 
welcome. 

The troubled area, however, is 
clearly that in which the greatest 
hopes for the Final Act were 
invested — that of the provisions re- 
lating to freer movement of persons 
and ideas. For example, too many in- 
dividuals remain without exit visas, 
and too many are punished and perse- 
cuted for merely expressing a desire 
to emigrate. Even here, however, the 
picture is mixed. The rate of resolu- 
tion of divided family cases has, in 
some instances, improved. In the last 
year or so the number of Jews re- 
ceiving permission to leave the Soviet 
Union has increased considerably, 
though not to the levels of the early 
1970's. The Federal Republic of 
Germany continues to have consider- 
able success in repatriating ethnic 
Germans from the Soviet Union and 
particularly from Poland and Romania 
and maintains special arrangements 
with the German Democratic Republic 
on behalf of those who wish to 
emigrate from East to West Germany. 
Also it should be noted that as more 
people emigrate from the East, more 
relatives with rights and desires to 
emigrate are left behind. 

Of even greater political impact is 
the fact that members of Final Act 
monitoring groups in the Soviet 
Union and in several other Eastern 
countries have been ruthlessly dealt 
with in violation of the pledges in the 
Final Act which confirmed ". . .the 
right of the individual to know and 
act upon his rights ... in this field. " 

There has been little if any im- 
provement in the availability of West- 



ern newspapers, books, and other 
sources of information in the Soviet 
Union and Eastern Europe, and in re- 
cent days strong pressures have been 
applied by the Soviet Union against 
American journalists seeking to carry 
out functions guaranteed by the Final 
Act. 

The history of the Soviet Union in- 
dicates that strong actions to block 
the impact of dangerous foreign 
trends and to stifle dissent have deep 
roots. When similar situations de- 
veloped in the past, Soviet responses 
were frequently more brutal than their 
actions today, and the West was even 
more limited in its possibilities for 
response. With the high-level public 
Soviet commitment to all of the 
statements of intent in the Helsinki 
Final Act, it has been possible to cite 
specific obligations and shortcomings 
in a way that gives the Soviets cause 
to consider carefully the international 
ramifications of their actions and, 
hopefully, moderate their harsh in- 
stincts in these matters. For example, 
in the case of the Soviet court action 
against Harold Piper and Craig Whit- 
ney, 5 we are able to defend the pro- 
bity of their actions by citing the ac- 
tual language of the Final Act which 
calls upon the signatory states to im- 
prove the working conditions for 
journalists by, among other things, 
increasing ". . .the opportunities for 
journalists ... to communicate per- 
sonally with their sources. . . " and 
by reaffirming that ". . .the legiti- 
mate pursuit of their professional ac- 
tivity will neither render journalists 
liable to expulsion nor otherwise 
penalize them.'" Similarly, in the 
case of the Soviets' outrageous arrest 
of the American representative of In- 
ternational Harvester, we can cite the 
basket 2 language in which the sig- 
natories undertook to improve the 
working conditions of representatives 
of foreign enterprises in numerous 
practical ways. 

Benefits of the CSCE 

Although the implementation rec- 
ord is predominately disappointing, 
we should take note of CSCE's 
tangential benefits. Most important, 
perhaps, has been the positive effect 
that CSCE has had and continues to 
have on Western political unity. In 
developing the agenda for the Hel- 
sinki conference, in insisting upon the 
inclusion of the human element in the 
Final Act, in their common determi- 
nation that Soviet and Eastern 
shortcomings be discussed candidly at 
Belgrade, and in their response to the 
current difficult period occasioned by 



the recent trials, the Western nations 
have given expression to their com- 
mon social and cultural values. 

U.S. policy is closely coordinated 
with our NATO allies, and the proc- 
ess of consultation has given new 
political impetus to the alliance. The 
members of the European Community 
have found in CSCE a vehicle by 
which they have been able to develop 
common political as well as economic 
policy. But the common thread of 
Western policy on CSCE extends be- 
yond the alliance and the Community 
to include most of the neutral and 
nonaligned nations of Europe. CSCE 
has therefore served to reinforce the 
political strength and solidarity of the 
West and has increased the West's 
perception of those basic differences 
which persist between Western and 
Eastern societies. This strengthened 
perception of Western values and the 
Soviet Union's defensive position 
with respect to implementation have, 
I believe, been significant factors in 
limiting the effectiveness of Com- 
munist parties among the people of 
Western Europe. 

The CSCE process has also pro- 
vided a mechanism within which the 
smaller nations of Europe, both those 
within and without alliances, can play 
a more important part in the diplo- 
macy of their continent than at any 
time since the end of the Second 
World War. They value this opportu- 
nity for its own sake, and it has made 
a contribution to their self-confidence 
and sense of security. In addition we 
find that participating states like Au- 
stria. Switzerland, Sweden, the Vati- 
can, and Yugoslavia have ideas and 
insights that find constructive outlets 
in CSCE activities. 

Again, the CSCE process and the 
wideranging provisions of the Final 
Act have established a framework 
within which Western governments, 
including the United States, have 
been able to accelerate the develop- 
ment of relations with the states of 
Eastern Europe. The extension of 
cooperation within the Final Act 
framework should not be judged 
solely on the proceedings at formal 
and quasi-public conferences such as 
Belgrade. The Soviet Union will al- 
ways insist on a substantial degree of 
bloc unity at such occasions. 

But our dialogue and that of our 
European friends with the countries of 
Eastern Europe is easier within the 
framework of the Helsinki Final Act. 
Our consultations with Romania on 
CSCE issues have been frequent, in- 
tensive, and fruitful. Our discussions 
on economic issues, cultural ex- 
changes, family reunification, and 



October 1978 



33 



other issues with such countries as 
Bulgaria and Poland have been use- 
ful. And the very real degree of im- 
proved relations with Hungary sym- 
bolized earlier this year by the return 
of the Crown of St. Stephen and the 
granting of most-favored-nation status 
is attributable in significant part to 
the determination of both our coun- 
tries to give concrete expression to 
the potential of the Final Act. 

One must nevertheless admit that 
East-West relations are presently 
under somewhat of a pall. Recent 
Soviet actions have led some in this 
country to question the value of the 
CSCE process and even to suggest 
that the United States should in some 
manner show its dissatisfaction with 
Soviet contempt for the Helsinki prin- 
ciples by renouncing the Final Act 
ourselves. This attitude is perhaps 
understandable but extremely 
shortsighted and counterproductive. 

The Final Act is a statement of 
political will, not a legally binding 
document. It contains no provision 
for abrogation or renunciation. It is 
also a document which reflects basic 
Western values of openness and 
cooperation. Were the United States 
to renounce the Final Act, we would 
be turning our backs on our own val- 
ues. Such an action would cancel no 
benefit that CSCE had conferred on 
the Soviet Union, since the Final Act 
does not "legitimize" anything the 
Soviet Union has done in Eastern 
Europe. Rather, the United States 
would be allowing the Soviets to es- 
cape from a document which commits 
them to undertakings that they have 
found difficult to implement but 
which remain very much in American 
interest. We would be viewed by our 
European friends — neutrals as well as 
allies — as pulling the plug at the first 
sign of difficulty on a hopeful but 
long-term exercise in collective dip- 
lomacy. Ironically, we would be 
creating the very situation that the 
Soviets demanded for so many years 
and the West resisted — a purely 
European security arrangement from 
which the United States was absent. 
The Madrid conference would go on 
as scheduled in November of 1980, as 
would the conference in Montreux 
on peaceful settlement of disputes be- 
ginning October 31, 1978, the Malta 
conference on aspects of Mediterra- 
nean cooperation beginning February 
13, 1979, and the CSCE scientific 
forum in Hamburg in February 1980, 
but our voice would not be heard nor 
would our veto be available to check 
unwise actions. We would gain 
nothing — and lose a great deal — by 
abandoning ship at the first sign of 



trouble, particularly when in my view 
we have the advantage legally, mor- 
ally, and diplomatically over the po- 
sitions put forward by the Soviet 
Union. 

The Future 

The Final Act and the CSCE proc- 
ess remain today what they have al- 
ways been — an integral part of the 
developing East-West relationship. 
Successes or failures in CSCE will 
affect the overall relationship just as 
other important aspects of the re- 
lationship from SALT to Somalia are 
bound to affect CSCE. The Soviets 
have always sought to advance the 
thesis that better implementation of 
the Final Act will only be possible 
after the superpowers act to advance 
detente through agreements in areas 
desired by the Soviet Union, particu- 
larly in the security and economic 
fields. The West has responded that 
greater cooperation is possible only if 
the public sees direct benefits in it 
and if previous commitments are met. 
The West, therefore, insists that dem- 
onstrated progress in all the important 
CSCE areas will promote progress in 
other fields. 

What should be clear, however, is 
that the dialogue begun at Helsinki is 
needed now more than ever. The 
present tension that exists in East- 
West relations is grounded in part in 
differing perceptions of the human 
rights question. The Final Act pro- 
vided us a measure by which to assess 
the situation, and the CSCE process 
affords us a means and rationale for 
raising in diplomatic channels the 
questions that trouble us. We can and 
must pursue these questions through 
CSCE while at the same time dealing 
with other vital East-West problems, 
such as Strategic Arms Limitation 
Talks, on their own merits and on 
their own terms. 

Even as we work for improvement 
on these vital human rights-related 
matters, CSCE also continues to offer 
a means for moving forward at the 
same time with a wide range of addi- 
tional cooperative matters dealt with 
in the Final Act which can deepen 
and solidify relations between East 
and West. The choice as to what use 
is made of CSCE — whether its 
broader cooperative promise can be 
more fully developed — is to a large 
extent in the hands of the Soviets. 
Whatever their attitude, CSCE is an 
invaluable tool that the United States 
intends to continue to use. We will be 
working in the closest consultation 
over the next few years with our al- 
lies and with the neutrals to develop 



common lines of approach. We shall 
also seek extensive consultations with 
Eastern nations in this effort. 

It is too early to predict what will 
occur at the next opportunity for a 
resumption of the multilateral 
dialogue at Madrid in 1980. The 
course of that meeting will be deter- 
mined to a significant extent by 
events in the interim, and the flexible 
CSCE process offers us extensive op- 
portunities. The fundamental elements 
of our approach are, however, rather 
clear and should be acceptable to 
those who value the CSCE process. 

• We will not abandon the task of 
making a responsible assessment of 
the record of implementation. 

• We will seek practical steps to 
encourage better compliance. 

• We will seek, to the extent pos- 
sible, to build upon the Final Act by 
reaching consensus on appropriate 
new areas of cooperation. 

One way to accomplish this third 
element would be to extract the best 
of the approximately 100 new ideas 
proposed at Belgrade so that their 
potential is not lost. These ideas 
might be explored in bilateral and 
multilateral contacts between now and 
Madrid so that if possible several of 
the most useful of them, representing 
advances in all major CSCE 
categories, can be refined and then 
hopefully agreed upon at the Madrid 
conference in 1980. 

With the United States continuing 
to play its proper leadership role and 
through such a careful step-by-step 
balanced process, we can promote the 
type of humane and secure coopera- 
tion which the Helsinki Final Act, by 
its very terms, envisages. 

We do not intend to abandon our 
efforts to promote security and coop- 
eration in Europe, in spite of the dis- 
appointments of recent months. □ 



'For text of the CSCE Final Act. see Bul- 
letin of Sept. 1. 1975, p. 323. 

2 For Ambassador Goldberg's statements at 
the opening and closing sessions of the review 
meeting, see Bulletins of Nov. 14. 1977. p. 
674. and April 1978. p. 40. respectively. 

3 For text of the concluding document, see 
Bulletin of April 1978. p. 43. 

4 Single copies of this fourth semiannual re- 
port (Special Report No. 45) may be obtained 
from the Correspondence Management Divi- 
sion, Bureau of Public Affairs. Department of 
State, Washington, D.C. 20520. 

5 Craig R Whitney of the New York Times 
and Harold D. Piper of the Baltimore Sun 
were formally accused on June 28. 1978. by 
the Soviet Government of having libeled 
Soviet state television. After being repri- 
manded for allegedly slandering the Soviet 
media and judicial system, the case against 
them was dropped in mid-Aug. 



34 



Most-Favor ed-Nation Tariff 
Status for Hungary and Romania 



by George S. Vest 

Statement before the Subcommittee 
on International Trade of the Senate 
Committee on Finance on July 12, 
1978. Mr. Vest is Assistant Secretary 
for European Affairs. ' 

I am pleased to have this opportu- 
nity to testify on behalf of further ex- 
tension of the President's waiver au- 
thority under Section 402 of the Trade 
Act and specifically his authority to 
continue the waivers permitting 
most-favored-nation tariff treatment 
for Romania and Hungary. 

Before I describe in detail the rea- 
sons we believe that continuation of 
the President's waiver authority for 
Romania and Hungary is warranted. I 
would like to outline for you the pol- 
icy considerations on which our rela- 
tions with both these countries are 
based. 



Policy Considerations 

It is our general policy to seek im- 
proved relations between the United 
States and the nations of Eastern 
Europe that in turn reciprocate our de- 
sire for improved relations. We be- 
lieve that better relations, based on the 
principle of mutual benefit, will 
strengthen the positive and construc- 
tive ties between East and West and 
promote the goals of the Helsinki 
Final Act. We believe that continua- 
tion of the President's authority to 
waive the limitations imposed by sec- 
tion 402 in appropriate cases can be an 
important instrument to promote these 
ends. 

Our efforts and those of previous 
Administrations to improve relations 
with Eastern Europe in no way indi- 
cate a lessening of our concern about 
the lack of democratic institutions and 
other basic elements of a free society 
in that part of the world. We continue 
to have profound disagreements with 
the governments of Eastern Europe 
over many questions of political free- 
dom and basic human and social val- 
ues. I would like to stress that the 
very expansion of relations with these 
countries has enabled us to talk more 
candidly with their governments about 
those differences. We believe that 
such a dialogue is an effective way to 
foster respect for the values that this 
country cherishes, including those in- 



corporated in the Helsinki Final Act. 

We have achieved significant prog- 
ress in our relations with both 
Romania and Hungary throughout this 
decade, to the advantage of our na- 
tions and peoples. Our relations with 
each country have taken different 
paths, reflecting in some measure the 
different policies pursued by those two 
governments. But for both, the estab- 
lishment of nondiscriminatory trade 
relations, which was accomplished in 
1975 with Romania and just last week 
with Hungary, provides a sound basis 
for further progress. If that basis were 
removed, our relations with both could 
be expected to deteriorate signifi- 
cantly. 

Hungary 

I believe you are already familiar 
with the reasons for the President's 
decision on April 7 to waive the pro- 
hibitions under Section 402 of the 
Trade Act with respect to Hungary. I 
explained them in my testimony before 
this subcommittee on May 9. The 
House of Representatives approved the 
U.S. -Hungarian agreement on May 22; 
the Senate did so on June 27. The 
agreement entered into force on 
July 7. 

We have received numerous expres- 
sions of interest from American firms 
who see improved prospects for doing 
business in Hungary. Our useful 
dialogue with Hungarian officials on 
matters of emigration and family 
reunification continues. Since my tes- 
timony in May two family cases have 
been resolved. At present there are 
five pending problem cases; resolution 
of two is expected shortly. We are 
satisfied that the Hungarian Govern- 
ment has continued to deal with 
emigration in a positive and human- 
itarian manner. For these reasons, we 
believe that the President's waiver 
authority for Hungary should be ex- 
tended for another 12 months. 

Romania 

Turning now to Romania, our desire 
to maintain the good relations that 
have already been established rests in 
large part on Romania's relative 
foreign policy independence. Let me 
review for you briefly some key 
examples of Romanian independence. 

• Since 1958 there have been no 



Department of State Bulletin 

Soviet troops in Romania, and 
Romania participates only to a very 
limited extent in Warsaw Pact military 
exercises. 

• Romania did not participate in, 
and strongly condemned, the 1968 in- 
vasion of Czechoslovakia. 

• Romania maintained diplomatic 
relations with Israel after the 1967 
Arab-Israeli conflict and has a con- 
structive working relationship with the 
Israelis. 

• Romania did not participate in the 
Arab-initiated oil embargo and in fact 
increased shipments of fuel oil and 
gasoline to the United States during 
that difficult period. 

• Romanian President Ceausescu 
played an important role in helping to 
set the stage for Egyptian President 
Sadat's historic visit to Jerusalem. 

• Since the end of World War II, 
over 300,000 Romanian Jews have 
been permitted to emigrate to Israel, 
and in addition Romania for a time 
facilitated the transit of Soviet Jews to 
Israel. 

• Romania also maintains good re- 
lations with the Arab countries, as 
well as with such countries as the 
People's Republic of China, the 
Democratic People's Republic of 
Korea, and Albania — contacts that 
sometimes can be useful to the United 
States. 

• Economically, Romania has 
broader ties with the non-Communist 
world than other Warsaw Pact states. 
Since 1974, more than half its trade 
has been with non-Communist 
partners. 

• The Romanians are among the 
strongest champions of the right of all 
Communist parties to chart their own 
course in a pragmatic way rather than 
following the lead of Moscow. This 
frequently puts them at odds with 
Moscow on ideological issues, such as 
' 'Eurocommunism . ' ' 

• At the Helsinki Conference on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe 
and at the Belgrade followup meeting, 
the Romanian delegation pursued its 
own path. The Romanians avoided 
polemics against the West on human 
rights issues and played an active and 
generally positive role that helped in 
some degree to bridge East-West dif- 
ferences and to advance the final con- 
sensus that emerged. 

In the context of these hearings, it 
is worthwhile remembering that 
Romania was the first country to enter 
into a trade agreement with the United 
States under the terms of the 
Jackson- Vanik amendment to the 
Trade Act of 1974. Romania took this 
step at a time when Soviet opposition 



October 1978 

to this amendment was abundantly 
clear. Without that Romanian initia- 
tive, it is highly doubtful whether even 
by now any other country would have 
taken such a step. 

Since the U.S. -Romanian trade 
agreement went into effect in August 
1975. our trade with Romania has 
continued to grow. In 1977, two-way 
trade reached $493 million with a bal- 
ance of $26 million in favor of the 
United States. This year's trade fig- 
ures show a continued increase in 
trade. U.S. exports to Romania totaled 
$124 million for the first 5 months. 
U.S. imports from Romania reached 
$114 million giving us a trade surplus 
of $10 million. 

Agricultural commodities such as 
soybeans and soybean products, 
wheat, and corn make up the largest 
share of U.S. exports to Romania. 
Since 1975 U.S. exports of manufac- 
tured goods such as steel plate and 
machine tools have been growing 
rapidly. The Presidential waiver for 
Romania has made it possible for the 
United States to use Commodity Credit 
Corporation financing for exports of 
agricultural products and Export- 
Import Bank financing for capital 
equipment sales. 

Since this committee last reviewed 
the question of extending most- 
favored-nation status to Romania, the 
most significant development in our 
relations has been the visit to the 
United States of Romanian President 
Nicolae Ceausescu. 2 President 
Ceausescu's visit in April provided an 
excellent opportunity to review all as- 
pects of our bilateral relations with 
Romania, to discuss issues of global 



TABLE 1 








ROMANIAN EMIGRATION 




TO THE UNITED STATES 




Immigrant 


Visas Issued by 


U.S. Embassy. 




Bucharest* 








1976 


1977 


1978 


January 


74 


69 


78 


February 


87 


59 


100 


March 


130 


138 


67 


April 


97 


101 


99 


May 


77 


129 


124 


June 


111 


106 


122 


July 


96 


111 




August 


104 


151 




September 


74 


106 




October 


40 


101 




November 


66 


94 




December 


65 


75 




Total 


1.021 


1,240 
y processing 


* Includ 


es third -countr 


but excludes dual nationals 







importance, and to cement the already 
good ties between our countries, 
thereby laying the basis for further 
progress. For example, we made very 
clear to the Romanian authorities that 
this Administration and this Congress 
remain deeply committed to the sup- 
port of human rights, both in the 
United States and abroad. As in the 
past, we found that our relations with 
Romania are sufficiently mature to en- 
able us to discuss usefully even issues 
on which we do not share the same 
perspective. We also continue to find 
a willingness on the Romanian side to 
resolve in a humanitarian way issues 
about which we have expressed our 
concern. Our experience with Romania 
shows that a solid bilateral relation- 
ship, of which the most-favored-nation 
status forms a part, is the best 
framework for such discussions. 

As this committee is aware, there is 
concern on the part of the Administra- 
tion, Members of Congress, and the 
American-Hungarian community with 
the Romanian Government's treatment 
of its ethnic Hungarian minority. We 
believe that this is primarily an inter- 
nal matter to be resolved by the citi- 
zens and Government of Romania. At 
the same time, we shall continue to 
lend whatever positive encouragement 
we can. 

In March of this year, President 
Ceausescu publicly acknowledged 
certain shortcomings of Romania's 
past minority policy and called for 
specific improvements, including in- 
creased work opportunities in places of 
origin, improved education in minority 
languages, and improved health care 
and medical education for members of 
minority groups. We hope that these 
Romanian actions will improve the 
situation of the minorities in Romania, 
but it should be remembered that this 
is a centuries-old problem to which no 
quick or easy solution is either possi- 
ble or likely. We note also that the 
Romanian and Hungarian Governments 
have discussed this question, and we 
hope this dialogue proves productive. 

Emigration from Romania 

During President Ceausescu's April 
visit, the question of emigration and 
reunification of divided families was 
discussed in detail. In the joint decla- 
ration issued on April 13, President 
Carter and President Ceausescu 
pledged: "To cooperate in the settle- 
ment of humanitarian issues, including 
family reunification, in the spirit of 
mutual understanding and goodwill." 
We believe that this pledge gives us a 
strengthened basis for expecting con- 
tinued progress in resolving emigration 



35 



and marriage cases in which we have 
expressed an interest. 

Romania's emigration performance, 
although certainly leaving room for 
further improvement, has shown the 
kind of progress since the waiver was 
continued last year that is required by 
the Trade Act. It is on this continuing 



TABLE 2 




ROMANIAN EMIGRATION TO THE 


UNITED STATES 


A 


nnual Totals 


1968 


68 


1969 


142 


1970 


373 


1971 


362 


1972 


348 


1973 


469 


1974 


407 


1975 


890 


1976 


1,021 


1977 


1,240 



progress that the President's recom- 
mendation is based. There are still 
many pending cases, including some 
longstanding and difficult ones, but we 
believe the long-term trend satisfies 
the requirements of title IV of the act. 

We have provided for you and your 
subcommittee statistics which enable 
us to assess Romania's emigration 
performance. Tables 1 and 2 show 
emigration to the United States. The 
figures represent the number of per- 
sons to whom our Embassy has issued 
immigrant visas or for whom 
documentation has been completed for 
final processing by the U.S. Immigra- 
tion and Naturalization Service office 
in Rome. 

If you look at emigration to the 
United States since the previous hear- 
ing before this subcommittee at the 
end of June 1977, you will find that 
1,228 persons received visas for per- 
manent resettlement in the United 
States since that time through June of 
this year. This represents a significant 
increase over the total for the previous 
12-month period, which was 1,047. It 
is worth noting that the major reason 
for this increase was the relatively 
steady rate of emigration; that is, there 
was no sharp drop-off this past winter 
as there was the previous winter. I 
might add that the current level of 
emigration to the United States is, of 
course, much higher than during the 
years before Romania received most- 
favored-nation tariff status. 

In addition, I should point out that 
our Embassy's statistics actually 
underrepresent the number of Roma- 



36 



TABLE 3 








ROMANIAN JEWISH EMIGRATION 




TO ISRAEL 








Number 


of Emigrants 




1976 


1977 


1978 


January 


328 


46 


63 


February 


232 


62 


73 


March 


99 


113 


96 


April 


51 


132 


77 


May 


143 


105 


148 


June 


21 1 


109 


111 


July 


237 


70 




August 


238 


113 




September 


117 


181 




October 


118 


197 




November 


79 


118 




December 


136 


88 




Total 


1,989 


1.334 





mans who have been granted permis- 
sion by their government to emigrate 
to the United States. There are two 
reasons for this. 

• First, many Romanians who ac- 
tually wish to emigrate to another 
country apply for permission to emi- 
grate to the United States because they 
believe this increases their chances of 
approval. If they emigrate elsewhere, 
they are not included in our statistics. 

• Second, a good number of Roma- 
nians apply for entry into the United 
States in third countries as refugees 
and are not included in our Embassy's 
statistics. Several hundred Romanians 
are in these two categories. 

There has been considerable prog- 
ress in resolving cases included in the 
representation list that our Embassy 
presented to the Romanian Foreign 
Ministry on March 28. That list con- 
tained the names of 942 persons seek- 
ing permission to emigrate to the 
United States or to marry an Ameri- 
can. By the end of June, 315 
persons — one-third of the total — had 
received approvals from the Romanian 
Government. We are particularly 
gratified by the large number of mar- 
riage approvals: 46 out of 60 or 77%. 
In addition, considerable progress has 
been made in resolving the most 
longstanding cases and in making it 
possible for persons who wish to apply 
for emigration to obtain the appro- 
priate forms. Denial of forms has been 



one way in which some Romanians 
have been prevented from emigrating. 

We are, of course, pressing for fur- 
ther progress, and a new representa- 
tion list was presented to the Foreign 
Ministry on July 5. This new list con- 
tains the names of 817 persons, many 
of whom — 222 to be exact — appear for 
the first time. 

We have also continued to make it 
clear to Romanian authorities that we 
are interested in emigration from 
Romania to Israel. The number of per- 
sons arriving in Israel from Romania 
during the first 6 months of 1978 
(January 1-June 30) was 568. This is 
almost exactly the same as the total 
for the comparable period last year 
(567). There is reason to believe that 
the increase in emigration to Israel in 
May and June reflects the discussion 
of this subject between Presidents 
Carter and Ceausescu. The present rate 
of emigration to Israel, however, re- 
mains considerably below that of pre- 
vious years. 

The problem of assessing Romanian 
emigration performance with regard to 
Israel is complicated by the difficulty 
of verifying the number of Romanian 
Jews who have applied to emigrate or 
who wish to depart. Romanian au- 
thorities consistently maintain that. 



TABLE 4 






ROMANIAN 


JEWISH 


EMIGRATION 




TO ISRAEL 


Approximate Annual Totals 


1971 




1,900 


1972 




3.000 


1973 




4,000 


1974 




3,700 


1975 




2,000 


1976 




2.000 


1977 




1.330 



with a handful of exceptions, all 
Romanian Jews who wish to emigrate 
will be permitted to do so. At the 
same time, they clearly do not wish to 
encourage emigration, by Romanian 
Jews or any other person. Because the 
procedures for emigration to Israel at 
least for now rule out the preparation 
of lists of Romanian Jews who wish to 
emigrate, it is not possible to say with 
any certainty how many Romanian 



Department of State Bulletin 

Jews wish to emigrate or how many 
are or feel prevented from doing so. 

Ultimately, we recognize that an ac- 
ceptable level of emigration from 
Romania to Israel is the principal con- 
cern of the two countries involved. 
Only the Israeli authorities can deter- 
mine which Romanians who have 
applied to emigrate to Israel are qual- 
ified to do so. At the same time, we 
intend to keep this matter constantly 
before the Romanian Government as a 
matter in which both the Administra- 
tion and the Congress are highly in- 
terested. 

I would like to add that emigration 
from Romania to the Federal Republic 
of Germany continues at a very high 
rate. Last year, over 10,000 persons 
emigrated to West Germany. Accord- 
ing to Romanian figures, which in the 
past have actually been lower than 
those provided by the West German 
Government, the 5-month total for 
1978 shows 4,153 persons approved 
for emigration to West Germany, of 
whom 3,321 have already left Romania. 

In addition to recommending to the 
Congress the continuation of his gen- 
eral waiver authority and the indi- 
vidual waivers for Romania and Hun- 
gary, the President informed the 
Congress on June 2 of his decision to 
extend the U.S-Romanian trade 
agreement for another 3 years. The 
trade agreement is a vital part of our 
improved relations with Romania. It 
creates a solid framework for trade 
growth while providing adequate pro- 
tection for import-sensitive U.S. in- 
dustries. Its political significance as a 
symbol of lasting, nondiscriminatory 
relations is considerable, and it helps 
lessen Romanian economic dependence 
on the Soviet Union. 

To further U.S. interests in Eastern 
Europe, the Administration strongly 
recommends extension of the Presi- 
dent's authority to waive Section 402 
of the Trade Act and to continue in 
effect the waivers for Romania and 
Hungary. □ 



'The complete transcript of the hearings 
will be published by the committee and will be 
available from the Superintendent of Docu- 
ments. U.S. Government Printing Office. 
Washington. DC. 20402. 

2 For text of material relating to President 
Ceausescu's visit, see Bulletin of June 1978. 
p. 36. 



October 1978 



37 



NARCOTICS: Control Efforts 
in Central America 
and the Caribbean 



by Joseph Linneman 

Based on a statement before the 
Subcommittee to Investigate Juvenile 
Delinquency of the Senate Committee 
on the Judiciary on August 22. 1978. 
Mr. Linneman is Deputy Senior Ad- 
viser and Deputy Director of the Of- 
fice of International Narcotics Con- 
trol. ' 

I am pleased to be with you today 
to discuss international narcotics 
control efforts, specifically the prob- 
lems of narcotics smuggling in the 
Caribbean and Central America. 

The use of the Caribbean islands as 
a transit route for illicit drugs reach- 
ing the United States is increasing. In 
particular. Jamaica and the Bahamas 
are becoming major transshipment 
points, both by air and sea. The Drug 
Enforcement Administration estimates 
that from July 1975 through March 
1978 approximately 250 tons of 
marijuana entered the United States 
from Jamaica. Recent Drug Enforce- 
ment Administration reports 
also indicate an increase in cocaine 
trafficking through Jamaica to dis- 
tribution networks in Florida and the 
eastern United States. 

The increasing importance of the 
Bahamas as a transshipment point is 
evidenced by the arrests of 1 1 Latin 
Americans during the first 5 months 
of 1978, each carrying at least one 
kilo of cocaine. Narcotics move eas- 
ily to the United States through the 
Bahamas area because of a number of 
factors, such as the large number of 
commercial air flights to the Bahamas 
from Latin America; the ease of 
smuggling via private boats and 
cruise ships to Florida and the east 
coast of the United States; less rigid 
Bahamian customs examination of 
tourists returning from Latin America; 
and relatively lower risks of prosecu- 
tion, conviction, and lengthy incar- 
ceration. 

Central America also appears to be 
gaining in importance as an illicit 
drug trafficking area. Traffickers 
utilize both private and commercial 



air and vessel transport to facilitate 
smuggling operations. The Govern- 
ments of Guatemala. Honduras, and 
Costa Rica have expressed concern 
over the growing problem of illicit 
narcotics traffic. In response, the 
U.S. Government has undertaken a 
number of initiatives designed to help 
curtail narcotics smuggling through 
the Caribbean and Central America, 
which I shall briefly describe. 

U.S. Initiatives 

Special, closely coordinated Coast 
Guard. Drug Enforcement Adminis- 
tration, and customs operations to 
monitor the various sea passages in the 
Caribbean and the Gulf of Mexico 
have resulted in large seizures of 
marijuana and cocaine. The Depart- 
ment of State has assisted these oper- 
ations by consultations with the Gov- 
ernments of Colombia, the Bahamas, 
Jamaica, and Honduras to effect their 
cooperation in interdiction activities. 
In May 1978 a joint Coast Guard and 
Customs Service team visited Colom- 
bia to evaluate and develop increased 
Colombian cooperation in coastal 
maritime interdiction. 

In the area of international agree- 
ments, the State Department is ex- 
pediting negotiations to conclude a 
judicial assistance agreement with the 
Government of the Bahamas. A 
model treaty on mutual assistance in 
law enforcement matters has been 
drafted by the Departments of State, 
Justice, and Treasury. We are re- 
questing blanket authority to negotiate 
such bilateral agreements with a 
number of states. The treaty provides 
for mutual assistance at both the in- 
vestigative and prosecutive stages. 
The Department of State is also sup- 
porting the development of bilateral 
projects with key Latin American 
countries for improved exchange of 
prosecutorial information. A Depart- 
ment of Justice team visited Colombia 
in June to discuss specific cases with 
the Colombian attorney general. 
Other countries will be selected in the 
future and plans made for visits of 



similar Justice-Drug Enforcement 
Administration teams. 

An interagency committee for 
coordination of maritime drug inter- 
diction was formed in February 1978 
under the auspices of the Department 
of State to coordinate the activities of 
the various U.S. agencies responsible 
for improving maritime drug interdic- 
tion efforts. The membership consists 
of representatives of the Departments 
of Justice and State. Coast Guard, the 
U.S. Customs Service, the Drug En- 
forcement Administration, and the 
Immigration and Naturalization Serv- 
ice. Working through this committee, 
we are trying to regularize our own 
domestic procedures through a series 
of agreements with those countries 
whose vessels are most often involved 
in trafficking operations. 

The legal subcommittee of the 
Strategy Council's narcotics working 
group is also developing plans for as- 
sessing the narcotics laws of the 
countries covered and. where appro- 
priate, working with foreign govern- 
ments in drafting effective and 
uniform legislation. 

The State Department is also 
working closely with the Departments 
of Treasury and Justice to develop a 
concerted attack on the financial as- 
pects of the narcotics traffic. The 
objectives of this plan are to facilitate 
negotiations with foreign governments 
for exchange of financial information 
regarding narcotics trafficking and 
currency transport status to assist 
U.S. efforts to prosecute violations in 
this area. We also hope to obtain the 
cooperation of foreign governments in 
freezing or seizure of narcotics- 
derived assets abroad. 

The Drug Enforcement Administra- 
tion, at the request of the Department 
of State, recently completed a special 
intelligence assessment of the narcot- 
ics problem in Central America and 
the Caribbean in order to provide a 
sound basis for the development of 
appropriate country and regional nar- 
cotics control programs in the area. 
As a result, an international narcotics 
control program evaluation officer is 
currently in the Bahamas to begin a 
needs-assessment of the drug traf- 
ficking situation. Based on his find- 
ings a survey team will visit the 
Bahamas to design the parameters of 
a project in conjunction with Baha- 
mian officials. A special study mis- 
sion is also being directed toward 
analyzing solutions to the growing 
illicit narcotics trafficking in 
Honduras. 



38 



Department of State Bulletin 



NUCLEAR POLICY: Balancing J\onprolifcration 

and Energy Security 



by Joseph S. Nye, Jr. 

Address before the Uranium Insti- 
tute in London on July 12, 1978. Mr. 
Nye is Deputy to the Under Secretary 
for Security Assistance, Science, and 
Technology. 

Since 1945 the power of the atom 
has posed a profound challenge to the 
military security of nations. Arnold 
Toynbee predicted that the nation-state 
and the split atom could not coexist on 
the same planet. Thus far we have 
done better than the dire predictions. 
Important steps have been taken and 
are currently being negotiated to con- 
trol the strategic nuclear arms com- 
petititon. But grave doubts exist about 
whether it will be possible to manage 
another three decades without the use 
of nuclear explosives in war if nuclear 
weaponry spreads to a large number of 
countries. Proliferation is likely to 
produce a more dangerous world for 
all nations. 

In the area of military security, 
there is general agreement over the 
appropriate steps to diminish the in- 
centives for nuclear proliferation. The 
maintenance of alliance relationships 
and support for the Nonproliferation 



Treaty are of fundamental importance. 
Efforts to negotiate arms control 
agreements such as the Strategic Arms 
Limitation Talks (SALT) and a com- 
prehensive test ban are significant 
steps. So also are efforts to create 
nuclear-weapon-free zones. In Latin 
America, for example, only Cuban 
ratification remains for the treaty of 
Tlatelolco to enter into force after the 
recently announced U.S., Argentine, 
Soviet, and French intended actions 
come into effect. 

Energy Security Problems 

At the same time, it is important to 
remember that for many countries, 
there is another urgent dimension to 
the security aspects of nuclear energy: 
energy security. The problem of 
energy security received dramatic at- 
tention when the oil crisis of 1973-74 
left an acute sense of insecurity among 
countries heavily dependent upon im- 
ported energy. Many nations view nu- 
clear energy as a major means of 
minimizing dependence on energy im- 
ports and are concerned that actions 
designed to reduce the military secu- 
rity risks of nuclear proliferation not 
worsen their energy security problems. 



The United States is keenly sensitive 
to the energy security situations of 
other countries. 

At the same time, it is important to 
keep the dimensions of the energy 
problem in perspective. The energy 
security issue is not one problem but 
three. The first is short term. It is the 
problem of vulnerability to sudden 
politically oriented disruptions of sup- 
ply. The best protection against this 
risk is a combination of national oil 
stockpiles; international cooperation 
and effective diplomacy to diminish 
the prospects of disruption. 

The second problem is midterm — 
and relates to the next decade. It is the 
prospect that rising world demand for 
Organization of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC) oil will not be 
adequately constrained by gradual 
price and conservation measures in the 
next few years, leading to rapid price 
increases in the mid-1980's with at- 
tendant depressing effects on 
economies and possible disruption of 
world financial markets. The best 
protection against this threat is appro- 
priate energy production and conser- 
vation efforts and price changes that 
reflect the replacement cost of energy. 

It is important to keep in mind that 



(Narcotics cont'd) 

Regional Efforts 

We are also encouraging more ef- 
fective regional narcotics control ef- 
forts, such as the May meeting in 
Lima of top narcotics enforcement 
officials from Peru, Ecuador, Bolivia, 
and Colombia. With U.S. Govern- 
ment technical advice and possible 
assistance in the future. Mexico and 
Guatemala are developing more ef- 
fective joint border control of narcot- 
ics. Cooperation is also underway in 
all Central American countries and 
Mexico in which the enforcement 
elements in each country will be 
linked to narcotics intelligence opera- 
tions in the United States. More ef- 
fective use of existing narcotics in- 
formation in the United States and 
direct international communications 
networks for the area will be very 
helpful in identifying suspect aircraft 
and traffickers. 



The Office of International Nar- 
cotics Control held its annual Latin 
American Narcotics Conference in 
Miami in November 1977. bringing 
together representatives of appropriate 
Federal, State, and regional agencies. 
Embassy officers involved in narcot- 
ics control from all Latin American 
posts attended the conference and de- 
veloped a new understanding of the 
complexities of the problem and the 
need for increased cooperation. 

The Department included narcotics 
as an issue for discussion during the 
Organization of American States an- 
nual conference. Particular emphasis 
was placed on narcotics during the 
bilateral substantive talks between the 
Secretary of State and Latin American 
foreign ministers. Our bilateral nar- 
cotics control programs with key 
South American producing countries 
are intended to reduce the supply of 
illicit narcotic drugs as close to the 



source as possible. 2 Our law en- 
forcement agencies believe that with- 
out these supply reduction efforts in 
other countries, effective interdiction 
of these drugs would be rendered 
even more difficult. 

The social, economic, and political 
costs to this nation and to the coun- 
tries involved associated with illicit 
narcotics production and trafficking 
are extremely serious. We welcome 
the interest of the subcommittee and 
its support of our efforts to curtail the 
flow of illicit drugs into the United 
States. D 



'The complele transcrip! of the hearings will 
be published by the committee and will be 
available from the Superintendent of Docu- 
ments, U.S. Government Printing Office, 
Washington. DC. 20402. 

; For a discussion of the international narcot- 
ics control program, see Bulletin of June 
1978. p. 42. 



October 1978 



39 



nuclear energy will not contribute sig- 
nificantly to the solution of either the 
short-term or midterm energy problem. 
For example, even if a nation such as 
Japan, with its major commitment to 
nuclear power, is fully successful in 
reaching its ambitious nuclear energy 
goal of 60,000 MWe [megawats 
electric] by 1990, it would reduce its 
dependence on imported energy by 
about 10%. In reality, then, Japanese 
energy security is far more dependent 
on the measures already mentioned in- 
cluding close cooperation with the 
United States and other states. In other 
words, in the short- and medium- 
term, the conflict between nonprolifer- 
ation concerns and energy security is 
nowhere nearly as severe as is some- 
times stated. 

The importance of nuclear energy is 
in relation to the third energy 
problem — how to manage the transi- 
tion from oil to other energy sources 
over the longer run of several decades. 
By the year 2000, nuclear energy may 
be contributing as much as 15% to the 
total energy consumption in the United 
States. The share of nuclear energy in 
Japan and Europe could be about 
one-fourth of total energy consump- 
tion. Solar energy proponents argue 
that nuclear power will not be the 
major alternative energy source of the 
next century. They argue that if $17 
billion in government subsidies are 
spent on solar energy as they were in 
the past two decades on nuclear in the 
United States alone, the current mod- 
est projections for solar energy will 
turn out to be serious underestimates. 

It is too early to be categoric about 
which energy sources will prove to be 
dominant by the middle of the next 
century. Governments should indeed 
go ahead with major development of 
solar and other renewable energy 
sources. But at a minimum, govern- 
ments would be unwise to deprive 
themselves of the nuclear option dur- 
ing the early part of the century when 
the transition from oil and gas is likely 
to occur. A rapid transition to renew- 
ables is likely to be costly and to in- 
volve unforeseen problems. A judi- 
cious energy policy, like any major 
social policy, should have flexibility 
and redundancy to protect against fail- 
ures. On this basis, nuclear energy has 
a major role to play in relation to the 
longrun problem in the United States 
even if solar optimism proves to be 
justified. This is even more true for 
other countries with less access to fos- 
sil fuel resources to help buffer the 
transition to renewable energy tech- 
nologies. 

The major solutions to this third 
energy security problem are appro- 



priate price movements and techno- 
logical development including both re- 
newables and nuclear. One danger is 
that the political constraints and debate 
in our democracies may deprive 
societies of the margin of energy se- 
curity that the existence of the nuclear 
option provides. If governments wish 
to maintain that option, they must 
show their publics that they are able to 
cope effectively with three key ques- 
tions: safe siting, long-term waste 
management, and nonproliferation. 

Nuclear Energy and 
Nonproliferation 

The connection between nuclear 
proliferation and peaceful uses of nu- 
clear energy is an ambiguous one. 
Nevertheless, it exists, and defenders 
of nuclear energy have done their 
cause a disservice by trying to pretend 
there is no relationship. The proper 
way to put the point is to demonstrate 
that steps can be taken to maintain or 
even increase the separation between 
peaceful uses of nuclear energy and 
military uses. 

Indeed, public perception of erosion 
of that distance after the Indian explo- 
sion contributed to the dissension over 
nuclear energy policy that has grown 
in several of the Western democracies 
since 1974. The position of the Cana- 
dian Government on more stringent 
safeguards and the history of the U.S. 
legislation of 1978 bear the marks of 
public opinion during this period. 

Four years ago India exploded a nu- 
clear device made from plutonium 
produced in an unsafeguarded reactor 
intended for "peaceful" purposes and 
then separated in a chemical reproc- 
essing plant. At the same time a 
number of other countries, with little 
or no commercial need for reprocess- 
ing facilities, were making efforts to 
acquire such plants. Some of these 
countries were located in areas of in- 
ternational tension or appeared to be 
reacting to parallel plans of their tra- 
ditional rivals. 

These developments were acutely 
worrisome. For while reprocessing 
obviously can serve legitimate ends, 
it is also the step that changes spent 
reactor fuel into weapons-usable ma- 
terial. And the acquisition of such 
material is, for nuclear-weapon aspi- 
rants, a politically and technically 
critical step. 

In 1976 no commercial reprocess- 
ing facility for light water reactor 
(LWR) fuel was operating anywhere 
in the world, but several were under 
construction. Other facilities had been 
operated earlier but they had all ex- 
perienced difficulties. Nonetheless, it 



was the general assumption that all 
nations would proceed with the recy- 
cle of plutonium in light water reac- 
tors. On that basis, an International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) study 
predicted that 46 countries would 
have reprocessing needs by 1990. 

The consequences of proceeding in 
this way would have involved a pro- 
liferation of facilities that produce 
plutonium in weapons-usable form, 
the creation of large stocks of 
plutonium, its transport to fuel fabri- 
cation facilities, and its presence at 
such facilities pending its incorpora- 
tion into fuel rods. The mixed oxide 
fuel itself would contain more readily 
recoverable plutonium than that in 
spent LWR fuel. While this dramatic 
increase in the accessibility of 
weapons-usable material would not 
necessarily lead to its misuse, it could 
both facilitate the acquisition of nu- 
clear weapons by a country that de- 
cided to acquire them and increase 
uncertainty about the intentions of 
neighboring countries. It would also 
greatly increase the opportunity for 
theft or seizure of weapons-usable 
materials by terrorists or other subna- 
tional groups. Multiplied by 46 re- 
processing nations (or even a fraction 
of that number) this situation would 
pose a major threat to global stability. 

Ironically, in the case of recycle in 
light water reactors, these prolifera- 
tion security risks would be incurred 
for only marginal economic or fuel 
security benefits. It was against this 
background that both the Ford Ad- 
ministration and the Carter Adminis- 
tration reached substantially the same 
conclusions about the need to proceed 
more cautiously by deferring com- 
mercial reprocessing. 

U.S. Nuclear Energy Strategy 

President Carter's April 1977 deci- 
sions about deferring the commer- 
cialization of plutonium focused 
primarily on the domestic choices he 
then faced. In essence, the Carter 
Administration balanced energy secu- 
rity and military security by choosing 
a middle path in domestic energy 
policy. That middle path avoids 
energy solutions that count prema- 
turely on either windmills or 
plutonium. It does include a signifi- 
cant role for nuclear energy. As the 
President said in March 1978: "Our 
current once-through fuel cycle is and 
will continue to be a significant con- 
tributor to our energy supply. Prop- 
erly managed, it can function without 
increasing the risks of proliferation. 
Our policy takes a responsible course 
between forgoing the energy benefits 



40 

of nuclear power and becoming com- 
mitted to commercialized use of 
plutonium before we know that we 
can deal safely with its risks. " 

The United States is investing 
heavily both in solar energy and in 
breeder reactor research and de- 
velopment as candidates, together 
with other applications, for the 
long-term follow-on to oil and gas. In 
the meantime, both coal and light 
water reactors will play important 
roles. Even with conservative esti- 
mates of 2.4 million short tons of 
proven and probable uranium (U.-tOs) 
reserves under $50/pound forward 
cost, and midrange nuclear growth 
assumption to 320 GWe [gigawatt] by 
the year 2000, the United States has 
adequate resources for the lifetimes of 
all light water reactors to be installed 
into the next century. 

At the same time, the United States 
is aware that other countries without 
coal and uranium reserves feel less 
secure about their ability to manage 
the longrun transition from oil to gas. 
This sense of energy insecurity has 
led them to project a greater reliance 
on the use of plutonium. At first 
glance, decisions about the commer- 
cialization of plutonium appear to be 
purely domestic energy strategy 
choices. But nuclear energy has a 
transnational dimension. Domestic 
choice can impose costs on other na- 
tions. Plutonium separated in one 
place can pose a threat to the security 
of all nations. 

Conversely, deferral or commer- 
cialization of plutonium can put pres- 
sure on world uranium supply and the 
prices other nations pay. It was a rec- 
ognition of this interdependence of 
domestic energy strategies that led 
President Carter to call for a cooper- 
ative international study of ways to 
design and manage the nuclear fuel 
cycle that would reconcile energy se- 
curity and military security concerns. 
Forty countries and four international 
organizations are now participating in 
the resulting International Nuclear 
Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE). 

The Uranium Issue 

INFCE deals with a number of as- 
pects of making the whole fuel cycle 
safer. The key question of uranium 
supply is the subject of a working 
group in INFCE. Nonetheless we 
cannot expect to have definitive an- 
swers to the question of the extent of 
global uranium resources within 2 
years. How then, should we handle 
this problem? 

First, we must understand the lim- 
itations of all estimates. Estimates of 



U.S. domestic reserves, uranium de- 
posits which have been delineated by 
drilling, are made by the Department 
of Energy from data voluntarily re- 
ported by the uranium industry and 
are relatively uncontroversial. How- 
ever, there are several methods of es- 
timating potential resources, ranging 
from extrapolating trends in discovery 
rates to making assumptions about 



Department of State Bulletin 

its continue to be discovered; exam- 
ples are Jabiluka, Australia, (with 
more than 250.000 tons uranium) and 
the rich "unconformity-related" de- 
posits in Canada. While it is possible 
that continent-wide geological proc- 
esses have segregated types of depos- 
its in such an extreme fashion, it 
seems likely that the emphasis on a 
particular type of formation in a given 



Nuclear energy is truly a transnational policy issue. . . . Those 
who bet now on the breeder [reactor] and those who bet for now on 
adequate uranium availability and improved technology must each 
make serious efforts to meet the security concern on the other side. 



geological abundance and underlying 
distributions of grade. The most com- 
prehensive and detailed projections 
are made by the Department of 
Energy using geologic and reserve 
information to extrapolate by analogy 
into unexplored areas. 

The data on which projections are 
based have been affected by the his- 
tory of uranium exploration and 
discovery. Until the late 1960's, 
exploration and resource development 
efforts worldwide were made largely 
in response to the requirements of 
governments for weapons material. 
Prices were set at levels which jus- 
tified exploration and exploitation 
only of deposits with high yields of 
U.sOh. An expectation of rapid growth 
in commercial nuclear power stimu- 
lated a great deal of activity in the 
late 1960's; the subsequent slow 
growth of nuclear power left the U.S. 
domestic industry in a depressed state 
until about 1974, with excess produc- 
tion capacity and little incentive to 
explore for or develop reserves. Since 
1974 the world industry has been very 
vigorous; however, lag times in re- 
porting and analysis mean that current 
projections do not fully reflect the 
intensive exploration activity of the 
last few years. The result of this his- 
tory is a less than adequate data base 
on which to plan long-term nuclear 
programs. 

Geological understanding of 
uranium occurrence is also far from 
complete. More than other metals, 
uranium is relatively mobile and is 
found in a variety of geologic set- 
tings. In the United States, about 
90% of discovered resources are in 
sandstones. Outside the United 
States, Russia, and China, nearly 90% 
are in nonsandstone formations. New 
environments with high-grade depos- 



country is at least partly the result of 
a narrow geological focus inspired by 
success. This suggests that existing 
projections of uranium resources are 
likely to be low. 

Worldwide, the most recent esti- 
mates of the Nuclear Energy Agency 
and the International Atomic Energy 
Energy Agency (December 1977) are 
for 2.8 million short tons U3O8 rea- 
sonably assured and 2.7 million tons 
estimated additional resources (below 
$50/pound U3O8). Uncertainties, and 
possible conservatism in estimates, 
are clearly greater for foreign projec- 
tions than in U.S. projections. It 
should also be noted that higher cost 
uranium may also be relevant in many 
circumstances yet is not included in 
these projections. 

The interesting policy question is 
where the differences in resources es- 
timates begin to matter. Cumulative 
world consumption, and even com- 
mitments, by the year 2000 would be 
well within the conservative uranium 
estimates. For the "present trend" 
scenario of the Nuclear Energy 
Agency (1000 GWe at the end of the 
century worldwide) consumption stays 
within the reasonably assured cate- 
gory while the related commitments 
(less than 5.5 million tons) stay 
within the estimated additional cate- 
gory. These figures mean that con- 
cerns about the physical existence of 
resources are not the critical limits for 
present policy decisions. Instead, re- 
liable access should be the predomi- 
nant concern. If exploration and 
evaluation continue to expand re- 
source horizons, increase the sources 
of supply, and broaden the market, it 
means that we can concentrate on 
measures such as national and mul- 
tilateral stockpiles which may prove 



October 1978 

to be both the safest and most eco- 
nomic way to address the allocation 
problem. 

New Technology 

Another factor to consider is new 
technology. During the next 10 years, 
advances in once-through fuel tech- 
nology could lead to uranium savings 
of at least 15% for the once-through 
LWR fuel cycle. These benefits, as- 
sociated with extending burnup, are 
particularly attractive in the near 
term. In the 1990's it may be possible 
to demonstrate the potential for in- 
creasing the savings an additional 
10-15%. if the necessary develop- 
ment programs are successfully com- 
pleted. 

Uranium resource requirements can 
also be reduced by extracting more of 
the fissile U-235 content from natural 
uranium. The United States has for 
some time conducted an advanced 
isotope separation technology pro- 
gram, which is still in the early stages 
of development. It is aimed at de- 
veloping an economically feasible 
technology for production of natural 
assay uranium recovered from the 
tails of current enrichment processes. 
[Ilf this technology is successfully de- 
veloped, then it will be possible, in 
the 1990's. to reduce the U-235 tails 
[assay from the value of 0.20 to 0.05, 
thus reducing uranium requirements 
| by almost 20%. 

Although the prospects of success- 
ful development and implementation 
II of advanced isotopic separation proc- 
esses and some of the long-term ad- 
vances in reactor technology are not 
(certain at this time, it appears that if 
both of these programs are success- 
fully carried out and implemented, it 
may be possible to achieve uranium 
[savings on the order of 45% in plants 
[starting up by the year 2000. These 
Itechnological advances may well be- 
Icome available prior to the time at 
Iwhich present high confidence, low 
cost uranium resources begin to be- 
come uncertain. 

Uranium and the Role of Plutonium 

U.S. policy is based on these con- 
siderations and the need to keep 
perspective in balancing energy and 
military security problems. Plutonium 
does not provide a solution to the 
short and midterm energy security 
problems, while its dispersal and 
utilization before the international 
system has learned how to cope with 
it threatens to add to the world's se- 
curity burden. Other technologies on 
the other hand do not now commit us 






to political problems we don't know 
how to deal with. For these reasons, 
the U.S. Government has opposed 
plutonium recycle in thermal reactors, 
which offers only marginal (if any) 
economic or energy security benefit. 
Diminished dependence on uranium 
imports can be accomplished more 
economically and safely through 
modest national stockpile programs. 

At the same time, we have not op- 
posed breeder reactor research and 
development programs because of the 
greater range of uncertainty sur- 
rounding estimates of their energy 
costs and benefits. A key element in 
this evaluation is the question of 
probable uranium resources. And 
since no one knows the answer to that 
question with certainty, we must be 
sure that we weigh the risks of being 
wrong from both the energy and the 
military security point of view. 

Essentially, nations are making 
energy and economic security bets 
about the availability of uranium and 
its likely price on the one hand versus 
the capital costs of the breeder reactor 
on the other. There are large uncer- 
tainties in the breeder capital costs 
and fuel cycle costs. If we consider 
the range of these estimates, we see 
that the lower priced breeder would 
compete with present light water 
reactors using uranium oxide priced at 
about $60/pound; while the more ex- 
pensive breeder would compete with 
uranium oxide priced at about $200/ 
pound. The improved light water 
reactor would compete at even higher 
uranium prices. We do not know now 
what the competitive costs will be. 
but it does raise the following ques- 
tions. Will the capital costs of the 
breeder escalate as has occurred with 
many high technology projects during 
the commercialization process? Will 
uranium reserves be exhausted and 
prices increase rapidly? Or will more 
resources be found as higher prices 
stimulate further drilling? 

No one can answer these questions 
with certainty. Yet given long lead 
times in high technology research and 
development projects, decisions must 
be made before all the facts are 
known. In order to maximize our area 
of common interest, we should strive 
for a situation in which nations can 
place different long-term energy bets 
without jeopardizing each other's se- 
curity interests. We ask those who bet 
on breeders to include security costs 
which they impose on others, par- 
ticularly safe fuel cycles, in their 
economic calculations. At the same 
time, they can rightly ask us for 
greater assurance on fuel supplies, 
and we are presently exploring bilat- 



41 



eral and multilateral fuel assurance 
options. Then each nation can bet as 
it wishes on the economics of the 
breeder without imposing the political 
costs of its actions on others. 

We ask those who choose to go 
ahead now with the breeder to include 
the following factors in their de- 
cisionmaking process. 

• Avoidance of the temptation to 
reduce per unit capital costs by pre- 
mature exports — the commercializa- 
tion of the breeder (and reprocessing) 
should be limited to situations where 
it has compelling advantages. 
Economies of scale arguments dictate 
that only the largest nuclear programs 
could satisfy such a condition for 
commercialization . 

• Fuel cycle facilities should be 
designed to make their misuse dif- 
ficult and time consuming, even 
though such design, as in the case of 
hot fuel fabrication, may involve ad- 
ditional cost. 

• Efforts should be made to 
minimize flows of cold plutonium or 
fuels with high concentrations of fis- 
sionable materials even if this adds to 
transport costs. 

• Multinational institutional ar- 
rangements should be utilized where 
there are compelling reasons to pro- 
ceed with new technology. While 
such arrangements could produce 
benefits in economic efficiency, such 
steps would be desirable even if they 
led to a net cost. 

Measures that would make these 
sorts of compromises possible are 
currently under discussion in the 
INFCE. Certainly the way the United 
States will respond to requests for 
transfers for reprocessing of U.S. ori- 
gin spent fuel will depend on the ex- 
tent to which other countries have 
made serious efforts to recognize and 
take proliferation concerns into ac- 
count. At the same time, we are ready 
to take their energy security concerns 
into account. 

Prospects For Stability 
After INFCE 

The United States sees INFCE as a 
cooperative international effort to 
evaluate the role of nuclear power 
technology in an international context 
and help develop an objective ap- 
preciation of the nonproliferation, 
economic, and other implications of 
different fuel cycle approaches. 
INFCE provides a 2-year period in 
which nations can re-examine as- 
sumptions and find ways to reconcile 
their overlapping but somewhat dif- 
ferent emphasis on the use of nuclear 



42 

energy. While INFCE has a technical 
cast, it is part of the political process 
of laying a basis for a stable interna- 
tional regime to govern nuclear 
energy through the end of the cen- 
tury. 

A stable international regime 
should build upon and reinforce the 
previous accomplishments of the 
Atoms for Peace program, the IAEA, 
and the Nonproliferation Treaty. Even 
if all new institutions are not under 
the jurisdiction of the IAEA, they 
should be consistent with it. and help 
to reinforce the safeguards system 
that has separated peaceful and mili- 
tary uses of nuclear energy in the 
past. The IAEA should be envisaged 
as the center of the institutional sys- 
tem. 

A stable regime should be designed 
to minimize the global distribution of 
weapons-usable materials and vulner- 
able points in the fuel cycle, while 
adequately meeting the energy secu- 
rity needs of all countries. One can 
visualize five basic norms for a 
strengthened international regime: 
full-scope safeguards, avoidance of 
unnecessarily sensitive facilities, use 
of diversion resistant technologies, 
joint control of sensitive facilities, 
and institutions to insure the avail- 
ability of the benefits of nuclear 
energy. 

The first norm — fuel-scope 
safeguards — is basic to the existing 
international regime that we are try- 
ing to reinforce. It is increasingly ac- 
cepted that full-scope safeguards pro- 
vide a credible assurance of peaceful 
intent, without interference with re- 
search or power programs. 

The second norm says countries 
should avoid sensitive facilities that 
involve weapons-usable materials 
unless they can be shown to be eco- 
nomically necessary. While allowing 
a range of interpretation, this norm 
rules out certain activities when they 
are clearly economically indefensible. 
This does not reserve sensitive 
facilities only to existing sites, but it 
does emphasize the shared interest of 
members of the international commu- 
nity in minimizing the vulnerable 
points in the global fuel cycle, and 
thus reducing the burden upon the 
international safeguards system. 

The third norm — use of technology 
that is as proliferation resistant as 
possible or appropriate in a particular 
institutional situation — appears to be 
attracting support. A number of in- 



teresting ideas have been suggested in 
the past years. While still too new to 
judge fully, such ideas indicate the 
value of continuing the search. At the 
front end of the fuel cycle, France 
has been investigating chemical en- 
richment techniques that ideally could 
increase the difficulty of producing 
weapons-grade material. The propo- 
nents of CIVEX reprocessing for a 
breeder system have suggested proc- 
esses and stipulated a useful set of 
criteria for terrorist proofing against 
which their technical suggestions can 
be judged. These criteria are: 

• No pure plutonium in storage; 

• No pure plutonium at any inter- 
mediate point; 

• No way to produce pure 
plutonium by simple process adjust- 
ment; 

• No way to produce pure 
plutonium without equipment modifi- 
cations; 

• No way to carry out equipment 
modifications with facilities and com- 
ponents normally on site; 

• No way to carry out the required 
equipment modifications without 
plant decontamination or entry into 
extremely high radiation fields; and 

• Length of time required for suc- 
cessful diversion should be such that 
adequate time is available for national 
and/or international responses. 

In the area of research reactors, 
both France and the United States are 
developing high density fuels that 
will provide sufficient neutron flux at 
lower levels of enrichment to cover 
nearly all experiments for which most 
research reactors are used. In short, 
developments and explorations in 
technology can help to create an en- 
vironment for a stable regime, though 
it should be remembered that techni- 
cal fixes alone do not solve the prob- 
lem of proliferation. 

The fourth and fifth norms suggest 
the need to develop two types of in- 
stitutions, both of which are included 
in the INFCE terms of reference. 
First we need to explore the charac- 
teristics of institutions to deal with 
the possibilities of effective joint 
control. Where sensitive facilities are 
economically essential and difficult to 
safeguard nationally, we should 
examine together forms of multina- 
tional ownership and management 
which might help to reinforce the ef- 
fect of international safeguards. The 
political costs of abrogating an ar- 



Department of State Bulletii 

rangement that involves a number ot 
states would be added to the costs of 
dismissing IAEA inspectors. Criteria 
and procedures can be developed tor 
"effective multinationality " which 
requires the involvement of a number 
of states while inhibiting replication 
or dissemination of the sensitive 
technology to national facilities. 

Finally, we need to develop in- 
stitutions to implement the principle 
of assurance of benefits. Supply as- 
surances, fuel trusts, and international 
spent fuel repositories are good 
examples. We are already making 
progress in discussions of a fuel trust, 
and President Carter has announced 
willingness to make a substantial 
commitment. Essentially this could be 
a stockpile of fuel to be released to 
countries which have all their 
facilities under safeguards, have a 
clean safeguards record, and have 
chosen not to develop sensitive 
facilities on a national basis. By re- 
lieving the burden on the world 
safeguards system, these actors de- 
serve special recognition and help 
with their potential energy security 
problem. Such a fuel trust need not 
be unduly large to accomplish its 
purpose of reinforcing the reliability 
of the uranium market by reducing 
political risks. Complementary bilat- 
eral and multilateral assurance meas- 
ures can also contribute to this goal. 

Conclusion 

In the largest sense of security — 
both energy and nonproliferation — the 
common interests of the nations 
utilizing nuclear energy outweigh the 
differences that divide them. Nuclear 
energy is truly a transnational policy 
issue. Domestic and international 
policy choices are inextricably in- 
tertwined. Those who bet now on the 
breeder and those who bet for now on 
adequate uranium availability and im- 
proved technology must each make 
serious efforts to meet the security 
concern on the other side. Neither 
must try to foreclose what may be the 
most important options for all. One 
can envisage a reasonable com- 
promise over current differences. Se- 
curity in its broadest dimension must 
prevail over any commercial consid- 
eration. On that bedrock it will be 
possible to construct a stable regime 
for the governance of nuclear energy 
while the uncertainties of uranium 
supply are left to the market, miners, 
and time to resolve. □ 



October 1978 



43 



PACIFIC: U.S. Relations 
With the Pacific Islands 



by Richard C. Holbrooke 

Statement before the Subcommittee 
on East Asian and Pacific Affairs of 
the Senate Committee on Foreign Re- 
lations on July 31, 1978. Mr. Hol- 
brooke is Assistant Secretary for East 
Asian and Pacific Affairs. ' 

The transition from colonial rule to 
independence must inevitably alter the 
relationship between the United States 
and the South Pacific region. It is this 
changed relationship and the decisions 
flowing from it that 1 would like to 
discuss with you today. 

In less than two decades, seven in- 
dependent nations have emerged in the 
area; your colleague. Senator Glenn, 
led our delegation to the celebration of 
the independence of the Solomon Is- 
lands only a few weeks ago. Self- 
government has come to most of the 
remaining territories, and there will be 
additional independent states within 
the next few years. These new states 
vary greatly in culture and size; they 
range from Papua New Guinea with 
almost 3 million people to tiny Tuvalu 
with only 8,000 inhabitants. 

There is a reservoir of great good 
will toward the United States among 
the peoples of the South Pacific and 
this enhances the prospects for cooper- 
ative relations between them and the 
United States. It will be to our advan- 
tage as well as theirs to foster this 
good will. These emerging states will 
have a role to play in the United Na- 
tions and in other international forums 
as well as in Third World councils. 
The waters surrounding the islands are 
promising sources of fish and other 
marine resources. The peoples of the 
islands — Micronesians. Melanesians, 
and Polynesians — have already en- 
riched our culture and benefitted from 
our educational and technical assist- 
ance; the time is ripe for a more active 
interchange. 

Evolution of the Islands 

During the battles of World War II, 
many of the Pacific Islands became 
very familiar to Americans in the 
Pacific and at home. I was deeply 
moved to see relics of that era still 
carefully preserved in Honiara. Even 
today, American veterans of Guadal- 
canal return to the Solomons annually; 
a number of them were honored guests 



at the independence ceremonies. 

In the years after the war the islands 
began their development toward self- 
government and regional cooperation. 
The process has been strikingly 
peaceful, carried on in a spirit of 
cooperation and accommodation be- 
tween the metropolitan powers and 
their Pacific territories. It is perhaps 
for this reason that the process has at- 
tracted less attention than it deserves. 

With the evolution of these ter- 
ritories proceeding under the auspices 
of our ANZUS [Australia. New Zea- 
land, United States pact] and NATO 
allies, we focused our own attention 
on our immediate responsibilities in 
Guam, American Samoa, and the 
Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. 
Even in those early days, however, we 
participated in an important effort to 
deal with problems and opportunities 
on a regional basis. We were among 
the original members of the South 
Pacific Commission, organized in 
1947 and including among its mem- 
bers metropolitan powers, independent 
states, and Pacific territories. 

In the 1950's and 1960's self- 
government became the rule rather 
than the exception in the islands. 
Since 1962 their progress toward inde- 
pendence has proceeded apace. West- 
ern Samoa, Nauru, Tonga, Fiji. Papua 
New Guinea, and the Solomons have 
become independent; the Cooks and 
Niue have gained a large measure of 
autonomy; Guam and American Samoa 
as well as the French territories have 
become self-governing; and Micronesia 
is expected to become self-governing 
within a few years. The British and 
French are prepared to grant the New 
Hebrides independence within the next 
few years. However, French Polynesia 
and New Caledonia are likely to re- 
main self-governing French territories 
for some time. American Samoa, 
Guam, and the Northern Marianas 
have expressed their desire to remain 
self-governing territories of the United 
States. 

Important changes have also taken 
place in South Pacific regional institu- 
tions. Once dominated by the met- 
ropolitan powers, the South Pacific 
Commission has become much more 
representative of the islands them- 
selves. Each of the island members 
now has an equal voice in its deliber- 
ations; the Commission's Secretary 
General is now normally selected from 



among the island members. A new 
organization — the South Pacific 
Forum, founded in 1972 by the inde- 
pendent states of the region — has 
become a central force in its orderly 
development. 

The new states of the South Pacific 
were fortunate in achieving their inde- 
pendence without the turmoil and 
bloodshed that has marked this process 
elsewhere. They are fortunate also to 
be emerging as members of a broader 
Pacific community at a time when 
peace prevails in most of the area and 
great power competition is muted. 

There are, to be sure, signs of 
growing Soviet and Chinese interest in 
the area. However, at this time the 
Soviet side seems to be concerned 
largely with advancing their fishing 
interests in the region and promoting 
their diplomatic standing vis-a-vis our 
own and that of the People's Republic 
of China. Peking is also interested in 
expanding its diplomatic presence in 
competition not only with Moscow but 
also with Taipei. 

The island states for their part, by 
virtue of their background, their 
democratic institutions, and their eco- 
nomic interests, are primarily oriented 
toward the West. They look for help 
in preserving free institutions and ad- 
vancing the welfare of their peoples to 
Australia and New Zealand, to Britain 
and France, and to the United States. 

U.S. Interests 

Our own interest in the region is 
inescapable. It is part of a Pacific 
community to which we are tied by 
geography and history as well as by 
growing economic interest. A stable, 
economically healthy South Pacific 
contributes not only to the peace and 
well-being of American territories in 
the region but also to the broader 
interests of the United States. 

We do not need to develop massive 
programs for the South Pacific; this 
would be contrary to the interests of 
the islands and our own. Nor should 
we seek a dominant role as initiator, 
helper, and guide. We do not wish in 
any way to impinge upon the 
sovereignty of these free peoples or to 
usurp the leadership role that belongs 
to them and to their near neighbors, 
Australia and New Zealand. 

The basic pillars of our policy in- 
clude: 

• Understanding and sympathy for 
the political and economic aspirations 
of the South Pacific peoples; 

• Support for South Pacific regional 
cooperation; 

• Particularly close and cooperative 



44 

ties with Australia and New Zealand; 
and 

• Continued cooperation with 
France and the United Kingdom in 
support of the progress of the South 
Pacific peoples. 

In implementing these principles, 
we will take into account the changes 
that have occurred in the last decade 
as well as the importance of insuring 
that the evolution of the region con- 
tinues along peaceful and productive 
lines. Thus over the next few years, 
we will be giving particular attention 
to: 

• Establishing a larger and more 
effective U.S. presence in the region; 

• Participating actively in South 
Pacific regional organizations; 

• Adapting existing programs and 
devising new ones to fit the unique 
needs of the developing island states; 

• Improving coordination among 
American and multilateral programs; 
and 

• Pursuing the Micronesian status 
negotiations with the goal of achieving 
a free association agreement between 
the United States and Micronesia and 
termination of the trusteeship by 1 98 1 . 

Increasing Contacts 

To bring us into closer contact with 
the independent Pacific island states, 
we are increasing our diplomatic rep- 
resentation in the region. We use mul- 
tiple accreditation of ambassadors to 
cover this wide region and we are 
urging the island states to do the same 
to insure that they have accredited 
ambassadors to the United States. We 
are taking a fresh look at our repre- 
sentation in the South Pacific to see if 
we are making the best use of our 
limited resources. We will also con- 
sider whether we should open a dip- 
lomatic post elsewhere in the region. 

A resident Ambassador, John Con- 
don, has been accredited to Fiji. Pub- 
lic affairs, administrative, and regional 
development officers have been added 
to the staff. President Carter has 
nominated our Ambassador to Papua 
New Guinea, Mary Olmsted, to serve 
also as Ambassador to the newly inde- 
pendent Solomon Islands. Our Ambas- 
sador to New Zealand, Armistead Sel- 
den, is concurrently accredited to the 
Kingdom of Tonga and to Western 
Samoa. The International Communi- 
cation Agency will expand its public 
affairs and cultural affairs programs. 
In time, we may ask your support in 
building on this modest beginning with 
additional posts. 

In Washington many parts of the 
government are more actively in con- 



tact with the South Pacific region than 
ever before in connection with 
fisheries and other interests. In my 
own bureau I have appointed a new 
Deputy Assistant Secretary, with spe- 
cial responsibilities for the South 
Pacific, and have established a new 
office which will focus solely on the 
affairs of the South and Southwest 
Pacific. My new deputy, Evelyn Col- 
bert, will bring long experience in 
East Asian affairs to the task of in- 
tegrating our South Pacific policy into 
our broader Pacific-wide interests. The 
Director of the new Office of Pacific 
Island Affairs. William Bodde. has 
been deeply involved in the Mi- 
cronesian negotiations for the last 
year; he will be assisted by a highly 
trained Pacific specialist. In the con- 
text ot the vast Washington bureauc- 
racy, these are hardly earthshaking 
moves. But as Senator Glenn can tes- 
tify, they were greeted with en- 
thusiasm by the Pacific island leaders 
we met during our recent visit to the 
area. 

We will also be promoting more 
contacts between Pacific Islanders and 
Americans both to demonstrate our 
own interest and to learn more about 
their interests and problems. Ship vis- 
its are one way of doing this. The 
Solomon Islanders were delighted by 
the presence of two U.S. Navy fri- 
gates, the Holt and the Whipple, at 
their independence celebrations; the 
Navy is now developing a more exten- 
sive program. 

Educational exchange is another 
way of increasing contacts and en- 
hancing understanding as well as pro- 
viding necessary training. We are 
already carrying on a number of edu- 
cational programs related to the South 
Pacific and will be expanding and 
strengthening some of them. 

The federally assisted East-West 
Center in Honolulu has encouraged the 
study of problems unique to the island 
region. The presence of the Prime 
Minister of Fiji. Ratu Sir Kamisese 
Mara, on the Center "s board of gover- 
nors has strengthened its ability to de- 
vise such programs. We are assisting 
the University of the South Pacific in 
Fiji to expand its extension service 
which uses a National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration satellite to make 
it possible for students throughout the 
Pacific to take university level courses 
while remaining on their home islands. 
Through the Fulbright program, we 
provide American professors for their 
regional universities. We will also be 
assisting others to pursue courses of 
study in American universities not yet 
available at the regional universities. 

The Peace Corps has made a par- 



Department of State Bulletir 

ticularly significant contribution to the 
region. There are over 540 volunteers 
in Fiji. Tonga, Western Samoa. Mi- 
cronesia, the Gilberts, and Tuvalu. In 
many of these islands they are the only 
Americans present. Their value is sub- 
stantial. 

As we strengthen our bilateral re- 
lationship we are also strengthening 
our regional role. For the first time a 
U.S. ambassador resident in the 
region — our Ambassador to Fiji, John 
Condon — will be the senior U.S. rep- 
resentative to the South Pacific Com- 
mission, bringing to his role in the 
Commission the sensitivity to the spe- 
cial needs and desires of the island 
states that only close acquaintance can 
provide. A regional Agency for Inter- 
national Development representative 
has also been assigned to our embassy 
in Suva. In addition to traveling 
throughout the region, he will work 
closely with the South Pacific Com- 
mission and the South Pacific Bureau 
for Economic Cooperation to foster an 
integrated regional approach to de- 
velopment problems. Our role in the 
South Pacific Commission cannot fail 
to benefit from this closer attention; I 
might mention in passing that the U.S. 
financial contribution to the Commis- 
sion has dropped from 20% of its 
operating budget to 17% because of 
the increased contributions by the is- 
land members. 

An example of increased U.S. in- 
volvement in South Pacific regional 
organizations is our participation in 
negotiations to establish a South 
Pacific Regional Fisheries Organiza- 
tion. Meeting in Suva last November 
and again in May of this year, we 
joined the island nations as well as 
France, the United Kingdom, their de- 
pendent territories, and Chile in pre- 
paring a draft treaty on this subject. 
The organization will be concerned 
with the management and conservation 
of marine resources — currently the 
most highly charged political and eco- 
nomic issue in the South Pacific. Par- 
ticipation offers the United States an 
opportunity to cooperate with the is- 
land states and territories in mutually 
beneficial development of fishing re- 
sources of the area. 

In the same vein, we have also 
made a special contribution of 
$300,000 to a new South Pacific 
Commission project designed to assess 
the skipjack tuna resources of the 
western Pacific. 

We are also working closely with 
such international organizations as the 
United Nations Development Program 
and the Asian Development Bank to 
coordinate and strengthen programs for 
the region. For example, we are look- 



October 1978 



45 



WORLD POPULATION: 
THE SILENT EXPLOSION— PART 1 



The tremendous growth of world population since World War II has come to 
be recognized as a critically important problem threatening in the most funda- 
mental way the well-being of mankind. 

This three-part series addresses the central issues of the population explosion 
and what can be done about it. Because population growth is far greater in the 
developing world than in the developed world, the series relates largely to the 
former. On the other hand, all nations face varying types of population problems, 
the United States being no exception, as brought out in the Rockefeller Commis- 
sion report. Population and the American Future, in 1972. Most importantly, we 
are one world. Adverse consequences of excessive population growth in one 
country ultimately affect all. 

Prepared by Ambassador Marshall Green, the Department of State's Coor- 
dinator of Population Affairs, and Robert A. Fearey, Special Assistant to 
Ambassador Green, this series is an effort to assist in understanding this 
long-range, but also highly urgent, problem and to indicate what recent experi- 
ence suggests are the most promising lines of attack on it. The presentation draws 
on recent U.S. Government and other sources, but some of the opinions ex- 
pressed are the authors' and do not necessarily reflect government policy. 
Demographic assistance has been provided by Mrs. Lydia K. Giffler, the State 
Department's demographer, and by the International Demographic Data Center, 
Population Division, Bureau of the Census. 

Due to the widely varying accuracy and recency of national population data, 
the figures cited are sometimes only approximations. They, nevertheless, are 
considered sufficiently accurate to support the conclusions presented. 

This series is being presented in three parts. Part I centers on the facts of the 
world population problem. Part 2, to be published in the November Bulletin, 
will examine the consequences of excessive population growth and what is now 
being done to reduce such growth. And part 3. in the December Bulletin, will 
focus on how world population control efforts may be rendered more effective. 



BASIC FACTS 

World Population Growth 

It took from mankind's earliest be- 
ginnings over a million years ago to the 
early 1800's for the world to reach a 
population of 1 billion. 



Succeeding decades saw a substan- 
tial decline in death rates as increasing 
agricultural and industrial productivity 
brought rising living standards, as 
public sanitation improved, as scien- 
tific medicine developed and became 
increasingly available (notably 
smallpox vaccination), and as better 



ing into ways in which the Asian De- 
velopment Bank might adjust its 
lending procedures to meet the unique 
requirements of the island states. 

To sum up, we see the orderly de- 
velopment of the South Pacific region 
as a contribution to the stability of the 
broader Pacific community. Our joint 
efforts there are still another way in 
which we strengthen our historic ties 
with our ANZUS allies and work to- 
gether for our mutual interests. The 
good will and friendship of the South 
Pacific states are important to U.S. 
policy objectives in the United Nations 
and elsewhere. 

Our historic bonds to the region 
forged in the dark days of World War 
II provide us with a large fund of good 



will on which to build. The experience 
of our own states and territories in the 
Pacific and the talents and interests of 
their peoples provide an additional im- 
portant resource. Great amounts of 
money or time are not required. We 
need only be sympathetic to the aspi- 
rations of the South Pacific peoples 
and true to our ideals. It is the inten- 
tion of the Department of State with 
the help of the U.S. Congress to carry 
out the policy I have outlined to you 
today. □ 



communications and transport per- 
mitted more effective action against 
famine. The world reached its second 
billion in about 100 years, by 1930. 

With accelerated advances in 
medicine, including the discovery and 
widespread use of antibiotics, with 
malaria control programs in effect in 
many areas of the world, and with fur- 
ther improvements in the production 
and distribution of food, the third bil- 
lion was reached in 30 years — 1960. 

The fourth billion was added in 15 
years, by 1975. It had taken only 45 
years for world population to double 
again, from 2 to 4 billion. 

Until the early 1960's, governments 
either evidenced little concern over 
population growth or such growth was 
welcomed as a reflection of economic 
vigor and as a source of military 
strength. This traditional perception 
gradually altered through the 1960's as 
many developing, low-income coun- 
tries experienced marked increases in 
the rate of population growth, in 
population size, and in the flow of 
surplus rural population to the cities. 
Many governments recognized that 
rapid population growth frustrated and 
negated economic and social develop- 
ment, and they began to formulate 
policies and programs to reduce high 
fertility levels. These programs have 
been reinforced by funding and techni- 
cal assistance from the United Nations, 
aid donor governments, and private 
sources. 

The rate of world population growth 
is believed to have peaked at about 2% 
around 1970, declining to about 
1.8-1.9% by 1977. At this rate— which 
is expected to continue to fall but at an 
unknown pace — world resources and 
national economies are called upon to 
support nearly 80 million additional 
persons every year. Barring widespread 
famine, nuclear holocaust, or other 
disaster, world population is expected 



'The complete transcript of the hearings 
will be published by the committee and will be 
available from the Superintendent of Docu- 
ments, U.S. Government Printing Office. 
Washington, D.C. 20402. 



Single copies of reprints of 
this three-part series, entitled 
"World Population: The Silent 
Explosion," are available from 
the Correspondence Managment 
Divison, Bureau of Public Af- 
fairs, Department of State, 
Washington, D.C. 20520. 



46 



Department of State Bulletin 



to number about 6 billion by the year 
2000. 

The level at which mankind's total 
number ultimately will peak appears to 
lie between 8 and 1 1 billion, depending 
on the determination and skill with 
which the world addresses the problem. 
With the ecosystems of the world al- 
ready heavily burdened at 4 billion, 
there is urgent need for nations, espe- 
cially those with high population 
growth rates, to deal with this problem 
more effectively. 

Charts 1 and 2 present graphically 
the slow historical, and rapid and ac- 
celerating current and prospective, 
growth of world population. Chart 1 
shows world population reaching 5.8 
billion in 2000 under the U.N.'s low 
projection variant, which assumes a 
one-third decline in fertility, on the 
average, between 1970 and the end of 
the century. Under the less optimistic 
U.N. medium projection variant, which 
assumes a fertility decline of only 24% 
during this period, world population is 
shown as reaching 6.25 billion in 2000. 
The U.N.'s high variant, projecting a 
population of 6.6 billion by 2000, is 
not shown because declines which have 
occurred since the mid- 1 960 's in the 
birth rates of some 30 developing 
countries, including China, suggest 
that that variant is no longer a real 
possibility. 

Chart 2 shows a breakdown of the 
2000 medium variant figure by de- 
veloped and developing regions. With 
both regions drawn to the same scale, 
the chart brings out strikingly the far 
greater present and. even more, future 
total population of the current de- 
veloping regions than of the current 
developed regions; the small antici- 
pated growth of the developed world's 
population between 1975 and 2000; the 
tremendous expansion of the develop- 
ing world's population in that period; 
and the great preponderance of 
younger, presently or prospectively 
fertile, age groups in the developing 
world's population now and, even 
more, in 2000. 



Geographic Distribution 

How will mankind's growing num- 
bers be distributed in the year 2000? 

The share of people in developing 
countries, many least able to support 
larger populations, will continue to rise 
in the remainder of this century — from 
66% in 1950 to 78% in 2000, accord- 
ing to the U.N. medium projection 
variant. The table below and chart 3 
present the prospect numerically and 
graphically. 

The table shows little change be- 







Annual Av. 






Share of 








Growth Rate (%) 




Population (%) 






1950- 


1970- 


1995- 










55* 


75** 


00** 


1950* 


1970* 


2000** 


World total 


1.7 


1.9 


1.6 


100.0 


100.0 


100.0 


Developed regions 


1.3 


0.9 


0.6 


34.3 


30.0 


21.7 


Developing regions 


1.9 


2.3 


1.9 


65.7 


700 


78.3 


Northern America 


1.8 


0.9 


0.7 


6.6 


6.3 


4.7 


Europe 


0.8 


0.6 


0.5 


15.7 


12.7 


8.6 


USSR. 


1.7 


1.0 


0.7 


7.2 


6.7 


5.0 


Africa 


2.1 


2.6 


2.8 


8.7 


9.7 


13.0 


Latin America 


2.7 


2.7 


2.4 


66 


7.8 


9.9 


China 


1.6 


1.7 


1.0 


22.3 


21.4 


18.4 


India 


1.7 


2.4 


1.8 


14.1 


15.0 


16.9 


Other Asia 


1.9 


2.4 


2.0 


18.3 


19.8 


22.9 


Oceania 


2.25 


2.0 


1.45 


0.5 


0.5 


0.5 


*Estimated 


"Projected 















tween the 1950-55 and 1995-2000 
population growth rates for some de- 
veloping regions. But the figures fail to 
bring out the anticipated major declines 
in the birth and death rates making up 
(along with migration) the overall 
growth rates. The 1.9% growth rate for 
the developing regions as a whole for 
1950-55 consists of a birth rate of 42 



and a death rate of 23 per 1 ,000 popu- 
lation. The 1.9% growth rate for 
1995-2000. on the other hand, projects 
a birth rate of 28 and a death rate of 9 
per 1,000 population. This projection 
assumes a continued trend toward the 
modernization (i.e., reduction) of birth 
and death rates in the developing re- 
gions. 



Chart 1 


The Growth of World Population Since the 
Beginning of the Industrial Era 

Billio 
Pe 


ns of 
Dple 


Years to 

Add 

Each Billion 


/ 
// 
// 
// 

Medium Projection Variant, ffl 


-6.0 
-5.0 


I (See Note 
[Below) 

il2-14 


Yielding 6.25 Billion in 2000 // 


Low Projection Variant, 1975f / 
Yielding 5.8 Billion in 2000 / / 

/1989 


-4.0 


>15 


196o/ 


-3.0 




1930/ 


-2.0 
-1.0 


>30 
>Over 100 


i i i i i 





I From the 
| Beginning 


1750 1800 1850 1900 1950 20 

Year 


00 


Note: The number of years it will take to add the fifth and subsequent billions will depend 

primarily on the pace of fertility declines, and to a lesser extent mortality trends, in LDC's. 


Source: Based on UN. estimates and projections, as assessed in 1973. 



October 1978 



47 



Chart 2 



Population by Age and Sex (1975 and 2000) 



Developed Regions 

1975 — 1.1 billion 
2000 — 1 .3 billion 



Age/ 



75+ 



Male 



I — I — I — I — I — I — I — I — I — I 1 — I — i — I — r 




Female 



I I Population in 1975 

■MM Increase I 975 to 2000 



"1 \~ I I I I I I I I I I I I — I 1 



320 280 240 200 160 120 80 40 40 80 120 160 200 240 280 320 

Millions 



Developing Regions 

1 975 — 3.0 billion 
2000 — 5.0 billion 



^%C 



75+ 




320 280 240 200 160 120 80 40 40 80 120 160 200 240 280 320 

Millions 

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census. The data projected for the year 2000 represent the Bureau's medium variant. 



Age Composition 

Chart 4 illustrates that developed 
countries (e.g., Sweden) have many 
imore people of labor-force age (15-64) 
than they have children less than 15 
wears old. In developing countries 
«e.g., Pakistan), the age-sex pyramid is 
imuch broader at the base, and the 
proportion of dependent children (less 
Ithan 15 years old) usually runs between 
40% and 45% of the total population, 
compared with 25% in the developed 
countries (1975 estimate). Put another 
iway, there is only about one adult of 
working age for each child under 15 in 
the developing world compared with 
nearly three adults of working age per 
child under 15 in the developed coun- 
tries. 

There are three major disadvantages 
to the heavily youth-oriented age dis- 
tribution of most developing countries. 



children relative to the size of the labor 
force increases the burden of child de- 
pendency, promotes spending for im- 
mediate consumption, restricts private 
and public saving, and inhibits invest- 
ment. 

• When the excessive number of 
children reach working age, they 
swamp the rural and urban labor mar- 
kets. Large numbers of unemployed 
and underemployed are both econom- 
ically wasteful and a potential source 
of social and political instability. 

• The cohort of young men and 
women entering the years of fertility is 
much larger — perhaps by three 
times — than the number of older people 
growing out of the age of fertility. This 
is a key factor underlying the high rate 
of population growth in the developing 
countries and is certain to accentuate 
overpopulation problems in the decades 
ahead. 



The large number of dependent The chart also brings out the greater 



old-age (65 + ) dependency burden 
borne by the developed than by the 
developing countries. However, the 
developed countries were able to build 
their economies, partly through the 
contributions of the now elderly, be- 
fore this burden became major. The 
problems it presents are arousing in- 
creasing concern in the developed 
countries but are less critical than those 
imposed on the developing countries by 
their heavily youth-biased age struc- 
tures. 



The Momentum Factor 

Even if it were possible to attain in 
the next few decades an average level 
of fertility worldwide which would 
merely replace the parental generation 
(i.e., a net reproduction rate — 
NRR — of 1, implying an average of 
2.1-2.5 children per woman, depend- 
ing on mortality conditions), popula- 



48 



Department of State Bulletin 



Chart 3 



The Population Explosion 

Where the People Are Likely to be in the Year 2000 



Early 1800's 



Year 
1900 1930 



1960 



1975 1990 2000 



Its effects are, and will be, greater in 
countries of Asia, Africa, and 
Latin America 




Population, by Region (millions) 





1970 


2000 


Percent Growth 
1970-2000 


Northern America 


226 


296 


31 


Latin America 


283 


620 


119 


Europe 


459 


540 


18 


Africa 


352 


814 


131 


USSR 


243 


315 


30 


India 


543 


1,059 


95 


China 


772 


1,148 


49 


Other Asia and 
Oceania 


732 


1,463 


100 



Northern 
America 



Latin 
America 



Europe 



Africa 



U.S.S.R. 



India 



China 



Other Asia 
& Oceania 



1.0 



1.65 



2.0 



Billions 



3.0 4.0* 5,3* 6.25* 



UN medium projection variant 



October 1978 



49 



tion would continue to grow for some 
50-70 years thereafter. The size of the 
eventually stabilized (nongrowing) 
population would be far larger than at 
the time fertility dropped to replace- 
ment level. 

The projections noted in the box 
(p. 50) are not intended to predict the 
actual course of world population 
growth but only to illustrate the 
enormous potential for growth built 
into the current youthful age structure 
of much of the world's population. 
For every decade of delay in achiev- 
ing an NRR of 1 — replacement 
level — the world's peak population 
will be some 15% greater (chart 5). 

It is conceivable that at some future 
point average family size in particular 
countries or regions, or in the world 
as a whole, may be less than two 
children (i.e., that fertility may 
stabilize at a level below replacement 
of the parental generation). This 
would, of course, speed up the cessa- 
tion of growth and bring stabilization 
at a smaller absolute size. A sustained 
fertility level below replacement 
would eventually lead to a decline in 
the absolute size of a population. This 
is not an objective of any govern- 
ment's current population policy, but 
this situation may change. 

Chart 6 illustrates the awesome 
potential for population growth in a 
specific developing country — Mexico. 

In 1970 Mexicans numbered 51 
million. Of this number, 46% were 
under 15 years of age and 65% were 
under 25 years. The NRR was esti- 
mated to be 2.7 female births per 
woman. Under assumptions of linear 
fertility decline, leveling off at re- 
placement level, Mexico's population 
would reach the following levels. 

• If replacement-level fertility is 
reached by 2000-05, the population 
will stop growing at about 174 mil- 
ilion, or 3.4 times its 1970 size. 

• If replacement-level fertility is 
reached by 2020-25, the population 
will stop growing at about 269 mil- 
lion, or 5.3 times its 1970 size. 

These figures should be modified 
by net emigration of undetermined 
magnitude, a large proportion to the 
United States. 

Mexico's demographic situation is 
typical of dozens of developing 
countries where, even under optimis- 
tic assumptions of fertility decline, 
the momentum of growth is bound to 
double or triple present population 
.levels. 

In 1972 the Mexican Government 
initiated a family planning program. 
By the end of 1977, the birth rate was 
believed to have declined to below 40 



Burden of Dependency 

The Burden of Child Dependency Weighs Heavily on LDCs 


Chart 4 


Pakistan 

Male 


Age 
~|75+ 

70-7' 

65-6 

j60-e 


1 
9 
4 
59 

Female 


55- 


50-54 


45-49 


40-44 


35-39 






30-34 










25-29 






20-24 






15-19 










10-14 










5-9 








0-4 




1 l 
10987654 32 1 1 2345678910 

Percent 
The Burden of Retirement-age Dependency is Heavier in DCs 




Age 


male 


Sweden 


75+ 






70-74 


65-69 






60-64 




55-59 




50-54 






Male 


45-49 


Fe 




40-44 




35-39 






30-34 








25-29 








20-24 








15-19 








10-14 






5-9 






0-4 


Source: Basec 


1 on U.I 


1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
54321012345 

Percent 

vl. data for 1975 











50 



If the world attained 


World population would And world population 


an NRR of 1 in* 


then stand at could be expected 




eventually to 




stabilize at 


1980-85 


4.2 billion (1980) 6.4 billion 


2000-05 


5.9 billion (2000) 8.4 billion 


2020-25 


8.4 billion (2020) 11.2 billion 


2040-45 


12.0 billion (2040) 15.2 billion 


*The decline in fertility 


is assumed to begin in all cases with the 1965-70 level. Thus, an 


NRR of 1 by 2000-05, foi 


example, implies a gradual reduction of fertility over a 35-year 


period. 




Note: These projections were developed by Tomas Frejka of the Population Council 



per 1,000 population. President Lopez 
Portillo has recently indicated a na- 
tional goal of reducing the rate of 
growth to 2.5% by the end of his 
term in office in 1982 and to 1% by 
the year 2000. 

International Migration 

In past centuries, millions of 
people suffering poverty, religious 
intolerance, or other hardships have 
emigrated to other countries. From 
the mid- 17th century to the cutbreak 
of World War II, more than 60 mil- 
lion Europeans, according to one es- 
timate, emigrated overseas, mostly to 
the Americas. The United States 
alone absorbed some 33 million 
European immigrants between 1820 
and 1940. 

In the years since World War II, 
added millions have moved across 
national boundaries under a variety of 
economic and political circumstances. 
In addition to the traditional inter- 
continental movements — mostly to the 
United States, Canada, and 
Australia — there have been mass 
transfers of populations following the 
partitioning of countries (e.g., on the 
Indian subcontinent); large-scale re- 
patriations of foreign nationals; and 
streams of refugees occasioned by 
political dislocations, particularly in 
Asia, Africa, and Europe. 

In the 1960's, labor migration be- 
came a growing component of post- 
war international movements. This 
flow has been primarily directed to 
Western Europe; in the 1970's, it 
branched out to oil-rich countries. In 
1976 foreign workers in Western 
Europe — coming largely from south- 
ern Europe, north Africa, and 
Turkey — numbered some 7.5 million, 
accompanied by 5.5 million depend- 
ents. 

Increased employment opportunities 
in the industrialized countries and 
liberalized immigration laws in some 
of them have resulted in a sharp in- 



Department of State Bulletin 

there are no reliable estimates of their 
number, but they are in the millions.) 
Almost two-thirds of the migrants to 
northern America, Australia, and 
New Zealand came from Latin 
America. The largest contingent of 
LDC migrants in Western Europe 
came from north Africa (Algeria, 
Morocco, Tunisia) and Turkey. In 
1974 there were 1 million Turks in 
the Federal Republic of Germany 
alone. LDC immigrants to the United 
Kingdom have come largely from the 
newly independent countries of the 
British Commonwealth. 

Social problems frequently arise for 
migrant workers and the host coun- 
crease in the numbers of migrants tries. Also, foreign labor markets de- 
from developing to developed regions pend on the economic vitality of the 

receiving countries and cannot be 
counted upon to remain open on the 



in recent decades. In 1974, according 
to U.N. estimates, there were some 
9.5 million migrants from less de- 
veloped countries (LDC's) in Western 
Europe, northern America, Australia, 
and New Zealand, a threefold in- 
crease over I960. 1 (These figures do 
not include illegal migrant workers; 



required scale. With the economic 
slowdown in Europe beginning in 
1973, the demand for migrant work- 
ers has fallen. Several countries have 
imposed stricter controls on the re- 
cruitment of foreign labor; some have 





Chart 5 


Momentum of World Population Growth 




Billions of 




Persons 




16 








Declining Fertility: 

Replacement-level Fertility > 


15.1 Bit* 


14 


_ (NRR = 1 .0) Reached in / 












- 2020-25 / 




12 
10 


2000-05 / 

1980-85 / 

^Stabilization Level / . — """"' 
/ / 
/ /' 
/ / 


11.2 Bil* 


8 
6 

4 


/ / 




///' 


■ —6.4 Bil* 


2 









i i i i I i i i i I i i i 


i I 


1970 2000 2050 


2100 


Year 




Source of Data: Tomas Frejka 





October 1978 



Chart 6 



Momentum of Mexico's Population Growth 



Millions of 
Persons 
450 r 



400- 



350 



300 



250- 



200 



150 



100 



50 



Declining Fertility: 
(NRR = 1 .0) Reached in 

2040-45 

2020-25 

2000-05 

1980-85 



"Stabilization Level 




419 Mil/ 



269 Mil. 



174 Mil.' 



113 Mil." 



_L 



J L 



J I I L 



J I I L 



1970 2000 

Source of Data: Tomas Frejka 



2050 



2100 



Year 



subsidized the return of foreign work- 
ers to their native lands. The growth 
of the working-age population in 
Western Europe, and increasing par- 
ticipation of women in the labor 
force, may further restrict employ- 
ment opportunities for migrant 
workers well into the 1980's. 
Resource-rich LDC's have attracted a 
considerable number of foreign work- 
ers in recent years, but these de- 
veloping countries' potential for 
absorbing additional migrant labor ap- 
pears limited. The pressure in poorer 
LDC's to emigrate, nevertheless, is 
likely to intensify in the years ahead, 
owing to the rapid — and in many 
countries accelerating — growth of the 
labor force. 

Migration to industrialized coun- 
tries has significantly eased the 
population pressure of a number of 
small and medium-sized developing 
countries — for example, Puerto Rico, 
Jamaica, Mexico, Turkey, Algeria, 



Morocco, and Tunisia. In 1974 Alge- 
rian workers abroad comprised 12% 
of the country's economically active 
population; Tunisian workers 
abroad — 7%; Moroccan and 
Turkish — 5%. (Migrant workers may 
also bring important financial advan- 
tages to their home countries; work- 
ers' remittances are an important 
source of foreign exchange.) But the 
9.5 million LDC migrants in indus- 
trialized countries in 1974 comprised 
on the average less than Vj% of the 
population of the sending countries. 
There are no areas left on Earth with 
unused land, job opportunities, and 
welcome for the tens of millions of 
emigrants which would be required to 
significantly ease population pres- 
sures in such major, overpopulated, 
low-income countries as India, Paki- 
stan. Bangladesh, or Indonesia, even 
if such numbers could be persuaded 
to leave their homelands. 

Emigration, in brief, can assist 



51 



some small and medium-sized de- 
veloping countries to meet their over- 
population problems, but it is of neg- 
ligible help for larger nations. 

Doubling Time 

One way to grasp the implications 
of a particular rate of population 
growth is to consider how long it will 
take a population to double at that 
growth rate. 

When a sum of money grows at 
compound interest, the interest rate is 
applied both to the original principal 
and to the proceeds of past interest 
payments, making total growth sig- 
nificantly faster than growth at simple 
interest. Thus, $1 at 1% simple inter- 
est takes 100 years to double, while 
$1 at 1% compound interest will dou- 
ble in 69 years. 

In the same way, when population 
grows both the original number of 
people and the numbers accruing from 
past growth increase. Thus, a popula- 
tion growing at 1% per year will take 
not 100 years but 69 years to double. 
A population growing at 2% per year 
will double in only 35 years. 

A quick way to calculate doubling 
time is to divide 69 by the percentage 
of growth. For example, if a coun- 
try's population growth rate is 3% per 
year, the population will double in 23 
years. 

The concept of a population "ex- 
plosion," with the developing coun- 
tries' populations heading sharply 
upward, thus derives from the combi- 
nation of an unprecedentedly rapid 
drop in death rates, much more 
slowly falling birth rates, and the 
compound, or geometric, arithmetic 
of the resulting population growth. 



Annual Growth 


Years to 


Rate (%) 


Double Population 


1.0 


69 


1.5 


46 


2.0 


35 


2.5 


28 


3.0 


23 


3.5 


20 


4.0 


17 



CHANGING PATTERNS 
OF POPULATION GROWTH 



Classical Demographic 
Transition Theory 

Before the onset of the Industrial 
Revolution in the late 18th century, 
European mortality and fertility rates 



52 

were both high. By the middle of the 
1930's, death rates and birth rates 
throughout the West had plummeted 
(chart 7). Demographers have sought 
ever since to clarify the sequence of 
this transition from high to low vital 
rates and the means by which it was 
accomplished. 

One of the resulting theories of 
demographic evolution, known as the 
demographic transition theory, pos- 
tulates that economic development 
brings about a fall in mortality, 
followed — after some time — by a fall 
in fertility. During the period of tran- 
sition from high to low death and 
birth rates, the pace of population 
growth accelerates markedly. More 
specifically: 

• The initial stage of high (popula- 
tion) growth potential evolves from a 
backdrop of high death and high birth 
rates. The former reflects the harsh 
struggle for existence and the latter 
the need to compensate for high 
mortality. During this stage, death 
rates begin to fall, under the influ- 
ence of modernization, including ris- 
ing levels of living and new controls 
over disease. Birth rates remain high, 
causing a rise in the rate of popula- 
tion expansion. 



• During the subsequent transi- 
tional stage, the rate of growth of the 
population is still relatively high, but 
a decline in birth rates becomes well 
established. The new ideal of the 
small family arises typically in urban, 
industrial settings. 

• The stage of incipient decline is 
reached when mortality is low and 
fertility levels hover around replace- 
ment level. A stabilization of fertility 
below replacement level would, of 
course, lead, in the absence of net 
immigration, to an eventual decline in 
the absolute size of a country's 
population. 



Theory's Relevance for LDC's 

The demographic transition theory, 
particularly its concepts of ( 1 ) more 
or less automatic decline in fertility 
subsequent to mortality reduction and 
(2) economic development as the mo- 
tive power for both declines, has 
shaped much of the thinking about 
population problems in today's de- 
veloping countries. It has often 
served as a basis of opposition to 
government policies and programs 
aimed at reducing average family size 
on the premise that economic de- 



Department of State Bulletir 

velopment will bring a reduction in 
fertility as a natural consequence of 
rising levels of living. 

The theory's supporters further 
contend that fertility will not decline 
in the absence of such prerequisites as 
rising levels of living, literacy, and 
declining infant mortality. Family 
planning services by themselves, it is 
held, are largely unavailing. "De- 
velopment is the best contraceptive" 
was widely proclaimed by Third 
World government delegations to the 
1974 World Population Conference. 2 

Recent reexamination of Europe's 
population experience has done nothing 
to disprove the premise that lowered 
fertility is a correlate of modernization. 
There can be no doubt of the reality 
and persistence of fertility declines in 
modernizing Europe. A more systema- 
tic documentation of mortality and fer- 
tility changes in Europe from the 18th 
through the early 20th centuries ap- 
pears to weaken, however, the validity 
of some aspects of the demographic 
transition theory and its usefulness in 
predicting the future course of birth 
and death rates in the currently de- 
veloping countries. 

Analysis of Europe's historical data 
by national subunits (e.g., provinces), 






Chart 7 



The Demographic Transition 



Annual Vital Rates 
(Per 1 ,000 Population) 

50 r 



40 



30 



20 



10 



Developed Countries 



Birth Rate 



Annual Vital Rates 
(Per 1 ,000 Population) 

50 r 



40 




Assumed trend in the absence of 

World Wars I and II 



Natural 

Increase 

0.8% 



1750 1800 1850 1900 1950 



2000 



In developed countries death rates declined slowly beginning 
in the late 18th century Birth rates followed closely. Population 
growth rates rarely exceeded 1 ,5% per year. 



Source: Based on U. N. estimates and projections (medium variant) 



30 



20 



10 



Developing Countries 



Birth Rate 




Natural 

Increase 

2.3% 



• Assumed trend in the absence of 
major upheavals (Tai-Ping Rebellion. 
Indian Mutiny, epidemics, World Wars) 



_l_ 



_l_ 




1750 1800 1850 1900 1950 2000 

In developing countries birth and death rates remained high 
through the first decades of the 20th century Then death 
rates began to drop. Birth rates stayed high and populations 
grew at 2.5, 3.0, and 3,5% or higher a year. Since the mid- 
1 960's some countries' birth rates have begun to decline. 



'ctober 1978 

ndertaken by the Office of Population 
Research, Princeton University, 
howed important regional variations in 
nitial mortality/fertility levels, timing 
if the onset of secular (sustained) de- 
lines in these levels, the pace of such 
leclines, and the apparent causes of 
hose declines. 
The reexamination showed that fer- 
lity levels and trends varied widely 
mong and within 19th century Euro- 
ean countries; that fertility declines 
ften preceded or coincided with mor- 
ality declines, instead of following 
lem; that regional variations in fertil- 
y appeared most closely related to 
ultural and linguistic rather than de- 
elopmental factors; and that, overall, 
ertility levels and trends bore no clear 
elation to development. Fertility de- 
lines occurred in provinces that were 
jral, very poor, not well educated, 
nd subject to high infant mortality, 
(ationwide, fertility began to fall in 
easant. Catholic France nearly a cen- 
try earlier than in England, though it 
as England that was the leader in the 
ldustrial Revolution. 
The relevance of the classical demo- 
raphic transition theory for today's 
DCs is also limited by differences in 
i ie population trends of present-day 
DCs and those of European countries 
comparable periods of their eco- 
^mic development. 

• The pace of decline from tradition- 
ly high mortality levels has been far 
eeper in the currently developing 
)untries than it was in Europe. Aver- 
se life expectancy in the West, 3 for 
sample, is estimated to have risen 
om 41 years in 1840 to 50.5 years in 
)00 — about 10 years in six decades, 
he average life expectancy for LDC's 
. a group has increased from 42 to 51 
ears in 15 years (between 1950-55 
id 1965-70). The rapid decline in 
DC mortality has been attributed 
■imarily to technological advances in 
e prevention and control of disease, 
tnployed independently of the 
>cioeconomic setting. Marked im- 
•ovements in the availability of food 
so played an important role in sharply 
:ducing death rates. 

• Birth rates at the beginning of the 
jveloping countries' demographic 
ansition were significantly higher 
lan in preindustrial Europe, due 
lainly to earlier and more universal 
larriage. The average birth rate for the 
DCs has been estimated at 42.1 per 
,000 population between 1950 and 
955; birth rates in 90 LDC's exceeded 
lis average. By contrast, the birth rate 
i Western Europe on the eve of the 
ldustrial Revolution is estimated at 
0-35 per 1.000. 4 



• Steeply reduced death rates and 
generally high birth rates have pro- 
duced natural growth rates in LDC's up 
to 3.5% a year or higher, two or three 
times as high as those experienced 
during Europe's period of most rapid 
population growth. At the peak of 
Costa Rica's fertility (1959-61), for 
example, the country's natural increase 
reached 3.8% a year; the rate exceeded 
3.5% for more than a decade. In Den- 
mark, by contrast, the rate of natural 
increase never exceeded 1.5%. 

The totally unprecedented dis- 
equilibrium between birth and death 
rates in the developing countries since 
the end of World War II is the reason 
for the massive burgeoning of world 
population. 



Prerequisites for 
Fertility Reduction 

The reexamination of Europe's his- 
torical demographic trends has led the 
project's senior researcher. Dr. Ansley 
Coale, to conclude that the following 
conditions are necessary for a major 
fall in marital fertility. 

• Fertility must be within the cal- 
culus of conscious choice. Potential 
parents must consider it acceptable be- 
havior to balance the advantages and 
disadvantages of having another child. 

• Perceived social and economic cir- 
cumstances must make reduced fertility 
seem advantageous to individual 
couples. 

• Effective techniques of fertility re- 
duction must be known and available, 
with sufficient communication between 
spouses and sustained will in both to 
use them successfully. 

It should be noted that neither the 
classical demographic transition theory 
nor its subsequent refinements indicate 
exactly what combination of social, 
economic, and political conditions give 
rise to the cited "calculus of conscious 
choice," to the interest in fertility re- 
duction techniques, or to the "sus- 
tained will" or motivation to practice 
family planning. As noted by Dr. 
Coale, the weakness of the concept of 
"transition" lies in the "difficulty of 
defining a precise threshold of 
modernization that will reliably iden- 
tify a population in which fertility is 
ready to fall. " 

Europe's demographic history to the 
mid- 1 930 's did provide two important 
lessons. It showed that changes in fer- 
tility due to the voluntary adaptation of 
individual families to new personal cir- 
cumstances evolve very gradually. It 
also showed that societal sanction of 
the idea of family planning is an im- 



53 



portant factor in the diffusion of its 
practice. 

Both findings argue in favor of ef- 
fective population policies and pro- 
grams, without denying the important 
role of a rising level of living as the 
most reliable path to declining birth 
rates. The retarding effect of rapid 
population growth on improvement of 
the living conditions of the average 
family in most developing countries 
renders it highly important for those 
countries to accelerate in every practic- 
able way the transition from high to 
low death and birth rates. Effectively 
organized family planning programs 
not only provide birth control informa- 
tion and clinical services but also speed 
up the diffusion of a basic prerequisite 
for the use of these services, namely 
making the notion of planned par- 
enthood acceptable. 

Birth rate reductions in present day 
developing countries are often closely 
correlated with economic and social 
progress (Singapore, Taiwan, Costa 
Rica, Hong Kong, South Korea, etc.). 
Significant declines in birth rates have 
also taken place, however, in relatively 
backward economic settings but under 
conditions of all-out mobilization of 
political, bureaucratic, and community 
resources (including womanpower) be- 
hind family planning (China and In- 
donesia). 

LDC Birth Rates in Transition: 
A Modest Beginning 

If present-day LDC's have experi- 
enced an accelerated pace of mortality 
decline, some are also showing an ear- 
lier onset and a faster rate of decline in 
birth rates than occurred in moderniz- 
ing Europe. Since the mid-1960's, 
some 30 LDC's, containing over two- 
thirds of the total LDC population, ap- 
pear to have reduced their birth rates by 
10% or more. 

Delayed marriages appear to exercise 
an important role in the reduction of 
birth rates in many LDC's, particularly 
in the initial phase of the decline. Ris- 
ing age at marriage is a product of 
socioeconomic development that pro- 
vides women with alternatives to an 
early marriage and motherhood and/or 
raises a couple's material requirements 
for marriage and delays the union until 
these requirements are satisfied, some- 
times with the help of the woman's 
newly acquired earning power. 

Large-scale temporary or permanent 
migration has also helped to depress 
the birth rate in a number of LDCs by 
reducing the proportion of the popula- 
tion in childbearing ages, separating 
families, delaying marriages, and ex- 
posing migrants to cultural values of 



54 



Department of State Bulleti 



.' 



;• 



SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY: 

Their Interaction With Foreign Polieu 



by Lucy Wilson Benson 

Based on an address before the Na- 
tional Science Board in Washington, 
D.C., on May 18, 1978. Mrs. Benson 
is Under Secretary for Security Assist- 
ance, Science, and Technology . 

I'm glad to have the opportunity to 
talk to the National Science Board this 
afternoon. The prominence of science 
in government today is, in part, a herit- 
age of World War II. But times are 
different and so are the demands and 
expectations. There is a new emphasis 
on the civilian aspects of science and 
technology after years of heavy em- 
phasis on military matters. In helping 
rebuild Europe, our major scientific 
and technological assistance and ex- 
change was with the developed coun- 
tries. Now it is with the developing 
countries. Then it was largely basic re- 
search; now there is more emphasis on 
application. 

Another change has taken place. The 
recovery of the advanced nations from 
the effects of World War II has meant 
that we are no longer, as we were early 
in the post-World War II era, the only 
exporter of science and technology to 
the four corners of the world. We have 
companions and we have competitors. 
This is undoubtedly good for us all, 



even though it complicates our diplo- 
macy. Nevertheless, our technology 
remains as a major, if not the major, 
aspect of how other peoples view us. 
And this reputation for technological 
excellence is an important source of 
power, influence, and potential diplo- 
matic leverage. 

All of this points to an extensive in- 
teraction with foreign affairs. Perhaps 
the most significant change as it affects 
our foreign policy is the growing mul- 
tinational character of science and 
technology-related problems and the 
growing complexity of the institutional 
arrangements set up to deal with them. 
The things that preoccupy the foreign 
policy managers today are big and al- 
most intractable problems. These are, 
of course, nuclear nonproliferation, 
energy use, pollution, climate, food, 
population control, and the use of the 
oceans. These are all problems beyond 
our capacity to deal with on a national 
basis alone. Thus the demand for new 
institutional arrangements and a new 
focus in such multilateral bodies as the 
U.N. specialized agencies. 

This has both a good and bad side. 
On the one hand it enlists the forces of 
diplomacy on the side of science and 
technology for ends that everybody 
agrees are important. But it also 
politicizes questions that I am sure 



(Population com' d) 

the receiving (usually developed) 
countries. 

The major cause of the decline in 
LDC birth rates to date, however, has 
been reduction in marital fertility, par- 
ticularly among women over 30 years 
of age. This decline relates — in various 
degrees — to a fairly steady growth in 
the proportion of women of child- 
bearing ages who use modern con- 
traceptive methods. Such use has been 
significantly accelerated in many 
LDC's by public provision of family 
planning information, education, and 
contraceptive services 

Observed reductions in some LDC 
birth rates may signal the beginnings of 
a sustained fertility decline for a large 
proportion of the LDC population. But 
this is not assured. The pace of future 
fertility declines is still unpredictable. 
The birth rate in Mauritius has risen 
since 1973; an upward trend in fertility 



has been observed in Jamaica and 
Trinidad and Tobago. Nevertheless, 
there is basis for cautious optimism 
that fertility will continue to decline in 
a broad range of LDC's. Unfortu- 
nately, this favorable development 
must, as we have seen, be viewed in a 
context of massively increasing world 
population totals. □ 



1 Only migrants whose stay in the host 
country is more than 1 year are included in 
this figure, comprising both permanent immi- 
grants and temporary (labor) migrants. 

2 For material concerning the World Popula- 
tion Conference, see Bulletin of Sept 30, 
1974, p. 429. 

'Based on mortality data for Denmark. En- 
gland and Wales. France, the Netherlands. 
Norway. Sweden, and the State of Mas- 
sachusetts. 

4 In the U.S. and Canada, birth rates in the 
18th and most of the 19th centuries were much 
higher. 



many of you would prefer to see re 
solved on their scientific and techno 
logical merit. 

What I would like to do is explon 
with you how we in the Department o 
State see this linkage of foreign polic; 
and science and technology — what ou 
objectives are and how we view ou 
own responsibilities in meeting them. 



Technology as a Major Concern 

First, we need to be clear that al 
though the words science and technol 
ogy both appear in my title and job de 
scription, the Department's interes 
tends to lie rather more toward tech 
nology than science. 

Obviously, one cannot exist withou 
the other: Each feeds on the successe 
and products of the other — althoug 
not always at predictable times or i 
predictable ways. I think that we coul 
agree that, in general, science is th 
pursuit of knowledge for its own sake 
and technology is the application c 
scientific knowledge and its derivative 
to the practical affairs of mankind. 

Thus, while we speak of science an 
technology in one breath, and while w 
cannot have one without the other, th* 
manner in which they interact wit 
foreign policy is quite different. Th 
Department of State is aware of thi 
difference, and we are aware also tha 
science has its own international 
transnational network in which the Na 
tional Science Foundation plays a criti 
cal role. But, while the Department o 
State performs an important function ii 
supporting and facilitating internationa 
transactions in science, our major con 
cern is with technology and its appli 
cation as an agent and tool in suppor 
of our foreign policy objectives. A; 
such, it is inextricably interwoven wit! 
politics and economics. 



Sis 



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The Role of Science and 
Technology in Security Policy 

Though the Department of State i; 
not directly concerned with the scien 
tific and technological underpinning; 
of a strong defense establishment, wt 
do have a compelling need to under- 
stand the technological dimensions ol 
that establishment as they affect arms 
control. 

The question here is not just under- 
standing the opportunities and prob 



ctober 1978 

ms that the technological characteris- 
es of specific systems may present to 
te arms controller, but also how tech- 
ology can be applied to verify and 
nforce agreements that may be 
ached. This applies not only to such 

t-piece agreements as SALT 
strategic Arms Limitation Talks] but 

agreements in which we are not di- 
i&t participants like Sinai II, where we 
ave provided some very innovative 
mete sensing technology to monitor 
raeli and Egyptian adherence to the 
greement. The role of science and 
chnology in the pursuit of our nuclear 
onproliferation policy is clearly 
nother important part of security 
Dlicy. 



ssisting Developing Countries 

In addition to maintaining the peace, 
curity, and well-being of our nation, 
te of the major objectives of the Car- 
Administration is to help meet, as 
*st we can, the aspirations of less 
rtunate nations in an increasingly 
terdependent world. Science and 
chnology play a critical role in all of 
lese areas. We are, for example, 
ading an interagency study on scien- 
1c and technological relationships with 
:veloping countries. The study in- 
>lves an assessment of resources and 
"< quirements and the political and eco- 
»! >mic implications of various courses 
i) action. Also, the President has given 
i s support to a foundation for interna- 
I onal technical cooperation which 
1 Duld establish a systematic approach 
i using science and technology for de- 
I rlopment. 

I Perhaps the most significant role sci- 
ence and technology can play today, to 
I lfill our objective to expand the 
i obal economy, is in aiding the de- 
I ilopment process in the developing 
puntries of the world. In this respect, 
|e are making a major effort to support 
Je 1979 U.N. Conference on Science 
i|iid Technology for Development. 

I I want to emphasize the essential 
|:rategy which underlies our approach. 

II is that the developing countries must 
) emselves participate in the selection 

id implementation of the technologies 
f ;eful for their purposes. Technology 
Bansfer on a sort of turnkey basis 
lion't work. We will focus our interest 
In developing scientific and techno- 
:|>gical resources in the less developed 

jountries, perhaps through such 
I'lechanisms as the proposed foundation 

j)r international technical cooperation. 

he involvement of U.S. institutions is 

r> be largely in response to that activ- 

Ky. It will be demand-pull, not 

U:chnology-push. 



Increased Responsibility 

We at the Department are no longer 
in a position where we can fulfill our 
responsibilities by simply clearing ca- 
bles produced by the scientific and 
technologically oriented agencies of the 
U.S. Government. We are being in- 
creasingly pressed to take the lead in 
developing initiatives, in coordinating 
programs, and in exercising a deter- 
mined and focused policy oversight of 
a vast range of complicated issues that 
heretofore the Department tended to 
leave to others. Two examples of ac- 
tivities that come to mind are the es- 
tablishment by the Department of two 
interagency working groups — one on 
the 1980-90 U.N. Decade for Drinking 
Water and Sanitation and a second 
on U.S. -Mexico Cooperation and De- 
sertification. 

We start from the premise that the 
Department has been given a mandate 
to take hold of, rather than react to, a 
much larger set of programs and re- 
sponsibilities than has been the case up 



55 



access to weapons-usable plutonium. 
What we need, of course, is reproc- 
essing techniques that do not produce 
weapons-usable plutonium. We also 
need to identify and develop a safer in- 
stitutional framework in which any re- 
processing that occurs may take place. 

In the immediate term, because of 
our view that reprocessing is prema- 
ture, we must take significant steps 
now to develop safe and economically 
attractive means to handle the storage 
of spent fuel. 

Finally, we must devise an interna- 
tional regime for controlling the spread 
of enrichment facilities, initially 
through a stronger fuel assurance sys- 
tem and, perhaps ultimately, through 
development of multinational structures 
to accommodate such facilities that 
eventually are built. 

Oceans. Oceans matters, if not as 
immediately in the forefront of public 
attention as nonproliferation, are still 
an immensely contentious issue both 
here and abroad. Beyond the very im- 



. . . science is the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake, and 
technology is the application of scientific knowledge and its derivatives 
to the practical affairs of mankind. 



to now. And it is particularly our 
charge to try to bring a better sense of 
order and discipline to the international 
activities of the technologically 
oriented agencies here in Washington. 
Let me give you a few specific exam- 
ples. 

Nuclear Nonproliferation. Nuclear 
nonproliferation has been at the top of 
this Administration's foreign policy 
agenda since it took office. Our objec- 
tive is to maintain the barriers, in the 
face of technological change, between 
the civil and military uses of nuclear 
energy. We want to permit — in fact we 
want to encourage — investment in 
safeguardable nuclear power without 
having to assume also the liability for 
having encouraged access to weapons- 
usable material, either at the uranium 
enrichment end of the nuclear fuel 
cycle or at the reprocessing end. 

The problems are indeed formi- 
dable — we must manage the diffusion 
of nuclear technology so that legitimate 
national energy needs are met while at 
the same time an evolving world con- 
sensus on an effective nonproliferation 
regime is strengthened. National pro- 
grams and priorities will not, in this 
environment, always coincide. 

Second, we must find feasible alter- 
natives to conventional reprocessing 
methods in order to avoid widespread 



portant and sticky problem of restric- 
tions on marine research, they involve 
conflicting needs for finite stocks of 
fish; conflicting views on what con- 
stitute national boundaries in the new 
200-mile conservation zone; and con- 
flicting requirements within the United 
States on the part of conservationists, 
the commercial fishing industry, and 
sports fishermen. 

If that weren't enough, the fish 
themselves have their own non- 
negotiable demands to make since 
some are coastal, some pelagic, and 
some anadromous. Each type presents 
its own challenging conservation re- 
quirements. As you can well imagine, 
congressional interest in the solutions 
the international community may de- 
vise to the problems of the world of 
fish is high, and where congressional 
dissatisfaction arises, domestic legis- 
lation is sure to follow. 

Environmental Concerns. On the 

positive side has been the painstaking 
effort to coordinate though various 
international bodies, such as the Or- 
ganization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development and the European 
Economic Community, the registration 
and regulation of handling toxic sub- 
stances. This is not a rapid process, 
but progress is being made. 

On the negative side the National 



56 

Environmental Policy Act is being in- 
terpreted by the Council on Environ- 
mental Quality to require environ- 
mental impact statements from the 
U.S. Government when it is involved 
in programs abroad that have poten- 
tially harmful effects on the environ- 
ment. Two suits have been brought 
against the government under this act. 
One on the paraquat spraying of 
marijuana in Mexico and the other 
against the Export-Import Bank for 
failing to provide in their internal reg- 
ulations for the preparation and filing 
of environmental impact statements on 
projects the Bank was financing 
abroad. 

The implications of this turn of 
events are serious. For starters, we 
could find a good portion of our gov- 
ernment programs tied up for years 
while Federal agencies struggle to de- 
fine and analyze environmental un- 
knowns in distant parts of the world. 
There are also possibilities for severe 
damage to commercial sectors with 
large overseas projects such as the nu- 
clear power, construction, and chemi- 
cal industries. 

Moreover, it is far from clear to 
those of us involved in this problem 
how we can provide impact statements 
required by law without the coopera- 
tion, indeed the full collaboration, of 
the foreign governments concerned. 
The infringement of sovereignty that 
these impact statements imply, and the 
atmosphere of paternalism they gener- 
ate, raise serious questions about the 
measure of collaboration we are likely 
to get, to say nothing of the reaction 
that would develop. 

Problems and Opportunities 

These are but three from a long list 
of interesting, challenging, perhaps 
even unmanageable problems facing 
us. On that list you will find desertifi- 
cation, water, toxic substances, de- 
forestation, air pollution, space, tech- 
nology transfer, health, food, climate, 
and many more. 

Each of these presents its own 
unique opportunities for our foreign 
relations; for enhancing our bilateral 
ties; for moving countries or regions in 
mutually felicitous directions; and for 
demonstrating our capacity for inno- 
vation and leadership in international 
scientific and technological affairs. 
Each also presents difficult prob- 
lems — some of which are quite new 
to the professional managers of for- 
eign policy. The increasing polari- 
zation of the globe in both its eco- 
nomic and political dimensions — the 
developed and underdeveloped, the 
haves and the have nots, the aligned 



Department of State Bulleti 



UNITED NATIONS: The Role 

of ECOSOC in International 

Economic Dialogue 



by Andrew Young 

Statement before the U.N. Economic 
and Social Council (ECOSOC) in gen- 
eral debate on July II. 1978. Ambas- 
sador Young is U.S. Permanent Repre- 
sentative to the United Nations.' 

Last year, I raised the question of the 
role of ECOSOC in the international 
economic dialogue. Clearly, the ques- 
tion remains a timely one. Many of our 
colleagues will be spending much time 
during this session wrestling with the 
question in the context of their effort to 
find a consensus on how to implement 
those aspects of the restructuring rec- 
ommendations that are designed to 
strengthen the role of ECOSOC. 
Meanwhile, I join others in this general 
debate in the Council in taking stock of 
the accomplishments and frustrations 
of the past year and in exchanging 
ideas as to where to proceed in the 
immediate future. 

The background of such a discussion 
must, of course, be the economic 
realities of today and our vision for 
tomorrow. The "World Economic Sur- 
vey," which we have among our 
documents for discussion, notes wide- 
spread uncertainty and unease about the 
global economy. This unease exists in 
all of our countries. We wrestle with 
problems of our balance of payments, 
of the supply and price of energy, of 
hesitant growth and unemployment. 
Calls for protectionism increase in de- 
veloped countries just as developing 
countries need to export more to meet 
current needs and heavy debt burdens. 



Inflation pursues all of us implacably. 

In the face of this situation, th> 
world community has recognized tha 
interdependence is not a phrase or 
matter of political choice but a state 
ment of fact. The world's economic 
problems affect all of us and cannot b< 
solved without the participation of al 
or without regard for the interests of all 

Put more positively, the world' 
economic progress, for the rest of thi 
century, is linked not only to economic 
revival in developed countries but t< 
the realization of the greatest potentia 
for growth that we have in thi 
world — which is the developing coum 
tries. The development of that potentia 
is of the highest priority to all of us. II 
should not be difficult to agree on . 
basic outline of what is needed to ac 
complish it. President Carter, in hi 
address to the Congress of Venezuela 
spoke of five steps we needed to take 
together: 

• Increasing capital flow to de 
veloping countries; 

• Building a more fair and morn 
open trading system; 

• Moderating disruptive pric 
movements in the world economy: 

• Developing and conserving energ; 
sources; and 

• Strengthening the technologica 
capacities of the developing world. 

I stress the words "take together' 
for each of these five elements entail; 
responsibilities for both developed anc 
developing countries. 

We are. after all, working to f ac i 1 i 
tate major structural changes in thi 



and nonaligned — make it impossible to 
impose solutions to international 
problems and difficult to negotiate 
them. Problems of strategy are par- 
ticularly great as, oftentimes, the so- 
lutions tend to be perceived by many 
of the participants as discriminatory, 
intrusive, and patronizing — in short, 
an old form of colonialism disguised 
in scientific dress. 

We also have a problem of 
priorities. We do not have in the De- 
partment, nor are we likely soon to 
acquire, the manpower to give full 
time and attention to all of the science 



ami technology issues that are befon 
us. Thus, where we put the emphasi: 
is a matter of great policy importance. 
We want to be in the position U 
make these decisions based on the bes 
available fact and judgment. That i; 
where we depend heavily on you anc 
on the outside scientific communit) 
for advice and evaluation. The mes- 
sage I want to leave with you is a ver> 
simple one. If you have some advice 
to give, or suggestions to make, don'i 
wait to be asked. We need your help, 
perhaps in ways we haven't ever 
thought of yet. 



October 1978 



57 



world economy. These cannot be ac- 
complished through rhetoric; they can- 
not be forced by diplomats or leaders 
upon people who do not understand 
them. The obligation to participate in 
this process cannot be pressed on some 
in the name of guilt for the past; nor 
can it be denied by others through 
ideological claims of innocence. No 
nations that contribute billions to death 
and destruction in today's world can 
claim innocence before the hungry 
millions who could be fed in the very 
areas where this destruction takes 
place. The sowing of seeds of destruc- 
tion, the dropping of bombs, the 
planting of landmines, and the rain of 
bullets cannot be expected to produce a 
harvest of blessings for anyone. 

Change will require the participation 
and the effective contributions of the 
people of all developed and developing 
countries. These changes must also be 
based on mutual interest; they must 
come from examining what we can do 
together. We all must be flexible about 
old positions and programs and bring a 
maximum of imagination to the search 
of new solutions. 

I would pledge to you, and to all 
here present, my own government's 
firm intention to contribute to this ef- 
fort. President Carter had the opportu- 
nity to discuss these issues during his 
meeting with Latin American and 
Caribbean leaders in Panama last 
month [June 16-17]. As a result. I can 
tell you that my government is com- 
mitted at the highest political level to 
expanding areas of agreement and con- 
vergence on North-South questions. 
The leaders of the industrialized coun- 
tries who are meeting in Bonn this 
month [July 16-17] will devote priority 
attention to this theme. 

The Committee of the Whole 

Here in the U.N. system our respon- 
sibility is to constantly improve the 
mechanism available for the exchange 
of views and the search for solutions to 
development problems. I would like to 
turn now to efforts made to enhance 
these capacities in four different ways; 
in the Committee of the Whole, 
through the international development 
strategy, in preparing for the U.N. 
Conference on Science and Technology 
jfor Development, and by restructuring 
the economic and social sectors of the 
U.N. system. 

When the Council met last year, the 
final ministerial-level meeting of the 
Paris Conference on International Eco- 
nomic Cooperation had just ended. In 
September the resumed 31st session of 
the General Assembly met to assess its 
results and decide on next steps. This 



session produced no agreed text. But it 
was in the course of that session that a 
general awareness arose that there was 
a missing element in the international 
system. A mechanism had to be de- 
vised to bring senior policymaking of- 
ficials together, on a periodic basis, to 
exchange views on the world economy 
and on unresolved problems and issues. 
It was also clear that this had to be 
done within the U.N. system. 

Thereafter at the 32d General As- 
sembly each government, or group of 
states, worked in its own way to find a 
formula to meet this need. After a good 
deal of work — characterized throughout 
by a common desire to succeed — a 
framework for the dialogue was 
reached in Resolution 32/174. We were 
proud of our accomplishment. But I 
suggest that few of the negotiators 
surmised the degree to which this was 
but a first step, and that the new flag- 
ship of international economic dialogue 
would be sailing in uncharted waters 
from its first days. We are fortunate in 
having so skilled a helmsman as Mr. 
Idriss Jazairy of Algeria to steer her. 

How was the new committee to work 
and implement its mandate? The human 
reaction in new situations is to cling to 
what one knows — to use old charts 
even in new seas. If the model of the 
Paris conference was not seen as par- 
ticularly pertinent, other familiar con- 
ceptions soon emerged. The conception 
of the developed countries began with 
the premise that the management of the 
world economy had indeed become a 
concern of developed and developing 
countries alike. From this came the 
view, or at least the hope, that such a 
process of management could imply not 
a North-South dialogue across the table 
but a common approach to common 
problems. The model which suggested 
itself was either the domestic one or, 
on an international level, that of the 
Organization for Economic Coopera- 
tion and Development which had so 
long proved useful as a forum for ex- 
changes of views working among de- 
veloped countries. 

The hope of most developed coun- 
tries was that frank exchanges of views 
among policymaking officials would 
contribute to a greater understanding of 
global economic problems and of posi- 
tions on outstanding issues. This, in 
turn, could lead to a greater con- 
vergence of views, leading to consen- 
sus in the respective specialized 
negotiating forums. Most developing 
countries, on the other hand, saw in the 
committees not only an opportunity to 
exchange views — but also to obtain 
specific commitments from the de- 
veloped countries on outstanding is- 
sues, commitments that would be re- 



corded in a final text to be agreed to by 
the committee itself following tradi- 
tional U.N. patterns. Without such a 
process, the premise of "joint man- 
agement" seemed to ignore a great 
body of proposals for change they had 
made . 

When the committee met at its first 
substantive session in May. both ap- 
proaches were used. There were ex- 
changes of views in the beginning 
which we believed useful. But finally 
the committee had begun an arduous 
effort at drafting a text. Members had 
little occasion for a general exchange 
of views or of new ideas. Failure to 
agree on such a text attested to the 
difficulty of producing common lan- 
guage on issues on which true substan- 
tive agreement was not yet possible. 
Most of us left with the conviction that 
further exploration of the committee's 
means of operation was necessary. We 
must find a way to use it as a unique 
forum that replicates neither the roles 
of existing U.N. policy bodies in 
adopting broad resolutions on out- 
standing questions nor those of existing 
specialized negotiating forums. 

I believe we can succeed if we bear 
four realities in mind. The first is that 
the overriding purpose of the commit- 
tee is to facilitate solutions to prob- 
lems. The second is that such solutions 
should evolve from the discussions at a 
high level. The third, perhaps less ob- 
vious than the first two. is that the 
ideas and possible solutions which are 
suggested in this discussion must have 
time for thorough exploration within 
governments. If we are, indeed, seek- 
ing important decisions on important 
problems, we cannot expect even a 
minister to be able to commit his gov- 
ernment without such exploration. 
Fourth, the end product of this process 
should be concrete new proposals to be 
put forward in the appropriate 
negotiating bodies. 



Proposed Approach to Committee 
Meetings 

We have given much thought in the 
U.S. Government as to how these 
realities could be reflected in a process 
which bridges the different perceptions 
of the committee's role. I can indicate 
the broad outlines of one possible for- 
mula. 

At the next and subsequent meetings 
of the Committee of the Whole, there 
would be, as we have had in May, a 
period of extensive exchanges of views 
among high-level officials. These dis- 
cussions should terminate with agree- 
ment on a list of a few selected topics 
which participating governments — 



58 

developed and developing alike — 
would engage themselves to explore, 
with a view to action or to the formu- 
lation of, new proposals in appropriate 
international fora. In a later session of 
the committee another discussion on 
these topics would be held, to see what 
progress had been made. Although 
there would be clearly no obligation to 
change positions on every issue, there 
would be an obligation for reappraisal. 
Finally, a last review of progress on 
agreed themes could be made at the 
special session at ministerial level in 
1980. 

Clearly, the key to the success of 
such an approach is in making the right 
choices. A delegation's proposals for 
topics for reexamination should be 
based on a realistic assessment of its 
government's capacity for flexibility. 
Where there seems little or no prospect 
for movement on the part of individual 
governments or groups, it would be 
better to admit it from the start and 
move on to more promising areas. 

This last observation also raises the 
question of the choice of priorities 
among subjects of discussion foreseen 
for future meetings of the committee. 
There is clearly a consensus that all of 
the major problem areas relating to a 
new international economic order 
should be discussed during the lifetime 
of the committee. However, of the 
various topics on what I cannot help 
but think is an over-ambitious agenda 
for the September meeting, I believe 
the problem of food and agricultural 
development seems the most pressing, 
the most amenable to new and addi- 
tional efforts, and hence the most 
worthy of our concentration. 

As the report prepared for the next 
meeting of the committee by the Food 
and Agriculture Organization notes, the 
long-term problem in this area remains 
unchanged; growth in agricultural pro- 
duction in the developing countries as a 
whole has fallen short of expectations. 
I have noted with particular dismay the 
fact that in 62 countries, representing 
43% of the population of the develop- 
ing world, growth in agricultural pro- 
duction between 1970 and 1977 has not 
even kept pace with levels of popula- 
tion growth. 

My very first address to this body, in 
the spring of last year, attempted to 
call attention to the problems of hunger 
and famine. 2 I did so because of my 
conviction that my own countrymen, at 
least, would find it difficult to conceive 
of a discussion of development which 
ignores the 400 million people of the 
world who are starving. If we are to 
gain popular support for the adjust- 
ments required in a process of struc- 
tural change in the world economy, we 



cannot put these people in a second 
plane. 

This is a human problem, but it is 
not only a humanitarian concern. A 
country cannot expand employment, 
especially in the industrial sector, 
without the food to feed those par- 
ticipating. Nor, as we learn from the 
experience of the early 1970's, can we 
hope to conquer inflation without 
eliminating the threat of critical food 
shortages and the major price increases 
which accompany them. Food 
security — a steady supply of food for 
all, and at reasonable prices — is in the 
interest of everyone. Unlike others, 
food is a renewable resource. The ex- 
pansion of agricultural production not 
only meets basic human needs but is 
essential to national efforts to combat 
inflation, create jobs, and, indeed to 
develop across the board. It is clear 
that a country can hardly plan de- 
velopment when much of its needed 
foreign exchange must go to pay for 
emergency food imports. This key 
linkage between food security and de- 
velopment is recognized in the foreign 
assistance bill now before the U.S. 
Congress, which calls for a worldwide 
cooperative effort to overcome the 
worst aspects of absolute poverty and 
to assure self-reliant growth in the de- 
veloping countries by the year 2000. 

The greatest potential for expanding 
food production is in the developing 
countries. It is a matter of simple eco- 
nomics that the developing countries 
can provide the greatest marginal re- 
turns on the utilization of scarce 
inputs — from oil products to fertilizers 
to gasoline. The United States wishes 
to make a maximum contribution to 
such development. In the coming 
weeks [on September 5, 1978 J, Presi- 
dent Carter will announce the creation 
of a Special Presidential Commission 
on World Hunger, which will tackle all 
aspects of the problem of food security. 
The appointment of Mr. Sol Linowitz, 
one of the negotiators of the newly 
ratified Panama Canal treaties, to head 
the commission is a clear indication 
that real results are expected of this 
new body. 



International Development Strategy 

One of the questions in which last 
year's General Assembly was unable to 
take action was that of a new interna- 
tional development strategy. Even the 
brief discussion that took place, how- 
ever, revealed the need to take what we 
call a zero-based approach to the sub- 
ject. That is, we should begin by ask- 
ing ourselves the most fundamental 
questions as to the uses and the utility 



Department of State Bulletin 

of a development strategy. One may 
well reexamine the value of the last 
international development strategy and 
the entire review and appraisal process 
which went with it. My government 
does not see this as a model for the 
next strategy. 

Since the adoption of the last 
strategy, the international community 
has set itself upon the task of achieving 
a new and more just international eco- 
nomic order. It is clear that any new 
strategy must reflect this concept. But 
how? Should every element on which 
discussion of a new order must 
focus — from trade to monetary affairs, 
from the conditions of technology 
transfer to shipping — be reflected in a 
new strategy as well? If so, given the 
divergence of views which remain in 
these many areas, we are not likely to 
be able to agree on a strategy in the 
relatively short time remaining. 

This might suggest that a new de- 
velopment strategy should not be 
synonymous with any particular vision 
of the new international economic 
order but complementary and suppor- 
tive of the evolutionary process 
through which a new order will be at- 
tained. In other words, the strategy 
might address itself to some of the 
problems, or linkages, inside the 
broader concepts of a new order. For 
example, national and international 
goals for industrialization presuppose a 
labor force physically and education- 
ally fit for the new tasks required of it; 
they presuppose also adequate food 
supplies for this new working popula- 
tion and adequate means of bringing 
these to industrialized areas. Develop- 
ment goals presuppose solutions to 
problems of housing and urban de- 
velopment; they require that attention 
be given to the problems of transporta- 
tion and communications, particularly 
in Africa. Clearly the link between the 
two "decades" cannot be overlooked. 
These problems should not be allowed 
to fall between the boards while inter- 
national attention is focused elsewhere. 

These questions, it is clear, are 
qualitative as much, if not more, than 
they are quantitative. My delegation 
has substantial doubts as to the advisi- 
bility of applying a set of targets across 
the board and to treating developed and 
developing countries as uniform 
groups. The setting of such targets is 
difficult even when left to national au- 
thorities; to negotiate them on a 
worldwide basis is to enter into an 
exercise which may bear little relation 
to reality. 

Rather, I suggest that a strategy 
might better concentrate on designating 
problems and exploring the means to 
solve them. By the same token, 



October 1978 

periodic views of progress would not 
De acromonious effects at welding re- 
ility with abstraction but exchanges of 
jseful experiences whereby one coun- 
:ry can learn from another. The de- 
velopment strategy too. should be an 
evolving concept. 

These are preliminary reflections, 
and there will be time to consider them 
n the months to come. What we would 
ask is that all concerned with a strategy 
jut away past examples and begin with 
he basic question of what form of 
strategy, if any, can serve as a real 
implement, and support, to the proc- 
:ss of achieving a new international 
:conomic order. 



U.N. Conference on 
Science and Technology 

In about 1 year from now we will be 
participating in the U.N. Conference 
jn Science and Technology for De- 
velopment in Vienna. ECOSOC has 
ecognized the central importance of 
he theme of this conference in desig- 
lating it a priority area for considera- 
ion. This stress parallels our own 
/iew. 

President Carter, in his remarks be- 
ore the Congress of Venezuela on 
viarch 29 notes that the development of 
he technological capacities of 
developing countries was essential to 
promote their self-reliance. He stressed 
)ur intention to make technical and 
cientific cooperation a key element in 
our relations with developing countries 
and pledged to work to this end through 
he United Nations and through private 
and public institutions. He proposed 
:he creation of a U.S. foundation for 
:echnological cooperation to facilitate 
jur efforts. We hope that the process of 
:reating this foundation will be well 
advanced by the time the conference 
:onvenes. 

It is in this spirit that our own prep- 
arations for the conference are pro- 
gressing. We hope, through our 
national paper, to share our own ex- 
periences, both in the development and 
in the application of technology, with 
the international community. We have 
been impressed with serious examina- 
tion of concrete needs and problems 
which the preparatory period has suc- 
ceeded in promoting, through the prep- 
aration of national and regional papers, 
and the consideration and selection of 
illustrative subject areas. It is our hope 
that further work on the conference and 
on the program of action will be 
grounded on the fruits of this valuable 
experience. In this way, we can be 
confident that the theme of science and 
technology for development will not be 
a subject for the attention of techno- 



crats but a source of improvement in 
the lives of men and women and a 
means to greater self-reliance in de- 
veloping countries. 

Restructuring Economic and 
Social Sectors 

Now I would return to where I 
began, in calling the Council's atten- 
tion to the need to act speedily in fol- 
lowing up on the historic step the Gen- 
eral Assembly took last year in passing 
Resolution 32/197 on restructuring the 
economic and social sectors of the 
U.N. system. 

We look forward to participating in 
informal discussions on this subject in 
the course of this session of the Coun- 
cil. These consultations will have many 
tasks. The one on which the most ex- 
changes have already been held is the 
implementation of the chapter con- 
cerning ECOSOC. My delegation con- 
tinues to believe that a significant revi- 
sion of the operating procedures of the 
Council and its various subsidiary or- 
gans is necessary for it to regain and 
fully exercise the role foreseen for it in 
the charter. 

The ECOSOC can and should play a 
vital role in helping the Second 
[Economic and Financial] and Third 
[Social, Humanitarian and Cultural] 
Committees of the General Assembly 
to better relate their work and thereby 
reflect the fundamental fact that eco- 
nomic and social progress are insepara- 
ble. In the 1980's a restructured 
ECOSOC should also be ready to fulfill 
the very first of the responsibilities 
listed, as item 1(A) in the recommen- 
dations, namely to serve as the central 
forum for the discussion of interna- 
tional economic and social issues of a 
global or interdisciplinary nature and 
the formulation of policy recommenda- 
tions thereon addressed to member 
states and to the U.N. system as a 
whole. 

But, if ECOSOC is to perform these 
general policy functions well, it must 
also find a way of streamlining its on- 
going work done by expert bodies, 
committees, and commissions. The 
direct assumption of responsibilities for 
the work of some committees and 
commissions in subject-oriented ses- 
sion provides a means of doing so and 
there is general agreement on that 
principle. 

We are still not sure, however, 
whether this can be converted to 
agreement on specifics. For, when spe- 
cific bodies are discussed, a kind of 
protective instinct emerges. There is a 
fear that if the work done in these is 
assumed directly by the Council, 
something will be "lost," that the 



59 

transfer of functions represents a form 
of demotion. These fears exist within 
all governments, sometimes confined 
to concern for one body, sometimes for 
many. The problem is that if these 
reservations are added together, the re- 
sult can only be the maintenance of the 
status quo. Let us hope, therefore, that 
all can agree to give the new approach 
a chance. Allowing for a review of the 
new system after its first 2 years seems 
a better way of meeting legitimate con- 
cerns than a consensus in the negative. 

Finally, a word about two proposals 
with which my delegation has been 
closely associated in the past. Follow- 
ing on our initiatives at the last two 
summer sessions of the ECOSOC. I 
wish first to turn to the work underway 
on the problem of corrupt practices, 
particularly illicit payments or bribery, 
in international commercial transac- 
tions. My government continues to 
place high priority on the successful 
conclusion of this work, as I think we 
all agree that such practices corrupt 
national institutions, twist the process 
of economic decisionmaking, distort 
the normal flow of goods and services, 
raise their costs to the consumer, and, 
thus, must be seen as a significant 
contribution to worldwide inflation. 

We are pleased with the progress 
made in the intergovernmental working 
group on corrupt practices, especially 
in its last session, and with the active 
and constructive participation of both 
developed and developing countries. 
We are gratified, too, at the endorse- 
ment given to the work of the group by 
the Commission on Transnational Cor- 
porations at its recent session. The 
working group has significantly nar- 
rowed differences on key issues, so we 
are ready to enter a new phase of 
activity. 

Pursuant to the recommendations of 
the working group, my delegation is 
prepared to introduce a resolution for 
adoption by this session of the Council 
that will convoke a diplomatic confer- 
ence to adopt an international conven- 
tion dealing with illicit payments and 
create a preparatory committee to lay 
the groundwork for that conference. 
We look forward to discussing our 
proposal with other delegations. 

One of the concepts which emerged 
from the seventh special session was 
that of a network for the exchange of 
technological information. The net- 
work was foreseen as a means to pro- 
vide users of technology, particularly 
developing countries, with the means 
of finding all possible sources to meet 
their needs, in any area. It could be 
described as an international directory 
of services or a directory to directories. 



60 

The first key steps have been taken 
in the network. The interagency task 
force created in 1975 has attested to the 
feasibility of the basic concept; one of 
its future key components, the United 
Nations Industrial Development Or- 
ganization's industrial technological 
information bank, is on the road to 
becoming operational, through agree- 
ment on first pilot areas. At the 32d 
General Assembly, a consensus resolu- 
tion, 32/178, sponsored by a host of 
countries from all continents, provided 
for the presentation of further concrete 
proposals to the 34th General Assem- 
bly. This resolution did not, however, 
elaborate on specific organizational 
steps to be taken to arrive at this end. 
My delegation hopes that in the course 
of this session we can see more clearly 
how the concrete implementation of 
this resolution will take place. □ 



'Introductory paragraph omitted; text from 
USUN press 71 of July 11, 1978. 

2 For text of address, see Bulletin of May 
16, 1977. p. 494. 



TREATIES: 

Current \vt ions 

MULTILATERAL 

Aviation 

Convention on offenses and certain other acts 
committed on board aircraft. Done at Tokyo 
Sept. 14. 1963. Entered into force Dec. 4. 
1969. TIAS 6768. 

Accession deposited: Sri Lanka, May 30. 
1978. 

Protocol on the authentic quadrilingual text of 
the convention on international civil aviation 
(Chicago. 1944) (TIAS 1591), with annex. 
Done at Montreal Sept. 30. 1977.' 
Acceptance deposited : Niger, Aug. 24. 
1978. 

Coffee 

International coffee agreement 1976. with an 
nexes. Done at London Dec. 3. 1975. En- 
tered into force provisionally. Oct. I. 1976. 
definitively. Aug. I. 1977 TIAS 8683 
Ratification deposited: Liberia, Aug. 28, 
1978. 

Cultural Property 

Convention on the means of prohibiting and 
preventing the illicit import, export, and 
transfer of ownership of cultural property. 
Adopted at Paris Nov. 14, 1970, at the 16th 
session of the UNESCO General Confer- 
ence. Entered into force Apr. 24. 1972. 2 
Acceptance deposited: Oman. June 2. 1978. 

Customs 

Convention concerning the International Union 



for the Publication of Customs Tariffs, reg- 
ulations for the execution of the convention, 
and final declarations Signed at Brussels 
July 5, 1890. Entered into force Apr I. 
1891. 26 Stat. 1518. 
Notification oj denunciation deposited 

Peru. July 26. 1978; effective Apr. I, 1982. 
Protocol modifying the convention signed at 
Brussels July 5. 1890. relating to the crea- 
tion of an International Union for the Publi- 
cation of Customs Tariffs. Done at Brussels 
Dec. 16. 1949. Entered into force May 5. 
1950; for the U.S. Sept. 15, 1957. TIAS 
3922. 
Notification oj denunciation deposited: 

Peru. July 26. 1978; effective Apr. I. 

1982. 
Convention establishing a Customs Coopera- 
tion Council, with annex. Done at Brussels 
Dec. 15. 1950. Entered into force Nov. 4. 
19<2; for the U.S. Nov. 5. 1970. TIAS 
7063. 
Accession deposited: Lesotho. Aug. 2. 

1978. 

Diplomatic Relations 

Vienna convention on diplomatic relations. 
Done at Vienna Apr. 18. 1961. Entered into 
force Apr. 24. 1964; for the U.S. Dec. 13. 
1972. TIAS 7502. 
Accession deposited Syria. Aug. 4. 1978. 

Energy 

Memorandum of understanding concerning co- 
operative information exchange relating to 
the development of solar heating and cool- 
ing systems in buildings. Formulated at 
Odeillo. France. Oct. 1^*, 1974. Entered 
into force July I, 1975. TIAS 8202. 
Signature: Central Organization for Applied 
Scientific Research (TNO). Netherlands. 
Apr. 28. 1978. 

Implementing agreement for a program of re- 
search and development on advanced heat 
pump systems, with annex. Done at Paris 
July 27. 1978. Entered into force July 27. 
1978. 

Implementing agreement for a program of re- 
search and development for energy conser- 
vation in cement manufacture, with annex. 
Done at Paris July 27. 1978. Entered into 
force July 27. 1978. 

Finance 

Articles of agreement of the International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
formulated at the Bretton Woods Conference 
July 1-22. 1944. Opened for signature at 
Washington Dec. 27, 1945. Entered into 
force Dec. 27. 1945. TIAS 1502. 
Signature and acceptance: Surinam. June 
27, 1978. 

Human Rights 

American convention on human rights. ("Pact 

of San Jose. Costa Rica") Done at San 

Jose Nov 22. 1469 Entered into force July 

18. 1978. 2 

Ratifications deposited. Jamaica. Aug. 7. 
I978; 3 Peru. July 28. 1978. 



Department of State Bulletin 

Patents 

Patent cooperation treaty, with regulations. 
Done at Washington June 19. 1970. Entered 
into force Jan. 24. 1978 (except for Chapter 
II). Chapter II entered into force Mar. 29, 
1978.- TIAS 8733. 

Ratification deposited: Denmark. Sept. 1, 
1978. 

Patents, Microorganisms 

Budapest treaty on the international recogni- 
tion of the deposit of microorganisms for the 
purpose of patent procedure, with regula- 
tions. Done at Budapest Apr. 28. 1977. ' 
Ratification deposited: Bulgaria. July 19, 
1978. 

Pollution 

Protocol relating to intervention on the high 
seas in cases of pollution by substances 
other than oil. Done at London Nov. 2, 
1973.' 

Instrument of ratification signed by the 
President: Aug. 3. 1978. 

Postal 

Constitution of the Universal Postal Union 
with final protocol, general regulations with 
final protocol, and convention with final 
protocol and regulations of execution. Done 
at Vienna July 10. 1964. Entered into force 
Jan. 1, 1966. TIAS 5881 
Ratification deposited: EI Salvador. Jan. 9, 

1978. 
Accession deposited: Djibouti. Nov. 18. 

1977. 
Additional protocol to the constitution of the 
Universal Postal Union with final protocol 
signed at Vienna July 10. 1964. general 
regulations with final protocol and annex. 
Signed at Tokyo Nov. 14. 1969. Entered 
into force July I, 1971. except for article V. 
which entered into force Jan. 1. 1971. TIAS 
7150. 
Ratification deposited: El Salvador. Apr. 

19. 1978. 
lecession deposited: Djibouti. Mar. 21, 

1978. 
Second additional protocol to the constitution 
of the Universal Postal Union of July 10, 
1964, general regulations with final protocol 
and annex, and the universal postal conven- 
tion with final protocol and detailed regula- 
tions Done at Lausanne July 5. 1974. En- 
tered into force Jan 1 . 1 976. TIAS 823 1 . 
Ratifications deposited: Chad. Mar. 23, 

1978; Chile. Mar. 20. 1978; El Salvador, 

Apr. 19. 1978; Yemen Arab Republic. 

May 26. 1978. 
Accession deposited: Djibouti. Mar. 21. 

1978. 
Money orders and postal travelers' checks 
agreement, with detailed regulations. Done 
at Lausanne July 5. 1974. Entered into force 
Jan. 1, 1976. TIAS 8232. 
Ratifications deposited: Chad. Mar. 23, 

1978; Chile. Mar 20. 1978; El Salvador. 

Apr 19. 1978; Yemen Arab Republic, 

May 26, 1978. 
Accession deposited: Djibouti. Mar. 21. 

1978. 



: 



ktober 1978 



61 



tional protocol to the constitution of the 
Postal Union of the Americas and Spain, gen- 
eral regulations, regulations governing the 
International Office and the Transfer Office, 
and convention with final protocol and de- 
tailed regulations. Done at Lima Mar. 18, 
1976. Entered into force Oct. 1, 1976, except 
for article 107, paragraph 1 of the general 
regulations which entered into force Mar. 18, 
1976. 4 
Ratification deposited: El Salvador. July 31, 

1978. 

oney order agreement and final protocol of 
the Postal Union of the Americas and Spain 
Done at Lima Mar. 18. 1976. Entered into 
force Oct. I, 1976." 
Ratification deposited: El Salvador, July 31, 

1978. 

reel post agreement, final protocol, and de- 
tailed regulations of the Postal Union of the 
Americas and Spain. Done at Lima Mar. 18. 
1976. Entered into force Oct. 1 . 1976." 
Ratification deposited: El Salvador, July 3 1 , 

1978. 

(blications 

itutes of the International Center for the 
Registration of Serial Publications. Done at 
°aris Nov. 14, 1974, and amended Oct. 11 
ind 12. 1976. Entered into force Jan. 21, 
1976; provisionally for the U.S. Mar. 31. 
1978. 

Accessions deposited: Belgium. Sept. 29. 
1976; Argentina and Federal Republic of 
Germany, Oct. 5, 1976; Libya, Jan. 6. 
1977; Brazil. Oct. 25. 1977; Hungary. 
Dec. 27. 1977; U.K.. Jan. 20. 1978; 
Nigeria, Feb. 1. 1978. Spain. Mar. 9, 
1978; Canada, Mar. 28. 1978; Finland, 
Apr 3. 1978; Poland, Apr. 4. 1978. 

cial Discrimination 

ernational convention on the elimination of 
ill forms of racial discrimination. Done at 
•lew York Dec. 21, 1965. Entered into force 
an. 4, 1969. 2 
Signature: Korea, Aug. 8, 1978. 

ifugees 

otocol relating to the status of refugees. Done 
it New York Jan. 31, 1967. Entered into force 
Dct. 4, 1967; for the U.S. Nov. 1. 1968. 
HAS 6577. 
Accession deposited: Spain. Aug. 14. 1978. 

fety at Sea 

ernational convention for the safety of life 
it sea, 1974, with annex. Done at London 
Vov. 1. 1974. ' 

Instrument of acceptance signed by the 
President: Aug. 15, 1978. 

gar 

ernational sugar agreement, 1977, with an- 
lexes. Done at Geneva Oct. 7, 1977. En- 
ered into force provisionally, Jan. 1, 1978. 
Ratification deposited: Argentina. Aug. 4, 

1978. 
Accession deposited: German Democratic 

Republic, Aug. 4, 1978. 

rrorism 

nvention on the prevention and punishment 



of crimes against internationally protected 
persons, including diplomatic agents. Done 
at New York Dec. 14. 1973. Entered into 
force Feb. 20, 1977. T1AS 8532. 
Ratification deposited: Romania. Aug. 15. 
1978. 

War 

Protocol additional to the Geneva conventions 
of 12 Aug. 1949, and relating to the protec- 
tion of victims of international armed con- 
flicts (protocol I), with annexes. Done at 
Geneva June 8. 1977. Enters into force Dec. 

7. 1978. 

Ratification deposited: Ghana, Feb. 28, 

1978. 
Signature: Yemen (Sana), Feb. 14, 1978. 
Protocol additional to the Geneva conventions 
of 12 Aug. 1949. and relating to the protec- 
tion of victims of noninternational armed 
conflicts (protocol II). Done at Geneva June 

8, 1977. Enters into force Dec. 7, 1978. 
Ratification deposited: Ghana, Feb. 28, 

1978. 
Signature: Yemen (Sana), Feb. 14, 1978. 

Wheat 

Protocol modifying and further extending the 
wheat trade convention (part of the interna- 
tional wheat agreement) 1971 (TIAS 7144). 
Done at Washington Apr. 26, 1978. Entered 
into force June 24. 1978, with respect to 
certain provisions; July 1, 1978, with respect 
to other provisions. 
Ratifications deposited: Iraq. Aug. 25, 

1978; Ireland (with statement). Aug. 18. 

1978; Mauritius. Aug. 30. 1978. 
Declaration of provisional application de- 
posited: Nigeria, Aug. 18. 1978. 
Protocol modifying and further extending the 
food aid convention (part of the interna- 
tional wheat agreement) 1971 (TIAS 7144). 
Done at Washington Apr. 26, 1978. Entered 
into force June 24, 1978, with respect to 
certain provisions; July 1, 1978. with re- 
spect to other provisions. 
Ratification deposited: Ireland, Aug. 18, 

1978. 



BILATERAL 

Australia 

Agreement relating to peaceful nuclear coopera- 
tion. Effected by exchange of notes at Can- 
berra Aug. 4 and 7. 1978. Entered into force 
Aug. 7. 1978. 

Memorandum of agreement relating to the 
provision of parts and services for air navi- 
gation equipment. Signed at Washington 
July 19 and Aug. 11. 1978. Entered into 
force Aug. 11, 1978. 

Bahamas 

Agreement continuing in force between the 
U.S. and the Bahamas the extradition treaty 
of Dec. 22. 1931 (TS 849), between the 
U.S. and the U.K. Effected by exchange of 
notes at Nassau and Washington Mar. 7, 
June 19, and Aug. 17. 1978. Entered into 
force Aug. 17, 1978. 



Bangladesh 

Agreement for a food for development pro- 
gram, relating to the agreement of Oct. 4, 
1974 (TIAS 7949), with annexes and min- 
utes. Signed at Dacca Aug. 2. 1978. En- 
tered into force Aug. 2. 1978. 

Agreement concerning the establishment of a 
Peace Corps program in Bangladesh. Signed 
at Washington July 13. 1978. Entered into 
force July 13, 1978. 

Bolivia 

Treaty on the execution of penal sentences. 
Signed at La Paz Feb. 10, 1978. 
Ratifications exchanged: Aug. 17. 1978. 
Entered into force: Aug. 17. 1978. 
Proclaimed by the President: Aug. 30. 
1978. 

Canada 

Treaty on the execution of penal sentences. 
Signed at Washington Mar. 2. 1977. En- 
tered into force July 19, 1978. 
Proclaimed by the President: Sept. 2, 1978. 

Memorandum of agreement relating to the 
provision of flight inspection services. 
Signed Mar. 10 and Apr. 1, 1978. Entered 
into force Apr. 1. 1978. 

Colombia 

Agreement relating to trade in cotton, wool, 
and manmade fiber textiles and textile prod- 
ucts, with annexes. Effected by exchange of 
notes at Bogota Aug. 3, 1978. Entered into 
force Aug. 3. 1978; effective July 1, 1978. 

Denmark 

Agreement relating to jurisdiction over vessels 
utilizing the Louisiana offshore oil port. 
Effected by exchange of notes at Washing- 
ton Aug. 17 and 22, 1978. Entered into 
force Aug. 22, 1978. 

Egypt 

Agreement amending the agreement for sales 
of agricultural commodities of Dec. 7. 
1977. Effected by exchange of notes at 
Cairo Aug. 3. 1978. Entered into force Aug. 
3, 1978. 

France 

Memorandum of understanding concerning a 
cooperative program in science and technol- 
ogy, with appendices. Signed at Paris May 
30. 1978. Entered into force May 30, 1978. 

Iceland 

Agreement amending the agreement of Jan. 
27. 1945 (59 Stat. 1464), relating to air 
transport services. Effected by exchange of 
notes at Washington Aug. 17, 1978. Entered 
into force Aug. 17. 1978. 

India 

Understanding relating to trade in tropical 
products, with lists. Effected by exchange 
of letters at Geneva July 26. 1978. Entered 
into force July 26. 1978. 

Ireland 

Memorandum of agreement relating to flight 
inspection services. Signed at Washington 
and Dublin March 10 and Aug. 4, 1978. 
Entered into force Aug. 4. 1978. 



62 

Israel 

Protocol relating to the U.S. -Israel air transport 
agreement of June 13, 1950 (TIAS 2610). 
Signed at Washington Aug. 16, 1978. Entered 
into force Aug. 16, 1978. 

Japan 

Agreement modifying and extending the ar- 
rangement of Sept. 27, 1974. as modified 
(TIAS 7934. 8181, 8644) concerning trade 
in cotton, wool, and manmade fiber textiles. 
Effected by exchange of notes at Washing- 
ton Aug. 28, 1978. Entered into force Aug. 
28. 1978. 

Agreement concerning payments from 
Japanese utility companies for uranium en- 
richment services. Effected by exchange of 
notes at Washington Sept. 1, 1978. Entered 
into force Sept. 1 . 1978. 

Korea 

Agreement amending the agreement for sales 
of agricultural commodities of July 21. 1977 
(TIAS 8821). Effected by exchange of notes 
at Seoul July 18. 1978. Entered into force 
July 18, 1978. 

Mexico 

Agreement amending the agreement of May 
23, 1978, relating to additional cooperative 
arrangements to curb the illegal traffic in 
narcotics. Effected by exchange of letters at 
Mexico July 11 and 13, 1978. Entered into 
force July 13, 1978 

Agreement amending the agreement of June 2. 
1977, as amended Sept. 28. 1977 (TIAS 
8952). relating to additional cooperative ar- 
rangements to curb the illegal traffic in nar- 
cotics. Effected by exchange of letters at 
Mexico July 20 and 26, 1978. Entered into 
force July 26, 1978. 

Minute 259 of the International Boundary and 
Water Commission amending and extending 
minute 240, as amended and extended (TIAS 
8712), relating to emergency deliveries of 
Colorado River waters for use in Tijuana. 
Adopted at El Paso July 27. 1978. Entered 
into force Aug. 11, 1978. 

Agreement relating to the provision and utili- 
zation of aircraft to curb the illegal traffic in 
narcotics. Effected by exchange of letters at 
Mexico Aug. 23, 1978. Entered into force 
Aug. 23, 1978. 

Agreement amending the agreement of June 2, 

1977. as amended Sept. 28, 1977 (TIAS 
8952). and July 20 and 26, 1978, relating to 
additional cooperative arrangements to curb 
the illegal traffic in narcotics. Effected by 
exchange of letters at Mexico Aug. 24, 

1978. Entered into force Aug. 24. 1978. 
Agreement relating to computerization of in- 
formation in support of programs against il 
legal narcotics production and traffic Ef- 
fected by exchange of letters at Mexico 
Aug. 25, 1978. Entered into force Aug. 25, 
1978. 

Philippines 

Agreement for sales of agricultural com 
modifies. Signed at Manila Aug. 24, 1978. 
Entered into force Aug 24, 1978. 



Saudi Arabia 

Project agreement for technical cooperation in 
science and technology, with appendices. 
Signed at Riyadh Feb. 29. 1976. 
Entered into force: Aug. 7, 1978. 

Project agreement for technical cooperation in 
customs administration and training. Signed 
at Riyadh and Washington June 1 1 and 22. 
1978. Entered into force Aug. 10. 1978. 

Project agreement for technical cooperation in 
supply management development, with at- 
tachments. Signed at Riyadh July 13. 1978. 
Entered into force Aug. 10. 1978. 

Sierra Leone 

Agreement for sales of agricultural com- 
modities. Signed at Freetown Aug. 31, 
1978. Entered into force Aug. 31, 1978. 

Sweden 

Agreement relating to jurisdiction over vessels 
utilizing the Louisiana offshore oil port. 
Effected by exchange of notes at Washing- 
ton Aug. 17 and 22, 1978. Entered into 
force Aug. 22, 1978. 

U.S.S.R. 

Agreement amending and extending the 
agreement of June 19. 1973 (TIAS 7652). 
on cooperation in the field of transportation. 
Effected by exchange of notes at Washing- 
ton June 19. 1978. Entered into force June 
19. 1978. 

United Arab Emirates 

Agreement amending and extending the 
agreement of July 10, 1976 (TIAS 8408). 
for technical assistance in connection with a 
project for collecting and conserving water 
supplies from surface runoff, with annexes. 
Effected by exchange of letters at Abu 
Dhabi June 24 and July 25, 1978. Entered 
into force July 25, 1978; effective July 1, 
1978. 

United Nations 

Agreement relating to a procedure for U.S. 
income tax reimbursement. Effected by ex- 
change of letters at New York June 30 and 
July 12. 1978. Entered into force July 12. 
1978. 

Zaire 

Agreement regarding the consolidation and re- 
scheduling of payments due under PL 480 
Title I agricultural commodity agreements, 
with annexes. Signed at Washington July 
19. 1978. Entered into force July 19. 1978. 

Zambia 

Agreement for sales of agricultural com- 
modities Signed at Lusaka Aug. 4. 1978. 
Entered into force Aug. 4. 1978. □ 



1 Not in force. 

2 Not in force for the U.S. 

'With declaration. 

4 Provisionally in force for the U.S. 



Department of State Bulleti 

PRESS RELEASES: 

Department of State 



August 1 7 -September 8 

Press releases may be obtained from the Of 
fice of Press Relations. Department of State 
Washington. DC 20520. 



Subject 



*336 



*337 



*338 



*339 



*340 



3/17 



8/23 



8/24 



8/28 



8/29 



•341 



8/30 



*342 



*343 



*344 



*345 



8/30 



9/1 



9/7 



9/8 



*346 



*347 



9/8 



9/8 



i 

! 

« 



State Department opens De 

troit passport agency. 
International Telegraph ani 
Telephone Consultativi 
Committee (CCITT), stud; 
group 1 , Sept .21. 

Nicholas A. Veliotes swon 
in as Ambassador to Jordai 
(biographic data). 

U.S., Iceland amend ai 
transport agreement. Aug 
17. 

Shipping Coordinating Com 
mittee (SCC), Subcom 
mittee on Safety of Life 
Sea (SOLAS), panel o 
bulk cargoes of the work 
ing group on subdivisio 
and stability, Sept. 21 . 

ACDA Director Paul C 
Warnke and Ambassador t 
the U.S.S.R. Malcolr 
Toon to address conferenc 
on U.S. security and th 
Soviet challenge. Philadel 
phia, Sept. 15. 

George M. Lane sworn in a 
Ambassador to the Yeme 
Arab Republic (biographi 
data). 

U.S.. Mexico amend textil 1' 
agreement. Apr. 26 am 
29. 

US nominations to the In 
ternational Court of Jus 
tice. 

ACDA Director Paul C 
Warnke and Leslie H 
Gelb. Director of th. 
Bureau of Politico-Militar; 
Affairs, to address confer 
ence on U.S. security am 
the Soviet challenge 
Tampa, Sept. 26. 

Ambassador Warnke and Mr 
Gelb to address confer 
ence, Miami. Sept. 26. 

International Radio Consul 
tative Committee (CCIR) I 
study group 5, Oct. 6. 



i 



* Not printed in the Bulletin. 



INDEX 



CTOBER 1978 
H)L. 78, NO. 2019 

i-ms Control 

lilancing Nonproliferation and Energy Secu- 
rity (Nye) 38 

Bit il— The Home Stretch (Warnke) 17 

lience and Technology — Their Interaction 

(With Foreign Policy (Benson) 54 

Is. and Soviet Strategic Capability Through 

[the Mid-1980's 24 

iiia. Prospects for International Action on 

Natural Rubber (Katz) 26 

liina. President Carter's News Conference of 

August 17 (excerpts) 12 

(immodities. Prospects for International Ac- 
tion on Natural Rubber (Katz) 26 

(ingress 

. Framework for Middle East Peace (Begin, 

Carter, Mondale, Sadat, joint statement, 

Itexts of documents and accompanying 

(letters) 1 

! ist-Favored-Nation Tariff Status for Hun- 
gary and Romania (Vest) 34 

j:rcotics Control Efforts in Central America 

ind the Caribbean (Linneman) 37 

;sident Carter's News Conference of August 

!l7 (excerpts) 12 

S- Relations With the Pacific Islands 

[Holbrooke) 43 

'veloping Countries 

e Role of ECOSOC in International Eco- 
nomic Dialogue (Young) 56 

; ience and Technology — Their Interaction 

With Foreign Policy (Benson) 54 

orld Population: The Silent Explosion — Part 

1 (Fearey, Giffler. Green) 45 

onomics. The Role of ECOSOC in Interna- 
tional Economic Dialogue (Young) 56 

•ypt. A Framework for Middle East Peace 

(Begin, Carter, Mondale, Sadat, joint state- 

; ment. texts of documents and accompanying 

; letters) 1 

lergy. Balancing Nonproliferation and 
Energy Security (Nye) 38 



Environment. Science and Technology — 
Their Interaction With Foreign Policy 
(Benson) 54 

Europe. The Potential of the Helsinki 
Dialogue (Nimetz) 29 

Human Rights. The Potential of the Helsinki 
Dialogue (Nimetz) 29 

Hungary. Most-Favored-Nation Tariff Status 
for Hungary and Romania ( Vest) 34 

Israel. A Framework for Middle East Peace 
(Begin. Carter, Mondale, Sadat, joint state- 
ment, texts of documents and accompanying 
letters) 1 

Latin America and the Carribbean. Narcot- 
ics Control Efforts in Central America and 
the Caribbean (Linneman) 37 

Middle East. President Carter's News Confer- 
ence of August 17 (excerpts) 12 

Military Affairs. President Carter's News 
Conference of August I 7 (excerpts) 12 

Monetary Affairs. President Carter's News 
Conference of August 17 (excerpts) 12 

Namibia. Peaceful Solutions to Conflicts in 
Namibia and Southern Rhodesia (Chris- 
topher) 15 

Narcotics. Narcotics Control Efforts in Cen- 
tral America and the Caribbean (Linne- 
man) 37 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Presi- 
dent Carter's News Conference of August 17 
(excerpts) 12 

Nuclear Policy 

Balancing Nonproliferation and Energy Secu- 
rity (Nye) 38 

Science and Technology — Their Interaction 
With Foreign Policy (Benson) 54 

Oceans. Science and Technology — Their In- 
teraction With Foreign Policy (Benson) .... 54 

Pacific. US Relations With the Pacific Is- 
lands (Holbrooke) 43 

Petroleum. President Carter's News Confer- 
ence of August 17 (excerpts) 12 

Population. World Population: The Silent 
Explosion — Part I (Fearey. Giffler, 
Green) 45 

Presidential Documents 

A Framework for Middle East Peace (Begin. 
Carter, Mondale. Sadat, joint statement, 
texts of documents and accompanying 
letters) I 

President Carter's News Conference of August 
17 (excerpts) 12 

Publications. GPO Sales 28 



Romania. Most-Favored-Nation Tariff Status 
for Hungary and Romania ( Vest) 34 

Science and Technology. Science and 
Technology — Their Interaction With Foreign 
Policy (Benson) 54 

Southern Rhodesia. Peaceful Solutions to 
Conflicts in Namibia and Southern Rhodesia 
(Christopher) 15 

Trade. Most-Favored-Nation Tariff Status for 
Hungary and Romania ( Vest) 34 

Treaties 

Current Actions 60 

A Framework for Middle East Peace (Begin. 
Carter. Mondale, Sadat, joint statement, 
texts of documents and accompanying 
letters) 1 

U.S.S.R. 

The Potential of the Helsinki Dialogue 
(Nimetz) 29 

President Carter's News Conference of August 
17 (excerpts) 12 

Salt II— The Home Stretch (Warnke) 17 

U.S. and Soviet Strategic Capability Through 
the Mid-1980's - 24 

United Nations. The Role of ECOSOC in In- 
ternational Economic Dialogue (Young) .... 56 



Name Index 

Begin, Menahem 1 

Benson, Lucy Wilson 54 

Carter, President 1,12 

Christopher, Warren 15 

Fearey. Robert A 45 

Giffler, Lydia K 45 

Green . Marshall 45 

Holbrooke. Richard C 43 

Katz. Julius L 26 

Linneman, Joseph 37 

Mondale, Vice President I 

Nimetz, Matthew 29 

Nye, Joseph S. , Jr 38 

Sadat, Anwar al- 1 

Vest. George S 34 

Warnke, Paul C 17 

Young. Andrew 56 



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Department 
of State 



m of State ~IW ~IW j & 

bulletin 



Novem her MO 7H 



\e Official Monthly Record of United States Foreign Policy / Volume 78 / Number 2020 




Department of State 

bulletin 

Volume 78 / Number 2020 / November 1978 



The Department of State Bulletin, 
published by the Office of Public Com- 
munication in the Bureau of Public 
Affairs, is the official record of U.S. 
foreign policy. Its purpose is to provide 
the public, the Congress, and govern- 
ment agencies with information on 
developments in U.S. foreign relations 
and the work of the Department of 
State and the Foreign Service. 

The Bulletin's contents include 
major addresses and news conferences 
of the President and the Secretary of 
State; statements made before congres- 
sional committees by the Secretary 
and other senior State Department of- 
ficials; special features and articles on 
international affairs; selected press re- 
leases issued by the White House, the 
Department, and the U.S. Mission to 
the United Nations; and treaties and 
other agreements to which the United 
States is or may become a party. 

The Secretary of State has deter- 
mined that the publication of this peri- 
odica! is necessary in the transaction of 
the public business required by law of 
this Department. Use of funds for 
printing this periodical has been ap- 
proved by the Director of the Office 
of Management and Budget through 
January 31, 1981. 

NOTE: Contents of this publication 
are not copyrighted and items con- 
tained herein may be reprinted. Cita- 
tion of the Department oe State 
Bulletin as the source will be appre- 
ciated. The Bulletin is indexed in the 
Readers' Guide to Periodical Litera- 
ture. 

For sale by the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Print- 
ing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402 

Price: 

12 issues plus annual index — 

$18.00 (domestic) $22.50 (foreign) 

Single copy— 

$1.40 (domestic) $1.80 (foreign) 



CYRUS R. VANCE 
Secretary of State 

HODDING CARTER III 

Assistant Secretary for Public Affa 

JOHN CLARK KIMBALL 

Consulting Editor 

PHYLLIS A. YOUNG 

Editor 

COLLEEN SUSSMAN 
Assistant Editor 



CONTENTS 



1 WORLD POPULATION: THE SILENT EXPLOSION— PART 2 

(Marshall Green. Robert A. Fearey. Lydia K. Giffler) 



THE PRESIDENT 

9 News Conferences of Sept. 28 and 
Oct. 10 

AFRICA 

13 Southern Rhodesia Executive Council 

Members Visit U.S. (Department 
Announcement. Joint U.S. -U.K. 
Statement) 

ARMS CONTROL 

14 A Balanced and Effective Defense 

(Harold Brown) 

16 Convention on the Hostile Use of En- 

vironmental Modification Tech- 
niques (Message from President 
Carter) 

17 Comprehensive Test Ban (Leslie H. 

Gelb) 

ECONOMICS 

19 Bonn Summit and Investment in De- 
veloping Countries (Richard N. 
Cooper) 

21 Multilateral Trade Negotiations (Mes- 
sage from President Carter) 

23 U.S. Export Policy (President Carter. 
Julius L. Katz) 

27 GPO Sales Publications 

EUROPE 

28 An Overview of U.S. -Soviet Relations 

(Marshall D. Shiilman) 

29 Letters of Credence (Germany. Ire- 

land) 

31 Ninth Report on Cyprus (President 
Center) 

33 An Overview of Eastern Europe f Wil- 
liam H. Liters) 



MIDDLE EAST 

42 Camp David Agreements (Harold H. 

Saunders) 

43 Secretary Vance's Middle East Visit 

UNITED NATIONS 

45 33d U.N. General Assembly Convenes 

(Secretary Vance) 

46 U.S. Delegation to the 33d U.N. Gen- 

eral Assembly 
48 World Conference To Combat Racism 
( White House Statement) 

50 United Nations Day, 1978 (President 

Carter) 

51 United Nations Day, 1978 (Proclama- 

tion) 

WESTERN HEMISPHERE 

51 The Role of Human Rights Policy in 
Arms Transfers for Latin America 
(Patricia M. Derian) 

53 Letter of Credence (Grenada) 

54 Arms Transfer Policy in Latin America 

(Foreign Relations Outline) 

55 U.S. -Mexico Commission on Cultural 

Cooperation 

TREATIES 

56 Current Actions 

58 PRESS RELEASES 



PUBLICATIONS 

58 1950 "Foreign Relations' 



"The Near East, 
Africa" 

INDEX 



Volume V: 
South Asia, and 



Supe 



MOV 2 



'9 



DEPOSITORY 



Chart 12 



Birth Rates in Selected Developing Countries: 
1965 and 1975 



5 



Singapore^ 
Cuba 



%m?%^sm%m%?a 



7///////////////////^^^^ 



China, Rep. of 



5 



(Taiwan) p^^^^^^ 

Chile (^ 
Trin. & Tob. 
Korea, Rep. of 



V///////////////////M^^^^^ 



5 



1975 
1965 



v//////////////////////// '///////A 



Mauri tius ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ ^^^^^%^^%^^^ 
Sri Lanka P 



Costa Rica 



V////////y "g^^%%^%%%^^%^^^^%i 



Jamaica BBBBBBBB^BfciMMi 
Panama ^ W///////////////////////A 

Malaysia ^ 
Colombia 

Tunisia 1%%?%^%^^^ 
Thailand p 

Turkey 

Egypt 

India 

Philippines 

Venezuela 

Dominican Rep.g 

Indonesia 

El Salvador 

U.S.A. 

10 20 30 40 

Live Births per 1 ,000 Population 
Source: Based on estimates by W. Parker Mauldin of The Population Council. New York, 1978. 




WORLD POPULATION: 
THE SILENT EXPLOSION— PART 2 



iNSEQUENCES OF 
CESSIVE GROWTH 

The consequences of excessive 
mlation growth are evident across 
spectrum of human, animal, and 
at life, mainly in developing but 
•> in the developed countries. 

mlation and Food Supply 

Tie 1974 U.N. World Food Confer- 
e resolved that ". . .all govern- 
its should. . . accept the goal that 
nin a decade no child will go to bed 
gry, that no family will fear for its 
t day's bread, and that no human 
ig's future and capacities will be 
ited by malnutrition. " 
here is. unhappily, no possibility 

this goal will be met in a decade or 
)od deal longer. Because of rampant 
ulation growth, and poverty due in 

to that growth, the hungry two- 
is of mankind is no better off today 
1 it was in 1974. 

n the industrialized democracies, 
i production increased an average 
2.1% per year during the decade 
8-77 and population increased 1%, 
a per capita food production gain of 
% a year. But in the developing 
•Id (excluding Communist Asia on 
ch data are lacking), a painfully 
ieved food production increase of 
'5% a year was largely offset by a 
ulation increase of 2.6%. (Recent 
ids in grain production are shown on 
rt 8.) Average per capita food in- 
; in the developing world in the 
'3-77 period (excluding Communist 
a) was about 2,185 calories per day, 
ipared with 3,340 calories in the 
ustrialized democracies. A 1977 
N, Food and Agriculture Organiza- 
l (FAO) survey found that in 23 
eloping countries, per capita daily 
aric supplies, in fact, declined be- 
en 1961-63 and 1972-74. 
,ow as it is, the developing world's 

capita food intake figure fails in 



Part 1 of this series appeared 
n the October Bulletin and set 
orth the facts of the world 
copulation problem. Part 3, to 
>e published next month, will 
ocus on how population control 
fforts may be rendered more 
ffective. 



two respects to reflect the depth of the 
problem. The starchy, predominantly 
grains and tubers diet of the developing 
world is less nutritious than that of the 
developed countries. And being an av- 
erage figure, including better-off 
countries and the better-off people in 
each country, the figure indicates a 
considerably larger per capita intake 
than the impoverished majority actually 
attains. Nearly 2 billion people in the 
developing countries are continually 
undernourished, with resultant low vi- 
tality, vulnerability to disease, and low 
life expectancy. Outright starvation, 
principally of children and the aged, 
occurs when drought, flood, or other 
disaster undercuts even this minimum 
level of subsistence, unless relief 
arrives. 

The technology of food production 
continues to advance, but successful 
applications have been primarily in de- 
veloped countries possessing the neces- 
sary capital. High-yielding green 
revolution seed varieties require com- 
plementary fertilizer; water; and dis- 
ease, insect, and weed control inputs 
for full effect, which often are not 
available to developing country farm- 
ers. Per acre yields in most developing 
countries remain far below those in the 
developed countries. 

Developing country population 
growth trends, on the one hand, and 
realistically anticipated food produc- 
tion increases in those countries, on the 
other, point to a need for mounting 
developing world food imports. The 
prospects are grim, as developing 
countries become increasingly depend- 
ent on such imports, predominantly 
from the single geographic-climatic 
zone of northern America. The FAO esti- 
mates that food deficits for developing 
countries (excluding Communist Asia) 
can be expected to increase fivefold 
between 1970 and 1990. Meeting those 
deficits through imports, sources of 
which cannot be assured, will force 
many of the developing nations deeper 
into debt, thus limiting their ability to 
finance other capital costs of develop- 
ment, including expanding food pro- 
duction. And even if the imported food 
is somehow available and the financial 
problems can somehow be overcome, 
physical movement of the enormous 
grain tonnages involved in feeding 
hundreds of millions of people will 
present tremendous problems. 

Efforts, sometimes desperate, to in- 



crease developing country food pro- 
duction through slash-burn farming and 
overuse of land can have precisely the 
opposite long-term effect on food pro- 
duction. The U.N. Environment Pro- 
grame. in a recent report on the state of 
the world environment, estimates that 
during the last quarter of this century, 
twice as many hectares of land will be 
lost to soil erosion and urban sprawl as 
will be added by bringing new land into 
cultivation. 

The best hope for raising developing 
country food production lies in in- 
creasing productivity of land. But this 
requires improvements in agricultural 
technology and infrastructure calling 
for capital expenditures beyond most 
developing countries' means, in addi- 
tion to policies favoring the small 
farmer, better water management, and 
other measures presenting difficult 
political and administrative problems. 
One must conclude that there is no 
practical solution to long-term food 
production problems that does not 
prominently include accelerated de- 
clines in population growth rates. 

It is sometimes said that there is no 
food problem, only a population prob- 
lem. This is an oversimplification — 
there would be food problems in many 
developing countries even if their 
populations were suddenly much re- 
duced. But, unquestionably, the severe 
undernourishment of two-fifths of 
mankind is attributable, in major part, 
to the handicap of too many mouths to 
feed. And the number grows daily. 

Population and Development 

Excessive population growth ad- 
versely affects economic progress in 
many developing nations. Specifically, 
it: 

• Lowers per capita living standards; 

• Absorbs resources needed for in- 
vestment in development; 

• Contributes to the income disparity 
between rich and poor; 

• Absorbs scarce foreign exchange 
for food imports; and 

• Intensifies unemployment and un- 
deremployment. 

Improving standards of living re- 
quires that economic growth signifi- 
cantly outpace population growth. Yet 
while the per capita income of all de- 
veloping countries increased over the 
past quarter century at an annual aver- 



Department of State Buli 



I"- 
".'■ 
ill 



Char •> 



Grain Production (1960 - 77) 

Total Production of Grain 



Population Growth 



Per Capita Grain Production 



Developing Countries 
• Developed Countries 



Million 
M Tons 
500 



Billions of 
Persons 
2.0r 




Kilograms 
700 r 



\f 



,--, I 



MV 



y 



i i i i 



j i i i i i i_ 



1960 



1965 1970 
Year 



1975 



1960 



1965 1970 
Year 



1975 



1960 



1965 1970 
Year 



1975 



Note: Grain production comprises on the average 35% of total food production in developed countries and 64% in developing countries. 

The greater variations in total and per capita gram production in developed than in developing countries are attributable to greater weather vanations in 
temperate than in tropical farming zones and to more extensive policy interventions by developed than developing country governments in farm 
acreage and production levels. 



Source of data: US Department of Agriculture 



r Excludes centrally-planned economies. 



II 
I 

f 

W 



rba 

Kipa 

K 

iin 

■v 

gii 

, 

Hi 



- 

I Dl 

is 

II! 

lor 
in 
isl 

it 



age rate of over 3%, in low-income 
countries — particularly those of popu- 
lous South Asia — per capita economic- 
growth was less than half the average 
rate. The real per capita income of 
some developing countries actually de- 
clined. Despite impressive achieve- 
ments since the 1950's in building up 
the foundations for economic and so- 
cial development, all too many people 
saw little or no improvements in their 
conditions of life. 

It has been argued that moderniza- 
tion and development produce lower 
fertility rates. But this is not an au- 
tomatic process. And where it docs 
occur, the process is likely to require 
many decades. During that time, rapid 
population growth slows development 
and widens the gap between rich and 
poor nations and between the rich and 
poor people within nations. 

Improvement of the agricultural 
sector is the key to economic develop- 
ment of most developing nations. But it 
is in the agricultural areas of these 
nations that human fertility is usually 
highest. The result is either out- 
migration or more and more people on 



the land (generally a combination of 
the two), further subdivisions of family 
holdings, lower productivity per 
worker, and a perpetuation of poverty. 

The discouraging cycle of develop- 
ment handicapped by excessive popu- 
lation growth, and of such growth con- 
tinuing because of stalled development, 
can be overcome only through a variety 
of carefully formulated, vigorously 
pursued measures adapted to each 
country's needs. But one of the princi- 
pal requirements in most LDC's is all 
too clearly the earliest possible reduc- 
tion of high fertility rates 

Population and Social Factors 

Excessive population growth has 
serious social consequences, especially 
in terms of unemployment, urban 
crowding, and overburdened education, 
health, and other public services. 

Unemployment/Underemployment. 

Unemployment, particularly of young 
people, is a major problem in the de- 
veloped world. But in the developing 
countries, the problem is immense and 



worsening. The number of yoi 
coming into the working-age rangi 
soaring, while job-creating devel 
ment proceeds too slowly. The rcsu 
rising unemployment or undercmpl 
ment. 

Taking the developing regions a< 
whole (excluding China for lack 
adequate data), the population in 
1 5—64 years age range is projected 
the United Nations to grow from 
billion in 1975 to 2.2 billion in 20 
an annual average rate of 2.9% (cl 
9). During this period, the socially I 
politically volatile 15-24 years ; 
group, in which unemployment is p 
ticularly high, is projected to gr 
rapidly, even assuming moderately 
creasing fertility. 

The International Labor Organizat 
(ILO) has projected that the number 
persons in the developing world lai 
force will grow from 1,011 million 
1970 to 1,933 million in 2000. an 
crease of 922 million workers, or 91 
in one generation. The ILO has furt 
estimated that 30% of the labor force 
the developing world will be either l 
employed or underemployed by 198C 



,:. 



mber 1978 



Ihe Government of Egypt recently 
mated that it costs, on the average. 

u t 7,000 Egyptian pounds 
$10,000) to create a new job and 

the work force will be crowing by 
But 350.000-400,000 people every 
r in Egypt. On this basis, as- 
omical expenditures will be re- 
ed to provide jobs for the projected 

million additional workers in the 

loping world as a whole over the 
0-2000 period. 

Irban Crowding. Unemployment/ 
eremployment in rural areas is a 
cipal cause of urban overcrowding. 

re there is not enough work in the 
ntryside for burgeoning population, 
ses of people swarm into already 
vded cities looking for jobs, often 
vain. It has been estimated that 
le developing countries' popula- 
s are doubling about every 25-30 
"s. their large cities are doubling 
y 10-15 years, and their urban 
ns or shantytowns every 5-7 years 
irt 10). 

he flow of migrants from rural 
is into crowded cities is a matter of 
cern for many developing countries. 

U.N. Population Commission re- 

on its 19th session (January 1977) 
its out that the governments of 130 
eloping countries regard this situa- 

as unacceptable. Some cities can 
longer be called cities but rather 
; urban agglomerations with exten- 
: shantytowns in which living con- 
ons are deplorable; agglomerations 
;re people, other than the urban elite 
1 middle classes, are without 
quate water, sanitation, health, 
cation, and other social services; 



SWELLING CITIES 

Estimates and Rough Projections 

of Selected Urban Agglomerations 

in Developing Countries 

(millions of persons) 

1960 1970 1975 2000 



Calcutta 




5.5 


6.9 


8.1 


19.7 


Mexico 


City 


4.9 


8.6 


10.9 


31.6 


Greater 


Bombay 


4 1 


5.8 


7.1 


19.1 


Greater Cairo 


3.7 


5.7 


6.9 


16.4 


Jakarta 




2.7 


4.3 


5.6 


16.9 


Seoul 




2.4 


5.4 


7.3 


18 7 


Delhi 




2.3 


3.5 


4.5 


13.2 


Manila 




2 2 


3.5 


4.4 


12.7 


Tehran 




1.9 


3.4 


4.4 


13.8 


Karachi 




1.8 


3.3 


4.5 


15.9 


Bogota 




1.7 


2.6 


3.4 


9.5 


Lagos 




0.8 


1.4 


2.1 


9.4 


Source: 


Based 


on U.N. estimate 


and 


medium variant 


projections. 







where people are often living five or 
six in a room, acutely aware of the 
great disparity in wealth and poverty 
about them. All this contributes to 
alienation and frustration on a massive 
scale. 

Overburdened Public Services. 

Many LDC populations are growing 
faster than educational, health, sani- 
tation, transport, and other public 
services can be provided. 

In education, for example, the 
pyramidal age structure of population 
growth, and funding shortages, have 
left educational systems increasingly 
incapable of meeting school facility 
and teacher needs (chart II). Many 
governments, once committed to uni- 
versal education, have quietly aban- 
doned that objective. In 1950 about 
44% of the world's adult popula- 
tion — or 700 million people — were 
illiterate. Since that time, the per- 
centage has declined, but the absolute 
number of illiterates has grown to 
about 800 million. Of these, almost 
two-thirds are women. 

Similarly, population growth has 
outstripped the provision of health 
facilities. Disappointing economic 
growth trends in most developing 
countries, and the long lead times in- 
volved in implementing health care 
services, suggest that attempts to 
supply fast-growing populations with 
medical care will fall farther and 
farther behind demand. Expanded use 
of paramedical personnel trained to 
perform routine health services should 
help to meet some of the need in 
countries adopting this technique. But 
unless population growth can be 
slowed, this approach will still leave 
vast unsatisfied health care require- 
ments. 



In sum, the social consequences of 
excessive population growth are 
highly damaging, both for the im- 
mediate well-being of a large propor- 
tion of humanity and for the prospects 
of improvement through development. 
Illiterate, untrained, disease-weak- 
ened people are unlikely to contribute 
effectively to the development proc- 
ess. 

Population and the Environment 

The population-environment re- 
lationship is a crucial one, especially 
for future generations. 

In recent decades, the Earth's veg- 
etation cover (farmlands, forests, and 
grasslands), fisheries, mineral re- 
sources, and atmosphere have suf- 
fered a sharply increased rate of de- 
pletion and pollution. 



In large part this has been the re- 
sult of intensive industrial and ag- 
ricultural development by the ad- 
vanced countries, seeking to improve 
their already high living standards. 
When population growth occurs in 
societies where wealth and technology 
have led to high production and con- 
sumption lifestyles, the added demand 
on energy supplies, fisheries, forest 
products, minerals, natural recreation 
areas, and water is inordinately large, 
as is the resulting pollution. The de- 
veloped nations are attempting to re- 
duce the environmental damage for 
which they are responsible through 
recently initiated, as yet inadequate, 
national and international conserva- 
tion and antipollution controls and 
through falling birth rates. 

Environmental degradation has also 
resulted from the desperate efforts of 
rapidly growing, impoverished popu- 
lations in the developing countries to 
increase food production, collect 
firewood for fuel, and otherwise sur- 
vive. Vast areas of Africa, South and 
Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and 
Latin America have been crippled by 
slash-and-burn agriculture, overcrop- 
ping, overgrazing, and consequent 
wind and water erosion. Millions of 
acres of forest have been sacrificed to 
the ever-growing need for cropland, 
firewood, and timber. Deprived of 
water-holding cover, millions of tons 
of virtually irreplaceable topsoil have 
been washed into the sea. The Sahel, 
Nepal, Haiti, Java, and many other 
regions have been described as 
ecological disaster areas. But the 
population pressures which caused the 
damage remain, with ever-growing 
numbers attempting to subsist from 
ever-depleting natural resources. 

The problem worldwide is evident 
in: 

• Most fundamentally, the destruc- 
tion of vegetation cover, the source of 
man's food and oxygen; 

• The decline, since 1970. in the 
world fishing catch, due largely to 
overfishing and pollution of spawning 
beds; 

• Rapid depletion of oil and gas 
reserves; 

• Similarly rapid depletion of met- 
als resources; 

• Overcrowding and impairment of 
national parks, wildlife preserves, 
city parks, beaches, and other natural 
recreational areas; 

• Destruction of animal and plant 
wildlife by farming, timbering, ur- 
banization, pesticide and fertilizer 
poisoning, and hunting; 

• Environmental illnesses (notably 
emphysema, stroke, parasitic infec- 



tions, heart disease, and cancer) 
caused by the introduction of new 
chemicals into the ecosystem, by air 
and water pollution, and by crowding; 

• Water shortages due to the mas- 
sive water requirements of modern 
agriculture, industry, and consumer 
living; depletion of underground 
water supplies; pollution of lakes and 
rivers; and exhaustion of promising 
water catchment and irrigation sites; 
and 

• Damaging rainfall and temper- 
ature pattern changes brought on by 
carbon dioxide in the atmosphere 
from wood and fossil fuels, dust from 
urban and agricultural activity, and 
the thermal effects of waste heat and 
economic activity. 

This environmental loss and dam- 
age is occurring in a world of 4 bil- 
lion people. In 25 scars the number 
of human consumers and polluters is 
expected to be about 6 billion, grow- 
ing to 8 billion or more. Environ- 
mental conservation and purity arc 
belatedly an accepted world goal. But 
the developed countries are moving 
far less rapidly than they might to 
control their heavy consumption of 
scarce materials and pollution of 
oceans and air. In the developing 
countries, where capital for conserva- 
tion and antipollution measures is 
scarce and requirements on natural re- 
sources for survival are heavy, more 
determined efforts to slow population 
growth would be a key contribution to 
the developing countries' own and the 
world's environmental protection 
efforts. 

There are those who believe that 
the world's biosphere, already heavily 
strained, simply cannot tolerate the 
combined impact of projected popu- 
lation growth, increasing resource 
use. and pollution. There is growing 
concern that mankind's mounting 
numbers, pressing against finite re- 
sources, will overshoot the carrying 
capacity of the Earth. 

Population and Political Factors 

The political implications of high 
population growth are difficult to de- 
fine for they vary from country to 
country, are resistant to isolation and 
analysis, and therefore do not lend 
themselves easily to generalizations. 
However, a few are offered 

High population growth rates, often 
attended by economic stagnation, 
overcrowded cities, social unrest, and 
pressures for foreign migration can 
undermine the internal stability of 
nations as well as complicate rela- 
tions among nations. Such conditions 
also detract from the environment 



needed to attract foreign capital, vital 
to achieving increased levels of eco- 
nomic growth. 

To the extent excessive population 
growth frustrates economic develop- 
ment, it is a fundamental factor in 
perpetuating and even widening the 
gap between the per capita incomes of 
rich and poor nations. The politiciza- 
tion of international economic rela- 
tions and their polarization along 
"North-South" lines are in them- 
selves creating new challenges and 
obstacles for improved cooperation 
between nations. Intensifying popula- 
tion pressures will serve to reinforce 
these trends. 

In centuries past, millions of poor 
have accepted their lot with resigna- 
tion and political apathy. This situa- 
tion is changing, as expanding com- 
munications instill greater awareness 
thai there can be a better life. Some 
can be expected to seek radical pre- 
scriptions in violence, including ter- 
rorism. There is real danger that vio- 
lence will grow and spread unless 
more effective means can be found 
for improving conditions of life for 
the masses. 

Overpopulation has been an under- 
lying factor in certain international 
conflicts and major internal disorders. 
This danger continues and may inten- 
sify as populations burgeon and the 
scramble for scarce raw materials 
intensifies. 

Such pressures seem destined to 
produce an increasingly turbulent and 
dangerous international environment 
for the pursuit of peace, stability, and 
improved conditions of life for all 
people. 



Department of State Bull; 

life support systems, and stationary 
declining living standards over m. 
of the developing world, is clear 



The overpopulation problem is 
most often viewed in broad economic, 
social, and political terms. But it is 
fundamentally a problem of the 
frustrations, deprivation, and suffer- 
ing of millions of individual human 
beings, predominantly in the de- 
veloping countries. Millions of 
women are caught up in a cycle of 
endless childbearing. wasted health, 
drudgery, and limited life expectancy. 
Vast numbers of children are born 
into a future of undernourishment, 
physical and mental impairment, and 
virtually no prospect of advancement 
and a better life. Multitudes of adults 
and youths are without meaningful 
employment. 

Population pressures are by no 
means the only cause of these condi- 
tions Poverty and suffering existed 
long before there were such pres- 
sures. But the central importance of 
overpopulation in the syndrome of 
mounting demands on diminishing 



WHAT IS BEING DONE? 






Growing Awareness of the Problen ii 
and of How It Must Be Met 



ft 

.;, 
id I 
lie 

fill 



Over the past 10-15 years, tht 
has been an encouraging increase 
world awareness of the populati 
problem. Many developing natil 
now appreciate the need for urgei 
far-reaching action to reduce popu 
tion growth if tomorrow's world 
not to be one of potentially disastro 
overcrowding, deprivation, and disc 
der. 

Developing countries have seen t 
situation as a matter of direct natior 
interest if their development effoi 
were not to be greatly impaired 
totally frustrated. At least thre 
fourths of the people in the develo 
ing world live in countries whe 
governments have now adopi 
population programs related to the 
economic development plans. D 
veloped nations also have populatii 
concerns, although they are differs 
from and generally less serious an 
urgent than those of LDC's. 

To a large extent, far-sighte 
public-spirited private individuals aj 
organizations have taken the lead 
sounding the alarm and initiating n 
tional and international populatii 
programs. The United Nations and 
concerned specialized and associai 
agencies, including the World Ban 
have become more and more i 
volved. In mid-1974, a U.N 
sponsored World Population Confe 
ence was held in Bucharest. Tl 
conference adopted a World Popul 
tion Plan of Action (WPPA) whii 
reflected a consensus of 136 pa. 
ticipating governments and whn 
stands today as a charter and beacf 
for effective, morally, and cultural 
acceptable population policies ar 
programs. (The Holy See did not pa 
ticipate in the consensus.) 

The WPPA emphasizes the fund; 
mental interrelationship of develop 
ment and population growth. It note 



1 



Single copies of reprints of this 
three-part series, entitled "World 
Population: The Silent Explosion," are 
available from the Correspondence 
Management Division, Bureau of Public 
Affairs, Department of State, Washing- 
ton, DC. 20520. 



-ember 1^78 



couples whom development has 
bled to attain above-minimum 
ng standards are more likely to de- 

fewer children and to devote the 
essary attention and resources to 
dementing that desire. But de- 
opment can proceed only with 
it difficulty, if at all. in the face 
excessive population growth. Ac- 
dingly the WPPA advocates a 

pronged approach in which de- 
opment is pursued in mutually 
forcing conjunction with popula- 
i programs. 

uch population programs have 
le to center in two broad areas — 
ivation of couples to desire small 
ilies and the provision of modern 
lily planning services. 

Motivation for Small Families. At 

:harest and earlier, it was recog- 
;d that broad economic and social 
elopment, leading to a preference 

small families, could not be an- 
pated in many developing coun- 
s for an indefinite period. On the 

r hand, experience had shown 
particular elements of. or ap- 
aches to, development are espe- 
ly effective in bringing fertility 
lines. Many countries' population 
cies have accordingly sought to 
)hasize those elements. 

Reduction of infant and child 
rtality — When parents expect a 
aer proportion of their children to 
/ive to adulthood, they have fewer 
surance births." In some countries 
Africa, Asia, and Latin America. 
r 50% of all deaths occur before 

age of five. Time and again, as 
lint and child mortality rates have 
n brought down, fertility rates 
e also declined. 

1 Expansion of basic education, 
ecially for girls — Studies in Latin 
ierica reveal that women who have 

pleted primary school average 
>ut two less children than those 
o have not. Schooling tends to 
ay the age of marriage for girls, 
is reducing the number of 
ldbearing years. For both men and 
men in traditional environments, it 
adens the students' view of the 
jortunities and potentialities of 
inclines them to think more for 
mselves, and reduces their suspi- 
n of social change, including fam- 
planning. Schooling also enhances 
girl's prospects of finding employ- 
nt outside the home that may com- 
e with raising a large family. And 
rents see children in school as 
*ang less immediate economic util- 

but greater long-term earning 
)acity; this conduces toward a more 
iipact, well-educated family norm 



with children better able to care for 
parents in their old age. 

• Increasing the productivity and 
income of the rural and urban 
poor — The fertility of subsistence 
landholders and landless farmers is 
characteristically high. Land and ten- 
ancy reform, assured availability of 
water, and effective extension of 
credit and other facilities enable such 
farmers to increase their productivity 
and income and thus to attain im- 
proved health, education, and living 
standards. This normally leads to a 
decline in birth rates. Government 
programs to enable urban poor to in- 
crease their productivity, earnings. 
and access to public services tend to 
be similarly rewarded with reduced 
fertility rates. 

• More equitable distribution of the 
benefits of economic growth — 
Economic growth alleviates poverty, 
thereby contributing to reduced fertil- 
ity, only if the masses of the people 
participate in that growth through in- 
creased employment, incomes, and 
consumption of goods and services. 
But typically in developing countries 
the upper 20% of the population re- 
ceive about 55% of the national in- 
come, and the lowest 20% receive 
about 5%. Some 40% of the popula- 
tion are outside the development 
process. Only when an equitable 
share of the benefits of growth are 
secured by the lower income groups 
does economic growth have substan- 
tial beneficial effect on fertility. 



• Enhancing the status of wom- 
en — Programs to enhance the social, 
economic, and political status of 
women contribute, perhaps more than 
any other measure, to reduced fertil- 
ity. Esteemed — and encouraged to 
esteem themselves — in their role as 
mothers, women are typically denied 
equal access to education, much less 
to salaried employment. Despite the 
burdens they carry of childbearing, 
housework, farming, and marketing, 
they also tend to have last claim on 
available food. The role of govern- 
ment in opening the door of opportu- 
nity to women in traditional, male- 
dominated societies is crucial. This is 
a matter of social justice and human- 
itarian concern. It will also have the 
likely effect of lowering birth rates. 

In the desperately poor circum- 
stances of wide areas of Africa, Asia, 
and Latin America parents may be 
powerfully motivated to have many 
children. From the perspective of 
their own private interests, as op- 
posed to wider community, national, 
and world perspectives of which such 
parents are little if at all aware, sur- 
viving children are highly desirable to 
help with farm and household tasks, 
to provide a measure of old-age se- 
curity, and as a response to ingrained 
religious and social values, including 
male dominance and machismo. A 
U.N. Fund for Population Activities 
(UNFPA) publication. The State of 
World Population 1978, reports a 



Chart 9 



Population of Working Ages in the Developing 
Countries* (1975 — 2000) 



Billions of 
Persons 

2r 1- 



* Excludes China 







] 25-64 Years 
115-24 Years 



IP 



Wfflm 




n 2 



1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 

Year 

Source: Based on U.N projections, medium variant, as assessed in 1973. 



Department of State Bullel 



survey in a section of Java, Indonesia, 
which showed that children can be net 
income earners for their families by 
the age of 9 or 10, performing the 
following functions: average age 
7.9 — caring for chickens and ducks; 
8 — caring for younger children; 
8.8 — fetching water; 9.3 — caring for 
goats and cattle; 9.5 — cutting fodder; 
9.7 — harvesting rice; 9.9 — 
transplanting rice; 12.9 — working for 
wages; and 13 — hoeing. The same 
UNFPA publication noted that: •"Ac- 
cording to some estimates, a poor 
family in rural India has to have six 
or seven children to be 95% certain of 
one surviving son." The population 
growth control-oriented elements of 
development cited above will not be 
easily implemented in the vast regions 
where these conditions and attitudes 
prevail. But experience indicates they 
offer the most promising means of 
enhancing desire for smaller families 
in the face of such conditions and at- 
titudes. 

Family Planning Services. Com- 
plementing their efforts in the area of 
motivation, many governments and 
government-supported private organi- 
zations have undertaken programs to 
provide parents with readily avail- 
able, effective, safe, and convenient 
means of family planning. 

The prime determinant of birth 



rates is the motivational factor — 
parental desire or nondesire for large 
families. But the ready availability of 
modern contraceptive information and 
supplies is also critically important to 
world fertility reduction. A 1976 In- 
ternational Planned Parenthood Fed- 
eration (IPPF) survey indicated that 
of the approximately 400 million 
women around the globe (excluding 
the U.S.S.R. and China) "at risk" of 
an unwanted pregnancy, two-thirds 
were not practicing contraception. In 
the developing countries, nearly 80% 
of couples "at risk" do not now have 
access to, or for other reasons do not 
use, contraceptive methods. At the 
same time, one out of every three or 
four pregnancies ends in abortion. 
Availability of family planning serv- 
ices would prevent many situations 
leading to abortions or unwanted 
births. 

Some couples' desire to restrict 
births is so strong that they will 
achieve their purpose whether modern 
contraceptives are available or not, 
through such traditional methods as 
late marriage, abstinence, withdrawal, 
rhythm, and abortion. Others' desire 
for large families is so strong that the 
availability of contraceptives would 
have little or no effect. But the ex- 
perience of recent years shows that 
couples can be influenced to avoid 
undesired births by knowledge that 
effective, safe, and convenient means 



Chart 10 



Urban Population in Developed and Developing 
Countries (1950, 1975, and 2000) 



Billions of 
Persons 
6.0T 



5.0- 



4.0 



3.0- 



2.0- 



1.0 



About half of world total population 
growth between 1 975 and 2000 is 
likely to take place in LDC towns 
and cities. 



LDCs 



Rural 



Urban 



LDCs 



LDCs 



DCs 



?54%? 



.,-,.-.„.. 



DCs 



■69V 



t27%- 



DCs 



■80 V 



39<? 



1950 1975 

Source: Based on U N estimates and medium variant projections 



2000 



to that end exist and by the real 
availability of such means. 



In sum, the critical importance 
the world population problem, a 
the more promising means of deal 
with it. are much more widely und 
stood than they were 10-15 ye 
ago. The awakening process must 
on, but the emphasis in much of 
world is now on the successful i 
plementation of population progra 
whose need and importance are r 
ognized and accepted. 



: 

lew 

J" ■ 

«ral 

in 

itlai 
icon 

effe 
ttwis 
cs 



Country Programs and 
Achievements 



Lea. 



Nearly 95% of the people of ti 
developing world live in countri 
whose governments have now adopt< 
family planning programs related 
national development plans and/ 
family health and welfare or whoi 
governments permit — and oft< 
support — private activities in th 
field. Only 8 of the 144 developii 
countries surveyed by the United N 
tions restrict in any way access 
modern methods of family regulation ] 

Family planning programs 
LDCs vary widely, however, 
quality and effectiveness. In the via 
of W. Parker Mauldin and Berna< 
Berelson of the Population Counc 
these programs "... range from vij 
orous and continuous efforts und 
skilled management to weak an 
spotty performance under indiffere 
administration, on down to no effci 
at all." 

The sharpest declines in LDC bir 
rates during the 1965-75 period (i.e 



!l 



■ 



reductions of 30% or more) occurn 
in Singapore, Cuba, Hong Kon, 
South Korea, Barbados, and Taiwi 
(chart 12 facing page 1). Reductions 
20-30% are estimated for Chili 
Trinidad and Tobago, Mauritius. Cos 
Rica, Malaysia, Colombia, Tunisi 
Thailand, Panama, Fiji, Jamaica, ai 
the Dominican Republic. Countries wi 
a 10-20% decline included the tw 
largest market economy LDCs — Ind 
and Indonesia — as well as the Phili| l 
pines. China's birth rate is unknowi 
but Chinese media report a steady de 
cline in the country's population growl 
rate in recent years. China's currei 
goal — vigorously pursued, by & 
indications — is to reduce its populatio 
growth rate to less than 1% by the en 
of 1980. 

All the above-cited countries havj 
instituted programs to reduce fertilityi 
and most have also, over the past 21 
years, made measurable, broad-base4 
social and economic progress. Thusj 



st 






:[ 



ember 1978 

only have these countries pro- 
:ed family planning — many of 
n vigorously — but most have acted 
improve health conditions; raise 
level of educational attainment; 
ance economic, political, and 
tural opportunities for women; 
, in some cases, achieve a higher 
relatively widespread distribution 
income. These measures have had 
effect of delaying marriage and 
rwise contributing to fertility de- 
es, 
should be noted that the fertil- 
declines in Singapore, South 
ea. Taiwan, and some other coun- 
s cited above began before 
ernment-sponsored family plan- 
g programs had commenced. It is 
yet clear whether such programs 
initiate a transition from high to 
fertility ahead of substantial eco- 
lic and social progress, as op- 
ed to accelerating a transition to 
er fertility in a context of such 
gress. Among non-Communist 
ntries, Indonesia offers perhaps 
most promising testing ground for 
umber of innovative approaches 
ard lowered fertility in the ab- 
ce of substantial social and eco- 
lic development. An intensive ef- 
is being made to gain the active 
iport of influential village 
ders — and village wives' clubs, 
Iwives, and other local groups — in 
ily planning activities and to inte- 
tte family planning services into 
;r social and economic develop- 
it programs at the village level. 
s program has recorded a remarka- 
growth in family planning accep- 
; notwithstanding the poverty of 
country. This has suggested to 
knowledgeable observer, follow- 
a field trip to Indonesia, that 
. extreme Malthusian pressures 
y provide the needed motivation 
en linked to a strong facilitating 
ily planning distribution] system 
ich reaches people at the local 
el." (Professor Ronald Freedman, 
iversity of Michigan) 



n sum, about 30 LDC's appear to 
'e reduced their birth rates by 
-40% in the 1965-75 period. The 
luctions have derived from a 
nber of causes but primarily from 
mutually reinforcing impact, in 
;lear proportion, of socioeconomic 
/elopment and family planning 
>grams. Though the example of 
se countries' achievement is highly 
portant, the reductions have only 
derately reduced overall LDC 
Dulation growth from 2.6% in the 
ly 1970's to about 2.4% today, 
ving aside China. 



Chart 11 



School Attendance in Developing Countries 



Millions of 
Persons 
900 r ' 



800 
700 
600 
500 
400 
300 

200 

100 




•Estimated 



Projected 



Medium Variant 



Low Variant 





Children not in School 
1960 — 210 million 
1974 — 270 million 



Idren in School 



1960 — 117 million 
1974 — 231 million 
H L 



1960 



1970 



It is impossible to say at what pace the 
proportion of children in school will rise in the 
1 976-2000 period The chart does, however, 
clearly indicate the tremendous growth in the 
number of children 5-14 years of age dunng 
that period and the heavy burden many LDCs 
will face in increasing, or even maintaining, 
the current proportion in school. 

I I I I 

2000 



1990 



1980 
Year 

Note: Excludes China, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, and the Socialist 
Republic of Vietnam. 
Source: Enrollment data from UNESCO, Statistical Yearbook 1976. 1977, Population estimates 
to 1975 from UN; projections from U S Bureau of the Census. 



External Support 

In their efforts to deal with their 
population problems, governments are 
able to turn to a variety of gov- 
ernmental and nongovernmental or- 
ganizations for advisory and funding 
assistance. About two-thirds of the 
funds devoted by the developing 
world (except the Asian Communist 
countries) to population purposes are 
indigenous and about one-third comes 
from external assistance. Such exter- 
nal assistance to population programs 
in 1965-78 totals $2.1 billion (chart 
13). 5 

Multilateral Assistance. The U.N. 
Fund for Population Activities 
(UNFPA) is the largest multilateral 
source of external funding for popu- 
lation action programs in developing 
countries. In its 9 years' existence, 
UNFPA has provided over $250 mil- 
lion in support of more than 1,200 
population projects in more than 100 
countries. In 1977 the Fund's annual 
budget, obtained from voluntary con- 
tributions by some 45 donor coun- 
tries, exceeded $100 million. The 
major donors have included Canada, 
Denmark, the Federal Republic of 
Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, 
Norway, Sweden, the United King- 
dom, and the United States. The 



United States in recent years has pro- 
vided about 30% of total UNFPA 
funding. 

UNFPA assistance is provided only 
upon the request of governments. The 
Fund is neutral as regards national 
population policies so long as the 
programs it supports are voluntary. 
The six areas in which the Fund can 
provide assistance are: basic popula- 
tion data, population dynamics, 
population policy, family planning, 
communication and education, and 
program development. Since the 
World Population Conference in 
1974, requests for UNFPA assistance 
have considerably exceeded its re- 
sources, requiring the Fund to deter- 
mine allocation priorities. 

Most of the projects that UNFPA 
supports are implemented through or- 
ganizations and specialized agencies 
of the U.N. system, acting in their 
respective fields of competence. 
Among these are the U.N. Office of 
Technical Cooperation, the U.N. De- 
velopment Program (UNDP), World 
Health Organization (WHO), U.N. 
Children's Fund (UNICEF), U.N. 
Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization (UNESCO), Food and 
Agriculture Organization (FAO), and 
International Labor Organization 
(ILO). Responding to the desire of 



International Assistance to Population Programs 

Primary Sources of Grant Funds (1965-78) 



Millions of 

U.S. Dollars 

320 r 

300 

280 

260 

240 

220 

200 

180 

160 

140 - 

120 

100 

80 

60 

40 

20 




Est 
310 



| Private Sources 

J Donor Governments other than the U S 

lUS Government (AID) 



368 3,4 R 



1 1 



1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 



Source Otlice or Population. Bureau lor Developmenl Support, US Agency lor International Developmenl Included in !he above figures are 
national conlnbubons to international populabon assistance oigani;ations sucn as UNFPA and IPPF 



developing countries, an increasing 
share of UNFPA support, now about 
27%, has been going directly to de- 
veloping country population agencies. 
The World Bank and its soft-loan 
affiliate, the International Develop- 
ment Association (IDA), entered the 
population assistance field in 1968. 
This reflected the Bank's conviction 
that rapid population growth is a 
major barrier to the economic and so- 
cial progress of many developing 
countries. Supported projects have in- 
cluded a widening range of activities 
relevant to an effective population 
program. Assistance is provided on 
conventional Bank terms or, in the 
case of especially weak economies, 
on highly subsidized soft-loan terms. 

Bilateral Assistance. The major 
national donors of population assist- 
ance are Canada, Denmark, the Fed- 
eral Republic of Germany, Japan, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, the 
United Kingdom, and the United 
States 

The U.S. program, comprising 
about two-thirds of the total over the 
1965-78 period, is administered by 
the Ageruv for International De- 
velopment (AID). It has assisted 
some 30 developing countries on a 
bilateral basis and another 50 coun- 
tries through programs sponsored by 
private organizations and intermediary 
agencies such as the IPPF and 
UNFPA 



The emphasis of the U.S. popula- 
tion assistance program, carried out 
in close conjunction with health as- 
sistance particularly for mothers and 
children, has been on the provision of 
contraceptive information and 
supplies. Recently, while maintaining 
and increasing this program, added 
emphasis has been given to programs 
to enhance motivation for the use of 
family planning services. Experience 
has demonstrated that both programs 
are required for maximum results in a 
mutually supporting relationship. 

Most of the eight non-U. S. donor 
countries' bilateral aid programs 
focus on innovative approaches in a 
limited number of countries of special 
interest. Several are participants in 
World Bank consortium projects in 
Bangladesh and Kenya. The major 
part of their population assistance, 
however, goes to the multilateral pro- 
grams of the United Nations and the 
IPPF. Over 60% of UNFPA 's funding 
and over 40% of the IPPF budget are 
provided by these eight countries. 

Nongovernmental Organizations. 

A large number of private, non- 
governmental organizations (NGO's) 
have become involved in various as- 
pects of the population field, includ- 
ing research, training, and the provi- 
sion of technical, commodity, and fi- 
nancial assistance to developing 
countries. Funding for these organi- 



Department of State Bullei \. 

zations has come from both priva 
and public sources. 

The United States has provide 
substantial financial support, throuj 
AID, to a number of NGO's in recoj 
nition of the need for many-sided e 
forts for effective overall populatic 
assistance to developing countrie 
The Ford and Rockefeller Found; 
tions have been major supporters < 
world population programs sine 
1965. 

NGO's have a unique capacity i 
undertake innovative or pioneerir tr 
activities, especially in the areas i 
contraception service delivery and u 
motivation. They are also an impo 
tant vehicle for population assistanc 
to countries lacking an official popi 
lation policy or program, or whe: 
foreign governmental aid is nn 
wanted. This has given NGO's a sij 
nificant role in many countrie 
working with private as well as go" 
ernment programs. 

The largest international NGO 
the IPPF, which provides assistant 
to some 90 affiliated national fami 
planning associations around tf 
world. In 1977 the IPPF budget w; 
more than $50 million. The majq 
IPPF contributors are Canada, Japai 
Sweden, the United Kingdom, and tr' 
United States (about 30%). 

Contraception service delivery, ii 
eluding the expansion of sterilizatic ■ ■ nclu 
programs and community-based coh iEs 
traceptive distribution projects, is tl 
top priority of IPPF national popul, 
tion policies and programs. Con 
munication and community educatic n 
receive priority where national pr< idi 
grams have taken on broad respons* 
bility for service delivery. Increasin 
emphasis is given to women's a( 
tivities associated with family plan 
ning and to improvement of the stati 
of women. 

Other leading population NGO's as 
the Pathfinder Fund, Family Plannin 
International Assistance, and Associa 
tion for Voluntary Sterilization. A 
provide technical, commodity, and fi 
nancial assistance to population pre 
grams in developing countries. 



Pi 
Id I 



tin 



mi 



K 
VI 

ipei 
loss 
Sit 
ted 

m 



pot 



s The figures in chart 13 are in year-by-ye 
current dollars. In real terms, taking accoun 
of inflation, international assistance to popi 
lation programs declined between 1972 an 
1977. 



II 

mil 
nli 

hi 



'J; i 

ii 



urn 
ii 



vcmber 1978 



THE PRESIDENT: 

News Conferences, 
Sept. 28 and Oct. I© (Excerpts) 



PT. 28 ' 






'd like to comment first on two 
y courageous actions that have been 
en recently. The first is by the Is- 
li Knesset — their parliament — latt 
t night, when they voted over- 
elmingly by more than a 4 to 1 
rgin for peace in the Middle East, 
luding the removal of the Israeli 
tiers from the Sinai, which is 
yptian territory. 

This is a continuation of the 
-irageous action that has already 
:n demonstrated by Prime Minister 
gin. who led the parliament debate, 
/e his full weight to this peace 
ve, and by President Sadat who 
>perated at Camp David in making 
»ossible. : 

Since the Knesset vote. I have 
iced to Prime Minister Begin; also, 
it a few minutes ago, since lunch, to 
sident Sadat. Both of them agree 
't there are no remaining obstacles 
proceeding as rapidly as possible to 
lclude a peace treaty between Israel 
i Egypt. 

['m very proud of this action on 
ir part. We will cooperate again as 
1 partners in the negotiations to 
nclude the final terms of the 
aeli-Egyptian peace treaty. 



Q. What will you do to make 
ime Minister Begin comply with 
ur understanding that Israel must 
entually withdraw from the West 
nk and, further, to build no set- 
ments there during the 5 years of 
gotiation? And will you consider a 
ristmas trip to the Middle East 
r the signing of the peace treaty? 

A. There *s nothing that I can make 
ime Minister Begin do. He's an in- 
pendent leader of an autonomous 
d independent nation, and I can only 
e persuasion and depend upon the 
atual trust that exists between me 
d him. 

There were 20 or 30 very crucial is- 
es that were obstacles at the begin- 
ng of the Camp David negotiations, 
lis was one of them. And I would 
less that it was after midnight 
iturday — less than 24 hours after the 
nal agreement was signed — that we 
ached these agreements. 



There are two elements of the dis- 
pute. One is at what time will the 
agreement not to build any more set- 
tlements be concluded. Prime Minister 
Begin 's interpretation is that this is to 
be maintained, the prohibition against 
new settlements, during the negotia- 
tions concerning the Sinai with Egypt. 
My very clear understanding is that 
it related to the negotiation for con- 
clusion in the West Bank-Gaza Strip 
of the establishment of a self- 
government. 

The other question concerns whether 
or not Israel would initiate new set- 
tlements after this negotiating period 
was concluded and the self-gov- 
ernment was established. 

I think the best answer to that is that 
this is an honest difference of opinion. 
The best answer I can give is to quote 
from a statement by Foreign Minister 
Dayan, who was with us at that mid- 
night meeting, and this is a statement 
he made at the Ben Gurion Airport on 
the 19th of September, when he ar- 
rived in Israel. ""Let us not delude 
ourselves" — I'm quoting him — "I 
have no doubt that when we enter into 
deliberations with the other three par- 
ties concerning what is to happen in 
the area in the 5 years of transi- 
tion" — that's the West Bank-Gaza 
Strip — "this question will come up 
and will be discussed and agreement 
will have to be reached on this sub- 
ject." 

So the degree of participation of the 
residents of the West Bank has still 
got to be determined. But it's an hon- 
est difference of opinion. It would 
certainly be no obstacle to the progress 
toward peace. 

But I can't say that we've resolved 
it yet. There's no personal animosity 
between myself and Prime Minister 
Begin. I certainly do not allege any 
improper action on his part. It's just 
an honest difference of opinion, which 
I think will be resolved. 

As far as my going to the Middle 
East is concerned, nothing would 
please me more than to participate in 
the signing of a peace treaty at an 
early date. But that's still to be 
negotiated. The only request that 
President Sadat made of me in the en- 
tire Camp David proceedings was that 
I come to Egypt. I promised him that I 
would sometime in the future. 



Q. If Prime Minister Begin per- 
sists, would you consider canceling 
the U.S. agreement to build airbases 
in the Negev for Israel? 

A. No. The letter to Israel concern- 
ing the two airports to be put in the 
Negev — I have already directed that 
that letter be sent to Israel. It's not 
being sent from me to Prime Minister 
Begin; it's being sent from Defense 
Secretary Harold Brown to Defense 
Minister Weizman. 

We have not agreed to build the air- 
bases. We've agreed to consult with 
the Israelis and participate in the cost 
of those rebuilt airbases, to the degree 
that we negotiate in the future. We 
will certainly participate in the cost, 
the degree to be determined in the 
future. 



Q. We hear reports that you feel 
pretty good about how the SALT 
negotiations are coming along these 
days. How close are we to a SALT 
agreement now? 

A. The issues that divide us and the 
Soviet Union on SALT have been con- 
stantly narrowed over the last 18 
months of negotiation. Now the issues 
are quite few. 

I also talked to Secretary Vance 
since lunch. He's been meeting today 
and yesterday with Foreign Minister 
Gromyko of the Soviet Union. I think 
that both men are negotiating aggres- 
sively and in good faith to reach a 
conclusion of the differences. 

I don't know what the outcome will 
be. It takes two to reach agreement. 
We hope to conclude a SALT agree- 
ment this year, and I will be meeting 
with Foreign Minister Gromyko Satur- 
day to capitalize upon the progress 
that I hope that Vance and Gromyko 
are making now. I don't see any in- 
surmountable obstacles. But if the 
Soviets are forthcoming and coopera- 
tive and are willing to compromise 
some of their positions, we will have 
an agreement. 



Q. The military is pushing an idea 
of digging a lot of holes in the 
ground for our land-based intercon- 
tinental ballistic missiles. So you 
truck them around; the Russians 
never know which hole the missile is 
in. The theory is the Russians have 
to hit all the holes in order to get all 
the missiles. Do you think that's a 
good idea, and how does that affect 
the SALT negotiations? 

A. That is one among many ideas. I 
think over a period of time, it has be- 



10 

come obvious that our fixed silo-type 
intercontinental ballistic missiles are 
becoming more and more vulnerable 
because of the accuracy of the Soviet 
missiles — ours are even more 
accurate — and the MIRV'ing of the 
Soviet missiles where they have many 
warheads on each missile, which 
we've had for a long time. 

The so-called multiple aim points or 
many silos for each missile is one idea 
that has been put forward. It has some 
very serious defects. I can only men- 
tion two at this time. One is, how do 
you verify that all the holes don't 
have missiles in them? It's obvious 
that we would be keeping the agree- 
ment, and we would not violate it. We 
don't know that that would be the case 
on the other side. And I believe that 
we would find, as we proceed further 
with it, that it would not only be very 
difficult if the Soviets adopted this 
same policy but very expensive as 
well. 

But that is one option that we are 
considering. And I would guess that 
by the end of this year, we would 
have gone through all the options in- 
cluding that one. And at that time, 
certainly at the time that SALT II 
agreement is reached, I will explain to 
the American people in the most 
careful and complete terms what our 
future plans for adequate strategic 
strength will be, probably going for 
the next 5 years. 

That's just one of the options now. 
It has some very serious defects. It's 
being considered. 

Q. There's a report that you are 
working for a settlement in Lebanon 
and that Syria and Israel would be 
involved. Could you verify this? 

A. This is a subject that President 
Sadat raised with me several times at 
Camp David. It's one in which we've 
been involved, as you know, for many 
months. 

There's a tragedy in Lebanon that 
the rest of the world has not 
adequately addressed, including our- 
selves The suffering of the people of 
Lebanon, through no fault of their own 
in almost ever) case, has been 
extraordinary. 

Obviously, the responsibility for re- 
solving the Lebanon question rests 
primarily on the shoulders of those 
who live there. My commitment has 
been to strengthen the Sarkis 
government — politically, econom- 
ically, and militarily. We gave them 
some aid so that the President of that 
country can control the affairs of the 
country itself. When we were flying 
back from Camp David on the heli- 
copter. President Sadat and I were 



talking about this; Prime Minister 
Begin joined in the conversation. All 
three of us committed ourselves to 
renew our support for the Sarkis gov- 
ernment, the Lebanese Government. 
So, they have the prime responsibility. 

The next two nations, I would say, 
that are the most intimately involved 
are Syria, which has large forces in 
Lebanon — invited in by the Lebanese 
Government because they cannot 
maintain order by themselves under 
existing circumstances — and Israel, 
which obviously wants a stable gov- 
ernment, stable people on their north- 
ern border. 

Other countries more removed geo- 
graphically also have an intense inter- 
est and influence in Lebanon. I would 
say two of them would be Saudi 
Arabia and Egypt. 

More distantly, other countries that 
have a direct historical interest, like 
the United States and France, would 
be involved. All this could be done 
under the aegis of the United Nations. 

But I think it's time for us to take 
joint action to call a conference of 
those who are involved, primarily the 
people who live in Lebanon — the dif- 
ferent factions there — and try to reach 
some solution that may involve a new 
charter for Lebanon. I'm not in favor 
of a partitioned Lebanon. I'd like to see 
a unified Lebanon, at peace, with a 
strong enough central government to 
control the situation there and protect 
its own people. 



Q. You said in your opening 
statement that both President Sadat 
and Prime Minister Begin said there 
are no remaining obstacles to con- 
cluding the Sinai treaty. Have they 
set a date yet for starting these 
talks? And how long would you es- 
timate that it would take to go 
through the formalities that still 
remain? 

A. I would hope that we could 
commence the talks within 2 weeks, 
but no specific date has been set. Both 
Prime Minister Begin and President 
Sadat today, when I talked to them on 
the phone, on their own initiative, said 
that they were expecting us to be full 
partners, as I was at Camp David, and 
they could see no obstacle to the peace 
talks beginning without delay. 

I think it will take 2 weeks to pre- 
pare for the talks. There are some of- 
ficial responsibilities that President 
Sadat has in his own country that will 
take place and be concluded within 2 
weeks. But that would be the ap- 
proximate timeframe. I'm not trying to 



Department of State Bulle 

be presumptuous, because no date h 
been set. 

Q. Prime Minister Begin is su 
posed to be sending a letter dealii 
with the Israeli position on the Wt 
Bank. Has that letter been receive 
yet? And would any delay on th 
letter perhaps hold up these talks < 
the Sinai? 



I 



A. Prime Minister Begin has se 
me a letter expressing his positio 
and I've also sent him a lett 
expressing my position. Now, I thii 
the next step would be for me at 
him, in good faith and in a friend! 
cooperative attitude, to try to work o 
the differences between us. 

Q. Will you make those lette 
available? 

A. I'll think it over. I can't answ 
because I would really — it suits r 
okay for the letters to be made avai 
able, but I can't unilaterally releai 
the letter that I sent to him or receiv> 
from him without his approval. 

My own inclination is to let all t 
correspondence be made public th 
relates to the Mideast settlement 
We've done that so far, even when \ 
had differences of opinion. But 
would have to get his permission h 
fore we could release the letters. 



il 



f< 



Q. Can you tell us a little mo 
about the nature of your partici] 
tion in this next round of talks? V 
mentioned full partnership. Will \< 
be personally involved with that, i 
will Secretary Vance be? 

A. I would guess that I would n 
be personally involved, except in 
case where the leaders of the other tv 
nations were involved. If there was 
dispute about a particular drawing of 
line or a phased withdrawal or som I 
thing of that kind that could not be r |> 



■ 



solved at the Foreign Minister or del 
gate level, then I would get involve 
it necessary. 

I wouldn't want to see the tall 
break down because of any timidity c 
my part. I consider it to be one of tf 
most important responsibilities that 
have. I would guess, though, that tr 
negotiations will be carried on at 
fairly high level, below the Presidei 
and Prime Minister level 

I understand from Prime Minist 
Begin that the leader of his delegatii 
will be Foreign Minister Dayan. 
don't know yet who will head th 
Egyptian delegation, and I've not yt 
decided on the American delegatio 
leader. But it'll be at a fairly hig 
level. 



"II vember 1978 

\nd the principles for settling the 
ai disagreements have all been re- 
ved. Now the details, which I don't 
nk are going to be highly controver- 
1, are the only things remaining to 
resolved. The exact decision of 
ether a particular road intersection 
a hilltop would be at the first with- 
iwal line, those are the kind of 
ngs that would be settled. And I 
ieve we have a good relationship 
ween the two leaders that wouldn't 
se a deterioration in the negotia- 
ns. 



:t. io- 1 



3. Are the separate peace talks 
it open on Thursday [October 12] 
tween Israel and Egypt linked in 
y way to negotiations on other 
ab lands under Israeli occupa- 
n? And have you ever answered 
tig Hussein's questions concerning 
■ clarification on the sovereignty 
ues? 

4. The two discussions on the 
lai, which relate to Egypt and Is- 
1 only on the one hand, and the 
■st Bank-Gaza Strip discussions on 

other, are not legally intercon- 
:ted. But I think throughout the 
Cmp David talks and in the minds of 
D self. Prime Minister Begin, and 
I-sident Sadat, they are interrelated. 
1? have been trying to induce the 
J danians. and to some lesser degree 
I far the Palestinians who live on the 
V'st Bank-Gaza Strip area, to partici- 
■<:e in the talks. 

We hope that they will both partici- 
l.e along with the Egyptians and the 
laelis. There's no doubt in my mind 
lit while the negotiating teams are in 
lishington. we will discuss both the 
Imai questions leading to an 
t yptian-Israeli peace treaty and also 
I: questions concerning the West 

I nk and Gaza Strip. 

II have not yet responded to the 
lestions that King Hussein sent to 
I;. I saw him on one of the television 
lograms reading the questions. 
Iiey're in the process of being as- 
Issed by the State Department and I 
fcsume when they get to me — 

Q. They were given to you pri- 
Itely, were they not? 

A. No, they were not. I've not yet 
liceived them personally. But I do 
liow basically what's in them. It's 

lportant that this be done expedi- 
nusly, and I will not delay it. but 

11 be several days. 



Q. Does Mr. Warnke's resignation 
have anything to do with the idea 
that perhaps he's not the right man 
to try to sell this treaty to the Sen- 
ate; and, second, to the SALT 
treaty, can you say today that you 
will submit a SALT agreement to 
the Senate for ratification or are you 
still holding out the possibility that 
you might just do it in an executive 
capacity? 

A. Mr. Warnke came to help us 
with the SALT negotiations as Direc- 
tor of the ACDA [Arms Control and 
Disarmament Agency] organization 
with the understanding that he would 
only stay for a limited period of time. 

At that time, last year, we thought 
that we would have a SALT agreement 
in 1977. Several months ago he told 
me that for personal reasons he would 
still like to step down. Quite early this 
past summer, I induced him to stay 
on. He will be the head of the Arms 
Control and Disarmament Agency until 
after Secretary Vance's upcoming trip 
to Moscow, after which he will step 
down. I wish he would stay on. He's a 
very good man, and he will be avail- 
able to testify to the Congress even 
after he returns to private life. 

I have not yet decided how to sub- 
mit the agreement or the treaty to the 
Congress. I think it would depend 
upon when it was concluded, but my 
preference would be to submit it as a 
treaty. 

Q. But you don't rule out the 
other? 

A. My preference is to submit it as 
a treaty. 

Q. Will you see Ian Smith [Prime 
Minister of the white regime in 
Southern Rhodesia] now that he's in 
the United States? And there's a 
second part to that question. Are 
you aware of any agreement Henry 
Kissinger made with Smith such that 
the United States would give 
Rhodesia full diplomatic recognition 
and an end to sanctions in return 
for a trend toward majority rule? 

A. I'm not familiar with that execu- 
tive agreemeent. I do not intend to see 
Mr. Smith. He's had a meeting with 
the Members of the Congress who in- 
vited him over and also had, I think, a 
2-hour meeting with Secretary Vance. 
There's no reason for me to meet with 
him. 

I think that the essence of it is what 
we're trying to do is to end the 
bloodshed in Rhodesia. We've not 
caused the bloodshed. We've not 
caused the war. But we have put for- 
ward publicly, without any secrecy 



11 

about it, along with the British, to the 
front-line Presidents, to the patriotic 
front, to the Smith regime, our pro- 
posals, that there be all-parties confer- 
ences where people who are in dispute 
can get together and talk and try to 
work out a means by which free and 
democratic elections can be held in 
Rhodesia — so that anyone who is 
qualified can run for office — and let 
the people of Rhodesia decide what 
kind of government they want. 

This is a proposal that Mr. Smith 
and his regime have not been willing 
to accept. But this is what we propose. 

If the parties in dispute prefer a 
different proposal and agree upon it, 
we would have no objection to that. 

Q. We are currently prosecuting a 
former CIA warrant officer for al- 
legedly selling a manual on one of 
our spy satellites to the Soviets. Can 
you tell us whether or not the 
Soviets having that manual has in 
any way compromised U.S. security 
and whether or not it has affected 
our SALT negotiations because it 
might make it more difficult for us 
to verify their strategic weapons 
systems? 

A. I would not want to comment on 
that particular case. Whenever the 
Soviets discover any information about 
our classified material, it's obviously 
potentially damaging to our country. It 
has not affected our SALT negotia- 
tions. 

I stated publicly, I think for the first 
time a President has done so, down at 
Cape Kennedy, Cape Canaveral, two 
or three Sundays ago, that we did have 
aerial surveillance. And I think that 
it's important for the American people 
to know that in the past and present 
and in the future, that our aerial sur- 
veillance capability would be adequate 
to affirm that the agreement on 
SALT — those in existence and those in 
the future — would be adequate. 

So the revelation of any secret in- 
formation or classified information is 
something to be avoided. It has not 
affected the SALT talks. Our ability to 
verify compliance will be adequate in 
the future. 



Q. You said there was no doubt 
that the subject of the West Bank 
would come up in the talks as well 
as that of Sinai. One of the Egyptian 
delegates has indicated that the 
Egyptians might be unwilling to sign 
a peace treaty without evidence of 
Israeli flexibility on the future ques- 
tion of settlements on the West 
Bank. 

Have the Israelis given any indi- 



12 

cation yet — for example, have they 
yet responded in this question of the 
exchange of letters and come around 
to the U.S. position on the future 
settlements in the West Bank? 

A. I don't believe that your opinion 
accurately expresses what President 
Sadat has told me. 1 don't think he 
would let any single element of the 
West Bank-Gaza Strip settlement pre- 
vent a conclusion of a treaty between 
Egypt and Israel. 

And I think the Israelis have been 
very forthcoming, in my experience 
with them at Camp David over long 
days of negotiation, concerning the 
West Bank and Gaza Strip. I think 
they're acting in good faith to set up 
an autonomous governing entity in the 
West Bank-Gaza Strip to withdraw 
their military government very ex- 
peditiously, and I think the settlements 
issue still remains open. But it's sub- 
ject to a negotiation. 

And last time I had a press confer- 
ence, I read the statement that 
Foreign Minister Dayan made in Is- 
rael, which I think is adequate, com- 
bined with a cessation of settlement 
activity altogether between now and 
the time the self-government is set 
up. 

The role of our government, our 
position has always been that the set- 
tlements in occupied territory are il- 
legal and are an obstacle to peace. 
I've not changed my opinion, but to 
summarize, I don't believe that this 
one issue, if unresolved expedi- 
tiously, would prevent the peace 
treaty between Israel and Egypt. 

Q. I'd like to ask you about Iran. 
How do we view the situation in- 
volving the Shah there now? Is he 
secure? How important is it to U.S. 
interests that the Shah remain in 
power? And what, if anything, can 
the U.S. Government do to keep 
him in power? 

A. The strategic importance to our 
country — I think to the entire Western 
world — of a good relationship with a 
strong and independent Iran is cru- 
cial. We have historic friendships 
with Iran. I think they are a great 
stabilizing force in their part of the 
world. They are a very important 
trade partner. They've acted very 
responsibly. 

My own belief is that the Shah has 
moved aggressively to establish 
democratic principles in Iran and to 
have a progressive attitude toward so- 
cial questions, social problems. This 
has been the source of much of the 
opposition to him in Iran. 

We have no inclination to try to 



decide the internal affairs of Iran. My 
own hopes have been that there could 
be peace there, an end to bloodshed, 
and an orderly transformation into 
more progressive social arrangements 
and also increased democratization of 
the government itself which I believe 
the Shah also espouses. He may not 
be moving fast enough for some; he 
may be moving too fast for others. I 
don't want to get involved in the 
specifics. 



Q. You indicated that if an all- 
parties conference would take place 
this would be an advantage to pos- 
sibly settling the problems in 
Rhodesia. Would you host such a 
conference in the United States? 

A. I have no preference about 
where it should be held. I think it 
would be better, perhaps, to hold it 
where the parties to the conference 
prefer. 

Two or three weeks ago I instructed 
Secretary Vance to propose to the 
front-line presidents and others that 
an all-parties conference be held in 
New York. This was not acceptable to 
some of them, and the idea was not 
carried to completion. 

But the important thing is to get the 
members who are in dispute who head 
armed forces that are killing each 
other in Rhodesia, Zimbabwe, and the 
surrounding areas and bring them to a 
table to talk about the differences and 
try to resolve them. 

I believe that this is the best ap- 
proach and. as I say, we are not wed- 
ded to a particular plan, although I 
think that the Anglo-American plan, 
so-called, has been accepted in its 
basic elements by all the front-line 
presidents and on occasion major 
parts of it by the Smith internal group 
and also the patriotic front. It's a 
good basis for negotiation. 

So we're doing the best we can to 
end the bloodshed and to bring peace 
without any tendency to force people 
to come to a certain place or to force 
people even to accept the elements of 
the settlement that we think are best. 



Q. I'd like to ask you about the 
future of the dollar. Do you feel 
that the inflationary — anti-infla- 
tionary steps that you plan to take 
after Congress leaves, combined 
with making good on the pledges of 
bond which would occur if Con- 
gress acts on your energy plan, 
would that in sum be sufficient to 
turn the dollar around or do you 
feel you have to do more than that 



Department of State Bullet 

in order to stem the erosion of tl 
value of the dollar against oth< 
currencies? 

A. You have to do more than ai 
two particular items. I think the mo 
important thing the Congress can c 
is to pass an energy package to gn 
us an identifiable American enerj 
policy. I think this would resto 
confidence in our government, conl 
dence in our people, more than an 
thing I can think of, among foreij 
nations which trade with us ait 
which trade in our currency an 
therefore, cause it sometimes to j 
down in an unwarranted degree- 
Obviously, controlling inflation 
another very major step forward th 
we can take to strengthen the dollar. 
We have done other things as wel 
We're trying to increase our expon 
to reduce our balance-of-trade defici 
We have sold additional amounts 
gold which is predictable policy no! 
and I think this helps to strength*, 
the dollar. 

And one of the most importai 
things that is occurring outside of ol 
own control, but modified in a beni 
ficial way at Bonn, was to strengths 
the economies of our major tradin 
partners, notably Japan and German 
As their economies are stronger, the 
can buy goods more from other cou 
tries, including ourselves. 

So I think all these factors coj 
bined would lower our trade defia 
and lead to a stronser dollar. 



.. 



lis 
,; 
lit 
K 

V 

I 

J 

fli 
Id 

ii 
i 



'For full text, see Weekly Compilation 
Presidential Documents of Oct. 2. 1978, 
1653 

: For documentation concerning the Can 
David summit meeting, see Bulletin of Oc 
1978. p. 1. 

-'For full text, see Weekly Compilation c 
Oct. 16. 



vember 1978 



AFRICA: Southern Rhodesia 

Executive Council Members 

Visit U.S. 



JPARTMENT 

WOUNCEMENT, OCT. 4' 



As you know, Ian Smith [Prime 
nister of the white regime in South- 
1 Rhodesia] and the members of the 
lisbury Executive Council have 
jght permission to visit the United 
ates in response to an invitation 
ued by 27 members of the U.S. 
nate. 

After careful and extensive review. 
Department of State has decided, 
an exceptional basis, to grant that 
|uest. 

In reaching its decision, the De- 
rtment weighed a number of com- 
x and serious considerations on all 
les. Ultimately, we decided to make 
exception and grant the requested 
as in this instance because we be- 
ve the visit can contribute to the 
)cess of achieving a settlement of 

t Rhodesian conflict, to which the 
ministration remains entirely com- 
jtted. Moreover, mindful of the need 
J hear all points of view on an issue 
I this importance as well as of the 
languished source of the invitation. 
I' believe that the visit can contribute 
I the American public *s understand- 
\i of this complicated matter and to 
■ e ir support of our search for an 
luitable and enduring settlement. 
I It is important that the reasons for 
I r involvement in efforts to settle the 
jiodesian conflict and our role in the 
I gotiations be clearly understood, 
lth here and abroad. 
I For the last 18 months, the United 
lates has participated jointly with the 
liited Kingdom in a major diplomatic 
Uitiative aimed at ending the increas- 
Igly bloody conflict in Rhodesia and 
Itablishing a basis for a peaceful and 
Iderly transition to majority rule. 

We have not favored one side or the 
iher in that conflict. We have resisted 
Iforts by both sides to make our role 
i. partisan one. We have not, for 
sample, accepted the demands by the 
[eternal parties that they be given a 
iminant role in the critical transition 
feriod leading up to elections. Simi- 
, rl y . we have not endorsed the ar- 
i.ngements of the internal settlement, 
ecause those arrangements do not 
jffer all parties the opportunity to 
larticipate equitably in free and fair 
lections held in peaceful circum- 
lances. 



What we have supported throughout 
our negotiating initiative is an ar- 
rangement that would assure the 
people of Zimbabwe their right to 
choose their own government in elec- 
tions that are manifestly fair and 
impartial. 

Our efforts in pursuing that goal 
have been unstinting. U.S. and British 
envoys, including Secretaries Vance 
and Owen and Ambassador Young, 
have traveled hundreds of thousands of 
miles in their attempts to reconcile the 
differences among the parties. 

We have done so because the parties 
have continued to wish us to play that 
role. One of the last hopes for a 
peaceful resolution of the Rhodesian 
conflict lies in the determination of the 
British and American Governments to 
pursue every avenue that might lead to 
a settlement. 

Our goal remains unchanged. 
Moreover, we are convinced that the 
achievement of it has become even 
more urgent. 

As the situation in Rhodesia be- 
comes more and more critical, we be- 
lieve it is important that we take every 
conceivable opportunity to help the 
parties reconcile their differences and 
to bring an end to the bloodshed and 
suffering. 

The visit of Mr. Smith and other 
members of the Executive Council to 
this country can provide such an op- 
portunity. We want to renew our dis- 
cussions with them in order to make it 
clear that what we are seeking for 
Rhodesia is not a solution that gives 
advantages to one population group 
over another but rather one that offers 
the best hope for all Rhodesians to 
live under conditions of peace and 
justice. 

We are confident that in their other 
contacts here the members of the 
Executive Council will receive this 
same message: that the achievement of 
peace in Zimbabwe requires the will- 
ingness of all parties to negotiate their 
differences. 

Reflecting our nation's commitment 
to freedom of speech and the impor- 
tance of public debate, we believe that 
the visit can enhance public under- 
standing of the situation in Rhodesia 
and of the various solutions being 
offered. 

It is important that we miss no op- 



13 

portunity, however remote it may 
seem, to settle this increasingly brutal 
and dangerous war. Our decision to 
admit Mr. Smith in this instance does 
not mean that we will cease to observe 
our responsibilities as a member of the 
United Nations under the Security 
Council's resolution on Rhodesia. It 
does not imply U.S. recognition of or 
support for the present Rhodesian ad- 
ministration nor does it represent an 
endorsement of the internal settlement 
proposed by the Salisbury group. 

Rather, it reflects our urgent desire 
at this crucial stage to leave no stone 
unturned, no opportunity ignored, and 
to further our efforts to end the 
bloodshed and suffering and to achieve 
the overriding objective of a peaceful 
and orderly transition to majority rule 
with respect for the rights of all. 



JOINT U.S. -U.K. STATEMENT, 
OCT. 9 



Our meeting today with Mr. Smith 
and his colleagues gave us the oppor- 
tunity to discuss the rapidly de- 
teriorating situation in Rhodesia and to 
stress the following points. 2 

• The only way to avoid a growing 
bloody and dangerous civil war in 
Rhodesia is for all the parties to meet 
with each other and agree upon a fair 
and peaceful solution. 

• To that end, we urged Mr. Smith 
and his colleagues to agree to such 
talks and bring about an end to the 
continuing bloodshed. 

• As we have previously proposed 
in the Anglo-American plan, the road 
to independence could lie through an 
impartially administered transition 
period leading to fair elections; a 
cease-fire, international observation, 
and a constitution for Rhodesia that 
would preserve the rights of white as 
well as black citizens. 3 But we will 
also support any solution agreed 
among the parties. 

• Each side now accepts the princi- 
ple of elections, but each also seeks 
dominance during the transition 
period. If each continues to insist that 
the other accept its terms, there can be 
no progress. 

• We remain impartial. The recent 
claims on each side that we favor the 
other are simply false. If we favored 
either one, we would hinder our abil- 
ity to work for a fair process that 
would end the bloodshed. Only free 
and fair elections — not outside 
powers — should decide the future of 
Rhodesia. All of us must remember 
that the decision for peace lies in the 
hands of the parties themselves. 



14 



Department of State Bui lei 



... 



ARMS CONTROL: 

A Balaneeil ami Effective Defense 



by Harold Brown 

Address before the annual national 
convention of the American Legion in 
New Orleans on August 22. 1978. 
Harold Brown is Secretary of 
Defense. 

I want to talk today about how we 
are working to assure our military 
security — both by building balanced 
and fully adequate armed forces of the 
kind we most need and by seeking 
arms control agreements consistent 
with the interests of this country. 

Last week President Carter sent 
back to the Congress, without his ap- 
proval, a defense procurement bill 
which would have weakened our de- 
fense by taking $2 billion from high 
priority defense needs in order to pay 
for one nuclear-powered aircraft car- 
rier. The President and I support the 
full amount of the Defense budget of 
$126 billion which he requested. We 
want no congressional cut to be made 
from it. But we do want that money 
spent wisely and spent where it is 
most needed. 

The nuclear aircraft carrier costs 
nearly a billion dollars more than 
would a future non-nuclear carrier. We 
plan to build carriers in the future, but 
we do not need to build this one now 
at the expense of more urgent needs. 
And we do not need to add $1 billion 
to the price tag. 

The President is asking the Congress 
that in the coming year, instead of 
building a $2 billion carrier with a nu- 
clear power plant, that great amount of 
money be applied to more urgent 
needs like the following: 



Southern Rhodesia (Cont'd) 

• We will continue to press all sides 
for an end to the senseless and brutal 
killing of civilians. 

We urged Mr. Smith and his col- 
leagues to consider these points sen 
ously and to agree to earl) roundtable 
discussions with the other parties □ 



'Read to news correspondents by acting De- 
partment spokesman Tom Reston 

'Secretary Vance and British Ambassador 
Peter Jaj led the U.S. and U.K. participants in 

the meeting. 

'For text of the Anglo-American plan, see 
Hi ii i us of Oct. 3, 1977, p. 424. 



• $800 million for helicopters, 
combat vehicles, and ammunition for 
the Army; 

• $200 million for airlift, electronic 
warfare equipment, and modern elec- 
tronically guided ordnance for all the 
services; 

• Half a billion dollars to upgrade 
the readiness of all our Armed Forces 
by providing spare parts, ship over- 
hauls, training, communications, and 
logistical support; 

• Several hundred million dollars 
more for research and development; 
and 

• More construction of modern gen- 
eral purpose naval ships. For instance, 
we could build next year two new 
guided missile frigates, three antisub- 
marine warfare ships, and a fleet 
oiler — all for less than one-third the 
cost of a nuclear-powered carrier. 

The President's action is one to en- 
hance our defense, and it certainly is 
not anti-Navy. We have the strongest 
navy in the world, and we intend to 
keep it that way. We need to have 
balanced forces to meet all our defense 
needs, including particularly the need 
for our forces that are in Europe or are 
oriented for combat there to combine 
with the forces of our NATO allies to 
counter the steady Soviet buildup. The 
Navy itself needs to bring the ship 
construction program into balance. It 
must stop the drift of the past 10 years 
toward a navy of fewer and fewer 
ships, each of which costs more and 
more to build. No ship, no matter how- 
costly and capable, can be in more 
than one place at a time. We want to 
keep ours the world's strongest 
navy — not to build the world's most 
expensive ship. 



The Military Balance 

Let me turn now to a broader look 
at where we stand in the world and 
how it shapes our defense decisions. I 
should note first, of course, that the 
overall relative strength of the United 
States and the Soviet Union depends 
on mote than military forces alone, 
although those forces are a necessary 
and crucial element. The total balance 
includes many parts — economic 
strength and productivity, political 
stability and cohesion, our technolog- 
ical skill, the appeal of our way of life 
and our international policies, and our 



national will. In these overall term 
there is no doubt in my mind that til 
United States is the most powerftl 
country in the world. We outstrip tl* 
Soviets in nearly every category I hav 
mentioned. It is only on the militai 
side that their society has been able i 
rival us. But the fact that they hav 
turned so much of their effort to mill 
tary activities is serious and has to U 
troubling to us. We need to do what 
necessary to keep a military balance I 
well as a favorable overall balance < 
national power. 

I noted a moment ago that we ai 
urging the Congress to keep our D« 
fense budget for next year at the fui 
amount the President requested ii 
January. We have also pledged, alon| 
with our NATO allies, to increase oil 
defense effort in real terms, after ai 
lowing for inflation, with a goal I 
about 3% increase per year. 

Why are we making this effort t 
increase our defense? In deciding jut 
how many defense dollars we neerj 
we have to start by looking at th 
military efforts and capabilities of th 
Soviet Union. I have examined thos* 
Soviet capabilities carefully with th 
help and advice of the Joint Chiefs c 
Staff. They and I meet at least once 
week, and I meet daily with Gem 
Jones, the Chairman of the Joir 
Chiefs of Staff. We consider fre 
quently what responses the Unite 
States should make to growth in Sovia 
military power. We find that th 
Soviets have been engaged in a sub 
stantial military buildup for nearly 2f 
years. Over that period they have in 
creased their military expenditures bj 
about 4% each year in real terms 
compounded, year in and year out 
And their buildup is continuing. 

But that does not mean that we ano 
our allies have been sitting on ou 
hands or that we have suddenly be- 
come inferior to the Warsaw Pact. Wt 
are not. And it does not mean that, as 
we continue to improve our forces, wt. 
should make them a carbon copy ol 
the Soviet posture or that we shoulc 
plan forces simply to match certain 
•Soviet capabilities. 

The Soviets must wrestle with a 
number of problems that we do not 
now have, especially with respect tOJ 
China. Their planning has to take into 
account a difficult geography and a 
harsh climate — though they do hav& 
the advantage of internal lines on 



jvember 1978 

mmunication. They lack willing and 
fective allies. Our planning should 
ither forget their burdens nor assume 
; have the same problems; we have 
oblems, but ours are different. 



le Nuclear Deterrent 

Thus, simple comparison of Soviet 
d American forces is only the be- 
.ning of understanding our military 
eds. In planning our forces, we need 
be careful not to be misled by such 
mparisons. 

Take the case of our strategic nu- 
;ar posture. With the warheads we 
•eady deploy, we can target all sig- 
ficant military objectives in the 
.viet Union, even after undergoing a 
st strike by the Soviets. Our basic 
tensive strength, in other words, is 
equate today. But as strategic forces 
ve grown more sophisticated in both 
e Soviet Union and the United 
ates, the requirements of deterrence 
ve become more demanding, not 
icessarily in terms of missile 
■row-weight or megatonnage or 
arheads— the sorts of measures one 
ten hears about — but rather in other 
nensions. 

For example, control and the ability 
withhold some offensive forces — to 
able to attack some targets and 
lare others at a particular phase of 
m bat — may be as important as rapid 
.action against the entire enemy 
irget system. As a consequence, our 
ifense needs improved communica- 
ms, command, and control, even 
ough such capability tends to be ig- 
ired in most simple comparisons of 
jviet and American strategic 
pabilities. 

Age also often is ignored in simple 
>mparisons. and some of our offen- 
've forces are growing old. Also, 
>me, particularly the ICBM [inter- 
mtinental ballistic missilel compo- 
;nt, are becoming more vulnerable 
an is desirable from the standpoint 
flexibility, even though we might 
:cide to use those forces under attack 
jfore they were destroyed. 
We have not been idle in the face of 
ese needs. Aging of the force is 
ing brought under control. The 
odernization of the submarine and 
jmber forces — with the Trident mis- 
le and with cruise missiles — is well 
ider way. We are moving toward de- 
jlopment of a new and more sophis- 
cated ICBM. And we are continuing 
) examine possible replacements for 
ar B-52 bombers. 
We are giving equal priority to our 
ther strategic force needs, even 
hough they are less visible and do not 






lend themselves to simple, numerical 
comparisons with Soviet capabilities. 

• Our warning systems are being 
improved. 

• We are developing increased ac- 
curacy for all our missiles — ballistic 
and cruise. 

• We are upgrading our communi- 
cations and ability to use those com- 
munications selectively. 

• New warheads soon will be de- 
ployed, and advanced avionics systems 
for our bombers are being tested. 

Right now, even after a Soviet sur- 
prise attack, we could deliver literally 
thousands of thermonuclear weapons 
to targets in the Soviet Union. Despite 
the improving Soviet offensive and 
defensive forces, that capability of 
ours is not going to decline in the fu- 
ture. It is going to increase. 

In response to the potential threat 
new Soviet ICBM's pose to our 
ICBM's. I have asked the military 
services and the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
to consider a number of options to en- 
hance the survivability of that leg of 
our nuclear deterrence triad, a triad 
which is composed of bombers and 
cruise missiles, submarine-launched 
ballistic missiles, and intercontinental 
land-based missiles. A number of 
mobile ICBM-basing concepts are 
being evaluated, including some in- 
volving alternate launch points tor 
each missile. This concept envisions 
moving missiles and their launchers 
among multiple sites which might 
themselves be hardened, thus substan- 
tially complicating Soviet targeting of 
our deterrent. 

No decision has been made whether 
or not to deploy mobile ICBM sys- 
tems, like the alternate launch point 
system (or multiple aim point system, 
as it is sometimes called) that I just 
mentioned. Nor have we decided 
which particular concept we would 
implement, if we were to elect to de- 
ploy a mobile ICBM system. The 
current and projected capabilities of 
our strategic forces give us time to 
study thoroughly questions of techni- 
cal feasibility, military effectiveness, 
and cost prior to making decisions 
about deploying mobile ICBM's. 

Any mobile ICBM-basing system 
would, of course, have to be fully 
consistent with all provisions, includ- 
ing verification provisions, of a 
strategic arms limitation agreement. 
The United States will not deploy a 
mobile ICBM system that would not 
permit adequate verification of the 
number of launchers deployed and 
other provisions of the agreement. 
You may be confident that we will in- 



15 

sist that any Soviet system meet the 
same verification standards. 

The parts of the joint draft text of 
the SALT II agreement that have al- 
ready been agreed allow deployment 
of mobile ICBM systems of the types 
we are considering. The draft agree- 
ment explicitly permits deployment of 
mobile ICBM launchers during its 
term, after the expiration of an interim 
protocol period which would end well 
before mobile ICBM systems would be 
ready for deployment. 

I know that some of you are con- 
cerned about SALT. I want to assure 
you that no SALT agreement will be 
signed unless it is in the interest of the 
United States to sign it. That means 
particularly that it must not undermine 
our military security. An acceptable 
strategic arms limitation agreement is 
not going to weaken the U.S. second- 
strike capability that I have described. 
We will retain our assurance, and the 
Soviets will know, that we can deliver 
such a devastating second-strike blow. 
And that will remain true despite the 
current Soviet civil defense program. 



Conventional Forces 

Let me turn finally to conventional 
forces. Here detailea comparisons 
count even more than in strategic 
forces. Despite the growth in Soviet 
theater capabilities, we and our allies 
already have bought and are paying for 
the land, naval, and air forces needed 
to protect our interests in the world. 
Despite our global responsibilities, we 
already are well equipped to deal with 
contingencies that allow ample time 
for readying and deploying our forces. 
If NATO could be sure of a month or 
more to set up its defenses, for exam- 
ple, I doubt that any Soviet marshal 
would recommend an attack on West- 
ern Europe. 

Unfortunately, however, we and our 
allies no longer can count on having 
that kind of time. The Soviet theater 
forces have changed most significantly 
not in numbers but in their ability to 
wage short, intense, non-nuclear cam- 
paigns using large, modernized forces 
with relatively little advance prepara- 
tion. In consequence, as Gen. Haig, 
the Supreme Allied Commander in 
Europe, recently observed, surprise 
attack has become more feasible. Our 
needs have changed accordingly, not 
toward larger forces but toward higher 
combat readiness, greater shortrun 
sustainability, improved interoperabil- 
ity with allies, and more long-range 
mobility for the forces we already 
have. 

Don't misunderstand me; I recog- 
nize the need for modern weapons. 



16 

We need improved equipment. But our 
modern weapons must be fully effec- 
tive Therefore, the members of our 
Armed Forces must be able to main- 
tain them, adequately train on them, 
and get them into a combat theater 
before our defenses are overrun. 

Combat effectiveness depends on 
many factors. We must keep the size 
of our forces, their modernization, 
their readiness (including their mobil- 
ity), and their sustainability in bal- 
ance, especially when the incentives 
for surprise attack and short, intense 
campaigns have gone up. Spending 
money on spare parts, unit training, 
and field exercises may not grab the 
headlines. But considering the invest- 
ment we already are making in hard- 
ware, that is the right way at the right 
time to neutralize the Soviet buildup. 
That is what the President had in 
mind, as I said earlier, when he sent 
the Defense authorization bill back to 
the Congress last week with a request 
to put our dollars where they will pro- 
vide us the greatest protection from 
the Soviet military effort. 



Security and Arms Control 

An adequately and properly bal- 
anced Defense budget, then, is one 
way we assure our security against the 
Soviet military threat. It is a necessary 
way, but it is not the only one. 

Although some may still be skepti- 
cal about arms control agreements — 
and it is a particular responsibility of 
mine not to be gullible about them — 
such agreements are another and com- 
plementary way of dealing with Soviet 
military efforts. The interests of the 
Soviet Union and the United States 
clearly diverge in many respects. But 
the Soviets understand that, as long as 
we remain strong — and I intend that we 
will — direct conflict with the United 
States and its friends could quickly 
lead to disaster. At a minimum, they 
share our interest in avoiding such a 
conflict. And there are other problems 
of mutual concern on which com- 
munication remains necessary and 
cooperation should be possible. We 
cannot afford to ignore those pos- 
sibilities. 

I say that because the interests of 



Convention on the Hostile Use 
of Environmental Modification Techniques 



MESSAGE TO THE SENATE, 
SEPT. 22' 

I am transmitting herewith, for the advice 
and consent of the Senate to ratification, the 
Convention on the Prohibition of Military or 
Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Mod- 
ification Techniques, signed at Geneva on May 
18. 1977. 

The Convention is the result of extensive 
study, debate, and negotiation at the Confer- 
ence of the Committee on Disarmament at 
Geneva and at the United Nations. It seeks to 
avert the dangers resulting from the hostile use 
of environmental modification techniques 
"having widespread, long lasting or severe 
effects as the means of destruction, damage or 
injury to any other Stale Party." 

In 1973, growing awareness of the need for 
protecting our environment led to the adoption 
of Senate Resolution 71 which urged the 
Executive Branch to negotiate a treaty pro- 
hibiting environmental wart.ire. The United 
States and the Soviet Union, after three rounds 
of bilateral consultations, tabled identical dull 
texts of a multilateral convention at the Confer- 
ence of the Committee on Disarmament in 
1975. Negotiations on the basis ot these texts 
resulted in the document I am transmitting to 
you today. 



I am also sending with the Convention four 
Understandings relating to Articles. 1. II. Ill 
and VIII. respectively. These Understandings 
are not incorporated into the Convention. They 
are part of the negotiating record and were in- 
cluded in the report transmitted by the Confer- 
ence of the Committee on Disarmament to the 
United Nations. The provisions of the Conven- 
tion and the Understandings are described in 
detail in the accompanying report of the De- 
partment of State. 

By prohibiting the hostile use of potentially 
disastrous environmental modification tech- 
niques, the Convention represents one more 
advance in the field of arms control to which 
my Administration is firmly committed. I rec- 
ommend that the Senate give prompt consid- 
eration to the Convention, and advise and con- 
sent to its ratification. 

Jimmy Carter □ 



'}. 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of Presi 
dential Documents of Sept. 25. 1978; also 
primed as S. Ex. K which also includes Secre- 
tar) Vance's letter of submittal and the texts of 
the conventions and the understandings 



Department of State Bullet 

the United States are best advanc; 
under conditions of peace and order 
change. We need as much stability an 
predictability as we can manage in oi 
internal relations, consistent with m 
tional security. U.S. and allied am 
buildups offer one way of obtainii 
security, stability, and predictabilit 
arms control provides another. Wh 
mix of the two works best depends c 
the circumstances. 

As matters now stand, we are we 
positioned for further competition an 
an arms buildup. But that is not on 
preferred path, if we can obtain sea 
rity, stability, and predictabilil 
through precise, equitable, and verift 
able arms control. In that case w 
prefer agreed restraints and reductioi 
to competition and buildups. As a m 
tion. we have no vested interest : 
arms races. 

Our preference for restraint is bour 
to be especially strong where nucle. 
forces are concerned. I say this ft 
several reasons. Nuclear weapor 
represent the only real threat to tr 
survival of the United States and, fl 
that matter, to that of the Sovii 
Union. Those weapons could destrc 
in hours all that the two nations ha* 
built over centuries. 

Both the United States and tr 
Soviet Union already deploy nucle; 
forces capable of this kind of destrui 
tion. As a consequence, it is increa 
ingly unlikely that further buildups b 
one side will yield a meaningful at 
vantage, providing that the other sic 
takes prudent countermeasures. This 
so even though civil defense or exot 
technologies may continue to creai 
the illusion of potential advantage. 

This is not to say that agreements tt 
limit strategic or other armaments cai 
solve all problems, remove all grounc 
for fear and suspicion, or bring a 
competition to a complete halt. Bb 
carefully drawn agreements, backed b 
verification of compliance with then"; 
can accomplish a great deal. 

• They can make the achievemer 
of future advantage even more un 
likely while allowing current vul 
nerabilities to be removed. 

• They can make future structure 
more predictable and lower the neei 
for extreme conservatism in our de 
fense planning. 

• They can contribute to a healthie 
political environment, an environment 
in which still further restraints can hi 
imposed on both sides according to tht 1 
principle of equivalence. 

I do not see any immediate prospeC| 
of achieving a mutual end to competi 
tion in military strength. A reasonable 
objective today is to maintain t hi 



wember 1978 

)dest momentum toward arms con- 

1. But arms control as such, I can 

sure you. is not our sole or even 

ncipal objective in SALT. What we 

nt. what we insist on, is that the se- 

•ity of the United States and its al- 

s be at least as assured with a SALT 

eement as without it. If an agree- 

nt does not meet that test, it will 

t be signed. If it does, it will be. 

But with or without SALT, our de- 

lse programs will, in the main, have 

continue. As we proceed with them, 

issue is not whether to have as 

ich defense as we need to protect 

r domestic and foreign interests. 

)body should doubt the absolute 

ority of that requirement. To the 

ent that there is an issue, it is over 

at, in detail, constitutes the neces- 

y defense. 

Experts can argue for hours — my 

n time is heavily involved in such 

isiderations — about how important, 

•wlutely or relatively, it is to add a 

th Army Division, a 27th fighter- 

ack wing, or a 13th attack carrier. 

e fact of the matter is that, with the 

ce structure we already have, indi- 

lual changes of that order are not 

ing to make much difference to our 

erall military effectiveness. But 

mges in our ability to maintain, 

'Ve, supply, and operate profession- 

•y the weapons already in our in- 

itories can make all the difference 

the world in our effectiveness and 

our deterrent power. You can recall 

or own military experiences. You 

jhbably remember the difficulties of 

|r forming your mission when 

% apons and equipment were not in 

a;quate supply or not functioning 

■ iperly or down for lack of spare 

Its 

! The President and I want tully ef- 
Itive forces. The competition from 
mt Soviet Union demands it. Real 
tidiness to fight is the most effective 
tJnter to the Soviet military threat. 
Iir resources must be spent to assure 
I'ectiveness for the kinds of conflicts 
lit are the most likely now and in the 
reseeable future. We must not drift 
Ick toward the old strategy of sac- 
ricing immediate readiness but 
lunting on a long time for niobil- 
lition — a strategy that was barely 
lisible in the 1930 - s. 

Today we do not have the luxury of 
gne. and combat readiness and quick 
isponse are what we need. As Secre- 
II 'y of Defense, I. with the concur- 
Ihce of the President, intend to shape 
jljd provide for our forces to meet 
pse very real requirements. You are 
(group who. because of those very 
'.;al requirements, can understand this, 
lope I will have your support. 



17 



Comprehensive Test Ban 



by Leslie H. Gelb 

Statement before the SALT II and 
CTB Panel of the House Committee on 
Armed Services on August 14, 1978. 
Mr. Gelb is Director of the Bureau of 
Politico- Military Affairs. ' 

Let me briefly review the com- 
prehensive test ban (CTB) from the 
perspective of America's larger politi- 
cal and security interests. CTB is part 
of a continuing, bipartisan effort car- 
ried out by all postwar Administra- 
tions. Each has tried to enhance our 
security by placing some restraints on 
the dangerous spiral of the nuclear 
arms race. These efforts began to bear 
fruit in the early 1960's. The follow- 
ing major accomplishments have 
helped to pave the way for a CTB. 

• In 1963 the United States, the 
U.S.S.R., and the United Kingdom 
negotiated the Limited Test Ban 
Treaty, which prohibits the testing of 
nuclear weapons in the atmosphere, 
outer space, and underwater. This left 
underground testing as the only per- 
mitted area remaining, but it set no 
limit on the yield level of the tests. 

• In 1967, building on an earlier 
U.N. resolution, the United States and 
U.S.S.R. further limited the scope of 
nuclear weapons activity by reaching 
an agreement prohibiting the stationing 
in outer space of objects carrying such 
weapons (Outer Space Treaty). 

• In 1968 the United States. United 
Kingdom, and U.S.S.R. took a major 
step on the path to halting the interna- 
tional, or "horizontal." spread of nu- 
clear weaponry by concluding the Nu- 
clear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). 
This has been ratified by 104 countries 



but there unfortunately remain some 
key holdouts. 

• In 1971 the United States, United 
Kingdom, and U.S.S.R.. building 
upon the Outer Space Treaty, con- 
cluded an agreement prohibiting the 
placing of nuclear weapons and other 
weapons of mass destruction on the 
seabeds and ocean floors (Seabed 
Arms Control Treaty). 

• In 1972 the United States and 
U.S.S.R. concluded SALT I. which: 
(a) put a cap on the antiballistic mis- 
sile (ABM) (defensive) systems of 
both sides and (b) limited for a 5-year 
period certain strategic offensive arms. 
This set the stage for SALT II, in 
which we are trying to bring about 
more significant limitations on offen- 
sive nuclear weaponry. 

What is it about these treaties that 
made them acceptable to the United 
States and enabled them to be ratified? 
The answer is that they have effec- 
tively enhanced and complemented our 
strong national defense posture. 

It is important to note that these 
treaties are not dependent upon any 
attempt to bring about an unrealistic- 
ally high level of mutual trust be- 
tween the United States and U.S.S.R. 
Instead, they are based on this simple 
fact — there is a clear mutuality of 
interests between the two superpowers 
in restraining the nuclear weapons race 
in this careful step-by-step manner. 

Equally important, the provisions of 
these treaties can be adequately ver- 
ified by the effective national technical 
means which we already possess. The 
treaties have, in effect, followed the 
pace of technological advancement. 
More ambitious undertakings were 
made possible when the state of tech- 



In closing, let me add that there is 
another and more fundamental reason 
why priority should go to combat 
readiness, assuring the immediate 
fighting capability of our people in 
uniform. It is that only people — 
professionally trained people with high 
morale — can make our weapons work. 
Even pushbuttons have to be pushed. 

As the Legion knows better than 
most, people are the greatest asset we 
have in defense. Technologically, we 
have a comparative advantage over the 
Soviet Union. But it is not nearly as 
great as the advantage we obtain from 
being a free people. The Soviets may 



be able to close the gap in weapons 
production and to narrow the gap in 
military technology. They will never 
come close to the spirit, the dedica- 
tion, and the initiative of the men and 
women in the Armed Forces of the 
United States. 

You, our veterans, gave us the mar- 
gin necessary to win victory in the 
past. The men and women of our 
Armed Forces today offer us the op- 
portunity for the same decisive mar- 
gin. As long as I am Secretary of De- 
fense, I intend to make the most of it. 
I hope to have your support in doing 
so. □ 



18 

nology permitted independent verifi- 
cation of their provisions 

There have been two other direct 
precursors to the present CTB negotia- 
tions, although these two treaties have 
not been ratified by the United States. 
The first is the 1974 Threshold Test 
Ban Treaty, which prohibits the testing 
of nuclear weapons with a yield of over 
150 kilotons. The second is the 1976 
agreement governing the use of under- 
ground nuclear explosions for peaceful 
purposes — the Peaceful Nuclear Explo- 
sions Treaty. 

We can now do better than these two 
relatively modest treaties. As you 
know, a CTB would effectively ban all 
weapons testing on both sides. And, 
due to a recent concession by the 
U.S.S.R., the CTB would include a 
protocol banning peaceful nuclear ex- 
plosions altogether for the duration of 
the treaty (while calling for negotia- 
tions to try to find a mutually accept- 
able means to carry out peaceful nu- 
clear explosions). 



Importance of a CTB 

President Carter, like his postwar 
predecessors of both political parties, is 
committed to continuing these efforts 
to cap, and ultimately reverse, the nu- 
clear arms race. He considers the 
achievement of a CTB as a key step in 
this process and as the logical continu- 
ation to the successful measures al- 
ready achieved. Two dimensions are 
critical. 

First, a CTB, along with future suc- 
cess in SALT, would be a crucial ele- 
ment in restraining the U.S. -Soviet nu- 
clear competition. It would render 
great service to our national security by 
constraining the ability of both sides to 
improve either their strategic or tactical 
nuclear capabilities, which they have 
done so markedly during the last few 
years. 

Without such a ban. on the other 
hand, international tensions would 
surely be exacerbated, and we would 
undoubtedly see a continuing Soviet 
buildup in various types of nuclear 
weaponry. Pressure would increase on 
the United States to match the 
U.S.S.R. buildup in kind. Needless to 
say, the cost would be staggering on 
both sides. If we did not effectively 
counter such a Soviet buildup, how- 
ever, the deterrent balance between the 
superpowers could be jeopardized. We 
are, if necessary, both willing and able 
to counter the Soviets in this way. But 
we must ask ourselves whether this is 
really the most effective way to insure 
our own security and that of our allies 



and to try to bring about a less precari- 
ous international environment. 

Second, the other critical dimension 
is CTB's relationship to our nonprolif- 
eration efforts. Because the spread of 
nuclear weapons threatens our national 
security in several ways, the President 
has made nuclear nonproliferation one 
of his top priorities. Presidents 
Eisenhower and Kennedy gave non- 
proliferation as their prime reason for 
supporting the limited test ban. The 
dangers of a world with many nuclear 
powers are real. Nuclear weapons 
could upset the military balance in 
troubled regions of the world. In every 
part of the world, the use of nuclear 
weapons by any state poses serious 
risks of widening the conflict and of 
jeopardizing U.S. interests. Moreover, 
the potential dangers presented by 
nuclear-armed terrorists are almost 
unthinkable. 

To minimize the spread of nuclear 
weapons, the Administration is pursu- 
ing a multifaceted policy. We are: 

• Seeking the widest possible adher- 
ence to the Nonproliferation Treaty; 

• Moving positively to strengthen 
international safeguards and control of 
civil nuclear facilities; 

• Urging restraint in international 
transfers of sensitive technologies; 

• Building a broad international con- 
sensus about the future structure and 
management of the nuclear fuel cycle 
through the International Nuclear Fuel 
Cycle Evaluation; 

• Taking steps to insure that our 
domestic nuclear policy is consistent 
with our international objectives, in- 
cluding assurances that we will remain 
a reliable supplier of nuclear materials; 
and 

• Doing our best to reduce any se- 
curity or prestige motives that states 
might have to develop nuclear explo- 
sives. 

The contribution of a nondis- 
criminatory CTB to our overall non- 
proliferation efforts relates to the first 
and last points. It would help reduce 
the motivations of non-nuclear-weapon 
states to proliferate. This contribution 
would increase with the duration of the 
treaty, but even a limited duration ban, 
if nondiscriminatory, would signifi- 
cantly benefit our nonproliferation ef- 
forts. It would do so in these ways. 

A CTB would strengthen the Non- 
proliferation Treaty. Many nations 
outside the Nonproliferation Treaty — 
such as India, Argentina, and 
Brazil — have based their refusal to ac- 
cede to the treaty on the ground that it 
is discriminatory, requiring non- 
nuclear-weapon states to forswear nu- 



Department of State Bulle - 

clear weapons while American ai 
Soviet weapons stockpiles continue 
grow and improve. In particular, the 
key nations and some NPT parti 
claim that the nuclear-weapon stat 
party to the treaty have not fulfill 
their obligations under article ^ 
". . . to pursue negotiations in gO( 
faith on effective measures relating 
cessation of the nuclear arms race at ; 
early date and to nuclear disarm 
ment. . . ." 

Non-nuclear-weapon states have pt 
sistently labeled a comprehensive U 
ban as an important arms control meil 
ure. Many of our close allies and sor 
key nonaligned states again called f 
immediate conclusion of a CTB at t 
recent U.N. Special Session on Disi 
mament. Consequently, a CTB trea 
would directly address and could d 
fleet criticism of discrimination ai 
facilitate the task of persuading ado 
tional states to join the NPT. 

When a new state ratifies the NPT. 
greatly reassures neighboring states 
the new party's peaceful intention 
This reassurance, in turn, reduces i« 
centives to acquire nuclear weapo 
throughout the region. Moreover, if* 
CTB enters into force by 1980, it w 
reduce the risk that nations will use t« 
NPT Review Conference as a vehicle 
weaken or withdraw from the NPT. 

A comprehensive test ban wou 
inhibit testing by threshold states. 

CTB would commit those no 
nuclear-weapon states who join to i 
cept constraints upon nuclear explosi 
development. These nations wou 
forswear any political or strateg 
benefits from the initial proof 
nuclear-weapons possession afford> 
by testing. Such an agreement woui 
be especially important for key natio 
which have not yet joined the NPT 
such as India. Pakistan. Egypt, Israt 
Argentina. Brazil, Spain, and Soil 
Africa. Six of these nations are parti 
to the Limited Test Ban Treaty, 
widely supported CTB — one that, u 
like the NPT, could not be attacked 
discriminatory — would be political 
costly for such states to reject. I 
therefore, represents an alternative 
NPT membership beneficial to o' 
nonproliferation efforts. There are re 
sonable prospects that a number of tl 
NPT holdouts will join. Even for tho 
that choose not to adhere, the existem 
of a CTB could well be a factor ii 
hibiting any decision to test. 

A CTB would strengthen the U.! 
bargaining position in bilater: 
negotiations on nuclear matter: 

Currently, sensitive negotiations ai 
underway with a number of countrie 
In the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act i 



i 



member 1978 



nericanj 



19 



*PT 



article 

^ in 

srace 



CWlt 






78. the Congress wisely required the 

egotiation of our agreements for nu- 

ar arrangements with other states 

iese safeguards must also be applied 

any new agreements for cooperation. 

ey are in no way meant to restrain 

peaceful use of atomic energy. 

In the course of these negotiations, 

issue of the self-restraint of the 

ted States in nuclear-weapons de- 

yment often arises. A comprehen- 

e test ban would materially improve 

U.S. bargaining position to achieve 

e important nonproliferation benefits 

m full-scope safeguards and other 

untary restraints. 

The problem of nuclear proliferation 
exceedingly complex. The Adminis- 
tion welcomes the participation of 
e Congress in carrying on our non- 
oliferation efforts on all fronts. To- 
ther we must continue to seek the 
operation of other nations in order to 
hieve our nonproliferation objec- 
ves. The CTB can be a significant 
ement of this joint effort. 
Of course, the CTB is not a panacea, 
cannot quantify for the committee 
I) nactly how much a CTB would help 
ur proliferation efforts. But I am con- 
dent that it will be of substantial 
enefit. And given the international 
;• xpectations for a CTB, failure to 



i NP 
stale 

lentil 



H 

ale.l 

i 



chieve a test ban would undermine our 
onproliferation efforts. 



'erification and Stockpile Reliability 

There are two additional issues 
/hich I would like to touch upon. The 
irst, which is still under painstaking 
egotiation in Geneva, is that of verifi- 
ation. U.S. and British negotiators 
lave pushed the Soviets very hard all 
long to agree to an impressive pack- 
ge of special verification measures, 
"his will complement the substantial 
chnical verification means which we 
ready possess. We are confident that 
adequate verification system can be 
rived at in the negotiations. We as- 
ure you that we will not sign any arms 
ontrol agreement which lacks this. 

Second, we are equally determined 
o insure that, under a CTB. we will 
ontinue to maintain a fully reliable 
lUclear deterrent. We have a very high 
Idegree of confidence in our stockpile at 
Ithis time, and the active safeguards 
(program which we would carry out 
lunder a CTB will insure that this re- 
mains the case. 



'Conclusion 

In sum this Administration believes, 

j as have all of its predecessors since the 

dawning of the nuclear era, that 



ECONOMICS: Bonn Summit and 
Investment in Developing Countries 



by Richard N. Cooper 

Statement before the Subcommittees 
on International Economic Policy and 
Trade and International Development 
oj the House Committee on Interna- 
tional Relations on September 20, 
1978. Mr. Cooper is Under Secretary 
for Economic Affairs. ' 

I am pleased to have this opportunity 
to appear before your subcommittees to 
discuss the results of the Bonn summit 
and to comment on certain proposals to 
stimulate economic growth through in- 
vestment in the developing countries. 
These two subjects are closely related. 
In fact, the Bonn meeting reflects a 
clear understanding by the participants 
that the problems of growth, inflation, 
payments imbalances, trade, energy, 
and development are all interrelated. 
The Bonn declaration specifically rec- 
ognizes that economic progress in de- 
veloping countries benefits industrial 
countries just as prosperity in industrial 
countries benefits the developing 
countries. 2 



Results of the Bonn Summit 

The Bonn summit was the fourth 
meeting in as many years of the heads 
of state and government of the seven 
major industrial democracies and the 
European Community to discuss the 
international economic situation. Pre- 
vious meetings were held at Ram- 
bouillet in November 1975, Puerto 
Rico in June 1976. and London in May 
1977. 

The Bonn meeting, like the three 
previous summits, enabled the leaders 
of the major industrialized countries to 
examine together the key problems of 
the world economy. They agreed on a 
comprehensive strategy to deal with 
these problems in a manner consistent 
with their close interrelationship. The 



Bonn summit emphasized the following 
themes. 

• The participants recognized that 
economic issues can be addressed in a 
concerted fashion, through mutually 
reinforcing actions, much more effec- 
tively than they can be addressed 
alone. Concerted action to increase 
growth, for example, can reduce the 
constraint of a significant deterioration 
in international payments which a 
country acting alone would face. The 
Declaration thus correctly characterizes 
the total effect of the program as 
greater than the sum of its parts. 

• The participants recognized that 
each country should contribute in a 
way commensurate with its particular 
situation. Given that the United States 
is now growing at a healthy rate, the 
President stressed his determination to 
reduce inflation and our dependence on 
foreign oil. Germany and Japan, with 
low inflation rates and balance-of- 
payments surpluses, agreed to take ap- 
propriate measures to expand domestic 
demand. 

• The Declaration recognizes that 
these are long-term problems which 
will only yield to sustained efforts. 
Actions to reduce energy consumption 
and dependence on imported oil. 
agreements to liberalize trade and 
strengthen trading rules, and actions to 
promote economic and social progress 
in developing countries are all exam- 
ples of policies which will have their 
full impact only in the coming decade 
and beyond. 

Let me just highlight some signifi- 
cant features of the Declaration. We 
were frankly pleased that the other 
summit participants, and especially 
Germany and Japan, were able to be as 
specific on measures to increase de- 
mand as they were. In the spirit of 
realism which characterized the Bonn 
meeting, these commitments stress 



America *s security must be pursued in 
two mutually reinforcing ways. 

• We must have a defense capability 
second to none. 

• We must strive to reduce the 
danger of war and the cost of an un- 
limited arms race through arms control. 

The comprehensive test ban we are 
negotiating is an integral part of this 
consistent American policy. It will help 



us sustain nuclear parity with the 
Soviet Union. It will help prevent the 
spread of nuclear weapons to states 
which do not have them. I deeply be- 
lieve it is deserving of your support. □ 



'The complete transcript of the hearings will 
be published by the committee and will be 
available from the Superintendent of Docu- 
ments. U.S. Government Printing Office. 
Washington, D.C. 20402. 



20 

government policy instruments rather 
than performance targets, the achieve- 
ment of which is often affected by 
forces beyond the control of individual 
governments. 

Chancellor Schmidt agreed to pro- 
pose to his legislature new measures in 
an amount of up to 1% of GNP to 
stimulate German growth. Pursuant to 
this commitment, the West German 
Cabinet on July 28 proposed a $5.6 
billion stimulation package for 1979 
and an additional stimulus of $1.6 bil- 
lion for 1980. 

Prime Minister Fukuda agreed to 
take additional measures if necessary to 
achieve Japan's growth target for fiscal 
year 1978 of 1%. The Japanese Gov- 
ernment submitted a supplemental 
budget proposal to the Diet on Sep- 
tember 2 which is designed to add 2.5 
trillion yen to domestic demand. These 
commitments might not have been pos- 
sible without the President's firm 
statement on inflation and energy. 

Although public attention in the area 
of energy was concentrated on actions 
expected of the United States, the dis- 
cussion of energy was far broader in 
scope. The participants emphasized co- 
operative efforts to develop energy 
sources, including renewable sources, 
in both the industrialized democracies 
and the developing countries. The im- 
portance of coal and the continued de- 
velopment of nuclear energy was also 
recognized. The Declaration stressed 
the role of the multilateral financial in- 
stitutions and of private investment in 
the energy field. 

The Bonn meeting also brought us 
closer to agreement in the multilateral 
trade negotiations. We would like to 
have been even further along than we 
are now. Nevertheless, the Framework 
of Understanding issued on July 13 in 
Geneva by the U.S. and other delega- 
tions reflects the advanced state of 
work on tariff reductions and on sev- 
eral international codes to reduce non- 
tariff barriers to trade. The summit 
participants welcomed this statement 
by the major trading countries and 
committed themselves to conclude suc- 
cessfully the detailed negotiations by 
December 15. This commitment en- 
compasses key areas such as agricul- 
ture, subsidies, and safeguards, where 
major decisions are needed. 

The participants also specifically en- 
dorsed the decisions of the Organiza- 
tion for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) Council of 
Ministers in June to renew the OECD 
trade pledge and to adopt guidelines for 
positive adjustment policies. These 
guidelines represent a significant step 
forward from the London summit Dec- 



Department of State Bulle; m 



laration. They will, if observed, dis- 
courage defensive policies which pre- 
vent structural change and encourage 
the acceptance and facilitation of such 
changes over time. Adherence to these 
guidelines will promote long-term 
growth and diminish the likelihood of 
short-term protectionist responses at 
the expense of other countries. 

At the summit there was a lively dis- 
cussion of international monetary pol- 
icy. All recognized that exchange rate 
stability can only be achieved by at- 
tacking the underlying fundamental 
problems of growth, energy, and infla- 
tion. At the same time, summit partici- 
pants pledged to intervene to counter 
disorderly conditions in the exchange 
markets. 

We are concerned by the decline of 
the dollar against certain currencies in 
recent weeks. The President has asked 
Treasury Secretary Blumenthal and 
Federal Reserve Board Chairman 
Miller to consider appropriate actions. 
We have taken several steps, and addi- 
tional measures can be expected as 
appropriate. 

Also at the summit there was a use- 
ful discussion of proposals for a Euro- 
pean monetary system. This is a very 
ambitious undertaking, intended to 
further advance efforts at European in- 
tegration. As such, it is surely to be 
welcomed and encouraged, consistent 
with longstanding U.S. support for 
European economic integration. If ef- 
forts to build such a system are suc- 
cessful, the Europeans will have a better 
framework for harmonizing economic 
policies and economic developments, 
including growth and inflation. 

Putting together a viable European 
monetary system involves a great deal 
of technical work, about which the 
European Community will keep other 
countries informed as details are 
worked out. Naturally, the effect of the 
system on third countries and on world 
financial markets cannot be judged 
favorable or unfavorable until such 
details are known. The European 
Community itself is still at an early 
stage in working out these specifics; 
their Finance Council met only 2 days 
ago to consider initial technical reports, 
and final decisions are not expected for 
several months. 

Considerable time was devoted to a 
discussion of the problems of the de- 
veloping countries. The Declaration 
explicitly recognizes the growing inter- 
dependence of developed and de- 
veloping countries, and summit 
participants committed themselves to 
increasing the flow of financial assist- 
ance and other resources tor develop- 
ment. The need for intensified and 






improved bilateral and multilateral a 
sistance in the energy field is speci 
ically stressed. The Declaration ah 
calls on the developing countries, pa 
ticularly the more advanced among ther 
to assume responsibilities which go wi 
their enhanced role in the world eco 
omy. 

Finally, the Declaration by the sur 
mit participants to combat internation 
terrorism in the form of aircra 
hijacking is a significant achievemen 
Essentially, the Declaration is a cor 
mitment to cut off air service to at 
from any country which fails to retu 
the hijacked aircraft. We are no 
working with representatives of othi 
summit countries to gain broader inte 
national support for the Declaratie 
and on procedures for its implement! 
tion. 



Proposals To Stimulate 
World Growth 

I would now like to turn specifical 
to the proposals which have been ma« 
here and abroad to stimulate wor 
growth by increasing investments in tl 
developing countries. All of these pr< 
posals are constructive attempts to ai 
dress the needs of the developir 
countries in a way which also benefi 
the industrial economies. The wor 
economic situation which these propo 
als address is characterized by: 

• Sluggish economic growth on tl 
part of many developed countries du 
in large part to lagging investment; 

• Large investment needs in dc 
veloping countries; and 

• A substantial amount of liqui 
funds which, for various reasons, d 
not always find their way to the dt 
veloping countries which need them th 
most. 

Investment in the Industrie 
Countries. Slow growth in business 
fixed investment in virtually all OEC1 
countries in recent years is a cause a. 
well as an effect of sluggish overffl 
growth rates. There is some concer 
that lower rates of investment ma 
gradually reduce the productiv 
capacities of the industrialized coun 
tries and that future expansions may 
therefore, encounter the types o 
bottlenecks that typically exacerbati 
inflation. It is also likely that lowe 
investment — particularly in researcl 
and development — limits an econ 
omy's ability to adjust over time toi 
changes in international competition. 

Investment is a key factor in tht 
maintenance of long-term economi 
growth. Over the years, countries witr 
higher investment levels and advancing 



>vember 1978 

■hnology have tended to grow faster, 
is. therefore, unsettling to note that 
: OECD has reported significant re- 
ctions in the rate of growth of the 
pital stock in manufacturing in the 
st half of the 1970's compared with 



the previous 5 years in almost all major 
industrialized countries. This is par- 
ticularly troublesome, since, as the 
OECD reports, capital requirements per 
unit of output are rising, not declining. 
Major influences on investment 



Muttila tera t Trade 
Negotiations 



ESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS, 
£PT. 28 ' 

I am today submitting to the Congress a 
jposal for legislation to extend for a brief 
riod the authority of the Secretary of the 
easury under Section 303(d) of the Tariff Act 
1930 to waive the application of counter- 
Ming duties. I hope that the Congress will be 
•le to enact the necessary legislation before 
journment sine die. 
If not extended, the waiver authority will 
pire on January 2, 1979. This would seri- 
isly jeopardize satisfactory conclusion of the 
jltilateral Trade Negotiations (MTN) under- 
ly in Geneva. Unless the waiver authority is 
tended to cover the period during which the 
ults of the MTN will be under review by the 
ingress, our ability to press ahead with the 
gotiations would be sharply limited. 
As stipulated by the Congress in the Trade 
it of 1974, negotiation of a satisfactory code 
subsidies and countervailing duties is a pri- 
ary U.S. objective in the MTN. The United 
Btes is seeking through such a code improved 
•scipline on the use of subsidies which ad- 
rsely affect trade. In our view, a satisfactory 
bsidy/countervailing duty code must include 
) new substantive rules on the use of internal 
d export subsidies which adequately protect 
nited States agricultural and industrial trading 
terests insofar as they are adversely affected 
' such subsidies, and (2) more effective pro- 
isions on notification, consultation and dis- 
ite settlement that will provide for timely 
solution of disputes involving the use of sub- 
dies in international trade. 
My Special Representative for Trade Negotia- 
ons [Robert S. Strauss] has informed me that 
le prospects for reaching agreement by year end 
a subsidy/countervailing duty code which 
leets the basic U.S. objectives are good — 
rovided that the waiver authority can be ex- 
nded until such a code has been submitted to. 
nd acted upon, by the Congress under the pro- 
edures of the Trade Act of 1974. In this con- 
ection. the legislation I am proposing would 
rovide that the countervailing duty waiver au- 
lority will expire as scheduled on January 2. 
979, unless we are able to report to the Con- 
ress before that date that a subsidy/ 



countervailing duty code has been negotiated 
among the key countries participating in the 
MTN and that the MTN itself has been substan- 
tially concluded. 

Under the countervailing duty waiver author- 
ity, the imposition of countervailing duties may 
be waived in a specific case only if "adequate 
steps have been taken to eliminate or substan- 
tially reduce the adverse effect" of the subsidy 
in question. This provision and the other lim- 
itations on the use of the waiver authority which 
are currently in the law would continue in effect 
if the waiver authority is extended. Thus. U.S. 
producers and workers will continue to be 
adequately protected from the adverse effects of 
subsidized competition. 

A successful conclusion to the MTN is essen- 
tial to U.S. economic policy. If the waiver au- 
thority is not extended, such a successful con- 
clusion will, as I have noted, be seriously 
jeopardized. Accordingly, I urge the Congress to 
act positively upon this legislative proposal as 
quickly as possible. 

Jimmy Carter 

Proposed Legislation 

Section 303 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 
U.S.C. 1303) as amended, is further amended 
by adding the following new sentence at the end 
of Subsection (d) (2). 

"The four-year period specified in the first 
sentence of this paragraph shall be extended 
until August 1, 1979. provided that before 
January 3, 1979, the President informs both 
Houses of Congress that agreement on a code 
governing the use of subsidies and counter- 
vailing duties has been reached and that the 
Multilateral Trade Negotiations as a whole have 
been substantially completed and provided 
further that any determination by the Secretary 
of the Treasury made pursuant to this section 
and in effect on January 2, 1979, shall, not- 
withstanding any expiration date set forth 
therein, remain in effect until August 1. 1979, 
unless prior thereto the Secretary has reason to. 
and does, revoke such determination." D 



1 Text from Weekly Compilation of Presiden- 
tial Documents of Oct. 2. 1978. 



21 

levels include the overall level of world 
demand, business confidence, capacity 
utilization, the cost of capital, and the 
cost and availability of complementary 
factors of production. With current 
rates of OECD growth lagging some- 
what behind recent historical rates and 
with capacity utilization rates relatively 
low, it is not surprising that investment 
is restrained. Pervasive uncertainty 
about inflation, threats of protec- 
tionism, erratic variations in exchange 
rates, and changing government 
policies all inhibit investment. 

OECD Economic Performance. 

Overall economic performance in the 
OECD countries continues to be a 
major determinant of developing coun- 
tries' growth; conversely, as develop- 
ing countries expand their industrial 
capacity, their performance will be- 
come increasingly important to the 
economic health of the industrial 
countries. 

Taking the United States as an 
example, our exports of manufactures 
to developing countries which are not 
members of the Organization of Petro- 
leum Exporting Countries (OPEC) were 
$20 billion, in 1977, or 23% of total 
U.S. export of manufactured goods. 
From the early 1970's to 1977, the 12 
fastest growing markets for U.S. ex- 
ports were in the Third World. A 
leveling off of exports to some of these 
markets in the last year or two, in part 
because of foreign exchange con- 
straints, could be an important factor in 
our large trade deficit. The aggregate 
economic performance of developing 
countries in the postwar period, a 
growth rate of approximately 5. 47c 
between 1950 and 1975. has been fairly 
good. Some 28 developing coun- 
tries — accounting for half of the 
population of the Third World — had, 
however, real per capita growth rates 
of less than 2% per year in the same 
period. Thus, the scope for improve- 
ment is substantial. 

In this framework it makes sense to 
ask whether the excess capacity which 
exists in some OECD countries could 
not be harnessed to satisfy some of the 
unmet demands in developing countries 
for the mutual benefit of both groups of 
countries. The reasoning is that indus- 
trial countries could expand employ- 
ment and incomes at the same time that 
developing countries could accelerate 
their accumulation of capital goods. 
Several proposals have been put forth 
which seek simultaneously to promote 
the development objectives in the de- 
veloping countries and to stimulate 
lagging growth in the OECD 
economies. They are very different in 



22 



scope and operation, and il is important 
to distinguish carefully among them. 

Resource Transfer. A proposal by 
the Nordic countries, made last spring 
at the U.N. General Assembly Com- 
mittee of the Whole, envisages a 
transfer of resources — perhaps on a 
massive scale resembling the Marshall 
plan. The proposal would allow for the 
possibility of directing the demand 
created in the developing countries to 
industries with excess capacity in de- 
veloped countries, thus fostering 
noninflationary growth in the short 
term and contributing to higher growth 
rates in the world economy in the long 
term. The proposal does not. however, 
address the question of how the mas- 
sive transfers are to be financed. 

Investment in Developing Coun- 
tries. The proposal submitted by Sen- 
ator Javits and Representatives Whalen 
and Simon, also large in scope, is more 
precise as to the source of funds for 
additional investment in developing 
countries. A large fund would be es- 
tablished, drawing on OPEC's holdings 
of official assets — now in excess of 
$150 billion and largely invested in 
short- to medium-term financial 
assets — to invest in long-term produc- 
tive projects in developing countries. 
The channeling of long-term capital to 
these countries is to both maintain the 
level of world economic activity and 
also provide financing for development 
programs. Without such a rechanneling 
of funds, it is argued, there is a danger 
that purchasing power transferred to 
surplus-saving countries will be held in 
shorter term financial assets in a lim- 
ited number of industrial countries, 
with longrun consequences being a re- 
duction in global demand and limited 
availability of long-term capital for 
investment. 

The World Bank is studying a simi- 
lar proposal put forward by Mexico to 
use reserves of countries in payments 
surpluses for a $15 billion long-term 
recycling facility for purchases by de- 
veloping countries of imports of capital 
goods. The key question which remains 
to be answered satisfactorily with re- 
spect to both the Javits-Whalen-Simon 
proposal and the Mexican proposal is 
how to go about attracting surplus 
country capital into the proposed new 
funds. To put the question another 
way: How do we convince OPEC or 
other countries in surplus, to partici- 
pate in such a plan? 

Another approach to the issue is thai 
taken by the OECD Secretariat in its 
recent work on stepped-up investment. 
The OECD Secretariat proposes an in- 
crease in long-term private investment 



in developing countries, concentrating 
on sectors of mutual interest to de- 
veloping and developed countries. 
Sectors recommended for additional 
investment are food, energy, raw ma- 
terials, and related processing and 
infrastructure. The primary method 
proposed to channel foreign investment 
capital into those sectors is cofinanc- 
ing, whereby private investors become 
partners with multilateral development 
banks in the financing of selected proj- 
ects. The concept of achieving greater 
participation of the commercial bank- 
ing sector via the co financing 
mechanism is attractive, and we plan to 
participate actively in further OECD 
work on this subject. 

Basic Questions 

None of the proposals I have referred 
to have been elaborated in great detail. 
I will confine myself therefore to the 
basic questions which we believe re- 
quire careful thought in evaluating any 
or all of the proposals. 

The most basic question is the terms 
on which the capital is being trans- 
ferred. If we are talking about substan- 
tial transfers of concessional capital to 
the poorer developing countries, we 
must recognize that concern with large 
budget deficits in the United States and 
in many other industrial countries is a 
powerful inhibition to any form of new 
government spending. Also, the type of 
spending in developing countries which 
will best stimulate the OECD 
economies may not be appropriate for 
the kind of development strategy we 
have been supporting — namely growth 
with equity. Demand for imports for 
these purposes in developing countries 
does not generally correspond to those 
sectors in OECD countries with excess 
capacity or to the need of some OECD 
countries to strengthen their external 
payments position. 

If we are talking about transferring 
capital at nonconcessional rates, then 
we need to ask why the international 
financial markets are not now per- 
forming this function. Clearly the mar- 
ket is working fairly well in moving 
short-term capital. Most developing 
countries have successfully drawn on 
nonconcessional and official sources to 
finance unprecedented current account 
deficits during the past few years 
While the system performed well, new 
official mechanisms in the International 
Monetary Fund, such as the Oil Facil- 
ity, the Trust Fund, ami the Extended 
Fund Facility, were created to cope 
with the magnitude of the payments 
balances which occurred. The 
Supplementary Financing Facility 



Department of State Bullet 

(Witteveen facility), which is sti 
awaiting congressional approval. \\i 
further strengthen the IMF's capacitj. 
to help countries overcome payment!,, 
difficulties and thereby to increase the 
spending for the products of the mdu; 
trialized countries. 

The real thrust of the proposals 
have discussed, however, is t 
mobilize capital from the OPEC cour 
tries and other sources for long-ten 
investments in developing countries 
To attract capital into a fund for lonj 
term investments (the Javits-Whaler 
Simon and Mexican plans) or int 
long-term cofinancing plans (th 
OECD plan) will require returns whic 
are remunerative to investors and cor 
ditions and assurances which are aq 
ceptable to them. Insofar as the risk 
associated with investments in de 
veloping countries are higher, becausi 
of a poor investment climate, inapprc 
priate government policies, or simpl 
poor economic prospects, or the ra 
payment period associated with thi 
capital transfer is longer, the returni 
will have to exceed those currentl 
available for medium-term invest 
ments. Such terms will limit both thj 
types of projects which can be undei 
taken and the number of countrie 
which can afford to assume furthe 
high-cost indebtedness. 

The idea of a Marshall plan for th 
Third World and of the less ambitiou 
alternatives derives its attractivenes 
from the presumption that such plan 
would act countercyclical^ to stimu 
late recovery in the industrial eoun 
tries. I have some reservations. Fund 
for projects are never lent or disburse 
quickly or easily. If capital imports ar 
to be additional and useful in develop 
ment efforts, a good deal of planning i 
required. There does not exist a shel 
of sensible projects awaiting funding 
new projects must be developed. Evei 
at the domestic level, the lags involve( 
between domestic policy measures t(» 
stimulate investment and result inj 
changes in investment can be. as we al 
know, rather long and unpredictable 
Using international investment 1 
achieve certain domestic targets is 
therefore, an even more uncertain en- 
terprise. Spending on such long-terrr 
projects should rather be governed b> 
long-term considerations. 

There clearly are cases of attractive 
long-term investment projects in de- 
veloping countries which are not im- 
plemented because of financing con- 
straints due to inadequate guarantees to 
potential investors. Increased official 
development assistance can, to some 
extent, serve to reduce these con- 
straints. 



A 






November 1978 

All summit participants agreed in 
3onn on the need to increase flows. 
50th bilateral and multilateral, of fi- 
nancial assistance and other resources 
"or development. Administration 
.pokesmen have made the same point 
epeatedly in testimony before Con- 
gress. 

The multilateral development banks 
ire in a particularly good position to 
lelp because of the role they are al- 
■eady playing in increasing the flow of 
ong-term capital to developing coun- 
ties. Their multilateral, nonpolitical 
;haracter. their reputation for financial 
ntegrity. and their ability to develop 
iound projects should make it possible 
or them to mobilize capital at noncon- 
:essional rates from OPEC and other 
surplus countries. These countries 
:ould increase their participation by 
purchasing more of the bonds issued by 
:he multilateral development banks. 
They may, however, find some form of 
rofinancing arrangements with the 
oanks to be more attractive because it 
ivvould allow them to pick and choose 
among projects and recipient countries. 

Developing countries would benefit 
from additional project financing at 
ireasonable terms while surplus coun- 
tries would benefit from the guarantees 
Iprovided by the participation of the 
'multilateral development banks as well 

Cis their project expertise. To perform 
his function adequately, the multilat- 
eral development banks must, of 
.course, have sufficient capital to 
backstop their borrowing. I hope we 
can count on congressional support for 
augmenting this capital as it becomes 
necessary. 

Conclusion 

I want to conclude by noting that the 
(Bonn summit was a positive step, but 
only one step, in a long and difficult 
process. We should have no illusions 
about the difficulty of the problems we 
face. Essential to the success of the 
effort is the support of the public and 
legislatures of each country. We also 
need more of the kind of thinking 
which obviously went into the prepara- 
tion of House Concurrent Resolution 
581. Finally. U.S. leadership is critical 
if we are to find effective solutions to 
global economic problems. Such lead- 
ership can only be based on close 
cooperation between the Administra- 
tion and Congress in energy, foreign 
assistance, and other key areas. 

As I have stressed, the basic concept 
of interdependence between developed 
and developing countries is valid. It is 
also clear that there is scope for addi- 
tional investment in developing coun- 



23 



U.S. Export Policy 



PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT, 
SEPT. 26 » 



It is important for this nation's eco- 
nomic vitality that both the private 
sector and the Federal Government 
place a higher priority on exports. I am 
today announcing a series of measures 
that evidences my Administration's 
strong commitment to do so. 

The large trade deficits the United 
States has experienced in recent years 
have weakened the value of the dollar, 
intensified inflationary pressures in our 
own economy, and heightened insta- 
bility in the world economy. These 
trade deficits have been caused by a 
number of factors. A major cause has 
been our excessive reliance on im- 
ported oil. We can reduce that reliance 
through the passage of sound energy 
legislation this year. 

Another factor is that the U.S. econ- 
omy has been growing at a stronger 
pace in recent years than the economies 
of our major trading partners. That has 
enabled us to purchase relatively more 
foreign goods while our trading 
partners have not been able to buy as 
much of our exports. We will begin to 
correct this imbalance as our trading 
partners meet the commitments to eco- 
nomic expansion they made at the 
Bonn summit. 

The relatively slow growth of 
American exports has also been an im- 
portant factor in our trade deficit prob- 
lem. Over the past 20 years, our ex- 
ports have grown at only half the rate 
of other industrial nations, and the 
United States has been losing its share 
of world markets. Until now, both 
business and government have ac- 
corded exports a relatively low prior- 
ity. These priorities must be changed. 

The measures I am announcing today- 



consist of actions this Administration 
has taken and will take to: 

(1) Provide increased direct assist- 
ance to U.S. exporters; 

(2) Reduce domestic barriers to ex- 
ports; and 

(3) Reduce foreign barriers to our 
exports and secure a fairer international 
trading system for all exporters. 

These actions are in furtherance of 
the commitment I made at the Bonn 
summit to an improved U.S. export 
performance. 

Direct Assistance 
to U.S. Exporters 

1 . Export-Import Bank. I have 
consistently supported a more effective 
and aggressive Export-Import Bank. 
During the past 2 years, my Adminis- 
tration has increased Eximbank's loan 
authorization fivefold — from $700 
million in FY 1977 to $3.6 billion for 
FY 1979. I intend to ask Congress for 
an additional $500 million in FY 1980, 
bringing Eximbank's total loan au- 
thorization to $4.1 billion. These au- 
thorizations will provide the Bank with 
the funds necessary to improve its 
competitiveness, in a manner consist- 
ent with our international obligations, 
through increased flexibility in the 
areas of interest rates, length of loans, 
and the percentage of a transaction it 
can finance. The Bank is also moving 
to simplify its fee schedules and to 
make its programs more accessible to 
smaller exporters and to agricultural 
exporters. 

2. SBA Loans to Small Exporters. 

The Small Business Administration 
will channel up to $100 million of its 
current authorization for loan guaran- 
tees to small business exporters to pro- 



tries and that these investments would, 
on balance, improve global economic 
performance. I have identified in this 
preliminary assessment a number of 
questions which merit a much closer 
examination. We will continue to 
examine these ideas internally and in 
conjunction with other countries in the 
United Nations, the OECD, and the 
World Bank. We welcome the guid- 



ance and advice of your committees on 
this subject. □ 



■The complete transcript of the hearings will 
be published by the committee and will be avail- 
able from the Superintendent of Documents. 
U.S. Government Printing Office. Washington. 
DC. 20402. 

2 For text of the Bonn Declaration and related 
material, see Bulletin of Sept. 1978. p. 1. 



24 



vide seed money for their entry into 
foreign markets. Small exporting firms 
meeting SBA's qualifications will be 
eligible for loan guarantees totaling up 
to $500,000 to meet needs for ex- 
panded production capacity and to ease 
cash flow problems involving overseas 
sales or initial marketing expenses. 

3. Export Development Programs. 

1 am directing the Office of Manage- 
ment and Budget to allocate an addi- 
tional $20 million in annual resources 
for export development programs of the 
Departments of Commerce and State to 
assist U.S. firms, particularly small 
and medium-sized businesses, in mar- 
keting abroad through: 

• A computerized information sys- 
tem to provide exporters with prompt 
access to international marketing op- 
portunities abroad and to expose 
American products to foreign buyers; 

• Risk sharing programs to help as- 
sociations and small companies meet 
initial export marketing costs; and 

• Targeted assistance to firms and 
industries with high export potential 
and intensified short-term export cam- 
paigns in promising markets. 

4. Agricultural Exports. Agricul- 
tural exports are a vital component of 
the U.S. trade balance. Over the past 
10 years, the volume of U.S. farm 
exports has doubled and the dollar 
value has nearly quadrupled. Trade in 
agricultural products will contribute a 
net surplus of almost $13 billion in 
fiscal year 1978. This strong perform- 
ance is due in part to this Administra- 
tion's multifaceted agricultural export 
policy, which will be strengthened and 
which includes: 

• An increase of almost $1 billion 
(up from $750 million in FY 1977 to 
$1.7 billion in FY 1978) in the level of 
short-term export credits; 

• An increase of almost 20% in the 
level of funding support for a highly 
successful program of cooperation with 
over 60 agricultural commodity associ- 
ations in market development; 

• Efforts in the multilateral trade 
negotiations to link the treatment of 
agricultural and nonagricultural prod- 
ucts; 

• Opening trade offices in key im- 
porting nations in order to facilitate the 
development of these markets; 

• Aggressive pursuit of an interna- 
tional wheat agreement, to insure our 
producers a fair share of the expanding 
world market; and 

• Support of legislation to provide 
intermediate export credit for selective 
agricultural exports. 

5. Tax Measures. I am hopeful that 



Congress will work with the Adminis- 
tration to promptly resolve the tax 
problems of Americans employed 
abroad, many of whom are directly in- 
volved in export efforts. Last February, 
I proposed tax relief for these citizens 
amounting to about $250 million a 
year. I think this proposal, which Con- 
gress has not approved, deals fairly 
and. during a time of great budget 
stringency, responsibly with this 
problem. I remain ready to work with 
the Congress to resolve this issue, but I 
cannot support proposals which run 
contrary to our strong concerns for 
budget prudence and tax equity. 
My Administration's concern for ex- 
ports is matched by our obligation to 
insure that government-sponsored ex- 
port incentives constitute an efficient 
use of the taxpayers' money. The DISC 
tax provision simply does not meet that 
basic test. It is a costly (over $1 billion 
a year) and inefficient incentive for 
exports. I continue to urge Congress to 
phase DISC out or at least make it 
simpler, less costly, and more effective 
than it is now. and my Administration 
stands ready to work with Congress 
toward that goal. 

Reduction of Domestic Barriers 
to Exports 

Direct financial and technical assist- 
ance to U.S. firms should encourage 
them to take advantage of the increas- 
ing competitiveness of our goods in 
international markets. Equally impor- 
tant will be the reduction of 
government-imposed disincentives and 
barriers which unnecessarily inhibit our 
firms from selling abroad. We can and 
will continue to administer the laws 
and policies affecting the international 
business community firmly and fairly, 
but we can also discharge that respon- 
sibility with a greater sensitivity to the 
importance of exports than has been the 
case in the past. 

1 . Export Consequences of Regu- 
lations. I am directing the heads of all 
executive departments and agencies to 
take into account, and weigh as a fac- 
tor, the possible adverse effects on our 
trade balance of their major adminis- 
trative and regulatory actions that have 
significant export consequences. They 
will report back on their progress in 
identifying and reducing such negative 
export effects where possible, consist- 
ent with other legal and policy obliga- 
tions. I will make a similar request of 
the independent regulatory agencies. In 
addition, the Council of Economic Ad- 
visers will consider export conse- 
quences as part of the Administration's 
regulatory analysis program. 



Department of State Bulletii: 

There may be areas, such as the ex- 
port of products which pose serious 
health and safety risks, where new reg- 
ulations are warranted. But through the 
steps outlined above, I intend to inject 
a greater awareness throughout the 
government of the effects on exports of 
administrative and regulatory actions. 

2. Export Controls for Foreign 
Policy Purposes. I am directing the 
Departments of Commerce. State, De- 
fense, and Agriculture to take export 
consequences fully into account when 
considering the use of export controls 
for foreign policy purposes. Weight 
will be given to whether the goods in 
question are also available from coun- 
tries other than the United States. 

3. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. 

At my direction, the Justice Depart- 
ment will provide guidance to the busi- 
ness community concerning its en- 
forcement priorities under the recently 
enacted foreign antibribery statute. 
This statute should not be viewed as an 
impediment to the conduct of legiti- 
mate business activities abroad. I am 
hopeful that American business will not 
forgo legitimate export opportunities 
because of uncertainty about the appli- 
cation of this statute. The guidance 
provided by the Justice Department 
should be helpful in that regard. 

4. Antitrust Laws. There are in- 
stances in which joint ventures and other 
kinds of cooperative arrangements be- 
tween American firms are necessary or 
desirable to improve our export perform- 
ance. The Justice Department has ad- 
vised that most such foreign joint ven- 
tures would not violate our antitrust 
laws and in many instances would ac- 
tually strengthen competition. This is 
especially true for one-time joint ven- 
tures created to participate in a single 
activity, such as a large construction 
project. In fact, no such joint conduct 
has been challenged under the antitrust 
laws in over 20 years. 

Nevertheless, many businessmen ap- 
parently are uncertain on this point, 
and this uncertainty can be a disincen- 
tive to exports. I have, therefore, in- 
structed the Justice Department, in 
conjunction with the Commerce De- 
partment, to clarify and explain the 
scope of the antitrust laws in this area, 
with special emphasis on the kinds of 
joint ventures that are unlikely to raise 
antitrust problems. 

I have also instructed the Justice De- 
partment to give expedited treatment to 
requests by business firms for guidance 
on international antitrust issues under 
the Department's business review pro- 
gram. Finally, I will appoint a business 
advisory panel to work with the Na- 



illei 



November 1978 



" ional Commission for the Review of 
he Antitrust Laws. 

5. Environmental Reviews. For a 

lumber of years the export community 

las faced the uncertainty of whether 

he National Environmental Policy Act 

NEPA) requires environmental impact 

eif itatements for Federal export licenses, 

>ermits. and approvals. 

I will shortly sign an Executive order 

vhich should assist U.S. exports by 

:liminating the present uncertainties 

to :oncerning the type of environmental 

i»l 'eviews that will be applicable and the 

Isi ^ederal actions relating to exports that 

XI vill be affected. The order will make 

:he following export-related clarifica- 

:ions. 

to 

• Environmental impact statements 

b j will not be required for Federal export 
e} licenses, permits, approvals, and other 
2xport-related actions that have poten- 
tial environmental effects in foreign 
tries. 

Export licenses issued by the De- 
partments of Commerce and Treasury 
will be exempt from any environmental 
reviews required by the Executive 
order. 

Abbreviated environmental re- 
views will be required only with re- 
spect to (1) nuclear reactors, (2) 
financing of products and facilities 
whose toxic effects create serious pub- 
lic health risks, and (3) certain Federal 
actions having a significant adverse 
effect on the environment of nonpar- 
ticipating third countries or natural re- 
sources of global importance. 

Accordingly, this order will establish 
environmental requirements for only a 
minor fraction (well below 5%) of the 
dollar volume of U.S. exports. At the 
same time, it will provide procedures 
to define and focus on those exports 
which should receive special scrutiny 
because of their major environmental 
impacts abroad. This Executive order 
will fairly balance our concern for the 
environment with our interest in pro- 
moting exports. 



Reduction in Foreign Trade 
Barriers and Subsidies 

We are also taking important inter- 
national initiatives to improve U.S. ex- 
port performance. Trade restrictions 
imposed by other countries inhibit our 
ability to export. Tariff and especially 
nontariff barriers restrict our ability to 
develop new foreign markets and ex- 
pand existing ones. We are now work- 
ing to eliminate or reduce these barriers 
through the multilateral trade negotia- 
tions (MTN) in Geneva. 

U.S. export performance is also ad- 



versely affected by the excessive finan- 
cial credits and subsidies which some 
of our trading partners offer to their 
own exporters. One of our major ob- 
jectives in the MTN is to negotiate an 
international code restricting the use of 
government subsidies for exports. In 
addition. I am directing the Secretary 
of the Treasury to undertake immediate 
consultations with our trading partners 
to expand the scope and tighten the 
terms of the existing international ar- 
rangement on export credits. 

I hope that our major trading 
partners will see the importance of 
reaching more widespread agreements 
on the use of export finance to avoid a 
costly competition which is econom- 
ically unsound and ultimately self- 
defeating for all of us. These interna- 
tional agreements are essential to 
assure that American exporters do not 
face unfair competition, and this Ad- 
ministration intends to work vigorously 
to secure them. 

Conclusion 

While these initiatives will assist 
private business in increasing exports, 
our export problem has been building 
for many years, and we cannot expect 
dramatic improvement overnight. In- 
creasing our exports will take time and 
require a sustained effort. Announce- 
ment of my Administration's export 
policy is not the end of our task but 
rather the beginning. To insure that this 
issue continues to receive priority at- 
tention, I am asking Secretary Kreps, 
in coordination with officials from 
other concerned government agencies, 
to direct the continuation of efforts to 
improve our export potential and per- 
formance. 

I will shortly sign an Executive order 
to reconstitute a more broadly based 
President's Export Council to bring a 
continuous flow of fresh ideas into our 
government policymaking process. I 
expect this Council to report to me 
annually through the Secretary of 
Commerce. 

Increasing U.S. exports is a major 
challenge — for business, for labor, and 
for government. Better export perform- 
ance by the United States would spur 
growth in the economy. It would create 
jobs. It would strengthen the dollar and 
fight inflation. 

There are no short-term, easy solu- 
tions. But the actions I am announcing 
today reflect my Administration's de- 
termination to give the United States 
trade deficit the high-level, sustained 
attention it deserves. They are the first 
step in a long-term effort to strengthen 
this nation's export position in world 
trade. 



25 



ASSISTANT SECRETARY KATZ, 
SEPT. 29 

Statement before the Subcommittee 
on International Economics of the 
Joint Economic Committee. Julius L. 
Katz is Assistant Secretary for Eco- 
nomic and Business Affairs. 2 

I am pleased to have the opportunity 
to discuss with this subcommittee the 
role of the Department of State and the 
Foreign Service in the newly an- 
nounced national export policy. 

The Department of State participated 
actively in the work of the interagency 
task force established by the President 
to recommend measures to increase 
U.S. exports. We welcome the com- 
prehensive package of recommenda- 
tions developed by the task force and 
approved by the President, including 
incentives for exports and reducing 
disincentives, which constitute the be- 
ginnings of a national export policy. 
We are especially gratified that the task 
force looked to a policy of increased 
exports as an important element in im- 
proving the current trade account. The 
President's commitment to export 
growth as an important national objec- 
tive will provide the direction needed 
in the executive branch and the Con- 
gress and should give the business 
community the confidence to pursue 
export opportunities more aggressively. 

The Department of State views the 
steps now being taken to develop a 
national export policy as only one ele- 
ment, but an essential element, of our 
overall foreign economic policy. 

A strong U.S. economy and a sound 
dollar are critical ingredients of a stable 
international economy. At the same 
time the United States has a critical 
stake in the health of the world econ- 
omy. It is for this reason that we seek 
to pursue policies which favorably af- 
fect global stability and growth: 

• Efforts in the current multilateral 
trade negotiations to expand trade and 
strengthen trading rules; 

• Solutions to the problems related 
to price stability and security of supply 
of food and other commodities; 

• Programs to conserve energy and 
develop new energy sources at home 
and abroad; 

• Facilities to insure the availability 
of balance-of-payments financing to 
those in need; and 

• Increased flows of financial assist- 
ance and resources for development. 

The success of these policies will 
open new export opportunities. These 
opportunities will not translate into in- 
creased U.S. exports unless U.S. busi- 
ness is prepared to respond to those 



26 

opportunities. Government policy can 
affect that response — positively or 
negatively. 



U.S. Trade 

Recent events have underscored the 
need for a clearly articulated national 
export policy. The United States had a 
$31 billion trade deficit in 1977. 
Through the first 7 months of 1978, the 
deficit is running at an even higher 
annual rate. There are a number of 
explanations: The strength of the U.S. 
recovery combined with the sluggish 
growth of domestic demand in Japan, 
West Germany, and many of our other 
trading partners; the high level of oil 
imports which now provides 40% of 
domestic consumption and a relatively 
high inflation rate in the country com- 
pared to those of West Germany and 
Japan. 

While all of these developments have 
played a role in our deficit, they may 
have masked another fundamental trade 
problem: Slow export growth and a 
deteriorating U.S. share in world trade, 
particularly in manufactured goods. 
Over the past 20 years, U.S. exports 
have grown at only half the rate of 
other industrial countries, with the di- 
vergence increasing in the last several 
years. When we take inflation into ac- 
count, real U.S. exports have virtually 
stood still for more than 3 years; this is 
in sharp contrast to our competitors 
who have managed real export growth 



Department of State Bulletin 



(even if we exclude their exports to the 
United States) of nearly 4% per year 
during the same period. While ag- 
ricultural exports have held up well, 
and have in fact even grown, the vol- 
ume of exports of American manufac- 
tured goods has fallen since 1974. In 
1976 we still enjoyed a $12 billion 
surplus in trade in manufactured goods. 
That surplus fell to $3 billion in 1977. 
So far this year, trade in this category 
is in deficit at an annual rate of $12 
billion. 

As a result of the depreciation of the 
dollar and the appreciation of the cur- 
rencies of our major trading partners, 
we should expect to see an improve- 
ment in our competitive position af- 
fecting both exports and imports. 
Again, the increased competitiveness 
of our exports which dollar deprecia- 
tion produces will only expand oppor- 
tunities. It will not insure that U.S. 
exporters take advantage of those op- 
portunities. 



U.S. Commercial Activities 

The Departments of Commerce and 
State jointly operate programs for ex- 
port promotion and marketing, and it is 
planned to expand these activities to 
assist in meeting the goal of maximiz- 
ing exports. The Department of State 
performs the following broad 
categories of functions in carrying out 
its export promotion activities. 



• We provide Foreign Service offi- 
cers qualified in economic and com- 
mercial affairs to conduct export 
promotion programs. The State De- 
partment has roughly 900 economic- 
commercial officers, 300 of whom are 
fully or principally engaged in com- 
mercial work. These officers work in 
the Department and in our embassies, 
consulates, and trade centers abroad. 

• We provide our overseas posts 
with guidance and assistance in man- 
aging their individual export promotion 
programs. Thirty-seven embassies in 
major commercial markets abroad op- 
erate under a State-Commerce annual 
plan called a country commercial pro- 
gram. This management-by-objective 
document establishes plans and pro- 
grams for efficiently utilizing our 
commercial resources to achieve spe- 
cific goals. Additional embassies in 
smaller markets target their activities 
and manage their resources under a 
simplified type of annual plan called a 
commercial action program. 

• We coordinate with other U.S. 
Government agencies to insure effec- 
tive export promotion assistance for the 
American business community. For 
example, information collected at 
Foreign Service posts is distributed in 
the United States by the Department of 
Commerce. 

• At our posts overseas we assist 
visiting American businessmen to es- 
tablish appropriate trade contacts and 



I 



[ 



PRESIDENT'S REMARKS, 
SEPT. 26* 

One of the problems that our nation has 
faced for several years, but with growing 
concern recently, has been the very high 
negative trade balance. We have imported 
a great deal more than we have exported. 

There are obviously several reasons for 
this. One is the extraordinary increase in 
the imports of oil which, as you know, 
have increased 800% in the last 6 years, so 
that we now import about half our total oil. 
This has created inflationary pressures. It 
has caused some doubt about our nation's 
leadership, and we have been considering 
lor a number ot months what we might do 
about this problem. 

I know the obvious cause for high trade 
imbalance is not exporting enough of the 
products that we ourselves can produce. 
Secretary Juanita Kreps — Secretary ot 
Commerce — has been working with a task 
force recently in trying to resolve this par- 
ticular aspect of our problem 

Obviously, exported goods create much 
needed jobs for Americans, and it corrects 
the defects that I've just described to you. 



We've never been a nation that emphasized 
exports enough, because we've been so 
highly blessed with natural resources, ap- 
proaching a degree almost of self- 
sufficiency. 

We've never depended upon exports as 
have other nations who trade with us like 
Japan , Germany, and others. But there's a 
growing consciousness in our country now 
that we would like to accelerate, that ex- 
port commitments should be a part of every 
producer in our country, both large. 
medium-sized, and small- 
Many people don't know how to export 
They don't know how to package goods lor 
sales overseas, how to get their products to 
a transportation center, how to deliver and 
handle the paperwork, how to locale 
foreign buyers. These are the kinds of edu- 
cational processes that we hope to explore. 
also. 

Lately we've been slowing down in re- 
search and development commitment in our 
country, as well, and we hope to expedite a 
recommitment to planning for the future, 
so that we can he technologically compati- 
ble and competitive with our foreign trad- 
ing partners. 



We also, of course, want to remove trade 
barriers that have been created by congres- 
sional action and by administrative action 
which prevents exports from going over- 
seas, and we are negotiating with our 
foreign trade partners to eliminate trade 
barriers that prevent our own products from 
entering their countries. In doing this, we 
must be careful not to lower our standards 
for environmental quality or the safety or 
health of American workers, or our com- 
mitment to principles of human rights and 
others on which our nation has been 
founded and exists 

Secretary of Commerce Juanita Kreps 
will now give you some specific proposals 
that have been evolved by her own depart 
ment, by Members of Congress, by other 
members of the Cabinet, and by the husi 
ness and labor leaders of our country.** 



*Made to reporters assembled in the 
Briefing Room at the White House (text 
from Weekly Compilation of Presidential 
Documents of Oct. 2. 1978) 

**FolIowing the President's remarks. 
Secretary Kreps held a news conference on 
the proposals, the text of which was issued 
as a White House press release. 



ovember 1978 

resolve any commercial problems 
Cot ey encounter. 

We assure that all activities under- 
ken under commercial programs are 
>nsistent with overall U.S. foreign 
)licy objectives. This is achieved 
rough frequent interagency meetings 
nong senior officials. 



27 



7 



The commercial activities performed 
/ the U.S. Foreign Service are aimed 
8 imarily at assisting firms to enter and 
nan cpand their markets abroad, giving 
>ecial attention to the needs of small 
1 id medium-sized companies. Foreign 
ervice posts provide these firms, 
irough the Department of Commerce, 
ith a continuing flow of reports on 
onomic trends and market develop- 
lents, market research, trade opportu- 
ities, major economic development 
rojects. and background financial and 
Dmmercial information on prospective 
gents, distributors, and purchasers of 
merican products. In addition, the 
osts actively help organize and pro- 
lote U.S. trade and industrial exhibi- 
ons abroad. They also arrange for 
>reign buyers to come to the United 
tates to visit American trade shows 

American firms. 
Our posts abroad also operate com- 
lercial libraries and publish and dis- 
ibute commercial newsletters to pro- 
ide the most important business and 
overnment buyers, agents, and end- 
sers with current information on 
imerican products, services, and tech- 
ology. These activities are, of course, 
i addition to the posts' ongoing assist- 
ince to visiting American businessmen 
(nd to the resident American business 
ommunity. 

With the need to service a larger 
lientele in mind, the Export Policy 
'ask Force indicated that increased 
omestic staffing and additional com- 
nercia! personnel in our Foreign Serv- 
ce posts abroad are necessary to carry 
ut expanded commercial activities. 
The President has directed the Office of 
4anagement and Budget to allocate an 
idditional $20 million in annual re- 
ources for export development pro- 

frams of the Departments of Com- 
lerce and State. 

With these new export promotion 

guidelines, we have begun exploring 

he following programs in order to be 

Drepared to accommodate this projected 

xpansion. 

• We have reviewed post commer- 
cial activities and business assistance 



patterns in order to determine in which 
geographic regions and at which em- 
bassies and consulates we might expect 
the heaviest initial commercial work- 
load increase to develop. 

• We are identifying those Foreign 
Service posts which can be expected to 
cope with the increased work require- 
ments without increasing their re- 
sources. 

• Then we will target selected key 
posts for additional personnel where 
this appears necessary. 

• We will explore means of in- 
creasing the flexibility of our personnel 
resource allocation process to speed 
our response in cases where the need 
for enhanced commercial services to 
U.S. export-motivated industries de- 
velops rapidly and/or exceeds present 
projections. 

In our preparations to expand the 
worldwide capabilities within the 
commercial function, we are seeking 
to absorb as much as possible of the 
cost of that expansion from existing 
resources within the Department. 

A key determinant of a nation's 
success in exporting is the existence 
of a substantial number of highly 
motivated and competitive domestic 
industries which are vigorously en- 
gaged in seeking out and exploiting 
sales opportunities in overseas mar- 
kets. Government export promotion 
programs can help assure that infor- 
mation on foreign markets and firms 
is available to present and potential 
exporters, that opportunities are 
available to exporters to display their 
products abroad, and that exports are 
not discriminated against by foreign 
governments. But export promotion 
programs of this or any other country 
cannot be effective in the absence of 
a strong commitment by the private 
sector itself to seek overseas markets. 

The positive government policies 
included in the new export policy are 
essential to provide the climate and 
framework for an expanded export 
effort. The Department of State is 
committed to giving its fullest support 
to this effort. □ 



1 Text from Weekly Compilation of Presi- 
dential Documents of Oct. 2, 1978. 

2 The complete transcript of the hearings 
will be published by the committee and will be 
available from the Superintendent of Docu- 
ments, U.S. Government Printing Office, 
Washington. DC. 20402. 



Publications 



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Remittances, parable to the Superintendent of 
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Agricultural Research. Agreement with 
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Egypt amending the agreement of October 

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600. (Cat. No. S9. 10:8828.) 
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15. 1975. TIAS 8879. 4 pp. 600. (Cat. No. 
S9. 10:8879.) □ 



28 



Department of State Bullet 



EUROPE: An Overview of U.S.'Soviet Relations 



jikes 
ii fw 



by Marshall D. Shulman 

Statement before the Subcommittee 
on Europe and the Middle East of the 
House Committee on International 
Relations on September 26, 1978. 
Ambassador Shulman is Special Ad- 
viser to the Secretary of State on 
Soviet Affairs. ' 

Last year when I had the privilege 
oi testifying before your subcommit- 
tee, I presented an overview of U.S.- 
Soviet relations as of that time — 
October 1 977.- Today, I propose to 
discuss the developments that have oc- 
curred in U.S. -Soviet relations since 
that time, to analyze the reasons for 
those developments, and to discuss 
present prospects for the relationship. 

It has been characteristic of U.S.- 
Soviet relations since World War II 
that they have fluctuated between 
periods of high and low tension. Dur- 
ing the past year, relations have 
moved toward relatively higher ten- 
sion, continuing an uneven trend from 
the latter part of 1975. 

From the point of view of the 
United States, the causes of this de- 
terioration were to be found mainly in 
the following Soviet actions. 

• In exploiting opportunities for the 
expansion of its influence in Africa, 
the Soviet Union exceeded a reason- 
able level of restraint in the transport 
of weapons and Cuban combat person- 
nel onto the continent, thereby exacer- 
bating local conflict situations. 

• The deployment of new strategic 
weapons systems and the continued up- 
grading of Soviet armaments in the 
European theatre raised uncertainties 
about Soviet intentions. 

• The heightening of Soviet police 
actions against Soviet dissidents, 
American correspondents, and an 
American businessman, and the con- 
tinued harassment of Soviet citizens 
who apply for emigration, reflected a 
lack of regard for commitments under 
the Helsinki agreement. 

While we cannot accept the Soviet 
view, it is important for us to engage 
in a serious analytical effort to identify 
key elements of the present Soviet 
world view. As we understand Soviet 
perceptions, the following charges 
which they have levied against the 
United States loom largest for them. 

• Moscow complains of dilatory 



conduct of negotiations on SALT, 
mutual and balanced force reductions, 
a comprehensive test ban, and the In- 
dian Ocean. 

• In the global political arena, the 
Soviet Union is suspicious of Western 
steps to strengthen China against the 
Soviet Union, resents exclusion from 
the Middle East negotiations, and be- 
lieves the reaction to its competition 
for influence in Africa is dispropor- 
tionate and unreasonable. 

• The Soviet regime sees a U.S. 
effort to use human rights issues to 
undermine its political authority. 

• It is disturbed by what it sees as 
efforts to rekindle the cold war by 
economic pinpricks. 

One of the difficulties of the situa- 
tion is that the Soviet leadership sees 
the deterioration in relations as largely 
stemming from cold war pressures 
within the United States and does not 
perceive how actions of the Soviet 
Union — its security apparatus, its 
military, its propagandists — have con- 
tributed to a hardening of American 
attitudes toward the Soviet Union. It 
is, of course, a natural tendency not 
"to see oursels as ithers see us," as 
the poet Bobby Burns put it, and we 
are not immune from this tendency. 
But the problem is compounded in the 
Soviet case by the fact that these are 
the actions of institutions deeply 
rooted in the Soviet system, and the 
world view of the leadership is cir- 
cumscribed by its limited experience 
of the outside world. 

ANALYSIS OF RECENT 
DEVELOPMENTS 

In seeking to understand why rela- 
tions have deteriorated, we can sort 
out some objective factors in the situ- 
ation. The relationship between the 
United States and the Soviet Union has 
always been subject to changes in the 
external international situation, which 
is the terrain on which the two coun- 
tries meet. 

In the present period, a principal 
factor is that the continent of Africa, 
culminating several decades of post 
colonial change, has entered upon a 
period of extraordinary fluidity, in 
which many sources of conflict have 
come to a head. This creates situations 
in which the Soviet Union sees op- 
portunities for the expansion of its in- 
fluence, and this in turn inevitably 



heightens the competitive tension 
the U.S. -Soviet relationship. Th 
Soviet Union has not interpreted "dt 
tente" or "peaceful coexistence' 
precluding such actions. 

There are also factors within th 
Soviet Union that contribute t 
heightened tension in the relationship 
The powerful entrenched polic 
bureaucracy inevitably presses fo 
tighter control and punitive action 
against the expression of dissider 
opinion during periods of reduced in 
ternational tension, thus precipitatin 
international reactions which cu 
across the foreign policy interests o 
the Soviet Union. Moreover, the con 
siderable strength of the militar 
bureaucracies tends to perpetuate sup 
port for military programs without re 
gard for their impact on the other in 
ternational policies of the government. 

In addition, there are factors in thi 
American situation which affect thi 
relationship. 

• The blurring of popular under 
standing of the limitations o 
"detente" contributed to a sense o" 
disillusionment and anger when tht 
competitive aspects of the relationship 
became more evident. 

• A measured and effective reaction 
to the military and political competi 
tion from the Soviet Union has been 
made more difficult by the persisting 
post-Vietnam apprehension that the 
United States may be seen as lacking 
sufficient will and resolution. 

• The implementation of a unified 
and coordinated foreign policy by the 
United States has become more com- 
plex, both because the issues them- 
selves have become more complex andl 
also as a result of the shifting balance 
of responsibility for the conduct of 
foreign policy between the executive 
and legislative branches of govern- 
ment. 

Given the existence of these factors 
in the external international situation 
and within the Soviet Union and the 
United States, it should not be sur- 
prising that the course of U.S. -Soviet 
relations does not follow a straight 
line. Nevertheless, it lies within our 
power to magnify or moderate the ef- 
fect of these factors. It should be evi- 
dent that it is in our national interest 
to moderate them, as much as possi- 
ble, since a high level of tension in 
the U.S. -Soviet relationship inevitably 



[RES 

l',v 



led 
ltl» 
lidsi 
Jays 

tacti 
lit) 
Ike 
itlof 
A 
lit 
lot 



November 1978 

makes all other problems facing us in 
our foreign relations more difficult and 



more dangerous. 



PRESENT STATE OF 
U.S. -SO VIET RELATIONS 

In this short perspective, one can 
only speak of trends with fingers 
crossed, but it appears possible that 
the deterioration in Soviet-American 
relations may have bottomed out in 
midsummer. During the August holi- 
days, a lull in the chain of actions and 
reactions gave both sides an opportu- 
nity to reflect on the consequences of 
the momentum that had been de- 
veloping in the downward spiral. 

A number of steps on the Soviet 
side in recent weeks suggests that the 
Soviet Union wishes to reverse the 
tide of events. 

• The court action against two 
American correspondents, who had 
been charged with slander as part of 
an effort to limit Western news re- 
porting on Soviet dissidents, was ter- 
minated. 

• An American businessman who 
had been charged with currency viola- 
tions, apparently in retaliation for the 
arrest of two Soviet citizens for es- 
pionage, was allowed to leave the 
country after a transparently contrived 
trial. 

• The inhumane severity of sen- 
tences in human rights cases has been 
relatively reduced in the most recent 
series of trials, following the convic- 
tion of Shcharanskiy, and the Soviet 
leadership has agreed to allow a 
number of families to leave the coun- 
try who had previously been denied 
permission to do so. The level of 
Jewish emigration from the Soviet 
Union has continued to rise and is now 
higher than at any time since 1973. 

• Although further serious problems 
may lie ahead in southern Africa, 
there are some grounds for a tentative 
judgment that the Soviet Union has 
observed certain limitations in 
Ethiopia and has not sought to prevent 
Angola from playing a constructive 
role in composing its relations with 
Zaire and in the Namibian problem. 

The logic of the Soviet situation 
suggests that the same reasons that 
prompted the Brezhnev regime about a 
decade ago to commit itself decisively 
to a foreign policy of "peaceful 
coexistence" (that is, a continuation of 
the competition without war and at re- 
duced levels of tension) are, if any- 
thing, more compelling today than they 
were then. Domestically, the Soviet 
system still faces the need for structural 



changes to raise both agricultural and 
industrial productivity and to encour- 
age the growth of the advanced tech- 
nological sector of its economy. 

In its foreign relations, the Soviet 
Union is concerned about delicate in- 
stabilities in Eastern Europe, a mount- 
ing challenge from China, and rela- 
tively unpromising prospects elsewhere 
in the world, with the partial and still 
uncertain exception of parts of Africa. 
In the military balance, the continued 
high level of resources devoted by the 
Soviet Union to its strategic and con- 
ventional forces has stimulated a higher 
level of military effort by the United 
States and its NATO allies. 

Each of these problems would be 
compounded by a foreign policy that 
would result in higher tensions. Mis- 
calculations, irrationality, and 
bureaucratic free wheeling are always 
possible, but if prudence and logic pre- 
vail, and if present and future Soviet 
leaders perceive that the United States 
is equally willing to conduct the re- 
lationship at reduced levels of tension, 
it should be possible to put matters 
onto a more sensible footing. 

For its part, the United States has 
been taking measured steps to encour- 
age further movement by the Soviet 
Union toward the resolution of funda- 
mental problems still unresolved. 

The strains of the recent past may 
create an opportunity for us to put the 
U.S. -Soviet relationship on a more 
realistic and steady course, in place of 
the alternations between extreme hos- 
tility and shallow optimism which have 
dominated our attitudes in the past. 

The President has made it clear that 
it is an integral element in U.S. foreign 
policy to recognize that the Soviet- 
American relationship in the present 
period, while fundamentally competi- 
tive in nature as a result of our differ- 
ent views of the world and our con- 
flicting long term aims, at the same 
time also includes some important 
overlapping interests. Preeminent 
among these common interests is the 
necessity of navigating the mine fields 



Letters 
of Credence 



On October 2, 1978. President Car- 
ter accepted the credentials of Dr. 
Horst Grunert of the German Demo- 
cratic Republic and Sean Donlon of 
Ireland as their countries' newly ap- 
pointed Ambassadors to the United 
States. □ 



29 

of conflict in the world today so that 
they do not precipitate a world nuclear 
war. 

From this it follows that the priority 
governing our relations with the Soviet 
Union in the present period is to 
strengthen our security by seeking to 
stabilize the military competition be- 
tween the two superpowers and by 
working toward a regulation of the 
political competition so that it does not 
increase the danger of war. Viewing 
the relationship with the Soviet Union 
as a process extending over many dec- 
ades, it is part of our longer term pur- 
pose to encourage a widening of the 
sphere of cooperative actions to effect 
a moderating influence on the funda- 
mental character of the relationship 
to the extent that this may become 
possible. 

CURRENT ISSUES IN 
U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS 

Strategic Arms Limitation Talks 

Although it has not received much 
public attention, the work of the two 
SALT delegations at Geneva has 
brought to completion perhaps 95% of 
a SALT II agreement. Their work is 
embodied in a joint draft agreement of 
more than 60 pages, which specifies in 
great technical detail the definitions, 
verification procedures, and other as- 
pects that must be covered with preci- 
sion to avoid later misunderstanding. 

Meanwhile, in a series of meetings 
between Secretary Vance and Foreign 
Minister Gromyko. the remaining is- 
sues have been under active negotia- 
tion. Although these issues are few in 
number, they are complex and impor- 
tant to one side or the other. There has 
been some narrowing of differences on 
these issues, and it is possible that 
agreement could be reached in the near 
future. 

Once agreement is reached, the re- 
sults will be placed before the Congress 
and the American people, and there 
will be a full opportunity for debate 
and discussion of every detail. I be- 
lieve that it will be the judgment of the 
Congress and the American people that 
the proposed SALT II agreement 
strengthens the security of the United 
States and of its allies. 

It will be apparent to all, I believe, 
that in the absence of such an agree- 
ment, both the United States and the 
Soviet Union would increase at 
dangerous rates the destructive capa- 
bility at their disposal and that the se- 
curity of both countries and of the en- 
tire world would thereby be seriously 
reduced. 

Agreement in SALT is not based 



30 

upon trust but is soundly based upon 
practical verification measures. 

A great effort has been made to con- 
tinue" the SALT negotiations, not- 
withstanding the increase of tension in 
other aspects of the Soviet-American 
relationship, on the self-evident 
grounds that our interest in reducing 
The danger of war by stabilizing the 
military competition does not become 
diminished during periods of greater 
tension The President and Secretary 
Vance have repeatedly emphasized that 
it would be short-sighted in the extreme 
to delay the completion of a strategic 
arms limitation accord for reasons re- 
lated to other issues. 

'n one crucial respect, SALT is dif- 
ferent from all other negotiations. We 
can never let it be far from our minds 
that what is at issue is the growing ca- 
pability of the human race to obliterate 
itself. Nothing in the human experience 
with warfare, nor in the extraordinary 
development of nuclear and missile 
technology in recent years, would jus- 
tify any sense of complacency about 
the possibility of nuclear war. The fact 
is that negotiations to limit nuclear 
capabilities have crawled in the past 9 
years, while destructive military tech- 
nology has had a phenomenal 
expansion — testimony at the same time 
to mankind's genius and lack of any 
sane sense of proportion. 

Other Arms Control Issues 

While SALT has been our most sig- 
nificant arms limitation negotiation, the 
United States and U.S.S.R. have con- 
tinued discussions in a variety of other 
forums. 

Comprehensive Test Ban. We have 
continued negotiations with the Soviet 
Union and the United Kingdom on a 
treaty banning nuclear weapons tests 
The desirability of this goal has never 
been in doubt, but a king-lasting con- 
cern has been whether such a ban 
would be verifiable. In the past months 
we have made major strides toward the 
establishment of an adequate verifica- 
tion regime. The Soviet Union has 
agreed to cease use of nuclear explo- 
sions for peaceful purposes, agreeing 
with us that at the present time it would 
be impossible to rule out military 
benefit from such events; it has also 
taken a general 1) constructive approach 
to other verification issues. Though de- 
cisions remain to be made in our own 
government and also on the part of the 
Soviet Union on our respective ap- 
proaches to some of the still unresolved 
issues, the completion of these trilat- 
eral negotiations should be possible. 

Mutual and Balanced Force Re- 
ductions. These negotiations have been 



underway in Vienna for more than 5 
years. The rate of progress in them has 
been exceedingly slow, to the point 
that the general public sometimes 
forgets they are still in train. But their 
pace derives from their complexity — 
and their importance. They are an ini- 
tial attempt to reach agreement on a 
politically and militarily significant re- 
duction in the level of the confrontation 
between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. 

The last few months have, in fact, 
produced some significant steps. A 
Western initiative in April was fol- 
lowed by an Eastern counterproposal in 
June which, while it moved toward ac- 
ceptance of the framework for an 
agreement which we had proposed 5 
years earlier, left serious differences 
with the Soviets on a number of sub- 
stantive issues, most importantly on the 
number of troops they and their allies 
presently have in the reduction area. 
But I am more optimistic now that the 
negotiations can produce a significant 
result than I could have been a year 
ago. 

Conventional Arms Transfer Lim- 
itations. Since my appearance before 
your subcommittee last October, U.S. 
and Soviet delegations have met three 
times to establish the groundwork for 
seeking agreement on general princi- 
ples to restrain arms transfers to third 
countries and regions. We have been 
pleased to note that the Soviet side has 
addressed the issue seriously. At the 
same time, the problem is enormously 
complex, and we cannot expect signifi- 
cant results immediately. The fact that 
the dialogue has begun, however, of- 
fers some hope. 

Antisatellite Arms Control. We 

have held one meeting with the Soviets 
on this subject. The Soviet Union has 
expressed interest in the possibility oi 
avoiding competition in the field of 
antisatellite weaponry. We hope to 
have a second session later this year. 

Indian Ocean. Since the fourth 
round of talks in February 1978. on 
stabilizing force levels in the Indian 
Ocean, these discussions have been in 
recess. It is the U.S. position that in- 
creased Soviet military presence and 
activit) in the region has been incon- 
sistent with the objectives of the talks. 
The U.S.S.R. has only recently re- 
turned to former levels of its naval 
forces, but their intentions with regard 
to the Arabian Peninsula and the Horn 
of Africa continue to arouse concern in 
the area. Since the goal of these discus- 
sions is io produce an agreement which 
would limit Soviet military presence 
and activitj in the area, as well as ours. 
I believe the United States would be 
receptive to evidence that the Soviet 



Department of State Bulletii 

Union is still seriously interested in the 
original objective agreed upon in these 
discussions — stabilization of the U.S. 
and Soviet military presence in the area 
at the level which obtained when the 
talks began, with the further goal ofl 
eventual reduction in these levels. 

Chemical Weapons and Radiologi- 
cal Weapons. Negotiations are pro- 
ceeding separately in Geneva on these 
two areas. Verification and definitional 
problems remain, but the prospects are 
good for the long term. 

In general, talks in the field of arms 
limitation have been productive as well 
as instructive, although extremely 
slow. There has been some narrowing 
of differences in the approach of the 
two countries toward these issues, and 
despite the suspicion that inevitably 
dominates matters affecting military 
security, the Soviet leadership clearly 
wishes to avoid nuclear war and shares 
our concern over the dangerous effect 
of unrestrained military — and particu- 
larly nuclear — competition. 

It is important to note that these 
talks, and any agreements that might 
result, are not inspired by or based on 
mutual trust nor by an effort simply to 
improve the general climate of rela- 
tions. Rather, both sides have realisti- 
cally assessed them to be in each 
country's self-interest. Progress in one 
area, particularly SALT, can enhance 
the prospects for progress on other is- 
sues. At the same time, each negotia- 
tion is carried out on its own merits, 
and concrete results will be the ulti- 
mate criteria on which we judge the 
success of our efforts to restrain the 
military competition. 

International Political Issues 

Africa. Since the Angolan conflict 
in 1975-76. and again since last Oc- 
tober, much of the controversy in 
U.S. -Soviet affairs has centered on the 
issue of Soviet activities in Africa. The 
introduction by the Soviets of modern 
military equipment. Cuban combat 
troops, and Soviet military advisers 
into conflicts in the Horn and in south- 
ern Africa has escalated the level of 
violence and obstructed the peaceful 
resolution of these disputes. The fact 
that these Soviet/Cuban forces remain 
in Angola and Ethiopia raises questions 
about Moscow's ultimate intentions 
and is of continuing concern to the 
United States and our allies. We have 
repeatedly made these concerns known 
to the Soviets at the highest level. 

Looking at the specific instances of 
Soviet actions in Africa, one is drawn 
to the conclusion that Moscow has 
sought primarily to take advantage of 
opportunities rather than to implement 



e 
I; 

Hi; 

lir 

lit! 



lovember 1978 



31 



me grand design for subversion of 
e continent. In Angola and Ethiopia, 
ie Soviet Union, by taking sides in 
ical disputes, was able to tip the bai- 
lee in favor of its clients. While ini- 
all\ successful, this policy has led the 
aviet Union into a position where 
k'en greater commitments, some 
§ainst its own interests, may be re- 
aired to maintain its position. 
In Angola. Soviet involvement arose 
om support of a national liberation 
ruggle against Portuguese colonial 
lie. In 1975 Soviet military assistance 
id Cuban troops insured the ascend- 
lce of one liberation group, the Pop- 
ar Movement for the Liberation of 
ngola. over its rivals. 

Western diplomatic efforts have 
>ught to facilitate a settlement in 
amibia and to encourage a reconcilia- 
:>n between Zaire and Angola, thereby 
ducing tension along their common 
irder. The Angolan Government has 
cently undertaken a concerted effort 

broaden its foreign policy through 
iproved relations with the West. 
In Ethiopia. Soviet intervention in 
ie Ethiopia-Somalia war was mou- 
nted by strategic, geopolitical, and 
eological considerations and was 
inforced by their expulsion from 
imalia in November 1977. After 
curing an Ethiopian victory in the 
gaden, the Soviet Union provided 
gistical support, but no Soviet or 
uban combat forces, for an Ethiopian 
Tensive in Eritrea. Support for the 
hiopians against the three Eritrean 
surgent groups — one of which, the 
iritrean People's Liberation Front, is a 
ngstanding Marxist revolutionary 
•ovement — created problems for the 
oviet Union in its relations with sev- 
ral radical Arab states and opened 
iem to criticism from radicals as well 

moderates in the recent Organization 
African Unity (OAU) and 
maligned conferences. Soviet efforts 

bring about a negotiated settlement 

Eritrea have, on the other hand, 
eated tensions in their relations with 
ie Mengistu regime in Ethiopia. 
In southern Africa, the Soviet Union 
as provided military assistance to 
lerrilla forces engaged in an OAU- 
pported effort to topple the white- 
ominated government in Rhodesia, 
he amount of Soviet assistance has 
en limited so far. however, by the 
Inwillingness of leaders of the sur- 
punding front-line states to allow a 
[irger Soviet/Cuban presence in guer- 
illa camps in their countries. Further, 
hese leaders have supported Anglo- 
Lmerican efforts to achieve an all- 
arties negotiated settlement and have 
ivored this course over options en- 
jiiling greater Soviet involvement. It is 



unclear whether this situation will con- 
tinue to prevail in Rhodesia, given the 
recent appeals for greater resort to 
violence. We continue to urge restraint 
upon the Soviet Union in recognition of 
the extremely serious consequences of 
an escalation of the fighting. 

In our view, African problems are 
best solved by Africans in an African 
context. By addressing the underlying 
problems, we reduce the opportunities 
for Soviet exploitation of African situ- 
ations. It is the actions of the African 
states which will ultimately lead to a 
reduction of the Soviet/Cuban presence 
and prevent their intrusion in future 
conflicts. 

Middle East. It is too early to assess 
the full impact of recent developments 
in the Middle East on U.S. -Soviet re- 
lations. The Soviet Union has sought to 
become an active participant in Middle 
East negotiations through the conven- 
ing of a Geneva conference, and it has 
bitterly expressed its frustration at the 
course of events that followed Presi- 
dent Sadat's trip to Jerusalem 
[November 1977], leading up to the 
Camp David summit meeting [Sep- 
tember 5-17. 1978]. Brezhnev, in a 
speech on September 22. criticized the 
Camp David summit results as intended 
to split the Arab countries. He said this 
could only make the situation in the 
Middle East more difficult. What the 
Soviet position will be in the long run 
may depend upon the position of Syria 
and the Palestine Liberation Organiza- 
tion. 

We recognize the strong Soviet 
interest in the Middle East and would 
welcome any positive contribution the 
U.S.S.R. can make to the long term 
amelioration of the problems of the 
area. 

The Chinese Factor. In recent 
months, there has been a marked inten- 
sification of Soviet expressions of con- 
cern about the developing relationship 
between the People's Republic of 
China and the United States, and this 
issue appears to be on its way to be- 
coming a major element in the U.S.- 
Soviet relationship. 

The heightening of Soviet concerns 
is primarily related to the recent out- 
ward thrust of China's foreign policy 
and its increasingly active efforts to 
oppose the Soviet Union in every part 
of the world. This includes the recent 
completion of the peace and friendship 
treaty between Japan and the P.R.C. 
(which the Soviet Union strongly op- 
posed), the flaring up of tensions be- 
tween China and Vietnam, the highly 
publicized visits of P.R.C. Chairman 
Hua Kuo-feng to Eastern Europe and 
Iran, and the new Chinese interest in 



acquiring Western technology and 
perhaps military hardware. 

The Administration is committed to 
seeking to continue to improve the 
U.S. -P.R.C. relations within the 
framework of the Shanghai com- 
munique. We have repeatedly made 
clear our official position that the nor- 
malization of Sino-U.S. relations 
would be a desirable development in 
the interest of world peace and not 
directed against the interest of any 
other state. 

While the Soviet Union has asserted 
that it has no objections to the move- 



\itith Report 
on Cyprus 



MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS, 
SEPT. 1 ' 

As required by Public Law 94-104. this re- 
port describes the progress that has been made 
towards a negotiated settlement on Cyprus in 
the past sixty days. 

The last report described proposals submitted 
by the Turkish Cypriots on April 13. and noted 
several expressions of flexibility subsequently 
made by the Turkish side. In July there were 
further encouraging signs. Both the Government 
of Cyprus and the Turkish Cypriot leadership 
put forward fresh and promising proposals for 
the resettlement of the important commercial 
and resort city of Varosha (New Famagusta). 
Varosha has been deserted and under Turkish 
control since the 1974 fighting Significantly, 
both sides foresee that progress on this issue 
will lead to a resumption of the intercommunal 
negotiations. 

We have urged the two Cypriot parties to 
give these proposals careful consideration, and 
plan to continue to encourage a satisfactory 
compromise on Varosha, one we hope will lead 
them to reconvene the intercommunal negotia- 
tions under the aegis of the Secretary General 
of the United Nations. 

Both the Congress and the Administration 
feel that the United States 1) should continue to 
play an active role in seeking a just and lasting 
Cyprus settlement, and 2) should continue to 
support the efforts of Secretary General Wald- 
heim. On August 14, the conference committee 
on the Security Assistance Bill approved the 
language to end the Turkish Arms Embargo. I 
consider this action appropriate and necessary 
to our continuing impartial and constructive 
role. 

Jimmy Carter □ 



1 Text from Weekly Compilation of Presi- 
dential Documents of Sept. 4. 



32 

ment toward normalization, it has ex- 
pressed particular concern that steps in 
this direction may be presented as di- 
rected against the Soviet Union, and it 
has shown special sensitivity to the 
prospect that the United States or the 
West may become a source of military 
technology or hardware for the 
People's Republic of China. 

Soviet apprehensions are deeply 
rooted, and the issue seems certain to 
remain a sensitive one in the Soviet- 
American dialogue. 

Human Rights 

The issue of human rights has con- 
tinued to be among the most conten- 
tious aspects of recent Soviet-American 
relations. This was evident at the Bel- 
grade Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe which reviewed 
implementation of the Helsinki Final 
Act. While from the Western point of 
view, the review conducted at Belgrade 
reaffirmed the legitimate interest of the 
international community in encourag- 
ing respect by individual states for their 
commitments to the enlargement of 
human rights, the Soviet response was 
to reject the process as an improper 
interference in its internal affairs. 

The Soviet Union sees our advocacy 
of individual human rights in the world 
as a fundamental challenge to the 
dominant political and ideological po- 
sition of the Soviet regime. It has re- 
peatedly made clear its position that 
public pressure on the human rights 
issue will be counterproductive in indi- 
vidual eases and will have a detrimen- 
tal effect on other aspects of our bilat- 
eral relationship. 

In recent months, the issue has been 
heightened by steps taken by the Soviet 
security apparatus against all forms of 
expression of internal dissent, cul- 
minating in an intensification of ar- 
rests, trials, and harassment of promi- 
nent supporters of the Helsinki 
monitoring groups and of those who 
have expressed publicly then desire to 
emigrate from the U.S.S.R. 

It was evident that people in the 
United States and other countries could 
not remain silent in the lace of the 
intensification of these repressive ac- 
tions, lest they appear to condone this 
serious setback to the cause of human 
rights. In the case of the United States, 
the reaction was expressed by a pow- 
erful surge of public condemnation and 
by actions of the government to con- 
strict certain aspects of the bilateral 
relationship. 

While the issue of human rights re- 
mains as an abrasive factor in the re- 
lationship, rooted in the fundamental!) 
different nature and philosophies of our 



two societies, the commitment of the 
United States to the furtherance of 
human rights worldwide remains firm. 
It will continue to seek to persuade the 
Soviet Union that the bilateral relation- 
ship can best be strengthened by 
scrupulous observance of international 
norms of human rights and a flexible 
and tolerant attitude in dealing with 
individual cases. 

Scientific, Academic, and Cultural 
Exchanges 

The 11 U.S. -U.S.S.R. governmental 
agreements on cooperation in scientific 
and technical fields have continued to 
promote joint research and information 
exchanges involving a wide range of 
official and private scientists. They are 
administered by U.S. Government 
agencies and. as official bilateral ac- 
tivities, were the subject of continuing 
review when Soviet actions against 
prominent dissidents and U.S. citizens 
in Moscow created serious strains in 
our relations. In this connection, three 
high-level delegations were postponed 
in July. 

We have, however, continued ac- 
tivities at the working level in support 
of research programs and expanding 
scientific contacts. Some American 
scientists, as an expression of concern 
about the fate of certain prominent 
Soviet scientists, have limited their 
participation in the scientific exchange 
programs, but leaders of the U.S. sci- 
entific community have, on balance, 
supported the long term benefits of sci- 
entific cooperation. The potential for 
scientific benefits from cooperation has 
already been demonstrated in several 
diverse fields — heart disease, elec- 
trometallurgy, and magnetohydro- 
dynamic production of electricity. 

Over the past 18 months, American 
participants have worked to produce 
greater substantive benefits and to in- 
sure balance in exchange programs. 
These efforts to some extent are re- 
flected in the slightly lower levels of 
activity as measured by travel under the 
agreements in 1477 compared to 1976. 





Americans 


Soviets 




to U.S.S.R. 


to U.S 


1976 


973 


876 


1977 


772 


668 



Under two additional agreements 
with the Soviet Academy of Sciences. 
the National Academy of Sciences and 
the American Council of Learned 
Societies have also continued to spon- 
sor exchanges in a range of scientific 
fields. A major review of the National 
Academy's activities conducted in 
1977 by the National Research Council 
concluded among other points that the 



Department of State Bullet 

program is worthwhile, that it helps t 
build the world scientific community 
and it can be helpful in amelioratin 
isolation of Soviet scientists. 

Cultural and academic exchang 
programs have been sustained at leve 
approximating the previous year but an 
growing in diversity as more direi 
contacts complement the official pre 
grams under the 6-year cultural rel; 
tions agreement signed in 1973. Undt 
the official program, postgraduate stu 
dents, senior researchers, and lecturei 
continue to be exchanged on a recip 
rocal basis. Approximate figures f( 
these ongoing exhanges are 4 
graduate students and young facult 
members each way annually, 10 senk 
researchers, and about 20 universit 
lecturers. A major International Con 
munication Agency exhibit on U.S 
agriculture is now touring the U.S.S.F 1 
and is expected to be seen by 1.3-1. 
million Soviet citizens in six citie; 
Recently the New England Conserv; 
tory Jazz Band performed in th 
U.S.S.R. and the Paul Taylor Dane 
Company is on tour in September an> 
October. 

Academic and cultural exchange 
retain their importance both because ( 
the intrinsic merit of communication i 
such fields and because of the contr 
butions made to improved mutual ui 
derstanding over the long term. 

The broad range of our contacts wit 
the U.S.S.R., both technical and cu< 
tural, is monitored by the Interagenc 
Coordinating Committee for U.S 
Soviet Affairs, eoehaired by the A; 
sistant Secretary of State for Europea 
Affairs and myself, under the authorit 
of the National Security Council. It lu 
proved a valuable instrument for ir 
suring that all activities are consistet 
with current policy guidance and ha 
given participants a sense of direetio 
and an appreciation of where each er 
deavor fits in the general pattern c 
relations. 

Economic Relations 

Although it is recognized that th 
development of economic relation 
with the Soviet Union could add a 
important stabilizing element to th 
total relationship and could be o 
benefit to both sides, this prospect ha 
been adversely affected during th' 
period under review. 

After a 5-year period of generall; 
steady growth. U.S. exports to th 
Soviet Union declined from $2.3 bif 
lion in 1976 to $1.6 billion in 1977- 
This reflected a decline in Soviet pur 
chases both of grain and of industria 
equipment. One factor in this declim 
was a Soviet effort to conserve its stocl 



•ember 1978 



33 



f hard currency. This factor also was 
Sponsible for a similar pattern of re- 
jSced Soviet purchases from several 
ther developed countries. 

U.S. imports from the Soviet Union 
fere valued at $234 million in 1977. 
bout the same level as for the past 5 
ears. 

The implementation of the stated 
olicy of this government to work to- 
/ard an improvement in economic re- 
gions with the Soviet Union has been 
dversely affected by the general fac- 
lrs in the relationship discussed ear- 
er, including in particular the prose- 
ution of the Moscow representative of 
iternational Harvester. 

In response to a number of actions 
tken by the Soviet Government, the 
Jnited States adopted several meas- 
res. including the provision for prior 
;view of sales of oil and gas equip- 
lent to the U.S.S.R. under the Export 
idministration Act. 



ONCLUSION 

It is evident that the difficulties in 
le U.S. -Soviet relationship in recent 
lonths have astringently washed away 
le remnants of any euphoric expecta- 
ions from the period of detente as it 
ppeared to exist 6 years ago. 

What remains, however, is an op- 
ortunity to build upon a realistic as- 
essment of the fundamental nature of 
le relationship and in particular to 
;alize in concrete steps the interests 
nat both countries should have in 
:abilizing the strategic military com- 
etition and in setting recognized con- 
traints on the conduct of the political 
ompetition. This is the most urgent 
spect of the relationship. 

For the future, one cannot escape the 
impression that the Soviet Union may 
e approaching some fundamental 
hoices — whether to allow the ele- 
ments of conflict in the relationship to 
eepen or to follow the course of re- 
traint and responsibility, leading to a 

idening of measures of cooperation. 

The United States has the means and 
tie will to protect its interests in either 
ase. But by our actions and by what 
•e say, we should make it clear be- 
ond any doubt that if the Soviet lead- 
rship chooses the wiser course of re- 
traint and responsibility, they will find 
he United States fully responsive. □ 



An Overview of Eastern Europe 



The complete transcript of the hearings will 
e published by the committee and will be avail- 
ble from the Superintendent of Documents. 
I.S. Government Printing Office, Washington. 
l.C. 20402. 

For text, see Bulletin of January 1978. p. 1 . 



by William H. Luers 

Statement before the Subcommittee 
on Europe and the Middle East of the 
House Committee on International 
Relations on September 7, 1978. Mr. 
Luers was Deputy Assistant Secretary 
for European Affairs at the time of his 
appearance before this subcommittee; 
he was subsequently sworn in as Am- 
bassador to Venezuela . ' 

Eastern Europe, which deserves in- 
creased attention and broader under- 
standing among the public at large, is 
rich in historical and cultural diversity 
and includes the ancestral homelands of 
many Americans. In fact, reading the 
roster of the U.S. Congress, one cannot 
but be struck by how many Members 
have surnames of Eastern European 
origin. 

This Administration has dedicated a 
special effort to improving relations 
with Eastern Europe. In doing so, we 
have built on the efforts of past Ad- 
ministrations to deal constructively 
with several of the countries in the 
region. We are mindful that our rela- 
tions are not carried out in a vacuum 
and that our policies must strike a re- 
sponsive chord with the countries in- 
volved in order to be effective. In 
dealing with us. Eastern European gov- 
ernments will proceed in terms of their 
interests as well as those of their 
neighbors and allies. We, in turn, will 
seek to keep our European allies at- 
tuned to our efforts. 

For the present purpose, we have 
defined Eastern Europe to include Po- 
land, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, 
Romania, Bulgaria, and the German 
Democratic Republic. All of these 
countries are members of both the War- 
saw Pact and the Council for Mutual 
Economic Assistance (COMECON). 

We will not discuss Yugoslavia or 
Albania today. Both are Communist, 
but neither is a member of the Warsaw 
Pact. Yugoslavia is nonaligned, and 
our relations with it are qualitatively 
very different from those of the War- 
saw Pact member states. We do not 
have diplomatic relations with Albania, 
which is now following a course inde- 
pendent of any major outside power. 



HISTORICAL SETTING 

Eastern Europe, as we speak of it 
today, is the military, political, and 



ideological buffer zone established 
across the heart of Europe by the 
Soviet Union as the fruit of its suc- 
cessful counterattack against Nazi 
Germany during the Second World 
War. Several of these states had 
emerged as creations of the peacemak- 
ers after the First World War: Poland 
was recreated after 123 years of foreign 
occupation by Germany, Tsarist Rus- 
sia, and Hapsburg Austria; Czechoslo- 
vakia and Hungary emerged as new 
entities out of the collapsing Austro- 
Hungarian Empire; and even Romania, 
although independent for 40 years be- 
fore World War I, assumed expanded 
dimensions by acquisition of new 
territories. 

Interwar Period 

In the interwar period, it was a fond 
hope of the Western political leaders 
that these new and inexperienced states 
would provide a buffer — or cordon 
sanitaire — between their countries and 
the Bolshevik Soviet state. In the brief 
20-year period between the two World 
Wars, these states struggled with the 
administrative management of their 
territories, unifying their countries; 
establishing control over their 
minorities; developing foreign policies 
usually based on their World War I 
alliances; and dealing with agricultural 
reform, economic dislocation and dis- 
aster, multiparty systems, and Com- 
munist and Fascist agitation. 

Except for Czechoslovakia, none of 
them succeeded in establishing any 
kind of stability or democratic repre- 
sentative system; all of them discov- 
ered that they were not strong enough 
to survive separately and that the Allies 
were not able to help them sufficiently. 
The economic depression, internal 
political instability, and the weakness 
of the Allies led the eastern Europeans 
to succumb to Hitler either gradually 
through political means or abruptly in 
battle like the Poles. 

Aftermath of World War II 

The outcome of the Second World 
War again altered the map of Eastern 
Europe. Nazi Germany was split into 
two successor states. Poland lost terri- 
tory in the east to the Soviet Union and 
gained in the west at the expense of 
Germany. The Germans also lost east 
Prussia, which was divided between 
the Soviet Union and Poland. Romania 



34 

lost Bessarabia and other pieces of ter- 
ritory to the Soviet Union and also 
yielded some to Bulgaria. Hungary and 
Czechoslovakia found themselves now 
with common borders with the Soviet 
Union, which acquired portions of 
Czechoslovak territory. 

Soviet armies were everywhere in 
occupation, giving direct support to 
Stalin's political objectives. Com- 
munist leaders, schooled in the prewar 
jails of their countries and in Soviet in- 
stitutions, came to power. These 
Communist leaders introduced Stalinist 
methods of rule, including wholesale 
changes in administration, economic 
management, judicial system, the se- 
curity apparatus, and other areas of na- 
tional life. The new leaders threw out 
those who had exercised power and re- 
placed them with reliable Communists 
loyal to Moscow. The Communist Par- 
ties became the ruling elites 
monopolizing the reins of power. 

De-Stalinization 

Soviet policy underwent change after 
Khruschev's de-Stalinization speech to 
the Soviet 20th Party Congress in 
1956. Efforts at abolishing the worse 
excesses of the period met with 
hardline resistance and rising expecta- 
tions of the population and split the 
Communist Parties of Eastern Europe. 

In Poland, workers' riots in 1956 
accelerated the process of change as the 
leaders made concessions to the 
people — the farmers, the workers, the 
intellectuals, and the Catholic Church. 

In Hungary, where a full-scale rev- 
olution broke out in Budapest in 1956. 
the divided Communist Party leaders 
found that their attempts at far-reaching 
changes were thwarted by the interven- 
tion of Soviet troops. The revolu- 
tionary government's call for with- 
drawal from the Warsaw Pact probably 
convinced the Soviets that intervention 
was the only course for maintaining 
control. Repression of those who had 
participated in the revolution and their 
supporters became the first order of 
business. Both Eastern Europe and the 
world learned that Soviet interests in 
Eastern Europe would brook no ex- 
treme change of system, no sudden 
change of foreign policy, no dim inn 
tion of the authority by the Communist 
Party over the levers of power 

1956-64 

In the aftermath of 1956, two paral- 
lel trends were discernible. On the one 
hand, the Soviet Union pressed forward 
toward the more effective cooperation 
of Warsaw Pact military forces and to- 
ward closer coordination of economic 



plans and policies within COMECON. 
On the other hand, Eastern European 
states gradually acquired greater free- 
dom to develop and pursue policies 
which would make their systems work 
better. 

For example, Hungary introduced a 
policy of conciliation toward non- 
Communists within the country with 
the maxim: ""Whoever is not against us 
is with us." It thereby reduced hostility 
between party members and nonparty 
people which had been so intense be- 
fore and immediately after the 1956 
period. All the Eastern European 
countries went through a process of 
rehabilitating many Communists who 
had been jailed or executed during the 
Stalinist period and of releasing non- 
Communists from jail. "Socialist le- 
gality" was emphasized, compromises 
with the oppressed religious faiths were 
explored, autarkic economic policies 
were reexamined, relations with the 
West were expanded, and attempts 
were begun to meet consumer needs. 



Late 1960's and Early 1970's 

A most dramatic expression of East- 
ern European nationalism came when 
Romania issued a statement in 1964 
declaring its intention to develop inde- 
pendent policies based on Romanian 
interests. Thereafter, differences on 
foreign policy issues between Romania 
and the Soviet Union became more 
explicit in a number of areas. 

Even while Romania was becoming 
more assertive internationally, in 
Czechoslovakia in 1968 the Soviets 
— joined by East Germany, Poland, 
Hungary, and Bulgaria — marched in to 
prevent the new leadership of that 
Communist Party from seeking to es- 
tablish a more human and pluralistic 
social order. Just as the Soviets could 
not tolerate the specter of Hungary 
leaving the Warsaw Pact of 1956, they 
could not tolerate the Communist Party 
of Czechoslovakia seeming to relin- 
quish its dominant role over society in 
1968. 

The era of detente has been accom- 
panied by significant changes in East- 
ern Europe. Each Communist Party has 
reevaluated its ways of dealing with 
consumer needs, economic problems, 
and public opinion. 

• Worker riots in Poland in i l )70 
highlighted the dangers to the Com- 
munist Party of ignoring or paying too 
little attention to worker demands for 
an increased standard of living, more 
consumer goods, and better housing 

• Czechoslovak leaders after 1968 
carefully provided the populace with 
expanded supplies of food and con- 



Department of State Bullet 

sumer goods in order to defuse politic 
discontent. 

• Hungary introduced its new eci 
nomic mechanism to get away from th 
highly centralized command econorr 
model and to reward efficient industri 
management and higher productivity. 

• East Germany continued to bui 
up its industrial capacity and achieve 
a measure of status assisted by tl 
political and economic understandin; 
reached bilaterally with West Germar 
and by the stability which develope 
after signature of the Quadriparti 
Agreement on Berlin. 

• Romania, following its ow 
maverick path, concentrated on 
flexible foreign policy while its lea< 
ership continued to require a sparU 
existence of its people. 

Recent years have witnessed furthi 
changes and trends in Eastern Europe 



CURRENT TRENDS 

The growing diversity in Eastei 
Europe must be seen in context. TI 
Soviet Union remains, as one Pole hi^ 
put it, "the dominant personality of thl 
region." The Communist leaders ( 
Eastern Europe have much in comma 
with the Soviet Politburo, not the lea'-, 
of which is their determination M 
maintain the power monopoly of th 
party. The Soviet Union insists that th 
Eastern European Communist state 
adhere to the Warsaw Pact. It is Soviu 
policy to integrate Eastern Europe t 
the maximum degree feasible. 

The Warsaw Pact and the COIV 
ECON continue to be the principal ir 
struments of Soviet integration policy 
On the ideological front, the Sovit 
Union has sought to subordinate th> 
national interests of the Eastern Eurc 
pean parties to those of "proletaria 
internationalism" as interpreted by th> 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union 
Fearing the ideological disintegrate 
of the Communist movement, th 
Soviets have made particular efforts I 
solidify the ideological support they re 
ceive from Eastern Europe. 

These Soviet efforts to achiev 
greater integration and more ideologi 
cal support have not been altogethe 
successful. For example, bilateralisn 
and nonconvertible currencies continue 
to be the predominant features of tradi 
among COMECON countries, evei 
though some progress has been made ii 
coordinating participation in joint rav 
materials extraction projects. 

In ideology, at the conference o 
European Communist Parties in Eas 
Berlin in June 1976, the Communis 
Parties of Western Europe and Yugo 






November 1978 

;lavia, joined by the Romanians, 
breed the adoption of a nonbinding 
inal document which, inter alia, rec- 
)gnized the equality and autonomy of 
ill Communist Parties and refrained 
rom criticism of the Chinese Com- 
nunist Party. 

Although Moscow seeks as much 
Tiilitary, economic, and political cohe- 
sion in Eastern Europe as feasible, it 
ilso has an important stake in Eastern 
urope's political stability and eco- 
nomic viability. The U.S.S.R. cannot 
neet all of Eastern Europe's raw mate- 
ial and technology needs. Lagging 
Productivity and technological ad- 
vancement have given rise to various 
ittempts at economic reform. 
Moreover, internal pressures, gener- 
ated by the aspirations of the nationally 
proud peoples of the area, have brought 
about political strains that can only be 
handled by these nations themselves. 
The Soviets have become reconciled, 
therefore, to some diversity as a 
trade-off for stability and viability. For 
reasons which relate to their own par- 
ticular situations, the nature and degree 
of this diversity has varied from coun- 
try to country. 



Differences in Foreign Policy 

With the exception of Romania, the 
countries of Eastern Europe continue to 
adhere quite closely to Soviet foreign 
policy positions. Only subtle nuances 
and differences of emphasis — based on 
differing national interests and 
priorities — are evident 

Romania continues to pursue a 
foreign policy which diverges from that 
of the U.S.S.R. in significant ways. 
For example, the Romanian Govern- 
ment has cultivated good relations with 
the People's Republic of China while 
maintaining neutrality in the Sino- 
Soviet dispute. It has obtained guest 
status in the nonaligned movement, 
retained diplomatic relations with Is- 
rael, and supported the right of all 
Communist Parties to chart their own 
courses. Romania has also declined to 
permit multilateral Warsaw Pact ac- 
tivities on its territory. 

Other nations in Eastern Europe 
demonstrate their separate identities in 
various ways. 

• Poland and Hungary, as well as 
Romania, have significantly expanded 
their trade and economic relations with 
Western nations and have turned in- 
creasingly to the West for technology 
and even management assistance. 
Other differences have emerged in in- 
ternational trade and financial matters. 

• Hungary has agreed to eliminate 
visas for Austrian citizens, reflecting a 



35 



EASTERN EUROPE— GENERAL STATISTICS (1977) 



Country 



Land 



Total 
Sq. Mi. 



Population 



(million) ' 



Economy 



GNP 2 

($billion) 



Per 
Capita 

GNP($) 



Steel 
Produc- 
tion 3 
(mil. Ml ) 



Bulgaria 



42.829 



8.8 



21 



2.400 



2.5 



Czechoslovakia 


49.370 


15.0 


60 


4.000 


14.7 


G.D.R. 


41.814 


16.8 


69 


4.100 


6.7 


Hungary 


35.915 


10.6 


28 


2.600 


3.7 


Poland 


120.664 


34.6 


95 


2.700 


15.6 


Romania 


91.699 


21.6 


57 


2,630 


10.7 


Totals 


382.291 


107.4 


330 


18.430 


53.9 



'Population data are for Jan 1977. Source: National Basic Intelligence Factbook, Jan. 
1977. 

: GNP data are based on U.S. purchasing power equivalents. Source: Central Intelligence 
Agency (ClAl estimates. 

'Steel production data are for 1976. Source: "Handbook of Economic Statistics," CIA, 
Sept. 1977. 



significant opening of its borders to 
Western Europe. 

• East Germany's long involvement 
in Africa has placed it in a position to 
participate in Soviet and Cuban ad- 
ventures in that continent. 

• Renewed differences have recently 
surfaced between individual Eastern 
European countries over traditional 
areas of dispute such as national 
minorities. The debate between Bul- 
garia and Yugoslavia over the Macedo- 
nian question has recently intensified, 
while the leaders of Romania and Hun- 
gary have publicly addressed questions 
concerning the nearly 2 million ethnic 
Hungarians living in Romania. 

Domestic Diversity 

More marked than the diversity in 
foreign policy have been the differing 
approaches each nation has taken to 
domestic developments. The recent 
trends have been generally favorable 
toward greater openness and more ac- 
cess to the West. 

Poland is still a most unusual Com- 
munist state with 80% of its arable 
land in private hands, a powerful and 
vital Catholic Church, and a private 
enterprise sector that is growing in im- 
portance. Moreover, artistic, intellec- 



tual, and political activity in Poland 
has continued to expand, encompassing 
not only the youth and students but 
evoking spontaneous responses from 
workers and farmers as well. Popular 
grumbling persists about inefficiencies 
and shortages of meat and other prod- 
ucts, thereby contributing to the intel- 
lectuals' criticisms of governmental 
policies. The Polish Government has 
reacted forcefully at times to these de- 
velopments, fearing the emergence of a 
coherent challenge to the party. 
Nevertheless, the diversity of opinions 
and attitudes available to Poles today is 
greater than ever before in the postwar 
period. 

Czechoslovakia, on the other hand, 
has maintained the tight controls im- 
posed in the months following the 
Soviet-led invasion of August 1968 
which put an end to efforts to achieve 
"socialism with a human face." The 
Czechoslovak Government continues to 
exclude the liberal Communist Party 
members of 1968 from political life, 
and the great majority of the population 
appears to avoid political involvement 
of any kind in favor of enjoying such 
benefits of consumerism as au- 
tomobiles and weekend cottages. A 
small group of dissident intellectuals, 
signers of the document "Charter '77," 



36 



are pressing the government to live up 
to the human rights obligations inher- 
ent in the country's own laws and in 
the Helsinki Final Act. 2 The govern- 
ment has responded with a mixture of 
harassment, intimidation, and attempts 
to ignore the dissidents. 

Hungary is presently characterized 
by stability, increasing consumer 
satisfaction, and a relatively relaxed 
cultural atmosphere. The government 
has achieved a measure of legitimacy 
in the eyes of the population and, given 
geopolitical realities, is generally per- 
ceived as doing what is possible for the 
welfare of the people. Some 340,000 
Hungarians visit the West annually, 
while more than 12 million 
foreigners — a number greater than 
Hungary's population — visit or transit 
Hungary each year. Western radio and 
TV broadcasts reach virtually the entire 
country. In the last two parliamentary 
elections several nonparty candidates 
defeated opponents who were party 
members. 

Romania continues to maintain u 
strictly orthodox internal order in con- 
trast to its active and independent 
foreign policy. However, there are 
growing signs that elements of the 
population have become restive over 
the consumer deprivation resulting 
from the government's crash effort to 
make Romania a "developed" country 
by 1985. One manifestation was a 
strike by miners in August 1977 pro- 
testing the lowering of pensions and 
poor working conditions. The strike 
was resolved with a mixture of conces- 
sions and toughness. This general dis- 
content seems to have been a major 
element in President Ceausescu's deci- 
sion this year to begin some tentative 
steps toward economic reform, includ- 
ing greater local participation in eco- 
nomic planning and a limited workers' 
role in the operation of industrial 
enterprises. 

In the German Democratic Repub- 
lic, the government's consumerist 
course, which has kept the population 
reasonably satisfied, is running into 
difficulties caused by a leveling off of 
production, an increasing hard cur- 
rency shortage, and a greater suscepti- 
bility to Western inflationary influence. 
The hard currency stores, which the 
government has set up to conserve 
foreign exchange and ration available 
supplies, have produced grumbling 
about an inequitable two-class system. 
The government's recent attempt to 
improve relations with the Evangelical 
(Lutheran) Church by granting it reg- 
ular television air time and providing 
logistic support for outdoor church 



meetings could be overshadowed by 
church-government differences over 
plans to introduce premilitary training 
into the public schools. 

Continuity is the predominant trend 
in Bulgaria where the government is 
wedded to Soviet political and eco- 
nomic orthodoxy. Shortages of 
foodstuffs and other nondurables, 
stemming in part from bad weather, 
have caused some discontent. How- 
ever, this has not led to any substantial 
outspoken opposition nor has the gov- 
ernment chosen to make concessions of 
a consumerist nature. 



Declining Growth Rates 
and Economic Problems 

Although each of the six Eastern 
European countries has evolved in dis- 
tinctly different ways from the tradi- 
tional "Stalinist" model, all share 
some common characteristics: central 
planning, administered prices, and a 
high priority on heavy industry. These 
elements cause a misallocation of re- 
sources within each country, and they 
distort trade between the countries 
which must be conducted on the basis 
of bilaterally negotiated barter agree- 
ments. 

As their economies have increased in 
size and complexity, the Soviet model 
has proven less and less effective. 
Also, the example of rising living 
standards in Western Europe has forced 
the Communist governments to pay 
more attention to the consumer needs 
of their own populations, thus reducing 
the resources available for investment. 
As a result, the high growth rates 
achieved by the Eastern European 
economies in the immediate postwar 
period declined in the 1960's. Al- 
though this gradual decline was inter- 
rupted in the early 1970's when trade 
and financial relations with the West 
were rapidly expanded, growth rates 
have begun to fall again. 

In the period 1965-70, the six East- 
ern European countries increased their 
per capita GNP at an annual average 
rate of 3.1%. In the first half of this 
decade that rate rose to 4.2%, but by 
1977 it had again declined to 3.2%. 
These declining growth rates reflect a 
series of economic problems in addi- 
tion to rising consumer demands and 
the rigidities of the centrally planned 
economies, namely, limited natural re- 
sources, manpower problems, and ag- 
ricultural difficulties. 

Shortages of natural resources, espe- 
cially energy resources have been a 
serious problem for the Eastern Euro- 
peans. Except for Poland which has 
abundant supplies of coal, copper, and 



Department of State Bulletin 

sulphur, and Romania, which still has 
some oil. Eastern Europe is resource 
poor and must import much of the basic 
raw materials it needs from outside the 
region. Most of Eastern Europe's 
energy imports have come from the 
Soviet Union. But the Soviets have 
raised the price and in some cases cut 
back their export of energy to Eastern 
Europe. An increase in intra- 
COMECON foreign trade prices in 
1975, a year earlier than scheduled, 
saw the price of Soviet crude oil jump 
by about 1307r, although it still re- 
mained lower than the world price. 

Demographic trends and manpower 
shortages are another set of serious 
problems these nations are facing. The 
manpower shortage throughout Eastern 
Europe is only partly attributable to a 
generation lost to war and to the emi- 
gration thereafter; it is mainly due to 
urban birth rates so low as to be of 
major concern to the governments of 
that area. Hungary, for example, has 
zero population growth, and the popu- 
lation of East Germany actually de- 
clined between 1965 and 1976. Fur- 
thermore, low population growth is ex- 
pected in all these countries at least 
through the end of this century. 

Traditionally, manpower shortages 
can be offset by drawing labor from the 
countryside. But the skilled technical 
workers needed are not available from 
the even more inefficient agricultural 
sectors. Another way to meet man- 
power shortages is with migrant work- 
ers. But there are probably not more 
than 150.000 "guest workers" in East- 
ern Europe — too few to be of signifi- 
cant assistance and almost all of them 
from other COMECON countries. 

Low labor productivity is another 
endemic problem. One of the 
paradoxes of the Eastern European 
economies is that while labor is scarce 
there is an enormous amount of un- 
deremployment. Workers are fre- 
quently stockpiled, as are other re- 
sources, by managers who fear in- 
creases in their output requirements. 
The shortage of labor is compounded 
by frequent shortages of consumer 
goods resulting in low worker incen- 
tives. Increased earnings do not auto- 
matically translate into increased real 
income. Classic examples of this 
problem have appeared recently among 
the miners who have protested in Po- 
land and struck in the Jiu Valley in 
Romania. 

Agricultural inefficiency is a 
hallmark of the systems of Eastern 
Europe. Between 1965 and 1975 East- 
ern European agricultural output grew 
about 2.2% annually. Poland sought to 
deal with agricultural inefficiency by 
leaving the land largely in private 



November 1978 



37 



hands. But farming there laeks invest- 
ment and modernization. Where large- 
scale modernization and mechanization 
of collective farms has been tried (such 
as in Bulgaria), incentives for indi- 
vidual productivity have been low. As 
result of chronically poor weather 
conditions, and these inefficiencies. 
Eastern Europe has been a net importer 
of foodstuffs for years, often at the cost 
of increased hard currency debts. Yet 
Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania have 



managed generally to be overall net 
exporters of grains. 

Attempts at Economic Reform 

Confronted with these complex 
problems and the inherent inefficien- 
cies of their economic systems, the 
governments of Eastern Europe, espe- 
cially in the more developed countries, 
have attempted to overcome their dif- 
ficulties by introducing programs de- 



EASTERN EUROPEAN TRADE 

(IN MILLIONS OF DOLLARS) 




Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports 

Bulgaria Czechoslovakia German Hungary Poland Romania 

Democratic 
Republic 

SOURCE: Central Intelligence Agency estimates based upon East European and Soviet trade 
statistics converted into U.S. dollars at official rates of exchange. 



signed to decentralize decisionmaking 
and permit a greater role for free mar- 
ket forces. Progress in actually 
achieving such '•reforms" has varied 
greatly within the area. 

Although Czechoslovakia took the 
lead in reforms in the late 1960's, the 
1968 Soviet-led invasion ended the ex- 
periments of Deputy Premier Sik and 
cast a pall over such efforts in other 
countries. The Czechoslovak reforms, 
which were the most far reaching of 
those proposed in Eastern Europe in the 
1960's, had implied a diminution or 
even elimination of the role of the 
Communist Party in the management of 
the economy. This linkage between 
economic reforms and the role of the 
Communist Party points up the intimate 
relationship between politics and eco- 
nomics in this region. 

Hungary went ahead with its new 
economic mechanism, a program intro- 
duced in 1968, which substantially in- 
creased the responsibility of individual 
enterprises and sought to regulate the 
economy by macroeconomic forces 
rather than direct controls. After 1973, 
further development of the mechanism 
was stalled by excessive rates of in- 
vestment, worker dissatisfaction with 
growing disparities in wage rates, and 
balance-of-payments problems. During 
the past year, however, the Hungarian 
Government has announced plans for 
basic price and tax reforms that could 
significantly increase the role of market 
forces in the Hungarian economy. 

Reforms in Poland have not gone so 
far as those in Hungary, but sporadic 
efforts continue to be made to reor- 
ganize the structure of Polish industry 
by decentralizing authority and tying 
together production and marketing 
units. The role of small private enter- 
prises, especially in service industries, 
has recently been allowed to expand, 
and new laws have been instituted to 
permit foreign investment in Poland. 
Romania and Bulgaria, the least de- 
veloped countries of the area, have not 
attempted to adopt wide-ranging eco- 
nomic reforms and thus far have 
largely retained their highly centralized 
systems in pursuit of broad-based in- 
dustrial growth. However, earlier this 
year. President Ceausescu announced 
several changes which could prove to 
be the first signs of an economic re- 
form in Romania. 



Economic Integration 

COMECON, the common Western 
acronym for the Council for Mutual 
Economic Assistance, appears to be 
moving slowly, if at all, toward the 
increased economic integration sought 



38 



Department of State Bulletii 



U.S. TRADE WITH EASTERN EUROPE— 1977 * 
(IN MILLIONS OF DOLLARS) 

-Rolling Mill and Metal Manufacturing Machinery 



Bulgaria 



Czecho- 
slovakia 



German 

Democratic 

Republic 



Hungary 



Poland 



Romania 




] Exports 
] Imports 



] 436.5 



I I L_l I I I I I I L 



100 



J I I I I I I L 



200 



J I L 



I l l I 



300 



J I L 



_l I L 



400 



J I I I 



SOURCE: OVERSEAS BUSINESS REPORTS, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, JULY 1978 

* One-third of the actual value of agricultural commodities which is exported to Eastern Europe is transshipped through third countries and 
is not reflected in the above data. The value of transshipped agricultural commodity exports to Czechoslovakia is $62.8 million; to the German 
Democratic Republic — $208.7 million; to Hungary — $14.8 million; and to Poland — $4.1 million (U.S. Department of Agriculture estimates, 1977). 



by the U.S.S.R. It remains an organi- 
zation without supranational powers, 
and an estimated 90% of intra- 
COMECON trade is carried out via 
bilateral clearing arrangements. The 
predominance of bilateralism is due 
largely to the absence of a convertible 
currency or a meaningful exchange rate 
or prices which reflect market forces 
and scarcities. 

The share of each Eastern European 
country's total foreign trade which is 
devoted to trade with other COMECON 
members varies widely. Bulgaria con- 
ducts approximately 80% of its trade 
with other COMECON countries and 
56% with the U.S.S.R., while only 
about 35$ of Romania's trade is with 
COMECON, of which about half is 
with the U.S.S.R. 

COMECON's moves toward inte- 
gration have taken the form of closer 
coordination of 5-year and longer term 
plans and cooperative projects in the 
areas of primary products and fuels. As 
of now, COMECON's joint efforts ap- 
pear to be restricted to projects from 
which the Eastern European countries 
can ultimately be expected to benefit 
directly: These include a natural gas 



pipeline and the production of items 
such as asbestos and cellulose. 



East-West Trade 

Since the early 1970's, Eastern 
European governments have given 
heavy stress to solving the problem of 
lagging industrial productivity by im- 
porting Western equipment and tech- 
nology on a greatly increased scale. 
Between 1970 and 1977, turnover with 
the developed West increased almost 
four times. 

The infusion of new technology 
seems to have had at least a temporar- 
ily beneficial effect on productivity in 
the Eastern economies. It has also 
stimulated the development of new 
ways of doing business in many of the 
Eastern countries. For example, 20 
U.S. firms have offices in Warsaw; 
there are American bank offices in 
Bucharest and in Warsaw; and an 
American firm owns 49% of a 
Budapest firm which produces medical 
instruments. Such arrangements have 
required changes in the domestic busi- 
ness laws and practices of the Eastern 
European countries, which now vary 



substantially from country to country. 

In Poland, businessmen find it rela- 
tively easy to make appointments withi 
the end-users of their products, while 
in other countries such appointments 
are sometimes difficult. Hungary pub- 
lishes more complete economic infor- 
mation than do some of the other 
countries. Joint equity ventures are 
permitted in some countries but not in 
others, and the rules for these ventures 
differ from country to country. 

Eastern Europe's hard currency ex- 
ports during the 1970's have not been 
sufficient to pay for imports from the 
West. As a result. Eastern European 
hard currency debt increased from 
about $4.6 billion in 1970 to about 
$31.4 billion at the end of 1977. The 
deficit has been covered mainly by 
borrowing from Western banks and 
governments. In some countries, par- 
ticularly Poland, these debts have be- 
come a serious concern to both borrow- 
ers and lenders. Eastern European im- 
ports from the West, which grew very 
rapidly in 1970-74, increased at a 
markedly reduced rate in 1975 and 
1976 and rose hardly at all in 1977. 

Poland, for example, has taken ef- 



November 1978 

fective steps to reduee its trade deficit. 
Poland's debt is large relative to its 
hard currency earnings and it is still 
growing, but Western creditors, in- 
cluding both U.S. Government and pri- 
vate lenders, have been favorably im- 
pressed by the efforts of the Polish 
Government to improve its trade bal- 
ance. As a result, these lenders con- 
tinue to extend credit to Poland. 



U.S. Trade 

U.S. trade with Eastern Europe in- 
creased four and one-half times be- 
tween 1970 and 1977 but is still less 
than \7c of our total foreign trade. In 
1977 the United States accounted for 
about 67c of total Eastern European 
trade with the West. This is due in part 
to the linguistic and geographic ad- 
vantages held by our Western European 
competitors, but it is also the result of 
the absence of normal trade relations 
between ourselves and three of the 
Eastern European countries. Eastern 
Europe will continue to see the United 
States as an attractive trade partner be- 
cause we have advanced technology 
and because we offer welcome compe- 
tition to their Western European 
suppliers. 

The United States has benefited from 
its trade with Eastern Europe despite its 
relatively small volume. In 1977 the 
United States had a trade surplus with 
the region of about $200 million. Since 
the beginning' of 1976, the Eastern 
Europeans have purchased about $2 
billion worth of U.S. agricultural 
commodities and well over $1 billion 
worth of U.S. manufactured goods. 



CONTEXT OF U.S. POLICY 

In the preceding sections of this 
statement we have attempted to outline 
the context in which U.S. policy must 
operate. 

Historically Eastern Europe has been 
alternatively a buffer zone and a 
battlefield, a spark for world wars, and 
an area of rivalry among great powers. 
But despite great power competition for 
the loyalties of the peoples of Eastern 
Europe, each nation in the area has 
tenaciously aspired to and has moved 
toward its own individual identity. 

Soviet power, which dominated the 
political evolution of Eastern Europe 
following 1945, is reconciled — within 
limits — to some diversity. The Soviet 
Union has evidently come to tolerate 
some diversity and national identity in 
Eastern Europe as a necessary trade-off 
for political stability and economic 
viability. 

Diversity is. therefore, an increas- 



ingly significant political characteristic 
in the area. While maintaining the pri- 
mary role of the Communist Party and 
the countries' formal commitments to 
the Warsaw Pact, there are increasing 
signs of differentiated domestic and. in 
some instances, foreign policies. 

Improved economic efficiency is the 
elusive goal of virtually all these gov- 
ernments. Within the constraints of 
ideology and politics, each government 
has tried differing approaches to eco- 
nomic reforms, incentives, imported 
technology, and foreign trade. 

U.S. Interests 

Eastern Europe is important to the 
United States for two fundamental 
reasons — security and humanitarian 
concerns. 

Our security is linked to Europe's. 
Two World Wars were ignited in East- 
ern Europe, and the machinery for a 
war infinitely more destructive than 
either of those is already in place. We 
must and will maintain a credible de- 
terrent to possible military aggression 
by Warsaw Pact forces. But this deter- 
rent must be accompanied by consistent 
diplomatic efforts to reduce the dangers 
of war and confrontation. To ignore the 
countries of Eastern Europe would be 
to leave peace to chance. 

The welfare of the peoples living in 
Eastern Europe matters deeply to all 
Americans. More than 15 million 
Americans have their heritage in that 
region. Millions of other Americans 
sympathize with the long struggle of 
the peoples of the region for independ- 
ence, security, and material progress. 

Related to both our security and hu- 
manitarian concerns is our interest in 
building more durable ties with the 
governments and peoples of Eastern 
Europe through expanded trade and 
economic interaction, through cultural 
and education exchanges, and through 
the increased interchange of people and 
ideas. These efforts may not produce 
measurable results in the short term, 
either in ameliorating East-West rela- 
tions or relations between the govern- 
ments and their peoples. But it is clear 
that the Eastern Europe of today is, in 
general, a more accessible and open 
area than it was two decades or even a 
decade ago. And we can be fairly cer- 
tain that a lack of effort to expand 
contacts with the region would result in 
greater state-to-state tensions and less 
progress on humanitarian questions. 

One caveat is important. The efforts 
of this and previous Administrations to 
improve relations with the countries of 
Eastern Europe in no way indicate a 
lessening of our concern about the lack 
of democratic institutions and other 



39 



basic elements of free societies in that 
part of the world. We continue to have 
profound disagreements with the gov- 
ernments of Eastern Europe over many 
questions of political freedoms and 
basic human and social values. We 
have seen hopeful trends in the evolu- 
tion of political rights in some coun- 
tries; there have been regressive steps 
in others. But the very expansion of 
relations with these countries has en- 
abled us to talk more candidly with 
their governments about our differ- 
ences both in bilateral discussions and 
in multilateral forums. 

Eastern European Interests 

The countries of Eastern Europe 
have strong interests in better relations 
with the United States. Paramount 
among these are their own security 
concerns. The region stands to lose 
disastrously from any major East- West 
armed confrontation. Their memories 
and scars of World War II are still 
fresh. The countries and peoples of the 
region see better relations with the 
United States, and with the West gen- 
erally, as a means of reducing the risk 
of such confrontation. They feel they 
have a special stake in stable and im- 
proving U.S. -Soviet relations. 

Second, these countries desire, 
partly through foreign ties, to enhance 
their national identities, of which they 
are justifiably proud. They can pursue 
these national aspirations most effec- 
tively in an atmosphere of relaxed 
East-West tensions. The governments 
are anxious to be accepted, particularly 
by their Western European neighbors 
and by the United States, as legitimate 
members of the international commu- 
nity. 

Third, all of the governments are 
committed to economic growth, and 
their peoples all aspire to a higher 
standard of living. Expanded economic 
and commercial relations with the 
United States — including access to our 
goods, technology, know-how, and 
markets — serve the goals both of the 
governments and of the peoples of 
Eastern Europe. 

Fourth, the improvement of relations 
with the United States responds to a 
deeply felt admiration for this country 
which remains nearly universal among 
people throughout Eastern Europe. To 
the extent that these governments deal 
with the United States in nonhostile 
terms, their peoples also feel more re- 
laxed about expressing their good will 
toward the United States. And to the 
extent that the governments care about 
the impact of their internal practices on 
American public opinion, they are less 
likely to employ repressive measures 



40 




and to violate recognized norms of 
human rights 

In economic, trade, and cultural re- 
lations, the countries of Western 
Europe have played a greater role his- 
torically in Eastern Europe than has the 
United States. However, in psycho- 
logical and political terms the United 
States is expected to play — and indeed 
plays — an important if not vital role. 



Past U.S. Policy 

In the immediate postwar era, U.S. 
policy toward Eastern Europe tended to 
function as a corollary of U.S. policy 
toward the Soviet Union. In the 1950's 



and I960's the cold war dominated our 
perceptions and conditioned our policy. 
We dealt with the region as part of the 
"Sino-Soviet bloc,*' and the "Iron 
Curtain" seemed an impenetrable bar- 
rier. Even during this period, however, 
there were harbingers of the more var- 
ied approach which has now become 
the rule rather than the exception. 

With Poland, for example, our rela- 
tions improved notably beginning in 
1956 when Poland initiated a policy of 
increased internal liberalization and 
eased its emigration policies. This was 
given added impetus in 1972 as part of 
the broader thaw in East-West rela- 
tions. 

With Romania, we developed more 



Department of State Bulletin 

constructive relations beginning in the 
mid-1960's which have continued 
since. In this case the improvement 
was made possible by Romania's rela- 
tively independent foreign policy 
which included an interest in better re- 
lations with the United States. In 1969 
Bucharest became the first capital of a 
Communist country to be visited by 
any American President. 

With the growth of a detente re- 
lationship with Moscow and with the 
growth of diversity in Eastern Europe, 
our relations with the countries of the 
area have developed beyond the limited 
previous range. This pattern of dealing 
with each country on an individual 
basis is determined in part by their 
willingness to develop constructive re- 
lations with us. We welcome moves 
toward internal liberalization or toward 
nationally based foreign policies. 

The evolution of U.S. policy toward 
the region is clear from earlier high- 
level U.S. statements. 

President Eisenhower, in an effort to 
erode cold war barriers, proposed a 
"people-to-people" program which 
continues to function and which serves 
one of the consistent goals of our pol- 
icy over many years — to expose people 
in different societies to each other in 
hopes of promoting broader mutual un- 
derstanding and reducing hostilities. 

In 1963 President Kennedy, in his 
American University speech, address- 
ing himself to the Communist states of 
Europe said: "So let us not be blind to 
our differences, but let us also direct 
attention to our common interests and 
to the means by which those differ- 
ences can be resolved. And if we can- 
not end now our differences, at least 
we can help make the world safe for 
diversity." 

In 1964 President Johnson spoke of 
"building bridges of understanding" 
across the gulf which had separated us 
from Eastern Europe, and in 1966 he 
proposed the expansion of peaceful 
trade between the United States and 
Eastern Europe. 

In 1973 Deputy Secretary of State 
Kenneth Rush said that "we seek to 
engage the countries of Eastern Europe 
in an expanding set of close and indi- 
vidual relationships." Rush also set out 
three principles for our policy toward 
Eastern Europe: to deal with each 
country "as an independent, sovereign 
state;" "to create a continuing eco- 
nomic relationship" through greater 
trade and investment; and to promote 
the engagement of the Eastern Euro- 
pean countries "in the affairs of 
Europe as a whole." 



sJovember 1978 

Current U.S. Policy and Options 

The range of U.S. policy options 
oward Eastern Europe today is implied 
n the pattern of past policies. We 
:ould approach the nations of the re- 
gion as adversaries, tied as a "bloc - " 
riilitarily. politically, and economi- 
cally to the Soviet Union or approach 
:ach nation individually and exploit all 
)pportunities to change the status quo 
without regard to the consequences and 
lower relationships in the area. 

Neither extreme is acceptable. We 
ntend neither to leave our relations 
.vith Eastern Europe hostage to rela- 
ions with the Soviet Union nor con- 
duct a policy that is reckless and de- 
stabilizing in Europe. The U.S. policy 
hat has evolved is designed to further 
)ur security interests in Europe and to 
ake into account the growing diversity 
)f the area. 

This Administration has devoted 
substantial energy, at a high level and 
n a consistent direction, to the pursuit 
)f our policy in Eastern Europe. Sec- 
retary Vance said in Budapest early 
his year: "The current Administration 
s seeking to improve its relationships 
■vith the countries of Eastern Europe. 
iach of us will have to approach this 
.vith our own national interests in- 
/olved. I think the best way to deal 
with these problems is to have face- 
co-face discussions where we can dis- 
:uss the differences and the common 
nterests, and we shall pursue these on 
he basis of dealing on a case-by-case 
->asis, country by country, on the vari- 
ous issues and common concerns which 
vve have. " 

Our policy then is based on the fol- 
lowing. 

• We recognize and support the in- 
dividuality of each nation in its ap- 
proach to domestic and foreign affairs. 

• We deal with each country as a 
sovereign nation while taking into ac- 
count the political and geographic 
realities of the area. 

• Our primary tools for improving 
relations with the area are expanded 
human contacts, trade, institutional 
cooperation, and information flow. 

• We are mindful of the limits of 
U.S. influence and of the importance 
of contributing to the security of all of 
Europe in pursuit of our policies. 

More specifically, we seek to: 

• Develop mutually beneficial bilat- 
eral relations to the extent that indi- 
vidual countries are willing and able to 
sustain them. For example, we have 
completed negotiation of consular 
agreements with all the Eastern Euro- 



pean countries except for the German 
Democratic Republic, and we have 
cultural and scientific exchange agree- 
ments with Bulgaria. Hungary, and 
Romania, and extensive exchange pro- 
grams with Poland; 

• Maintain high-level contact with 
leaders of those Eastern European 
countries with which our relations have 
shown adequate improvement. Imple- 
menting this policy. President Carter 
visited" Poland in December 1977, 
President Ceausescu of Romania vis- 
ited the United States in April 1978, 
and cabinet level officials have ex- 
changed visits with several countries in 
the area; 

• Explore all possibilities provided 
by the Helsinki Final Act to stimulate 
contacts and to achieve concrete prog- 
ress on the practical problems which 
continue to hinder relations with the 
countries of Eastern Europe. In par- 
ticular, we seek solutions to problems 
affecting the lives of individuals and 
encourage the observance of funda- 
mental human rights. We are especially 
concerned over the need for progress 
on divided family problems, which are 



BACKGROUND NOTES 

Background Notes is a series of short, 
factual pamphlets on the countries of the 
world. Each Note contains information 
on the country's people, land, history, 
government, political conditions, econ- 
omy, foreign relations, and U.S. policy. 
Included also is a profile, brief travel 
notes, map, list of government officials, 
and a reading list. Notes are available on 
the six East European countries (with 
order numbers) discussed in this article 
and the USSR.: 

Bulgaria (044-000-91040-3) 
Czechoslovakia (044-000-91 102-7) 
German Democratic Republic 

(044-000-91159-1) 
Hungary (044-000-91016-1) 
Poland (044-000-91 180-9) 
Romania (044-000-99914-5) 
USSR. (044-000-91025-0) 

Individual Background Notes may be 
obtained for 700 each from the Superin- 
tendent of Documents, U.S. Government 
Printing Office. Washington, DC. 
20402. (Orders of 100 or more copies of 
the same Notes mailed to the same ad- 
dress are sold at a 25% discount.) Re- 
mittances in the form of a check or 
money order payable to the Superinten- 
dent of Documents must accompany 
orders. 



41 

of direct interest to many American 
citizens; 

• Promote constructive and positive 
participation in international organiza- 
tions and peaceful resolution of dis- 
putes. In particular, we encourage sup- 
port for African political solutions to 
African problems, and we oppose East- 
ern European participation in Soviet 
and Cuban military activities in Africa 
and other troubled regions. Also, we 
encourage Eastern European nations to 
play a more constructive role in the 
Middle East as Romania has done; 

• Improve trade and economic rela- 
tions through the resolution of 
nationalization claims and. where pos- 
sible and appropriate, by the reciprocal 
extension of most-favored-nation 
(MFN) tariff treatment. We have now 
concluded claims agreements with all 
of the countries of the region except for 
Czechoslovakia and the German 
Democratic Republic. The implemen- 
tation earlier this summer of the 
U.S. -Hungarian trade agreement makes 
Hungary the third country in Eastern 
Europe (after Poland and Romania) 
with which we exchange MFN tariff 
treatment, reflecting the development 
of our relations with those countries 
across the board. We also seek to ex- 
pand our bilateral trade through in- 
creased commercial opportunities and 
business facilitation. Periodic 
government-to-government consulta- 
tions on a number of levels help to 
expand our bilateral trade; 

• Engage the Eastern European 
countries more fully in world trade and 
international economic activities, such 
as in the current multilateral trade 
negotiations in Geneva and in various 
North-South economic issues; 

• Reduce the number of opposing 
forces in central Europe through seri- 
ous pursuit of the Vienna talks on 
mutual and balanced force reductions. 

In conclusion, we believe that our 
policies toward the countries of Eastern 
Europe and the objectives we seek 
through these policies are generally 
supported, on a bipartisan basis, by the 
vast majority of the American public. 
Our approach is one which we believe 
is best designed to enable the United 
States to play a constructive role in 
Eastern Europe. D 



1 The complete transcript of the hearings will 
be published by the committee and will be 
available from the Superintendent of Docu- 
ments. U.S. Government Printing Office, 
Washington. DC. 20402. 

- Charter '77 is a private group established in 
Czechoslovakia to monitor compliance with the 
Helsinki Final Act. 



42 



Department of State Bulled 



MIDDLE EAST: 

Camp David Agreements 






by Harold H. Saunders 

Statement before the Subcommittee 
on Europe and the Middle Falsi of the 
House Committee on International 
Relations on September 28, 1978. Mr. 
Saunders is Assistant Secretary for 
Near Eastern and South Asian Af- 
fairs. ' 

I appreciate your inviting me to tes- 
tify on the agreements reached at Camp 
David, because it is essential that we 
work together to build on the founda- 
tion for peace laid in these meetings. 2 

The framework for peace produced 
at Camp David by President Sadat. 
Prime Minister Begin, and President 
Carter provides an unprecedented op- 
portunity for the people of the Middle 
East to turn away from the long and 
tragic course of conflict, tension. 
stalemate, and terror that has for so 
long afflicted Israelis and Arabs — and 
the world at large. As President Carter 
said: 

There are still great difficulties that remain 
and many hard issues to be settled The i|ues- 
tions that have brought warfare and bitterness 
to the Middle East for the last 30 years will nut 
be settled overnight. But we should all recog- 
nize the substantial achievements that have 
been made. 

It would be tragic to lose this op- 
portunity 

The issues that underlie the Arab- 
Israeli dispute have been recognized by 
successive American Administrations 
as having profound consequences for 
America's own interests — our historic 
and moral commitment to the people of 
the region, the important anil mutually 
beneficial economic relationships be 
tween the United States and the Middle- 
Eastern nations, and the dangers which 
perpetual crisis in the region pose for 
world peace and freedom. 

The U.S. diplomatic role in the Mid- 
dle East has been and continues to be a 
matter of national importance to us. It 
has been, as well, indispensable to 
hopes for a negotiated settlement by the 
parties, for it is the United States alone 
among the world's nations that both 
Israel and its Arab neighbors have been 
prepared to work with on this complex 
and difficult problem. 

The President's effort at Camp David 
was conducted in this spirit — with 
humility, with perseverance, and with 
the deepest sense of responsibility to- 



ward the interests of the American 
people, toward the nations and peoples 
of the Middle East, and in the cause of 
peace, justice, and cooperative prog- 
ress. As a result of this effort, the 
prospects for peace in the Middle East 
have been advanced significantly, and 
good prospects exist for even further 
progress — if the parties to the Arab- 
Israeli conflict commit themselves to 
seizing the opportunity that now is 
offered. 

No international agreement can suc- 
ceed unless it provides a balance of 
benefits. Each party must be able to 
perceive that its particular interests are 
addressed seriously and with a sense of 
reciprocal advantage and responsibil- 
ity. This is all the more true in the case 
of any agreement to advance the cause 
of peace in the Middle East. All the 
central dimensions — human, political, 
security, and psychological — must be 
dealt with in a balanced and fair man- 
ner if we are to expect the parties to 
commit themselves to go forward with 
the peaceful resolution of the differ- 
ences that for so long have caused war 
and destruction. 

Israel 

Support for a secure, free, and 
democratic Israel in the Middle East 
has been and will remain a permanent 
feature of American foreign policy; in- 
deed it is a moral commitment by our 
country and a strategic concern. The 
ties of friendship that bind out- 
two nations will, I am sure, be strength- 
ened by the Camp David agreements. 

Israel, like any nation, has a right to 
recognition and acceptance by its im- 
mediate neighbors and by all nations. 
Beyond this. Israel, like any nation, 
has a right to live in security — a secu- 
rity that would derive from its own 
Strength and fortitude, from the grow- 
ing cooperation and good will of its 
neighbors, and from linn security ar- 
rangements agreed between them. The 
I amp David agreements go further to- 
ward meeting all of these fundamental 
concerns of Israel than any interna- 
tional action since the founding of the 
modem State of Israel. 

For Israel, these agreements speak to 
the centuries-old aspiration of the 
Jewish people to live in peace in a state 
of their own in the land of their 
forefathers, within secure and recog- 
nized borders, and to take their riuhtful 



place in the international community o 
nations. As President Carter said 
". . . this great aspiration of Israel ha: 
been certified without constraint in thi 
greatest degree of enthusiasm by Presi 
dent Sadat, the leader of one of tht 
greatest nations on Earth." 

In practical terms. Israel now cat 
look realistically to a future of ful 
peace with Egypt while it carrie." 
through the resolution of problems tha 
will lead to peace with all of it; 
neighbors. The agreement with Egyp> 
provides for diplomatic relations, an 
end to boycotts, the right to tree pas 
sage through international waterways 
and other ties characteristic of norma 
peaceful relations between sovereign 
states. 

The framework agreements alsi 
contain another indispensable 
element — arrangements to guarantee 
the security of the parties. 

In the Sinai: 

• A wide demilitarized zone; 

• A limited armament zone east oi 
the Suez Canal; 

• U.N. forces in a zone along the 
Egyptian-Israeli border and the Gulf ot 
Aqaba; 

• U.N. forces to assure freedom ol 
passage through the Tiran Strait ami as 
a buffer between Sinai and da/a; 

• Relocation of Israeli airfields easi 
of the border, in the Negev; and 

• A small limited armament zone on 
the Israeli side of the border. 

In the West Bank and Gaza: 

• Israeli security forces will remain 
m specified security locations to pro- 
vide for Israel's security: 

• There will be arrangements for as- 
suring internal security: 

• There will be a 5-year interim 
period before the final status of the 
area is decided; anil 

• Israel has a voice, together with 
Egypt, Jordan, and the Palestinians, in 
the determination o\ the final status ot 
the area and its boundaries 

These concrete security arrange- 
ments are. of course, important, but far 
more is involved. True security cannot 
be achieved by physical, material, or 
geographical measures alone; true se- 
curity must be founded on a relation- 
ship of amity, trust, mutual respect, 
and acceptance between a nation and 
its neighbors. For the first time ever, 
this can become an actuality — not just 



[ovember 1978 

dream — tor the people ot Israel 
Vith a responsible and positive ap- 
roaeh to the provisions of these 
ramework documents, a new era of 
mtual friendship, respect, and cooper- 
tion between Israel and its 
eighbors — and all the benefits that can 
low from this — becomes a reality. 

If the nations of the Middle East can 
eize the opportunity before them and 
ross the threshold to peace, no one 
vill benefit more than the people of 
srael. At long last. Israel will be able 
o begin to free itself of the crushing 
efense burden which its citizens have 
ad to bear from the inception of the 
tate. 

Today Israel's development has 
eached a point where the advantages 
vhich peace can bring to progress are 
nprecedentedly bright. Peace can re- 
ease the extraordinary talents and 
nergies of the people of Israel to ad- 
Iress the range of modern problems. In 
ier capita terms, Israel possesses more 
cientists. engineers, physicians, and 
ither professionals and technicians 
rained in public service fields than 
nost nations of the world. Already, 
iespite 30 years of conflict and ten- 
ions. Israel's contributions to human 
nd material development in areas such 
s health, agriculture, the environment. 
Iternative sources of energy, and 
yater conservation have been remarka- 
ile. Under conditions of peace. Israel's 
lready disproportionate contribution to 
olutions to some of its — and the 
world's — most pressing issues will be 
nagnified. 

The Arab Side 

President Sadat and Egypt can take 
l;reat pride in the extent to which the 
jramp David agreements speak to the 
|:oncerns of the Arab world at large. 
Through its contribution to the docu- 
nent entitled "A Framework for Peace 
In the Middle East [Agreed at Camp 
[David]," Egypt has laid the founda- 
tions for an overall Arab-Israeli settle- 
nent and established a procedure and 
jrinciples which can be used by all 
[Israel's neighbors who are prepared to 
ijiegotiate for peace and security on the 
basis of all the principles and provi- 
sions of U.N. Security Council Res- 
olution 242, which applies to each of 
jthese negotiations — Egypt. Jordan, 
iSyria, and Lebanon. If the opportunity 
lis seized, the results can shape the 
future of the Middle East for decades to 
Icome. It can mean a Middle East that 
lean live in dignity, with expanding 
jprosperity and influence, and freed 
from the shadow of outside pressure or 
Ithreat. It offers an avenue for the Arabs 
to work together, not in the negative 



way of marshaling their energies 
against a common adversary but toward 
the attainment of the highest human 
goals. 

At the heart of Arab concerns, of 
course, are the West Bank and Gaza 
and the Palestinian problem. The 
"Framework for Peace in the Middle 
East" offers the Arabs a fair and hon- 
orable way to begin resolving these 
problems. While not achieving every- 
thing the Arab people want at a single 
stroke, it sets in motion a political 
process which will significantly ad- 
vance legitimate Arab objectives while 
assuring Israel's security and its right 
to live in peace with its neighbors. 

To anyone who has worked on these 
problems, it must be evident that the 
issues involved in the West Bank and 
Gaza and in the Palestinian question 
generally are far too complex to be 
resolved all at once. Because of this we 
have long felt that the only realistic 
approach to their solution would be to 
establish a 5-year transitional period 
for the West Bank and Gaza in which 
the decisions that needed to be made 
could be dealt with in a logical 
sequence. 

That approach has been agreed to by 
Egypt and Israel, and they have invited 
other parties to the Arab-Israeli conflict 
to support it. As the key Arab nations 
consider their choice, it is imperative 
that they understand what the 
framework agreed at Camp David 
achieves. 

For the first time in history a Palestin- 
ian self-governing body will be 
established — something that has never 
before existed. 

• Throughout the West Bank and 
Gaza. Palestinian authority will be es- 
tablished during the transitional period, 
pending negotiation of final bound- 
aries. 

• The Israeli military government 
and its civilian administration will be 
withdrawn and will be replaced by a 
Palestinian self-governing authority 
freely elected by the inhabitants of 
these areas. A major initial removal of 
Israeli military forces will take place, 
and those remaining will be redeployed 
in specified locations. A strong local 
Palestinian police force under Palestin- 
ian authority will come into being. 

• The Palestinians — along with 
Egypt. Israel, and Jordan — will par- 
ticipate in negotiations based on all the 
provisions and principles of U.N. Se- 
curity Council Resolution 242; they 
will thereby have a clear voice in de- 
termining their own future. They will 
participate in setting up their self- 
governing authority, in the negotiations 
to determine the final status of the 



43 



West Bank and Gaza, and in the 
negotiations for an Israel-Jordan peace 
treaty. Their agreement on the final 
status of the West Bank and Gaza will 
be submitted to a vote by the elected 
representatives of the inhabitants of the 
West Bank and Gaza to ratify or reject. 
Their elected representatives will, by 
themselves, decide how they shall gov- 
ern themselves after the 5-year transi- 
tional period, consistent with the terms 
of their agreement on the final status of 
the area. 

• These arrangements will set in 
motion a political process in the West 
Bank and Gaza which will establish 
Palestinian authority and administration 
with full autonomy there. 

• There are also provisions for 
Palestinians not now in the West Bank 
and Gaza. Representatives from among 
these Palestinians as mutually agreed 
may join the negotiations among 
Egypt. Israel, and Jordan on establish- 
ing the elected self-governing authority 
in the West Bank and Gaza. Through- 
out the transitional period in all the 
negotiations that will take place, re- 
sponsible Palestinians in this area and 
outside almost certainly will reflect 
each other's views and concerns. 

• Israel has agreed that the solution 
from negotiations must recognize the 
legitimate rights of the Palestinian 
people and their just requirements. 

This framework provides a start — 
self-government for one-third of all the 
Palestinian people in the world within 
the agreed framework. The issue to be 
decided now is whether to concentrate 
on assuring this historic step — which 
in 5 years will lead to a determination 
of the final status of the area approved 
by the elected representatives of the 
inhabitants of the West Bank and 
Gaza — or whether to reject this step in 
order to pursue the impossible goal of 



Secretary Venice's 
Middle East Visit 

On September 19, 1978, Secretary 
Vance departed Washington to brief 
the leaders of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, 
and Syria on the Egyptian-Israeli 
agreements reached at Camp David. He 
visited Jordan September 20-21. Saudi 
Arabia September 21-24. and Syria 
September 24. The Secretary returned 
to the United States September 25. 

Press releases related to this visit 
are Nos. 359 (September 19), 360 
(September 20). and 364 and 365 
(September 21). □ 



44 

an immediate resolution of all out- 
standing issues. We believe it is im- 
perative to get the process started now. 

Let me dwell on this point for a 
moment. I have found that this is one 
of the most difficult points for some of 
our friends in the Middle East to under- 
stand. We have started from the knowl- 
edge that all of the complicated issues 
in an Arab-Israeli settlement cannot be 
resolved in one negotiation at one time. 
Therefore, we have put them in se- 
quence and provided procedures for 
their resolution within an agreed 
period. Meanwhile, each change in the 
situation will produce new conditions 
which will make it possible to resolve 
issues later that cannot be resolved 
now. 

This framework speaks as well to a 
deep human concern of the Arab people 
and indeed of all people. At Camp 
David we found both the Israelis and 
the Egyptians eager to come to grips 
with the tragic refugee problem. For 
the first time, two parties to the con- 
flict have committed themselves to 
work with other interested parties to 
establish agreed procedures for a 
prompt, just, and permanent resolution 
of this too long unresolved problem. 
More immediately, the agreement pro- 
vides for the creation of a mechanism 
which should permit early readmission 
of persons displaced from the West 
Bank and Gaza in 1967. These people 
will be able to reestablish themselves 
in their homes and pursue their liveli- 
hoods for themselves and their families 
in dignity and justice. 

Finally, the document entitled 
"Framework for the Conclusion of a 
Peace Treaty Between Egypt and Is- 
rael" provides tor restoration of the 
full exercise of Egyptian sovereignty 
over the Sinai to the internationally 
recognized border. This agreement 
calls for the full withdrawal of Israeli 
forces from the Sinai; and after an 
interim withdrawal, which can be ac- 
complished quickly, the establishment 
of normal peaceful relations between 



the two countries, including dip- 
lomatic relations. This offers the 
Egyptian people, who have suffered 
and sacrificed so much in the wars of 
the past three decades, the possibility 
of devoting their considerable energies 
and resources to the cause of economic 
and social progress. 

The United States 

Let me conclude by noting the Camp 
David agreements serve critical Ameri- 
can interests in the Middle East as well. 
The Camp David agreements: 

• Provide renewed expression of 
America's traditional moral dedication 
to help find just and peaceful solutions 
to international problems and particu- 
larly to find a peace that will benefit all 
the people of the Middle East while 
serving American interests; 

• Demonstrate that our commitment 
to the security and well-being of Israel 
is effective and enduring; 

• Strengthen our effort to deepen 
lies with our friends in the Arab world. 
with its increasingly influential inter- 
national role; 

• Lessen the danger of the Middle 
East becoming a focus or flashpoint of 
conflict between the great powers that 
could lead to nuclear war; 

• Further the interest of our allies 
and ourselves in a peaceful Middle 
East; 

• Contribute to an international en- 
vironment which can narrow the gap 
between the rich and technological!) 
advanced nations and the developing 
world; and above all 

• If accepted by the parties for im- 
plementation and supported widely by 
the international community, will be a 
bulwark for further efforts to establish 
peace and cooperation among all 
nations. 

The United States remains com- 
mitted to a just and lasting overall 
peace for the Middle East. The Camp 
David agreements do not bring such a 



Department of State Bulled 

peace immediately into existence — tW 
delicate complex of issues on the Wesi 
Bank and Gaza will have to be settlec 
and peace achieved between Israel ana 
its other neighbors. Jordan. Syria, an« 
Lebanon — but they lay the groundworl 
for a comprehensive settlement. 

The outcome at Camp David is ; 
major step toward phased, cumulatia 
agreements through which a record o 
success and confidence can be com 
piled and on which further and. at soim 
point, ultimate decisions can bi 
reached to achieve a final accord. 

The choice now is clear. It i 
whether to turn away from thesi 
agreements because they do not answj 
every question, provide for every dj 
tail, insure all parties against all risk 
or whether they will be supported fo 
what they are — a framework for peaci 
which can set in motion a political am 
psychological dynamic capable o 
transforming this terrible and tragi* 
conflict into the just, lasting, and com 
prehensive peace that the nations ot thi 
Middle East have so long sought. Thi. 
unprecedented involvement ot thi 
President of the United States at Cam] 
David demonstrated the meaning of thi 
U.S. commitment to help achiel 
peace in the Middle East. The parties 
and all those interested in the Middle 
East problem, can rest assured that th. 
United States will remain fully in 
volved until a final, just, and lastin; 
settlement is achieved. 

We have said for many years nov 
that the modern history of the Middli 
East has been a record of lost opportu 
nities. All of us recognize that we nov 
face an opportunity of unprecedentec 
potential for peace and that this tunc i 
must not be lost. 



h 



1 The complete transcript of the hearings wj| 
be published b) the committee and will he aNail 
able from the Superintendent "I Documents 
U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 
[) C 20402 

-'For texts ol the agreements and other mate- 
rial concerning the summit, see Bulletin ot 

Oct. iy7x, P i 



November 1978 



45 



UNITED NATIONS: 

33d General Assembly Convenes 



by Secretary Vance 

Statement at the opening session of 
the U.N. General Assembly on Sep- 
tember 29, iy78. [ 

A generation ago. the United Nations 
was created by men and women who 
shared a vision. 

• They saw the need, in the wake of 
war, to create stronger international in- 
stitutions that could dampen the flames 
of conflict and lift nations and people 
to a new level of material well-being. 

• They saw the need to afford self- 
determination to millions. 

• They saw the need for the world 
community to take a compelling stand 
against repression, discrimination, and 
the denial of the rights of man. 

The men and women who gathered 
iin San Francisco raised their sights 
labove the differences and divisions of 
Ithe moment. They dared to see the 
world as it could be — a world where 
those who were hungry are fed, 
where those who were poor have es- 
caped the degradation of poverty, 
where diplomacy among nations is a 
pervasive substitute for violence among 
nations, and where the resources of the 
world are used effectively and shared 
equitably. 

In the years since, the record of the 
United Nations in working toward this 
vision has been one of accomplish- 
ment. It has played an indispensable 
part in the process of peaceful decol- 
onization, in defusing tensions among 
nations through its peacekeeping mis- 
sions, and in promoting genuine eco- 
nomic and social progress. 

Today, the members of this body 
still share that common vision. And we 
understand, far better than ever before, 
our common destiny — that no nation, 
acting alone, can assure its people 
peace and economic security; that the 
future of each of our nations depends 
upon the future of all of our nations. 

Our challenge today is to summon 
the political will to act in concert to- 
ward the goals we share — to go beyond 
the rhetoric of interdependence and to 
j begin to recognize its inescapable im- 
j plications for the national interests of 
I each of us. 

We must build a new consensus on 

this proposition: that in this new era, 

I each nation must weigh more carefully 

than ever before its long term interest 



in a healthy global community when 
making decisions about its immediate 
concerns. For only through cooperation 
and compromise in the short run can 
we assure our longer term future. 

On crucial issues, the coming 
months will present turning points of 
incalculable importance. In negotia- 
tions on the Middle East, on southern 
Africa, on trade, on arms control, and 
on many other pressing problems, 
genuine progress has been made. With- 
out continued progress, the gains we 
have already made can be lost 

This point applies not to any single 
nation nor group of nations, but to 
every nation, including my own. 

The resolution of dangerous regional 
disputes and progress in limiting 
weaponry must always be at the top of 
the immediate international agenda. I 
will return to these issues later. But we 
cannot so concentrate our energies on 
the political diplomacy of international 
peace, essential as it is, that we dis- 
cover too late that international in- 
equities, and poverty and injustice 
within nations, make peace among na- 
tions impossible. 

So let me concentrate my comments 
today on those issues that so central I \ 
touch people's lives around the 
globe — economic security, equitable 
development of the Earth's resources, 
and individual freedom. 

International Economic System 

Shared economic progress requires a 
global consensus on the benefits of 
cooperation among nations. Coopera- 
tion and compromise are often dif- 
ficult. 

• The economic problems we share 
require long term efforts, but we are all 
constrained by domestic concerns which 
call for immediate attention. 

• The problems we share are so 
widespread in their impact that solu- 
tions cannot be found by a single na- 
tion or group of nations. 

• These problems require more than 
general agreements. Application of 
substantial technical and financial re- 
sources are necessary. Debate over 
sterile texts will neither feed the hun- 
gry nor create new jobs for the un- 
employed. Only common action can be 
effective. And each must contribute if 
all are to benefit. 

Only 3 or 4 years ago there was 



extraordinary tension between North 
and South. Each side was deeply suspi- 
cious of the other's motives. Each held 
sharply different perceptions of global 
needs and priorities. 

But these differences have been 
narrowed. From the seventh special 
session, through the U.N. Conference 
on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) 
IV, the Conference on International 
Economic Cooperation, and the meet- 
ings of this Assembly — and through 
other serious efforts in the Organiza- 
tion for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) and the eco- 
nomic summits — agreement has been 
achieved on several basic issues relat- 
ing to a new international economic 
order. 

• We are agreed on the need to work 
toward the elimination of poverty in all 
countries. Concessional aid flows have 
increased. More attention is being de- 
voted to food production. Satisfying 
basic economic needs is becoming a 
greater priority of the international 
community. 

• We are agreed on the urgent need 
to accelerate equitable, noninflationary 
growth. The Geneva trade negotiations 
are in their final stages. We are dis- 
cussing guidelines for international 
investment. Private capital flows are 
increasing. The facilities of the Inter- 
national Monetary Fund (IMF) have 
been expanded, and discussions are 
underway to expand the facilities of the 
multilateral development banks. 

• We are agreed on the need to re- 
duce economic instability and uncer- 
tainty. The IMF is playing a major role 
in providing balance-of-payments 
financing to those most severely af- 
fected by recent disruptions in the 
world economy. We are engaged in 
serious discussions on a variety of 
commodity arrangements, including a 
system of internationally coordinated 
national grain reserves. 

• We are agreed on the need to 
facilitate smooth adjustment for work- 
ers and businesses that have borne the 
brunt of changing economic circum- 
stances. The Bonn summit made clear 
that we must intensify our efforts in 
this area. 

Because we have come far, the road 
ahead will be even more challenging. 
for the most difficult issues remain. To 
maintain our progress, we should be 
guided by three fundamental principles 



46 

in the North-South discussions over the 
coming months. 

First, every nation must resist the 
temptation to solve its own economic 
problems at the expense of others. We 
must fashion our domestic policies on 
the basis of global as well as national 
needs. 

Second, all nations which bear their 
fair share of responsibility should bene- 
fit from a healthy world economy. 

Third, all nations must enter inter- 
national economic negotiations with a 
spirit of accommodation. 

These principles will not by them- 
selves solve the problems we face. But 
without their general acceptance, there 
can be no genuine progress. Adherence 
to them will prevent critical negotia- 
tions from turning into polarizing and 
self-defeating tests of will. 

Let me discuss several major issues 
where the application of these princi- 
ples can make the difference between 
success and failure. 

Committee of the Whole 

One of our most recent collective 
efforts to address the economic chal- 
lenges we share was the establishment 
of the Committee of the Whole. This 
Committee has the potential to look at 
economic issues comprehensively and 
to identify longer term priorities. The 
United States strongly supports this 
forum. 

The meeting in May made progress 
in identifying some important areas of 
agreement between industrial and de- 
veloping countries. Substantive discus- 
sions in the Committee had an impor- 
tant impact on the June ministerial 
meeting of the OECD and in the Bonn 
summit. We, of course, shared the dis- 
appointment of other delegates that a 
procedural impasse earlier this month 
interrupted the Committee's work. 

Since the September meeting, we 
have carefully examined the statements 
made by others on this issue We have 
noted in particular statements by the 
chairman to the Committee on Sep- 
tember 8 and to the press on September 
1 1 and have taken account of sub- 
sequent consultations. It is now gener- 
ally agreed that the Committee would 
not seek to provide specific solutions to 
problems outstanding in other bodies 
Rather, it would achieve agreed con- 
clusions on fundamental or crucial un- 
derlying issues and only to the extent 
that all members agreed to decide on 
them. 

We are satisfied that on the basis of 
these statements, sufficient procedural 
agreement now exists to resume sub- 



stantive work in the manner suggested 
by the chairman at the end of the in- 
formal consultations on September 6. 

Trade 

The spirit which must guide our 
work in the Committee of the Whole 
applies as well to our policies on trade. 
The developing world is no longer on 
the periphery of world trade. Increas- 
ingly, growth in the developing coun- 
tries is important to the health of in- 
dustrial countries. 

Commitment to open trade, how- 
ever, is extremely fragile. It is tempting 
for one nation to use trade restrictions to 
export its economic difficulties. It is 
often easy to avoid adjustments which 
are beneficial in the long term but which 
in the short run present difficult problems 
for workers and industry. 

We must be concerned about rising 
protectionist pressures, but we should 
also recognize that world trade has ex- 
panded remarkably well in recent 
years. Despite a deep recession in the 
early 1970's, we not only avoided the 
trading wars of the 1930's, we con- 
tinued negotiations to liberalize and 
improve the world trading system. Our 
ability to conclude these trade negotia- 
tions successfully this year is a critical 
test of our commitment to an open 
trading system. And agreement will 
stimulate production. It will provide 
jobs. And it will help reduce inflation. 

Beyond our efforts to expand trade, 
the United States will fulfill our com- 



U.S. DELEGATION, 
33D U.N. GENERAL 
ASSEMBLY* 

Representatives 

Andrew Young 

James F. Leonard 

Abraham A. Ribicoff, U.S. Senator from 

the Stale of Connecticut 
James B Pearson. U.S. Senator from the 

State of Kansas 
Set Charles Momjian 

Alternate Representatives 

Donald F. McHenry 
Melissa F. Wells 
Angelique O. Stahl 
John W. Hechinger 
Richard W. Petree 



"Text from USUN press release S< ol 
Sept. 26. 1978. which includes bio- 
graphic data on each delegate. 



Department of State Bulletir 

mitment to assist developing nations 
through differential measures includ- 
ing, where appropriate, special and 
more favorable treatment. We in turn 
expect those developing countries 
which can do so to contribute to trade 
liberalization by improving access to 
their markets. Improved access will not 
only benefit the industrial countries, it 
will be even more important to many 
developing countries. 

Finally, we believe that in trade, as 
elsewhere, the developing countries 
should have a voice in determining the 
policies which affect them. We have 
encouraged their full involvement in 
the Geneva negotiations We urge de- 
veloping countries, especially those 
which play a large role in international 
trade, to participate actively in the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade and in the agreements that result 
from the Geneva negotiations so that 
their interests are fully represented. 



Commodities 

An essential element of trade for 
most developing nations is their export 
of basic commodities. At UNCTAD IV 
we agreed to intensify our collective 
effort to address commodity problems. 
Progress has not always been as fast as 
we all would like, but this has gener- 
ally reflected the technical complexity 
of commodity issues rather than lack of 
political will or good faith. We will 
continue to work for stabilization 
agreements and other measures that 
strengthen commodity markets. 

Let me affirm also that we believe a 
soundly designed common fund could 
play a useful role in alleviating com- 
modity problems. A well-structured 
fund will provide economic benefits to 
participating countries. We also recog- 
nize that establishment of a fund is of 
major political importance to the gen- 
eral North-South dialogue. 

We will cooperate with others to 
bring the common fund negotiations to 
a successful conclusion. Recent con- 
sultations have identified a con- 
vergence of views on some issues. All 
agree that a fund could play a useful 
role in reducing the overall financial 
costs of supporting buffer stocks which 
effectively stabilize prices. 

In addition, there is a growing reel 
ognition of the importance of en- 
couraging improved productivity and 
more effective marketing of many 
commodities. A separate "second win- 
dow " of the common fund, based on 
voluntary contributions and operating 
under agreed guidelines, might be an 
appropriate mechanism. We are pre- 
pared to negotiate flexibly on this 



Movember 1978 



ssuc. as (in others, if there is a si 

ipproach on all sides. 
While progress has been made on 
' iome issues, important differences still 

emain. Movement on all sides of the 

onferenee table will be necessary. But 
1 .ve are convinced that with mutual ac- 

rommodation a workable agreement 

:an be achieved. 
an; 

Resource Transfers 

As with trade, increased resource 
lows to the developing world must be 
Dart of an international system of 
hared responsibility. 

We ought not think of resource 
transfers as a sacrifice for donors or a 
4 unilateral benefit for recipients. They 
are an economic investment in the fu- 
ture of all countries. They will contrib- 
ute to global economic growth, greater 
trade, and enhanced prosperity for us 
all. 

My country is committed to increas- 
ing our contributions both to multilat- 
ral and bilateral development efforts. 
We have done so in the past year: Our 
nultilateral commitments increased 
31% and our bilateral program ex- 
oanded by 20%. And because we are 
determined that U.S. aid funds will be 
used effectively, we will concentrate 
jur efforts in countries where programs 
jare aimed most directly at meeting the 
essential needs of their people. 

The United States believes strongly 
that a key objective of foreign assist- 
ance should be to help meet basic 
human needs. We recognize that na- 
tions will have different development 
priorities in approaching this goal. 
Whether emphasis is on enhancing the 
productivity of the poor, increasing 
food production, improving health, or 
expanding industry which creates jobs, 
the critical ingredient in every nation is 
to have all its citizens — men and 
women — as active participants and 
beneficiaries in their nation's growth. 

Finally, we recognize the debt prob- 
lems that many of the least developed 
countries face. We will soon have au- 
thority from our Congress for retroac- 
tive adjustment of certain aid terms 
which would permit us to help those 
most in need. 



Managing Global Resources 

As we work together to promote 
leconomic development, we must also 
lassure an equitable sharing of the 
[world's resources. Four issues demand 
our urgent attention. 

Food. Our first urgent priority is 
i assuring adequate food and stable ag- 
ricultural prices for all people. Four 



years have passed since the World 
Food Conference, where we agreed on 
measures we must take for the future. 
But despite our efforts, the fundamen- 
tal problems remain. 

• Food production is hardly keeping 
pace with the growth in population. 

• Food deficits in many countries are 
increasing. 

• Negotiations on grain reserves 
have dragged on without success. 

We believe progress must be made. 

The United States has created a 9- 
million-ton farmer-held grain reserve. 
We have proposed to our Congress the 
establishment of an international emer- 
gency wheat reserve of 6 million tons 
to provide food for emergency needs in 
developing countries. We intend to 
maintain our food aid level at a fair 
share of the target set at the World 
Food Conference. We will continue to 
support the activities of international 
organizations devoted to food produc- 
tion, such as the International Fund for 
Agricultural Development. And we in- 
tend to make food aid a more effective 
tool in support of development. 

I propose that this Assembly review 
the world food situation — to identify 
the current obstacles to progress and to 
restore a sense of urgency to meeting 
mankind's most basic need. We must 
not be lulled by good weather and 
plentiful harvests. Another tragedy is 
inevitable unless we act now. 

Energy. We must act now to de- 
velop new energy resources so that we 
avoid a harsh transition to the time 
when fossil fuels will no longer be 
plentiful. This task has several dimen- 
sions. 

• There must be an expansion of oil 
and gas production. And we need to 
improve our conservation of these 
energy sources, especially in the 
United States. The World Bank has 
expanded its lending to help developing 
countries increase their fossil fuel 
supplies. We welcome this, and we 
also encourage the regional develop- 
ment banks to assist. 

• The development of nuclear 
energy will also be central to the future 
of many countries. We hope the Inter- 
national Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation 
will provide a consensus on nuclear 
technologies free from the serious risk 
of nuclear weapons proliferation. My 
government supports the development 
of safeguardable nuclear power, in- 
cluding assured nuclear fuel supplies. 
The developing nations should, of 
course, participate in the design and 
management of the institutions which 



47 

form the basis of an international nu- 
clear energy regime. 

• Priority attention must be given to 
the development of renewable energy 
sources. Many technologies already 
exist for harnessing solar, wind, and 
geothermal power. All of us can bene- 
fit from these technologies, but a spe- 
cial effort should be made to meet the 
needs of the poorer countries. 

Two opportunities now exist for the 
United Nations to continue to play an 
important role. 

• The United States supports the 
proposed U.N. conference on new and 
renewable energy. It could result in a 
more coordinated U.N. energy effort 
and clearer priorities. It could also pro- 
vide up-to-date information on renewa- 
ble energy technology and examine the 
role of the private sector in energy 
development. 

• The U.N. Development Program 
might also expand its efforts to help 
nations assess their own renewable 
energy possibilities, finance the testing 
of new technologies, and provide 
training and technical assistance for 
effective energy management. 

The United States is willing to con- 
tribute to a major global effort to de- 
velop new energy sources. We will in- 
tensify our assistance programs in this 
area. We will increase domestic re- 
search which can benefit all nations. 
And we will expand cooperative energy 
programs from which we too stand to 
benefit. 

Law of the Sea. We must strive to 
conclude successfully the Law of the 
Sea negotiations. At stake is whether 
this vast expanse of the globe will be 
an arena of conflict or cooperation. 

Considerable progress has been made 
on a number of issues in these negotia- 
tions. These achievements have been 
obscured, however, by continued 
stalemate over seabed mining. The 
basis for an equitable solution already 
exists and is widely accepted. It per- 
mits all sides to benefit fully from sea- 
bed mining, with private firms as well 
as an international enterprise allowed 
to mine on a competitive basis. A 
mutually acceptable solution is im- 
perative, and it is possible. 

Time is running out for reaching an 
agreed solution. Without it, seabed 
mining will inevitably take place but in 
the absence of an internationally agreed 
framework. This would be less satis- 
factory than a widely supported inter- 
national regime. 

Science and Technology. Finally is 
the critical question of how best to 



48 

harness technology and science tor the 
benefit of mankind. 

We hope that the U.N. Conference 
on Science and Technology for De- 
velopment will focus attention on how 
all countries can contribute their 
knowledge to global development. It 
will be particularly important to find 
ways for developing nations 10 enhance 
their capacity to generate, select, and 
apply technology for their own de- 
velopment priorities. We will contrib- 
ute to the work of the conference, and 
we hope to benefit from it. 

Furthermore to help mobilize the 
technical talents and knowledge of our 
nation on behalf of the development of 
others, we intend to establish during 
the coming year a new foundation for 
international technological coopera- 
tion. 



Enhancement of Human Dignity 

The ultimate purpose of all our 
policies is the enhancement of human 
dignity. The rights to food, to shelter, 
to a decent education, to adequate 
health — the rights which lie at the heart 
of our approach to economic issues — 
are hollow without political and civil 
freedoms — freedom from torture and 
government mistreatment: freedom to 
worship, to travel, and to speak with- 
out fear; freedom to participate in the 
affairs of one's government. There is 
no incompatibility among economic, 
political, and civil rights, no choice 
that must be made among them. They 
reenforce one another 

We commemorate in this Assembly 
the 30th anniversary of the Universal 
Declaration on Human Rights. Dag 
Hammarskjold described the Declara- 
tion as a "living document." We have 
a continuing obligation to keep that 
document alive in our own nations. 
And as members of the United Nations, 
we must strengthen the international 
machinery that serves to promote the 
full range of human rights — political 
and economic 

We have made significant progress 
in the past year. Concern tor human 
rights is more central to international 
discourse today than ever bet ore. But 
more needs to be done. 

• This Assembly should review the 
activities of the various U.N. human 
rights institutions. 

• We must resolve in this Assembly 
to make torture alien to the experience 
of every nation and to conclude an 
international agreement to outlaw it. 

• We need to insure that we are 
doing all we can to end conditions 
which are tantamount to genocide. 

• We must ask what more each of us 



Department of State Bulletir 



can do to insure the vitality of the 
Universal Declaration — to provide am- 
nesty to prisoners of conscience, to 
assure due process for all, and to ad- 
vance social justice and equity for our 
people 

In addition, the plight of one group 
of individuals — refugees — demands 
our special compassion. We urge all 
nations to increase their support for the 
vital humanitarian work of the High 
Commissioner for Refugees. 

The refugee problem is not confined 
to any single region. In Africa alone, 
some 2 million individuals are now 
outside their native lands. We must do 
more to offer them sustenance, secu- 
rity, and a realistic hope of resettle- 
ment or return to their homelands. 

In Southeast Asia, hundreds of new 
refugees from Indochina appear daily, 
some risking their lives to cross bor- 
ders, others challenging the sea in 
every form of vessel. We urgently need 
greater efforts to provide them 
sanctuary. We hope that the High 
Commissioner will consider convening 
an international conference in the very 
near future to seek humane solutions to 
the desperate plight of these refugees. 
We propose that consideration also be 
given at a later date to a general con- 
ference on the worldwide refugee 
problem. 

International Peacekeeping 

Too often the anguish of the up- 
rooted is grim testimony to our col lee 
tive failure to achieve international 
peace. War and strife are the enemies 
of the fundamental rights 1 have dis- 
cussed. 

Today my government and many of 
those assembled here are actively 
pursuing the path of peace in troubled 
areas of the world. 

Middle East. The accords achieved 
at Camp David offer hope that at long 
last a turning point has been reached in 
the Middle East. The agreement 
achieved between Egypt and Israel. 
with active American participation, 
constitutes a framework for a com- 
prehensive peace settlement. Much re- 
mains to be done in ensuing stages of 
negotiations, but a major step has been 
taken in resolving the difficult issues 
that lie at the heart of 30 years of 
Arab-Israel hostility. 

As negotiations are pursued on the 
basis of the Camp David framework, a 
dynamic process will be set in motion 
that can profoundly change attitudes on 
the issues that remain to be resolved. 
That process will significantly advance 
legitimate Arab objectives while pro 



tecting IsraeCs security. It is our hope 
that the members of this body will lend 
their full support to the task of building 
a just and lasting peace upon this 
framework. 

In his recent address before Con- 
gress, President Carter reviewed the 
main elements of the Camp David 



World 
Conference To 
Combat Racism 



ist« 

Ifii 

IS In 

I 
Oil 

;.■ 
i\ 
/;. 
if. 
IV( 

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T: 
li 



WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, 
AUG. 18 1 

This week representatives of many 
nations are meeting in Geneva in a 
World Conference to Combat Racism 
and Racial Discrimination. 

The conference marks the midpoint 
of the U.N. Decade for Action to 
Combat Racism and Racial Discrimi- 
nation, a decade whose initiation the 
United States strongly supported. But 
the United States is unable to partici- 
pate in this potentially important con- 
ference, although we will monitor the 
proceedings, because the definition of 
"racism" has been perverted tor 
political ends by including Zionism as 
one of its forms. The United States 
cannot associate itself with the decade 
so long as it endorses the patently false 
definition of Zionism as a form of ra- 
cism. 

Instead we hope that this conference 
will return to the original purpose of 
the decade, so that we might rejoin this 
international effort to eliminate racism 
throughout the world. We will work 
toward this end because we know the 
challenge that racism poses and tor 
more than a century we have struggled 
to heal its scars. We know our goals 
have not been fully accomplished, yet 
we are encouraged and deeply com- 
mitted to them. Domestically and in- 
ternationally, we will continue to pur- 
sue this great common purpose in the 
context of other uncompromised ef- 
forts. 

We call on all nations to respect the 
original objectives of the United Na- 
tions Decade Against Racism and to 
resist efforts that distort its purpose and 
erode its moral force. 



ti 



ill 



■Text from Weekl\ Compilation of Presi- 
dential Documents of Aug. 21, 1978. 



lovember 1978 



49 



^reements. As the President said, our 
istoric position on settlements in oc- 
jpied territory has remained constant, 
s he further said, no peace agreement 
ill be either just or secure if it does 
ot resolve the problem of the Palestin- 
ins in the broadest sense. We believe 
lat the Palestinian people must be as- 
ired that they and their descendants 
in live with dignity and freedom and 
ave the opportunity for economic ful- 
llment and for political expression. 
he Camp David accords state that the 
;gotiated solution must recognize the 

gitimate rights of the Palestinian 
eople. 

The Camp David accords make a 
)lid start toward achieving these goals 
ir the Palestinians in real terms. In the 
/est Bank and Gaza, the framework 
rovides that Israeli occupation shall 
id and a self-governing authority shall 
; instituted. This can be achieved 
ithin a few months. Thus, for the first 
me, the Palestinians have the prospect 
F governing themselves within the 
amework that has been agreed. 

The Camp David framework also 

ves the Palestinians a vital role in 
taping their destiny by recognizing 

em as participants in all aspects of 

e negotiations that determine their 
iture. They will participate in the 
jegotiations to set up their self- 
jverning authority, in those to deter- 
: ine the final status of the West Bank 
I id Gaza, and in those leading to a 
>rdan-Israel peace treaty. Finally, the 
ireement on the final status of the 
'est Bank and Gaza will be submitted 
i a vote of representatives of the in- 
abitants for either ratification or 
Ejection. 

These steps set in motion a political 
I'ocess of the utmost importance to all 
alestinians. 

The Camp David accords concentrate 
n the means by which self-government 
an be established for the Palestinians 
ving in the West Bank and Gaza, but 
Here was also clear recognition by all 
iiree leaders at Camp David that the 
iroblem of the Palestinians living out- 
lide these areas must also be 
ddressed. 

We recognize that this problem has 
lolitical as well as humanitarian di- 
mensions which must be resolved as an 
;itegral part of a durable peace settle- 
tent. When the Camp David accords 
ell for "... the resolution of the 
alestinian problem' in all its aspects," 
ney acknowledge and embrace that 
central fact. As the political institutions 
|f self-government take shape in the 
|Vest Bank and Gaza through negotia- 
pns among the parties, the relation- 
ihip between those institutions and the 
Palestinians living outside the area 



should be defined, including the ques- 
tion of admission of Palestinian refu- 
gees to the West Bank and Gaza. 

The framework provides for the es- 
tablishment of a committee to decide 
on the modalities of admission to the 
West Bank and Gaza of persons dis- 
placed in the 1967 war. For the first 
time, the parties to the conflict — Egypt 
and Israel — have agreed to work with 
each other and with other interested 
parties to establish agreed procedures 
for a prompt, just, and permanent res- 
olution of the refugee problem. 

As President Carter stated in his ad- 
dress to Congress, the United States is 
irrevocably committed to bringing 
about a satisfactory solution to the 
problem of the Palestinian refugees 
We will play an active role in the res- 
olution of this problem. A solution 
must reflect the relevant U.N. resolu- 
tions relating to these refugees. 

We urge the international community 
to support Egypt and Israel in estab- 
lishing procedures urgently to address 
this issue in all its aspects. And the 
international community should con- 
tribute to a program to promote eco- 
nomic development in the West Bank 
and Gaza as well as to assist those 
refugees residing elsewhere. 

We are determined to achieve a fair 
and just settlement of the Middle East 
question in all its parts, and we hope 
the Palestinian people will seize this 
historic opportunity. It is our hope that 
the people of the Middle East will 
agree that it is imperative to begin the 
negotiating process now — and not to 
stand still until every last issue is re- 
solved. We urge the other interested 
parties to join the negotiations without 
delay. 

As the Middle East peace process 
moves forward, it is vital to maintain 
the effectiveness of the U.N's 
peacekeeping role there. It is critical 
that the mandates of U.N. peacekeep- 
ing forces in the Golan Heights and 
Sinai be renewed this fall. They have 
thus far helped all sides avoid renewed 
hostilities; they must now remain to 
help achieve a stable peace. 

Lebanon. In Lebanon, the fighting 
and tragic loss of life continues. The 
U.N.'s interim force in southern Leba- 
non has done much to stabilize the 
situation in that part of the country, 
and we call on all to support this effort 
to help reassert Lebanese authority. 

Elsewhere in Lebanon confrontation 
and tensions continue at a high pitch. 
President Carter has made clear in his 
address to the joint session of Congress 
following the Camp David summit, and 
again yesterday [at a news conference], 



his determination to spare no effort to 
assist in finding a solution to the 
Lebanese tragedy. As the President 
said yesterday, it is time for us to take 
joint action to call for a conference of 
those who are involved and try to reach 
some solution. It may involve a new 
charter for Lebanon. 

Namibia. In Namibia, the world 
community faces a fundamental chal- 
lenge. I will be commenting on this 
more fully this afternoon in the Secu- 
rity Council. Let me simply say now 
that the United States is determined to 
see Namibia achieve independence in 
accordance with the contact group pro- 
posal and Security Council Resolution 
43 1. 2 We call upon South Africa to 
cooperate fully with the United Nations 
so that this critical opportunity for a 
peaceful settlement will not be lost. 

Rhodesia. In Rhodesia, time may be 
running out for the possibilities of 
diplomacy. But we will continue to 
work with the British Government, the 
governments in the region, and the 
parties to seek a negotiated solution. 
We condemn the murder of innocent 
civilians as a matter of both conscience 
and reason. The prospects for peace in 
Rhodesia will diminish if violence 
increases. 



BACKGROUND NOTE 

ON THE UNITED NATIONS 

The Office of Public Communication, 
Department of State, has just released a 
pamphlet on the United Nations, the 
latest in the Background Notes series. 

This Note describes the Organiza- 
tion's history; the functions of the Secu- 
rity Council, the General Assembly, the 
Economic and Social Council, the Trus- 
teeship Council, the International Court 
of Justice, the Secretariat, and the 
U.N.'s specialized agencies and pro- 
grams; the financial arrangements of the 
U.N. system; peacekeeping, disarma- 
ment, and human rights efforts; and U.S. 
participation and policy. Included also 
are a profile, a list of members, principal 
U.S. officials, and a reading list. 

Individual copies of this Background 
Note on the United Nations may be ob- 
tained for 70C each from the Superinten- 
dent of Documents, U.S. Government 
Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 
20402. (Orders of 100 or more copies of 
the same Note mailed to the same ad- 
dress are sold at a 25% discount.) Re- 
mittances in the form of a check or 
money order payable to the Superinten- 
dent of Documents must accompany or- 
ders. 



50 



Cyprus. On Cyprus, an opportunity 
now exists to help the two communities 
narrow their differences and achieve a 
just and lasting solution to this long- 
standing problem. The United Nations 
has done a commendable job of nur- 
turing an atmosphere which should now 
make possible productive inter/com- 
munal negotiations. 

To grasp this opportunity, we would 
welcome and actively support a re- 
newed effort by Secretary General 
Waldheim to help the parties reach 
agreement on a sovereign, bicom- 
munal. nonaligned federal republic of 
Cyprus which would meet the concerns 
of the people of Cyprus. 

Nicaragua. In this atmosphere, we 
must respond to the agony of those 
caught up in the violence and 
bloodshed of Nicaragua. We and sev- 
eral countries in Latin America have 
offered to assist in the mediation of 
Nicaragua's internal crisis. It is our 
hope and expectation that all parties 
concerned will accept these offers and 
agree to a fair mediation process in 
which all can have confidence. Only a 
democratic solution in Nicaragua — not 
repression or violence — can lead to an 
enduring stability and true peace. 

Terrorism. As we work together to 
find peaceful resolutions to the most 
dangerous regional disputes, we must 
also seek at this assembly to strengthen 
the U.N.'s peacekeeping capability. 
And while this Organization works to 
limit violence among nations, we must 
not lose sight of the havoc wreaked by 
those who perpetrate terrorist acts on 
innocent persons. No single nation, 
acting alone, can deal adequately with 
this serious problem. Collective action 
is essential. 

We are beginning to make some 
progress. Last year the General As- 
sembly adopted a significant resolution 
on aircraft hijacking. The Bonn Dec 
laration of this July produced a much- 
needed agreement on the harboring of 
hijackers. We strongly urge all nations 
to subscribe to this Declaration. 

Arms Control. The pursuit of peace 
and security must go beyond resolving 
conflicts and preventing violence. The 
security of all is enhanced if nations 
limit the weapons of war through 
mutually negotiated arms control 
agreements. 

We are engaged with the Soviet 
Union and other nations in a broad 
range of arms control negotiations. 

• The conclusion of a strategic arms 
limitation agreement with the Soviet 
Union is a fundamental goal of the 
United States. We hope that we may 



Department of State Bullet 



I nited Nations Day, 1978 



PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT, 
SEPT. 19 1 

On this day marking the opening of 
the 33d U.N. General Assembly, I 
have signed this proclamation desig- 
nating October 24 as United Nations 
Day, 1978. The proclamation is a call 
for increased attention and support by 
the American people for the United 
Nations and its affiliated agencies. 

The United Nations is now more in- 
volved than ever before with many of 
the central issues of our time, and we 
cannot fully advance our national inter- 
ests or help build a more peaceful 
world if we ignore the potential of the 
United Nations. 

As a peacekeeper, the United Na- 
tions at this moment has four major 
operations in the Middle East and in 
Cyprus. In addition, the Security 
Council is expected to adopt soon a 
mandate for a U.N. civilian and mili- 
tary presence which will implement the 



agreed settlement in Namibia. And th 
British-American proposal for settle 
ment of the Rhodesian crisis also im 
eludes a U.N. peacekeeping role. 

In the vital field of development, th 
U.N. system has become the world' 
largest purveyor of technical assist 
ance, helping to press developmen 
programs in various fields, to uncove 
mineral deposits, and to identify in 
vestment opportunities. Few U.N. ac 
tivities are more critical to the Unite 
States than promotion of the rapid an' 
orderly development of the poorer na 
tions of the world — countries whicl 
already constitute our fastest growin, 
export market and the source of man 
of our mineral requirements. And con 
duct of the critical North-South eco 
nomic dialogue is occurring largel 
under the auspices of the Unitei 
Nations. 

In the promotion of human rights 
which has been one of the major con' 
cerns of my Administration, we hav 



conclude a SALT II agreement before 
the end of this year. 

• The United States hopes that early 
progress can be made in concluding a 
comprehensive agreement to end the 
testing of nuclear weapons. 

• Increased efforts are critically 
needed to prevent the spread of nuclear 
weapons. It is important to prepare 
fully for the 1980 Nonproliferation 
Treaty review conference; to continue 
to make progress in the International 
Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation; and to 
recognize one of the important 
achievements of the Special Session on 
Disarmament (SSOD) — the decision 
by several nuclear powers to pledge, 
under specific circumstances, to refrain 
from use of nuclear weapons against 
non-nuclear states. We suggest that the 
Security Council take note of these 
pledges 

• The United States will also work 
to realize the call in the SSOD Decla- 
ration of Principles and Program of 
Action tor restraint in the transfer of 
conventional arms. We are actively 
discussing with the Soviet Union how 
our two nations might encourage re- 
straint consistent with the legitimate 
right to self-defense and international 
obligations. We are encouraged by the 
new initiatives already being undertak- 
en to promote restraint on a regional 
basis in Latin America, and we stand 



ready to support similar efforts b 
countries in other regions. 

Conclusion 

Let me emphasize that on all thi 
issues I have addressed today, what wi 
share is greater than how we differ. Wi 
share the same small planet. We shan 
human aspirations — for better lives, fo« 
greater opportunity, for freedom ant 
security. And because we share ; 
common destiny, we are compelled U 
resolve our differences. 

If we focus on these common inter- 
ests, we can begin to find the common 
ground for global progress. We can. a^ 
Jean Monnet said, "'put our problems 
on one side of the table and all of us or 
the other. " 

The measure of our progress will not 
be whether we achieve all of our goals 
in this generation, for that will surely 
prove to be impossible; it is whether 
we can now summon the will to move 
forward together so that our children 
may benefit from our efforts and our 
\ ision. 



1 Press release 376. 

-For text of the proposal for a Namihian 
settlement and related material, see ButLETlNJ 
ot lime l l '7K. p. 50; for text of Security Coun- 
cil Resolution 431. see Bulletin of Sept. 
I«J7K. p. 46. 



November 1978 



Seen heartened by recent advances 
"lithin the U.N. system, even as we 
flecognize that much more progress 
jeeds to be made. International organi- 
ations can play an especially vital role in 
lis field. This December we will mark 
le 30th anniversary of the Universal 
>eclaration of Human Rights, a prod- 
ct of the United Nations, which pro- 
ides a special reason to hope and work 
or greater progress in human rights 
round the world. 

Nor should the more direct bene- 
ts of our participation in the United 
lations be overlooked. Americans are 
lore protected from health hazards, air 
ccidents, sea catastrophes, and en- 
ironmental dangers than ever before 
ecause of U.N. activities. U.N. pro- 
rams like the World Health Organiza- 
on's smallpox eradication campaign 
r the World Meteorological Organiza- 
on's World Weather Watch cost rela- 
vely little, yet they save the American 
eople several hundred million dollars 
very year — year after year. We could 
ot possibly carry out these programs 
y ourselves except at enormous cost, 
t is appropriate that we acknowledge 
nee a year the unusual contributions to 
air health and welfare that are pro- 
ided by these critical programs. 

For all of these reasons, the United 
Jations is of clear and growing value 
o the United States, and the proclama- 
ion issued today is a reflection of that 
oncern. 

In March of this year, I submitted to 
tie Congress a special report on my 
iews for possible reforms of the 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE: 

The Role of Human Rights Policy 
in Arms Transfers 



by Patricia M. Derian 

Based on a statement before the 
Subcommittee on Inter-American Af- 
fairs of the House Committee on Inter- 
national Relations on August 9. 1978. 
Ms. Derian is Assistant Secretary of 
Stale for Human Rights and Human- 
itarian Affairs. ' 

I welcome the opportunity to discuss 
with you the role of our human rights 
policy in arms transfers for Latin 
America. Before addressing this spe- 



cific subject. I would like to make 
seven general points. 

First, our human rights policy is a 
global policy. It is not directed at any 
one country or any one region. Last fall 
I traveled in East Asia to Singapore, 
the Philippines, Indonesia, and Thai- 
land to discuss our human rights con- 
cerns with the governments of that re- 
gion. When Under Secretary of State 
for Political Affairs David Newsom 
visited the Middle East and South Asia 
this past July, he also carried the 
message. In our relations with the 



United Nations system. 2 Among the 
things that I would like to see are: 

• More effective procedures for the 
settlement of disputes between 
nations — before they erupt into 
bloodshed; 

• Increased preparedness for dis- 
patch of U.N. troops in peacekeeping 
efforts whenever and wherever needed; 

• Quicker and more effective reac- 
tions to reported human rights abuses; 

• A study of ways we might develop 



UNITED NATIONS DAY, 1978 

A Proclamation* 

The founding of the United Nations, on 
October 24. 1945, was an historic attempt 
to establish a framework for international 
cooperation. 

The nations of the world now face such 
tasks as maintaining international peace 
and security; promoting basic human 
rights; building a better international eco- 
nomic order; and allocating fairly the 
globe's natural resources. The United 
Nations and its affiliated agencies bring 
together representatives of all nations to 
work together toward these goals. It holds 
out the vision of a truly cooperative 
world — a world at peace. 

As one of its founding members, as its 
leading contributor, and as its host coun- 
try, the United States feels a special pride 
in the Organization's accomplishments. 

Now. Therefore. I, Jimmy Carter. 
President of the United States of 



America, do hereby designate Tuesday. 
October 24. 1978. as United Nations 
Day. 

I have appointed Clifton C. Garvin. 
Jr., to be United States National Chair- 
man for United Nations Day. 

I urge Americans to become better ac- 
quainted with the institutions that make 
up the United Nations, to consider its role 
in addressing the problems of global 
interdependence, and to help it resolve 
the array of critical international issues 
that face us in these times. 

In Witness Whereof, I have hereunto 
set my hand this nineteenth day of Sep- 
tember, in the year of our Lord nineteen 
hundred seventy-eight, and of the Inde- 
pendence of the United States of America 
the two hundred and third. 

Jimmy Carter 

*No. 4597 (text from Weekly Compila- 
tion of Presidential Documents of Sept. 
25. 1978). 



autonomous sources of revenue for the 
international community; 

• Increased accountability for the 
expenditure of the funds contributed by 
149 nations; and 

• Greater operational efficiency. 

It is clearly in the American interest 
to insure that the United Nations oper- 
ates as effectively as it can, and we are 
now working with other U.N. members 
and with Secretary General Waldheim 
to bring this about. 

As we undertake this important ef- 
fort, I believe that Americans 
everywhere need to reflect more fully 
on the important contributions of the 
United Nations — the opportunities it 
provides and the direct benefits it 
brings. With this in mind, I ask the 
Congress to continue to provide the 
U.N. with the moral backing and fi- 
nancial support that have permitted the 
United States to play the significant 
role in the Organization that we have 
since it was created. 

The proclamation issued today will 
provide an appropriate reference point 
for increased attention to the United 
Nations and its affiliated agencies. I 
ask all Americans to join me in rein- 
forcing our support for this vital 
institution. □ 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of Presi- 
dential Documents of Sept. 25, 1978. 

2 Copies of this report, entitled "Reform and 
Restructuring of the U.N. System" (Selected 
Documents No. S) may be obtained from the 
Correspondence Management Division. Bureau 
of Public Affairs, Department of State, Wash- 
ington. DC. 20520. 



52 

Soviet Union and with other members 
of the Warsaw Pact, human rights have 
been a primary concern. Thus, we 
emphasize human rights in our rela- 
tions around the world. 

Second, the policy must be im- 
plemented pragmatically. This means 
human rights objectives cannot be de- 
terminative of each and every foreign 
policy decision. Other factors, includ- 
ing U.S. security interests, must be 
considered and weighed in the de- 
cisionmaking process. In addition, the 
diversity of history and culture and the 
different stages of development of in- 
dividual countries must be taken into 
account. Different methods may be 
required depending on the exact cir- 
cumstances of a particular situation. 

Third, international law is our guide 
to the definition of human rights. Al- 
though the policy reflects basic Ameri- 
can ideals, it is not an attempt to im- 
pose uniquely American values. The 
rights about which we are con- 
cerned — the right to be free from arbi- 
trary arrest, to be free from torture, 
rights of political expression, and 
rights to basic economic needs — are 
not the private property of one nation 
or one culture. They are recognized in 
the Charter of the United Nations, the 
U.N. Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, and other international agree- 
ments and convenants as being univer- 
sal and applicable throughout the 
world. The countries of the Western 
Hemisphere have also acknowledged 
basic human rights in the Charter of the 
Organization of American States 
(OAS) and are now according addi- 
tional attention to them in the Ameri- 
can Convention on Human Rights, 
which is now ratified by 12 countries 
and has recently entered into force. 

Fourth, the promotion of interna- 
tionally recognized human rights is in 
fulfillment of obligations imposed upon 
us by the international agreements and 
covenants described above. For exam- 
ple, under the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, we pledged to promote 
'"universal respect for and observance 
of human rights and fundamental free- 
doms." President Carter put it this wa\ 
in a speech last year before the United 
Nations: "All the signatories of the 
United Nations Charter have pledged 
themselves to observe and to respect 
basic human rights. Thus, no member 
of the United Nations can claim that 
mistreatment of its citizens is solely its 
own business." 

Fifth, our policy reflects extensive 
congressional mandates in the area ol 
human rights and foreign affairs. As a 
general matter, the Congress has di- 



Department of State Bulleti 



rected in Section 502B of the Foreign 
Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, 
that". . . a principal goal of the 
foreign policy of the United States is to 
promote the increased observance of 
internationally recognized human rights 
by all countries." PL 95-45, Section 
109, authorizing State Department 
funding for FY '78, directs the Secre- 
tary of State to report annually to the 
Congress on proposals '*. . . that 
would strengthen human rights ... in 
the conduct of United States foreign 
policy. ..." That same legislation 
established the position of Assistant 
Secretary of State for Human Rights 
and Humanitarian Affairs which I now 
occupy. There is, in addition, exten- 
sive legislative history accompanying 
all these statutes, indicating that the 
Congress expects human rights consid- 
erations to be part of all decisionmak- 
ing in foreign affairs. 

In specific statutes. Congress has 
directed the executive to apply human 
rights criteria to a broad spectrum of 
programs of foreign economic and fi- 
nancial assistance, as well as to arms 
transfers. These programs include the 
Agency for International Development 
(AID), Food for Peace, international 
financial institutions, the Overseas Pri- 
vate Investment Corporation (OPIC). 
and the Export-Import Bank. 

In order to convey a sense of how 
extensive the congressional directives 
for integrating human rights criteria 
into different aspects of our policy, I 
would like to cite for you the major 
statutory provisions on human rights 
and concessional economic assistance. 

• Section 1 16 of the Foreign Assist- 
ance Act of 1961, as amended, states 
that no assistance may be granted to a 
government ". . . which engages in a 
consistent pattern of gross violations of 
. . . human rights . . . unless such as- 
sistance will directly benefit . . . needy 
people . . . ." 

• Section 112 of PL 480. provides 
that no food aid may be granted to an) 
government ". . . which engages in 
a consistent pattern of gross violations 
of . human rights . . . unless lit] 
will directly benefit . . . needy 
people . . . . " 

• Section 701 of the International 
Financial Institutions Act requires that 
the U.S. Government use its vote in 
such institutions to "advance the cause 
of human rights " 

• Section 2(b)( I)(B) of the 
I \ port -Import Bank Act of 1945 re- 
quires that the Bank "... take into 
account, in consultation with the Sec- 
retary of State, the observance of and 
respect for human rights in the country 
to receive the exports supported b\ a 






loan or financial guarantee . . . ." 

• Section 113 of the Foreign Assist 
ance Appropriations Act of 1971 for 
bids the use of funds appropriated by 
that act ". . . to provide security as-i 
sistance to any country for the purpost 
of aiding directly the efforts of tin 
government of such country to reprei 
the legitimate rights of the populatior 
of such country contrary to the Univer- 
sal Declaration of Human Rights. " 

• Section 239(1) of the Foreign As 
sistance Act of 1961, as amended, re 
quires that OPIC ". . . take into ac 
count in the conduct of its programs it # 
a country, in consultation with th< 
Secretary of State, all available infoj 
mation about observance of and respec 
for human rights ..." and subject! 
OPIC to Section 1 16 of the Act. 

Sixth, it is our policy not to inter 
vene in the internal affairs of any Latin 
American country. But where basio 
human rights are violated, we adjust 
our own policies and programs, in 
accordance with both international ob- 
ligations and U.S. law. 



t 

ilii 
Isi 
■['. 
mm 

nn 



Seventh, we recognize that tht 
scourge of terrorism seriously violate.'' 
basic human rights. But terrorism can- 
not excuse arbitrary arrest, summan 
execution, torture, and other denials ol 
fundamental freedoms. Secretary of 
State Vance made this point in his 
address to the OAS General Assembly 
in 1977: "If terrorism and violence in 
the name of dissent cannot be con- 
doned, neither can violence that is 
officially sanctioned .... The sures* 
way to defeat terrorism is to promote 
justice in our societies . . . ." 



Arms Transfers 

I would like, at this point, to turn to 
the more specific subject of the role of 
our human rights policy in arms trans- 
fers. There are numerous dimensions 
along which we conduct foreign rela- 
tions. At the most basic level, we and 
other governments exchange ambas- 
sadors and diplomatic representation. 
We may also engage in trade, cooper- 
ate in cultural and scientific matters, 
supply economic assistance, or form a 
military relationship. 

While we attempt to take human 
rights into account in all aspects of our 
relationship, it has particular relevance 
to arms transfers. This is because arms 
transfers by us to a repressive regime 
are associated and tend to associate us 
with the conditions of force that sustain 
repression. Transfers may link the 
United States with regimes that violate 
basic human rights and fundamental 
freedoms and thereby undermine our 



! i 



ivember 1978 



53 



Rditional support for those ideals, 
lonflict with our international obliga- 
ions. tarnish our reputation, and dam- 
be our long-term national interests. 

i In this area of arms transfers, we are 
prected by the Congress to take human 
ghts considerations into account in 
he formation of specific programs and 
blicies. Section 502B of the Foreign. 
Lssistance Act of 1961. as amended. 
prects the President to formulate and 
onduct such programs ". . . in a 
nanner which will promote and ad- 
pnce human rights and avoid identifi- 
Ution of the United States, through 
jch programs, with governments 
•hich deny to their people internation- 
llly recognized human rights and fun- 
amental freedoms. ..." To aid in 
nplementation of this directive, see- 
on 502B requires the preparation, in 
pch fiscal year, of a report of the 
uman rights practices of each country 
roposed as a recipient of security as- 
stance. 

In addition to section 502B. the 
resident's arms transfer policy, issued 
m May 19, 1977, also recognizes the 
nportance of human rights. The Presi- 
ent affirmed that the United States 
I ould give continued emphasis to for- 
lulating and conducting our programs 
f arms transfers in a manner which 
ill promote and advance respect for 
jman rights in recipient countries. 

The procedures for formulating pro- 
Irams of arms transfers, including im- 
ilementation of the directives of see- 
on 502B, were set out in some detail 
»r the committee in hearings con- 
acted last February. 2 

The importance we attach to human 
ghts has been part of the complex of 
hanging developments in Latin 
.merica. No one can fail to recognize 
lat widespread violations of basic 
uman rights continue in certain court- 
lies in Latin America. But, even after 

relatively short period of time, there 
j; already real and significant change. 

• An open political campaign took 
lace in the Dominican Republic, and 
ext week the inauguration of a demo- 
ratically elected president of the op- 



Letter 
of Credence 

I On October 2, 1978. George Ashley 
jriffith presented his credentials to 
President Carter as the newly appointed 
Embassador from Grenada. □ 



position party is scheduled. This is an 
accomplishment of the people of the 
Dominican Republic. 

• The Inter-American Human Rights 
Commission has been strengthened and 
its activities expanded. It has visited 
Panama and El Salvador and will be 
traveling next week to Haiti. Nicaragua 
has committed itself to receive the 
commission in the future. 

• In Ecuador and Peru, the process 
of return to popular election of national 
leadership is underway. In Ecuador, 
the first round of elections for Presi- 
dent was successfully held last month, 
and a runoff is now scheduled for Sep- 
tember or October. In Peru, open elec- 
tions took place for a constituent as- 
sembly which has already convened 
and begun deliberations. 

• In Bolivia we are distressed by the 
interruption of the recent electoral 
process. We recognize, however, that 
in the past year, political prisoners 
have been freed, exiles have returned, 
civil due process has improved, and 
press and trade union freedoms have 
been restored. 

• In Haiti there have been some im- 
provements reported in prison condi- 
tions, prisoner releases, and some 
police have been disciplined for re- 
ported acts of brutality. 

• In other countries, there have been 
significant releases of political prison- 
ers, a reduction in or an end to reports 
of torture, and a reassertion of the au- 
thority of civilian courts. 

• At the recent OAS General As- 
sembly, the resolution in support of the 
advancement of human rights passed by 
an overwhelming majority. And in 
those countries whose governments op- 
posed the resolution, there is now 
widespread support among the popula- 
tion and active political groups. 

The fundamental objective of the 
human rights policy is to improve the 
observance of basic human rights 
throughout the world. We believe that 
we have made important strides toward 
that goal. At the same time, the human 
rights policy has had another important 
effect — it has strengthened our position 
and influence in the world. Human 
rights is an area where our ideals and 
self-interest strongly coincide. 



Strengthened U.S. Interests 

The policy has strengthened U.S. 
interests in at least three separate ways. 

First, our human rights policy ena- 
bles us to regain the political high 
ground that our history as a nation of 
free men and women has given us in 



competition for world influence and 
prestige. Our willingness to press for 
human rights progress among our 
friends, as well as with our adver- 
saries, has increased the credibility of 
our commitment to freedom. Thus, our 
human rights policy has generated 
widespread support for the United 
States throughout the world. 

Second, the policy helps insure 
friendly relations over the long run 
with other countries. If we ignore op- 
pression, we may obtain closer rela- 
tions with a particular regime over the 
short run. But there is significant risk 
that its successor will be hostile to our 
interests. We must not espouse a policy 
which leads a government to be hostile 
to U.S. interests because of U.S. ties 
with a prior regime that practiced 
oppression. 

Third, our policy is important to the 
health and integrity of own society 
within the United States. Our most im- 
portant asset is our free institutions. 
Our democratic society is what makes 
possible our economic and military 
strength. It is the bedrock of our secu- 
rity. It is our special commitment to 
human freedom and dignity that makes 
us unique. Support for or indifference 
to oppression in other countries 
weakens the foundation of our own 
democracy at home. 

Concern has been expressed about 
the possible costs associated with the 
application of our human rights policy 
to arms transfers to Latin America: the 
effect on of governments to which we 
refuse transfers and the domestic eco- 
nomic loss that may result when we do 
not make sales. But I believe that the 
benefits of our policy clearly outweigh 
these other factors. 

First, the policy has produced con- 
siderable political good will for the 
United States throughout Latin 
America. Our relations with constitu- 
tional governments are much closer 
than before. And our stand for human 
rights has won respect from peoples 
throughout the hemisphere. Any possi- 
ble transitory or short-term loss of in- 
fluence with a particular regime must 
be balanced against these more durable 
and long-term gains. 

While there may be some economic 
costs associated with the application of 
the human rights policy to arms trans- 
fers, we believe that they are justified 
as an investment in the future. 
Moreover, it is important to keep the 
economic factor in perspective. The 
overwhelming majority of U.S. exports 
to Latin America are not subject to 
human rights review. It is only those 
items that lend themselves to use either 



54 



A mi. s Transfer Potivy 
in Latin America 



Foreign Relations Outline* 

Latin American nations traditionally 
have displayed a cautious attitude to- 
ward arms purchases and tend to give 
priority to economic development. 
Most do not feel threatened sufficiently 
to justify priority for external defense 
requirements. The desire to modernize 
military establishments derives primar- 
ily from internal considerations and the 
need to maintain independent military 
forces as a manifestation of 
sovereignty. 



U.S. Policy 

Our Latin American arms policy is 
part of the global policy enunciated in 
President Carter's May 1977 statement 
on arms transfers. 

• We will utilize arms transfers to 
promote our security and that of our 
close friends, but the burden of persua- 
sion is on those who favor a particular 
sale rather than on those who oppose it. 

• We will not be the first supplier to 
introduce into the region advanced 
weapons systems that would create a 
new or significantly higher combat ca- 
pability. 

• The State Department carefully 
monitors the travel and activities in the 
hemisphere of promoters of U.S. arms 
sales. 

• We assess the economic impact of 
arms transfers, particularly on recip- 
ients of U.S. economic aid. 

• We carefully consider the human 
rights situation in proposed recipient 
countries. 

• We encourage regional agreements 



among purchasers to limit arms acqui- 
sitions. 

• Where sales are approved, we em- 
phasize that the sales agreement pro- 
hibits third party transfers except with 
prior U.S. approval. 

We have not approved for sale or 
export in the region sophisticated air- 
craft more advanced than the F-5 and 
the A-4; ballistic missiles and rockets 
regardless of range; advanced technol- 
ogy missiles; assorted military articles 
that raise special policy problems such 
as silencers, napalm, incendiary muni- 
tions, "smart" and cluster bombs, 
flame throwers, radiological weapons, 
and delayed action munitions; and 
major combatant vessels such as 
battleships, cruisers, and aircraft car- 
riers. Not prohibited, but examined on 
a case-by-case basis, are short-range 
tactical missiles, certain ship-to-ship 
missiles, and air-to-air missiles. 



U.S. Transfers 

Security assistance and arms trans- 
fers to Latin America reflect a U.S. 
political and security interest. They 
have helped maintain cooperative rela- 
tions with military establishments 
which have in some cases a potentially 
significant role to play in hemispheric 
defense. For a period following World 
War II. surplus U.S. equipment domi- 
nated the small Latin American arms 
market, but more recently other nations 
have sold more weapons in Latin 
America than the United States. About 
24% of our foreign military sales to the 
region are for major items such as air- 
craft, ships, artillery, and ammunition. 



Role of Human Rights — Cont'd 

by the police in the commission of 
human rights violation or by the mili- 
tary that are subject to such review. A 
significant proportion of even these ex- 
ports go to countries with a positive 
human rights record and so are not 
constrained by human rights consid- 
erations. Moreover, even where our 
human rights policy does impede the 
transfer of arms, there are long-run 
economic benefits to be considered. By 
creating over the long run a more 
friendly political atmosphere for the 
U.S. Government, we also engender a 
more favorable economic environment 
for U.S. business. 



In conclusion, we believe that our 
policy has made a major and significant 
difference — both for the victims of op- 
pression and for our own national 
interest. We will continue to make 
human rights a fundamental goal of our 
foreign policy. □ 



'The complete transcript of the hearings will 
be published by the committee and will he 
available from the Superintendent of Doc- 
uments, U.S. Government Printing Office, 
Washington. D.C. 20402. 

2 For texts of statements on arms transfer 
policy, see Bulletin of March 1978, pp. 42 
and 45. 



Department of State Bulleti 

The balance is for spare parts 
supporting noncombat equipment, ano 
supporting services — including 
training. 



Decreasing U.S. Role 

Only 3 7c of all U.S. arms sales goto 
Latin America. As our role as an arms 
supplier in the region has decreased, so 
have U.S. personnel available to man 
age security assistance programs. Our 
security assistance-related military 
presence in the area will drop from a 
high of 769 in 1968 to fewer than IOC 
in FY 1979. Until 1976. the Unitec 
States maintained 18 military missions 
in the area. Since then, in accordance 
with various legislative requirements, 
that presence has been drastically re- 
duced. In FY 1979, for example, only 
Panama will have a security assistance 
management group of more than sixf 1 '; 
military personnel. 

Arms Limitation Initiatives 

With a few exceptions, the Latir 
American nations have not signifi- 
cantly sacrificed their developmeni 
goals for the weaponry in which they 
have invested. This record is now 
under some strain, however, because ol 
the increased cost of modern weapons 
Recognizing this fact, Argentina 
Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador 
Panama, Peru, and Venezuela signec 
the Declaration of Ayacucho in 1974 
stating their intent to cooperate in lim 
iting arms acquisitions. At Venezuelar 
initiative, the Foreign Ministers of the 
Ayacucho countries announced in June 
1978 that they would meet to considei 
a broader region-wide conventional 
arms restraint agreement. Mexico cir- 
culated a similar and more detailed 
proposal at a meeting of the Organiza- 
tion of American States. We fully sup- 
port these initiatives and are prepared 
to work with other suppliers to insure 
that any agreements worked out by 
Latin American states are respected. D 



'Taken from a Department of State puhlica- 
tion in the GIST series, released in July 1478 
This outline is designed to be a quick reference 
aid on U.S. foreign relations. It is not intended 
as a comprehensive U.S. foreign polic) Stall 
ment. The outline was based on a statement by 
John A Bushnell. Deputy Assistant Secretary 
for Inter-American Affairs, before the Sub- 
committee on Inter-American Affairs of the , 
House Committee on International Relations on | 
June 27, 1978. The complete transcript of the 
hearings will be published by the committee I 
and will be available from the Superintendent J 
of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of- 
fice. Washington, D.C. 20402. 



November 1978 



l/.S.-iWe.vieo Commission 
on Cultural Cooperation 



The third meeting of the Joint 
Jnited States-Mexico Commission on 
ultural Co-operation, established by 
xchange of notes of June 15. 1972, 
>ok place in Mexico City July 17-18, 
978. Following are a summary and 
nnexes 11 and 111 of the final state- 
ment of the Commission issued on July 
8, 1978. 

The Mexican delegation to the third meeting 
f the Commission was presided over by Lie. 
Haria Emilia Telez. Under Secretary of the 
ecretariat of Foreign Affairs, and the U.S. 
elegation by Dr Alice S. Ilchman. Associate 
)irector for Educational and Cultural Affairs of 
le International Communication Agency. 

The work of the meeting was carried out as 
ollows: 

• Exchange of commentaries on cultural ac- 
vities for the period 1975-78; 

• Recommendations for cultural cooperation, 
bjectives. and priorities for the period 
978-80; 

• Recommendations for cultural cooperation 
the border area, objectives, and priorities; 

• Exchange of status reports on the Lincoln- 
uarez scholarship programs; 

• Procedural and administrative matters; and 

• Other matters. 

The delegations reached agreement in several 
ireas, including educational cooperation and the 
mprovement of cultural and educational rela- 
ions in the border area. 

Vnnex II — Education 

The Governments of Mexico and the United 
States, wishing to improve and expand educa- 

ional activities and exchanges and to achieve 
[greater co-ordination and understanding of 

:xisting activities among institutions of both 
i;ountries. consider it important to establish 
Effective mechanisms to achieve the priorities 
lind objectives agreed upon in the e lucational 
lirea. 

I Objectives: 

1 Encourage greater co-operation among 
Educational institutions particularly in areas that 
[would enhance mutual understanding between 
She two countries 

I 2. Develop a greater understanding among 
Mexican and American Universities and re- 
search institutions of the two countries in order 

j:o facilitate and improve exchange programs at 
[the undergraduate and graduate levels in areas 

if primary mutual interest. 
3. Improve the teaching of English in Mexico 

and the teaching of Spanish in the United States 
las an important instrument in the achievement 



Priorities: 

1. Initiate a study of the current relationships 
and programs among educational and research 
institutions in both countries preparatory to the 
establishment of a clearing house of documen- 
tation and information. For this purpose a cor- 
responding group or committee shall be formed 
with the participation of the institutions each 
country considers appropriate. 

2. Continue the Lincoln-Juarez scholarship 
program, and exchange status reports every six 
months. 

3. Exchange of publications and informa- 
tional material about education. 

4 Continue the counseling program at the 
Benjamin Franklin Library. 

5. Encourage the exchange of scholars and 
specialists to study and visit in areas of interest 
for both countries. 

6. Study the English and Spanish teaching 
programs in each country in order to improve 
them. 



Arts and Humanities 

The arts and humanities play an important 
role in the relations between both countries. 
Geographical proximity offers the opportunity 
for continued expansion of the arts and 
humanities originating in each country in ac- 
cordance with the interests of public and private 
institutions dedicated to cultural activities. 



Objectives: 

1 . Expand and improve relations among pub- 
lic and private institutions responsible for cul- 
tural policy and activities in both countries. 

2. Encourage cultural programs focussed on 
better understanding between both countries. 

Priorities: 

1. Encourage the exchange of groups and 
individuals in the plastic and performing arts. 

2. Collaborate in the training and profes- 
sionalization of Mexican artists in the United 
States and American artists in Mexico. 

3 Encourage co-operation among the 
museums of both countries in accordance with 
their interests. 

4. Encourage the exchange of experiences in 
the areas of anthropology and ethnography in 
accordance with the internal regulations of the 
institutions concerned. 

5. Stimulate the expansion of exchanges of 
exhibitions. 

6. Encourage greater contact and interchange 
of writers and literary materials. 

7. Work towards greater co-operation in the 
fields of radio, television and film-making. 

8. Promote the presentation by national art- 
ists of works of the other country. 

9. Seek ways to promote mutual sharing of 
the artistic achievements of third countries 



55 

being presented in Mexico or the United States 
and interchange information in this respect. 

Annex III — U.S. -Mexico Border 

Context: 

The Bilateral Cultural and Educational rela- 
tions between the United States and Mexico in 
the border area have been carried out through 
various mechanisms. It is important that these 
cultural and educational relationships be well 
co-ordinated in the future in order to achieve 
the broadest possible understanding. 

Objectives: 

1 . Development of greater mutual under- 
standing of the cultural, educational, and 
touristic context of the border region and the 
identification of problems among those areas 
requiring short-term and long-term attention. 

2. Better co-ordination of mutual efforts to 
improve educational and cultural relations in the 
border region. 

3 Increased public and private efforts in 
areas of primary concern to both countries. 

Priorities: 

I . To encourage the continued development 
of cultural and educational activities in the 
border area both jointly and within the two 
countries and requesting the institutions that 
carry out these activities to provide, to the 
extent possible, relevant information to the ap- 
propriate entities to be determined by each 
government 

In the case of Mexico this information shall 
be provided to the office of the Co-ordinator 
General of the National Program for the De- 
velopment of Frontier Areas and Free Zones in 
the Secretariat of Programs and Budget. With 
regard to the activities carried out by American 
institutions this information should be provided 
to The Southwest Border Regional Commission, 
and coordinated studies referred to in Articles a 
and b of the report of the Social Working 
Group of the United States-Mexico Consultative 
Mechanism quoted as follows: 

a. carrying out a study designed to deter- 
mine the present cultural and educational con- 
ditions in the border area, with emphasis on the 
quality of artistic, bilingual and bicultural edu- 
cation; 

b analyzing the action which both coun- 
tries are taking jointly in the border area with 
regard to culture, artistic education and social 
welfare, with a special evaluation of completed 
activities. 

In the case of Mexico the supervision will be 
established by the Co-ordinator General of the 
National Program for the Development of Fron- 
tier Areas and Free Zones in the Secretariat of 
Programs and Budget and for the United States 
by the International Communication Agency in 
consultation with the United States Co- 
Chairman of the U.S. -Mexico Social Working 
Group. 

3. The suggestions for the solution of the 
problems and necessities identified as a result 
of the research referred to in article C will be 
presented to the institutions cited in point 2 
above. '-' 



56 



TREATIES: 

Current Actions 

MULTILATERAL 

Antarctica 

The Antarctic Treaty. Signed at Washington 
Dee. I, 1959. Entered into forte June 23, 
1961. TIAS4780. 

Accession deposited: Bulgaria, Sept. I I . 
1978. 

Aviation 

Protocol on the authentic trilingual text of the 
convention on international civil aviation. 
Chicago, 1944 (T1AS 1591), with annex. 
Done at Buenos Aires Sept. 24, 1968. En- 
tered into force Oct. 24, 1968. TIAS 6605. 
Acceptance deposited: Finland, Oct. 13, 
1978. 

Convention for the suppression of unlawful 
seizure of aircraft. Done at The Hague Dec. 
16, 1970. Entered into force Oct. 14. 1971 
TIAS 7192. 
Accession deposited: Libya, Oct. 4. 1978. 

Protocol on the authentic cjuadrilingual text ol 
the convention on international civil aviation 
(Chicago. 1944) (TIAS 1591), with annex. 
Done at Montreal Sept. 30, 1977. ' 
Acceptance deposited : U.K.. Oct. 3, 
1978. 

Bills of Lading 

Protocol to amend the international convention 
for the unification of certain rules of law 
relating to bills of lading signed at Brussels 
Aug. 25, 1924 (TS 931). Done at Brussels 
Feb. 23, 1968. Entered into force June 23, 
1977. J 

Ratification deposited: Belgium, Sept. 6, 
1978. 

Coffee 

International coffee agreement 1976, with an- 
nexes. Done at London Dec 3, 1975 En- 
tered into force provisionally Oct. 1, 1976, 
definitively, Aug. 1 . 1977. TIAS 8683. 
Ratifications deposited: Finland. Sept 14, 
1978; Italy. Sept. 18. 1978; Netherlands, 3 
Sept. 6, 1978. 

Collisions 

Convention on the international regulations for 
preventing collisions at sea, 1972, with reg- 
ulations. Done at London Oct. 20, 1972. 
Entered into force July 15, 1977. TIAS 
8587. 

Accession deposited: Bangladesh. Mav 10, 
1978. 

Customs 

Convention establishing a Customs Coopera- 
tion Council, with annex Done at Brussels 
Dec. 15, 1950. Entered into force Nov 4, 
1952, for the U.S. Nov 5, 1970, TIAS 
7063. 

Accession deposited Botswana. Aug 25, 
1978. 

Customs convention regarding E.C.S. carnets 
for commercial samples, with annex and 
protocol of signature. Done at Brussels Mar 
1, 1956. Entered into force Oct. 3, 1957; 
for the U.S. Mar. 3, 1969. TIAS 6632. 
Notification oj denunciation deposited: Fed- 
eral Republic of Germany, Aug 29, 
1978; effective Nov. 29, 1978. 

Defense 

Memorandum of understanding for interna- 
tional collaboration on the NAT!) explosion 
resistant multi influence sweep system 
(ERMISS). Opened for signature Apr. 5. 
1978. Entered into force Apr. 25. 1978; tor 
the U.S. Aug. 24, 1978. 



Finance 

Agreement establishing the International Fund 
for Agricultural Development Done at 
Rome June 13, 1976. Entered into force 
Nov. 30, 1977. TIAS 8765. 
Ratification deposited Argentina. Sept. II, 
1978. 

Fisheries 

Protocol amending the international conven- 
tion for the high seas fisheries of the North 
Pacific Ocean of May 9. 1952. as amended 
(TIAS 2786, 5385). with agreed minutes 
and memoranda of understanding. Done at 
Tokyo Apr. 25. 1978. ' 

Senate advice and consent to ratification: 
Oct. 11. 1978. 

Convention on conduct of fishing operations in 
the North Atlantic, with annexes Done at 
London June I, 1967. Entered into force 
Sept. 26, 1976. 2 

Accession deposited. German Democratic 
Republic. Mar. 9. 1978." s * 

Human Rights 

International convenant on civil and political 
rights. Done at New York Dec. 16. 1966. 
Entered into force May 23. 1 976. 2 
Ratifications deposited: Austria, Sept. 8, 
1978; Italy. Sept. 15, 1978. 

International covenant on economic, social, 
and cultural rights. Done at New York Dec. 
16. 1966. Entered into force Jan. 3, 1976. 2 
Ratifications deposited: Austria, Sept. 8, 
1978; Italy. Sept. 15, 1978. 

International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development 

Articles of agreement of the International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
formulated at Bretton Woods Conference 
July 1-22, 1944. Opened for signature at 
Washington Dec. 27. 1945. Entered into 
force Dec. 27, 1945. TIAS 1502 
Signature and acceptance: Solomon Islands, 
Sept. 22, 1978. 

International Monetary Fund 

Articles of agreement of the International 
Monetary Fund, formulated at the Bretton 
Woods Conference July 1-22, 1944. Opened 
for signature at Washington Dec. 27, 1945. 
Entered into force Dec. 27. 1945 TIAS 
1501. 

Signature and acceptance Solomon Islands, 
Sept. 22, 1978. 

Load Lines 

International convention on load lines, 1966. 
Done at London Apr. 5, 1966. Entered into 
force July 21. 1968. TIAS 6331 
Accession deposited: Bangladesh, May 10, 
1978 

Meteorology 

Convention of the World Meteorological Or- 
ganization. Done at Washington Oct. II, 
1947 Entered into force Mar 23. 1950. 
TIAS 2052. 

Accession deposited: The Gambia, Oct. 2, 
1978. 

Narcotic Drugs 

Sinelc convention on narcotic drugs, 1961 
Done at New York Mar. 30, 1961. Entered 
into force Dec 13, 1964; lor the U.S. June 

24, 1967. TIAS 6208 

A cce ssion deposited: Libya, Sept 27, 1978. 

Protocol amending the single convention on 
narcotic drui;s. 1961, Done at Geneva Mar. 

25, 1972. Entered into force Aug. 8, 1975. 
I IAS XI 18. 

Accessions deposited Iraq, Sept. 25, 1978; 
Libya, Sept. 27, 1978. 

Oil Pollution— Civil Liability 

International convention on civil liability tor 

oil pollution damage Done at Brussels Nov. 

20. I960 Entered into force June 19. 

I975. 3 



Department of State Bulletin 

Ratification deposited: Indonesia. Sept. 1 
1978. 

Oil Pollution — Compensation Fund 

International convention on the establishing 

of an international fund for compensatior 
foi oil pollution damage. Done at Brussels 
Dec 18. 1971 Entered into force Oct. 16. 
1978- 

Accession deposited: Indonesia. Sept. 1 
1978. 



ill 

r, 

I' 



Pollution 

Protocol relating to intervention on the lngr 
seas in cases of pollution by substancfl 
other than oil Done at London Nov. 2 
1973.' 
Ratification deposited: U.S.. Sept. 7. 1978. 

Protocol of 1978 relating to the international 
convention for the prevention of pollutior 
from ships. 1973. Done at London Feb. 17 
1978. ' 
Signature: U.K.. Aug. 24, 1978. 7 

Postal 

Second additional protocol to the constitution 
of the Universal Postal Union of July 10, 
1964. general regulations with final protocol 
and annex, and the universal postal conven- 
tion with final protocol and detailed rcgula- 
tions. Done at Lausanne July 5. 1974. En- 
tered into force Jan I . 1976. TIAS 8232. 
Ratification deposited: Libya, Mar 15. 
1978. 

Money orders and postal travelers' checks 
agreement, with detailed regulations. Done 
at Lausanne July 5. 1974. Entered into force 
Jan. 1. 1976. TIAS 8232. 
Ratification deposited: Libya. Mar. 15. 
1978. 

Safety at Sea 

International convention for the safety of life 
at sea. 1974. with annex. Done at London 
Nov. 1. 1 974.' 
Ratifications deposited: Spain. Sept. 5 

1978; U.S.. Sept. 7, 1978. 
Protocol of 1978 relating to the international 

convention for the safetv of life at sea. 

1974. Done at London Feb 17. 1978.' 
Signatures: Belgium. Sept. 8. 1978; 7 U.K., 

Aug. 24, 1978 ' 

Telecommunications 

International telecommunication convention 
with annexes and protocol. Done at Malaga- 
Torremolinos Oct. 25. 1973. Entered into 
force Jan. 1, 1975; for the U.S. Apr. 7, 
1976. TIAS 8572. 
Ratifications deposited: Cameroon. 

non, June 1, 1978; Niger. June 7 

Turkey, July 6, 1978. 
Final Acts of the World Administrate 

Conference for the planning of the 
broadcasting-satellite service in frequence 
bands 11.7-12.2 GHz (in Regions 2 and 3) 
and 11.7-12.5 GHz (in Region 11. with an- 
nexes Done at Geneva Feb. 13. 1977. En- 
ters into force Jan. 1 . 1979. 
Notifications ol approval deposited: 

Malaysia, June 8. 1978; U.K.. Julv 6, 

1978." 

Terrorism 

Convention on the prevention and punishment 
of crimes against internationally protected 
persons, including diplomatic agents. Done 
at New York Dec. 14, 1973. Entered into 
toiee Feb. 20. 1977. TIAS 8532. 
Accession deposited: Jamaica, Sept. 21, 
1978. 

Tin 

Fifth international tin agreement, with an- 
nexes. Done at Geneva June 21. 1975. En- 
tered into force provisionally July 1, 1976; 
definitively June 14, 1977. TIAS 8607. 
Ratifications deposited: Belgium, Luxem- 
bourg, Sept. 20. 1978. 



Illi 

lb( 
5i 
loi 
lil 

I 

III 

ib 
lio 



Leba- 
1978; 

Radio 



ove tuber 147<S 

onnage Measurement 

ternational convention on tonnage measure- 
ment of ships. 1964, with annexes Done at 
London June 23. 1969.' 
Acceptance deposited: Philippines. Sept. 6. 
1978. 

nited Nations 

larter of the LI nited Nations and Statute of 
the International Court of Justice. Signed at 
San Francisco June 26, 1945. Entered into 
force Oct. 24. 1945. TS 993. 
Admission la membership: Solomon Is- 
lands. Sept 19. 1978. 

heat 

otocol modifying and further extending the 
wheat trade convention (part of the interna- 
tional wheat agreement). 1971 (TIAS 7144). 
Done at Washington Apr. 26. 1978. Entered 
into force June 24. 1978. with respect to 
certain provisions. July I, 1978. with re- 
spect to other provisions. 
Accession deposited: Cuba (with declara- 
tions) Sept. 15. 1978. 
Ratifications deposited: Federal Republic of 
Germany, Sept 28. 1978;" Peru. Oct. 5. 
1978. 
otocol modifying and further extending the 
food aid convention (part of the interna- 
tional wheal agreement) 1971 (TIAS 7144). 
Done at Washington Apr. 26. 1978. Entered 
into force June 24. 1978. with respect to 
certain provisions. July 1, 1978, with re- 
spect to other provisions. 
Ratification deposited: Federal Republic of 
Germany. Sept. 28. 1978." 

orld Heritage 

invention concerning the protection of the 
world cultural and natural heritage. Done at 
'Paris Nov. 23, 1972. Entered into force 
Dec. 17. 1975. TIAS 8226. 
Acceptance deposited: Nepal, June 20, 

1978. 
Ratification deposited: Italy. June 23. 1978. 



[LATERAL 

jlivia 

Lgreement amending the agreement for sales 

I of agricultural commodities of May 31. 

1978. Effected by exchange of notes at La 

Paz Aug. 31 and Sept. 1. 1978. Entered into 

force Sept. 1. 1978 

had 

[rant agreement amending the agreement of 

I Aug. 25, 1977 concerning the human re- 
sources development project. Signed at 
N'Djamena Feb. 28. 1978. Entered into 
force Feb. 28, 1978. 

Irant agreement for the rural sanitary water 
project. Signed at N'Djamena Apr. II. 
1978. Entered into force Apr. 11, 1978. 

loject grant agreement for agricultural in- 
stitutional development with annexes. 
Signed at N'Djamena Aug. 15, 1978. En- 
tered into force Aug. 15, 1978. 

gyp< 

rant agreement amending the agreement of 
Aug. 11, 1977, as amended Aug. 31. 1977. 

land May 18. 1978, for technology transfer 

I and manpower development III. Signed at 
Cairo Aug. 15. 1978. Entered into force 

, Aug. 15, 1978. 

troject grant agreement for development plan- 
ning studies. Signed at Cairo Aug. 17. 
1978. Entered into force Aug. 17. 1978. 

roject agreement for narcotics control en- 
forcement. Signed at Cairo Sept. 29. 1978. 

i Entered into force Sept. 29. 1978. 

llong Kong 

lgreement amending the agreement of Aug 8. 

1977 (TIAS 8936), relating to trade in cot- 

I ton, wool, and manmade fiber textiles. Ef- 

I fected by exchange of letters at Washington 



Sept. 20 and 25. 1978. Entered into force 
Sept. 25. 1978. 

Italy 

Agreement on the matter of social security. 

Signed at Washington May 23. 1973 

Entry into force: Nov. I, 1978. 
Administrative protocol for the implementation 

of the agreement on social security of May 

23. 1973. Signed at Rome Nov. 22, 1977. 

Entry into force: Nov. 1, 1978. 

Jamaica 

Agreement amending the agreement for sales 
of agricultural commodities of Aug. 2, 
1978. Effected by exchange of notes at 
Kingston Sept. 5. 1978. 

Kuwait 

Agreement on procedures for mutual assist- 
ance in connection with matters relating to 
the Boeing Company. Signed at Washington 
Oct. 6. 1978. Entered into force Oct. 6. 
1978. 

Liberia 

Agreement amending the agreement of Apr. 10 
and 18. 1973 (TIAS 3635). relating to the 
establishment, operation, and maintenance 
of an OMEGA navigational station. Effected 
by exchange of notes at Monrovia Mar. 22 
and Aug. 22. 1978. Entered into force Aug. 
22, 1978. 

Mexico 

Agreement for cooperation on environmental 
programs and transboundary problems. Ef- 
fected by exchange of notes at Mexico and 
Tlatelolco June 14 and 19. 1978. 
Entered into force: June 19, 1978. 

Morocco 

Project grant agreement for nonformal educa- 
tion for women, with annexes. Signed at 
Rabat Aug. 14. 1978. Entered into force 
Aug. 14. 1978. 

Project grant agreement for industrial and 
commercial job training for women, with 
annexes. Signed at Rabat Aug 14. 1978. 
Entered into force Aug. 14, 1978. 

Nigeria 

Convention and supplementary protocol relat- 
ing to the avoidance of double taxation and 
the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect 
to taxes on income, signed by the U.S. and 
the U.K. at Washington Apr. 16, 1945 
(TIAS 1546), modified by supplementary 
protocols of May 25, 1954, and August 19. 
1957 (TIAS 3165. 4124), and extended to 
Nigeria. Entered into force for Nigeria July 
28. 1959. 

Termination: As respects U.S. tax. for the 
taxable years beginning on or after Jan. 1, 
1979; as respects Nigeria income tax, for 
any year of assessment beginning on or 
after Apr 1, 1979. 

Panama 

Agreement relating to economic and military 
cooperation. Effected by exchange of notes 
at Panama Sept. 7, 1978. Entered into force 
Sept. 7. 1978. 

Philippines 

Project loan and grant agreement for small 
farmer systems. Signed at Manila Aug. 18. 
1978. Entered into force Aug. 18, 1978. 

Agreement relating to trade in cotton, wool, 
and manmade fiber textiles and textile prod- 
ucts, with annexes. Effected by exchange of 
notes at Manila Aug. 22 and 24, 1978. En- 
tered into force Aug. 24. 1978; effective 
Jan. 1, 1978. 

Romania 

Agreement amending the agreements of June 
17. 1977. as amended (TIAS 8833) relating 
to trade in wool and manmade fiber textiles 
and Jan. 6 and 25, 1978, relating to trade in 
cotton textiles. Effected by exchange of 



57 

letters at Washington and New York July 27 
and Sept. 1 I. 1978. Entered into force Sept. 
I I. 1978. 

Singapore 

Agreement relating to trade in cotton, wool, 
and manmade fiber textiles and textile prod- 
ucts, with annexes. Effected by exchange of 
notes at Washington Sept. 21 and 22. 1978. 
Entered into force Sept. 22. 1978; effective 
Jan. I, 1978. 

Sudan 

Project grant agreement for southern man- 
power development project. Signed at 
Khartoum Aug. 30, 1978. Entered into force 
Aug. 30. 1978. 

Project grant agreement for primary health 
care — Part II (Northern Provinces). Signed 
at Khartoum Aug. 30. 1978. Entered into 
force Aug. 30, 1978. 

Turkey 

Agreement regarding the consolidation and re- 
scheduling of certain debts owed to, 
guaranteed, or insured by the U.S. Govern- 
ment and its agencies, with annexes. Signed 
at Washington Sept. 21, 1978. Enters into 
force upon receipt by Turkey of written 
notice that U.S. laws and regulations cov- 
ering debt rescheduling have been complied 
with. 

U.S.S.R. 

Convention concerning the conservation of 
migratory birds and their environment- 
Signed at Moscow Nov. 19, 1976. 
Ratifications exchanged Oct. 13, 1978. 

Entered into force: Oct. 13. 1978. 

United Kingdom 

Agreement concerning defense areas in the 
Turks and Caicos Islands. Effected by ex- 
change of notes at Washington Sept. 29. 
1978. Entered into force Sept. 29. 1978. 

Zaire 

Agreement relating to acquisition of U.S. 
Government-owned domestic and foreign 
excess property by Zaire. Signed at Wash- 
ington and Kinshasa July 10 and Aug. 9. 
1978. Entered into force Aug. 9. 1978. 

Agreement for sales of agricultural com- 
modities, relating to the agreement of Mar. 
25, 1976 (TIAS 8403). with memoranda of 
understanding. Signed at Kinshasa Aug. 25, 
1978. Entered into force Aug. 25, 1978. □ 



1 Not in force. 

2 Not in force for the U.S. 
'For the Kingdom in Europe. 

4 With reservation. 

5 With statement. 

6 With declaration. 
'Subject to ratification. 

8 Also in respect of Antigua, Dominica, St. 
Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, 
Brunei, territories under the territorial 
sovereignty of the U.K., and, within the limits 
of jurisdiction therein, the Condominium of 
the New Hebrides. 

"With a statement; applicable to Berlin 
(West). 



58 



Department of State Bullet 



PRESS RELEASES: 

Department of State 



September 1 1 -October 13 

Press releases may be obtained from the 
Office of Press Relations, Department of 
State, Washington, DC. 20520. 



No. Date 

*348 9/11 



♦349 9/13 



*350 9/13 



*351 9/13 



*352 9/14 



*353 9/14 

*354 g/14 

*355 9/15 

*356 9/15 

*357 9/18 

*358 9/19 



*359 9/19 
*360 9/20 
*361 9/20 



*362 9/20 
•363 9/21 



*364 9/21 



Subject 

Joint U.S. -Republic of Korea 
statement on the standing 
committee on nuclear and 
other energy technology. 

International Telegraph and 
Telephone Consultative 
Committee (CCITT), 
study group 4, Oct. 1 1 . 

Shipping Coordinating 
Committee (SCC), Sub- 
committee on Safety of 
Life at Sea (SOLAS), 
working group on radio 
communications, Oct. 19. 

Advisory committee to the 
U.S. section of the Inter- 
national Commission for 
the Conservation of Atlan- 
tic Tunas, Oct. 4. 

Advisory committee to the 
U.S. section of the Inter- 
national North Pacific 
Fisheries Commission, 
Sept 26 (partially closed 
meeting). 

U.S.. Philippines sign new 
textile agreement, Aug. 22 
and 24. 

U.S. -Japan communique on 
the joint planning and 
coordination committee on 
environmental protection. 

CCITT. study group 1. Oct. 
12. 

U.S., Colombia sign textile 
agreement, Aug. 3. 

Advisory Committee on Pri- 
vate International Law. 
Oct. 25. 

Vance: address at the 
Women's Action Organi- 
zation award ceremony 
(delivered by Assistant 
Secretary Moose), Sept. 
I I 

Vance: departure statement. 
Andrews Air Force Base 

Vance: arrival statement. 
Amman. 

SCC, National Committee 
for the Prevention of Ma- 
rine Pollution. Nov. 28. 

S< C, Oct. 12. 

William H. Luers sworn in 
as Ambassador to Ven- 
ezuela (biographic data). 

Vance. Ibrahim: remarks, 
Amman Airport 



*365 


9/21 


*366 


9/22 


*367 


9/26 


♦368 


9/27 


♦369 


9/27 



"370 9/27 



*371 



*372 



*374 



*375 



376 



*377 



*379 

*380 
*381 



9/27 



9/27 



*373 9/27 



9/27 



9/27 



9/29 



9/29 



*378 9/29 



10/2 

10/3 
10/3 



*382 10/6 

*383 10/6 

*384 10/10 

♦385 10/10 

*386 10/13 



Vance: arrival remarks. 
Riyadh. 

Advisory Committee on In- 
ternational Intellectual 
Property, Oct. 30. 

U.S., Japan sign textile 
agreement, Aug. 28. 

Polish-American Day, Oct. 
5. 

Advisory Committee on 
Transnational Enterprises, 
Oct. 12. 

SCC, SOLAS, working 
group on ship design and 
equipment, Oct. 18. 

SCC. SOLAS, working 
group on fire protection. 
Oct. 19. 

Ocean Affairs Advisory 
Committee, Nov. 8 (par- 
tially closed meeting). 

U.S., Romania amend textile 
agreement, July 27 and 
Sept. 11. 

U.S., Hong Kong establish 
export limits, exchange of 
letters, Sept. 20 and 25. 

U.S., Singapore sign textile 
agreement, Sept. 21 and 
22. 

Vance: statement before the 
33d U.N. General Assem- 
bly. 

Advisory Committee on the 
Law of the Sea, Oct. 30 
(closed session) and Oct. 
3 I (partially closed). 

Ambler H. Moss, Jr., sworn 
in as Ambassador to 
Panama (biographic data). 

John Gunther Dean sworn in 
as Ambassador to Lebanon 
(biographic data). 

Town Meeting on foreign 
policy. Norfolk, Nov. 4. 

National foreign policy con- 
ference for community and 
junior college chief 
executive officers. Oct. 
2-3. 

Harold E. Horan sworn in as 
Ambassador to Malawi 
(biographic data) 

ACDA Director Paul C. 
Warnke to address confer- 
ence on U.S. security and 
the Soviet challenge. 
Pittsburgh. Oct. 17. 

Advisory Committee on 

Historical Diplomatic 
Documentation, Nov. 13. 

Fine Arts Committee. Nov. 
13. 

Richard B Parker sworn in 
as Ambassador to Morocco 
(biographic data). Q 



REPLICATIONS 



1950 "Foreign Relations" Volume V 
"The Near East, South Asia, 
and Africa" 1 

The Department of State released o 
July 5, 1978, "Foreign Relations c 
the United States," 1950, volume V 
"The Near East, South Asia, and A 
rica." The "Foreign Relations" serie 
has been published continuously sine 
1861 as the official record of America 
foreign policy. 

This volume presents 1 ,889 pages c 
previously unpublished documentatio 
(much of it newly declassified) o 
basic U.S. security interests in th 
Near East and South Asia; military an 
political talks with the United Kinj 
dom; the Tripartite Declaration of Ma 
25, 1950, by the United States, th 
United Kingdom, and France concerr 
ing Near Eastern arms and security 
U.S. proposals for economic, techn 
cal, and military assistance; and petrc 
leum policy. A section on U.S. rela 
tions with Israel and U.S. interest i 
the Arab-Israeli conflict over the futui 
status of Palestine comprises the large: 
single collection of material in the vo 
ume. Other sections of the volum 
present documentation on bilateral re 
lations with Egypt, Greece, Iran, Irac, 
Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syrk 
Turkey, and Yemen. 

Documentation on South Asia ir 
eludes coverage of the dispute betwee 
India and Pakistan over Kashmir, an 
U.S. relations with Afghanistan, India 
Nepal, and Pakistan. A substantia 
section on Africa covers general U.S 
policies with respect to Africa; partici 
pation in discussions on the disposition 
of the former Italian colonies in Afric. 
(Libya. Eritrea, and Italian Somali 
land); and relations with Ethiopia 
Liberia. Morocco. Tunisia, and thi 
Union of South Africa. 

"Foreign Relations," 1950. volume 
V, was prepared in the Office of tht 
Historian. Bureau of Public Affairs 
Department of State. Five other vol 
times for 1950 have already been pub 
lished, and one more is in preparation 
One volume for 1951 has also beer 
published, and six others are in prep- 
aration. Copies of volume V for 195C 
(Department of State publication 8927; 
may be purchased for $15.50 (domestic 
postpaid). Checks or money orders 
should be made out to the Superinten- 
dent of Documents and should be sent 
to the U.S. Government Book Store, 
Department of State. Washington, 
D.C. 20520. C 



■J; 
I 



' Not printed in the Bulletin. 



1 Press release 269. 






INDEX 



NOVEMBER 1978 
'OL. 78, NO. 2020 

frica. Southern Rhodesia Executive Council 
Members Visit U.S. (Department announce- 
ment, joint U.S. -U.K. statement) 13 

Tins Control 
Balanced and Effective Defense (Brown) . . 14 

omprehensive Test Ban (Gelb) 17 

onvention on the Hostile Use of Environmental 
Modification Techniques (message from 
President Carter) 16 

n Overview of U.S. -Soviet Relations (Shul- 
man) 28 

resident Carter's News Conferences of Sept. 28 
and Oct. 10 (excerpts) 9 

3d U.N. General Assembly Convenes 
(Vance) 45 

ulgaria. An Overview of Eastern Europe 
(Luers) 33 

'ommodities. 33d U.N. General Assembly 
Convenes ( Vance) 45 

ongress 

onn Summit and Investment in Developing 
Countries (Cooper) 19 

amp David Agreements (Saunders) 42 

omprehensive Test Ban (Gelb) 17 

onvention on the Hostile Use of Environmental 
Modification Techniques (message from 
President Carter) 16 

lultilateral Trade Negotiations (message from 
President Carter) 21 

inth Report on Cyprus (Carter) 31 

n Overview of Eastern Europe (Luers) 33 

n Overview of U.S. -Soviet Relations (Shul- 
man) 28 

he Role of Human Rights Policy in Arms 
Transfers for Latin America (Derian) 51 

.S. Export Policy (Carter, Katz) 23 

yprus 

I inth Report on Cyprus (Carter) 31 
id U.N. General Assembly Convenes 
(Vance) 45 
zechoslovakia. An Overview of Eastern 
Europe (Luers) 33 

'eveloping Countries 
llonn Summit and Investment in Developing 

Countries (Cooper) 19 

■ /orld Population: The Silent Explosion — Part 2 

t (Fearey, Giffler, Green) I 

Iconomics. Bonn Summit and Investment in 

I Developing Countries (Cooper) 19 

ducational and Cultural Affairs. U.S.- 

■ Mexico Commission on Cultural Cooper- 

II ation 55 

vgypt 

'amp David Agreements (Saunders) 42 

'(resident Carter's News Conferences of Sept. 28 
I and Oct. 10 (excerpts) 9 

13d U.N. General Assembly Convenes 
I] ( Vance) 45 

Energy. 33d U.N. General Assembly Convenes 

j (Vance) 45 

urope. Country Background Notes 41 



Food. 33d U.N. General Assembly Convenes 

(Vance) 45 

Germany 

Letter of Credence (Grunert) 29 

An Overview of Eastern Europe (Luers) 33 

Grenada. Letter of Credence (Griffith) 53 

Human Rights 

An Overview of U.S. -Soviet Relations (Shul- 

man) 28 

The Role of Human Rights Policy in Arms 

Transfers for Latin America (Derian) 51 

33d U.N. General Assembly Convenes 

(Vance) 45 

Hungary. An Overview of Eastern Europe 

(Luers) 33 

Industrialized Democracies. Bonn Summit and 

Investment in Developing Countries 

(Cooper) 19 

Iran. President Carter's News Conferences of 

Sept. 28 and Oct 10 (excerpts) 9 

Ireland. Letter of Credence (Donlon) 29 

Israel 

Camp David Agreements (Saunders) 42 

President Carter's News Conferences of Sept. 28 

and Oct. 10 (excerpts) 9 

33d U.N. General Assembly Convenes 

(Vance) 45 

Jordan. President Carter's News Conferences of 

Sept. 28 and Oct. 10 (excerpts) 9 

Latin America and the Caribbean 

Arms Transfer Policy in Latin America (foreign 

relations outline) 54 

The Role of Human Rights Policy in Arms 

Transfers for Latin America (Derian) 51 

Lebanon 

President Carter's News Conferences of Sept. 28 

and Oct. 10 (excerpts) 9 

33d U.N. General Assembly Convenes 

(Vance) 45 

Mexico. U.S. -Mexico Commission on Cultural 

Cooperation 55 

Middle East 

Secretary Vance's Middle East Visit 43 

33d U.N. General Assembly Convenes 

(Vance) 45 

Military Affairs. A Balanced and Effective 

Defense ( Brown) 14 

Monetary Affairs. President Carter's News 

Conferences of Sept. 28 and Oct. 10 (ex- 
cerpts) 9 

Namibia. 33d U.N. General Assembly Con- 
venes ( Vance) 45 

Oceans. 33d U.N. General Assembly Convenes 

(Vance) 45 

Poland. An Overview of Eastern Europe 

(Luers) 33 

Population. World Population: The Silent 

Explosion — Part 2 (Fearey. Giffler. 

Green) 1 

Presidential Documents 
Convention on the Hostile Use of Environmental 

Modification Techniques 16 

Multilateral Trade Negotiations 21 

Ninth Report on Cyprus 31 

President Carter's News Conferences of Sept. 28 

and Oct. 10 (excerpts) 9 

United Nations Day, 1978 50 

United Nations Day, 1978 (proclamation) ... .51 

U.S. Export Policy 23 

Publications 

Country Background Notes 41 



GPO Sales Publications 27 

1950 "Foreign Relations" Volume V: "The Near 
East, South Asia, and Africa" 58 

United Nations Background Note 49 

Refugees. 33d U.N. General Assembly Con- 
venes ( Vance) 45 

Romania. An Overview of Eastern Europe 
(Luers) 33 

Security Assistance 

Arms Transfer Policy in Latin America (foreign 
relations outline) 54 

The Role of Human Rights Policy in Arms 
Transfers for Latin America (Derian) 51 

Southern Rhodesia 

President Carter's News Conferences of Sept. 28 
and Oct. 10 (excerpts) 9 

Southern Rhodesia Executive Council Members 
Visit U.S. (Department announcement, joint 
U.S. -U.K. statement) 13 

33d U.N. General Assembly Convenes 
(Vance) 45 

Terrorism. 33d U.N. General Assembly Con- 
venes ( Vance) 45 

Trade 

Multilateral Trade Negotiations (message from 
President Carter) 21 

33d U.N. General Assembly Convenes 

(Vance) 45 

U.S. Export Policy (Carter, Katz) 23 

Treaties 

Convention on the Hostile Use of Environmental 
Modification Techniques (message from 
President Carter) 16 

Current Actions 56 

U.S.S.R. 

A Balanced and Effective Defense (Brown) 14 

Comprehensive Test Ban (Gelb) 17 

An Overview of U.S. -Soviet Relations (Shul- 
man) 28 

United Nations 

33d U.N. General Assembly Convenes 
(Vance) 45 

United Nations Background Note 49 

United Nations Day, 1978 (Carter) 50 

United Nations Day, 1978 (proclamation) ... .51 

U.S. Delegation to the 33d U.N. General As- 
sembly 46 

World Conference To Combat Racism (White 
House statement) 48 



Name Index 

Brown, Harold 14 

Carter, President .... 9, 16. 21 , 23, 31 , 50. 51 

Cooper. Richard N 19 

Derian. Patricia M 51 

Donlon. Sean 29 

Fearey, Robert A 1 

Gelb, Leslie H 17 

Giffler, Lydia K 1 

Green. Marshall 1 

Griffith, George Ashley . . .53 

Grunert, Horst 29 

Katz. Julius L . 23 

Luers, William H . 33 

Saunders, Harold H 42 

Shulman, Marshall D 28 

Vance. Secretary 45 



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Department 



Jf of State ~MW JW j & 

bulletin 



December 1978 



■* 



e Official Monthly Record of United States Foreign Policy / Volume 78 / Number 2021 

\3: I 




Department of State 

bulletin 

Volume 78 Number 2021 / December 1978 



The Department of State Bulletin, 
published by the Office of Public Com- 
munication in the Bureau of Public 
Affairs, is the official record of U.S. 
foreign policy. Its purpose is to provide 
the public, the Congress, and govern- 
ment agencies with information on 
developments in U.S. foreign relations 
and the work of the Department of 
State and the Foreign Service. 

The Bulletin's contents include 
major addresses and news conferences 
of the President and the Secretary of 
State; statements made before congres- 
sional committees by the Secretary 
and other senior State Department of- 
ficials; special features and articles on 
international affairs; selected press re- 
leases issued by the White House, the 
Department, and the U.S. Mission to 
the United Nations; and treaties and 
other agreements to which the United 
States is or may become a party. 

The Secretary of State has deter- 
mined that the publication of this peri- 
odical is necessary in the transaction of 
the public business required by law of 
this Department. Use of funds for 
printing this periodical has been ap- 
proved by the Director of the Office 
of Management and Budget through 
January 31, 1981. 

NOTE: Contents of this publication 
are not copyrighted and items con- 
tained herein may be reprinted. Cita- 
tion of the Department of State 
Bulletin as the source will be appre- 
ciated. The Bulletin is indexed in the 
Readers' Guide to Periodical Litera- 
ture. 

For sale by the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Print- 
ing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402 

Price: 

12 issues plus annual index — 
$18.00 (domestic) $22.50 (foreign) 

Single copy— 

$1.40 (domestic) $1.80 (foreign) 



CYRUS R. VANCE 

Secretary of State 

HODDING CARTER III 

Assistant Secretary for Public Affa 

JOHN CLARK KIMBALL 

Consulting Editor 

PHYLLIS A. YOUNG 

Editor 

COLLEEN SUSSMAN 
Assistant Editor 



CONTENTS 



I SALT AND AMERICAN SECURITY 

5 AMBASSADOR WARNKE'S NEWS CONFERENCE OF OCTOBER 30 

6 ACDA/SALT OFFICIALS 



THE PRESIDENT 

12 The United States and Its Economic 

Responsibilities 
14 Interview on •'Bill Movers' Journal" 

THE SECRETARY 

17 News Conference of November 3 

20 Visit to Europe and the Middle East 

AFRICA 

21 Secretary Vance Discusses Namibia 

With South African Officials 
(News Conference, Joint State- 
ment, South African Statement, 
Western Five Statement) 

25 U.S., U.K., Rhodesian Executive 
Council Meeting (Department An- 
nouncement , Joint U .S .- U .K . 
Statement) 

25 Rhodesian Raids (Department State- 
ments) 

27 Southern Rhodesia (Foreign Rela- 
tions Outline) 

27 Letter of Credence (Mali) 

EAST ASIA 

28 The Dominoes That Did Not Fall 

(David D. Newsom) 

29 Arms Sales to Taiwan (Department 

Statement) 

30 GPO Sales Publications 

ECONOMICS 

31 Measures to Strengthen the Dollar 

(President Carter, Secretary Blu- 
menthal) 

31 Congressional Documents 

32 Managing Economic Problems in the 

Industrialized Democracies (Robert 
D. Hormats) 

EUROPE 

36 Armaments Cooperation in NATO 

( Warren Christopher) 

37 Secretary Vance Visits Moscow 

37 Letter of Credence (Romania) 

38 U.S. Military Cooperation With Tur- 

key (President Carter, Memoran- 
dum to the Secretary of State, De- 
partment Statement) 



FOOD 

39 Presidential Commission on World 

Hunger (President Carter) 

MIDDLE EAST 

40 Egyptian-Israeli Peace Negotiations 

(President Carter, Foreign Minis- 
ter Day an. Defense Minister Has- 
san Ali, White House Statement) 

OCEANS 

42 Law of the Sea Conference (Elliot L. 

Richardson) 

43 Expanded Canadian Maritime Bound- 

ary Claim (Department Statement) 

POPULATION 

44 World Population: The Silent 

Explosion — Part 3 (Marshall 
Green, Robert A. Fearey) 

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 

48 The Challenge of Science and Tech- 
nology for Development (Charles 
William Maynes) 

SOUTH ASIA 

52 Superpowers and Regional Alliances 
in South Asia (David D. Newsom) 

54 Indian Ocean Arms Limitation 

Negotiations (Leslie H. Gelb) 

55 Letter of Credence (Bangladesh) 

UNITED NATIONS 

56 Namibia (Secretary Vance, Text of 

Resolution) 

57 Southern Rhodesia (John W. 

Hechinger) 

TREATIES 

58 Current Actions 

61 PRESS RELEASES 

INDEX 

Supt i 






DEPOSITORY 





SUBLIMIT 



820 




SUBLIMIT 




1,200 

MAXIMUM 



J^^^ 



SLBMs- THE ABOVE PLUS 

MIRVed SUBMARINE 
LAUNCHED BALLISTIC 
MISSILES 



SUBLIMIT 




1,020 

MAXIMUM 




BOMBERS- BOTH OF THE ABOVE PLUS 
LONG-RANGE BOMBERS 
CARRYING CRUISE MISSILES 



OVERALL CEILING 




2,250 

MAXIMUM 



TOTAL DELIVERY SYSTEMS: ALL OF THE ABOVE PLUS 
UNMIRVed MISSILES AND 
BOMBERS NOT CARRYING 
CRUISE MISSILES 



w 



SALT AND AMERICAN SECURITY 



The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks 
ALT) between the United States and 
Soviet Union have been formally 
derway since 1969, during the Ad- 
inistrations of three American 
esidents — Richard Nixon, Gerald 
rd, and Jimmy Carter. The purpose 
the talks is to promote our national 
;urity by reducing the risk of nuclear 
ir through negotiation of mutual lim- 
on strategic nuclear arms. In May 
72 the negotiations resulted in the 
st SALT agreements — the Treaty on 
: Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile 
stems (Antiballistic Missile Treaty) 
i the Interim Agreement on the Lim- 
tion of Strategic Offensive Arms, 
ice then — during nearly 6 years of 
lgh bargaining — both nations have 
ived at the broad outlines of a new 
■eement, called SALT II, and accord 
> been reached on many of its spe- 
ic provisions. 

SALT — and all arms control 
licy — is part of national security 
licy. Our basic arms control policy 
ii our specific negotiating positions 
|l developed through the National Se- 
fity Council with the participation of 
i the responsible agencies and their 
lads — the Secretary of State, the 

!:retary of Defense, the Chairman of 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Director 
'■ the Arms Control and Disarmament 
C ency, and the Director of the Central 
telligence Agency. The U.S. SALT 
[legation, which is negotiating with 
jit U.S.S.R. delegation in Geneva 
[der instructions approved by the 
l:sident, has representation from the 



This article is taken from a 
pamphlet of the same title pre- 
i pared by the Arms Control and 
i Disarmament Agency and re- 
leased in November 1978. Indi- 
vidual copies of the pamphlet 
i may be purchased for $1.10 each 
from the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government 
^Printing Office, Washington, 
1D.C. 20402. (Orders of 100 or 
\more copies of the same pam- 
Sphlet mailed to the same address 
\are sold at a 25% discount.) Re- 
mittance in the form of a check 
\or money order payable to the 
\Superintendent of Documents 
must accompany orders. 



agencies responsible for national secu- 
rity policy. 

In the nuclear age, both military 
forces and arms control serve our na- 
tional security. We need a strong and 
flexible military capability to deter any 
potential aggressor from attacking and, 
if deterrence should fail, to defend our- 
selves and our allies. Our nuclear and 
conventional forces — land, sea, and 
air — are designed for these missions. 

As the nuclear arms race developed, 
however, both the United States and 
the Soviet Union recognized that an 
unlimited arms race might endanger 
rather than preserve the security of 
both nations. This recognition gave 
birth to the SALT process, which, in 
its simplest terms, seeks equitable and 
adequately verifiable limitations on 
strategic arms to enhance the national 
security of both sides. 

In SALT, the stakes are enormous. 
The fact that nuclear weapons have not 
been employed for over 30 years 
should not cause us to ignore the awe- 
some consequences of nuclear war. 
Weapons with intercontinental ranges 
and previously unimagined explosive 
power can destroy in minutes what it 
has taken centuries to build. Although 
we are confident of our ability to 
maintain nuclear deterrence and a clear 
balance in strategic forces, without a 
new agreement we could face the pos- 
sibility of an escalating arms race, in- 
creased tension between this nation and 
the Soviet Union, and a greater risk of 
the catastrophe of nuclear war. SALT 
may well be the most important negoti- 
ation the United States has ever 
undertaken. 

A national debate on this most seri- 
ous of issues has already begun. Below 
are answers to some of the questions 
that Americans are asking about SALT 
and American security. 

Which nation has stronger 
strategic forces today, the United 
States or the Soviet Union? 

In terms of overall strategic nuclear 
power, the two nations are roughly 
equal. Both sides have immensely 
powerful strategic nuclear forces that 
can bring catastrophic devastation to 
each other or any other attacker. 

In terms of specific forces, the 
United States leads in some categories; 
the Soviets lead in others. Today, for 
example, we have about twice as many 



deliverable strategic nuclear warheads. 
The Soviets have more and larger 
land-based missiles, but ours are more 
accurate. We have a substantially 
larger heavy bomber force, more of 
which is on alert, and our bombers are 
more capable. The Soviets have exten- 
sive air defenses, whereas U.S. air de- 
fenses are minimal. Both nations pos- 
sess secure retaliatory weapons on bal- 
listic missile-firing submarines. The 
Soviet Union possesses a larger number 
of submarines and submarine-launched 
ballistic missiles (SLBM's); however, 
the United States has far more of its 
strategic nuclear weapons at sea on its 
submarines than does the Soviet Union. 
Although the Soviets are making 
major efforts to catch up, we continue, 
in most cases, to be far ahead of the 
Soviet Union in economic and techno- 
logical strength — important for pre- 
serving strong strategic capabilities in 
the future. Looking to this future, both 
sides are modernizing their forces so 
that each may always maintain power- 
ful and secure strategic nuclear power. 

What will be in the SALT II 
agreement? 

SALT II will consist of a basic 
agreement which will remain in force 
through 1985, a protocol which will 
expire well before that date, and a 
statement of principles which will es- 
tablish general guidelines for sub- 
sequent negotiations, SALT III. 

Each country initially will be limited 
to an equal total number of 2,400 
strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, a 
ceiling which will be reduced to 2,250 
well before 1985. Under this overall 
ceiling, there will also be three impor- 
tant sublimits: a 1,320 sublimit on 
launchers of land-based intercontinen- 
tal ballistic missiles (ICBM's) 
equipped with multiple independ- 
ently-targetable reentry vehicles 
(MIRV's), launchers of MIRV'ed 
SLBM's, and airplanes equipped for 
long-range cruise missiles; within the 
1,320, a 1,200 sublimit on launchers 
of MIRVed ballistic missiles (ICBM's 
and SLBM's); and within the 1,200, an 
820 sublimit on launchers of MIRV'ed 
ICBM's. 

The sublimits on MIRV's are im- 
portant because the use of MIRV's 
rapidly increases the ability of each 
side to strike a greater number of 
targets on the other side. The protocol 



may include such measures as a ban on 
the deployment of launchers of mobile 
ICBM's and limitations on cruise mis- 
siles. 

What will the SALT II agreement 
mean for American security? 

The new agreement will improve our 
security in several significant ways. 

• It will place equal numerical limits 
on the overall U.S. and Soviet strategic 
forces. To comply, the Soviets will 
have to dismantle or destroy up to 300 
strategic systems. We will not have to 
dismantle or destroy any systems that 
currently are operational. 

• It will hold the deployment of 



Soviet strategic forces, including their 
most threatening intercontinental mis- 
siles, well below what they could de- 
ploy in the absence of an agreement. 

• It will somewhat reduce uncer- 
tainty in our strategic planning, since 
we will know the maximum number of 
strategic systems the Soviet Union will 
be allowed to deploy. 

• It will contain important provi- 
sions to help us determine that the 
Soviets are living up to their obliga- 
tions in the agreement. 

• It will allow us the flexibility we 
need to continue the strategic programs 
we require. 

In sum SALT II will provide a 
framework for maintaining essential 




SOVIET UNION 




STRATEGIC 

NUCLEAR 

WARHEADS 



9,000 + 



5,000 + 



LAND 
DASED 
MISSILES 
(ICDM's) 



1,054 



1,400 



HEAVY 
BOMBERS 




350 



* 



150 






SLBM 
LAUNCHERS 




656 






950 



Department of State Bulle 



8 
111 



equivalence between the United Sta j 
and the Soviet Union, and it will, 
conjunction with an aggressive U. 
strategic force modernization progra 
contribute to stability in the strate] ,, 
balance. 



[Ii 



ifi 



How can we be sure that the Ri 
sians will live up to the agreement' 

In SALT we do not rely on trust 
Soviet good faith. The 1972 SAL1 
agreements established the princij 
that both nations would use their 
verse and sophisticated intelliger 
capabilities — known as "natioi 
technical means" — to monitor co 
pliance. National technical meai 
such as satellite photography, are vi 
effective. Through them, we are able 
monitor the number of strategic nucl 
delivery systems the Soviets have; th 
basic characteristics; and when, whe 
and how they are tested. The SAL' 
agreements also prohibited any infc 
ference with these means and any 
liberate concealment measures wh 
could impede verification of co 
pliance with the provisions of th< 
agreements. 

SALT II will continue these prohi 
tions and will, in fact, contain ad 
tional detailed provisions to incre 
our confidence that the Soviets 
complying with the agreement, 
should be noted that without a SA 
agreement containing such prohi 
tions, the Soviets would be free to 
any and all methods of concealme 
making our overall monitoring task 
more difficult. 

The SALT I agreements also p 
vided for the establishment of the jc 
Standing Consultative Commission 
forum in which the United States ; 
the U.S.S.R. address questions ab 
matters relating to the implementat 
of the agreements, including questit 
of compliance. In the commissi 
both sides have raised a number of 
tivities which they judged to be a 
biguous or subject to question a 
which were thus a source of some ci 
cern. In each case the United States I 
raised, the activity in question 1 
either ceased or additional informat 
has allayed our concern. 

At the same time, both sides h; 
made it clear that the dynamic nature 
implementation and compliance coi 
require the reopening of any of the 
subjects or the raising of new questic 
at any time. Consequently, the Sovi 
are well aware that the United Sta 
will call them to account for any qu 
tionable activities relating to th 
strategic programs and will expi 
satisfactory resolution of any proble 
involved. 



Fu 



it 



II 



cember 1978 



Under the SALT agreement, won't 
r Minuteman missiles be vulnera- 
_ to Soviet attack? 

With or without SALT, our Min- 
:man missiles will become increas- 
;ly vulnerable to attack by Soviet 
BM's. This situation is the result of 
viet advances in missile accuracy 
upled with the deployment of large 
mbers of ICBM-carried nuclear 
rheads. It is not the result of SALT. 

To guard against the potential vul 
rability of any one part of our 
ategic forces is a major reason why 
United States has maintained a bal- 
:ed strategic nuclear force of land- 
sed ICBM's, submarine-launched 
listic missiles, and heavy bombers. 
:h element of this force has its own 
erational advantages and poses 
que problems for the other side. 

Furthermore, although no decisions 
/e been made, the United States is 
imining other options such as alter- 
ive, more survivable methods for 
;ing ICBM's to compensate for the 
:reasing vulnerability of fixed 
M's. The SALT II draft, as pres- 
ly agreed, explicitly permits de- 
yment of mobile ICBM launchers 
er the expiration of the protocol 
riod — well before such systems 
• uld be ready for deployment. 

j The use of Minuteman vulnerability 
list be viewed in perspective. The 
aviets face substantial uncertainties in 
inning an attack on our Minuteman: 
Iw reliable and accurate will their 
Bssiles really be; can they avoid hav- 
ii; the explosion of one attacking 

■ rhead damage the effectiveness of 
ipsequent attacking warheads; can 
1 y be certain of the hardness of our 
jssile silos; and would the United 
lites launch its own ICBM's once it 
|s determined that a massive Soviet 

■ BM attack was underway, thus 

I ving only empty holes for the Soviet 
Bssiles to hit? 

iFinally, as Secretary of Defense 
jirold Brown has stated, the vulnera- 
lity of the Minuteman — even if we 

II nothing about it — "would not be 
■aonymous with the vulnerability of 
be United States, or even of the 

■ ategic deterrent." This is because 
linuteman missiles constitute only a 
Irt of our retaliatory forces. Any 
I viet planner must realize that even a 
Mccessful attack on the Minuteman 
wuld still leave the Soviet Union vul- 
flrable to massive response by our 
flllistic missile-firing submarines and 
lavy bombers. The damage these re- 
taining froces could do would be dev- 
jtating. 



What about Soviet civil defense? 

Soviet civil defense cannot change 
the current strategic weapons balance 
or the fundamentally disastrous nature 
of a major nuclear exchange between 
the United States and the Soviet Union. 
The destruction that our retaliation 
would bring could mean only catas- 
trophe for the Soviet Union. The im- 
mediate effects caused by blast, fire, 
and fallout would be followed by 
long-term consequences. Most indus- 
tries would be destroyed, and wide- 
spread starvation and death from dis- 
ease would almost certainly occur. So- 
cial order would be weakened to the 
point of breakdown. There would, 
furthermore, be large-scale contamina- 
tion of the environment with unpredict- 
able consequences. 

We are monitoring the Soviet civil 
defense program very carefully. Their 
civil defense program represents a sub- 
stantially larger effort than ours. How- 
ever, compared to the United States, 
the Soviet Union faces even more im- 
posing civil defense problems: severe 
climatic conditions, more concentrated 
urban areas, more population located 
near industrial targets, and an in- 
adequate transportation for large-scale 
evacuation. 

Despite their civil defense program, 
there is no possibility than in an all-out 
nuclear war the Soviets could avoid the 
deaths of tens of millions of their citi- 
zens and the destruction of most of 
their industrial resources and urban 
areas. As a recently released analysis 
by the Central Intelligence Agency 
concluded: "We do not believe that the 
Soviets' present civil defenses would 
embolden them deliberately to expose 
the USSR to a higher risk of nuclear 
attack." 



What about the Soviet "Backfire" 
bomber? 

The Soviets have developed a mod- 
ern, swing-wing bomber which bears 
the NATO designation "Backfire." Its 
characteristics fall between the charac- 
teristics generally attributed to existing 
heavy bombers and those of medium 
bombers (tactical aircraft and medium 
bombers on both sides are not covered 
by the SALT ceilings). The Backfire 
can reach a significant number of 
targets in the United States on one- 
way, high-altitude, unrefueled mis- 
sions. However, close observation over 
a period of years indicates that this 
bomber is currently being deployed for 
use in a theater or naval strike role and 
is a replacement for older Soviet 
medium bombers. 

In this regard, it should be noted that 



the United States has a number of air- 
craft which, when deployed in forward 
bases such as in the European theater, 
are capable of striking targets in the 
Soviet Union. We have refused to in- 
clude these aircraft in SALT because 
they are theater systems and the Soviet 
forces which they face are not covered 
by the SALT limits. 

The United States has indicated to 
the Soviets that the Backfire can be 
excluded from the permitted overall 
SALT totals if, and only if, the Soviets 
undertake commitments which will in- 
hibit the Backfire from assuming an 
intercontinental role in the future, as 
well as impose limits on its production 
rate. These commitments would have 
the same status as the SALT agree- 
ments, binding the Soviets to the com- 
mitments contained therein. Although 
there are no assurances that the 
Backfire would not be used against the 
United States in time of conflict, these 
commitments by the Soviet Union are 
designed to inhibit the Backfire from 
being given an operational interconti- 
nental role and to limit its overall 
strategic potential. 

Won't SALT II constrain the U.S. 
cruise missile program? 

We have been careful to preserve 
those cruise missile options most im- 
portant to our defense needs. The new 
agreement will permit us to go ahead 
with the deployment of the air- 
launched, long-range cruise missiles 
we now have decided to deploy on 
heavy bombers. The principal lim- 
itations on cruise missiles will be con- 
tained in the shorter term protocol. 

Even during the period of the pro- 
tocol we will be permitted to flight-test 
all types of cruise missiles and to de- 
ploy ground- and sea-launched cruise 
missiles capable of ranges up to 600 
kilometers (about 375 miles). We will 
be able to go ahead with development 
and testing programs for all types of 
cruise missiles without altering present 
schedules. After the protocol expires, 
there will be no limitations on ground- 
and sea-launched cruise missiles unless 
mutually agreed upon in subsequent 
negotiations. Cruise missile limitations 
will be an agenda item for SALT III. 

Will SALT II stop us from de- 
veloping mobile intercontinental bal- 
listic missiles? 

No. The protocol will prohibit each 
side from deploying mobile ICBM 
launchers and flight-testing ICBM's 
from mobile launchers. Research and 
development programs short of 
flight-testing will not be affected. 



B-52 • U.S. A 



47 



LENGTH IN MEIERS 



U.S.S.R. • DACKFIRE-D 




UNITED STATES MILITARY POSTURE FOR FY 1 979". US Joint Chiefs of Stoff 



At present the United States is 
studying a number of mobile ICBM- 
basing concepts, including some in- 
volving alternate launch points for each 
missile. No decision has been made 
whether or not to deploy mobile ICBM 
systems. Nor have we decided which 
particular concept we would implement 
if we were to elect to deploy a mobile 
ICBM system. The current and pro- 
jected capabilities of our strategic 
forces give us time to study thoroughly 
questions of technical feasibility, mili- 
tary effectiveness, and cost prior to 
making decisions about deploying 
mobile ICBMs. 

The parts of the joint draft text of the 
SALT II agreement that have already 
been agreed upon allow deployment of 
mobile ICBM systems of the types we 
are considering. The draft agreement 
explicitly permits deployment of mobile 
ICBM launchers during its term, after 
the expiration of an interim protocol 
period which would end well before 
mobile ICBM systems would be ready 
for deployment. 

Any mobile ICBM basing system 
would, of course, have to be fully con- 
sistent with all provisions — including 
the verification provisions — of a 
strategic arms limitation agreement. 
The United States will not deploy a 
mobile ICBM system that would not 
permit adequate verification of the 
number of launchers deployed, and 
other provisions of the agreement. We 
will insist that any Soviet system meet 
the same verification standards. 



sile and other sophisticated technology. 
SALT, furthermore, will not affect our 
important efforts to strengthen NATO's 
conventional forces. We have con- 
sulted closely with our allies through- 
out the course of the SALT negotia- 
tions and have taken into account allied 
security concerns in our negotiating 
positions. 



How will SALT II affect our 
NATO allies? 

SALT II will not place any restric- 
tions on the nuclear forces of France 
and Great Britain, and it will not limit 
any of America's nuclear weapons 
systems located in Europe. There will 
be no ban on the transfer of cruise mis- 



How do the cancellation of the B-l 
bomber and the decision to defer 
production of the "neutron bomb" 
relate to SALT? 

The B-l decision was not an arms 
control decision. It was made sepa- 
rately from SALT in the interest of 
providing the United States with a 
strong, efficient, and cost-effective na- 
tional defense. Instead of the B-l 
bomber, we have chosen to develop 
cruise missiles and particularly, in the 
near term, to equip some of our exist- 
ing bombers with highly accurate, 
long-range cruise missiles to insure the 
continued effectiveness of our bomber 
force. This decision will result in a 
dual threat — manned penetrating 
bombers and cruise missiles — to 
Soviet air defenses in future years. 

The neutron warhead is not a 
strategic weapon and, therefore, has 
not been discussed at SALT. It is a 
tactical weapon designed to counter 
Soviet offensive forces in central 
Europe. The neutron warhead has not 
been cancelled; the decision on its full 
production and deployment has been 
deferred — to see if appropriate, 
meaningful restraint by the Soviet 
Union will make its production and de- 
ployment unnecessary. 

Why should we sign an agreement 
with the Soviet Union when that 
country promotes instability in Af- 
rica and other parts of the world? 



a 



Department of State Bulleti 

Negotiating a SALT agreement doef" 
not mean that we approve of Sovit 
foreign or domestic policies or the 
form of government. The United State 
will continue to oppose Soviet policie 
where they conflict with ours. SALT 
not a reward that we are giving th 
Soviet Union for good behavior. Rathe 
SALT is worth pursuing only if, by i 
self, it promotes our national security 

The emerging SALT agreement, i 
conjunction with our ongoing defens 
programs, does improve our nation; 
security by supporting continue 
strategic nuclear stability and by nt 1 
ducing the risk of nuclear war. n 

IP 

Will SALT I really slow the arm " 
race? 

"Ves. While there is still a long wa 
to go, and we wish more rapid projt' 
ress, the SALT process has alread Hi 
slowed the arms raOe 

In SALT I, the United States and tl » 
Soviet Union curtailed an expensiv 
competition in defensive missiles t 
agreeing to mutual limitations on ai 
tiballistic missile (ABM) systems. D» 
ployment of ABM's could have stimn 
lated the expansion of offensiv 
strategic forces to offset them. 

In the Interim Agreement on tl - 
Limitation of Strategic Offensiv 
Arms, the United States and the Sovi 
Union froze land-based and submarii 
ballistic missile launchers at the leve 
existing or under construction in 197: 
The freeze stopped the Soviet buildi 
of ICBM launchers, although tr 
agreement did permit the Soviets 
have a greater number of total ICBN fide 
SLBM launchers for the duration of th 
Interim Agreement than the Unite 
States. We, however, were left wii 
more deliverable strategic warheac 
and other advantages. 

SALT II will establish equal aggn 
gate ceilings for strategic nuclear d< 
livery vehicles (ICBM and SLBI 
launchers and heavy bombers) an 
common subceilings on launchers ft 
missiles carrying MIRV's. EstablisI 
ment of such equality in numbers wi 
require the Soviet Union to reduce 
considerable number of strategic sy; 
terns. In addition, SALT II will provid 
for reductions below the initial overa 
ceiling, which will require a further n 
duction in the Soviet strategic force 

To limit the qualitative arms race i 
weapons technology, the new agret' 
ment will, for example, place cor 
straints on the introduction of ne> 
types of ballistic missiles, althoug 
agreement has not been reached on th, 
specific constraints. The statement c 
principles for SALT III will lay a gen 
eral framework and foundation fc 



ill 
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II 
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ecember 1978 



Ambassador Warnke^s JVews Conference 
of October 30 (Excerpts) 



I have just a couple of comments I 
ant to make, sort of in the line of 
irting thoughts. There have been 
me who find a certain symbolism in 
e fact that I'm leaving on Halloween, 
aughter] But I figured I would get 
st about as many bad jokes if I picked 
iother holiday — Thanksgiving, for 
ample, would be subject to misin- 
rpretation, as would Christmas. And I 
uldn't wait until April 1st. So I 
ought this was about as good a time 
any. 

I've had some thoughts these last 
ys about the entire process of arms 
ntrol and how the job has stacked up 
against my hopes and my expecta- 
»ns. You always hope, of course, to 
i better. But then you're always 
ateful that you didn't do worse. 
I But the one real conclusion that I've 
I me to is that arms control just 
lesn't come naturally. It's a very un- 
I tural act. And that's one of the rea- 
lms why it takes such a long time, 
nu are faced with the necessity of 
jniting your own military options in 
« der to find some restrictions that you 
tin get on the other side's forces. 

And when you're faced with that 
loice, those military options that 
l;u're restricting sometimes look a lot 
I'tter than they ever looked before, 
.id, therefore, it gets harder and 
| rder to give them up. And at the 
sme time, of course, you do have the 
k jective of trying to get the other side 
i cut back or to limit particular things. 
I I think if you look at the experience 
: SALT to date, you can see the 
| enomenon that I'm describing. We 
pve, in fact, preserved options that 
Ipuld, perhaps, have been something 
Hat we could have given up to the im- 
jovement of the overall strategic situ- 
I on. 

I We had that experience with 
BlRV's [multiple independently- 



targetable reentry vehicles] in SALT I. 
And that's one of the reasons why I 
feel that what's been sometimes de- 
scribed as the most controversial part 
of SALT II may be, in the long run, a 
structural innovation which is of 
value — and that's the protocol. 

There have been suggestions, re- 
peatedly, that we would have less trou- 
ble with SALT if we eliminated the 
protocol because of its possible prece- 
dential impact — because of the fact 
that some in the Senate may say that 
once you get the protocol, in effect, 
you're kind of stuck with it. 

But it does seem to me that it's got a 
major value, and that's that it prevents 
you from making decisions in the heat 
of negotiations that could be ill- 
considered decisions. It does give you 
the opportunity for thought, and it does 
permit you to reach a reasoned conclu- 
sion after thorough analysis of the pros 
and cons. I think you can see that in the 
particular items that are in the protocol. 
Really, what the protocol controls now 
is the question of deployment of 
long-range, ground-launched cruise 
missiles and sea-launched cruise mis- 
siles, and deployment of mobile 
ICBM [intercontinental ballistic mis- 
sile] launchers. 

Now those are both the kinds of is- 
sues on which, if you made a decision 
at this time, it could be a wrong one. If 
you had to make an up or down deci- 
sion on either one now, I suspect that 
the decision would be up — that the de- 
cision would be to permit long-range, 
ground-launched cruise missiles and 
mobile launchers of ICBM's. 

Maybe eventually that's going to be 
the decision we come to. And maybe 
that would be the right thing to do. But 
I don't think that we've thought 
through the implications of either of 
those systems at the present time. And 
we haven't been able to come to a rea- 



rther progress in reducing the nuclear 
enals of both sides and for further 

strictions on qualitative improve- 

ents. 
!] It is important to realize the price of 
|l)t reaching agreement on SALT II. 

n expansion of the strategic arms 

■>mpetition, at significant monetary 
list, could follow, with an increasing 
iinger that future weapons systems 
i'uild increase the incentives to resort 



to nuclear weapons in time of crisis. 

SALT represents an opportunity to 
take a major step to enhance 
stability — based on achieving an equi- 
table and adequately verifiable 
agreement — and, therefore, it should 
be pursued. A satisfactory agreement 
also will maintain the efforts of both 
sides to continue the search for further 
agreements on the entire range of arms 
limitations. □ 



soned decision as to whether or not, 
when both sides acquire those systems, 
we would be better off or worse off. 

So that, as I said, it seems to me that 
this may turn out to be not the contro- 
versial part of SALT II because it means 
that you don't have to pay the price for 
an arms control agreement by making a 
premature decision on a system which, 
when both sides have acquired it, may 
be against the interests of the United 
States. 

With regard to where we are today 
on SALT, I can't, of course, get into 
the negotiating positions. I think that 
would be a disservice at what is proba- 
bly the most delicate stage of the 
negotiations. But it does seem to me 
that we're now so close and that the is- 
sues remaining are such that it, to me, 
is inconceivable that the two sides 
can't complete it and can't complete it 
at some time in the fairly near future. 

We have, essentially, two kinds of 
issues. One of them will be the techni- 
cal details which are being worked out 
in Geneva, and the other is a couple of 
issues of substance primarily relating to 
the tradeoffs of the restrictions on 
numbers of cruise missiles as compared 
with inhibitions on modernization or 
modification of ICBM's. 

And there, the two sides have come 
closer together. But it's going to take 
some more time and some more negoti- 
ations. We don't have any schedule set 
up for meetings at the foreign minister 
level and certainly not a summit meet- 
ing. But I think sometimes we lose 
sight of the fact that the negotiations 
have been virtually continuous and that 
the two delegations have been in 
Geneva since May of 1977 except for a 
short Christmas break and a short break 
this summer. 



Q. SALT has been under negotia- 
tion now for 6 years. And you've 
been at it for 2 years — those same is- 
sues have held it up for a long period 
of time now. Why is there no 
SALT— 

A. I tried to answer that by just say- 
ing that the process itself is a difficult 
one; that it's awfully hard to reach 
meaningful arms control agreements. 
You could reach sort of a token agree- 
ment in a short period of time. 

But if you're trying genuinely to end 
up with something which is not only 
going to be good in itself but also lay 



Department of State Bulled; 



kci 



the basis for later steps, it's going to go 
slowly. Here what we're trying to do 
is, unlike the SALT I Interim 
Agreement on offensive arms, to do 
more than just sort of ratify the arms 
competition. 

We are trying, actually, to interfere 
with programs that otherwise would be 
completed. And as I say, that's an un- 
natural kind of an act on the part of any 
sovereign state. And, therefore, it's 
one which is taken with a great deal of 
resistance. 

Q. To what extent have political 
factors in the last several months 
held up — on both our side and their 
side — either complicated or in any 
way delayed progress toward a 
treaty? 

A. That's a difficult question to an- 
swer, and I don't think that you can an- 
swer it except by guessing. As you 
know, I've been maintaining consist- 
ently that there should not be linkage 
between SALT and other elements in 
the relationship — that you can't use 
SALT as a reward; you can't use it as 
punishment. It has to stand on its own 
feet. At the same time, I think that you 
have to recognize that the general cli- 
mate of relations does affect the 
negotiations. And I believe that had 
there been less strain in the relationship 
this year, there would have been more 
receptivity on both sides. 

I think when you tend to feel that the 
other side is behaving in a fashion of 
which you disapprove, that you are not 
apt to be perhaps as responsive to their 
positions as you might otherwise be. 
But, as I say, it's an atmospheric thing 
rather than a logical thing. But it does 
have some effect. 



Q. Your comments about the value 
of the protocol in not deciding these 
issues of cruise missiles and mobile 
missiles while we complete negotia- 
tions could be turned around and 
used to imply a criticism of the issues 
that are being decided in the heat of 
negotiations — and maybe the things 
that have ended up in the treaty are 
being decided too nastily. Is that — 

A. No. I don't think that I would ac- 
cept that. 

Q. It amounts to what you are 
saying. 

A. No. What I say is there are some 
items on which decisions are really not 
ready, and that the risk would be to de- 
cide those prematurely. They aren't 
ripe for decision. 

Q. But have all those been saved 
for the protocol? 



ACDA/SALT 

Officials 

Paul C. Warnke resigned as Director 
of the Arms Control and Disarmament 
Agency and chairman of the U.S. dele- 
gation to the Strategic Arms Limitation 
Talks, effective October 31, 1978. He 
had held these positions since March 
1977. Secretary Vance has appointed 
Ambassador Warnke a special consult- 
ant to the Secretary of State for arms 
control affairs. 

The President announced on October 
20 his intention to nominate retired 
Army Lt. Gen. George M. Seignious II 
to be Director of the Arms Control and 
Disarmament Agency; on October 26 
the President appointed Ralph Earle II 
as chairman of the U.S. delegation to 
the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. □ 



A. I would say that they have. Take, 
for example, the question of a ban on 
new types. At one point, we considered 
that to be a protocol item. But we've 
been able to reach an agreement which 
preserves the options that we feel are 
important to preserve. And, therefore, 
you can move that into the treaty. If 
you remember, at one point, what we 
were proposing was no new type of 
ICBM. And we were willing to do that 
for the protocol period — but with the 
understanding now that there will be 
one exception on each side, there's no 
reason to make that a protocol item. 
Because the only thing we are in- 
terested in for the entire treaty period is 
the possibility of one new ICBM. 

Q. Was it a mistake, then, last 
March or April [1977] to propose 
wholesale cutbacks? The Adminis- 
tration's first position would have 
required all sorts of major decisions. 
Did you lose time? 

A. No. 

Q. Because now you're in favor 
of — what you're saying now — and I 
don't know if you were in favor of it 
then — the limited measures, putting 
issues off, temporary measures, and 
yet you came out, if I remember, for 
a huge substantial slash — 

A. I think there are basically two an- 
swers to that. One of them is that I 
certainly don't maintain that you ought 
to put all issues off. You shouldn't. 
You ought to decide, on a long-term 
basis, as many of them as you are pre- 
pared to make a considered judgment 
on. 

But what I've suggested is that there 
are always going to be a couple of 



items that aren't ripe for decision; ju: 
as the question of ground-launche 
cruise missiles or the question o 
mobile launchers of ICBM's are nc 
now ripe for decision. After all, wit 
regard to a mobile ICBM launcher, w 
haven't even been able to arrive at 
concept which is satisfactory to us. S 
that's the sort of issue that ought to b 
put off. 

The issues such as drastic reductior nt; 
are issues that we have been prepare 
to decide now. And we would hav 
been happy if the Soviet Union ha 
been prepared to decide on that poii 
too. 



si 
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in 
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ivi 

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Q. It was a long time ago. But d 
you think you've lost time? 

A. It's hard to say. 

Q. Are they punishing us for it? 

A. No, I don't think that they'i 
punishing us for it. And it seems to m 
that it's going to work out all rigb 
That we're in a position in which, 
you take a look at the two proposals < 
March 1977, where we're going to en 
up is in between, but in between muc 
more on the side of the comprehensn 
proposal than on the side of the deferr 
proposal. 






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Q. I wonder if you could addre 
these apparent contradictions — 
least looking through the other er 
of the telescope — and, with yoi 
perspective here and when you wei 
over at the Pentagon, kind of sugge 
how you might handle it. The botto 
line in the SALT agreement presun * 
ably is, hopefully, to keep fro 
blowing each other up and to sa' "' 
money. On the one hand, the Pent; 
gon is committed to a 3% increase i f= 
real terms in its budget, year afti ' 
year, no matter what happens i f 
SALT. On the other hand, we'i Tl 
talking about making the land-base ■ 
missiles invulnerable, no matter if * 
costs $40 million for an MX or no 
How do you square what's going o :i 
in the real world with armamen 
and the theoretical objective of lov »-t 
ering the price and the dange ■ 
through a SALT agreement? 

A. Talking first about the econom 
issue. As you know, of course, betti'j! 
than I, the strategic arms budget is thi ( 
smaller part of the total defens 
budget. And, as a consequence, eve |, 
with quite substantial reductions, thJ ^ 
wouldn't necessarily mean a very sul 
stantial reduction in the overall budget 

I have never thought of arms contn 
as being primarily directed at savin 
money, because I sort of suspect th; 



December 1978 



pu would find other things to do with 
le money in the defense field if you 
tved a certain amount of money in 
(trategic arms. 

[ I'd say that the big cost saving from 
sALT II will come from the absence of 
living to do things that you otherwise 
flight have to do. I believe, for exam- 
lie, that if you did not have SALT II, 
le Soviet Union would go ahead with 
hrtain programs that would be stopped 
|y SALT II. 

I Intelligence sources indicate that 
ley would have a very, very substan- 
lally greater number of missiles. 
Ihere's no reason to feel that they 
lould stop at 308 SS-18's. There's 
|;rtainly no reason to feel that they 
lould stop at 10 RV's on the SS-18's. 
Ihey would have a very substantial 

itential for exponentially increasing 
le number of warheads. Under those 
"rcumstances, I don't hold with those 
I'ho say that we would sit back and let 
lem acquire that kind of an apparent 
flvantage. So that we would do certain 
Iher things, too, and they would be 

;ry expensive things. 
I think that it's, you know, as com- 

ired to what would happen otherwise, 
1 at we're going to be saving a great 
pal of money. But as far as there 

:ing some sort of a saving that you 

in point to, I think that's going to be 
, ird to do. 

Q. Do you believe that we have to 
ake the land-based missile less vul- 
;rable or can we settle for just the 
r and sea versions and there's 
)thing sacred about the triad? 

A. My position, as always, is impre- 

se and compromised. I would say 

ither of those. I would not eliminate 

Le triad because it seems to me that 

ie maintenance of the land-based 

'BM force, at a minimum, compli- 

i tes Soviet attack plans. 

They would have, to a considerable 
(.tent, to disarm themselves in order to 
lunch any sort of a reasonably suc- 
rssful attack on our land-based forces. 
Ind, therefore. I wouldn't advocate 
'] rowing our ICBM's away. At the 
i me time, I have not heard any con- 
rfete program that would give us, as 
r as I'm concerned, a measure of 
: eater survivability for the land-based 
(tree. 

, The solutions that I've heard just re- 
lit in a multiplication of the fixed 
>rgets and at the expense of verifi- 
>ility so that you lose control over the 
umber of warheads that could attack 
Jose fixed targets. So that I would 
jive to see a more sophisticated plan 
an the tunnel, for example, or the 
jiell game before I would have any 
'infidence that you had improved sur- 



vivability and hadn't, in fact, lessened 
it. 

It's theoretically possible to come up 
with some sort of a plan that would in- 
crease survivability. I wonder whether 
we would find it desirable to put a tre- 
mendous amount of money in it or 
whether, perhaps, the vulnerability of 
Minuteman isn't substantially over- 
rated. 

My own view is that any military 
planner that, under present circum- 
stances, could speculate on his ability 
to eliminate the vast bulk of our ICBM 
forces would have lost his mind. He 
would have to plan an attack with the 
most exquisite precision. He would 
have to count on weapons that he's 
never used functioning almost flaw- 
lessly. 

And he would have to count on the 
fact that, with something like 30 min- 
utes warning, the President of the 
United States would sit calmly by as 
the missiles thundered overhead. 
Whether he would or whether he 
wouldn't, I don't think that the Soviet 
military planner could plan on that. 
And the circumstances are such that he 
would have initiated nuclear war by 
doing less than as complete a job as he 
might otherwise be able to do on our 
ability to retaliate or our willingness to 
retaliate. So I don't put a great deal of 
stock in the idea that the Minuteman is, 
in fact, vulnerable at this stage or is 
going to become such in the early 
I980's. 



But if you could, in fact, find some 
way to eliminate even that theoretical 
risk, that, obviously, would improve 
strategic stability. I think we ought to 
continue to think about the concepts 
but not go ahead with one until we've 
found one that makes sense. 



Q. About the delicate stage — 

A. Yes. The issues that are left: Are 
they tougher per se than the issues that 
have been resolved? 

Q. Or is it that they're the last is- 
sues and were in the stage you called 
the delicate stage because everything 
is dependent on finally wrapping it 
up? 

A. I would say the latter. I would 
say that the toughest issues have been 
resolved. And looking back on the way 
in which this has evolved, I think that 
some of the toughest questions were re- 
solved a year ago September. 

Q. OK. Then that means for at 
least a year, issues that are not the 
toughest issues have resisted solu- 
tion? 

A. That plus putting the agreement 
in principle that was reached in Sep- 
tember of 1977 into treaty language. 
It's a difficult thing. 

Q. I guess I'm having trouble 
grasping why you can't push that 
other 5% [inaudible] because the as- 



George M. Seignious II was born June 21, 
1921, in Orangeburg, S.C. He graduated 
from The Citadel in 1942. receiving a Regular 
Army commission as second lieutenant of 
infantry. During World War II. he served in 
Europe with the 10th Armored Division and 
rose from platoon leader to assistant opera- 
tions officer of the division. 

Gen Seignious' duty assignments have in- 
cluded serving as military assistant and 
executive assistant to the Secretary of the 
Army; Director of the Policy Planning Staff 
in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of 
Defense (International Security Affairs); 
military adviser to W. Averell Harriman and 
Cyrus R. Vance at the Paris peace talks on 
Vietnam; Commanding General of the 3d 
U.S. Infantry Division; U.S. Commander in 
Berlin; and adviser to U.S. Ambassador 
Kenneth Rush during the quadripartite 
negotiations in Berlin in 1971. 

In 1971 and 1972 Gen. Seignious served as 
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Se- 
curity Assistance) and Director of the De- 
fense Security Assistance Agency. From 
1972 to 1974, he was Director of the Joint 
Staff for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He retired 




from the Army in 1974. having attained the 
rank of Lieutenant General and became 
president of The Citadel. He has served as 
the "at large" member of the President's 
SALT negotiating delegation since Sep- 
tember 1977. On October 20, President Car- 
ter announced his intention to nominate Gen. 
Seignious to be the Director of the Arms 
Control and Disarmament Agency. This 
nomination requires Senate confirmation. 
The President subsequently named Gen. 
Seignious as ACDA Director under a recess 
appointment effective December 1 . 



8 

sumption is that both are interested 
in the SALT treaty and want one. 

A. Yes. 

Q. Since they're not the toughest 
issues, it's not like leaving Jerusalem 
to the end. What's the problem, 
again? Is it a political problem here? 
Is it a military problem there? 

A. I don't have any good answer. 
The issues that are left — although some 
of them are important — are not issues 
that are of basic significance to the 
strategic balance, or at least the differ- 
ence between the positions of the two 
sides is not so great as to be that im- 
portant to the strategic balance. 

One of the problems, I think, is that 
as you get down to those last few is- 
sues, both sides tend to be quite resist- 
ant. 

Q. But nobody's taken anything 
back, have they, in the course of 
these negotiations? 

A. No. 



Q. Do you have any regrets about 
the protocol now, in the sense that it 
does — whether it's a good argument 
or not — give the other side of the ar- 
gument that if, for example, the Rus- 
sians haven't reached the 2,250 level 
by 1981, or by the expiration of the 
protocol, or any of the other terms 
envisaged by the treaty, that they can 
then come to us and say, well, unless 
you extend the range limitations on 
the ground- and sea-launched mis- 
siles or on mobile ICBM's then we 
will not go ahead and complete the 
terms of the treaty. Obviously, that's 
[inaudible]. 

A. No. I don't have any such ap- 
prehensions. What you would be say- 
ing, then, if you were the Soviet side, 
is: Unless you agree to extend the term 
which has been agreed upon, I will 
violate the agreement. That's a threat 
you can always make, but it's a threat 
which is fatal to any chance of the 
agreement remaining viable. I don't 
think that anybody is going to be able 
to get anywhere with either the United 
States or the Soviet Union by saying to 
the other side: Unless you capitulate on 
something, I'm going to violate the 
treaty. It's not a plausible threat. Or 
else it's a threat which indicates that 
the treaty isn't worth having. 

Q. I get the impression from the 
discussion about the tradeoff of 
numbers of cruise missiles vis-a-vis 
replacement rights and that kind of 
thing that that's as much, at least, 
and perhaps more a matter of politi- 



cal decision than it is really one re- 
lated to the strategic objective of 
maintaining the strategic balance. Is 
that correct? 

A. As I said in answer to an earlier 
question, the difference between the 
sides, at this point, is not so great as to 
be of tremendous strategic importance. 
But at the same time, I think we have 
to recognize that cruise missiles on 
airplanes is a system that we've de- 
cided upon. It's one that we're going to 
deploy. It's one that we regard as 
necessary in order to preserve the 
manned bomber part of our deterrent. 

As a consequence, we are not pre- 
pared to accept limits that we feel are 
incompatible with doing that and doing 
it effectively. 

Q. How do you verify that a 
ground- or sea-launched cruise mis- 
sile is not dropped out of an airplane 
and tested at greater than 375 miles? 

A. It really is something of a mis- 
nomer, I think, to refer to ground- 
launched cruise missiles or sea- 
launched cruise missiles or air- 
launched missiles. They're all nothing 
but cruise missiles. And the question, 
then, is to control how you base them. 
The fundamental control is a testing 
control. 

And as long as you've got a testing 
control, then you've got some guaran- 
tee. The problem, fortunately, at the 
present time is a Soviet problem be- 
cause we're the ones who have the 
modern cruise missiles. As a conse- 
quence, I'm probably more relaxed 
about verification on cruise missiles 
than I am about things the Soviets 
presently can do. 

And it's one of the reasons why we 
felt that the restrictions on ground- 
launched cruise missiles and sea- 
launched cruise missiles ought to be 
protocol restrictions. It's one of the 
questions that's just going to have to be 
worked out. It's whether, if you have 
continuing limitations, they will be 
verifiable. Because, at some point, the 
verification problem will be ours as 
much as theirs. 



Q. I don't want you to engage in 
[inaudible] prophecy, but if you 
could give us some feeling as to how 
you feel this treaty will fare in the 
Senate — you've got a pretty good 
sense of how it's going to shape 
up — and what do you think will be 
the greatest problems with it? 

A. Of course, I probably am the 
least objective person whom you could 
ask the question as to how it's going to 
do in the Senate. It will do a lot better 



IT 

A. 
lei 
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Department of State Bullett (et 

than I did. [Laughter] But then it 
probably a worthier object. But it 
hard for me to see why anybody woul 
be against it on the merits of the treat 
itself. 

So let's deal with that first of all, bt 
cause if you look at the treaty itself, 
does set equal aggregates and, thenfeti" 
fore, complies with the Jackso 
amendment. It does provide for redut 
tions which will impact on the Sovic 
and not on us. It does provide for sue 
ceilings that will at least begin to rs 
strain what we regard as the mo 
dangerous of the strategic systems, 
will have a subceiling on MIRV'e 
ballistic missiles. And then a furtht 
lower subceiling on MIRV'ed ICBM 
It does restrain qualitative developmei 
by restrictions on new types and o 
modifications and modernization, 
does begin to offset — in fact substai 
tially offset — the greater throw-weigl 
of the Soviet missiles by the fraction; 
tion freeze. 

And it does preserve the military 0| 
tions that we have regarded as bein 
important. It does permit us to mot 
ernize each part of the strategic dete 
rent triad. Looking at just the merits ( 
the agreement, I can't see how anyboc 
can conclude that the absence of SAL 
would be better than the presence t 
SALT. 

It does begin to move toward effe i 
tive strategic arms control. So that tl 
major difficulty that SALT will ei 
counter. I think, probably will have 
do with things that are totally extrins L 
to SALT itself, and that will be the a 
mospherics. 

One of the congressional advise 
went through Geneva, I guess it w; 
sometime last summer, and I spent trl( 
day with him. He had the briefings. Hit 
met with the delegation. He met wiifb| 
the Soviet negotiators. And I said at tl 
end of the day, all right, now — tell mt| 
Senator, what's wrong with SALT 
And he said, I will tell you what th 
problems are: first, the B-l decisioi 
second, the neutron bomb decisioi 
third, the withdrawal of troops froi 
Korea; fourth, the Panama Canal; fi 
the Horn of Africa. 

And I said, well now, you and I bo 
know that none of these have anythiii| 
to do with SALT. And he said, yes, bi 
they are part of the atmospherics; the | 
are part of a situation in which it look 
to a lot of us as though the Unite 
States is on the retreat and the Soviet, 
are on the advance all over the world. 
So I think it's that kind of thing thi 
will enter into anti-SALT sentimen 
more than the merits of the agreement. 



Q. Do you think it's been a goc 



: 



jcember 1978 

lea to negotiate with Congress over 
»ur shoulder and — 

A. I think it's inevitable. Now 
(nether it's good or whether it's bad is 
nquestion of whether you're talking 
liout the convenience of the Adminis- 
Iition or whether you're talking about 
I; desirable operation of the American 
Istem. There was a time at which 
mny Senators would have assumed 
Is was not their responsibility. 

iQ. I mean, trying to get them on 
g agreement that preempts all the 
jiticism rather than getting the best 
issible agreement you can come up 
.th and selling it. In a sense, this 
is dragged out for so long because 
iu're worried about so many differ- 
lt things and so many reactions on 
te Hill that you're trying to fore- 
jise all the — 

A. I don't regard those as being dif- 
ilent objectives. It seems to me that 
lu've got to negotiate on the basis 
lit if you do the best job you can and 
§: the best treaty you can, then that's 
jing to have the best chance of being 
3:epted by the Congress. 
3 So I don't see them as being separate 
cjectives at all. If what you mean is 
I I think it's been a mistake to have 
cngressional advisers come to 
( neva, I think it's been a plus. 



Q. Do you think there's a lot of 
us control in this treaty? 

m.. Yes, I do. 



Q. This is a dangerous kind of 
cestion because it invites being 
sipped down. But could you put 
jurself in the Russian mind and try 
t describe how you think they per- 
iive this treaty? Do they think 
t;y're taking us to the cleaners in 
4; strategic balance? Are they try- 
i ; to avoid spending a lot of dough? 
I - do they perceive SALT in roughly 
ti same terms as this Administra- 
te does? 

A. I've often thought about that. 
Ihy is it that they seem to be so in- 
vested in completing the SALT 
! reement? And first — I'm sure it's 
I'jnecessary but, first — let me disclaim 
;y possibility that they could think 
f:y are taking us to the cleaners. 

I mean, after all, what they are doing 
■! agree to equal aggregates; agree that 
fcy will cut back on systems when we 
i n't have to; and agree to limitations 

lich, to a large extent, offset the ad- 

mtage that they have in throw-weight 
the ICBM's. 



Ralph Earle II was born September 26, 
1928, in Bryn Mawr, Pa. He received an 
A.B. from Harvard (1950) and an LL.B. 
from Harvard Law School ( 1955). He served 
in the U.S. Army from 1950 to 1952. 

Mr. Earle practiced law in Philadelphia 
from 1956 to 1968. In 1968 and 1969, he 
served as principal Deputy Assistant Secre- 
tary of Defense and Acting Assistant Secre- 
tary of Defense for International Security 
Affairs. He was Defense Adviser to the U.S. 
Mission to NATO (1969-72) and was a con- 
sultant for SALT in the Office of the Secre- 
tary of Defense (1972-73). He was the Arms 
Control and Disarmament Agency Represen- 
tative on the U.S. delegation to SALT from 
1973 until May 11, 1977. when he became 
alternate chairman of the U.S. delegation. 
Mr. Earle became chairman of the delega- 
tion, with the rank of Ambassador, upon the 




resignation of Paul C. Warnke on October 
31, 1978. 



So that as compared with where they 
would be without a treaty, they cer- 
tainly can't feel that they have some- 
how imposed unequal restrictions on 
us. I would much rather have my side 
of the case in presenting it to the Sen- 
ate. But it just seems to me that there 
are so many reasons why they should 
be interested in a SALT agreement 
that it doesn't surprise me that they 
are, in fact. For one thing, the eco- 
nomic argument is a much more potent 
one for them than it is for us. They've 
got fewer resources and it costs them 
more. And they have many, many more 
unmet needs than we have. 

Then there are political reasons that 1 
think are perhaps more important to 
them than they are to us. I certainly 
have the impression that they derive a 
lot of satisfaction from being seen as a 
coequal of the United States negotiat- 
ing on strategic arms and also other 
arms control matters. 

I think in terms of their perception of 
their world position that this is a factor. 
I think it's very clear that Mr. 
Brezhnev has got a heavy political in- 
vestment in SALT; after all, he was the 
one who negotiated the Vladivostok 
accord. And he still doesn't have that 
reduced to a treaty. 

I have been told repeatedly that we 
don't appreciate how much political 
blood Mr. Brezhnev had to expend at 
Vladivostok. 

Q. You were told by the Soviets 
or — 

A. Yes. Told by the Soviets. And 
then I think that also, if you look at it 
in terms of the overall military impli- 
cations, I think that they are very wor- 
ried about proliferation. And I have 
seen that throughout the comprehensive 



test ban talks, and I see it very much in 
SALT. 

And they realize that we're pretty 
much on the hook, both of us, in the 
Nonproliferation Treaty, to do some- 
thing about our own strategic arsenals. 
Look at their excitement and concern 
about the possibility of South Africa 
testing a nuclear weapon. So I think 
that they are driven to a considerable 
extent by that. 

And I think they should be; I think 
we should be. Because I can't really 
believe that the number of countries 
that are capable of building nuclear 
weapons will continue to eschew that 
possibility unless we do something 
about controlling our own. 

And then I feel genuinely that the 
prospect of an unfettered competition 
with the United States is, to them, a 
very unappetizing one. They are very 
aware of our superior technology. I 
think they feel that if everything is al- 
lowed to go totally unrestricted, they're 
going to have a hell of a time trying to 
keep up. And I think they're right. 

So I can think of a lot of reasons that 
are in their own self-interest. 

Q. [Inaudible; concerns toughest 
issues] 

A. I would say a couple of them 
were tougher than any that we've got 
left. One of them was the entire busi- 
ness of the MIRV launcher-type 
counting rule. You know, what we had 
been pushing for a long time was the 
idea that there had to be a rule in which 
anything that looked like the launcher 
of a MIRV'ed missile would count. 

And they had agreed to the MIRV- 
type rule under which if a missile was 
of a type that had ever been tested with 
MIRV's, it counted as a MIRV'ed mis- 



10 



sile. But they were not willing, until 
September of 1977, to accept the idea 
that a launcher that looked like a 
launcher that had ever launched or 
contained a missile of a type that had 
ever been tested with MIRV's would 
count as the launcher of a MIRV'ed 
missile. And that, I think, was a fairly 
major step. 

Another one was the business of how 
you were going to count heavy 
bombers with cruise missiles. Re- 
member, that was the issue as to 
whether or not they would count 
against the MIRV ceiling. 

Q. [Inaudible] that's still a major 
question; how many? 

A. No. A different question. At that 
point, they were arguing that a' heavy 
bomber with long-range cruise missiles 
would count as if it were a MIRV'ed 
ballistic missile launcher. 

And that was a very important issue 
for us because if we had then gone 
ahead with the upgrading of our 
strategic bombers, it would have 
counted against our entitlement of 
MIRV'ed ballistic missiles. So that, 
again, was a very major agreement. 
Those were two of the principal ones. 

Q. [Inaudible; concerns SALT III] 

A. As far as the timing of SALT III 
is concerned, I think that that's pretty 
much agreed by both sides that we will 
do that promptly after the completion 
of SALT II. And I think we should. It's 
hard to see what kind of form SALT III 
will take. 

It will be very different from SALT 
II because you won't have to go 
through all of the basics. In SALT II, 
you had to negotiate all of the boiler- 
plate of a treaty — the definitions, the 
question of the verification rules, a lot 
of things that won't have to be re- 
negotiated. 

In a sense, you could visualize 
SALT III as sort of a series of amend- 
ments of SALT II. You could take a 
particular package of amendments and 
try and negotiate them. But this is 
something, obviously, that we're going 
to have to feel our way toward. 

As far as Gromyko's comments are 
concerned, all I can think of that he 
may have been referring to is that they 
have pushed for a long time, of course, 
to include our forward-based systems 
and the nuclear forces of allied states 
as part of SALT. 

Now that's the basic dichotomy be- 
tween the definitions of strategic 
weapons, with our maintaining that 
strategic weapons are those that can be 
launched from one country and strike 



Department of State Bullet 



(( 



the other country, whereas they main- 
tain that any weapons that can strike 
the territory of the other country ought 
to be counted as strategic. 

That's what they yielded in Vlad- 
ivostok. That was the fundamental 
breakthrough that President Ford ac- 
complished. But they have made it very 
clear always that they would try and 
raise forward-based systems and the 
forces of the other side as part of SALT 
111. 

We have made it equally clear that 
we aren't prepared now to concede that 
these would be relevant to a SALT 
agreement. And if they were, in fact, 
to be involved — that is, the forward- 
based systems — then we would be pre- 
pared to discuss that issue only in con- 
junction with a discussion of theater 
nuclear forces on both sides. 

We've also made it clear that, as far 
as we're concerned, SALT is bilateral. 
And, therefore, the forces of other 
countries aren't relevant to the issue. 
But I have no doubt that they will con- 
tinue to push their position, and I think 
that's what Mr. Gromyko meant. 



Q. Do you have any thoughts on 
the splitting of your hats once again? 

A. Gee. That's an unprepossessing 
metaphor. I hope my head wasn't in it. 

Q. And having a military man in 
charge of the Agency? 

A. Let me address both of those 
questions. I felt, when I took this job, 
that it was very important that the di- 
rector of ACDA be the chief negotiator 
of SALT. I felt that way because it 
seemed to me that ACDA had to be in 
the principal arms control action. 

And that if you just had the director- 
ship, you would be in a position in 
which you were almost a kind of an 
arms control policy planner. But you 
didn't have any piece of the actual op- 
erational business. Because of the fact 
that I've had both jobs, I don't think 
that it's as important for somebody to 
have both jobs in the future. 

And in addition to that, as you prob- 
ably know, in the Arms Control Act, 
we were able to get an amendment 
through back in 1977 to set up a posi- 
tion of Special Negotiator for Arms 
Control, which is the statutory position 
that Ralph Earle holds. 

So that the structural relationship of 
ACDA to SALT is now very well es- 
tablished. As a consequence, I don't 
really worry about the fact that the job 
has been split. As a matter of fact, as a 
practical matter, it's been split for 
some time, as you very well know. 



Most of the time, Ralph has been 
charge of the actual day-to-day nego' 
ations. And I've either been here or 
Geneva or elsewhere engaged in oth 
arms control negotiations. 

As far as having a military man, n 
feeling on that is it depends on tl 
military man. 

I don't think that either race, se 
previous condition of servitude, 
what your professional background h 
been ought to be a disqualificatii 
from holding a high office in the A 
ministration. And this is a very got 
General. This is a guy who has demo 
strated his sympathy for arms conti 
principles. 

Again, I'm quite biased because 
was at my request that the Preside 
appointed him as the at-large delegi 
at the SALT talks. And I did so b 
cause I knew him and knew his repui 
tion. So that I think that he is abu 
dantly qualified for the job. 

Q. More on the military — ai 
putting the negotiations with tl 
Soviets aside for a second — what h 
it been like to negotiate within t 
Administration? How has your o\ 
position stood up in these contest 
And how have you done with t 
Pentagon and other places aroui 
Washington? 

A. I think I've done pretty well. I s 
as well as I would have liked to ha 
done. But I would say that the voice 
ACDA has been heard and that we' 
won our share of arguments. 

Q. What kind of struggle is 
though? And is it a real one? 

A. It's the kind of struggle y 
would anticipate. You've got, after a 
a situation in which the SALT positio 
are established by a total interagen 
process, which is the way it should b 
You can't expect when you sit in 
NSC [National Security Council] su 
committee meeting that you're going 
find a total congruity of views amo 
the Secretary of State, the Secretary 
Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiel 
Director of Central Intelligence, a: 
me. 

So that you do have a lot of debate 
But I think that's both natural and, 
think, entirely healthy. And 1 think y< 
end up with a better product as a resu 
I've had the distinct advantage of ha 
ing known a lot of the people who a 
involved in the process for a number 
years. After all, I worked with ( 
Vance and Harold Brown in the Pent 
gon back a decade and more ago. Ai 
that relationship has, I think, been n 
only something that has made my j< 
more pleasant but has also enabled 



id 



ro 
eat 

ml 
ml 

I 

IK 

ic 

k 

IN 

ft: 



\\ 



v 



kember 1978 

talk on a very frank and candid, 
sis and to resolve a lot of differ- 
es that might otherwise have been 
source of irritation. I think that 
t's worked pretty well. I don't really 
lilt the process. I think that the prod- 
It has been a good one. But even if it 
iren't, I couldn't blame the process, 
•cause it does seem to me that this is 
jmething which does require the sort 
consensus positions that can be ar- 
ed at only by a total interagency 
cess. 



Q. Going back to ratification — 
laving out atmospherics — could 
Jur foresee how Jackson and com- 
lny could get a hold, a lever on the 
Eaty itself, with respect to equal 
ijgregates? 

A. With respect to equal aggregates'.' 

Q. With respect to the measured 
inferences within the treaty. 

A. If you mean compliance with the 

:kson amendment, the Vladivostok 

cords established that. You re- 

;mber the big argument then was 

^liether or not we ought to yield the 

linciple of equal aggregates of 

'iercontinental-range systems. 

We have that, so that that's been 
I isfied. The only other argument that 
Jybody could make is that they are 
: 1 1 with an advantage in throw- weight 
I the ICBM's. But that's not the result 
( SALT; that's a result of the fact that 
I did not elect to build the very large 
I BM's and still haven't. 

Q. Throw-weight is much more — 

..A. But, as I say, they can't blame 
lit on SALT. And without SALT, the 
Irow-weight disparity would be 
.|;ater because of the fact that they 
|)uld not be limited to the present 
Imber of heavy ICBM's. But if you 
:|Dk at our 1CBM force structure, we 
l.ven't even matched the SS-19, 
Jiich is classified as a light ICBM. 
;, And it's because of the fact that, for 
Ime reason — I think probably for a 
ijiod reason — our military planners did 
|>t feel that this was a prudent expen- 
Iture of resources. So I can't see how 
liy argument could be made that 
ij\LT II somehow does not comply 
Sith the principles of equality. It does. 



{ Q. Semenov was in the job for 9 
;ars. 

; A. Yes. 

Q. And you've been in the job for 
hat — almost 2 years? 



11 



A. Yes. 

Q. You took it rather reluctantly, 
as I recall. 

A. Grew to love it, though. 

Q. Was it worth it? And what do 
you feel you achieved? 

A. There are two ways of looking at 
that question. One personal and one 
from the standpoint of accomplish- 
ment. From the personal standpoint, it 
certainly has been worthwhile. I've 
enjoyed it. I've found dealing with the 
Russians to be fascinating. I've found 
the subject matter to be of great inter- 
est. I've always had an interest in 
strategic arms. 

It's been very rewarding also be- 
cause of the tremendous support that 
I've received, particularly from Secre- 
tary Vance and from President Carter. 
And that is always, of course, some- 
thing that leads you to feel that you've 
had a unique experience. 

From the standpoint of accomplish- 
ment, I would like to think that the 
treaty is a little better because I've 
been a participant. I can't prove that, 
but I shall continue to think so. I think 
also that I've been head of the ACDA 
at a point at which we've been able to 
give the Agency, perhaps, more weight 
and brought it closer to fulfilling its 
statutory responsibilities. 

I don't take credit for that myself but 
attribute it to the fact that I was there at 
a time in which we had an Administra- 
tion which placed arms control very 
high on the agenda of priority items. 
And I think that President Carter's rec- 
ord in that respect is really a distin- 
guished one. 

It's one of the difficulties we had at 
the Special Session on Disarmament 
back last May and June. You know, we 
tried to think of things that we ought to 
come out for. And the real problem 
was that we were doing most of them. 
And, as a consequence, in order to 
come out with anything that looked 
dramatic, it would have been quite 
gimmicky. 

But after all, the President not only 
is going ahead with SALT, and has 
tried very hard to make major strides 
toward an effective strategic nuclear 
arms control, but also he has, for the 
first time since 1963, really genuinely 
tried to reach a comprehensive test ban. 

We've got the antisatellite talks 
going. We would have gotten further 
on Indian Ocean stabilization if it had 
not been for the developments in the 
Horn of Africa. The conventional arms 
transfer talks have proven to be much 



BACKGROUND 
INFORMATION ON SALT 

SALT I agreements (Treaty on the Lim- 
itation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Sys- 
tems and Interim Agreement on the 
Limitation of Strategic Offensive 
Arms). Bulletin of June 26, 1972, p. 
918. 
"Soviet Civil Defense." Report released 
by the CIA in July 1978 and printed by 
the Department of State as Special Re- 
port No. 47, Sept. 1978.* 
"The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks." 
Department of State Special Report 
No. 46. July 1978.* 
"Compliance With the SALT I Agree- 
ments " Administration report released 
by the Department of State and the 
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 
in Feb. 1978 and published in the 
Bulletin of Apr. 1978, p. 10. 

"Verification of the Proposed SALT II 
Agreement " Administration report 
released by the Senate Committee on 
Foreign Relations in Feb. 1978 and 
published in the Bulletin of Apr. 
1978, p. 15. 

"The SALT Process." Pamphlet released 
by the Department of State, June 
1978.* 

"Arms Control and National Security." 
Address by Secretary Vance on Apr. 
10, 1978. Bulletin of May 1978, 
p. 20. 

"Key Features of the SALT II Negotia- 
tions." Remarks by Paul C. Warnke on 
June 2, 1978.** 

"The United States and the Soviet 
Union." Address by President Carter 
on June 7, 1978. Bulletin of July 
1978, p. 14. 

"SALT II — The Home Stretch." Ad- 
dress by Paul C. Warnke on Aug. 23, 
1978. Bulletin of Oct. 1978, p. 17. 

"U.S. and Soviet Strategic Capability 
Through the Mid- 1 980 's." ACDA re- 
port of Aug. 1978. Bulletin of Oct. 
1978, p. 24. 

"SALT — The Alternative is Unaccept- 
able." Address by Paul C. Warnke on 
Sept. 12, 1978.** 

"Strengthening U.S. Security Through 
SALT." Address by Paul C. Warnke 
on Sept. 15, 1978.** 



* Single copies are available from the 
Correspondence Management Division, 
Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of 
State, Washington, D.C. 20520. 

** Copies are available from the Public 
Affairs Office, Arms Control and Disar- 
mament Agency, Washington, D.C. 
20451. 



12 



Department of State Bulleti, v 



THE PRESIDENT: 

The United States and 
its Eeonomie Responsibilities 



Remarks at the opening session of 
the 26th World Conference of the In- 
ternational Chamber of Commerce in 
Orlando, Florida, on October 1, 
197X. 1 

We meet at an unusual time in our 
world's history. It's a moment of rela- 
tive calm. We are more or less free of 
overt, international warfare, more or 
less free of the severe dislocations that 
have disrupted our economies in the 
past. Yet, in this moment, we must 
face the deeper problems of humanity. 
None of us can ignore hunger, although 
we may never personally experience 
hunger. We cannot ignore the problems 
of overpopulation or the unequal divi- 
sion of the world's goods, even though 
we might obviously have gotten and 
retained more than our share. 

We've all learned that in an interde- 
pendent world, we can only advance 
when we advance together. As human 
beings, our sense of mercy and justice 
is offended when injustice so freely 
reigns. 

It's in this time of relative calm that 
we can assess our reasons, weigh our 
obligations, and decide how best to 
exert and apply our efforts to these 
great obligations that you and I face to- 
gether as leaders. 

The Cause of Peace 

There is one responsibility that 
transcends all others, and that is the 
cause of peace. Leaders often underes- 
timate the wisdom of our people and 
how much our people desire peace. 

We saw a dramatic demonstration of 



this recently. Almost a year ago, when 
two brave leaders — President Sadat 
and Prime Minister Begin — took the 
first long step toward peace, their 
people rejoiced on the streets. Where 
they expected hatred, there was ob- 
vious demonstration of friendship and 
even love. Where they expected dis- 
pleasure or condemnation, there was 
overwhelming rejoicing. 

My belief is that the great hunger for 
a peaceful world imposes on us the ob- 
ligation to use the resources we control 
constructively, to use them to minimize 
frictions that can lead to war. And my 
belief is that the people of other 
neighboring countries, even in the 
Middle East, also equally yearn for 
peace, even though some leaders may 
not yet recognize this fact. 

As the leader of my own govern- 
ment, there is no responsibility that I 
take more seriously. It guides every 
decision I make about our nation's de- 
fense forces. For I know that our un- 
questioned strength is the surest 
guarantee for liberty for ourselves and 
perhaps even stability and security in 
the world. 

But I also know that the pursuit of 
military strength alone is not enough. 
We must have the confidence and the 
courage to pursue every avenue for 
peace and to realize that this pursuit is 
not a sign of weakness. That is why 
Secretary Vance and I have just spent 
long hours, even yesterday, with 
Foreign Minister Gromyko, negotiating 
in earnest hope of an early agreement 
on a strategic arms limitation treaty 
between our countries. 

But government does not bear the 



Wamke (Cont'd) 

more of a seminal event than would 
have been thought at the time that we 
started the bilaterals. 

We are making progress on restric- 
tions on chemical warfare and 
radiological warfare. We are going to 
have a second set of talks to prevent 
the development and retention of an 
antisatellite capability. It's awfully 
hard for me to see what particular field 
of arms control we have not initiated 
discussions in and aren't making prog- 
ress in. 



As a consequence, looking back at 
my time, I would have to feel that I 
was in the fortunate position of being 
head of the Agency and chief SALT 
negotiator at a time at which this was 
an important part of overall American 
foreign policy. I don't take credit for 
it, but I'm grateful for it. □ 



sole responsibility for peace. Through goi 
out history, the forces that can unite u 
also have often driven us apart. Ideol » 
ogy, religion, allegiance to nation; 
soil — all have the power to bring wt 
among peoples or to enable them t 
find peace and concord. 

This audience possesses another sue 
powerful force. Within this centur 
we've seen narrow economic interest ^ 
cause the friction that led to devastai 
ing wars. But we've seen the sanr 
economic forces lift humanity abov 
the bitterest previous divisions. 

Most of us here can remember tfr 
days when the United States was er 
gaged in total war against Germany an 
Japan, countries that are now ou 
closest allies. Largely through th 
bonds of trade and commerce, thes 
nations have become our partners i 
seeking a prosperous global future. 

I've often wondered what woul 
have happened if we had the sarni 
bonds of trade and commerce befoi 
1939 or before 1941. That's why I'i 
such a staunch advocate of glob; 
commerce. That's why I'm determine 
to increase substantially U.S. trac 
with other nations, including the Sovic 
Union and the People's Republic < 
China. 

I will not compromise, of coursi 
our nation's security nor that of our a> 
lies, but I believe that fruitful ecc 
nomic relationships can advance tr 
security of all peoples on Earth. 

Let me repeat that governments cai 
not achieve this goal alone. Evei 
company, every corporation, even 
economic leader involved in intern; 
tional commerce can aggravate tensiot 
by encouraging protectionism, by se 
ting nation against nation and ric 
against poor, or it can work to ove - 
come and to prevent these same negi 
tive forces. 

That responsibility weighs heavil 
on all of us who are in positions c 
privilege. We know that if power ( 
profit is pursued for itself, and nothin 
more, that we are not worthy of ou 
gifts, but more importantly, our worl 
will suffer. Without leaders of visior 
we can never solve the problems th; 
most sorely afflict us and those th; 
threaten us even more in the future. 



Text from AC DA press release 23 of Nov. I, 
I97H; the full text may be obtained from Office 
of Public Affairs, Arms Control and Disarma- 
ment Agency, Washington, DC. 20-151. 



Social Justice 

There is another responsibility that i 
imposed upon us, that of simpl 
justice — justice among nations of th 
world, justice among the people! 
within each nation. 

It's not too much to believe that al 
people should have an equal opportu 
nity to enjoy life's rewards, whethe 
they were born in a poor country or 
rich one, whether they were raised tr 



In 



" 



December 1978 



13 



)or parents or by those of wealth. 
The world's governments have a re- 
lonsibility to pursue social justice. In 
e United States we've increased our 
reign aid appropriations and raised a 
rong voice on behalf of human rights. 
)litical rights, social rights, economic 
ghts in our own country and through- 
it the world. We recognize that trade 
id free economies also offer a good 
>pe of improving living standards and 
better chance of protecting individual 
sedoms in the broadest definition of 
e word "freedom." 

conomic Justice 

It's very important that we all work 
bring all nations of the world, espe- 
ally the Eastern nations, the members 
the Organization of Petroleum Ex- 
iting Countries, and the undeve- 
loped nations, more closely into the 
arid financial and economic organi- 
tions, like the International Monetary 
ind, the World Bank, regional banks, 
d others. To meet our own respon- 
lilities, we're expanding our exports, 
staining our economic growth at the 
te which permits us to buy from other 
tions, and taking tough but sensible 
:ps to preserve the value of the dollar 
a reserve currency. 
These actions will help to distribute 
e world's wealth more equitably in 
e future. But I know as well that you 
present multinational companies; 
ime of you can often do more than 
'vernments to determine how fairly 
I; world's rewards are shared. 

The International Chamber deserves 
leat credit for the contributions that 
; u've made, for the ethical code you 
j veloped, for your work with the 
hited Nations, and your many other 
jogressive and admirable acts. Or- 
j nizations like your own and the com- 
Inies your members represent have 
lought the benefits of trade, technol- 
l;y, education, and medicine to parts 
I the world that had been too long 
« thout them. 

i But you realized as well as I how 

Iten a few corporate leaders have been 

jiown to exploit weak nations, to 

(•use poor and inarticulate workers, to 

llerate racism, and often to overlook 

n^ibery, payoffs, and corruption by 

(justed employees. You know how 

k|ten some have been unworthy of the 

.eat power and influence they possess. 

:nd you know as well as I that power 

1 ng abused cannot be maintained. It 

nnot be maintained, not only because 

I's wrong but because it defies the 

storical trend of our times. 

[For the past few decades, nation- 

lism was a vision which inspired and 

,'oved people around the world to 

eate a nation that was independent. 



no matter how small or weak it may 
have been. Now that revolution, 
nationalism, has largely been com- 
pleted. And other goals are 
emerging — goals of justice, equity, 
human rights, and freedom. 

These are the wave of the present 
and the wave of the future. We should 
not fight this wave. We should ride it, 
be part of it, encourage it, let it nurture 
a better life for those who yearn and for 
those of us who already enjoy. If we 
can marshal our resources in the cause 
of right, if we can pursue peace and 
justice as energetically as we pursue 



Foreign Oil. The second step is to 
reduce our dependence on foreign oil. 
We are on the verge of enacting a com- 
prehensive energy program — I predict 
that it will be done before the Congress 
adjourns — which will increase our 
domestic production, shift to more 
plentiful supplies of fuel, and reduce 
the waste of all forms of energy in our 
country. 

Energy is a worldwide problem, and 
our responsibilities extend far beyond 
our own borders. We will never at- 
tempt to obstruct exploration and the 
development of worldwide energy re- 



Every company, every corporation, every economic leader involved in 
international commerce can aggravate tensions by encouraging pro- 
tectionism, by setting nation against nation and rich against poor, or it 
can work to overcome and to protect these same negative forces. 



power and profit, then we can achieve 
these goals and in the process win the 
fight against our other modern evils, 
such as international terrorism, which 
threaten many of us. 

These are all shared responsibilities, 
ones you must take as seriously as I. 
But there are some very specific re- 
sponsibilities of the U.S. Government 
which I would like to mention briefly 
here this evening, because they affect 
everyone here and those you represent 
back home. 

Economic Stability 

The United States has a responsibil- 
ity to contribute to global economic 
stability and well-being. There are 
three important steps our nation is tak- 
ing, based on the commitments I made 
2 months ago in Bonn. 

Inflation. The first is to reduce in- 
flation. I will soon announce a tough 
new program designed to bring infla- 
tion under control. We've already acted 
to make sure that the government sets 
an example, cutting unnecessary 
spending, reducing Federal pay in- 
creases, removing unnecessary regula- 
tions, cutting the Federal deficit, and 
letting the free market set prices 
wherever it can. 

We've tried a quick experiment re- 
lating to the international and domestic 
airlines. Fares have been drastically re- 
duced. The number of passengers has 
been greatly increased. The profits of 
the airlines have also grown. Soon I 
will ask for an expanded anti-inflation 
program with balanced and reasonable 
sacrifices from business, labor, and 
every other segment of our economy, 
along with government. 



sources. Our great technology is avail- 
able for others to use. 



Trade and Investment. The third 
pledge we made at Bonn was to expand 
our exports and to broaden world trade 
and investment, and I might add, while 
discouraging the excessive speculation 
in currencies that unsettles foreign ex- 
change markets. We will expand our 
exports to get our current account defi- 
cit under control. 

Recent statistics are encouraging. 
And factors that have already come 
into existence will enhance this trend in 
the coming months. The rate of growth 
of our nation is now much more in 
phase with the rate of growth of our 
trade partners. A lower valued dollar 
will make our own products more at- 
tractive. And controlling inflation in 
our country, minimizing the imports of 
oil over a period of time, will help to 
expand our exports as contrasted with 
our imports. 

U.S. trade relationships and export 
performance are not just a domestic 
concern. As our trade encourages 
peace, our export growth will spur the 
world economy. 

U.S. food production is a great 
world resource, and more stable stor- 
age and supplies will increase agricul- 
tural exports at more predictable and 
reasonable prices to help feed the hun- 
gry people of the world. It also reduces 
our trade deficit, which in turn 
strengthens the dollar. 

We accept and will honor the re- 
sponsibilities that go with the dollar's 
role as an international reserve of cur- 
rency. Our present policies are de- 
signed to fight inflation and achieve 
that goal, and I have no doubt that the 



14 

dollar will rise in response to its fun- 
damental value and the emerging eco- 
nomic trends which I have just de- 
scribed. Stable, noninflationary growth 
enables public and private institutions 
to meet their obligations to the poor 
two-thirds of the world. 

We must do more to help these 
countries by trade, by aid, by other 
measures. Private enterprise has a large 
responsibility here. World prosperity 
depends at least as much on the 
wisdom and foresight of private busi- 
ness leaders as on the good sense of 
government. 

I described the steps the U.S. Gov- 
ernment is taking, not because they 



/ believe . . . that the best way 
to achieve the world we seek is 
through a free political and eco- 
nomic system. 



will solve all our problems — because 
they won't — nor because they are un- 
usually brave ones — because they are 
not. I mention them as an indication of 
how deeply I believe my nation has a 
responsibility in the world. 

Each of these steps involves some 
sacrifice for the American public. In 
many cases they require deferral of goals 
we would prefer to pursue. But the 
American public is ready to meet this 
challenge. I have no doubt about that. I 
think my nation has come to the recog- 
nition that only through vision, ac- 
commodation, and occasional sacrifice 
can we be worthy of our privilege; that 
only by fulfilling our obligations can 
we win many of the rewards that are 
truly worth possessing. 

I believe, as 1 know you do, that the 
best way to achieve the world we seek 
is through a free political and economic 
system. This means a political system 
in which governments answer for their 
actions to their people. It means an 
economic system in which resources 
are allocated as much as possible by 
private, not government, decisions. 

I believe in a free market system. I 
prospered in it, as a businessman. I 
know it's the best route for progress for 
all. But here, again, it would be a 
mistake to blame government for pro- 
tectionist decisions. Hardly a week 
goes by that I don't have some very 
conservative businessman or a group of 
businessmen come to me to ask for 
government protection of his own 
interests, at the same time deploring 
protectionism for all others. 



Department of State Bulletin 






Interview for 
"Bill Moyers 9 Journal" (Excerpts) 



Am 



President Carter held an interview 
with Bill Movers in the Oval Office on 
November 13, 1978, for broadcast 
later that evening on the Public Broad- 
casting System. ' 



Q. What do you think the Soviets 
are up to? Do you see them as 
primarily a defensive power seeking 
to solidify their own position in the 
world, or do you see them as an ag- 
gressive power, seeking to enlarge 
their position in the world? 

A. To be perhaps excessively gener- 
ous, but not too far off the mark, I 
think, first of all, they want peace and 
security for their own people, and they 
undoubtedly exaggerate any apparent 
threat to themselves and have to, to be 
sure that they are able to protect them- 
selves. At the same time, as is the case 
with us, they would like to expand 
their influence among other people in 
the world, believing that their system 
of government, their philosophy, is 
the best. 

This means that we have to plan in 
the future in the presence of peace be- 
tween us to be competitive with them 
and able to compete both aggressively 
and successfully. 

But I would say that those are their 
two basic motives as is the case with 
us — security for themselves and to 
have their own influence felt in the rest 
of the world as much as possible. 

Q. There is a school of thought 
which says that their aim is to 
achieve superiority over us in both 
conventional and strategic weapons 



and that we must, therefore, not set- 
tle to be equal with them but to have 
superiority over them. These are the 
hard choices you're talking about 
Where do you come out in that 
debate? 



A. They will never be superior to us 
in national strength nor overall military 
strength. We are by far the strongei 
nation economically. Our productivity i 
capacity is superior and I think always 
will be. 

We've got a vibrant, dynamic social 
and political system based on freedom, 
individuality, and a common purpose 
that's engendered from the desire oil 
our own people, not imposed from: 
above by an autocratic government. I 
think our absence of desire to control 
other people around the world gives us< 
a competitive advantage once a new 
government is established or as thejj 
search about for friends. We are bettei 
trusted than the Soviet Union. The» 
spend more than twice as much of theii 
gross national product on military 
matters, but we are still much stronger 
and we will always be stronger thar 
they are at least in our lifetimes. 

We are surrounded by friends anc; 
allies; Canada in the north, Mexico in 
the south, two open and accessible 
oceans on the east and west. The 
Soviets, when looked at from the 
perspective of the Kremlin, are faced 
with almost a billion Chinese who have 
a strong animosity and distrust toward 
the Soviets. Toward the west, in East- 
ern Europe, their allies and friends 
can't be depended on nearly so strongly 
as our own. They have a difficult 
chance to have access to the oceans in 



ei 

up 
1 

nl 

ID 

III 

ft! 

I 



)ll 



"I 



In choosing the theme for your 26th 
conference — "Enterprise, Freedom, 
and the Future"— the International 
Chamber has recognized the essential 
linkage between free people, free na- 
tions, and free enterprise. Our future 
course will be determined by our abil- 
ity to sustain these freedoms. We must 
meet our responsibilities to others, to 
keep and enhance these freedoms 
which we cherish. Any abuses of our 
power and influence will lead to inter- 
national constraints and controls and a 
lack of freedom. 

Peace and freedom are our first 
priorities. So long as we have a free 
play of ideas and information, so long 



-■ 



k 



as we maintain a climate that stimulates 
invention, innovation, competition, our 
public and private institutions will have 
the intellectual ferment and the tech- 
nological progress we need to produce 
social and economic progress. I know 
the deliberations that follow here in 
Florida will be stimulating and produc- 
tive. And I'm sure that you will leave 
Disney World ready to launch a new 
assault on the problems that command 
our future attention. □ 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of Presi- 
dential Documents of Oct. 9, 1 978 (opening 
paragraphs omitted). 



:ember 1978 



15 



unrestricted fashion; their climate is 

t as good as ours; their lands are not 

productive. 

^nd so I think that in any sort of 

:sent or future challenge from the 

viet Union, our nation stacks up very 

11, and 1 thank God for it. 

Q. But do you think the number 

mentality which you hear many 

»ple espouse is a healthy mental- 

? Is the whole question of being 

mber one, one that can ever result 

lanything but an increasing escala- 

In of tensions and increasing arms 

Denditures? 

V. In nuclear weapons, which is, 
i know, where our competition with 
Soviets is most direct, we've both 
epted the concept of rough equiva- 
cy; that is, we are just about equal. 
;y have heavier warheads; we have 
re of them. We have three different 
terns for delivery of warheads — if 
ever need to, and I don't think we 
r will have to — that are mutually 
portive. We have a much higher de- 
oped electronics technology; our 
veillance systems are probably as 
>d or better than theirs. 
)ur submarines are quieter than 
Itirs. We've got an advantage in 
{) ing a tremendous reservoir of a free 
a;rprise business system that can be 
jnvative and aggressive. We have a 
l:h closer correlation between the 
eduction of civilian or peaceful 
^ ds on the one hand and military on 
h other. 

o I think that in the case of nuclear 
l/upons, we have an equivalency with 
hn. and they recognize it, and vice 
■a. 

ioth of us realize that no one can 
jick the other with impunity. We can 
§3rb, even if we had to, an attack by 
ij Soviets and still destroy their 
sentry, and they know it, and vice 
la. 

o I think that the horrible threat of 
»:ty of mutual destruction will pre- 
*.t an attack being launched. We 
I 't intend to evolve, and neither do 
ill Soviets intend to evolve, a capacity 
lalestroy the other nation without our- 
■ves being destroyed by nuclear 
"c;es. 

n the case of land weapons, as I said 
lore, the Soviets have vulnerable 
taders. They have neighbors whom 
•y can't trust as well as we, and they 
Be even in the nuclear field three 
■er nuclear powers which are poten- 
m adversaries in case of a crisis — the 
■ inese, the British, and the 
!(nch — in addition to ourselves. We 
■i't have any of those as potential ad- 
wsaries for us. 
iut I think for any nation to have a 



macho attitude, that we're going to be 
so powerful that we can dominate or 
destroy the other nation would be 
counterproductive, and I don't think 
that even if we wanted to do that, 
either we or the Soviets could have that 
capability. 

Q. Let me apply the multiple 
choice difficult options equation to a 
couple of other contemporary and 
very live issues. One is Iran. What 
are the options facing you there? 

A. We look on the Shah, as you 
know, as a friend, a loyal ally, and the 
good relationship that Iran has had and 
has now with ourselves and with the 
other democracies in the world, the 
Western powers, as being very con- 
structive and valuable. Also, having a 
strong and independent Iran in that area 
is a very stabilizing factor, and we 
would hate to see it disrupted by vio- 
lence and the government fall with an 
unpredictable result. The Shah has 
been primarily criticized within Iran 
because he has tried to democratize the 
country and because he's instituted so- 
cial reforms in a very rapid fashion. 

Some of his domestic adversaries 
either disagree with the way he's done 
it, or think he hasn't moved fast 
enough, or too fast, and deplore his 
breaking of ancient religious and social 
customs, as Iran has become modern. 

Q. But he was also criticized for 
running a police state — political 
prisoners — 

A. That's exactly right. I think the 
Shah has had that criticism, sometimes 
perhaps justified — I don't know the 
details of it. But I think there's no 
doubt that Iran has made great social 
progress and has moved toward a freer 
expression of people. Even in recent 
months, for instance, the Shah has au- 
thorized or directed, I guess, the Parlia- 
ment to have all of its deliberations 
open and televised, something that we 
don't even do in our country here. 

Q. You think this is all too late? 

A. I hope not. I don't know what 
will come eventually. I would hope 
that a coalition government could be 
formed rapidly. At the present time, 
there's a quasimilitary government. 
The Shah has reconfirmed his commit- 
ment to have open and democratic 
elections, maybe within 6 months or 8 
months. I hope that would be possible. 

Our inclination is for the Iranian 
people to have a clear expression of 
their own views and to have a govern- 
ment intact in Iran that accurately ex- 
presses a majority view in Iran. 

Q. But can we do anything to en- 
courage that, or are our hands tied? 



A. No, we don't try to interfere in 
the internal affairs of Iran. 

Q. We did put the Shah in, but 
you're saying we can't keep him in. 

A. I think that's a decision to be 
made by the people of that country. 

Q. Does it hurt you sometimes to 
have to sit back and do nothing when 
you know there are large stakes in a 
part of the world beyond your influ- 
ence? 

A. We don't have any inclination to 
be involved in the internal affairs of 
another country unless our own secu- 
rity should be directly threatened, and 
that's a philosophy that I have es- 
poused ever since I've been in the na- 
tional political realm. 

I just think we've learned our lessons 
the hard way in Vietnam and in other 
instances, and we've tried to be loyal 
to our allies and loyal to our friends, to 
encourage one-person, one-vote, 
majority rule, the democratic proc- 
esses, the protection of human rights. 

Obviously, we have not always suc- 
ceeded in encouraging other people to 
measure up to our own standards, but I 
think we've been consistent in our ef- 
fort. 

Q. But this is, again, where some 
criticism arises in some circles in this 
country who say the Soviets have a 
stake in what happens in Iran, and 
they are free to move clandestinely or 
any other way that they wish; but if 
we take the position that you're es- 
pousing we'll sit back and do nothing 
when we should be in there covertly 
or clandestinely or overtly taking a 
tough stand saying that we may not 
like the Shah but we need him in 
power. You're saying that day is 
over, that we cannot do that. 

A. No, we have made it clear 
through my own public statements and 
those of Secretary Vance that we sup- 
port the Shah and support the present 
government, recognizing that we don't 
have any control over the decisions ul- 
timately made by the Iranian people 
and the stability of that region; the ab- 
sence of the success of terrorism, of 
violence, the anarchy that might come 
with the complete disruption of their 
government is a threat to peace. 

We don't have any evidence that the 
Soviets, for instance, are trying to 
disrupt the existing government struc- 
ture in Iran nor that they are a source of 
violence in Iran. I think they 
recognize — they have a very long 
mutual border with Iran, and a stable 
government there no matter who its 
leaders might be is valuable to them. 

This might change. If it becomes ob- 



16 



vious that the Shah is very vulnerable 
and that other forces might come into 
power, the Soviets might change their 
obvious posture. But that's the obser- 
vation that we have now. 

Q. What about the Middle East? 

A. I have put hundreds of hours in 
both preparation and direct negotiation 
with the leaders in the Middle East, 
particularly Egypt and Israel. And 
Secretary Vance, even to the extent of 
abandoning some of his other respon- 
sibilities in foreign affairs, has tried to 
bring about a successful conclusion of 
the peace treaty negotiations. 

There, again, we don't have any au- 
thority over anyone else. We can't use 
pressure to make the Israelis and 
Egyptians come to a peaceful settle- 
ment of the disputes that have divided 
them. 

The Camp David framework, which 
was almost miraculous in its 
conclusion — it seems more miraculous 
in retrospect than it did at the time — is 
a sound basis for peace between Egypt 
and Israel. 2 There's no doubt that both 
nations would be highly benefited by 
peace. 

Q. But yet the talks seem to be at 
an impasse as of tonight. 

A. The present disagreements, com- 
pared to the benefits to be derived, are 
relatively insignificant. The benefits 
are so overwhelming in comparison 
with the differences that I hope that the 
Egyptians and Israelis will move to- 
ward peace. 

Q. What's holding it up tonight? 

A. At Camp David it was a 
framework, it was an outline that had a 
lot of substance to it. But it required 
negotiation of details and specifics, and 
there is no way that you could have a 
peace treaty with all of the ends tied 
down and all of the detailed agreements 
reached, the maps drawn, the lines de- 
lineated, time schedules agreed without 
going far beyond what the Camp David 
outline required. 

And so both sides have demanded 
from the others additional assurances 
far above and beyond what Camp 
David said specifically. This is inher- 
ent in the process. And I think in some 
cases, in many cases, the two govern- 
ments have reached agreement fairly 
well. 

Now I don't know what's going to 
happen. We hope that they will con- 
tinue to work in reaching agreement, to 
understand one another, to balance the 
consequences of failure against the 
benefits to be derived from the success 
and be flexible on both sides. 

These are ancient arguments, histori- 



cal distrusts, not easy to overcome, and 
the frustrating part about it is that we 
are involved in the negotiations, but we 
can't make Israel accept the Egyptians' 
demands, nor vice versa. We have to 
try to tone down those demands and 
use our influence. I don't know what 
will happen about it. We just pray that 
agreements will be reached. 

Q. Are you asking both sides to 
make further concessions? 

A. Oh, yes — every day and night. 
We ask both sides to please be con- 
structive, to please not freeze your po- 
sition, to please to continue to 
negotiate, to please yield on this pro- 
posal, to adopt this compromise. 

These have been and are our efforts 
on a constant basis. It would be horri- 
ble, I think, if we failed to reach a 
peaceful agreement between Israel and 
Egypt. 

Q. What would happen? 

A. And then see our children, our 
grandchildren, future generations look 
back and say these little tiny 
technicalities, phrases, phrasing of 
ideas, legalisms, which at that time 
seemed to be paramount in the eyes of 
the Egyptian and the Israeli agree- 
ments, have absolutely no historical 
significance. And that's basically what 
the problems are. 

Q. Are you saying that the impasse 
as of today is because of technicalities 
and not major principles? 

A. Yes, compared to the principles 
that have already been resolved and the 
overall scope of things, the dis- 
agreements now relatively are insig- 
nificant. 

Q. Egypt wants to tie the present 
negotiations, I understand, to some 
future resolution of the Gaza Strip 
and the West Bank. Israel is resisting 
that. Who's being more stubborn? 

A. I wouldn't want to start saying 
who's being more stubborn. I think 
there's adequate stubbornness to be 
allotted to both sides. 

Q. You mentioned grandchildren, 
and I heard you say after Camp 
David that at one critical moment 
that was resolved because of some- 
body thinking about grandchildren. 
Would you tell me about that? 

A. It might be a mistake to attach too 
much importance to it, but during the 
last few hours of negotiations at Camp 
David when it looked like everything 
was going to break down, then Prime 
Minister Begin sent me over some 
photographs of me and him and Presi- 
dent Sadat and wanted me to autograph 
them. 



Department of State Bullet Kl " 

And the issue at that time w 
Jerusalem, which was an almost insuf rl " 
mountable obstacle that we later r 
solved by not including it at all in tl 
framework. And instead of just puttii 
my signature on it, which Preside 
Sadat had done, I sent my secretar 
Susan Clough, over and got the nam 
from one of his aides of all his gran> 
children. So I personally autographed 
to his granddaughters and grandsoi 
and signed my name, and I carried 
over to him in one of the most ten 
moments, and I handed it to him and I 
started to talk to me about the brea 
down of the negotiations. 

He looked down and saw that I hi 
written all of his grandchildren's nam 
on the individual pictures and signi 
them, and he started telling me abo 
his favorite grandchild and the chara 
teristics of the different ones. He anc 
had quite an emotional discussi( 
about the benefits to my two grandch 
dren and to his if we could reach peac 
And I think it broke the tension th 
existed there that could have been 
obstacle to any sort of resolution at th 
time. 



Q. What does that say to yt 
about the nature of these probler 
and their resolution? 

A. You know, when you put t 
problems in the focus of how they ; 
feet people — little children, familie 
the loss of life — the agreements an 
the need for agreement becom 
paramount. When you put the focus 
the hands of international lawyers at 
get it down to technicalities — Is a ca 
tain event going to take place in 
months or 8V2 months or 10 months, 
this going to happen before that? Is th 
demarcation line going to go aroui 
this hill or through the hill, on tl 
other side of the hill? Can the observ 
tion towers be 150 feet high, 200 fe 
high, 125 feet high? — the human 
mension of it becomes obvious 
paramount. But when the negotiato 
sit around a table and start talking, tl 
human dimension tends to fade aw; 
and you get bogged down in tr 
legalisms and the language and tl 
exact time schedule when from a hi 
toric perspective they have no signif 
cance. 

Another problem has been and th 
has been one of the most serioi 
problems — at Camp David we didn 
have daily press briefings, and this w; 
the agreement when we started here i 
Washington, that neither side woul 
make a direct statement to the pres: 
As you know, this has not been hoi 
ored at all, and it's created enormoi 
additional and unnecessary problerr 
for us. 



ion 
lai 



In 






10 



na 



l 



» 



1 



(ecember 1978 



17 



Q. You mean leaks from both gov- 
rnments are — 

A. Not just leaks; I mean almost 
very day I see interviews in the na- 
onal television of at least one of the 
des in the dispute. And also at Camp 
>avid I was working directly with the 
eads of state. Here we work with the 
egotiators, and the negotiators then 
:fer their decision back to the head of 
tate or the cabinet, the cabinet re- 
erses itself, reverses the negotiators 
n a language change or one word, and 
1 effect you get the most radical mem- 
ers of the governments who have a 
tajor input into the negotiating process 
ither than having the heads of state 
lere 100 yards away so that they can 
:solve those issues once and for all. 

So I think the follow-up to Camp 
avid has been much more time con- 
iming and much more frustrating than 

was when the three of us were 
imarily leading the discussions. 

Q. I read that the Camp David log 
towed that you spent 21Vi hours 
ith Sadat and 29 hours with Begin 
id 9 hours alone with Sadat and 6 
>urs alone with Begin with no one 
se in the room, the way F.D.R. 
ied to do with Churchill. 
Do you think that you could re- 
live most of these large issues we 
ce if you could just get people in a 
loin like this and talk to them? It 
>ed to be said Lyndon Johnson 
•uld have done much better had he 
'en able to persuade people one- 
l-one instead of having to use tele- 
sion and public speeches. 
Do you think that other problems 
>u face could be resolved if you 
iuld meet nose-to-nose in a sense 
ith the adversaries? 

A. I couldn't guarantee success, but 
:hink obviously the likelihood of suc- 
ss would be better. 



□ 



THE SECRETARY: 

News Conference of Novemher 3 



■For full text, see Weekly Compilation of 
esidential Documents of Nov. 28, 1978. 
! For texts of the accords reached at Camp 
vid and signed on Sept. 17, see Bulletin of 
t. 1978, p. 7. 



First, I have a few words to say 
about the Middle East negotiations. I 
know that all of you are interested in 
the Middle East negotiations, and I 
want to bring you up to date. I ob- 
viously will not be able to go into de- 
tail. 

We are still in the midst of sensitive 
negotiations, and we want to preserve 
their confidentiality as we did during 
the Camp David negotiations. Let me 
say that we have continued to make 
steady progress in the negotiations on 
the text of the peace treaty. 1 I had a 
good meeting yesterday with Prime 
Minister Begin in New York, and we 
made important progress. We have now 
resolved almost all the substantive is- 
sues. 

We will also continue to work inten- 
sively on the annexes to the treaty. 
Much of this is a matter of drafting, but 
there are some remaining issues in the 
annexes as well. 

In my discussions with the Prime 
Minister yesterday, we spent almost all 
of our time on the remaining issues in 
the current negotiations, including the 
question of how to get the negotiations 
started on the other issues covered in 
the Camp David general framework. 
We also devoted some of our time to a 
discussion of bilateral matters, and we 
will be continuing a discussion of these 
various items. 

That is all, I believe, that I have to 
say at this point. I will be glad to an- 
swer any questions. 

Q. I know we will be coming back 
to the Middle East, so let me try to 
clear SALT away, if I could. 

More than a year ago the President 
said that within weeks the outline of 
an agreement would be in hand — an 
agreement that he said would be the 
pride of the country. That was Oc- 
tober 7th, a year ago. 

There is no summit; there is no 
agreement. In fact I don't even know 
that there is a meeting set up be- 
tween you and the Soviet Foreign 
Minister. Could you tell us what 
went wrong, if something has gone 
wrong? 

A. The negotiation of a treaty on 
strategic arms limitation is a vitally 
important and a very difficult negotia- 
tion. It affects the most fundamental 
interests of the two nations involved, 
and therefore, it must be and is treated 
with the greatest of care by the parties. 



We have been slowly making prog- 
ress in resolving the issues which 
separate the two countries. We have 
left a handful of issues, as you know, 
and we hope that we will, in the near 
future, be able to resolve those issues 
as well. 

I think we should not set ourselves 
an artificial deadline. What we are 
looking for is an agreement which will 
protect our interests, which will protect 
the interests of our allies, and which I 
know the Soviet Union wishes to pro- 
tect their interests as well. And, there- 
fore, I think it is fitting and appropriate 
that we should proceed carefully, 
methodically, and one-by-one remove 
these issues until we reach the common 
objective which we clearly both 
share — namely, to achieve a sound and 
an equitable treaty. 

This I believe will be done. I have 
said to you before that I cannot predict 
an exact date when this will be done. I 
believe it is still possible that it could 
happen this year, but I don't want to 
try and predict with certainty that it 
will. Let me say that I can assure you 
that we will devote our full interests 
and time to continuing to try to make 
progress in closing the remaining is- 
sues. 

Q. You mentioned that you spoke 
with Prime Minister Begin about 
bilateral issues yesterday. There are 
reports that Israel is seeking sub- 
stantial American aid for the Sinai 
withdrawal. In fact there is one re- 
port out of Israel this morning that 
that request may go as high as $10 
billion, plus another billion for the 
airfields. 

Can you tell us, first, has the 
United States committed itself, in 
principle, to giving Israel that sub- 
stantial financial aid? And two, can 
you give us any kind of range on what 
numbers we are talking about? 

A. The only document which has 
been exchanged between the United 
States and Israel relates to the airfields. 
This is a public document which I think 
all of you are familiar with. It is a let- 
ter which went from Secretary Brown 
to Minister Ezer Weizman, and I might 
read the last paragraph of that because 
it pertains to the subject. 2 

I suggest that our two governments consult on 
the scope and costs of the two new airbases as 
well as on related forms of assistance which the 



18 



United States might appropriately provide in 
light of the special problems which may be pre- 
sented by carrying out such a project on an ur- 
gent basis The President is prepared to seek the 
necessary Congressional approvals tor such as- 
sistance as may be agreed upon by the U.S. side 
as a result of such negotiations. 

That is the only agreement that has 
been reached between the parties with 
respect to the question of assistance. 

We did, yesterday, discuss the ques- 
tion of a possible loan to Israel, which 
was raised by the Prime Minister. We 
said that we would take the matter 
under consideration. Obviously, that 
kind of a question would require very 
careful study. 

The figure which you mentioned is 
nowhere near the figure which was 
suggested by the Prime Minister. It's 
way above what the Prime Minister 
suggested. I don't want to get into de- 
tails because this is a matter which is 
still under discussion, so I think I will 
leave it at that. 

Q. Could I just straighten out — so 
in other words, the Sinai support 
would come in the form of a loan — as 
the negotiations now have it. 

A. That is the request of Israel. 

Q. And there would be no grant, 
or there would be no — 

A. That is their request. 

Q. Could you tell us if you have 
had any response from King Hussein 
about possibly joining the negotia- 
tions since the answers to his ques- 
tions were delivered? 

And secondly, if I might ask, do 
you think it will be possible for Egypt 
and Israel to proceed in negotiations 
fairly rapidly to implement the plan 
for Palestinian autonomy on the 
West Bank even if Jordan does not 
join the negotiations? 

A. First, we have been in touch with 
King Hussein. We are in touch with 
him on a very frequent basis, both by 
correspondence between the two heads 
of government as well as through dip- 
lomatic channels. It would be inappro- 
priate for me to go into the details of 
those conversations, but I can assure 
that such conversations are continuing 
on a regular basis. 

With respect to your second ques- 
tion: One of the documents which 
would be exchanged in connection with 
the signing of a peace treaty deals with 
the question of timing in terms of ad- 
dressing the issue of carrying out the 
provisions of the general framework. I 
don't want to go any further into detail 
as to what that time might be, but let 



me say, obviously, this is an important 
subject and will be one which will be 
addressed at the same time that the one 
of the signing of the treaty is 
addressed. 

Q. In other words, the two sides 
could proceed, do you think, to begin 
implementing the plan for setting up 
administrative councils in the West 
Bank even if Jordan does not join the 
talks? 

A. I believe that is the case. 

Q. Last night on public television 
your Iran desk officer, Henry 
Precht, appeared, and he reported 
that there were quiet talks going on 
between the Shah and some of the 
moderate opposition leaders to 
achieve a compromise, and that these 
talks involve political and economic 
issues. I wonder what you could tell 
us about those talks and what the 
prospects are that they might achieve 
some sort of stability there? 

A. Let me say a few words about 
Iran and the situation in Iran, and then 
I will speak briefly to your question. 

Iran over the past decade has made a 
very important contribution to the sta- 
bility of the Middle East. The United 
States has worked very closely with the 
Shah, and Iran is a close and valued 
ally. 

Iran has recently reached a stage in 
its development where the Shah has 
believed it is essential to broaden par- 
ticipation in the political life of Iran, 
and we have supported this plan of 
liberalization. 

The continuing violence and the 
strikes in Iran are a serious problem for 
the government, and we fully support 
the efforts of the Shah to restore order 
while continuing his program of 
liberalization. And we hope that 
everyone in Iran will recognize that 
continuing turmoil and destruction 
serve no one's interest. 

As to the specific question that you 
raise, this is an internal question as to 
what the exact nature of the discussions 
are and a question which I think should 
be addressed by the Iranians rather than 
by the United States. 

Q. Could you explain how the 
United States believes that it will be 
possible for you, at one and the same 
time, to restore order and continue 
liberalization? 

A. I think that they are not at all in- 
consistent. I think that law and order 
can be restored. I think at the same 
time one can continue along the course 
which the Shah has charted for himself 
and for his nation. As you know, he 
has set forth a plan which would lead 



Department of State Bulletin 

to elections in the year 1979: and there 
is no inconsistency in reestablishing 
stability within the nation and moving 
on subsequently to the holding of elec 
tions according to his liberal izatior 
plan. 

Q. Did you get anywhere in youi 
talks with Mr. Begin on the disput* 
over the thickening of the West Bank 
settlements? And I had a relatec 
question about settlements. Is tin 
United States, in principle — 

A. One by one. On the question o 
the thickening of the settlements, tha 
question has not yet been resolved be 
tween ourselves and Israel and remain 
a continuing subject of discussion be 
tween us. 

Q. What is behind the fact that thi 
new meeting between you and Mr 
Gromyko has not been arranged? Di 
you see a new date for a new round' 

A. Since I went to Moscow and me 
with Foreign Minister Gromyko an« 
with President Brezhnev, we have beei 
assessing, in an orderly way, the re 
suits of the discussions which wer 
held in those negotiations. In thi 
meantime, the delegations have beei 
continuing to meet in Geneva to dis 
cuss the matters before them. When w 
have completed our assessment, w 
will be in touch with the Soviet Unio |fl 
either through diplomatic channels c 
through direct consultations at variou 
levels, including possibly anothe 
meeting between myself and th 
Foreign Minister. It is proceeding in ajiir 
orderly fashion. lis 

Q. How do you get an administra , 
tive council — if you don't hav 
partners such as Hussein and th 
local Palestinians on the West Bank, 
think that you said a moment ago 
that you could still proceed with (h 
process of getting this administratis 
council set up. How do you do that i 
you don't have the people to talk to'. 

A. First of all, as you'll recall in thi 
Camp David accords, there is provisioi 
for Palestinians from the West Banl 
and Gaza to participate as members o 
the delegations of the various parties 
That would mean that Egypt could in 
elude such Palestinians in its delega 
tion. 

In addition, we would hope that, a. 
the discussions get under way, we wil 
begin to find people beginning to par 
ticipate in a more active way througl 
consultation with those who would bt 
involved in the negotiations leading u[ 
to the setting up of the modalities fo 
the elections. 

There is. 1 think, certainly in m} 
judgment, increasing interest on hov J 



December 1978 

■his process is going to work, and many 

jbuestions are being asked about how it 

ill be organized and how it will go 

forward. So I think there is a real pos- 

ibility that we will find more and more 

nterest in participation as it goes 

orward. 

Q. Is the conclusion of the peace 
talks between Egypt and Israel, in- 
volving the United States, in any way 
iependent upon or linked to a res- 
)lution of the issue involving Ameri- 
an aid for redeployment costs in the 
Sinai or a resolution of the settle- 
nents issue? 

A. It has not been specifically 
inked, no. No. They are obviously 
questions which have been discussed, 
■>ut there has been no direct linkage. 

H Q. There have been reports, one, 
here were secret talks between the 
Jnited States and China on normali- 
sation; two, Washington has ac- 
cepted Peking's preconditions; and, 
hree, normalization will take place 

uy the end of President Carter's first 
erm. I would like to have your 
omment. 

A. We stated at the outset of Presi- 

lent Carter's Administration that one 
i )f our objectives was the normalization 
(i)f relations with the People's Republic 
i >f China. We have also stated that the 

]uestion of timing and modalities was 

m issue, or a pair of issues, that would 
i lave to be dealt with very carefully 

hrough painstaking discussions. We 
l ilso pointed out that an important fac- 
tor was our concern for the well-being 

)f the people of Taiwan. 
We have had discussions ever since 
jhe beginning of the Administration on 
Shese basic issues. No decisions have 
iieen made nor can I predict what either 
jhe modalities or the timing would be 

n reaching such an ultimate objective 

is we have set for ourselves. 

Q. There has been a very large 
iropaganda campaign in the Soviet 
doc countries against the develop- 
nent of the neutron weapon in this 
country. I'd like to ask you if any of 
the Soviet bloc countries has ever 
nade formal representations to our 
government on the subject of the 
neutron bomb? 

A. I specifically discussed this sub- 
ject in Moscow when I was there and 
expressed our views as to the question, 
and they expressed their views with re- 
spect to the issue. 

Q. Who started it? 

A. I can't remember whether they 
did or I did, but it was discussed. 



Q. And that was the only time this 
has come up in government-to- 
government talks? 

A. In the past there have been, as 
you know, letters written by the Soviet 
Union to a number of countries on the 
question of the enhanced radiation 
weapon. 

Q. But to us? 

A. We have received in the past a 
letter on this, yes. 

Q. Yesterday the State Depart- 
ment issued a very harsh statement 
following the raids into Zambia. Do 
you believe that these recent raids 
cast serious doubts about the sincer- 
ity of the Smith regime to attend an 
all-parties conference? 

A. Let me say some general words 
about the situation in Rhodesia and 
then I'll answer specifically your ques- 
tion. 

I must be very frank with you that 
there have been setbacks in trying to 
make progress toward the peaceful res- 
olution of the problem of Rhodesia. 
These setbacks have occurred on both 
sides. They are to be seen in such 
things as the shooting down of the Vis- 
count and the deaths of civilians in 
Rhodesia. They have also been re- 
flected in the attacks such as those 
which you referred to. Both of these 
kinds of actions have been a real set- 
back to the chance of achieving a 
peaceful resolution of this problem. 

The basic question is whether or not 
the parties have the will to achieve 
a peaceful settlement. I don't know the 
answer to that question. I can say, 
however, that clearly the task has been 
made more difficult by such things as 
the raids that you have referred to. 

Coming to your specific question, 
although Mr. Smith stated when he was 
here in the United States that he was 
prepared to go to an all-parties confer- 
ence without preconditions, at the very 
same time, raids were being launched 
across the border which were an ob- 
vious impediment to the holding of any 
such talks. 

Let me stress, however, that we still 
believe very strongly that the door must 
be kept open and that we must work 
toward trying to find a peaceful solu- 
tion to the Rhodesian problem through 
the joint efforts of ourselves, the 
British, and others. And this would be 
done, in our judgment, through free 
and fair and independent elections 
which would lead to the free choice of 
the people of Zimbabwe in determining 
who their future leaders should be and 
what the form of that government 
should be. And we will continue to 
support those efforts. 



19 



Q. Mr. Secretary, Chinese Vice 
Premier Teng Hsiao-ping recently vis- 
ited Japan, and he said there will be 
no war in the Korean Peninsula by 
North Korean attack. And both 
Prime Minister Fukuda and Teng 
Hsiao-ping agreed on the need of re- 
sumption of the dialogue between 
North and South Korea. 

What is your assessment on this 
agreement and what is U.S. policy on 
the dialogue issue of North and South 
Korea? 

A. We have encouraged a dialogue 
between the South Koreans and the 
North Koreans to resolve their differ- 
ences. There has been difficulty, as 
you know, however, in ever getting 
any such a dialogue going or. in the 
one occasion where it really started, to 
keep it going on the tracks. It petered 
out, and it has not been able to go for- 
ward. So, therefore, we would encour- 
age discussions that could lead to a 
peaceful resolution of the differences 
between them. 

But insofar as we are concerned, we 
would not enter into any such discus- 
sions, even if invited, unless the South 
Koreans were present. We have made 
this very, very clear. 

Q. There have been a number of 
reports to the effect that China and 
France are negotiating over the sale 
of some antitank and other types of 
essentially defensive weapons. The 
U.S. policy is that it will not sell 
weapons to the People's Republic of 
China. 

I wonder if you've made any rep- 
resentations to the French about 
whether you think they should, as a 
member of the NATO alliance, sell 
weapons to the People's Republic of 
China and whether the Soviets have 
brought the issue up in your discus- 
sions with them, and what they have 
said about their feelings about it. 

A. As you correctly stated, it is our 
strong and unequivocal policy that we 
do not intend to, nor will we, sell 
military equipment — weapons — to 
either the People's Republic of China 
or to the Soviet Union. 

Insofar as other nations are con- 
cerned, this is a matter which each of 
them must decide for itself. 

Thirdly, with respect to your ques- 
tion, has this ever been raised with us 
by the Soviet Union, the answer is yes, 
it has been raised by the Soviet Union. 
This is a matter of great sensitivity to 
the Soviet Union, and they have raised 
the question of the sale of weapons to 
the People's Republic of China not 
only with us but with many other 
nations. 



20 



Q. I wonder if you could say what 
impact the sentencing of the two 
Soviet spies in Newark has had on 
Soviet- American relations — whether 
there have been any protests, any 
threats of retaliation; and whether 
the SALT talks are being held a 
hostage to that sentencing; and what 
the prospects are for release of these 
two men before serving their 50-year 
terms? 

A. The SALT talks are not being 
held a hostage to this matter. 

Secondly, the question of the two 
Soviets who have just been sentenced 
has obviously been a subject of discus- 
sion between ourselves and the Soviet 
Union on a number of occasions. I 
think it's inappropriate for me to go 
into the substance of the discussions in 
a public forum such as this. 

Q. You and [Deputy] Secretary 
Christopher had a lot to do with the 
President's setting up an intervention 
fund to support the dollar. Are you 
now fully prepared to cooperate with 
Chancellor Schmidt's so-called new 
European monetary system, since it 
also has as its stated goal supporting 
the international role of the dollar? 

A. Our position with respect to the 
European proposal is that in principle 
we support the proposal. Insofar as 
what the details of the proposal will be. 
obviously that's something that we 
would like to take a look at when you 
get down to fine print; but in principle 
we would support it 

Q. I understood you said there is 
still a disagreement on the West 
Bank settlements. I am interested in 
exactly where things stand. What did 
you say to Mr. Begin? Did you say 
that by adding 400 new families to 
the settlements he would be going 
against the commitment he made at 
Camp David? 

A. I'm not going to go into the de- 
tails of what I said to Mr. Begin. It's 
not appropriate that I should do so. He 
understands our position very, very 
clearly on this. 

Q. We don't; I don't. 

A. It is not appropriate for me to go 
into the details of our conversation. 

Q. Just to discuss another issue of 
recognition, early on in the Admin- 
istration you said that the United 
States would be willing to have dip- 
lomatic relations with Hanoi so long 
as there were no preconditions. It's 
been reported that the Vietnamese 
are now saying they have no precon- 
ditions on diplomatic relations. 

Can you predict when you might 



actually have an exchange of embas- 
sies or something like that, or what's 
holding up such a decision? 

A. Let me say the answer is no, you 
cannot predict. Let me then review 
what the situation is. 

As you know, last year we had three 
sets of meetings, which took place in 
Paris, with respect to the overall ques- 
tion of normalization. During those 
talks, the position of the Vietnamese 
was laid out. That position was one 
which was unacceptable to the United 
States because of the demand for aid. 

There has been another meeting re- 
cently, as you know, at the United Na- 
tions during the General Assembly, at 
which there was a general review of the 
situation as between our two nations. 
The position of the Vietnamese is 
somewhat clarified as a result of those 
discussions. No decisions, however, 
have been made with respect to this 
issue. And as I said at the outset, I 
cannot make any prediction about if 
and when there would be normaliza- 
tion. 

Q. Could you say whether they 
have dropped their demand for aid 
as a precondition for normalization? 

A. I would interpret what they are 
saying now as having dropped that 
condition. 

Q. With respect to the fighting be- 
tween Tanzania and Uganda, as nearly 
as you can determine, what is behind 
that conflict and what is the United 
States doing to help the situation in 
view of President Nyerere's 
determination — or stated determina- 
tion — to pursue the thing militarily? 

A. Our information with respect to 
the situation is both fragmentary and 
sketchy. 

I think we do have the general out- 
lines, probably, of what is taking place 
now. It is quite clear that Ugandan 
troops have crossed the border and 
penetrated 18 miles, at least, into Tan- 
zanian territory. The fighting is going 
forward there. Insofar as American 
citizens are concerned, who were in the 
area, all of those are safe and ac- 
counted for. 

Our position is very clear on this. 
This is a clear violation of the borders 
of Tanzania by Uganda. This is totally 
in conflict with the principle of the 
OAU [Organization of African Unity] 
which relates to the territorial integrity 
of all of the African states, and we 
fully and completely support the posi- 
tion of President Nyerere that the 
forces of Uganda should be withdrawn 
immediately in accordance with the 
well-established principles of territorial 



Department of State Bulletin^. 

integrity. And we will work to support 
diplomatically the achievement of that 
objective. 

Q. Just to clear up one point on 
the Middle East, you said early on 
that you resolved almost all substan- 
tive issues. That came within the 
context of your meeting with Mr 
Begin. Are there any substantive is 
sues that the United States has with 
Egypt, or are they all — the few that 
remain — with Israel? 



A. When I said almost all, I really 
mean almost all. 



Q. In terms of both sides? 

A. Both sides, both sides. 



□ 



Press release 413. 

'For texts of the documents agreed to at 
Camp David, see Bulletin of Oct. 1978, p. 7. 

2 For the full text of this letter and other ac 
companying letters, see Bulletin of Oct. 
1978. p. 10. 



Secretary Vance 

to Visit Europe 

and the Middle East 



On December 5, 1978, Department 
spokesman Hodding Carter III an- 
nounced that Secretary Vance will visit 
London December 8-10 to address the 
Royal Institute of International Affairs. 

He will then proceed to Cairo on De- 
cember 10 and thereafter to Jerusalem 
to explore ways of resuming the 
Egypt-Israeli discussions with the ob- 
jective of concluding the negotiations 
which have been conducted on the 
basis of the frameworks agreed to at 
Camp David. The Secretary's trip fol- 
lows our consultations with both gov- 
ernments, including the recent talks in 
Washington with Prime Minister Khali! 
and the exchange of letters between 
President Sadat and Prime Minister 
Begin. D 



: 



K 



■P 



ecember 1978 



21 



AFRICA: Secretary Vance 

Discusses Namibia 

With South African Officials 



Secretary Vance departed Washing- 
n October 13, 1978, for Pretoria, 
here he met with South African Gov- 
nment officials (October 14-18) to 
scuss Namibia. (He then traveled to 
eneva before going to Moscow.) 
allowing are the texts of the Secre- 
ry's news conference held in Geneva 
d three statements issued in Pretoria 
October 19. 

jSCRETARY'S NEWS 
CONFERENCE, 
ENEVA, OCT. 19' 

I think you've all probably had 
*'pies handed to you now of the draft 
uint statement which was distributed at 
12 press conference which was held a 
It earlier today in Pretoria by the 
,)Uth African Government [text fol- 
ws this news conference]. As you 
i ve been able to see from the draft 
lint statement, it contains certain 
ims on which agreement was reached 
; d other items on which agreement 
'is not reached. 

The items on which there was 
i reement in principle were those re- 
!:ing to issues where there was further 
urification required. The first of those 
ms the question of the police force. 
Isofar as that is concerned it appears 
lit that no longer is a problem insofar 
1 the South Africans are concerned, 
nereas previously they had raised 
< estions on that provision of the Sec- 
itary General's report and of the 
|oposal. 

Secondly, insofar as the issue of 
(nsultations is concerned, again there, 
( the document which was issued ear- 
1t says that the South African delega- 
l>n felt that the question of consulta- 
l»n now can be resolved. 
On the question of troops, again 
l;re the issue seems to be resolved in 
.■ms of principle. 

In paragraph 3 of the document — and 
might read it because I think it's an 
iportant paragraph — it's stated that 
:he South African Government and 
e five Foreign Ministers accordingly 
lieve that it would now be appro- 
bate for the Secretary General's spe- 
lal representative, Mr. Ahtisaari 
larti Ahtisaari of Finland], to resume 
s discussion with the South African 
dministrator General of Namibia 



[Martinus Steyn] within the framework 
of Security Council Resolution 435 
which endorsed the Secretary General's 
report. The aim of these discussions 
would be to work out the modalities of 
the proposed elections under U.N. 
supervision and to fix a date for these 
elections." 

It goes on then to say "the five 
Foreign Ministers, therefore, intend to 
recommend to the Secretary General 
that he should instruct Mr. Ahtisaari to 
proceed to Windhoek as soon as possi- 
ble. In addition, it was regarded as ap- 
propriate to recommend to the Secre- 
tary General that he begin consultations 
on the composition of the military 
component of UNTAG [U.N. Transi- 
tion Assistance Group]. 

The next two paragraphs indicate a 
clear difference of view — a sharp dif- 
ference of view — between the two 
parties. 

Paragraph 4 deals with the position 
of the South African Government with 
respect to elections which they have 
planned for December which they de- 
scribe as elections which must be seen 
as an internal process to elect leaders. 

The five Foreign Ministers state in 
the joint statement that with regard to 
the unilateral elections in December, 
they saw no way of reconciling such 
elections with the proposal which they 
put forward and which the Security 
Council has endorsed. They further 
stated that any such unilateral measure 
in relation to the electoral process will 
be regarded as null and void. 

Accordingly, in sum, what you have 
is a disagreement on the latter two is- 
sues but an agreement in principle on 
other important issues which had been 
unresolved and a joint recommendation 
that Mr. Ahtisaari, the special repre- 
sentative of the Secretary General, 
should proceed as soon as possible to 
Windhoek to resume discussions with 
the Administrator General to determine 
the modalities for working out the 
necessary steps and procedures and the 
fixing of a date for elections under 
Resolution 435 [see p. 57]. 

Q. Aren't those two mutually 
contradictory in the sense that the 
South Africans are saying elections 
they're going to hold are legitimate 
and at the same time the five Foreign 
Ministers and apparently the South 



Africans are saying there are going 
to be other elections? 

A. The South Africans have said in 
their unilateral statement that they re- 
gard elections which they have planned 
for December as elections which are an 
internal matter to elect leaders. What 
will happen with respect to those elec- 
tions, what the function of those lead- 
ers would be, whether it would be an 
advisory function to the Administrator 
General remains to be seen, and it re- 
mains to be seen whether indeed, in 
fact, the elections themselves will go 
forward. 

We both agree — both sides — that it 
is at the heart of the matter that we go 
forward to complete the process of set- 
ting up the procedures for elections 
pursuant to Security Council Resolu- 
tion 435 and that we should get at that 
business immediately. So the important 
thing is the one election — and the only 
election that really counts — namely 
that under the resolution enacted by the 
Security Council. 

Q. That's a rather flat statement, 
there's no way of reconciling and yet 
when Mr. Botha [South African 
Prime Minister Pieter Botha] says he 
will use his best efforts to persuade 
local leaders elected in December to 
go ahead with a later election, do you 
still find no air there — no room to 
qualify the very flat statement, no 
way of reconciling? 

A. I think we're going to have to 
wait and see what actually does happen 
with respect to December elections. 
And if they are minimized, that's one 
situation. The important thing is to see 
the implementation of the action with 
respect to the U.N. elections, and that 
is the key that we have to take a look at. 

Q. I'm sorry, I don't know what 
you mean by "minimize." 

A. We don't know actually, if such 
elections are held, what the function of 
the so-called leaders would be. If it 
were an advisory function, that would 
be one thing, and it would have a 
minimal effect; so that I think if they're 
talking about that kind of a thing, then 
it means one thing. And if they show 
that they are determined to go forward 
and to work with Mr. Ahtisaari to bring 
about final and complete elections 
which would lead to an independent 
Namibia under the U.N. resolution, 
then that's something different. 

Q. Is it clear to you whether South 
Africa intends to maintain sov- 
ereignty over South West Africa after 
they have the December elections and 
the leaders are chosen, is it clear that 



22 

they will continue to be responsible 
for the actions of those chosen lead- 
ers, or is the possibility now being 
left open by South Africa that those 
leaders will have the right to deter- 
mine the course of Southwest Africa 
themselves? Is that implicit in saying 
they will try to persuade them — 

A. No. It is not. South Africa will 
retain sovereignty. 

Q. It has committed itself to that? 

A. That is clear. Yes. 

Q. Mr. Botha is being quoted this 
morning saying that after the outcome 
of the December elections. South Af- 
rica will remain in charge of the ter- 
ritory, enabling the United Nations to 
effectively disregard the poll. Now why 
would they have an election and then 
enable the United Nations to disregard 
the poll? 

A. It is up to them to decide how 
they want to handle their own internal 
affairs. The important thing is, how are 
we going to go forward and carry out 
the elections under the Security Coun- 
cil resolution which will lead to a fair 
and independent election pursuant to 
which an independent Namibia can 
come into being. 

Q. Do you have a target date for 
elections? 

A. We have stated we thought that 
elections could be held in May or June, 
and one of the important things which 



SECRETARY'S STATEMENT, 
PRETORIA, OCT. 18* 

First on behalf of my colleagues and 
myself. 1 wish to express our deep ap- 
preciation to our hosts for their very 
kind hospitality. We have come many 
thousands of miles to engage in these 
discussions in the search for a peaceful 
resolution of the problem of Namibia. 

Our discussions have been intensive. 
They have continued, as you know, over 
a period of 3 days. During that period 
we have put several proposals on the 
table Those proposals are still being 
considered by the South African Gov- 
ernment. Their consideration of these 
proposals will continue throughout today 
and this evening and tomorrow morning, 
and I expect that they will be making an 
announcement tomorrow sometime with 
respect to their conclusions 

Accordingly, we do not believe that it 
is appropriate for us to make any com- 
ments on the details of any of these pro- 
posals until the South African Govern- 
ment has reached its conclusions. 



♦Press release 394 of Oct. 19, 1978 



Mr. Ahtisaari would be discussing 
would be the fixing of a date. 

Q. These clear sharp differences of 
view that you referred to, where do 
those differences lead you in refer- 
ence to the possibility of the imposi- 
tion of sanctions? When you get back 
to the States this question is certainly 
going to come up at the United 
Nations. 

A. I think at this point one has to see 
what happens with respect to the ques- 
tion of Mr. Ahtisaari going out to 
Southwest Africa — to Namibia — to 
have his discussions with Mr. Steyn — 
Judge Steyn. And until we see what 
happens there I don't think we get to 
the question which you raise. 

Q. Do you have a commitment 
from the South Africans that Justice 
Martinus Steyn will continue to be 
the Administrator General after the 
December elections? 

A. No. 

Q. Do you have an agreement on a 
date for indpendence? 

A. A date for independence? The 
date for independence will be depend- 
ent upon the procedures set forth in the 
proposal. I'll ask Mr. McHenry 
[Deputy U.S. Representative to the 
U.N. Security Council Donald 
McHenry] to speak to that. 

A. [Ambassador McHenry]. The 
date for independence was left open in 
the proposal because much will depend 
upon what the constituent assembly de- 
cides to do. It could, conceivably, de- 
cide that it was agreed upon the nature 
of a constitution and turn itself into a 
new government, in which case the in- 
dependence would be very early. 

Or it could decide to draft a con- 
stitution, submit that constitution to 
another election — that is to approve the 
constitution — in which case the date for 
independence would be further off. But 
it was left open there because one had 
to get the views of the constituent 
assembly. 

Q. This is the constituent assembly 
that follows out of the U.N.— 

A. U.N. -supervised elections. 

Q. Are you in a situation here 
which is roughly comparable to 
Rhodesia in the sense that once the 
internal election is held, then the 
other side— SWAPO [South West Af- 
rica People's Organization] — will say 
that since they have constituted 
themselves as a government, that 
they are unwilling to come in on the 
terms laid down by that government 
for elections, very much in the way 



Department of State Bullet 

that the patriotic front now refusi 
to — 



v. 



to 
or 

A. No, I don't think that's the casfni 
and I certainly don't accept that a 
sumption. I think the common aim c 
all the parties is to try and move fo 
ward to a date at which there can H 
final elections to set up an independe 
government. 

Q. When was the language in l¥ 
joint communique agreed? What w 
the process that occurred after yc||B 
left Pretoria? Can you just give us a 
outline on that? 

A. We made a number of pn 
posals which we left with them- 
several proposals. I would put it — ai 
one of the proposals was a propos 
to — in the exact form that we ha' 
here. They said that they would want 
discuss among themselves and wi 
such other people as they would wi 
to call in to meet with them the vario' 
proposals which we had made and thi 
would be in touch with us with respe 
to what their determinations were aft 
such consultations. We had agreed wi 
them in advance that all of the propc 
als which we made remain on tl 
table so that we would be willing to a 
cept any of those proposals includi; 
this particular proposal. 

Q. Can you tell us what the oth 
proposals were? 

A. No, I'm not going to go into tf 
now. 

Q. Have you been in touch with St 
retary General Waldheim on this? 

A. Yes, I have. 

Q. Before the formal stateme 
was issued, the things that you s; 
here that you're going to recommei 
to him you've already talked ov 
informally? 

A. I talked to him in the most ge 
eral terms yesterday about this becau 
before there was agreement. I didr 
feel it was appropriate to discuss wi 
anybody what the various particul 
elements of the proposal were. I ha 
been in touch with his office th 
morning, and I have discussed the sp 



h 



cific elements with some of his cc 

leagues, and I will be talking to hi 

directly later on, after this pre 
conference. 

Q. With Mr. Ahtisaari — have yc 
dealt with him directly? n 

A. No, I have not— with the Und^tr 
Secretaries, yes. ' * 

Q. Can you confirm whether i * 
not President Carter invited M' 
Botha to come to the United Stat 1 t 
and what the conditions are? 



December 1978 

A. No, I don't want to get into any- 
ling having to do with the exchange of 
orrespondence between the President 
nd Prime Minister Botha. As you 
now, insofar as personal letters be- 
ween heads of government are con- 
erned, that's up to the two heads of 
overnment to decide whether or not 
ley want to make those public, and I 
ave no authority at this point to indi- 
ate the — 

Q. It was said this morning on 
IBC that the invitation was 
xtended. 

A. That's BBC's comment. 

Q. Could you give your interpre- 
ition of the unilateral South African 
tatement? It seems they're talking 
bout the U.N. elections, that is a 
eally firm commitment to those. 

A. On the unilateral statement as you 
now, we have issued what we call an 
iditional statement of the five in re- 
>onse to this unilateral statement, and 
ere we point out that it is necessary to 
ovide a firm framework for the elec- 
ral process and to reduce uncertainty. 

We go on to say that insofar as a 
ate is concerned, that no one can be 
lowed to delay unilaterally the hold- 
g of U.N. -supervised elections. And 
en we went on to point out that if the 
ireed date of the election appeared to 
: at risk through acts of violence or 
timidation or any other failure to 
irry out the provisions of the propos- 
s, it would be for the Secretary Gen- 
i al to bring the matter immediately to 
Security Council and that the gov- 
nments of the Western five undertook 

support necessary action in the Se- 
irity Council. 

We then went on to point out further 
at the five Western governments also 
idertook to maintain observers in 

indhoek during the transitional 

riod and to do everything possible to 
sure the implementation of the pro- 
>sals which we have put forward. 

We concluded by stating that we 
ere confident that the Security Coun- 
1 would respond promptly and effec- 
/ely to any situation where the agreed 
ite of the election appeared to be at 

k and would maintain the election 

ite and that, therefore, there would be 

i) case for any unilateral action. We 

ink that that completely answers the 

i lil ateral statement issued by the 

|j"ime Minister. 

Q. Do you have any doubt that 
lere will be a U.N. -supervised elec- 
9n? 

I A. We'll have to see what happens 
[(hen we have further conversations 
j:tween Mr. Ahtisaari and the Ad- 
inistrator General. 



Q. To turn it around, there are no 
assurances though? 

A. There are no assurances at this 
point. 

Q. Don't you think that the reac- 
tion of the United Nations is going to 
be that this is much less than satis- 
factory? 

A. I don't know what the U.N. Se- 
curity Council is going to say. I believe 
that what has been proposed here is, or 
reflects, a step forward. I believe it 
clearly reflects a desire on the part of 
the parties to see whether we cannot 
move forward to complete the process 
under Security Council Resolution 435 
and that that is a positive sign. There 
may be differences of view with re- 
spect to this in the Security Council, 
and we'll have to see when the discus- 
sion of that takes place. 

Q. Is it inaccurate to describe this 
as a standoff? 

A. [Laughter] I don't want to 
characterize it as a standoff or use any 
other single word to characterize it. 
What I would like to say is that I think 
that it indicates some progress. We'll 
have to wait and see whether or not it 
works out. 

Q. Have you been in touch with 
any of the black African countries 
which had earlier talked about seek- 
ing economic sanctions if full accept- 
ance by South Africa had not come 
by next Monday? Have you been in 
touch with them on this situation 
which has now been developed to see 
whether they are intending to con- 
tinue to push for sanctions next 
Monday? 

A. We — the five — have either been 
in touch or will be in touch today with 
all of those countries. I informed one 
of them last night on my way back of 
what had happened during the 3 days of 
discussions. 

Q. At the point of being in touch 
simply to explain what happened or 
to seek their understanding of wait- 
ing a little longer than beyond next 
Monday, or what? 

A. Our objective is to explain what 
has happened, to answer their ques- 
tions, and to urge them to let the proc- 
ess which we are recommending go 
forward. 

Q. This is hypothetical and also a 
step back a couple of years in time. 
In your experience with American 
business, and on our needs for cer- 
tain manganese and other valuable 
imports from South Africa, should 
there be sanctions, simply — and 



23 



maybe simple-mindedly put — would 
it hurt South Africa or us more? 

A. I really don't want to get into that 
question. That is a hypothetical ques- 
tion. Obviously, the question of sanc- 
tions has been looked at in the past and 
evaluations have been made on such is- 
sues as you raise but I — the issue is not 
before us at this moment, and I prefer 
not to bring it up. 

Q. Has there been any consultation 
with American business leaders 
about the possibility or at least the 
consideration of sanctions — any in- 
formal readings or consultations? 

A. The only work which has been 
done in this area over the past has been 
basically discussions within the gov- 
ernment itself. 

Q. Had you hoped, before you 
went to Pretoria, to be able to talk 
the South Africans out of the De- 
cember elections? 

A. The answer is yes. I had hoped 
to, but we were unable to do so. 

Q. Are you disappointed? 

A. [Laughter] I think the situation 
speaks for itself. 

Q. We didn't have any details of 
what actually went on Monday and 
Tuesday. Can you give us any help 
on that? What you started in on, how 
you proceeded along, just fill in — 

A. Yes, I can fill you in briefly on 
that. We started in, as you know, with 
a meeting with the Prime Minister. The 
Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister, 
the Secretary of State, and General 
Mallan were at the meeting on behalf 
of the South African Government, and 
the five [Western] Foreign Ministers 
were present representing our respective 
countries. 

We started off with a general discus- 
sion of the overall situation, each of us 
expressing our views with respect to 
the general situation. We then began to 
discuss some of the more specific as- 
pects of it. 

Following that the Prime Minister 
turned the meeting over to a discussion 
between the Foreign Minister and his 
colleagues and ourselves, and from 
there on it was a question of discus- 
sions and negotiations between the 
Foreign Minister and his colleagues 
and ourselves. 

However, as I pointed out — no, I don't 
guess I did — but the fact is that the 
Prime Minister joined us from time- 
to-time during the 2 days that followed 
that first day. He joined us at dinner 
where we had a working dinner — 
substantive dinner — where we dis- 



24 



Department of State Bulletit 



cussed these issues, and from time-to- 
time during our discussions the five of 
us together with the Foreign Minister 
joined the Prime Minister to discuss the 
issues. So he participated in the discus- 
sions as well as people at the ministe- 
rial level. 

Q. At any time during the discus- 
sions, did you discuss the South Afri- 
can domestic racial problem situa- 
tion? 

A. I had general discussions cover- 
ing a whole variety of issues with the 
Prime Minister. 

Q. Do you see a successful resolu- 
tion of the Namibia conflict as lead- 
ing to a more normal relationship 
between the United States and South 
Africa that would involve implicitly 
an attempt by the United States — by 
the Carter Administration — to have 
greater understanding of South Af- 
rica's problems? 

A. I think that a satisfactory resolu- 
tion of the Namibian problem would 
have a beneficial effect not only in 
Namibia and in the relationships in the 
region in general, but obviously it 
would help in terms of the atmosphere 
between the United States and the Gov- 
ernment of South Africa. 

Q. You have spoken in the past of 
the relationship between Namibia 
and Rhodesia. Does the mixed suc- 
cess that you had here retard in any 
way your hopes for making progress 
on Rhodesia? 

A. On the Rhodesian situation, we 
will know a little bit more about it 
when we have the meetings with Mr. 
Smith on Friday in Washington. Again, 
the situation is not very clear as to what 
the facts actually are, but I hope we'll 
have some further clarification as a re- 
sult of the meetings on Friday. 

I continue to believe that it is very 
much in the interest of all of the parties 
first, to bring the bloodshed to an end 
in Rhodesia; secondly, to move as fast 
as possible toward free and fair elec- 
tions; and thirdly, in that process, that 
this be done by an all-parties confer- 
ence. I would certainly agree that any 
such all-parties conference must be a 
well-prepared conference at which all 
the parties could sit down together, 
then the chances of arriving at a 
peaceful solution — a solution which re- 
solved the differences among the vari- 
ous parties — is much greater than the 
situation we face now where there is 
just no conversation between them. 



JOINT SOUTH AFRICAN- 
WESTERN FIVE STATEMENT, 
OCT. 19 2 

On 25 April 1978 the South African 
Government announced its acceptance 
of the proposals of the Western five for 
an internationally acceptable settlement 
of the Namibia problem. However, 
when the U.N. Secretary General pub- 
lished his report on the implementation 
of the proposals, the South African 
Government expressed concern that 
certain aspects of the report were not in 
accordance with the Western proposal. 
The areas of concern were the size of 
the military component of UNTAG, the 
question of consultations, the proposal 
for police monitors, and the date of the 
elections. The statement by the Secre- 
tary General in the Security Council on 
29 September addressed itself to 
clarification of these areas of concern. 

The five Foreign Ministers and the 
South African Government discussed 
these clarifications further in order to 
establish common ground on the im- 
plementation of the report of the Sec- 
retary General. 

The following main points were 
examined. 

I. Police Force. 

While the South African delegation 
considered the number of civilian per- 
sonnel envisaged for police-monitoring 
responsibilities excessive, it believed 
that the Secretary General's explana- 
tory statement in the Security Council 
had removed South Africa's preoccu- 
pation with the character and role of 
the personnel concerned. It had become 
clear that the functions of the existing 
police forces would not be affected. 

II. Consultation. 

The five intimated their agreement 
that they were committed to the princi- 
ple of fair consultation, emphasizing 
that this had been reaffirmed by the 
Secretary General in his introductory 
statement of 29 September in the Se- 
curity Council. This would cover, inter 
alia, the composition and actual size of 
the military component of UNTAG. 
The five intimated that they would seek 
confirmation that their interpretation 
coincided with that of the Secretary 
General. On that basis the South Afri- 
can delegation felt that the question of 
consultation could be resolved. 

III. Troops. 

The composition and the actual total 
figure of UNTAG would be determined 
by the Secretary General after consul- 
tation by his special representative with 
the Administrator General in the light 
of the prevailing circumstances. 

The South African Government and 



the five Foreign Ministers accordingly 
believe that it would now be appro- 
priate for the Secretary General's spe 
cial representative, Mr. Ahtisaari, tc 
resume his discussion with the Soutr 
African Administrator General o: 
Namibia within the framework of Se 
curity Council Resolution 435 whicr 
endorsed the Secretary General's re 
port. The aim of these discussion; 
would be to work out the modalities o 
the proposed elections under U.N 
supervision and to fix a date for thest 
elections. The five Foreign Ministers 
therefore, intend to recommend to th< 
Secretary General that he should in 
struct Mr. Ahtisaari to proceed to Wind 
hoek as soon as possible. In addition 
it was regarded as appropriate to rec 
ommend to the Secretary General tha 
he begin consultations on the composi 
tion of the military component o 
UNTAG. 

The South African Governmen 
stated that the planned December elec 
tions must be seen as an internal proc 
ess to elect leaders. 

The South African Government wil 
thereafter use its best efforts to per 
suade them seriously to consider way 
and means of achieving internationa 
recognition through the good offices o 
the special representative and the Ad 
ministrator General. 

In the implementation of this goa 
the special representative would con 
suit with the Administrator General o 
all aspects of the Secretary General' 
report (including the fixing of a furthe 
election date). 

The five Foreign Ministers state 
with regard to the unilateral election 
in December that they saw no way o 
reconciling such elections with th 
proposal which they put forward am 
which the Security Council has en- 
dorsed. Any such unilateral measure ii 
relation to the electoral process will b< 
regarded as null and void. 

SOUTH AFRICAN STATEMENT, 
OCT. 19 

No South African troop reductioi 
without peace. Election date not to bi 
affected by continuation of violence. 

1 . The South African delegatioi 
stressed that the reduction of Soutl 
African troops in South West Afric; 
would only commence if and when ; 
complete and a comprehensive cessa 
tion of hostilities had been brough 
about. 

2. A continuation of violence can 
therefore, interrupt and delay indefi 
nitely the reduction of South Afncai 
troops and, therefore, conceivably alsc 
the holding of elections. 



"(December 1978 

3. To prevent any party from unilat- 
erally delaying the holding of elec- 
tions, it is, therefore, necessary that a 
firm election date be fixed. This date 
must then be adhered to irrespective of 
whether there is a cessation of hos- 
tilities and a consequent reduction of 
South African troops. 



WESTERN FIVE STATEMENT, 
OCT. 19 3 



25 



The fixing of a date is necessary to 
provide a firm framework for the elec- 
toral process and to reduce uncertainty. 
The proposals of the Western five 
adopted by the Security Council estab- 
ished a number of prerequisites before 

a 1the official political campaign starts. In 
this connection the South African Gov- 
ernment stressed that the withdrawal of 
South African troops would only begin 
upon cessation of hostilities. The five 
oointed out that this would be brought 
about following notification to the 
Secretary General of an agreed cease- 
fire. 

No party can be allowed to delay 
jnilaterally the holding of U.N. super- 
vised elections. If the agreed date of 
:he election appeared to be at risk 
Jirough acts of violence or intimidation 
jr any other failure to carry out the 
provisions of the proposals, it would be 
or the Secretary General to bring the 
natter immediately to the Security 
Zouncil and the governments of the 

ie Western five undertake to support 
accessary action in the Security Coun- 
:il. The five Western governments 
indertake to maintain observers in 

11 Windhoek during the transitional 
oeriod and to do everything possible to 
nsure the implementation of the pro- 
posals leading to elections on the 
igreed date. 

The five Foreign Ministers are con- 
ident that the Security Council would 
espond promptly and effectively to 
iny situation where the agreed date of 
he election appeared to be at risk and 
.vould maintain that election date and 
hat there will, therefore, be no case 

i, 'or any unilateral action. □ 



•Press release 396 of Oct. 20, 1978. 

Mssued in Pretoria (text from USUN press 
elease 100 of Oct. 20). 

"Issued in Pretoria (text from USUN press 
release 101 of Oct. 20) 



t .S.. I .It.. Rhodesian 
Executive Council Meeting 



DEPARTMENT 
ANNOUNCEMENT, 
OCT. 16" 

Members of the Senate Foreign Re- 
lations Committee have informed the 
Department that on October 12 Ian 
Smith told them he was now in favor of 
an all-parties conference with no pre- 
conditions. On October 14 in San 
Diego, Mr. Smith reportedly added that 
all members of the Rhodesian Execu- 
tive Council shared this view. 

After consultation with members of 
the Senate Foreign Relations Commit- 
tee about their discussion with Mr. 
Smith, the Department has invited him 
and his colleagues on the Executive 
Council to meet in Washington with 
senior Department officials and British 
representatives at the end of the week 
for a further exploration of the views 
they have expressed to the Senate 
committee. 

It is recognized by all that a suc- 
cessful all-parties meeting will require 
thorough and careful preparation, in- 
cluding advance consideration of an 



PARTICIPANTS 

United States 

David D. Newsom, Acting Secretary of 
State (Under Secretary for Political 
Affairs) 

Richard Moose, Assistant Secretary for 
African Affairs 

Anthony Lake, Director, Policy Plan- 
ning Staff 

Stephen Low, U.S. Ambassador to Zam- 
bia 

George Moose, Deputy Director, Office 
of South African Affairs 

Ann Holloway, Assistant to U.S. Am- 
bassador to the U.N. Andrew Young 

Mary Ann Spiegel, Member, Policy 
Planning Staff 

United Kingdom 

Peter Jay, Ambassador to the U.S. 
Clifford Squire, Counselor, British Em- 
bassy 

Rhodesian Executive Council 

Reverend Ndabanigi Sithole, Current 

Chairman 
Ian Smith, Member 
Bishop Abel Muzorewa, Member 
Chief Jeremiah Chirau, Member 
John Gaylard, Secretary, Executive 

Council 
John Snell. Secretary to Mr. Smith 
Kenneth Towsey, Director, Rhodesian 

Information Office 



agenda. It is anticipated, therefore, that 
in addition to this further discussion 
with Mr. Smith and his associates, 
there will be discussions with the other 
parties as well. 



JOINT U.S.-U.K. STATEMENT, 
OCT. 20 2 

In the course of discussions today 
with representatives of the British and 
American Governments, the members 
of the Rhodesian Executive Council 
confirmed their willingness to attend a 
well-prepared all-parties conference 
without preconditions. 

In that context, the two sides iden- 
tified certain broad areas for discussion 
between the parties and discussed the 
issues to be considered at a conference 
and other relevant matters. 

The British and American Govern- 
ments now plan to hold discussions 
with the other parties before proceed- 
ing further. 

The British and American represen- 
tatives reiterated their strong concern 
over the escalating cycle of violence in 
the area. In particular, they referred to 
the raids into Zambia and Mozambique 
and the likely impact of these actions 
on the negotiating situation. □ 



'Read to news correspondents by acting De- 
partment spokesman Tom Reston. 

-Read to news correspondents by acting De- 
partment spokesman Tom Reston; also issued 
as USUN press release 102. 



Rhodesian 
Raids 



DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, 
OCT. 23' 

On October 19 the Department con- 
demned the reported Rhodesian raids 
into Mozambique and Zambia, noting 
our concern that this intensification of 
the fighting would jeopardize efforts to 
bring about a negotiated settlement in 
Rhodesia. In his meeting with members 
of the Rhodesian Executive Council on 
October 20, Acting Secretary of State 
David Newsom reiterated these con- 
cerns directly to the Salisbury parties. 

The Rhodesian attacks now appear to 
be among the heaviest and most de- 




structive of the war, particularly in 
terms of the loss of life. We especially 
regret that these attacks were carried 
out while the Executive Council was 
traveling in the United States em- 
phasizing its readiness to negotiate. 

This dramatic and untimely escala- 
tion will not bring about an end to 
conflict; it inflames the attitudes of 
other parties and could confound ef- 
forts to promote meaningful negotia- 
tions. Should these actions continue, 
the violence and suffering will be pro- 
longed, and a negotiated solution will 
become still more difficult to achieve. 

The United States has repeatedly 
condemned the escalation of violence 
by both sides in the Rhodesian conflict. 
If there is to be any hope of achieving 



an early settlement to this increasingly 
brutal and dangerous conflict, then it is 
incumbent upon all parties to recognize 
and demonstrate the wisdom of re- 
straint. 



DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, 
NOV. 2 2 

The Rhodesian military has an- 
nounced that its planes have again 
bombed targets in Zambia. Initial re- 
ports indicate that some of these targets 
were in heavily populated areas within 
a few miles of the capital of Lusaka. 
These attacks constitute a further un- 
warranted and deplorable escalation of 
the Rhodesian war. 



The United States is deeply disturhei 
by these actions and strongly deplore; 
this latest in a series of recent military 
actions which threaten to create ar 
even more dangerous situation in 
southern Africa. 

Such actions can only add to the ten 
sions, bitterness, and distrust among 
the parties and make it more difficult k 
achieve a settlement that will end the 
fighting and bloodshed. If there is to be 
any hope of bringing this brutal and 
dangerous conflict to an end, actions 
such as these must cease. 



ti 



'Read to news correspondents by acting De- 
partment spokesman Tom Reston. 

-'Read to news correspondents by acting De- 
partment spokesman Kenneth Brown. 



December 1978 



Southern Rhodesia 



7 oreign Relations Outline 1 

A British colony since 1890, 
Uiodesia today is populated by about 
!53,00O whites and 6.5 million blacks, 
"he white colonists obtained self- 
.overnment in 1923, and since that 
lime they have severely limited the 
lolitical rights and economic opportu- 
nities of blacks. 

In November 1965, after rejecting 
Sritain's insistence that he move to- 
ward majority rule. Prime Minister Ian 
imith announced a "unilateral decla- 
ation of independence" from the 
Jnited Kingdom. The U.N. Security 
'ouncil, with U.S. support, imposed 
imited economic sanctions on 
r.hodesia in 1966 and a virtually total 
mbargo on trade in 1968. For over 10 
lears, the struggle has continued — 
irough guerrilla warfare and political 
ction — for control of what is to be- 
ome independent Zimbabwe. 

.frican Nationalism 

In the early 1960's, African nation- 
Mists in Rhodesia formed two rival 
roups — the Zimbabwe African Na- 
onal Union (ZANU) and the Zim- 
abwe African People's Union 
^APU), which advocated black voting 
ghts and eventual majority rule. Both 
'ere banned and their leaders detained 
r forced into exile. They ultimately 
lrned to guerrilla warfare from bases 
) neighboring countries. 

By the early 1970's, regular skir- 
lishes with Rhodesian forces had oc- 
urred, and since then civilian and 
lilitary casualties on both sides have 
tcreased substantially. Eventually a 
)ose ZAPU-ZANU alliance, known as 
te patriotic front, was formed. Inside 
.hodesia, other nationalist groups — at 
jmes affiliated with the parties con- 
tituting the patriotic front — formed 
nd reformed but continued to work for 
ifrican political rights. 

inglo- American Plan 

The United Kingdom and the United 
itates are working with all parties to 
itie conflict to achieve a peaceful, in- 
jrnationally recognized settlement. On 
ieptember 1, 1977, detailed Anglo- 
American proposals for a settlement 
vere announced, setting forth basic 
irinciples which we and the British 
upport. These include: 



• An independent Zimbabwe 
(Rhodesia); 

• A transition period; 

• Majority rule; 

• Preindependence elections based 
on universal suffrage; 

• Elections administered by a neu- 
tral, impartial authority; 

• A democratic constitution with an 
integral bill of rights; and 

• The formation of an army loyal to 
the new government. 

Although reactions were mixed, no 
party rejected the plan. 2 



Internal Solution 

Following presentation of the 
Anglo-American proposals, the Smith 
regime began negotiating with the 
internal nationalists on a transfer of 
power, and in March 1978 Smith 
signed the Salisbury agreement with 
three black leaders. 

This agreement provided for inde- 
pendence by the end of 1978, qualified 
majority rule, eventual elections with 
universal suffrage, and an interim ad- 
ministration headed by an executive 
council and a cabinet with black mem- 
bership. However, the civil service, the 
military, and the judiciary would re- 
main unaffected under the Salisbury 
agreement during the crucial election 
and transition period. 

For 10 years, 28 of 100 seats in the 
new parliament — a number sufficient to 
block constitutional amendments — 
would be chosen by Rhodesia's 3% 
white population. The external 
nationalists refused to participate in the 
settlement, mainly because it requires 
that they first lay down their arms and 
subject themselves during the transition 
to the administrative control of the 
present authorities. 

U.S. Policy 

U.S. policy on Rhodesia is to perse- 
vere with the United Kingdom in ef- 
forts to find a fair solution and to 
maintain our position as an honest 
broker among the contending parties. 
This approach offers the best chance to 
reach an acceptable agreement and to 
avoid a situation easily exploitable by 
the Soviets and the Cubans. Moreover, 
demonstrating to other African states 
our commitment and concern provides 
the strongest counterpoint to Soviet/ 



27 

Cuban use of military power and per- 
mits a continued strong U.S. role in 
Africa. 

Our policy is based on the following 
premises. 

• The conflict will continue unless a 
solution can be found offering a realis- 
tic possibility for fair participation in 
the transition government and the 
electoral process by the main 
parties — the Salisbury group and the 
patriotic front. 

• Soviet and Cuban intervention is a 
strong possibility if the conflict con- 
tinues, and U.S. interests would suffer. 

• A peaceful, internationally recog- 
nized solution can be obtained only 
through negotiation; the best chance 
now appears to lie in engaging all par- 
ties in a transition process, with none 
having a predominant influence. 

• The United States does not favor 
one side against the other. Endorsing 
either side's negotiating position would 
prejudice the political opportunities of 
the other and could further inflame the 
conflict. 

• We believe that the Anglo- 
American proposals provide the best 
basis for an agreement, but we would 
support any other arrangements worked 
out by the parties consistent with our 
support for principles of democratic 
government. 

All parties have agreed on the prin- 
ciples of independence, majority rule, 
universal suffrage, an independent 
judiciary, and the broad outlines of a 
constitution protecting the rights of all. 
The United States hopes they can also 
agree on arrangements for the impartial 
administration of the country for an 
interim period in which all parties can 
compete equally in free elections. □ 



•Taken from a Department of State publica- 
tion in the GIST series, released in June 1978. 
This outline is designed to be a quick reference 
aid on U.S. foreign relations. It is not intended 
as a comprehensive U.S. foreign policy state- 
ment. 

2 For full text of the plan, see Bulletin of 
Oct. 3, 1977, p. 424. 



Letter 

of Credence 

On November 16, 1978, Macky 
Koreissi Aguibou Tall presented his 
credentials to President Carter as the 
newly appointed Ambassador from 
Mali. □ 



28 



Department of State Bulletin > 



EAST ASIA: The Dominoes 
That Did Vol Fall 



by David D. Newsom 

Address before the Far East Council 
on Trade and Industry in New York on 
October 2, 1978. Mr. Newsom is 
Under Secretary for Political Affairs. ' 

Any pundit looking back on his 4- or 
5-year predictions on the course of 
events in Southeast Asia can only be 
embarrassed. The dominoes which 
were to have fallen did not fall. The 
nations which were to have emerged 
from the war with the strength and de- 
termination to take over Southeast Asia 
are fighting among themselves. 

We were reminded of this dramatic 
irony recently in Washington when the 
representatives of the five nations of 
the Association of South East Asian 
Nations (ASEAN)— Thailand, Ma- 
laysia, Singapore, Indonesia, and 
the Philippines — gathered for their 
periodic dialogue with the United 
States. Each of these nations last year 
had a growth rate better than 6'/f . 
Each demonstrated a stability which, 
despite problems, gave it confidence 
and hope for the future. The area as a 
whole has become one of the major 
centers for U.S. trade. 

Why did our gloomy forecasts not 
come true? Why is Southeast Asia 
today, despite recognized problems, 
one of the most hopeful areas of the 
developing world? 

It is still not easy to draw conclu- 
sions on the nature of the Vietnam war. 
Yet, there is much to suggest that the 
carrying of the revolution to the states 
of Southeast Asia, beyond Indochina, 
was not a priority objective in Hanoi. 
Their immediate priorities related to 
the expulsion of the foreigners, begin- 
ning with the French, and to the 
reunification of what they considered 
their traditional nation. 

It is now even clearer that, while 
Vietnam had an extraordinary capacity 
to wage war on its territory, it was, ba- 
sically, a very undeveloped country. 
The Vietnamese search for outside help 
now is not only a manifestation of their 
political requirements and reconstruc- 
tion needs; it is also evidence of the 
basic underdevelopment of their coun- 
try. 

To suggest that the threat may not 
have been as great as many felt, how- 
ever, is not to detract from the accom- 
plishments of those nations on the 
periphery of Indochina. It is, perhaps, 



to suggest greater caution on our part in 
our predictions on the course of events 
in other societies. 

Strengths of ASEAN States 

In the nations which now comprise 
ASEAN, there was greater strength 
than many assumed at the time. This 
strength was manifested, first, in the 
calmness with which these nations 
reacted to the events in Indochina. 
Many of the more alarming expressions 
were on this side, rather than their side 
of the Pacific. 

Although resources and productive 
capabilities are substantial in some 
areas of the region, these are not the 
fundamental source of the strength we 
now see emerging. Rather the confi- 
dence gained from winning and main- 
taining their independence and the 
strong spirit of nationalism that per- 
vades the area have provided the basic 
impetus for progress and success. 

• Thailand, except for the period of 
Japanese occupation, has never been 
under foreign domination. 

• Malaysia has emerged from the 
trials of its postwar emergency and has 
been independent since 1957. 

• Singapore, a remarkable city state, 
has been independent since 1965. 

• Indonesia, fully independent after 
1949, and the Philippines, in 1946, are 
among the two earliest states to become 
free in the post-World War II move- 
ment. 

A second major source of strength 
among the ASEAN nations is the ex- 
traordinary and pragmatic quality of 
the leadership that has emerged. Each 
of these nations has in its own way 
created cadres of capable people who 
are facing squarely the major problems 
of each nation. 

In Indonesia, well-trained econ- 
omists and technicians helped the 
military and political leaders turn the 
economic shambles, overwhelming 
debt, and rampant inflation of the 
Sukarno era into effective progress in 





Correct 


ion 






In the An 


gust 1978 


Hi l i i iin 


(P 


3). 


!he GNP f 


igure for 


Western 


Samoa 


should have 


been $.045 ($45 mill 


ion 


) for 


1974. 











economic development. They also 
helped the nation weather the impact of 
the Pertamina crisis. 

Universities and other institutions of 
higher learning in Malaysia and Singa- 
pore have provided cadres to meet the 
continuing needs for upgrading in the 
managerial, technical, and scientific 
areas. The growth rate of both coun- 
tries is spectacular. 

The Filipino economic planners have 
parlayed advanced business degrees 
obtained in the United States and in- 
herent entrepreneurial skills into a 
polished mix of free enterprise and 
state economic planning. Economic 
growth in the range of 6% per annum 
has helped ease severe balance-of-pay- 
ments problems stemming from the oil 
crisis. 

Thailand's new generation of eco- 
nomic policymakers and managers are: 
for the most part Western educated and 
understand the market mechanism. We 
see them striving to strike a proper bal- 
ance between private enterprise and in- 
vestment and what they perceive to be 
a need for state management of certain 
strategic economic sectors. 

Regional and International Relations 

Nowhere is the confidence of the 
ASEAN nations in themselves more 
manifested than in their relations witht 
each other and with the rest of the 
world. 

When Americans look at ASEAN, 
they sometimes tend to look for mora 
dramatic manifestations of the cooper- 
ation among these nations than may be 
realistic at this stage. We must look at 
the starting point. During my time in 
Southeast Asia, I was struck by how 
little these nations (except for Singa- 
pore and Malaysia) knew of each other 
until recently. Although geographically 
proximate, there is great diversity ire 
the region, much of it growing from 
barriers erected by different colonial 
ties and old disputes which needed to 
be overcome and reconciled. Few ofl 
the universities in one country even had 
courses relating to the cultures of their 
neighbors. Malaysia and Indonesia had 
been at war during Sukarno's time. 

The ASEAN economies were more 
competitive than complementary and 
the focus of their foreign economic ef- 
forts has been outside rather than 
within the region. Moreover, these 
were not well-developed European na- 
tions which could move swiftly into 
sophisticated economic relationships. It 
took Europe 15 years to create the 
European Economic Community 
(EEC). 

Nonetheless, the ASEAN countries 
have perceived the importance of closer 



/ 



December 1978 



29 



pgional cooperation. They have de- 
jeloped an elaborate framework of 
onsultation on all major economic is- 
jues. These consultations range from 
lonthly meetings at the ministerial 
pvel to frequent technical-level discus- 
lions. ASEAN has begun the process 
If abolishing duties on trade and has 
|;ached agreement on several hundred 
[ems. They are working on the estab- 
Ishment of regional industrial projects. 
Uninhibited by the political consid- 
erations which sometimes make de- 
eloping countries hesitate to talk with 
Ithers, the states of ASEAN moved 
lery quickly after their summit meeting 
t Bali in February 1976 to expand 
xisting dialogues with the EEC and 
.ustralia and to establish dialogues 
ith their other major trading 
artners — Canada, Japan, and then the 
nited States. 

' The United States and ASEAN have 

nbarked on a series of high-level eco- 

I3mic consultations, beginning with 

leetings September 1977 in Manila 

id August of this year in Washington. 

s a consequence of this dialogue, 

I .S. economic policy toward Southeast 

sia is now being shaped to take 

SEAN into account, in addition to 

aditional bilateral relationships. As an 

<ample, bearing particularly on the 

iterests of the business community, 

)hn Moore [President and Chairman 

w the Export-Import Bank] is leading 

i Eximbank team visit to ASEAN. 

ustralia, and New Zealand in Oc- 

■>ber and November, and about the 

lame time Chuck Robinson [former 

>eputy Secretary of State] is heading 

n investment mission to ASEAN spon- 

jred by the Overseas Private Invest- 

lent Corporation (OPIC). 

Not only did the states of ASEAN 

tove to talk to their traditional friends, 

Jt they moved also to establish satis- 

tctory relationships with their Com- 

mnist neighbors. The trend has helped 

lute the criticism from both Moscow 

;nd Peking which was once leveled at 

: lis organization. 

On our side, we welcomed the fact 
kiat, only 3 years after the end of the 
I'ietnam war, these nations feel suffi- 
ently strong to extend their hand to 
le Communist states of Asia. This is a 
'ositive note in the Asian scene. I 
ould stress here our own hope that 
'ietnam will indeed be a peaceful par- 
cipant in Southeast Asia. 

'he Future 

And now — what of the future? In 
lach of the countries — in its own 
/ay — development is the priority, 
"hroughout the area there is a recogni- 
ion that, in the long run, only the suc- 



cess of their freer economic systems 
will overcome the challenge of the 
Communist models to the north. In the 
eyes of the ASEAN leaders, this strug- 
gle is far more real and significant than 
any possible military confrontation. 

Indonesia. Indonesia is the poorest 
of the five. Its birth as a nation was ac- 
companied by war, internal insurrec- 
tion, and nationalistic economic 
policies which left it on the verge of 
bankruptcy. Its island character, 
stretching 3,500 miles across the 
Pacific, provides a special challenge to 
development. Despite oil and natural 
gas, its annual per capita income is still 
only about $300. 

Its food deficit makes it the largest 
importer of rice in the world. Its popu- 
lation pressures on the islands of Java 
and Bali compound the problem of de- 
velopment. Yet each of these major 
problems is being tackled. A high 
priority is being given to irrigation, 
fertilizer, and the use of higher yield 
strains of rice. Its population program, 
particularly in the densely settled areas 
of East Java and Bali, is considered 
one of the most successful in the 
world. 

Singapore. At independence, Singa- 
pore found itself with a flourishing en- 
trepot trade, a good location, and the 
skills of its people but few resources. 
Within a decade the Government of 
Singapore transformed the island into a 
significant manufacturing center and 
moved away from purely entrepot ac- 
tivities to oil refining, electronics, and 
ship repair and construction. It is fast 
becoming a major financial center for 
the region, and with nearly 500 U.S. 
corporations having offices there, a 
major focus for U.S. firms trading with 
the entire region. It now has the second 
■highest per capita GNP in Asia (ap- 
proximately $2,900 in 1977) and has 
maintained growth rates of over 8% 
during the past few years, having had 
double digit growth the previous 
decade. 

Malaysia. Rich in rubber, tin, palm 
oil, tropical woods, and petroleum, 
Malaysia's strategy has been to 
maximize earnings from its com- 
modities while at the same time de- 
veloping a manufacturing sector em- 
phasizing high labor-intensive technol- 
ogy such as electronics. Its growth 
rates which have averaged 8-10% per 
annum are expected to continue. 

Philippines. Belying the apparent 
abundance of land, the 7,000-island 
Philippine Archipelago is highly 
mountainous and provides limited ara- 



ble area. Because of this and the tradi- 
tionally high birth rate, primary atten- 
tion has been directed at increased pro- 
ductivity of foodstuffs and concomitant 
efforts at population growth restraint. 
Some measurable success has been 
achieved in that the population growth 
rate has declined from the high of 3.4% 
of 1970 to a more acceptable level of 
2.85% today. Equally important, for 
the past 2 years the Philippines has 
been self-sufficient in rice and has even 
enjoyed a modest exportable surplus. 
The Philippines program for rural 
electrification cooperatives has proved 
so successful that it is now used as a 
model and training ground for other 
developing countries. 

Thailand. Thailand is predominantly 
an agrarian nation characterized by se- 
vere regional and rural-urban income 



Inns Sales 
to Taiwan 



DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, 
NOV. 6 1 

The U.S. Government has consid- 
ered a number of requests from the Re- 
public of China (R.O.C.) for weapons 
purchases. On the basis of an assess- 
ment of Taiwan's legitimate defense 
needs and the President's policy on 
arms transfers, we have decided to 
offer for sale to the R.O.C. additional 
F-5E interceptor aircraft with improved 
weaponry, including precision-guided 
munitions and Maverick missiles. We 
had earlier informed the R.O.C. that we 
would not object to their purchasing the 
Israeli KFIR fighter which is equipped 
with U.S. components. 

We have turned down Taiwan's re- 
quest for the F-4, F-16, and F-18 on 
the grounds that these would violate the 
Administration's arms transfer policy. 
In conveying these decisions to the 
R.O.C, we did not address their re- 
quest for the so-called F-5G since a 
decision has not been made to produce 
such a follow-on aircraft to the F-5E. 
The F-5E which will be offered to 
Taiwan, with its improved armament, 
will provide an additional capability to 
help meet the R.O.C. s defense re- 
quirements. The United States will 
continue to be responsive to Taiwan's 
legitimate defense needs. □ 



1 Read to news correspondents by acting De- 
partment spokeswoman Jill Schuker. 



30 



disparities. The present government 
has announced its plans to redress in- 
come disparities and focus its efforts 
on rural-based industry, intensification 
of land use, and diversification of ag- 
riculture. Development of indigenous 
gas discoveries should relieve 
balance-of-payments problems stem- 
ming from imported energy and possi- 
bly release needed foreign exchange 
earnings for further development of ex- 
port oriented agri-based industries. 

Economic development has not been 
the only problem confronting the na- 
tions of Southeast Asia. Each of the 
nations of ASEAN emerged into inde- 
pendence with problems of internal 
friction and the need for stronger 
political institutions and cohesion. 
Each in its own way has sought to deal 
with these problems. 

• Thailand has faced rural insurgen- 
cies and frequent changes in govern- 
ment but has been able to maintain a 
high degree of political continuity 
under the King. 

• The progress in Malaysia's politi- 
cal stability was demonstrated by the 
recent election. Malays and Chinese 
alike supported the victory of Prime 
Minister Hussein Onn's party. 

• Singapore remains stable and 
prosperous under its unique leader, 
Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew. 

• Indonesia's political institutions 
have recently survived the test of 
another national election. Its internal 
reconciliation has been marked by the 
continuing release of those detained 
after the 1965 abortive Communist 
coup. 

• The Philippines is still plagued by 
the 300-year-old Muslim insurrection 
in the south. President Marcos, after 6 
years of martial law, is now seeking 
new political institutions through a re- 
cently elected interim National Assem- 
bly. 

In stressing the progress in several 
areas of these nations, I do not ignore 
the weaknesses and shortcomings that 
are common to new nations. But they 
are often dwelt upon. For those of you 
in business, asking the question of 
whether this is an area that merits your 
attention, I can properly dwell on the 
positive. It is not everywhere in the 
world that you can find five developing 
countries, with a total population of a 
quarter of a billion people, generally 
supportive of the free enterprise sys- 
tem, welcoming foreign investment, 
representing a rapidly growing market 
for U.S. goods, and with a reasonable 
degree of stability. I well know that 
many of you may feel that some of the 
policies of these countries raise ques- 



tions about their genuine interest in 
foreign investment. My impression is 
that, while there are frustrations and 
differences, the leaders possess in 
common a basic desire for an effective 
balance between their political neces- 
sities and the climate for investment 
and trade. Moreover, they are prepared 
to talk with foreign representatives 
about the problems they may face. 

Officially, we see in these countries 
a significant indigenous grouping of 
nations with which we have much in 
common. Their strength lies in the fact 
that they are free to associate with 
many states of different systems, not 
just with us. They can be considered 
nonaligned in the best sense of the 
word. 

With some, such as the Philippines, 
we have special ties through a defense 
treaty and the presence of our military 
bases. But in no sense has this pre- 
vented the Philippines from a free and 
independent foreign policy. 

The dominoes did not fall because 
they had inherent strengths and con- 
centrated on development of their 
economies and effective political in- 
stitutions, and because the problems 
within Indochina were far greater than 
we perceived. It is now in the interest 
of all the friends of ASEAN, through 
active trade and investment and 
through official assistance as required, 
to see that their philosophies and their 
systems point the way for their peoples 
to a bright future. Neither they nor we 
want other Asian models to extend or 
to prevail. □ 



Introductory paragraph omitted. 



Publications 



GPO SALES 

Publications ma\ be ordered by catalog or 
stock number from the Superintendent oj 

Documents, U S Government Priming Office. 
Washington, DC. 2<>4()2 A 25 91 discount is 
made on orders for 11)1) or more copies Oj any 
one publication mailed lo the same address. 
Remittances, payable to the Superintendent oj 

Documents, must accompany orders Prices 
shown below, which unhide domestic postage. 

ate subjet l Ui i llange 

Kit-ill Secondary and Feeder Roads Project. 

Agreement with the Philippines TIAS 8666. 

35 pp SI 40 (Cat, No. S9. 10:8666). 
Trade in Cotton, Wool, and Man-Made 
Fiber Textiles and Textile Products. Agree- 
ment with Macau. TIAS 8672 3 pp 60?. (Cat. 
No. S9. 10:8672). 



Department of State Bulletin 

Science and Technology Program. Memoran- 
dum of Understanding with the Republic of 
Korea. TIAS 8678. 8 pp. 70C. (Cat. No. 
S9. 10:8678). 

Waterworks Systems. Agreement with the 
Philippines. TIAS 8703. 38 pp. $1.40. (Cat. No. 
S9. 10:8703.) 

Rural Electrification. Agreement with the 
Philippines. TIAS 8704. 32 pp. $1.30. (Cat. No. 
S9. 10:8704.) 

Air Transport Services. Agreement with Sin- 
gapore. TIAS 8721. 8 pp. 700. (Cat. No. 
S9. 10:8721.) 
Economic Assistance. Agreement with the Re- 
public of Korea. TIAS 8730. 2 pp. 50?. (Cat. 
No. S9. 10:8730.) 

Trade in Textiles. Agreements with Thailand, 
amending the agreement of December 29, 
1975. TIAS 8780. 8pp. 80?. (Cat. No. 
S9. 10:8780.) 
Express Mail Service. Agreement with Japan. 
TIAS 8794. 3 pp. 60? (Cat. No. 
S9. 10:8794.) 
Express Mail Service. Agreement with Hong 
Kong TIAS 8795. 2 pp. 50?. (Cat. No. 
S9. 10:8795 ) 
Integrated Communications System. Agree- 
ment with Thailand. TIAS 8837. 7 pp. 80?. 
(Cat. No. S9. 10:8837.) 
Research Institute of Medical Sciences. 
Agreement with Thailand, modifying and 
continuing the agreements of December 23 
1960 and April I and 25. 1963. TIAS 8840 
3 pp 70?. (Cat No. S9 10:8840.) 
Military Assistance — Eligibility Require 
ments Pursuant to the International Secu 
rity Assistance and Arms Export Control 
Act of 1976. Agreement with Malaysia 
TIAS 8845. 5 pp. 70?. (Cat No 
S9. 10:8845.) 
Family Planning. Agreement with Indonesia 
TIAS 8848 26 pp $1.30. (Cat No. 
S9. 10:8848 ) 
Surakarta Potable Water. Agreement with 
Indonesia. TIAS 8849 32 pp. $1.40. (Cat. 
No S9. 10:8849.) 
Ammunition Storage. Agreement with Thai- 
land TIAS 8850. 5 pp. 70?. (Cat. No. 
S9 10:8850 | 

Whaling — International Observer Scheme. 

Agreement with Japan, extending the agree- 
ment of May 2. 1975, as extended TIAS 
8874. 6 pp. 70?. (Cat. No. S9. 10:8874.) 

Trade in Textiles. Agreement with the Philip- 
pines, amending and extending the agree- 
ment of October 15. 1975. as amended. 
TIAS 8880. 5 pp. 70?, (Cat. No. 
S9. 10:8880.) 

Trade in Textiles. Agreements with the 
Philippines, amending ihe agreement of Oc- 
tober 15. 1975. as amended and extended. 
TIAS 8881 20 pp. $1.10 (Cat No. 
S9. 10:8881.) 

Air Transport Services. Agreement with 
Japan, amending the agreement of August 
11, 1952. as amended. TIAS 8882. 4 pp. 
70?. (Cat. No. S9. 10:8882.) □ 



)ecember 1978 



31 



ECONOMICS: Measures to 
Strengthen the Dollar 



REMARKS OF THE PRESIDENT 
ND TREASURY SECRETARY 
[LUMENTHAL, NOV. 1 ' 

president Carter 

I Last week, I pledged my Adminis- 
lation to a balanced, concerted, and 
Lstained program to fight inflation. 
I hat program requires effective 
talkies to assure a strong dollar. 
I The basic factors that affect the 
Irength of the dollar are heading in the 
Ight direction. We now have an energy 
rogram passed by Congress; our trade 
bficit is declining; and last week, I put 
i place a strong anti-inflation pro- 
ram. 

i The continuing decline in the ex- 
lange value of the dollar is clearly not 
arranted by the fundamental eco- 
jmic situation. That decline threatens 
:onomic progress at home and abroad 
id the success of our anti-inflation 
•ogram . 

As a major step in the anti-inflation 
"ogram, it is now necessary to act to 
meet the excessive decline in the 
jllar which has recently occurred, 
herefore, pursuant to my request that 
rong action be taken, the Department 
F the Treasury and the Federal Re- 
;rve Board are today initiating meas- 
■es in both domestic and international 
onetary fields to assure the strength 
F the dollar. 

The international components of this 

rogram have been developed with 

kther major governments and with 

:ntral banks. They intend to cooperate 

illy with the United States in attaining 

ir mutual objectives. 

Secretary Blumenthal and Chairman 

fliller are announcing detailed meas- 

res immediately. 

secretary Blumenthal 

In the past few months the United 
itates has taken action to correct the 
nbalances that have characterized our 
:onomy. We have passed an energy 
ill which will lead to a reduction of 
ur dependence on imported oil. We 
ave implemented a program to en- 
iance exports as a national priority. 
i/e have launched a tough and deter- 
liined anti-inflation campaign. We 
|ave taken steps to reduce the govern- 
ment's preemption of the nation's fi- 
ancial resources by cutting dramati- 
our budget deficit. 



ally 



We have also moved decisively to- 
ward undoing the overregulation of our 
great economy. We have enacted a tax 
bill which will enhance capital forma- 
tion and improve productivity. More 
must and will be done, but the prereq- 
uisites for improved economic per- 
formance are in place. 

Recent moves in the dollar exchange 
rates have not only exceeded any de- 
cline related to the fundamental factors 
but plainly are hampering progress to- 
ward the price stability, balance-of- 
payments improvement, and enhanced 
climate for investment and growth 
which these measures are designed to 
bring about. 

The time has, therefore, come to call 
a halt to these developments. At the 
President's direction, Chairman [of the 
Federal Reserve Board G. William] 
Miller and I are today announcing 
comprehensive corrective actions. 

Effective immediately, the Federal 
Reserve is raising the discount rate 
from 8V2 to 9'/2% and is imposing a 
supplementary reserve requirement 
equal to 2 percentage points of time 
deposits of $100,000 or more. 

In addition to domestic measures 
being taken by the Federal Reserve, the 
United States will, in cooperation with 
the Governments and central banks of 
Germany and Japan, and the Swiss Na- 
tional Bank, intervene in a forceful and 
coordinated manner in the amounts re- 
quired to correct the situation. The 
United States has arranged facilities 
totaling $30 billion in the currencies of 
these three countries, which will fi- 
nance the U.S. contribution to the 
coordinated market intervention 
activities of the four participating 
countries. 

That $30 billion in the currencies of 
these three countries are being raised 
through a drawing of the U.S. reserve 
tranche of the International Monetary 
Fund; through the sale of special 
drawing rights to Germany, Japan, and 
Switzerland; through a substantial in- 
crease in the Federal Reserve swap 
lines with the Bundesbank, the Bank of 
Japan, and the Swiss National Bank; 
and through our intention to issue 
foreign currency denominated securi- 
ties. Together, this will make up the 
$30 billion package. 

In addition, the Treasury will in- 
crease its gold sales to at least IV2 mil- 
lion ounces monthly, beginning in De- 
cember. The currency mobilization 



measures will be described in more 
detail, and Under Secretary Solomon is 
here to answer any questions. 2 

The fact is that the foreign exchange 
situation that this program is designed 
to correct has gotten out of hand. It 
must end, and it will end. The dollar's 
deterioration has already led to a rise in 
import competitive prices, which fur- 
ther fuels inflation and perpetuates a 
vicious cycle. And the image of the 
American economy and its leadership 
is adversely affected by this. 

We feel that failure to act now would 
be injurious to the American and to the 
world economy. Our economy is 
strong. Steps have been taken to 
strengthen it further, and the funda- 
mental economic conditions and 
growth trends in the four nations that 
are a party to this agreement are mov- 
ing toward a better international bal- 
ance. 

Assisted by the actions we have now 
announced, this will provide an im- 
proved framework for a restoration of 
more stable exchange markets and the 
correction of the recent excessive ex- 
change rate movements. □ 



1 Made to reporters assembled in the Briefing 
Room at the While House (text from Weekly 
Compilation of Presidential Documents of Nov. 
6. 1978). 

2 Following Secretary Blumenthal's remarks, 
Anthony M. Solomon, Under Secretary of the 
Treasury for Monetary Affairs, and he held a 
news conference on the Treasury Department 
and Federal Reserve System measures; the text 
of this news conference was issued as a White 
House press release on Nov. 1. 



Congressional 
Documents 



Department of Defense Appropriations for Fis- 
cal Year 1978. Report of the committee of 
conference to accompany H.R. 7933. H. 
Rept. 95-565. Aug. 4, 1977. 57 pp. 

Canadian Tax Provisions on U.S. Broadcast- 
ing. Report of the Senate Committee on 
Foreign Relations to accompany S. Res. 152. 
S. Rept. 95-402. Aug. 5, 1977. 3 pp. 

Customs Procedural Reform. Report of the 
House Committee on Ways and Means to ac- 
company H.R. 8149. H. Rept. 95-621. Sept. 
23. 1977. 66 pp. 

Unlawful Corporate Payments Act of 1977. 
Report of the House Committee on Interstate 
and Foreign Commerce, together with minor- 
ity views, to accompany H.R. 3815. H. 
Rept 95-640. Sept. 28, 1977. 21 pp 

Increased Funding for the Reception of Foreign 
Dignitaries. Report of the Senate Committee 
on Foreign Relations to accompany S. Res. 
278. S. Rept. 95-459. Sept. 30, 1977. 
2 pp. □ 



32 



Department of State Bulletin 



Managing Economic Problems 
in the industri€tUzed Democracies 



by Robert D. Hormats 

Address before the third U.S. -EC 
(European Community) Economic 
Journalists' Conference at the Airlie 
House in Virginia on September 9, 
1978. Mr. Hormats is Deputy Assist- 
ant Secretary for Economic and Busi- 
ness Affairs . 

I shall try in this discussion to cover 
three related sets of issues: first, recent 
underlying trends common to Western 
Europe and the United States; second, 
a few of the major economic problems 
before us; and third, the issue of lead- 
ership in our societies and in the world 
economy. 



Recent Trends 

Without attempting to be exhaustive, 
I would suggest three trends which 
contribute to the complexity of con- 
temporary economic problems. 

The first trend relates to the inten- 
sive push and pull among political 
pressures which has resulted in a 
marked change in the economic 
characteristics of our societies in recent 
years. The so-called single-interest 
pressure group has made development 
of a national consensus especially dif- 
ficult. A certain "refeudalization" of 
politics has taken place, as 
individuals — perhaps reacting to the 
bigness and distance of government — 
seek to amplify their voices through 
participation in these groups. The abil- 
ity of governments or broad political 
parties to balance competing interests 
and aggregate them into policies which 
have the support of a substantial per- 
centage of the electorate is corre- 
spondingly diminished. 

The industrialized democracies, in 
this respect, share a common dilemma. 
On the one hand our democratic tradi- 
tion demands that our institutions be 
sensitive to a wide variety of interests. 
On the other hand, because individuals 
increasingly express themselves on 
many issues not through elected district 
or state representatives who can at that 
level aggregate them but rather as part 
of specifically focused, nationwide 
constituencies, democratic govern- 
ments find it difficult to formulate and 
implement broad policies which serve 
the long-term national interest. 

These pressure groups, as well as in- 
dividual citizens, have become adept in 



using the system — the bureaucracies, 
regulatory bodies, the legislatures, and, 
most strikingly, the courts — to block or 
at least substantially delay policies 
which they find distasteful. In this 
post-Vietnam, post-Watergate era, the 
political dissent of the 1960's has been 
translated into the economic dissent of 
the 1970's. Thus, while we have be- 
come in one sense more democratized 
through greater access to the instru- 
ments of power, we have in another 
sense become considerably less so. It 
has become difficult to mold, or even 
identify, a "will of the majority" and 
even more difficult to convince indi- 
viduals and groups to compromise 
with, or bend to meet, the democratic 
consensus. 

The second trend relates to the ends 
to which the aforementioned pressures 
are directed. The economic success of 
the industrialized democracies since 
World War II has resulted in new types 
of economic demands being placed on 
governments. The progress of the last 
25 years — most clearly manifest in the 
dramatic improvements in living and 
working conditions — has brought the 
average American and European a life- 
style which a generation ago would 
have been considered a prerogative of 
only the very rich. 

Because of this success, the em- 
phasis of government economic 
policies appears to have shifted. In 
earlier years the achievement of rapid 
economic growth was a strong unifying 
objective behind which broad political 
coalitions could rally and to which 
narrower interests were generally sub- 
ordinated. Today the goal of economic 
growth is often indirectly dominated by 
social, environmental, and distribu- 
tional goals. I stress the word "indi- 
rectly" because, except for a relatively 
small number of people or groups op- 
posed to further economic growth, few 
want to believe that the measures they 
advocate will reduce economic growth. 
just as few want to believe that the 
single action they support will contrib- 
ute to inflation. But many actions taken 
by governments, however virtuous 
the motive, tend cumulatively to reduce 
productivity, place a drag on growth, 
and contribute to inflationary 
pressures. 

These same social and equity con- 
cerns lead toward policies which at- 
tempt to minimize, or protect citizens 
from, risk — be it from a nuclear reac- 



tor, the noise of the Concorde, or com- 
petition from imports. The strong 
desire to preserve what we have fre- 
quently undermines our willingness to 
accept the kinds of changes which 
would produce greater economic well- 
being in the long run but with painful 
adjustment or risk to certain individuals 
or groups. The trade-off of less risk for 
less growth may be entirely appropriate 
in many circumstances. Given, how- 
ever, the difficulty of identifying the 
long-term economic costs of each 
risk-averting decision when that deci- 
sion is made, I have to question 
whether we are fully conscious of the 
implications of this trade-off. 

Economic policymakers must, 
therefore, cope with a growing section 
of the population which is interested in 
preserving the status quo along with 
another substantial portion which be- 
lieves that improvements in the quality 
of life are costless — that society has 
little need to make hard choices or set 
priorities and that multiple demands 
can be accommodated. 

The third trend, which follows from 
the first two, is toward greater uncer- 
tainty and a consequent lack of long- 
term focus in government policies. The 
practical economic result of the pres- 
sures I have identified is that economic 
policy tends more often than not to be 
erratic. Leaders frequently adjust 
policies to accommodate popular sen- 
timent. New legal or social consid- 
erations are constantly being injected 
into our economic planning. As leaders 
or institutions attempt to satisfy politi- 
cal or social sentiments of the moment, 
they tend to focus less on the longer 
term problems and to ignore the 
cumulative effects of their actions. 

A striking example of this trend is 
found in the many new sources of in- 
flation being built into our economies 
through policies — many to be sure with 
considerable merit — which respond to 
relatively short-term pressures. The in- 
hibiting effect on investment in new 
capacity and jobs of uncertainties re- 
sulting from frequent changes in eco- 
nomic rules is another good example. 
In addition to these economic costs 
there is also a political cost. While the 
body politic demands quick responses 
to current pressures, it tends to judge 
leaders, institutions, and systems 
primarily by their ability to resolve 
longer term problems such as inflation 
and growth. Thus, there may be an in- 



» 



ecember 1978 



erse correlation between efforts to 
itisfy short-term political pressures 
nd long-term political support. 

lountertrends 

Let me punctuate this rather pes- 
mistic train of thought by identifying 
vo developments which appear to be 
loving in the opposite direction, to- 
ard a simplification of the process of 
:onomic management. 

The first is that the popular senti- 
tent for an increased government role 
1 economic affairs seems to have 
bated on both sides of the Atlantic. 
he recent economic difficulties ex- 
erienced by our societies have brought 
bout a rethinking of the proper role of 
overnment. Large budget deficits, 
igh taxes, over-regulation, and doubts 
s to the ability of the government to 
utguess the market in investment pol- 
:y have created sentiment in many 
uarters for a reduction, or at least a 
andstill, in the current level of gov- 
"nment intervention. 

In Western Europe today, we see 
;ss pressure for nationalization, 
rowing disenchantment with state- 
wned enterprises, and a recognition of 
le need for a revitalized private sec- 
>r. In a recent poll in the United 
ingdom, 78% of those questioned 
aid they were opposed to further 
ationalization. The recent liberaliza- 
on measures of Prime Minister Barre 
l France imply a marked change in at- 
tude in that country. Even the Italian 
ommunist Party has recently ex- 
ressed disenchantment with state- 
wned corporations. In the United 
tates, there appear to be strong popu- 
ir views that a reduction in govern- 
lent regulation and in disincentives to 
apital formation in the private sector 
lay well help stimulate lagging in- 
estment and reduce inflation. 

The second countertrend is the 
reater perception of several national 
aders of the political as well as the 
:onomic benefits of establishing and 
dhering to consistent policy direc- 
ons. Leaders who have adopted con- 
sent economic policies have gener- 
ted renewed public confidence in their 
:adership and in the economic systems 
ver which they preside. A few cases 
tand out. While perhaps greeted with 
:ss than total enthusiasm initially, the 
olicies of [President] Giscard and 
Prime Minister] Barre have generated 
rowing public confidence both be- 
ause of their perceived correctness 
nd because of the apparent determina- 
on of the French leadership to adhere 
3 them. The policies of Prime Minister 
.allaghan and Chancellor [of the Ex- 
hequer] Healey, also unpopular in 



some quarters initially, have led to a 
long-term strengthening of confidence 
in Britain and important improvements 
in the British economy. These policies 
have led to a firming of economic ac- 
tivity in France and a strong recovery 
in the United Kingdom. Political sta- 
bility in both countries has increased as 
a result. 

Four Major Economic Issues 

Let me now turn to several issues 
which, against this backdrop, our 
societies must address more forcefully. 

Inflation. While concern over un- 
employment and inflation compete for 
attention, the problem of inflation ap- 
pears today to have emerged the victor 
in such competition in the United 
States and, I believe, in many countries 
of Western Europe. The problem seems 
so intractable, it affects all people in 
any society, and its adverse economic 
effects tend to divide Western 
societies. The middle classes who find 
their savings eroded and their lifestyles 
deteriorating feel that the rich can pro- 
tect themselves while the poor are pro- 
tected by government welfare pro- 
grams. This attitude puts pressure on 
programs designed to benefit lower in- 
come groups. 

Many of the causes of inflation are 
built into our economies through 
legislation and regulation. The most 
frequently advocated prescription 



33 



credibility — needed to persuade busi- 
ness to hold down prices and labor to 
hold down wage demands — is consid- 
erably reduced. 

Societies will from time to time in- 
evitably decide for entirely appropriate 
reasons to take actions which are in- 
flationary. But if the inflationary trend 
is to be reversed, we must be consid- 
erably more judicious about the selec- 
tion and timing of such actions. As a 
beginning, we should strengthen the 
presumption against measures which 
increase inflationary pressures and 
undertake a more energetic effort to 
remove previously built-in rigidities. 

While such an approach would un- 
doubtedly be burdensome to certain 
groups, the costs would be smaller for 
society at large than the ultimate costs 
of inappropriate actions or of delaying 
appropriate actions. If and when neces- 
sary, action to alleviate the costs to in- 
dividuals, such as protection of a dying 
industry, should be temporary and 
should aim to facilitate adjustment 
rather than to preserve the status quo. 
Such an orientation would not only di- 
rectly reduce inflation but would also 
establish a longer term expectation that 
inflation will decline. I am, for in- 
stance, struck by the fact that Germany 
has a higher rate of money creation and 
a larger budget deficit as a percentage 
of GNP than the United States at the 
same time that it has an inflation rate of 
less than one-half that of the United 
States. I suspect that one important 



Economic policymakers must . . . cope with a growing section of the 
population which is interested in preserving the status quo along with 
another substantial portion which believes that improvements in the 
quality of life are costless .... 



against inflation, however, appears to 
be tighter fiscal and monetary policy. 
While such a prescription is in many 
cases the right one, it frequently tends 
to divert attention from the need for 
governments to be considerably more 
aware of the inflationary implications 
of specific decisions in such areas as 
environmental protection, health and 
safety regulations, minimum wages, 
agricultural policy, and import restric- 
tions. 

As I noted earlier, it is easy to argue 
that any given policy in itself is not 
going to significantly increase infla- 
tion. But tne cumulative impact of 
small individual measures can indeed 
be significant — and has been. 
Moreover, as a result of this accumula- 
tion of measures, governments' 



reason for this good performance on 
inflation results from widespread ex- 
pectations on the part of the citizenry 
that the German Government will act in 
noninflationary ways, that labor and 
business will act in a similar spirit, and 
that the efforts of all the major actors 
to hold down inflation will be mutually 
reinforcing. 

Energy. The second critical eco- 
nomic problem we need to address is 
that of energy. Our ability to adapt to 
the new global energy situation through 
a reduction in our reliance on imported 
oil is critical to the resumption of sus- 
tained economic growth, as well as to 
our political and security interests. We 
have a temporary respite because of 
new supplies from the North Sea and 



34 

Alaska and slow economic growth in 
many countries. It is. however, no 
better than being in the eye of a hur- 
ricane. Unless we make a more pur- 
poseful effort, particularly in my own 
country, the problem can only worsen 
dramatically. 

While efforts to increase energy pro- 
duction are perhaps the most important 
element in the solution, I should like to 
focus on one of the less discussed 
elements — energy-saving capital in- 
vestment. We are seeing some reduc- 
tion in the ratio of energy to output in 
our economies. Elementary economics 
tells us that as energy becomes more 
expensive we should begin to see a 
substitution of labor and energy- 
efficient capital for energy-intensive 
capital. Recent data lead to the conclu- 
sion that this substitution is beginning 
to take place. Some observers suggest 



Youth Unemployment. A third 
problem is youth unemployment. The 
figures are staggering. In the OECD 
[Organization for Economic Coopera- 
tion and Development] area as a whole, 
unemployment rates for those between 
the ages of 15 and 24 are on average 
three times as high as overall un- 
employment rates. The unemployment 
rate in this country for black teenagers 
is nearly 40%. The social costs of this 
situation are enormous because un- 
employed young people — especially 
blacks and other groups already 
disadvantaged — feel they have no place 
in society, fall further and further be- 
hind others who get entry-level jobs, 
and come to altogether reject the soci- 
ety that spurned them. The seeds of 
rage are building in our society as this 
rejected group becomes larger. 

While no easy answers exist, the 



The leadership of the industrial democracies is today more interna- 
tional and more economically experienced than at perhaps any time in 
this century. 



that this is at least part of the explana- 
tion for the reduction in unemployment 
in the United States. 

But the adjustment to date has only 
been partial. The sharp increase in oil 
prices made part of our capital stock 
obsolete, causing firms to idle some of 
their most energy-intensive equipment. 
Productivity fell as fewer goods were 
produced by the same number of work- 
ers, a development which, along with 
high energy cost per unit of output, 
contributed to inflation. Increased cap- 
ital costs and low-capacity utilization 
were holding back the replacement of 
obsolete and inefficient capital. Un- 
certainty about energy policies, prices, 
supply availability, and regulation re- 
tards replacement still further. 

Although higher rates of economic 
growth are frequently looked at in 
terms of the short-term oil import 
costs, the long-term economic and 
energy conservation benefits are sig- 
nificant. Specifically tax and energy 
policies aimed at speedy adjustment of 
capital stock would facilitate increased 
investment in energy-efficient equip- 
ment, thus also increasing productivity 
and employment and reducing infla- 
tion. Also, as I noted earlier, the pri- 
vate sector must have confidence that 
government policies will be stable and 
consistent before committing invest- 
ment funds. 



problem is serious enough that we 
should reassess many aspects of our 
economies which have long been taken 
for granted to identify solutions. For 
instance, many countries, in pursuit of 
their social/economic priorities, have 
instituted various systems of taxes on 
employment which, in some cases, 
may be counterproductive. For in- 
stance, in attempting to assure 
adequate retirement and other benefits 
through social security and equitable 
wage levels through the minimum 
wage, labor costs may be ratcheted up 
to the point that they reduce employ- 
ment opportunities. Similarly, in- 
creasing job security, through laws 
which make it so difficult to lay off 
workers that firms are reluctant to hire 
new ones, can similarly frustrate the 
specific goals these programs aim to 
achieve. 

Adjustment to Imports From De- 
veloping Countries. Fourth is the 
problem of adjustment to imports from 
the developing countries. Manufac- 
tured goods — both labor and capital 
intensive — have been rapidly replacing 
raw materials in the export profiles of 
the more advanced developing coun- 
tries. Since 1955 manufactured goods 
as a share of developing country export 
earnings have expanded from 10 '/< to 
40% and significant further growth is 
anticipated. 



Department of State Bulletin 

To put this development in perspec- 
tive, roughly 23% (nearly $34 billion) 
of total U.S. imports in 1977 came 
from non-OPEC [Organization of Pe- 
troleum Exporting Countries] de- 
veloping countries. The comparable 
figure for Western Europe is about 
10%. Nonetheless, concern is high on 
both sides of the Atlantic about the rate 
of penetration of imports in key sec- 
tors, provoking charges that developing 
countries have an "unfair advantage" 
in labor-intensive manufacturing. 

To better understand this problem, a 
few facts are worth noting. First, while 
imports do, admittedly, displace work- 
ers in sensitive industries, the amount 
of displacement is considerably smaller 
than that which results from productiv- 
ity improvements, competition, and in- 
dustrial consolidation within our coun- 
tries. A study of the German economy, 
for instance, has shown that, in the 
manufacturing sector, growth of pro- 
ductivity during the 1962-75 period 
displaced 48 workers for every one 
displaced by imports from developing 
countries. The fact that job displace- 
ment resulting from productivity im- 
provements leads to improved con- 
sumer welfare and lower rates of 
inflation is clear. Imports do likewise, 
although their displacement effects are 
more noticeable than their benefits. 

Second, imports from