Search the history of over 505 billion pages on the Internet.
Open Library
Full text of "Department of State bulletin"
See other formats
BOSTON
PUBLIC
LIBRARY
Department
of State
W of State ~1W ~iW j &
bulletin
Oviobvr 1978
ie Official Monthly Record of United States Foreign Policy / Volume 78 / Number 2019
S /.3:
iV
'*v.
t^~*&2
»i. "*
m~*
*
-^ t
■I
* „■
lis
si •
J&l
^•fe
/
%.
alt II / 17
pulation /
m
'•
nppartmvnt of State
bulletin
Volume 78 / Number 2019 / October 1978
Cover Photo:
President Sadat
President Carter
Prime Minister Begin
The Department of State Bulletin,
published by the Office of Public Com-
munication in the Bureau of Public
Affairs, is the official record of U.S.
foreign policy. Its purpose is to provide
the public, the Congress, and govern-
ment agencies with information on
developments in U.S. foreign relations
and the work of the Department of
State and the Foreign Service.
The Bulletin's contents include
major addresses and news conferences
of the President and the Secretary of
State; statements made before congres-
sional committees by the Secretary
and other senior State Department of-
ficials; special features and articles on
international affairs; selected press re-
leases issued by the White House, the
Department, and the U.S. Mission to
the United Nations; and treaties and
other agreements to which the United
States is or may become a party.
The Secretary of State has deter-
mined that the publication of this peri-
odical is necessary in the transaction of
the public business required by law of
this Department. Use of funds for
printing this periodical has been ap-
proved by the Director of the Office
of Management and Budget through
January 31, 1981.
NOTE: Contents of this publication
are not copyrighted and items con-
tained herein may be reprinted. Cita-
tion of the Department oe State
Bulletin as the source will be appre-
ciated. The Bulletin is indexed in the
Readers' Guide to Periodical Litera-
ture.
For sale by the Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Print-
ing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402
Price:
12 issues plus annual index —
$18.00 (domestic) $22.50 (foreign)
Single copy—
$1.40 (domestic) $1.80 (foreign)
CYRUS R VANCE
Secretary of State
HODDING CARTER III
Assistant Secretary for Public Affai
JOHN CLARK KIMBALL
Consulting Editor
PHYLLIS A YOUNG
Editor
COLLEEN SUSSMAN
Assistant Editor
CONTENTS
A FRAMEWORK FOR MIDDLE EAST PEACE
President Carter's Address to the Congress
Remarks by President Carter, Viee President Mandate, President Sadat, and Prime
Minister Begin
Joint Statement
Texts of Documents and Accompanying Letters
THE PRESIDENT
12 News Conference of August 17
AFRICA
15 Peaceful Solutions to Conflicts in
Namibia and Southern Rhodesia
f Warren Christopher)
ARMS CONTROL
17 SALT II— The Home Stretch (Paul C.
Warnke)
24 U.S. and Soviet Strategic Capability
Through the Mid- 1 980 's (ACDA
Report)
ECONOMICS
26 Prospects for International Action on
Natural Rubber (Julius L. Katz)
28 GPO Sales Publications
EUROPE
29 The Potential of the Helsinki
Dialogue (Matthew Nimetz)
34 Most-Favored-Nation Tariff Status for
Hungary and Romania (George S.
Vest)
NARCOTICS
37 Narcotics Control Efforts in Central
America and the Caribbean (Joseph
Linneman)
NUCLEAR POLICY
38 Balancing Nonproliferation and
Energy Security (Joseph S. Nve,
Jr.)
PACIFIC
43 U.S. Relations With the Pacific Is-
lands (Richard C. Holbrooke)
POPULATION
45 World Population: The Silent
Explosion — Part 1 (Marshall
Green, Robert A. Fearer. Lydia K
Giffler)
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
54 Science and Technology — Their In-
teraction With Foreign Policy
(Lucy Wilson Benson)
UNITED NATIONS
56 The Role of ECOSOC in International
Economic Dialogue (Andrew
Young)
TREATIES
60 Current Actions
62 PRESS RELEASES
INDEX
Boston Publi: Library
Superintendent of Documents
OCT o 1 1973
DEPOSITORY
Clockwise from top:
President Curler holds a pi e summit foreign policy luncheon with (from left to
right) Secretary Vance, Viee President Mondale, Secretary Brown. Presidential
aide Jordan, U.S. Ambassador to Egypt tilts, and U.S. Ambassador to Israel
Lewis ( National Set urity Adviser Brzezinski is seated between Mr Jordan and
Mr. Eilts.).
President Carter and Israeli Defense Minister Weizman.
Secretary Vance and National Security Adviser Brzezinski
Prime Minister Begin and President Sadat (in the bah om on the right) receive a
standing ovation during the President's address to the joint session oj the
Congress.
President Carter and President Sadat .
A FRAMEWORK FOR MIDDLE EAST PEACE
In August 8. 1978, President Carter announced that Egyptian President
\ar al-Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menahem Begin had accepted an
tation to meet at Camp David, Maryland, to seek a framework for peace in
I Middle East. The meetings were held September 5-17.
following are President Carter's address before a joint session of the Con-
Uss. his remarks upon departing for Camp David, the exchange of remarks
wteen Vice President Mondale and President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin
j'fl the latters' separate arrivals at Andrews Air Force Base, a joint statement,
I remarks by the three leaders at the ceremony when they signed the two
%uments, and the texts of those documents and accompanying letters.
RESIDENT'S ADDRESS
IFORE THE CONGRESS,
}PT. 18'
/ice President Mondale. Speaker
Weill, distinguished Members of the
I ted States Congress. Justices of the
fireme Court, other leaders of our
jat nation, ladies and gentlemen: It's
\n more than 2,000 years since there
|; peace between Egypt and a free
I ish nation. If our present expecta-
i is are realized, this year we shall
I such peace again.
! "he first thing I would like to do is
tgive tribute to the two men who
lie this impossible dream now be-
lie a real possibility — the two great
Hers with whom I have met for the
I 2 weeks at Camp David — first,
Ssident Anwar Sadat of Egypt and
I other, of course, is Prime Minister
il nahem Begin of the nation of
lei.
know that all of you would agree
t these are two men of great per-
al courage, representing nations of
>ples who are deeply grateful to
m for the achievement which they
7 e realized. And I am personally
jteful to them for what they have
lie.
1 \t Camp David we sought a peace
It is not only of vital importance to
|ir own two nations but to all the
|>ple of the Middle East, to all the
J>ple of the United States, and, in-
l:d, to all the world as well,
rhe world prayed for the success of
I" efforts, and I am glad to announce
t you that these prayers have been
iiwered.
I've come to discuss with you to-
>;ht what these two leaders have ac-
mplished, and what this means to all
us.
The United States has had no choice
Jt to be deeply concerned about the
Sddle East and to try to use our influ-
ce and our efforts to advance the
cause of peace. For the last 30 years,
through four wars, the people of this
troubled region have paid a terrible
price in suffering and division and
hatred and bloodshed. No two nations
have suffered more than Egypt and Is-
rael. But the dangers and the costs of
conflicts in this region for our own
nation have been great as well. We
have longstanding friendships among
the nations there and the peoples of the
region, and we have profound moral
commitments which are deeply rooted
in our values as a people.
The strategic location of these coun-
tries and the resources that they possess
mean that events in the Middle East
directly affect people everywhere. We
and our friends could not be indifferent
if a hostile power were to establish
domination there. In few areas of the
world is there a greater risk that a local
conflict could spread among other na-
tions adjacent to them and then perhaps
erupt into a tragic confrontation be-
tween us superpowers ourselves.
Our people have come to understand
that unfamiliar names — like Sinai,
Aqaba, Sharm el Sheikh. Ras en Naqb.
Gaza, the West Bank of Jordan — can
have a direct and immediate bearing on
our own well-being as a nation and our
hope for a peaceful world.
That is why we in the United States
cannot afford to be idle bystanders and
why we have been full partners in the
search for peace and why it is so vital
to our nation that these meetings at
Camp David have been a success.
Through the long years of conflict,
four main issues have divided the par-
ties involved.
• One is the nature of peace —
whether peace will simply mean that
the guns are silenced, that the bombs
no longer fall, that the tanks cease to
roll, or whether it will mean that the
nations of the Middle East can deal
with each other as neighbors and as
equals and as friends, with a full range
of diplomatic and cultural and eco-
nomic and human relations between
them. That's been the basic question.
The Camp David agreement has de-
fined such relationships, I'm glad to
announce to you, between Israel and
Egypt.
• The second main issue is providing
for the security of all parties involved,
including, of course, our friends the
President Carter addresses the Congress; behind him Vice President Mondale and Speaker of rhe
House Thomas P. O' Neitl applaud.
Israelis, so that none of them need fear
attack or military threats from one
another. When implemented, the Camp
David agreement, I'm glad to announce
to you, will provide for such mutual
security.
• The third is the question of agree-
ment on secure and recognized bound-
aries, the end of military occupation,
and the granting of self-government or
else the return to other nations of ter-
ritories which have been occupied by
Israel since the 1967 conflict. The
Camp David agreement, I'm glad to
announce to you, provides for the
realization of all these goals.
• And finally, there is the painful
human question of the fate of the
Palestinians who live or who have lived
in these disputed regions. The Camp
David agreement guarantees that the
Palestinian people may participate in
the resolution of the Palestinian prob-
lem in all its aspects, a commitment
that Israel has made in writing and
which is supported and appreciated,
I'm sure, by all the world.
Over the last 18 months, there has
been, of course, some progress on
these issues. Egypt and Israel came
close to agreeing about the first
issue — the nature of peace. They then
saw that the second and third
issues — that is, withdrawal and
security — were intimately connected,
closely entwined. But fundamental di-
visions still remained in other areas —
about the fate of the Palestinians, the
future of the West Bank and Gaza, and
the future of Israeli settlements in oc-
cupied Arab territories.
We all remember the hopes for peace
that were inspired by President Sadat's
initiative — that great and historic
visit to Jerusalem last November that
thrilled the world and by the warm and
genuine personal response of Prime
Minister Begin and the Israeli people
and by the mutual promise between
them, publicly made, that there would
be no more war. These hopes were
sustained when Prime Minister Begin
reciprocated by visiting Ismailia on
Christmas Day.
That progress continued but at a
slower and slower pace through the
early part of the year. And by early
summer, the negotiations had come to a
standstill once again.
It was this stalemate and the prospect
for an even worse future that prompted
me to invite both President Sadat and
Prime Minister Begin to join me at
Camp David.
They accepted, as you know, in-
stantly, without delay, without precon-
ditions, without consultation even be-
tween them. It's impossible to over-
state the courage of these two men or
the foresight they have shown. Only
through high ideals, through com-
promises of words and not principle,
and through a willingness to look deep
into the human heart and to understand
the problems and hopes and dreams of
one another can progress in a difficult
situation like this ever be made.
That's what these men and their wise
and diligent advisers who are here with
us tonight have done during the last 13
days.
When this conference began, I said
that the prospects for success were re-
mote. Enormous barriers of ancient
Prime Minister Begin, President Carter, and President Sadat.
Department of State Bulhp
history and nationalism and suspic
would have to be overcome if we w
to meet our objectives.
But President Sadat and Pri
Minister Begin have overcome th
barriers, exceeded our fondest exp
tations, and have signed two agr
ments that hold out the possibility
resolving issues that history had tau
us could not be resolved.
The first of these documents is ei
tied "A Framework for Peace in
Middle East Agreed at Camp Davit
It deals with a comprehensive set!
ment, comprehensive settlement
tween Israel and all her neighbors,
well as the difficult question of
Palestinian people and the future of
West Bank and the Gaza area.
The Israeli military government o
these areas will be withdrawn and \
be replaced with a self-government
the Palestinians who live there. A
Israel has committed that this gove
ment will have full autonomy. Pit
Minister Begin said to me seve
times, not partial autonomy, but 1
autonomy.
Israeli forces will be withdrawn :
redeployed into specified locations
protect Israel's security. The Pales
ians will further participate in de I
mining their own future through M s
in which their own elected represei 9
tives, the inhabitants of the West B I
and Gaza, will negotiate with Eg I
and Israel and Jordan to determine j
final status of the West Bank and Ga !
Israel has agreed, has commit n
themselves, that the legitimate right; V
the Palestinian people will be rec I
nized. After the signing of t s
framework last night, and during
negotiations concerning the establi
ment of the Palestinian se
government, no new Israeli settleme
will be established in this area. T
future settlements issue will be decic
among the negotiating parties.
The final status of the West Be
and Gaza will be decided before I
end of the 5-year transitional peri
during which the Palestinian Arabs vj(
have their own government, as part o '
negotiation which will produce a pe*
treaty between Israel and Jorda,
specifying borders, withdrawal, I
those very crucial issues.
These negotiations will be based I
all the provisions and the principles f
Security Council Resolution 242, wl
which you all are so familiar. Tj
agreement on the final status of tht5
areas will then be submitted to a v<|
by the representatives of the inhabitaii
of the West Bank and Gaza, and th/
will have the right for the first tiif
in their history — the Palestinii
"I tober 1978
jple — to decide how they will gov-
i themselves permanently.
We also believe, of course, all of us.
it there should be a just settlement of
i problems of displaced persons and
ugees, which takes into account ap-
>priate U.N. resolutions.
Finally, this document also outlines
variety of security arrangements to
mnforce peace between Israel and her
Highbors .
iThis is, indeed, a comprehensive and
f r framework for peace in the Middle
1st. and I'm glad to report this to you.
iThe second agreement is entitled a
| ; ramework for the Conclusion of a
lace Treaty Between Egypt and Is-
ll." It returns to Egypt its full exer-
|;e of sovereignty over the Sinai
Ininsula and establishes several secu-
1/ zones, recognizing carefully that
J/ereignty right for the protection of
I parties. It also provides that Egypt
ill extend full diplomatic recognition
| Israel at the time the Israelis com-
:te an interim withdrawal from most
the Sinai, which will take place be-
sen 3 months and 9 months after the
^elusion of the peace treaty. And the
ace treaty is to be fully negotiated
J signed no later than 3 months from
t night.
I think I should also report that
ime Minister Begin and President
i dat have already challenged each
Iter to conclude the treaty even ear-
kr. This final conclusion of a peace
aty will be completed late in De-
imber. And it would be a wonderful
i iristmas present for the world.
Final and complete withdrawal of all
iaeli forces will take place between 2
id 3 years following the conclusion of
I j peace treaty.
■ While both parties are in total
(reement on all the goals that I have
st described to you, there is one issue
I which agreement has not yet been
i ached. Egypt states that agreement to
[move the Israeli settlements from
^yptian territory is a prerequisite to a
, ace treaty. Israel says that the issue
I the Israeli settlements should be re-
ived during the peace negotiations
emselves.
Now. within 2 weeks with each
ember of the Knesset, or the Israeli
irliament acting as individuals, not
>nstrained by party loyalty, the Knes-
t will decide on the issue of the set-
:ments. Our own government's posi-
on, my own personal position, is
ell-known on this issue and has been
)nsistent. It is my strong hope, my
rayer, that the question of Israeli set-
ements on Egyptian territory will not
b the final obstacle to peace.
None of us should underestimate the
istoric importance of what has already
been done. This is the first time that an
Arab and an Israeli leader have signed
a comprehensive framework for peace.
It contains the seeds of a time when the
Middle East, with all its vast potential,
may be a land of human richness and
fulfillment, rather than a land of bitter-
ness and continued conflict. No region
in the world has greater natural and
human resources than this one. And
nowhere have they been more heavily
weighed down by intense hatred and
frequent war. These agreements hold
out the real possibility that this burden
might finally be lifted.
On September 28. 1978. the Israeli
Knesset approved the Camp David
agreements by a vote of 85 to 19, with 16
abstentions.
But we must also not forget the
magnitude of the obstacles that still
remain. The summit exceeded our
highest expectations — but we know
that it left many difficult issues which
are still to be resolved. These issues
will require careful negotiation in the
months to come. The Egyptian and Is-
raeli people must recognize the tangi-
ble benefits that peace will bring and
support the decisions their leaders have
made so that a secure and a peaceful
future can be achieved for them. The
American public, you and I, must also
offer our full support to those who have
made decisions that are difficult and
those who have very difficult decisions
still to make.
What lies ahead for all of us is to
recognize the statesmanship that Presi-
dent Sadat and Prime Minister Begin
have shown and to invite others in that
region to follow their example. I have
already last night invited the other
leaders of the Arab world to help sus-
tain progress toward a comprehensive
peace. We must also join in an effort to
bring an end to the conflict and the
terrible suffering in Lebanon.
This is a subject that President Sadat
discussed with me many times while I
was in Camp David with him. And the
first time that the three of us met to-
gether, this was a subject of heated
discussion. On the way to Washington
last night in the helicopter, we mutu-
ally committed ourselves to join with
other nations, with the Lebanese people
themselves, all factions, with President
Sarkis, with Syria and Saudi Arabia,
perhaps the European countries like
France, to try to move toward a solu-
tion of the problem in Lebanon which
is so vital to us and to the poor people
in Lebanon who have suffered so
much.
We will want to consult on this mat-
ter and on these documents and their
meaning with all of the leaders, par-
ticularly the Arab leaders. And I'm
pleased to say to you tonight that just a
few minutes ago, King Hussein of Jor-
dan and King Khalid of Saudi
Arabia — perhaps other leaders
later — but these two have already
agreed to receive Secretary Vance,
who will be leaving tomorrow to ex-
plain to them the terms of the Camp
David agreement.
And we hope to secure their support
for the realization of the new hopes and
dreams of the people of the Middle
East.
This is an important mission, and
this responsibility I can tell you, based
on my last 2 weeks with him, could not
possibly rest on the shoulders of a more
able and dedicated and competent man
than Secretary Cyrus Vance.
Finally, let me say that for many
years the Middle East has been a
textbook for pessimism, a demonstra-
tion that diplomatic ingenuity was no
match for intractable human conflicts.
Today we are privileged to see the
chance for one of the sometimes rare
bright moments in human history — a
chance that may offer the way to peace.
We have a chance for peace because
these two brave leaders found within
themselves the willingness to work to-
gether to seek these lasting prospects
for peace, which we all want so badly.
And for that, I hope that you will share
my prayer of thanks and my hope that
the promise of this moment shall be
fully realized.
The prayers at Camp David were the
same as those of the shepherd King
David who prayed in the 85th Psalm:
"Wilt thou not revive us again: that thy
people may rejoice in thee? ... I will
hear that God the Lord will speak: for
he will speak peace unto his people,
and to his saints: but let them not return
again to folly."
And I would like to say, as a Chris-
tian, to these two friends of mine, the
words of Jesus: "Blessed are the
peacemakers: for they shall be the chil-
dren of God."
PRESIDENT'S REMARKS,
DEPARTURE FOR CAMP DAVID,
SEPT. 4 2
I'm leaving now for Camp David to
prepare for a very important meeting
between myself. President Sadat of
Egypt, and Prime Minister Begin of
Israel. During the next few days, very
important decisions will be made by
us, working with our advisers repre-
senting three great nations, searching
4
Department of State Bulk
for peace in the Middle East which
can help greatly to insure peace in the
future throughout the world; by the
Congress while I'm gone, in dealing
with many very important issues, in-
cluding the evolution of an energy
policy for our nation.
As we meet at Camp David, no one
can insure the degree of success
which we might enjoy. The issues are
very complicated. The disagreements
are deep. Four wars have not led to
peace in that troubled region of the
world. There is no cause for exces-
sive optimism, but there is also no
cause for despair.
The greatest single factor which
causes me to be encouraged is my
sure knowledge that Prime Minister
Begin and President Sadat genuinely
want peace. They are determined to
make progress, and so am I.
We will need the encouragement
and the prayers of everyone in our
nation, in all three nations, through-
out the world, who want success to
come from our deliberations. Com-
promises will be mandatory. Without
them, no progress can be expected.
Flexibility will be the essence of our
hopes. And my own role will be that
of a full partner, not trying to impose
the will of the United States on others
but searching for common ground on
which agreements can be reached and
searching for exchanges of com-
promise that are mutually advantage-
ous to all nations involved.
I know the seriousness with which
President Sadat and Prime Minister
Begin come to our country, and I
have tried to prepare myself as well
as I possibly could to bring success to
these efforts.
It will have to be a mutual thing,
and all of us will enter these discus-
sions without prejudice toward one
another, with a spirit of good will and
with the realization of the sober re-
sponsibilities that fall on us.
Lastly, I would say that we will be
almost uniquely isolated from the
press and from the outside world. My
hope is that this degree of personal
interchange, without the necessity for
political posturing or defense of a
transient stand or belief, will be
constructive.
There will be a great deal of effort
made to insure and enhance mutual
trust in one another and to recognize
accurately that we all want the same
ultimate goal. There is no doubt in
my mind about this.
I want to express, in closing, my
thanks to these two great leaders for
their willingness to come when the
political consequences of failure
might be very severe and when the
prospects of complete success are
very remote. We'll do the best we
can, and I fervently ask the support
and prayers of all those who share
with us a hope that we might bring a
new prospect for peace to the Middle
East.
PRESIDENT SADAT'S ARRIVAL,
ANDREWS AIR FORCE BASE,
SEPT. 5 3
Vice President Mondale: Mr.
President, on behalf of President
Carter and the people of the United
President Carter with (from left to right) Defense Minister Ezet Weizman, Mrs Begin, press
sit retary Dun Pattir, Yehiel Kadashi of the Prime Minister's offit e. and Prime Minister Begin
States, we welcome you again to
United States with a warm heart. 1
people of our country admire grea
your wisdom, your courage, and y(
statesmanship. Welcome to t
United States.
President Sadat: Mr. Vice Pre
dent. Mr. Vance, thank you for yi
thoughtful words and the genui
sentiments you express toward i
and the Egyptian people.
As you well know, these feelir
are mutual. The Egyptian peop
value very highly the ever-growi
friendship and cooperation with t
people and leadership of the Unit
States. We are also gratified by t
keen interest you are maintaining
the establishment of a comprehensh
just, and lasting peace in the Mid(
East.
All along, we have held the vii
that this nation is the most qualifi
to be a full partner in the peace pre
ess. Your heritage is unique and so
your global responsibility. When y
demonstrated your determination
assume such responsibility fully, y
reaffirmed the faith of my people
the United States and its dedication
the cause of peace.
We come here at the crucial cro
roads. The challenge is tremendoi
but we have no choice except to
cept the challenge. We cannot affc
to fail the hopes of nations all o\
the world. No one has the right
block the road to peace. This is
time for maneuvers and worn o
ideas; it is time for magnanimity a
reason.
I pray to God Almighty to guide
in this great endeavor and to enat
us to achieve the noble goal whi
inspired President Carter to call f
this conference. This inspiration
and shall remain a brave and galla
act of statesmanship. Together
shall proceed to build a viable str
ture for peace on the solid foundatii
of law and legitimacy. Together, v
shall realize the hopes of those wl
believe in the supremacy of right at
justice, and together we sha
overcome.
PRIME MINISTER BEGIN'S
ARRIVAL, ANDREWS AIR
FORCE BASE, SEPT. 5 4
Vice President Mondale: M
Prime Minister, on behalf of Mi
Carter and the American people,
welcome you warmly to the Unite
States. The American people deepl
admire your leadership--its geniu;
its strength, its compassion. Abov
Rtober 1978
11. we admire your profound com-
ptment to peace, so appropriate at
his historic moment. Mr. Prime
Minister, we welcome you with a
l/arm heart.
Prime Minister Begin: Mr. Vice
President. Mr. Secretary of State,
udies and gentlemen, dear friends:
lour times I visited the President of
iie United States in the interests of
leace. since we were elected by our
eoples to conduct their affairs, to
lare for the future, and for the pres-
ervation of liberty and democracy in
|ur countries and elsewhere. Twice I
net the President of Egypt in a spirit
f understanding, in good will and a
ommon striving for peace in
erusalem and in Ismailia. However,
nere is no doubt that this fifth meet-
ng with President Carter, and the
lird with President Sadat, is the most
nportant. the most momentous of
lem all.
My friends and colleagues, the
oreign Minister, the Defense Minis-
;r. and I and our friends and advisers
/ill make all endeavors possible to
•jach an agreement so that the peace
irocess can continue and ultimately
<e crowned with peace treaties. This
> the peace mission on behalf of
/hich we come now to you, Mr. Vice
•resident, to the United States and to
mr dear friend, the President of the
Inited States.
We are grateful to the President for
ne hospitality he bestowed upon us
n his retreat at Camp David and let
|S all hope that out of that unique
Kolitical conclave a day will come
'hen the nations of the world will
ay: "Habemus pacem" — "We have
eace."
OINT STATEMENT,
EPT. 6 s
After four wars, despite vast human
fforts, the Holy Land does not yet
njoy the blessings of peace.
Conscious of the grave issues
/hich face us, we place our trust in
he God of our fathers, from whom
/e seek wisdom and guidance.
As we meet here at Camp David we
sk people of all faiths to pray with
is that peace and justice may result
rom these deliberations.
EXCHANGE OF REMARKS,
SEPT. 17 6
President Carter
When we first arrived at Camp
David, the first thing upon which we
President Carter with (from left to right) President Sadat, Secretary Vance, and Under Secretary
Osama el-Baz of the Egyptian Foreign Ministry.
agreed was to ask the people of the
world to pray that our negotiations
would be successful. Those prayers
have been answered far beyond any
expectations. We are privileged to
witness tonight a significant achieve-
ment in the cause of peace, an
achievement none thought possible a
year ago. or even a month ago. an
achievement that reflects the courage
and wisdom of these two leaders.
Through 13 long days at Camp
David, we have seen them display
determination and vision and flexibil-
ity which was needed to make this
agreement come to pass. All of us
owe them our gratitude and respect.
They know that they will always have
my personal admiration.
There are still great difficulties that
remain and many hard issues to be
settled. The questions that have
brought warfare and bitterness to the
Middle East for the last 30 years will
not be settled overnight. But we
should all recognize the substantial
achievements that have been made.
One of the agreements that Presi-
dent Sadat and Prime Minister Begin
are signing tonight is entitled, "A
Framework for Peace in the Middle
East [Agreed at Camp David]."
[Applause]
This framework concerns the prin-
ciples and some specifics in the most
substantive way which will govern a
comprehensive peace settlement. It
deals specifically with the future of
the West Bank and Gaza and the need
to resolve the Palestinian problem in
all its aspects. The framework docu-
ment proposes a 5-year transitional
period in the West Bank and Gaza
during which the Israeli military gov-
ernment will be withdrawn and a
self-governing authority will be
elected with full autonomy.
It also provides for Israeli forces to
remain in specified locations during
this period to protect Israel's security.
The Palestinians will have the right
to participate in the determination of
their own future, in negotiations
which will resolve the final status of
the West Bank and Gaza, and then to
produce an Israeli-Jordanian peace
treaty.
These negotiations will be based on
all the provisions and all the princi-
ples of U.N. Security Council Res-
olution 242. And it provides that Is-
rael may live in peace within secure
and recognized borders.
And this great aspiration of Israel
has been certified without constraint
with the greatest degree of enthusiasm
by President Sadat, the leader of one
of the greatest nations on Earth.
[Applause]
The other document is entitled.
"Framework for the Conclusion of a
Peace Treaty Between Egypt and
Israel."
It provides for the full exercise of
Egyptian sovereignty over the Sinai.
It calls for the full withdrawal of Is-
raeli forces from the Sinai; and after
an interim withdrawal which will be
accomplished very quickly, the es-
tablishment of normal, peaceful rela-
tions between the two countries, in-
cluding diplomatic relations.
[Applause]
Together with accompanying let-
ters, which we will make public to-
morrow, these two Camp David
agreements provide the basis for
Department of State Bulleti.J
progress and peace throughout the
Middle East.
There is one issue on which agree-
ment has not been reached. Egypt
states that the agreement to remove
Israeli settlements from Egyptian ter-
ritory is a prerequisite to a peace
treaty. Israel states that the issue of
the Israeli settlements should be re-
solved during the peace negotiations.
That's a substantial difference.
Within the next 2 weeks, the Knes-
set will decide on the issue of these
settlements.
Tomorrow night, I will go before
the Congress to explain these agree-
ments more fully and to talk about
their implications for the United States
and for the world. For the moment,
and in closing, I want to speak more
personally about my admiration for all
of those who have taken part in this
process, and my hope that the promise
of this moment will be fulfilled.
During the last 2 weeks, the mem-
bers of all three delegations have spent
endless hours, day and night, talking,
negotiating, grappling with problems
that have divided their people for 30
years. Whenever there was a danger
that human energy would fail or pa-
tience would be exhausted or good will
would run out — and there were many
such moments — these two leaders and
the able advisers in all delegations
found the resources within them to
keep the chances for peace alive.
The long days at Camp David are
over. But many months of difficult
negotiations still lie ahead.
I hope that the foresight and the
wisdom that have made this session a
success will guide these leaders and
the leaders of all nations as they con-
tinue the progress toward peace.
[Applause]
President Sadat
Dear President Carter, in this his-
toric moment. I would like to express
to you my heartfelt congratulations
and appreciation. For long days and
nights, you devoted your time and
energy to the pursuit of peace. You
have been most courageous when you
took the gigantic step of convening
this meeting. The challenge was great.
and the risks were high, but so was
your determination.
You made a commitment to be a
full partner in the peace process. I'm
happy to say that you have honored
your commitment.
The signing of the framework for
the comprehensive peace settlement
has a significance far beyond the
event. It signals the emergence of a
new peace initiative with the American
nation in the heart of the entire proc-
ess.
In the weeks ahead, important deci-
sions have to be made if we are to
proceed on the road to peace. We have
to reaffirm the faith of the Palestinian
people in the ideal of peace.
The continuation of your active role
is indispensable. We need your help
and the support of the American
people. Let me seize this opportunity
to thank each and every American for
his genuine interest in the cause of
people in the Middle East.
Dear friend, we came to Camp
David with all the good will and faith
we possessed, and we left Camp
David a few minutes ago with a re-
newed sense of hope and inspiration.
We are looking forward to the days
ahead with an added determination to
pursue the noble goal of peace.
Your able assistants spared no effort
to bring out this happy conclusion. We
appreciate their spirit and dedication.
Our hosts at Camp David and the State
of Maryland were most generous and
hospitable. To each one of them and
to all those who are watching this
great event, I say thank you.
Let us join in a prayer to God Al-
mighty to guide our path. Let us
pledge to make the spirit of Camp
David a new chapter in the history of
our nations. [Applause]
Prime Minister Begin
Mr. President of the United States,
Mr. President of the Arab Republic of
Egypt, ladies and gentlemen: The
Camp David conference should be re-
named. It was the "Jimmy Carter
conference." [Laughter, applause]
The President undertook an initia-
tive most imaginative in our time and
brought President Sadat and myself
and our colleagues and friends and ad-
visers together under one roof. In it-
self it was a great achievement.
But the President took a great risk
for himself and did it with great civil
courage. And it was a famous French
field commander who said that it is
much more difficult to show civil
courage than military courage. And
the President worked. As far as my
historic experience is concerned, I
think that he worked harder than our
forefathers did in Egypt, building the
pyramids. [Laughter, applause]
Yes, indeed, he worked day and
night, and so did we — [laughter] day
and night. We used to go to bed at
Camp David between 3:00 and 4:00
o'clock in the morning, arise, as we
are used to since our boyhood, be-
tween 5:00 and 6:00, and continue
working.
From left to right. Deputy Prime Ministe
Hassan Touhamy, Foreign Minister Mohamet
Ibrahim Kamel, and Chef cle Cabinet of th
Foreign Minister's office Ahmad Maher c
Egypt with President Carter.
The President showed interest i
every section, every paragraph, ever
sentence, every word, every lette
[laughter] of the framework agree
ments.
We had some difficult moments, i
usually, there are some crises ii<
negotiations; as usually, somebod
gives a hint that perhaps he would lik
to pick up and go home. [Laughtei
It's all usual. But ultimately, ladie
and gentlemen, the President of th
United States won the day. And peac
now celebrates a great victory for th
nations of Egypt and Israel and for a
mankind.
Mr. President, we, the Israelii
thank you from the bottom of oi
hearts for all you have done for th
sake of peace, for which we praye
and yearned more than 30 years. Th
Jewish people suffered much, to
much. And, therefore, peace to us is
striving, coming innermost from oil
heart and soul.
Now when I came here to the Cam
David conference, I said perhaps as
result of our work, one day peopl
will, in every corner of the world, b
able to say "Habemus pacem" in th
spirit of these days. Can we say s<|
tonight? Not yet. We still have to go
road until my friend President Sada
and I sign the peace treaties. W
promised each other that we shall di
so within 3 months.
Mr. President [President Sadat], to
night at this celebration of the grea
historic event, let us promise eacl]
October 1978
jbther that we shall do it earlier than
■within 3 months. [Laughter, applause]
Mr. President, you inscribed your
■name forever in the history of two an-
tbient civilized peoples, the people of
■Egypt and the people of Israel. Thank
Eyou. Mr. President.
I would like to say a few words
■about my friend. President Sadat. We
ftnet for the first time in our lives last
JjNovember in Jerusalem. He came to
jus as a guest, a former enemy, and
'during our first meeting, we became
H friends.
In the Jewish teachings, there is a
■tradition that the greatest achievement
■of a human being is to turn his enemy
linto a friend, and this we do in rec-
iprocity. Since then, we had some
(difficult days. [Laughter] I'm not
Igoing now to tell you the saga of those
Kays. Everything belongs to the past.
■Today, I visited President Sadat in his
lcabin because in Camp David you
Idon't have houses, you only have cab-
fins. [Laughter] And he then came to
•visit me. We shook hands. And, thank
JGod, we again could have said to
leach other, "You are my friend."
[Applause]
And, indeed, we shall go on work-
ing in understanding and in friendship
and with good will. We will still have
[problems to solve. Camp David
proved that any problem can be
solved, if there is good will and un-
derstanding and some, some wisdom.
May I thank my own colleagues and
friends, the Foreign Minister, the De-
i fense Minister; Professor Barak who
I was the Attorney General and now
: he's going to be His Honor, the Jus-
j tice of the Supreme Court — the Israeli
i Brandeis — and Dr. Rosenne [legal
' adviser to the Foreign Minister] and
' our wonderful Ambassador to the
United States, Mr. Simcha Dinitz. and
\ all our friends, because without them,
that achievement wouldn't have been
possible.
I express my thanks to all the mem-
bers of the American delegation,
headed by the Secretary of State, a
man whom we love and respect. And
so I express my thanks to all the
members of the Egyptian delegation
who worked so hard together with us,
headed by Deputy Prime Minister Mr.
Touhamy, for all they have done to
achieve this moment. It is a great
moment in the history of our nations
and. indeed, of mankind.
I looked for a precedent; I didn't
i find it. It was a unique conference.
perhaps one of the most important
since the Vienna conference in the
19th century; perhaps.
And now, ladies and gentlemen,
allow me to turn to my own people
from the White House in my own na-
tive tongue.
[Brief remarks in Hebrew.]
President Carter
The first document that we will sign
is entitled, "A Framework for Peace
in the Middle East Agreed at Camp
David," and the texts of these two
documents will be released tomorrow.
The documents will be signed by
President Sadat and Prime Minister
Begin. And it will be witnessed by
me.
We have to exchange three docu-
ments, so we'll all sign three times for
this one.
[The three leaders signed the first
document.]
I might say that the first document
is quite comprehensive in nature, en-
compassing a framework by which Is-
rael can later negotiate peace treaties
between herself and Lebanon, Syria,
Jordan, as well as the outline of this
document that we will now sign.
And as you will later see, in study-
ing the documents, it also provides for
the realization of the hopes and
dreams of the people who live in the
West Bank and Gaza Strip and will
assure Israel peace in the generations
ahead.
This second document is the one
relating to a framework for a peace
treaty between Egypt and Israel. And
this is the document that calls for the
completion of the peace treaty negoti-
ations within 3 months. And I have
noticed the challenge extended by
these two gentlemen to each other.
They will complete within 3
months — I might say that this docu-
ment encompasses almost all of the
issues between the two countries and
resolves those issues. A few lines re-
main to be drawn on maps, and the
question of the settlements is to be
resolved. Other than that, most of the
major issues are resolved already in
this document. We will now sign this
document as well.
[The three leaders signed the second
document.]
TEXTS OF DOCUMENTS,
SIGNED SEPT. 17 7
A FRAMEWORK FOR PEACE
IN THE MIDDLE EAST
AGREED AT CAMP DAVID
Muhammad Anwar al-Sadat, President of
the Arab Republic of Egypt, and Menachem
Begin, Prime Minister of Israel, met with
Jimmy Carter. President of the United States
of America, at Camp David from September 5
to September 17. 1978, and have agreed on
the following framework for peace in the Mid-
dle East. They invite other parties to the
Arab-Israeli conflict to adhere to it
Preamble
The search for peace in the Middle East
must be guided by the following:
• The agreed basis for a peaceful settlement
of the conflict between Israel and its neighbors
is United Nations Security Council Resolution
242. in all its parts. 8
• After four wars during thirty years, de-
spite intensive human efforts, the Middle East,
which is the cradle of civilization and the
birthplace of three great religions, does not yet
enjoy the blessings of peace. The people of
the Middle East yearn for peace so that the
vast human and natural resources of the region
can be turned to the pursuits of peace and so
that this area can become a model for coexist-
ence and cooperation among nations.
• The historic initiative of President Sadat
in visiting Jerusalem and the reception ac-
corded to him by the Parliament, government
and people of Israel, and the reciprocal visit of
Prime Minister Begin to Ismailia, the peace
proposals made by both leaders, as well as the
warm reception of these missions by the
peoples of both countries, have created an un-
precedented opportunity for peace which must
not be lost if this generation and future gener-
ations are to be spared the tragedies of war.
• The provisions of the Charter of the
United Nations and the other accepted norms
of international law and legitimacy now pro-
vide accepted standards for the conduct of re-
lations among all states.
• To achieve a relationship of peace, in the
spirit of Article 2 of the United Nations Char-
ter, future negotiations between Israel and any
neighbor prepared to negotiate peace and se-
curity with it. are necessary for the purpose of
carrying out all the provisions and principles
of Resolutions 242 and 338.
• Peace requires respect for the sovereignty,
territorial integrity and political independence
of every state in the area and their right to live
in peace within secure and recognized bound-
aries free from threats or acts of force. Prog-
ress toward that goal can accelerate movement
toward a new era of reconciliation in the Mid-
dle East marked by cooperation in promoting
economic development, in maintaining stabil-
ity, and in assuring security.
• Security is enhanced by a relationship of
peace and by cooperation between nations
which enjoy normal relations. In addition,
under the terms of peace treaties, the parties
can, on the basis of reciprocity, agree to spe-
cial security arrangements such as de-
militarized zones, limited armaments areas,
early warning stations, the presence of inter-
national forces, liaison, agreed measures for
President Sadat. President Carter, and Prime Minister Begin sign the documents in the East
Room of the White House. Secretary Vance stands behind President Sadat.
monitoring, and other arrangements that they
agree are useful.
Framework
Taking these factors into account, the par-
ties are determined to reach a just, com-
prehensive, and durable settlement of the
Middle East conflict through the conclusion of
peace treaties based on Security Council Res-
olutions 242 and 338 in all their parts. Their
purpose is to achieve peace and good
neighborly relations. They recognize that, for
peace to endure, it must involve all those who
have been most deeply affected by the con-
flict. They therefore agree that this framework
as appropriate is intended by them to consti-
tute a basis for peace not only between Egypt
and Israel, but also between Israel and each of
its other neighbors which is prepared to
negotiate peace with Israel on this basis. With
that objective in mind, they have agreed to
proceed as follows:
A West Bank and Gaza
I. Egypt. Israel. Jordan and the representa-
tives of the Palestinian people should partici-
pate in negotiations on the resolution of the
Palestinian problem in all its aspects. To
achieve that objective, negotiations relating to
the West Bank and Gaza should proceed in
three stages:
(a) Egypt and Israel agree that, in order to
ensure a peaceful and orderly transfer of au-
thority, and taking into account the security
concerns of all the parties, there should be
transitional arrangements for the West Bank
and Gaza for a period not exceeding live
years. In order to provide full autonomy to the
inhabitants, under these arrangements the Is-
raeli military government and its civilian ad-
ministration will be withdrawn as soon as a
self-governing authority has been freely
elected by the inhabitants of these areas to
replace the existing military government. To
negotiate the details of a transitional arrange-
ment, the Government of Jordan will be in-
vited to join the negotiations on the basis of
this framework These new arrangements
should give due consideration both to the prin-
ciple of self-government by the inhabitants of
these territories and to the legitimate security
concerns of the parties involved.
(b) Egypt. Israel, and Jordan will agree on
the modalities for establishing the elected
self-governing authority in the West Bank and
Gaza. The delegations of Egypt and Jordan
may include Palestinians from the West Bank
and Gaza or other Palestinians as mutually
agreed. The parties will negotiate an agree-
ment which will define the powers and re-
sponsibilities of the self-governing authority to
be exercised in the West Bank and Gaza. A
withdrawal of Israeli armed forces will take
place and there will be a redeployment of the
remaining Israeli forces into specified security
locations. The agreement will also include ar-
rangements for assuring internal and external
security and public order. A strong local
police force will be established, which may
include Jordanian citizens. In addition. Israeli
and Jordanian forces will participate in joint
patrols and in the manning of control posts to
assure the security of the borders.
(c) When the self-governing authority (ad-
ministrative council) in the West Bank and
Gaza is established and inaugurated, the tran-
sitional period of five \cars will begin. As
soon as possible, but not later than the third
year alter the beginning of the transitional
period, negotiations will take place to deter-
mine the final status of the West Bank and
Gaza and its relationship with its neighbors,
and to conclude a peace treat) between Israel
Department of State Bulleti>
and Jordan by the end of the transitiona
period. These negotiations will be conducte<
among Egypt. Israel. Jordan, and the electei
representatives of the inhabitants of the Wes
Bank and Gaza. Two separate but relatet
committees will be convened, one committee
consisting of repfesentatives of the four partie;
which will negotiate and agree on the fina
status of the West Bank and Gaza, and it;
relationship with its neighbors, and the seconc
committee, consisting of representatives o
Israel and representatives of Jordan to bt
joined by the elected representatives of tht
inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza, tc
negotiate the peace treaty between Israel anc
Jordan, taking into account the agreemen
reached on the final status of the West BanV
and Gaza. The negotiations shall be based ot
all the provisions and principles of UN Secu
rity Council Resolution 242. The negotiation;
will resolve, among other matters, the locatior
of the boundaries and the nature of the secu-
rity arrangements. The solution from the
negotiations must also recognize the legitimatf
rights of the Palestinian people and their jus
requirements. In this way. the Palestinian;
will participate in the determination of theii
own future through:
1) The negotiations among Egypt. Israel
Jordan and the representatives of the inhabi
tants of the West Bank and Gaza to agree oi
the final status of the West Bank and Gaza am
other outstanding issues by the end of thi
transitional period.
2) Submitting their agreement to a vote h\
the elected representatives of the inhabitant;
of the West Bank and Gaza.
3) Providing for the elected representa
tives of the inhabitants of the West Bank anc
Gaza to decide how they shall govern them
selves consistent with the provisions of their
agreement.
4 1 Participating as stated above in tht
work of the committee negotiating the peace
treaty between Israel and Jordan.
2. All necessary measures will be taken and
provisions made to assure the security of Israel
and its neighbors during the transitional period
and beyond. To assist in providing such secu-
rity, a strong local police force will be con-
stituted by the self-governing authority. It will
be composed of inhabitants of the West Bank
and Gaza. The police will maintain continuing
liaison on internal security matters with the
designated Israeli. Jordanian, and Egyptian
officers
3. During the transitional period, represent-
atives of Egypt. Israel, Jordan, and the self-
governing authority will constitute a continu-
ing committee to decide by agreement on the
modalities of admission of persons displaced
from the West Bank and Gaza in 1967. to-
gether with necessary measures to prevent
disruption and disorder. Other matters of
common concern may also be dealt with by
this committee.
4. Egypt and Israel will work with each
other and with other interested parties to es-
'October 1978
Htablish agreed procedures for a prompt, just
land permanent implementation of the resolu-
tion of the refugee problem.
MB. Egypt-Israel
1. Egypt and Israel undertake not to resort
llto the threat or the use of force to settle dis-
putes Any disputes shall be settled by peace-
ful means in accordance with the provisions of
ikrticle 33 of the Charter of the United Na-
i tions.
2. In order to achieve peace between them.
» the parties agree to negotiate in good faith
with a goal of concluding within three months
from the signing of this Framework a peace
Jfreaty between them, while inviting the other
loarties to the conflict to proceed simultane-
JlDUsly to negotiate and conclude similar peace
reaties with a view to achieving a comprehen-
sive peace in the area. The Framework for the
^Conclusion of a Peace Treaty Between Egypt
ind Israel will govern the peace negotiations
Aretween them. The parties will agree on the
Inodalities and the timetable for the im-
plementation of their obligations under the
reaty
C. Associated Principles
1. Egypt and Israel state that the principles
snd provisions described below should apply
o peace treaties between Israel and each of its
leighbors — Egypt. Jordan. Syria and Lebanon.
2. Signatories shall establish among them-
selves relationships normal to states at peace
a ith one another. To this end, they should
undertake to abide by all the provisions of the
Charter of the United Nations. Steps to be
aken in this respect include:
(a) full recognition;
(b) abolishing economic boycotts;
(c) guaranteeing that under their jurisdiction
he citizens of the other parties shall enjoy the
protection of the due process of law.
3. Signatories should explore possibilities
for economic development in the context of
final peace treaties, with the objective of con-
tributing to the atmosphere of peace, coopera-
tion and friendship which is their common
goal.
4. Claims Commissions may be established
for the mutual settlement of all financial
claims.
5. The United States shall be invited to par-
ticipate in the talks on matters related to the
modalities of the implementation of the
agreements and working out the timetable
for the carrying out of the obligations of the
parties.
6. The United Nations Security Council
shall be requested to endorse the peace treaties
and ensure that their provisions shall not be
violated. The permanent members of the Se-
curity Council shall be requested to underwrite
the peace treaties and ensure respect for their
provisions. They shall also be requested to
conform their policies and actions with the
undertakings contained in this Framework.
For the Government of the
Arab Republic of Egypt:
A. Sadat
For the Government
of Israel:
M Begin
Witnessed by:
Jimmy Carter. President
of the United States of America
FRAMEWORK FOR THE CONCLUSION
OF A PEACE TREATY BETWEEN
EGYPT AND ISRAEL
In order to achieve peace between them.
Israel and Egypt agree to negotiate in good
faith with a goal of concluding within three
months of the signing of this framework a
peace treaty between them.
It is agreed that:
The site of the negotiations will be under a
United Nations flag at a location or locations
to be mutually agreed.
All of the principles of U.N. Resolution 242
will apply in this resolution of the dispute
between Israel and Egypt.
Unless otherwise mutually agreed, terms of
the peace treaty will be implemented between
two and three years after the peace treaty is
signed.
The following matters are agreed between
the parties:
(a) the full exercise of Egyptian sovereignty
up to the internationally recognized border
between Egypt and mandated Palestine;
(b) the withdrawal of Israeli armed forces
from the Sinai;
(c) the use of airfields left by the Israelis
near El Arish. Rafah. Ras en Naqb. and Sharm
el Sheikh for civilian purposes only, including
possible commercial use by all nations;
(d) the right of free passage by ships of
Israel through the Gulf of Suez and the Suez
Canal on the basis of the Constantinople Con-
vention of 1888 applying to all nations; the
Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba are in-
ternational waterways to be open to all nations
for unimpeded and nonsuspendable freedom of
navigation and overflight;
(e) the construction of a highway between
the Sinai and Jordan near Elat with guaranteed
free and peaceful passage by Egypt and Jor-
dan: and
(f) the stationing of military forces listed
below .
Stationing of Forces
A. No more than one division (mechanized
or infantry) of Egyptian armed forces will be
stationed within an area lying approximately
50 kilometers (km) east of the Gulf of Suez
and the Suez Canal.
B. Only United Nations forces and civil
U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL
RESOLUTION 242*
The Security Council.
Expressing its continuing concern
with the grave situation in the Middle
East,
Emphasizing the inadmissibility of
the acquisition of territory by war and
the need to work for a just and lasting
peace in which every State in the area
can live in security.
Emphasizing further that all Member
States in their acceptance of the Charter
of the United Nations have undertaken a
commitment to act in accordance with
Article 2 of the Charter,
1 . Affirms that the fulfillment of
Charter principles requires the estab-
lishment of a just and lasting peace in
the Middle East which should include
the application of both the following
principles:
(i) Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces
from territories occupied in the recent
conflict;
(ii) Termination of all claims or
states of belligerency and respect for
and acknowledgement of the
sovereignty, territorial integrity and
political independence of every State in
the area and their right to live in peace
within secure and recognized bound-
aries free from threats or acts of force;
2. Affirms further the necessity
(a) For guaranteeing freedom of navi-
gation through international waterways
in the area;
(b) For achieving a just settlement of
the refugee problem;
(c) For guaranteeing the territorial
inviolability and political independence
of every State in the area, through
measures including the establishment of
demilitarized zones;
3. Requests the Secretary-General to
designate a Special Representative to
proceed to the Middle East to establish
and maintain contacts with the States
concerned in order to promote agree-
ment and assist efforts to achieve a
peaceful and accepted settlement in ac-
cordance with the provisions and prin-
ciples in this resolution;
4. Requests the Secretary-General to
report to the Security Council on the
progress of the efforts of the Special
Representative as soon as possible.
♦Adopted unanimously on Nov. 22.
1967.
10
Department of State Bullet
police equipped with light weapons to perform
normal police functions will be stationed
within an area lying west of the international
border and the Gulf of Aqaba, varying in
width from 20 km to 40 km.
C. In the area within 3 km east of the inter-
national border there will be Israeli limited
military forces not to exceed four infantry
battalions and United Nations observers.
D. Border patrol units, not to exceed three
battalions, will supplement the civil police in
maintaining order in the area not included
above.
The exact demarcation of the above areas
will be as decided during the peace negotia-
tions.
Early warning stations may exist to insure
compliance with the terms of the agreement.
United Nations forces will be stationed: (a)
in part of the area in the Sinai lying within
about 20 km of the Mediterranean Sea and
adjacent to the international border, and (b) in
the Sharm el Sheikh area to ensure freedom of
passage through the Strait of Tiran; and these
forces will not be removed unless such re-
moval is approved by the Security Council of
the United Nations with a unanimous vote of
the five permanent members.
After a peace treaty is signed, and after the
interim withdrawal is complete, normal rela-
tions will be established between Egypt and
Israel, including: full recognition, including
diplomatic, economic and cultural relations;
termination of economic boycotts and barriers
to the free movement of goods and people; and
mutual protection of citizens by the due proc-
ess of law.
Interim Withdrawal
Between three months and nine months after
the signing of the peace treaty, all Israeli
U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL
RESOLUTION 338*
The Security Council
1 . Culls upon all parties to the pres-
ent fighting to cease all firing and ter-
minate all military activity immediately,
no later than 12 hours after the moment
of the adoption of this decision, in the
positions they now occupy;
2. Calls upon the parties concerned to
start immediately after the cease-fire the
implementation of Security Council res-
olution 242 (1967) in all of its parts;
3. Decides that, immediately and
concurrently with the cease-fire, negoti-
ations start between the parties con-
cerned under appropriate auspices
aimed at establishing a just and durable
peace in the Middle East.
'Adopted on Oct 22. 1973, by a vote
of 14 to (P.R.C. did not participate in
the voting).
forces will withdraw east of a line extending
from a point east of El Arish to Ras Muham-
mad, the exact location of this line to be de-
termined by mutual agreement.
For the Government of the
Arab Republic of Egypt:
A Sadat
For the Government
of Israel:
M Begin
Witnessed by:
Jimmy Carter. President
of the United States of America
ACCOMPANYING LETTERS
uisite to any negotiations on
between Egypt and Israel.
Sincerely.
peace tre;
Sinai Settlements 9
September 17, 1978
Dear Mr. President:
I have the honor to inform you that during
two weeks after my return home I will submit a
motion before Israel's Parliament (the Knesset)
to decide on the following question:
If during the negotiations to conclude a
peace treaty between Israel and Egypt all out-
standing issues are agreed upon, "are you in
favor of the removal of the Israeli settlers from
the northern and southern Sinai areas or are you
in favor of keeping the aforementioned settlers
in those areas?"
The vote, Mr. President, on this issue will be
completely free from the usual Parliamentary
Party discipline to the effect that although the
coalition is being now supported by 70 mem-
bers out of 120, every member of the Knesset,
as I believe, both on the Government and the
Opposition benches will be enabled to vote in
accordance with his own conscience.
Sincerely yours.
(signed)
Menachem Begin
The President
Camp David
Thurmont. Maryland
September 22, 1978
Dear Mr. President:
I transmit herewith a copy of a letter to me
from Prime Minister Begin setting forth how he
proposes to present the issue of the Sinai set-
tlements to the Knesset for the latter's deci-
sion
In this connection. 1 understand from your
letter that Knesset approval to withdraw all
Israeli settlers from Sinai according to a time-
table within the period specified for the im-
plementation of the peace treaty is a prereq-
(signed)
Jimmy Carter
Enclosure:
Letter from Prime Minister Begin
His Excellency
Anwar Al-Sadat
President of the Arab
Republic of Egypt
Cairo
September 17, 19
Dear Mr President:
In connection with the "Framework for
Settlement in Sinai" to be signed tonight,
would like to reaffirm the position of the Ar
Republic of Egypt with respect to the sett
ments:
1 All Israeli settlers must be withdra'
from Sinai according to a timetable within t
period specified for the implementation of t
peace treaty
2 Agreement by the Israeli Government a
its constitutional institutions to this basic pr;
ciple is therefore a prerequisite to starti
peace negotiations for concluding a pea
treaty.
3. If Israel fails to meet this commitme
the "Framework" shall be void and invalid.
Sincerely,
(signed)
Mohamed Anwar El Sadat
His Excellency Jimmy Carter
President of the United States
September 22. 19'
Dear Mr. Prime Minister:
I have received your letter of September 1
1978, describing how you intend to place t
question of the future of Israeli settlements
Sinai before the Knesset for its decision.
Enclosed is a copy of President Sadat's leti
to me on this subject.
Sincerely,
(signed)
Jimmy Carter
Enclosure:
Letter from President Sadat
His Excellency
Menachem Begin
Prime Minister of Israel
Jerusalem" 1
September 17, 19
Dear Mr President,
I am writing you to reaffirm the position
the Arab Republic of Egypt with respect
Jerusalem:
1. Arab Jerusalem is an integral part of t
Jctober 1M78
11
West Bank. Legal and historical Arab rights in
He City must be respected and restored,
i 2. Arab Jerusalem should be under Arab
uvereignty.
] 3. The Palestinian inhabitants of Arab
'Jerusalem are entitled to exercise their legiti-
mate national rights, being part of the Palesti-
ian People in the West Bank.
,\ 4. Relevant Security Council Resolutions,
narticularly Resolutions 242 and 267, must be
pplied with regard to Jerusalem. All the meas-
res taken by Israel to alter the status of the
ity are null and void and should be rescinded.
5. All peoples must have free access to the
'lity and enjoy the free exercise of worship and
le right to visit and transit to the holy places
ithout distinction or discrimination
. 6. The holy places of each faith may be
i laced under the administration and control of
flieir representatives.
f 7. Essential functions in the City should be
ndivided and a joint municipal council com-
posed of an equal number of Arab and Israeli
members can supervise the carrying out of
-Jiese functions. In this way, the City shall be
ndivided.
Sincerely,
(signed)
Mohamed Anwar El Sadat
is Excellency Jimmy Carter
resident of the United States
17 September 1978
•ear Mr President.
I have the honor to inform you, Mr. Presi-
ent, that on 28 June 1967 — Israel's Parliament
The Knesset) promulgated and adopted a law
) the effect: "the Government is empowered
y a decree to apply the law, the jurisdiction
nd administration of the State to any part of
iretz Israel (land of Israel — Palestine), as
tated in that decree. "
On the basis of this law, the Government of
srael decreed in July 1967 that Jerusalem is
me city indivisible, the Capital of the State of
srael.
Sincerely,
(signed)
Menachem Begin
'he President
Tamp David
Tiurmont, Maryland
September 22, 1978
)ear Mr President:
I have received your letter of September 17,
:978, setting forth the Egyptian position on
erusalem. I am transmitting a copy of that
Better to Prime Minister Begin for his informa-
ion.
The position of the United States on
lerusalem remains as stated by Ambassador
3oldberg in the United Nations General As-
sembly on July 14, 1967." and subsequently
by Ambassador Yost in the United Nations
Security Council on July 1 , 1 969. ' '
Sincerely,
(signed)
Jimmy Carter
His Excellency
Anwar al-Sadat
President of the Arab
Republic of Egypt
Cairo
Implementation of Comprehensive
Settlement ' 3
September 17, 1978
Dear Mr. President:
In connection with the "Framework for
Peace in the Middle East", I am writing you
this letter to inform you of the position of the
Arab Republic of Egypt, with respect to the
implementation of the comprehensive settle-
ment.
To ensure the implementation of the provi-
sions related to the West Bank and Gaza and in
order to safeguard the legitimate rights of the
Palestinian people, Egypt will be prepared to
assume the Arab role emanating from these
provisions, following consultations with Jordan
and the representatives of the Palestinian
people.
Sincerely,
(signed)
Mohamed Anwar El Sadat
His Excellency
Jimmy Carter
President of the United States
The White House
Washington, D.C.
Airbases 15
September 28, 1978
Definition of Terms"
September 22. 1978
Dear Mr. Prime Minister:
I hereby acknowledge that you have in-
formed me as follows:
A) In each paragraph of the Agreed
Framework Document the expressions "Pales-
tinians" or "Palestinian People" are being and
will be construed and understood by you as
"Palestinian Arabs."
B) In each paragraph in which the expression
"West Bank" appears, it is being, and will be,
understood by the Government of Israel as
Judea and Samaria.
Sincerely,
(signed)
Jimmy Carter
His Excellency
Menachem Begin
Prime Minister of Israel
Editor's Note
Any
additional correspondence
wi
11 be
printed
in the Bulletin when
it
has
been publicly released.
Dear Mr. Minister:
The U.S. understands that, in connection
with carrying out the agreements reached at
Camp David, Israel intends to build two mili-
tary airbases at appropriate sites in the Negev
to replace the airbases at Eitam and Etzion
which will be evacuated by Israel in accordance
with the peace treaty to be concluded between
Egypt and Israel. We also understand the spe-
cial urgency and priority which Israel attaches
to preparing the new bases in light of its con-
viction that it cannot safely leave the Sinai
airbases until the new ones are operational.
I suggest that our two governments consult
on the scope and costs of the two new airbases
as well as on related forms of assistance which
the United States might appropriately provide
in light of the special problems which may be
presented by carrying out such a project on an
urgent basis. The President is prepared to seek
the necessary Congressional approvals for such
assistance as may be agreed upon by the U.S.
side as a result of such consultations.
(signed)
Harold Brown
Secretary of Defense
The Honorable
Ezer Weizman
Minister of Defense
Government of Israel □
'Text from Weekly Compilation of Presi-
dential Documents of Sept. 25, 1978.
2 Made to reporters assembled on the South
Lawn of the White House (text from Weekly
Compilation of Sept. II).
J Text from White House press release of
Sept. 5.
4 Text from White House press release of
Sept. 5.
Mssued by President Carter, President
Sadat, and Prime Minister Begin at Camp
David (text from Weekly Compilation of Sept.
11).
6 Made in the East Room of the White House
at the signing ceremony (text from Weekly
Compilation of Sept. 25).
'Texts from Weekly Compilation of Sept.
25.
8 The texts of Resolutions 242 and 338 are
annexed to this document [original in agree-
ment],
'Released by the White House on Sept. 22
(text from Weekly Compilation of Sept. 25).
'"Released by the White House on Sept. 22
(text from Weekly Compilation of Sept. 25).
"For text of Ambassador Goldberg's state-
ment, see Bulletin of July 31 , 1967, p. 148.
12 For text of Ambassador Yost's statement,
see Bulletin of July 28, 1969, p. 76.
"Released by the White House on Sept. 22
(text from Weekly Compilation of Sept. 25).
"Released by the White House on Sept. 22
(text from Weekly Compilation of Sept. 25).
15 Released by the Department of Defense on
Sept. 29.
12
THE PRESIDENT:
News Conference
of August 1 7 (Excerpts)
As President of the United States,
my ultimate responsibility is to the
protection of our nation's security, and
as Commander in Chief of our Armed
Forces, it's my obligation to see that
those forces are operationally ready,
fully equipped, and prepared for any
contingency. Because I take these re-
sponsibilities seriously, I submitted
this spring a defense budget designed
to improve our military preparedness
and calling for increased spending in
real terms, above and beyond the cost
of inflation, especially for enhanced
readiness and for the urgent re-
quirements of strengthening our NATO
forces.
Because of these same obligations,
and with the concurrence of the Sec-
retary of Defense, I have decided to
veto the defense authorization bill
which the Congress passed last week. 1
This is not a question of money.
The Congress has reduced only
slightly the amount of money that I
recommended for our nation's defense.
It's a question of how that money is
going to be spent — whether it will be
concentrated in the most vital areas
of need or diverted to less crucial
projects.
We must have the strongest possible
defense within the budget limits set by
Congress. We cannot afford to waste
our national defense dollars. We need
better maintenance and logistical sup-
port, more research and development,
a more flexible Navy. And we need
these improvements now. not 8 or 10
years in the future. The defense au-
thorization bill does not meet any of
these requirements.
There are four particularly disturb-
ing areas in which this bill, by cutting
into the muscle of our military re-
quest, could weaken our defenses and
erode our contributions to NATO.
This bill, for instance, cuts $800
million for weapons and equipment for
our Army forces, undermining our
commitment to NATO at the very time
when our allies recognize the urgent
need to improve the power and the
readiness of our forces in Europe.
This bill would also cut $200 mil-
lion for Air Force weapons and
equipment which would add flexibility
and strength to our military forces, not
only in NATO and this country but
throughout the world.
This bill would also cause a cut of
half a billion dollars — $500
million — from readiness funds. This is
an unglamorous part, but it's neces-
sary for expenditures for ship over-
hauls, weapon repairs, spare parts,
personnel training, and the logistical
support which guarantees that we can
move our forces and have them act
immediately when they're needed.
And this bill also cuts very heavily
from military research and develop-
ment funds. I had requested a sub-
stantial increase in these funds to
sustain our position of technical ex-
cellence in a world where circum-
stances change rapidly and where
weapons are increasingly dependent on
advanced technology. The bill that has
passed the Congress could lead to an
actual decrease in these funds for next
year.
The ultimate effect of this bill
would also weaken our Navy by ag-
gravating the dangerous trend away
from a larger number of different
kinds of ships, which can maintain our
military presence on the high seas, and
toward a disturbingly small number of
ships which are increasingly costly.
What the Congress has done with
the money being cut from these vital
areas is to authorize a fifth nuclear-
powered aircraft carrier, which we do
not need. This would be the most ex-
pensive ship ever built. Its purchase
price, even estimated now, would be
at least $2 billion, and the aircraft it
would carry and the extra ships re-
quired to escort and defend it would
cost billions more in years to come.
In order to use our dollars for their
maximum effect, we must choose the
armor, artillery, aircraft, and support
that will immediately bolster our
strength, especially in NATO. By di-
verting funds away from more impor-
tant defense needs in order to build a
very expensive nuclear aircraft carrier.
this bill would reduce our commitment
to NATO, waste the resources avail-
able for defense, and weaken our
nation's military capabilities in the
future.
I will be glad to cooperate with
Congress in passing a more responsi-
ble bill, and I urge the Members of
Congress to face that duty as soon as
they return from their recess. The na-
tion's interest and my oath of office
■•
Department of State Bulleti|
require me to veto this bill and to see
a stronger defense for our country.
Q. Your direct involvement in th<
Middle East summit conference nex
month is seeming to be a high-risl
gamble. Could you say what led yoi
to take this step and what are thi
risks? What happens if this effor
fails?
:
A. Let me say, first of all, that w
don't act just as a nonintereste>
mediator or message carrier in th
Mideast negotiations. Our own na
tional security is vitally involved, no
only in maintaining peace around th'
world but especially in the Middl
East, and we have devoted our utmos
effort to bringing about a peaceful res
olution of the longstanding Middl
Eastern disputes.
I have met in small groups and pri
vately with Prime Minister Begin am
with President Sadat on many occa
sions. I think I know them both quiti
well, and I am absolutely convincei
that both men want peace, and thi
people in both nations genuinely warn
peace.
All of us were pleased las
November [and December] when th*
exchange of visits took place — Sada
going to Jerusalem, Begin going t<
Ismailia. It was one of the happies
few weeks of my career as Presiden
not to be involved in those negotia
tions and to see them face-to-face
trying to work out the differences be
tween them.
Since then, the interrelationship
which brought us such high hopes las
winter have deteriorated rapidly. Ir
spite of our best efforts, recently
those peace talks broke down com
pletely, not only at the high level ol
the Prime Minister and President bui
even at a lower level involving cabinet
officers themselves. Even when Sec-
retary Vance had scheduled a trip tc
the Mideast, we could not get the
leaders to agree to meet.
It is a very high risk thing for me
politically, because now I think if we
are unsuccessful at Camp David, I will
certainly have to share part of the
blame for that failure. But I don't see
that I could do anything differently,
because I'm afraid that if the leaders
do not meet and do not permit their
subordinates to meet in a continuing
series of tough negotiations that the
situation in the Middle East might be
much more serious in the future even
than it is now.
So, I decided on my own, and later
got the concurrence of my top
advisers — including Secretary of State
Vance and the Vice President and
others — to invite both those men to
ctober 1978
neet with me at Camp David. We do
lot have any assurance of success. I
lo not anticipate being completely
uccessful there and having a peace
reaty signed in that brief period of
ime. But if we can get them to sit
own and discuss honestly and sin-
erely their desires for peace, to
xplore the compatibilities between
■hem, to identify very clearly the dif-
ferences, try to resolve those differ-
ences, then I think we can set a
iramework for peace in the future.
| It may result only in a redetermina-
tion or recommitment to continue sub-
. equent negotiations. We might make
Jiiore progress than that. But we will
o there as a full partner in the discus-
lions, depending primarily, however,
>|n the two national leaders themselves
I) work out the differences between
Item.
I I pray and I hope the whole nation,
lie whole world will pray that we do
Jot fail, because failure could result in
I new conflict in the Middle East
hich could severely damage the se-
JJurity of our own country.
Q. You're said to be very deeply
I mcerned about the dollar. Is there
dollar crisis? What are you going
: p do about it? And why haven't you
i 9ne something yet? And I have a
'Uowup. [Laughter]
. A. I am deeply concerned about the
I )llar. And I have asked Secretary of
treasury Mike Blumenthal and the
i hairman of the Federal Reserve, Bill
■ tiller, and others to consult with one
t tother and to give me advice on steps
i: at can be taken by them and by me.
"I There are some factors that are en-
luraging in the long run. Recent
onthly data have shown that our
ilance-of-trade deficit is going down,
believe that we've made good prog-
ss in seeing an increase in the eco-
)mic growth of other nations over-
as so that they are better able now
id in the future to buy our goods
an they have been in the past, when
e were growing fast and we could
ford to buy their goods.
The Congress can contribute. The
ngle most important thing that Con-
fess can do to control inflation and
so to ease the pressures on the dollar
id to reduce our severe adverse trade
ilance is to pass an energy bill. I've
one everything in the world that I
iuld do and so have my Cabinet
embers and all my staff members
id many hundreds of people around
e country to induce Congress to go
lead and act on a comprehensive
lergy bill. They have not yet done
). They've been working on it since
pril of 1977. We still have hopes
that the Congress will act successfully.
Another underlying problem, of
course, is inflation, and we are dealing
with that on many levels. One, of
course, is to hold down the size of the
Federal deficit. We've made good
progress there. I know that when I ran
for President in 1976, the Federal
deficit was in the sixties of billions of
dollars. By 1978, it was down to the
fifties of billions of dollars; '79, the
forties of billions of dollars, low for-
ties; and by the 1980 fiscal year, I am
determined to have it down in the
thirties of billions of dollars.
We are eliminating excessive
spending and demonstrating to our
country and the rest of the world that
we are determined to hold down infla-
tion. But it's a tenacious thing. It
would be erroneous for me to insinuate
to the American people that it's easy
and that we're going to solve it over-
night. Everybody has got to help. But
if we can top it out — the inflationary
curve — this year, I think that will send
a good signal to the world monetary
markets.
We have a combination of prob-
lems, some of which we are address-
ing successfully, some of which are
very difficult, but we are all working
in concert. And I believe that the un-
derlying economic strength of our na-
tion will prevent a further deterioration
in the status of our nation and a fur-
ther deterioration in the dollar, par-
ticularly if the Congress will act and if
we can act in this Administration to
address those questions that I've just
described.
Q. Back to the summit and what-
ever preparations may have been
made. I want to push one step fur-
ther, if I may. Is there an agreement
or an arrangement or even a slight
arrangement already in place before
you go into this big meeting?
A. In my letter to both Prime
Minister Begin and Sadat, I outlined
some of the principles on which we
should meet, not negotiating principles
but the need, for instance, to lessen
the vituperation that had been sweep-
ing back and forth between govern-
ment leaders, to express in a positive
fashion their determination to come to
Camp David with flexibility and with
an ability on the part of those govern-
ment leaders to act.
The immediacy of their response —
they did not delay at all, when they
read my letter, to say "I will come to
Camp David" — is indicative of good
faith on their part. But I do not have
any commitment from them to change
their previously expressed positions as
13
a prerequisite or prelude to coming to
Camp David.
Q. Your Agriculture Secretary
was quoted as saying earlier this
week that you intended to retaliate
against the cheapshot artists in Con-
gress who oppose some of your pro-
grams. What is your attitude toward
Congress as you come up to the
Labor Day recess?
A. I would say that in general, the
Congress has been very cooperative
and very constructive. I think any
analysis of the accomplishments of
Congress last year in the domestic
field would be favorable. We ad-
dressed the most difficult questions of
all successfully. The energy question
was put off until this year and still has
not yet been addressed.
In foreign affairs this year, I think
the Congress has acted with great
judgment and also with great courage
to deal with some longstanding ques-
tions involving sales of weapons to the
moderate Arab nations, approval of
the Panama Canal treaties, removal of
the embargo against Turkey, and so
forth.
I have never discussed this subject
with the Secretary of Agriculture, and
he's never discussed it with me. But I
certainly don't have any animosity
against any Member of Congress. I do
not have a list of Congress Members
who are worthy of punishment. I have
no inclination to do that; it's not part
of my nature. And I think it would be
counterproductive if I attempted it.
Q. Earlier this year, you
suggested that the time might come
when you would have to move ad-
ministratively to impose import fees
or quotas on foreign oil. My ques-
tion is, are we near that time, and if
Congress should adjourn this year
without passing what you consider
to be a substantial energy bill, will
you do it?
A. That's an option that I will
maintain open for myself. Obviously
there are several options that can be
exercised, the most advantageous of
which to consumers, to oil producers,
to our own country, and, I think, to
the rest of the world, is to pass the
energy proposal as I presented it to the
Congress — to impose a tax on oil, to
reduce its waste, and to encourage
more use of American oil in the first
place, and to distribute the revenues
from that tax back immediately to the
American people. This would be a
very constructive attitude.
The second one would be, in the
absence of congressional action, for
me to impose, through Executive order
14
under the present law, either import
quotas, limiting the amount of oil that
could come in, or import fees, which
would charge extra for oil coming into
the nation. And, of course, the other
option, which is one that I think would
be at the bottom of the list, would be
to permit the oil companies to unilat-
erally increase the price of their oil
very high and to let the consumers pay
for it to the enrichment of the oil
companies themselves.
That's a list of the options that I can
think of at this moment that exist for
me. And my preference, of course, is
for the Congress to act. But I cannot
foreclose the option that I have to act
unilaterally through Executive order if
the Congress does not act.
Q. Do you plan to continue selec-
tive trade sanctions against the
Soviet Union since some allied na-
tions, such as France, are unwilling
to cooperate in technological
boycotts?
A. We obviously don't have any in-
clination to declare a trade embargo
against the Soviet Union to stop all
trade. It's to the advantage of our
country to have trade with the Soviet
Union. I think embargoes that have
been imposed in the past by previous
Administrations — for instance, an un-
announced and unilateral stopping of
shipments of feed grains and food
grains and soybeans overseas — has
been very detrimental to our country. I
do not intend to do that. But we'll
assess each individual sale on the basis
of several criteria, one of the most
important ones of which is, does this
sale contribute to an enhancement of
the Soviet's military capability and is
this country the only reasonable source
of a supply for that particular item?
And we have a very well established
procedure in the government for car-
rying out that analysis. And I believe
that my own cancellation of the sale of
a very large computer a month or so
ago was well-advised, but we'll have
to consider each one of those addi-
tional items as they are proposed on
its own merits.
It takes a long time for a decision
like that to get to my desk. Most of
them are simply canceled before they
ever arrive — even come in to my at-
tention. The Commerce Department
and others assess it; the State Depart-
ment has to approve it before it comes
to me. But we'll have to assess them
on an individual basis.
Q. Getting back to energy and the
veto today, Senator Jackson was
suggesting today that this is going to
be a big problem for the energy bill,
now that you've vetoed the defense
bill, because he says the aircraft
carrier was kind of the glue that
held that thing together, and it took
them 6 months to get the bill. And
he says now it's going to be a prob-
lem, and he says we've got so many
headaches and this is another one. It
seems rather significant to me, in
that he's the man that is carrying
that energy bill for you.
A. I met this morning with Senator
Jackson and others to go over the rea-
sons for my veto. He did not disagree
with the reasons that I expressed. I
have not had a single adviser who told
me that we ought to go ahead with the
nuclear aircraft carrier.
The only concerns that anyone has
expressed to me is that it might create
additional work for Congress in cor-
recting an error that I think they made,
or that it might cause me political
problems in having vetoed a bill and
had a confrontation with Congress.
I don't desire to do anything with
Congress but to cooperate with them.
We are working now in the House,
which will first take up the veto since
the bill originated in the House, to
make sure that we can sustain my veto
on the basis of its own merits. I don't
see any reason to link the building of a
nuclear aircraft carrier, which will be
completed maybe in 1987, with the
approval of a conference committee
report on natural gas that's been
negotiated now for almost 16 months.
Q. Yes, sir, but are you confident
someone up there might not see it?
A. I cannot guarantee that nobody
considers it, but I can tell you this: It
won't be the first problem we've had
with the natural gas bill. [Laughter]
Department of State Bullet
one that's mutually set. We have
very good representative in Chin;
Leonard Woodcock. They have a vei
fine representative here, a new repn
sentative not known as an ambassado
in Washington whom I've not yet met
But we are constantly exploring
ways to have better relationships wil
China. First of all, no matter what ot
relationship is with them on a bilater,
basis, we want China to be a peacefi
nation, to be secure, and to have the
beneficial effects felt around the worh
Secondly, we want our bilateral n
lationships with them to be better, t
enhance trade, communications, stu
dent exchange, and so forth, whethi
or not we have diplomatic relations i
such. And then, of course, the fin;
thing is to hope for diplomatic rel;
tions when we're both willing to pre,
ceed expeditiously and when we'i
both willing to accommodate on
another's wishes.
I can't tell you what the pace of th.
might be. It's not something that
could unilaterally impose upon then
and I have to judge by what their Fi
sponse might be.
I think there's a new impression-
certainly that I have of the leadershi
in China — that they are more ou
reaching now, they're more outgoing.
The present visit of Chairman Hu;
for instance, to Romania, is a goc|
indication and an almost unpn
cedented thing for them to go out im
the Eastern European world, an
perhaps even other countries as we
later on. to make visits. I think th.
they are reaching out in a spirit (
friendship. If they do, I will respon
in good faith. I just cannot give you
time schedule.
[
Q. During a recent interview you
made the point that both we and the
Chinese are patient on the subject of
establishing full diplomatic rela-
tions. My question concerns the ex-
tent of that patience on your part,
whether now it might be something
indefinitely on the back burner or
something you would like to see ac-
complished between now and, let's
say, the end of 1980.
A. The normalization of relations
with the People's Republic of China
has always been a goal of my Admin-
istration. It was a goal of my prede-
cessors under the general provisions of
the Shanghai communique that was
signed by President Nixon on his his-
toric visit to China.
The pace of negotiations must be
For full text, see Weekh Compilation of Presl
dential Documents of Aug. 21, 1978, p. 1438
'For the text of President Carter's message t
the House of Representatives returning H RJ
10929 without approval on Aug. 17, 1978, se
Weekly Compilation of Aug. 21, p. 1447.
Ictober 1978
15
AFRICA: Peaceful Solutions to Conflicts
in Namibia and Southern Rhodesia
y Warren Christopher
Based on an address before the liti-
ation section of the American Bar
ssociation in New York on August 9,
$78. Mr. Christopher is Deputy Sec-
tary of State.
I want to talk briefly at the outset
Dout our efforts to find peaceful so-
itions to serious regional conflicts
1 tat threaten peace. Our participation
l the peacemaking process is
■itical — in Namibia, in Rhodesia, in
ebanon and elsewhere in the Middle
ast, in Cyprus, and in other serious
ouble spots of the world. These re-
onal disputes contain the seeds of
ider conflict. Each poses a grave risk
world peace in a nuclear age.
The heaviest toll falls on those who
"re caught in the conflict. Resources
id energy are drained from the work
building better lives and stronger
icieties. And as the weaponry of re-
onal conflict becomes more sophisti-
ited, the potential cost in human
v>es grows more dear.
We must all recognize that there are
) instant solutions or quick remedies
ir disputes with such deep roots,
ecades — sometimes centuries — of
utual suspicion and distrust are not
usily overcome. And basic differ-
tces of race, religion, ethnic back-
ound, and national identity often
el the discord. But it is equally im-
)rtant to recognize that progress can
[J: made, that seemingly irreconcilable
fferences can be overcome. And the
nited States has a unique role to play
working for this progress.
There has been, in recent years, an
l warranted pessimism about the pos-
< bilities for American diplomacy. It
' ay stem in part from the fact that we
e dealing with an increasingly com-
icated world scene in which there
e many more nations than a genera-
Dn ago and the relative influence of
ty one country is diminished.
Professor Stanley Hoffmann recently
ascribed our past diplomatic experi-
•tce as having been premised either
i isolation or on supremacy. Now, in
more pluralistic world, our challenge
to lead even when we do not domi-
ite; to use our immense and un-
oubted strength to inspire other
ations — strong and weak — to work
ith us toward goals we share and
innot reach alone.
I have no doubt that the United
States can effectively play this role.
For our power — while perhaps di-
minished in relative terms — has never
been greater in absolute terms. Our
military strength is immense; our eco-
nomic influence unparalleled. The re-
cent reassertion of our concern for
human rights, the breadth of our rela-
tions throughout the world, and our
evident commitment to peacemaking in
troubled regions make us valued as a
mediator. And our democratic domes-
tic traditions, which emphasize build-
ing coalitions around shared interests,
serve us well when we are working to
build inclusive and cooperative diplo-
matic efforts abroad.
U.S. Role in Namibia
We have recently had an example of
this kind of new American leadership
in Namibia. Let me briefly describe
what has happened.
In the late 1800's a colony twice the
size of California was established by
Germany on the southwest coast of
Africa. In the geography books of our
youth, it was called Southwest Africa.
Now it is called Namibia.
After World War I, administration
of this area was transferred to
neighboring South Africa under a
League of Nations mandate. After
World War II, South Africa declined
to allow self-determination for the ter-
ritory and extended apartheid to
Namibia.
In 1966 South Africa's international
mandate was revoked by the United
Nations with U.S. support. South Af-
rica refused to accept this decision.
The conflict over independence for the
people of Namibia, and transition to
majority rule, has become more in-
tense in recent years, with increasing
clashes between South African forces
and those of Namibian nationalists.
Sixteen months ago, the five West-
ern members of the U.N. Security
Council — the United States, Britain,
West Germany, France, and
Canada — launched an unprecedented
joint effort to resolve the Namibia
problem peacefully. From the start,
the five made clear that they favored
no particular Namibian political group.
At the same time, they realized that it
was essential to gain the agreement of
the two parties engaged in armed con-
flict in Namibia — South Africa and the
South West Africa People's Organiza-
tion known as SWAPO.
In the spring of 1977, discussions
began among representatives of the
five Western countries — what became
known as the "contact group" — and
South Africa and SWAPO. Through-
out, the Western five kept all Nami-
bian political groups informed of sig-
nificant developments in the talks. The
neighboring African states of Zambia.
Mozambique, Angola, Tanzania, and
Botswana — the so-called front-line
states — as well as others in Africa,
were deeply engaged at each stage of
the negotiating process.
Because the parties would not en-
gage in direct negotiations, the contact
group used a variety of diplomatic
techniques. At times, it engaged in a
form of "shuttle diplomacy," moving
back and forth among the parties and
the various African states that were
playing an indispensable role. At one
critical point in February of this year,
representatives of South Africa and
SWAPO were invited to New York for
several days of intensive "proximity
talks." Although the parties were not
in the same room together, they were
able to exchange views through
negotiating intermediaries.
One of the extraordinary aspects of
these negotiations was the ability of
the five-nation contact group to func-
tion together as a unit. Many individu-
als, from each of the countries in-
volved, played critical roles. I think
all who were involved would agree
that the vision and persistence of Am-
bassadors Andrew Young [U.S. Per-
manent Representative to the United
Nations] and Donald McHenry
[Deputy Representative to the U.N.
Security Council] of our delegation to
the United Nations have been vital.
President Carter and Secretary Vance
provided constant leadership and pol-
icy guidance.
There were many times when the
mistrust built up over the years set
back the chances for a settlement.
Now, however, at long last, the
negotiations have produced an agree-
ment between South Africa and
SWAPO to cease hostilities and to
proceed with a prompt transition to
independence and majority rule
through U.N. -supervised elections.
Two weeks ago, the U.N. Security
Council endorsed this agreement and
launched the process for establishing
16
international peacekeeping and super-
vision during the critical transition
period. On August 6, the U.N. Sec-
retary General's special representative
[Marti Ahtisaari of Finland] arrived in
Namibia to begin the process of es-
tablishing a U.N. presence in that
country.
A great deal of hard work remains
to assure that the agreement is suc-
cessfully implemented. It is likely
that both parties will attempt, during
the coming period, to reopen various
issues on which they were unable to
obtain full satisfaction during the
lengthy negotiations which led up to
the final agreement. Such pressures
will have to be resisted. For our part,
the United States will lend its full
support to the implementation effort.
Approach Toward Negotiations
on Namibia
It may be useful, I think, to take a
moment to identify the major ele-
ments of the Namibia effort and to
consider their relevance to achieving
a peaceful resolution of other regional
conflicts. No two regional conflicts
are likely to yield to precisely the
same approaches, but nevertheless
there are important lessons to be
found in the principles which guided
the Namibian endeavor.
• A settlement must reflect the will
of the parties themselves. A solution
cannot be imposed from the outside.
It must be perceived by all of the
interested parties as meeting their
vital interests.
• To endure, a settlement must not
only have the support of the
negotiating parties, it must gain the
acceptance and support of the people
directly affected by it. The future of
Namibia will be determined by open
elections, whose fairness will be
guaranteed by U.N. supervision.
• The mediation of impartial na-
tions whose negotiators are respected
by both sides is indispensable. An-
tagonism and distrust between the two
sides in Namibia made negotiations
all but impossible in the absence of
outside mediators such as the contact
group. They provided a channel for
communicating ideas and com-
promises and, ultimately, for reaching
agreement.
• Encouragement and cooperative
diplomacy from other key countries in
the region can play a vital role. The
neighboring African states were of
crucial importance in gaining the trust
and support of SWAPO. Their experi-
ence in gaining their own independ-
ence gave them an understanding of
what was needed to achieve a solu-
tion. Their interest in peace and sta-
bility in the area led them to work
closely with the contact group to
achieve a peaceful solution.
• The continued commitment of the
international community to making
the settlement work is critical. With
its historic connection to Namibia,
the United Nations has provided the
framework for reaching an agreement.
It will now provide the machinery for
implementing that agreement and as-
suring the new Namibian Government
international support and acceptance.
In addition to supervising the election
process, the United Nations will pro-
vide a substantial civil and military
presence to assure fair elections. And
ultimately, the United Nations and its
specialized agencies will help the new
government strengthen its political
institutions and develop its economy.
Major Elements of
Negotiations on Rhodesia
The approach I have described —
based on democratic principles and
cooperative diplomacy — worked well
in Namibia. These are also the fun-
damental elements of our negotiations
on Rhodesia.
As in Namibia, an end to the
fighting in Rhodesia, and a peaceful
transition to majority rule, can only
come from an agreement that is ac-
ceptable to all the parties and that
protects the rights of all citizens of
Rhodesia — black and white. In the
absence of such an agreement, the
prospect is for increased bloodshed.
In Rhodesia, we are acting in sup-
port of Great Britain, which has pri-
mary responsibility as the colonial
power and has worked over the years
to secure a peaceful settlement. We
have been engaged in this effort with
the African states of the region. They
share our commitment to a just and
peaceful settlement of a growing war
that would have tragic consequences
for the entire region. And we are
working in the context of a
longstanding U.N. concern for the
future of Rhodesia.
The proposals we have put forward
with the British would provide for
fair nationwide elections open to all
parties on an equal basis and under
impartial outside supervision. A U.N.
force would maintain the peace and
help prevent intimidation during this
crucial period. U.N. observers would
help guarantee that elections are fair
and that their results are recognized
by the world community. We believe
that these proposals provide the best
means of achieving a negotiated set-
Department of State Bullet
tlement, but we would support at
alternative arrangement which tl
parties themselves can accept.
There has been progress. Each sit
has agreed to the principle of majori
rule through elections. But both all
seek to dominate the transition pro
ess. We are working to bring the
together in an "all parties" meetii
to agree to a process that all will si
as fair and that can therefore bring ;
end to the conflict.
To keep open this door to
negotiated settlement among all tl
parties, it is essential that the Unitt
States not choose sides. Some ha'
argued that we should now suppc
the agreement between Ian Smith at
some of the black leaders — and cea:
our participation in the U.N. sani
tions against Rhodesia — before tru
free elections are held. We ai
pleased that recent efforts in the Se
ate and House to lift sanctions ir
mediately were rejected.
There are several reasons why
strongly believe that siding wi'
either the internal or the external pa
ties would be a dangerous course,
would not help to end the fighting
Rhodesia. Whatever one may thir
about the two sides to the conflict,
seems clear that the fighting will n
stop until both sides come together
negotiate a transition process all a
cept as fair. And only such a rest,
will eliminate the opportunity fl
growing involvement in the confli
by other nations less committed to tl
processes of peace.
The only realistic channel no
open for bringing the parties togeth'
is the U.S. -U.K. negotiating effor
That effort will remain alive only ;
long as we remain impartial an
retain the confidence of all partit
involved.
The wiser course, in my judgmen
is to persist in our efforts, as we di
in Namibia, to bring the parties tc
gether to resolve their difference
through negotiations and to work fc
a peaceful transition to a stable an
internationally accepted nation whet
both blacks and whites can prosper.
As I conclude, let me emphasiz
that the United States will maintai
its unyielding commitment to th
processes of peace. We want never t
be in the position, years hence, c
asking whether, had we worke
harder to keep open those processes
a war could have been avoided. C
n
i
October 1978
17
ARMS CONTROL: SALT Ml-The Home Stretch
My Paul C. Warnke
Following are an address and
mestion-and-answer session before
he Foreign Policy Association in
few York on August 23, 1978. Mr.
Varnke is Director of the Arms Con-
rol and Disarmament Agency and
hairman of the delegation to the
trategic Arms Limitation Talks
SALT) with the personal rank of
Imbassador. '
As you can see from my title,
SALT II— The Home Stretch, " I am
uite optimistic that we are, in fact,
earing the completion of what has
een a very long race. SALT II, as I
m sure you know, has been in
egotiation for almost 6 years. In that
eriod, most of the major problems
ave been solved.
We are close to the full develop-
lent of a detailed, comprehensive
greement that will break new ground
l arms control. Agreement has been
;ached on verification measures, on
ew ceilings, and on subceilings for
articular categories of strategic nu-
lear delivery vehicles.
Agreement is now emerging on re-
xaints on new types of missiles and
n improvement of existing missiles,
nd the new SALT agreement will
lean both quantitative and qualitative
mitations on the Soviet nuclear
eapons that are aimed at American
ities and our military targets.
But I would have to say that the
:latively few problems that remain
J re very tough ones. That, I think, is
i) be expected, because they are the
ist problems. They are the ones that
ave proven to be the least tractable,
am, however, convinced that we can
Dmplete the home stretch and that
le result will be an agreement which
rotects and advances the security of
le United States.
background
I would like to ask you to step back
nd take a long view of SALT, as a
rocess, to consider how and why we
ecame involved in it, what we have
ccomplished to date, and what we
ave come to learn of the implica-
10ns of SALT — first and foremost for
ur national security but also for our
stations with the Soviet Union —
ecause SALT deals with the core of
the power balance between the United
States and the Soviet Union, specif-
ically with the most important and
most dangerous component of that
balance — those nuclear weapons
which, if ever used, would mean the
devastation of both societies.
So SALT thus involves fundamen-
tal and vital security interests of both
countries. Because this is so, you
might ask why the SALT talks didn't
begin until the late 1960's? Why was
it that they didn't start sooner —
perhaps in the early 1950's?
I think the answer to this question
can be found in the history of U.S.-
Soviet relations and the evolution of
the military balance between these
countries since the end of World War
II and the beginning of the nuclear
age. Out of the wartime alliance, and
with Europe and Japan in ruins, the
United States and the Soviet Union
emerged as the two dominant and
rival powers.
to allow this lead to persist as long as
they possessed the resources to close
the gap. Even if our strategic nuclear
edge did not allow us consistently to
thwart Soviet foreign policy objec-
tives and its ability to project its
military power, a combination of
historic Russian sensitivity to the ac-
tivities of the West and Soviet ideol-
ogy drove the U.S.S.R., at no small
cost, to try and catch up with the
United States in strategic nuclear
forces.
By the mid-1960's, programs for
this Soviet effort were firmly estab-
lished and underway, and thus the
two superpowers were forced to face
the implications of the new military
reality. For the United States, it
meant that no longer could we rely —
either in practice or even in
rhetoric — on the doctrine of massive
nuclear retaliation, a doctrine that
actually had been eroding for nearly a
decade.
Agreement is now emerging on restraints on new types of mis-
siles and on improvement of existing missiles. [It] will mean both
quantitative and qualitative limitations on the Soviet nuclear
weapons that are aimed at American cities and our military
targets.
Fundamental differences in goals,
values, and political systems led in-
evitably to this rivalry and to a bipo-
lar world. And for many years any
kind of useful relations or productive
negotiations between our two coun-
tries appeared almost impossible.
Many questioned whether we could
even live together, and the term
"coexistence" acquired a pejorative
connotation. So that arms control in
these circumstances seemed a very
unpromising prospect.
Moreover, you have to remember
that for about two decades we had,
first, a nuclear monopoly and then a
clear nuclear superiority. For the
Soviet Union, arms control
negotiations— in the light of this great
American lead — seemed to offer
nothing but permanent second-class
status. And for the United States, be-
cause of our immensely greater
strategic capability, arms control was
a topic of no particular urgency.
The Soviets could not be expected
Since the late 1950's, it has be-
come increasingly clear that Soviet
possession of a nuclear retaliatory ca-
pability meant instead that our mili-
tary forces must be capable of flexi-
ble response, commensurate with the
military challenge; because otherwise
the Soviet Union would be left with
wide freedom of action to use, or
threaten to use. its conventional
military power.
Now there have been some who
have argued that we never should
have allowed the Russians to over-
come our nuclear superiority. A
group recently formed insists that we
should now regain that strategic nu-
clear superiority. They do not, how-
ever, tell us how that can be done.
Nor do they say how the effort to do
so can be kept from creating an un-
bridled competition and the accumu-
lation of further and more deadly nu-
clear weapons that would mean
superiority for neither side and di-
minished security for both.
18
The fact is that in a nuclear race
between countries with the resources
of the United States and the Soviet
Union, one side can gain and main-
tain strategic superiority only if the
other side defaults. Now we know
that we would never be willing to
concede nuclear superiority to the
Soviets, and I think we have no basis
for hoping that they may be more in-
dulgent and give us that advantage.
So it is the inescapable logic of
strategic nuclear weapons and the
terrible consequences of their wide-
scale use, if strategic stability should
disappear and deterrence should fail,
that even bitter competitors have to
give serious thought to the benefits of
limited cooperation in the form of
arms control. This is the case for us,
whatever our distaste for Soviet am-
bitions abroad and repression at
home.
You will remember that the first
manifestation of this dawning
realism about nuclear arms came in
the consideration of the deployment
of antiballistic missile systems. In the
mid-1960's, the Soviets were ex-
panding their air defense and begin-
ning to deploy some ballistic missile
defenses, and the question we had to
face was whether we should move our
research and development program on
antiballistic missiles beyond that de-
velopment stage into actual deploy-
ment. There were those within gov-
ernment who consistently urged that
course.
What I regard as the seminal state-
ment in the new strategic arms debate
was a speech delivered by the then
Secretary of Defense, Robert
McNamara, in 1967. 2 This was an
historic contribution to public under-
standing of strategic policy.
In his speech. Secretary McNamara
outlined the basic concepts of nuclear
strategy and explained the new
realities of deterrence and the mutual
vulnerability of the United States and
the Soviet Union to the ballistic mis-
siles of the other side. He emphasized
that the problem with ABM's, with
antiballistic missile defenses, was not
the problem of cost but the fact that
the system itself was vulnerable to
countermeasures which the other side
could take. No matter how many an-
tiballistic missiles one side might as-
semble, the other side could match
that, and more than match that, with
offensive nuclear warheads and also
with dummy warheads.
So that even if the ABM were
technically feasible, U.S. deployment
of a massive anti-Soviet ABM system
would, as Secretary McNamara put it,
have ". . . strongly motivated [the
Soviets] to so increase their offensive
Department of State Bulleti
capability as to cancel out our defen-
sive advantage.*'
We could, as the Secretary of De-
fense pointed out, guess at Soviet in-
tentions, match their ABM deploy-
ments, respond to internal pressures
for new offensive systems to over-
come the antiballistic missile de-
fenses, and try to preserve our secu-
rity interests in a new round of the
nuclear arms race. "But," he con-
tinued, "what we would much prefer
to do is to come to a realistic and
reasonably riskless agreement with
the Soviet Union which would effec-
tively prevent such an arms race. "
And with that speech, Mr.
McNamara placed negotiated arms
control explicitly where it belongs — in
the context of national security. It
was really out of this new perception
of the strategic realities that SALT
was born. It was the relative parity of
the strategic nuclear forces of both
sides that made SALT possible, and it
was the stability of that balance that
made SALT desirable.
When the United States was still
strategically superior, the Soviet
Union didn't dare to negotiate, and
we felt no need to do so. But once
parity was achieved, another round of
the arms race with the rich, strong-
willed, and technologically powerful
United States would provide the
With our highly sophisticated
national technical means of
verification, we don't have to
rely on Soviet assurances.
Soviet Union with neither greater se-
curity nor greater status; because with
the forces in relative balance, neither
side could rationally be tempted to
launch a preemptive first strike.
President Johnson, in tying his ac-
tions on ABM's to Soviet willingness
to negotiate limitations on ABM's,
was really the one who committed the
United States to the SALT process.
And every President since then. Re-
publican and Democratic, has con-
tinued that commitment to arms con-
trol.
Their consistent belief is expressed
in President Carter's introduction to
my agency's 1977 annual report. He
noted that: "When necessary, we will
maintain our security and protect our
interests by strengthening our military
capabilities. Whenever possible,
however, we seek to enhance our se-
curity through arms control. Our se-
curity and the security of all nations
can be better served through equitable
fc'
■'
\
IS
\
and verifiable limits on arms tha
through unbridled competition. Th
United States has chosen arms contro
as an essential means of promoting it
security."
ft
flli
Accomplishments
In SALT there already have beei
significant accomplishments. Th
SALT I agreements in 1972 includei
a treaty which drastically limited an
tiballistic missile defenses, and tha '
treaty was so successful that it wa ■
later amended to cut back the per
mitted deployment of ABM system s >
from two to one. The ABM treat;
logically removed a major incentiv
to build up offensive systems; be
cause of the fact that the ABM's wer
essentially banned, it meant that yo>
did not have to engage in a furthe
accumulation of offensive warhead
in order to penetrate what would be
come a nonexistent defense.
In addition, in SALT I there was a:
Interim Agreement on control o
strategic offensive arms. This essen
tially froze the number of strategi
missile launchers at the levels alread; 51
deployed or under construction.
Taken together, these SALT
agreements constituted recognitio
that the key to strategic stability an-
to a lower risk of nuclear war was t
preserve the retaliatory capability o
each side; and that, accordingly
building of more and more offensiv
weapons was unnecessary, dangerous
and inconsistent with our goal of
secure world.
Since May of 1972, when SALT
was signed in Moscow, the carefu
and at times. I would say, painfu
development of a SALT II agreemen
has been proceeding. In late 1974
there was a major breakthrough
President Ford and the then Genera
Secretary Brezhnev agreed in Vlad
ivostok that the SALT II agreemen
would provide for equal aggregates it
intercontinental nuclear delivery sys
terns.
Moreover, the Soviet side agreec
that these equal numbers could bt
part of the new treaty, without an)
compensation to them for the fact tha
the United States maintains — in base;
in Europe — the so-called ''for-
ward-based systems" that enable us tc
target additional thousands of nucleai
weapons against the Soviet Union.
It is important that we now embody
this principle of equal aggregates in a
formal treaty, because even if it were
limited to this feature alone, SALT II
would be very much in the interests
of the United States. And from this
starting point of equal ceilings on the
number of total launchers and launch-
October 1978
rs of missiles with multiple,
ndependently-targetable reentry ve-
licles that we refer to as MIR Vs. we
an go on to parallel reductions in
hese ceilings. It has already been
greed at Geneva that Vladivostok
eilings of 2,400 strategic nuclear-
lelivery vehicles, of which 1,320 can
ie MIRV'ed, will be cut back early
m in the course of SALT II. And it
ias also been agreed that there will
>e a separate subceiling on the land-
iased intercontinental ballistic mis-
iles (ICBM's) with MIRVs.
We want that separate subceiling
ecause these are the most dangerous,
tie most destabilizing of the nuclear
/eapons. They are the ones that pose
ie greater threat of a counterforce
apability against the missile forces
f the other side, and hence a threat
) the assured retaliatory capability.
.essons From SALT
As we have moved in the last dec-
de of SALT from unrestricted ac-
amulation of nuclear weapons to the
eginning of control and now to the
rospect of effective quantitative as
ell as qualitative restrictions, we
lave learned a good deal about the
lirocess. We have learned a good deal
jfpout how it works and what it means
>r the U.S. -Soviet relationship.
The first lesson that we have
' arnod is that we can negotiate
bout strategic arms and that the
.'suiting agreements will work. The
itiballistic missile limitation treaty
iid, in fact, limit the deployment of
allistic missile defenses. I pointed
1 at that we have cut back from two
lites in each country to one; and, as a
l»atter of fact, we have deactivated
'|| ur own one site, because we don't
:ed it to protect our deterrent.
The second lesson is that strategic
rms control agreements can be de-
eloped which are, in fact, verifi-
ble by our national technical
leans. Unless we can have adequate
insurance that the other side is com-
plying with arms control provisions,
ny arms control agreement will be-
rame a source of suspicion and fric-
lon, rather than a source of comfort
Ind confidence. With our highly
IjDphisticated national technical means
jlf verification, we don't have to rely
JJn Soviet assurances. We have been
fible to determine under the SALT I
Agreements, and we will be able to
ijetermine under a SALT II agree-
ment, that the limits — both quantita-
tive and qualitative — are, in fact,
eing met by the Soviet Union.
i The provisions on verification that
jlave already been agreed upon pro-
hibit any measures of deliberate con-
cealment which would impede our
ability to verify compliance, and they
specifically prohibit any interference
with our national technical means.
Moreover, after long negotiation, and
in the face of the traditional Soviet
reluctance to disclose facts on mili-
tary forces, the Soviet negotiators
agreed earlier this year to an ex-
change of data that will establish an
19
MIRVs, SALT I left MIRVs to run
free.
Now, today, in the course of the
development of SALT II, a frequent
criticism that I hear is that SALT II
won't prevent the Soviets from ac-
quiring the theoretical potential to
threaten land-based forces in a coun-
terforce first strike.
I have mentioned that interconti-
nental ballistic missiles (ICBM's)
. . . the common recognition that we share an interest in survival
has enabled SALT to continue despite the intermittent strains in
the U.S. -Soviet relationship.
agreed data base against which we
can measure the reductions to the new
agreed-upon lower ceilings.
And because of the impossibility of
determining by national technical
means what kind of a missile is in
any particular missile launcher, we
have now agreed that a launcher will
be counted as a launcher of a MIRV
missile if it is of a type which has
ever contained or launched a missile
which is of a type which has ever
been tested with MIRVs. That sup-
plements our national technical means
of verification and gives us an identi-
fiable feature against which we can
measure compliance with the SALT
ceilings.
There is a third, and I think a
very important, lesson that we have
learned in the SALT process, and
that's the fact that arms control
agreements only limit those things
that are specifically covered by the
agreement. We can't rely on com-
pliance with the spirit of an agree-
ment; you have to have the letter.
You have to have something to which
you can point and say that this is an
agreed-upon provision which limits
the activity in which each side can
engage. And we have to recognize
that any new weapon, or any new de-
velopment, that is excluded from the
coverage of the agreement is per-
mitted for both sides — that to the ex-
tent that we preserve options, we pre-
serve them also for the Soviet Union.
For example, the SALT I agree-
ment limited antiballistic missiles,
and it limited launchers of offensive
missiles of intercontinental range. It
didn't limit warheads, and it didn't
limit MIRV testing and MIRV de-
ployment. So it is somewhat ironical
that although SALT I banned any
major deployment of antiballistic mis-
siles because these would lead to of-
fensive countermeasures such as
with MIRVs are the most dangerous,
the most destabilizing of nuclear-
weapons systems because they pos-
sess the combination of accuracy and
yield that enables them to strike hard
targets, such as our hardened Min-
uteman silos. Now, without SALT,
this possible vulnerability would ob-
viously become greater, but the
threat, at least in theory, does exist.
It exists because of the fact that the
Soviets have been able to multiply
their warheads, because SALT I did
not prevent the development of
MIRVs.
So the MIRV option that we chose
to keep open for ourselves has thus
come back to haunt us. Now, in
SALT II, the reductions in MIRV
ballistic missile launchers — and par-
ticularly the subceiling that I have
mentioned on MIRV'ed interconti-
nental ballistic missiles — will make a
beginning toward meeting this prob-
lem; but it won't be until SALT III,
at the earliest, that we will be able
fully to undo that which SALT I al-
lowed to be done in proliferating
reentry vehicles.
I would say then that the third les-
son we have learned from SALT is
that in the SALT process we should
protect only those military options we
genuinely need and those in which the
net balance, if both sides go ahead,
will at least be equal and preferably
will give us some benefits. We should
avoid those things which mean only
an unnecessary and futile intensifica-
tion of the nuclear arms competition.
And it is with this thought in mind
that we arrived at a three-piece
framework for SALT II.
SALT II will consist of three parts.
One is the basic agreement, which, as
it now stands in the joint draft text,
places specific limits through 1985 on
total launchers, on launchers of
MIRV missiles, and on launchers of
MIRV'ed ICBM's.
20
The second part is a short-term
protocol, which puts short-term limits
on certain types of systems on which
we are not yet ready to make a final
program decision. For the period of
the protocol, deployment of mobile
launchers of ICBM's is banned. For
that same protocol period, there is a
ban on the actual deployment of long-
range ground and sea-launched cruise
missiles. The testing of these systems
can continue; and while the protocol
continues, we can determine whether
longer term restrictions should be
negotiated as part of SALT III or
whether our interests warrant the ac-
tual production and deployment of
these new systems.
We will, of course, have to keep in
mind the experience of the matching
Soviet development of MIRV's and
be alert to the fact that if we elect to
have the freedom to go ahead with
these new systems after the period of
the protocol, we must anticipate that
the Soviets will do the same. The de-
sirability of preserving the options
must be balanced against the possibly
adverse effects of the introduction of
a new nuclear-weapons system into
the strategic arms competition.
There is a fourth lesson that has
been taught us during a decade of
SALT and that is that in the con-
text of overall U.S. -Soviet relations,
SALT has developed a value and a
momentum of its own. Since 1969
the common recognition that we share
an interest in survival has enabled
SALT to continue despite the inter-
mittent strains in the U.S. -Soviet re-
lationship.
I mentioned earlier the many dif-
ferences between the United States
and the Soviet Union. With or with-
out SALT, I think we have to antici-
pate that we will continue to be com-
petitors who share unmatched military
power but very little else; that we will
continue to have very different views
of a desirable world order and of a
domestic system which promotes the
well-being of its citizens. We have to
expect that there will be times of ten-
sion, times when the international
dialogue will be bitter and abrasive.
Our disagreement with many Soviet
policies and many of its actions, both
within and outside the Soviet Union,
will necessarily affect our attitude
toward that government.
But we pursue SALT to lessen the
risk of nuclear war and to insure our
own survival as a modern, function-
ing society. I therefore — and I am
sure this will come as no surprise to
you — find myself in total disagree-
ment with those who have suggested
that we should cancel or suspend the
SALT talks because of Soviet and
Cuban intervention in Africa or
Soviet suppression of independent
voices within that country. As I see
it, SALT is not just a byproduct of
detente nor can it be used as a bribe
to make the Soviets behave in a
fashion of which we approve.
SALT, of course, doesn't exist in
total isolation. The Soviet invasion of
Czechoslovakia, almost exactly a
decade ago, had the further tragic
consequence of postponing for more
than a year the initiation of talks on
limiting strategic nuclear arms. As
indicated in President Johnson's
memoirs, he was prepared to an-
nounce on August 21, 1968, that he
and Premier Kosygin would meet on
September 30 to begin strategic arms
limitation talks. But it was on August
20 that Soviet, Bulgarian. East Ger-
man, Hungarian, and Polish army
units moved into Czechoslovakia.
Neither American nor international
public opinion would have understood
the initiation of arms control discus-
sions in the unhealthy climate of the
summer that followed the Prague
spring. And by that fall, when talks
might have been started, the Johnson
Administration had run out of time.
So, it was not until November 17,
1969 — in a new U.S. Administra-
tion — that American and Soviet dele-
gations met in Helsinki and ex-
changed the opening statements on
the limitation of strategic arms.
But since then SALT has gone
ahead despite many U.S. -Soviet fric-
tions. SALT I — we have to
remember — was signed in May of
1972, just about a month after the
United States had mined Haiphong
harbor and trapped Soviet ships.
We have pursued, and we will
continue to pursue, our aims in the
field of human rights; but Soviet re-
sentment about this has never caused
any ripples in our negotiations in
Geneva. The issue has never been
raised with me by any Soviet
negotiator.
We can't be sure that continued
progress in the SALT process will
improve detente, but I believe we can
be certain if SALT fails, the chances
of improved relations and of chan-
neling the U.S. -Soviet rivalry into
less dangerous areas of competition
would be immeasurably damaged.
To me, the relationship between
SALT and detente is much like the
relationship between SALT and the
goal of halting the proliferation of
nuclear weapons. Success in SALT
won't automatically bring either de-
tente or nonproliferation, but the fail-
Department of State Bulletin,
ure of SALT would leave us with a
very dismal prospect of achieving
either objective.
There is a fifth lesson that I think
is to be learned from our experience
with SALT, and that is that we can
pursue it without risk and, indeed,
with major benefit to our national
security. SALT, in fact, complements;
our assured retaliatory capability with
less cost and at less risk.
To begin with, we can proceed
with SALT because of the fact that
we have the technology, the re-[
sources, and the forces to meet our
strategic military needs. We are not
negotiating from fear, but we are
negotiating with confidence. We are j
negotiating from strength and not
from weakness.
To illustrate my point, a study re-
cently completed by the Arms Control |
and Disarmament Agency (see p. 24)
vividly shows that while pursuing
SALT, we have maintained the re-
taliatory capability that protects us
against the use, or threatened use. of
Soviet nuclear forces. Today, our re-
taliatory capability could do more
damage to the Soviet Union after a
Soviet first-strike than that first-strike
could to the United States. Our
second-strike, destructive capability
exceeds the Soviet Union's first-strike
capability.
And our study also shows that
while the United States and Soviet
forces will both become substantially
more capable and, really, essentially
equal in capability by the mid- 1 980 's,
our retaliatory capability after a
Soviet first-strike will at that time ex-
ceed our current ability to retaliate
against Soviet targets.
In a speech that was delivered yes-
terday. Secretary of Defense Harold
Brown confirmed this increase in our
second-strike capability, despite any
improvements in the Soviet offensive
or defensive forces. This, I would
submit, doesn't square with the
image, which is suggested by some,
that the United States has been
hamstrung by SALT while the Soviets
race ahead.
SALT has left us free to make
those changes in each part of our de-
terrent nuclear triad — the interconti-
nental ballistic missiles, the subma-
rine launched ballistic missiles, and
our heavy bombers — which will in-
sure their viability in the light of
Soviet military improvements.
SALT II will enable us to go ahead
with the military options which our
military planners tell us are neces-
sary. Under the limits of SALT II.
our heavy bomber force will be mod-
)ctober 1978
rnized by being equipped with
ong-range cruise missiles, missiles
vith a range that enables them to stay
mtside of Soviet air defenses and still
strike the lucrative Soviet targets.
We are free to go ahead with the
~rident ballistic missile submarine
nd the longer range ballistic missiles
•hat can be launched from ocean areas
(lose to the United States and still
naintain complete target coverage of
he Soviet Union.
Sixth, SALT II will impose
leaningful limits on Soviet
trategic forces. To comply with the
greement, the Soviets will have to
ismantle or destroy up to several
undred strategic systems. The new
igreement, furthermore, will hold the
leployment of Soviet strategic forces
(ell below what they would deploy in
le absence of an agreement. Our in-
lligence sources indicate that the net
Uing in the number of Soviet
i rategic nuclear delivery systems
i rgeted against the United States is
omething in the order of 900 — that
eans 900 less systems as a result of
KLT. And that, by any definition, is
plus for American security.
I have suggested that SALT is a
| ocess. I don't think that SALT II is
ning to be the ultimate word in
rategic arms control. It will mean a
eaningful step forward, but we
lould regard this as a continuing
1 ocess in which we move deliber-
|ely, cautiously, but confidently to-
ard the effective control of strategic
; iclear weapons and the elimination
the greatest threat to the survival
the United States and of the world.
Q. The first general set of ques-
i sns is: How near are you to an
•reement? What is in the way? Is
> politics? Will it be before or after
e election? How important is this,
i ; against other problems of negoti-
I ion with the Soviet Union?
A. As far as timing is concerned, I
in not rash enough to make any kind
I a prediction. If you look at it in
t rms of where we were, say, 3
* onths ago, and where we are
•■ day — if we make that same amount
progress, we would certainly have
i(i agreement well before the end of
|\e year.
S As far as the timing of it is con-
hrned, my instructions from the
'resident are to complete a negotia-
Ipn when we can get an agreement
iiat we want, that other consid-
ations are not to be taken into ac-
>unt, that we will get an agreement
li soon as we have one that serves
'e interests of the United States.
I think that this is the only way in
which we can negotiate. You
shouldn't set for yourself any sort of
arbitrary deadlines, which will just
mean that you are not going to
negotiate effectively. And you
shouldn't postpone the opportunity to
grasp an agreement which does meet
your criteria.
Q. The largest set of questions we
have put here could be put in under
a single heading, I think: Can you
trust — should you trust — the Rus-
sians? What about their activities,
which you touched on, in Africa?
What about the danger that they
may have a significant — perhaps a
compelling — civil defense program?
What about their killer satellites?
What about — can you really be sure
on verification? And on what
ground do we think that there is
truly a common interest in SALT?
And why do you negotiate from
weakness?
A. You have given me the material
for an additional 40-minute speech. I
would say that the short answer is
that you can trust the Soviet Union to
behave in its own interests. And I
think that is the only trust you can
place in any sovereign country.
We don't trust the Soviet Union. It
is why we have been very careful to
work out the verification provisions
that I have outlined. Those will en-
able us, by our national technical
21
I don't think that anybody can en-
visage the destructive capability of
that number of warheads — -each one
of which is many times the size of the
primitive weapon that devastated
Hiroshima. The idea that somehow
the Soviet Union can protect itself by
having every Muscovite shoulder his
spade, take the subway out to the
suburbs, and walk into the tundra
until he can finally dig a hole —
provided it was not frozen — I think it
is an illusion. Again, I quote Secre-
tary Brown. In his speech yesterday
he indicated that whatever the Soviet
Union tried to do, in the way of
either offensive improvements or de-
fensive improvements, would not im-
pair our retaliatory capability.
With regard to antisatellite sys-
tems, we obviously view with alarm
the possibility that both sides may
engage in a race in space that could
give both sides the ability to destroy
the satellites of the other side. That
would not only interfere with verifi-
cation, it would also interfere with a
number of developments that have
proven to be of great civilian impor-
tance. SALT cannot control the de-
velopment of the capability. It does
prohibit any use, so that whatever the
capability might be, it could not be
used without completely destroying
the SALT agreement.
In order to deal with the question
of capability, we recently initiated
talks on a prohibition of the develop-
. . . my instructions from the President are to complete a negoti-
ation when we can get an agreement that we want. . . we will get
an agreement as soon as we have one that serves the interests of
the United States.
means, to determine whether or not
the limits of SALT II are being met.
I am confident that those verifica-
tion provisions are adequate for the
purpose. They are the verification
provisions that we proposed and that
eventually, after long and very skill-
ful negotiations, we managed to get
the Soviet Union to accept.
As far as their other activities are
concerned, mention has been made of
civil defense. I say the real risk of
civil defense is that the country that
put money in it may convince itself
that the money has not been wasted
and, therefore, may bask in the illu-
sion of invulnerability. The fact of
the matter is that our more than 9,000
nuclear warheads could totally satu-
rate any civil defense effort and
wreak totally unacceptable havoc on
the Soviet Union.
ment of antisatellite weapons. I par-
ticipated in those talks in Helsinki at
the beginning of June. We have a
further round of talks coming up. We
have to realize that either there is
going to be a ban on antisatellite
systems for both countries or else
both sides will, in fact, go ahead.
The short answer, in the course of
a long answer, is that we do not trust
the Soviet Union. It is why we have
developed a SALT agreement that
doesn't rely on trust but relies on our
own ability to verify compliance.
Q. I have a set of questions about
the vulnerability of Minuteman and
the role of multiple aiming point
systems. When do we think that
Minuteman will really be
vulnerable— 1980? 1982? Later?
And how do we think that we would
22
verify a Soviet multiple aiming-
point system, if they, also, took this
choice?
A. As far as Minuteman vulnera-
bility is concerned, as I mentioned,
there will be at least a theoretical
vulnerability at the point at which the
Soviet Union has the number of
warheads and the degree of accuracy
that would enable them, with some
degree of confidence, to deposit two
reentry vehicles on each Minuteman
site.
There are some who say that will
occur by the mid- 1 980 's. Some say
earlier than that. Some say never.
There are formidable problems in
planning the kind of attack which that
scenario would envisage. You would
have to be able to send over enough
missiles so that you had enough
warheads so that you had two for
each Minuteman silo. You would
have to time your attack with the ex-
quisite precision that would enable
you to reach that point at which the
Department of State Bullet
missiles launched from submarines.
The Soviet Union has something like
70% in intercontinental ballistic mis-
siles. So, if intercontinental ballistic
missiles are vulnerable, then 70% of
their force is at risk; something like
30% of our force is at risk.
As far as mobile launchers are con-
cerned, that option is preserved after
the protocol period. We can test any
type of mobile ICBM launcher im-
mediately. And if we decide that this
is something we have to do to protect
even the 30% of our deterrent force,
we would be free to go ahead with it
at the end of the protocol period.
As far as verification is concerned,
you have to recognize that SALT
limits launchers, not missiles. You
can't verify how many missiles there
are. You can verify the number of
launchers. So the verification problem
requires that you have a system in
which you can tell what the launcher
is and how many of them there are.
And any system that we utilized
would meet that criterion, because we
[The United States and the Soviet Union] have to recognize that if we
continue to go ahead with an unchecked competition in strategic arms,
we can't expect the rest of the world to stand by and indefinitely
eschew the acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability of their own.
oncoming missiles were not destroyed
by the explosion of their predeces-
sors, the so-called fratricide problem.
You would have to assume virtually
flawless performance of a system that
has never been tested in anger. And
you would also have to assume that
the President of the United States
would stand calmly by, while Soviet
missiles — with something like 20-,
25-, 30-minutes warning — thundered
overhead to attack our missiles. Now.
I don't think the President of the
United States would do that, and I am
quite sure that no Soviet planner in
his right mind would assume that the
United States would leave its missiles
to be destroyed once we had assured
proof of a Soviet attack.
So I tend to be with those that say
that the vulnerability is largely
theoretical. But, if I am wrong, we
are taking, and have taken, the steps
to make sure that our retaliatory ca-
pability is preserved. The fact that
you could predict a point at which
fixed targets could be vulnerable was
what compelled us in decades past to
develop the ballistic missile subma-
rine, and it put a substantial part of
our total resources into our ballistic
would insist on that criterion being
met by the Soviet Union.
Q. Moving on to a cluster of
questions on related issues, what is
the relation between SALT and the
concern of our allies? You have
touched on the issue of nonprolifer-
ation; how about mutual and bal-
anced force reductions (MBFR)?
And what is the relation, also, be-
tween SALT and a comprehensive
test ban?
A. There is no direct relationship
between SALT and these other arms
control negotiations. You could have
success in SALT and still not assure
that you would have a comprehensive
test ban. However, the two are, in a
sense, complementary. For example.
I have mentioned that what we are
trying to negotiate is some sort of a
prohibition on development of new
strategic arms. Obviously, if you had
a comprehensive test ban, that would
give you additional assurance that
new strategic arms weren't being de-
veloped, because you could not de-
velop a new warhead without exten-
sive testing. But the two of them do
proceed independently of one another.
It is quite interesting that when
am in Geneva dealing with both negol
ations, there is almost no social ii
terrelationship between the two Sovii
delegations, and they never discu;
the problems of the other negotiatioi
They maintain an almost complete!
isolated approach to the separal
negotiations.
As far as mutual and balanced fore
reduction talks are concernec
again, there is no direct relationshi|
Obviously, it would improve th
overall degree of confidence betwee
the two sides if we were able to pr<
ceed with reasonable parallelism c
the two.
But MBFR. you have to remembe
is geographically limited. It involvi
only the central European situatioi
and therefore you could not negotia
in MBFR any restrictions on Sovic
theater nuclear forces that were n<
located within the central Europe^
area themselves. Systems that wei
located in the Soviet Union, directe
at Western European targets, woui
be entirely outside the coverage (
MBFR.
It seems to me that at some poin
in order to complete the arms contn
agenda, what we will have to do is
develop some sort of a forum i
which we can negotiate meaningfi
restrictions on the theater nucle;
forces, the intermediate range balli
tic missile systems of the Sovi.
Union, and, of course, then sorr
matching restraints on our longi
range forward-based systems. But th
forum does not exist as yet.
Q. We have a cluster of questioi
that relate to what will happen
you do get an agreement: Have yo
let the opponents of the agreemen
or the critics, get the jump in th
national debate? Are you plannin
an effort at persuasion? When wi
it begin? Have you considered ;
given the difficulty of a two-thiro
vote, the possibility of an executiv
agreement? What would be the ac
vantages and disadvantages of that
And how optimistic are you aboi ■■
the country's agreement to wha
you may agree to?
A. First of all, we have to depei
sonalize it. It won't be what I agre
to; it will be what the U.S. Govern
ment agrees to. I think it has to b
understood that the entire process o
developing positions in SALT is a
interagency process. It is done by
subcommittee of the National Securit
Council, on which sit the Secretary o
State, the Secretary of Defense, th'
President's National Security Adviser
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, th
).'
October 1978
Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency, and I am entitled to one
small vote in that committee. That is
where the positions are developed.
That is where we determine what
moves we are prepared to make.
As far as letting the opposition get
a jump on us, I think you have to
recognize that it is awfully difficult to
defend a treaty which doesn't yet
exist against somebody else's dream.
I can dream up a better treaty than we
are going to be able to present. It
would be a very one-sided treaty, and
I have no realistic hope that the
Soviet Union — or anybody else in
their right mind — would accept it. We
Whave to recognize that in order to get
■restrictions on Soviet systems that we
■don't like, we have to forego certain
■ military options of our own. There
jare those who will oppose any SALT
■ treaty, because they oppose any re-
Bstrictions on American total military
jl freedom. I think they are wrong, but
Ithey are entitled to their own opinion.
I think that the only way that SALT
lean be sold is on its merits. I believe
that the agreement will commend it-
j self to anybody who approaches arms
| :ontrol with an objective frame of
nind. Those who think that you
should not be doing business with the
■'Soviet Union, obviously, aren't going
«to be satisfied.
But, to me, it is going to be a
question of whether or not the agree-
■ ment improves the security of the
United States. I think an agreement
• which limits Soviet systems, which
, requires them to reduce, which pre-
sents them from going ahead with a
■whole new fifth generation of inter-
j Continental ballistic missiles — that
I means a net reduction, as compared
1 with where they would be by 1985, of
^something in excess of 900 nuclear
| delivery systems — is not going to be
livery hard to sell. And I look forward
lto the debate with a good deal of
expectation.
Q. I guess I should draw your
attention to the question of an
executive agreement versus a
treaty.
A. That, of course, is a possible
option. I think that in terms of the
ratification problem that it wouldn't
make an awful lot of difference; be-
cause, of course, in order to invoke
cloture, you would need 60 votes in
the Senate in any event. So it is a
question of seven less votes, as com-
pared to the problems of getting
ratification through both houses of the
Congress. It's a decision that, I think,
will be made on the basis of congres-
sional sentiment, as much as on any
other consideration. We have consid-
ered that SALT would be a treaty.
Now, of course, as 1985 comes
closer, it begins to look more like a
short-term executive agreement. But,
as I say, that decision remains open.
It will be made, obviously, in close
consultation with the Congress.
Q. I think I will just sum up with
one more question, if I may, Am-
bassador Warnke, and that is if you
would summarize for us your own
sense of how near we are, actually
on the clauses. And if you have — if
there is one or another point that
you would like to single out, is
there a difference of substance that
you find particularly troubling, or
are you basically optimistic because
you have called your speech "SALT
II— the Home Stretch?"
A. I would say that we are, in fact,
very close at this point, that we have
solved much more difficult problems
than any of those that remain. The
remaining problems have to do, for
the most part, with the degree and
coverage of the restrictions on new
types of missile systems.
The Soviet Union would like to
impose tighter constraints on our
cruise missiles. We would like to
have tight constraints on the Soviet
ballistic missiles. One of the prob-
lems that exists is the fact that the
Soviets do have bigger missiles than
we have. We opted, back in the
1960's, to go for the solid-fueled,
smaller, but more reliable, systems.
They have continued with the larger,
liquid-fueled systems, so, as a result,
they have larger throw-weight. One
obvious improvement in the strategic
situation would be to limit the way in
which they could modify these exist-
ing systems. If we can ban most of
23
the new systems, if we can prevent
modifications, modernization, in-
creased reentry vehicles on the exist-
ing systems, then we have lessened
the prospects of Minuteman vulnera-
bility, and we have created a more
stable strategic situation.
I think that we are getting there. I
think that the Soviet Union recognizes
that they, too, have an interest in a
SALT treaty. I have speculated
sometimes on the reasons why they
would be interested — I mean, if they
want it, is it because they think it is
good for them and bad for us? There
is always that chance. But I think it is
probably more realistic to consider
why it is that we would have a com-
mon interest, and there are a variety
of reasons. I have mentioned the
common interest in survival. There is
also the common interest in stopping
the proliferation of nuclear weapons.
Both of us have to recognize that if
we continue to go ahead with an un-
checked competition in strategic
arms, we can't expect the rest of the
world to stand by and indefinitely es-
chew the acquisition of a nuclear
weapons capability of their own.
I think, also, that the Soviet Union
recognizes that the alternative to
SALT is, for them, not a very ap-
petizing one. I don't agree with those
who say that we need SALT, because
it is the best we can do in preventing
the Soviet Union from massively
overcoming us. I think that we have
the resources, we have the will, we
have the technology so that we could
keep up in any kind of an unbridled
competition. I know that the Soviet
Union knows that, too. And, there-
fore, the alternative to SALT is
merely the indefinite perpetuation of
a strategic arms competition, which
we won't allow them to win. Under
these circumstances, I think that we
both have incentives to overcome the
remaining differences. I think that
can be done and in the not-too-distant
future. d
1 ACDA press release.
2 For text of address, see Bulletin of Oct.
9, 1967. p. 443.
24
I/.S. and Soviet Strategy?
Capabilitg Through the md-1980 9 s
Report of the Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency, August 1978.*
Many of the static measures used to
compare U.S. and Soviet strategic
forces deal only with factors such as
numbers of bombers, missiles,
weapons, throw-weight, and megatons.
Other factors not considered can far
outweigh these simple static measures.
These factors include, but are not lim-
ited to, the readiness of the forces,
their survivability, their ability to
penetrate defenses, their accuracy and
reliability, and what it is they have to
attack.
The "capability index" used in this
study attempts to place in perspective
the relative capabilities of the U.S.
and Soviet strategic forces according
to a common measure of effectiveness.
This measure is one which focuses on
what the forces "can do" as opposed
to what the two forces "look like."
Basis for Analysis
The first step in the process is to
determine what it is that the forces
will be used against in the event of a
nuclear exchange. It is generally ac-
cepted that the various categories of
targets will include industrial and eco-
nomic facilities, civilian and military
command and control facilities, and
military targets such as missile launch-
ers, submarine ports, airfields, and
troop installations. In terms of vul-
nerability it is more appropriate to
categorize the targets according to
their susceptibility to destruction. The
majority of potential targets are very
soft. That is, any nuclear weapon
which detonates within a few thousand
feet will probably destroy the target.
Other targets such as missile silos,
weapons storage, and command and
control facilities are built to withstand
all but direct hits and near misses.
In this analysis a basic target set is
assumed against which the capabilities
of the two forces are measured. While
there are asymmetries within the U.S.
and Soviet target systems on a func-
tional basis, it is not unreasonable to
assume an equal number of hard and
soft targets for purposes of comparing
overall capability. In this analysis it is
assumed that each country has 1 ,500
hard targets (2,000 psi) 2 and 5,000
soft targets (10 psi). Excursions to this
base case have been made. They show
that the results are not particularly
sensitive to the variations in the total
number of targets, the hardness of the
targets, or the ratio of hard to soft
targets.
This means of measuring force ca-
pability cannot be used to evaluate the
full impact of the current and pro-
jected Soviet strategic forces. Nor
should this study be the sole basis for
accepting or rejecting proposed
changes in the U.S. force posture.
However, the overall capability of nu-
clear forces to accomplish their de-
signed objectives — destruction of
targets — has to play a major role in
any comparative assessment of relative
strength.
The analysis which follows com-
pares the capability of U.S. and Soviet
strategic forces for the present and for
the mid-1980's against a common
target set.
Relative Strategic Capability of
U.S. and Soviet Forces in 1978
While the Soviets lead the United
States in some of the static indices of
strategic force comparison, the United
States is clearly ahead today in terms
of target destruction capability.
Chart 1 shows the current Soviet
capability to destroy a target system
consisting of 1,500 hard targets and
5,000 soft targets. The curve which
originates at the lower left corner of
the graph shows the damage expect-
ancy for a sequentially higher alloca-
tion of weapons to hard targets. The
dotted curve which begins in the lower
right corner of the graph indicates the
percentage of soft targets destroyed by
the weapons not allocated to hard
targets. For example, if no weapons
are allocated to hard targets then all
weapons are used against soft targets
and 75 c /c of the soft targets are de-
stroyed. At the other extreme, if all
weapons are used against hard targets
and none against soft then the Soviets
could destroy 56 % of the 1,500 hard
targets.
To illustrate the use of these curves
consider the case where the Soviets
might desire a damage expectancy of
70% against the soft targets. With
1978 forces this is achievable but in
order to destroy 70% of the soft
targets only 6% of the force would be
available to strike the hard targets.
Therefore, from the curves of chart I .
;lft
s
■:. •
;
K
Department of State Bulletir
if 709c of the soft targets are de-
stroyed then only 14 % of the hard
targets would be destroyed. An in-
teresting way of comparing forces is
shown in the appendix.
Chart 2 contains the Soviet 1978
capability curves from chart 1 as well
as the curves which show how capa-
ble the current U.S. strategic forces
would be against the same target
system after riding out the Soviet
first-strike. In these curves both
forces are in a generated alert pos-
ture. All force characteristics such as
alert readiness, accuracy, weapon
yield, and reliability have been taken
into account as well as estimates of
U.S. bomber force capability to
penetrate Soviet air defenses.
It can be observed from the com-
puter plot of chart 2 that the retalia-
tory capability of U.S. forces in 1978
exceeds the first-strike capability of
the Soviets against both hard and soft
targets. It can be seen in this chart
that for any weapon allocation U.S.
forces in a retaliatory attack create a
larger destruction than Soviet forces
in a first-strike. For example, an allo-
cation in which 80% of the force was
used against soft targets while the
other 20% was used against hard
targets would yield the following
results.
Hard Targets Soft Targets
Destroyed Destroyed
Soviet first-strike 28% 61%
U.S. retaliation 43% 77%
One of the major contributors to
U.S. hard target kill capability is the
U.S. manned bomber force. This
force is not provocative from a first-
strike viewpoint because of its rela-
tively slow response time (as com-
pared to intercontinental ballistic
missiles — ICBM's); however, in re-
taliation it has the capability to de-
stroy a wide spectrum of targets.
Relative Strategic Capability of
U.S. and Soviet Forces in the
Mid-1980's
Both forces are projected to
undergo extensive modernization be-
tween now and the mid-1980's. For
the United States the changes which
will take place include improved ac-
curacy and higher yield warheads for
the Minuteman III ICBM; the de-
ployment of the new and larger Tri-
dent submarines equipped with the
new Trident C-4 missile; the backfit-
ting of the Trident C-4 missile into
many of the Poseidon submarines;
ctober 1978
nd the introduction into the U.S.
omber force of the air-launched
ruise missile (ALCM).
Chart 3 shows a comparison of the
US. retaliatory capability in 1978 to
lat of the mid-1980s. It can clearly
e seen in this chart that the U.S.
taliatory capability in the mid-
980's is substantially larger than our
urrent capability.
Soviet strategic force improvements
re even more dramatic. The MIRV -
!ig which is currently underway will
ave been completed; better missile
.-curacy is forecast; and several new
eapon systems are projected to be
Chart 1
Current First Strike Capability of Soviet
Strategic Forces
Percent
Destruction
100
Legend
Percent
Destruction
100
20 40 60 80 100
Percent of Weapons Allocated to Hard Targets
(Remaining Weapons Allocated to Soft Targets)
deployed. In chart 4 the first-strike
capabilities of the current and pro-
jected Soviet strategic forces are
shown. As can be seen in the chart
Soviet first-strike capability in the
mid- 1 980 's has increased sharply over
the current Soviet first-strike capabil-
ity. It can be noted that the most sig-
nificant increase in capability is in
hard target destruction.
The analysis takes into account the
SALT II agreement now being
negotiated. Although it is not possible
to predict Soviet force improvements
in the absence of a SALT II agree-
ment, it is apparent that the overall
Chart 2
A Comparison of Current Soviet First
Strike Capability and U.S. Retaliatory
Capability
Percent
Destruction
100
Percent
Destruction
100
Legend
40 60 80 100
Percent ol Weapons Allocated to Hard Targets
(Remaining Weapons Allocated to Soft Targets)
25
capability could be greater since it
would be unrestrained by the SALT
limitations.
In chart 5 the U.S. retaliatory ca-
pability is compared to the Soviet
first-strike potential. Both forces are
roughly in balance; however, the
overall capability of the United States
to attack hard targets is about 10 per-
centage points lower than the Soviet
first-strike capability primarily be-
cause of the losses incurred by the
U.S. Minuteman force.
Observations
On the basis of the capability index
used in this study the following ob-
servations can be made.
• The United States is ahead of the
Soviet Union today in target destruc-
tion capability.
• Both the United States and Soviet
forces will become substantially more
capable by the mid-1980's.
• U.S. retaliatory capability after a
Soviet first-strike in the mid-1980's
exceeds the current retaliatory capa-
bility.
• The capability of U.S. and Soviet
strategic forces in the mid- 1 980 's is
essentially equal.
APPENDIX— Equal Damage Point
An interesting way to examine the
curves presented in this report is at
the point where the hard and soft
targets curves cross. At this point the
damage to both hard and soft targets
is equal. This point will be referred to
as the equal damage point (EDP).
Chart 3
A Comparison of Current and Future
(mid-1980's) U.S. Capability to
Retaliate
Percent Percent
Destruction Destruction
100
U.S. (mid-1980s)
100
20 40 60 80 100
Percent of Weapons Allocated to Hard Targets
(Remaining Weapons Allocated to Soft Targets)
Chart 4
A Comparison of Current and Future
(mid-1980's) Soviet First Strike Capa-
bility
20 40 60 80 100
Percent of Weapons Allocated to Hard Targets
(Remaining Weapons Allocated to Soft Targets)
Chart 5
A Comparison of Soviet First Strike
Capability and U.S. Retaliatory Capabil-
ity in the mid-1980's
Legend
Hard Target Damage
Soft Target Damage . . ,
20 40 60 80 100
Percent of Weapons Allocated to Hard Targets
(Remaining Weapons Allocated to Soft Targets)
26
Department of State Bulleti
.
ECONOMICS: Prospects for
international Action on
Natural Rubber
by Julius L. Katz
Address before the 25th assembly of
the International Rubber Study Group
on June 19, 1978. Mr. Katz is Assist-
ant Secretary for Economic and Busi-
ness Affairs.
We are honored to serve as host to
the 25th assembly of the International
Rubber Study Group. The United
States was a charter member of the
International Rubber Study Group at
its formation in 1944 and the new
group's first assembly was held the
next year in Washington. The group is
one of the oldest, and indeed one of
the most useful, international com-
modity organizations representing both
producers and consumers. Its statisti-
cal information on natural rubber and
synthetic rubber production, consump-
tion, and trade has benefitted industry
and government alike. The studies it
has undertaken on problems of the
rubber industry and its supply-demand
projections have been very useful.
And its annual meetings have provided
an opportunity for representatives of
some 30 countries to meet regularly to
discuss common problems and de-
velopments in world rubber markets.
My own experience in the com-
modities field does not date back quite
as far as the International Rubber
Study Group's, but international com-
modity issues have been a major
preoccupation of mine over many
years. While my current respon-
sibilities cover the spectrum of inter-
national economic problems, I find
myself frequently engaged — by per-
sonal choice as well as circum-
stance — in our government's efforts to
address specific commodity issues. So
it is a personal pleasure to welcome
this important commodity group to
meet with us in Washington.
Since early 1977, a series of discus-
sions on natural rubber have taken
place under the auspices of the U.N.
Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD). At the latest preparatory
meeting, held 4 months ago, produc-
ing and consuming countries agreed to
participate in formal negotiations for
an international price stabilization
agreement. Those negotiations will
begin in November. In light of these
developments, I would like first to re-
view briefly the outlook for natural
rubber and then focus on the prospects
of achieving agreement at the forth-
coming negotiations in Geneva.
The Role of Natural Rubber
Over the last century, the natural
rubber industry has changed dramat-
ically. Natural rubber was initially
obtained wild from several species in
the Amazon basin, but today is pro-
duced primarily in Southeast Asia
from organized plantings of a single
specie. In the interim, agricultural,
physiological, and biochemical re-
f Strategic Capability — cont'd)
In chart 2 which compares the cur-
rent Soviet first-strike capability to
U.S. retaliatory capability, the
Soviets could achieve a 48% damage
expectancy on the 6,500 targets by al-
locating 36% of their weapons to hard
targets and the remaining 64% to the
soft targets. The U.S. retaliatory capa-
bility at the EDP is to destroy 58'; ol
the 6,500 targets. A U.S. retaliation,
therefore, has 10 percentage points
more capability against this target set
than a Soviet first-strike.
Examining charts 3 and 4 one can
see that the EDP and U.S. retaliatory
forces grows by 24 percentage points
between now and the mid-1980's.
while that of the Soviet first-strike
grows by 35 percentage points over
that same period.
The net effect of the current U.S.
lead and the more rapid Soviet growth
between now and the mid- 1 980 's is
that the equal damage points of a
Soviet first-strike and a U.S. retalia-
tion are equal in the mid- 1980 time
period. C
1 ACDA press release.
2 The stated level of hardness is the over-
pressure in pounds of pressure per square inch
which the target can withstand [footnote in
original].
search have transformed the origina
tree into a more efficient producer. I:
1977 the world trade in natural rubbe
had climbed to 3.2 million tons am
was valued at $2.2 billion. Excludin;
oil, natural rubber ranks sixth in valu
among the primary products traded o
world markets.
Natural rubber is of majo
socioeconomic importance to the de
veloping countries of Southeast Asiai
which supply over 90% of world pro
duction; it is also of growing impoi
tance to a number of countries in Al
rica and Latin America. Nearly 2.
million workers are directly employe
in natural rubber cultivation. Ove
three-quarters of world production i
by smallholders — subsistence farmer
who typically own fewer than 1
acres. Moreover, natural rubber is
significant earner of much-neede
foreign exchange. In 1976 Malaysi
generated 23% of its foreign exchang
receipts from natural rubber and In
donesia 21% of non-oil receipts. Tin
figures for Sri Lanka and Thailan as
were 18% and 9%, respectively.
Natural rubber is also important t i
the industrialized countries, which ac
count collectively for over 80% o>
world consumption. The transportatio
industry, particularly commercial an
passenger tire production, has tradi
tionally accounted for the bulk of de
mand. In recent years, though, othe
sectors such as latex products, belting
footwear, and cable insulation hav
been rapidly increasing their con
sumption. Natural rubber is particu
lady important to the United States, a
the world's largest single consumer c
this product. In 1977 our imports tc
taled nearly 800,000 tons. Thi
equates to almost 8 pounds of nature
rubber per capita and amounts to ove
20% of world production. Given ou
growing demand for radial tires, th<
U.S. market for natural rubber appear
certain to continue to expand rapidly.
.:
«
Trends
There are currently several trend
underway which individually and col
lectively promise significant futurt
changes in the natural rubber market.
First, the traditional demand struc
ture is changing. Higher oil price:
have slowed down growth in tota
world elastomer (natural and synthetic
rubber) demand. As a result, it ap
pears likely in the next 15 years thai
annual growth in world elastomer corv
sumption will decline from the recen
historical average of 6.5% to abou
5%. The automotive industry of th«
developed countries will remain the
tjtetober 1978
n, eading consumer, but its growth in
|i tatural rubber use should taper off in
^ he 1980's. Other industrial uses in the
jj leveloped countries, coupled with the
ij tutomotive sectors of the developing
ill md nonmarket countries, should help
( >ffset those slowdowns. On balance,
lowever, we see the overall outlook as
j| avorable, with total elastomer con-
j, umption growing at a rate leaving
ioth natural and synthetic rubber
imple scope for expansion.
Second, the energy situation has
iltered the competitive relationship
>etween natural and synthetic rubber,
'rior to 1973 synthetic rubber, based
>n monomers produced from inexpen-
ive petrochemical products, enjoyed a
listinct price advantage. The fourfold
ncrease in oil prices changed this re-
ationship by doubling the cost of most
nonomers. Although the international
>il market currently is slack, future
etroleutn price levels and supplies
smain highly uncertain. Meanwhile,
he cost of natural rubber — whose
ftrgest component is labor — has not
teen as strongly or directly influ-
mced. The result has been a substan-
al improvement in its ability to com-
ete in elastomer markets.
Third, new technologies and pro-
uction techniques continue to be de-
eloped in the field of synthetic rub-
ers. Cis-Polyisoprene, a synthetic
lbber that is a virtual chemical dupli-
ate of natural rubber, is already
vailable but presently more costly
J tan its natural counterpart. In addi-
| on, new "convenience" rubbers —
jhich would facilitate processing —
nd "specialty" rubbers — which are
resigned to perform well under ex-
treme conditions — may soon be avail-
able. There also has been renewed
Interest in guayule, the latex-
]iroducing shrub indigenous to Mexico
Ind the southwestern United States.
I'hese developments — and the apparent
jlDmmitment of nonmarket economies
K) increasing their synthetic rubber
[I reduction — could offset natural rub-
ler's increased competitiveness.
Fourth, most projections indicate
liat a supply shortfall in natural rub-
j'er appears likely in the late 1980's.
lis I have already mentioned, world
lemand for elastomers is likely to
Irow at 5% annually over the next 15
Bears or so. Replanting and technical
linovations will allow natural rubber
reduction to climb from its historic
Iverage growth of 3% annually to
erhaps 4% per year. But even with
lis effort, a gap between production
llnd consumption seems likely to de-
jelop in the latter part of the next
iecade.
Production Investment and Price
Instability
To reduce that anticipated future
shortage of natural rubber, expanded
production and increased investment
are needed. An international workshop
held last month in Southeast Asia pro-
vided an opportunity to view firsthand
the production situation of the natural
rubber industry. Particularly impres-
sive were technological innovations
which would provide increased
supplies of natural rubber if effectively
and energetically implemented. These
innovations encompass:
• Higher yielding trees which could
raise current annual yields by two or
three times;
• New planting materials and tech-
niques which can reduce the immatu-
rity period of rubber trees from the
traditional 6 to 7 years down to 3 to 4
years, thus reducing investment costs
substantially;
• Chemical stimulants capable of
cutting production costs and enhancing
yields of relatively mature trees; and
• Methods of stemming losses from
endemic tree diseases.
Programs to implement these inno-
vations are underway in all of the pro-
ducing countries, but the levels of ef-
fort and effectiveness vary consid-
erably among the producing countries.
As a result, in the near future there
will have to be sizable new invest- •
ments if the opportunity facing natural
rubber producers is to be seized and
natural rubber shortfalls avoided in the
late 1980's.
Natural rubber prices, however,
have traditionally displayed a consid-
erable degree of instability, with
strong rises — notably in 1951, 1955,
1960, and 1973-74— followed by
sharp and sudden declines. This be-
havior has tended to destabilize small-
holders' incomes, complicate planning
for national development, and impact
adversely on foreign exchange earn-
ings. It has also tended to contribute
to unjustified investment during
periods of high prices and underin-
vestment during periods of low prices.
As such, short-term price instability
has clearly been among the factors
generating resistance to needed long-
term investments.
Prospects for an International
Agreement
Our own analyses and the UNCTAD
discussions have shown that a properly
designed and implemented price
stabilization agreement on natural rub-
ber could provide benefits to both con-
27
suming and producing countries. From
the standpoint of producer countries,
an agreement could:
• Offer greater predictability of
smallholder incomes and foreign ex-
change earnings;
• Encourage investments that would
steadily and substantially increase nat-
ural rubber production and stimulate
rural development; and
• Boost consumption of natural rub-
ber, thus making it possible for small-
holder incomes and foreign exchange
earnings to rise.
The U.S. interest in such an agree-
ment, and I assume that of most con-
suming countries, would be to:
• Moderate the extent to which vol-
atile raw material prices trigger in-
flationary pressures and
• Create an atmosphere that would
help to assure future needed supplies
of natural rubber at reasonable prices.
Looking to the Negotiations
In theory, it is not difficult to ap-
preciate that an international buffer
stock agreement could offset imper-
fections in the competitive rubber
market, while avoiding interference
with basic supply/demand factors or
underlying price signals in the market.
In doing so, an agreement should
confer some of the benefits just listed.
In practice, though, establishing a
buffer stock agreement is not a simple
matter. Commodity markets are com-
plex, and the political realities of the
multilateral negotiation process com-
pound the problem. Each government
brings to the bargaining table its own
set of economic and political objec-
tives, as well as its peculiar perspec-
tive on the problem.
The negotiations beginning in
Geneva next November will need to
resolve an array of closely linked is-
sues before a satisfactory agreement
can emerge. These issues include the
proper buffer stock size and location;
the width of the price band to be de-
fended and the rules for adjusting the
band; the procedures for market inter-
vention by the buffer stock manager;
the scale of government contributions
to financing the buffer stock; and the
decisionmaking rules.
Two of these issues — export con-
trols and pricing provisions — are likely
to be troublesome. Given their signifi-
cance, I would like to elaborate in
some detail our views on each of
them.
Export controls are advanced in
most negotiations for commodity
agreements as a means of supple-
28
meriting buffer stocks to insure de-
fense of floor prices. Part of their ap-
peal lies in the notion that they will
decrease the required buffer stock
size, thus reducing the participants' fi-
nancial obligations in comparison with
a pure buffer stock agreement. Our
experiences with other commodities
and our analysis of the rubber market,
however, suggest that export controls
have serious disadvantages. In par-
ticular, export controls:
• Are cumbersome devices, difficult
to negotiate and implement;
• Freeze export patterns to the dis-
advantage of more active and efficient
producers, especially when the con-
trols are based upon past export per-
formances;
• Impair the agreement's ability to
defend a price ceiling once demand
picks up. particularly if production re-
strictions are also imposed;
• Are particularly difficult to design
and could be destabilizing; and
• Inefficiently idle factors of pro-
duction which could be devoted more
advantageously to buffer stock size.
In regard to pricing provisions gen-
erally, our preference is for measures
that enhance the operation of the free
market rather than replace it. We op-
pose arrangements that introduce arti-
fically rigid restrictions on the market
or try to peg prices at levels above
those which supply and demand can
sustain. In our view, the aim should
be to stabilize the market price around
its long-term trend as determined by
market prices, rather than by institu-
tional fiat. We seek an approach which
would enable producers, consumers,
and investors to respond to clearer
market signals while erratic pressures
on price movements would be damp-
ened. Market distortions and misallo-
cation of resources could thus be
minimized.
In the specific case of rubber, we
believe that in determining the width
of the price band, it will be necessary
to take into account the size of the
buffer stock and its ability to contrib-
ute to price stabilization within that
range. The design — and operation — of
the mechanism for adjusting that price-
band should be based primarily upon
long-term trends.
Conclusion
As the negotiations approach, we
are working with other countries to
develop a proposal that will incorpo-
rate recommendations for the major
economic provisions of an agreement.
In so doing we are giving careful con-
sideration to the proposals of both
producer and consumer countries. If
the constructive atmosphere which has
characterized the preparatory discus-
sions carries over to the formal negoti-
ations, the prospects are good for an
agreement that will serve the interests
of both producers and consumers.
Looking beyond the November
negotiations, we will inevitably face
the question of the International Rub-
ber Study Group's future role and its
relationship to a secretariat created by
a new international agreement. One
possibility might be for the group to
retain all its present functions and the
traditional London headquarters but at
the same time to acquire a close
working relationship with the sec-
retariat of the newly created interna-
tional body. Such an agreement would
maintain the valuable expertise already
developed by the International Rubber
Study Group, lower operating costs of
the newly created body's secretariat,
and reduce overlapping of efforts.
Those of us here today, though, have
not been tasked — nor are we now
equipped — to reach a decision on this
important question.
In the meantime, I am certain
that — in the tradition of the group —
the discussion at this week's as-
semblage will make a substantial con-
tribution to the preparatory process for
the negotiation by deepening our
mutual understanding of the key issues
facing the rubber industry.
On behalf of the U.S. Government.
I extend our warmest welcome and
best wishes for a fruitful meeting. □
Publications
GPO SALES
Publications may be ordered by catalog or
stock number from the Superintendent of Docu-
ments, U.S. Government Printing Office,
Washington, DC. 20402. A 25% discount is
made on orders for 100 or more copies of any
one publication mailed to the same address.
Remittances, payable to the Superintendent of
Documents, must accompany orders. Prices
shown below, which include domestic postage,
are subject to change.
The Trade Debate. A history of U.S. trade and
its effect on foreign policy. Includes discus-
sion questions, tables, and useful words and
phrases. Pub. 8942. $1.20. (Stock No. 044-
000-01682-6.)
Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with
Lebanon. TIAS 8676 19 pp. $1. (Cat. No.
S9. 10:8676.)
Department of State Bulleti
Agricultural Commodities. Agreement wil
Indonesia. TIAS 8677. 17 pp. $1. (Cat. Nc
S9. 10:8677.)
Investment Guaranties. Agreement wit
Syria. TIAS 8707. 24 pp. $1.20 (Cat. N<
S9. 10:8707.)
Agricultural Commodities — Transfers Undi
Title II. Agreement with Peru. TIAS 8709.
pp. 700. (Cat. No. S9. 10:8709.)
Agricultural Commodities — Transfers Undt
Title II. Agreement with Pakistan. TIA
8710. 5 pp. 600. (Cat. No. S9. 10:8710.)
Agricultural Commodities — Transfers Undt
Title II. Agreement with Mozambique. TIA i,
8711. 4pp. 60?. (Cat. No. S9. 10:8711.)
Agricultural Commodities. Agreement wit
Ethiopia. TIAS 8715. 26 pp. $1.20. (Cal
No. S9. 10:8715.)
Agricultural Commodities. Agreement wit
Syria. TIAS 8716. 22 pp. $1. (Cat No
S9. 10:8716.)
Agricultural Commodities. Agreement witl
Syria. TIAS 8717. 7 pp. 700. (Cat. No
S9. 10:8717.)
International Fund for Agricultural De
velopment. Agreement with other govern
ments. TIAS 8765. 201 pp. $3.50. (Cat
No. S9. 10:8765.)
Agricultural Commodities. Agreement witl
Tanzania. TIAS 8784. 5 pp. 600. (Cat. No
S9. 10:8784.)
Trade-Meat Imports. Agreement with othe
governments. TIAS 8783. 62 pp. $1.80'
(Cat. No. S9. 10:8783.)
Economic Stability. Agreement with Jordan
TIAS 8785. 3 pp. 600. (Cat. No
9.10:8785.)
Agricultural Commodities. Agreements witl
Portugal, amending ihe Agreement of Oc
tober 22. 1976 TIAS 8812. 8 pp. 700
(Cat. No. S9. 10:8812.)
Agricultural Commodities. Agreement witl
Zaire. TIAS 8813. 10 pp. 700. (Cat. No
S9. 10:8813.)
Commodity Import Program. Agreement with
Egypt. TIAS 8815 15 pp. 900. (Cat. No.
S9. 10:8815.)
Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with
Egypt, amending the agreement of October
26, 1976. as amended. TIAS 8818. 3 pp.
600. (Cat. No. S9. 10:8818.)
Agricultural Commodities — Transfers Under
Title II. Agreement with Cape Verde. TIAS
8819. 7 pp. 800. (Cat. No. S9. 10:8819.)
Agricultural Commodities — Transfers Under
Title II. Agreement with Ghana. TIAS 8820.
3 pp. 700 (Cat. No. S9. 10:8820.)
Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with
the Republic of Korea. TIAS 8821. 20 pp.
$1. (Cat. No. S9. 10:8821.)
Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with
Jordan amending the agreement of November
29, 1976. TIAS 8822 5 pp 700. (Cat. No. I
S9. 10:8822.)
Agricultural Commodities. Agreemen
Tunisia, amending the agreement of January j
21. 1977. TIAS 8823. 3 pp. 700. (Cat. No. |]
S9. 10:8823.) i
k
Ui
101
-
It NO. |j
J"
it with |
October 1978
29
EUROPE: The Potential
of the Helsinki Dialogue
by Matthew Nimetz
Address before the annual meeting
of the American Bar Association in
New York on August 3, 1978. Mr.
Nimetz is Counselor of the Depart-
ment of State .
Perhaps at no time since the Hel-
sinki Final Act was signed by the
leaders of the 35 European and North
American states at the summit in
1975 has it been so much in the news
as in the wake of the trials of Orlov,
Shcharanskiy , Petkus, and other
Soviet dissidents this spring and
iummer. 1 I welcome this opportunity
:o discuss the potential of the Hel-
sinki dialogue.
The behavior of the Soviet Union
ooth internally and externally, espe-
cially over the past 6 months or so,
las been a matter of grave concern
or the American public and for the
\dministration. We entertain no illu-
ions about the totalitarian nature of
ooviet society. We recognize that our
elationship is essentially an adver-
;ary one, defined by challenges both
deological and overt, though tem-
pered by cooperative activities in
ome areas.
We believe it is in our fundamental
lational interest to moderate the tone
ind character of this adversary re-
ationship and to expand the areas in
■vhich cooperative ventures are mutu-
ally advantageous. Equally, we owe it
o ourselves, our children, and the
oeople of other nations to seek every
leasonable opportunity for reaching
igreements with the Soviet Union that
vill help control dangerous military
ompetition and lessen the risk of nu-
lear war. These efforts to seek out
ireas of agreement, particularly in
irms control, do not in any way sig-
ify our acquiescence in Soviet mis-
reatment of American diplomats,
jusinessmen, and journalists or their
>wn courageous citizens who are
nerely trying to act on the rights
>romised to them under the Helsinki
•■inal Act and other international
greements.
The events of the past year have
emonstrated how difficult it is for a
Communist state to put into practice,
ven to a limited extent, certain ele-
nental rights, such as those contained
n the Helsinki Final Act. However,
he fact that the Soviet leadership has
not implemented important elements
of their Helsinki commitments in no
way diminishes the potential of the
Final Act to the citizens of East and
West alike, or the advantages of the
Helsinki process to long-term Western
interests.
I believe that the Final Act, and the
process of which it is the most tangi-
ble product, can contribute to a more
stable and more beneficial East-West
relationship. This potential can be
realized only over a considerable
period of time and then only if cool
and informed judgment is exercised
by all concerned — by governments
and by the citizenry of the par-
ticipating states.
The Final Act in Context
The document signed at Helsinki in
the summer of 1975 marked the con-
clusion of the Conference on Security
and Cooperation in Europe, which is
commonly referred to as CSCE. Such
a conference was first proposed by
the Soviets in the mid-1950's and
then picked up again by President
Brezhnev with renewed enthusiasm
shortly after his ascent to power.
The West had no interest in such a
conference, considering it to be a
ploy to legitimize Soviet claims on
Eastern Europe while weakening the
bonds between Western Europe and
the United States. In fact, the Soviets
had originally hoped to restrict the
conference to European states so that
their security situation could be dis-
cussed without the presence of the
United States.
At the end of the 1960's the NATO
alliance began to express cautious
interest in some kind of pan-European
conference, provided that the United
States and Canada took part and pro-
vided practical steps were taken to
deal with several of Europe's most
pressing security problems, especially
regarding Berlin and conventional
forces in central Europe.
During this period the Federal Re-
public of Germany launched its
Ostpolitik in an attempt to defuse
some of the major postwar European
problems revolving around the Ger-
man question. At the same time the
United States and the Soviet Union
were also reaching agreement on a
range of subjects, including SALT I
and cultural and scientific exchanges.
It was in this context of substantial
movement to relax political tensions
across a broad front that agreement
was reached to open preparatory
CSCE talks in Helsinki late in 1972.
Between the first Soviet suggestion
and the actual convocation of a con-
ference, more than a decade had
passed and the entire nature of the
conference had changed.
While the word "security" was
retained in its title, the concept of
"cooperation" was added. Potentially
explosive political issues such as the
German problem and the hardcore se-
curity issues, including strategic arms
limitation and reduction of troop
levels in central Europe, were being
dealt with in more limited special
forums (the Quadripartite Agreement
on Berlin and the start of talks in
Vienna on mutual and balanced force
reductions in central Europe). CSCE
concentrated therefore upon security
in a more general sense — the security
that would come from an expansion
of cooperation between East and West
in a wide range of areas including
economic, humanitarian, educational,
and cultural.
The Final Act was divided into
three basic areas, or baskets. A Dec-
laration on Principles [Guiding Rela-
tions between Participating States],
contained in basket 1 , was not the
quasipeace treaty originally suggested
by the Soviet Union. During the 2
years of negotiations, it evolved into
a general restatement of long-
accepted principles of interstate be-
havior such as sovereign equality and
non-threat or non-use of force. These
principles were drawn from and are con-
sistent with earlier statements of inter-
national law such as the U.N. Charter,
the U.N. Declaration on Friendly Re-
lations, and the U.N. Definition of
Aggression.
A most important accomplishment
was to include a strongly worded af-
firmation of respect for human rights
and fundamental freedoms in the
Declaration on Principles as one of 10
principles governing the participating
states in their mutual relations. That
principle was carefully drafted to be
consistent with earlier statements in
such documents as the U.N. Charter,
the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, and the U.N. covenants on
civil, political, economic, and social
rights. In so doing it gave added
30
force to those documents and promi-
nence to the commitment of the 35
governments to pay heed to them.
Another important part of basket 1
was a set of military confidence-
building measures which, in an in-
novative way, seek to promote secu-
rity by providing for notifications of
military exercises, the presence of
observers at such exercises, and other
constructive steps.
The most interesting and innovative
accomplishment at Helsinki was the
inclusion of a series of concrete,
practical commitments in basket 3
designed to improve the flow of
people and ideas between East and
West.
These provisions were not written
in tight treaty language but rather in a
somewhat more flexible form of ex-
pression favored by diplomats who
are seeking to reach agreement in
controversial areas. To some extent
they did not go as far as the classical
international legal statements sum-
marized in the basket 1 principle of
respect for human rights and funda-
mental freedoms. For example, article
13 of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, incorporated by refer-
ence in the basket 1 principle, states
that: "Everyone has the right to leave
any country, including his own, and
to return to his country." Basket 3 of
the Final Act says that: "The par-
ticipating States will deal in a posi-
tive and humanitarian spirit with the
applications of persons who wish to
be reunited with members of their
family. . . ." It pledges the par-
ticipating states to ". . . deal with
applications in this field as expedi-
tiously as possible." It says that:
"Applications for the purpose of
family reunification which are not
granted may be renewed at the appro-
priate level and will be reconsidered
at reasonably short intervals by the
authorities of the country of residence
or destination, whichever is con-
cerned .... ' These provisions are
not all-encompassing, but they pro-
vide concrete commitments from
which diplomats can discuss and
often solve particular emigration
cases.
The Helsinki achievement thus was
to fold human rights concerns into the
developing fabric of East-West de-
tente. It established the point that
detente would have to deal not only
with arms and armies, with balance of
payments and benefits for govern-
ments, but also with the practical,
day-to-day concerns of people —
businessmen, family members, jour-
nalists, clergymen, and others.
There were two reasons for the
West's insistence upon this. It was
believed that by encouraging the
Soviet Union and other Communist
states toward a more open and toler-
ant treatment of people and ideas,
much of the suspicion that fueled
postwar hostility could be replaced,
in an evolutionary process, by an in-
creasing sense of mutual confidence.
It was also recognized that a policy of
active cooperation with the East could
only be sustained in the long run for
the democracies of the West if our
publics could perceive and experience
direct benefits.
This, I would point out, was by no
means merely or even primarily an
American policy. It was carefully de-
veloped and coordinated policy of the
nations of the NATO alliance and of
the major Western European neutrals.
It was always recognized, of
course, that the Final Act's ultimate
value would have to be judged not on
the day it was signed but at some
point rather far in the future. It is
important to emphasize that the Final
Act is not a treaty but a political
document signed by heads of state or
government with the solemn intention
of giving meaning to the words of the
agreement. President Ford and
President Carter have both em-
phasized that the test would not be
the aspirations expressed but rather the
goals fulfilled.
There were many who believed that
the words to which the heads of 35
nations subscribed at Helsinki would,
in fact, be forgotten rather quickly.
Clearly this has not happened. In-
deed, few documents are quoted or
referred to more often today than the
Helsinki Final Act. It is important to
understand why this agreement has
such vitality. There have been, I be-
lieve, three mutually supporting
reasons.
• The Final Act achieved a reso-
nance among the citizenry of the
Soviet Union and the countries of
Eastern Europe that was unforeseen
during the long years of negotiation.
The formation of monitoring groups
calling for the full implementation by
their governments of the pledges they
had made and the attempt by other
courageous individuals to exercise the
civil and political rights delineated in
the Final Act or to apply for emigra-
tion visas also focused new public
attention in the West upon the CSCE
process. The harsh response, particu-
larly in the Soviet Union and Czecho-
slovakia, greatly increased interest in
the content of the Helsinki agreement
in both the East and the West.
• The election of an Administration
Department of State Bulletin
in the United States pledged to make
human rights one of the major pillars
of its foreign policy gave particular
prominence to the Final Act and the
CSCE process. The President showed
that he took those commitments seri-
ously. The support he received from
the Congress — in particular the CSCE
Commission under Congressman
Dante Fascell — demonstrated legisla-
tive support. And the sympathetic
reaction to the goals of Helsinki from
a broad spectrum of public
opinion — religious, ethnic, human-
itarian, legal, and business — gave
strength to the U.S. position. The at-
titude in Western Europe was also
supportive, bolstering the united ef-
forts of Western governments in
promoting compliance.
• The Helsinki Final Act, almost
without parallel for a major interna-
tional document, neither assumed its
automatic implementation nor left that
process to the traditional modes of
bilateral or multilateral diplomacy.
Instead, it contained explicit provi-
sion for followup, most notably for a
series of review meetings that would
be charged with the primary task of
assessing the state of implementation
and determining, if possible, what
additional measures might be under-
taken to improve implementation.
This type of built-in diplomatic re-
view procedure is perhaps particularly
useful for a political document like
the Final Act which the signatories
explicitly declared not be legally
binding. It is a device that the inter-
national community should also con-
sider using in the future for legally
binding multilateral agreements. Such
mandated followup meetings offer a
number of advantages over traditional
procedures for effecting compliance,
since parties are provided regular op-
portunities to raise matters of concern
without broaching the always serious
questions of renegotiation or renunci-
ation. At the same time, it provides a
framework for making further ad-
vances and for overcoming stumbling
blocks by negotiating additional,
functionally related agreements if the
circumstances permit.
The Belgrade Followup
The first CSCE review meeting,
held in Belgrade from October 4,
1977, to March 8, 1978, has a long-
range significance that transcends the
innocuous phrases of its short, dry
communique or the contentious and
almost indeterminate nature of its
semipublic debates. The meeting
served as a catalyst for focusing pub-
October 1978
31
lie attention on the content of the
Helsinki Final Act. This public
notice, more widespread in Europe
than in the United States, made it
certain that Western delegations
would conduct a thorough and candid
review of the implementation record
and that the review would necessarily
focus on the generally negative East-
ern record. The fact that the U.S.
delegation was led by a former Su-
preme Court Justice and U.S. Ambas-
sador to the United Nations, Arthur J.
Goldberg, further served to direct
public attention to the meeting. 2
At the same time, it turned out,
after the review was accomplished,
that there was no practical possibility
for the meeting to agree either on
further measures to improve im-
plementation or on a document that
described the conclusions of the con-
ference in detail. Under the rules by
which CSCE proceeds, all decisions
must be taken by consensus, which is
defined as the absence of objection by
any participant. Agreements reached
carry great weight because they have
been freely accepted by 35 states,
each of which possesses an absolute
veto. However, agreement can be re-
duced to the lowest common de-
nominator when one state, as in the
case of the Soviet Union at Belgrade,
chooses to insist on its blocking
power.
The first 3 months of the Belgrade
meeting were devoted to the review
of implementation and consideration
of proposed new measures designed
to improve implementation. The re-
maining period was devoted to
negotiation of the concluding docu-
ment. 3 The Soviets made it plain
from the first days of January 1978
that despite repeated efforts by the
West, and especially by the neutral
and nonaligned delegations, to pro-
duce substantive compromises, they
would accept nothing in the conclud-
ing document that referred directly to
human rights. Most other delegations
were unable to accept a Soviet-
supported document that would have
referred selectively to their proposals
in the security field and to a few in-
nocuous matters while ignoring major
issues that had played so prominent a
part in the meeting and were integral
aspects of the Final Act itself.
The result was a short document
which nonetheless did contain a
number of significant points. The
concluding document reaffirmed the
commitment of all the participating
states to implement the Final Act. It
provided for the process to continue
by establishing that a second
Belgrade-style review meeting would
be held in Madrid in the fall of 1980.
It also provided for the convening of
three expert meetings which, between
Belgrade and Madrid, would consider
specialized topics and help give vital-
ity and added depth to the CSCE
process.
Perhaps the central question of the
Belgrade meeting, however, revolves
around the specially creative aspect of
the Final Act — the insertion of the
human element into East-West rela-
tions. Throughout the Belgrade
meeting the Soviet Union insisted that
Western criticism of Soviet or Eastern
European human rights practices with
respect to principle VII and basket 3
that the participating states "held a
thorough exchange of views" and
that: "It was recognized that the ex-
change of views constitutes in itself a
valuable contribution towards the
achievement of the aims set by the
CSCE, although different views were
expressed as to the degree of im-
plementation of the Final Act reached
so far." Through the diplomatic ver-
biage one can perceive an implicit ac-
ceptance of the responsible and
detailed manner in which the West
conducted the review of implementa-
tion. Moreover, it was agreed that the
Madrid meeting would be patterned
on the Belgrade precedent.
. . . the fact that the Soviet leadership has not implemented important
elements of their Helsinki commitments in no way diminishes the
potential of the Final Act to the citizens of East and West alike ....
of the Final Act was itself a violation
of the Final Act. The Soviets cited
the sixth principle, "Non-intervention
in internal affairs," as the basis for
their position.
Western delegations, and notably
the American representatives, insisted
that the Soviet position was untenable
legally and politically. We noted that
parties to the Final Act had the ob-
vious right to make observations
about the degree of implementation
by another party of commitments
mutually undertaken. We emphasized
that such verbal comment and analy-
sis, particularly in a meeting con-
vened to assess the record of im-
plementation, could not be construed
as the sort of forceful intervention
which the sixth principle was de-
signed to cover. We also pointed out
that expressions of international con-
cern for matters affecting the funda-
mental rights of individuals were a
basic political element of the Final
Act and that unless this aspect was
retained. Western popular support for
CSCE and for other areas of East-
West cooperation would be
endangered.
In our judgment the course of the
Belgrade meeting substantially con-
firmed the Western position. The
Soviet Union occasionally dropped its
own theoretical defenses by attacking
in some detail Western, particularly
American, human rights practices.
We welcomed this interchange, not
because we considered that the Soviet
comments were accurate but because
we wish to be able in CSCE to en-
gage in a candid debate.
Most significantly, the Belgrade
concluding document acknowledges
Current Status of CSCE
Where then do we stand with CSCE
after more than 3 years of experience
with the Final Act? How is the CSCE
process affecting the lives of indi-
viduals throughout the 35 signatory
states'? What is the role of CSCE in
the present state of East-West rela-
tions and over the next several years?
The answer to these questions must
be both tentative and complex.
To begin with, there certainly has
not been adequate progress toward
full implementation. The U.S. as-
sessment of the implementation rec-
ord, essentially as it was expressed at
Belgrade, can be found in the series
of semiannual reports which the State
Department prepares and the Presi-
dent transmits as required by law to
the CSCE Commission. The most re-
cent report is dated June 3, 1978. 4 The
congressional CSCE Commission,
which works in close, effective coop-
eration with the executive, has also
compiled its own quite similar public
assessments. We consider that the
Final Act reflects basic accepted
worldwide standards, with which the
United States and the other Western
countries have largely been in com-
pliance from the time the document
was signed. Still, we recognize the
need to improve our performance in
certain areas.
The 1977 McGovern amendment in
visa waivers was a useful step to im-
prove U.S. compliance. Based upon
basket 3 provisions, it liberalized
entry procedures with respect to indi-
viduals who might otherwise be pre-
vented from visiting the United States
because of their political affiliations.
32
Department of State Bulletin
There is an unfortunate attempt
underway in the Congress to undo
this progress as a riposte to recent
Soviet actions. In our view such a
backward step would complicate the
East-West debate in an unhelpful
manner, for it would permit the
Soviet Union to point to a concrete
example of U.S. backsliding when-
ever we mention recent Soviet
actions.
Although we consider that com-
pliance by the Soviet Union, and in
varying degrees by Eastern European
countries, to be generally insufficient,
the picture is not uniformly bad.
There has been a record of good-faith
compliance, for example, by all
CSCE nations with the military
confidence-building measures. Com-
pliance with basket 2 economic provi-
sions and many of the less controver-
sial provisions for cooperation in
cultural and educational matters has
continued in a generally positive pat-
tern, although even in these areas
considerable improvement would be
welcome.
The troubled area, however, is
clearly that in which the greatest
hopes for the Final Act were
invested — that of the provisions re-
lating to freer movement of persons
and ideas. For example, too many in-
dividuals remain without exit visas,
and too many are punished and perse-
cuted for merely expressing a desire
to emigrate. Even here, however, the
picture is mixed. The rate of resolu-
tion of divided family cases has, in
some instances, improved. In the last
year or so the number of Jews re-
ceiving permission to leave the Soviet
Union has increased considerably,
though not to the levels of the early
1970's. The Federal Republic of
Germany continues to have consider-
able success in repatriating ethnic
Germans from the Soviet Union and
particularly from Poland and Romania
and maintains special arrangements
with the German Democratic Republic
on behalf of those who wish to
emigrate from East to West Germany.
Also it should be noted that as more
people emigrate from the East, more
relatives with rights and desires to
emigrate are left behind.
Of even greater political impact is
the fact that members of Final Act
monitoring groups in the Soviet
Union and in several other Eastern
countries have been ruthlessly dealt
with in violation of the pledges in the
Final Act which confirmed ". . .the
right of the individual to know and
act upon his rights ... in this field. "
There has been little if any im-
provement in the availability of West-
ern newspapers, books, and other
sources of information in the Soviet
Union and Eastern Europe, and in re-
cent days strong pressures have been
applied by the Soviet Union against
American journalists seeking to carry
out functions guaranteed by the Final
Act.
The history of the Soviet Union in-
dicates that strong actions to block
the impact of dangerous foreign
trends and to stifle dissent have deep
roots. When similar situations de-
veloped in the past, Soviet responses
were frequently more brutal than their
actions today, and the West was even
more limited in its possibilities for
response. With the high-level public
Soviet commitment to all of the
statements of intent in the Helsinki
Final Act, it has been possible to cite
specific obligations and shortcomings
in a way that gives the Soviets cause
to consider carefully the international
ramifications of their actions and,
hopefully, moderate their harsh in-
stincts in these matters. For example,
in the case of the Soviet court action
against Harold Piper and Craig Whit-
ney, 5 we are able to defend the pro-
bity of their actions by citing the ac-
tual language of the Final Act which
calls upon the signatory states to im-
prove the working conditions for
journalists by, among other things,
increasing ". . .the opportunities for
journalists ... to communicate per-
sonally with their sources. . . " and
by reaffirming that ". . .the legiti-
mate pursuit of their professional ac-
tivity will neither render journalists
liable to expulsion nor otherwise
penalize them.'" Similarly, in the
case of the Soviets' outrageous arrest
of the American representative of In-
ternational Harvester, we can cite the
basket 2 language in which the sig-
natories undertook to improve the
working conditions of representatives
of foreign enterprises in numerous
practical ways.
Benefits of the CSCE
Although the implementation rec-
ord is predominately disappointing,
we should take note of CSCE's
tangential benefits. Most important,
perhaps, has been the positive effect
that CSCE has had and continues to
have on Western political unity. In
developing the agenda for the Hel-
sinki conference, in insisting upon the
inclusion of the human element in the
Final Act, in their common determi-
nation that Soviet and Eastern
shortcomings be discussed candidly at
Belgrade, and in their response to the
current difficult period occasioned by
the recent trials, the Western nations
have given expression to their com-
mon social and cultural values.
U.S. policy is closely coordinated
with our NATO allies, and the proc-
ess of consultation has given new
political impetus to the alliance. The
members of the European Community
have found in CSCE a vehicle by
which they have been able to develop
common political as well as economic
policy. But the common thread of
Western policy on CSCE extends be-
yond the alliance and the Community
to include most of the neutral and
nonaligned nations of Europe. CSCE
has therefore served to reinforce the
political strength and solidarity of the
West and has increased the West's
perception of those basic differences
which persist between Western and
Eastern societies. This strengthened
perception of Western values and the
Soviet Union's defensive position
with respect to implementation have,
I believe, been significant factors in
limiting the effectiveness of Com-
munist parties among the people of
Western Europe.
The CSCE process has also pro-
vided a mechanism within which the
smaller nations of Europe, both those
within and without alliances, can play
a more important part in the diplo-
macy of their continent than at any
time since the end of the Second
World War. They value this opportu-
nity for its own sake, and it has made
a contribution to their self-confidence
and sense of security. In addition we
find that participating states like Au-
stria. Switzerland, Sweden, the Vati-
can, and Yugoslavia have ideas and
insights that find constructive outlets
in CSCE activities.
Again, the CSCE process and the
wideranging provisions of the Final
Act have established a framework
within which Western governments,
including the United States, have
been able to accelerate the develop-
ment of relations with the states of
Eastern Europe. The extension of
cooperation within the Final Act
framework should not be judged
solely on the proceedings at formal
and quasi-public conferences such as
Belgrade. The Soviet Union will al-
ways insist on a substantial degree of
bloc unity at such occasions.
But our dialogue and that of our
European friends with the countries of
Eastern Europe is easier within the
framework of the Helsinki Final Act.
Our consultations with Romania on
CSCE issues have been frequent, in-
tensive, and fruitful. Our discussions
on economic issues, cultural ex-
changes, family reunification, and
October 1978
33
other issues with such countries as
Bulgaria and Poland have been use-
ful. And the very real degree of im-
proved relations with Hungary sym-
bolized earlier this year by the return
of the Crown of St. Stephen and the
granting of most-favored-nation status
is attributable in significant part to
the determination of both our coun-
tries to give concrete expression to
the potential of the Final Act.
One must nevertheless admit that
East-West relations are presently
under somewhat of a pall. Recent
Soviet actions have led some in this
country to question the value of the
CSCE process and even to suggest
that the United States should in some
manner show its dissatisfaction with
Soviet contempt for the Helsinki prin-
ciples by renouncing the Final Act
ourselves. This attitude is perhaps
understandable but extremely
shortsighted and counterproductive.
The Final Act is a statement of
political will, not a legally binding
document. It contains no provision
for abrogation or renunciation. It is
also a document which reflects basic
Western values of openness and
cooperation. Were the United States
to renounce the Final Act, we would
be turning our backs on our own val-
ues. Such an action would cancel no
benefit that CSCE had conferred on
the Soviet Union, since the Final Act
does not "legitimize" anything the
Soviet Union has done in Eastern
Europe. Rather, the United States
would be allowing the Soviets to es-
cape from a document which commits
them to undertakings that they have
found difficult to implement but
which remain very much in American
interest. We would be viewed by our
European friends — neutrals as well as
allies — as pulling the plug at the first
sign of difficulty on a hopeful but
long-term exercise in collective dip-
lomacy. Ironically, we would be
creating the very situation that the
Soviets demanded for so many years
and the West resisted — a purely
European security arrangement from
which the United States was absent.
The Madrid conference would go on
as scheduled in November of 1980, as
would the conference in Montreux
on peaceful settlement of disputes be-
ginning October 31, 1978, the Malta
conference on aspects of Mediterra-
nean cooperation beginning February
13, 1979, and the CSCE scientific
forum in Hamburg in February 1980,
but our voice would not be heard nor
would our veto be available to check
unwise actions. We would gain
nothing — and lose a great deal — by
abandoning ship at the first sign of
trouble, particularly when in my view
we have the advantage legally, mor-
ally, and diplomatically over the po-
sitions put forward by the Soviet
Union.
The Future
The Final Act and the CSCE proc-
ess remain today what they have al-
ways been — an integral part of the
developing East-West relationship.
Successes or failures in CSCE will
affect the overall relationship just as
other important aspects of the re-
lationship from SALT to Somalia are
bound to affect CSCE. The Soviets
have always sought to advance the
thesis that better implementation of
the Final Act will only be possible
after the superpowers act to advance
detente through agreements in areas
desired by the Soviet Union, particu-
larly in the security and economic
fields. The West has responded that
greater cooperation is possible only if
the public sees direct benefits in it
and if previous commitments are met.
The West, therefore, insists that dem-
onstrated progress in all the important
CSCE areas will promote progress in
other fields.
What should be clear, however, is
that the dialogue begun at Helsinki is
needed now more than ever. The
present tension that exists in East-
West relations is grounded in part in
differing perceptions of the human
rights question. The Final Act pro-
vided us a measure by which to assess
the situation, and the CSCE process
affords us a means and rationale for
raising in diplomatic channels the
questions that trouble us. We can and
must pursue these questions through
CSCE while at the same time dealing
with other vital East-West problems,
such as Strategic Arms Limitation
Talks, on their own merits and on
their own terms.
Even as we work for improvement
on these vital human rights-related
matters, CSCE also continues to offer
a means for moving forward at the
same time with a wide range of addi-
tional cooperative matters dealt with
in the Final Act which can deepen
and solidify relations between East
and West. The choice as to what use
is made of CSCE — whether its
broader cooperative promise can be
more fully developed — is to a large
extent in the hands of the Soviets.
Whatever their attitude, CSCE is an
invaluable tool that the United States
intends to continue to use. We will be
working in the closest consultation
over the next few years with our al-
lies and with the neutrals to develop
common lines of approach. We shall
also seek extensive consultations with
Eastern nations in this effort.
It is too early to predict what will
occur at the next opportunity for a
resumption of the multilateral
dialogue at Madrid in 1980. The
course of that meeting will be deter-
mined to a significant extent by
events in the interim, and the flexible
CSCE process offers us extensive op-
portunities. The fundamental elements
of our approach are, however, rather
clear and should be acceptable to
those who value the CSCE process.
• We will not abandon the task of
making a responsible assessment of
the record of implementation.
• We will seek practical steps to
encourage better compliance.
• We will seek, to the extent pos-
sible, to build upon the Final Act by
reaching consensus on appropriate
new areas of cooperation.
One way to accomplish this third
element would be to extract the best
of the approximately 100 new ideas
proposed at Belgrade so that their
potential is not lost. These ideas
might be explored in bilateral and
multilateral contacts between now and
Madrid so that if possible several of
the most useful of them, representing
advances in all major CSCE
categories, can be refined and then
hopefully agreed upon at the Madrid
conference in 1980.
With the United States continuing
to play its proper leadership role and
through such a careful step-by-step
balanced process, we can promote the
type of humane and secure coopera-
tion which the Helsinki Final Act, by
its very terms, envisages.
We do not intend to abandon our
efforts to promote security and coop-
eration in Europe, in spite of the dis-
appointments of recent months. □
'For text of the CSCE Final Act. see Bul-
letin of Sept. 1. 1975, p. 323.
2 For Ambassador Goldberg's statements at
the opening and closing sessions of the review
meeting, see Bulletins of Nov. 14. 1977. p.
674. and April 1978. p. 40. respectively.
3 For text of the concluding document, see
Bulletin of April 1978. p. 43.
4 Single copies of this fourth semiannual re-
port (Special Report No. 45) may be obtained
from the Correspondence Management Divi-
sion, Bureau of Public Affairs. Department of
State, Washington, D.C. 20520.
5 Craig R Whitney of the New York Times
and Harold D. Piper of the Baltimore Sun
were formally accused on June 28. 1978. by
the Soviet Government of having libeled
Soviet state television. After being repri-
manded for allegedly slandering the Soviet
media and judicial system, the case against
them was dropped in mid-Aug.
34
Most-Favor ed-Nation Tariff
Status for Hungary and Romania
by George S. Vest
Statement before the Subcommittee
on International Trade of the Senate
Committee on Finance on July 12,
1978. Mr. Vest is Assistant Secretary
for European Affairs. '
I am pleased to have this opportu-
nity to testify on behalf of further ex-
tension of the President's waiver au-
thority under Section 402 of the Trade
Act and specifically his authority to
continue the waivers permitting
most-favored-nation tariff treatment
for Romania and Hungary.
Before I describe in detail the rea-
sons we believe that continuation of
the President's waiver authority for
Romania and Hungary is warranted. I
would like to outline for you the pol-
icy considerations on which our rela-
tions with both these countries are
based.
Policy Considerations
It is our general policy to seek im-
proved relations between the United
States and the nations of Eastern
Europe that in turn reciprocate our de-
sire for improved relations. We be-
lieve that better relations, based on the
principle of mutual benefit, will
strengthen the positive and construc-
tive ties between East and West and
promote the goals of the Helsinki
Final Act. We believe that continua-
tion of the President's authority to
waive the limitations imposed by sec-
tion 402 in appropriate cases can be an
important instrument to promote these
ends.
Our efforts and those of previous
Administrations to improve relations
with Eastern Europe in no way indi-
cate a lessening of our concern about
the lack of democratic institutions and
other basic elements of a free society
in that part of the world. We continue
to have profound disagreements with
the governments of Eastern Europe
over many questions of political free-
dom and basic human and social val-
ues. I would like to stress that the
very expansion of relations with these
countries has enabled us to talk more
candidly with their governments about
those differences. We believe that
such a dialogue is an effective way to
foster respect for the values that this
country cherishes, including those in-
corporated in the Helsinki Final Act.
We have achieved significant prog-
ress in our relations with both
Romania and Hungary throughout this
decade, to the advantage of our na-
tions and peoples. Our relations with
each country have taken different
paths, reflecting in some measure the
different policies pursued by those two
governments. But for both, the estab-
lishment of nondiscriminatory trade
relations, which was accomplished in
1975 with Romania and just last week
with Hungary, provides a sound basis
for further progress. If that basis were
removed, our relations with both could
be expected to deteriorate signifi-
cantly.
Hungary
I believe you are already familiar
with the reasons for the President's
decision on April 7 to waive the pro-
hibitions under Section 402 of the
Trade Act with respect to Hungary. I
explained them in my testimony before
this subcommittee on May 9. The
House of Representatives approved the
U.S. -Hungarian agreement on May 22;
the Senate did so on June 27. The
agreement entered into force on
July 7.
We have received numerous expres-
sions of interest from American firms
who see improved prospects for doing
business in Hungary. Our useful
dialogue with Hungarian officials on
matters of emigration and family
reunification continues. Since my tes-
timony in May two family cases have
been resolved. At present there are
five pending problem cases; resolution
of two is expected shortly. We are
satisfied that the Hungarian Govern-
ment has continued to deal with
emigration in a positive and human-
itarian manner. For these reasons, we
believe that the President's waiver
authority for Hungary should be ex-
tended for another 12 months.
Romania
Turning now to Romania, our desire
to maintain the good relations that
have already been established rests in
large part on Romania's relative
foreign policy independence. Let me
review for you briefly some key
examples of Romanian independence.
• Since 1958 there have been no
Department of State Bulletin
Soviet troops in Romania, and
Romania participates only to a very
limited extent in Warsaw Pact military
exercises.
• Romania did not participate in,
and strongly condemned, the 1968 in-
vasion of Czechoslovakia.
• Romania maintained diplomatic
relations with Israel after the 1967
Arab-Israeli conflict and has a con-
structive working relationship with the
Israelis.
• Romania did not participate in the
Arab-initiated oil embargo and in fact
increased shipments of fuel oil and
gasoline to the United States during
that difficult period.
• Romanian President Ceausescu
played an important role in helping to
set the stage for Egyptian President
Sadat's historic visit to Jerusalem.
• Since the end of World War II,
over 300,000 Romanian Jews have
been permitted to emigrate to Israel,
and in addition Romania for a time
facilitated the transit of Soviet Jews to
Israel.
• Romania also maintains good re-
lations with the Arab countries, as
well as with such countries as the
People's Republic of China, the
Democratic People's Republic of
Korea, and Albania — contacts that
sometimes can be useful to the United
States.
• Economically, Romania has
broader ties with the non-Communist
world than other Warsaw Pact states.
Since 1974, more than half its trade
has been with non-Communist
partners.
• The Romanians are among the
strongest champions of the right of all
Communist parties to chart their own
course in a pragmatic way rather than
following the lead of Moscow. This
frequently puts them at odds with
Moscow on ideological issues, such as
' 'Eurocommunism . ' '
• At the Helsinki Conference on
Security and Cooperation in Europe
and at the Belgrade followup meeting,
the Romanian delegation pursued its
own path. The Romanians avoided
polemics against the West on human
rights issues and played an active and
generally positive role that helped in
some degree to bridge East-West dif-
ferences and to advance the final con-
sensus that emerged.
In the context of these hearings, it
is worthwhile remembering that
Romania was the first country to enter
into a trade agreement with the United
States under the terms of the
Jackson- Vanik amendment to the
Trade Act of 1974. Romania took this
step at a time when Soviet opposition
October 1978
to this amendment was abundantly
clear. Without that Romanian initia-
tive, it is highly doubtful whether even
by now any other country would have
taken such a step.
Since the U.S. -Romanian trade
agreement went into effect in August
1975. our trade with Romania has
continued to grow. In 1977, two-way
trade reached $493 million with a bal-
ance of $26 million in favor of the
United States. This year's trade fig-
ures show a continued increase in
trade. U.S. exports to Romania totaled
$124 million for the first 5 months.
U.S. imports from Romania reached
$114 million giving us a trade surplus
of $10 million.
Agricultural commodities such as
soybeans and soybean products,
wheat, and corn make up the largest
share of U.S. exports to Romania.
Since 1975 U.S. exports of manufac-
tured goods such as steel plate and
machine tools have been growing
rapidly. The Presidential waiver for
Romania has made it possible for the
United States to use Commodity Credit
Corporation financing for exports of
agricultural products and Export-
Import Bank financing for capital
equipment sales.
Since this committee last reviewed
the question of extending most-
favored-nation status to Romania, the
most significant development in our
relations has been the visit to the
United States of Romanian President
Nicolae Ceausescu. 2 President
Ceausescu's visit in April provided an
excellent opportunity to review all as-
pects of our bilateral relations with
Romania, to discuss issues of global
TABLE 1
ROMANIAN EMIGRATION
TO THE UNITED STATES
Immigrant
Visas Issued by
U.S. Embassy.
Bucharest*
1976
1977
1978
January
74
69
78
February
87
59
100
March
130
138
67
April
97
101
99
May
77
129
124
June
111
106
122
July
96
111
August
104
151
September
74
106
October
40
101
November
66
94
December
65
75
Total
1.021
1,240
y processing
* Includ
es third -countr
but excludes dual nationals
importance, and to cement the already
good ties between our countries,
thereby laying the basis for further
progress. For example, we made very
clear to the Romanian authorities that
this Administration and this Congress
remain deeply committed to the sup-
port of human rights, both in the
United States and abroad. As in the
past, we found that our relations with
Romania are sufficiently mature to en-
able us to discuss usefully even issues
on which we do not share the same
perspective. We also continue to find
a willingness on the Romanian side to
resolve in a humanitarian way issues
about which we have expressed our
concern. Our experience with Romania
shows that a solid bilateral relation-
ship, of which the most-favored-nation
status forms a part, is the best
framework for such discussions.
As this committee is aware, there is
concern on the part of the Administra-
tion, Members of Congress, and the
American-Hungarian community with
the Romanian Government's treatment
of its ethnic Hungarian minority. We
believe that this is primarily an inter-
nal matter to be resolved by the citi-
zens and Government of Romania. At
the same time, we shall continue to
lend whatever positive encouragement
we can.
In March of this year, President
Ceausescu publicly acknowledged
certain shortcomings of Romania's
past minority policy and called for
specific improvements, including in-
creased work opportunities in places of
origin, improved education in minority
languages, and improved health care
and medical education for members of
minority groups. We hope that these
Romanian actions will improve the
situation of the minorities in Romania,
but it should be remembered that this
is a centuries-old problem to which no
quick or easy solution is either possi-
ble or likely. We note also that the
Romanian and Hungarian Governments
have discussed this question, and we
hope this dialogue proves productive.
Emigration from Romania
During President Ceausescu's April
visit, the question of emigration and
reunification of divided families was
discussed in detail. In the joint decla-
ration issued on April 13, President
Carter and President Ceausescu
pledged: "To cooperate in the settle-
ment of humanitarian issues, including
family reunification, in the spirit of
mutual understanding and goodwill."
We believe that this pledge gives us a
strengthened basis for expecting con-
tinued progress in resolving emigration
35
and marriage cases in which we have
expressed an interest.
Romania's emigration performance,
although certainly leaving room for
further improvement, has shown the
kind of progress since the waiver was
continued last year that is required by
the Trade Act. It is on this continuing
TABLE 2
ROMANIAN EMIGRATION TO THE
UNITED STATES
A
nnual Totals
1968
68
1969
142
1970
373
1971
362
1972
348
1973
469
1974
407
1975
890
1976
1,021
1977
1,240
progress that the President's recom-
mendation is based. There are still
many pending cases, including some
longstanding and difficult ones, but we
believe the long-term trend satisfies
the requirements of title IV of the act.
We have provided for you and your
subcommittee statistics which enable
us to assess Romania's emigration
performance. Tables 1 and 2 show
emigration to the United States. The
figures represent the number of per-
sons to whom our Embassy has issued
immigrant visas or for whom
documentation has been completed for
final processing by the U.S. Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Service office
in Rome.
If you look at emigration to the
United States since the previous hear-
ing before this subcommittee at the
end of June 1977, you will find that
1,228 persons received visas for per-
manent resettlement in the United
States since that time through June of
this year. This represents a significant
increase over the total for the previous
12-month period, which was 1,047. It
is worth noting that the major reason
for this increase was the relatively
steady rate of emigration; that is, there
was no sharp drop-off this past winter
as there was the previous winter. I
might add that the current level of
emigration to the United States is, of
course, much higher than during the
years before Romania received most-
favored-nation tariff status.
In addition, I should point out that
our Embassy's statistics actually
underrepresent the number of Roma-
36
TABLE 3
ROMANIAN JEWISH EMIGRATION
TO ISRAEL
Number
of Emigrants
1976
1977
1978
January
328
46
63
February
232
62
73
March
99
113
96
April
51
132
77
May
143
105
148
June
21 1
109
111
July
237
70
August
238
113
September
117
181
October
118
197
November
79
118
December
136
88
Total
1,989
1.334
mans who have been granted permis-
sion by their government to emigrate
to the United States. There are two
reasons for this.
• First, many Romanians who ac-
tually wish to emigrate to another
country apply for permission to emi-
grate to the United States because they
believe this increases their chances of
approval. If they emigrate elsewhere,
they are not included in our statistics.
• Second, a good number of Roma-
nians apply for entry into the United
States in third countries as refugees
and are not included in our Embassy's
statistics. Several hundred Romanians
are in these two categories.
There has been considerable prog-
ress in resolving cases included in the
representation list that our Embassy
presented to the Romanian Foreign
Ministry on March 28. That list con-
tained the names of 942 persons seek-
ing permission to emigrate to the
United States or to marry an Ameri-
can. By the end of June, 315
persons — one-third of the total — had
received approvals from the Romanian
Government. We are particularly
gratified by the large number of mar-
riage approvals: 46 out of 60 or 77%.
In addition, considerable progress has
been made in resolving the most
longstanding cases and in making it
possible for persons who wish to apply
for emigration to obtain the appro-
priate forms. Denial of forms has been
one way in which some Romanians
have been prevented from emigrating.
We are, of course, pressing for fur-
ther progress, and a new representa-
tion list was presented to the Foreign
Ministry on July 5. This new list con-
tains the names of 817 persons, many
of whom — 222 to be exact — appear for
the first time.
We have also continued to make it
clear to Romanian authorities that we
are interested in emigration from
Romania to Israel. The number of per-
sons arriving in Israel from Romania
during the first 6 months of 1978
(January 1-June 30) was 568. This is
almost exactly the same as the total
for the comparable period last year
(567). There is reason to believe that
the increase in emigration to Israel in
May and June reflects the discussion
of this subject between Presidents
Carter and Ceausescu. The present rate
of emigration to Israel, however, re-
mains considerably below that of pre-
vious years.
The problem of assessing Romanian
emigration performance with regard to
Israel is complicated by the difficulty
of verifying the number of Romanian
Jews who have applied to emigrate or
who wish to depart. Romanian au-
thorities consistently maintain that.
TABLE 4
ROMANIAN
JEWISH
EMIGRATION
TO ISRAEL
Approximate Annual Totals
1971
1,900
1972
3.000
1973
4,000
1974
3,700
1975
2,000
1976
2.000
1977
1.330
with a handful of exceptions, all
Romanian Jews who wish to emigrate
will be permitted to do so. At the
same time, they clearly do not wish to
encourage emigration, by Romanian
Jews or any other person. Because the
procedures for emigration to Israel at
least for now rule out the preparation
of lists of Romanian Jews who wish to
emigrate, it is not possible to say with
any certainty how many Romanian
Department of State Bulletin
Jews wish to emigrate or how many
are or feel prevented from doing so.
Ultimately, we recognize that an ac-
ceptable level of emigration from
Romania to Israel is the principal con-
cern of the two countries involved.
Only the Israeli authorities can deter-
mine which Romanians who have
applied to emigrate to Israel are qual-
ified to do so. At the same time, we
intend to keep this matter constantly
before the Romanian Government as a
matter in which both the Administra-
tion and the Congress are highly in-
terested.
I would like to add that emigration
from Romania to the Federal Republic
of Germany continues at a very high
rate. Last year, over 10,000 persons
emigrated to West Germany. Accord-
ing to Romanian figures, which in the
past have actually been lower than
those provided by the West German
Government, the 5-month total for
1978 shows 4,153 persons approved
for emigration to West Germany, of
whom 3,321 have already left Romania.
In addition to recommending to the
Congress the continuation of his gen-
eral waiver authority and the indi-
vidual waivers for Romania and Hun-
gary, the President informed the
Congress on June 2 of his decision to
extend the U.S-Romanian trade
agreement for another 3 years. The
trade agreement is a vital part of our
improved relations with Romania. It
creates a solid framework for trade
growth while providing adequate pro-
tection for import-sensitive U.S. in-
dustries. Its political significance as a
symbol of lasting, nondiscriminatory
relations is considerable, and it helps
lessen Romanian economic dependence
on the Soviet Union.
To further U.S. interests in Eastern
Europe, the Administration strongly
recommends extension of the Presi-
dent's authority to waive Section 402
of the Trade Act and to continue in
effect the waivers for Romania and
Hungary. □
'The complete transcript of the hearings
will be published by the committee and will be
available from the Superintendent of Docu-
ments. U.S. Government Printing Office.
Washington. DC. 20402.
2 For text of material relating to President
Ceausescu's visit, see Bulletin of June 1978.
p. 36.
October 1978
37
NARCOTICS: Control Efforts
in Central America
and the Caribbean
by Joseph Linneman
Based on a statement before the
Subcommittee to Investigate Juvenile
Delinquency of the Senate Committee
on the Judiciary on August 22. 1978.
Mr. Linneman is Deputy Senior Ad-
viser and Deputy Director of the Of-
fice of International Narcotics Con-
trol. '
I am pleased to be with you today
to discuss international narcotics
control efforts, specifically the prob-
lems of narcotics smuggling in the
Caribbean and Central America.
The use of the Caribbean islands as
a transit route for illicit drugs reach-
ing the United States is increasing. In
particular. Jamaica and the Bahamas
are becoming major transshipment
points, both by air and sea. The Drug
Enforcement Administration estimates
that from July 1975 through March
1978 approximately 250 tons of
marijuana entered the United States
from Jamaica. Recent Drug Enforce-
ment Administration reports
also indicate an increase in cocaine
trafficking through Jamaica to dis-
tribution networks in Florida and the
eastern United States.
The increasing importance of the
Bahamas as a transshipment point is
evidenced by the arrests of 1 1 Latin
Americans during the first 5 months
of 1978, each carrying at least one
kilo of cocaine. Narcotics move eas-
ily to the United States through the
Bahamas area because of a number of
factors, such as the large number of
commercial air flights to the Bahamas
from Latin America; the ease of
smuggling via private boats and
cruise ships to Florida and the east
coast of the United States; less rigid
Bahamian customs examination of
tourists returning from Latin America;
and relatively lower risks of prosecu-
tion, conviction, and lengthy incar-
ceration.
Central America also appears to be
gaining in importance as an illicit
drug trafficking area. Traffickers
utilize both private and commercial
air and vessel transport to facilitate
smuggling operations. The Govern-
ments of Guatemala. Honduras, and
Costa Rica have expressed concern
over the growing problem of illicit
narcotics traffic. In response, the
U.S. Government has undertaken a
number of initiatives designed to help
curtail narcotics smuggling through
the Caribbean and Central America,
which I shall briefly describe.
U.S. Initiatives
Special, closely coordinated Coast
Guard. Drug Enforcement Adminis-
tration, and customs operations to
monitor the various sea passages in the
Caribbean and the Gulf of Mexico
have resulted in large seizures of
marijuana and cocaine. The Depart-
ment of State has assisted these oper-
ations by consultations with the Gov-
ernments of Colombia, the Bahamas,
Jamaica, and Honduras to effect their
cooperation in interdiction activities.
In May 1978 a joint Coast Guard and
Customs Service team visited Colom-
bia to evaluate and develop increased
Colombian cooperation in coastal
maritime interdiction.
In the area of international agree-
ments, the State Department is ex-
pediting negotiations to conclude a
judicial assistance agreement with the
Government of the Bahamas. A
model treaty on mutual assistance in
law enforcement matters has been
drafted by the Departments of State,
Justice, and Treasury. We are re-
questing blanket authority to negotiate
such bilateral agreements with a
number of states. The treaty provides
for mutual assistance at both the in-
vestigative and prosecutive stages.
The Department of State is also sup-
porting the development of bilateral
projects with key Latin American
countries for improved exchange of
prosecutorial information. A Depart-
ment of Justice team visited Colombia
in June to discuss specific cases with
the Colombian attorney general.
Other countries will be selected in the
future and plans made for visits of
similar Justice-Drug Enforcement
Administration teams.
An interagency committee for
coordination of maritime drug inter-
diction was formed in February 1978
under the auspices of the Department
of State to coordinate the activities of
the various U.S. agencies responsible
for improving maritime drug interdic-
tion efforts. The membership consists
of representatives of the Departments
of Justice and State. Coast Guard, the
U.S. Customs Service, the Drug En-
forcement Administration, and the
Immigration and Naturalization Serv-
ice. Working through this committee,
we are trying to regularize our own
domestic procedures through a series
of agreements with those countries
whose vessels are most often involved
in trafficking operations.
The legal subcommittee of the
Strategy Council's narcotics working
group is also developing plans for as-
sessing the narcotics laws of the
countries covered and. where appro-
priate, working with foreign govern-
ments in drafting effective and
uniform legislation.
The State Department is also
working closely with the Departments
of Treasury and Justice to develop a
concerted attack on the financial as-
pects of the narcotics traffic. The
objectives of this plan are to facilitate
negotiations with foreign governments
for exchange of financial information
regarding narcotics trafficking and
currency transport status to assist
U.S. efforts to prosecute violations in
this area. We also hope to obtain the
cooperation of foreign governments in
freezing or seizure of narcotics-
derived assets abroad.
The Drug Enforcement Administra-
tion, at the request of the Department
of State, recently completed a special
intelligence assessment of the narcot-
ics problem in Central America and
the Caribbean in order to provide a
sound basis for the development of
appropriate country and regional nar-
cotics control programs in the area.
As a result, an international narcotics
control program evaluation officer is
currently in the Bahamas to begin a
needs-assessment of the drug traf-
ficking situation. Based on his find-
ings a survey team will visit the
Bahamas to design the parameters of
a project in conjunction with Baha-
mian officials. A special study mis-
sion is also being directed toward
analyzing solutions to the growing
illicit narcotics trafficking in
Honduras.
38
Department of State Bulletin
NUCLEAR POLICY: Balancing J\onprolifcration
and Energy Security
by Joseph S. Nye, Jr.
Address before the Uranium Insti-
tute in London on July 12, 1978. Mr.
Nye is Deputy to the Under Secretary
for Security Assistance, Science, and
Technology.
Since 1945 the power of the atom
has posed a profound challenge to the
military security of nations. Arnold
Toynbee predicted that the nation-state
and the split atom could not coexist on
the same planet. Thus far we have
done better than the dire predictions.
Important steps have been taken and
are currently being negotiated to con-
trol the strategic nuclear arms com-
petititon. But grave doubts exist about
whether it will be possible to manage
another three decades without the use
of nuclear explosives in war if nuclear
weaponry spreads to a large number of
countries. Proliferation is likely to
produce a more dangerous world for
all nations.
In the area of military security,
there is general agreement over the
appropriate steps to diminish the in-
centives for nuclear proliferation. The
maintenance of alliance relationships
and support for the Nonproliferation
Treaty are of fundamental importance.
Efforts to negotiate arms control
agreements such as the Strategic Arms
Limitation Talks (SALT) and a com-
prehensive test ban are significant
steps. So also are efforts to create
nuclear-weapon-free zones. In Latin
America, for example, only Cuban
ratification remains for the treaty of
Tlatelolco to enter into force after the
recently announced U.S., Argentine,
Soviet, and French intended actions
come into effect.
Energy Security Problems
At the same time, it is important to
remember that for many countries,
there is another urgent dimension to
the security aspects of nuclear energy:
energy security. The problem of
energy security received dramatic at-
tention when the oil crisis of 1973-74
left an acute sense of insecurity among
countries heavily dependent upon im-
ported energy. Many nations view nu-
clear energy as a major means of
minimizing dependence on energy im-
ports and are concerned that actions
designed to reduce the military secu-
rity risks of nuclear proliferation not
worsen their energy security problems.
The United States is keenly sensitive
to the energy security situations of
other countries.
At the same time, it is important to
keep the dimensions of the energy
problem in perspective. The energy
security issue is not one problem but
three. The first is short term. It is the
problem of vulnerability to sudden
politically oriented disruptions of sup-
ply. The best protection against this
risk is a combination of national oil
stockpiles; international cooperation
and effective diplomacy to diminish
the prospects of disruption.
The second problem is midterm —
and relates to the next decade. It is the
prospect that rising world demand for
Organization of Petroleum Exporting
Countries (OPEC) oil will not be
adequately constrained by gradual
price and conservation measures in the
next few years, leading to rapid price
increases in the mid-1980's with at-
tendant depressing effects on
economies and possible disruption of
world financial markets. The best
protection against this threat is appro-
priate energy production and conser-
vation efforts and price changes that
reflect the replacement cost of energy.
It is important to keep in mind that
(Narcotics cont'd)
Regional Efforts
We are also encouraging more ef-
fective regional narcotics control ef-
forts, such as the May meeting in
Lima of top narcotics enforcement
officials from Peru, Ecuador, Bolivia,
and Colombia. With U.S. Govern-
ment technical advice and possible
assistance in the future. Mexico and
Guatemala are developing more ef-
fective joint border control of narcot-
ics. Cooperation is also underway in
all Central American countries and
Mexico in which the enforcement
elements in each country will be
linked to narcotics intelligence opera-
tions in the United States. More ef-
fective use of existing narcotics in-
formation in the United States and
direct international communications
networks for the area will be very
helpful in identifying suspect aircraft
and traffickers.
The Office of International Nar-
cotics Control held its annual Latin
American Narcotics Conference in
Miami in November 1977. bringing
together representatives of appropriate
Federal, State, and regional agencies.
Embassy officers involved in narcot-
ics control from all Latin American
posts attended the conference and de-
veloped a new understanding of the
complexities of the problem and the
need for increased cooperation.
The Department included narcotics
as an issue for discussion during the
Organization of American States an-
nual conference. Particular emphasis
was placed on narcotics during the
bilateral substantive talks between the
Secretary of State and Latin American
foreign ministers. Our bilateral nar-
cotics control programs with key
South American producing countries
are intended to reduce the supply of
illicit narcotic drugs as close to the
source as possible. 2 Our law en-
forcement agencies believe that with-
out these supply reduction efforts in
other countries, effective interdiction
of these drugs would be rendered
even more difficult.
The social, economic, and political
costs to this nation and to the coun-
tries involved associated with illicit
narcotics production and trafficking
are extremely serious. We welcome
the interest of the subcommittee and
its support of our efforts to curtail the
flow of illicit drugs into the United
States. D
'The complele transcrip! of the hearings will
be published by the committee and will be
available from the Superintendent of Docu-
ments, U.S. Government Printing Office,
Washington. DC. 20402.
; For a discussion of the international narcot-
ics control program, see Bulletin of June
1978. p. 42.
October 1978
39
nuclear energy will not contribute sig-
nificantly to the solution of either the
short-term or midterm energy problem.
For example, even if a nation such as
Japan, with its major commitment to
nuclear power, is fully successful in
reaching its ambitious nuclear energy
goal of 60,000 MWe [megawats
electric] by 1990, it would reduce its
dependence on imported energy by
about 10%. In reality, then, Japanese
energy security is far more dependent
on the measures already mentioned in-
cluding close cooperation with the
United States and other states. In other
words, in the short- and medium-
term, the conflict between nonprolifer-
ation concerns and energy security is
nowhere nearly as severe as is some-
times stated.
The importance of nuclear energy is
in relation to the third energy
problem — how to manage the transi-
tion from oil to other energy sources
over the longer run of several decades.
By the year 2000, nuclear energy may
be contributing as much as 15% to the
total energy consumption in the United
States. The share of nuclear energy in
Japan and Europe could be about
one-fourth of total energy consump-
tion. Solar energy proponents argue
that nuclear power will not be the
major alternative energy source of the
next century. They argue that if $17
billion in government subsidies are
spent on solar energy as they were in
the past two decades on nuclear in the
United States alone, the current mod-
est projections for solar energy will
turn out to be serious underestimates.
It is too early to be categoric about
which energy sources will prove to be
dominant by the middle of the next
century. Governments should indeed
go ahead with major development of
solar and other renewable energy
sources. But at a minimum, govern-
ments would be unwise to deprive
themselves of the nuclear option dur-
ing the early part of the century when
the transition from oil and gas is likely
to occur. A rapid transition to renew-
ables is likely to be costly and to in-
volve unforeseen problems. A judi-
cious energy policy, like any major
social policy, should have flexibility
and redundancy to protect against fail-
ures. On this basis, nuclear energy has
a major role to play in relation to the
longrun problem in the United States
even if solar optimism proves to be
justified. This is even more true for
other countries with less access to fos-
sil fuel resources to help buffer the
transition to renewable energy tech-
nologies.
The major solutions to this third
energy security problem are appro-
priate price movements and techno-
logical development including both re-
newables and nuclear. One danger is
that the political constraints and debate
in our democracies may deprive
societies of the margin of energy se-
curity that the existence of the nuclear
option provides. If governments wish
to maintain that option, they must
show their publics that they are able to
cope effectively with three key ques-
tions: safe siting, long-term waste
management, and nonproliferation.
Nuclear Energy and
Nonproliferation
The connection between nuclear
proliferation and peaceful uses of nu-
clear energy is an ambiguous one.
Nevertheless, it exists, and defenders
of nuclear energy have done their
cause a disservice by trying to pretend
there is no relationship. The proper
way to put the point is to demonstrate
that steps can be taken to maintain or
even increase the separation between
peaceful uses of nuclear energy and
military uses.
Indeed, public perception of erosion
of that distance after the Indian explo-
sion contributed to the dissension over
nuclear energy policy that has grown
in several of the Western democracies
since 1974. The position of the Cana-
dian Government on more stringent
safeguards and the history of the U.S.
legislation of 1978 bear the marks of
public opinion during this period.
Four years ago India exploded a nu-
clear device made from plutonium
produced in an unsafeguarded reactor
intended for "peaceful" purposes and
then separated in a chemical reproc-
essing plant. At the same time a
number of other countries, with little
or no commercial need for reprocess-
ing facilities, were making efforts to
acquire such plants. Some of these
countries were located in areas of in-
ternational tension or appeared to be
reacting to parallel plans of their tra-
ditional rivals.
These developments were acutely
worrisome. For while reprocessing
obviously can serve legitimate ends,
it is also the step that changes spent
reactor fuel into weapons-usable ma-
terial. And the acquisition of such
material is, for nuclear-weapon aspi-
rants, a politically and technically
critical step.
In 1976 no commercial reprocess-
ing facility for light water reactor
(LWR) fuel was operating anywhere
in the world, but several were under
construction. Other facilities had been
operated earlier but they had all ex-
perienced difficulties. Nonetheless, it
was the general assumption that all
nations would proceed with the recy-
cle of plutonium in light water reac-
tors. On that basis, an International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) study
predicted that 46 countries would
have reprocessing needs by 1990.
The consequences of proceeding in
this way would have involved a pro-
liferation of facilities that produce
plutonium in weapons-usable form,
the creation of large stocks of
plutonium, its transport to fuel fabri-
cation facilities, and its presence at
such facilities pending its incorpora-
tion into fuel rods. The mixed oxide
fuel itself would contain more readily
recoverable plutonium than that in
spent LWR fuel. While this dramatic
increase in the accessibility of
weapons-usable material would not
necessarily lead to its misuse, it could
both facilitate the acquisition of nu-
clear weapons by a country that de-
cided to acquire them and increase
uncertainty about the intentions of
neighboring countries. It would also
greatly increase the opportunity for
theft or seizure of weapons-usable
materials by terrorists or other subna-
tional groups. Multiplied by 46 re-
processing nations (or even a fraction
of that number) this situation would
pose a major threat to global stability.
Ironically, in the case of recycle in
light water reactors, these prolifera-
tion security risks would be incurred
for only marginal economic or fuel
security benefits. It was against this
background that both the Ford Ad-
ministration and the Carter Adminis-
tration reached substantially the same
conclusions about the need to proceed
more cautiously by deferring com-
mercial reprocessing.
U.S. Nuclear Energy Strategy
President Carter's April 1977 deci-
sions about deferring the commer-
cialization of plutonium focused
primarily on the domestic choices he
then faced. In essence, the Carter
Administration balanced energy secu-
rity and military security by choosing
a middle path in domestic energy
policy. That middle path avoids
energy solutions that count prema-
turely on either windmills or
plutonium. It does include a signifi-
cant role for nuclear energy. As the
President said in March 1978: "Our
current once-through fuel cycle is and
will continue to be a significant con-
tributor to our energy supply. Prop-
erly managed, it can function without
increasing the risks of proliferation.
Our policy takes a responsible course
between forgoing the energy benefits
40
of nuclear power and becoming com-
mitted to commercialized use of
plutonium before we know that we
can deal safely with its risks. "
The United States is investing
heavily both in solar energy and in
breeder reactor research and de-
velopment as candidates, together
with other applications, for the
long-term follow-on to oil and gas. In
the meantime, both coal and light
water reactors will play important
roles. Even with conservative esti-
mates of 2.4 million short tons of
proven and probable uranium (U.-tOs)
reserves under $50/pound forward
cost, and midrange nuclear growth
assumption to 320 GWe [gigawatt] by
the year 2000, the United States has
adequate resources for the lifetimes of
all light water reactors to be installed
into the next century.
At the same time, the United States
is aware that other countries without
coal and uranium reserves feel less
secure about their ability to manage
the longrun transition from oil to gas.
This sense of energy insecurity has
led them to project a greater reliance
on the use of plutonium. At first
glance, decisions about the commer-
cialization of plutonium appear to be
purely domestic energy strategy
choices. But nuclear energy has a
transnational dimension. Domestic
choice can impose costs on other na-
tions. Plutonium separated in one
place can pose a threat to the security
of all nations.
Conversely, deferral or commer-
cialization of plutonium can put pres-
sure on world uranium supply and the
prices other nations pay. It was a rec-
ognition of this interdependence of
domestic energy strategies that led
President Carter to call for a cooper-
ative international study of ways to
design and manage the nuclear fuel
cycle that would reconcile energy se-
curity and military security concerns.
Forty countries and four international
organizations are now participating in
the resulting International Nuclear
Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE).
The Uranium Issue
INFCE deals with a number of as-
pects of making the whole fuel cycle
safer. The key question of uranium
supply is the subject of a working
group in INFCE. Nonetheless we
cannot expect to have definitive an-
swers to the question of the extent of
global uranium resources within 2
years. How then, should we handle
this problem?
First, we must understand the lim-
itations of all estimates. Estimates of
U.S. domestic reserves, uranium de-
posits which have been delineated by
drilling, are made by the Department
of Energy from data voluntarily re-
ported by the uranium industry and
are relatively uncontroversial. How-
ever, there are several methods of es-
timating potential resources, ranging
from extrapolating trends in discovery
rates to making assumptions about
Department of State Bulletin
its continue to be discovered; exam-
ples are Jabiluka, Australia, (with
more than 250.000 tons uranium) and
the rich "unconformity-related" de-
posits in Canada. While it is possible
that continent-wide geological proc-
esses have segregated types of depos-
its in such an extreme fashion, it
seems likely that the emphasis on a
particular type of formation in a given
Nuclear energy is truly a transnational policy issue. . . . Those
who bet now on the breeder [reactor] and those who bet for now on
adequate uranium availability and improved technology must each
make serious efforts to meet the security concern on the other side.
geological abundance and underlying
distributions of grade. The most com-
prehensive and detailed projections
are made by the Department of
Energy using geologic and reserve
information to extrapolate by analogy
into unexplored areas.
The data on which projections are
based have been affected by the his-
tory of uranium exploration and
discovery. Until the late 1960's,
exploration and resource development
efforts worldwide were made largely
in response to the requirements of
governments for weapons material.
Prices were set at levels which jus-
tified exploration and exploitation
only of deposits with high yields of
U.sOh. An expectation of rapid growth
in commercial nuclear power stimu-
lated a great deal of activity in the
late 1960's; the subsequent slow
growth of nuclear power left the U.S.
domestic industry in a depressed state
until about 1974, with excess produc-
tion capacity and little incentive to
explore for or develop reserves. Since
1974 the world industry has been very
vigorous; however, lag times in re-
porting and analysis mean that current
projections do not fully reflect the
intensive exploration activity of the
last few years. The result of this his-
tory is a less than adequate data base
on which to plan long-term nuclear
programs.
Geological understanding of
uranium occurrence is also far from
complete. More than other metals,
uranium is relatively mobile and is
found in a variety of geologic set-
tings. In the United States, about
90% of discovered resources are in
sandstones. Outside the United
States, Russia, and China, nearly 90%
are in nonsandstone formations. New
environments with high-grade depos-
country is at least partly the result of
a narrow geological focus inspired by
success. This suggests that existing
projections of uranium resources are
likely to be low.
Worldwide, the most recent esti-
mates of the Nuclear Energy Agency
and the International Atomic Energy
Energy Agency (December 1977) are
for 2.8 million short tons U3O8 rea-
sonably assured and 2.7 million tons
estimated additional resources (below
$50/pound U3O8). Uncertainties, and
possible conservatism in estimates,
are clearly greater for foreign projec-
tions than in U.S. projections. It
should also be noted that higher cost
uranium may also be relevant in many
circumstances yet is not included in
these projections.
The interesting policy question is
where the differences in resources es-
timates begin to matter. Cumulative
world consumption, and even com-
mitments, by the year 2000 would be
well within the conservative uranium
estimates. For the "present trend"
scenario of the Nuclear Energy
Agency (1000 GWe at the end of the
century worldwide) consumption stays
within the reasonably assured cate-
gory while the related commitments
(less than 5.5 million tons) stay
within the estimated additional cate-
gory. These figures mean that con-
cerns about the physical existence of
resources are not the critical limits for
present policy decisions. Instead, re-
liable access should be the predomi-
nant concern. If exploration and
evaluation continue to expand re-
source horizons, increase the sources
of supply, and broaden the market, it
means that we can concentrate on
measures such as national and mul-
tilateral stockpiles which may prove
October 1978
to be both the safest and most eco-
nomic way to address the allocation
problem.
New Technology
Another factor to consider is new
technology. During the next 10 years,
advances in once-through fuel tech-
nology could lead to uranium savings
of at least 15% for the once-through
LWR fuel cycle. These benefits, as-
sociated with extending burnup, are
particularly attractive in the near
term. In the 1990's it may be possible
to demonstrate the potential for in-
creasing the savings an additional
10-15%. if the necessary develop-
ment programs are successfully com-
pleted.
Uranium resource requirements can
also be reduced by extracting more of
the fissile U-235 content from natural
uranium. The United States has for
some time conducted an advanced
isotope separation technology pro-
gram, which is still in the early stages
of development. It is aimed at de-
veloping an economically feasible
technology for production of natural
assay uranium recovered from the
tails of current enrichment processes.
[Ilf this technology is successfully de-
veloped, then it will be possible, in
the 1990's. to reduce the U-235 tails
[assay from the value of 0.20 to 0.05,
thus reducing uranium requirements
| by almost 20%.
Although the prospects of success-
ful development and implementation
II of advanced isotopic separation proc-
esses and some of the long-term ad-
vances in reactor technology are not
(certain at this time, it appears that if
both of these programs are success-
fully carried out and implemented, it
may be possible to achieve uranium
[savings on the order of 45% in plants
[starting up by the year 2000. These
Itechnological advances may well be-
Icome available prior to the time at
Iwhich present high confidence, low
cost uranium resources begin to be-
come uncertain.
Uranium and the Role of Plutonium
U.S. policy is based on these con-
siderations and the need to keep
perspective in balancing energy and
military security problems. Plutonium
does not provide a solution to the
short and midterm energy security
problems, while its dispersal and
utilization before the international
system has learned how to cope with
it threatens to add to the world's se-
curity burden. Other technologies on
the other hand do not now commit us
to political problems we don't know
how to deal with. For these reasons,
the U.S. Government has opposed
plutonium recycle in thermal reactors,
which offers only marginal (if any)
economic or energy security benefit.
Diminished dependence on uranium
imports can be accomplished more
economically and safely through
modest national stockpile programs.
At the same time, we have not op-
posed breeder reactor research and
development programs because of the
greater range of uncertainty sur-
rounding estimates of their energy
costs and benefits. A key element in
this evaluation is the question of
probable uranium resources. And
since no one knows the answer to that
question with certainty, we must be
sure that we weigh the risks of being
wrong from both the energy and the
military security point of view.
Essentially, nations are making
energy and economic security bets
about the availability of uranium and
its likely price on the one hand versus
the capital costs of the breeder reactor
on the other. There are large uncer-
tainties in the breeder capital costs
and fuel cycle costs. If we consider
the range of these estimates, we see
that the lower priced breeder would
compete with present light water
reactors using uranium oxide priced at
about $60/pound; while the more ex-
pensive breeder would compete with
uranium oxide priced at about $200/
pound. The improved light water
reactor would compete at even higher
uranium prices. We do not know now
what the competitive costs will be.
but it does raise the following ques-
tions. Will the capital costs of the
breeder escalate as has occurred with
many high technology projects during
the commercialization process? Will
uranium reserves be exhausted and
prices increase rapidly? Or will more
resources be found as higher prices
stimulate further drilling?
No one can answer these questions
with certainty. Yet given long lead
times in high technology research and
development projects, decisions must
be made before all the facts are
known. In order to maximize our area
of common interest, we should strive
for a situation in which nations can
place different long-term energy bets
without jeopardizing each other's se-
curity interests. We ask those who bet
on breeders to include security costs
which they impose on others, par-
ticularly safe fuel cycles, in their
economic calculations. At the same
time, they can rightly ask us for
greater assurance on fuel supplies,
and we are presently exploring bilat-
41
eral and multilateral fuel assurance
options. Then each nation can bet as
it wishes on the economics of the
breeder without imposing the political
costs of its actions on others.
We ask those who choose to go
ahead now with the breeder to include
the following factors in their de-
cisionmaking process.
• Avoidance of the temptation to
reduce per unit capital costs by pre-
mature exports — the commercializa-
tion of the breeder (and reprocessing)
should be limited to situations where
it has compelling advantages.
Economies of scale arguments dictate
that only the largest nuclear programs
could satisfy such a condition for
commercialization .
• Fuel cycle facilities should be
designed to make their misuse dif-
ficult and time consuming, even
though such design, as in the case of
hot fuel fabrication, may involve ad-
ditional cost.
• Efforts should be made to
minimize flows of cold plutonium or
fuels with high concentrations of fis-
sionable materials even if this adds to
transport costs.
• Multinational institutional ar-
rangements should be utilized where
there are compelling reasons to pro-
ceed with new technology. While
such arrangements could produce
benefits in economic efficiency, such
steps would be desirable even if they
led to a net cost.
Measures that would make these
sorts of compromises possible are
currently under discussion in the
INFCE. Certainly the way the United
States will respond to requests for
transfers for reprocessing of U.S. ori-
gin spent fuel will depend on the ex-
tent to which other countries have
made serious efforts to recognize and
take proliferation concerns into ac-
count. At the same time, we are ready
to take their energy security concerns
into account.
Prospects For Stability
After INFCE
The United States sees INFCE as a
cooperative international effort to
evaluate the role of nuclear power
technology in an international context
and help develop an objective ap-
preciation of the nonproliferation,
economic, and other implications of
different fuel cycle approaches.
INFCE provides a 2-year period in
which nations can re-examine as-
sumptions and find ways to reconcile
their overlapping but somewhat dif-
ferent emphasis on the use of nuclear
42
energy. While INFCE has a technical
cast, it is part of the political process
of laying a basis for a stable interna-
tional regime to govern nuclear
energy through the end of the cen-
tury.
A stable international regime
should build upon and reinforce the
previous accomplishments of the
Atoms for Peace program, the IAEA,
and the Nonproliferation Treaty. Even
if all new institutions are not under
the jurisdiction of the IAEA, they
should be consistent with it. and help
to reinforce the safeguards system
that has separated peaceful and mili-
tary uses of nuclear energy in the
past. The IAEA should be envisaged
as the center of the institutional sys-
tem.
A stable regime should be designed
to minimize the global distribution of
weapons-usable materials and vulner-
able points in the fuel cycle, while
adequately meeting the energy secu-
rity needs of all countries. One can
visualize five basic norms for a
strengthened international regime:
full-scope safeguards, avoidance of
unnecessarily sensitive facilities, use
of diversion resistant technologies,
joint control of sensitive facilities,
and institutions to insure the avail-
ability of the benefits of nuclear
energy.
The first norm — fuel-scope
safeguards — is basic to the existing
international regime that we are try-
ing to reinforce. It is increasingly ac-
cepted that full-scope safeguards pro-
vide a credible assurance of peaceful
intent, without interference with re-
search or power programs.
The second norm says countries
should avoid sensitive facilities that
involve weapons-usable materials
unless they can be shown to be eco-
nomically necessary. While allowing
a range of interpretation, this norm
rules out certain activities when they
are clearly economically indefensible.
This does not reserve sensitive
facilities only to existing sites, but it
does emphasize the shared interest of
members of the international commu-
nity in minimizing the vulnerable
points in the global fuel cycle, and
thus reducing the burden upon the
international safeguards system.
The third norm — use of technology
that is as proliferation resistant as
possible or appropriate in a particular
institutional situation — appears to be
attracting support. A number of in-
teresting ideas have been suggested in
the past years. While still too new to
judge fully, such ideas indicate the
value of continuing the search. At the
front end of the fuel cycle, France
has been investigating chemical en-
richment techniques that ideally could
increase the difficulty of producing
weapons-grade material. The propo-
nents of CIVEX reprocessing for a
breeder system have suggested proc-
esses and stipulated a useful set of
criteria for terrorist proofing against
which their technical suggestions can
be judged. These criteria are:
• No pure plutonium in storage;
• No pure plutonium at any inter-
mediate point;
• No way to produce pure
plutonium by simple process adjust-
ment;
• No way to produce pure
plutonium without equipment modifi-
cations;
• No way to carry out equipment
modifications with facilities and com-
ponents normally on site;
• No way to carry out the required
equipment modifications without
plant decontamination or entry into
extremely high radiation fields; and
• Length of time required for suc-
cessful diversion should be such that
adequate time is available for national
and/or international responses.
In the area of research reactors,
both France and the United States are
developing high density fuels that
will provide sufficient neutron flux at
lower levels of enrichment to cover
nearly all experiments for which most
research reactors are used. In short,
developments and explorations in
technology can help to create an en-
vironment for a stable regime, though
it should be remembered that techni-
cal fixes alone do not solve the prob-
lem of proliferation.
The fourth and fifth norms suggest
the need to develop two types of in-
stitutions, both of which are included
in the INFCE terms of reference.
First we need to explore the charac-
teristics of institutions to deal with
the possibilities of effective joint
control. Where sensitive facilities are
economically essential and difficult to
safeguard nationally, we should
examine together forms of multina-
tional ownership and management
which might help to reinforce the ef-
fect of international safeguards. The
political costs of abrogating an ar-
Department of State Bulletii
rangement that involves a number ot
states would be added to the costs of
dismissing IAEA inspectors. Criteria
and procedures can be developed tor
"effective multinationality " which
requires the involvement of a number
of states while inhibiting replication
or dissemination of the sensitive
technology to national facilities.
Finally, we need to develop in-
stitutions to implement the principle
of assurance of benefits. Supply as-
surances, fuel trusts, and international
spent fuel repositories are good
examples. We are already making
progress in discussions of a fuel trust,
and President Carter has announced
willingness to make a substantial
commitment. Essentially this could be
a stockpile of fuel to be released to
countries which have all their
facilities under safeguards, have a
clean safeguards record, and have
chosen not to develop sensitive
facilities on a national basis. By re-
lieving the burden on the world
safeguards system, these actors de-
serve special recognition and help
with their potential energy security
problem. Such a fuel trust need not
be unduly large to accomplish its
purpose of reinforcing the reliability
of the uranium market by reducing
political risks. Complementary bilat-
eral and multilateral assurance meas-
ures can also contribute to this goal.
Conclusion
In the largest sense of security —
both energy and nonproliferation — the
common interests of the nations
utilizing nuclear energy outweigh the
differences that divide them. Nuclear
energy is truly a transnational policy
issue. Domestic and international
policy choices are inextricably in-
tertwined. Those who bet now on the
breeder and those who bet for now on
adequate uranium availability and im-
proved technology must each make
serious efforts to meet the security
concern on the other side. Neither
must try to foreclose what may be the
most important options for all. One
can envisage a reasonable com-
promise over current differences. Se-
curity in its broadest dimension must
prevail over any commercial consid-
eration. On that bedrock it will be
possible to construct a stable regime
for the governance of nuclear energy
while the uncertainties of uranium
supply are left to the market, miners,
and time to resolve. □
October 1978
43
PACIFIC: U.S. Relations
With the Pacific Islands
by Richard C. Holbrooke
Statement before the Subcommittee
on East Asian and Pacific Affairs of
the Senate Committee on Foreign Re-
lations on July 31, 1978. Mr. Hol-
brooke is Assistant Secretary for East
Asian and Pacific Affairs. '
The transition from colonial rule to
independence must inevitably alter the
relationship between the United States
and the South Pacific region. It is this
changed relationship and the decisions
flowing from it that 1 would like to
discuss with you today.
In less than two decades, seven in-
dependent nations have emerged in the
area; your colleague. Senator Glenn,
led our delegation to the celebration of
the independence of the Solomon Is-
lands only a few weeks ago. Self-
government has come to most of the
remaining territories, and there will be
additional independent states within
the next few years. These new states
vary greatly in culture and size; they
range from Papua New Guinea with
almost 3 million people to tiny Tuvalu
with only 8,000 inhabitants.
There is a reservoir of great good
will toward the United States among
the peoples of the South Pacific and
this enhances the prospects for cooper-
ative relations between them and the
United States. It will be to our advan-
tage as well as theirs to foster this
good will. These emerging states will
have a role to play in the United Na-
tions and in other international forums
as well as in Third World councils.
The waters surrounding the islands are
promising sources of fish and other
marine resources. The peoples of the
islands — Micronesians. Melanesians,
and Polynesians — have already en-
riched our culture and benefitted from
our educational and technical assist-
ance; the time is ripe for a more active
interchange.
Evolution of the Islands
During the battles of World War II,
many of the Pacific Islands became
very familiar to Americans in the
Pacific and at home. I was deeply
moved to see relics of that era still
carefully preserved in Honiara. Even
today, American veterans of Guadal-
canal return to the Solomons annually;
a number of them were honored guests
at the independence ceremonies.
In the years after the war the islands
began their development toward self-
government and regional cooperation.
The process has been strikingly
peaceful, carried on in a spirit of
cooperation and accommodation be-
tween the metropolitan powers and
their Pacific territories. It is perhaps
for this reason that the process has at-
tracted less attention than it deserves.
With the evolution of these ter-
ritories proceeding under the auspices
of our ANZUS [Australia. New Zea-
land, United States pact] and NATO
allies, we focused our own attention
on our immediate responsibilities in
Guam, American Samoa, and the
Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands.
Even in those early days, however, we
participated in an important effort to
deal with problems and opportunities
on a regional basis. We were among
the original members of the South
Pacific Commission, organized in
1947 and including among its mem-
bers metropolitan powers, independent
states, and Pacific territories.
In the 1950's and 1960's self-
government became the rule rather
than the exception in the islands.
Since 1962 their progress toward inde-
pendence has proceeded apace. West-
ern Samoa, Nauru, Tonga, Fiji. Papua
New Guinea, and the Solomons have
become independent; the Cooks and
Niue have gained a large measure of
autonomy; Guam and American Samoa
as well as the French territories have
become self-governing; and Micronesia
is expected to become self-governing
within a few years. The British and
French are prepared to grant the New
Hebrides independence within the next
few years. However, French Polynesia
and New Caledonia are likely to re-
main self-governing French territories
for some time. American Samoa,
Guam, and the Northern Marianas
have expressed their desire to remain
self-governing territories of the United
States.
Important changes have also taken
place in South Pacific regional institu-
tions. Once dominated by the met-
ropolitan powers, the South Pacific
Commission has become much more
representative of the islands them-
selves. Each of the island members
now has an equal voice in its deliber-
ations; the Commission's Secretary
General is now normally selected from
among the island members. A new
organization — the South Pacific
Forum, founded in 1972 by the inde-
pendent states of the region — has
become a central force in its orderly
development.
The new states of the South Pacific
were fortunate in achieving their inde-
pendence without the turmoil and
bloodshed that has marked this process
elsewhere. They are fortunate also to
be emerging as members of a broader
Pacific community at a time when
peace prevails in most of the area and
great power competition is muted.
There are, to be sure, signs of
growing Soviet and Chinese interest in
the area. However, at this time the
Soviet side seems to be concerned
largely with advancing their fishing
interests in the region and promoting
their diplomatic standing vis-a-vis our
own and that of the People's Republic
of China. Peking is also interested in
expanding its diplomatic presence in
competition not only with Moscow but
also with Taipei.
The island states for their part, by
virtue of their background, their
democratic institutions, and their eco-
nomic interests, are primarily oriented
toward the West. They look for help
in preserving free institutions and ad-
vancing the welfare of their peoples to
Australia and New Zealand, to Britain
and France, and to the United States.
U.S. Interests
Our own interest in the region is
inescapable. It is part of a Pacific
community to which we are tied by
geography and history as well as by
growing economic interest. A stable,
economically healthy South Pacific
contributes not only to the peace and
well-being of American territories in
the region but also to the broader
interests of the United States.
We do not need to develop massive
programs for the South Pacific; this
would be contrary to the interests of
the islands and our own. Nor should
we seek a dominant role as initiator,
helper, and guide. We do not wish in
any way to impinge upon the
sovereignty of these free peoples or to
usurp the leadership role that belongs
to them and to their near neighbors,
Australia and New Zealand.
The basic pillars of our policy in-
clude:
• Understanding and sympathy for
the political and economic aspirations
of the South Pacific peoples;
• Support for South Pacific regional
cooperation;
• Particularly close and cooperative
44
ties with Australia and New Zealand;
and
• Continued cooperation with
France and the United Kingdom in
support of the progress of the South
Pacific peoples.
In implementing these principles,
we will take into account the changes
that have occurred in the last decade
as well as the importance of insuring
that the evolution of the region con-
tinues along peaceful and productive
lines. Thus over the next few years,
we will be giving particular attention
to:
• Establishing a larger and more
effective U.S. presence in the region;
• Participating actively in South
Pacific regional organizations;
• Adapting existing programs and
devising new ones to fit the unique
needs of the developing island states;
• Improving coordination among
American and multilateral programs;
and
• Pursuing the Micronesian status
negotiations with the goal of achieving
a free association agreement between
the United States and Micronesia and
termination of the trusteeship by 1 98 1 .
Increasing Contacts
To bring us into closer contact with
the independent Pacific island states,
we are increasing our diplomatic rep-
resentation in the region. We use mul-
tiple accreditation of ambassadors to
cover this wide region and we are
urging the island states to do the same
to insure that they have accredited
ambassadors to the United States. We
are taking a fresh look at our repre-
sentation in the South Pacific to see if
we are making the best use of our
limited resources. We will also con-
sider whether we should open a dip-
lomatic post elsewhere in the region.
A resident Ambassador, John Con-
don, has been accredited to Fiji. Pub-
lic affairs, administrative, and regional
development officers have been added
to the staff. President Carter has
nominated our Ambassador to Papua
New Guinea, Mary Olmsted, to serve
also as Ambassador to the newly inde-
pendent Solomon Islands. Our Ambas-
sador to New Zealand, Armistead Sel-
den, is concurrently accredited to the
Kingdom of Tonga and to Western
Samoa. The International Communi-
cation Agency will expand its public
affairs and cultural affairs programs.
In time, we may ask your support in
building on this modest beginning with
additional posts.
In Washington many parts of the
government are more actively in con-
tact with the South Pacific region than
ever before in connection with
fisheries and other interests. In my
own bureau I have appointed a new
Deputy Assistant Secretary, with spe-
cial responsibilities for the South
Pacific, and have established a new
office which will focus solely on the
affairs of the South and Southwest
Pacific. My new deputy, Evelyn Col-
bert, will bring long experience in
East Asian affairs to the task of in-
tegrating our South Pacific policy into
our broader Pacific-wide interests. The
Director of the new Office of Pacific
Island Affairs. William Bodde. has
been deeply involved in the Mi-
cronesian negotiations for the last
year; he will be assisted by a highly
trained Pacific specialist. In the con-
text ot the vast Washington bureauc-
racy, these are hardly earthshaking
moves. But as Senator Glenn can tes-
tify, they were greeted with en-
thusiasm by the Pacific island leaders
we met during our recent visit to the
area.
We will also be promoting more
contacts between Pacific Islanders and
Americans both to demonstrate our
own interest and to learn more about
their interests and problems. Ship vis-
its are one way of doing this. The
Solomon Islanders were delighted by
the presence of two U.S. Navy fri-
gates, the Holt and the Whipple, at
their independence celebrations; the
Navy is now developing a more exten-
sive program.
Educational exchange is another
way of increasing contacts and en-
hancing understanding as well as pro-
viding necessary training. We are
already carrying on a number of edu-
cational programs related to the South
Pacific and will be expanding and
strengthening some of them.
The federally assisted East-West
Center in Honolulu has encouraged the
study of problems unique to the island
region. The presence of the Prime
Minister of Fiji. Ratu Sir Kamisese
Mara, on the Center "s board of gover-
nors has strengthened its ability to de-
vise such programs. We are assisting
the University of the South Pacific in
Fiji to expand its extension service
which uses a National Aeronautics and
Space Administration satellite to make
it possible for students throughout the
Pacific to take university level courses
while remaining on their home islands.
Through the Fulbright program, we
provide American professors for their
regional universities. We will also be
assisting others to pursue courses of
study in American universities not yet
available at the regional universities.
The Peace Corps has made a par-
Department of State Bulletir
ticularly significant contribution to the
region. There are over 540 volunteers
in Fiji. Tonga, Western Samoa. Mi-
cronesia, the Gilberts, and Tuvalu. In
many of these islands they are the only
Americans present. Their value is sub-
stantial.
As we strengthen our bilateral re-
lationship we are also strengthening
our regional role. For the first time a
U.S. ambassador resident in the
region — our Ambassador to Fiji, John
Condon — will be the senior U.S. rep-
resentative to the South Pacific Com-
mission, bringing to his role in the
Commission the sensitivity to the spe-
cial needs and desires of the island
states that only close acquaintance can
provide. A regional Agency for Inter-
national Development representative
has also been assigned to our embassy
in Suva. In addition to traveling
throughout the region, he will work
closely with the South Pacific Com-
mission and the South Pacific Bureau
for Economic Cooperation to foster an
integrated regional approach to de-
velopment problems. Our role in the
South Pacific Commission cannot fail
to benefit from this closer attention; I
might mention in passing that the U.S.
financial contribution to the Commis-
sion has dropped from 20% of its
operating budget to 17% because of
the increased contributions by the is-
land members.
An example of increased U.S. in-
volvement in South Pacific regional
organizations is our participation in
negotiations to establish a South
Pacific Regional Fisheries Organiza-
tion. Meeting in Suva last November
and again in May of this year, we
joined the island nations as well as
France, the United Kingdom, their de-
pendent territories, and Chile in pre-
paring a draft treaty on this subject.
The organization will be concerned
with the management and conservation
of marine resources — currently the
most highly charged political and eco-
nomic issue in the South Pacific. Par-
ticipation offers the United States an
opportunity to cooperate with the is-
land states and territories in mutually
beneficial development of fishing re-
sources of the area.
In the same vein, we have also
made a special contribution of
$300,000 to a new South Pacific
Commission project designed to assess
the skipjack tuna resources of the
western Pacific.
We are also working closely with
such international organizations as the
United Nations Development Program
and the Asian Development Bank to
coordinate and strengthen programs for
the region. For example, we are look-
October 1978
45
WORLD POPULATION:
THE SILENT EXPLOSION— PART 1
The tremendous growth of world population since World War II has come to
be recognized as a critically important problem threatening in the most funda-
mental way the well-being of mankind.
This three-part series addresses the central issues of the population explosion
and what can be done about it. Because population growth is far greater in the
developing world than in the developed world, the series relates largely to the
former. On the other hand, all nations face varying types of population problems,
the United States being no exception, as brought out in the Rockefeller Commis-
sion report. Population and the American Future, in 1972. Most importantly, we
are one world. Adverse consequences of excessive population growth in one
country ultimately affect all.
Prepared by Ambassador Marshall Green, the Department of State's Coor-
dinator of Population Affairs, and Robert A. Fearey, Special Assistant to
Ambassador Green, this series is an effort to assist in understanding this
long-range, but also highly urgent, problem and to indicate what recent experi-
ence suggests are the most promising lines of attack on it. The presentation draws
on recent U.S. Government and other sources, but some of the opinions ex-
pressed are the authors' and do not necessarily reflect government policy.
Demographic assistance has been provided by Mrs. Lydia K. Giffler, the State
Department's demographer, and by the International Demographic Data Center,
Population Division, Bureau of the Census.
Due to the widely varying accuracy and recency of national population data,
the figures cited are sometimes only approximations. They, nevertheless, are
considered sufficiently accurate to support the conclusions presented.
This series is being presented in three parts. Part I centers on the facts of the
world population problem. Part 2, to be published in the November Bulletin,
will examine the consequences of excessive population growth and what is now
being done to reduce such growth. And part 3. in the December Bulletin, will
focus on how world population control efforts may be rendered more effective.
BASIC FACTS
World Population Growth
It took from mankind's earliest be-
ginnings over a million years ago to the
early 1800's for the world to reach a
population of 1 billion.
Succeeding decades saw a substan-
tial decline in death rates as increasing
agricultural and industrial productivity
brought rising living standards, as
public sanitation improved, as scien-
tific medicine developed and became
increasingly available (notably
smallpox vaccination), and as better
ing into ways in which the Asian De-
velopment Bank might adjust its
lending procedures to meet the unique
requirements of the island states.
To sum up, we see the orderly de-
velopment of the South Pacific region
as a contribution to the stability of the
broader Pacific community. Our joint
efforts there are still another way in
which we strengthen our historic ties
with our ANZUS allies and work to-
gether for our mutual interests. The
good will and friendship of the South
Pacific states are important to U.S.
policy objectives in the United Nations
and elsewhere.
Our historic bonds to the region
forged in the dark days of World War
II provide us with a large fund of good
will on which to build. The experience
of our own states and territories in the
Pacific and the talents and interests of
their peoples provide an additional im-
portant resource. Great amounts of
money or time are not required. We
need only be sympathetic to the aspi-
rations of the South Pacific peoples
and true to our ideals. It is the inten-
tion of the Department of State with
the help of the U.S. Congress to carry
out the policy I have outlined to you
today. □
communications and transport per-
mitted more effective action against
famine. The world reached its second
billion in about 100 years, by 1930.
With accelerated advances in
medicine, including the discovery and
widespread use of antibiotics, with
malaria control programs in effect in
many areas of the world, and with fur-
ther improvements in the production
and distribution of food, the third bil-
lion was reached in 30 years — 1960.
The fourth billion was added in 15
years, by 1975. It had taken only 45
years for world population to double
again, from 2 to 4 billion.
Until the early 1960's, governments
either evidenced little concern over
population growth or such growth was
welcomed as a reflection of economic
vigor and as a source of military
strength. This traditional perception
gradually altered through the 1960's as
many developing, low-income coun-
tries experienced marked increases in
the rate of population growth, in
population size, and in the flow of
surplus rural population to the cities.
Many governments recognized that
rapid population growth frustrated and
negated economic and social develop-
ment, and they began to formulate
policies and programs to reduce high
fertility levels. These programs have
been reinforced by funding and techni-
cal assistance from the United Nations,
aid donor governments, and private
sources.
The rate of world population growth
is believed to have peaked at about 2%
around 1970, declining to about
1.8-1.9% by 1977. At this rate— which
is expected to continue to fall but at an
unknown pace — world resources and
national economies are called upon to
support nearly 80 million additional
persons every year. Barring widespread
famine, nuclear holocaust, or other
disaster, world population is expected
'The complete transcript of the hearings
will be published by the committee and will be
available from the Superintendent of Docu-
ments, U.S. Government Printing Office.
Washington, D.C. 20402.
Single copies of reprints of
this three-part series, entitled
"World Population: The Silent
Explosion," are available from
the Correspondence Managment
Divison, Bureau of Public Af-
fairs, Department of State,
Washington, D.C. 20520.
46
Department of State Bulletin
to number about 6 billion by the year
2000.
The level at which mankind's total
number ultimately will peak appears to
lie between 8 and 1 1 billion, depending
on the determination and skill with
which the world addresses the problem.
With the ecosystems of the world al-
ready heavily burdened at 4 billion,
there is urgent need for nations, espe-
cially those with high population
growth rates, to deal with this problem
more effectively.
Charts 1 and 2 present graphically
the slow historical, and rapid and ac-
celerating current and prospective,
growth of world population. Chart 1
shows world population reaching 5.8
billion in 2000 under the U.N.'s low
projection variant, which assumes a
one-third decline in fertility, on the
average, between 1970 and the end of
the century. Under the less optimistic
U.N. medium projection variant, which
assumes a fertility decline of only 24%
during this period, world population is
shown as reaching 6.25 billion in 2000.
The U.N.'s high variant, projecting a
population of 6.6 billion by 2000, is
not shown because declines which have
occurred since the mid- 1 960 's in the
birth rates of some 30 developing
countries, including China, suggest
that that variant is no longer a real
possibility.
Chart 2 shows a breakdown of the
2000 medium variant figure by de-
veloped and developing regions. With
both regions drawn to the same scale,
the chart brings out strikingly the far
greater present and. even more, future
total population of the current de-
veloping regions than of the current
developed regions; the small antici-
pated growth of the developed world's
population between 1975 and 2000; the
tremendous expansion of the develop-
ing world's population in that period;
and the great preponderance of
younger, presently or prospectively
fertile, age groups in the developing
world's population now and, even
more, in 2000.
Geographic Distribution
How will mankind's growing num-
bers be distributed in the year 2000?
The share of people in developing
countries, many least able to support
larger populations, will continue to rise
in the remainder of this century — from
66% in 1950 to 78% in 2000, accord-
ing to the U.N. medium projection
variant. The table below and chart 3
present the prospect numerically and
graphically.
The table shows little change be-
Annual Av.
Share of
Growth Rate (%)
Population (%)
1950-
1970-
1995-
55*
75**
00**
1950*
1970*
2000**
World total
1.7
1.9
1.6
100.0
100.0
100.0
Developed regions
1.3
0.9
0.6
34.3
30.0
21.7
Developing regions
1.9
2.3
1.9
65.7
700
78.3
Northern America
1.8
0.9
0.7
6.6
6.3
4.7
Europe
0.8
0.6
0.5
15.7
12.7
8.6
USSR.
1.7
1.0
0.7
7.2
6.7
5.0
Africa
2.1
2.6
2.8
8.7
9.7
13.0
Latin America
2.7
2.7
2.4
66
7.8
9.9
China
1.6
1.7
1.0
22.3
21.4
18.4
India
1.7
2.4
1.8
14.1
15.0
16.9
Other Asia
1.9
2.4
2.0
18.3
19.8
22.9
Oceania
2.25
2.0
1.45
0.5
0.5
0.5
*Estimated
"Projected
tween the 1950-55 and 1995-2000
population growth rates for some de-
veloping regions. But the figures fail to
bring out the anticipated major declines
in the birth and death rates making up
(along with migration) the overall
growth rates. The 1.9% growth rate for
the developing regions as a whole for
1950-55 consists of a birth rate of 42
and a death rate of 23 per 1 ,000 popu-
lation. The 1.9% growth rate for
1995-2000. on the other hand, projects
a birth rate of 28 and a death rate of 9
per 1,000 population. This projection
assumes a continued trend toward the
modernization (i.e., reduction) of birth
and death rates in the developing re-
gions.
Chart 1
The Growth of World Population Since the
Beginning of the Industrial Era
Billio
Pe
ns of
Dple
Years to
Add
Each Billion
/
//
//
//
Medium Projection Variant, ffl
-6.0
-5.0
I (See Note
[Below)
il2-14
Yielding 6.25 Billion in 2000 //
Low Projection Variant, 1975f /
Yielding 5.8 Billion in 2000 / /
/1989
-4.0
>15
196o/
-3.0
1930/
-2.0
-1.0
>30
>Over 100
i i i i i
I From the
| Beginning
1750 1800 1850 1900 1950 20
Year
00
Note: The number of years it will take to add the fifth and subsequent billions will depend
primarily on the pace of fertility declines, and to a lesser extent mortality trends, in LDC's.
Source: Based on UN. estimates and projections, as assessed in 1973.
October 1978
47
Chart 2
Population by Age and Sex (1975 and 2000)
Developed Regions
1975 — 1.1 billion
2000 — 1 .3 billion
Age/
75+
Male
I — I — I — I — I — I — I — I — I — I 1 — I — i — I — r
Female
I I Population in 1975
■MM Increase I 975 to 2000
"1 \~ I I I I I I I I I I I I — I 1
320 280 240 200 160 120 80 40 40 80 120 160 200 240 280 320
Millions
Developing Regions
1 975 — 3.0 billion
2000 — 5.0 billion
^%C
75+
320 280 240 200 160 120 80 40 40 80 120 160 200 240 280 320
Millions
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census. The data projected for the year 2000 represent the Bureau's medium variant.
Age Composition
Chart 4 illustrates that developed
countries (e.g., Sweden) have many
imore people of labor-force age (15-64)
than they have children less than 15
wears old. In developing countries
«e.g., Pakistan), the age-sex pyramid is
imuch broader at the base, and the
proportion of dependent children (less
Ithan 15 years old) usually runs between
40% and 45% of the total population,
compared with 25% in the developed
countries (1975 estimate). Put another
iway, there is only about one adult of
working age for each child under 15 in
the developing world compared with
nearly three adults of working age per
child under 15 in the developed coun-
tries.
There are three major disadvantages
to the heavily youth-oriented age dis-
tribution of most developing countries.
children relative to the size of the labor
force increases the burden of child de-
pendency, promotes spending for im-
mediate consumption, restricts private
and public saving, and inhibits invest-
ment.
• When the excessive number of
children reach working age, they
swamp the rural and urban labor mar-
kets. Large numbers of unemployed
and underemployed are both econom-
ically wasteful and a potential source
of social and political instability.
• The cohort of young men and
women entering the years of fertility is
much larger — perhaps by three
times — than the number of older people
growing out of the age of fertility. This
is a key factor underlying the high rate
of population growth in the developing
countries and is certain to accentuate
overpopulation problems in the decades
ahead.
The large number of dependent The chart also brings out the greater
old-age (65 + ) dependency burden
borne by the developed than by the
developing countries. However, the
developed countries were able to build
their economies, partly through the
contributions of the now elderly, be-
fore this burden became major. The
problems it presents are arousing in-
creasing concern in the developed
countries but are less critical than those
imposed on the developing countries by
their heavily youth-biased age struc-
tures.
The Momentum Factor
Even if it were possible to attain in
the next few decades an average level
of fertility worldwide which would
merely replace the parental generation
(i.e., a net reproduction rate —
NRR — of 1, implying an average of
2.1-2.5 children per woman, depend-
ing on mortality conditions), popula-
48
Department of State Bulletin
Chart 3
The Population Explosion
Where the People Are Likely to be in the Year 2000
Early 1800's
Year
1900 1930
1960
1975 1990 2000
Its effects are, and will be, greater in
countries of Asia, Africa, and
Latin America
Population, by Region (millions)
1970
2000
Percent Growth
1970-2000
Northern America
226
296
31
Latin America
283
620
119
Europe
459
540
18
Africa
352
814
131
USSR
243
315
30
India
543
1,059
95
China
772
1,148
49
Other Asia and
Oceania
732
1,463
100
Northern
America
Latin
America
Europe
Africa
U.S.S.R.
India
China
Other Asia
& Oceania
1.0
1.65
2.0
Billions
3.0 4.0* 5,3* 6.25*
UN medium projection variant
October 1978
49
tion would continue to grow for some
50-70 years thereafter. The size of the
eventually stabilized (nongrowing)
population would be far larger than at
the time fertility dropped to replace-
ment level.
The projections noted in the box
(p. 50) are not intended to predict the
actual course of world population
growth but only to illustrate the
enormous potential for growth built
into the current youthful age structure
of much of the world's population.
For every decade of delay in achiev-
ing an NRR of 1 — replacement
level — the world's peak population
will be some 15% greater (chart 5).
It is conceivable that at some future
point average family size in particular
countries or regions, or in the world
as a whole, may be less than two
children (i.e., that fertility may
stabilize at a level below replacement
of the parental generation). This
would, of course, speed up the cessa-
tion of growth and bring stabilization
at a smaller absolute size. A sustained
fertility level below replacement
would eventually lead to a decline in
the absolute size of a population. This
is not an objective of any govern-
ment's current population policy, but
this situation may change.
Chart 6 illustrates the awesome
potential for population growth in a
specific developing country — Mexico.
In 1970 Mexicans numbered 51
million. Of this number, 46% were
under 15 years of age and 65% were
under 25 years. The NRR was esti-
mated to be 2.7 female births per
woman. Under assumptions of linear
fertility decline, leveling off at re-
placement level, Mexico's population
would reach the following levels.
• If replacement-level fertility is
reached by 2000-05, the population
will stop growing at about 174 mil-
ilion, or 3.4 times its 1970 size.
• If replacement-level fertility is
reached by 2020-25, the population
will stop growing at about 269 mil-
lion, or 5.3 times its 1970 size.
These figures should be modified
by net emigration of undetermined
magnitude, a large proportion to the
United States.
Mexico's demographic situation is
typical of dozens of developing
countries where, even under optimis-
tic assumptions of fertility decline,
the momentum of growth is bound to
double or triple present population
.levels.
In 1972 the Mexican Government
initiated a family planning program.
By the end of 1977, the birth rate was
believed to have declined to below 40
Burden of Dependency
The Burden of Child Dependency Weighs Heavily on LDCs
Chart 4
Pakistan
Male
Age
~|75+
70-7'
65-6
j60-e
1
9
4
59
Female
55-
50-54
45-49
40-44
35-39
30-34
25-29
20-24
15-19
10-14
5-9
0-4
1 l
10987654 32 1 1 2345678910
Percent
The Burden of Retirement-age Dependency is Heavier in DCs
Age
male
Sweden
75+
70-74
65-69
60-64
55-59
50-54
Male
45-49
Fe
40-44
35-39
30-34
25-29
20-24
15-19
10-14
5-9
0-4
Source: Basec
1 on U.I
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
54321012345
Percent
vl. data for 1975
50
If the world attained
World population would And world population
an NRR of 1 in*
then stand at could be expected
eventually to
stabilize at
1980-85
4.2 billion (1980) 6.4 billion
2000-05
5.9 billion (2000) 8.4 billion
2020-25
8.4 billion (2020) 11.2 billion
2040-45
12.0 billion (2040) 15.2 billion
*The decline in fertility
is assumed to begin in all cases with the 1965-70 level. Thus, an
NRR of 1 by 2000-05, foi
example, implies a gradual reduction of fertility over a 35-year
period.
Note: These projections were developed by Tomas Frejka of the Population Council
per 1,000 population. President Lopez
Portillo has recently indicated a na-
tional goal of reducing the rate of
growth to 2.5% by the end of his
term in office in 1982 and to 1% by
the year 2000.
International Migration
In past centuries, millions of
people suffering poverty, religious
intolerance, or other hardships have
emigrated to other countries. From
the mid- 17th century to the cutbreak
of World War II, more than 60 mil-
lion Europeans, according to one es-
timate, emigrated overseas, mostly to
the Americas. The United States
alone absorbed some 33 million
European immigrants between 1820
and 1940.
In the years since World War II,
added millions have moved across
national boundaries under a variety of
economic and political circumstances.
In addition to the traditional inter-
continental movements — mostly to the
United States, Canada, and
Australia — there have been mass
transfers of populations following the
partitioning of countries (e.g., on the
Indian subcontinent); large-scale re-
patriations of foreign nationals; and
streams of refugees occasioned by
political dislocations, particularly in
Asia, Africa, and Europe.
In the 1960's, labor migration be-
came a growing component of post-
war international movements. This
flow has been primarily directed to
Western Europe; in the 1970's, it
branched out to oil-rich countries. In
1976 foreign workers in Western
Europe — coming largely from south-
ern Europe, north Africa, and
Turkey — numbered some 7.5 million,
accompanied by 5.5 million depend-
ents.
Increased employment opportunities
in the industrialized countries and
liberalized immigration laws in some
of them have resulted in a sharp in-
Department of State Bulletin
there are no reliable estimates of their
number, but they are in the millions.)
Almost two-thirds of the migrants to
northern America, Australia, and
New Zealand came from Latin
America. The largest contingent of
LDC migrants in Western Europe
came from north Africa (Algeria,
Morocco, Tunisia) and Turkey. In
1974 there were 1 million Turks in
the Federal Republic of Germany
alone. LDC immigrants to the United
Kingdom have come largely from the
newly independent countries of the
British Commonwealth.
Social problems frequently arise for
migrant workers and the host coun-
crease in the numbers of migrants tries. Also, foreign labor markets de-
from developing to developed regions pend on the economic vitality of the
receiving countries and cannot be
counted upon to remain open on the
in recent decades. In 1974, according
to U.N. estimates, there were some
9.5 million migrants from less de-
veloped countries (LDC's) in Western
Europe, northern America, Australia,
and New Zealand, a threefold in-
crease over I960. 1 (These figures do
not include illegal migrant workers;
required scale. With the economic
slowdown in Europe beginning in
1973, the demand for migrant work-
ers has fallen. Several countries have
imposed stricter controls on the re-
cruitment of foreign labor; some have
Chart 5
Momentum of World Population Growth
Billions of
Persons
16
Declining Fertility:
Replacement-level Fertility >
15.1 Bit*
14
_ (NRR = 1 .0) Reached in /
- 2020-25 /
12
10
2000-05 /
1980-85 /
^Stabilization Level / . — """"'
/ /
/ /'
/ /
11.2 Bil*
8
6
4
/ /
///'
■ —6.4 Bil*
2
i i i i I i i i i I i i i
i I
1970 2000 2050
2100
Year
Source of Data: Tomas Frejka
October 1978
Chart 6
Momentum of Mexico's Population Growth
Millions of
Persons
450 r
400-
350
300
250-
200
150
100
50
Declining Fertility:
(NRR = 1 .0) Reached in
2040-45
2020-25
2000-05
1980-85
"Stabilization Level
419 Mil/
269 Mil.
174 Mil.'
113 Mil."
_L
J L
J I I L
J I I L
1970 2000
Source of Data: Tomas Frejka
2050
2100
Year
subsidized the return of foreign work-
ers to their native lands. The growth
of the working-age population in
Western Europe, and increasing par-
ticipation of women in the labor
force, may further restrict employ-
ment opportunities for migrant
workers well into the 1980's.
Resource-rich LDC's have attracted a
considerable number of foreign work-
ers in recent years, but these de-
veloping countries' potential for
absorbing additional migrant labor ap-
pears limited. The pressure in poorer
LDC's to emigrate, nevertheless, is
likely to intensify in the years ahead,
owing to the rapid — and in many
countries accelerating — growth of the
labor force.
Migration to industrialized coun-
tries has significantly eased the
population pressure of a number of
small and medium-sized developing
countries — for example, Puerto Rico,
Jamaica, Mexico, Turkey, Algeria,
Morocco, and Tunisia. In 1974 Alge-
rian workers abroad comprised 12%
of the country's economically active
population; Tunisian workers
abroad — 7%; Moroccan and
Turkish — 5%. (Migrant workers may
also bring important financial advan-
tages to their home countries; work-
ers' remittances are an important
source of foreign exchange.) But the
9.5 million LDC migrants in indus-
trialized countries in 1974 comprised
on the average less than Vj% of the
population of the sending countries.
There are no areas left on Earth with
unused land, job opportunities, and
welcome for the tens of millions of
emigrants which would be required to
significantly ease population pres-
sures in such major, overpopulated,
low-income countries as India, Paki-
stan. Bangladesh, or Indonesia, even
if such numbers could be persuaded
to leave their homelands.
Emigration, in brief, can assist
51
some small and medium-sized de-
veloping countries to meet their over-
population problems, but it is of neg-
ligible help for larger nations.
Doubling Time
One way to grasp the implications
of a particular rate of population
growth is to consider how long it will
take a population to double at that
growth rate.
When a sum of money grows at
compound interest, the interest rate is
applied both to the original principal
and to the proceeds of past interest
payments, making total growth sig-
nificantly faster than growth at simple
interest. Thus, $1 at 1% simple inter-
est takes 100 years to double, while
$1 at 1% compound interest will dou-
ble in 69 years.
In the same way, when population
grows both the original number of
people and the numbers accruing from
past growth increase. Thus, a popula-
tion growing at 1% per year will take
not 100 years but 69 years to double.
A population growing at 2% per year
will double in only 35 years.
A quick way to calculate doubling
time is to divide 69 by the percentage
of growth. For example, if a coun-
try's population growth rate is 3% per
year, the population will double in 23
years.
The concept of a population "ex-
plosion," with the developing coun-
tries' populations heading sharply
upward, thus derives from the combi-
nation of an unprecedentedly rapid
drop in death rates, much more
slowly falling birth rates, and the
compound, or geometric, arithmetic
of the resulting population growth.
Annual Growth
Years to
Rate (%)
Double Population
1.0
69
1.5
46
2.0
35
2.5
28
3.0
23
3.5
20
4.0
17
CHANGING PATTERNS
OF POPULATION GROWTH
Classical Demographic
Transition Theory
Before the onset of the Industrial
Revolution in the late 18th century,
European mortality and fertility rates
52
were both high. By the middle of the
1930's, death rates and birth rates
throughout the West had plummeted
(chart 7). Demographers have sought
ever since to clarify the sequence of
this transition from high to low vital
rates and the means by which it was
accomplished.
One of the resulting theories of
demographic evolution, known as the
demographic transition theory, pos-
tulates that economic development
brings about a fall in mortality,
followed — after some time — by a fall
in fertility. During the period of tran-
sition from high to low death and
birth rates, the pace of population
growth accelerates markedly. More
specifically:
• The initial stage of high (popula-
tion) growth potential evolves from a
backdrop of high death and high birth
rates. The former reflects the harsh
struggle for existence and the latter
the need to compensate for high
mortality. During this stage, death
rates begin to fall, under the influ-
ence of modernization, including ris-
ing levels of living and new controls
over disease. Birth rates remain high,
causing a rise in the rate of popula-
tion expansion.
• During the subsequent transi-
tional stage, the rate of growth of the
population is still relatively high, but
a decline in birth rates becomes well
established. The new ideal of the
small family arises typically in urban,
industrial settings.
• The stage of incipient decline is
reached when mortality is low and
fertility levels hover around replace-
ment level. A stabilization of fertility
below replacement level would, of
course, lead, in the absence of net
immigration, to an eventual decline in
the absolute size of a country's
population.
Theory's Relevance for LDC's
The demographic transition theory,
particularly its concepts of ( 1 ) more
or less automatic decline in fertility
subsequent to mortality reduction and
(2) economic development as the mo-
tive power for both declines, has
shaped much of the thinking about
population problems in today's de-
veloping countries. It has often
served as a basis of opposition to
government policies and programs
aimed at reducing average family size
on the premise that economic de-
Department of State Bulletir
velopment will bring a reduction in
fertility as a natural consequence of
rising levels of living.
The theory's supporters further
contend that fertility will not decline
in the absence of such prerequisites as
rising levels of living, literacy, and
declining infant mortality. Family
planning services by themselves, it is
held, are largely unavailing. "De-
velopment is the best contraceptive"
was widely proclaimed by Third
World government delegations to the
1974 World Population Conference. 2
Recent reexamination of Europe's
population experience has done nothing
to disprove the premise that lowered
fertility is a correlate of modernization.
There can be no doubt of the reality
and persistence of fertility declines in
modernizing Europe. A more systema-
tic documentation of mortality and fer-
tility changes in Europe from the 18th
through the early 20th centuries ap-
pears to weaken, however, the validity
of some aspects of the demographic
transition theory and its usefulness in
predicting the future course of birth
and death rates in the currently de-
veloping countries.
Analysis of Europe's historical data
by national subunits (e.g., provinces),
Chart 7
The Demographic Transition
Annual Vital Rates
(Per 1 ,000 Population)
50 r
40
30
20
10
Developed Countries
Birth Rate
Annual Vital Rates
(Per 1 ,000 Population)
50 r
40
Assumed trend in the absence of
World Wars I and II
Natural
Increase
0.8%
1750 1800 1850 1900 1950
2000
In developed countries death rates declined slowly beginning
in the late 18th century Birth rates followed closely. Population
growth rates rarely exceeded 1 ,5% per year.
Source: Based on U. N. estimates and projections (medium variant)
30
20
10
Developing Countries
Birth Rate
Natural
Increase
2.3%
• Assumed trend in the absence of
major upheavals (Tai-Ping Rebellion.
Indian Mutiny, epidemics, World Wars)
_l_
_l_
1750 1800 1850 1900 1950 2000
In developing countries birth and death rates remained high
through the first decades of the 20th century Then death
rates began to drop. Birth rates stayed high and populations
grew at 2.5, 3.0, and 3,5% or higher a year. Since the mid-
1 960's some countries' birth rates have begun to decline.
'ctober 1978
ndertaken by the Office of Population
Research, Princeton University,
howed important regional variations in
nitial mortality/fertility levels, timing
if the onset of secular (sustained) de-
lines in these levels, the pace of such
leclines, and the apparent causes of
hose declines.
The reexamination showed that fer-
lity levels and trends varied widely
mong and within 19th century Euro-
ean countries; that fertility declines
ften preceded or coincided with mor-
ality declines, instead of following
lem; that regional variations in fertil-
y appeared most closely related to
ultural and linguistic rather than de-
elopmental factors; and that, overall,
ertility levels and trends bore no clear
elation to development. Fertility de-
lines occurred in provinces that were
jral, very poor, not well educated,
nd subject to high infant mortality,
(ationwide, fertility began to fall in
easant. Catholic France nearly a cen-
try earlier than in England, though it
as England that was the leader in the
ldustrial Revolution.
The relevance of the classical demo-
raphic transition theory for today's
DCs is also limited by differences in
i ie population trends of present-day
DCs and those of European countries
comparable periods of their eco-
^mic development.
• The pace of decline from tradition-
ly high mortality levels has been far
eeper in the currently developing
)untries than it was in Europe. Aver-
se life expectancy in the West, 3 for
sample, is estimated to have risen
om 41 years in 1840 to 50.5 years in
)00 — about 10 years in six decades,
he average life expectancy for LDC's
. a group has increased from 42 to 51
ears in 15 years (between 1950-55
id 1965-70). The rapid decline in
DC mortality has been attributed
■imarily to technological advances in
e prevention and control of disease,
tnployed independently of the
>cioeconomic setting. Marked im-
•ovements in the availability of food
so played an important role in sharply
:ducing death rates.
• Birth rates at the beginning of the
jveloping countries' demographic
ansition were significantly higher
lan in preindustrial Europe, due
lainly to earlier and more universal
larriage. The average birth rate for the
DCs has been estimated at 42.1 per
,000 population between 1950 and
955; birth rates in 90 LDC's exceeded
lis average. By contrast, the birth rate
i Western Europe on the eve of the
ldustrial Revolution is estimated at
0-35 per 1.000. 4
• Steeply reduced death rates and
generally high birth rates have pro-
duced natural growth rates in LDC's up
to 3.5% a year or higher, two or three
times as high as those experienced
during Europe's period of most rapid
population growth. At the peak of
Costa Rica's fertility (1959-61), for
example, the country's natural increase
reached 3.8% a year; the rate exceeded
3.5% for more than a decade. In Den-
mark, by contrast, the rate of natural
increase never exceeded 1.5%.
The totally unprecedented dis-
equilibrium between birth and death
rates in the developing countries since
the end of World War II is the reason
for the massive burgeoning of world
population.
Prerequisites for
Fertility Reduction
The reexamination of Europe's his-
torical demographic trends has led the
project's senior researcher. Dr. Ansley
Coale, to conclude that the following
conditions are necessary for a major
fall in marital fertility.
• Fertility must be within the cal-
culus of conscious choice. Potential
parents must consider it acceptable be-
havior to balance the advantages and
disadvantages of having another child.
• Perceived social and economic cir-
cumstances must make reduced fertility
seem advantageous to individual
couples.
• Effective techniques of fertility re-
duction must be known and available,
with sufficient communication between
spouses and sustained will in both to
use them successfully.
It should be noted that neither the
classical demographic transition theory
nor its subsequent refinements indicate
exactly what combination of social,
economic, and political conditions give
rise to the cited "calculus of conscious
choice," to the interest in fertility re-
duction techniques, or to the "sus-
tained will" or motivation to practice
family planning. As noted by Dr.
Coale, the weakness of the concept of
"transition" lies in the "difficulty of
defining a precise threshold of
modernization that will reliably iden-
tify a population in which fertility is
ready to fall. "
Europe's demographic history to the
mid- 1 930 's did provide two important
lessons. It showed that changes in fer-
tility due to the voluntary adaptation of
individual families to new personal cir-
cumstances evolve very gradually. It
also showed that societal sanction of
the idea of family planning is an im-
53
portant factor in the diffusion of its
practice.
Both findings argue in favor of ef-
fective population policies and pro-
grams, without denying the important
role of a rising level of living as the
most reliable path to declining birth
rates. The retarding effect of rapid
population growth on improvement of
the living conditions of the average
family in most developing countries
renders it highly important for those
countries to accelerate in every practic-
able way the transition from high to
low death and birth rates. Effectively
organized family planning programs
not only provide birth control informa-
tion and clinical services but also speed
up the diffusion of a basic prerequisite
for the use of these services, namely
making the notion of planned par-
enthood acceptable.
Birth rate reductions in present day
developing countries are often closely
correlated with economic and social
progress (Singapore, Taiwan, Costa
Rica, Hong Kong, South Korea, etc.).
Significant declines in birth rates have
also taken place, however, in relatively
backward economic settings but under
conditions of all-out mobilization of
political, bureaucratic, and community
resources (including womanpower) be-
hind family planning (China and In-
donesia).
LDC Birth Rates in Transition:
A Modest Beginning
If present-day LDC's have experi-
enced an accelerated pace of mortality
decline, some are also showing an ear-
lier onset and a faster rate of decline in
birth rates than occurred in moderniz-
ing Europe. Since the mid-1960's,
some 30 LDC's, containing over two-
thirds of the total LDC population, ap-
pear to have reduced their birth rates by
10% or more.
Delayed marriages appear to exercise
an important role in the reduction of
birth rates in many LDC's, particularly
in the initial phase of the decline. Ris-
ing age at marriage is a product of
socioeconomic development that pro-
vides women with alternatives to an
early marriage and motherhood and/or
raises a couple's material requirements
for marriage and delays the union until
these requirements are satisfied, some-
times with the help of the woman's
newly acquired earning power.
Large-scale temporary or permanent
migration has also helped to depress
the birth rate in a number of LDCs by
reducing the proportion of the popula-
tion in childbearing ages, separating
families, delaying marriages, and ex-
posing migrants to cultural values of
54
Department of State Bulleti
.'
;•
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY:
Their Interaction With Foreign Polieu
by Lucy Wilson Benson
Based on an address before the Na-
tional Science Board in Washington,
D.C., on May 18, 1978. Mrs. Benson
is Under Secretary for Security Assist-
ance, Science, and Technology .
I'm glad to have the opportunity to
talk to the National Science Board this
afternoon. The prominence of science
in government today is, in part, a herit-
age of World War II. But times are
different and so are the demands and
expectations. There is a new emphasis
on the civilian aspects of science and
technology after years of heavy em-
phasis on military matters. In helping
rebuild Europe, our major scientific
and technological assistance and ex-
change was with the developed coun-
tries. Now it is with the developing
countries. Then it was largely basic re-
search; now there is more emphasis on
application.
Another change has taken place. The
recovery of the advanced nations from
the effects of World War II has meant
that we are no longer, as we were early
in the post-World War II era, the only
exporter of science and technology to
the four corners of the world. We have
companions and we have competitors.
This is undoubtedly good for us all,
even though it complicates our diplo-
macy. Nevertheless, our technology
remains as a major, if not the major,
aspect of how other peoples view us.
And this reputation for technological
excellence is an important source of
power, influence, and potential diplo-
matic leverage.
All of this points to an extensive in-
teraction with foreign affairs. Perhaps
the most significant change as it affects
our foreign policy is the growing mul-
tinational character of science and
technology-related problems and the
growing complexity of the institutional
arrangements set up to deal with them.
The things that preoccupy the foreign
policy managers today are big and al-
most intractable problems. These are,
of course, nuclear nonproliferation,
energy use, pollution, climate, food,
population control, and the use of the
oceans. These are all problems beyond
our capacity to deal with on a national
basis alone. Thus the demand for new
institutional arrangements and a new
focus in such multilateral bodies as the
U.N. specialized agencies.
This has both a good and bad side.
On the one hand it enlists the forces of
diplomacy on the side of science and
technology for ends that everybody
agrees are important. But it also
politicizes questions that I am sure
(Population com' d)
the receiving (usually developed)
countries.
The major cause of the decline in
LDC birth rates to date, however, has
been reduction in marital fertility, par-
ticularly among women over 30 years
of age. This decline relates — in various
degrees — to a fairly steady growth in
the proportion of women of child-
bearing ages who use modern con-
traceptive methods. Such use has been
significantly accelerated in many
LDC's by public provision of family
planning information, education, and
contraceptive services
Observed reductions in some LDC
birth rates may signal the beginnings of
a sustained fertility decline for a large
proportion of the LDC population. But
this is not assured. The pace of future
fertility declines is still unpredictable.
The birth rate in Mauritius has risen
since 1973; an upward trend in fertility
has been observed in Jamaica and
Trinidad and Tobago. Nevertheless,
there is basis for cautious optimism
that fertility will continue to decline in
a broad range of LDC's. Unfortu-
nately, this favorable development
must, as we have seen, be viewed in a
context of massively increasing world
population totals. □
1 Only migrants whose stay in the host
country is more than 1 year are included in
this figure, comprising both permanent immi-
grants and temporary (labor) migrants.
2 For material concerning the World Popula-
tion Conference, see Bulletin of Sept 30,
1974, p. 429.
'Based on mortality data for Denmark. En-
gland and Wales. France, the Netherlands.
Norway. Sweden, and the State of Mas-
sachusetts.
4 In the U.S. and Canada, birth rates in the
18th and most of the 19th centuries were much
higher.
many of you would prefer to see re
solved on their scientific and techno
logical merit.
What I would like to do is explon
with you how we in the Department o
State see this linkage of foreign polic;
and science and technology — what ou
objectives are and how we view ou
own responsibilities in meeting them.
Technology as a Major Concern
First, we need to be clear that al
though the words science and technol
ogy both appear in my title and job de
scription, the Department's interes
tends to lie rather more toward tech
nology than science.
Obviously, one cannot exist withou
the other: Each feeds on the successe
and products of the other — althoug
not always at predictable times or i
predictable ways. I think that we coul
agree that, in general, science is th
pursuit of knowledge for its own sake
and technology is the application c
scientific knowledge and its derivative
to the practical affairs of mankind.
Thus, while we speak of science an
technology in one breath, and while w
cannot have one without the other, th*
manner in which they interact wit
foreign policy is quite different. Th
Department of State is aware of thi
difference, and we are aware also tha
science has its own international
transnational network in which the Na
tional Science Foundation plays a criti
cal role. But, while the Department o
State performs an important function ii
supporting and facilitating internationa
transactions in science, our major con
cern is with technology and its appli
cation as an agent and tool in suppor
of our foreign policy objectives. A;
such, it is inextricably interwoven wit!
politics and economics.
Sis
■!'.
1"!
,'
<:.
■"i
I J
'
';
r
'.
i,
[.»
':
The Role of Science and
Technology in Security Policy
Though the Department of State i;
not directly concerned with the scien
tific and technological underpinning;
of a strong defense establishment, wt
do have a compelling need to under-
stand the technological dimensions ol
that establishment as they affect arms
control.
The question here is not just under-
standing the opportunities and prob
ctober 1978
ms that the technological characteris-
es of specific systems may present to
te arms controller, but also how tech-
ology can be applied to verify and
nforce agreements that may be
ached. This applies not only to such
t-piece agreements as SALT
strategic Arms Limitation Talks] but
agreements in which we are not di-
i&t participants like Sinai II, where we
ave provided some very innovative
mete sensing technology to monitor
raeli and Egyptian adherence to the
greement. The role of science and
chnology in the pursuit of our nuclear
onproliferation policy is clearly
nother important part of security
Dlicy.
ssisting Developing Countries
In addition to maintaining the peace,
curity, and well-being of our nation,
te of the major objectives of the Car-
Administration is to help meet, as
*st we can, the aspirations of less
rtunate nations in an increasingly
terdependent world. Science and
chnology play a critical role in all of
lese areas. We are, for example,
ading an interagency study on scien-
1c and technological relationships with
:veloping countries. The study in-
>lves an assessment of resources and
"< quirements and the political and eco-
»! >mic implications of various courses
i) action. Also, the President has given
i s support to a foundation for interna-
I onal technical cooperation which
1 Duld establish a systematic approach
i using science and technology for de-
I rlopment.
I Perhaps the most significant role sci-
ence and technology can play today, to
I lfill our objective to expand the
i obal economy, is in aiding the de-
I ilopment process in the developing
puntries of the world. In this respect,
|e are making a major effort to support
Je 1979 U.N. Conference on Science
i|iid Technology for Development.
I I want to emphasize the essential
|:rategy which underlies our approach.
II is that the developing countries must
) emselves participate in the selection
id implementation of the technologies
f ;eful for their purposes. Technology
Bansfer on a sort of turnkey basis
lion't work. We will focus our interest
In developing scientific and techno-
:|>gical resources in the less developed
jountries, perhaps through such
I'lechanisms as the proposed foundation
j)r international technical cooperation.
he involvement of U.S. institutions is
r> be largely in response to that activ-
Ky. It will be demand-pull, not
U:chnology-push.
Increased Responsibility
We at the Department are no longer
in a position where we can fulfill our
responsibilities by simply clearing ca-
bles produced by the scientific and
technologically oriented agencies of the
U.S. Government. We are being in-
creasingly pressed to take the lead in
developing initiatives, in coordinating
programs, and in exercising a deter-
mined and focused policy oversight of
a vast range of complicated issues that
heretofore the Department tended to
leave to others. Two examples of ac-
tivities that come to mind are the es-
tablishment by the Department of two
interagency working groups — one on
the 1980-90 U.N. Decade for Drinking
Water and Sanitation and a second
on U.S. -Mexico Cooperation and De-
sertification.
We start from the premise that the
Department has been given a mandate
to take hold of, rather than react to, a
much larger set of programs and re-
sponsibilities than has been the case up
55
access to weapons-usable plutonium.
What we need, of course, is reproc-
essing techniques that do not produce
weapons-usable plutonium. We also
need to identify and develop a safer in-
stitutional framework in which any re-
processing that occurs may take place.
In the immediate term, because of
our view that reprocessing is prema-
ture, we must take significant steps
now to develop safe and economically
attractive means to handle the storage
of spent fuel.
Finally, we must devise an interna-
tional regime for controlling the spread
of enrichment facilities, initially
through a stronger fuel assurance sys-
tem and, perhaps ultimately, through
development of multinational structures
to accommodate such facilities that
eventually are built.
Oceans. Oceans matters, if not as
immediately in the forefront of public
attention as nonproliferation, are still
an immensely contentious issue both
here and abroad. Beyond the very im-
. . . science is the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake, and
technology is the application of scientific knowledge and its derivatives
to the practical affairs of mankind.
to now. And it is particularly our
charge to try to bring a better sense of
order and discipline to the international
activities of the technologically
oriented agencies here in Washington.
Let me give you a few specific exam-
ples.
Nuclear Nonproliferation. Nuclear
nonproliferation has been at the top of
this Administration's foreign policy
agenda since it took office. Our objec-
tive is to maintain the barriers, in the
face of technological change, between
the civil and military uses of nuclear
energy. We want to permit — in fact we
want to encourage — investment in
safeguardable nuclear power without
having to assume also the liability for
having encouraged access to weapons-
usable material, either at the uranium
enrichment end of the nuclear fuel
cycle or at the reprocessing end.
The problems are indeed formi-
dable — we must manage the diffusion
of nuclear technology so that legitimate
national energy needs are met while at
the same time an evolving world con-
sensus on an effective nonproliferation
regime is strengthened. National pro-
grams and priorities will not, in this
environment, always coincide.
Second, we must find feasible alter-
natives to conventional reprocessing
methods in order to avoid widespread
portant and sticky problem of restric-
tions on marine research, they involve
conflicting needs for finite stocks of
fish; conflicting views on what con-
stitute national boundaries in the new
200-mile conservation zone; and con-
flicting requirements within the United
States on the part of conservationists,
the commercial fishing industry, and
sports fishermen.
If that weren't enough, the fish
themselves have their own non-
negotiable demands to make since
some are coastal, some pelagic, and
some anadromous. Each type presents
its own challenging conservation re-
quirements. As you can well imagine,
congressional interest in the solutions
the international community may de-
vise to the problems of the world of
fish is high, and where congressional
dissatisfaction arises, domestic legis-
lation is sure to follow.
Environmental Concerns. On the
positive side has been the painstaking
effort to coordinate though various
international bodies, such as the Or-
ganization for Economic Cooperation
and Development and the European
Economic Community, the registration
and regulation of handling toxic sub-
stances. This is not a rapid process,
but progress is being made.
On the negative side the National
56
Environmental Policy Act is being in-
terpreted by the Council on Environ-
mental Quality to require environ-
mental impact statements from the
U.S. Government when it is involved
in programs abroad that have poten-
tially harmful effects on the environ-
ment. Two suits have been brought
against the government under this act.
One on the paraquat spraying of
marijuana in Mexico and the other
against the Export-Import Bank for
failing to provide in their internal reg-
ulations for the preparation and filing
of environmental impact statements on
projects the Bank was financing
abroad.
The implications of this turn of
events are serious. For starters, we
could find a good portion of our gov-
ernment programs tied up for years
while Federal agencies struggle to de-
fine and analyze environmental un-
knowns in distant parts of the world.
There are also possibilities for severe
damage to commercial sectors with
large overseas projects such as the nu-
clear power, construction, and chemi-
cal industries.
Moreover, it is far from clear to
those of us involved in this problem
how we can provide impact statements
required by law without the coopera-
tion, indeed the full collaboration, of
the foreign governments concerned.
The infringement of sovereignty that
these impact statements imply, and the
atmosphere of paternalism they gener-
ate, raise serious questions about the
measure of collaboration we are likely
to get, to say nothing of the reaction
that would develop.
Problems and Opportunities
These are but three from a long list
of interesting, challenging, perhaps
even unmanageable problems facing
us. On that list you will find desertifi-
cation, water, toxic substances, de-
forestation, air pollution, space, tech-
nology transfer, health, food, climate,
and many more.
Each of these presents its own
unique opportunities for our foreign
relations; for enhancing our bilateral
ties; for moving countries or regions in
mutually felicitous directions; and for
demonstrating our capacity for inno-
vation and leadership in international
scientific and technological affairs.
Each also presents difficult prob-
lems — some of which are quite new
to the professional managers of for-
eign policy. The increasing polari-
zation of the globe in both its eco-
nomic and political dimensions — the
developed and underdeveloped, the
haves and the have nots, the aligned
Department of State Bulleti
UNITED NATIONS: The Role
of ECOSOC in International
Economic Dialogue
by Andrew Young
Statement before the U.N. Economic
and Social Council (ECOSOC) in gen-
eral debate on July II. 1978. Ambas-
sador Young is U.S. Permanent Repre-
sentative to the United Nations.'
Last year, I raised the question of the
role of ECOSOC in the international
economic dialogue. Clearly, the ques-
tion remains a timely one. Many of our
colleagues will be spending much time
during this session wrestling with the
question in the context of their effort to
find a consensus on how to implement
those aspects of the restructuring rec-
ommendations that are designed to
strengthen the role of ECOSOC.
Meanwhile, I join others in this general
debate in the Council in taking stock of
the accomplishments and frustrations
of the past year and in exchanging
ideas as to where to proceed in the
immediate future.
The background of such a discussion
must, of course, be the economic
realities of today and our vision for
tomorrow. The "World Economic Sur-
vey," which we have among our
documents for discussion, notes wide-
spread uncertainty and unease about the
global economy. This unease exists in
all of our countries. We wrestle with
problems of our balance of payments,
of the supply and price of energy, of
hesitant growth and unemployment.
Calls for protectionism increase in de-
veloped countries just as developing
countries need to export more to meet
current needs and heavy debt burdens.
Inflation pursues all of us implacably.
In the face of this situation, th>
world community has recognized tha
interdependence is not a phrase or
matter of political choice but a state
ment of fact. The world's economic
problems affect all of us and cannot b<
solved without the participation of al
or without regard for the interests of all
Put more positively, the world'
economic progress, for the rest of thi
century, is linked not only to economic
revival in developed countries but t<
the realization of the greatest potentia
for growth that we have in thi
world — which is the developing coum
tries. The development of that potentia
is of the highest priority to all of us. II
should not be difficult to agree on .
basic outline of what is needed to ac
complish it. President Carter, in hi
address to the Congress of Venezuela
spoke of five steps we needed to take
together:
• Increasing capital flow to de
veloping countries;
• Building a more fair and morn
open trading system;
• Moderating disruptive pric
movements in the world economy:
• Developing and conserving energ;
sources; and
• Strengthening the technologica
capacities of the developing world.
I stress the words "take together'
for each of these five elements entail;
responsibilities for both developed anc
developing countries.
We are. after all, working to f ac i 1 i
tate major structural changes in thi
and nonaligned — make it impossible to
impose solutions to international
problems and difficult to negotiate
them. Problems of strategy are par-
ticularly great as, oftentimes, the so-
lutions tend to be perceived by many
of the participants as discriminatory,
intrusive, and patronizing — in short,
an old form of colonialism disguised
in scientific dress.
We also have a problem of
priorities. We do not have in the De-
partment, nor are we likely soon to
acquire, the manpower to give full
time and attention to all of the science
ami technology issues that are befon
us. Thus, where we put the emphasi:
is a matter of great policy importance.
We want to be in the position U
make these decisions based on the bes
available fact and judgment. That i;
where we depend heavily on you anc
on the outside scientific communit)
for advice and evaluation. The mes-
sage I want to leave with you is a ver>
simple one. If you have some advice
to give, or suggestions to make, don'i
wait to be asked. We need your help,
perhaps in ways we haven't ever
thought of yet.
October 1978
57
world economy. These cannot be ac-
complished through rhetoric; they can-
not be forced by diplomats or leaders
upon people who do not understand
them. The obligation to participate in
this process cannot be pressed on some
in the name of guilt for the past; nor
can it be denied by others through
ideological claims of innocence. No
nations that contribute billions to death
and destruction in today's world can
claim innocence before the hungry
millions who could be fed in the very
areas where this destruction takes
place. The sowing of seeds of destruc-
tion, the dropping of bombs, the
planting of landmines, and the rain of
bullets cannot be expected to produce a
harvest of blessings for anyone.
Change will require the participation
and the effective contributions of the
people of all developed and developing
countries. These changes must also be
based on mutual interest; they must
come from examining what we can do
together. We all must be flexible about
old positions and programs and bring a
maximum of imagination to the search
of new solutions.
I would pledge to you, and to all
here present, my own government's
firm intention to contribute to this ef-
fort. President Carter had the opportu-
nity to discuss these issues during his
meeting with Latin American and
Caribbean leaders in Panama last
month [June 16-17]. As a result. I can
tell you that my government is com-
mitted at the highest political level to
expanding areas of agreement and con-
vergence on North-South questions.
The leaders of the industrialized coun-
tries who are meeting in Bonn this
month [July 16-17] will devote priority
attention to this theme.
The Committee of the Whole
Here in the U.N. system our respon-
sibility is to constantly improve the
mechanism available for the exchange
of views and the search for solutions to
development problems. I would like to
turn now to efforts made to enhance
these capacities in four different ways;
in the Committee of the Whole,
through the international development
strategy, in preparing for the U.N.
Conference on Science and Technology
jfor Development, and by restructuring
the economic and social sectors of the
U.N. system.
When the Council met last year, the
final ministerial-level meeting of the
Paris Conference on International Eco-
nomic Cooperation had just ended. In
September the resumed 31st session of
the General Assembly met to assess its
results and decide on next steps. This
session produced no agreed text. But it
was in the course of that session that a
general awareness arose that there was
a missing element in the international
system. A mechanism had to be de-
vised to bring senior policymaking of-
ficials together, on a periodic basis, to
exchange views on the world economy
and on unresolved problems and issues.
It was also clear that this had to be
done within the U.N. system.
Thereafter at the 32d General As-
sembly each government, or group of
states, worked in its own way to find a
formula to meet this need. After a good
deal of work — characterized throughout
by a common desire to succeed — a
framework for the dialogue was
reached in Resolution 32/174. We were
proud of our accomplishment. But I
suggest that few of the negotiators
surmised the degree to which this was
but a first step, and that the new flag-
ship of international economic dialogue
would be sailing in uncharted waters
from its first days. We are fortunate in
having so skilled a helmsman as Mr.
Idriss Jazairy of Algeria to steer her.
How was the new committee to work
and implement its mandate? The human
reaction in new situations is to cling to
what one knows — to use old charts
even in new seas. If the model of the
Paris conference was not seen as par-
ticularly pertinent, other familiar con-
ceptions soon emerged. The conception
of the developed countries began with
the premise that the management of the
world economy had indeed become a
concern of developed and developing
countries alike. From this came the
view, or at least the hope, that such a
process of management could imply not
a North-South dialogue across the table
but a common approach to common
problems. The model which suggested
itself was either the domestic one or,
on an international level, that of the
Organization for Economic Coopera-
tion and Development which had so
long proved useful as a forum for ex-
changes of views working among de-
veloped countries.
The hope of most developed coun-
tries was that frank exchanges of views
among policymaking officials would
contribute to a greater understanding of
global economic problems and of posi-
tions on outstanding issues. This, in
turn, could lead to a greater con-
vergence of views, leading to consen-
sus in the respective specialized
negotiating forums. Most developing
countries, on the other hand, saw in the
committees not only an opportunity to
exchange views — but also to obtain
specific commitments from the de-
veloped countries on outstanding is-
sues, commitments that would be re-
corded in a final text to be agreed to by
the committee itself following tradi-
tional U.N. patterns. Without such a
process, the premise of "joint man-
agement" seemed to ignore a great
body of proposals for change they had
made .
When the committee met at its first
substantive session in May. both ap-
proaches were used. There were ex-
changes of views in the beginning
which we believed useful. But finally
the committee had begun an arduous
effort at drafting a text. Members had
little occasion for a general exchange
of views or of new ideas. Failure to
agree on such a text attested to the
difficulty of producing common lan-
guage on issues on which true substan-
tive agreement was not yet possible.
Most of us left with the conviction that
further exploration of the committee's
means of operation was necessary. We
must find a way to use it as a unique
forum that replicates neither the roles
of existing U.N. policy bodies in
adopting broad resolutions on out-
standing questions nor those of existing
specialized negotiating forums.
I believe we can succeed if we bear
four realities in mind. The first is that
the overriding purpose of the commit-
tee is to facilitate solutions to prob-
lems. The second is that such solutions
should evolve from the discussions at a
high level. The third, perhaps less ob-
vious than the first two. is that the
ideas and possible solutions which are
suggested in this discussion must have
time for thorough exploration within
governments. If we are, indeed, seek-
ing important decisions on important
problems, we cannot expect even a
minister to be able to commit his gov-
ernment without such exploration.
Fourth, the end product of this process
should be concrete new proposals to be
put forward in the appropriate
negotiating bodies.
Proposed Approach to Committee
Meetings
We have given much thought in the
U.S. Government as to how these
realities could be reflected in a process
which bridges the different perceptions
of the committee's role. I can indicate
the broad outlines of one possible for-
mula.
At the next and subsequent meetings
of the Committee of the Whole, there
would be, as we have had in May, a
period of extensive exchanges of views
among high-level officials. These dis-
cussions should terminate with agree-
ment on a list of a few selected topics
which participating governments —
58
developed and developing alike —
would engage themselves to explore,
with a view to action or to the formu-
lation of, new proposals in appropriate
international fora. In a later session of
the committee another discussion on
these topics would be held, to see what
progress had been made. Although
there would be clearly no obligation to
change positions on every issue, there
would be an obligation for reappraisal.
Finally, a last review of progress on
agreed themes could be made at the
special session at ministerial level in
1980.
Clearly, the key to the success of
such an approach is in making the right
choices. A delegation's proposals for
topics for reexamination should be
based on a realistic assessment of its
government's capacity for flexibility.
Where there seems little or no prospect
for movement on the part of individual
governments or groups, it would be
better to admit it from the start and
move on to more promising areas.
This last observation also raises the
question of the choice of priorities
among subjects of discussion foreseen
for future meetings of the committee.
There is clearly a consensus that all of
the major problem areas relating to a
new international economic order
should be discussed during the lifetime
of the committee. However, of the
various topics on what I cannot help
but think is an over-ambitious agenda
for the September meeting, I believe
the problem of food and agricultural
development seems the most pressing,
the most amenable to new and addi-
tional efforts, and hence the most
worthy of our concentration.
As the report prepared for the next
meeting of the committee by the Food
and Agriculture Organization notes, the
long-term problem in this area remains
unchanged; growth in agricultural pro-
duction in the developing countries as a
whole has fallen short of expectations.
I have noted with particular dismay the
fact that in 62 countries, representing
43% of the population of the develop-
ing world, growth in agricultural pro-
duction between 1970 and 1977 has not
even kept pace with levels of popula-
tion growth.
My very first address to this body, in
the spring of last year, attempted to
call attention to the problems of hunger
and famine. 2 I did so because of my
conviction that my own countrymen, at
least, would find it difficult to conceive
of a discussion of development which
ignores the 400 million people of the
world who are starving. If we are to
gain popular support for the adjust-
ments required in a process of struc-
tural change in the world economy, we
cannot put these people in a second
plane.
This is a human problem, but it is
not only a humanitarian concern. A
country cannot expand employment,
especially in the industrial sector,
without the food to feed those par-
ticipating. Nor, as we learn from the
experience of the early 1970's, can we
hope to conquer inflation without
eliminating the threat of critical food
shortages and the major price increases
which accompany them. Food
security — a steady supply of food for
all, and at reasonable prices — is in the
interest of everyone. Unlike others,
food is a renewable resource. The ex-
pansion of agricultural production not
only meets basic human needs but is
essential to national efforts to combat
inflation, create jobs, and, indeed to
develop across the board. It is clear
that a country can hardly plan de-
velopment when much of its needed
foreign exchange must go to pay for
emergency food imports. This key
linkage between food security and de-
velopment is recognized in the foreign
assistance bill now before the U.S.
Congress, which calls for a worldwide
cooperative effort to overcome the
worst aspects of absolute poverty and
to assure self-reliant growth in the de-
veloping countries by the year 2000.
The greatest potential for expanding
food production is in the developing
countries. It is a matter of simple eco-
nomics that the developing countries
can provide the greatest marginal re-
turns on the utilization of scarce
inputs — from oil products to fertilizers
to gasoline. The United States wishes
to make a maximum contribution to
such development. In the coming
weeks [on September 5, 1978 J, Presi-
dent Carter will announce the creation
of a Special Presidential Commission
on World Hunger, which will tackle all
aspects of the problem of food security.
The appointment of Mr. Sol Linowitz,
one of the negotiators of the newly
ratified Panama Canal treaties, to head
the commission is a clear indication
that real results are expected of this
new body.
International Development Strategy
One of the questions in which last
year's General Assembly was unable to
take action was that of a new interna-
tional development strategy. Even the
brief discussion that took place, how-
ever, revealed the need to take what we
call a zero-based approach to the sub-
ject. That is, we should begin by ask-
ing ourselves the most fundamental
questions as to the uses and the utility
Department of State Bulletin
of a development strategy. One may
well reexamine the value of the last
international development strategy and
the entire review and appraisal process
which went with it. My government
does not see this as a model for the
next strategy.
Since the adoption of the last
strategy, the international community
has set itself upon the task of achieving
a new and more just international eco-
nomic order. It is clear that any new
strategy must reflect this concept. But
how? Should every element on which
discussion of a new order must
focus — from trade to monetary affairs,
from the conditions of technology
transfer to shipping — be reflected in a
new strategy as well? If so, given the
divergence of views which remain in
these many areas, we are not likely to
be able to agree on a strategy in the
relatively short time remaining.
This might suggest that a new de-
velopment strategy should not be
synonymous with any particular vision
of the new international economic
order but complementary and suppor-
tive of the evolutionary process
through which a new order will be at-
tained. In other words, the strategy
might address itself to some of the
problems, or linkages, inside the
broader concepts of a new order. For
example, national and international
goals for industrialization presuppose a
labor force physically and education-
ally fit for the new tasks required of it;
they presuppose also adequate food
supplies for this new working popula-
tion and adequate means of bringing
these to industrialized areas. Develop-
ment goals presuppose solutions to
problems of housing and urban de-
velopment; they require that attention
be given to the problems of transporta-
tion and communications, particularly
in Africa. Clearly the link between the
two "decades" cannot be overlooked.
These problems should not be allowed
to fall between the boards while inter-
national attention is focused elsewhere.
These questions, it is clear, are
qualitative as much, if not more, than
they are quantitative. My delegation
has substantial doubts as to the advisi-
bility of applying a set of targets across
the board and to treating developed and
developing countries as uniform
groups. The setting of such targets is
difficult even when left to national au-
thorities; to negotiate them on a
worldwide basis is to enter into an
exercise which may bear little relation
to reality.
Rather, I suggest that a strategy
might better concentrate on designating
problems and exploring the means to
solve them. By the same token,
October 1978
periodic views of progress would not
De acromonious effects at welding re-
ility with abstraction but exchanges of
jseful experiences whereby one coun-
:ry can learn from another. The de-
velopment strategy too. should be an
evolving concept.
These are preliminary reflections,
and there will be time to consider them
n the months to come. What we would
ask is that all concerned with a strategy
jut away past examples and begin with
he basic question of what form of
strategy, if any, can serve as a real
implement, and support, to the proc-
:ss of achieving a new international
:conomic order.
U.N. Conference on
Science and Technology
In about 1 year from now we will be
participating in the U.N. Conference
jn Science and Technology for De-
velopment in Vienna. ECOSOC has
ecognized the central importance of
he theme of this conference in desig-
lating it a priority area for considera-
ion. This stress parallels our own
/iew.
President Carter, in his remarks be-
ore the Congress of Venezuela on
viarch 29 notes that the development of
he technological capacities of
developing countries was essential to
promote their self-reliance. He stressed
)ur intention to make technical and
cientific cooperation a key element in
our relations with developing countries
and pledged to work to this end through
he United Nations and through private
and public institutions. He proposed
:he creation of a U.S. foundation for
:echnological cooperation to facilitate
jur efforts. We hope that the process of
:reating this foundation will be well
advanced by the time the conference
:onvenes.
It is in this spirit that our own prep-
arations for the conference are pro-
gressing. We hope, through our
national paper, to share our own ex-
periences, both in the development and
in the application of technology, with
the international community. We have
been impressed with serious examina-
tion of concrete needs and problems
which the preparatory period has suc-
ceeded in promoting, through the prep-
aration of national and regional papers,
and the consideration and selection of
illustrative subject areas. It is our hope
that further work on the conference and
on the program of action will be
grounded on the fruits of this valuable
experience. In this way, we can be
confident that the theme of science and
technology for development will not be
a subject for the attention of techno-
crats but a source of improvement in
the lives of men and women and a
means to greater self-reliance in de-
veloping countries.
Restructuring Economic and
Social Sectors
Now I would return to where I
began, in calling the Council's atten-
tion to the need to act speedily in fol-
lowing up on the historic step the Gen-
eral Assembly took last year in passing
Resolution 32/197 on restructuring the
economic and social sectors of the
U.N. system.
We look forward to participating in
informal discussions on this subject in
the course of this session of the Coun-
cil. These consultations will have many
tasks. The one on which the most ex-
changes have already been held is the
implementation of the chapter con-
cerning ECOSOC. My delegation con-
tinues to believe that a significant revi-
sion of the operating procedures of the
Council and its various subsidiary or-
gans is necessary for it to regain and
fully exercise the role foreseen for it in
the charter.
The ECOSOC can and should play a
vital role in helping the Second
[Economic and Financial] and Third
[Social, Humanitarian and Cultural]
Committees of the General Assembly
to better relate their work and thereby
reflect the fundamental fact that eco-
nomic and social progress are insepara-
ble. In the 1980's a restructured
ECOSOC should also be ready to fulfill
the very first of the responsibilities
listed, as item 1(A) in the recommen-
dations, namely to serve as the central
forum for the discussion of interna-
tional economic and social issues of a
global or interdisciplinary nature and
the formulation of policy recommenda-
tions thereon addressed to member
states and to the U.N. system as a
whole.
But, if ECOSOC is to perform these
general policy functions well, it must
also find a way of streamlining its on-
going work done by expert bodies,
committees, and commissions. The
direct assumption of responsibilities for
the work of some committees and
commissions in subject-oriented ses-
sion provides a means of doing so and
there is general agreement on that
principle.
We are still not sure, however,
whether this can be converted to
agreement on specifics. For, when spe-
cific bodies are discussed, a kind of
protective instinct emerges. There is a
fear that if the work done in these is
assumed directly by the Council,
something will be "lost," that the
59
transfer of functions represents a form
of demotion. These fears exist within
all governments, sometimes confined
to concern for one body, sometimes for
many. The problem is that if these
reservations are added together, the re-
sult can only be the maintenance of the
status quo. Let us hope, therefore, that
all can agree to give the new approach
a chance. Allowing for a review of the
new system after its first 2 years seems
a better way of meeting legitimate con-
cerns than a consensus in the negative.
Finally, a word about two proposals
with which my delegation has been
closely associated in the past. Follow-
ing on our initiatives at the last two
summer sessions of the ECOSOC. I
wish first to turn to the work underway
on the problem of corrupt practices,
particularly illicit payments or bribery,
in international commercial transac-
tions. My government continues to
place high priority on the successful
conclusion of this work, as I think we
all agree that such practices corrupt
national institutions, twist the process
of economic decisionmaking, distort
the normal flow of goods and services,
raise their costs to the consumer, and,
thus, must be seen as a significant
contribution to worldwide inflation.
We are pleased with the progress
made in the intergovernmental working
group on corrupt practices, especially
in its last session, and with the active
and constructive participation of both
developed and developing countries.
We are gratified, too, at the endorse-
ment given to the work of the group by
the Commission on Transnational Cor-
porations at its recent session. The
working group has significantly nar-
rowed differences on key issues, so we
are ready to enter a new phase of
activity.
Pursuant to the recommendations of
the working group, my delegation is
prepared to introduce a resolution for
adoption by this session of the Council
that will convoke a diplomatic confer-
ence to adopt an international conven-
tion dealing with illicit payments and
create a preparatory committee to lay
the groundwork for that conference.
We look forward to discussing our
proposal with other delegations.
One of the concepts which emerged
from the seventh special session was
that of a network for the exchange of
technological information. The net-
work was foreseen as a means to pro-
vide users of technology, particularly
developing countries, with the means
of finding all possible sources to meet
their needs, in any area. It could be
described as an international directory
of services or a directory to directories.
60
The first key steps have been taken
in the network. The interagency task
force created in 1975 has attested to the
feasibility of the basic concept; one of
its future key components, the United
Nations Industrial Development Or-
ganization's industrial technological
information bank, is on the road to
becoming operational, through agree-
ment on first pilot areas. At the 32d
General Assembly, a consensus resolu-
tion, 32/178, sponsored by a host of
countries from all continents, provided
for the presentation of further concrete
proposals to the 34th General Assem-
bly. This resolution did not, however,
elaborate on specific organizational
steps to be taken to arrive at this end.
My delegation hopes that in the course
of this session we can see more clearly
how the concrete implementation of
this resolution will take place. □
'Introductory paragraph omitted; text from
USUN press 71 of July 11, 1978.
2 For text of address, see Bulletin of May
16, 1977. p. 494.
TREATIES:
Current \vt ions
MULTILATERAL
Aviation
Convention on offenses and certain other acts
committed on board aircraft. Done at Tokyo
Sept. 14. 1963. Entered into force Dec. 4.
1969. TIAS 6768.
Accession deposited: Sri Lanka, May 30.
1978.
Protocol on the authentic quadrilingual text of
the convention on international civil aviation
(Chicago. 1944) (TIAS 1591), with annex.
Done at Montreal Sept. 30. 1977.'
Acceptance deposited : Niger, Aug. 24.
1978.
Coffee
International coffee agreement 1976. with an
nexes. Done at London Dec. 3. 1975. En-
tered into force provisionally. Oct. I. 1976.
definitively. Aug. I. 1977 TIAS 8683
Ratification deposited: Liberia, Aug. 28,
1978.
Cultural Property
Convention on the means of prohibiting and
preventing the illicit import, export, and
transfer of ownership of cultural property.
Adopted at Paris Nov. 14, 1970, at the 16th
session of the UNESCO General Confer-
ence. Entered into force Apr. 24. 1972. 2
Acceptance deposited: Oman. June 2. 1978.
Customs
Convention concerning the International Union
for the Publication of Customs Tariffs, reg-
ulations for the execution of the convention,
and final declarations Signed at Brussels
July 5, 1890. Entered into force Apr I.
1891. 26 Stat. 1518.
Notification oj denunciation deposited
Peru. July 26. 1978; effective Apr. I, 1982.
Protocol modifying the convention signed at
Brussels July 5. 1890. relating to the crea-
tion of an International Union for the Publi-
cation of Customs Tariffs. Done at Brussels
Dec. 16. 1949. Entered into force May 5.
1950; for the U.S. Sept. 15, 1957. TIAS
3922.
Notification oj denunciation deposited:
Peru. July 26. 1978; effective Apr. I.
1982.
Convention establishing a Customs Coopera-
tion Council, with annex. Done at Brussels
Dec. 15. 1950. Entered into force Nov. 4.
19<2; for the U.S. Nov. 5. 1970. TIAS
7063.
Accession deposited: Lesotho. Aug. 2.
1978.
Diplomatic Relations
Vienna convention on diplomatic relations.
Done at Vienna Apr. 18. 1961. Entered into
force Apr. 24. 1964; for the U.S. Dec. 13.
1972. TIAS 7502.
Accession deposited Syria. Aug. 4. 1978.
Energy
Memorandum of understanding concerning co-
operative information exchange relating to
the development of solar heating and cool-
ing systems in buildings. Formulated at
Odeillo. France. Oct. 1^*, 1974. Entered
into force July I, 1975. TIAS 8202.
Signature: Central Organization for Applied
Scientific Research (TNO). Netherlands.
Apr. 28. 1978.
Implementing agreement for a program of re-
search and development on advanced heat
pump systems, with annex. Done at Paris
July 27. 1978. Entered into force July 27.
1978.
Implementing agreement for a program of re-
search and development for energy conser-
vation in cement manufacture, with annex.
Done at Paris July 27. 1978. Entered into
force July 27. 1978.
Finance
Articles of agreement of the International
Bank for Reconstruction and Development
formulated at the Bretton Woods Conference
July 1-22. 1944. Opened for signature at
Washington Dec. 27, 1945. Entered into
force Dec. 27. 1945. TIAS 1502.
Signature and acceptance: Surinam. June
27, 1978.
Human Rights
American convention on human rights. ("Pact
of San Jose. Costa Rica") Done at San
Jose Nov 22. 1469 Entered into force July
18. 1978. 2
Ratifications deposited. Jamaica. Aug. 7.
I978; 3 Peru. July 28. 1978.
Department of State Bulletin
Patents
Patent cooperation treaty, with regulations.
Done at Washington June 19. 1970. Entered
into force Jan. 24. 1978 (except for Chapter
II). Chapter II entered into force Mar. 29,
1978.- TIAS 8733.
Ratification deposited: Denmark. Sept. 1,
1978.
Patents, Microorganisms
Budapest treaty on the international recogni-
tion of the deposit of microorganisms for the
purpose of patent procedure, with regula-
tions. Done at Budapest Apr. 28. 1977. '
Ratification deposited: Bulgaria. July 19,
1978.
Pollution
Protocol relating to intervention on the high
seas in cases of pollution by substances
other than oil. Done at London Nov. 2,
1973.'
Instrument of ratification signed by the
President: Aug. 3. 1978.
Postal
Constitution of the Universal Postal Union
with final protocol, general regulations with
final protocol, and convention with final
protocol and regulations of execution. Done
at Vienna July 10. 1964. Entered into force
Jan. 1, 1966. TIAS 5881
Ratification deposited: EI Salvador. Jan. 9,
1978.
Accession deposited: Djibouti. Nov. 18.
1977.
Additional protocol to the constitution of the
Universal Postal Union with final protocol
signed at Vienna July 10. 1964. general
regulations with final protocol and annex.
Signed at Tokyo Nov. 14. 1969. Entered
into force July I, 1971. except for article V.
which entered into force Jan. 1. 1971. TIAS
7150.
Ratification deposited: El Salvador. Apr.
19. 1978.
lecession deposited: Djibouti. Mar. 21,
1978.
Second additional protocol to the constitution
of the Universal Postal Union of July 10,
1964, general regulations with final protocol
and annex, and the universal postal conven-
tion with final protocol and detailed regula-
tions Done at Lausanne July 5. 1974. En-
tered into force Jan 1 . 1 976. TIAS 823 1 .
Ratifications deposited: Chad. Mar. 23,
1978; Chile. Mar. 20. 1978; El Salvador,
Apr. 19. 1978; Yemen Arab Republic.
May 26. 1978.
Accession deposited: Djibouti. Mar. 21.
1978.
Money orders and postal travelers' checks
agreement, with detailed regulations. Done
at Lausanne July 5. 1974. Entered into force
Jan. 1, 1976. TIAS 8232.
Ratifications deposited: Chad. Mar. 23,
1978; Chile. Mar 20. 1978; El Salvador.
Apr 19. 1978; Yemen Arab Republic,
May 26, 1978.
Accession deposited: Djibouti. Mar. 21.
1978.
:
ktober 1978
61
tional protocol to the constitution of the
Postal Union of the Americas and Spain, gen-
eral regulations, regulations governing the
International Office and the Transfer Office,
and convention with final protocol and de-
tailed regulations. Done at Lima Mar. 18,
1976. Entered into force Oct. 1, 1976, except
for article 107, paragraph 1 of the general
regulations which entered into force Mar. 18,
1976. 4
Ratification deposited: El Salvador. July 31,
1978.
oney order agreement and final protocol of
the Postal Union of the Americas and Spain
Done at Lima Mar. 18. 1976. Entered into
force Oct. I, 1976."
Ratification deposited: El Salvador, July 31,
1978.
reel post agreement, final protocol, and de-
tailed regulations of the Postal Union of the
Americas and Spain. Done at Lima Mar. 18.
1976. Entered into force Oct. 1 . 1976."
Ratification deposited: El Salvador, July 3 1 ,
1978.
(blications
itutes of the International Center for the
Registration of Serial Publications. Done at
°aris Nov. 14, 1974, and amended Oct. 11
ind 12. 1976. Entered into force Jan. 21,
1976; provisionally for the U.S. Mar. 31.
1978.
Accessions deposited: Belgium. Sept. 29.
1976; Argentina and Federal Republic of
Germany, Oct. 5, 1976; Libya, Jan. 6.
1977; Brazil. Oct. 25. 1977; Hungary.
Dec. 27. 1977; U.K.. Jan. 20. 1978;
Nigeria, Feb. 1. 1978. Spain. Mar. 9,
1978; Canada, Mar. 28. 1978; Finland,
Apr 3. 1978; Poland, Apr. 4. 1978.
cial Discrimination
ernational convention on the elimination of
ill forms of racial discrimination. Done at
•lew York Dec. 21, 1965. Entered into force
an. 4, 1969. 2
Signature: Korea, Aug. 8, 1978.
ifugees
otocol relating to the status of refugees. Done
it New York Jan. 31, 1967. Entered into force
Dct. 4, 1967; for the U.S. Nov. 1. 1968.
HAS 6577.
Accession deposited: Spain. Aug. 14. 1978.
fety at Sea
ernational convention for the safety of life
it sea, 1974, with annex. Done at London
Vov. 1. 1974. '
Instrument of acceptance signed by the
President: Aug. 15, 1978.
gar
ernational sugar agreement, 1977, with an-
lexes. Done at Geneva Oct. 7, 1977. En-
ered into force provisionally, Jan. 1, 1978.
Ratification deposited: Argentina. Aug. 4,
1978.
Accession deposited: German Democratic
Republic, Aug. 4, 1978.
rrorism
nvention on the prevention and punishment
of crimes against internationally protected
persons, including diplomatic agents. Done
at New York Dec. 14. 1973. Entered into
force Feb. 20, 1977. T1AS 8532.
Ratification deposited: Romania. Aug. 15.
1978.
War
Protocol additional to the Geneva conventions
of 12 Aug. 1949, and relating to the protec-
tion of victims of international armed con-
flicts (protocol I), with annexes. Done at
Geneva June 8. 1977. Enters into force Dec.
7. 1978.
Ratification deposited: Ghana, Feb. 28,
1978.
Signature: Yemen (Sana), Feb. 14, 1978.
Protocol additional to the Geneva conventions
of 12 Aug. 1949. and relating to the protec-
tion of victims of noninternational armed
conflicts (protocol II). Done at Geneva June
8, 1977. Enters into force Dec. 7, 1978.
Ratification deposited: Ghana, Feb. 28,
1978.
Signature: Yemen (Sana), Feb. 14, 1978.
Wheat
Protocol modifying and further extending the
wheat trade convention (part of the interna-
tional wheat agreement) 1971 (TIAS 7144).
Done at Washington Apr. 26, 1978. Entered
into force June 24. 1978, with respect to
certain provisions; July 1, 1978, with respect
to other provisions.
Ratifications deposited: Iraq. Aug. 25,
1978; Ireland (with statement). Aug. 18.
1978; Mauritius. Aug. 30. 1978.
Declaration of provisional application de-
posited: Nigeria, Aug. 18. 1978.
Protocol modifying and further extending the
food aid convention (part of the interna-
tional wheat agreement) 1971 (TIAS 7144).
Done at Washington Apr. 26, 1978. Entered
into force June 24, 1978, with respect to
certain provisions; July 1, 1978. with re-
spect to other provisions.
Ratification deposited: Ireland, Aug. 18,
1978.
BILATERAL
Australia
Agreement relating to peaceful nuclear coopera-
tion. Effected by exchange of notes at Can-
berra Aug. 4 and 7. 1978. Entered into force
Aug. 7. 1978.
Memorandum of agreement relating to the
provision of parts and services for air navi-
gation equipment. Signed at Washington
July 19 and Aug. 11. 1978. Entered into
force Aug. 11, 1978.
Bahamas
Agreement continuing in force between the
U.S. and the Bahamas the extradition treaty
of Dec. 22. 1931 (TS 849), between the
U.S. and the U.K. Effected by exchange of
notes at Nassau and Washington Mar. 7,
June 19, and Aug. 17. 1978. Entered into
force Aug. 17, 1978.
Bangladesh
Agreement for a food for development pro-
gram, relating to the agreement of Oct. 4,
1974 (TIAS 7949), with annexes and min-
utes. Signed at Dacca Aug. 2. 1978. En-
tered into force Aug. 2. 1978.
Agreement concerning the establishment of a
Peace Corps program in Bangladesh. Signed
at Washington July 13. 1978. Entered into
force July 13, 1978.
Bolivia
Treaty on the execution of penal sentences.
Signed at La Paz Feb. 10, 1978.
Ratifications exchanged: Aug. 17. 1978.
Entered into force: Aug. 17. 1978.
Proclaimed by the President: Aug. 30.
1978.
Canada
Treaty on the execution of penal sentences.
Signed at Washington Mar. 2. 1977. En-
tered into force July 19, 1978.
Proclaimed by the President: Sept. 2, 1978.
Memorandum of agreement relating to the
provision of flight inspection services.
Signed Mar. 10 and Apr. 1, 1978. Entered
into force Apr. 1. 1978.
Colombia
Agreement relating to trade in cotton, wool,
and manmade fiber textiles and textile prod-
ucts, with annexes. Effected by exchange of
notes at Bogota Aug. 3, 1978. Entered into
force Aug. 3. 1978; effective July 1, 1978.
Denmark
Agreement relating to jurisdiction over vessels
utilizing the Louisiana offshore oil port.
Effected by exchange of notes at Washing-
ton Aug. 17 and 22, 1978. Entered into
force Aug. 22, 1978.
Egypt
Agreement amending the agreement for sales
of agricultural commodities of Dec. 7.
1977. Effected by exchange of notes at
Cairo Aug. 3. 1978. Entered into force Aug.
3, 1978.
France
Memorandum of understanding concerning a
cooperative program in science and technol-
ogy, with appendices. Signed at Paris May
30. 1978. Entered into force May 30, 1978.
Iceland
Agreement amending the agreement of Jan.
27. 1945 (59 Stat. 1464), relating to air
transport services. Effected by exchange of
notes at Washington Aug. 17, 1978. Entered
into force Aug. 17. 1978.
India
Understanding relating to trade in tropical
products, with lists. Effected by exchange
of letters at Geneva July 26. 1978. Entered
into force July 26. 1978.
Ireland
Memorandum of agreement relating to flight
inspection services. Signed at Washington
and Dublin March 10 and Aug. 4, 1978.
Entered into force Aug. 4. 1978.
62
Israel
Protocol relating to the U.S. -Israel air transport
agreement of June 13, 1950 (TIAS 2610).
Signed at Washington Aug. 16, 1978. Entered
into force Aug. 16, 1978.
Japan
Agreement modifying and extending the ar-
rangement of Sept. 27, 1974. as modified
(TIAS 7934. 8181, 8644) concerning trade
in cotton, wool, and manmade fiber textiles.
Effected by exchange of notes at Washing-
ton Aug. 28, 1978. Entered into force Aug.
28. 1978.
Agreement concerning payments from
Japanese utility companies for uranium en-
richment services. Effected by exchange of
notes at Washington Sept. 1, 1978. Entered
into force Sept. 1 . 1978.
Korea
Agreement amending the agreement for sales
of agricultural commodities of July 21. 1977
(TIAS 8821). Effected by exchange of notes
at Seoul July 18. 1978. Entered into force
July 18, 1978.
Mexico
Agreement amending the agreement of May
23, 1978, relating to additional cooperative
arrangements to curb the illegal traffic in
narcotics. Effected by exchange of letters at
Mexico July 11 and 13, 1978. Entered into
force July 13, 1978
Agreement amending the agreement of June 2.
1977, as amended Sept. 28. 1977 (TIAS
8952). relating to additional cooperative ar-
rangements to curb the illegal traffic in nar-
cotics. Effected by exchange of letters at
Mexico July 20 and 26, 1978. Entered into
force July 26, 1978.
Minute 259 of the International Boundary and
Water Commission amending and extending
minute 240, as amended and extended (TIAS
8712), relating to emergency deliveries of
Colorado River waters for use in Tijuana.
Adopted at El Paso July 27. 1978. Entered
into force Aug. 11, 1978.
Agreement relating to the provision and utili-
zation of aircraft to curb the illegal traffic in
narcotics. Effected by exchange of letters at
Mexico Aug. 23, 1978. Entered into force
Aug. 23, 1978.
Agreement amending the agreement of June 2,
1977. as amended Sept. 28, 1977 (TIAS
8952). and July 20 and 26, 1978, relating to
additional cooperative arrangements to curb
the illegal traffic in narcotics. Effected by
exchange of letters at Mexico Aug. 24,
1978. Entered into force Aug. 24. 1978.
Agreement relating to computerization of in-
formation in support of programs against il
legal narcotics production and traffic Ef-
fected by exchange of letters at Mexico
Aug. 25, 1978. Entered into force Aug. 25,
1978.
Philippines
Agreement for sales of agricultural com
modifies. Signed at Manila Aug. 24, 1978.
Entered into force Aug 24, 1978.
Saudi Arabia
Project agreement for technical cooperation in
science and technology, with appendices.
Signed at Riyadh Feb. 29. 1976.
Entered into force: Aug. 7, 1978.
Project agreement for technical cooperation in
customs administration and training. Signed
at Riyadh and Washington June 1 1 and 22.
1978. Entered into force Aug. 10. 1978.
Project agreement for technical cooperation in
supply management development, with at-
tachments. Signed at Riyadh July 13. 1978.
Entered into force Aug. 10. 1978.
Sierra Leone
Agreement for sales of agricultural com-
modities. Signed at Freetown Aug. 31,
1978. Entered into force Aug. 31, 1978.
Sweden
Agreement relating to jurisdiction over vessels
utilizing the Louisiana offshore oil port.
Effected by exchange of notes at Washing-
ton Aug. 17 and 22, 1978. Entered into
force Aug. 22, 1978.
U.S.S.R.
Agreement amending and extending the
agreement of June 19. 1973 (TIAS 7652).
on cooperation in the field of transportation.
Effected by exchange of notes at Washing-
ton June 19. 1978. Entered into force June
19. 1978.
United Arab Emirates
Agreement amending and extending the
agreement of July 10, 1976 (TIAS 8408).
for technical assistance in connection with a
project for collecting and conserving water
supplies from surface runoff, with annexes.
Effected by exchange of letters at Abu
Dhabi June 24 and July 25, 1978. Entered
into force July 25, 1978; effective July 1,
1978.
United Nations
Agreement relating to a procedure for U.S.
income tax reimbursement. Effected by ex-
change of letters at New York June 30 and
July 12. 1978. Entered into force July 12.
1978.
Zaire
Agreement regarding the consolidation and re-
scheduling of payments due under PL 480
Title I agricultural commodity agreements,
with annexes. Signed at Washington July
19. 1978. Entered into force July 19. 1978.
Zambia
Agreement for sales of agricultural com-
modities Signed at Lusaka Aug. 4. 1978.
Entered into force Aug. 4. 1978. □
1 Not in force.
2 Not in force for the U.S.
'With declaration.
4 Provisionally in force for the U.S.
Department of State Bulleti
PRESS RELEASES:
Department of State
August 1 7 -September 8
Press releases may be obtained from the Of
fice of Press Relations. Department of State
Washington. DC 20520.
Subject
*336
*337
*338
*339
*340
3/17
8/23
8/24
8/28
8/29
•341
8/30
*342
*343
*344
*345
8/30
9/1
9/7
9/8
*346
*347
9/8
9/8
i
!
«
State Department opens De
troit passport agency.
International Telegraph ani
Telephone Consultativi
Committee (CCITT), stud;
group 1 , Sept .21.
Nicholas A. Veliotes swon
in as Ambassador to Jordai
(biographic data).
U.S., Iceland amend ai
transport agreement. Aug
17.
Shipping Coordinating Com
mittee (SCC), Subcom
mittee on Safety of Life
Sea (SOLAS), panel o
bulk cargoes of the work
ing group on subdivisio
and stability, Sept. 21 .
ACDA Director Paul C
Warnke and Ambassador t
the U.S.S.R. Malcolr
Toon to address conferenc
on U.S. security and th
Soviet challenge. Philadel
phia, Sept. 15.
George M. Lane sworn in a
Ambassador to the Yeme
Arab Republic (biographi
data).
U.S.. Mexico amend textil 1'
agreement. Apr. 26 am
29.
US nominations to the In
ternational Court of Jus
tice.
ACDA Director Paul C
Warnke and Leslie H
Gelb. Director of th.
Bureau of Politico-Militar;
Affairs, to address confer
ence on U.S. security am
the Soviet challenge
Tampa, Sept. 26.
Ambassador Warnke and Mr
Gelb to address confer
ence, Miami. Sept. 26.
International Radio Consul
tative Committee (CCIR) I
study group 5, Oct. 6.
i
* Not printed in the Bulletin.
INDEX
CTOBER 1978
H)L. 78, NO. 2019
i-ms Control
lilancing Nonproliferation and Energy Secu-
rity (Nye) 38
Bit il— The Home Stretch (Warnke) 17
lience and Technology — Their Interaction
(With Foreign Policy (Benson) 54
Is. and Soviet Strategic Capability Through
[the Mid-1980's 24
iiia. Prospects for International Action on
Natural Rubber (Katz) 26
liina. President Carter's News Conference of
August 17 (excerpts) 12
(immodities. Prospects for International Ac-
tion on Natural Rubber (Katz) 26
(ingress
. Framework for Middle East Peace (Begin,
Carter, Mondale, Sadat, joint statement,
Itexts of documents and accompanying
(letters) 1
! ist-Favored-Nation Tariff Status for Hun-
gary and Romania (Vest) 34
j:rcotics Control Efforts in Central America
ind the Caribbean (Linneman) 37
;sident Carter's News Conference of August
!l7 (excerpts) 12
S- Relations With the Pacific Islands
[Holbrooke) 43
'veloping Countries
e Role of ECOSOC in International Eco-
nomic Dialogue (Young) 56
; ience and Technology — Their Interaction
With Foreign Policy (Benson) 54
orld Population: The Silent Explosion — Part
1 (Fearey, Giffler. Green) 45
onomics. The Role of ECOSOC in Interna-
tional Economic Dialogue (Young) 56
•ypt. A Framework for Middle East Peace
(Begin, Carter, Mondale, Sadat, joint state-
; ment. texts of documents and accompanying
; letters) 1
lergy. Balancing Nonproliferation and
Energy Security (Nye) 38
Environment. Science and Technology —
Their Interaction With Foreign Policy
(Benson) 54
Europe. The Potential of the Helsinki
Dialogue (Nimetz) 29
Human Rights. The Potential of the Helsinki
Dialogue (Nimetz) 29
Hungary. Most-Favored-Nation Tariff Status
for Hungary and Romania ( Vest) 34
Israel. A Framework for Middle East Peace
(Begin. Carter, Mondale, Sadat, joint state-
ment, texts of documents and accompanying
letters) 1
Latin America and the Carribbean. Narcot-
ics Control Efforts in Central America and
the Caribbean (Linneman) 37
Middle East. President Carter's News Confer-
ence of August 17 (excerpts) 12
Military Affairs. President Carter's News
Conference of August I 7 (excerpts) 12
Monetary Affairs. President Carter's News
Conference of August 17 (excerpts) 12
Namibia. Peaceful Solutions to Conflicts in
Namibia and Southern Rhodesia (Chris-
topher) 15
Narcotics. Narcotics Control Efforts in Cen-
tral America and the Caribbean (Linne-
man) 37
North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Presi-
dent Carter's News Conference of August 17
(excerpts) 12
Nuclear Policy
Balancing Nonproliferation and Energy Secu-
rity (Nye) 38
Science and Technology — Their Interaction
With Foreign Policy (Benson) 54
Oceans. Science and Technology — Their In-
teraction With Foreign Policy (Benson) .... 54
Pacific. US Relations With the Pacific Is-
lands (Holbrooke) 43
Petroleum. President Carter's News Confer-
ence of August 17 (excerpts) 12
Population. World Population: The Silent
Explosion — Part I (Fearey. Giffler,
Green) 45
Presidential Documents
A Framework for Middle East Peace (Begin.
Carter, Mondale. Sadat, joint statement,
texts of documents and accompanying
letters) I
President Carter's News Conference of August
17 (excerpts) 12
Publications. GPO Sales 28
Romania. Most-Favored-Nation Tariff Status
for Hungary and Romania ( Vest) 34
Science and Technology. Science and
Technology — Their Interaction With Foreign
Policy (Benson) 54
Southern Rhodesia. Peaceful Solutions to
Conflicts in Namibia and Southern Rhodesia
(Christopher) 15
Trade. Most-Favored-Nation Tariff Status for
Hungary and Romania ( Vest) 34
Treaties
Current Actions 60
A Framework for Middle East Peace (Begin.
Carter. Mondale, Sadat, joint statement,
texts of documents and accompanying
letters) 1
U.S.S.R.
The Potential of the Helsinki Dialogue
(Nimetz) 29
President Carter's News Conference of August
17 (excerpts) 12
Salt II— The Home Stretch (Warnke) 17
U.S. and Soviet Strategic Capability Through
the Mid-1980's - 24
United Nations. The Role of ECOSOC in In-
ternational Economic Dialogue (Young) .... 56
Name Index
Begin, Menahem 1
Benson, Lucy Wilson 54
Carter, President 1,12
Christopher, Warren 15
Fearey. Robert A 45
Giffler, Lydia K 45
Green . Marshall 45
Holbrooke. Richard C 43
Katz. Julius L 26
Linneman, Joseph 37
Mondale, Vice President I
Nimetz, Matthew 29
Nye, Joseph S. , Jr 38
Sadat, Anwar al- 1
Vest. George S 34
Warnke, Paul C 17
Young. Andrew 56
Superintendent of Documents
U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington, D.C. 20402
OFFICIAL BUSINESS
Postage and Fees Paid
Department of State
STA-501
Second Class
i
Subscription Renewals: To insure uninterrupted service, please renew your subscription promptly when you
receive the expiration notice from the Superintendent of Documents. Due to the time required to process
renewals, notices are sent out three months in advance of the expiration date. Any problems involving your
subscription will receive immediate attention if you write to: Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government
Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.
Department
of State
m of State ~IW ~IW j &
bulletin
Novem her MO 7H
\e Official Monthly Record of United States Foreign Policy / Volume 78 / Number 2020
Department of State
bulletin
Volume 78 / Number 2020 / November 1978
The Department of State Bulletin,
published by the Office of Public Com-
munication in the Bureau of Public
Affairs, is the official record of U.S.
foreign policy. Its purpose is to provide
the public, the Congress, and govern-
ment agencies with information on
developments in U.S. foreign relations
and the work of the Department of
State and the Foreign Service.
The Bulletin's contents include
major addresses and news conferences
of the President and the Secretary of
State; statements made before congres-
sional committees by the Secretary
and other senior State Department of-
ficials; special features and articles on
international affairs; selected press re-
leases issued by the White House, the
Department, and the U.S. Mission to
the United Nations; and treaties and
other agreements to which the United
States is or may become a party.
The Secretary of State has deter-
mined that the publication of this peri-
odica! is necessary in the transaction of
the public business required by law of
this Department. Use of funds for
printing this periodical has been ap-
proved by the Director of the Office
of Management and Budget through
January 31, 1981.
NOTE: Contents of this publication
are not copyrighted and items con-
tained herein may be reprinted. Cita-
tion of the Department oe State
Bulletin as the source will be appre-
ciated. The Bulletin is indexed in the
Readers' Guide to Periodical Litera-
ture.
For sale by the Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Print-
ing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402
Price:
12 issues plus annual index —
$18.00 (domestic) $22.50 (foreign)
Single copy—
$1.40 (domestic) $1.80 (foreign)
CYRUS R. VANCE
Secretary of State
HODDING CARTER III
Assistant Secretary for Public Affa
JOHN CLARK KIMBALL
Consulting Editor
PHYLLIS A. YOUNG
Editor
COLLEEN SUSSMAN
Assistant Editor
CONTENTS
1 WORLD POPULATION: THE SILENT EXPLOSION— PART 2
(Marshall Green. Robert A. Fearey. Lydia K. Giffler)
THE PRESIDENT
9 News Conferences of Sept. 28 and
Oct. 10
AFRICA
13 Southern Rhodesia Executive Council
Members Visit U.S. (Department
Announcement. Joint U.S. -U.K.
Statement)
ARMS CONTROL
14 A Balanced and Effective Defense
(Harold Brown)
16 Convention on the Hostile Use of En-
vironmental Modification Tech-
niques (Message from President
Carter)
17 Comprehensive Test Ban (Leslie H.
Gelb)
ECONOMICS
19 Bonn Summit and Investment in De-
veloping Countries (Richard N.
Cooper)
21 Multilateral Trade Negotiations (Mes-
sage from President Carter)
23 U.S. Export Policy (President Carter.
Julius L. Katz)
27 GPO Sales Publications
EUROPE
28 An Overview of U.S. -Soviet Relations
(Marshall D. Shiilman)
29 Letters of Credence (Germany. Ire-
land)
31 Ninth Report on Cyprus (President
Center)
33 An Overview of Eastern Europe f Wil-
liam H. Liters)
MIDDLE EAST
42 Camp David Agreements (Harold H.
Saunders)
43 Secretary Vance's Middle East Visit
UNITED NATIONS
45 33d U.N. General Assembly Convenes
(Secretary Vance)
46 U.S. Delegation to the 33d U.N. Gen-
eral Assembly
48 World Conference To Combat Racism
( White House Statement)
50 United Nations Day, 1978 (President
Carter)
51 United Nations Day, 1978 (Proclama-
tion)
WESTERN HEMISPHERE
51 The Role of Human Rights Policy in
Arms Transfers for Latin America
(Patricia M. Derian)
53 Letter of Credence (Grenada)
54 Arms Transfer Policy in Latin America
(Foreign Relations Outline)
55 U.S. -Mexico Commission on Cultural
Cooperation
TREATIES
56 Current Actions
58 PRESS RELEASES
PUBLICATIONS
58 1950 "Foreign Relations'
"The Near East,
Africa"
INDEX
Volume V:
South Asia, and
Supe
MOV 2
'9
DEPOSITORY
Chart 12
Birth Rates in Selected Developing Countries:
1965 and 1975
5
Singapore^
Cuba
%m?%^sm%m%?a
7///////////////////^^^^
China, Rep. of
5
(Taiwan) p^^^^^^
Chile (^
Trin. & Tob.
Korea, Rep. of
V///////////////////M^^^^^
5
1975
1965
v//////////////////////// '///////A
Mauri tius ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ ^^^^^%^^%^^^
Sri Lanka P
Costa Rica
V////////y "g^^%%^%%%^^%^^^^%i
Jamaica BBBBBBBB^BfciMMi
Panama ^ W///////////////////////A
Malaysia ^
Colombia
Tunisia 1%%?%^%^^^
Thailand p
Turkey
Egypt
India
Philippines
Venezuela
Dominican Rep.g
Indonesia
El Salvador
U.S.A.
10 20 30 40
Live Births per 1 ,000 Population
Source: Based on estimates by W. Parker Mauldin of The Population Council. New York, 1978.
WORLD POPULATION:
THE SILENT EXPLOSION— PART 2
iNSEQUENCES OF
CESSIVE GROWTH
The consequences of excessive
mlation growth are evident across
spectrum of human, animal, and
at life, mainly in developing but
•> in the developed countries.
mlation and Food Supply
Tie 1974 U.N. World Food Confer-
e resolved that ". . .all govern-
its should. . . accept the goal that
nin a decade no child will go to bed
gry, that no family will fear for its
t day's bread, and that no human
ig's future and capacities will be
ited by malnutrition. "
here is. unhappily, no possibility
this goal will be met in a decade or
)od deal longer. Because of rampant
ulation growth, and poverty due in
to that growth, the hungry two-
is of mankind is no better off today
1 it was in 1974.
n the industrialized democracies,
i production increased an average
2.1% per year during the decade
8-77 and population increased 1%,
a per capita food production gain of
% a year. But in the developing
•Id (excluding Communist Asia on
ch data are lacking), a painfully
ieved food production increase of
'5% a year was largely offset by a
ulation increase of 2.6%. (Recent
ids in grain production are shown on
rt 8.) Average per capita food in-
; in the developing world in the
'3-77 period (excluding Communist
a) was about 2,185 calories per day,
ipared with 3,340 calories in the
ustrialized democracies. A 1977
N, Food and Agriculture Organiza-
l (FAO) survey found that in 23
eloping countries, per capita daily
aric supplies, in fact, declined be-
en 1961-63 and 1972-74.
,ow as it is, the developing world's
capita food intake figure fails in
Part 1 of this series appeared
n the October Bulletin and set
orth the facts of the world
copulation problem. Part 3, to
>e published next month, will
ocus on how population control
fforts may be rendered more
ffective.
two respects to reflect the depth of the
problem. The starchy, predominantly
grains and tubers diet of the developing
world is less nutritious than that of the
developed countries. And being an av-
erage figure, including better-off
countries and the better-off people in
each country, the figure indicates a
considerably larger per capita intake
than the impoverished majority actually
attains. Nearly 2 billion people in the
developing countries are continually
undernourished, with resultant low vi-
tality, vulnerability to disease, and low
life expectancy. Outright starvation,
principally of children and the aged,
occurs when drought, flood, or other
disaster undercuts even this minimum
level of subsistence, unless relief
arrives.
The technology of food production
continues to advance, but successful
applications have been primarily in de-
veloped countries possessing the neces-
sary capital. High-yielding green
revolution seed varieties require com-
plementary fertilizer; water; and dis-
ease, insect, and weed control inputs
for full effect, which often are not
available to developing country farm-
ers. Per acre yields in most developing
countries remain far below those in the
developed countries.
Developing country population
growth trends, on the one hand, and
realistically anticipated food produc-
tion increases in those countries, on the
other, point to a need for mounting
developing world food imports. The
prospects are grim, as developing
countries become increasingly depend-
ent on such imports, predominantly
from the single geographic-climatic
zone of northern America. The FAO esti-
mates that food deficits for developing
countries (excluding Communist Asia)
can be expected to increase fivefold
between 1970 and 1990. Meeting those
deficits through imports, sources of
which cannot be assured, will force
many of the developing nations deeper
into debt, thus limiting their ability to
finance other capital costs of develop-
ment, including expanding food pro-
duction. And even if the imported food
is somehow available and the financial
problems can somehow be overcome,
physical movement of the enormous
grain tonnages involved in feeding
hundreds of millions of people will
present tremendous problems.
Efforts, sometimes desperate, to in-
crease developing country food pro-
duction through slash-burn farming and
overuse of land can have precisely the
opposite long-term effect on food pro-
duction. The U.N. Environment Pro-
grame. in a recent report on the state of
the world environment, estimates that
during the last quarter of this century,
twice as many hectares of land will be
lost to soil erosion and urban sprawl as
will be added by bringing new land into
cultivation.
The best hope for raising developing
country food production lies in in-
creasing productivity of land. But this
requires improvements in agricultural
technology and infrastructure calling
for capital expenditures beyond most
developing countries' means, in addi-
tion to policies favoring the small
farmer, better water management, and
other measures presenting difficult
political and administrative problems.
One must conclude that there is no
practical solution to long-term food
production problems that does not
prominently include accelerated de-
clines in population growth rates.
It is sometimes said that there is no
food problem, only a population prob-
lem. This is an oversimplification —
there would be food problems in many
developing countries even if their
populations were suddenly much re-
duced. But, unquestionably, the severe
undernourishment of two-fifths of
mankind is attributable, in major part,
to the handicap of too many mouths to
feed. And the number grows daily.
Population and Development
Excessive population growth ad-
versely affects economic progress in
many developing nations. Specifically,
it:
• Lowers per capita living standards;
• Absorbs resources needed for in-
vestment in development;
• Contributes to the income disparity
between rich and poor;
• Absorbs scarce foreign exchange
for food imports; and
• Intensifies unemployment and un-
deremployment.
Improving standards of living re-
quires that economic growth signifi-
cantly outpace population growth. Yet
while the per capita income of all de-
veloping countries increased over the
past quarter century at an annual aver-
Department of State Buli
I"-
".'■
ill
Char •>
Grain Production (1960 - 77)
Total Production of Grain
Population Growth
Per Capita Grain Production
Developing Countries
• Developed Countries
Million
M Tons
500
Billions of
Persons
2.0r
Kilograms
700 r
\f
,--, I
MV
y
i i i i
j i i i i i i_
1960
1965 1970
Year
1975
1960
1965 1970
Year
1975
1960
1965 1970
Year
1975
Note: Grain production comprises on the average 35% of total food production in developed countries and 64% in developing countries.
The greater variations in total and per capita gram production in developed than in developing countries are attributable to greater weather vanations in
temperate than in tropical farming zones and to more extensive policy interventions by developed than developing country governments in farm
acreage and production levels.
Source of data: US Department of Agriculture
r Excludes centrally-planned economies.
II
I
f
W
rba
Kipa
K
iin
■v
gii
,
Hi
-
I Dl
is
II!
lor
in
isl
it
age rate of over 3%, in low-income
countries — particularly those of popu-
lous South Asia — per capita economic-
growth was less than half the average
rate. The real per capita income of
some developing countries actually de-
clined. Despite impressive achieve-
ments since the 1950's in building up
the foundations for economic and so-
cial development, all too many people
saw little or no improvements in their
conditions of life.
It has been argued that moderniza-
tion and development produce lower
fertility rates. But this is not an au-
tomatic process. And where it docs
occur, the process is likely to require
many decades. During that time, rapid
population growth slows development
and widens the gap between rich and
poor nations and between the rich and
poor people within nations.
Improvement of the agricultural
sector is the key to economic develop-
ment of most developing nations. But it
is in the agricultural areas of these
nations that human fertility is usually
highest. The result is either out-
migration or more and more people on
the land (generally a combination of
the two), further subdivisions of family
holdings, lower productivity per
worker, and a perpetuation of poverty.
The discouraging cycle of develop-
ment handicapped by excessive popu-
lation growth, and of such growth con-
tinuing because of stalled development,
can be overcome only through a variety
of carefully formulated, vigorously
pursued measures adapted to each
country's needs. But one of the princi-
pal requirements in most LDC's is all
too clearly the earliest possible reduc-
tion of high fertility rates
Population and Social Factors
Excessive population growth has
serious social consequences, especially
in terms of unemployment, urban
crowding, and overburdened education,
health, and other public services.
Unemployment/Underemployment.
Unemployment, particularly of young
people, is a major problem in the de-
veloped world. But in the developing
countries, the problem is immense and
worsening. The number of yoi
coming into the working-age rangi
soaring, while job-creating devel
ment proceeds too slowly. The rcsu
rising unemployment or undercmpl
ment.
Taking the developing regions a<
whole (excluding China for lack
adequate data), the population in
1 5—64 years age range is projected
the United Nations to grow from
billion in 1975 to 2.2 billion in 20
an annual average rate of 2.9% (cl
9). During this period, the socially I
politically volatile 15-24 years ;
group, in which unemployment is p
ticularly high, is projected to gr
rapidly, even assuming moderately
creasing fertility.
The International Labor Organizat
(ILO) has projected that the number
persons in the developing world lai
force will grow from 1,011 million
1970 to 1,933 million in 2000. an
crease of 922 million workers, or 91
in one generation. The ILO has furt
estimated that 30% of the labor force
the developing world will be either l
employed or underemployed by 198C
,:.
mber 1978
Ihe Government of Egypt recently
mated that it costs, on the average.
u t 7,000 Egyptian pounds
$10,000) to create a new job and
the work force will be crowing by
But 350.000-400,000 people every
r in Egypt. On this basis, as-
omical expenditures will be re-
ed to provide jobs for the projected
million additional workers in the
loping world as a whole over the
0-2000 period.
Irban Crowding. Unemployment/
eremployment in rural areas is a
cipal cause of urban overcrowding.
re there is not enough work in the
ntryside for burgeoning population,
ses of people swarm into already
vded cities looking for jobs, often
vain. It has been estimated that
le developing countries' popula-
s are doubling about every 25-30
"s. their large cities are doubling
y 10-15 years, and their urban
ns or shantytowns every 5-7 years
irt 10).
he flow of migrants from rural
is into crowded cities is a matter of
cern for many developing countries.
U.N. Population Commission re-
on its 19th session (January 1977)
its out that the governments of 130
eloping countries regard this situa-
as unacceptable. Some cities can
longer be called cities but rather
; urban agglomerations with exten-
: shantytowns in which living con-
ons are deplorable; agglomerations
;re people, other than the urban elite
1 middle classes, are without
quate water, sanitation, health,
cation, and other social services;
SWELLING CITIES
Estimates and Rough Projections
of Selected Urban Agglomerations
in Developing Countries
(millions of persons)
1960 1970 1975 2000
Calcutta
5.5
6.9
8.1
19.7
Mexico
City
4.9
8.6
10.9
31.6
Greater
Bombay
4 1
5.8
7.1
19.1
Greater Cairo
3.7
5.7
6.9
16.4
Jakarta
2.7
4.3
5.6
16.9
Seoul
2.4
5.4
7.3
18 7
Delhi
2.3
3.5
4.5
13.2
Manila
2 2
3.5
4.4
12.7
Tehran
1.9
3.4
4.4
13.8
Karachi
1.8
3.3
4.5
15.9
Bogota
1.7
2.6
3.4
9.5
Lagos
0.8
1.4
2.1
9.4
Source:
Based
on U.N. estimate
and
medium variant
projections.
where people are often living five or
six in a room, acutely aware of the
great disparity in wealth and poverty
about them. All this contributes to
alienation and frustration on a massive
scale.
Overburdened Public Services.
Many LDC populations are growing
faster than educational, health, sani-
tation, transport, and other public
services can be provided.
In education, for example, the
pyramidal age structure of population
growth, and funding shortages, have
left educational systems increasingly
incapable of meeting school facility
and teacher needs (chart II). Many
governments, once committed to uni-
versal education, have quietly aban-
doned that objective. In 1950 about
44% of the world's adult popula-
tion — or 700 million people — were
illiterate. Since that time, the per-
centage has declined, but the absolute
number of illiterates has grown to
about 800 million. Of these, almost
two-thirds are women.
Similarly, population growth has
outstripped the provision of health
facilities. Disappointing economic
growth trends in most developing
countries, and the long lead times in-
volved in implementing health care
services, suggest that attempts to
supply fast-growing populations with
medical care will fall farther and
farther behind demand. Expanded use
of paramedical personnel trained to
perform routine health services should
help to meet some of the need in
countries adopting this technique. But
unless population growth can be
slowed, this approach will still leave
vast unsatisfied health care require-
ments.
In sum, the social consequences of
excessive population growth are
highly damaging, both for the im-
mediate well-being of a large propor-
tion of humanity and for the prospects
of improvement through development.
Illiterate, untrained, disease-weak-
ened people are unlikely to contribute
effectively to the development proc-
ess.
Population and the Environment
The population-environment re-
lationship is a crucial one, especially
for future generations.
In recent decades, the Earth's veg-
etation cover (farmlands, forests, and
grasslands), fisheries, mineral re-
sources, and atmosphere have suf-
fered a sharply increased rate of de-
pletion and pollution.
In large part this has been the re-
sult of intensive industrial and ag-
ricultural development by the ad-
vanced countries, seeking to improve
their already high living standards.
When population growth occurs in
societies where wealth and technology
have led to high production and con-
sumption lifestyles, the added demand
on energy supplies, fisheries, forest
products, minerals, natural recreation
areas, and water is inordinately large,
as is the resulting pollution. The de-
veloped nations are attempting to re-
duce the environmental damage for
which they are responsible through
recently initiated, as yet inadequate,
national and international conserva-
tion and antipollution controls and
through falling birth rates.
Environmental degradation has also
resulted from the desperate efforts of
rapidly growing, impoverished popu-
lations in the developing countries to
increase food production, collect
firewood for fuel, and otherwise sur-
vive. Vast areas of Africa, South and
Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and
Latin America have been crippled by
slash-and-burn agriculture, overcrop-
ping, overgrazing, and consequent
wind and water erosion. Millions of
acres of forest have been sacrificed to
the ever-growing need for cropland,
firewood, and timber. Deprived of
water-holding cover, millions of tons
of virtually irreplaceable topsoil have
been washed into the sea. The Sahel,
Nepal, Haiti, Java, and many other
regions have been described as
ecological disaster areas. But the
population pressures which caused the
damage remain, with ever-growing
numbers attempting to subsist from
ever-depleting natural resources.
The problem worldwide is evident
in:
• Most fundamentally, the destruc-
tion of vegetation cover, the source of
man's food and oxygen;
• The decline, since 1970. in the
world fishing catch, due largely to
overfishing and pollution of spawning
beds;
• Rapid depletion of oil and gas
reserves;
• Similarly rapid depletion of met-
als resources;
• Overcrowding and impairment of
national parks, wildlife preserves,
city parks, beaches, and other natural
recreational areas;
• Destruction of animal and plant
wildlife by farming, timbering, ur-
banization, pesticide and fertilizer
poisoning, and hunting;
• Environmental illnesses (notably
emphysema, stroke, parasitic infec-
tions, heart disease, and cancer)
caused by the introduction of new
chemicals into the ecosystem, by air
and water pollution, and by crowding;
• Water shortages due to the mas-
sive water requirements of modern
agriculture, industry, and consumer
living; depletion of underground
water supplies; pollution of lakes and
rivers; and exhaustion of promising
water catchment and irrigation sites;
and
• Damaging rainfall and temper-
ature pattern changes brought on by
carbon dioxide in the atmosphere
from wood and fossil fuels, dust from
urban and agricultural activity, and
the thermal effects of waste heat and
economic activity.
This environmental loss and dam-
age is occurring in a world of 4 bil-
lion people. In 25 scars the number
of human consumers and polluters is
expected to be about 6 billion, grow-
ing to 8 billion or more. Environ-
mental conservation and purity arc
belatedly an accepted world goal. But
the developed countries are moving
far less rapidly than they might to
control their heavy consumption of
scarce materials and pollution of
oceans and air. In the developing
countries, where capital for conserva-
tion and antipollution measures is
scarce and requirements on natural re-
sources for survival are heavy, more
determined efforts to slow population
growth would be a key contribution to
the developing countries' own and the
world's environmental protection
efforts.
There are those who believe that
the world's biosphere, already heavily
strained, simply cannot tolerate the
combined impact of projected popu-
lation growth, increasing resource
use. and pollution. There is growing
concern that mankind's mounting
numbers, pressing against finite re-
sources, will overshoot the carrying
capacity of the Earth.
Population and Political Factors
The political implications of high
population growth are difficult to de-
fine for they vary from country to
country, are resistant to isolation and
analysis, and therefore do not lend
themselves easily to generalizations.
However, a few are offered
High population growth rates, often
attended by economic stagnation,
overcrowded cities, social unrest, and
pressures for foreign migration can
undermine the internal stability of
nations as well as complicate rela-
tions among nations. Such conditions
also detract from the environment
needed to attract foreign capital, vital
to achieving increased levels of eco-
nomic growth.
To the extent excessive population
growth frustrates economic develop-
ment, it is a fundamental factor in
perpetuating and even widening the
gap between the per capita incomes of
rich and poor nations. The politiciza-
tion of international economic rela-
tions and their polarization along
"North-South" lines are in them-
selves creating new challenges and
obstacles for improved cooperation
between nations. Intensifying popula-
tion pressures will serve to reinforce
these trends.
In centuries past, millions of poor
have accepted their lot with resigna-
tion and political apathy. This situa-
tion is changing, as expanding com-
munications instill greater awareness
thai there can be a better life. Some
can be expected to seek radical pre-
scriptions in violence, including ter-
rorism. There is real danger that vio-
lence will grow and spread unless
more effective means can be found
for improving conditions of life for
the masses.
Overpopulation has been an under-
lying factor in certain international
conflicts and major internal disorders.
This danger continues and may inten-
sify as populations burgeon and the
scramble for scarce raw materials
intensifies.
Such pressures seem destined to
produce an increasingly turbulent and
dangerous international environment
for the pursuit of peace, stability, and
improved conditions of life for all
people.
Department of State Bull;
life support systems, and stationary
declining living standards over m.
of the developing world, is clear
The overpopulation problem is
most often viewed in broad economic,
social, and political terms. But it is
fundamentally a problem of the
frustrations, deprivation, and suffer-
ing of millions of individual human
beings, predominantly in the de-
veloping countries. Millions of
women are caught up in a cycle of
endless childbearing. wasted health,
drudgery, and limited life expectancy.
Vast numbers of children are born
into a future of undernourishment,
physical and mental impairment, and
virtually no prospect of advancement
and a better life. Multitudes of adults
and youths are without meaningful
employment.
Population pressures are by no
means the only cause of these condi-
tions Poverty and suffering existed
long before there were such pres-
sures. But the central importance of
overpopulation in the syndrome of
mounting demands on diminishing
WHAT IS BEING DONE?
Growing Awareness of the Problen ii
and of How It Must Be Met
ft
.;,
id I
lie
fill
Over the past 10-15 years, tht
has been an encouraging increase
world awareness of the populati
problem. Many developing natil
now appreciate the need for urgei
far-reaching action to reduce popu
tion growth if tomorrow's world
not to be one of potentially disastro
overcrowding, deprivation, and disc
der.
Developing countries have seen t
situation as a matter of direct natior
interest if their development effoi
were not to be greatly impaired
totally frustrated. At least thre
fourths of the people in the develo
ing world live in countries whe
governments have now adopi
population programs related to the
economic development plans. D
veloped nations also have populatii
concerns, although they are differs
from and generally less serious an
urgent than those of LDC's.
To a large extent, far-sighte
public-spirited private individuals aj
organizations have taken the lead
sounding the alarm and initiating n
tional and international populatii
programs. The United Nations and
concerned specialized and associai
agencies, including the World Ban
have become more and more i
volved. In mid-1974, a U.N
sponsored World Population Confe
ence was held in Bucharest. Tl
conference adopted a World Popul
tion Plan of Action (WPPA) whii
reflected a consensus of 136 pa.
ticipating governments and whn
stands today as a charter and beacf
for effective, morally, and cultural
acceptable population policies ar
programs. (The Holy See did not pa
ticipate in the consensus.)
The WPPA emphasizes the fund;
mental interrelationship of develop
ment and population growth. It note
1
Single copies of reprints of this
three-part series, entitled "World
Population: The Silent Explosion," are
available from the Correspondence
Management Division, Bureau of Public
Affairs, Department of State, Washing-
ton, DC. 20520.
-ember 1^78
couples whom development has
bled to attain above-minimum
ng standards are more likely to de-
fewer children and to devote the
essary attention and resources to
dementing that desire. But de-
opment can proceed only with
it difficulty, if at all. in the face
excessive population growth. Ac-
dingly the WPPA advocates a
pronged approach in which de-
opment is pursued in mutually
forcing conjunction with popula-
i programs.
uch population programs have
le to center in two broad areas —
ivation of couples to desire small
ilies and the provision of modern
lily planning services.
Motivation for Small Families. At
:harest and earlier, it was recog-
;d that broad economic and social
elopment, leading to a preference
small families, could not be an-
pated in many developing coun-
s for an indefinite period. On the
r hand, experience had shown
particular elements of. or ap-
aches to, development are espe-
ly effective in bringing fertility
lines. Many countries' population
cies have accordingly sought to
)hasize those elements.
Reduction of infant and child
rtality — When parents expect a
aer proportion of their children to
/ive to adulthood, they have fewer
surance births." In some countries
Africa, Asia, and Latin America.
r 50% of all deaths occur before
age of five. Time and again, as
lint and child mortality rates have
n brought down, fertility rates
e also declined.
1 Expansion of basic education,
ecially for girls — Studies in Latin
ierica reveal that women who have
pleted primary school average
>ut two less children than those
o have not. Schooling tends to
ay the age of marriage for girls,
is reducing the number of
ldbearing years. For both men and
men in traditional environments, it
adens the students' view of the
jortunities and potentialities of
inclines them to think more for
mselves, and reduces their suspi-
n of social change, including fam-
planning. Schooling also enhances
girl's prospects of finding employ-
nt outside the home that may com-
e with raising a large family. And
rents see children in school as
*ang less immediate economic util-
but greater long-term earning
)acity; this conduces toward a more
iipact, well-educated family norm
with children better able to care for
parents in their old age.
• Increasing the productivity and
income of the rural and urban
poor — The fertility of subsistence
landholders and landless farmers is
characteristically high. Land and ten-
ancy reform, assured availability of
water, and effective extension of
credit and other facilities enable such
farmers to increase their productivity
and income and thus to attain im-
proved health, education, and living
standards. This normally leads to a
decline in birth rates. Government
programs to enable urban poor to in-
crease their productivity, earnings.
and access to public services tend to
be similarly rewarded with reduced
fertility rates.
• More equitable distribution of the
benefits of economic growth —
Economic growth alleviates poverty,
thereby contributing to reduced fertil-
ity, only if the masses of the people
participate in that growth through in-
creased employment, incomes, and
consumption of goods and services.
But typically in developing countries
the upper 20% of the population re-
ceive about 55% of the national in-
come, and the lowest 20% receive
about 5%. Some 40% of the popula-
tion are outside the development
process. Only when an equitable
share of the benefits of growth are
secured by the lower income groups
does economic growth have substan-
tial beneficial effect on fertility.
• Enhancing the status of wom-
en — Programs to enhance the social,
economic, and political status of
women contribute, perhaps more than
any other measure, to reduced fertil-
ity. Esteemed — and encouraged to
esteem themselves — in their role as
mothers, women are typically denied
equal access to education, much less
to salaried employment. Despite the
burdens they carry of childbearing,
housework, farming, and marketing,
they also tend to have last claim on
available food. The role of govern-
ment in opening the door of opportu-
nity to women in traditional, male-
dominated societies is crucial. This is
a matter of social justice and human-
itarian concern. It will also have the
likely effect of lowering birth rates.
In the desperately poor circum-
stances of wide areas of Africa, Asia,
and Latin America parents may be
powerfully motivated to have many
children. From the perspective of
their own private interests, as op-
posed to wider community, national,
and world perspectives of which such
parents are little if at all aware, sur-
viving children are highly desirable to
help with farm and household tasks,
to provide a measure of old-age se-
curity, and as a response to ingrained
religious and social values, including
male dominance and machismo. A
U.N. Fund for Population Activities
(UNFPA) publication. The State of
World Population 1978, reports a
Chart 9
Population of Working Ages in the Developing
Countries* (1975 — 2000)
Billions of
Persons
2r 1-
* Excludes China
] 25-64 Years
115-24 Years
IP
Wfflm
n 2
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
Year
Source: Based on U.N projections, medium variant, as assessed in 1973.
Department of State Bullel
survey in a section of Java, Indonesia,
which showed that children can be net
income earners for their families by
the age of 9 or 10, performing the
following functions: average age
7.9 — caring for chickens and ducks;
8 — caring for younger children;
8.8 — fetching water; 9.3 — caring for
goats and cattle; 9.5 — cutting fodder;
9.7 — harvesting rice; 9.9 —
transplanting rice; 12.9 — working for
wages; and 13 — hoeing. The same
UNFPA publication noted that: •"Ac-
cording to some estimates, a poor
family in rural India has to have six
or seven children to be 95% certain of
one surviving son." The population
growth control-oriented elements of
development cited above will not be
easily implemented in the vast regions
where these conditions and attitudes
prevail. But experience indicates they
offer the most promising means of
enhancing desire for smaller families
in the face of such conditions and at-
titudes.
Family Planning Services. Com-
plementing their efforts in the area of
motivation, many governments and
government-supported private organi-
zations have undertaken programs to
provide parents with readily avail-
able, effective, safe, and convenient
means of family planning.
The prime determinant of birth
rates is the motivational factor —
parental desire or nondesire for large
families. But the ready availability of
modern contraceptive information and
supplies is also critically important to
world fertility reduction. A 1976 In-
ternational Planned Parenthood Fed-
eration (IPPF) survey indicated that
of the approximately 400 million
women around the globe (excluding
the U.S.S.R. and China) "at risk" of
an unwanted pregnancy, two-thirds
were not practicing contraception. In
the developing countries, nearly 80%
of couples "at risk" do not now have
access to, or for other reasons do not
use, contraceptive methods. At the
same time, one out of every three or
four pregnancies ends in abortion.
Availability of family planning serv-
ices would prevent many situations
leading to abortions or unwanted
births.
Some couples' desire to restrict
births is so strong that they will
achieve their purpose whether modern
contraceptives are available or not,
through such traditional methods as
late marriage, abstinence, withdrawal,
rhythm, and abortion. Others' desire
for large families is so strong that the
availability of contraceptives would
have little or no effect. But the ex-
perience of recent years shows that
couples can be influenced to avoid
undesired births by knowledge that
effective, safe, and convenient means
Chart 10
Urban Population in Developed and Developing
Countries (1950, 1975, and 2000)
Billions of
Persons
6.0T
5.0-
4.0
3.0-
2.0-
1.0
About half of world total population
growth between 1 975 and 2000 is
likely to take place in LDC towns
and cities.
LDCs
Rural
Urban
LDCs
LDCs
DCs
?54%?
.,-,.-.„..
DCs
■69V
t27%-
DCs
■80 V
39<?
1950 1975
Source: Based on U N estimates and medium variant projections
2000
to that end exist and by the real
availability of such means.
In sum, the critical importance
the world population problem, a
the more promising means of deal
with it. are much more widely und
stood than they were 10-15 ye
ago. The awakening process must
on, but the emphasis in much of
world is now on the successful i
plementation of population progra
whose need and importance are r
ognized and accepted.
:
lew
J" ■
«ral
in
itlai
icon
effe
ttwis
cs
Country Programs and
Achievements
Lea.
Nearly 95% of the people of ti
developing world live in countri
whose governments have now adopt<
family planning programs related
national development plans and/
family health and welfare or whoi
governments permit — and oft<
support — private activities in th
field. Only 8 of the 144 developii
countries surveyed by the United N
tions restrict in any way access
modern methods of family regulation ]
Family planning programs
LDCs vary widely, however,
quality and effectiveness. In the via
of W. Parker Mauldin and Berna<
Berelson of the Population Counc
these programs "... range from vij
orous and continuous efforts und
skilled management to weak an
spotty performance under indiffere
administration, on down to no effci
at all."
The sharpest declines in LDC bir
rates during the 1965-75 period (i.e
!l
■
reductions of 30% or more) occurn
in Singapore, Cuba, Hong Kon,
South Korea, Barbados, and Taiwi
(chart 12 facing page 1). Reductions
20-30% are estimated for Chili
Trinidad and Tobago, Mauritius. Cos
Rica, Malaysia, Colombia, Tunisi
Thailand, Panama, Fiji, Jamaica, ai
the Dominican Republic. Countries wi
a 10-20% decline included the tw
largest market economy LDCs — Ind
and Indonesia — as well as the Phili| l
pines. China's birth rate is unknowi
but Chinese media report a steady de
cline in the country's population growl
rate in recent years. China's currei
goal — vigorously pursued, by &
indications — is to reduce its populatio
growth rate to less than 1% by the en
of 1980.
All the above-cited countries havj
instituted programs to reduce fertilityi
and most have also, over the past 21
years, made measurable, broad-base4
social and economic progress. Thusj
st
:[
ember 1978
only have these countries pro-
:ed family planning — many of
n vigorously — but most have acted
improve health conditions; raise
level of educational attainment;
ance economic, political, and
tural opportunities for women;
, in some cases, achieve a higher
relatively widespread distribution
income. These measures have had
effect of delaying marriage and
rwise contributing to fertility de-
es,
should be noted that the fertil-
declines in Singapore, South
ea. Taiwan, and some other coun-
s cited above began before
ernment-sponsored family plan-
g programs had commenced. It is
yet clear whether such programs
initiate a transition from high to
fertility ahead of substantial eco-
lic and social progress, as op-
ed to accelerating a transition to
er fertility in a context of such
gress. Among non-Communist
ntries, Indonesia offers perhaps
most promising testing ground for
umber of innovative approaches
ard lowered fertility in the ab-
ce of substantial social and eco-
lic development. An intensive ef-
is being made to gain the active
iport of influential village
ders — and village wives' clubs,
Iwives, and other local groups — in
ily planning activities and to inte-
tte family planning services into
;r social and economic develop-
it programs at the village level.
s program has recorded a remarka-
growth in family planning accep-
; notwithstanding the poverty of
country. This has suggested to
knowledgeable observer, follow-
a field trip to Indonesia, that
. extreme Malthusian pressures
y provide the needed motivation
en linked to a strong facilitating
ily planning distribution] system
ich reaches people at the local
el." (Professor Ronald Freedman,
iversity of Michigan)
n sum, about 30 LDC's appear to
'e reduced their birth rates by
-40% in the 1965-75 period. The
luctions have derived from a
nber of causes but primarily from
mutually reinforcing impact, in
;lear proportion, of socioeconomic
/elopment and family planning
>grams. Though the example of
se countries' achievement is highly
portant, the reductions have only
derately reduced overall LDC
Dulation growth from 2.6% in the
ly 1970's to about 2.4% today,
ving aside China.
Chart 11
School Attendance in Developing Countries
Millions of
Persons
900 r '
800
700
600
500
400
300
200
100
•Estimated
Projected
Medium Variant
Low Variant
Children not in School
1960 — 210 million
1974 — 270 million
Idren in School
1960 — 117 million
1974 — 231 million
H L
1960
1970
It is impossible to say at what pace the
proportion of children in school will rise in the
1 976-2000 period The chart does, however,
clearly indicate the tremendous growth in the
number of children 5-14 years of age dunng
that period and the heavy burden many LDCs
will face in increasing, or even maintaining,
the current proportion in school.
I I I I
2000
1990
1980
Year
Note: Excludes China, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, and the Socialist
Republic of Vietnam.
Source: Enrollment data from UNESCO, Statistical Yearbook 1976. 1977, Population estimates
to 1975 from UN; projections from U S Bureau of the Census.
External Support
In their efforts to deal with their
population problems, governments are
able to turn to a variety of gov-
ernmental and nongovernmental or-
ganizations for advisory and funding
assistance. About two-thirds of the
funds devoted by the developing
world (except the Asian Communist
countries) to population purposes are
indigenous and about one-third comes
from external assistance. Such exter-
nal assistance to population programs
in 1965-78 totals $2.1 billion (chart
13). 5
Multilateral Assistance. The U.N.
Fund for Population Activities
(UNFPA) is the largest multilateral
source of external funding for popu-
lation action programs in developing
countries. In its 9 years' existence,
UNFPA has provided over $250 mil-
lion in support of more than 1,200
population projects in more than 100
countries. In 1977 the Fund's annual
budget, obtained from voluntary con-
tributions by some 45 donor coun-
tries, exceeded $100 million. The
major donors have included Canada,
Denmark, the Federal Republic of
Germany, Japan, the Netherlands,
Norway, Sweden, the United King-
dom, and the United States. The
United States in recent years has pro-
vided about 30% of total UNFPA
funding.
UNFPA assistance is provided only
upon the request of governments. The
Fund is neutral as regards national
population policies so long as the
programs it supports are voluntary.
The six areas in which the Fund can
provide assistance are: basic popula-
tion data, population dynamics,
population policy, family planning,
communication and education, and
program development. Since the
World Population Conference in
1974, requests for UNFPA assistance
have considerably exceeded its re-
sources, requiring the Fund to deter-
mine allocation priorities.
Most of the projects that UNFPA
supports are implemented through or-
ganizations and specialized agencies
of the U.N. system, acting in their
respective fields of competence.
Among these are the U.N. Office of
Technical Cooperation, the U.N. De-
velopment Program (UNDP), World
Health Organization (WHO), U.N.
Children's Fund (UNICEF), U.N.
Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization (UNESCO), Food and
Agriculture Organization (FAO), and
International Labor Organization
(ILO). Responding to the desire of
International Assistance to Population Programs
Primary Sources of Grant Funds (1965-78)
Millions of
U.S. Dollars
320 r
300
280
260
240
220
200
180
160
140 -
120
100
80
60
40
20
Est
310
| Private Sources
J Donor Governments other than the U S
lUS Government (AID)
368 3,4 R
1 1
1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978
Source Otlice or Population. Bureau lor Developmenl Support, US Agency lor International Developmenl Included in !he above figures are
national conlnbubons to international populabon assistance oigani;ations sucn as UNFPA and IPPF
developing countries, an increasing
share of UNFPA support, now about
27%, has been going directly to de-
veloping country population agencies.
The World Bank and its soft-loan
affiliate, the International Develop-
ment Association (IDA), entered the
population assistance field in 1968.
This reflected the Bank's conviction
that rapid population growth is a
major barrier to the economic and so-
cial progress of many developing
countries. Supported projects have in-
cluded a widening range of activities
relevant to an effective population
program. Assistance is provided on
conventional Bank terms or, in the
case of especially weak economies,
on highly subsidized soft-loan terms.
Bilateral Assistance. The major
national donors of population assist-
ance are Canada, Denmark, the Fed-
eral Republic of Germany, Japan, the
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, the
United Kingdom, and the United
States
The U.S. program, comprising
about two-thirds of the total over the
1965-78 period, is administered by
the Ageruv for International De-
velopment (AID). It has assisted
some 30 developing countries on a
bilateral basis and another 50 coun-
tries through programs sponsored by
private organizations and intermediary
agencies such as the IPPF and
UNFPA
The emphasis of the U.S. popula-
tion assistance program, carried out
in close conjunction with health as-
sistance particularly for mothers and
children, has been on the provision of
contraceptive information and
supplies. Recently, while maintaining
and increasing this program, added
emphasis has been given to programs
to enhance motivation for the use of
family planning services. Experience
has demonstrated that both programs
are required for maximum results in a
mutually supporting relationship.
Most of the eight non-U. S. donor
countries' bilateral aid programs
focus on innovative approaches in a
limited number of countries of special
interest. Several are participants in
World Bank consortium projects in
Bangladesh and Kenya. The major
part of their population assistance,
however, goes to the multilateral pro-
grams of the United Nations and the
IPPF. Over 60% of UNFPA 's funding
and over 40% of the IPPF budget are
provided by these eight countries.
Nongovernmental Organizations.
A large number of private, non-
governmental organizations (NGO's)
have become involved in various as-
pects of the population field, includ-
ing research, training, and the provi-
sion of technical, commodity, and fi-
nancial assistance to developing
countries. Funding for these organi-
Department of State Bullei \.
zations has come from both priva
and public sources.
The United States has provide
substantial financial support, throuj
AID, to a number of NGO's in recoj
nition of the need for many-sided e
forts for effective overall populatic
assistance to developing countrie
The Ford and Rockefeller Found;
tions have been major supporters <
world population programs sine
1965.
NGO's have a unique capacity i
undertake innovative or pioneerir tr
activities, especially in the areas i
contraception service delivery and u
motivation. They are also an impo
tant vehicle for population assistanc
to countries lacking an official popi
lation policy or program, or whe:
foreign governmental aid is nn
wanted. This has given NGO's a sij
nificant role in many countrie
working with private as well as go"
ernment programs.
The largest international NGO
the IPPF, which provides assistant
to some 90 affiliated national fami
planning associations around tf
world. In 1977 the IPPF budget w;
more than $50 million. The majq
IPPF contributors are Canada, Japai
Sweden, the United Kingdom, and tr'
United States (about 30%).
Contraception service delivery, ii
eluding the expansion of sterilizatic ■ ■ nclu
programs and community-based coh iEs
traceptive distribution projects, is tl
top priority of IPPF national popul,
tion policies and programs. Con
munication and community educatic n
receive priority where national pr< idi
grams have taken on broad respons*
bility for service delivery. Increasin
emphasis is given to women's a(
tivities associated with family plan
ning and to improvement of the stati
of women.
Other leading population NGO's as
the Pathfinder Fund, Family Plannin
International Assistance, and Associa
tion for Voluntary Sterilization. A
provide technical, commodity, and fi
nancial assistance to population pre
grams in developing countries.
Pi
Id I
tin
mi
K
VI
ipei
loss
Sit
ted
m
pot
s The figures in chart 13 are in year-by-ye
current dollars. In real terms, taking accoun
of inflation, international assistance to popi
lation programs declined between 1972 an
1977.
II
mil
nli
hi
'J; i
ii
urn
ii
vcmber 1978
THE PRESIDENT:
News Conferences,
Sept. 28 and Oct. I© (Excerpts)
PT. 28 '
'd like to comment first on two
y courageous actions that have been
en recently. The first is by the Is-
li Knesset — their parliament — latt
t night, when they voted over-
elmingly by more than a 4 to 1
rgin for peace in the Middle East,
luding the removal of the Israeli
tiers from the Sinai, which is
yptian territory.
This is a continuation of the
-irageous action that has already
:n demonstrated by Prime Minister
gin. who led the parliament debate,
/e his full weight to this peace
ve, and by President Sadat who
>perated at Camp David in making
»ossible. :
Since the Knesset vote. I have
iced to Prime Minister Begin; also,
it a few minutes ago, since lunch, to
sident Sadat. Both of them agree
't there are no remaining obstacles
proceeding as rapidly as possible to
lclude a peace treaty between Israel
i Egypt.
['m very proud of this action on
ir part. We will cooperate again as
1 partners in the negotiations to
nclude the final terms of the
aeli-Egyptian peace treaty.
Q. What will you do to make
ime Minister Begin comply with
ur understanding that Israel must
entually withdraw from the West
nk and, further, to build no set-
ments there during the 5 years of
gotiation? And will you consider a
ristmas trip to the Middle East
r the signing of the peace treaty?
A. There *s nothing that I can make
ime Minister Begin do. He's an in-
pendent leader of an autonomous
d independent nation, and I can only
e persuasion and depend upon the
atual trust that exists between me
d him.
There were 20 or 30 very crucial is-
es that were obstacles at the begin-
ng of the Camp David negotiations,
lis was one of them. And I would
less that it was after midnight
iturday — less than 24 hours after the
nal agreement was signed — that we
ached these agreements.
There are two elements of the dis-
pute. One is at what time will the
agreement not to build any more set-
tlements be concluded. Prime Minister
Begin 's interpretation is that this is to
be maintained, the prohibition against
new settlements, during the negotia-
tions concerning the Sinai with Egypt.
My very clear understanding is that
it related to the negotiation for con-
clusion in the West Bank-Gaza Strip
of the establishment of a self-
government.
The other question concerns whether
or not Israel would initiate new set-
tlements after this negotiating period
was concluded and the self-gov-
ernment was established.
I think the best answer to that is that
this is an honest difference of opinion.
The best answer I can give is to quote
from a statement by Foreign Minister
Dayan, who was with us at that mid-
night meeting, and this is a statement
he made at the Ben Gurion Airport on
the 19th of September, when he ar-
rived in Israel. ""Let us not delude
ourselves" — I'm quoting him — "I
have no doubt that when we enter into
deliberations with the other three par-
ties concerning what is to happen in
the area in the 5 years of transi-
tion" — that's the West Bank-Gaza
Strip — "this question will come up
and will be discussed and agreement
will have to be reached on this sub-
ject."
So the degree of participation of the
residents of the West Bank has still
got to be determined. But it's an hon-
est difference of opinion. It would
certainly be no obstacle to the progress
toward peace.
But I can't say that we've resolved
it yet. There's no personal animosity
between myself and Prime Minister
Begin. I certainly do not allege any
improper action on his part. It's just
an honest difference of opinion, which
I think will be resolved.
As far as my going to the Middle
East is concerned, nothing would
please me more than to participate in
the signing of a peace treaty at an
early date. But that's still to be
negotiated. The only request that
President Sadat made of me in the en-
tire Camp David proceedings was that
I come to Egypt. I promised him that I
would sometime in the future.
Q. If Prime Minister Begin per-
sists, would you consider canceling
the U.S. agreement to build airbases
in the Negev for Israel?
A. No. The letter to Israel concern-
ing the two airports to be put in the
Negev — I have already directed that
that letter be sent to Israel. It's not
being sent from me to Prime Minister
Begin; it's being sent from Defense
Secretary Harold Brown to Defense
Minister Weizman.
We have not agreed to build the air-
bases. We've agreed to consult with
the Israelis and participate in the cost
of those rebuilt airbases, to the degree
that we negotiate in the future. We
will certainly participate in the cost,
the degree to be determined in the
future.
Q. We hear reports that you feel
pretty good about how the SALT
negotiations are coming along these
days. How close are we to a SALT
agreement now?
A. The issues that divide us and the
Soviet Union on SALT have been con-
stantly narrowed over the last 18
months of negotiation. Now the issues
are quite few.
I also talked to Secretary Vance
since lunch. He's been meeting today
and yesterday with Foreign Minister
Gromyko of the Soviet Union. I think
that both men are negotiating aggres-
sively and in good faith to reach a
conclusion of the differences.
I don't know what the outcome will
be. It takes two to reach agreement.
We hope to conclude a SALT agree-
ment this year, and I will be meeting
with Foreign Minister Gromyko Satur-
day to capitalize upon the progress
that I hope that Vance and Gromyko
are making now. I don't see any in-
surmountable obstacles. But if the
Soviets are forthcoming and coopera-
tive and are willing to compromise
some of their positions, we will have
an agreement.
Q. The military is pushing an idea
of digging a lot of holes in the
ground for our land-based intercon-
tinental ballistic missiles. So you
truck them around; the Russians
never know which hole the missile is
in. The theory is the Russians have
to hit all the holes in order to get all
the missiles. Do you think that's a
good idea, and how does that affect
the SALT negotiations?
A. That is one among many ideas. I
think over a period of time, it has be-
10
come obvious that our fixed silo-type
intercontinental ballistic missiles are
becoming more and more vulnerable
because of the accuracy of the Soviet
missiles — ours are even more
accurate — and the MIRV'ing of the
Soviet missiles where they have many
warheads on each missile, which
we've had for a long time.
The so-called multiple aim points or
many silos for each missile is one idea
that has been put forward. It has some
very serious defects. I can only men-
tion two at this time. One is, how do
you verify that all the holes don't
have missiles in them? It's obvious
that we would be keeping the agree-
ment, and we would not violate it. We
don't know that that would be the case
on the other side. And I believe that
we would find, as we proceed further
with it, that it would not only be very
difficult if the Soviets adopted this
same policy but very expensive as
well.
But that is one option that we are
considering. And I would guess that
by the end of this year, we would
have gone through all the options in-
cluding that one. And at that time,
certainly at the time that SALT II
agreement is reached, I will explain to
the American people in the most
careful and complete terms what our
future plans for adequate strategic
strength will be, probably going for
the next 5 years.
That's just one of the options now.
It has some very serious defects. It's
being considered.
Q. There's a report that you are
working for a settlement in Lebanon
and that Syria and Israel would be
involved. Could you verify this?
A. This is a subject that President
Sadat raised with me several times at
Camp David. It's one in which we've
been involved, as you know, for many
months.
There's a tragedy in Lebanon that
the rest of the world has not
adequately addressed, including our-
selves The suffering of the people of
Lebanon, through no fault of their own
in almost ever) case, has been
extraordinary.
Obviously, the responsibility for re-
solving the Lebanon question rests
primarily on the shoulders of those
who live there. My commitment has
been to strengthen the Sarkis
government — politically, econom-
ically, and militarily. We gave them
some aid so that the President of that
country can control the affairs of the
country itself. When we were flying
back from Camp David on the heli-
copter. President Sadat and I were
talking about this; Prime Minister
Begin joined in the conversation. All
three of us committed ourselves to
renew our support for the Sarkis gov-
ernment, the Lebanese Government.
So, they have the prime responsibility.
The next two nations, I would say,
that are the most intimately involved
are Syria, which has large forces in
Lebanon — invited in by the Lebanese
Government because they cannot
maintain order by themselves under
existing circumstances — and Israel,
which obviously wants a stable gov-
ernment, stable people on their north-
ern border.
Other countries more removed geo-
graphically also have an intense inter-
est and influence in Lebanon. I would
say two of them would be Saudi
Arabia and Egypt.
More distantly, other countries that
have a direct historical interest, like
the United States and France, would
be involved. All this could be done
under the aegis of the United Nations.
But I think it's time for us to take
joint action to call a conference of
those who are involved, primarily the
people who live in Lebanon — the dif-
ferent factions there — and try to reach
some solution that may involve a new
charter for Lebanon. I'm not in favor
of a partitioned Lebanon. I'd like to see
a unified Lebanon, at peace, with a
strong enough central government to
control the situation there and protect
its own people.
Q. You said in your opening
statement that both President Sadat
and Prime Minister Begin said there
are no remaining obstacles to con-
cluding the Sinai treaty. Have they
set a date yet for starting these
talks? And how long would you es-
timate that it would take to go
through the formalities that still
remain?
A. I would hope that we could
commence the talks within 2 weeks,
but no specific date has been set. Both
Prime Minister Begin and President
Sadat today, when I talked to them on
the phone, on their own initiative, said
that they were expecting us to be full
partners, as I was at Camp David, and
they could see no obstacle to the peace
talks beginning without delay.
I think it will take 2 weeks to pre-
pare for the talks. There are some of-
ficial responsibilities that President
Sadat has in his own country that will
take place and be concluded within 2
weeks. But that would be the ap-
proximate timeframe. I'm not trying to
Department of State Bulle
be presumptuous, because no date h
been set.
Q. Prime Minister Begin is su
posed to be sending a letter dealii
with the Israeli position on the Wt
Bank. Has that letter been receive
yet? And would any delay on th
letter perhaps hold up these talks <
the Sinai?
I
A. Prime Minister Begin has se
me a letter expressing his positio
and I've also sent him a lett
expressing my position. Now, I thii
the next step would be for me at
him, in good faith and in a friend!
cooperative attitude, to try to work o
the differences between us.
Q. Will you make those lette
available?
A. I'll think it over. I can't answ
because I would really — it suits r
okay for the letters to be made avai
able, but I can't unilaterally releai
the letter that I sent to him or receiv>
from him without his approval.
My own inclination is to let all t
correspondence be made public th
relates to the Mideast settlement
We've done that so far, even when \
had differences of opinion. But
would have to get his permission h
fore we could release the letters.
il
f<
Q. Can you tell us a little mo
about the nature of your partici]
tion in this next round of talks? V
mentioned full partnership. Will \<
be personally involved with that, i
will Secretary Vance be?
A. I would guess that I would n
be personally involved, except in
case where the leaders of the other tv
nations were involved. If there was
dispute about a particular drawing of
line or a phased withdrawal or som I
thing of that kind that could not be r |>
■
solved at the Foreign Minister or del
gate level, then I would get involve
it necessary.
I wouldn't want to see the tall
break down because of any timidity c
my part. I consider it to be one of tf
most important responsibilities that
have. I would guess, though, that tr
negotiations will be carried on at
fairly high level, below the Presidei
and Prime Minister level
I understand from Prime Minist
Begin that the leader of his delegatii
will be Foreign Minister Dayan.
don't know yet who will head th
Egyptian delegation, and I've not yt
decided on the American delegatio
leader. But it'll be at a fairly hig
level.
"II vember 1978
\nd the principles for settling the
ai disagreements have all been re-
ved. Now the details, which I don't
nk are going to be highly controver-
1, are the only things remaining to
resolved. The exact decision of
ether a particular road intersection
a hilltop would be at the first with-
iwal line, those are the kind of
ngs that would be settled. And I
ieve we have a good relationship
ween the two leaders that wouldn't
se a deterioration in the negotia-
ns.
:t. io- 1
3. Are the separate peace talks
it open on Thursday [October 12]
tween Israel and Egypt linked in
y way to negotiations on other
ab lands under Israeli occupa-
n? And have you ever answered
tig Hussein's questions concerning
■ clarification on the sovereignty
ues?
4. The two discussions on the
lai, which relate to Egypt and Is-
1 only on the one hand, and the
■st Bank-Gaza Strip discussions on
other, are not legally intercon-
:ted. But I think throughout the
Cmp David talks and in the minds of
D self. Prime Minister Begin, and
I-sident Sadat, they are interrelated.
1? have been trying to induce the
J danians. and to some lesser degree
I far the Palestinians who live on the
V'st Bank-Gaza Strip area, to partici-
■<:e in the talks.
We hope that they will both partici-
l.e along with the Egyptians and the
laelis. There's no doubt in my mind
lit while the negotiating teams are in
lishington. we will discuss both the
Imai questions leading to an
t yptian-Israeli peace treaty and also
I: questions concerning the West
I nk and Gaza Strip.
II have not yet responded to the
lestions that King Hussein sent to
I;. I saw him on one of the television
lograms reading the questions.
Iiey're in the process of being as-
Issed by the State Department and I
fcsume when they get to me —
Q. They were given to you pri-
Itely, were they not?
A. No, they were not. I've not yet
liceived them personally. But I do
liow basically what's in them. It's
lportant that this be done expedi-
nusly, and I will not delay it. but
11 be several days.
Q. Does Mr. Warnke's resignation
have anything to do with the idea
that perhaps he's not the right man
to try to sell this treaty to the Sen-
ate; and, second, to the SALT
treaty, can you say today that you
will submit a SALT agreement to
the Senate for ratification or are you
still holding out the possibility that
you might just do it in an executive
capacity?
A. Mr. Warnke came to help us
with the SALT negotiations as Direc-
tor of the ACDA [Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency] organization
with the understanding that he would
only stay for a limited period of time.
At that time, last year, we thought
that we would have a SALT agreement
in 1977. Several months ago he told
me that for personal reasons he would
still like to step down. Quite early this
past summer, I induced him to stay
on. He will be the head of the Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency until
after Secretary Vance's upcoming trip
to Moscow, after which he will step
down. I wish he would stay on. He's a
very good man, and he will be avail-
able to testify to the Congress even
after he returns to private life.
I have not yet decided how to sub-
mit the agreement or the treaty to the
Congress. I think it would depend
upon when it was concluded, but my
preference would be to submit it as a
treaty.
Q. But you don't rule out the
other?
A. My preference is to submit it as
a treaty.
Q. Will you see Ian Smith [Prime
Minister of the white regime in
Southern Rhodesia] now that he's in
the United States? And there's a
second part to that question. Are
you aware of any agreement Henry
Kissinger made with Smith such that
the United States would give
Rhodesia full diplomatic recognition
and an end to sanctions in return
for a trend toward majority rule?
A. I'm not familiar with that execu-
tive agreemeent. I do not intend to see
Mr. Smith. He's had a meeting with
the Members of the Congress who in-
vited him over and also had, I think, a
2-hour meeting with Secretary Vance.
There's no reason for me to meet with
him.
I think that the essence of it is what
we're trying to do is to end the
bloodshed in Rhodesia. We've not
caused the bloodshed. We've not
caused the war. But we have put for-
ward publicly, without any secrecy
11
about it, along with the British, to the
front-line Presidents, to the patriotic
front, to the Smith regime, our pro-
posals, that there be all-parties confer-
ences where people who are in dispute
can get together and talk and try to
work out a means by which free and
democratic elections can be held in
Rhodesia — so that anyone who is
qualified can run for office — and let
the people of Rhodesia decide what
kind of government they want.
This is a proposal that Mr. Smith
and his regime have not been willing
to accept. But this is what we propose.
If the parties in dispute prefer a
different proposal and agree upon it,
we would have no objection to that.
Q. We are currently prosecuting a
former CIA warrant officer for al-
legedly selling a manual on one of
our spy satellites to the Soviets. Can
you tell us whether or not the
Soviets having that manual has in
any way compromised U.S. security
and whether or not it has affected
our SALT negotiations because it
might make it more difficult for us
to verify their strategic weapons
systems?
A. I would not want to comment on
that particular case. Whenever the
Soviets discover any information about
our classified material, it's obviously
potentially damaging to our country. It
has not affected our SALT negotia-
tions.
I stated publicly, I think for the first
time a President has done so, down at
Cape Kennedy, Cape Canaveral, two
or three Sundays ago, that we did have
aerial surveillance. And I think that
it's important for the American people
to know that in the past and present
and in the future, that our aerial sur-
veillance capability would be adequate
to affirm that the agreement on
SALT — those in existence and those in
the future — would be adequate.
So the revelation of any secret in-
formation or classified information is
something to be avoided. It has not
affected the SALT talks. Our ability to
verify compliance will be adequate in
the future.
Q. You said there was no doubt
that the subject of the West Bank
would come up in the talks as well
as that of Sinai. One of the Egyptian
delegates has indicated that the
Egyptians might be unwilling to sign
a peace treaty without evidence of
Israeli flexibility on the future ques-
tion of settlements on the West
Bank.
Have the Israelis given any indi-
12
cation yet — for example, have they
yet responded in this question of the
exchange of letters and come around
to the U.S. position on the future
settlements in the West Bank?
A. I don't believe that your opinion
accurately expresses what President
Sadat has told me. 1 don't think he
would let any single element of the
West Bank-Gaza Strip settlement pre-
vent a conclusion of a treaty between
Egypt and Israel.
And I think the Israelis have been
very forthcoming, in my experience
with them at Camp David over long
days of negotiation, concerning the
West Bank and Gaza Strip. I think
they're acting in good faith to set up
an autonomous governing entity in the
West Bank-Gaza Strip to withdraw
their military government very ex-
peditiously, and I think the settlements
issue still remains open. But it's sub-
ject to a negotiation.
And last time I had a press confer-
ence, I read the statement that
Foreign Minister Dayan made in Is-
rael, which I think is adequate, com-
bined with a cessation of settlement
activity altogether between now and
the time the self-government is set
up.
The role of our government, our
position has always been that the set-
tlements in occupied territory are il-
legal and are an obstacle to peace.
I've not changed my opinion, but to
summarize, I don't believe that this
one issue, if unresolved expedi-
tiously, would prevent the peace
treaty between Israel and Egypt.
Q. I'd like to ask you about Iran.
How do we view the situation in-
volving the Shah there now? Is he
secure? How important is it to U.S.
interests that the Shah remain in
power? And what, if anything, can
the U.S. Government do to keep
him in power?
A. The strategic importance to our
country — I think to the entire Western
world — of a good relationship with a
strong and independent Iran is cru-
cial. We have historic friendships
with Iran. I think they are a great
stabilizing force in their part of the
world. They are a very important
trade partner. They've acted very
responsibly.
My own belief is that the Shah has
moved aggressively to establish
democratic principles in Iran and to
have a progressive attitude toward so-
cial questions, social problems. This
has been the source of much of the
opposition to him in Iran.
We have no inclination to try to
decide the internal affairs of Iran. My
own hopes have been that there could
be peace there, an end to bloodshed,
and an orderly transformation into
more progressive social arrangements
and also increased democratization of
the government itself which I believe
the Shah also espouses. He may not
be moving fast enough for some; he
may be moving too fast for others. I
don't want to get involved in the
specifics.
Q. You indicated that if an all-
parties conference would take place
this would be an advantage to pos-
sibly settling the problems in
Rhodesia. Would you host such a
conference in the United States?
A. I have no preference about
where it should be held. I think it
would be better, perhaps, to hold it
where the parties to the conference
prefer.
Two or three weeks ago I instructed
Secretary Vance to propose to the
front-line presidents and others that
an all-parties conference be held in
New York. This was not acceptable to
some of them, and the idea was not
carried to completion.
But the important thing is to get the
members who are in dispute who head
armed forces that are killing each
other in Rhodesia, Zimbabwe, and the
surrounding areas and bring them to a
table to talk about the differences and
try to resolve them.
I believe that this is the best ap-
proach and. as I say, we are not wed-
ded to a particular plan, although I
think that the Anglo-American plan,
so-called, has been accepted in its
basic elements by all the front-line
presidents and on occasion major
parts of it by the Smith internal group
and also the patriotic front. It's a
good basis for negotiation.
So we're doing the best we can to
end the bloodshed and to bring peace
without any tendency to force people
to come to a certain place or to force
people even to accept the elements of
the settlement that we think are best.
Q. I'd like to ask you about the
future of the dollar. Do you feel
that the inflationary — anti-infla-
tionary steps that you plan to take
after Congress leaves, combined
with making good on the pledges of
bond which would occur if Con-
gress acts on your energy plan,
would that in sum be sufficient to
turn the dollar around or do you
feel you have to do more than that
Department of State Bullet
in order to stem the erosion of tl
value of the dollar against oth<
currencies?
A. You have to do more than ai
two particular items. I think the mo
important thing the Congress can c
is to pass an energy package to gn
us an identifiable American enerj
policy. I think this would resto
confidence in our government, conl
dence in our people, more than an
thing I can think of, among foreij
nations which trade with us ait
which trade in our currency an
therefore, cause it sometimes to j
down in an unwarranted degree-
Obviously, controlling inflation
another very major step forward th
we can take to strengthen the dollar.
We have done other things as wel
We're trying to increase our expon
to reduce our balance-of-trade defici
We have sold additional amounts
gold which is predictable policy no!
and I think this helps to strength*,
the dollar.
And one of the most importai
things that is occurring outside of ol
own control, but modified in a beni
ficial way at Bonn, was to strengths
the economies of our major tradin
partners, notably Japan and German
As their economies are stronger, the
can buy goods more from other cou
tries, including ourselves.
So I think all these factors coj
bined would lower our trade defia
and lead to a stronser dollar.
..
lis
,;
lit
K
V
I
J
fli
Id
ii
i
'For full text, see Weekly Compilation
Presidential Documents of Oct. 2. 1978,
1653
: For documentation concerning the Can
David summit meeting, see Bulletin of Oc
1978. p. 1.
-'For full text, see Weekly Compilation c
Oct. 16.
vember 1978
AFRICA: Southern Rhodesia
Executive Council Members
Visit U.S.
JPARTMENT
WOUNCEMENT, OCT. 4'
As you know, Ian Smith [Prime
nister of the white regime in South-
1 Rhodesia] and the members of the
lisbury Executive Council have
jght permission to visit the United
ates in response to an invitation
ued by 27 members of the U.S.
nate.
After careful and extensive review.
Department of State has decided,
an exceptional basis, to grant that
|uest.
In reaching its decision, the De-
rtment weighed a number of com-
x and serious considerations on all
les. Ultimately, we decided to make
exception and grant the requested
as in this instance because we be-
ve the visit can contribute to the
)cess of achieving a settlement of
t Rhodesian conflict, to which the
ministration remains entirely com-
jtted. Moreover, mindful of the need
J hear all points of view on an issue
I this importance as well as of the
languished source of the invitation.
I' believe that the visit can contribute
I the American public *s understand-
\i of this complicated matter and to
■ e ir support of our search for an
luitable and enduring settlement.
I It is important that the reasons for
I r involvement in efforts to settle the
jiodesian conflict and our role in the
I gotiations be clearly understood,
lth here and abroad.
I For the last 18 months, the United
lates has participated jointly with the
liited Kingdom in a major diplomatic
Uitiative aimed at ending the increas-
Igly bloody conflict in Rhodesia and
Itablishing a basis for a peaceful and
Iderly transition to majority rule.
We have not favored one side or the
iher in that conflict. We have resisted
Iforts by both sides to make our role
i. partisan one. We have not, for
sample, accepted the demands by the
[eternal parties that they be given a
iminant role in the critical transition
feriod leading up to elections. Simi-
, rl y . we have not endorsed the ar-
i.ngements of the internal settlement,
ecause those arrangements do not
jffer all parties the opportunity to
larticipate equitably in free and fair
lections held in peaceful circum-
lances.
What we have supported throughout
our negotiating initiative is an ar-
rangement that would assure the
people of Zimbabwe their right to
choose their own government in elec-
tions that are manifestly fair and
impartial.
Our efforts in pursuing that goal
have been unstinting. U.S. and British
envoys, including Secretaries Vance
and Owen and Ambassador Young,
have traveled hundreds of thousands of
miles in their attempts to reconcile the
differences among the parties.
We have done so because the parties
have continued to wish us to play that
role. One of the last hopes for a
peaceful resolution of the Rhodesian
conflict lies in the determination of the
British and American Governments to
pursue every avenue that might lead to
a settlement.
Our goal remains unchanged.
Moreover, we are convinced that the
achievement of it has become even
more urgent.
As the situation in Rhodesia be-
comes more and more critical, we be-
lieve it is important that we take every
conceivable opportunity to help the
parties reconcile their differences and
to bring an end to the bloodshed and
suffering.
The visit of Mr. Smith and other
members of the Executive Council to
this country can provide such an op-
portunity. We want to renew our dis-
cussions with them in order to make it
clear that what we are seeking for
Rhodesia is not a solution that gives
advantages to one population group
over another but rather one that offers
the best hope for all Rhodesians to
live under conditions of peace and
justice.
We are confident that in their other
contacts here the members of the
Executive Council will receive this
same message: that the achievement of
peace in Zimbabwe requires the will-
ingness of all parties to negotiate their
differences.
Reflecting our nation's commitment
to freedom of speech and the impor-
tance of public debate, we believe that
the visit can enhance public under-
standing of the situation in Rhodesia
and of the various solutions being
offered.
It is important that we miss no op-
13
portunity, however remote it may
seem, to settle this increasingly brutal
and dangerous war. Our decision to
admit Mr. Smith in this instance does
not mean that we will cease to observe
our responsibilities as a member of the
United Nations under the Security
Council's resolution on Rhodesia. It
does not imply U.S. recognition of or
support for the present Rhodesian ad-
ministration nor does it represent an
endorsement of the internal settlement
proposed by the Salisbury group.
Rather, it reflects our urgent desire
at this crucial stage to leave no stone
unturned, no opportunity ignored, and
to further our efforts to end the
bloodshed and suffering and to achieve
the overriding objective of a peaceful
and orderly transition to majority rule
with respect for the rights of all.
JOINT U.S. -U.K. STATEMENT,
OCT. 9
Our meeting today with Mr. Smith
and his colleagues gave us the oppor-
tunity to discuss the rapidly de-
teriorating situation in Rhodesia and to
stress the following points. 2
• The only way to avoid a growing
bloody and dangerous civil war in
Rhodesia is for all the parties to meet
with each other and agree upon a fair
and peaceful solution.
• To that end, we urged Mr. Smith
and his colleagues to agree to such
talks and bring about an end to the
continuing bloodshed.
• As we have previously proposed
in the Anglo-American plan, the road
to independence could lie through an
impartially administered transition
period leading to fair elections; a
cease-fire, international observation,
and a constitution for Rhodesia that
would preserve the rights of white as
well as black citizens. 3 But we will
also support any solution agreed
among the parties.
• Each side now accepts the princi-
ple of elections, but each also seeks
dominance during the transition
period. If each continues to insist that
the other accept its terms, there can be
no progress.
• We remain impartial. The recent
claims on each side that we favor the
other are simply false. If we favored
either one, we would hinder our abil-
ity to work for a fair process that
would end the bloodshed. Only free
and fair elections — not outside
powers — should decide the future of
Rhodesia. All of us must remember
that the decision for peace lies in the
hands of the parties themselves.
14
Department of State Bui lei
...
ARMS CONTROL:
A Balaneeil ami Effective Defense
by Harold Brown
Address before the annual national
convention of the American Legion in
New Orleans on August 22. 1978.
Harold Brown is Secretary of
Defense.
I want to talk today about how we
are working to assure our military
security — both by building balanced
and fully adequate armed forces of the
kind we most need and by seeking
arms control agreements consistent
with the interests of this country.
Last week President Carter sent
back to the Congress, without his ap-
proval, a defense procurement bill
which would have weakened our de-
fense by taking $2 billion from high
priority defense needs in order to pay
for one nuclear-powered aircraft car-
rier. The President and I support the
full amount of the Defense budget of
$126 billion which he requested. We
want no congressional cut to be made
from it. But we do want that money
spent wisely and spent where it is
most needed.
The nuclear aircraft carrier costs
nearly a billion dollars more than
would a future non-nuclear carrier. We
plan to build carriers in the future, but
we do not need to build this one now
at the expense of more urgent needs.
And we do not need to add $1 billion
to the price tag.
The President is asking the Congress
that in the coming year, instead of
building a $2 billion carrier with a nu-
clear power plant, that great amount of
money be applied to more urgent
needs like the following:
Southern Rhodesia (Cont'd)
• We will continue to press all sides
for an end to the senseless and brutal
killing of civilians.
We urged Mr. Smith and his col-
leagues to consider these points sen
ously and to agree to earl) roundtable
discussions with the other parties □
'Read to news correspondents by acting De-
partment spokesman Tom Reston
'Secretary Vance and British Ambassador
Peter Jaj led the U.S. and U.K. participants in
the meeting.
'For text of the Anglo-American plan, see
Hi ii i us of Oct. 3, 1977, p. 424.
• $800 million for helicopters,
combat vehicles, and ammunition for
the Army;
• $200 million for airlift, electronic
warfare equipment, and modern elec-
tronically guided ordnance for all the
services;
• Half a billion dollars to upgrade
the readiness of all our Armed Forces
by providing spare parts, ship over-
hauls, training, communications, and
logistical support;
• Several hundred million dollars
more for research and development;
and
• More construction of modern gen-
eral purpose naval ships. For instance,
we could build next year two new
guided missile frigates, three antisub-
marine warfare ships, and a fleet
oiler — all for less than one-third the
cost of a nuclear-powered carrier.
The President's action is one to en-
hance our defense, and it certainly is
not anti-Navy. We have the strongest
navy in the world, and we intend to
keep it that way. We need to have
balanced forces to meet all our defense
needs, including particularly the need
for our forces that are in Europe or are
oriented for combat there to combine
with the forces of our NATO allies to
counter the steady Soviet buildup. The
Navy itself needs to bring the ship
construction program into balance. It
must stop the drift of the past 10 years
toward a navy of fewer and fewer
ships, each of which costs more and
more to build. No ship, no matter how-
costly and capable, can be in more
than one place at a time. We want to
keep ours the world's strongest
navy — not to build the world's most
expensive ship.
The Military Balance
Let me turn now to a broader look
at where we stand in the world and
how it shapes our defense decisions. I
should note first, of course, that the
overall relative strength of the United
States and the Soviet Union depends
on mote than military forces alone,
although those forces are a necessary
and crucial element. The total balance
includes many parts — economic
strength and productivity, political
stability and cohesion, our technolog-
ical skill, the appeal of our way of life
and our international policies, and our
national will. In these overall term
there is no doubt in my mind that til
United States is the most powerftl
country in the world. We outstrip tl*
Soviets in nearly every category I hav
mentioned. It is only on the militai
side that their society has been able i
rival us. But the fact that they hav
turned so much of their effort to mill
tary activities is serious and has to U
troubling to us. We need to do what
necessary to keep a military balance I
well as a favorable overall balance <
national power.
I noted a moment ago that we ai
urging the Congress to keep our D«
fense budget for next year at the fui
amount the President requested ii
January. We have also pledged, alon|
with our NATO allies, to increase oil
defense effort in real terms, after ai
lowing for inflation, with a goal I
about 3% increase per year.
Why are we making this effort t
increase our defense? In deciding jut
how many defense dollars we neerj
we have to start by looking at th
military efforts and capabilities of th
Soviet Union. I have examined thos*
Soviet capabilities carefully with th
help and advice of the Joint Chiefs c
Staff. They and I meet at least once
week, and I meet daily with Gem
Jones, the Chairman of the Joir
Chiefs of Staff. We consider fre
quently what responses the Unite
States should make to growth in Sovia
military power. We find that th
Soviets have been engaged in a sub
stantial military buildup for nearly 2f
years. Over that period they have in
creased their military expenditures bj
about 4% each year in real terms
compounded, year in and year out
And their buildup is continuing.
But that does not mean that we ano
our allies have been sitting on ou
hands or that we have suddenly be-
come inferior to the Warsaw Pact. Wt
are not. And it does not mean that, as
we continue to improve our forces, wt.
should make them a carbon copy ol
the Soviet posture or that we shoulc
plan forces simply to match certain
•Soviet capabilities.
The Soviets must wrestle with a
number of problems that we do not
now have, especially with respect tOJ
China. Their planning has to take into
account a difficult geography and a
harsh climate — though they do hav&
the advantage of internal lines on
jvember 1978
mmunication. They lack willing and
fective allies. Our planning should
ither forget their burdens nor assume
; have the same problems; we have
oblems, but ours are different.
le Nuclear Deterrent
Thus, simple comparison of Soviet
d American forces is only the be-
.ning of understanding our military
eds. In planning our forces, we need
be careful not to be misled by such
mparisons.
Take the case of our strategic nu-
;ar posture. With the warheads we
•eady deploy, we can target all sig-
ficant military objectives in the
.viet Union, even after undergoing a
st strike by the Soviets. Our basic
tensive strength, in other words, is
equate today. But as strategic forces
ve grown more sophisticated in both
e Soviet Union and the United
ates, the requirements of deterrence
ve become more demanding, not
icessarily in terms of missile
■row-weight or megatonnage or
arheads— the sorts of measures one
ten hears about — but rather in other
nensions.
For example, control and the ability
withhold some offensive forces — to
able to attack some targets and
lare others at a particular phase of
m bat — may be as important as rapid
.action against the entire enemy
irget system. As a consequence, our
ifense needs improved communica-
ms, command, and control, even
ough such capability tends to be ig-
ired in most simple comparisons of
jviet and American strategic
pabilities.
Age also often is ignored in simple
>mparisons. and some of our offen-
've forces are growing old. Also,
>me, particularly the ICBM [inter-
mtinental ballistic missilel compo-
;nt, are becoming more vulnerable
an is desirable from the standpoint
flexibility, even though we might
:cide to use those forces under attack
jfore they were destroyed.
We have not been idle in the face of
ese needs. Aging of the force is
ing brought under control. The
odernization of the submarine and
jmber forces — with the Trident mis-
le and with cruise missiles — is well
ider way. We are moving toward de-
jlopment of a new and more sophis-
cated ICBM. And we are continuing
) examine possible replacements for
ar B-52 bombers.
We are giving equal priority to our
ther strategic force needs, even
hough they are less visible and do not
lend themselves to simple, numerical
comparisons with Soviet capabilities.
• Our warning systems are being
improved.
• We are developing increased ac-
curacy for all our missiles — ballistic
and cruise.
• We are upgrading our communi-
cations and ability to use those com-
munications selectively.
• New warheads soon will be de-
ployed, and advanced avionics systems
for our bombers are being tested.
Right now, even after a Soviet sur-
prise attack, we could deliver literally
thousands of thermonuclear weapons
to targets in the Soviet Union. Despite
the improving Soviet offensive and
defensive forces, that capability of
ours is not going to decline in the fu-
ture. It is going to increase.
In response to the potential threat
new Soviet ICBM's pose to our
ICBM's. I have asked the military
services and the Joint Chiefs of Staff
to consider a number of options to en-
hance the survivability of that leg of
our nuclear deterrence triad, a triad
which is composed of bombers and
cruise missiles, submarine-launched
ballistic missiles, and intercontinental
land-based missiles. A number of
mobile ICBM-basing concepts are
being evaluated, including some in-
volving alternate launch points tor
each missile. This concept envisions
moving missiles and their launchers
among multiple sites which might
themselves be hardened, thus substan-
tially complicating Soviet targeting of
our deterrent.
No decision has been made whether
or not to deploy mobile ICBM sys-
tems, like the alternate launch point
system (or multiple aim point system,
as it is sometimes called) that I just
mentioned. Nor have we decided
which particular concept we would
implement, if we were to elect to de-
ploy a mobile ICBM system. The
current and projected capabilities of
our strategic forces give us time to
study thoroughly questions of techni-
cal feasibility, military effectiveness,
and cost prior to making decisions
about deploying mobile ICBM's.
Any mobile ICBM-basing system
would, of course, have to be fully
consistent with all provisions, includ-
ing verification provisions, of a
strategic arms limitation agreement.
The United States will not deploy a
mobile ICBM system that would not
permit adequate verification of the
number of launchers deployed and
other provisions of the agreement.
You may be confident that we will in-
15
sist that any Soviet system meet the
same verification standards.
The parts of the joint draft text of
the SALT II agreement that have al-
ready been agreed allow deployment
of mobile ICBM systems of the types
we are considering. The draft agree-
ment explicitly permits deployment of
mobile ICBM launchers during its
term, after the expiration of an interim
protocol period which would end well
before mobile ICBM systems would be
ready for deployment.
I know that some of you are con-
cerned about SALT. I want to assure
you that no SALT agreement will be
signed unless it is in the interest of the
United States to sign it. That means
particularly that it must not undermine
our military security. An acceptable
strategic arms limitation agreement is
not going to weaken the U.S. second-
strike capability that I have described.
We will retain our assurance, and the
Soviets will know, that we can deliver
such a devastating second-strike blow.
And that will remain true despite the
current Soviet civil defense program.
Conventional Forces
Let me turn finally to conventional
forces. Here detailea comparisons
count even more than in strategic
forces. Despite the growth in Soviet
theater capabilities, we and our allies
already have bought and are paying for
the land, naval, and air forces needed
to protect our interests in the world.
Despite our global responsibilities, we
already are well equipped to deal with
contingencies that allow ample time
for readying and deploying our forces.
If NATO could be sure of a month or
more to set up its defenses, for exam-
ple, I doubt that any Soviet marshal
would recommend an attack on West-
ern Europe.
Unfortunately, however, we and our
allies no longer can count on having
that kind of time. The Soviet theater
forces have changed most significantly
not in numbers but in their ability to
wage short, intense, non-nuclear cam-
paigns using large, modernized forces
with relatively little advance prepara-
tion. In consequence, as Gen. Haig,
the Supreme Allied Commander in
Europe, recently observed, surprise
attack has become more feasible. Our
needs have changed accordingly, not
toward larger forces but toward higher
combat readiness, greater shortrun
sustainability, improved interoperabil-
ity with allies, and more long-range
mobility for the forces we already
have.
Don't misunderstand me; I recog-
nize the need for modern weapons.
16
We need improved equipment. But our
modern weapons must be fully effec-
tive Therefore, the members of our
Armed Forces must be able to main-
tain them, adequately train on them,
and get them into a combat theater
before our defenses are overrun.
Combat effectiveness depends on
many factors. We must keep the size
of our forces, their modernization,
their readiness (including their mobil-
ity), and their sustainability in bal-
ance, especially when the incentives
for surprise attack and short, intense
campaigns have gone up. Spending
money on spare parts, unit training,
and field exercises may not grab the
headlines. But considering the invest-
ment we already are making in hard-
ware, that is the right way at the right
time to neutralize the Soviet buildup.
That is what the President had in
mind, as I said earlier, when he sent
the Defense authorization bill back to
the Congress last week with a request
to put our dollars where they will pro-
vide us the greatest protection from
the Soviet military effort.
Security and Arms Control
An adequately and properly bal-
anced Defense budget, then, is one
way we assure our security against the
Soviet military threat. It is a necessary
way, but it is not the only one.
Although some may still be skepti-
cal about arms control agreements —
and it is a particular responsibility of
mine not to be gullible about them —
such agreements are another and com-
plementary way of dealing with Soviet
military efforts. The interests of the
Soviet Union and the United States
clearly diverge in many respects. But
the Soviets understand that, as long as
we remain strong — and I intend that we
will — direct conflict with the United
States and its friends could quickly
lead to disaster. At a minimum, they
share our interest in avoiding such a
conflict. And there are other problems
of mutual concern on which com-
munication remains necessary and
cooperation should be possible. We
cannot afford to ignore those pos-
sibilities.
I say that because the interests of
Convention on the Hostile Use
of Environmental Modification Techniques
MESSAGE TO THE SENATE,
SEPT. 22'
I am transmitting herewith, for the advice
and consent of the Senate to ratification, the
Convention on the Prohibition of Military or
Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Mod-
ification Techniques, signed at Geneva on May
18. 1977.
The Convention is the result of extensive
study, debate, and negotiation at the Confer-
ence of the Committee on Disarmament at
Geneva and at the United Nations. It seeks to
avert the dangers resulting from the hostile use
of environmental modification techniques
"having widespread, long lasting or severe
effects as the means of destruction, damage or
injury to any other Stale Party."
In 1973, growing awareness of the need for
protecting our environment led to the adoption
of Senate Resolution 71 which urged the
Executive Branch to negotiate a treaty pro-
hibiting environmental wart.ire. The United
States and the Soviet Union, after three rounds
of bilateral consultations, tabled identical dull
texts of a multilateral convention at the Confer-
ence of the Committee on Disarmament in
1975. Negotiations on the basis ot these texts
resulted in the document I am transmitting to
you today.
I am also sending with the Convention four
Understandings relating to Articles. 1. II. Ill
and VIII. respectively. These Understandings
are not incorporated into the Convention. They
are part of the negotiating record and were in-
cluded in the report transmitted by the Confer-
ence of the Committee on Disarmament to the
United Nations. The provisions of the Conven-
tion and the Understandings are described in
detail in the accompanying report of the De-
partment of State.
By prohibiting the hostile use of potentially
disastrous environmental modification tech-
niques, the Convention represents one more
advance in the field of arms control to which
my Administration is firmly committed. I rec-
ommend that the Senate give prompt consid-
eration to the Convention, and advise and con-
sent to its ratification.
Jimmy Carter □
'}.
'Text from Weekly Compilation of Presi
dential Documents of Sept. 25. 1978; also
primed as S. Ex. K which also includes Secre-
tar) Vance's letter of submittal and the texts of
the conventions and the understandings
Department of State Bullet
the United States are best advanc;
under conditions of peace and order
change. We need as much stability an
predictability as we can manage in oi
internal relations, consistent with m
tional security. U.S. and allied am
buildups offer one way of obtainii
security, stability, and predictabilit
arms control provides another. Wh
mix of the two works best depends c
the circumstances.
As matters now stand, we are we
positioned for further competition an
an arms buildup. But that is not on
preferred path, if we can obtain sea
rity, stability, and predictabilil
through precise, equitable, and verift
able arms control. In that case w
prefer agreed restraints and reductioi
to competition and buildups. As a m
tion. we have no vested interest :
arms races.
Our preference for restraint is bour
to be especially strong where nucle.
forces are concerned. I say this ft
several reasons. Nuclear weapor
represent the only real threat to tr
survival of the United States and, fl
that matter, to that of the Sovii
Union. Those weapons could destrc
in hours all that the two nations ha*
built over centuries.
Both the United States and tr
Soviet Union already deploy nucle;
forces capable of this kind of destrui
tion. As a consequence, it is increa
ingly unlikely that further buildups b
one side will yield a meaningful at
vantage, providing that the other sic
takes prudent countermeasures. This
so even though civil defense or exot
technologies may continue to creai
the illusion of potential advantage.
This is not to say that agreements tt
limit strategic or other armaments cai
solve all problems, remove all grounc
for fear and suspicion, or bring a
competition to a complete halt. Bb
carefully drawn agreements, backed b
verification of compliance with then";
can accomplish a great deal.
• They can make the achievemer
of future advantage even more un
likely while allowing current vul
nerabilities to be removed.
• They can make future structure
more predictable and lower the neei
for extreme conservatism in our de
fense planning.
• They can contribute to a healthie
political environment, an environment
in which still further restraints can hi
imposed on both sides according to tht 1
principle of equivalence.
I do not see any immediate prospeC|
of achieving a mutual end to competi
tion in military strength. A reasonable
objective today is to maintain t hi
wember 1978
)dest momentum toward arms con-
1. But arms control as such, I can
sure you. is not our sole or even
ncipal objective in SALT. What we
nt. what we insist on, is that the se-
•ity of the United States and its al-
s be at least as assured with a SALT
eement as without it. If an agree-
nt does not meet that test, it will
t be signed. If it does, it will be.
But with or without SALT, our de-
lse programs will, in the main, have
continue. As we proceed with them,
issue is not whether to have as
ich defense as we need to protect
r domestic and foreign interests.
)body should doubt the absolute
ority of that requirement. To the
ent that there is an issue, it is over
at, in detail, constitutes the neces-
y defense.
Experts can argue for hours — my
n time is heavily involved in such
isiderations — about how important,
•wlutely or relatively, it is to add a
th Army Division, a 27th fighter-
ack wing, or a 13th attack carrier.
e fact of the matter is that, with the
ce structure we already have, indi-
lual changes of that order are not
ing to make much difference to our
erall military effectiveness. But
mges in our ability to maintain,
'Ve, supply, and operate profession-
•y the weapons already in our in-
itories can make all the difference
the world in our effectiveness and
our deterrent power. You can recall
or own military experiences. You
jhbably remember the difficulties of
|r forming your mission when
% apons and equipment were not in
a;quate supply or not functioning
■ iperly or down for lack of spare
Its
! The President and I want tully ef-
Itive forces. The competition from
mt Soviet Union demands it. Real
tidiness to fight is the most effective
tJnter to the Soviet military threat.
Iir resources must be spent to assure
I'ectiveness for the kinds of conflicts
lit are the most likely now and in the
reseeable future. We must not drift
Ick toward the old strategy of sac-
ricing immediate readiness but
lunting on a long time for niobil-
lition — a strategy that was barely
lisible in the 1930 - s.
Today we do not have the luxury of
gne. and combat readiness and quick
isponse are what we need. As Secre-
II 'y of Defense, I. with the concur-
Ihce of the President, intend to shape
jljd provide for our forces to meet
pse very real requirements. You are
(group who. because of those very
'.;al requirements, can understand this,
lope I will have your support.
17
Comprehensive Test Ban
by Leslie H. Gelb
Statement before the SALT II and
CTB Panel of the House Committee on
Armed Services on August 14, 1978.
Mr. Gelb is Director of the Bureau of
Politico- Military Affairs. '
Let me briefly review the com-
prehensive test ban (CTB) from the
perspective of America's larger politi-
cal and security interests. CTB is part
of a continuing, bipartisan effort car-
ried out by all postwar Administra-
tions. Each has tried to enhance our
security by placing some restraints on
the dangerous spiral of the nuclear
arms race. These efforts began to bear
fruit in the early 1960's. The follow-
ing major accomplishments have
helped to pave the way for a CTB.
• In 1963 the United States, the
U.S.S.R., and the United Kingdom
negotiated the Limited Test Ban
Treaty, which prohibits the testing of
nuclear weapons in the atmosphere,
outer space, and underwater. This left
underground testing as the only per-
mitted area remaining, but it set no
limit on the yield level of the tests.
• In 1967, building on an earlier
U.N. resolution, the United States and
U.S.S.R. further limited the scope of
nuclear weapons activity by reaching
an agreement prohibiting the stationing
in outer space of objects carrying such
weapons (Outer Space Treaty).
• In 1968 the United States. United
Kingdom, and U.S.S.R. took a major
step on the path to halting the interna-
tional, or "horizontal." spread of nu-
clear weaponry by concluding the Nu-
clear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT).
This has been ratified by 104 countries
but there unfortunately remain some
key holdouts.
• In 1971 the United States, United
Kingdom, and U.S.S.R.. building
upon the Outer Space Treaty, con-
cluded an agreement prohibiting the
placing of nuclear weapons and other
weapons of mass destruction on the
seabeds and ocean floors (Seabed
Arms Control Treaty).
• In 1972 the United States and
U.S.S.R. concluded SALT I. which:
(a) put a cap on the antiballistic mis-
sile (ABM) (defensive) systems of
both sides and (b) limited for a 5-year
period certain strategic offensive arms.
This set the stage for SALT II, in
which we are trying to bring about
more significant limitations on offen-
sive nuclear weaponry.
What is it about these treaties that
made them acceptable to the United
States and enabled them to be ratified?
The answer is that they have effec-
tively enhanced and complemented our
strong national defense posture.
It is important to note that these
treaties are not dependent upon any
attempt to bring about an unrealistic-
ally high level of mutual trust be-
tween the United States and U.S.S.R.
Instead, they are based on this simple
fact — there is a clear mutuality of
interests between the two superpowers
in restraining the nuclear weapons race
in this careful step-by-step manner.
Equally important, the provisions of
these treaties can be adequately ver-
ified by the effective national technical
means which we already possess. The
treaties have, in effect, followed the
pace of technological advancement.
More ambitious undertakings were
made possible when the state of tech-
In closing, let me add that there is
another and more fundamental reason
why priority should go to combat
readiness, assuring the immediate
fighting capability of our people in
uniform. It is that only people —
professionally trained people with high
morale — can make our weapons work.
Even pushbuttons have to be pushed.
As the Legion knows better than
most, people are the greatest asset we
have in defense. Technologically, we
have a comparative advantage over the
Soviet Union. But it is not nearly as
great as the advantage we obtain from
being a free people. The Soviets may
be able to close the gap in weapons
production and to narrow the gap in
military technology. They will never
come close to the spirit, the dedica-
tion, and the initiative of the men and
women in the Armed Forces of the
United States.
You, our veterans, gave us the mar-
gin necessary to win victory in the
past. The men and women of our
Armed Forces today offer us the op-
portunity for the same decisive mar-
gin. As long as I am Secretary of De-
fense, I intend to make the most of it.
I hope to have your support in doing
so. □
18
nology permitted independent verifi-
cation of their provisions
There have been two other direct
precursors to the present CTB negotia-
tions, although these two treaties have
not been ratified by the United States.
The first is the 1974 Threshold Test
Ban Treaty, which prohibits the testing
of nuclear weapons with a yield of over
150 kilotons. The second is the 1976
agreement governing the use of under-
ground nuclear explosions for peaceful
purposes — the Peaceful Nuclear Explo-
sions Treaty.
We can now do better than these two
relatively modest treaties. As you
know, a CTB would effectively ban all
weapons testing on both sides. And,
due to a recent concession by the
U.S.S.R., the CTB would include a
protocol banning peaceful nuclear ex-
plosions altogether for the duration of
the treaty (while calling for negotia-
tions to try to find a mutually accept-
able means to carry out peaceful nu-
clear explosions).
Importance of a CTB
President Carter, like his postwar
predecessors of both political parties, is
committed to continuing these efforts
to cap, and ultimately reverse, the nu-
clear arms race. He considers the
achievement of a CTB as a key step in
this process and as the logical continu-
ation to the successful measures al-
ready achieved. Two dimensions are
critical.
First, a CTB, along with future suc-
cess in SALT, would be a crucial ele-
ment in restraining the U.S. -Soviet nu-
clear competition. It would render
great service to our national security by
constraining the ability of both sides to
improve either their strategic or tactical
nuclear capabilities, which they have
done so markedly during the last few
years.
Without such a ban. on the other
hand, international tensions would
surely be exacerbated, and we would
undoubtedly see a continuing Soviet
buildup in various types of nuclear
weaponry. Pressure would increase on
the United States to match the
U.S.S.R. buildup in kind. Needless to
say, the cost would be staggering on
both sides. If we did not effectively
counter such a Soviet buildup, how-
ever, the deterrent balance between the
superpowers could be jeopardized. We
are, if necessary, both willing and able
to counter the Soviets in this way. But
we must ask ourselves whether this is
really the most effective way to insure
our own security and that of our allies
and to try to bring about a less precari-
ous international environment.
Second, the other critical dimension
is CTB's relationship to our nonprolif-
eration efforts. Because the spread of
nuclear weapons threatens our national
security in several ways, the President
has made nuclear nonproliferation one
of his top priorities. Presidents
Eisenhower and Kennedy gave non-
proliferation as their prime reason for
supporting the limited test ban. The
dangers of a world with many nuclear
powers are real. Nuclear weapons
could upset the military balance in
troubled regions of the world. In every
part of the world, the use of nuclear
weapons by any state poses serious
risks of widening the conflict and of
jeopardizing U.S. interests. Moreover,
the potential dangers presented by
nuclear-armed terrorists are almost
unthinkable.
To minimize the spread of nuclear
weapons, the Administration is pursu-
ing a multifaceted policy. We are:
• Seeking the widest possible adher-
ence to the Nonproliferation Treaty;
• Moving positively to strengthen
international safeguards and control of
civil nuclear facilities;
• Urging restraint in international
transfers of sensitive technologies;
• Building a broad international con-
sensus about the future structure and
management of the nuclear fuel cycle
through the International Nuclear Fuel
Cycle Evaluation;
• Taking steps to insure that our
domestic nuclear policy is consistent
with our international objectives, in-
cluding assurances that we will remain
a reliable supplier of nuclear materials;
and
• Doing our best to reduce any se-
curity or prestige motives that states
might have to develop nuclear explo-
sives.
The contribution of a nondis-
criminatory CTB to our overall non-
proliferation efforts relates to the first
and last points. It would help reduce
the motivations of non-nuclear-weapon
states to proliferate. This contribution
would increase with the duration of the
treaty, but even a limited duration ban,
if nondiscriminatory, would signifi-
cantly benefit our nonproliferation ef-
forts. It would do so in these ways.
A CTB would strengthen the Non-
proliferation Treaty. Many nations
outside the Nonproliferation Treaty —
such as India, Argentina, and
Brazil — have based their refusal to ac-
cede to the treaty on the ground that it
is discriminatory, requiring non-
nuclear-weapon states to forswear nu-
Department of State Bulle -
clear weapons while American ai
Soviet weapons stockpiles continue
grow and improve. In particular, the
key nations and some NPT parti
claim that the nuclear-weapon stat
party to the treaty have not fulfill
their obligations under article ^
". . . to pursue negotiations in gO(
faith on effective measures relating
cessation of the nuclear arms race at ;
early date and to nuclear disarm
ment. . . ."
Non-nuclear-weapon states have pt
sistently labeled a comprehensive U
ban as an important arms control meil
ure. Many of our close allies and sor
key nonaligned states again called f
immediate conclusion of a CTB at t
recent U.N. Special Session on Disi
mament. Consequently, a CTB trea
would directly address and could d
fleet criticism of discrimination ai
facilitate the task of persuading ado
tional states to join the NPT.
When a new state ratifies the NPT.
greatly reassures neighboring states
the new party's peaceful intention
This reassurance, in turn, reduces i«
centives to acquire nuclear weapo
throughout the region. Moreover, if*
CTB enters into force by 1980, it w
reduce the risk that nations will use t«
NPT Review Conference as a vehicle
weaken or withdraw from the NPT.
A comprehensive test ban wou
inhibit testing by threshold states.
CTB would commit those no
nuclear-weapon states who join to i
cept constraints upon nuclear explosi
development. These nations wou
forswear any political or strateg
benefits from the initial proof
nuclear-weapons possession afford>
by testing. Such an agreement woui
be especially important for key natio
which have not yet joined the NPT
such as India. Pakistan. Egypt, Israt
Argentina. Brazil, Spain, and Soil
Africa. Six of these nations are parti
to the Limited Test Ban Treaty,
widely supported CTB — one that, u
like the NPT, could not be attacked
discriminatory — would be political
costly for such states to reject. I
therefore, represents an alternative
NPT membership beneficial to o'
nonproliferation efforts. There are re
sonable prospects that a number of tl
NPT holdouts will join. Even for tho
that choose not to adhere, the existem
of a CTB could well be a factor ii
hibiting any decision to test.
A CTB would strengthen the U.!
bargaining position in bilater:
negotiations on nuclear matter:
Currently, sensitive negotiations ai
underway with a number of countrie
In the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act i
i
member 1978
nericanj
19
*PT
article
^ in
srace
CWlt
78. the Congress wisely required the
egotiation of our agreements for nu-
ar arrangements with other states
iese safeguards must also be applied
any new agreements for cooperation.
ey are in no way meant to restrain
peaceful use of atomic energy.
In the course of these negotiations,
issue of the self-restraint of the
ted States in nuclear-weapons de-
yment often arises. A comprehen-
e test ban would materially improve
U.S. bargaining position to achieve
e important nonproliferation benefits
m full-scope safeguards and other
untary restraints.
The problem of nuclear proliferation
exceedingly complex. The Adminis-
tion welcomes the participation of
e Congress in carrying on our non-
oliferation efforts on all fronts. To-
ther we must continue to seek the
operation of other nations in order to
hieve our nonproliferation objec-
ves. The CTB can be a significant
ement of this joint effort.
Of course, the CTB is not a panacea,
cannot quantify for the committee
I) nactly how much a CTB would help
ur proliferation efforts. But I am con-
dent that it will be of substantial
enefit. And given the international
;• xpectations for a CTB, failure to
i NP
stale
lentil
H
ale.l
i
chieve a test ban would undermine our
onproliferation efforts.
'erification and Stockpile Reliability
There are two additional issues
/hich I would like to touch upon. The
irst, which is still under painstaking
egotiation in Geneva, is that of verifi-
ation. U.S. and British negotiators
lave pushed the Soviets very hard all
long to agree to an impressive pack-
ge of special verification measures,
"his will complement the substantial
chnical verification means which we
ready possess. We are confident that
adequate verification system can be
rived at in the negotiations. We as-
ure you that we will not sign any arms
ontrol agreement which lacks this.
Second, we are equally determined
o insure that, under a CTB. we will
ontinue to maintain a fully reliable
lUclear deterrent. We have a very high
Idegree of confidence in our stockpile at
Ithis time, and the active safeguards
(program which we would carry out
lunder a CTB will insure that this re-
mains the case.
'Conclusion
In sum this Administration believes,
j as have all of its predecessors since the
dawning of the nuclear era, that
ECONOMICS: Bonn Summit and
Investment in Developing Countries
by Richard N. Cooper
Statement before the Subcommittees
on International Economic Policy and
Trade and International Development
oj the House Committee on Interna-
tional Relations on September 20,
1978. Mr. Cooper is Under Secretary
for Economic Affairs. '
I am pleased to have this opportunity
to appear before your subcommittees to
discuss the results of the Bonn summit
and to comment on certain proposals to
stimulate economic growth through in-
vestment in the developing countries.
These two subjects are closely related.
In fact, the Bonn meeting reflects a
clear understanding by the participants
that the problems of growth, inflation,
payments imbalances, trade, energy,
and development are all interrelated.
The Bonn declaration specifically rec-
ognizes that economic progress in de-
veloping countries benefits industrial
countries just as prosperity in industrial
countries benefits the developing
countries. 2
Results of the Bonn Summit
The Bonn summit was the fourth
meeting in as many years of the heads
of state and government of the seven
major industrial democracies and the
European Community to discuss the
international economic situation. Pre-
vious meetings were held at Ram-
bouillet in November 1975, Puerto
Rico in June 1976. and London in May
1977.
The Bonn meeting, like the three
previous summits, enabled the leaders
of the major industrialized countries to
examine together the key problems of
the world economy. They agreed on a
comprehensive strategy to deal with
these problems in a manner consistent
with their close interrelationship. The
Bonn summit emphasized the following
themes.
• The participants recognized that
economic issues can be addressed in a
concerted fashion, through mutually
reinforcing actions, much more effec-
tively than they can be addressed
alone. Concerted action to increase
growth, for example, can reduce the
constraint of a significant deterioration
in international payments which a
country acting alone would face. The
Declaration thus correctly characterizes
the total effect of the program as
greater than the sum of its parts.
• The participants recognized that
each country should contribute in a
way commensurate with its particular
situation. Given that the United States
is now growing at a healthy rate, the
President stressed his determination to
reduce inflation and our dependence on
foreign oil. Germany and Japan, with
low inflation rates and balance-of-
payments surpluses, agreed to take ap-
propriate measures to expand domestic
demand.
• The Declaration recognizes that
these are long-term problems which
will only yield to sustained efforts.
Actions to reduce energy consumption
and dependence on imported oil.
agreements to liberalize trade and
strengthen trading rules, and actions to
promote economic and social progress
in developing countries are all exam-
ples of policies which will have their
full impact only in the coming decade
and beyond.
Let me just highlight some signifi-
cant features of the Declaration. We
were frankly pleased that the other
summit participants, and especially
Germany and Japan, were able to be as
specific on measures to increase de-
mand as they were. In the spirit of
realism which characterized the Bonn
meeting, these commitments stress
America *s security must be pursued in
two mutually reinforcing ways.
• We must have a defense capability
second to none.
• We must strive to reduce the
danger of war and the cost of an un-
limited arms race through arms control.
The comprehensive test ban we are
negotiating is an integral part of this
consistent American policy. It will help
us sustain nuclear parity with the
Soviet Union. It will help prevent the
spread of nuclear weapons to states
which do not have them. I deeply be-
lieve it is deserving of your support. □
'The complete transcript of the hearings will
be published by the committee and will be
available from the Superintendent of Docu-
ments. U.S. Government Printing Office.
Washington, D.C. 20402.
20
government policy instruments rather
than performance targets, the achieve-
ment of which is often affected by
forces beyond the control of individual
governments.
Chancellor Schmidt agreed to pro-
pose to his legislature new measures in
an amount of up to 1% of GNP to
stimulate German growth. Pursuant to
this commitment, the West German
Cabinet on July 28 proposed a $5.6
billion stimulation package for 1979
and an additional stimulus of $1.6 bil-
lion for 1980.
Prime Minister Fukuda agreed to
take additional measures if necessary to
achieve Japan's growth target for fiscal
year 1978 of 1%. The Japanese Gov-
ernment submitted a supplemental
budget proposal to the Diet on Sep-
tember 2 which is designed to add 2.5
trillion yen to domestic demand. These
commitments might not have been pos-
sible without the President's firm
statement on inflation and energy.
Although public attention in the area
of energy was concentrated on actions
expected of the United States, the dis-
cussion of energy was far broader in
scope. The participants emphasized co-
operative efforts to develop energy
sources, including renewable sources,
in both the industrialized democracies
and the developing countries. The im-
portance of coal and the continued de-
velopment of nuclear energy was also
recognized. The Declaration stressed
the role of the multilateral financial in-
stitutions and of private investment in
the energy field.
The Bonn meeting also brought us
closer to agreement in the multilateral
trade negotiations. We would like to
have been even further along than we
are now. Nevertheless, the Framework
of Understanding issued on July 13 in
Geneva by the U.S. and other delega-
tions reflects the advanced state of
work on tariff reductions and on sev-
eral international codes to reduce non-
tariff barriers to trade. The summit
participants welcomed this statement
by the major trading countries and
committed themselves to conclude suc-
cessfully the detailed negotiations by
December 15. This commitment en-
compasses key areas such as agricul-
ture, subsidies, and safeguards, where
major decisions are needed.
The participants also specifically en-
dorsed the decisions of the Organiza-
tion for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) Council of
Ministers in June to renew the OECD
trade pledge and to adopt guidelines for
positive adjustment policies. These
guidelines represent a significant step
forward from the London summit Dec-
Department of State Bulle; m
laration. They will, if observed, dis-
courage defensive policies which pre-
vent structural change and encourage
the acceptance and facilitation of such
changes over time. Adherence to these
guidelines will promote long-term
growth and diminish the likelihood of
short-term protectionist responses at
the expense of other countries.
At the summit there was a lively dis-
cussion of international monetary pol-
icy. All recognized that exchange rate
stability can only be achieved by at-
tacking the underlying fundamental
problems of growth, energy, and infla-
tion. At the same time, summit partici-
pants pledged to intervene to counter
disorderly conditions in the exchange
markets.
We are concerned by the decline of
the dollar against certain currencies in
recent weeks. The President has asked
Treasury Secretary Blumenthal and
Federal Reserve Board Chairman
Miller to consider appropriate actions.
We have taken several steps, and addi-
tional measures can be expected as
appropriate.
Also at the summit there was a use-
ful discussion of proposals for a Euro-
pean monetary system. This is a very
ambitious undertaking, intended to
further advance efforts at European in-
tegration. As such, it is surely to be
welcomed and encouraged, consistent
with longstanding U.S. support for
European economic integration. If ef-
forts to build such a system are suc-
cessful, the Europeans will have a better
framework for harmonizing economic
policies and economic developments,
including growth and inflation.
Putting together a viable European
monetary system involves a great deal
of technical work, about which the
European Community will keep other
countries informed as details are
worked out. Naturally, the effect of the
system on third countries and on world
financial markets cannot be judged
favorable or unfavorable until such
details are known. The European
Community itself is still at an early
stage in working out these specifics;
their Finance Council met only 2 days
ago to consider initial technical reports,
and final decisions are not expected for
several months.
Considerable time was devoted to a
discussion of the problems of the de-
veloping countries. The Declaration
explicitly recognizes the growing inter-
dependence of developed and de-
veloping countries, and summit
participants committed themselves to
increasing the flow of financial assist-
ance and other resources tor develop-
ment. The need for intensified and
improved bilateral and multilateral a
sistance in the energy field is speci
ically stressed. The Declaration ah
calls on the developing countries, pa
ticularly the more advanced among ther
to assume responsibilities which go wi
their enhanced role in the world eco
omy.
Finally, the Declaration by the sur
mit participants to combat internation
terrorism in the form of aircra
hijacking is a significant achievemen
Essentially, the Declaration is a cor
mitment to cut off air service to at
from any country which fails to retu
the hijacked aircraft. We are no
working with representatives of othi
summit countries to gain broader inte
national support for the Declaratie
and on procedures for its implement!
tion.
Proposals To Stimulate
World Growth
I would now like to turn specifical
to the proposals which have been ma«
here and abroad to stimulate wor
growth by increasing investments in tl
developing countries. All of these pr<
posals are constructive attempts to ai
dress the needs of the developir
countries in a way which also benefi
the industrial economies. The wor
economic situation which these propo
als address is characterized by:
• Sluggish economic growth on tl
part of many developed countries du
in large part to lagging investment;
• Large investment needs in dc
veloping countries; and
• A substantial amount of liqui
funds which, for various reasons, d
not always find their way to the dt
veloping countries which need them th
most.
Investment in the Industrie
Countries. Slow growth in business
fixed investment in virtually all OEC1
countries in recent years is a cause a.
well as an effect of sluggish overffl
growth rates. There is some concer
that lower rates of investment ma
gradually reduce the productiv
capacities of the industrialized coun
tries and that future expansions may
therefore, encounter the types o
bottlenecks that typically exacerbati
inflation. It is also likely that lowe
investment — particularly in researcl
and development — limits an econ
omy's ability to adjust over time toi
changes in international competition.
Investment is a key factor in tht
maintenance of long-term economi
growth. Over the years, countries witr
higher investment levels and advancing
>vember 1978
■hnology have tended to grow faster,
is. therefore, unsettling to note that
: OECD has reported significant re-
ctions in the rate of growth of the
pital stock in manufacturing in the
st half of the 1970's compared with
the previous 5 years in almost all major
industrialized countries. This is par-
ticularly troublesome, since, as the
OECD reports, capital requirements per
unit of output are rising, not declining.
Major influences on investment
Muttila tera t Trade
Negotiations
ESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS,
£PT. 28 '
I am today submitting to the Congress a
jposal for legislation to extend for a brief
riod the authority of the Secretary of the
easury under Section 303(d) of the Tariff Act
1930 to waive the application of counter-
Ming duties. I hope that the Congress will be
•le to enact the necessary legislation before
journment sine die.
If not extended, the waiver authority will
pire on January 2, 1979. This would seri-
isly jeopardize satisfactory conclusion of the
jltilateral Trade Negotiations (MTN) under-
ly in Geneva. Unless the waiver authority is
tended to cover the period during which the
ults of the MTN will be under review by the
ingress, our ability to press ahead with the
gotiations would be sharply limited.
As stipulated by the Congress in the Trade
it of 1974, negotiation of a satisfactory code
subsidies and countervailing duties is a pri-
ary U.S. objective in the MTN. The United
Btes is seeking through such a code improved
•scipline on the use of subsidies which ad-
rsely affect trade. In our view, a satisfactory
bsidy/countervailing duty code must include
) new substantive rules on the use of internal
d export subsidies which adequately protect
nited States agricultural and industrial trading
terests insofar as they are adversely affected
' such subsidies, and (2) more effective pro-
isions on notification, consultation and dis-
ite settlement that will provide for timely
solution of disputes involving the use of sub-
dies in international trade.
My Special Representative for Trade Negotia-
ons [Robert S. Strauss] has informed me that
le prospects for reaching agreement by year end
a subsidy/countervailing duty code which
leets the basic U.S. objectives are good —
rovided that the waiver authority can be ex-
nded until such a code has been submitted to.
nd acted upon, by the Congress under the pro-
edures of the Trade Act of 1974. In this con-
ection. the legislation I am proposing would
rovide that the countervailing duty waiver au-
lority will expire as scheduled on January 2.
979, unless we are able to report to the Con-
ress before that date that a subsidy/
countervailing duty code has been negotiated
among the key countries participating in the
MTN and that the MTN itself has been substan-
tially concluded.
Under the countervailing duty waiver author-
ity, the imposition of countervailing duties may
be waived in a specific case only if "adequate
steps have been taken to eliminate or substan-
tially reduce the adverse effect" of the subsidy
in question. This provision and the other lim-
itations on the use of the waiver authority which
are currently in the law would continue in effect
if the waiver authority is extended. Thus. U.S.
producers and workers will continue to be
adequately protected from the adverse effects of
subsidized competition.
A successful conclusion to the MTN is essen-
tial to U.S. economic policy. If the waiver au-
thority is not extended, such a successful con-
clusion will, as I have noted, be seriously
jeopardized. Accordingly, I urge the Congress to
act positively upon this legislative proposal as
quickly as possible.
Jimmy Carter
Proposed Legislation
Section 303 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19
U.S.C. 1303) as amended, is further amended
by adding the following new sentence at the end
of Subsection (d) (2).
"The four-year period specified in the first
sentence of this paragraph shall be extended
until August 1, 1979. provided that before
January 3, 1979, the President informs both
Houses of Congress that agreement on a code
governing the use of subsidies and counter-
vailing duties has been reached and that the
Multilateral Trade Negotiations as a whole have
been substantially completed and provided
further that any determination by the Secretary
of the Treasury made pursuant to this section
and in effect on January 2, 1979, shall, not-
withstanding any expiration date set forth
therein, remain in effect until August 1. 1979,
unless prior thereto the Secretary has reason to.
and does, revoke such determination." D
1 Text from Weekly Compilation of Presiden-
tial Documents of Oct. 2. 1978.
21
levels include the overall level of world
demand, business confidence, capacity
utilization, the cost of capital, and the
cost and availability of complementary
factors of production. With current
rates of OECD growth lagging some-
what behind recent historical rates and
with capacity utilization rates relatively
low, it is not surprising that investment
is restrained. Pervasive uncertainty
about inflation, threats of protec-
tionism, erratic variations in exchange
rates, and changing government
policies all inhibit investment.
OECD Economic Performance.
Overall economic performance in the
OECD countries continues to be a
major determinant of developing coun-
tries' growth; conversely, as develop-
ing countries expand their industrial
capacity, their performance will be-
come increasingly important to the
economic health of the industrial
countries.
Taking the United States as an
example, our exports of manufactures
to developing countries which are not
members of the Organization of Petro-
leum Exporting Countries (OPEC) were
$20 billion, in 1977, or 23% of total
U.S. export of manufactured goods.
From the early 1970's to 1977, the 12
fastest growing markets for U.S. ex-
ports were in the Third World. A
leveling off of exports to some of these
markets in the last year or two, in part
because of foreign exchange con-
straints, could be an important factor in
our large trade deficit. The aggregate
economic performance of developing
countries in the postwar period, a
growth rate of approximately 5. 47c
between 1950 and 1975. has been fairly
good. Some 28 developing coun-
tries — accounting for half of the
population of the Third World — had,
however, real per capita growth rates
of less than 2% per year in the same
period. Thus, the scope for improve-
ment is substantial.
In this framework it makes sense to
ask whether the excess capacity which
exists in some OECD countries could
not be harnessed to satisfy some of the
unmet demands in developing countries
for the mutual benefit of both groups of
countries. The reasoning is that indus-
trial countries could expand employ-
ment and incomes at the same time that
developing countries could accelerate
their accumulation of capital goods.
Several proposals have been put forth
which seek simultaneously to promote
the development objectives in the de-
veloping countries and to stimulate
lagging growth in the OECD
economies. They are very different in
22
scope and operation, and il is important
to distinguish carefully among them.
Resource Transfer. A proposal by
the Nordic countries, made last spring
at the U.N. General Assembly Com-
mittee of the Whole, envisages a
transfer of resources — perhaps on a
massive scale resembling the Marshall
plan. The proposal would allow for the
possibility of directing the demand
created in the developing countries to
industries with excess capacity in de-
veloped countries, thus fostering
noninflationary growth in the short
term and contributing to higher growth
rates in the world economy in the long
term. The proposal does not. however,
address the question of how the mas-
sive transfers are to be financed.
Investment in Developing Coun-
tries. The proposal submitted by Sen-
ator Javits and Representatives Whalen
and Simon, also large in scope, is more
precise as to the source of funds for
additional investment in developing
countries. A large fund would be es-
tablished, drawing on OPEC's holdings
of official assets — now in excess of
$150 billion and largely invested in
short- to medium-term financial
assets — to invest in long-term produc-
tive projects in developing countries.
The channeling of long-term capital to
these countries is to both maintain the
level of world economic activity and
also provide financing for development
programs. Without such a rechanneling
of funds, it is argued, there is a danger
that purchasing power transferred to
surplus-saving countries will be held in
shorter term financial assets in a lim-
ited number of industrial countries,
with longrun consequences being a re-
duction in global demand and limited
availability of long-term capital for
investment.
The World Bank is studying a simi-
lar proposal put forward by Mexico to
use reserves of countries in payments
surpluses for a $15 billion long-term
recycling facility for purchases by de-
veloping countries of imports of capital
goods. The key question which remains
to be answered satisfactorily with re-
spect to both the Javits-Whalen-Simon
proposal and the Mexican proposal is
how to go about attracting surplus
country capital into the proposed new
funds. To put the question another
way: How do we convince OPEC or
other countries in surplus, to partici-
pate in such a plan?
Another approach to the issue is thai
taken by the OECD Secretariat in its
recent work on stepped-up investment.
The OECD Secretariat proposes an in-
crease in long-term private investment
in developing countries, concentrating
on sectors of mutual interest to de-
veloping and developed countries.
Sectors recommended for additional
investment are food, energy, raw ma-
terials, and related processing and
infrastructure. The primary method
proposed to channel foreign investment
capital into those sectors is cofinanc-
ing, whereby private investors become
partners with multilateral development
banks in the financing of selected proj-
ects. The concept of achieving greater
participation of the commercial bank-
ing sector via the co financing
mechanism is attractive, and we plan to
participate actively in further OECD
work on this subject.
Basic Questions
None of the proposals I have referred
to have been elaborated in great detail.
I will confine myself therefore to the
basic questions which we believe re-
quire careful thought in evaluating any
or all of the proposals.
The most basic question is the terms
on which the capital is being trans-
ferred. If we are talking about substan-
tial transfers of concessional capital to
the poorer developing countries, we
must recognize that concern with large
budget deficits in the United States and
in many other industrial countries is a
powerful inhibition to any form of new
government spending. Also, the type of
spending in developing countries which
will best stimulate the OECD
economies may not be appropriate for
the kind of development strategy we
have been supporting — namely growth
with equity. Demand for imports for
these purposes in developing countries
does not generally correspond to those
sectors in OECD countries with excess
capacity or to the need of some OECD
countries to strengthen their external
payments position.
If we are talking about transferring
capital at nonconcessional rates, then
we need to ask why the international
financial markets are not now per-
forming this function. Clearly the mar-
ket is working fairly well in moving
short-term capital. Most developing
countries have successfully drawn on
nonconcessional and official sources to
finance unprecedented current account
deficits during the past few years
While the system performed well, new
official mechanisms in the International
Monetary Fund, such as the Oil Facil-
ity, the Trust Fund, ami the Extended
Fund Facility, were created to cope
with the magnitude of the payments
balances which occurred. The
Supplementary Financing Facility
Department of State Bullet
(Witteveen facility), which is sti
awaiting congressional approval. \\i
further strengthen the IMF's capacitj.
to help countries overcome payment!,,
difficulties and thereby to increase the
spending for the products of the mdu;
trialized countries.
The real thrust of the proposals
have discussed, however, is t
mobilize capital from the OPEC cour
tries and other sources for long-ten
investments in developing countries
To attract capital into a fund for lonj
term investments (the Javits-Whaler
Simon and Mexican plans) or int
long-term cofinancing plans (th
OECD plan) will require returns whic
are remunerative to investors and cor
ditions and assurances which are aq
ceptable to them. Insofar as the risk
associated with investments in de
veloping countries are higher, becausi
of a poor investment climate, inapprc
priate government policies, or simpl
poor economic prospects, or the ra
payment period associated with thi
capital transfer is longer, the returni
will have to exceed those currentl
available for medium-term invest
ments. Such terms will limit both thj
types of projects which can be undei
taken and the number of countrie
which can afford to assume furthe
high-cost indebtedness.
The idea of a Marshall plan for th
Third World and of the less ambitiou
alternatives derives its attractivenes
from the presumption that such plan
would act countercyclical^ to stimu
late recovery in the industrial eoun
tries. I have some reservations. Fund
for projects are never lent or disburse
quickly or easily. If capital imports ar
to be additional and useful in develop
ment efforts, a good deal of planning i
required. There does not exist a shel
of sensible projects awaiting funding
new projects must be developed. Evei
at the domestic level, the lags involve(
between domestic policy measures t(»
stimulate investment and result inj
changes in investment can be. as we al
know, rather long and unpredictable
Using international investment 1
achieve certain domestic targets is
therefore, an even more uncertain en-
terprise. Spending on such long-terrr
projects should rather be governed b>
long-term considerations.
There clearly are cases of attractive
long-term investment projects in de-
veloping countries which are not im-
plemented because of financing con-
straints due to inadequate guarantees to
potential investors. Increased official
development assistance can, to some
extent, serve to reduce these con-
straints.
A
November 1978
All summit participants agreed in
3onn on the need to increase flows.
50th bilateral and multilateral, of fi-
nancial assistance and other resources
"or development. Administration
.pokesmen have made the same point
epeatedly in testimony before Con-
gress.
The multilateral development banks
ire in a particularly good position to
lelp because of the role they are al-
■eady playing in increasing the flow of
ong-term capital to developing coun-
ties. Their multilateral, nonpolitical
;haracter. their reputation for financial
ntegrity. and their ability to develop
iound projects should make it possible
or them to mobilize capital at noncon-
:essional rates from OPEC and other
surplus countries. These countries
:ould increase their participation by
purchasing more of the bonds issued by
:he multilateral development banks.
They may, however, find some form of
rofinancing arrangements with the
oanks to be more attractive because it
ivvould allow them to pick and choose
among projects and recipient countries.
Developing countries would benefit
from additional project financing at
ireasonable terms while surplus coun-
tries would benefit from the guarantees
Iprovided by the participation of the
'multilateral development banks as well
Cis their project expertise. To perform
his function adequately, the multilat-
eral development banks must, of
.course, have sufficient capital to
backstop their borrowing. I hope we
can count on congressional support for
augmenting this capital as it becomes
necessary.
Conclusion
I want to conclude by noting that the
(Bonn summit was a positive step, but
only one step, in a long and difficult
process. We should have no illusions
about the difficulty of the problems we
face. Essential to the success of the
effort is the support of the public and
legislatures of each country. We also
need more of the kind of thinking
which obviously went into the prepara-
tion of House Concurrent Resolution
581. Finally. U.S. leadership is critical
if we are to find effective solutions to
global economic problems. Such lead-
ership can only be based on close
cooperation between the Administra-
tion and Congress in energy, foreign
assistance, and other key areas.
As I have stressed, the basic concept
of interdependence between developed
and developing countries is valid. It is
also clear that there is scope for addi-
tional investment in developing coun-
23
U.S. Export Policy
PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT,
SEPT. 26 »
It is important for this nation's eco-
nomic vitality that both the private
sector and the Federal Government
place a higher priority on exports. I am
today announcing a series of measures
that evidences my Administration's
strong commitment to do so.
The large trade deficits the United
States has experienced in recent years
have weakened the value of the dollar,
intensified inflationary pressures in our
own economy, and heightened insta-
bility in the world economy. These
trade deficits have been caused by a
number of factors. A major cause has
been our excessive reliance on im-
ported oil. We can reduce that reliance
through the passage of sound energy
legislation this year.
Another factor is that the U.S. econ-
omy has been growing at a stronger
pace in recent years than the economies
of our major trading partners. That has
enabled us to purchase relatively more
foreign goods while our trading
partners have not been able to buy as
much of our exports. We will begin to
correct this imbalance as our trading
partners meet the commitments to eco-
nomic expansion they made at the
Bonn summit.
The relatively slow growth of
American exports has also been an im-
portant factor in our trade deficit prob-
lem. Over the past 20 years, our ex-
ports have grown at only half the rate
of other industrial nations, and the
United States has been losing its share
of world markets. Until now, both
business and government have ac-
corded exports a relatively low prior-
ity. These priorities must be changed.
The measures I am announcing today-
consist of actions this Administration
has taken and will take to:
(1) Provide increased direct assist-
ance to U.S. exporters;
(2) Reduce domestic barriers to ex-
ports; and
(3) Reduce foreign barriers to our
exports and secure a fairer international
trading system for all exporters.
These actions are in furtherance of
the commitment I made at the Bonn
summit to an improved U.S. export
performance.
Direct Assistance
to U.S. Exporters
1 . Export-Import Bank. I have
consistently supported a more effective
and aggressive Export-Import Bank.
During the past 2 years, my Adminis-
tration has increased Eximbank's loan
authorization fivefold — from $700
million in FY 1977 to $3.6 billion for
FY 1979. I intend to ask Congress for
an additional $500 million in FY 1980,
bringing Eximbank's total loan au-
thorization to $4.1 billion. These au-
thorizations will provide the Bank with
the funds necessary to improve its
competitiveness, in a manner consist-
ent with our international obligations,
through increased flexibility in the
areas of interest rates, length of loans,
and the percentage of a transaction it
can finance. The Bank is also moving
to simplify its fee schedules and to
make its programs more accessible to
smaller exporters and to agricultural
exporters.
2. SBA Loans to Small Exporters.
The Small Business Administration
will channel up to $100 million of its
current authorization for loan guaran-
tees to small business exporters to pro-
tries and that these investments would,
on balance, improve global economic
performance. I have identified in this
preliminary assessment a number of
questions which merit a much closer
examination. We will continue to
examine these ideas internally and in
conjunction with other countries in the
United Nations, the OECD, and the
World Bank. We welcome the guid-
ance and advice of your committees on
this subject. □
■The complete transcript of the hearings will
be published by the committee and will be avail-
able from the Superintendent of Documents.
U.S. Government Printing Office. Washington.
DC. 20402.
2 For text of the Bonn Declaration and related
material, see Bulletin of Sept. 1978. p. 1.
24
vide seed money for their entry into
foreign markets. Small exporting firms
meeting SBA's qualifications will be
eligible for loan guarantees totaling up
to $500,000 to meet needs for ex-
panded production capacity and to ease
cash flow problems involving overseas
sales or initial marketing expenses.
3. Export Development Programs.
1 am directing the Office of Manage-
ment and Budget to allocate an addi-
tional $20 million in annual resources
for export development programs of the
Departments of Commerce and State to
assist U.S. firms, particularly small
and medium-sized businesses, in mar-
keting abroad through:
• A computerized information sys-
tem to provide exporters with prompt
access to international marketing op-
portunities abroad and to expose
American products to foreign buyers;
• Risk sharing programs to help as-
sociations and small companies meet
initial export marketing costs; and
• Targeted assistance to firms and
industries with high export potential
and intensified short-term export cam-
paigns in promising markets.
4. Agricultural Exports. Agricul-
tural exports are a vital component of
the U.S. trade balance. Over the past
10 years, the volume of U.S. farm
exports has doubled and the dollar
value has nearly quadrupled. Trade in
agricultural products will contribute a
net surplus of almost $13 billion in
fiscal year 1978. This strong perform-
ance is due in part to this Administra-
tion's multifaceted agricultural export
policy, which will be strengthened and
which includes:
• An increase of almost $1 billion
(up from $750 million in FY 1977 to
$1.7 billion in FY 1978) in the level of
short-term export credits;
• An increase of almost 20% in the
level of funding support for a highly
successful program of cooperation with
over 60 agricultural commodity associ-
ations in market development;
• Efforts in the multilateral trade
negotiations to link the treatment of
agricultural and nonagricultural prod-
ucts;
• Opening trade offices in key im-
porting nations in order to facilitate the
development of these markets;
• Aggressive pursuit of an interna-
tional wheat agreement, to insure our
producers a fair share of the expanding
world market; and
• Support of legislation to provide
intermediate export credit for selective
agricultural exports.
5. Tax Measures. I am hopeful that
Congress will work with the Adminis-
tration to promptly resolve the tax
problems of Americans employed
abroad, many of whom are directly in-
volved in export efforts. Last February,
I proposed tax relief for these citizens
amounting to about $250 million a
year. I think this proposal, which Con-
gress has not approved, deals fairly
and. during a time of great budget
stringency, responsibly with this
problem. I remain ready to work with
the Congress to resolve this issue, but I
cannot support proposals which run
contrary to our strong concerns for
budget prudence and tax equity.
My Administration's concern for ex-
ports is matched by our obligation to
insure that government-sponsored ex-
port incentives constitute an efficient
use of the taxpayers' money. The DISC
tax provision simply does not meet that
basic test. It is a costly (over $1 billion
a year) and inefficient incentive for
exports. I continue to urge Congress to
phase DISC out or at least make it
simpler, less costly, and more effective
than it is now. and my Administration
stands ready to work with Congress
toward that goal.
Reduction of Domestic Barriers
to Exports
Direct financial and technical assist-
ance to U.S. firms should encourage
them to take advantage of the increas-
ing competitiveness of our goods in
international markets. Equally impor-
tant will be the reduction of
government-imposed disincentives and
barriers which unnecessarily inhibit our
firms from selling abroad. We can and
will continue to administer the laws
and policies affecting the international
business community firmly and fairly,
but we can also discharge that respon-
sibility with a greater sensitivity to the
importance of exports than has been the
case in the past.
1 . Export Consequences of Regu-
lations. I am directing the heads of all
executive departments and agencies to
take into account, and weigh as a fac-
tor, the possible adverse effects on our
trade balance of their major adminis-
trative and regulatory actions that have
significant export consequences. They
will report back on their progress in
identifying and reducing such negative
export effects where possible, consist-
ent with other legal and policy obliga-
tions. I will make a similar request of
the independent regulatory agencies. In
addition, the Council of Economic Ad-
visers will consider export conse-
quences as part of the Administration's
regulatory analysis program.
Department of State Bulletii:
There may be areas, such as the ex-
port of products which pose serious
health and safety risks, where new reg-
ulations are warranted. But through the
steps outlined above, I intend to inject
a greater awareness throughout the
government of the effects on exports of
administrative and regulatory actions.
2. Export Controls for Foreign
Policy Purposes. I am directing the
Departments of Commerce. State, De-
fense, and Agriculture to take export
consequences fully into account when
considering the use of export controls
for foreign policy purposes. Weight
will be given to whether the goods in
question are also available from coun-
tries other than the United States.
3. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.
At my direction, the Justice Depart-
ment will provide guidance to the busi-
ness community concerning its en-
forcement priorities under the recently
enacted foreign antibribery statute.
This statute should not be viewed as an
impediment to the conduct of legiti-
mate business activities abroad. I am
hopeful that American business will not
forgo legitimate export opportunities
because of uncertainty about the appli-
cation of this statute. The guidance
provided by the Justice Department
should be helpful in that regard.
4. Antitrust Laws. There are in-
stances in which joint ventures and other
kinds of cooperative arrangements be-
tween American firms are necessary or
desirable to improve our export perform-
ance. The Justice Department has ad-
vised that most such foreign joint ven-
tures would not violate our antitrust
laws and in many instances would ac-
tually strengthen competition. This is
especially true for one-time joint ven-
tures created to participate in a single
activity, such as a large construction
project. In fact, no such joint conduct
has been challenged under the antitrust
laws in over 20 years.
Nevertheless, many businessmen ap-
parently are uncertain on this point,
and this uncertainty can be a disincen-
tive to exports. I have, therefore, in-
structed the Justice Department, in
conjunction with the Commerce De-
partment, to clarify and explain the
scope of the antitrust laws in this area,
with special emphasis on the kinds of
joint ventures that are unlikely to raise
antitrust problems.
I have also instructed the Justice De-
partment to give expedited treatment to
requests by business firms for guidance
on international antitrust issues under
the Department's business review pro-
gram. Finally, I will appoint a business
advisory panel to work with the Na-
illei
November 1978
" ional Commission for the Review of
he Antitrust Laws.
5. Environmental Reviews. For a
lumber of years the export community
las faced the uncertainty of whether
he National Environmental Policy Act
NEPA) requires environmental impact
eif itatements for Federal export licenses,
>ermits. and approvals.
I will shortly sign an Executive order
vhich should assist U.S. exports by
:liminating the present uncertainties
to :oncerning the type of environmental
i»l 'eviews that will be applicable and the
Isi ^ederal actions relating to exports that
XI vill be affected. The order will make
:he following export-related clarifica-
:ions.
to
• Environmental impact statements
b j will not be required for Federal export
e} licenses, permits, approvals, and other
2xport-related actions that have poten-
tial environmental effects in foreign
tries.
Export licenses issued by the De-
partments of Commerce and Treasury
will be exempt from any environmental
reviews required by the Executive
order.
Abbreviated environmental re-
views will be required only with re-
spect to (1) nuclear reactors, (2)
financing of products and facilities
whose toxic effects create serious pub-
lic health risks, and (3) certain Federal
actions having a significant adverse
effect on the environment of nonpar-
ticipating third countries or natural re-
sources of global importance.
Accordingly, this order will establish
environmental requirements for only a
minor fraction (well below 5%) of the
dollar volume of U.S. exports. At the
same time, it will provide procedures
to define and focus on those exports
which should receive special scrutiny
because of their major environmental
impacts abroad. This Executive order
will fairly balance our concern for the
environment with our interest in pro-
moting exports.
Reduction in Foreign Trade
Barriers and Subsidies
We are also taking important inter-
national initiatives to improve U.S. ex-
port performance. Trade restrictions
imposed by other countries inhibit our
ability to export. Tariff and especially
nontariff barriers restrict our ability to
develop new foreign markets and ex-
pand existing ones. We are now work-
ing to eliminate or reduce these barriers
through the multilateral trade negotia-
tions (MTN) in Geneva.
U.S. export performance is also ad-
versely affected by the excessive finan-
cial credits and subsidies which some
of our trading partners offer to their
own exporters. One of our major ob-
jectives in the MTN is to negotiate an
international code restricting the use of
government subsidies for exports. In
addition. I am directing the Secretary
of the Treasury to undertake immediate
consultations with our trading partners
to expand the scope and tighten the
terms of the existing international ar-
rangement on export credits.
I hope that our major trading
partners will see the importance of
reaching more widespread agreements
on the use of export finance to avoid a
costly competition which is econom-
ically unsound and ultimately self-
defeating for all of us. These interna-
tional agreements are essential to
assure that American exporters do not
face unfair competition, and this Ad-
ministration intends to work vigorously
to secure them.
Conclusion
While these initiatives will assist
private business in increasing exports,
our export problem has been building
for many years, and we cannot expect
dramatic improvement overnight. In-
creasing our exports will take time and
require a sustained effort. Announce-
ment of my Administration's export
policy is not the end of our task but
rather the beginning. To insure that this
issue continues to receive priority at-
tention, I am asking Secretary Kreps,
in coordination with officials from
other concerned government agencies,
to direct the continuation of efforts to
improve our export potential and per-
formance.
I will shortly sign an Executive order
to reconstitute a more broadly based
President's Export Council to bring a
continuous flow of fresh ideas into our
government policymaking process. I
expect this Council to report to me
annually through the Secretary of
Commerce.
Increasing U.S. exports is a major
challenge — for business, for labor, and
for government. Better export perform-
ance by the United States would spur
growth in the economy. It would create
jobs. It would strengthen the dollar and
fight inflation.
There are no short-term, easy solu-
tions. But the actions I am announcing
today reflect my Administration's de-
termination to give the United States
trade deficit the high-level, sustained
attention it deserves. They are the first
step in a long-term effort to strengthen
this nation's export position in world
trade.
25
ASSISTANT SECRETARY KATZ,
SEPT. 29
Statement before the Subcommittee
on International Economics of the
Joint Economic Committee. Julius L.
Katz is Assistant Secretary for Eco-
nomic and Business Affairs. 2
I am pleased to have the opportunity
to discuss with this subcommittee the
role of the Department of State and the
Foreign Service in the newly an-
nounced national export policy.
The Department of State participated
actively in the work of the interagency
task force established by the President
to recommend measures to increase
U.S. exports. We welcome the com-
prehensive package of recommenda-
tions developed by the task force and
approved by the President, including
incentives for exports and reducing
disincentives, which constitute the be-
ginnings of a national export policy.
We are especially gratified that the task
force looked to a policy of increased
exports as an important element in im-
proving the current trade account. The
President's commitment to export
growth as an important national objec-
tive will provide the direction needed
in the executive branch and the Con-
gress and should give the business
community the confidence to pursue
export opportunities more aggressively.
The Department of State views the
steps now being taken to develop a
national export policy as only one ele-
ment, but an essential element, of our
overall foreign economic policy.
A strong U.S. economy and a sound
dollar are critical ingredients of a stable
international economy. At the same
time the United States has a critical
stake in the health of the world econ-
omy. It is for this reason that we seek
to pursue policies which favorably af-
fect global stability and growth:
• Efforts in the current multilateral
trade negotiations to expand trade and
strengthen trading rules;
• Solutions to the problems related
to price stability and security of supply
of food and other commodities;
• Programs to conserve energy and
develop new energy sources at home
and abroad;
• Facilities to insure the availability
of balance-of-payments financing to
those in need; and
• Increased flows of financial assist-
ance and resources for development.
The success of these policies will
open new export opportunities. These
opportunities will not translate into in-
creased U.S. exports unless U.S. busi-
ness is prepared to respond to those
26
opportunities. Government policy can
affect that response — positively or
negatively.
U.S. Trade
Recent events have underscored the
need for a clearly articulated national
export policy. The United States had a
$31 billion trade deficit in 1977.
Through the first 7 months of 1978, the
deficit is running at an even higher
annual rate. There are a number of
explanations: The strength of the U.S.
recovery combined with the sluggish
growth of domestic demand in Japan,
West Germany, and many of our other
trading partners; the high level of oil
imports which now provides 40% of
domestic consumption and a relatively
high inflation rate in the country com-
pared to those of West Germany and
Japan.
While all of these developments have
played a role in our deficit, they may
have masked another fundamental trade
problem: Slow export growth and a
deteriorating U.S. share in world trade,
particularly in manufactured goods.
Over the past 20 years, U.S. exports
have grown at only half the rate of
other industrial countries, with the di-
vergence increasing in the last several
years. When we take inflation into ac-
count, real U.S. exports have virtually
stood still for more than 3 years; this is
in sharp contrast to our competitors
who have managed real export growth
Department of State Bulletin
(even if we exclude their exports to the
United States) of nearly 4% per year
during the same period. While ag-
ricultural exports have held up well,
and have in fact even grown, the vol-
ume of exports of American manufac-
tured goods has fallen since 1974. In
1976 we still enjoyed a $12 billion
surplus in trade in manufactured goods.
That surplus fell to $3 billion in 1977.
So far this year, trade in this category
is in deficit at an annual rate of $12
billion.
As a result of the depreciation of the
dollar and the appreciation of the cur-
rencies of our major trading partners,
we should expect to see an improve-
ment in our competitive position af-
fecting both exports and imports.
Again, the increased competitiveness
of our exports which dollar deprecia-
tion produces will only expand oppor-
tunities. It will not insure that U.S.
exporters take advantage of those op-
portunities.
U.S. Commercial Activities
The Departments of Commerce and
State jointly operate programs for ex-
port promotion and marketing, and it is
planned to expand these activities to
assist in meeting the goal of maximiz-
ing exports. The Department of State
performs the following broad
categories of functions in carrying out
its export promotion activities.
• We provide Foreign Service offi-
cers qualified in economic and com-
mercial affairs to conduct export
promotion programs. The State De-
partment has roughly 900 economic-
commercial officers, 300 of whom are
fully or principally engaged in com-
mercial work. These officers work in
the Department and in our embassies,
consulates, and trade centers abroad.
• We provide our overseas posts
with guidance and assistance in man-
aging their individual export promotion
programs. Thirty-seven embassies in
major commercial markets abroad op-
erate under a State-Commerce annual
plan called a country commercial pro-
gram. This management-by-objective
document establishes plans and pro-
grams for efficiently utilizing our
commercial resources to achieve spe-
cific goals. Additional embassies in
smaller markets target their activities
and manage their resources under a
simplified type of annual plan called a
commercial action program.
• We coordinate with other U.S.
Government agencies to insure effec-
tive export promotion assistance for the
American business community. For
example, information collected at
Foreign Service posts is distributed in
the United States by the Department of
Commerce.
• At our posts overseas we assist
visiting American businessmen to es-
tablish appropriate trade contacts and
I
[
PRESIDENT'S REMARKS,
SEPT. 26*
One of the problems that our nation has
faced for several years, but with growing
concern recently, has been the very high
negative trade balance. We have imported
a great deal more than we have exported.
There are obviously several reasons for
this. One is the extraordinary increase in
the imports of oil which, as you know,
have increased 800% in the last 6 years, so
that we now import about half our total oil.
This has created inflationary pressures. It
has caused some doubt about our nation's
leadership, and we have been considering
lor a number ot months what we might do
about this problem.
I know the obvious cause for high trade
imbalance is not exporting enough of the
products that we ourselves can produce.
Secretary Juanita Kreps — Secretary ot
Commerce — has been working with a task
force recently in trying to resolve this par-
ticular aspect of our problem
Obviously, exported goods create much
needed jobs for Americans, and it corrects
the defects that I've just described to you.
We've never been a nation that emphasized
exports enough, because we've been so
highly blessed with natural resources, ap-
proaching a degree almost of self-
sufficiency.
We've never depended upon exports as
have other nations who trade with us like
Japan , Germany, and others. But there's a
growing consciousness in our country now
that we would like to accelerate, that ex-
port commitments should be a part of every
producer in our country, both large.
medium-sized, and small-
Many people don't know how to export
They don't know how to package goods lor
sales overseas, how to get their products to
a transportation center, how to deliver and
handle the paperwork, how to locale
foreign buyers. These are the kinds of edu-
cational processes that we hope to explore.
also.
Lately we've been slowing down in re-
search and development commitment in our
country, as well, and we hope to expedite a
recommitment to planning for the future,
so that we can he technologically compati-
ble and competitive with our foreign trad-
ing partners.
We also, of course, want to remove trade
barriers that have been created by congres-
sional action and by administrative action
which prevents exports from going over-
seas, and we are negotiating with our
foreign trade partners to eliminate trade
barriers that prevent our own products from
entering their countries. In doing this, we
must be careful not to lower our standards
for environmental quality or the safety or
health of American workers, or our com-
mitment to principles of human rights and
others on which our nation has been
founded and exists
Secretary of Commerce Juanita Kreps
will now give you some specific proposals
that have been evolved by her own depart
ment, by Members of Congress, by other
members of the Cabinet, and by the husi
ness and labor leaders of our country.**
*Made to reporters assembled in the
Briefing Room at the White House (text
from Weekly Compilation of Presidential
Documents of Oct. 2. 1978)
**FolIowing the President's remarks.
Secretary Kreps held a news conference on
the proposals, the text of which was issued
as a White House press release.
ovember 1978
resolve any commercial problems
Cot ey encounter.
We assure that all activities under-
ken under commercial programs are
>nsistent with overall U.S. foreign
)licy objectives. This is achieved
rough frequent interagency meetings
nong senior officials.
27
7
The commercial activities performed
/ the U.S. Foreign Service are aimed
8 imarily at assisting firms to enter and
nan cpand their markets abroad, giving
>ecial attention to the needs of small
1 id medium-sized companies. Foreign
ervice posts provide these firms,
irough the Department of Commerce,
ith a continuing flow of reports on
onomic trends and market develop-
lents, market research, trade opportu-
ities, major economic development
rojects. and background financial and
Dmmercial information on prospective
gents, distributors, and purchasers of
merican products. In addition, the
osts actively help organize and pro-
lote U.S. trade and industrial exhibi-
ons abroad. They also arrange for
>reign buyers to come to the United
tates to visit American trade shows
American firms.
Our posts abroad also operate com-
lercial libraries and publish and dis-
ibute commercial newsletters to pro-
ide the most important business and
overnment buyers, agents, and end-
sers with current information on
imerican products, services, and tech-
ology. These activities are, of course,
i addition to the posts' ongoing assist-
ince to visiting American businessmen
(nd to the resident American business
ommunity.
With the need to service a larger
lientele in mind, the Export Policy
'ask Force indicated that increased
omestic staffing and additional com-
nercia! personnel in our Foreign Serv-
ce posts abroad are necessary to carry
ut expanded commercial activities.
The President has directed the Office of
4anagement and Budget to allocate an
idditional $20 million in annual re-
ources for export development pro-
frams of the Departments of Com-
lerce and State.
With these new export promotion
guidelines, we have begun exploring
he following programs in order to be
Drepared to accommodate this projected
xpansion.
• We have reviewed post commer-
cial activities and business assistance
patterns in order to determine in which
geographic regions and at which em-
bassies and consulates we might expect
the heaviest initial commercial work-
load increase to develop.
• We are identifying those Foreign
Service posts which can be expected to
cope with the increased work require-
ments without increasing their re-
sources.
• Then we will target selected key
posts for additional personnel where
this appears necessary.
• We will explore means of in-
creasing the flexibility of our personnel
resource allocation process to speed
our response in cases where the need
for enhanced commercial services to
U.S. export-motivated industries de-
velops rapidly and/or exceeds present
projections.
In our preparations to expand the
worldwide capabilities within the
commercial function, we are seeking
to absorb as much as possible of the
cost of that expansion from existing
resources within the Department.
A key determinant of a nation's
success in exporting is the existence
of a substantial number of highly
motivated and competitive domestic
industries which are vigorously en-
gaged in seeking out and exploiting
sales opportunities in overseas mar-
kets. Government export promotion
programs can help assure that infor-
mation on foreign markets and firms
is available to present and potential
exporters, that opportunities are
available to exporters to display their
products abroad, and that exports are
not discriminated against by foreign
governments. But export promotion
programs of this or any other country
cannot be effective in the absence of
a strong commitment by the private
sector itself to seek overseas markets.
The positive government policies
included in the new export policy are
essential to provide the climate and
framework for an expanded export
effort. The Department of State is
committed to giving its fullest support
to this effort. □
1 Text from Weekly Compilation of Presi-
dential Documents of Oct. 2, 1978.
2 The complete transcript of the hearings
will be published by the committee and will be
available from the Superintendent of Docu-
ments, U.S. Government Printing Office,
Washington. DC. 20402.
Publications
GPO SALES
Publications may be ordered by catalog or
stock number from the Superintendent of Docu-
ments, U.S. Government Printing Office.
Washington. DC. 20402. A 25% discount is
made on orders for 100 or more copies of any
one publication mailed to the same address.
Remittances, parable to the Superintendent of
Documents, must accompany orders. Prices
shown below, which include domestic postage,
are subject to change.
Agricultural Research. Agreement with
Bangladesh. TIAS 8788. 23 pp. $1.20. (Cat.
No. S9. 10:8788.)
Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with
Egypt amending the agreement of October
26, 1976, as amended. TIAS 8828. 2 pp.
600. (Cat. No. S9. 10:8828.)
Trade in Textiles. Agreement with the
Socialist Republic of Romania. TIAS 8831. 3
pp. 700. (Cat. No. S9. 10:8831.)
Trade in Textiles. Agreement with the
Socialist Republic of Romania. TIAS 8833.
9 pp. 800. (Cat. No. S9. 10:8833.)
Trade in Textiles. Agreement with the Re-
public of Korea. TIAS 8835. 5 pp. 70?.
(Cat. No. S9. 10:8835.)
Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with
Sudan TIAS 8856. 11 pp. 900. (Cat. No.
S9. 10:8856.)
Agricultural Cooperative Development.
Agreement with Liberia. TIAS 8857. 14 pp.
900. (Cat. No. S9. 10:8857.)
Agricultural Commodities — Transfer Under
Title II. Agreement with Somalia. TIAS
8859. 3 pp. 700. (Cat. No. S9. 10:8859.)
Agricultural Commodities — Transfer Under
Title II. Agreement with the World Food
Program. TIAS 8860. 2 pp. 600 (Cat. No.
S9. 10:8860.)
Agricultural Commodities — Transfer Under
Title II. Agreement with Tanzania. TIAS
8861. 3 pp. 700. (Cat. No. S9. 10:8861.)
Agricultural Commodities — Transfer Under
Title II. Agreement with Senegal. TIAS
8862. 5 pp. 700. (Cat. No. S9. 10:8862.)
Agricultural Commodities — Transfer Under
Title II. Agreement with the Philippines.
TIAS 8865. 8 pp. 800. (Cat. No.
S9. 10:8865.)
Trade in Textiles. Agreement with the Philip-
pines, amending the agreement of October
15. 1975. TIAS 8879. 4 pp. 600. (Cat. No.
S9. 10:8879.) □
28
Department of State Bullet
EUROPE: An Overview of U.S.'Soviet Relations
jikes
ii fw
by Marshall D. Shulman
Statement before the Subcommittee
on Europe and the Middle East of the
House Committee on International
Relations on September 26, 1978.
Ambassador Shulman is Special Ad-
viser to the Secretary of State on
Soviet Affairs. '
Last year when I had the privilege
oi testifying before your subcommit-
tee, I presented an overview of U.S.-
Soviet relations as of that time —
October 1 977.- Today, I propose to
discuss the developments that have oc-
curred in U.S. -Soviet relations since
that time, to analyze the reasons for
those developments, and to discuss
present prospects for the relationship.
It has been characteristic of U.S.-
Soviet relations since World War II
that they have fluctuated between
periods of high and low tension. Dur-
ing the past year, relations have
moved toward relatively higher ten-
sion, continuing an uneven trend from
the latter part of 1975.
From the point of view of the
United States, the causes of this de-
terioration were to be found mainly in
the following Soviet actions.
• In exploiting opportunities for the
expansion of its influence in Africa,
the Soviet Union exceeded a reason-
able level of restraint in the transport
of weapons and Cuban combat person-
nel onto the continent, thereby exacer-
bating local conflict situations.
• The deployment of new strategic
weapons systems and the continued up-
grading of Soviet armaments in the
European theatre raised uncertainties
about Soviet intentions.
• The heightening of Soviet police
actions against Soviet dissidents,
American correspondents, and an
American businessman, and the con-
tinued harassment of Soviet citizens
who apply for emigration, reflected a
lack of regard for commitments under
the Helsinki agreement.
While we cannot accept the Soviet
view, it is important for us to engage
in a serious analytical effort to identify
key elements of the present Soviet
world view. As we understand Soviet
perceptions, the following charges
which they have levied against the
United States loom largest for them.
• Moscow complains of dilatory
conduct of negotiations on SALT,
mutual and balanced force reductions,
a comprehensive test ban, and the In-
dian Ocean.
• In the global political arena, the
Soviet Union is suspicious of Western
steps to strengthen China against the
Soviet Union, resents exclusion from
the Middle East negotiations, and be-
lieves the reaction to its competition
for influence in Africa is dispropor-
tionate and unreasonable.
• The Soviet regime sees a U.S.
effort to use human rights issues to
undermine its political authority.
• It is disturbed by what it sees as
efforts to rekindle the cold war by
economic pinpricks.
One of the difficulties of the situa-
tion is that the Soviet leadership sees
the deterioration in relations as largely
stemming from cold war pressures
within the United States and does not
perceive how actions of the Soviet
Union — its security apparatus, its
military, its propagandists — have con-
tributed to a hardening of American
attitudes toward the Soviet Union. It
is, of course, a natural tendency not
"to see oursels as ithers see us," as
the poet Bobby Burns put it, and we
are not immune from this tendency.
But the problem is compounded in the
Soviet case by the fact that these are
the actions of institutions deeply
rooted in the Soviet system, and the
world view of the leadership is cir-
cumscribed by its limited experience
of the outside world.
ANALYSIS OF RECENT
DEVELOPMENTS
In seeking to understand why rela-
tions have deteriorated, we can sort
out some objective factors in the situ-
ation. The relationship between the
United States and the Soviet Union has
always been subject to changes in the
external international situation, which
is the terrain on which the two coun-
tries meet.
In the present period, a principal
factor is that the continent of Africa,
culminating several decades of post
colonial change, has entered upon a
period of extraordinary fluidity, in
which many sources of conflict have
come to a head. This creates situations
in which the Soviet Union sees op-
portunities for the expansion of its in-
fluence, and this in turn inevitably
heightens the competitive tension
the U.S. -Soviet relationship. Th
Soviet Union has not interpreted "dt
tente" or "peaceful coexistence'
precluding such actions.
There are also factors within th
Soviet Union that contribute t
heightened tension in the relationship
The powerful entrenched polic
bureaucracy inevitably presses fo
tighter control and punitive action
against the expression of dissider
opinion during periods of reduced in
ternational tension, thus precipitatin
international reactions which cu
across the foreign policy interests o
the Soviet Union. Moreover, the con
siderable strength of the militar
bureaucracies tends to perpetuate sup
port for military programs without re
gard for their impact on the other in
ternational policies of the government.
In addition, there are factors in thi
American situation which affect thi
relationship.
• The blurring of popular under
standing of the limitations o
"detente" contributed to a sense o"
disillusionment and anger when tht
competitive aspects of the relationship
became more evident.
• A measured and effective reaction
to the military and political competi
tion from the Soviet Union has been
made more difficult by the persisting
post-Vietnam apprehension that the
United States may be seen as lacking
sufficient will and resolution.
• The implementation of a unified
and coordinated foreign policy by the
United States has become more com-
plex, both because the issues them-
selves have become more complex andl
also as a result of the shifting balance
of responsibility for the conduct of
foreign policy between the executive
and legislative branches of govern-
ment.
Given the existence of these factors
in the external international situation
and within the Soviet Union and the
United States, it should not be sur-
prising that the course of U.S. -Soviet
relations does not follow a straight
line. Nevertheless, it lies within our
power to magnify or moderate the ef-
fect of these factors. It should be evi-
dent that it is in our national interest
to moderate them, as much as possi-
ble, since a high level of tension in
the U.S. -Soviet relationship inevitably
[RES
l',v
led
ltl»
lidsi
Jays
tacti
lit)
Ike
itlof
A
lit
lot
November 1978
makes all other problems facing us in
our foreign relations more difficult and
more dangerous.
PRESENT STATE OF
U.S. -SO VIET RELATIONS
In this short perspective, one can
only speak of trends with fingers
crossed, but it appears possible that
the deterioration in Soviet-American
relations may have bottomed out in
midsummer. During the August holi-
days, a lull in the chain of actions and
reactions gave both sides an opportu-
nity to reflect on the consequences of
the momentum that had been de-
veloping in the downward spiral.
A number of steps on the Soviet
side in recent weeks suggests that the
Soviet Union wishes to reverse the
tide of events.
• The court action against two
American correspondents, who had
been charged with slander as part of
an effort to limit Western news re-
porting on Soviet dissidents, was ter-
minated.
• An American businessman who
had been charged with currency viola-
tions, apparently in retaliation for the
arrest of two Soviet citizens for es-
pionage, was allowed to leave the
country after a transparently contrived
trial.
• The inhumane severity of sen-
tences in human rights cases has been
relatively reduced in the most recent
series of trials, following the convic-
tion of Shcharanskiy, and the Soviet
leadership has agreed to allow a
number of families to leave the coun-
try who had previously been denied
permission to do so. The level of
Jewish emigration from the Soviet
Union has continued to rise and is now
higher than at any time since 1973.
• Although further serious problems
may lie ahead in southern Africa,
there are some grounds for a tentative
judgment that the Soviet Union has
observed certain limitations in
Ethiopia and has not sought to prevent
Angola from playing a constructive
role in composing its relations with
Zaire and in the Namibian problem.
The logic of the Soviet situation
suggests that the same reasons that
prompted the Brezhnev regime about a
decade ago to commit itself decisively
to a foreign policy of "peaceful
coexistence" (that is, a continuation of
the competition without war and at re-
duced levels of tension) are, if any-
thing, more compelling today than they
were then. Domestically, the Soviet
system still faces the need for structural
changes to raise both agricultural and
industrial productivity and to encour-
age the growth of the advanced tech-
nological sector of its economy.
In its foreign relations, the Soviet
Union is concerned about delicate in-
stabilities in Eastern Europe, a mount-
ing challenge from China, and rela-
tively unpromising prospects elsewhere
in the world, with the partial and still
uncertain exception of parts of Africa.
In the military balance, the continued
high level of resources devoted by the
Soviet Union to its strategic and con-
ventional forces has stimulated a higher
level of military effort by the United
States and its NATO allies.
Each of these problems would be
compounded by a foreign policy that
would result in higher tensions. Mis-
calculations, irrationality, and
bureaucratic free wheeling are always
possible, but if prudence and logic pre-
vail, and if present and future Soviet
leaders perceive that the United States
is equally willing to conduct the re-
lationship at reduced levels of tension,
it should be possible to put matters
onto a more sensible footing.
For its part, the United States has
been taking measured steps to encour-
age further movement by the Soviet
Union toward the resolution of funda-
mental problems still unresolved.
The strains of the recent past may
create an opportunity for us to put the
U.S. -Soviet relationship on a more
realistic and steady course, in place of
the alternations between extreme hos-
tility and shallow optimism which have
dominated our attitudes in the past.
The President has made it clear that
it is an integral element in U.S. foreign
policy to recognize that the Soviet-
American relationship in the present
period, while fundamentally competi-
tive in nature as a result of our differ-
ent views of the world and our con-
flicting long term aims, at the same
time also includes some important
overlapping interests. Preeminent
among these common interests is the
necessity of navigating the mine fields
Letters
of Credence
On October 2, 1978. President Car-
ter accepted the credentials of Dr.
Horst Grunert of the German Demo-
cratic Republic and Sean Donlon of
Ireland as their countries' newly ap-
pointed Ambassadors to the United
States. □
29
of conflict in the world today so that
they do not precipitate a world nuclear
war.
From this it follows that the priority
governing our relations with the Soviet
Union in the present period is to
strengthen our security by seeking to
stabilize the military competition be-
tween the two superpowers and by
working toward a regulation of the
political competition so that it does not
increase the danger of war. Viewing
the relationship with the Soviet Union
as a process extending over many dec-
ades, it is part of our longer term pur-
pose to encourage a widening of the
sphere of cooperative actions to effect
a moderating influence on the funda-
mental character of the relationship
to the extent that this may become
possible.
CURRENT ISSUES IN
U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
Although it has not received much
public attention, the work of the two
SALT delegations at Geneva has
brought to completion perhaps 95% of
a SALT II agreement. Their work is
embodied in a joint draft agreement of
more than 60 pages, which specifies in
great technical detail the definitions,
verification procedures, and other as-
pects that must be covered with preci-
sion to avoid later misunderstanding.
Meanwhile, in a series of meetings
between Secretary Vance and Foreign
Minister Gromyko. the remaining is-
sues have been under active negotia-
tion. Although these issues are few in
number, they are complex and impor-
tant to one side or the other. There has
been some narrowing of differences on
these issues, and it is possible that
agreement could be reached in the near
future.
Once agreement is reached, the re-
sults will be placed before the Congress
and the American people, and there
will be a full opportunity for debate
and discussion of every detail. I be-
lieve that it will be the judgment of the
Congress and the American people that
the proposed SALT II agreement
strengthens the security of the United
States and of its allies.
It will be apparent to all, I believe,
that in the absence of such an agree-
ment, both the United States and the
Soviet Union would increase at
dangerous rates the destructive capa-
bility at their disposal and that the se-
curity of both countries and of the en-
tire world would thereby be seriously
reduced.
Agreement in SALT is not based
30
upon trust but is soundly based upon
practical verification measures.
A great effort has been made to con-
tinue" the SALT negotiations, not-
withstanding the increase of tension in
other aspects of the Soviet-American
relationship, on the self-evident
grounds that our interest in reducing
The danger of war by stabilizing the
military competition does not become
diminished during periods of greater
tension The President and Secretary
Vance have repeatedly emphasized that
it would be short-sighted in the extreme
to delay the completion of a strategic
arms limitation accord for reasons re-
lated to other issues.
'n one crucial respect, SALT is dif-
ferent from all other negotiations. We
can never let it be far from our minds
that what is at issue is the growing ca-
pability of the human race to obliterate
itself. Nothing in the human experience
with warfare, nor in the extraordinary
development of nuclear and missile
technology in recent years, would jus-
tify any sense of complacency about
the possibility of nuclear war. The fact
is that negotiations to limit nuclear
capabilities have crawled in the past 9
years, while destructive military tech-
nology has had a phenomenal
expansion — testimony at the same time
to mankind's genius and lack of any
sane sense of proportion.
Other Arms Control Issues
While SALT has been our most sig-
nificant arms limitation negotiation, the
United States and U.S.S.R. have con-
tinued discussions in a variety of other
forums.
Comprehensive Test Ban. We have
continued negotiations with the Soviet
Union and the United Kingdom on a
treaty banning nuclear weapons tests
The desirability of this goal has never
been in doubt, but a king-lasting con-
cern has been whether such a ban
would be verifiable. In the past months
we have made major strides toward the
establishment of an adequate verifica-
tion regime. The Soviet Union has
agreed to cease use of nuclear explo-
sions for peaceful purposes, agreeing
with us that at the present time it would
be impossible to rule out military
benefit from such events; it has also
taken a general 1) constructive approach
to other verification issues. Though de-
cisions remain to be made in our own
government and also on the part of the
Soviet Union on our respective ap-
proaches to some of the still unresolved
issues, the completion of these trilat-
eral negotiations should be possible.
Mutual and Balanced Force Re-
ductions. These negotiations have been
underway in Vienna for more than 5
years. The rate of progress in them has
been exceedingly slow, to the point
that the general public sometimes
forgets they are still in train. But their
pace derives from their complexity —
and their importance. They are an ini-
tial attempt to reach agreement on a
politically and militarily significant re-
duction in the level of the confrontation
between NATO and the Warsaw Pact.
The last few months have, in fact,
produced some significant steps. A
Western initiative in April was fol-
lowed by an Eastern counterproposal in
June which, while it moved toward ac-
ceptance of the framework for an
agreement which we had proposed 5
years earlier, left serious differences
with the Soviets on a number of sub-
stantive issues, most importantly on the
number of troops they and their allies
presently have in the reduction area.
But I am more optimistic now that the
negotiations can produce a significant
result than I could have been a year
ago.
Conventional Arms Transfer Lim-
itations. Since my appearance before
your subcommittee last October, U.S.
and Soviet delegations have met three
times to establish the groundwork for
seeking agreement on general princi-
ples to restrain arms transfers to third
countries and regions. We have been
pleased to note that the Soviet side has
addressed the issue seriously. At the
same time, the problem is enormously
complex, and we cannot expect signifi-
cant results immediately. The fact that
the dialogue has begun, however, of-
fers some hope.
Antisatellite Arms Control. We
have held one meeting with the Soviets
on this subject. The Soviet Union has
expressed interest in the possibility oi
avoiding competition in the field of
antisatellite weaponry. We hope to
have a second session later this year.
Indian Ocean. Since the fourth
round of talks in February 1978. on
stabilizing force levels in the Indian
Ocean, these discussions have been in
recess. It is the U.S. position that in-
creased Soviet military presence and
activit) in the region has been incon-
sistent with the objectives of the talks.
The U.S.S.R. has only recently re-
turned to former levels of its naval
forces, but their intentions with regard
to the Arabian Peninsula and the Horn
of Africa continue to arouse concern in
the area. Since the goal of these discus-
sions is io produce an agreement which
would limit Soviet military presence
and activitj in the area, as well as ours.
I believe the United States would be
receptive to evidence that the Soviet
Department of State Bulletii
Union is still seriously interested in the
original objective agreed upon in these
discussions — stabilization of the U.S.
and Soviet military presence in the area
at the level which obtained when the
talks began, with the further goal ofl
eventual reduction in these levels.
Chemical Weapons and Radiologi-
cal Weapons. Negotiations are pro-
ceeding separately in Geneva on these
two areas. Verification and definitional
problems remain, but the prospects are
good for the long term.
In general, talks in the field of arms
limitation have been productive as well
as instructive, although extremely
slow. There has been some narrowing
of differences in the approach of the
two countries toward these issues, and
despite the suspicion that inevitably
dominates matters affecting military
security, the Soviet leadership clearly
wishes to avoid nuclear war and shares
our concern over the dangerous effect
of unrestrained military — and particu-
larly nuclear — competition.
It is important to note that these
talks, and any agreements that might
result, are not inspired by or based on
mutual trust nor by an effort simply to
improve the general climate of rela-
tions. Rather, both sides have realisti-
cally assessed them to be in each
country's self-interest. Progress in one
area, particularly SALT, can enhance
the prospects for progress on other is-
sues. At the same time, each negotia-
tion is carried out on its own merits,
and concrete results will be the ulti-
mate criteria on which we judge the
success of our efforts to restrain the
military competition.
International Political Issues
Africa. Since the Angolan conflict
in 1975-76. and again since last Oc-
tober, much of the controversy in
U.S. -Soviet affairs has centered on the
issue of Soviet activities in Africa. The
introduction by the Soviets of modern
military equipment. Cuban combat
troops, and Soviet military advisers
into conflicts in the Horn and in south-
ern Africa has escalated the level of
violence and obstructed the peaceful
resolution of these disputes. The fact
that these Soviet/Cuban forces remain
in Angola and Ethiopia raises questions
about Moscow's ultimate intentions
and is of continuing concern to the
United States and our allies. We have
repeatedly made these concerns known
to the Soviets at the highest level.
Looking at the specific instances of
Soviet actions in Africa, one is drawn
to the conclusion that Moscow has
sought primarily to take advantage of
opportunities rather than to implement
e
I;
Hi;
lir
lit!
lovember 1978
31
me grand design for subversion of
e continent. In Angola and Ethiopia,
ie Soviet Union, by taking sides in
ical disputes, was able to tip the bai-
lee in favor of its clients. While ini-
all\ successful, this policy has led the
aviet Union into a position where
k'en greater commitments, some
§ainst its own interests, may be re-
aired to maintain its position.
In Angola. Soviet involvement arose
om support of a national liberation
ruggle against Portuguese colonial
lie. In 1975 Soviet military assistance
id Cuban troops insured the ascend-
lce of one liberation group, the Pop-
ar Movement for the Liberation of
ngola. over its rivals.
Western diplomatic efforts have
>ught to facilitate a settlement in
amibia and to encourage a reconcilia-
:>n between Zaire and Angola, thereby
ducing tension along their common
irder. The Angolan Government has
cently undertaken a concerted effort
broaden its foreign policy through
iproved relations with the West.
In Ethiopia. Soviet intervention in
ie Ethiopia-Somalia war was mou-
nted by strategic, geopolitical, and
eological considerations and was
inforced by their expulsion from
imalia in November 1977. After
curing an Ethiopian victory in the
gaden, the Soviet Union provided
gistical support, but no Soviet or
uban combat forces, for an Ethiopian
Tensive in Eritrea. Support for the
hiopians against the three Eritrean
surgent groups — one of which, the
iritrean People's Liberation Front, is a
ngstanding Marxist revolutionary
•ovement — created problems for the
oviet Union in its relations with sev-
ral radical Arab states and opened
iem to criticism from radicals as well
moderates in the recent Organization
African Unity (OAU) and
maligned conferences. Soviet efforts
bring about a negotiated settlement
Eritrea have, on the other hand,
eated tensions in their relations with
ie Mengistu regime in Ethiopia.
In southern Africa, the Soviet Union
as provided military assistance to
lerrilla forces engaged in an OAU-
pported effort to topple the white-
ominated government in Rhodesia,
he amount of Soviet assistance has
en limited so far. however, by the
Inwillingness of leaders of the sur-
punding front-line states to allow a
[irger Soviet/Cuban presence in guer-
illa camps in their countries. Further,
hese leaders have supported Anglo-
Lmerican efforts to achieve an all-
arties negotiated settlement and have
ivored this course over options en-
jiiling greater Soviet involvement. It is
unclear whether this situation will con-
tinue to prevail in Rhodesia, given the
recent appeals for greater resort to
violence. We continue to urge restraint
upon the Soviet Union in recognition of
the extremely serious consequences of
an escalation of the fighting.
In our view, African problems are
best solved by Africans in an African
context. By addressing the underlying
problems, we reduce the opportunities
for Soviet exploitation of African situ-
ations. It is the actions of the African
states which will ultimately lead to a
reduction of the Soviet/Cuban presence
and prevent their intrusion in future
conflicts.
Middle East. It is too early to assess
the full impact of recent developments
in the Middle East on U.S. -Soviet re-
lations. The Soviet Union has sought to
become an active participant in Middle
East negotiations through the conven-
ing of a Geneva conference, and it has
bitterly expressed its frustration at the
course of events that followed Presi-
dent Sadat's trip to Jerusalem
[November 1977], leading up to the
Camp David summit meeting [Sep-
tember 5-17. 1978]. Brezhnev, in a
speech on September 22. criticized the
Camp David summit results as intended
to split the Arab countries. He said this
could only make the situation in the
Middle East more difficult. What the
Soviet position will be in the long run
may depend upon the position of Syria
and the Palestine Liberation Organiza-
tion.
We recognize the strong Soviet
interest in the Middle East and would
welcome any positive contribution the
U.S.S.R. can make to the long term
amelioration of the problems of the
area.
The Chinese Factor. In recent
months, there has been a marked inten-
sification of Soviet expressions of con-
cern about the developing relationship
between the People's Republic of
China and the United States, and this
issue appears to be on its way to be-
coming a major element in the U.S.-
Soviet relationship.
The heightening of Soviet concerns
is primarily related to the recent out-
ward thrust of China's foreign policy
and its increasingly active efforts to
oppose the Soviet Union in every part
of the world. This includes the recent
completion of the peace and friendship
treaty between Japan and the P.R.C.
(which the Soviet Union strongly op-
posed), the flaring up of tensions be-
tween China and Vietnam, the highly
publicized visits of P.R.C. Chairman
Hua Kuo-feng to Eastern Europe and
Iran, and the new Chinese interest in
acquiring Western technology and
perhaps military hardware.
The Administration is committed to
seeking to continue to improve the
U.S. -P.R.C. relations within the
framework of the Shanghai com-
munique. We have repeatedly made
clear our official position that the nor-
malization of Sino-U.S. relations
would be a desirable development in
the interest of world peace and not
directed against the interest of any
other state.
While the Soviet Union has asserted
that it has no objections to the move-
\itith Report
on Cyprus
MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS,
SEPT. 1 '
As required by Public Law 94-104. this re-
port describes the progress that has been made
towards a negotiated settlement on Cyprus in
the past sixty days.
The last report described proposals submitted
by the Turkish Cypriots on April 13. and noted
several expressions of flexibility subsequently
made by the Turkish side. In July there were
further encouraging signs. Both the Government
of Cyprus and the Turkish Cypriot leadership
put forward fresh and promising proposals for
the resettlement of the important commercial
and resort city of Varosha (New Famagusta).
Varosha has been deserted and under Turkish
control since the 1974 fighting Significantly,
both sides foresee that progress on this issue
will lead to a resumption of the intercommunal
negotiations.
We have urged the two Cypriot parties to
give these proposals careful consideration, and
plan to continue to encourage a satisfactory
compromise on Varosha, one we hope will lead
them to reconvene the intercommunal negotia-
tions under the aegis of the Secretary General
of the United Nations.
Both the Congress and the Administration
feel that the United States 1) should continue to
play an active role in seeking a just and lasting
Cyprus settlement, and 2) should continue to
support the efforts of Secretary General Wald-
heim. On August 14, the conference committee
on the Security Assistance Bill approved the
language to end the Turkish Arms Embargo. I
consider this action appropriate and necessary
to our continuing impartial and constructive
role.
Jimmy Carter □
1 Text from Weekly Compilation of Presi-
dential Documents of Sept. 4.
32
ment toward normalization, it has ex-
pressed particular concern that steps in
this direction may be presented as di-
rected against the Soviet Union, and it
has shown special sensitivity to the
prospect that the United States or the
West may become a source of military
technology or hardware for the
People's Republic of China.
Soviet apprehensions are deeply
rooted, and the issue seems certain to
remain a sensitive one in the Soviet-
American dialogue.
Human Rights
The issue of human rights has con-
tinued to be among the most conten-
tious aspects of recent Soviet-American
relations. This was evident at the Bel-
grade Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe which reviewed
implementation of the Helsinki Final
Act. While from the Western point of
view, the review conducted at Belgrade
reaffirmed the legitimate interest of the
international community in encourag-
ing respect by individual states for their
commitments to the enlargement of
human rights, the Soviet response was
to reject the process as an improper
interference in its internal affairs.
The Soviet Union sees our advocacy
of individual human rights in the world
as a fundamental challenge to the
dominant political and ideological po-
sition of the Soviet regime. It has re-
peatedly made clear its position that
public pressure on the human rights
issue will be counterproductive in indi-
vidual eases and will have a detrimen-
tal effect on other aspects of our bilat-
eral relationship.
In recent months, the issue has been
heightened by steps taken by the Soviet
security apparatus against all forms of
expression of internal dissent, cul-
minating in an intensification of ar-
rests, trials, and harassment of promi-
nent supporters of the Helsinki
monitoring groups and of those who
have expressed publicly then desire to
emigrate from the U.S.S.R.
It was evident that people in the
United States and other countries could
not remain silent in the lace of the
intensification of these repressive ac-
tions, lest they appear to condone this
serious setback to the cause of human
rights. In the case of the United States,
the reaction was expressed by a pow-
erful surge of public condemnation and
by actions of the government to con-
strict certain aspects of the bilateral
relationship.
While the issue of human rights re-
mains as an abrasive factor in the re-
lationship, rooted in the fundamental!)
different nature and philosophies of our
two societies, the commitment of the
United States to the furtherance of
human rights worldwide remains firm.
It will continue to seek to persuade the
Soviet Union that the bilateral relation-
ship can best be strengthened by
scrupulous observance of international
norms of human rights and a flexible
and tolerant attitude in dealing with
individual cases.
Scientific, Academic, and Cultural
Exchanges
The 11 U.S. -U.S.S.R. governmental
agreements on cooperation in scientific
and technical fields have continued to
promote joint research and information
exchanges involving a wide range of
official and private scientists. They are
administered by U.S. Government
agencies and. as official bilateral ac-
tivities, were the subject of continuing
review when Soviet actions against
prominent dissidents and U.S. citizens
in Moscow created serious strains in
our relations. In this connection, three
high-level delegations were postponed
in July.
We have, however, continued ac-
tivities at the working level in support
of research programs and expanding
scientific contacts. Some American
scientists, as an expression of concern
about the fate of certain prominent
Soviet scientists, have limited their
participation in the scientific exchange
programs, but leaders of the U.S. sci-
entific community have, on balance,
supported the long term benefits of sci-
entific cooperation. The potential for
scientific benefits from cooperation has
already been demonstrated in several
diverse fields — heart disease, elec-
trometallurgy, and magnetohydro-
dynamic production of electricity.
Over the past 18 months, American
participants have worked to produce
greater substantive benefits and to in-
sure balance in exchange programs.
These efforts to some extent are re-
flected in the slightly lower levels of
activity as measured by travel under the
agreements in 1477 compared to 1976.
Americans
Soviets
to U.S.S.R.
to U.S
1976
973
876
1977
772
668
Under two additional agreements
with the Soviet Academy of Sciences.
the National Academy of Sciences and
the American Council of Learned
Societies have also continued to spon-
sor exchanges in a range of scientific
fields. A major review of the National
Academy's activities conducted in
1977 by the National Research Council
concluded among other points that the
Department of State Bullet
program is worthwhile, that it helps t
build the world scientific community
and it can be helpful in amelioratin
isolation of Soviet scientists.
Cultural and academic exchang
programs have been sustained at leve
approximating the previous year but an
growing in diversity as more direi
contacts complement the official pre
grams under the 6-year cultural rel;
tions agreement signed in 1973. Undt
the official program, postgraduate stu
dents, senior researchers, and lecturei
continue to be exchanged on a recip
rocal basis. Approximate figures f(
these ongoing exhanges are 4
graduate students and young facult
members each way annually, 10 senk
researchers, and about 20 universit
lecturers. A major International Con
munication Agency exhibit on U.S
agriculture is now touring the U.S.S.F 1
and is expected to be seen by 1.3-1.
million Soviet citizens in six citie;
Recently the New England Conserv;
tory Jazz Band performed in th
U.S.S.R. and the Paul Taylor Dane
Company is on tour in September an>
October.
Academic and cultural exchange
retain their importance both because (
the intrinsic merit of communication i
such fields and because of the contr
butions made to improved mutual ui
derstanding over the long term.
The broad range of our contacts wit
the U.S.S.R., both technical and cu<
tural, is monitored by the Interagenc
Coordinating Committee for U.S
Soviet Affairs, eoehaired by the A;
sistant Secretary of State for Europea
Affairs and myself, under the authorit
of the National Security Council. It lu
proved a valuable instrument for ir
suring that all activities are consistet
with current policy guidance and ha
given participants a sense of direetio
and an appreciation of where each er
deavor fits in the general pattern c
relations.
Economic Relations
Although it is recognized that th
development of economic relation
with the Soviet Union could add a
important stabilizing element to th
total relationship and could be o
benefit to both sides, this prospect ha
been adversely affected during th'
period under review.
After a 5-year period of generall;
steady growth. U.S. exports to th
Soviet Union declined from $2.3 bif
lion in 1976 to $1.6 billion in 1977-
This reflected a decline in Soviet pur
chases both of grain and of industria
equipment. One factor in this declim
was a Soviet effort to conserve its stocl
•ember 1978
33
f hard currency. This factor also was
Sponsible for a similar pattern of re-
jSced Soviet purchases from several
ther developed countries.
U.S. imports from the Soviet Union
fere valued at $234 million in 1977.
bout the same level as for the past 5
ears.
The implementation of the stated
olicy of this government to work to-
/ard an improvement in economic re-
gions with the Soviet Union has been
dversely affected by the general fac-
lrs in the relationship discussed ear-
er, including in particular the prose-
ution of the Moscow representative of
iternational Harvester.
In response to a number of actions
tken by the Soviet Government, the
Jnited States adopted several meas-
res. including the provision for prior
;view of sales of oil and gas equip-
lent to the U.S.S.R. under the Export
idministration Act.
ONCLUSION
It is evident that the difficulties in
le U.S. -Soviet relationship in recent
lonths have astringently washed away
le remnants of any euphoric expecta-
ions from the period of detente as it
ppeared to exist 6 years ago.
What remains, however, is an op-
ortunity to build upon a realistic as-
essment of the fundamental nature of
le relationship and in particular to
;alize in concrete steps the interests
nat both countries should have in
:abilizing the strategic military com-
etition and in setting recognized con-
traints on the conduct of the political
ompetition. This is the most urgent
spect of the relationship.
For the future, one cannot escape the
impression that the Soviet Union may
e approaching some fundamental
hoices — whether to allow the ele-
ments of conflict in the relationship to
eepen or to follow the course of re-
traint and responsibility, leading to a
idening of measures of cooperation.
The United States has the means and
tie will to protect its interests in either
ase. But by our actions and by what
•e say, we should make it clear be-
ond any doubt that if the Soviet lead-
rship chooses the wiser course of re-
traint and responsibility, they will find
he United States fully responsive. □
An Overview of Eastern Europe
The complete transcript of the hearings will
e published by the committee and will be avail-
ble from the Superintendent of Documents.
I.S. Government Printing Office, Washington.
l.C. 20402.
For text, see Bulletin of January 1978. p. 1 .
by William H. Luers
Statement before the Subcommittee
on Europe and the Middle East of the
House Committee on International
Relations on September 7, 1978. Mr.
Luers was Deputy Assistant Secretary
for European Affairs at the time of his
appearance before this subcommittee;
he was subsequently sworn in as Am-
bassador to Venezuela . '
Eastern Europe, which deserves in-
creased attention and broader under-
standing among the public at large, is
rich in historical and cultural diversity
and includes the ancestral homelands of
many Americans. In fact, reading the
roster of the U.S. Congress, one cannot
but be struck by how many Members
have surnames of Eastern European
origin.
This Administration has dedicated a
special effort to improving relations
with Eastern Europe. In doing so, we
have built on the efforts of past Ad-
ministrations to deal constructively
with several of the countries in the
region. We are mindful that our rela-
tions are not carried out in a vacuum
and that our policies must strike a re-
sponsive chord with the countries in-
volved in order to be effective. In
dealing with us. Eastern European gov-
ernments will proceed in terms of their
interests as well as those of their
neighbors and allies. We, in turn, will
seek to keep our European allies at-
tuned to our efforts.
For the present purpose, we have
defined Eastern Europe to include Po-
land, Czechoslovakia, Hungary,
Romania, Bulgaria, and the German
Democratic Republic. All of these
countries are members of both the War-
saw Pact and the Council for Mutual
Economic Assistance (COMECON).
We will not discuss Yugoslavia or
Albania today. Both are Communist,
but neither is a member of the Warsaw
Pact. Yugoslavia is nonaligned, and
our relations with it are qualitatively
very different from those of the War-
saw Pact member states. We do not
have diplomatic relations with Albania,
which is now following a course inde-
pendent of any major outside power.
HISTORICAL SETTING
Eastern Europe, as we speak of it
today, is the military, political, and
ideological buffer zone established
across the heart of Europe by the
Soviet Union as the fruit of its suc-
cessful counterattack against Nazi
Germany during the Second World
War. Several of these states had
emerged as creations of the peacemak-
ers after the First World War: Poland
was recreated after 123 years of foreign
occupation by Germany, Tsarist Rus-
sia, and Hapsburg Austria; Czechoslo-
vakia and Hungary emerged as new
entities out of the collapsing Austro-
Hungarian Empire; and even Romania,
although independent for 40 years be-
fore World War I, assumed expanded
dimensions by acquisition of new
territories.
Interwar Period
In the interwar period, it was a fond
hope of the Western political leaders
that these new and inexperienced states
would provide a buffer — or cordon
sanitaire — between their countries and
the Bolshevik Soviet state. In the brief
20-year period between the two World
Wars, these states struggled with the
administrative management of their
territories, unifying their countries;
establishing control over their
minorities; developing foreign policies
usually based on their World War I
alliances; and dealing with agricultural
reform, economic dislocation and dis-
aster, multiparty systems, and Com-
munist and Fascist agitation.
Except for Czechoslovakia, none of
them succeeded in establishing any
kind of stability or democratic repre-
sentative system; all of them discov-
ered that they were not strong enough
to survive separately and that the Allies
were not able to help them sufficiently.
The economic depression, internal
political instability, and the weakness
of the Allies led the eastern Europeans
to succumb to Hitler either gradually
through political means or abruptly in
battle like the Poles.
Aftermath of World War II
The outcome of the Second World
War again altered the map of Eastern
Europe. Nazi Germany was split into
two successor states. Poland lost terri-
tory in the east to the Soviet Union and
gained in the west at the expense of
Germany. The Germans also lost east
Prussia, which was divided between
the Soviet Union and Poland. Romania
34
lost Bessarabia and other pieces of ter-
ritory to the Soviet Union and also
yielded some to Bulgaria. Hungary and
Czechoslovakia found themselves now
with common borders with the Soviet
Union, which acquired portions of
Czechoslovak territory.
Soviet armies were everywhere in
occupation, giving direct support to
Stalin's political objectives. Com-
munist leaders, schooled in the prewar
jails of their countries and in Soviet in-
stitutions, came to power. These
Communist leaders introduced Stalinist
methods of rule, including wholesale
changes in administration, economic
management, judicial system, the se-
curity apparatus, and other areas of na-
tional life. The new leaders threw out
those who had exercised power and re-
placed them with reliable Communists
loyal to Moscow. The Communist Par-
ties became the ruling elites
monopolizing the reins of power.
De-Stalinization
Soviet policy underwent change after
Khruschev's de-Stalinization speech to
the Soviet 20th Party Congress in
1956. Efforts at abolishing the worse
excesses of the period met with
hardline resistance and rising expecta-
tions of the population and split the
Communist Parties of Eastern Europe.
In Poland, workers' riots in 1956
accelerated the process of change as the
leaders made concessions to the
people — the farmers, the workers, the
intellectuals, and the Catholic Church.
In Hungary, where a full-scale rev-
olution broke out in Budapest in 1956.
the divided Communist Party leaders
found that their attempts at far-reaching
changes were thwarted by the interven-
tion of Soviet troops. The revolu-
tionary government's call for with-
drawal from the Warsaw Pact probably
convinced the Soviets that intervention
was the only course for maintaining
control. Repression of those who had
participated in the revolution and their
supporters became the first order of
business. Both Eastern Europe and the
world learned that Soviet interests in
Eastern Europe would brook no ex-
treme change of system, no sudden
change of foreign policy, no dim inn
tion of the authority by the Communist
Party over the levers of power
1956-64
In the aftermath of 1956, two paral-
lel trends were discernible. On the one
hand, the Soviet Union pressed forward
toward the more effective cooperation
of Warsaw Pact military forces and to-
ward closer coordination of economic
plans and policies within COMECON.
On the other hand, Eastern European
states gradually acquired greater free-
dom to develop and pursue policies
which would make their systems work
better.
For example, Hungary introduced a
policy of conciliation toward non-
Communists within the country with
the maxim: ""Whoever is not against us
is with us." It thereby reduced hostility
between party members and nonparty
people which had been so intense be-
fore and immediately after the 1956
period. All the Eastern European
countries went through a process of
rehabilitating many Communists who
had been jailed or executed during the
Stalinist period and of releasing non-
Communists from jail. "Socialist le-
gality" was emphasized, compromises
with the oppressed religious faiths were
explored, autarkic economic policies
were reexamined, relations with the
West were expanded, and attempts
were begun to meet consumer needs.
Late 1960's and Early 1970's
A most dramatic expression of East-
ern European nationalism came when
Romania issued a statement in 1964
declaring its intention to develop inde-
pendent policies based on Romanian
interests. Thereafter, differences on
foreign policy issues between Romania
and the Soviet Union became more
explicit in a number of areas.
Even while Romania was becoming
more assertive internationally, in
Czechoslovakia in 1968 the Soviets
— joined by East Germany, Poland,
Hungary, and Bulgaria — marched in to
prevent the new leadership of that
Communist Party from seeking to es-
tablish a more human and pluralistic
social order. Just as the Soviets could
not tolerate the specter of Hungary
leaving the Warsaw Pact of 1956, they
could not tolerate the Communist Party
of Czechoslovakia seeming to relin-
quish its dominant role over society in
1968.
The era of detente has been accom-
panied by significant changes in East-
ern Europe. Each Communist Party has
reevaluated its ways of dealing with
consumer needs, economic problems,
and public opinion.
• Worker riots in Poland in i l )70
highlighted the dangers to the Com-
munist Party of ignoring or paying too
little attention to worker demands for
an increased standard of living, more
consumer goods, and better housing
• Czechoslovak leaders after 1968
carefully provided the populace with
expanded supplies of food and con-
Department of State Bullet
sumer goods in order to defuse politic
discontent.
• Hungary introduced its new eci
nomic mechanism to get away from th
highly centralized command econorr
model and to reward efficient industri
management and higher productivity.
• East Germany continued to bui
up its industrial capacity and achieve
a measure of status assisted by tl
political and economic understandin;
reached bilaterally with West Germar
and by the stability which develope
after signature of the Quadriparti
Agreement on Berlin.
• Romania, following its ow
maverick path, concentrated on
flexible foreign policy while its lea<
ership continued to require a sparU
existence of its people.
Recent years have witnessed furthi
changes and trends in Eastern Europe
CURRENT TRENDS
The growing diversity in Eastei
Europe must be seen in context. TI
Soviet Union remains, as one Pole hi^
put it, "the dominant personality of thl
region." The Communist leaders (
Eastern Europe have much in comma
with the Soviet Politburo, not the lea'-,
of which is their determination M
maintain the power monopoly of th
party. The Soviet Union insists that th
Eastern European Communist state
adhere to the Warsaw Pact. It is Soviu
policy to integrate Eastern Europe t
the maximum degree feasible.
The Warsaw Pact and the COIV
ECON continue to be the principal ir
struments of Soviet integration policy
On the ideological front, the Sovit
Union has sought to subordinate th>
national interests of the Eastern Eurc
pean parties to those of "proletaria
internationalism" as interpreted by th>
Communist Party of the Soviet Union
Fearing the ideological disintegrate
of the Communist movement, th
Soviets have made particular efforts I
solidify the ideological support they re
ceive from Eastern Europe.
These Soviet efforts to achiev
greater integration and more ideologi
cal support have not been altogethe
successful. For example, bilateralisn
and nonconvertible currencies continue
to be the predominant features of tradi
among COMECON countries, evei
though some progress has been made ii
coordinating participation in joint rav
materials extraction projects.
In ideology, at the conference o
European Communist Parties in Eas
Berlin in June 1976, the Communis
Parties of Western Europe and Yugo
November 1978
;lavia, joined by the Romanians,
breed the adoption of a nonbinding
inal document which, inter alia, rec-
)gnized the equality and autonomy of
ill Communist Parties and refrained
rom criticism of the Chinese Com-
nunist Party.
Although Moscow seeks as much
Tiilitary, economic, and political cohe-
sion in Eastern Europe as feasible, it
ilso has an important stake in Eastern
urope's political stability and eco-
nomic viability. The U.S.S.R. cannot
neet all of Eastern Europe's raw mate-
ial and technology needs. Lagging
Productivity and technological ad-
vancement have given rise to various
ittempts at economic reform.
Moreover, internal pressures, gener-
ated by the aspirations of the nationally
proud peoples of the area, have brought
about political strains that can only be
handled by these nations themselves.
The Soviets have become reconciled,
therefore, to some diversity as a
trade-off for stability and viability. For
reasons which relate to their own par-
ticular situations, the nature and degree
of this diversity has varied from coun-
try to country.
Differences in Foreign Policy
With the exception of Romania, the
countries of Eastern Europe continue to
adhere quite closely to Soviet foreign
policy positions. Only subtle nuances
and differences of emphasis — based on
differing national interests and
priorities — are evident
Romania continues to pursue a
foreign policy which diverges from that
of the U.S.S.R. in significant ways.
For example, the Romanian Govern-
ment has cultivated good relations with
the People's Republic of China while
maintaining neutrality in the Sino-
Soviet dispute. It has obtained guest
status in the nonaligned movement,
retained diplomatic relations with Is-
rael, and supported the right of all
Communist Parties to chart their own
courses. Romania has also declined to
permit multilateral Warsaw Pact ac-
tivities on its territory.
Other nations in Eastern Europe
demonstrate their separate identities in
various ways.
• Poland and Hungary, as well as
Romania, have significantly expanded
their trade and economic relations with
Western nations and have turned in-
creasingly to the West for technology
and even management assistance.
Other differences have emerged in in-
ternational trade and financial matters.
• Hungary has agreed to eliminate
visas for Austrian citizens, reflecting a
35
EASTERN EUROPE— GENERAL STATISTICS (1977)
Country
Land
Total
Sq. Mi.
Population
(million) '
Economy
GNP 2
($billion)
Per
Capita
GNP($)
Steel
Produc-
tion 3
(mil. Ml )
Bulgaria
42.829
8.8
21
2.400
2.5
Czechoslovakia
49.370
15.0
60
4.000
14.7
G.D.R.
41.814
16.8
69
4.100
6.7
Hungary
35.915
10.6
28
2.600
3.7
Poland
120.664
34.6
95
2.700
15.6
Romania
91.699
21.6
57
2,630
10.7
Totals
382.291
107.4
330
18.430
53.9
'Population data are for Jan 1977. Source: National Basic Intelligence Factbook, Jan.
1977.
: GNP data are based on U.S. purchasing power equivalents. Source: Central Intelligence
Agency (ClAl estimates.
'Steel production data are for 1976. Source: "Handbook of Economic Statistics," CIA,
Sept. 1977.
significant opening of its borders to
Western Europe.
• East Germany's long involvement
in Africa has placed it in a position to
participate in Soviet and Cuban ad-
ventures in that continent.
• Renewed differences have recently
surfaced between individual Eastern
European countries over traditional
areas of dispute such as national
minorities. The debate between Bul-
garia and Yugoslavia over the Macedo-
nian question has recently intensified,
while the leaders of Romania and Hun-
gary have publicly addressed questions
concerning the nearly 2 million ethnic
Hungarians living in Romania.
Domestic Diversity
More marked than the diversity in
foreign policy have been the differing
approaches each nation has taken to
domestic developments. The recent
trends have been generally favorable
toward greater openness and more ac-
cess to the West.
Poland is still a most unusual Com-
munist state with 80% of its arable
land in private hands, a powerful and
vital Catholic Church, and a private
enterprise sector that is growing in im-
portance. Moreover, artistic, intellec-
tual, and political activity in Poland
has continued to expand, encompassing
not only the youth and students but
evoking spontaneous responses from
workers and farmers as well. Popular
grumbling persists about inefficiencies
and shortages of meat and other prod-
ucts, thereby contributing to the intel-
lectuals' criticisms of governmental
policies. The Polish Government has
reacted forcefully at times to these de-
velopments, fearing the emergence of a
coherent challenge to the party.
Nevertheless, the diversity of opinions
and attitudes available to Poles today is
greater than ever before in the postwar
period.
Czechoslovakia, on the other hand,
has maintained the tight controls im-
posed in the months following the
Soviet-led invasion of August 1968
which put an end to efforts to achieve
"socialism with a human face." The
Czechoslovak Government continues to
exclude the liberal Communist Party
members of 1968 from political life,
and the great majority of the population
appears to avoid political involvement
of any kind in favor of enjoying such
benefits of consumerism as au-
tomobiles and weekend cottages. A
small group of dissident intellectuals,
signers of the document "Charter '77,"
36
are pressing the government to live up
to the human rights obligations inher-
ent in the country's own laws and in
the Helsinki Final Act. 2 The govern-
ment has responded with a mixture of
harassment, intimidation, and attempts
to ignore the dissidents.
Hungary is presently characterized
by stability, increasing consumer
satisfaction, and a relatively relaxed
cultural atmosphere. The government
has achieved a measure of legitimacy
in the eyes of the population and, given
geopolitical realities, is generally per-
ceived as doing what is possible for the
welfare of the people. Some 340,000
Hungarians visit the West annually,
while more than 12 million
foreigners — a number greater than
Hungary's population — visit or transit
Hungary each year. Western radio and
TV broadcasts reach virtually the entire
country. In the last two parliamentary
elections several nonparty candidates
defeated opponents who were party
members.
Romania continues to maintain u
strictly orthodox internal order in con-
trast to its active and independent
foreign policy. However, there are
growing signs that elements of the
population have become restive over
the consumer deprivation resulting
from the government's crash effort to
make Romania a "developed" country
by 1985. One manifestation was a
strike by miners in August 1977 pro-
testing the lowering of pensions and
poor working conditions. The strike
was resolved with a mixture of conces-
sions and toughness. This general dis-
content seems to have been a major
element in President Ceausescu's deci-
sion this year to begin some tentative
steps toward economic reform, includ-
ing greater local participation in eco-
nomic planning and a limited workers'
role in the operation of industrial
enterprises.
In the German Democratic Repub-
lic, the government's consumerist
course, which has kept the population
reasonably satisfied, is running into
difficulties caused by a leveling off of
production, an increasing hard cur-
rency shortage, and a greater suscepti-
bility to Western inflationary influence.
The hard currency stores, which the
government has set up to conserve
foreign exchange and ration available
supplies, have produced grumbling
about an inequitable two-class system.
The government's recent attempt to
improve relations with the Evangelical
(Lutheran) Church by granting it reg-
ular television air time and providing
logistic support for outdoor church
meetings could be overshadowed by
church-government differences over
plans to introduce premilitary training
into the public schools.
Continuity is the predominant trend
in Bulgaria where the government is
wedded to Soviet political and eco-
nomic orthodoxy. Shortages of
foodstuffs and other nondurables,
stemming in part from bad weather,
have caused some discontent. How-
ever, this has not led to any substantial
outspoken opposition nor has the gov-
ernment chosen to make concessions of
a consumerist nature.
Declining Growth Rates
and Economic Problems
Although each of the six Eastern
European countries has evolved in dis-
tinctly different ways from the tradi-
tional "Stalinist" model, all share
some common characteristics: central
planning, administered prices, and a
high priority on heavy industry. These
elements cause a misallocation of re-
sources within each country, and they
distort trade between the countries
which must be conducted on the basis
of bilaterally negotiated barter agree-
ments.
As their economies have increased in
size and complexity, the Soviet model
has proven less and less effective.
Also, the example of rising living
standards in Western Europe has forced
the Communist governments to pay
more attention to the consumer needs
of their own populations, thus reducing
the resources available for investment.
As a result, the high growth rates
achieved by the Eastern European
economies in the immediate postwar
period declined in the 1960's. Al-
though this gradual decline was inter-
rupted in the early 1970's when trade
and financial relations with the West
were rapidly expanded, growth rates
have begun to fall again.
In the period 1965-70, the six East-
ern European countries increased their
per capita GNP at an annual average
rate of 3.1%. In the first half of this
decade that rate rose to 4.2%, but by
1977 it had again declined to 3.2%.
These declining growth rates reflect a
series of economic problems in addi-
tion to rising consumer demands and
the rigidities of the centrally planned
economies, namely, limited natural re-
sources, manpower problems, and ag-
ricultural difficulties.
Shortages of natural resources, espe-
cially energy resources have been a
serious problem for the Eastern Euro-
peans. Except for Poland which has
abundant supplies of coal, copper, and
Department of State Bulletin
sulphur, and Romania, which still has
some oil. Eastern Europe is resource
poor and must import much of the basic
raw materials it needs from outside the
region. Most of Eastern Europe's
energy imports have come from the
Soviet Union. But the Soviets have
raised the price and in some cases cut
back their export of energy to Eastern
Europe. An increase in intra-
COMECON foreign trade prices in
1975, a year earlier than scheduled,
saw the price of Soviet crude oil jump
by about 1307r, although it still re-
mained lower than the world price.
Demographic trends and manpower
shortages are another set of serious
problems these nations are facing. The
manpower shortage throughout Eastern
Europe is only partly attributable to a
generation lost to war and to the emi-
gration thereafter; it is mainly due to
urban birth rates so low as to be of
major concern to the governments of
that area. Hungary, for example, has
zero population growth, and the popu-
lation of East Germany actually de-
clined between 1965 and 1976. Fur-
thermore, low population growth is ex-
pected in all these countries at least
through the end of this century.
Traditionally, manpower shortages
can be offset by drawing labor from the
countryside. But the skilled technical
workers needed are not available from
the even more inefficient agricultural
sectors. Another way to meet man-
power shortages is with migrant work-
ers. But there are probably not more
than 150.000 "guest workers" in East-
ern Europe — too few to be of signifi-
cant assistance and almost all of them
from other COMECON countries.
Low labor productivity is another
endemic problem. One of the
paradoxes of the Eastern European
economies is that while labor is scarce
there is an enormous amount of un-
deremployment. Workers are fre-
quently stockpiled, as are other re-
sources, by managers who fear in-
creases in their output requirements.
The shortage of labor is compounded
by frequent shortages of consumer
goods resulting in low worker incen-
tives. Increased earnings do not auto-
matically translate into increased real
income. Classic examples of this
problem have appeared recently among
the miners who have protested in Po-
land and struck in the Jiu Valley in
Romania.
Agricultural inefficiency is a
hallmark of the systems of Eastern
Europe. Between 1965 and 1975 East-
ern European agricultural output grew
about 2.2% annually. Poland sought to
deal with agricultural inefficiency by
leaving the land largely in private
November 1978
37
hands. But farming there laeks invest-
ment and modernization. Where large-
scale modernization and mechanization
of collective farms has been tried (such
as in Bulgaria), incentives for indi-
vidual productivity have been low. As
result of chronically poor weather
conditions, and these inefficiencies.
Eastern Europe has been a net importer
of foodstuffs for years, often at the cost
of increased hard currency debts. Yet
Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania have
managed generally to be overall net
exporters of grains.
Attempts at Economic Reform
Confronted with these complex
problems and the inherent inefficien-
cies of their economic systems, the
governments of Eastern Europe, espe-
cially in the more developed countries,
have attempted to overcome their dif-
ficulties by introducing programs de-
EASTERN EUROPEAN TRADE
(IN MILLIONS OF DOLLARS)
Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports
Bulgaria Czechoslovakia German Hungary Poland Romania
Democratic
Republic
SOURCE: Central Intelligence Agency estimates based upon East European and Soviet trade
statistics converted into U.S. dollars at official rates of exchange.
signed to decentralize decisionmaking
and permit a greater role for free mar-
ket forces. Progress in actually
achieving such '•reforms" has varied
greatly within the area.
Although Czechoslovakia took the
lead in reforms in the late 1960's, the
1968 Soviet-led invasion ended the ex-
periments of Deputy Premier Sik and
cast a pall over such efforts in other
countries. The Czechoslovak reforms,
which were the most far reaching of
those proposed in Eastern Europe in the
1960's, had implied a diminution or
even elimination of the role of the
Communist Party in the management of
the economy. This linkage between
economic reforms and the role of the
Communist Party points up the intimate
relationship between politics and eco-
nomics in this region.
Hungary went ahead with its new
economic mechanism, a program intro-
duced in 1968, which substantially in-
creased the responsibility of individual
enterprises and sought to regulate the
economy by macroeconomic forces
rather than direct controls. After 1973,
further development of the mechanism
was stalled by excessive rates of in-
vestment, worker dissatisfaction with
growing disparities in wage rates, and
balance-of-payments problems. During
the past year, however, the Hungarian
Government has announced plans for
basic price and tax reforms that could
significantly increase the role of market
forces in the Hungarian economy.
Reforms in Poland have not gone so
far as those in Hungary, but sporadic
efforts continue to be made to reor-
ganize the structure of Polish industry
by decentralizing authority and tying
together production and marketing
units. The role of small private enter-
prises, especially in service industries,
has recently been allowed to expand,
and new laws have been instituted to
permit foreign investment in Poland.
Romania and Bulgaria, the least de-
veloped countries of the area, have not
attempted to adopt wide-ranging eco-
nomic reforms and thus far have
largely retained their highly centralized
systems in pursuit of broad-based in-
dustrial growth. However, earlier this
year. President Ceausescu announced
several changes which could prove to
be the first signs of an economic re-
form in Romania.
Economic Integration
COMECON, the common Western
acronym for the Council for Mutual
Economic Assistance, appears to be
moving slowly, if at all, toward the
increased economic integration sought
38
Department of State Bulletii
U.S. TRADE WITH EASTERN EUROPE— 1977 *
(IN MILLIONS OF DOLLARS)
-Rolling Mill and Metal Manufacturing Machinery
Bulgaria
Czecho-
slovakia
German
Democratic
Republic
Hungary
Poland
Romania
] Exports
] Imports
] 436.5
I I L_l I I I I I I L
100
J I I I I I I L
200
J I L
I l l I
300
J I L
_l I L
400
J I I I
SOURCE: OVERSEAS BUSINESS REPORTS, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, JULY 1978
* One-third of the actual value of agricultural commodities which is exported to Eastern Europe is transshipped through third countries and
is not reflected in the above data. The value of transshipped agricultural commodity exports to Czechoslovakia is $62.8 million; to the German
Democratic Republic — $208.7 million; to Hungary — $14.8 million; and to Poland — $4.1 million (U.S. Department of Agriculture estimates, 1977).
by the U.S.S.R. It remains an organi-
zation without supranational powers,
and an estimated 90% of intra-
COMECON trade is carried out via
bilateral clearing arrangements. The
predominance of bilateralism is due
largely to the absence of a convertible
currency or a meaningful exchange rate
or prices which reflect market forces
and scarcities.
The share of each Eastern European
country's total foreign trade which is
devoted to trade with other COMECON
members varies widely. Bulgaria con-
ducts approximately 80% of its trade
with other COMECON countries and
56% with the U.S.S.R., while only
about 35$ of Romania's trade is with
COMECON, of which about half is
with the U.S.S.R.
COMECON's moves toward inte-
gration have taken the form of closer
coordination of 5-year and longer term
plans and cooperative projects in the
areas of primary products and fuels. As
of now, COMECON's joint efforts ap-
pear to be restricted to projects from
which the Eastern European countries
can ultimately be expected to benefit
directly: These include a natural gas
pipeline and the production of items
such as asbestos and cellulose.
East-West Trade
Since the early 1970's, Eastern
European governments have given
heavy stress to solving the problem of
lagging industrial productivity by im-
porting Western equipment and tech-
nology on a greatly increased scale.
Between 1970 and 1977, turnover with
the developed West increased almost
four times.
The infusion of new technology
seems to have had at least a temporar-
ily beneficial effect on productivity in
the Eastern economies. It has also
stimulated the development of new
ways of doing business in many of the
Eastern countries. For example, 20
U.S. firms have offices in Warsaw;
there are American bank offices in
Bucharest and in Warsaw; and an
American firm owns 49% of a
Budapest firm which produces medical
instruments. Such arrangements have
required changes in the domestic busi-
ness laws and practices of the Eastern
European countries, which now vary
substantially from country to country.
In Poland, businessmen find it rela-
tively easy to make appointments withi
the end-users of their products, while
in other countries such appointments
are sometimes difficult. Hungary pub-
lishes more complete economic infor-
mation than do some of the other
countries. Joint equity ventures are
permitted in some countries but not in
others, and the rules for these ventures
differ from country to country.
Eastern Europe's hard currency ex-
ports during the 1970's have not been
sufficient to pay for imports from the
West. As a result. Eastern European
hard currency debt increased from
about $4.6 billion in 1970 to about
$31.4 billion at the end of 1977. The
deficit has been covered mainly by
borrowing from Western banks and
governments. In some countries, par-
ticularly Poland, these debts have be-
come a serious concern to both borrow-
ers and lenders. Eastern European im-
ports from the West, which grew very
rapidly in 1970-74, increased at a
markedly reduced rate in 1975 and
1976 and rose hardly at all in 1977.
Poland, for example, has taken ef-
November 1978
fective steps to reduee its trade deficit.
Poland's debt is large relative to its
hard currency earnings and it is still
growing, but Western creditors, in-
cluding both U.S. Government and pri-
vate lenders, have been favorably im-
pressed by the efforts of the Polish
Government to improve its trade bal-
ance. As a result, these lenders con-
tinue to extend credit to Poland.
U.S. Trade
U.S. trade with Eastern Europe in-
creased four and one-half times be-
tween 1970 and 1977 but is still less
than \7c of our total foreign trade. In
1977 the United States accounted for
about 67c of total Eastern European
trade with the West. This is due in part
to the linguistic and geographic ad-
vantages held by our Western European
competitors, but it is also the result of
the absence of normal trade relations
between ourselves and three of the
Eastern European countries. Eastern
Europe will continue to see the United
States as an attractive trade partner be-
cause we have advanced technology
and because we offer welcome compe-
tition to their Western European
suppliers.
The United States has benefited from
its trade with Eastern Europe despite its
relatively small volume. In 1977 the
United States had a trade surplus with
the region of about $200 million. Since
the beginning' of 1976, the Eastern
Europeans have purchased about $2
billion worth of U.S. agricultural
commodities and well over $1 billion
worth of U.S. manufactured goods.
CONTEXT OF U.S. POLICY
In the preceding sections of this
statement we have attempted to outline
the context in which U.S. policy must
operate.
Historically Eastern Europe has been
alternatively a buffer zone and a
battlefield, a spark for world wars, and
an area of rivalry among great powers.
But despite great power competition for
the loyalties of the peoples of Eastern
Europe, each nation in the area has
tenaciously aspired to and has moved
toward its own individual identity.
Soviet power, which dominated the
political evolution of Eastern Europe
following 1945, is reconciled — within
limits — to some diversity. The Soviet
Union has evidently come to tolerate
some diversity and national identity in
Eastern Europe as a necessary trade-off
for political stability and economic
viability.
Diversity is. therefore, an increas-
ingly significant political characteristic
in the area. While maintaining the pri-
mary role of the Communist Party and
the countries' formal commitments to
the Warsaw Pact, there are increasing
signs of differentiated domestic and. in
some instances, foreign policies.
Improved economic efficiency is the
elusive goal of virtually all these gov-
ernments. Within the constraints of
ideology and politics, each government
has tried differing approaches to eco-
nomic reforms, incentives, imported
technology, and foreign trade.
U.S. Interests
Eastern Europe is important to the
United States for two fundamental
reasons — security and humanitarian
concerns.
Our security is linked to Europe's.
Two World Wars were ignited in East-
ern Europe, and the machinery for a
war infinitely more destructive than
either of those is already in place. We
must and will maintain a credible de-
terrent to possible military aggression
by Warsaw Pact forces. But this deter-
rent must be accompanied by consistent
diplomatic efforts to reduce the dangers
of war and confrontation. To ignore the
countries of Eastern Europe would be
to leave peace to chance.
The welfare of the peoples living in
Eastern Europe matters deeply to all
Americans. More than 15 million
Americans have their heritage in that
region. Millions of other Americans
sympathize with the long struggle of
the peoples of the region for independ-
ence, security, and material progress.
Related to both our security and hu-
manitarian concerns is our interest in
building more durable ties with the
governments and peoples of Eastern
Europe through expanded trade and
economic interaction, through cultural
and education exchanges, and through
the increased interchange of people and
ideas. These efforts may not produce
measurable results in the short term,
either in ameliorating East-West rela-
tions or relations between the govern-
ments and their peoples. But it is clear
that the Eastern Europe of today is, in
general, a more accessible and open
area than it was two decades or even a
decade ago. And we can be fairly cer-
tain that a lack of effort to expand
contacts with the region would result in
greater state-to-state tensions and less
progress on humanitarian questions.
One caveat is important. The efforts
of this and previous Administrations to
improve relations with the countries of
Eastern Europe in no way indicate a
lessening of our concern about the lack
of democratic institutions and other
39
basic elements of free societies in that
part of the world. We continue to have
profound disagreements with the gov-
ernments of Eastern Europe over many
questions of political freedoms and
basic human and social values. We
have seen hopeful trends in the evolu-
tion of political rights in some coun-
tries; there have been regressive steps
in others. But the very expansion of
relations with these countries has en-
abled us to talk more candidly with
their governments about our differ-
ences both in bilateral discussions and
in multilateral forums.
Eastern European Interests
The countries of Eastern Europe
have strong interests in better relations
with the United States. Paramount
among these are their own security
concerns. The region stands to lose
disastrously from any major East- West
armed confrontation. Their memories
and scars of World War II are still
fresh. The countries and peoples of the
region see better relations with the
United States, and with the West gen-
erally, as a means of reducing the risk
of such confrontation. They feel they
have a special stake in stable and im-
proving U.S. -Soviet relations.
Second, these countries desire,
partly through foreign ties, to enhance
their national identities, of which they
are justifiably proud. They can pursue
these national aspirations most effec-
tively in an atmosphere of relaxed
East-West tensions. The governments
are anxious to be accepted, particularly
by their Western European neighbors
and by the United States, as legitimate
members of the international commu-
nity.
Third, all of the governments are
committed to economic growth, and
their peoples all aspire to a higher
standard of living. Expanded economic
and commercial relations with the
United States — including access to our
goods, technology, know-how, and
markets — serve the goals both of the
governments and of the peoples of
Eastern Europe.
Fourth, the improvement of relations
with the United States responds to a
deeply felt admiration for this country
which remains nearly universal among
people throughout Eastern Europe. To
the extent that these governments deal
with the United States in nonhostile
terms, their peoples also feel more re-
laxed about expressing their good will
toward the United States. And to the
extent that the governments care about
the impact of their internal practices on
American public opinion, they are less
likely to employ repressive measures
40
and to violate recognized norms of
human rights
In economic, trade, and cultural re-
lations, the countries of Western
Europe have played a greater role his-
torically in Eastern Europe than has the
United States. However, in psycho-
logical and political terms the United
States is expected to play — and indeed
plays — an important if not vital role.
Past U.S. Policy
In the immediate postwar era, U.S.
policy toward Eastern Europe tended to
function as a corollary of U.S. policy
toward the Soviet Union. In the 1950's
and I960's the cold war dominated our
perceptions and conditioned our policy.
We dealt with the region as part of the
"Sino-Soviet bloc,*' and the "Iron
Curtain" seemed an impenetrable bar-
rier. Even during this period, however,
there were harbingers of the more var-
ied approach which has now become
the rule rather than the exception.
With Poland, for example, our rela-
tions improved notably beginning in
1956 when Poland initiated a policy of
increased internal liberalization and
eased its emigration policies. This was
given added impetus in 1972 as part of
the broader thaw in East-West rela-
tions.
With Romania, we developed more
Department of State Bulletin
constructive relations beginning in the
mid-1960's which have continued
since. In this case the improvement
was made possible by Romania's rela-
tively independent foreign policy
which included an interest in better re-
lations with the United States. In 1969
Bucharest became the first capital of a
Communist country to be visited by
any American President.
With the growth of a detente re-
lationship with Moscow and with the
growth of diversity in Eastern Europe,
our relations with the countries of the
area have developed beyond the limited
previous range. This pattern of dealing
with each country on an individual
basis is determined in part by their
willingness to develop constructive re-
lations with us. We welcome moves
toward internal liberalization or toward
nationally based foreign policies.
The evolution of U.S. policy toward
the region is clear from earlier high-
level U.S. statements.
President Eisenhower, in an effort to
erode cold war barriers, proposed a
"people-to-people" program which
continues to function and which serves
one of the consistent goals of our pol-
icy over many years — to expose people
in different societies to each other in
hopes of promoting broader mutual un-
derstanding and reducing hostilities.
In 1963 President Kennedy, in his
American University speech, address-
ing himself to the Communist states of
Europe said: "So let us not be blind to
our differences, but let us also direct
attention to our common interests and
to the means by which those differ-
ences can be resolved. And if we can-
not end now our differences, at least
we can help make the world safe for
diversity."
In 1964 President Johnson spoke of
"building bridges of understanding"
across the gulf which had separated us
from Eastern Europe, and in 1966 he
proposed the expansion of peaceful
trade between the United States and
Eastern Europe.
In 1973 Deputy Secretary of State
Kenneth Rush said that "we seek to
engage the countries of Eastern Europe
in an expanding set of close and indi-
vidual relationships." Rush also set out
three principles for our policy toward
Eastern Europe: to deal with each
country "as an independent, sovereign
state;" "to create a continuing eco-
nomic relationship" through greater
trade and investment; and to promote
the engagement of the Eastern Euro-
pean countries "in the affairs of
Europe as a whole."
sJovember 1978
Current U.S. Policy and Options
The range of U.S. policy options
oward Eastern Europe today is implied
n the pattern of past policies. We
:ould approach the nations of the re-
gion as adversaries, tied as a "bloc - "
riilitarily. politically, and economi-
cally to the Soviet Union or approach
:ach nation individually and exploit all
)pportunities to change the status quo
without regard to the consequences and
lower relationships in the area.
Neither extreme is acceptable. We
ntend neither to leave our relations
.vith Eastern Europe hostage to rela-
ions with the Soviet Union nor con-
duct a policy that is reckless and de-
stabilizing in Europe. The U.S. policy
hat has evolved is designed to further
)ur security interests in Europe and to
ake into account the growing diversity
)f the area.
This Administration has devoted
substantial energy, at a high level and
n a consistent direction, to the pursuit
)f our policy in Eastern Europe. Sec-
retary Vance said in Budapest early
his year: "The current Administration
s seeking to improve its relationships
■vith the countries of Eastern Europe.
iach of us will have to approach this
.vith our own national interests in-
/olved. I think the best way to deal
with these problems is to have face-
co-face discussions where we can dis-
:uss the differences and the common
nterests, and we shall pursue these on
he basis of dealing on a case-by-case
->asis, country by country, on the vari-
ous issues and common concerns which
vve have. "
Our policy then is based on the fol-
lowing.
• We recognize and support the in-
dividuality of each nation in its ap-
proach to domestic and foreign affairs.
• We deal with each country as a
sovereign nation while taking into ac-
count the political and geographic
realities of the area.
• Our primary tools for improving
relations with the area are expanded
human contacts, trade, institutional
cooperation, and information flow.
• We are mindful of the limits of
U.S. influence and of the importance
of contributing to the security of all of
Europe in pursuit of our policies.
More specifically, we seek to:
• Develop mutually beneficial bilat-
eral relations to the extent that indi-
vidual countries are willing and able to
sustain them. For example, we have
completed negotiation of consular
agreements with all the Eastern Euro-
pean countries except for the German
Democratic Republic, and we have
cultural and scientific exchange agree-
ments with Bulgaria. Hungary, and
Romania, and extensive exchange pro-
grams with Poland;
• Maintain high-level contact with
leaders of those Eastern European
countries with which our relations have
shown adequate improvement. Imple-
menting this policy. President Carter
visited" Poland in December 1977,
President Ceausescu of Romania vis-
ited the United States in April 1978,
and cabinet level officials have ex-
changed visits with several countries in
the area;
• Explore all possibilities provided
by the Helsinki Final Act to stimulate
contacts and to achieve concrete prog-
ress on the practical problems which
continue to hinder relations with the
countries of Eastern Europe. In par-
ticular, we seek solutions to problems
affecting the lives of individuals and
encourage the observance of funda-
mental human rights. We are especially
concerned over the need for progress
on divided family problems, which are
BACKGROUND NOTES
Background Notes is a series of short,
factual pamphlets on the countries of the
world. Each Note contains information
on the country's people, land, history,
government, political conditions, econ-
omy, foreign relations, and U.S. policy.
Included also is a profile, brief travel
notes, map, list of government officials,
and a reading list. Notes are available on
the six East European countries (with
order numbers) discussed in this article
and the USSR.:
Bulgaria (044-000-91040-3)
Czechoslovakia (044-000-91 102-7)
German Democratic Republic
(044-000-91159-1)
Hungary (044-000-91016-1)
Poland (044-000-91 180-9)
Romania (044-000-99914-5)
USSR. (044-000-91025-0)
Individual Background Notes may be
obtained for 700 each from the Superin-
tendent of Documents, U.S. Government
Printing Office. Washington, DC.
20402. (Orders of 100 or more copies of
the same Notes mailed to the same ad-
dress are sold at a 25% discount.) Re-
mittances in the form of a check or
money order payable to the Superinten-
dent of Documents must accompany
orders.
41
of direct interest to many American
citizens;
• Promote constructive and positive
participation in international organiza-
tions and peaceful resolution of dis-
putes. In particular, we encourage sup-
port for African political solutions to
African problems, and we oppose East-
ern European participation in Soviet
and Cuban military activities in Africa
and other troubled regions. Also, we
encourage Eastern European nations to
play a more constructive role in the
Middle East as Romania has done;
• Improve trade and economic rela-
tions through the resolution of
nationalization claims and. where pos-
sible and appropriate, by the reciprocal
extension of most-favored-nation
(MFN) tariff treatment. We have now
concluded claims agreements with all
of the countries of the region except for
Czechoslovakia and the German
Democratic Republic. The implemen-
tation earlier this summer of the
U.S. -Hungarian trade agreement makes
Hungary the third country in Eastern
Europe (after Poland and Romania)
with which we exchange MFN tariff
treatment, reflecting the development
of our relations with those countries
across the board. We also seek to ex-
pand our bilateral trade through in-
creased commercial opportunities and
business facilitation. Periodic
government-to-government consulta-
tions on a number of levels help to
expand our bilateral trade;
• Engage the Eastern European
countries more fully in world trade and
international economic activities, such
as in the current multilateral trade
negotiations in Geneva and in various
North-South economic issues;
• Reduce the number of opposing
forces in central Europe through seri-
ous pursuit of the Vienna talks on
mutual and balanced force reductions.
In conclusion, we believe that our
policies toward the countries of Eastern
Europe and the objectives we seek
through these policies are generally
supported, on a bipartisan basis, by the
vast majority of the American public.
Our approach is one which we believe
is best designed to enable the United
States to play a constructive role in
Eastern Europe. D
1 The complete transcript of the hearings will
be published by the committee and will be
available from the Superintendent of Docu-
ments. U.S. Government Printing Office,
Washington. DC. 20402.
- Charter '77 is a private group established in
Czechoslovakia to monitor compliance with the
Helsinki Final Act.
42
Department of State Bulled
MIDDLE EAST:
Camp David Agreements
by Harold H. Saunders
Statement before the Subcommittee
on Europe and the Middle Falsi of the
House Committee on International
Relations on September 28, 1978. Mr.
Saunders is Assistant Secretary for
Near Eastern and South Asian Af-
fairs. '
I appreciate your inviting me to tes-
tify on the agreements reached at Camp
David, because it is essential that we
work together to build on the founda-
tion for peace laid in these meetings. 2
The framework for peace produced
at Camp David by President Sadat.
Prime Minister Begin, and President
Carter provides an unprecedented op-
portunity for the people of the Middle
East to turn away from the long and
tragic course of conflict, tension.
stalemate, and terror that has for so
long afflicted Israelis and Arabs — and
the world at large. As President Carter
said:
There are still great difficulties that remain
and many hard issues to be settled The i|ues-
tions that have brought warfare and bitterness
to the Middle East for the last 30 years will nut
be settled overnight. But we should all recog-
nize the substantial achievements that have
been made.
It would be tragic to lose this op-
portunity
The issues that underlie the Arab-
Israeli dispute have been recognized by
successive American Administrations
as having profound consequences for
America's own interests — our historic
and moral commitment to the people of
the region, the important anil mutually
beneficial economic relationships be
tween the United States and the Middle-
Eastern nations, and the dangers which
perpetual crisis in the region pose for
world peace and freedom.
The U.S. diplomatic role in the Mid-
dle East has been and continues to be a
matter of national importance to us. It
has been, as well, indispensable to
hopes for a negotiated settlement by the
parties, for it is the United States alone
among the world's nations that both
Israel and its Arab neighbors have been
prepared to work with on this complex
and difficult problem.
The President's effort at Camp David
was conducted in this spirit — with
humility, with perseverance, and with
the deepest sense of responsibility to-
ward the interests of the American
people, toward the nations and peoples
of the Middle East, and in the cause of
peace, justice, and cooperative prog-
ress. As a result of this effort, the
prospects for peace in the Middle East
have been advanced significantly, and
good prospects exist for even further
progress — if the parties to the Arab-
Israeli conflict commit themselves to
seizing the opportunity that now is
offered.
No international agreement can suc-
ceed unless it provides a balance of
benefits. Each party must be able to
perceive that its particular interests are
addressed seriously and with a sense of
reciprocal advantage and responsibil-
ity. This is all the more true in the case
of any agreement to advance the cause
of peace in the Middle East. All the
central dimensions — human, political,
security, and psychological — must be
dealt with in a balanced and fair man-
ner if we are to expect the parties to
commit themselves to go forward with
the peaceful resolution of the differ-
ences that for so long have caused war
and destruction.
Israel
Support for a secure, free, and
democratic Israel in the Middle East
has been and will remain a permanent
feature of American foreign policy; in-
deed it is a moral commitment by our
country and a strategic concern. The
ties of friendship that bind out-
two nations will, I am sure, be strength-
ened by the Camp David agreements.
Israel, like any nation, has a right to
recognition and acceptance by its im-
mediate neighbors and by all nations.
Beyond this. Israel, like any nation,
has a right to live in security — a secu-
rity that would derive from its own
Strength and fortitude, from the grow-
ing cooperation and good will of its
neighbors, and from linn security ar-
rangements agreed between them. The
I amp David agreements go further to-
ward meeting all of these fundamental
concerns of Israel than any interna-
tional action since the founding of the
modem State of Israel.
For Israel, these agreements speak to
the centuries-old aspiration of the
Jewish people to live in peace in a state
of their own in the land of their
forefathers, within secure and recog-
nized borders, and to take their riuhtful
place in the international community o
nations. As President Carter said
". . . this great aspiration of Israel ha:
been certified without constraint in thi
greatest degree of enthusiasm by Presi
dent Sadat, the leader of one of tht
greatest nations on Earth."
In practical terms. Israel now cat
look realistically to a future of ful
peace with Egypt while it carrie."
through the resolution of problems tha
will lead to peace with all of it;
neighbors. The agreement with Egyp>
provides for diplomatic relations, an
end to boycotts, the right to tree pas
sage through international waterways
and other ties characteristic of norma
peaceful relations between sovereign
states.
The framework agreements alsi
contain another indispensable
element — arrangements to guarantee
the security of the parties.
In the Sinai:
• A wide demilitarized zone;
• A limited armament zone east oi
the Suez Canal;
• U.N. forces in a zone along the
Egyptian-Israeli border and the Gulf ot
Aqaba;
• U.N. forces to assure freedom ol
passage through the Tiran Strait ami as
a buffer between Sinai and da/a;
• Relocation of Israeli airfields easi
of the border, in the Negev; and
• A small limited armament zone on
the Israeli side of the border.
In the West Bank and Gaza:
• Israeli security forces will remain
m specified security locations to pro-
vide for Israel's security:
• There will be arrangements for as-
suring internal security:
• There will be a 5-year interim
period before the final status of the
area is decided; anil
• Israel has a voice, together with
Egypt, Jordan, and the Palestinians, in
the determination o\ the final status ot
the area and its boundaries
These concrete security arrange-
ments are. of course, important, but far
more is involved. True security cannot
be achieved by physical, material, or
geographical measures alone; true se-
curity must be founded on a relation-
ship of amity, trust, mutual respect,
and acceptance between a nation and
its neighbors. For the first time ever,
this can become an actuality — not just
[ovember 1978
dream — tor the people ot Israel
Vith a responsible and positive ap-
roaeh to the provisions of these
ramework documents, a new era of
mtual friendship, respect, and cooper-
tion between Israel and its
eighbors — and all the benefits that can
low from this — becomes a reality.
If the nations of the Middle East can
eize the opportunity before them and
ross the threshold to peace, no one
vill benefit more than the people of
srael. At long last. Israel will be able
o begin to free itself of the crushing
efense burden which its citizens have
ad to bear from the inception of the
tate.
Today Israel's development has
eached a point where the advantages
vhich peace can bring to progress are
nprecedentedly bright. Peace can re-
ease the extraordinary talents and
nergies of the people of Israel to ad-
Iress the range of modern problems. In
ier capita terms, Israel possesses more
cientists. engineers, physicians, and
ither professionals and technicians
rained in public service fields than
nost nations of the world. Already,
iespite 30 years of conflict and ten-
ions. Israel's contributions to human
nd material development in areas such
s health, agriculture, the environment.
Iternative sources of energy, and
yater conservation have been remarka-
ile. Under conditions of peace. Israel's
lready disproportionate contribution to
olutions to some of its — and the
world's — most pressing issues will be
nagnified.
The Arab Side
President Sadat and Egypt can take
l;reat pride in the extent to which the
jramp David agreements speak to the
|:oncerns of the Arab world at large.
Through its contribution to the docu-
nent entitled "A Framework for Peace
In the Middle East [Agreed at Camp
[David]," Egypt has laid the founda-
tions for an overall Arab-Israeli settle-
nent and established a procedure and
jrinciples which can be used by all
[Israel's neighbors who are prepared to
ijiegotiate for peace and security on the
basis of all the principles and provi-
sions of U.N. Security Council Res-
olution 242, which applies to each of
jthese negotiations — Egypt. Jordan,
iSyria, and Lebanon. If the opportunity
lis seized, the results can shape the
future of the Middle East for decades to
Icome. It can mean a Middle East that
lean live in dignity, with expanding
jprosperity and influence, and freed
from the shadow of outside pressure or
Ithreat. It offers an avenue for the Arabs
to work together, not in the negative
way of marshaling their energies
against a common adversary but toward
the attainment of the highest human
goals.
At the heart of Arab concerns, of
course, are the West Bank and Gaza
and the Palestinian problem. The
"Framework for Peace in the Middle
East" offers the Arabs a fair and hon-
orable way to begin resolving these
problems. While not achieving every-
thing the Arab people want at a single
stroke, it sets in motion a political
process which will significantly ad-
vance legitimate Arab objectives while
assuring Israel's security and its right
to live in peace with its neighbors.
To anyone who has worked on these
problems, it must be evident that the
issues involved in the West Bank and
Gaza and in the Palestinian question
generally are far too complex to be
resolved all at once. Because of this we
have long felt that the only realistic
approach to their solution would be to
establish a 5-year transitional period
for the West Bank and Gaza in which
the decisions that needed to be made
could be dealt with in a logical
sequence.
That approach has been agreed to by
Egypt and Israel, and they have invited
other parties to the Arab-Israeli conflict
to support it. As the key Arab nations
consider their choice, it is imperative
that they understand what the
framework agreed at Camp David
achieves.
For the first time in history a Palestin-
ian self-governing body will be
established — something that has never
before existed.
• Throughout the West Bank and
Gaza. Palestinian authority will be es-
tablished during the transitional period,
pending negotiation of final bound-
aries.
• The Israeli military government
and its civilian administration will be
withdrawn and will be replaced by a
Palestinian self-governing authority
freely elected by the inhabitants of
these areas. A major initial removal of
Israeli military forces will take place,
and those remaining will be redeployed
in specified locations. A strong local
Palestinian police force under Palestin-
ian authority will come into being.
• The Palestinians — along with
Egypt. Israel, and Jordan — will par-
ticipate in negotiations based on all the
provisions and principles of U.N. Se-
curity Council Resolution 242; they
will thereby have a clear voice in de-
termining their own future. They will
participate in setting up their self-
governing authority, in the negotiations
to determine the final status of the
43
West Bank and Gaza, and in the
negotiations for an Israel-Jordan peace
treaty. Their agreement on the final
status of the West Bank and Gaza will
be submitted to a vote by the elected
representatives of the inhabitants of the
West Bank and Gaza to ratify or reject.
Their elected representatives will, by
themselves, decide how they shall gov-
ern themselves after the 5-year transi-
tional period, consistent with the terms
of their agreement on the final status of
the area.
• These arrangements will set in
motion a political process in the West
Bank and Gaza which will establish
Palestinian authority and administration
with full autonomy there.
• There are also provisions for
Palestinians not now in the West Bank
and Gaza. Representatives from among
these Palestinians as mutually agreed
may join the negotiations among
Egypt. Israel, and Jordan on establish-
ing the elected self-governing authority
in the West Bank and Gaza. Through-
out the transitional period in all the
negotiations that will take place, re-
sponsible Palestinians in this area and
outside almost certainly will reflect
each other's views and concerns.
• Israel has agreed that the solution
from negotiations must recognize the
legitimate rights of the Palestinian
people and their just requirements.
This framework provides a start —
self-government for one-third of all the
Palestinian people in the world within
the agreed framework. The issue to be
decided now is whether to concentrate
on assuring this historic step — which
in 5 years will lead to a determination
of the final status of the area approved
by the elected representatives of the
inhabitants of the West Bank and
Gaza — or whether to reject this step in
order to pursue the impossible goal of
Secretary Venice's
Middle East Visit
On September 19, 1978, Secretary
Vance departed Washington to brief
the leaders of Jordan, Saudi Arabia,
and Syria on the Egyptian-Israeli
agreements reached at Camp David. He
visited Jordan September 20-21. Saudi
Arabia September 21-24. and Syria
September 24. The Secretary returned
to the United States September 25.
Press releases related to this visit
are Nos. 359 (September 19), 360
(September 20). and 364 and 365
(September 21). □
44
an immediate resolution of all out-
standing issues. We believe it is im-
perative to get the process started now.
Let me dwell on this point for a
moment. I have found that this is one
of the most difficult points for some of
our friends in the Middle East to under-
stand. We have started from the knowl-
edge that all of the complicated issues
in an Arab-Israeli settlement cannot be
resolved in one negotiation at one time.
Therefore, we have put them in se-
quence and provided procedures for
their resolution within an agreed
period. Meanwhile, each change in the
situation will produce new conditions
which will make it possible to resolve
issues later that cannot be resolved
now.
This framework speaks as well to a
deep human concern of the Arab people
and indeed of all people. At Camp
David we found both the Israelis and
the Egyptians eager to come to grips
with the tragic refugee problem. For
the first time, two parties to the con-
flict have committed themselves to
work with other interested parties to
establish agreed procedures for a
prompt, just, and permanent resolution
of this too long unresolved problem.
More immediately, the agreement pro-
vides for the creation of a mechanism
which should permit early readmission
of persons displaced from the West
Bank and Gaza in 1967. These people
will be able to reestablish themselves
in their homes and pursue their liveli-
hoods for themselves and their families
in dignity and justice.
Finally, the document entitled
"Framework for the Conclusion of a
Peace Treaty Between Egypt and Is-
rael" provides tor restoration of the
full exercise of Egyptian sovereignty
over the Sinai to the internationally
recognized border. This agreement
calls for the full withdrawal of Israeli
forces from the Sinai; and after an
interim withdrawal, which can be ac-
complished quickly, the establishment
of normal peaceful relations between
the two countries, including dip-
lomatic relations. This offers the
Egyptian people, who have suffered
and sacrificed so much in the wars of
the past three decades, the possibility
of devoting their considerable energies
and resources to the cause of economic
and social progress.
The United States
Let me conclude by noting the Camp
David agreements serve critical Ameri-
can interests in the Middle East as well.
The Camp David agreements:
• Provide renewed expression of
America's traditional moral dedication
to help find just and peaceful solutions
to international problems and particu-
larly to find a peace that will benefit all
the people of the Middle East while
serving American interests;
• Demonstrate that our commitment
to the security and well-being of Israel
is effective and enduring;
• Strengthen our effort to deepen
lies with our friends in the Arab world.
with its increasingly influential inter-
national role;
• Lessen the danger of the Middle
East becoming a focus or flashpoint of
conflict between the great powers that
could lead to nuclear war;
• Further the interest of our allies
and ourselves in a peaceful Middle
East;
• Contribute to an international en-
vironment which can narrow the gap
between the rich and technological!)
advanced nations and the developing
world; and above all
• If accepted by the parties for im-
plementation and supported widely by
the international community, will be a
bulwark for further efforts to establish
peace and cooperation among all
nations.
The United States remains com-
mitted to a just and lasting overall
peace for the Middle East. The Camp
David agreements do not bring such a
Department of State Bulled
peace immediately into existence — tW
delicate complex of issues on the Wesi
Bank and Gaza will have to be settlec
and peace achieved between Israel ana
its other neighbors. Jordan. Syria, an«
Lebanon — but they lay the groundworl
for a comprehensive settlement.
The outcome at Camp David is ;
major step toward phased, cumulatia
agreements through which a record o
success and confidence can be com
piled and on which further and. at soim
point, ultimate decisions can bi
reached to achieve a final accord.
The choice now is clear. It i
whether to turn away from thesi
agreements because they do not answj
every question, provide for every dj
tail, insure all parties against all risk
or whether they will be supported fo
what they are — a framework for peaci
which can set in motion a political am
psychological dynamic capable o
transforming this terrible and tragi*
conflict into the just, lasting, and com
prehensive peace that the nations ot thi
Middle East have so long sought. Thi.
unprecedented involvement ot thi
President of the United States at Cam]
David demonstrated the meaning of thi
U.S. commitment to help achiel
peace in the Middle East. The parties
and all those interested in the Middle
East problem, can rest assured that th.
United States will remain fully in
volved until a final, just, and lastin;
settlement is achieved.
We have said for many years nov
that the modern history of the Middli
East has been a record of lost opportu
nities. All of us recognize that we nov
face an opportunity of unprecedentec
potential for peace and that this tunc i
must not be lost.
h
1 The complete transcript of the hearings wj|
be published b) the committee and will he aNail
able from the Superintendent "I Documents
U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington,
[) C 20402
-'For texts ol the agreements and other mate-
rial concerning the summit, see Bulletin ot
Oct. iy7x, P i
November 1978
45
UNITED NATIONS:
33d General Assembly Convenes
by Secretary Vance
Statement at the opening session of
the U.N. General Assembly on Sep-
tember 29, iy78. [
A generation ago. the United Nations
was created by men and women who
shared a vision.
• They saw the need, in the wake of
war, to create stronger international in-
stitutions that could dampen the flames
of conflict and lift nations and people
to a new level of material well-being.
• They saw the need to afford self-
determination to millions.
• They saw the need for the world
community to take a compelling stand
against repression, discrimination, and
the denial of the rights of man.
The men and women who gathered
iin San Francisco raised their sights
labove the differences and divisions of
Ithe moment. They dared to see the
world as it could be — a world where
those who were hungry are fed,
where those who were poor have es-
caped the degradation of poverty,
where diplomacy among nations is a
pervasive substitute for violence among
nations, and where the resources of the
world are used effectively and shared
equitably.
In the years since, the record of the
United Nations in working toward this
vision has been one of accomplish-
ment. It has played an indispensable
part in the process of peaceful decol-
onization, in defusing tensions among
nations through its peacekeeping mis-
sions, and in promoting genuine eco-
nomic and social progress.
Today, the members of this body
still share that common vision. And we
understand, far better than ever before,
our common destiny — that no nation,
acting alone, can assure its people
peace and economic security; that the
future of each of our nations depends
upon the future of all of our nations.
Our challenge today is to summon
the political will to act in concert to-
ward the goals we share — to go beyond
the rhetoric of interdependence and to
j begin to recognize its inescapable im-
j plications for the national interests of
I each of us.
We must build a new consensus on
this proposition: that in this new era,
I each nation must weigh more carefully
than ever before its long term interest
in a healthy global community when
making decisions about its immediate
concerns. For only through cooperation
and compromise in the short run can
we assure our longer term future.
On crucial issues, the coming
months will present turning points of
incalculable importance. In negotia-
tions on the Middle East, on southern
Africa, on trade, on arms control, and
on many other pressing problems,
genuine progress has been made. With-
out continued progress, the gains we
have already made can be lost
This point applies not to any single
nation nor group of nations, but to
every nation, including my own.
The resolution of dangerous regional
disputes and progress in limiting
weaponry must always be at the top of
the immediate international agenda. I
will return to these issues later. But we
cannot so concentrate our energies on
the political diplomacy of international
peace, essential as it is, that we dis-
cover too late that international in-
equities, and poverty and injustice
within nations, make peace among na-
tions impossible.
So let me concentrate my comments
today on those issues that so central I \
touch people's lives around the
globe — economic security, equitable
development of the Earth's resources,
and individual freedom.
International Economic System
Shared economic progress requires a
global consensus on the benefits of
cooperation among nations. Coopera-
tion and compromise are often dif-
ficult.
• The economic problems we share
require long term efforts, but we are all
constrained by domestic concerns which
call for immediate attention.
• The problems we share are so
widespread in their impact that solu-
tions cannot be found by a single na-
tion or group of nations.
• These problems require more than
general agreements. Application of
substantial technical and financial re-
sources are necessary. Debate over
sterile texts will neither feed the hun-
gry nor create new jobs for the un-
employed. Only common action can be
effective. And each must contribute if
all are to benefit.
Only 3 or 4 years ago there was
extraordinary tension between North
and South. Each side was deeply suspi-
cious of the other's motives. Each held
sharply different perceptions of global
needs and priorities.
But these differences have been
narrowed. From the seventh special
session, through the U.N. Conference
on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)
IV, the Conference on International
Economic Cooperation, and the meet-
ings of this Assembly — and through
other serious efforts in the Organiza-
tion for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) and the eco-
nomic summits — agreement has been
achieved on several basic issues relat-
ing to a new international economic
order.
• We are agreed on the need to work
toward the elimination of poverty in all
countries. Concessional aid flows have
increased. More attention is being de-
voted to food production. Satisfying
basic economic needs is becoming a
greater priority of the international
community.
• We are agreed on the urgent need
to accelerate equitable, noninflationary
growth. The Geneva trade negotiations
are in their final stages. We are dis-
cussing guidelines for international
investment. Private capital flows are
increasing. The facilities of the Inter-
national Monetary Fund (IMF) have
been expanded, and discussions are
underway to expand the facilities of the
multilateral development banks.
• We are agreed on the need to re-
duce economic instability and uncer-
tainty. The IMF is playing a major role
in providing balance-of-payments
financing to those most severely af-
fected by recent disruptions in the
world economy. We are engaged in
serious discussions on a variety of
commodity arrangements, including a
system of internationally coordinated
national grain reserves.
• We are agreed on the need to
facilitate smooth adjustment for work-
ers and businesses that have borne the
brunt of changing economic circum-
stances. The Bonn summit made clear
that we must intensify our efforts in
this area.
Because we have come far, the road
ahead will be even more challenging.
for the most difficult issues remain. To
maintain our progress, we should be
guided by three fundamental principles
46
in the North-South discussions over the
coming months.
First, every nation must resist the
temptation to solve its own economic
problems at the expense of others. We
must fashion our domestic policies on
the basis of global as well as national
needs.
Second, all nations which bear their
fair share of responsibility should bene-
fit from a healthy world economy.
Third, all nations must enter inter-
national economic negotiations with a
spirit of accommodation.
These principles will not by them-
selves solve the problems we face. But
without their general acceptance, there
can be no genuine progress. Adherence
to them will prevent critical negotia-
tions from turning into polarizing and
self-defeating tests of will.
Let me discuss several major issues
where the application of these princi-
ples can make the difference between
success and failure.
Committee of the Whole
One of our most recent collective
efforts to address the economic chal-
lenges we share was the establishment
of the Committee of the Whole. This
Committee has the potential to look at
economic issues comprehensively and
to identify longer term priorities. The
United States strongly supports this
forum.
The meeting in May made progress
in identifying some important areas of
agreement between industrial and de-
veloping countries. Substantive discus-
sions in the Committee had an impor-
tant impact on the June ministerial
meeting of the OECD and in the Bonn
summit. We, of course, shared the dis-
appointment of other delegates that a
procedural impasse earlier this month
interrupted the Committee's work.
Since the September meeting, we
have carefully examined the statements
made by others on this issue We have
noted in particular statements by the
chairman to the Committee on Sep-
tember 8 and to the press on September
1 1 and have taken account of sub-
sequent consultations. It is now gener-
ally agreed that the Committee would
not seek to provide specific solutions to
problems outstanding in other bodies
Rather, it would achieve agreed con-
clusions on fundamental or crucial un-
derlying issues and only to the extent
that all members agreed to decide on
them.
We are satisfied that on the basis of
these statements, sufficient procedural
agreement now exists to resume sub-
stantive work in the manner suggested
by the chairman at the end of the in-
formal consultations on September 6.
Trade
The spirit which must guide our
work in the Committee of the Whole
applies as well to our policies on trade.
The developing world is no longer on
the periphery of world trade. Increas-
ingly, growth in the developing coun-
tries is important to the health of in-
dustrial countries.
Commitment to open trade, how-
ever, is extremely fragile. It is tempting
for one nation to use trade restrictions to
export its economic difficulties. It is
often easy to avoid adjustments which
are beneficial in the long term but which
in the short run present difficult problems
for workers and industry.
We must be concerned about rising
protectionist pressures, but we should
also recognize that world trade has ex-
panded remarkably well in recent
years. Despite a deep recession in the
early 1970's, we not only avoided the
trading wars of the 1930's, we con-
tinued negotiations to liberalize and
improve the world trading system. Our
ability to conclude these trade negotia-
tions successfully this year is a critical
test of our commitment to an open
trading system. And agreement will
stimulate production. It will provide
jobs. And it will help reduce inflation.
Beyond our efforts to expand trade,
the United States will fulfill our com-
U.S. DELEGATION,
33D U.N. GENERAL
ASSEMBLY*
Representatives
Andrew Young
James F. Leonard
Abraham A. Ribicoff, U.S. Senator from
the Stale of Connecticut
James B Pearson. U.S. Senator from the
State of Kansas
Set Charles Momjian
Alternate Representatives
Donald F. McHenry
Melissa F. Wells
Angelique O. Stahl
John W. Hechinger
Richard W. Petree
"Text from USUN press release S< ol
Sept. 26. 1978. which includes bio-
graphic data on each delegate.
Department of State Bulletir
mitment to assist developing nations
through differential measures includ-
ing, where appropriate, special and
more favorable treatment. We in turn
expect those developing countries
which can do so to contribute to trade
liberalization by improving access to
their markets. Improved access will not
only benefit the industrial countries, it
will be even more important to many
developing countries.
Finally, we believe that in trade, as
elsewhere, the developing countries
should have a voice in determining the
policies which affect them. We have
encouraged their full involvement in
the Geneva negotiations We urge de-
veloping countries, especially those
which play a large role in international
trade, to participate actively in the
General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade and in the agreements that result
from the Geneva negotiations so that
their interests are fully represented.
Commodities
An essential element of trade for
most developing nations is their export
of basic commodities. At UNCTAD IV
we agreed to intensify our collective
effort to address commodity problems.
Progress has not always been as fast as
we all would like, but this has gener-
ally reflected the technical complexity
of commodity issues rather than lack of
political will or good faith. We will
continue to work for stabilization
agreements and other measures that
strengthen commodity markets.
Let me affirm also that we believe a
soundly designed common fund could
play a useful role in alleviating com-
modity problems. A well-structured
fund will provide economic benefits to
participating countries. We also recog-
nize that establishment of a fund is of
major political importance to the gen-
eral North-South dialogue.
We will cooperate with others to
bring the common fund negotiations to
a successful conclusion. Recent con-
sultations have identified a con-
vergence of views on some issues. All
agree that a fund could play a useful
role in reducing the overall financial
costs of supporting buffer stocks which
effectively stabilize prices.
In addition, there is a growing reel
ognition of the importance of en-
couraging improved productivity and
more effective marketing of many
commodities. A separate "second win-
dow " of the common fund, based on
voluntary contributions and operating
under agreed guidelines, might be an
appropriate mechanism. We are pre-
pared to negotiate flexibly on this
Movember 1978
ssuc. as (in others, if there is a si
ipproach on all sides.
While progress has been made on
' iome issues, important differences still
emain. Movement on all sides of the
onferenee table will be necessary. But
1 .ve are convinced that with mutual ac-
rommodation a workable agreement
:an be achieved.
an;
Resource Transfers
As with trade, increased resource
lows to the developing world must be
Dart of an international system of
hared responsibility.
We ought not think of resource
transfers as a sacrifice for donors or a
4 unilateral benefit for recipients. They
are an economic investment in the fu-
ture of all countries. They will contrib-
ute to global economic growth, greater
trade, and enhanced prosperity for us
all.
My country is committed to increas-
ing our contributions both to multilat-
ral and bilateral development efforts.
We have done so in the past year: Our
nultilateral commitments increased
31% and our bilateral program ex-
oanded by 20%. And because we are
determined that U.S. aid funds will be
used effectively, we will concentrate
jur efforts in countries where programs
jare aimed most directly at meeting the
essential needs of their people.
The United States believes strongly
that a key objective of foreign assist-
ance should be to help meet basic
human needs. We recognize that na-
tions will have different development
priorities in approaching this goal.
Whether emphasis is on enhancing the
productivity of the poor, increasing
food production, improving health, or
expanding industry which creates jobs,
the critical ingredient in every nation is
to have all its citizens — men and
women — as active participants and
beneficiaries in their nation's growth.
Finally, we recognize the debt prob-
lems that many of the least developed
countries face. We will soon have au-
thority from our Congress for retroac-
tive adjustment of certain aid terms
which would permit us to help those
most in need.
Managing Global Resources
As we work together to promote
leconomic development, we must also
lassure an equitable sharing of the
[world's resources. Four issues demand
our urgent attention.
Food. Our first urgent priority is
i assuring adequate food and stable ag-
ricultural prices for all people. Four
years have passed since the World
Food Conference, where we agreed on
measures we must take for the future.
But despite our efforts, the fundamen-
tal problems remain.
• Food production is hardly keeping
pace with the growth in population.
• Food deficits in many countries are
increasing.
• Negotiations on grain reserves
have dragged on without success.
We believe progress must be made.
The United States has created a 9-
million-ton farmer-held grain reserve.
We have proposed to our Congress the
establishment of an international emer-
gency wheat reserve of 6 million tons
to provide food for emergency needs in
developing countries. We intend to
maintain our food aid level at a fair
share of the target set at the World
Food Conference. We will continue to
support the activities of international
organizations devoted to food produc-
tion, such as the International Fund for
Agricultural Development. And we in-
tend to make food aid a more effective
tool in support of development.
I propose that this Assembly review
the world food situation — to identify
the current obstacles to progress and to
restore a sense of urgency to meeting
mankind's most basic need. We must
not be lulled by good weather and
plentiful harvests. Another tragedy is
inevitable unless we act now.
Energy. We must act now to de-
velop new energy resources so that we
avoid a harsh transition to the time
when fossil fuels will no longer be
plentiful. This task has several dimen-
sions.
• There must be an expansion of oil
and gas production. And we need to
improve our conservation of these
energy sources, especially in the
United States. The World Bank has
expanded its lending to help developing
countries increase their fossil fuel
supplies. We welcome this, and we
also encourage the regional develop-
ment banks to assist.
• The development of nuclear
energy will also be central to the future
of many countries. We hope the Inter-
national Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation
will provide a consensus on nuclear
technologies free from the serious risk
of nuclear weapons proliferation. My
government supports the development
of safeguardable nuclear power, in-
cluding assured nuclear fuel supplies.
The developing nations should, of
course, participate in the design and
management of the institutions which
47
form the basis of an international nu-
clear energy regime.
• Priority attention must be given to
the development of renewable energy
sources. Many technologies already
exist for harnessing solar, wind, and
geothermal power. All of us can bene-
fit from these technologies, but a spe-
cial effort should be made to meet the
needs of the poorer countries.
Two opportunities now exist for the
United Nations to continue to play an
important role.
• The United States supports the
proposed U.N. conference on new and
renewable energy. It could result in a
more coordinated U.N. energy effort
and clearer priorities. It could also pro-
vide up-to-date information on renewa-
ble energy technology and examine the
role of the private sector in energy
development.
• The U.N. Development Program
might also expand its efforts to help
nations assess their own renewable
energy possibilities, finance the testing
of new technologies, and provide
training and technical assistance for
effective energy management.
The United States is willing to con-
tribute to a major global effort to de-
velop new energy sources. We will in-
tensify our assistance programs in this
area. We will increase domestic re-
search which can benefit all nations.
And we will expand cooperative energy
programs from which we too stand to
benefit.
Law of the Sea. We must strive to
conclude successfully the Law of the
Sea negotiations. At stake is whether
this vast expanse of the globe will be
an arena of conflict or cooperation.
Considerable progress has been made
on a number of issues in these negotia-
tions. These achievements have been
obscured, however, by continued
stalemate over seabed mining. The
basis for an equitable solution already
exists and is widely accepted. It per-
mits all sides to benefit fully from sea-
bed mining, with private firms as well
as an international enterprise allowed
to mine on a competitive basis. A
mutually acceptable solution is im-
perative, and it is possible.
Time is running out for reaching an
agreed solution. Without it, seabed
mining will inevitably take place but in
the absence of an internationally agreed
framework. This would be less satis-
factory than a widely supported inter-
national regime.
Science and Technology. Finally is
the critical question of how best to
48
harness technology and science tor the
benefit of mankind.
We hope that the U.N. Conference
on Science and Technology for De-
velopment will focus attention on how
all countries can contribute their
knowledge to global development. It
will be particularly important to find
ways for developing nations 10 enhance
their capacity to generate, select, and
apply technology for their own de-
velopment priorities. We will contrib-
ute to the work of the conference, and
we hope to benefit from it.
Furthermore to help mobilize the
technical talents and knowledge of our
nation on behalf of the development of
others, we intend to establish during
the coming year a new foundation for
international technological coopera-
tion.
Enhancement of Human Dignity
The ultimate purpose of all our
policies is the enhancement of human
dignity. The rights to food, to shelter,
to a decent education, to adequate
health — the rights which lie at the heart
of our approach to economic issues —
are hollow without political and civil
freedoms — freedom from torture and
government mistreatment: freedom to
worship, to travel, and to speak with-
out fear; freedom to participate in the
affairs of one's government. There is
no incompatibility among economic,
political, and civil rights, no choice
that must be made among them. They
reenforce one another
We commemorate in this Assembly
the 30th anniversary of the Universal
Declaration on Human Rights. Dag
Hammarskjold described the Declara-
tion as a "living document." We have
a continuing obligation to keep that
document alive in our own nations.
And as members of the United Nations,
we must strengthen the international
machinery that serves to promote the
full range of human rights — political
and economic
We have made significant progress
in the past year. Concern tor human
rights is more central to international
discourse today than ever bet ore. But
more needs to be done.
• This Assembly should review the
activities of the various U.N. human
rights institutions.
• We must resolve in this Assembly
to make torture alien to the experience
of every nation and to conclude an
international agreement to outlaw it.
• We need to insure that we are
doing all we can to end conditions
which are tantamount to genocide.
• We must ask what more each of us
Department of State Bulletir
can do to insure the vitality of the
Universal Declaration — to provide am-
nesty to prisoners of conscience, to
assure due process for all, and to ad-
vance social justice and equity for our
people
In addition, the plight of one group
of individuals — refugees — demands
our special compassion. We urge all
nations to increase their support for the
vital humanitarian work of the High
Commissioner for Refugees.
The refugee problem is not confined
to any single region. In Africa alone,
some 2 million individuals are now
outside their native lands. We must do
more to offer them sustenance, secu-
rity, and a realistic hope of resettle-
ment or return to their homelands.
In Southeast Asia, hundreds of new
refugees from Indochina appear daily,
some risking their lives to cross bor-
ders, others challenging the sea in
every form of vessel. We urgently need
greater efforts to provide them
sanctuary. We hope that the High
Commissioner will consider convening
an international conference in the very
near future to seek humane solutions to
the desperate plight of these refugees.
We propose that consideration also be
given at a later date to a general con-
ference on the worldwide refugee
problem.
International Peacekeeping
Too often the anguish of the up-
rooted is grim testimony to our col lee
tive failure to achieve international
peace. War and strife are the enemies
of the fundamental rights 1 have dis-
cussed.
Today my government and many of
those assembled here are actively
pursuing the path of peace in troubled
areas of the world.
Middle East. The accords achieved
at Camp David offer hope that at long
last a turning point has been reached in
the Middle East. The agreement
achieved between Egypt and Israel.
with active American participation,
constitutes a framework for a com-
prehensive peace settlement. Much re-
mains to be done in ensuing stages of
negotiations, but a major step has been
taken in resolving the difficult issues
that lie at the heart of 30 years of
Arab-Israel hostility.
As negotiations are pursued on the
basis of the Camp David framework, a
dynamic process will be set in motion
that can profoundly change attitudes on
the issues that remain to be resolved.
That process will significantly advance
legitimate Arab objectives while pro
tecting IsraeCs security. It is our hope
that the members of this body will lend
their full support to the task of building
a just and lasting peace upon this
framework.
In his recent address before Con-
gress, President Carter reviewed the
main elements of the Camp David
World
Conference To
Combat Racism
ist«
Ifii
IS In
I
Oil
;.■
i\
/;.
if.
IV(
-..
..
T:
li
WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT,
AUG. 18 1
This week representatives of many
nations are meeting in Geneva in a
World Conference to Combat Racism
and Racial Discrimination.
The conference marks the midpoint
of the U.N. Decade for Action to
Combat Racism and Racial Discrimi-
nation, a decade whose initiation the
United States strongly supported. But
the United States is unable to partici-
pate in this potentially important con-
ference, although we will monitor the
proceedings, because the definition of
"racism" has been perverted tor
political ends by including Zionism as
one of its forms. The United States
cannot associate itself with the decade
so long as it endorses the patently false
definition of Zionism as a form of ra-
cism.
Instead we hope that this conference
will return to the original purpose of
the decade, so that we might rejoin this
international effort to eliminate racism
throughout the world. We will work
toward this end because we know the
challenge that racism poses and tor
more than a century we have struggled
to heal its scars. We know our goals
have not been fully accomplished, yet
we are encouraged and deeply com-
mitted to them. Domestically and in-
ternationally, we will continue to pur-
sue this great common purpose in the
context of other uncompromised ef-
forts.
We call on all nations to respect the
original objectives of the United Na-
tions Decade Against Racism and to
resist efforts that distort its purpose and
erode its moral force.
ti
ill
■Text from Weekl\ Compilation of Presi-
dential Documents of Aug. 21, 1978.
lovember 1978
49
^reements. As the President said, our
istoric position on settlements in oc-
jpied territory has remained constant,
s he further said, no peace agreement
ill be either just or secure if it does
ot resolve the problem of the Palestin-
ins in the broadest sense. We believe
lat the Palestinian people must be as-
ired that they and their descendants
in live with dignity and freedom and
ave the opportunity for economic ful-
llment and for political expression.
he Camp David accords state that the
;gotiated solution must recognize the
gitimate rights of the Palestinian
eople.
The Camp David accords make a
)lid start toward achieving these goals
ir the Palestinians in real terms. In the
/est Bank and Gaza, the framework
rovides that Israeli occupation shall
id and a self-governing authority shall
; instituted. This can be achieved
ithin a few months. Thus, for the first
me, the Palestinians have the prospect
F governing themselves within the
amework that has been agreed.
The Camp David framework also
ves the Palestinians a vital role in
taping their destiny by recognizing
em as participants in all aspects of
e negotiations that determine their
iture. They will participate in the
jegotiations to set up their self-
jverning authority, in those to deter-
: ine the final status of the West Bank
I id Gaza, and in those leading to a
>rdan-Israel peace treaty. Finally, the
ireement on the final status of the
'est Bank and Gaza will be submitted
i a vote of representatives of the in-
abitants for either ratification or
Ejection.
These steps set in motion a political
I'ocess of the utmost importance to all
alestinians.
The Camp David accords concentrate
n the means by which self-government
an be established for the Palestinians
ving in the West Bank and Gaza, but
Here was also clear recognition by all
iiree leaders at Camp David that the
iroblem of the Palestinians living out-
lide these areas must also be
ddressed.
We recognize that this problem has
lolitical as well as humanitarian di-
mensions which must be resolved as an
;itegral part of a durable peace settle-
tent. When the Camp David accords
ell for "... the resolution of the
alestinian problem' in all its aspects,"
ney acknowledge and embrace that
central fact. As the political institutions
|f self-government take shape in the
|Vest Bank and Gaza through negotia-
pns among the parties, the relation-
ihip between those institutions and the
Palestinians living outside the area
should be defined, including the ques-
tion of admission of Palestinian refu-
gees to the West Bank and Gaza.
The framework provides for the es-
tablishment of a committee to decide
on the modalities of admission to the
West Bank and Gaza of persons dis-
placed in the 1967 war. For the first
time, the parties to the conflict — Egypt
and Israel — have agreed to work with
each other and with other interested
parties to establish agreed procedures
for a prompt, just, and permanent res-
olution of the refugee problem.
As President Carter stated in his ad-
dress to Congress, the United States is
irrevocably committed to bringing
about a satisfactory solution to the
problem of the Palestinian refugees
We will play an active role in the res-
olution of this problem. A solution
must reflect the relevant U.N. resolu-
tions relating to these refugees.
We urge the international community
to support Egypt and Israel in estab-
lishing procedures urgently to address
this issue in all its aspects. And the
international community should con-
tribute to a program to promote eco-
nomic development in the West Bank
and Gaza as well as to assist those
refugees residing elsewhere.
We are determined to achieve a fair
and just settlement of the Middle East
question in all its parts, and we hope
the Palestinian people will seize this
historic opportunity. It is our hope that
the people of the Middle East will
agree that it is imperative to begin the
negotiating process now — and not to
stand still until every last issue is re-
solved. We urge the other interested
parties to join the negotiations without
delay.
As the Middle East peace process
moves forward, it is vital to maintain
the effectiveness of the U.N's
peacekeeping role there. It is critical
that the mandates of U.N. peacekeep-
ing forces in the Golan Heights and
Sinai be renewed this fall. They have
thus far helped all sides avoid renewed
hostilities; they must now remain to
help achieve a stable peace.
Lebanon. In Lebanon, the fighting
and tragic loss of life continues. The
U.N.'s interim force in southern Leba-
non has done much to stabilize the
situation in that part of the country,
and we call on all to support this effort
to help reassert Lebanese authority.
Elsewhere in Lebanon confrontation
and tensions continue at a high pitch.
President Carter has made clear in his
address to the joint session of Congress
following the Camp David summit, and
again yesterday [at a news conference],
his determination to spare no effort to
assist in finding a solution to the
Lebanese tragedy. As the President
said yesterday, it is time for us to take
joint action to call for a conference of
those who are involved and try to reach
some solution. It may involve a new
charter for Lebanon.
Namibia. In Namibia, the world
community faces a fundamental chal-
lenge. I will be commenting on this
more fully this afternoon in the Secu-
rity Council. Let me simply say now
that the United States is determined to
see Namibia achieve independence in
accordance with the contact group pro-
posal and Security Council Resolution
43 1. 2 We call upon South Africa to
cooperate fully with the United Nations
so that this critical opportunity for a
peaceful settlement will not be lost.
Rhodesia. In Rhodesia, time may be
running out for the possibilities of
diplomacy. But we will continue to
work with the British Government, the
governments in the region, and the
parties to seek a negotiated solution.
We condemn the murder of innocent
civilians as a matter of both conscience
and reason. The prospects for peace in
Rhodesia will diminish if violence
increases.
BACKGROUND NOTE
ON THE UNITED NATIONS
The Office of Public Communication,
Department of State, has just released a
pamphlet on the United Nations, the
latest in the Background Notes series.
This Note describes the Organiza-
tion's history; the functions of the Secu-
rity Council, the General Assembly, the
Economic and Social Council, the Trus-
teeship Council, the International Court
of Justice, the Secretariat, and the
U.N.'s specialized agencies and pro-
grams; the financial arrangements of the
U.N. system; peacekeeping, disarma-
ment, and human rights efforts; and U.S.
participation and policy. Included also
are a profile, a list of members, principal
U.S. officials, and a reading list.
Individual copies of this Background
Note on the United Nations may be ob-
tained for 70C each from the Superinten-
dent of Documents, U.S. Government
Printing Office, Washington, D.C.
20402. (Orders of 100 or more copies of
the same Note mailed to the same ad-
dress are sold at a 25% discount.) Re-
mittances in the form of a check or
money order payable to the Superinten-
dent of Documents must accompany or-
ders.
50
Cyprus. On Cyprus, an opportunity
now exists to help the two communities
narrow their differences and achieve a
just and lasting solution to this long-
standing problem. The United Nations
has done a commendable job of nur-
turing an atmosphere which should now
make possible productive inter/com-
munal negotiations.
To grasp this opportunity, we would
welcome and actively support a re-
newed effort by Secretary General
Waldheim to help the parties reach
agreement on a sovereign, bicom-
munal. nonaligned federal republic of
Cyprus which would meet the concerns
of the people of Cyprus.
Nicaragua. In this atmosphere, we
must respond to the agony of those
caught up in the violence and
bloodshed of Nicaragua. We and sev-
eral countries in Latin America have
offered to assist in the mediation of
Nicaragua's internal crisis. It is our
hope and expectation that all parties
concerned will accept these offers and
agree to a fair mediation process in
which all can have confidence. Only a
democratic solution in Nicaragua — not
repression or violence — can lead to an
enduring stability and true peace.
Terrorism. As we work together to
find peaceful resolutions to the most
dangerous regional disputes, we must
also seek at this assembly to strengthen
the U.N.'s peacekeeping capability.
And while this Organization works to
limit violence among nations, we must
not lose sight of the havoc wreaked by
those who perpetrate terrorist acts on
innocent persons. No single nation,
acting alone, can deal adequately with
this serious problem. Collective action
is essential.
We are beginning to make some
progress. Last year the General As-
sembly adopted a significant resolution
on aircraft hijacking. The Bonn Dec
laration of this July produced a much-
needed agreement on the harboring of
hijackers. We strongly urge all nations
to subscribe to this Declaration.
Arms Control. The pursuit of peace
and security must go beyond resolving
conflicts and preventing violence. The
security of all is enhanced if nations
limit the weapons of war through
mutually negotiated arms control
agreements.
We are engaged with the Soviet
Union and other nations in a broad
range of arms control negotiations.
• The conclusion of a strategic arms
limitation agreement with the Soviet
Union is a fundamental goal of the
United States. We hope that we may
Department of State Bullet
I nited Nations Day, 1978
PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT,
SEPT. 19 1
On this day marking the opening of
the 33d U.N. General Assembly, I
have signed this proclamation desig-
nating October 24 as United Nations
Day, 1978. The proclamation is a call
for increased attention and support by
the American people for the United
Nations and its affiliated agencies.
The United Nations is now more in-
volved than ever before with many of
the central issues of our time, and we
cannot fully advance our national inter-
ests or help build a more peaceful
world if we ignore the potential of the
United Nations.
As a peacekeeper, the United Na-
tions at this moment has four major
operations in the Middle East and in
Cyprus. In addition, the Security
Council is expected to adopt soon a
mandate for a U.N. civilian and mili-
tary presence which will implement the
agreed settlement in Namibia. And th
British-American proposal for settle
ment of the Rhodesian crisis also im
eludes a U.N. peacekeeping role.
In the vital field of development, th
U.N. system has become the world'
largest purveyor of technical assist
ance, helping to press developmen
programs in various fields, to uncove
mineral deposits, and to identify in
vestment opportunities. Few U.N. ac
tivities are more critical to the Unite
States than promotion of the rapid an'
orderly development of the poorer na
tions of the world — countries whicl
already constitute our fastest growin,
export market and the source of man
of our mineral requirements. And con
duct of the critical North-South eco
nomic dialogue is occurring largel
under the auspices of the Unitei
Nations.
In the promotion of human rights
which has been one of the major con'
cerns of my Administration, we hav
conclude a SALT II agreement before
the end of this year.
• The United States hopes that early
progress can be made in concluding a
comprehensive agreement to end the
testing of nuclear weapons.
• Increased efforts are critically
needed to prevent the spread of nuclear
weapons. It is important to prepare
fully for the 1980 Nonproliferation
Treaty review conference; to continue
to make progress in the International
Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation; and to
recognize one of the important
achievements of the Special Session on
Disarmament (SSOD) — the decision
by several nuclear powers to pledge,
under specific circumstances, to refrain
from use of nuclear weapons against
non-nuclear states. We suggest that the
Security Council take note of these
pledges
• The United States will also work
to realize the call in the SSOD Decla-
ration of Principles and Program of
Action tor restraint in the transfer of
conventional arms. We are actively
discussing with the Soviet Union how
our two nations might encourage re-
straint consistent with the legitimate
right to self-defense and international
obligations. We are encouraged by the
new initiatives already being undertak-
en to promote restraint on a regional
basis in Latin America, and we stand
ready to support similar efforts b
countries in other regions.
Conclusion
Let me emphasize that on all thi
issues I have addressed today, what wi
share is greater than how we differ. Wi
share the same small planet. We shan
human aspirations — for better lives, fo«
greater opportunity, for freedom ant
security. And because we share ;
common destiny, we are compelled U
resolve our differences.
If we focus on these common inter-
ests, we can begin to find the common
ground for global progress. We can. a^
Jean Monnet said, "'put our problems
on one side of the table and all of us or
the other. "
The measure of our progress will not
be whether we achieve all of our goals
in this generation, for that will surely
prove to be impossible; it is whether
we can now summon the will to move
forward together so that our children
may benefit from our efforts and our
\ ision.
1 Press release 376.
-For text of the proposal for a Namihian
settlement and related material, see ButLETlNJ
ot lime l l '7K. p. 50; for text of Security Coun-
cil Resolution 431. see Bulletin of Sept.
I«J7K. p. 46.
November 1978
Seen heartened by recent advances
"lithin the U.N. system, even as we
flecognize that much more progress
jeeds to be made. International organi-
ations can play an especially vital role in
lis field. This December we will mark
le 30th anniversary of the Universal
>eclaration of Human Rights, a prod-
ct of the United Nations, which pro-
ides a special reason to hope and work
or greater progress in human rights
round the world.
Nor should the more direct bene-
ts of our participation in the United
lations be overlooked. Americans are
lore protected from health hazards, air
ccidents, sea catastrophes, and en-
ironmental dangers than ever before
ecause of U.N. activities. U.N. pro-
rams like the World Health Organiza-
on's smallpox eradication campaign
r the World Meteorological Organiza-
on's World Weather Watch cost rela-
vely little, yet they save the American
eople several hundred million dollars
very year — year after year. We could
ot possibly carry out these programs
y ourselves except at enormous cost,
t is appropriate that we acknowledge
nee a year the unusual contributions to
air health and welfare that are pro-
ided by these critical programs.
For all of these reasons, the United
Jations is of clear and growing value
o the United States, and the proclama-
ion issued today is a reflection of that
oncern.
In March of this year, I submitted to
tie Congress a special report on my
iews for possible reforms of the
WESTERN HEMISPHERE:
The Role of Human Rights Policy
in Arms Transfers
by Patricia M. Derian
Based on a statement before the
Subcommittee on Inter-American Af-
fairs of the House Committee on Inter-
national Relations on August 9. 1978.
Ms. Derian is Assistant Secretary of
Stale for Human Rights and Human-
itarian Affairs. '
I welcome the opportunity to discuss
with you the role of our human rights
policy in arms transfers for Latin
America. Before addressing this spe-
cific subject. I would like to make
seven general points.
First, our human rights policy is a
global policy. It is not directed at any
one country or any one region. Last fall
I traveled in East Asia to Singapore,
the Philippines, Indonesia, and Thai-
land to discuss our human rights con-
cerns with the governments of that re-
gion. When Under Secretary of State
for Political Affairs David Newsom
visited the Middle East and South Asia
this past July, he also carried the
message. In our relations with the
United Nations system. 2 Among the
things that I would like to see are:
• More effective procedures for the
settlement of disputes between
nations — before they erupt into
bloodshed;
• Increased preparedness for dis-
patch of U.N. troops in peacekeeping
efforts whenever and wherever needed;
• Quicker and more effective reac-
tions to reported human rights abuses;
• A study of ways we might develop
UNITED NATIONS DAY, 1978
A Proclamation*
The founding of the United Nations, on
October 24. 1945, was an historic attempt
to establish a framework for international
cooperation.
The nations of the world now face such
tasks as maintaining international peace
and security; promoting basic human
rights; building a better international eco-
nomic order; and allocating fairly the
globe's natural resources. The United
Nations and its affiliated agencies bring
together representatives of all nations to
work together toward these goals. It holds
out the vision of a truly cooperative
world — a world at peace.
As one of its founding members, as its
leading contributor, and as its host coun-
try, the United States feels a special pride
in the Organization's accomplishments.
Now. Therefore. I, Jimmy Carter.
President of the United States of
America, do hereby designate Tuesday.
October 24. 1978. as United Nations
Day.
I have appointed Clifton C. Garvin.
Jr., to be United States National Chair-
man for United Nations Day.
I urge Americans to become better ac-
quainted with the institutions that make
up the United Nations, to consider its role
in addressing the problems of global
interdependence, and to help it resolve
the array of critical international issues
that face us in these times.
In Witness Whereof, I have hereunto
set my hand this nineteenth day of Sep-
tember, in the year of our Lord nineteen
hundred seventy-eight, and of the Inde-
pendence of the United States of America
the two hundred and third.
Jimmy Carter
*No. 4597 (text from Weekly Compila-
tion of Presidential Documents of Sept.
25. 1978).
autonomous sources of revenue for the
international community;
• Increased accountability for the
expenditure of the funds contributed by
149 nations; and
• Greater operational efficiency.
It is clearly in the American interest
to insure that the United Nations oper-
ates as effectively as it can, and we are
now working with other U.N. members
and with Secretary General Waldheim
to bring this about.
As we undertake this important ef-
fort, I believe that Americans
everywhere need to reflect more fully
on the important contributions of the
United Nations — the opportunities it
provides and the direct benefits it
brings. With this in mind, I ask the
Congress to continue to provide the
U.N. with the moral backing and fi-
nancial support that have permitted the
United States to play the significant
role in the Organization that we have
since it was created.
The proclamation issued today will
provide an appropriate reference point
for increased attention to the United
Nations and its affiliated agencies. I
ask all Americans to join me in rein-
forcing our support for this vital
institution. □
'Text from Weekly Compilation of Presi-
dential Documents of Sept. 25, 1978.
2 Copies of this report, entitled "Reform and
Restructuring of the U.N. System" (Selected
Documents No. S) may be obtained from the
Correspondence Management Division. Bureau
of Public Affairs, Department of State, Wash-
ington. DC. 20520.
52
Soviet Union and with other members
of the Warsaw Pact, human rights have
been a primary concern. Thus, we
emphasize human rights in our rela-
tions around the world.
Second, the policy must be im-
plemented pragmatically. This means
human rights objectives cannot be de-
terminative of each and every foreign
policy decision. Other factors, includ-
ing U.S. security interests, must be
considered and weighed in the de-
cisionmaking process. In addition, the
diversity of history and culture and the
different stages of development of in-
dividual countries must be taken into
account. Different methods may be
required depending on the exact cir-
cumstances of a particular situation.
Third, international law is our guide
to the definition of human rights. Al-
though the policy reflects basic Ameri-
can ideals, it is not an attempt to im-
pose uniquely American values. The
rights about which we are con-
cerned — the right to be free from arbi-
trary arrest, to be free from torture,
rights of political expression, and
rights to basic economic needs — are
not the private property of one nation
or one culture. They are recognized in
the Charter of the United Nations, the
U.N. Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, and other international agree-
ments and convenants as being univer-
sal and applicable throughout the
world. The countries of the Western
Hemisphere have also acknowledged
basic human rights in the Charter of the
Organization of American States
(OAS) and are now according addi-
tional attention to them in the Ameri-
can Convention on Human Rights,
which is now ratified by 12 countries
and has recently entered into force.
Fourth, the promotion of interna-
tionally recognized human rights is in
fulfillment of obligations imposed upon
us by the international agreements and
covenants described above. For exam-
ple, under the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, we pledged to promote
'"universal respect for and observance
of human rights and fundamental free-
doms." President Carter put it this wa\
in a speech last year before the United
Nations: "All the signatories of the
United Nations Charter have pledged
themselves to observe and to respect
basic human rights. Thus, no member
of the United Nations can claim that
mistreatment of its citizens is solely its
own business."
Fifth, our policy reflects extensive
congressional mandates in the area ol
human rights and foreign affairs. As a
general matter, the Congress has di-
Department of State Bulleti
rected in Section 502B of the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961, as amended,
that". . . a principal goal of the
foreign policy of the United States is to
promote the increased observance of
internationally recognized human rights
by all countries." PL 95-45, Section
109, authorizing State Department
funding for FY '78, directs the Secre-
tary of State to report annually to the
Congress on proposals '*. . . that
would strengthen human rights ... in
the conduct of United States foreign
policy. ..." That same legislation
established the position of Assistant
Secretary of State for Human Rights
and Humanitarian Affairs which I now
occupy. There is, in addition, exten-
sive legislative history accompanying
all these statutes, indicating that the
Congress expects human rights consid-
erations to be part of all decisionmak-
ing in foreign affairs.
In specific statutes. Congress has
directed the executive to apply human
rights criteria to a broad spectrum of
programs of foreign economic and fi-
nancial assistance, as well as to arms
transfers. These programs include the
Agency for International Development
(AID), Food for Peace, international
financial institutions, the Overseas Pri-
vate Investment Corporation (OPIC).
and the Export-Import Bank.
In order to convey a sense of how
extensive the congressional directives
for integrating human rights criteria
into different aspects of our policy, I
would like to cite for you the major
statutory provisions on human rights
and concessional economic assistance.
• Section 1 16 of the Foreign Assist-
ance Act of 1961, as amended, states
that no assistance may be granted to a
government ". . . which engages in a
consistent pattern of gross violations of
. . . human rights . . . unless such as-
sistance will directly benefit . . . needy
people . . . ."
• Section 112 of PL 480. provides
that no food aid may be granted to an)
government ". . . which engages in
a consistent pattern of gross violations
of . human rights . . . unless lit]
will directly benefit . . . needy
people . . . . "
• Section 701 of the International
Financial Institutions Act requires that
the U.S. Government use its vote in
such institutions to "advance the cause
of human rights "
• Section 2(b)( I)(B) of the
I \ port -Import Bank Act of 1945 re-
quires that the Bank "... take into
account, in consultation with the Sec-
retary of State, the observance of and
respect for human rights in the country
to receive the exports supported b\ a
loan or financial guarantee . . . ."
• Section 113 of the Foreign Assist
ance Appropriations Act of 1971 for
bids the use of funds appropriated by
that act ". . . to provide security as-i
sistance to any country for the purpost
of aiding directly the efforts of tin
government of such country to reprei
the legitimate rights of the populatior
of such country contrary to the Univer-
sal Declaration of Human Rights. "
• Section 239(1) of the Foreign As
sistance Act of 1961, as amended, re
quires that OPIC ". . . take into ac
count in the conduct of its programs it #
a country, in consultation with th<
Secretary of State, all available infoj
mation about observance of and respec
for human rights ..." and subject!
OPIC to Section 1 16 of the Act.
Sixth, it is our policy not to inter
vene in the internal affairs of any Latin
American country. But where basio
human rights are violated, we adjust
our own policies and programs, in
accordance with both international ob-
ligations and U.S. law.
t
ilii
Isi
■['.
mm
nn
Seventh, we recognize that tht
scourge of terrorism seriously violate.''
basic human rights. But terrorism can-
not excuse arbitrary arrest, summan
execution, torture, and other denials ol
fundamental freedoms. Secretary of
State Vance made this point in his
address to the OAS General Assembly
in 1977: "If terrorism and violence in
the name of dissent cannot be con-
doned, neither can violence that is
officially sanctioned .... The sures*
way to defeat terrorism is to promote
justice in our societies . . . ."
Arms Transfers
I would like, at this point, to turn to
the more specific subject of the role of
our human rights policy in arms trans-
fers. There are numerous dimensions
along which we conduct foreign rela-
tions. At the most basic level, we and
other governments exchange ambas-
sadors and diplomatic representation.
We may also engage in trade, cooper-
ate in cultural and scientific matters,
supply economic assistance, or form a
military relationship.
While we attempt to take human
rights into account in all aspects of our
relationship, it has particular relevance
to arms transfers. This is because arms
transfers by us to a repressive regime
are associated and tend to associate us
with the conditions of force that sustain
repression. Transfers may link the
United States with regimes that violate
basic human rights and fundamental
freedoms and thereby undermine our
! i
ivember 1978
53
Rditional support for those ideals,
lonflict with our international obliga-
ions. tarnish our reputation, and dam-
be our long-term national interests.
i In this area of arms transfers, we are
prected by the Congress to take human
ghts considerations into account in
he formation of specific programs and
blicies. Section 502B of the Foreign.
Lssistance Act of 1961. as amended.
prects the President to formulate and
onduct such programs ". . . in a
nanner which will promote and ad-
pnce human rights and avoid identifi-
Ution of the United States, through
jch programs, with governments
•hich deny to their people internation-
llly recognized human rights and fun-
amental freedoms. ..." To aid in
nplementation of this directive, see-
on 502B requires the preparation, in
pch fiscal year, of a report of the
uman rights practices of each country
roposed as a recipient of security as-
stance.
In addition to section 502B. the
resident's arms transfer policy, issued
m May 19, 1977, also recognizes the
nportance of human rights. The Presi-
ent affirmed that the United States
I ould give continued emphasis to for-
lulating and conducting our programs
f arms transfers in a manner which
ill promote and advance respect for
jman rights in recipient countries.
The procedures for formulating pro-
Irams of arms transfers, including im-
ilementation of the directives of see-
on 502B, were set out in some detail
»r the committee in hearings con-
acted last February. 2
The importance we attach to human
ghts has been part of the complex of
hanging developments in Latin
.merica. No one can fail to recognize
lat widespread violations of basic
uman rights continue in certain court-
lies in Latin America. But, even after
relatively short period of time, there
j; already real and significant change.
• An open political campaign took
lace in the Dominican Republic, and
ext week the inauguration of a demo-
ratically elected president of the op-
Letter
of Credence
I On October 2, 1978. George Ashley
jriffith presented his credentials to
President Carter as the newly appointed
Embassador from Grenada. □
position party is scheduled. This is an
accomplishment of the people of the
Dominican Republic.
• The Inter-American Human Rights
Commission has been strengthened and
its activities expanded. It has visited
Panama and El Salvador and will be
traveling next week to Haiti. Nicaragua
has committed itself to receive the
commission in the future.
• In Ecuador and Peru, the process
of return to popular election of national
leadership is underway. In Ecuador,
the first round of elections for Presi-
dent was successfully held last month,
and a runoff is now scheduled for Sep-
tember or October. In Peru, open elec-
tions took place for a constituent as-
sembly which has already convened
and begun deliberations.
• In Bolivia we are distressed by the
interruption of the recent electoral
process. We recognize, however, that
in the past year, political prisoners
have been freed, exiles have returned,
civil due process has improved, and
press and trade union freedoms have
been restored.
• In Haiti there have been some im-
provements reported in prison condi-
tions, prisoner releases, and some
police have been disciplined for re-
ported acts of brutality.
• In other countries, there have been
significant releases of political prison-
ers, a reduction in or an end to reports
of torture, and a reassertion of the au-
thority of civilian courts.
• At the recent OAS General As-
sembly, the resolution in support of the
advancement of human rights passed by
an overwhelming majority. And in
those countries whose governments op-
posed the resolution, there is now
widespread support among the popula-
tion and active political groups.
The fundamental objective of the
human rights policy is to improve the
observance of basic human rights
throughout the world. We believe that
we have made important strides toward
that goal. At the same time, the human
rights policy has had another important
effect — it has strengthened our position
and influence in the world. Human
rights is an area where our ideals and
self-interest strongly coincide.
Strengthened U.S. Interests
The policy has strengthened U.S.
interests in at least three separate ways.
First, our human rights policy ena-
bles us to regain the political high
ground that our history as a nation of
free men and women has given us in
competition for world influence and
prestige. Our willingness to press for
human rights progress among our
friends, as well as with our adver-
saries, has increased the credibility of
our commitment to freedom. Thus, our
human rights policy has generated
widespread support for the United
States throughout the world.
Second, the policy helps insure
friendly relations over the long run
with other countries. If we ignore op-
pression, we may obtain closer rela-
tions with a particular regime over the
short run. But there is significant risk
that its successor will be hostile to our
interests. We must not espouse a policy
which leads a government to be hostile
to U.S. interests because of U.S. ties
with a prior regime that practiced
oppression.
Third, our policy is important to the
health and integrity of own society
within the United States. Our most im-
portant asset is our free institutions.
Our democratic society is what makes
possible our economic and military
strength. It is the bedrock of our secu-
rity. It is our special commitment to
human freedom and dignity that makes
us unique. Support for or indifference
to oppression in other countries
weakens the foundation of our own
democracy at home.
Concern has been expressed about
the possible costs associated with the
application of our human rights policy
to arms transfers to Latin America: the
effect on of governments to which we
refuse transfers and the domestic eco-
nomic loss that may result when we do
not make sales. But I believe that the
benefits of our policy clearly outweigh
these other factors.
First, the policy has produced con-
siderable political good will for the
United States throughout Latin
America. Our relations with constitu-
tional governments are much closer
than before. And our stand for human
rights has won respect from peoples
throughout the hemisphere. Any possi-
ble transitory or short-term loss of in-
fluence with a particular regime must
be balanced against these more durable
and long-term gains.
While there may be some economic
costs associated with the application of
the human rights policy to arms trans-
fers, we believe that they are justified
as an investment in the future.
Moreover, it is important to keep the
economic factor in perspective. The
overwhelming majority of U.S. exports
to Latin America are not subject to
human rights review. It is only those
items that lend themselves to use either
54
A mi. s Transfer Potivy
in Latin America
Foreign Relations Outline*
Latin American nations traditionally
have displayed a cautious attitude to-
ward arms purchases and tend to give
priority to economic development.
Most do not feel threatened sufficiently
to justify priority for external defense
requirements. The desire to modernize
military establishments derives primar-
ily from internal considerations and the
need to maintain independent military
forces as a manifestation of
sovereignty.
U.S. Policy
Our Latin American arms policy is
part of the global policy enunciated in
President Carter's May 1977 statement
on arms transfers.
• We will utilize arms transfers to
promote our security and that of our
close friends, but the burden of persua-
sion is on those who favor a particular
sale rather than on those who oppose it.
• We will not be the first supplier to
introduce into the region advanced
weapons systems that would create a
new or significantly higher combat ca-
pability.
• The State Department carefully
monitors the travel and activities in the
hemisphere of promoters of U.S. arms
sales.
• We assess the economic impact of
arms transfers, particularly on recip-
ients of U.S. economic aid.
• We carefully consider the human
rights situation in proposed recipient
countries.
• We encourage regional agreements
among purchasers to limit arms acqui-
sitions.
• Where sales are approved, we em-
phasize that the sales agreement pro-
hibits third party transfers except with
prior U.S. approval.
We have not approved for sale or
export in the region sophisticated air-
craft more advanced than the F-5 and
the A-4; ballistic missiles and rockets
regardless of range; advanced technol-
ogy missiles; assorted military articles
that raise special policy problems such
as silencers, napalm, incendiary muni-
tions, "smart" and cluster bombs,
flame throwers, radiological weapons,
and delayed action munitions; and
major combatant vessels such as
battleships, cruisers, and aircraft car-
riers. Not prohibited, but examined on
a case-by-case basis, are short-range
tactical missiles, certain ship-to-ship
missiles, and air-to-air missiles.
U.S. Transfers
Security assistance and arms trans-
fers to Latin America reflect a U.S.
political and security interest. They
have helped maintain cooperative rela-
tions with military establishments
which have in some cases a potentially
significant role to play in hemispheric
defense. For a period following World
War II. surplus U.S. equipment domi-
nated the small Latin American arms
market, but more recently other nations
have sold more weapons in Latin
America than the United States. About
24% of our foreign military sales to the
region are for major items such as air-
craft, ships, artillery, and ammunition.
Role of Human Rights — Cont'd
by the police in the commission of
human rights violation or by the mili-
tary that are subject to such review. A
significant proportion of even these ex-
ports go to countries with a positive
human rights record and so are not
constrained by human rights consid-
erations. Moreover, even where our
human rights policy does impede the
transfer of arms, there are long-run
economic benefits to be considered. By
creating over the long run a more
friendly political atmosphere for the
U.S. Government, we also engender a
more favorable economic environment
for U.S. business.
In conclusion, we believe that our
policy has made a major and significant
difference — both for the victims of op-
pression and for our own national
interest. We will continue to make
human rights a fundamental goal of our
foreign policy. □
'The complete transcript of the hearings will
be published by the committee and will he
available from the Superintendent of Doc-
uments, U.S. Government Printing Office,
Washington. D.C. 20402.
2 For texts of statements on arms transfer
policy, see Bulletin of March 1978, pp. 42
and 45.
Department of State Bulleti
The balance is for spare parts
supporting noncombat equipment, ano
supporting services — including
training.
Decreasing U.S. Role
Only 3 7c of all U.S. arms sales goto
Latin America. As our role as an arms
supplier in the region has decreased, so
have U.S. personnel available to man
age security assistance programs. Our
security assistance-related military
presence in the area will drop from a
high of 769 in 1968 to fewer than IOC
in FY 1979. Until 1976. the Unitec
States maintained 18 military missions
in the area. Since then, in accordance
with various legislative requirements,
that presence has been drastically re-
duced. In FY 1979, for example, only
Panama will have a security assistance
management group of more than sixf 1 ';
military personnel.
Arms Limitation Initiatives
With a few exceptions, the Latir
American nations have not signifi-
cantly sacrificed their developmeni
goals for the weaponry in which they
have invested. This record is now
under some strain, however, because ol
the increased cost of modern weapons
Recognizing this fact, Argentina
Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador
Panama, Peru, and Venezuela signec
the Declaration of Ayacucho in 1974
stating their intent to cooperate in lim
iting arms acquisitions. At Venezuelar
initiative, the Foreign Ministers of the
Ayacucho countries announced in June
1978 that they would meet to considei
a broader region-wide conventional
arms restraint agreement. Mexico cir-
culated a similar and more detailed
proposal at a meeting of the Organiza-
tion of American States. We fully sup-
port these initiatives and are prepared
to work with other suppliers to insure
that any agreements worked out by
Latin American states are respected. D
'Taken from a Department of State puhlica-
tion in the GIST series, released in July 1478
This outline is designed to be a quick reference
aid on U.S. foreign relations. It is not intended
as a comprehensive U.S. foreign polic) Stall
ment. The outline was based on a statement by
John A Bushnell. Deputy Assistant Secretary
for Inter-American Affairs, before the Sub-
committee on Inter-American Affairs of the ,
House Committee on International Relations on |
June 27, 1978. The complete transcript of the
hearings will be published by the committee I
and will be available from the Superintendent J
of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of-
fice. Washington, D.C. 20402.
November 1978
l/.S.-iWe.vieo Commission
on Cultural Cooperation
The third meeting of the Joint
Jnited States-Mexico Commission on
ultural Co-operation, established by
xchange of notes of June 15. 1972,
>ok place in Mexico City July 17-18,
978. Following are a summary and
nnexes 11 and 111 of the final state-
ment of the Commission issued on July
8, 1978.
The Mexican delegation to the third meeting
f the Commission was presided over by Lie.
Haria Emilia Telez. Under Secretary of the
ecretariat of Foreign Affairs, and the U.S.
elegation by Dr Alice S. Ilchman. Associate
)irector for Educational and Cultural Affairs of
le International Communication Agency.
The work of the meeting was carried out as
ollows:
• Exchange of commentaries on cultural ac-
vities for the period 1975-78;
• Recommendations for cultural cooperation,
bjectives. and priorities for the period
978-80;
• Recommendations for cultural cooperation
the border area, objectives, and priorities;
• Exchange of status reports on the Lincoln-
uarez scholarship programs;
• Procedural and administrative matters; and
• Other matters.
The delegations reached agreement in several
ireas, including educational cooperation and the
mprovement of cultural and educational rela-
ions in the border area.
Vnnex II — Education
The Governments of Mexico and the United
States, wishing to improve and expand educa-
ional activities and exchanges and to achieve
[greater co-ordination and understanding of
:xisting activities among institutions of both
i;ountries. consider it important to establish
Effective mechanisms to achieve the priorities
lind objectives agreed upon in the e lucational
lirea.
I Objectives:
1 Encourage greater co-operation among
Educational institutions particularly in areas that
[would enhance mutual understanding between
She two countries
I 2. Develop a greater understanding among
Mexican and American Universities and re-
search institutions of the two countries in order
j:o facilitate and improve exchange programs at
[the undergraduate and graduate levels in areas
if primary mutual interest.
3. Improve the teaching of English in Mexico
and the teaching of Spanish in the United States
las an important instrument in the achievement
Priorities:
1. Initiate a study of the current relationships
and programs among educational and research
institutions in both countries preparatory to the
establishment of a clearing house of documen-
tation and information. For this purpose a cor-
responding group or committee shall be formed
with the participation of the institutions each
country considers appropriate.
2. Continue the Lincoln-Juarez scholarship
program, and exchange status reports every six
months.
3. Exchange of publications and informa-
tional material about education.
4 Continue the counseling program at the
Benjamin Franklin Library.
5. Encourage the exchange of scholars and
specialists to study and visit in areas of interest
for both countries.
6. Study the English and Spanish teaching
programs in each country in order to improve
them.
Arts and Humanities
The arts and humanities play an important
role in the relations between both countries.
Geographical proximity offers the opportunity
for continued expansion of the arts and
humanities originating in each country in ac-
cordance with the interests of public and private
institutions dedicated to cultural activities.
Objectives:
1 . Expand and improve relations among pub-
lic and private institutions responsible for cul-
tural policy and activities in both countries.
2. Encourage cultural programs focussed on
better understanding between both countries.
Priorities:
1. Encourage the exchange of groups and
individuals in the plastic and performing arts.
2. Collaborate in the training and profes-
sionalization of Mexican artists in the United
States and American artists in Mexico.
3 Encourage co-operation among the
museums of both countries in accordance with
their interests.
4. Encourage the exchange of experiences in
the areas of anthropology and ethnography in
accordance with the internal regulations of the
institutions concerned.
5. Stimulate the expansion of exchanges of
exhibitions.
6. Encourage greater contact and interchange
of writers and literary materials.
7. Work towards greater co-operation in the
fields of radio, television and film-making.
8. Promote the presentation by national art-
ists of works of the other country.
9. Seek ways to promote mutual sharing of
the artistic achievements of third countries
55
being presented in Mexico or the United States
and interchange information in this respect.
Annex III — U.S. -Mexico Border
Context:
The Bilateral Cultural and Educational rela-
tions between the United States and Mexico in
the border area have been carried out through
various mechanisms. It is important that these
cultural and educational relationships be well
co-ordinated in the future in order to achieve
the broadest possible understanding.
Objectives:
1 . Development of greater mutual under-
standing of the cultural, educational, and
touristic context of the border region and the
identification of problems among those areas
requiring short-term and long-term attention.
2. Better co-ordination of mutual efforts to
improve educational and cultural relations in the
border region.
3 Increased public and private efforts in
areas of primary concern to both countries.
Priorities:
I . To encourage the continued development
of cultural and educational activities in the
border area both jointly and within the two
countries and requesting the institutions that
carry out these activities to provide, to the
extent possible, relevant information to the ap-
propriate entities to be determined by each
government
In the case of Mexico this information shall
be provided to the office of the Co-ordinator
General of the National Program for the De-
velopment of Frontier Areas and Free Zones in
the Secretariat of Programs and Budget. With
regard to the activities carried out by American
institutions this information should be provided
to The Southwest Border Regional Commission,
and coordinated studies referred to in Articles a
and b of the report of the Social Working
Group of the United States-Mexico Consultative
Mechanism quoted as follows:
a. carrying out a study designed to deter-
mine the present cultural and educational con-
ditions in the border area, with emphasis on the
quality of artistic, bilingual and bicultural edu-
cation;
b analyzing the action which both coun-
tries are taking jointly in the border area with
regard to culture, artistic education and social
welfare, with a special evaluation of completed
activities.
In the case of Mexico the supervision will be
established by the Co-ordinator General of the
National Program for the Development of Fron-
tier Areas and Free Zones in the Secretariat of
Programs and Budget and for the United States
by the International Communication Agency in
consultation with the United States Co-
Chairman of the U.S. -Mexico Social Working
Group.
3. The suggestions for the solution of the
problems and necessities identified as a result
of the research referred to in article C will be
presented to the institutions cited in point 2
above. '-'
56
TREATIES:
Current Actions
MULTILATERAL
Antarctica
The Antarctic Treaty. Signed at Washington
Dee. I, 1959. Entered into forte June 23,
1961. TIAS4780.
Accession deposited: Bulgaria, Sept. I I .
1978.
Aviation
Protocol on the authentic trilingual text of the
convention on international civil aviation.
Chicago, 1944 (T1AS 1591), with annex.
Done at Buenos Aires Sept. 24, 1968. En-
tered into force Oct. 24, 1968. TIAS 6605.
Acceptance deposited: Finland, Oct. 13,
1978.
Convention for the suppression of unlawful
seizure of aircraft. Done at The Hague Dec.
16, 1970. Entered into force Oct. 14. 1971
TIAS 7192.
Accession deposited: Libya, Oct. 4. 1978.
Protocol on the authentic cjuadrilingual text ol
the convention on international civil aviation
(Chicago. 1944) (TIAS 1591), with annex.
Done at Montreal Sept. 30, 1977. '
Acceptance deposited : U.K.. Oct. 3,
1978.
Bills of Lading
Protocol to amend the international convention
for the unification of certain rules of law
relating to bills of lading signed at Brussels
Aug. 25, 1924 (TS 931). Done at Brussels
Feb. 23, 1968. Entered into force June 23,
1977. J
Ratification deposited: Belgium, Sept. 6,
1978.
Coffee
International coffee agreement 1976, with an-
nexes. Done at London Dec 3, 1975 En-
tered into force provisionally Oct. 1, 1976,
definitively, Aug. 1 . 1977. TIAS 8683.
Ratifications deposited: Finland. Sept 14,
1978; Italy. Sept. 18. 1978; Netherlands, 3
Sept. 6, 1978.
Collisions
Convention on the international regulations for
preventing collisions at sea, 1972, with reg-
ulations. Done at London Oct. 20, 1972.
Entered into force July 15, 1977. TIAS
8587.
Accession deposited: Bangladesh. Mav 10,
1978.
Customs
Convention establishing a Customs Coopera-
tion Council, with annex Done at Brussels
Dec. 15, 1950. Entered into force Nov 4,
1952, for the U.S. Nov 5, 1970, TIAS
7063.
Accession deposited Botswana. Aug 25,
1978.
Customs convention regarding E.C.S. carnets
for commercial samples, with annex and
protocol of signature. Done at Brussels Mar
1, 1956. Entered into force Oct. 3, 1957;
for the U.S. Mar. 3, 1969. TIAS 6632.
Notification oj denunciation deposited: Fed-
eral Republic of Germany, Aug 29,
1978; effective Nov. 29, 1978.
Defense
Memorandum of understanding for interna-
tional collaboration on the NAT!) explosion
resistant multi influence sweep system
(ERMISS). Opened for signature Apr. 5.
1978. Entered into force Apr. 25. 1978; tor
the U.S. Aug. 24, 1978.
Finance
Agreement establishing the International Fund
for Agricultural Development Done at
Rome June 13, 1976. Entered into force
Nov. 30, 1977. TIAS 8765.
Ratification deposited Argentina. Sept. II,
1978.
Fisheries
Protocol amending the international conven-
tion for the high seas fisheries of the North
Pacific Ocean of May 9. 1952. as amended
(TIAS 2786, 5385). with agreed minutes
and memoranda of understanding. Done at
Tokyo Apr. 25. 1978. '
Senate advice and consent to ratification:
Oct. 11. 1978.
Convention on conduct of fishing operations in
the North Atlantic, with annexes Done at
London June I, 1967. Entered into force
Sept. 26, 1976. 2
Accession deposited. German Democratic
Republic. Mar. 9. 1978." s *
Human Rights
International convenant on civil and political
rights. Done at New York Dec. 16. 1966.
Entered into force May 23. 1 976. 2
Ratifications deposited: Austria, Sept. 8,
1978; Italy. Sept. 15, 1978.
International covenant on economic, social,
and cultural rights. Done at New York Dec.
16. 1966. Entered into force Jan. 3, 1976. 2
Ratifications deposited: Austria, Sept. 8,
1978; Italy. Sept. 15, 1978.
International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development
Articles of agreement of the International
Bank for Reconstruction and Development
formulated at Bretton Woods Conference
July 1-22, 1944. Opened for signature at
Washington Dec. 27. 1945. Entered into
force Dec. 27, 1945. TIAS 1502
Signature and acceptance: Solomon Islands,
Sept. 22, 1978.
International Monetary Fund
Articles of agreement of the International
Monetary Fund, formulated at the Bretton
Woods Conference July 1-22, 1944. Opened
for signature at Washington Dec. 27, 1945.
Entered into force Dec. 27. 1945 TIAS
1501.
Signature and acceptance Solomon Islands,
Sept. 22, 1978.
Load Lines
International convention on load lines, 1966.
Done at London Apr. 5, 1966. Entered into
force July 21. 1968. TIAS 6331
Accession deposited: Bangladesh, May 10,
1978
Meteorology
Convention of the World Meteorological Or-
ganization. Done at Washington Oct. II,
1947 Entered into force Mar 23. 1950.
TIAS 2052.
Accession deposited: The Gambia, Oct. 2,
1978.
Narcotic Drugs
Sinelc convention on narcotic drugs, 1961
Done at New York Mar. 30, 1961. Entered
into force Dec 13, 1964; lor the U.S. June
24, 1967. TIAS 6208
A cce ssion deposited: Libya, Sept 27, 1978.
Protocol amending the single convention on
narcotic drui;s. 1961, Done at Geneva Mar.
25, 1972. Entered into force Aug. 8, 1975.
I IAS XI 18.
Accessions deposited Iraq, Sept. 25, 1978;
Libya, Sept. 27, 1978.
Oil Pollution— Civil Liability
International convention on civil liability tor
oil pollution damage Done at Brussels Nov.
20. I960 Entered into force June 19.
I975. 3
Department of State Bulletin
Ratification deposited: Indonesia. Sept. 1
1978.
Oil Pollution — Compensation Fund
International convention on the establishing
of an international fund for compensatior
foi oil pollution damage. Done at Brussels
Dec 18. 1971 Entered into force Oct. 16.
1978-
Accession deposited: Indonesia. Sept. 1
1978.
ill
r,
I'
Pollution
Protocol relating to intervention on the lngr
seas in cases of pollution by substancfl
other than oil Done at London Nov. 2
1973.'
Ratification deposited: U.S.. Sept. 7. 1978.
Protocol of 1978 relating to the international
convention for the prevention of pollutior
from ships. 1973. Done at London Feb. 17
1978. '
Signature: U.K.. Aug. 24, 1978. 7
Postal
Second additional protocol to the constitution
of the Universal Postal Union of July 10,
1964. general regulations with final protocol
and annex, and the universal postal conven-
tion with final protocol and detailed rcgula-
tions. Done at Lausanne July 5. 1974. En-
tered into force Jan I . 1976. TIAS 8232.
Ratification deposited: Libya, Mar 15.
1978.
Money orders and postal travelers' checks
agreement, with detailed regulations. Done
at Lausanne July 5. 1974. Entered into force
Jan. 1. 1976. TIAS 8232.
Ratification deposited: Libya. Mar. 15.
1978.
Safety at Sea
International convention for the safety of life
at sea. 1974. with annex. Done at London
Nov. 1. 1 974.'
Ratifications deposited: Spain. Sept. 5
1978; U.S.. Sept. 7, 1978.
Protocol of 1978 relating to the international
convention for the safetv of life at sea.
1974. Done at London Feb 17. 1978.'
Signatures: Belgium. Sept. 8. 1978; 7 U.K.,
Aug. 24, 1978 '
Telecommunications
International telecommunication convention
with annexes and protocol. Done at Malaga-
Torremolinos Oct. 25. 1973. Entered into
force Jan. 1, 1975; for the U.S. Apr. 7,
1976. TIAS 8572.
Ratifications deposited: Cameroon.
non, June 1, 1978; Niger. June 7
Turkey, July 6, 1978.
Final Acts of the World Administrate
Conference for the planning of the
broadcasting-satellite service in frequence
bands 11.7-12.2 GHz (in Regions 2 and 3)
and 11.7-12.5 GHz (in Region 11. with an-
nexes Done at Geneva Feb. 13. 1977. En-
ters into force Jan. 1 . 1979.
Notifications ol approval deposited:
Malaysia, June 8. 1978; U.K.. Julv 6,
1978."
Terrorism
Convention on the prevention and punishment
of crimes against internationally protected
persons, including diplomatic agents. Done
at New York Dec. 14, 1973. Entered into
toiee Feb. 20. 1977. TIAS 8532.
Accession deposited: Jamaica, Sept. 21,
1978.
Tin
Fifth international tin agreement, with an-
nexes. Done at Geneva June 21. 1975. En-
tered into force provisionally July 1, 1976;
definitively June 14, 1977. TIAS 8607.
Ratifications deposited: Belgium, Luxem-
bourg, Sept. 20. 1978.
Illi
lb(
5i
loi
lil
I
III
ib
lio
Leba-
1978;
Radio
ove tuber 147<S
onnage Measurement
ternational convention on tonnage measure-
ment of ships. 1964, with annexes Done at
London June 23. 1969.'
Acceptance deposited: Philippines. Sept. 6.
1978.
nited Nations
larter of the LI nited Nations and Statute of
the International Court of Justice. Signed at
San Francisco June 26, 1945. Entered into
force Oct. 24. 1945. TS 993.
Admission la membership: Solomon Is-
lands. Sept 19. 1978.
heat
otocol modifying and further extending the
wheat trade convention (part of the interna-
tional wheat agreement). 1971 (TIAS 7144).
Done at Washington Apr. 26. 1978. Entered
into force June 24. 1978. with respect to
certain provisions. July I, 1978. with re-
spect to other provisions.
Accession deposited: Cuba (with declara-
tions) Sept. 15. 1978.
Ratifications deposited: Federal Republic of
Germany, Sept 28. 1978;" Peru. Oct. 5.
1978.
otocol modifying and further extending the
food aid convention (part of the interna-
tional wheal agreement) 1971 (TIAS 7144).
Done at Washington Apr. 26. 1978. Entered
into force June 24. 1978. with respect to
certain provisions. July 1, 1978, with re-
spect to other provisions.
Ratification deposited: Federal Republic of
Germany. Sept. 28. 1978."
orld Heritage
invention concerning the protection of the
world cultural and natural heritage. Done at
'Paris Nov. 23, 1972. Entered into force
Dec. 17. 1975. TIAS 8226.
Acceptance deposited: Nepal, June 20,
1978.
Ratification deposited: Italy. June 23. 1978.
[LATERAL
jlivia
Lgreement amending the agreement for sales
I of agricultural commodities of May 31.
1978. Effected by exchange of notes at La
Paz Aug. 31 and Sept. 1. 1978. Entered into
force Sept. 1. 1978
had
[rant agreement amending the agreement of
I Aug. 25, 1977 concerning the human re-
sources development project. Signed at
N'Djamena Feb. 28. 1978. Entered into
force Feb. 28, 1978.
Irant agreement for the rural sanitary water
project. Signed at N'Djamena Apr. II.
1978. Entered into force Apr. 11, 1978.
loject grant agreement for agricultural in-
stitutional development with annexes.
Signed at N'Djamena Aug. 15, 1978. En-
tered into force Aug. 15, 1978.
gyp<
rant agreement amending the agreement of
Aug. 11, 1977, as amended Aug. 31. 1977.
land May 18. 1978, for technology transfer
I and manpower development III. Signed at
Cairo Aug. 15. 1978. Entered into force
, Aug. 15, 1978.
troject grant agreement for development plan-
ning studies. Signed at Cairo Aug. 17.
1978. Entered into force Aug. 17. 1978.
roject agreement for narcotics control en-
forcement. Signed at Cairo Sept. 29. 1978.
i Entered into force Sept. 29. 1978.
llong Kong
lgreement amending the agreement of Aug 8.
1977 (TIAS 8936), relating to trade in cot-
I ton, wool, and manmade fiber textiles. Ef-
I fected by exchange of letters at Washington
Sept. 20 and 25. 1978. Entered into force
Sept. 25. 1978.
Italy
Agreement on the matter of social security.
Signed at Washington May 23. 1973
Entry into force: Nov. I, 1978.
Administrative protocol for the implementation
of the agreement on social security of May
23. 1973. Signed at Rome Nov. 22, 1977.
Entry into force: Nov. 1, 1978.
Jamaica
Agreement amending the agreement for sales
of agricultural commodities of Aug. 2,
1978. Effected by exchange of notes at
Kingston Sept. 5. 1978.
Kuwait
Agreement on procedures for mutual assist-
ance in connection with matters relating to
the Boeing Company. Signed at Washington
Oct. 6. 1978. Entered into force Oct. 6.
1978.
Liberia
Agreement amending the agreement of Apr. 10
and 18. 1973 (TIAS 3635). relating to the
establishment, operation, and maintenance
of an OMEGA navigational station. Effected
by exchange of notes at Monrovia Mar. 22
and Aug. 22. 1978. Entered into force Aug.
22, 1978.
Mexico
Agreement for cooperation on environmental
programs and transboundary problems. Ef-
fected by exchange of notes at Mexico and
Tlatelolco June 14 and 19. 1978.
Entered into force: June 19, 1978.
Morocco
Project grant agreement for nonformal educa-
tion for women, with annexes. Signed at
Rabat Aug. 14. 1978. Entered into force
Aug. 14. 1978.
Project grant agreement for industrial and
commercial job training for women, with
annexes. Signed at Rabat Aug 14. 1978.
Entered into force Aug. 14, 1978.
Nigeria
Convention and supplementary protocol relat-
ing to the avoidance of double taxation and
the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect
to taxes on income, signed by the U.S. and
the U.K. at Washington Apr. 16, 1945
(TIAS 1546), modified by supplementary
protocols of May 25, 1954, and August 19.
1957 (TIAS 3165. 4124), and extended to
Nigeria. Entered into force for Nigeria July
28. 1959.
Termination: As respects U.S. tax. for the
taxable years beginning on or after Jan. 1,
1979; as respects Nigeria income tax, for
any year of assessment beginning on or
after Apr 1, 1979.
Panama
Agreement relating to economic and military
cooperation. Effected by exchange of notes
at Panama Sept. 7, 1978. Entered into force
Sept. 7. 1978.
Philippines
Project loan and grant agreement for small
farmer systems. Signed at Manila Aug. 18.
1978. Entered into force Aug. 18, 1978.
Agreement relating to trade in cotton, wool,
and manmade fiber textiles and textile prod-
ucts, with annexes. Effected by exchange of
notes at Manila Aug. 22 and 24, 1978. En-
tered into force Aug. 24. 1978; effective
Jan. 1, 1978.
Romania
Agreement amending the agreements of June
17. 1977. as amended (TIAS 8833) relating
to trade in wool and manmade fiber textiles
and Jan. 6 and 25, 1978, relating to trade in
cotton textiles. Effected by exchange of
57
letters at Washington and New York July 27
and Sept. 1 I. 1978. Entered into force Sept.
I I. 1978.
Singapore
Agreement relating to trade in cotton, wool,
and manmade fiber textiles and textile prod-
ucts, with annexes. Effected by exchange of
notes at Washington Sept. 21 and 22. 1978.
Entered into force Sept. 22. 1978; effective
Jan. I, 1978.
Sudan
Project grant agreement for southern man-
power development project. Signed at
Khartoum Aug. 30, 1978. Entered into force
Aug. 30. 1978.
Project grant agreement for primary health
care — Part II (Northern Provinces). Signed
at Khartoum Aug. 30. 1978. Entered into
force Aug. 30, 1978.
Turkey
Agreement regarding the consolidation and re-
scheduling of certain debts owed to,
guaranteed, or insured by the U.S. Govern-
ment and its agencies, with annexes. Signed
at Washington Sept. 21, 1978. Enters into
force upon receipt by Turkey of written
notice that U.S. laws and regulations cov-
ering debt rescheduling have been complied
with.
U.S.S.R.
Convention concerning the conservation of
migratory birds and their environment-
Signed at Moscow Nov. 19, 1976.
Ratifications exchanged Oct. 13, 1978.
Entered into force: Oct. 13. 1978.
United Kingdom
Agreement concerning defense areas in the
Turks and Caicos Islands. Effected by ex-
change of notes at Washington Sept. 29.
1978. Entered into force Sept. 29. 1978.
Zaire
Agreement relating to acquisition of U.S.
Government-owned domestic and foreign
excess property by Zaire. Signed at Wash-
ington and Kinshasa July 10 and Aug. 9.
1978. Entered into force Aug. 9. 1978.
Agreement for sales of agricultural com-
modities, relating to the agreement of Mar.
25, 1976 (TIAS 8403). with memoranda of
understanding. Signed at Kinshasa Aug. 25,
1978. Entered into force Aug. 25, 1978. □
1 Not in force.
2 Not in force for the U.S.
'For the Kingdom in Europe.
4 With reservation.
5 With statement.
6 With declaration.
'Subject to ratification.
8 Also in respect of Antigua, Dominica, St.
Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, St. Lucia, St. Vincent,
Brunei, territories under the territorial
sovereignty of the U.K., and, within the limits
of jurisdiction therein, the Condominium of
the New Hebrides.
"With a statement; applicable to Berlin
(West).
58
Department of State Bullet
PRESS RELEASES:
Department of State
September 1 1 -October 13
Press releases may be obtained from the
Office of Press Relations, Department of
State, Washington, DC. 20520.
No. Date
*348 9/11
♦349 9/13
*350 9/13
*351 9/13
*352 9/14
*353 9/14
*354 g/14
*355 9/15
*356 9/15
*357 9/18
*358 9/19
*359 9/19
*360 9/20
*361 9/20
*362 9/20
•363 9/21
*364 9/21
Subject
Joint U.S. -Republic of Korea
statement on the standing
committee on nuclear and
other energy technology.
International Telegraph and
Telephone Consultative
Committee (CCITT),
study group 4, Oct. 1 1 .
Shipping Coordinating
Committee (SCC), Sub-
committee on Safety of
Life at Sea (SOLAS),
working group on radio
communications, Oct. 19.
Advisory committee to the
U.S. section of the Inter-
national Commission for
the Conservation of Atlan-
tic Tunas, Oct. 4.
Advisory committee to the
U.S. section of the Inter-
national North Pacific
Fisheries Commission,
Sept 26 (partially closed
meeting).
U.S.. Philippines sign new
textile agreement, Aug. 22
and 24.
U.S. -Japan communique on
the joint planning and
coordination committee on
environmental protection.
CCITT. study group 1. Oct.
12.
U.S., Colombia sign textile
agreement, Aug. 3.
Advisory Committee on Pri-
vate International Law.
Oct. 25.
Vance: address at the
Women's Action Organi-
zation award ceremony
(delivered by Assistant
Secretary Moose), Sept.
I I
Vance: departure statement.
Andrews Air Force Base
Vance: arrival statement.
Amman.
SCC, National Committee
for the Prevention of Ma-
rine Pollution. Nov. 28.
S< C, Oct. 12.
William H. Luers sworn in
as Ambassador to Ven-
ezuela (biographic data).
Vance. Ibrahim: remarks,
Amman Airport
*365
9/21
*366
9/22
*367
9/26
♦368
9/27
♦369
9/27
"370 9/27
*371
*372
*374
*375
376
*377
*379
*380
*381
9/27
9/27
*373 9/27
9/27
9/27
9/29
9/29
*378 9/29
10/2
10/3
10/3
*382 10/6
*383 10/6
*384 10/10
♦385 10/10
*386 10/13
Vance: arrival remarks.
Riyadh.
Advisory Committee on In-
ternational Intellectual
Property, Oct. 30.
U.S., Japan sign textile
agreement, Aug. 28.
Polish-American Day, Oct.
5.
Advisory Committee on
Transnational Enterprises,
Oct. 12.
SCC, SOLAS, working
group on ship design and
equipment, Oct. 18.
SCC. SOLAS, working
group on fire protection.
Oct. 19.
Ocean Affairs Advisory
Committee, Nov. 8 (par-
tially closed meeting).
U.S., Romania amend textile
agreement, July 27 and
Sept. 11.
U.S., Hong Kong establish
export limits, exchange of
letters, Sept. 20 and 25.
U.S., Singapore sign textile
agreement, Sept. 21 and
22.
Vance: statement before the
33d U.N. General Assem-
bly.
Advisory Committee on the
Law of the Sea, Oct. 30
(closed session) and Oct.
3 I (partially closed).
Ambler H. Moss, Jr., sworn
in as Ambassador to
Panama (biographic data).
John Gunther Dean sworn in
as Ambassador to Lebanon
(biographic data).
Town Meeting on foreign
policy. Norfolk, Nov. 4.
National foreign policy con-
ference for community and
junior college chief
executive officers. Oct.
2-3.
Harold E. Horan sworn in as
Ambassador to Malawi
(biographic data)
ACDA Director Paul C.
Warnke to address confer-
ence on U.S. security and
the Soviet challenge.
Pittsburgh. Oct. 17.
Advisory Committee on
Historical Diplomatic
Documentation, Nov. 13.
Fine Arts Committee. Nov.
13.
Richard B Parker sworn in
as Ambassador to Morocco
(biographic data). Q
REPLICATIONS
1950 "Foreign Relations" Volume V
"The Near East, South Asia,
and Africa" 1
The Department of State released o
July 5, 1978, "Foreign Relations c
the United States," 1950, volume V
"The Near East, South Asia, and A
rica." The "Foreign Relations" serie
has been published continuously sine
1861 as the official record of America
foreign policy.
This volume presents 1 ,889 pages c
previously unpublished documentatio
(much of it newly declassified) o
basic U.S. security interests in th
Near East and South Asia; military an
political talks with the United Kinj
dom; the Tripartite Declaration of Ma
25, 1950, by the United States, th
United Kingdom, and France concerr
ing Near Eastern arms and security
U.S. proposals for economic, techn
cal, and military assistance; and petrc
leum policy. A section on U.S. rela
tions with Israel and U.S. interest i
the Arab-Israeli conflict over the futui
status of Palestine comprises the large:
single collection of material in the vo
ume. Other sections of the volum
present documentation on bilateral re
lations with Egypt, Greece, Iran, Irac,
Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syrk
Turkey, and Yemen.
Documentation on South Asia ir
eludes coverage of the dispute betwee
India and Pakistan over Kashmir, an
U.S. relations with Afghanistan, India
Nepal, and Pakistan. A substantia
section on Africa covers general U.S
policies with respect to Africa; partici
pation in discussions on the disposition
of the former Italian colonies in Afric.
(Libya. Eritrea, and Italian Somali
land); and relations with Ethiopia
Liberia. Morocco. Tunisia, and thi
Union of South Africa.
"Foreign Relations," 1950. volume
V, was prepared in the Office of tht
Historian. Bureau of Public Affairs
Department of State. Five other vol
times for 1950 have already been pub
lished, and one more is in preparation
One volume for 1951 has also beer
published, and six others are in prep-
aration. Copies of volume V for 195C
(Department of State publication 8927;
may be purchased for $15.50 (domestic
postpaid). Checks or money orders
should be made out to the Superinten-
dent of Documents and should be sent
to the U.S. Government Book Store,
Department of State. Washington,
D.C. 20520. C
■J;
I
' Not printed in the Bulletin.
1 Press release 269.
INDEX
NOVEMBER 1978
'OL. 78, NO. 2020
frica. Southern Rhodesia Executive Council
Members Visit U.S. (Department announce-
ment, joint U.S. -U.K. statement) 13
Tins Control
Balanced and Effective Defense (Brown) . . 14
omprehensive Test Ban (Gelb) 17
onvention on the Hostile Use of Environmental
Modification Techniques (message from
President Carter) 16
n Overview of U.S. -Soviet Relations (Shul-
man) 28
resident Carter's News Conferences of Sept. 28
and Oct. 10 (excerpts) 9
3d U.N. General Assembly Convenes
(Vance) 45
ulgaria. An Overview of Eastern Europe
(Luers) 33
'ommodities. 33d U.N. General Assembly
Convenes ( Vance) 45
ongress
onn Summit and Investment in Developing
Countries (Cooper) 19
amp David Agreements (Saunders) 42
omprehensive Test Ban (Gelb) 17
onvention on the Hostile Use of Environmental
Modification Techniques (message from
President Carter) 16
lultilateral Trade Negotiations (message from
President Carter) 21
inth Report on Cyprus (Carter) 31
n Overview of Eastern Europe (Luers) 33
n Overview of U.S. -Soviet Relations (Shul-
man) 28
he Role of Human Rights Policy in Arms
Transfers for Latin America (Derian) 51
.S. Export Policy (Carter, Katz) 23
yprus
I inth Report on Cyprus (Carter) 31
id U.N. General Assembly Convenes
(Vance) 45
zechoslovakia. An Overview of Eastern
Europe (Luers) 33
'eveloping Countries
llonn Summit and Investment in Developing
Countries (Cooper) 19
■ /orld Population: The Silent Explosion — Part 2
t (Fearey, Giffler, Green) I
Iconomics. Bonn Summit and Investment in
I Developing Countries (Cooper) 19
ducational and Cultural Affairs. U.S.-
■ Mexico Commission on Cultural Cooper-
II ation 55
vgypt
'amp David Agreements (Saunders) 42
'(resident Carter's News Conferences of Sept. 28
I and Oct. 10 (excerpts) 9
13d U.N. General Assembly Convenes
I] ( Vance) 45
Energy. 33d U.N. General Assembly Convenes
j (Vance) 45
urope. Country Background Notes 41
Food. 33d U.N. General Assembly Convenes
(Vance) 45
Germany
Letter of Credence (Grunert) 29
An Overview of Eastern Europe (Luers) 33
Grenada. Letter of Credence (Griffith) 53
Human Rights
An Overview of U.S. -Soviet Relations (Shul-
man) 28
The Role of Human Rights Policy in Arms
Transfers for Latin America (Derian) 51
33d U.N. General Assembly Convenes
(Vance) 45
Hungary. An Overview of Eastern Europe
(Luers) 33
Industrialized Democracies. Bonn Summit and
Investment in Developing Countries
(Cooper) 19
Iran. President Carter's News Conferences of
Sept. 28 and Oct 10 (excerpts) 9
Ireland. Letter of Credence (Donlon) 29
Israel
Camp David Agreements (Saunders) 42
President Carter's News Conferences of Sept. 28
and Oct. 10 (excerpts) 9
33d U.N. General Assembly Convenes
(Vance) 45
Jordan. President Carter's News Conferences of
Sept. 28 and Oct. 10 (excerpts) 9
Latin America and the Caribbean
Arms Transfer Policy in Latin America (foreign
relations outline) 54
The Role of Human Rights Policy in Arms
Transfers for Latin America (Derian) 51
Lebanon
President Carter's News Conferences of Sept. 28
and Oct. 10 (excerpts) 9
33d U.N. General Assembly Convenes
(Vance) 45
Mexico. U.S. -Mexico Commission on Cultural
Cooperation 55
Middle East
Secretary Vance's Middle East Visit 43
33d U.N. General Assembly Convenes
(Vance) 45
Military Affairs. A Balanced and Effective
Defense ( Brown) 14
Monetary Affairs. President Carter's News
Conferences of Sept. 28 and Oct. 10 (ex-
cerpts) 9
Namibia. 33d U.N. General Assembly Con-
venes ( Vance) 45
Oceans. 33d U.N. General Assembly Convenes
(Vance) 45
Poland. An Overview of Eastern Europe
(Luers) 33
Population. World Population: The Silent
Explosion — Part 2 (Fearey. Giffler.
Green) 1
Presidential Documents
Convention on the Hostile Use of Environmental
Modification Techniques 16
Multilateral Trade Negotiations 21
Ninth Report on Cyprus 31
President Carter's News Conferences of Sept. 28
and Oct. 10 (excerpts) 9
United Nations Day, 1978 50
United Nations Day, 1978 (proclamation) ... .51
U.S. Export Policy 23
Publications
Country Background Notes 41
GPO Sales Publications 27
1950 "Foreign Relations" Volume V: "The Near
East, South Asia, and Africa" 58
United Nations Background Note 49
Refugees. 33d U.N. General Assembly Con-
venes ( Vance) 45
Romania. An Overview of Eastern Europe
(Luers) 33
Security Assistance
Arms Transfer Policy in Latin America (foreign
relations outline) 54
The Role of Human Rights Policy in Arms
Transfers for Latin America (Derian) 51
Southern Rhodesia
President Carter's News Conferences of Sept. 28
and Oct. 10 (excerpts) 9
Southern Rhodesia Executive Council Members
Visit U.S. (Department announcement, joint
U.S. -U.K. statement) 13
33d U.N. General Assembly Convenes
(Vance) 45
Terrorism. 33d U.N. General Assembly Con-
venes ( Vance) 45
Trade
Multilateral Trade Negotiations (message from
President Carter) 21
33d U.N. General Assembly Convenes
(Vance) 45
U.S. Export Policy (Carter, Katz) 23
Treaties
Convention on the Hostile Use of Environmental
Modification Techniques (message from
President Carter) 16
Current Actions 56
U.S.S.R.
A Balanced and Effective Defense (Brown) 14
Comprehensive Test Ban (Gelb) 17
An Overview of U.S. -Soviet Relations (Shul-
man) 28
United Nations
33d U.N. General Assembly Convenes
(Vance) 45
United Nations Background Note 49
United Nations Day, 1978 (Carter) 50
United Nations Day, 1978 (proclamation) ... .51
U.S. Delegation to the 33d U.N. General As-
sembly 46
World Conference To Combat Racism (White
House statement) 48
Name Index
Brown, Harold 14
Carter, President .... 9, 16. 21 , 23, 31 , 50. 51
Cooper. Richard N 19
Derian. Patricia M 51
Donlon. Sean 29
Fearey, Robert A 1
Gelb, Leslie H 17
Giffler, Lydia K 1
Green. Marshall 1
Griffith, George Ashley . . .53
Grunert, Horst 29
Katz. Julius L . 23
Luers, William H . 33
Saunders, Harold H 42
Shulman, Marshall D 28
Vance. Secretary 45
Superintendent of Documents
U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington, D.C. 20402
OFFICIAL BUSINESS
Postage and Fees Paid
Department of State
STA-501
Second Class
U.S.MAIL
Subscription Renewals: To insure uninterrupted service, please renew your subscription promptly when you
receive the expiration notice from the Superintendent of Documents. Due to the time required to process
renewals, notices are sent out three months in advance of the expiration date. Any problems involving your
subscription will receive immediate attention if you write to: Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government
Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 2040Z .
Department
Jf of State ~MW JW j &
bulletin
December 1978
■*
e Official Monthly Record of United States Foreign Policy / Volume 78 / Number 2021
\3: I
Department of State
bulletin
Volume 78 Number 2021 / December 1978
The Department of State Bulletin,
published by the Office of Public Com-
munication in the Bureau of Public
Affairs, is the official record of U.S.
foreign policy. Its purpose is to provide
the public, the Congress, and govern-
ment agencies with information on
developments in U.S. foreign relations
and the work of the Department of
State and the Foreign Service.
The Bulletin's contents include
major addresses and news conferences
of the President and the Secretary of
State; statements made before congres-
sional committees by the Secretary
and other senior State Department of-
ficials; special features and articles on
international affairs; selected press re-
leases issued by the White House, the
Department, and the U.S. Mission to
the United Nations; and treaties and
other agreements to which the United
States is or may become a party.
The Secretary of State has deter-
mined that the publication of this peri-
odical is necessary in the transaction of
the public business required by law of
this Department. Use of funds for
printing this periodical has been ap-
proved by the Director of the Office
of Management and Budget through
January 31, 1981.
NOTE: Contents of this publication
are not copyrighted and items con-
tained herein may be reprinted. Cita-
tion of the Department of State
Bulletin as the source will be appre-
ciated. The Bulletin is indexed in the
Readers' Guide to Periodical Litera-
ture.
For sale by the Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Print-
ing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402
Price:
12 issues plus annual index —
$18.00 (domestic) $22.50 (foreign)
Single copy—
$1.40 (domestic) $1.80 (foreign)
CYRUS R. VANCE
Secretary of State
HODDING CARTER III
Assistant Secretary for Public Affa
JOHN CLARK KIMBALL
Consulting Editor
PHYLLIS A. YOUNG
Editor
COLLEEN SUSSMAN
Assistant Editor
CONTENTS
I SALT AND AMERICAN SECURITY
5 AMBASSADOR WARNKE'S NEWS CONFERENCE OF OCTOBER 30
6 ACDA/SALT OFFICIALS
THE PRESIDENT
12 The United States and Its Economic
Responsibilities
14 Interview on •'Bill Movers' Journal"
THE SECRETARY
17 News Conference of November 3
20 Visit to Europe and the Middle East
AFRICA
21 Secretary Vance Discusses Namibia
With South African Officials
(News Conference, Joint State-
ment, South African Statement,
Western Five Statement)
25 U.S., U.K., Rhodesian Executive
Council Meeting (Department An-
nouncement , Joint U .S .- U .K .
Statement)
25 Rhodesian Raids (Department State-
ments)
27 Southern Rhodesia (Foreign Rela-
tions Outline)
27 Letter of Credence (Mali)
EAST ASIA
28 The Dominoes That Did Not Fall
(David D. Newsom)
29 Arms Sales to Taiwan (Department
Statement)
30 GPO Sales Publications
ECONOMICS
31 Measures to Strengthen the Dollar
(President Carter, Secretary Blu-
menthal)
31 Congressional Documents
32 Managing Economic Problems in the
Industrialized Democracies (Robert
D. Hormats)
EUROPE
36 Armaments Cooperation in NATO
( Warren Christopher)
37 Secretary Vance Visits Moscow
37 Letter of Credence (Romania)
38 U.S. Military Cooperation With Tur-
key (President Carter, Memoran-
dum to the Secretary of State, De-
partment Statement)
FOOD
39 Presidential Commission on World
Hunger (President Carter)
MIDDLE EAST
40 Egyptian-Israeli Peace Negotiations
(President Carter, Foreign Minis-
ter Day an. Defense Minister Has-
san Ali, White House Statement)
OCEANS
42 Law of the Sea Conference (Elliot L.
Richardson)
43 Expanded Canadian Maritime Bound-
ary Claim (Department Statement)
POPULATION
44 World Population: The Silent
Explosion — Part 3 (Marshall
Green, Robert A. Fearey)
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
48 The Challenge of Science and Tech-
nology for Development (Charles
William Maynes)
SOUTH ASIA
52 Superpowers and Regional Alliances
in South Asia (David D. Newsom)
54 Indian Ocean Arms Limitation
Negotiations (Leslie H. Gelb)
55 Letter of Credence (Bangladesh)
UNITED NATIONS
56 Namibia (Secretary Vance, Text of
Resolution)
57 Southern Rhodesia (John W.
Hechinger)
TREATIES
58 Current Actions
61 PRESS RELEASES
INDEX
Supt i
DEPOSITORY
SUBLIMIT
820
SUBLIMIT
1,200
MAXIMUM
J^^^
SLBMs- THE ABOVE PLUS
MIRVed SUBMARINE
LAUNCHED BALLISTIC
MISSILES
SUBLIMIT
1,020
MAXIMUM
BOMBERS- BOTH OF THE ABOVE PLUS
LONG-RANGE BOMBERS
CARRYING CRUISE MISSILES
OVERALL CEILING
2,250
MAXIMUM
TOTAL DELIVERY SYSTEMS: ALL OF THE ABOVE PLUS
UNMIRVed MISSILES AND
BOMBERS NOT CARRYING
CRUISE MISSILES
w
SALT AND AMERICAN SECURITY
The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
ALT) between the United States and
Soviet Union have been formally
derway since 1969, during the Ad-
inistrations of three American
esidents — Richard Nixon, Gerald
rd, and Jimmy Carter. The purpose
the talks is to promote our national
;urity by reducing the risk of nuclear
ir through negotiation of mutual lim-
on strategic nuclear arms. In May
72 the negotiations resulted in the
st SALT agreements — the Treaty on
: Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile
stems (Antiballistic Missile Treaty)
i the Interim Agreement on the Lim-
tion of Strategic Offensive Arms,
ice then — during nearly 6 years of
lgh bargaining — both nations have
ived at the broad outlines of a new
■eement, called SALT II, and accord
> been reached on many of its spe-
ic provisions.
SALT — and all arms control
licy — is part of national security
licy. Our basic arms control policy
ii our specific negotiating positions
|l developed through the National Se-
fity Council with the participation of
i the responsible agencies and their
lads — the Secretary of State, the
!:retary of Defense, the Chairman of
Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Director
'■ the Arms Control and Disarmament
C ency, and the Director of the Central
telligence Agency. The U.S. SALT
[legation, which is negotiating with
jit U.S.S.R. delegation in Geneva
[der instructions approved by the
l:sident, has representation from the
This article is taken from a
pamphlet of the same title pre-
i pared by the Arms Control and
i Disarmament Agency and re-
leased in November 1978. Indi-
vidual copies of the pamphlet
i may be purchased for $1.10 each
from the Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government
^Printing Office, Washington,
1D.C. 20402. (Orders of 100 or
\more copies of the same pam-
Sphlet mailed to the same address
\are sold at a 25% discount.) Re-
mittance in the form of a check
\or money order payable to the
\Superintendent of Documents
must accompany orders.
agencies responsible for national secu-
rity policy.
In the nuclear age, both military
forces and arms control serve our na-
tional security. We need a strong and
flexible military capability to deter any
potential aggressor from attacking and,
if deterrence should fail, to defend our-
selves and our allies. Our nuclear and
conventional forces — land, sea, and
air — are designed for these missions.
As the nuclear arms race developed,
however, both the United States and
the Soviet Union recognized that an
unlimited arms race might endanger
rather than preserve the security of
both nations. This recognition gave
birth to the SALT process, which, in
its simplest terms, seeks equitable and
adequately verifiable limitations on
strategic arms to enhance the national
security of both sides.
In SALT, the stakes are enormous.
The fact that nuclear weapons have not
been employed for over 30 years
should not cause us to ignore the awe-
some consequences of nuclear war.
Weapons with intercontinental ranges
and previously unimagined explosive
power can destroy in minutes what it
has taken centuries to build. Although
we are confident of our ability to
maintain nuclear deterrence and a clear
balance in strategic forces, without a
new agreement we could face the pos-
sibility of an escalating arms race, in-
creased tension between this nation and
the Soviet Union, and a greater risk of
the catastrophe of nuclear war. SALT
may well be the most important negoti-
ation the United States has ever
undertaken.
A national debate on this most seri-
ous of issues has already begun. Below
are answers to some of the questions
that Americans are asking about SALT
and American security.
Which nation has stronger
strategic forces today, the United
States or the Soviet Union?
In terms of overall strategic nuclear
power, the two nations are roughly
equal. Both sides have immensely
powerful strategic nuclear forces that
can bring catastrophic devastation to
each other or any other attacker.
In terms of specific forces, the
United States leads in some categories;
the Soviets lead in others. Today, for
example, we have about twice as many
deliverable strategic nuclear warheads.
The Soviets have more and larger
land-based missiles, but ours are more
accurate. We have a substantially
larger heavy bomber force, more of
which is on alert, and our bombers are
more capable. The Soviets have exten-
sive air defenses, whereas U.S. air de-
fenses are minimal. Both nations pos-
sess secure retaliatory weapons on bal-
listic missile-firing submarines. The
Soviet Union possesses a larger number
of submarines and submarine-launched
ballistic missiles (SLBM's); however,
the United States has far more of its
strategic nuclear weapons at sea on its
submarines than does the Soviet Union.
Although the Soviets are making
major efforts to catch up, we continue,
in most cases, to be far ahead of the
Soviet Union in economic and techno-
logical strength — important for pre-
serving strong strategic capabilities in
the future. Looking to this future, both
sides are modernizing their forces so
that each may always maintain power-
ful and secure strategic nuclear power.
What will be in the SALT II
agreement?
SALT II will consist of a basic
agreement which will remain in force
through 1985, a protocol which will
expire well before that date, and a
statement of principles which will es-
tablish general guidelines for sub-
sequent negotiations, SALT III.
Each country initially will be limited
to an equal total number of 2,400
strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, a
ceiling which will be reduced to 2,250
well before 1985. Under this overall
ceiling, there will also be three impor-
tant sublimits: a 1,320 sublimit on
launchers of land-based intercontinen-
tal ballistic missiles (ICBM's)
equipped with multiple independ-
ently-targetable reentry vehicles
(MIRV's), launchers of MIRV'ed
SLBM's, and airplanes equipped for
long-range cruise missiles; within the
1,320, a 1,200 sublimit on launchers
of MIRVed ballistic missiles (ICBM's
and SLBM's); and within the 1,200, an
820 sublimit on launchers of MIRV'ed
ICBM's.
The sublimits on MIRV's are im-
portant because the use of MIRV's
rapidly increases the ability of each
side to strike a greater number of
targets on the other side. The protocol
may include such measures as a ban on
the deployment of launchers of mobile
ICBM's and limitations on cruise mis-
siles.
What will the SALT II agreement
mean for American security?
The new agreement will improve our
security in several significant ways.
• It will place equal numerical limits
on the overall U.S. and Soviet strategic
forces. To comply, the Soviets will
have to dismantle or destroy up to 300
strategic systems. We will not have to
dismantle or destroy any systems that
currently are operational.
• It will hold the deployment of
Soviet strategic forces, including their
most threatening intercontinental mis-
siles, well below what they could de-
ploy in the absence of an agreement.
• It will somewhat reduce uncer-
tainty in our strategic planning, since
we will know the maximum number of
strategic systems the Soviet Union will
be allowed to deploy.
• It will contain important provi-
sions to help us determine that the
Soviets are living up to their obliga-
tions in the agreement.
• It will allow us the flexibility we
need to continue the strategic programs
we require.
In sum SALT II will provide a
framework for maintaining essential
SOVIET UNION
STRATEGIC
NUCLEAR
WARHEADS
9,000 +
5,000 +
LAND
DASED
MISSILES
(ICDM's)
1,054
1,400
HEAVY
BOMBERS
350
*
150
SLBM
LAUNCHERS
656
950
Department of State Bulle
8
111
equivalence between the United Sta j
and the Soviet Union, and it will,
conjunction with an aggressive U.
strategic force modernization progra
contribute to stability in the strate] ,,
balance.
[Ii
ifi
How can we be sure that the Ri
sians will live up to the agreement'
In SALT we do not rely on trust
Soviet good faith. The 1972 SAL1
agreements established the princij
that both nations would use their
verse and sophisticated intelliger
capabilities — known as "natioi
technical means" — to monitor co
pliance. National technical meai
such as satellite photography, are vi
effective. Through them, we are able
monitor the number of strategic nucl
delivery systems the Soviets have; th
basic characteristics; and when, whe
and how they are tested. The SAL'
agreements also prohibited any infc
ference with these means and any
liberate concealment measures wh
could impede verification of co
pliance with the provisions of th<
agreements.
SALT II will continue these prohi
tions and will, in fact, contain ad
tional detailed provisions to incre
our confidence that the Soviets
complying with the agreement,
should be noted that without a SA
agreement containing such prohi
tions, the Soviets would be free to
any and all methods of concealme
making our overall monitoring task
more difficult.
The SALT I agreements also p
vided for the establishment of the jc
Standing Consultative Commission
forum in which the United States ;
the U.S.S.R. address questions ab
matters relating to the implementat
of the agreements, including questit
of compliance. In the commissi
both sides have raised a number of
tivities which they judged to be a
biguous or subject to question a
which were thus a source of some ci
cern. In each case the United States I
raised, the activity in question 1
either ceased or additional informat
has allayed our concern.
At the same time, both sides h;
made it clear that the dynamic nature
implementation and compliance coi
require the reopening of any of the
subjects or the raising of new questic
at any time. Consequently, the Sovi
are well aware that the United Sta
will call them to account for any qu
tionable activities relating to th
strategic programs and will expi
satisfactory resolution of any proble
involved.
Fu
it
II
cember 1978
Under the SALT agreement, won't
r Minuteman missiles be vulnera-
_ to Soviet attack?
With or without SALT, our Min-
:man missiles will become increas-
;ly vulnerable to attack by Soviet
BM's. This situation is the result of
viet advances in missile accuracy
upled with the deployment of large
mbers of ICBM-carried nuclear
rheads. It is not the result of SALT.
To guard against the potential vul
rability of any one part of our
ategic forces is a major reason why
United States has maintained a bal-
:ed strategic nuclear force of land-
sed ICBM's, submarine-launched
listic missiles, and heavy bombers.
:h element of this force has its own
erational advantages and poses
que problems for the other side.
Furthermore, although no decisions
/e been made, the United States is
imining other options such as alter-
ive, more survivable methods for
;ing ICBM's to compensate for the
:reasing vulnerability of fixed
M's. The SALT II draft, as pres-
ly agreed, explicitly permits de-
yment of mobile ICBM launchers
er the expiration of the protocol
riod — well before such systems
• uld be ready for deployment.
j The use of Minuteman vulnerability
list be viewed in perspective. The
aviets face substantial uncertainties in
inning an attack on our Minuteman:
Iw reliable and accurate will their
Bssiles really be; can they avoid hav-
ii; the explosion of one attacking
■ rhead damage the effectiveness of
ipsequent attacking warheads; can
1 y be certain of the hardness of our
jssile silos; and would the United
lites launch its own ICBM's once it
|s determined that a massive Soviet
■ BM attack was underway, thus
I ving only empty holes for the Soviet
Bssiles to hit?
iFinally, as Secretary of Defense
jirold Brown has stated, the vulnera-
lity of the Minuteman — even if we
II nothing about it — "would not be
■aonymous with the vulnerability of
be United States, or even of the
■ ategic deterrent." This is because
linuteman missiles constitute only a
Irt of our retaliatory forces. Any
I viet planner must realize that even a
Mccessful attack on the Minuteman
wuld still leave the Soviet Union vul-
flrable to massive response by our
flllistic missile-firing submarines and
lavy bombers. The damage these re-
taining froces could do would be dev-
jtating.
What about Soviet civil defense?
Soviet civil defense cannot change
the current strategic weapons balance
or the fundamentally disastrous nature
of a major nuclear exchange between
the United States and the Soviet Union.
The destruction that our retaliation
would bring could mean only catas-
trophe for the Soviet Union. The im-
mediate effects caused by blast, fire,
and fallout would be followed by
long-term consequences. Most indus-
tries would be destroyed, and wide-
spread starvation and death from dis-
ease would almost certainly occur. So-
cial order would be weakened to the
point of breakdown. There would,
furthermore, be large-scale contamina-
tion of the environment with unpredict-
able consequences.
We are monitoring the Soviet civil
defense program very carefully. Their
civil defense program represents a sub-
stantially larger effort than ours. How-
ever, compared to the United States,
the Soviet Union faces even more im-
posing civil defense problems: severe
climatic conditions, more concentrated
urban areas, more population located
near industrial targets, and an in-
adequate transportation for large-scale
evacuation.
Despite their civil defense program,
there is no possibility than in an all-out
nuclear war the Soviets could avoid the
deaths of tens of millions of their citi-
zens and the destruction of most of
their industrial resources and urban
areas. As a recently released analysis
by the Central Intelligence Agency
concluded: "We do not believe that the
Soviets' present civil defenses would
embolden them deliberately to expose
the USSR to a higher risk of nuclear
attack."
What about the Soviet "Backfire"
bomber?
The Soviets have developed a mod-
ern, swing-wing bomber which bears
the NATO designation "Backfire." Its
characteristics fall between the charac-
teristics generally attributed to existing
heavy bombers and those of medium
bombers (tactical aircraft and medium
bombers on both sides are not covered
by the SALT ceilings). The Backfire
can reach a significant number of
targets in the United States on one-
way, high-altitude, unrefueled mis-
sions. However, close observation over
a period of years indicates that this
bomber is currently being deployed for
use in a theater or naval strike role and
is a replacement for older Soviet
medium bombers.
In this regard, it should be noted that
the United States has a number of air-
craft which, when deployed in forward
bases such as in the European theater,
are capable of striking targets in the
Soviet Union. We have refused to in-
clude these aircraft in SALT because
they are theater systems and the Soviet
forces which they face are not covered
by the SALT limits.
The United States has indicated to
the Soviets that the Backfire can be
excluded from the permitted overall
SALT totals if, and only if, the Soviets
undertake commitments which will in-
hibit the Backfire from assuming an
intercontinental role in the future, as
well as impose limits on its production
rate. These commitments would have
the same status as the SALT agree-
ments, binding the Soviets to the com-
mitments contained therein. Although
there are no assurances that the
Backfire would not be used against the
United States in time of conflict, these
commitments by the Soviet Union are
designed to inhibit the Backfire from
being given an operational interconti-
nental role and to limit its overall
strategic potential.
Won't SALT II constrain the U.S.
cruise missile program?
We have been careful to preserve
those cruise missile options most im-
portant to our defense needs. The new
agreement will permit us to go ahead
with the deployment of the air-
launched, long-range cruise missiles
we now have decided to deploy on
heavy bombers. The principal lim-
itations on cruise missiles will be con-
tained in the shorter term protocol.
Even during the period of the pro-
tocol we will be permitted to flight-test
all types of cruise missiles and to de-
ploy ground- and sea-launched cruise
missiles capable of ranges up to 600
kilometers (about 375 miles). We will
be able to go ahead with development
and testing programs for all types of
cruise missiles without altering present
schedules. After the protocol expires,
there will be no limitations on ground-
and sea-launched cruise missiles unless
mutually agreed upon in subsequent
negotiations. Cruise missile limitations
will be an agenda item for SALT III.
Will SALT II stop us from de-
veloping mobile intercontinental bal-
listic missiles?
No. The protocol will prohibit each
side from deploying mobile ICBM
launchers and flight-testing ICBM's
from mobile launchers. Research and
development programs short of
flight-testing will not be affected.
B-52 • U.S. A
47
LENGTH IN MEIERS
U.S.S.R. • DACKFIRE-D
UNITED STATES MILITARY POSTURE FOR FY 1 979". US Joint Chiefs of Stoff
At present the United States is
studying a number of mobile ICBM-
basing concepts, including some in-
volving alternate launch points for each
missile. No decision has been made
whether or not to deploy mobile ICBM
systems. Nor have we decided which
particular concept we would implement
if we were to elect to deploy a mobile
ICBM system. The current and pro-
jected capabilities of our strategic
forces give us time to study thoroughly
questions of technical feasibility, mili-
tary effectiveness, and cost prior to
making decisions about deploying
mobile ICBMs.
The parts of the joint draft text of the
SALT II agreement that have already
been agreed upon allow deployment of
mobile ICBM systems of the types we
are considering. The draft agreement
explicitly permits deployment of mobile
ICBM launchers during its term, after
the expiration of an interim protocol
period which would end well before
mobile ICBM systems would be ready
for deployment.
Any mobile ICBM basing system
would, of course, have to be fully con-
sistent with all provisions — including
the verification provisions — of a
strategic arms limitation agreement.
The United States will not deploy a
mobile ICBM system that would not
permit adequate verification of the
number of launchers deployed, and
other provisions of the agreement. We
will insist that any Soviet system meet
the same verification standards.
sile and other sophisticated technology.
SALT, furthermore, will not affect our
important efforts to strengthen NATO's
conventional forces. We have con-
sulted closely with our allies through-
out the course of the SALT negotia-
tions and have taken into account allied
security concerns in our negotiating
positions.
How will SALT II affect our
NATO allies?
SALT II will not place any restric-
tions on the nuclear forces of France
and Great Britain, and it will not limit
any of America's nuclear weapons
systems located in Europe. There will
be no ban on the transfer of cruise mis-
How do the cancellation of the B-l
bomber and the decision to defer
production of the "neutron bomb"
relate to SALT?
The B-l decision was not an arms
control decision. It was made sepa-
rately from SALT in the interest of
providing the United States with a
strong, efficient, and cost-effective na-
tional defense. Instead of the B-l
bomber, we have chosen to develop
cruise missiles and particularly, in the
near term, to equip some of our exist-
ing bombers with highly accurate,
long-range cruise missiles to insure the
continued effectiveness of our bomber
force. This decision will result in a
dual threat — manned penetrating
bombers and cruise missiles — to
Soviet air defenses in future years.
The neutron warhead is not a
strategic weapon and, therefore, has
not been discussed at SALT. It is a
tactical weapon designed to counter
Soviet offensive forces in central
Europe. The neutron warhead has not
been cancelled; the decision on its full
production and deployment has been
deferred — to see if appropriate,
meaningful restraint by the Soviet
Union will make its production and de-
ployment unnecessary.
Why should we sign an agreement
with the Soviet Union when that
country promotes instability in Af-
rica and other parts of the world?
a
Department of State Bulleti
Negotiating a SALT agreement doef"
not mean that we approve of Sovit
foreign or domestic policies or the
form of government. The United State
will continue to oppose Soviet policie
where they conflict with ours. SALT
not a reward that we are giving th
Soviet Union for good behavior. Rathe
SALT is worth pursuing only if, by i
self, it promotes our national security
The emerging SALT agreement, i
conjunction with our ongoing defens
programs, does improve our nation;
security by supporting continue
strategic nuclear stability and by nt 1
ducing the risk of nuclear war. n
IP
Will SALT I really slow the arm "
race?
"Ves. While there is still a long wa
to go, and we wish more rapid projt'
ress, the SALT process has alread Hi
slowed the arms raOe
In SALT I, the United States and tl »
Soviet Union curtailed an expensiv
competition in defensive missiles t
agreeing to mutual limitations on ai
tiballistic missile (ABM) systems. D»
ployment of ABM's could have stimn
lated the expansion of offensiv
strategic forces to offset them.
In the Interim Agreement on tl -
Limitation of Strategic Offensiv
Arms, the United States and the Sovi
Union froze land-based and submarii
ballistic missile launchers at the leve
existing or under construction in 197:
The freeze stopped the Soviet buildi
of ICBM launchers, although tr
agreement did permit the Soviets
have a greater number of total ICBN fide
SLBM launchers for the duration of th
Interim Agreement than the Unite
States. We, however, were left wii
more deliverable strategic warheac
and other advantages.
SALT II will establish equal aggn
gate ceilings for strategic nuclear d<
livery vehicles (ICBM and SLBI
launchers and heavy bombers) an
common subceilings on launchers ft
missiles carrying MIRV's. EstablisI
ment of such equality in numbers wi
require the Soviet Union to reduce
considerable number of strategic sy;
terns. In addition, SALT II will provid
for reductions below the initial overa
ceiling, which will require a further n
duction in the Soviet strategic force
To limit the qualitative arms race i
weapons technology, the new agret'
ment will, for example, place cor
straints on the introduction of ne>
types of ballistic missiles, althoug
agreement has not been reached on th,
specific constraints. The statement c
principles for SALT III will lay a gen
eral framework and foundation fc
ill
s.
i
i;>
II
IS
ii
l(
to
m
.:
E
R
pel
HI
[th
J«
ecember 1978
Ambassador Warnke^s JVews Conference
of October 30 (Excerpts)
I have just a couple of comments I
ant to make, sort of in the line of
irting thoughts. There have been
me who find a certain symbolism in
e fact that I'm leaving on Halloween,
aughter] But I figured I would get
st about as many bad jokes if I picked
iother holiday — Thanksgiving, for
ample, would be subject to misin-
rpretation, as would Christmas. And I
uldn't wait until April 1st. So I
ought this was about as good a time
any.
I've had some thoughts these last
ys about the entire process of arms
ntrol and how the job has stacked up
against my hopes and my expecta-
»ns. You always hope, of course, to
i better. But then you're always
ateful that you didn't do worse.
I But the one real conclusion that I've
I me to is that arms control just
lesn't come naturally. It's a very un-
I tural act. And that's one of the rea-
lms why it takes such a long time,
nu are faced with the necessity of
jniting your own military options in
« der to find some restrictions that you
tin get on the other side's forces.
And when you're faced with that
loice, those military options that
l;u're restricting sometimes look a lot
I'tter than they ever looked before,
.id, therefore, it gets harder and
| rder to give them up. And at the
sme time, of course, you do have the
k jective of trying to get the other side
i cut back or to limit particular things.
I I think if you look at the experience
: SALT to date, you can see the
| enomenon that I'm describing. We
pve, in fact, preserved options that
Ipuld, perhaps, have been something
Hat we could have given up to the im-
jovement of the overall strategic situ-
I on.
I We had that experience with
BlRV's [multiple independently-
targetable reentry vehicles] in SALT I.
And that's one of the reasons why I
feel that what's been sometimes de-
scribed as the most controversial part
of SALT II may be, in the long run, a
structural innovation which is of
value — and that's the protocol.
There have been suggestions, re-
peatedly, that we would have less trou-
ble with SALT if we eliminated the
protocol because of its possible prece-
dential impact — because of the fact
that some in the Senate may say that
once you get the protocol, in effect,
you're kind of stuck with it.
But it does seem to me that it's got a
major value, and that's that it prevents
you from making decisions in the heat
of negotiations that could be ill-
considered decisions. It does give you
the opportunity for thought, and it does
permit you to reach a reasoned conclu-
sion after thorough analysis of the pros
and cons. I think you can see that in the
particular items that are in the protocol.
Really, what the protocol controls now
is the question of deployment of
long-range, ground-launched cruise
missiles and sea-launched cruise mis-
siles, and deployment of mobile
ICBM [intercontinental ballistic mis-
sile] launchers.
Now those are both the kinds of is-
sues on which, if you made a decision
at this time, it could be a wrong one. If
you had to make an up or down deci-
sion on either one now, I suspect that
the decision would be up — that the de-
cision would be to permit long-range,
ground-launched cruise missiles and
mobile launchers of ICBM's.
Maybe eventually that's going to be
the decision we come to. And maybe
that would be the right thing to do. But
I don't think that we've thought
through the implications of either of
those systems at the present time. And
we haven't been able to come to a rea-
rther progress in reducing the nuclear
enals of both sides and for further
strictions on qualitative improve-
ents.
!] It is important to realize the price of
|l)t reaching agreement on SALT II.
n expansion of the strategic arms
■>mpetition, at significant monetary
list, could follow, with an increasing
iinger that future weapons systems
i'uild increase the incentives to resort
to nuclear weapons in time of crisis.
SALT represents an opportunity to
take a major step to enhance
stability — based on achieving an equi-
table and adequately verifiable
agreement — and, therefore, it should
be pursued. A satisfactory agreement
also will maintain the efforts of both
sides to continue the search for further
agreements on the entire range of arms
limitations. □
soned decision as to whether or not,
when both sides acquire those systems,
we would be better off or worse off.
So that, as I said, it seems to me that
this may turn out to be not the contro-
versial part of SALT II because it means
that you don't have to pay the price for
an arms control agreement by making a
premature decision on a system which,
when both sides have acquired it, may
be against the interests of the United
States.
With regard to where we are today
on SALT, I can't, of course, get into
the negotiating positions. I think that
would be a disservice at what is proba-
bly the most delicate stage of the
negotiations. But it does seem to me
that we're now so close and that the is-
sues remaining are such that it, to me,
is inconceivable that the two sides
can't complete it and can't complete it
at some time in the fairly near future.
We have, essentially, two kinds of
issues. One of them will be the techni-
cal details which are being worked out
in Geneva, and the other is a couple of
issues of substance primarily relating to
the tradeoffs of the restrictions on
numbers of cruise missiles as compared
with inhibitions on modernization or
modification of ICBM's.
And there, the two sides have come
closer together. But it's going to take
some more time and some more negoti-
ations. We don't have any schedule set
up for meetings at the foreign minister
level and certainly not a summit meet-
ing. But I think sometimes we lose
sight of the fact that the negotiations
have been virtually continuous and that
the two delegations have been in
Geneva since May of 1977 except for a
short Christmas break and a short break
this summer.
Q. SALT has been under negotia-
tion now for 6 years. And you've
been at it for 2 years — those same is-
sues have held it up for a long period
of time now. Why is there no
SALT—
A. I tried to answer that by just say-
ing that the process itself is a difficult
one; that it's awfully hard to reach
meaningful arms control agreements.
You could reach sort of a token agree-
ment in a short period of time.
But if you're trying genuinely to end
up with something which is not only
going to be good in itself but also lay
Department of State Bulled;
kci
the basis for later steps, it's going to go
slowly. Here what we're trying to do
is, unlike the SALT I Interim
Agreement on offensive arms, to do
more than just sort of ratify the arms
competition.
We are trying, actually, to interfere
with programs that otherwise would be
completed. And as I say, that's an un-
natural kind of an act on the part of any
sovereign state. And, therefore, it's
one which is taken with a great deal of
resistance.
Q. To what extent have political
factors in the last several months
held up — on both our side and their
side — either complicated or in any
way delayed progress toward a
treaty?
A. That's a difficult question to an-
swer, and I don't think that you can an-
swer it except by guessing. As you
know, I've been maintaining consist-
ently that there should not be linkage
between SALT and other elements in
the relationship — that you can't use
SALT as a reward; you can't use it as
punishment. It has to stand on its own
feet. At the same time, I think that you
have to recognize that the general cli-
mate of relations does affect the
negotiations. And I believe that had
there been less strain in the relationship
this year, there would have been more
receptivity on both sides.
I think when you tend to feel that the
other side is behaving in a fashion of
which you disapprove, that you are not
apt to be perhaps as responsive to their
positions as you might otherwise be.
But, as I say, it's an atmospheric thing
rather than a logical thing. But it does
have some effect.
Q. Your comments about the value
of the protocol in not deciding these
issues of cruise missiles and mobile
missiles while we complete negotia-
tions could be turned around and
used to imply a criticism of the issues
that are being decided in the heat of
negotiations — and maybe the things
that have ended up in the treaty are
being decided too nastily. Is that —
A. No. I don't think that I would ac-
cept that.
Q. It amounts to what you are
saying.
A. No. What I say is there are some
items on which decisions are really not
ready, and that the risk would be to de-
cide those prematurely. They aren't
ripe for decision.
Q. But have all those been saved
for the protocol?
ACDA/SALT
Officials
Paul C. Warnke resigned as Director
of the Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency and chairman of the U.S. dele-
gation to the Strategic Arms Limitation
Talks, effective October 31, 1978. He
had held these positions since March
1977. Secretary Vance has appointed
Ambassador Warnke a special consult-
ant to the Secretary of State for arms
control affairs.
The President announced on October
20 his intention to nominate retired
Army Lt. Gen. George M. Seignious II
to be Director of the Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency; on October 26
the President appointed Ralph Earle II
as chairman of the U.S. delegation to
the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. □
A. I would say that they have. Take,
for example, the question of a ban on
new types. At one point, we considered
that to be a protocol item. But we've
been able to reach an agreement which
preserves the options that we feel are
important to preserve. And, therefore,
you can move that into the treaty. If
you remember, at one point, what we
were proposing was no new type of
ICBM. And we were willing to do that
for the protocol period — but with the
understanding now that there will be
one exception on each side, there's no
reason to make that a protocol item.
Because the only thing we are in-
terested in for the entire treaty period is
the possibility of one new ICBM.
Q. Was it a mistake, then, last
March or April [1977] to propose
wholesale cutbacks? The Adminis-
tration's first position would have
required all sorts of major decisions.
Did you lose time?
A. No.
Q. Because now you're in favor
of — what you're saying now — and I
don't know if you were in favor of it
then — the limited measures, putting
issues off, temporary measures, and
yet you came out, if I remember, for
a huge substantial slash —
A. I think there are basically two an-
swers to that. One of them is that I
certainly don't maintain that you ought
to put all issues off. You shouldn't.
You ought to decide, on a long-term
basis, as many of them as you are pre-
pared to make a considered judgment
on.
But what I've suggested is that there
are always going to be a couple of
items that aren't ripe for decision; ju:
as the question of ground-launche
cruise missiles or the question o
mobile launchers of ICBM's are nc
now ripe for decision. After all, wit
regard to a mobile ICBM launcher, w
haven't even been able to arrive at
concept which is satisfactory to us. S
that's the sort of issue that ought to b
put off.
The issues such as drastic reductior nt;
are issues that we have been prepare
to decide now. And we would hav
been happy if the Soviet Union ha
been prepared to decide on that poii
too.
si
It i
|tt
in
I'l
\l
ivi
li?'
i
»S
K!
Q. It was a long time ago. But d
you think you've lost time?
A. It's hard to say.
Q. Are they punishing us for it?
A. No, I don't think that they'i
punishing us for it. And it seems to m
that it's going to work out all rigb
That we're in a position in which,
you take a look at the two proposals <
March 1977, where we're going to en
up is in between, but in between muc
more on the side of the comprehensn
proposal than on the side of the deferr
proposal.
\r
M
I
[CI
V
a
Iva
k
I)
I
It
II
111
iil
Q. I wonder if you could addre
these apparent contradictions —
least looking through the other er
of the telescope — and, with yoi
perspective here and when you wei
over at the Pentagon, kind of sugge
how you might handle it. The botto
line in the SALT agreement presun *
ably is, hopefully, to keep fro
blowing each other up and to sa' "'
money. On the one hand, the Pent;
gon is committed to a 3% increase i f=
real terms in its budget, year afti '
year, no matter what happens i f
SALT. On the other hand, we'i Tl
talking about making the land-base ■
missiles invulnerable, no matter if *
costs $40 million for an MX or no
How do you square what's going o :i
in the real world with armamen
and the theoretical objective of lov »-t
ering the price and the dange ■
through a SALT agreement?
A. Talking first about the econom
issue. As you know, of course, betti'j!
than I, the strategic arms budget is thi (
smaller part of the total defens
budget. And, as a consequence, eve |,
with quite substantial reductions, thJ ^
wouldn't necessarily mean a very sul
stantial reduction in the overall budget
I have never thought of arms contn
as being primarily directed at savin
money, because I sort of suspect th;
December 1978
pu would find other things to do with
le money in the defense field if you
tved a certain amount of money in
(trategic arms.
[ I'd say that the big cost saving from
sALT II will come from the absence of
living to do things that you otherwise
flight have to do. I believe, for exam-
lie, that if you did not have SALT II,
le Soviet Union would go ahead with
hrtain programs that would be stopped
|y SALT II.
I Intelligence sources indicate that
ley would have a very, very substan-
lally greater number of missiles.
Ihere's no reason to feel that they
lould stop at 308 SS-18's. There's
|;rtainly no reason to feel that they
lould stop at 10 RV's on the SS-18's.
Ihey would have a very substantial
itential for exponentially increasing
le number of warheads. Under those
"rcumstances, I don't hold with those
I'ho say that we would sit back and let
lem acquire that kind of an apparent
flvantage. So that we would do certain
Iher things, too, and they would be
;ry expensive things.
I think that it's, you know, as com-
ired to what would happen otherwise,
1 at we're going to be saving a great
pal of money. But as far as there
:ing some sort of a saving that you
in point to, I think that's going to be
, ird to do.
Q. Do you believe that we have to
ake the land-based missile less vul-
;rable or can we settle for just the
r and sea versions and there's
)thing sacred about the triad?
A. My position, as always, is impre-
se and compromised. I would say
ither of those. I would not eliminate
Le triad because it seems to me that
ie maintenance of the land-based
'BM force, at a minimum, compli-
i tes Soviet attack plans.
They would have, to a considerable
(.tent, to disarm themselves in order to
lunch any sort of a reasonably suc-
rssful attack on our land-based forces.
Ind, therefore. I wouldn't advocate
'] rowing our ICBM's away. At the
i me time, I have not heard any con-
rfete program that would give us, as
r as I'm concerned, a measure of
: eater survivability for the land-based
(tree.
, The solutions that I've heard just re-
lit in a multiplication of the fixed
>rgets and at the expense of verifi-
>ility so that you lose control over the
umber of warheads that could attack
Jose fixed targets. So that I would
jive to see a more sophisticated plan
an the tunnel, for example, or the
jiell game before I would have any
'infidence that you had improved sur-
vivability and hadn't, in fact, lessened
it.
It's theoretically possible to come up
with some sort of a plan that would in-
crease survivability. I wonder whether
we would find it desirable to put a tre-
mendous amount of money in it or
whether, perhaps, the vulnerability of
Minuteman isn't substantially over-
rated.
My own view is that any military
planner that, under present circum-
stances, could speculate on his ability
to eliminate the vast bulk of our ICBM
forces would have lost his mind. He
would have to plan an attack with the
most exquisite precision. He would
have to count on weapons that he's
never used functioning almost flaw-
lessly.
And he would have to count on the
fact that, with something like 30 min-
utes warning, the President of the
United States would sit calmly by as
the missiles thundered overhead.
Whether he would or whether he
wouldn't, I don't think that the Soviet
military planner could plan on that.
And the circumstances are such that he
would have initiated nuclear war by
doing less than as complete a job as he
might otherwise be able to do on our
ability to retaliate or our willingness to
retaliate. So I don't put a great deal of
stock in the idea that the Minuteman is,
in fact, vulnerable at this stage or is
going to become such in the early
I980's.
But if you could, in fact, find some
way to eliminate even that theoretical
risk, that, obviously, would improve
strategic stability. I think we ought to
continue to think about the concepts
but not go ahead with one until we've
found one that makes sense.
Q. About the delicate stage —
A. Yes. The issues that are left: Are
they tougher per se than the issues that
have been resolved?
Q. Or is it that they're the last is-
sues and were in the stage you called
the delicate stage because everything
is dependent on finally wrapping it
up?
A. I would say the latter. I would
say that the toughest issues have been
resolved. And looking back on the way
in which this has evolved, I think that
some of the toughest questions were re-
solved a year ago September.
Q. OK. Then that means for at
least a year, issues that are not the
toughest issues have resisted solu-
tion?
A. That plus putting the agreement
in principle that was reached in Sep-
tember of 1977 into treaty language.
It's a difficult thing.
Q. I guess I'm having trouble
grasping why you can't push that
other 5% [inaudible] because the as-
George M. Seignious II was born June 21,
1921, in Orangeburg, S.C. He graduated
from The Citadel in 1942. receiving a Regular
Army commission as second lieutenant of
infantry. During World War II. he served in
Europe with the 10th Armored Division and
rose from platoon leader to assistant opera-
tions officer of the division.
Gen Seignious' duty assignments have in-
cluded serving as military assistant and
executive assistant to the Secretary of the
Army; Director of the Policy Planning Staff
in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of
Defense (International Security Affairs);
military adviser to W. Averell Harriman and
Cyrus R. Vance at the Paris peace talks on
Vietnam; Commanding General of the 3d
U.S. Infantry Division; U.S. Commander in
Berlin; and adviser to U.S. Ambassador
Kenneth Rush during the quadripartite
negotiations in Berlin in 1971.
In 1971 and 1972 Gen. Seignious served as
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Se-
curity Assistance) and Director of the De-
fense Security Assistance Agency. From
1972 to 1974, he was Director of the Joint
Staff for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He retired
from the Army in 1974. having attained the
rank of Lieutenant General and became
president of The Citadel. He has served as
the "at large" member of the President's
SALT negotiating delegation since Sep-
tember 1977. On October 20, President Car-
ter announced his intention to nominate Gen.
Seignious to be the Director of the Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency. This
nomination requires Senate confirmation.
The President subsequently named Gen.
Seignious as ACDA Director under a recess
appointment effective December 1 .
8
sumption is that both are interested
in the SALT treaty and want one.
A. Yes.
Q. Since they're not the toughest
issues, it's not like leaving Jerusalem
to the end. What's the problem,
again? Is it a political problem here?
Is it a military problem there?
A. I don't have any good answer.
The issues that are left — although some
of them are important — are not issues
that are of basic significance to the
strategic balance, or at least the differ-
ence between the positions of the two
sides is not so great as to be that im-
portant to the strategic balance.
One of the problems, I think, is that
as you get down to those last few is-
sues, both sides tend to be quite resist-
ant.
Q. But nobody's taken anything
back, have they, in the course of
these negotiations?
A. No.
Q. Do you have any regrets about
the protocol now, in the sense that it
does — whether it's a good argument
or not — give the other side of the ar-
gument that if, for example, the Rus-
sians haven't reached the 2,250 level
by 1981, or by the expiration of the
protocol, or any of the other terms
envisaged by the treaty, that they can
then come to us and say, well, unless
you extend the range limitations on
the ground- and sea-launched mis-
siles or on mobile ICBM's then we
will not go ahead and complete the
terms of the treaty. Obviously, that's
[inaudible].
A. No. I don't have any such ap-
prehensions. What you would be say-
ing, then, if you were the Soviet side,
is: Unless you agree to extend the term
which has been agreed upon, I will
violate the agreement. That's a threat
you can always make, but it's a threat
which is fatal to any chance of the
agreement remaining viable. I don't
think that anybody is going to be able
to get anywhere with either the United
States or the Soviet Union by saying to
the other side: Unless you capitulate on
something, I'm going to violate the
treaty. It's not a plausible threat. Or
else it's a threat which indicates that
the treaty isn't worth having.
Q. I get the impression from the
discussion about the tradeoff of
numbers of cruise missiles vis-a-vis
replacement rights and that kind of
thing that that's as much, at least,
and perhaps more a matter of politi-
cal decision than it is really one re-
lated to the strategic objective of
maintaining the strategic balance. Is
that correct?
A. As I said in answer to an earlier
question, the difference between the
sides, at this point, is not so great as to
be of tremendous strategic importance.
But at the same time, I think we have
to recognize that cruise missiles on
airplanes is a system that we've de-
cided upon. It's one that we're going to
deploy. It's one that we regard as
necessary in order to preserve the
manned bomber part of our deterrent.
As a consequence, we are not pre-
pared to accept limits that we feel are
incompatible with doing that and doing
it effectively.
Q. How do you verify that a
ground- or sea-launched cruise mis-
sile is not dropped out of an airplane
and tested at greater than 375 miles?
A. It really is something of a mis-
nomer, I think, to refer to ground-
launched cruise missiles or sea-
launched cruise missiles or air-
launched missiles. They're all nothing
but cruise missiles. And the question,
then, is to control how you base them.
The fundamental control is a testing
control.
And as long as you've got a testing
control, then you've got some guaran-
tee. The problem, fortunately, at the
present time is a Soviet problem be-
cause we're the ones who have the
modern cruise missiles. As a conse-
quence, I'm probably more relaxed
about verification on cruise missiles
than I am about things the Soviets
presently can do.
And it's one of the reasons why we
felt that the restrictions on ground-
launched cruise missiles and sea-
launched cruise missiles ought to be
protocol restrictions. It's one of the
questions that's just going to have to be
worked out. It's whether, if you have
continuing limitations, they will be
verifiable. Because, at some point, the
verification problem will be ours as
much as theirs.
Q. I don't want you to engage in
[inaudible] prophecy, but if you
could give us some feeling as to how
you feel this treaty will fare in the
Senate — you've got a pretty good
sense of how it's going to shape
up — and what do you think will be
the greatest problems with it?
A. Of course, I probably am the
least objective person whom you could
ask the question as to how it's going to
do in the Senate. It will do a lot better
IT
A.
lei
que
lllC
Ml
ise
.:
Si
Department of State Bullett (et
than I did. [Laughter] But then it
probably a worthier object. But it
hard for me to see why anybody woul
be against it on the merits of the treat
itself.
So let's deal with that first of all, bt
cause if you look at the treaty itself,
does set equal aggregates and, thenfeti"
fore, complies with the Jackso
amendment. It does provide for redut
tions which will impact on the Sovic
and not on us. It does provide for sue
ceilings that will at least begin to rs
strain what we regard as the mo
dangerous of the strategic systems,
will have a subceiling on MIRV'e
ballistic missiles. And then a furtht
lower subceiling on MIRV'ed ICBM
It does restrain qualitative developmei
by restrictions on new types and o
modifications and modernization,
does begin to offset — in fact substai
tially offset — the greater throw-weigl
of the Soviet missiles by the fraction;
tion freeze.
And it does preserve the military 0|
tions that we have regarded as bein
important. It does permit us to mot
ernize each part of the strategic dete
rent triad. Looking at just the merits (
the agreement, I can't see how anyboc
can conclude that the absence of SAL
would be better than the presence t
SALT.
It does begin to move toward effe i
tive strategic arms control. So that tl
major difficulty that SALT will ei
counter. I think, probably will have
do with things that are totally extrins L
to SALT itself, and that will be the a
mospherics.
One of the congressional advise
went through Geneva, I guess it w;
sometime last summer, and I spent trl(
day with him. He had the briefings. Hit
met with the delegation. He met wiifb|
the Soviet negotiators. And I said at tl
end of the day, all right, now — tell mt|
Senator, what's wrong with SALT
And he said, I will tell you what th
problems are: first, the B-l decisioi
second, the neutron bomb decisioi
third, the withdrawal of troops froi
Korea; fourth, the Panama Canal; fi
the Horn of Africa.
And I said, well now, you and I bo
know that none of these have anythiii|
to do with SALT. And he said, yes, bi
they are part of the atmospherics; the |
are part of a situation in which it look
to a lot of us as though the Unite
States is on the retreat and the Soviet,
are on the advance all over the world.
So I think it's that kind of thing thi
will enter into anti-SALT sentimen
more than the merits of the agreement.
Q. Do you think it's been a goc
:
jcember 1978
lea to negotiate with Congress over
»ur shoulder and —
A. I think it's inevitable. Now
(nether it's good or whether it's bad is
nquestion of whether you're talking
liout the convenience of the Adminis-
Iition or whether you're talking about
I; desirable operation of the American
Istem. There was a time at which
mny Senators would have assumed
Is was not their responsibility.
iQ. I mean, trying to get them on
g agreement that preempts all the
jiticism rather than getting the best
issible agreement you can come up
.th and selling it. In a sense, this
is dragged out for so long because
iu're worried about so many differ-
lt things and so many reactions on
te Hill that you're trying to fore-
jise all the —
A. I don't regard those as being dif-
ilent objectives. It seems to me that
lu've got to negotiate on the basis
lit if you do the best job you can and
§: the best treaty you can, then that's
jing to have the best chance of being
3:epted by the Congress.
3 So I don't see them as being separate
cjectives at all. If what you mean is
I I think it's been a mistake to have
cngressional advisers come to
( neva, I think it's been a plus.
Q. Do you think there's a lot of
us control in this treaty?
m.. Yes, I do.
Q. This is a dangerous kind of
cestion because it invites being
sipped down. But could you put
jurself in the Russian mind and try
t describe how you think they per-
iive this treaty? Do they think
t;y're taking us to the cleaners in
4; strategic balance? Are they try-
i ; to avoid spending a lot of dough?
I - do they perceive SALT in roughly
ti same terms as this Administra-
te does?
A. I've often thought about that.
Ihy is it that they seem to be so in-
vested in completing the SALT
! reement? And first — I'm sure it's
I'jnecessary but, first — let me disclaim
;y possibility that they could think
f:y are taking us to the cleaners.
I mean, after all, what they are doing
■! agree to equal aggregates; agree that
fcy will cut back on systems when we
i n't have to; and agree to limitations
lich, to a large extent, offset the ad-
mtage that they have in throw-weight
the ICBM's.
Ralph Earle II was born September 26,
1928, in Bryn Mawr, Pa. He received an
A.B. from Harvard (1950) and an LL.B.
from Harvard Law School ( 1955). He served
in the U.S. Army from 1950 to 1952.
Mr. Earle practiced law in Philadelphia
from 1956 to 1968. In 1968 and 1969, he
served as principal Deputy Assistant Secre-
tary of Defense and Acting Assistant Secre-
tary of Defense for International Security
Affairs. He was Defense Adviser to the U.S.
Mission to NATO (1969-72) and was a con-
sultant for SALT in the Office of the Secre-
tary of Defense (1972-73). He was the Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency Represen-
tative on the U.S. delegation to SALT from
1973 until May 11, 1977. when he became
alternate chairman of the U.S. delegation.
Mr. Earle became chairman of the delega-
tion, with the rank of Ambassador, upon the
resignation of Paul C. Warnke on October
31, 1978.
So that as compared with where they
would be without a treaty, they cer-
tainly can't feel that they have some-
how imposed unequal restrictions on
us. I would much rather have my side
of the case in presenting it to the Sen-
ate. But it just seems to me that there
are so many reasons why they should
be interested in a SALT agreement
that it doesn't surprise me that they
are, in fact. For one thing, the eco-
nomic argument is a much more potent
one for them than it is for us. They've
got fewer resources and it costs them
more. And they have many, many more
unmet needs than we have.
Then there are political reasons that 1
think are perhaps more important to
them than they are to us. I certainly
have the impression that they derive a
lot of satisfaction from being seen as a
coequal of the United States negotiat-
ing on strategic arms and also other
arms control matters.
I think in terms of their perception of
their world position that this is a factor.
I think it's very clear that Mr.
Brezhnev has got a heavy political in-
vestment in SALT; after all, he was the
one who negotiated the Vladivostok
accord. And he still doesn't have that
reduced to a treaty.
I have been told repeatedly that we
don't appreciate how much political
blood Mr. Brezhnev had to expend at
Vladivostok.
Q. You were told by the Soviets
or —
A. Yes. Told by the Soviets. And
then I think that also, if you look at it
in terms of the overall military impli-
cations, I think that they are very wor-
ried about proliferation. And I have
seen that throughout the comprehensive
test ban talks, and I see it very much in
SALT.
And they realize that we're pretty
much on the hook, both of us, in the
Nonproliferation Treaty, to do some-
thing about our own strategic arsenals.
Look at their excitement and concern
about the possibility of South Africa
testing a nuclear weapon. So I think
that they are driven to a considerable
extent by that.
And I think they should be; I think
we should be. Because I can't really
believe that the number of countries
that are capable of building nuclear
weapons will continue to eschew that
possibility unless we do something
about controlling our own.
And then I feel genuinely that the
prospect of an unfettered competition
with the United States is, to them, a
very unappetizing one. They are very
aware of our superior technology. I
think they feel that if everything is al-
lowed to go totally unrestricted, they're
going to have a hell of a time trying to
keep up. And I think they're right.
So I can think of a lot of reasons that
are in their own self-interest.
Q. [Inaudible; concerns toughest
issues]
A. I would say a couple of them
were tougher than any that we've got
left. One of them was the entire busi-
ness of the MIRV launcher-type
counting rule. You know, what we had
been pushing for a long time was the
idea that there had to be a rule in which
anything that looked like the launcher
of a MIRV'ed missile would count.
And they had agreed to the MIRV-
type rule under which if a missile was
of a type that had ever been tested with
MIRV's, it counted as a MIRV'ed mis-
10
sile. But they were not willing, until
September of 1977, to accept the idea
that a launcher that looked like a
launcher that had ever launched or
contained a missile of a type that had
ever been tested with MIRV's would
count as the launcher of a MIRV'ed
missile. And that, I think, was a fairly
major step.
Another one was the business of how
you were going to count heavy
bombers with cruise missiles. Re-
member, that was the issue as to
whether or not they would count
against the MIRV ceiling.
Q. [Inaudible] that's still a major
question; how many?
A. No. A different question. At that
point, they were arguing that a' heavy
bomber with long-range cruise missiles
would count as if it were a MIRV'ed
ballistic missile launcher.
And that was a very important issue
for us because if we had then gone
ahead with the upgrading of our
strategic bombers, it would have
counted against our entitlement of
MIRV'ed ballistic missiles. So that,
again, was a very major agreement.
Those were two of the principal ones.
Q. [Inaudible; concerns SALT III]
A. As far as the timing of SALT III
is concerned, I think that that's pretty
much agreed by both sides that we will
do that promptly after the completion
of SALT II. And I think we should. It's
hard to see what kind of form SALT III
will take.
It will be very different from SALT
II because you won't have to go
through all of the basics. In SALT II,
you had to negotiate all of the boiler-
plate of a treaty — the definitions, the
question of the verification rules, a lot
of things that won't have to be re-
negotiated.
In a sense, you could visualize
SALT III as sort of a series of amend-
ments of SALT II. You could take a
particular package of amendments and
try and negotiate them. But this is
something, obviously, that we're going
to have to feel our way toward.
As far as Gromyko's comments are
concerned, all I can think of that he
may have been referring to is that they
have pushed for a long time, of course,
to include our forward-based systems
and the nuclear forces of allied states
as part of SALT.
Now that's the basic dichotomy be-
tween the definitions of strategic
weapons, with our maintaining that
strategic weapons are those that can be
launched from one country and strike
Department of State Bullet
((
the other country, whereas they main-
tain that any weapons that can strike
the territory of the other country ought
to be counted as strategic.
That's what they yielded in Vlad-
ivostok. That was the fundamental
breakthrough that President Ford ac-
complished. But they have made it very
clear always that they would try and
raise forward-based systems and the
forces of the other side as part of SALT
111.
We have made it equally clear that
we aren't prepared now to concede that
these would be relevant to a SALT
agreement. And if they were, in fact,
to be involved — that is, the forward-
based systems — then we would be pre-
pared to discuss that issue only in con-
junction with a discussion of theater
nuclear forces on both sides.
We've also made it clear that, as far
as we're concerned, SALT is bilateral.
And, therefore, the forces of other
countries aren't relevant to the issue.
But I have no doubt that they will con-
tinue to push their position, and I think
that's what Mr. Gromyko meant.
Q. Do you have any thoughts on
the splitting of your hats once again?
A. Gee. That's an unprepossessing
metaphor. I hope my head wasn't in it.
Q. And having a military man in
charge of the Agency?
A. Let me address both of those
questions. I felt, when I took this job,
that it was very important that the di-
rector of ACDA be the chief negotiator
of SALT. I felt that way because it
seemed to me that ACDA had to be in
the principal arms control action.
And that if you just had the director-
ship, you would be in a position in
which you were almost a kind of an
arms control policy planner. But you
didn't have any piece of the actual op-
erational business. Because of the fact
that I've had both jobs, I don't think
that it's as important for somebody to
have both jobs in the future.
And in addition to that, as you prob-
ably know, in the Arms Control Act,
we were able to get an amendment
through back in 1977 to set up a posi-
tion of Special Negotiator for Arms
Control, which is the statutory position
that Ralph Earle holds.
So that the structural relationship of
ACDA to SALT is now very well es-
tablished. As a consequence, I don't
really worry about the fact that the job
has been split. As a matter of fact, as a
practical matter, it's been split for
some time, as you very well know.
Most of the time, Ralph has been
charge of the actual day-to-day nego'
ations. And I've either been here or
Geneva or elsewhere engaged in oth
arms control negotiations.
As far as having a military man, n
feeling on that is it depends on tl
military man.
I don't think that either race, se
previous condition of servitude,
what your professional background h
been ought to be a disqualificatii
from holding a high office in the A
ministration. And this is a very got
General. This is a guy who has demo
strated his sympathy for arms conti
principles.
Again, I'm quite biased because
was at my request that the Preside
appointed him as the at-large delegi
at the SALT talks. And I did so b
cause I knew him and knew his repui
tion. So that I think that he is abu
dantly qualified for the job.
Q. More on the military — ai
putting the negotiations with tl
Soviets aside for a second — what h
it been like to negotiate within t
Administration? How has your o\
position stood up in these contest
And how have you done with t
Pentagon and other places aroui
Washington?
A. I think I've done pretty well. I s
as well as I would have liked to ha
done. But I would say that the voice
ACDA has been heard and that we'
won our share of arguments.
Q. What kind of struggle is
though? And is it a real one?
A. It's the kind of struggle y
would anticipate. You've got, after a
a situation in which the SALT positio
are established by a total interagen
process, which is the way it should b
You can't expect when you sit in
NSC [National Security Council] su
committee meeting that you're going
find a total congruity of views amo
the Secretary of State, the Secretary
Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiel
Director of Central Intelligence, a:
me.
So that you do have a lot of debate
But I think that's both natural and,
think, entirely healthy. And 1 think y<
end up with a better product as a resu
I've had the distinct advantage of ha
ing known a lot of the people who a
involved in the process for a number
years. After all, I worked with (
Vance and Harold Brown in the Pent
gon back a decade and more ago. Ai
that relationship has, I think, been n
only something that has made my j<
more pleasant but has also enabled
id
ro
eat
ml
ml
I
IK
ic
k
IN
ft:
\\
v
kember 1978
talk on a very frank and candid,
sis and to resolve a lot of differ-
es that might otherwise have been
source of irritation. I think that
t's worked pretty well. I don't really
lilt the process. I think that the prod-
It has been a good one. But even if it
iren't, I couldn't blame the process,
•cause it does seem to me that this is
jmething which does require the sort
consensus positions that can be ar-
ed at only by a total interagency
cess.
Q. Going back to ratification —
laving out atmospherics — could
Jur foresee how Jackson and com-
lny could get a hold, a lever on the
Eaty itself, with respect to equal
ijgregates?
A. With respect to equal aggregates'.'
Q. With respect to the measured
inferences within the treaty.
A. If you mean compliance with the
:kson amendment, the Vladivostok
cords established that. You re-
;mber the big argument then was
^liether or not we ought to yield the
linciple of equal aggregates of
'iercontinental-range systems.
We have that, so that that's been
I isfied. The only other argument that
Jybody could make is that they are
: 1 1 with an advantage in throw- weight
I the ICBM's. But that's not the result
( SALT; that's a result of the fact that
I did not elect to build the very large
I BM's and still haven't.
Q. Throw-weight is much more —
..A. But, as I say, they can't blame
lit on SALT. And without SALT, the
Irow-weight disparity would be
.|;ater because of the fact that they
|)uld not be limited to the present
Imber of heavy ICBM's. But if you
:|Dk at our 1CBM force structure, we
l.ven't even matched the SS-19,
Jiich is classified as a light ICBM.
;, And it's because of the fact that, for
Ime reason — I think probably for a
ijiod reason — our military planners did
|>t feel that this was a prudent expen-
Iture of resources. So I can't see how
liy argument could be made that
ij\LT II somehow does not comply
Sith the principles of equality. It does.
{ Q. Semenov was in the job for 9
;ars.
; A. Yes.
Q. And you've been in the job for
hat — almost 2 years?
11
A. Yes.
Q. You took it rather reluctantly,
as I recall.
A. Grew to love it, though.
Q. Was it worth it? And what do
you feel you achieved?
A. There are two ways of looking at
that question. One personal and one
from the standpoint of accomplish-
ment. From the personal standpoint, it
certainly has been worthwhile. I've
enjoyed it. I've found dealing with the
Russians to be fascinating. I've found
the subject matter to be of great inter-
est. I've always had an interest in
strategic arms.
It's been very rewarding also be-
cause of the tremendous support that
I've received, particularly from Secre-
tary Vance and from President Carter.
And that is always, of course, some-
thing that leads you to feel that you've
had a unique experience.
From the standpoint of accomplish-
ment, I would like to think that the
treaty is a little better because I've
been a participant. I can't prove that,
but I shall continue to think so. I think
also that I've been head of the ACDA
at a point at which we've been able to
give the Agency, perhaps, more weight
and brought it closer to fulfilling its
statutory responsibilities.
I don't take credit for that myself but
attribute it to the fact that I was there at
a time in which we had an Administra-
tion which placed arms control very
high on the agenda of priority items.
And I think that President Carter's rec-
ord in that respect is really a distin-
guished one.
It's one of the difficulties we had at
the Special Session on Disarmament
back last May and June. You know, we
tried to think of things that we ought to
come out for. And the real problem
was that we were doing most of them.
And, as a consequence, in order to
come out with anything that looked
dramatic, it would have been quite
gimmicky.
But after all, the President not only
is going ahead with SALT, and has
tried very hard to make major strides
toward an effective strategic nuclear
arms control, but also he has, for the
first time since 1963, really genuinely
tried to reach a comprehensive test ban.
We've got the antisatellite talks
going. We would have gotten further
on Indian Ocean stabilization if it had
not been for the developments in the
Horn of Africa. The conventional arms
transfer talks have proven to be much
BACKGROUND
INFORMATION ON SALT
SALT I agreements (Treaty on the Lim-
itation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Sys-
tems and Interim Agreement on the
Limitation of Strategic Offensive
Arms). Bulletin of June 26, 1972, p.
918.
"Soviet Civil Defense." Report released
by the CIA in July 1978 and printed by
the Department of State as Special Re-
port No. 47, Sept. 1978.*
"The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks."
Department of State Special Report
No. 46. July 1978.*
"Compliance With the SALT I Agree-
ments " Administration report released
by the Department of State and the
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
in Feb. 1978 and published in the
Bulletin of Apr. 1978, p. 10.
"Verification of the Proposed SALT II
Agreement " Administration report
released by the Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations in Feb. 1978 and
published in the Bulletin of Apr.
1978, p. 15.
"The SALT Process." Pamphlet released
by the Department of State, June
1978.*
"Arms Control and National Security."
Address by Secretary Vance on Apr.
10, 1978. Bulletin of May 1978,
p. 20.
"Key Features of the SALT II Negotia-
tions." Remarks by Paul C. Warnke on
June 2, 1978.**
"The United States and the Soviet
Union." Address by President Carter
on June 7, 1978. Bulletin of July
1978, p. 14.
"SALT II — The Home Stretch." Ad-
dress by Paul C. Warnke on Aug. 23,
1978. Bulletin of Oct. 1978, p. 17.
"U.S. and Soviet Strategic Capability
Through the Mid- 1 980 's." ACDA re-
port of Aug. 1978. Bulletin of Oct.
1978, p. 24.
"SALT — The Alternative is Unaccept-
able." Address by Paul C. Warnke on
Sept. 12, 1978.**
"Strengthening U.S. Security Through
SALT." Address by Paul C. Warnke
on Sept. 15, 1978.**
* Single copies are available from the
Correspondence Management Division,
Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of
State, Washington, D.C. 20520.
** Copies are available from the Public
Affairs Office, Arms Control and Disar-
mament Agency, Washington, D.C.
20451.
12
Department of State Bulleti, v
THE PRESIDENT:
The United States and
its Eeonomie Responsibilities
Remarks at the opening session of
the 26th World Conference of the In-
ternational Chamber of Commerce in
Orlando, Florida, on October 1,
197X. 1
We meet at an unusual time in our
world's history. It's a moment of rela-
tive calm. We are more or less free of
overt, international warfare, more or
less free of the severe dislocations that
have disrupted our economies in the
past. Yet, in this moment, we must
face the deeper problems of humanity.
None of us can ignore hunger, although
we may never personally experience
hunger. We cannot ignore the problems
of overpopulation or the unequal divi-
sion of the world's goods, even though
we might obviously have gotten and
retained more than our share.
We've all learned that in an interde-
pendent world, we can only advance
when we advance together. As human
beings, our sense of mercy and justice
is offended when injustice so freely
reigns.
It's in this time of relative calm that
we can assess our reasons, weigh our
obligations, and decide how best to
exert and apply our efforts to these
great obligations that you and I face to-
gether as leaders.
The Cause of Peace
There is one responsibility that
transcends all others, and that is the
cause of peace. Leaders often underes-
timate the wisdom of our people and
how much our people desire peace.
We saw a dramatic demonstration of
this recently. Almost a year ago, when
two brave leaders — President Sadat
and Prime Minister Begin — took the
first long step toward peace, their
people rejoiced on the streets. Where
they expected hatred, there was ob-
vious demonstration of friendship and
even love. Where they expected dis-
pleasure or condemnation, there was
overwhelming rejoicing.
My belief is that the great hunger for
a peaceful world imposes on us the ob-
ligation to use the resources we control
constructively, to use them to minimize
frictions that can lead to war. And my
belief is that the people of other
neighboring countries, even in the
Middle East, also equally yearn for
peace, even though some leaders may
not yet recognize this fact.
As the leader of my own govern-
ment, there is no responsibility that I
take more seriously. It guides every
decision I make about our nation's de-
fense forces. For I know that our un-
questioned strength is the surest
guarantee for liberty for ourselves and
perhaps even stability and security in
the world.
But I also know that the pursuit of
military strength alone is not enough.
We must have the confidence and the
courage to pursue every avenue for
peace and to realize that this pursuit is
not a sign of weakness. That is why
Secretary Vance and I have just spent
long hours, even yesterday, with
Foreign Minister Gromyko, negotiating
in earnest hope of an early agreement
on a strategic arms limitation treaty
between our countries.
But government does not bear the
Wamke (Cont'd)
more of a seminal event than would
have been thought at the time that we
started the bilaterals.
We are making progress on restric-
tions on chemical warfare and
radiological warfare. We are going to
have a second set of talks to prevent
the development and retention of an
antisatellite capability. It's awfully
hard for me to see what particular field
of arms control we have not initiated
discussions in and aren't making prog-
ress in.
As a consequence, looking back at
my time, I would have to feel that I
was in the fortunate position of being
head of the Agency and chief SALT
negotiator at a time at which this was
an important part of overall American
foreign policy. I don't take credit for
it, but I'm grateful for it. □
sole responsibility for peace. Through goi
out history, the forces that can unite u
also have often driven us apart. Ideol »
ogy, religion, allegiance to nation;
soil — all have the power to bring wt
among peoples or to enable them t
find peace and concord.
This audience possesses another sue
powerful force. Within this centur
we've seen narrow economic interest ^
cause the friction that led to devastai
ing wars. But we've seen the sanr
economic forces lift humanity abov
the bitterest previous divisions.
Most of us here can remember tfr
days when the United States was er
gaged in total war against Germany an
Japan, countries that are now ou
closest allies. Largely through th
bonds of trade and commerce, thes
nations have become our partners i
seeking a prosperous global future.
I've often wondered what woul
have happened if we had the sarni
bonds of trade and commerce befoi
1939 or before 1941. That's why I'i
such a staunch advocate of glob;
commerce. That's why I'm determine
to increase substantially U.S. trac
with other nations, including the Sovic
Union and the People's Republic <
China.
I will not compromise, of coursi
our nation's security nor that of our a>
lies, but I believe that fruitful ecc
nomic relationships can advance tr
security of all peoples on Earth.
Let me repeat that governments cai
not achieve this goal alone. Evei
company, every corporation, even
economic leader involved in intern;
tional commerce can aggravate tensiot
by encouraging protectionism, by se
ting nation against nation and ric
against poor, or it can work to ove -
come and to prevent these same negi
tive forces.
That responsibility weighs heavil
on all of us who are in positions c
privilege. We know that if power (
profit is pursued for itself, and nothin
more, that we are not worthy of ou
gifts, but more importantly, our worl
will suffer. Without leaders of visior
we can never solve the problems th;
most sorely afflict us and those th;
threaten us even more in the future.
Text from AC DA press release 23 of Nov. I,
I97H; the full text may be obtained from Office
of Public Affairs, Arms Control and Disarma-
ment Agency, Washington, DC. 20-151.
Social Justice
There is another responsibility that i
imposed upon us, that of simpl
justice — justice among nations of th
world, justice among the people!
within each nation.
It's not too much to believe that al
people should have an equal opportu
nity to enjoy life's rewards, whethe
they were born in a poor country or
rich one, whether they were raised tr
In
"
December 1978
13
)or parents or by those of wealth.
The world's governments have a re-
lonsibility to pursue social justice. In
e United States we've increased our
reign aid appropriations and raised a
rong voice on behalf of human rights.
)litical rights, social rights, economic
ghts in our own country and through-
it the world. We recognize that trade
id free economies also offer a good
>pe of improving living standards and
better chance of protecting individual
sedoms in the broadest definition of
e word "freedom."
conomic Justice
It's very important that we all work
bring all nations of the world, espe-
ally the Eastern nations, the members
the Organization of Petroleum Ex-
iting Countries, and the undeve-
loped nations, more closely into the
arid financial and economic organi-
tions, like the International Monetary
ind, the World Bank, regional banks,
d others. To meet our own respon-
lilities, we're expanding our exports,
staining our economic growth at the
te which permits us to buy from other
tions, and taking tough but sensible
:ps to preserve the value of the dollar
a reserve currency.
These actions will help to distribute
e world's wealth more equitably in
e future. But I know as well that you
present multinational companies;
ime of you can often do more than
'vernments to determine how fairly
I; world's rewards are shared.
The International Chamber deserves
leat credit for the contributions that
; u've made, for the ethical code you
j veloped, for your work with the
hited Nations, and your many other
jogressive and admirable acts. Or-
j nizations like your own and the com-
Inies your members represent have
lought the benefits of trade, technol-
l;y, education, and medicine to parts
I the world that had been too long
« thout them.
i But you realized as well as I how
Iten a few corporate leaders have been
jiown to exploit weak nations, to
(•use poor and inarticulate workers, to
llerate racism, and often to overlook
n^ibery, payoffs, and corruption by
(justed employees. You know how
k|ten some have been unworthy of the
.eat power and influence they possess.
:nd you know as well as I that power
1 ng abused cannot be maintained. It
nnot be maintained, not only because
I's wrong but because it defies the
storical trend of our times.
[For the past few decades, nation-
lism was a vision which inspired and
,'oved people around the world to
eate a nation that was independent.
no matter how small or weak it may
have been. Now that revolution,
nationalism, has largely been com-
pleted. And other goals are
emerging — goals of justice, equity,
human rights, and freedom.
These are the wave of the present
and the wave of the future. We should
not fight this wave. We should ride it,
be part of it, encourage it, let it nurture
a better life for those who yearn and for
those of us who already enjoy. If we
can marshal our resources in the cause
of right, if we can pursue peace and
justice as energetically as we pursue
Foreign Oil. The second step is to
reduce our dependence on foreign oil.
We are on the verge of enacting a com-
prehensive energy program — I predict
that it will be done before the Congress
adjourns — which will increase our
domestic production, shift to more
plentiful supplies of fuel, and reduce
the waste of all forms of energy in our
country.
Energy is a worldwide problem, and
our responsibilities extend far beyond
our own borders. We will never at-
tempt to obstruct exploration and the
development of worldwide energy re-
Every company, every corporation, every economic leader involved in
international commerce can aggravate tensions by encouraging pro-
tectionism, by setting nation against nation and rich against poor, or it
can work to overcome and to protect these same negative forces.
power and profit, then we can achieve
these goals and in the process win the
fight against our other modern evils,
such as international terrorism, which
threaten many of us.
These are all shared responsibilities,
ones you must take as seriously as I.
But there are some very specific re-
sponsibilities of the U.S. Government
which I would like to mention briefly
here this evening, because they affect
everyone here and those you represent
back home.
Economic Stability
The United States has a responsibil-
ity to contribute to global economic
stability and well-being. There are
three important steps our nation is tak-
ing, based on the commitments I made
2 months ago in Bonn.
Inflation. The first is to reduce in-
flation. I will soon announce a tough
new program designed to bring infla-
tion under control. We've already acted
to make sure that the government sets
an example, cutting unnecessary
spending, reducing Federal pay in-
creases, removing unnecessary regula-
tions, cutting the Federal deficit, and
letting the free market set prices
wherever it can.
We've tried a quick experiment re-
lating to the international and domestic
airlines. Fares have been drastically re-
duced. The number of passengers has
been greatly increased. The profits of
the airlines have also grown. Soon I
will ask for an expanded anti-inflation
program with balanced and reasonable
sacrifices from business, labor, and
every other segment of our economy,
along with government.
sources. Our great technology is avail-
able for others to use.
Trade and Investment. The third
pledge we made at Bonn was to expand
our exports and to broaden world trade
and investment, and I might add, while
discouraging the excessive speculation
in currencies that unsettles foreign ex-
change markets. We will expand our
exports to get our current account defi-
cit under control.
Recent statistics are encouraging.
And factors that have already come
into existence will enhance this trend in
the coming months. The rate of growth
of our nation is now much more in
phase with the rate of growth of our
trade partners. A lower valued dollar
will make our own products more at-
tractive. And controlling inflation in
our country, minimizing the imports of
oil over a period of time, will help to
expand our exports as contrasted with
our imports.
U.S. trade relationships and export
performance are not just a domestic
concern. As our trade encourages
peace, our export growth will spur the
world economy.
U.S. food production is a great
world resource, and more stable stor-
age and supplies will increase agricul-
tural exports at more predictable and
reasonable prices to help feed the hun-
gry people of the world. It also reduces
our trade deficit, which in turn
strengthens the dollar.
We accept and will honor the re-
sponsibilities that go with the dollar's
role as an international reserve of cur-
rency. Our present policies are de-
signed to fight inflation and achieve
that goal, and I have no doubt that the
14
dollar will rise in response to its fun-
damental value and the emerging eco-
nomic trends which I have just de-
scribed. Stable, noninflationary growth
enables public and private institutions
to meet their obligations to the poor
two-thirds of the world.
We must do more to help these
countries by trade, by aid, by other
measures. Private enterprise has a large
responsibility here. World prosperity
depends at least as much on the
wisdom and foresight of private busi-
ness leaders as on the good sense of
government.
I described the steps the U.S. Gov-
ernment is taking, not because they
/ believe . . . that the best way
to achieve the world we seek is
through a free political and eco-
nomic system.
will solve all our problems — because
they won't — nor because they are un-
usually brave ones — because they are
not. I mention them as an indication of
how deeply I believe my nation has a
responsibility in the world.
Each of these steps involves some
sacrifice for the American public. In
many cases they require deferral of goals
we would prefer to pursue. But the
American public is ready to meet this
challenge. I have no doubt about that. I
think my nation has come to the recog-
nition that only through vision, ac-
commodation, and occasional sacrifice
can we be worthy of our privilege; that
only by fulfilling our obligations can
we win many of the rewards that are
truly worth possessing.
I believe, as 1 know you do, that the
best way to achieve the world we seek
is through a free political and economic
system. This means a political system
in which governments answer for their
actions to their people. It means an
economic system in which resources
are allocated as much as possible by
private, not government, decisions.
I believe in a free market system. I
prospered in it, as a businessman. I
know it's the best route for progress for
all. But here, again, it would be a
mistake to blame government for pro-
tectionist decisions. Hardly a week
goes by that I don't have some very
conservative businessman or a group of
businessmen come to me to ask for
government protection of his own
interests, at the same time deploring
protectionism for all others.
Department of State Bulletin
Interview for
"Bill Moyers 9 Journal" (Excerpts)
Am
President Carter held an interview
with Bill Movers in the Oval Office on
November 13, 1978, for broadcast
later that evening on the Public Broad-
casting System. '
Q. What do you think the Soviets
are up to? Do you see them as
primarily a defensive power seeking
to solidify their own position in the
world, or do you see them as an ag-
gressive power, seeking to enlarge
their position in the world?
A. To be perhaps excessively gener-
ous, but not too far off the mark, I
think, first of all, they want peace and
security for their own people, and they
undoubtedly exaggerate any apparent
threat to themselves and have to, to be
sure that they are able to protect them-
selves. At the same time, as is the case
with us, they would like to expand
their influence among other people in
the world, believing that their system
of government, their philosophy, is
the best.
This means that we have to plan in
the future in the presence of peace be-
tween us to be competitive with them
and able to compete both aggressively
and successfully.
But I would say that those are their
two basic motives as is the case with
us — security for themselves and to
have their own influence felt in the rest
of the world as much as possible.
Q. There is a school of thought
which says that their aim is to
achieve superiority over us in both
conventional and strategic weapons
and that we must, therefore, not set-
tle to be equal with them but to have
superiority over them. These are the
hard choices you're talking about
Where do you come out in that
debate?
A. They will never be superior to us
in national strength nor overall military
strength. We are by far the strongei
nation economically. Our productivity i
capacity is superior and I think always
will be.
We've got a vibrant, dynamic social
and political system based on freedom,
individuality, and a common purpose
that's engendered from the desire oil
our own people, not imposed from:
above by an autocratic government. I
think our absence of desire to control
other people around the world gives us<
a competitive advantage once a new
government is established or as thejj
search about for friends. We are bettei
trusted than the Soviet Union. The»
spend more than twice as much of theii
gross national product on military
matters, but we are still much stronger
and we will always be stronger thar
they are at least in our lifetimes.
We are surrounded by friends anc;
allies; Canada in the north, Mexico in
the south, two open and accessible
oceans on the east and west. The
Soviets, when looked at from the
perspective of the Kremlin, are faced
with almost a billion Chinese who have
a strong animosity and distrust toward
the Soviets. Toward the west, in East-
ern Europe, their allies and friends
can't be depended on nearly so strongly
as our own. They have a difficult
chance to have access to the oceans in
ei
up
1
nl
ID
III
ft!
I
)ll
"I
In choosing the theme for your 26th
conference — "Enterprise, Freedom,
and the Future"— the International
Chamber has recognized the essential
linkage between free people, free na-
tions, and free enterprise. Our future
course will be determined by our abil-
ity to sustain these freedoms. We must
meet our responsibilities to others, to
keep and enhance these freedoms
which we cherish. Any abuses of our
power and influence will lead to inter-
national constraints and controls and a
lack of freedom.
Peace and freedom are our first
priorities. So long as we have a free
play of ideas and information, so long
-■
k
as we maintain a climate that stimulates
invention, innovation, competition, our
public and private institutions will have
the intellectual ferment and the tech-
nological progress we need to produce
social and economic progress. I know
the deliberations that follow here in
Florida will be stimulating and produc-
tive. And I'm sure that you will leave
Disney World ready to launch a new
assault on the problems that command
our future attention. □
'Text from Weekly Compilation of Presi-
dential Documents of Oct. 9, 1 978 (opening
paragraphs omitted).
:ember 1978
15
unrestricted fashion; their climate is
t as good as ours; their lands are not
productive.
^nd so I think that in any sort of
:sent or future challenge from the
viet Union, our nation stacks up very
11, and 1 thank God for it.
Q. But do you think the number
mentality which you hear many
»ple espouse is a healthy mental-
? Is the whole question of being
mber one, one that can ever result
lanything but an increasing escala-
In of tensions and increasing arms
Denditures?
V. In nuclear weapons, which is,
i know, where our competition with
Soviets is most direct, we've both
epted the concept of rough equiva-
cy; that is, we are just about equal.
;y have heavier warheads; we have
re of them. We have three different
terns for delivery of warheads — if
ever need to, and I don't think we
r will have to — that are mutually
portive. We have a much higher de-
oped electronics technology; our
veillance systems are probably as
>d or better than theirs.
)ur submarines are quieter than
Itirs. We've got an advantage in
{) ing a tremendous reservoir of a free
a;rprise business system that can be
jnvative and aggressive. We have a
l:h closer correlation between the
eduction of civilian or peaceful
^ ds on the one hand and military on
h other.
o I think that in the case of nuclear
l/upons, we have an equivalency with
hn. and they recognize it, and vice
■a.
ioth of us realize that no one can
jick the other with impunity. We can
§3rb, even if we had to, an attack by
ij Soviets and still destroy their
sentry, and they know it, and vice
la.
o I think that the horrible threat of
»:ty of mutual destruction will pre-
*.t an attack being launched. We
I 't intend to evolve, and neither do
ill Soviets intend to evolve, a capacity
lalestroy the other nation without our-
■ves being destroyed by nuclear
"c;es.
n the case of land weapons, as I said
lore, the Soviets have vulnerable
taders. They have neighbors whom
•y can't trust as well as we, and they
Be even in the nuclear field three
■er nuclear powers which are poten-
m adversaries in case of a crisis — the
■ inese, the British, and the
!(nch — in addition to ourselves. We
■i't have any of those as potential ad-
wsaries for us.
iut I think for any nation to have a
macho attitude, that we're going to be
so powerful that we can dominate or
destroy the other nation would be
counterproductive, and I don't think
that even if we wanted to do that,
either we or the Soviets could have that
capability.
Q. Let me apply the multiple
choice difficult options equation to a
couple of other contemporary and
very live issues. One is Iran. What
are the options facing you there?
A. We look on the Shah, as you
know, as a friend, a loyal ally, and the
good relationship that Iran has had and
has now with ourselves and with the
other democracies in the world, the
Western powers, as being very con-
structive and valuable. Also, having a
strong and independent Iran in that area
is a very stabilizing factor, and we
would hate to see it disrupted by vio-
lence and the government fall with an
unpredictable result. The Shah has
been primarily criticized within Iran
because he has tried to democratize the
country and because he's instituted so-
cial reforms in a very rapid fashion.
Some of his domestic adversaries
either disagree with the way he's done
it, or think he hasn't moved fast
enough, or too fast, and deplore his
breaking of ancient religious and social
customs, as Iran has become modern.
Q. But he was also criticized for
running a police state — political
prisoners —
A. That's exactly right. I think the
Shah has had that criticism, sometimes
perhaps justified — I don't know the
details of it. But I think there's no
doubt that Iran has made great social
progress and has moved toward a freer
expression of people. Even in recent
months, for instance, the Shah has au-
thorized or directed, I guess, the Parlia-
ment to have all of its deliberations
open and televised, something that we
don't even do in our country here.
Q. You think this is all too late?
A. I hope not. I don't know what
will come eventually. I would hope
that a coalition government could be
formed rapidly. At the present time,
there's a quasimilitary government.
The Shah has reconfirmed his commit-
ment to have open and democratic
elections, maybe within 6 months or 8
months. I hope that would be possible.
Our inclination is for the Iranian
people to have a clear expression of
their own views and to have a govern-
ment intact in Iran that accurately ex-
presses a majority view in Iran.
Q. But can we do anything to en-
courage that, or are our hands tied?
A. No, we don't try to interfere in
the internal affairs of Iran.
Q. We did put the Shah in, but
you're saying we can't keep him in.
A. I think that's a decision to be
made by the people of that country.
Q. Does it hurt you sometimes to
have to sit back and do nothing when
you know there are large stakes in a
part of the world beyond your influ-
ence?
A. We don't have any inclination to
be involved in the internal affairs of
another country unless our own secu-
rity should be directly threatened, and
that's a philosophy that I have es-
poused ever since I've been in the na-
tional political realm.
I just think we've learned our lessons
the hard way in Vietnam and in other
instances, and we've tried to be loyal
to our allies and loyal to our friends, to
encourage one-person, one-vote,
majority rule, the democratic proc-
esses, the protection of human rights.
Obviously, we have not always suc-
ceeded in encouraging other people to
measure up to our own standards, but I
think we've been consistent in our ef-
fort.
Q. But this is, again, where some
criticism arises in some circles in this
country who say the Soviets have a
stake in what happens in Iran, and
they are free to move clandestinely or
any other way that they wish; but if
we take the position that you're es-
pousing we'll sit back and do nothing
when we should be in there covertly
or clandestinely or overtly taking a
tough stand saying that we may not
like the Shah but we need him in
power. You're saying that day is
over, that we cannot do that.
A. No, we have made it clear
through my own public statements and
those of Secretary Vance that we sup-
port the Shah and support the present
government, recognizing that we don't
have any control over the decisions ul-
timately made by the Iranian people
and the stability of that region; the ab-
sence of the success of terrorism, of
violence, the anarchy that might come
with the complete disruption of their
government is a threat to peace.
We don't have any evidence that the
Soviets, for instance, are trying to
disrupt the existing government struc-
ture in Iran nor that they are a source of
violence in Iran. I think they
recognize — they have a very long
mutual border with Iran, and a stable
government there no matter who its
leaders might be is valuable to them.
This might change. If it becomes ob-
16
vious that the Shah is very vulnerable
and that other forces might come into
power, the Soviets might change their
obvious posture. But that's the obser-
vation that we have now.
Q. What about the Middle East?
A. I have put hundreds of hours in
both preparation and direct negotiation
with the leaders in the Middle East,
particularly Egypt and Israel. And
Secretary Vance, even to the extent of
abandoning some of his other respon-
sibilities in foreign affairs, has tried to
bring about a successful conclusion of
the peace treaty negotiations.
There, again, we don't have any au-
thority over anyone else. We can't use
pressure to make the Israelis and
Egyptians come to a peaceful settle-
ment of the disputes that have divided
them.
The Camp David framework, which
was almost miraculous in its
conclusion — it seems more miraculous
in retrospect than it did at the time — is
a sound basis for peace between Egypt
and Israel. 2 There's no doubt that both
nations would be highly benefited by
peace.
Q. But yet the talks seem to be at
an impasse as of tonight.
A. The present disagreements, com-
pared to the benefits to be derived, are
relatively insignificant. The benefits
are so overwhelming in comparison
with the differences that I hope that the
Egyptians and Israelis will move to-
ward peace.
Q. What's holding it up tonight?
A. At Camp David it was a
framework, it was an outline that had a
lot of substance to it. But it required
negotiation of details and specifics, and
there is no way that you could have a
peace treaty with all of the ends tied
down and all of the detailed agreements
reached, the maps drawn, the lines de-
lineated, time schedules agreed without
going far beyond what the Camp David
outline required.
And so both sides have demanded
from the others additional assurances
far above and beyond what Camp
David said specifically. This is inher-
ent in the process. And I think in some
cases, in many cases, the two govern-
ments have reached agreement fairly
well.
Now I don't know what's going to
happen. We hope that they will con-
tinue to work in reaching agreement, to
understand one another, to balance the
consequences of failure against the
benefits to be derived from the success
and be flexible on both sides.
These are ancient arguments, histori-
cal distrusts, not easy to overcome, and
the frustrating part about it is that we
are involved in the negotiations, but we
can't make Israel accept the Egyptians'
demands, nor vice versa. We have to
try to tone down those demands and
use our influence. I don't know what
will happen about it. We just pray that
agreements will be reached.
Q. Are you asking both sides to
make further concessions?
A. Oh, yes — every day and night.
We ask both sides to please be con-
structive, to please not freeze your po-
sition, to please to continue to
negotiate, to please yield on this pro-
posal, to adopt this compromise.
These have been and are our efforts
on a constant basis. It would be horri-
ble, I think, if we failed to reach a
peaceful agreement between Israel and
Egypt.
Q. What would happen?
A. And then see our children, our
grandchildren, future generations look
back and say these little tiny
technicalities, phrases, phrasing of
ideas, legalisms, which at that time
seemed to be paramount in the eyes of
the Egyptian and the Israeli agree-
ments, have absolutely no historical
significance. And that's basically what
the problems are.
Q. Are you saying that the impasse
as of today is because of technicalities
and not major principles?
A. Yes, compared to the principles
that have already been resolved and the
overall scope of things, the dis-
agreements now relatively are insig-
nificant.
Q. Egypt wants to tie the present
negotiations, I understand, to some
future resolution of the Gaza Strip
and the West Bank. Israel is resisting
that. Who's being more stubborn?
A. I wouldn't want to start saying
who's being more stubborn. I think
there's adequate stubbornness to be
allotted to both sides.
Q. You mentioned grandchildren,
and I heard you say after Camp
David that at one critical moment
that was resolved because of some-
body thinking about grandchildren.
Would you tell me about that?
A. It might be a mistake to attach too
much importance to it, but during the
last few hours of negotiations at Camp
David when it looked like everything
was going to break down, then Prime
Minister Begin sent me over some
photographs of me and him and Presi-
dent Sadat and wanted me to autograph
them.
Department of State Bullet Kl "
And the issue at that time w
Jerusalem, which was an almost insuf rl "
mountable obstacle that we later r
solved by not including it at all in tl
framework. And instead of just puttii
my signature on it, which Preside
Sadat had done, I sent my secretar
Susan Clough, over and got the nam
from one of his aides of all his gran>
children. So I personally autographed
to his granddaughters and grandsoi
and signed my name, and I carried
over to him in one of the most ten
moments, and I handed it to him and I
started to talk to me about the brea
down of the negotiations.
He looked down and saw that I hi
written all of his grandchildren's nam
on the individual pictures and signi
them, and he started telling me abo
his favorite grandchild and the chara
teristics of the different ones. He anc
had quite an emotional discussi(
about the benefits to my two grandch
dren and to his if we could reach peac
And I think it broke the tension th
existed there that could have been
obstacle to any sort of resolution at th
time.
Q. What does that say to yt
about the nature of these probler
and their resolution?
A. You know, when you put t
problems in the focus of how they ;
feet people — little children, familie
the loss of life — the agreements an
the need for agreement becom
paramount. When you put the focus
the hands of international lawyers at
get it down to technicalities — Is a ca
tain event going to take place in
months or 8V2 months or 10 months,
this going to happen before that? Is th
demarcation line going to go aroui
this hill or through the hill, on tl
other side of the hill? Can the observ
tion towers be 150 feet high, 200 fe
high, 125 feet high? — the human
mension of it becomes obvious
paramount. But when the negotiato
sit around a table and start talking, tl
human dimension tends to fade aw;
and you get bogged down in tr
legalisms and the language and tl
exact time schedule when from a hi
toric perspective they have no signif
cance.
Another problem has been and th
has been one of the most serioi
problems — at Camp David we didn
have daily press briefings, and this w;
the agreement when we started here i
Washington, that neither side woul
make a direct statement to the pres:
As you know, this has not been hoi
ored at all, and it's created enormoi
additional and unnecessary problerr
for us.
ion
lai
In
10
na
l
»
1
(ecember 1978
17
Q. You mean leaks from both gov-
rnments are —
A. Not just leaks; I mean almost
very day I see interviews in the na-
onal television of at least one of the
des in the dispute. And also at Camp
>avid I was working directly with the
eads of state. Here we work with the
egotiators, and the negotiators then
:fer their decision back to the head of
tate or the cabinet, the cabinet re-
erses itself, reverses the negotiators
n a language change or one word, and
1 effect you get the most radical mem-
ers of the governments who have a
tajor input into the negotiating process
ither than having the heads of state
lere 100 yards away so that they can
:solve those issues once and for all.
So I think the follow-up to Camp
avid has been much more time con-
iming and much more frustrating than
was when the three of us were
imarily leading the discussions.
Q. I read that the Camp David log
towed that you spent 21Vi hours
ith Sadat and 29 hours with Begin
id 9 hours alone with Sadat and 6
>urs alone with Begin with no one
se in the room, the way F.D.R.
ied to do with Churchill.
Do you think that you could re-
live most of these large issues we
ce if you could just get people in a
loin like this and talk to them? It
>ed to be said Lyndon Johnson
•uld have done much better had he
'en able to persuade people one-
l-one instead of having to use tele-
sion and public speeches.
Do you think that other problems
>u face could be resolved if you
iuld meet nose-to-nose in a sense
ith the adversaries?
A. I couldn't guarantee success, but
:hink obviously the likelihood of suc-
ss would be better.
□
THE SECRETARY:
News Conference of Novemher 3
■For full text, see Weekly Compilation of
esidential Documents of Nov. 28, 1978.
! For texts of the accords reached at Camp
vid and signed on Sept. 17, see Bulletin of
t. 1978, p. 7.
First, I have a few words to say
about the Middle East negotiations. I
know that all of you are interested in
the Middle East negotiations, and I
want to bring you up to date. I ob-
viously will not be able to go into de-
tail.
We are still in the midst of sensitive
negotiations, and we want to preserve
their confidentiality as we did during
the Camp David negotiations. Let me
say that we have continued to make
steady progress in the negotiations on
the text of the peace treaty. 1 I had a
good meeting yesterday with Prime
Minister Begin in New York, and we
made important progress. We have now
resolved almost all the substantive is-
sues.
We will also continue to work inten-
sively on the annexes to the treaty.
Much of this is a matter of drafting, but
there are some remaining issues in the
annexes as well.
In my discussions with the Prime
Minister yesterday, we spent almost all
of our time on the remaining issues in
the current negotiations, including the
question of how to get the negotiations
started on the other issues covered in
the Camp David general framework.
We also devoted some of our time to a
discussion of bilateral matters, and we
will be continuing a discussion of these
various items.
That is all, I believe, that I have to
say at this point. I will be glad to an-
swer any questions.
Q. I know we will be coming back
to the Middle East, so let me try to
clear SALT away, if I could.
More than a year ago the President
said that within weeks the outline of
an agreement would be in hand — an
agreement that he said would be the
pride of the country. That was Oc-
tober 7th, a year ago.
There is no summit; there is no
agreement. In fact I don't even know
that there is a meeting set up be-
tween you and the Soviet Foreign
Minister. Could you tell us what
went wrong, if something has gone
wrong?
A. The negotiation of a treaty on
strategic arms limitation is a vitally
important and a very difficult negotia-
tion. It affects the most fundamental
interests of the two nations involved,
and therefore, it must be and is treated
with the greatest of care by the parties.
We have been slowly making prog-
ress in resolving the issues which
separate the two countries. We have
left a handful of issues, as you know,
and we hope that we will, in the near
future, be able to resolve those issues
as well.
I think we should not set ourselves
an artificial deadline. What we are
looking for is an agreement which will
protect our interests, which will protect
the interests of our allies, and which I
know the Soviet Union wishes to pro-
tect their interests as well. And, there-
fore, I think it is fitting and appropriate
that we should proceed carefully,
methodically, and one-by-one remove
these issues until we reach the common
objective which we clearly both
share — namely, to achieve a sound and
an equitable treaty.
This I believe will be done. I have
said to you before that I cannot predict
an exact date when this will be done. I
believe it is still possible that it could
happen this year, but I don't want to
try and predict with certainty that it
will. Let me say that I can assure you
that we will devote our full interests
and time to continuing to try to make
progress in closing the remaining is-
sues.
Q. You mentioned that you spoke
with Prime Minister Begin about
bilateral issues yesterday. There are
reports that Israel is seeking sub-
stantial American aid for the Sinai
withdrawal. In fact there is one re-
port out of Israel this morning that
that request may go as high as $10
billion, plus another billion for the
airfields.
Can you tell us, first, has the
United States committed itself, in
principle, to giving Israel that sub-
stantial financial aid? And two, can
you give us any kind of range on what
numbers we are talking about?
A. The only document which has
been exchanged between the United
States and Israel relates to the airfields.
This is a public document which I think
all of you are familiar with. It is a let-
ter which went from Secretary Brown
to Minister Ezer Weizman, and I might
read the last paragraph of that because
it pertains to the subject. 2
I suggest that our two governments consult on
the scope and costs of the two new airbases as
well as on related forms of assistance which the
18
United States might appropriately provide in
light of the special problems which may be pre-
sented by carrying out such a project on an ur-
gent basis The President is prepared to seek the
necessary Congressional approvals tor such as-
sistance as may be agreed upon by the U.S. side
as a result of such negotiations.
That is the only agreement that has
been reached between the parties with
respect to the question of assistance.
We did, yesterday, discuss the ques-
tion of a possible loan to Israel, which
was raised by the Prime Minister. We
said that we would take the matter
under consideration. Obviously, that
kind of a question would require very
careful study.
The figure which you mentioned is
nowhere near the figure which was
suggested by the Prime Minister. It's
way above what the Prime Minister
suggested. I don't want to get into de-
tails because this is a matter which is
still under discussion, so I think I will
leave it at that.
Q. Could I just straighten out — so
in other words, the Sinai support
would come in the form of a loan — as
the negotiations now have it.
A. That is the request of Israel.
Q. And there would be no grant,
or there would be no —
A. That is their request.
Q. Could you tell us if you have
had any response from King Hussein
about possibly joining the negotia-
tions since the answers to his ques-
tions were delivered?
And secondly, if I might ask, do
you think it will be possible for Egypt
and Israel to proceed in negotiations
fairly rapidly to implement the plan
for Palestinian autonomy on the
West Bank even if Jordan does not
join the negotiations?
A. First, we have been in touch with
King Hussein. We are in touch with
him on a very frequent basis, both by
correspondence between the two heads
of government as well as through dip-
lomatic channels. It would be inappro-
priate for me to go into the details of
those conversations, but I can assure
that such conversations are continuing
on a regular basis.
With respect to your second ques-
tion: One of the documents which
would be exchanged in connection with
the signing of a peace treaty deals with
the question of timing in terms of ad-
dressing the issue of carrying out the
provisions of the general framework. I
don't want to go any further into detail
as to what that time might be, but let
me say, obviously, this is an important
subject and will be one which will be
addressed at the same time that the one
of the signing of the treaty is
addressed.
Q. In other words, the two sides
could proceed, do you think, to begin
implementing the plan for setting up
administrative councils in the West
Bank even if Jordan does not join the
talks?
A. I believe that is the case.
Q. Last night on public television
your Iran desk officer, Henry
Precht, appeared, and he reported
that there were quiet talks going on
between the Shah and some of the
moderate opposition leaders to
achieve a compromise, and that these
talks involve political and economic
issues. I wonder what you could tell
us about those talks and what the
prospects are that they might achieve
some sort of stability there?
A. Let me say a few words about
Iran and the situation in Iran, and then
I will speak briefly to your question.
Iran over the past decade has made a
very important contribution to the sta-
bility of the Middle East. The United
States has worked very closely with the
Shah, and Iran is a close and valued
ally.
Iran has recently reached a stage in
its development where the Shah has
believed it is essential to broaden par-
ticipation in the political life of Iran,
and we have supported this plan of
liberalization.
The continuing violence and the
strikes in Iran are a serious problem for
the government, and we fully support
the efforts of the Shah to restore order
while continuing his program of
liberalization. And we hope that
everyone in Iran will recognize that
continuing turmoil and destruction
serve no one's interest.
As to the specific question that you
raise, this is an internal question as to
what the exact nature of the discussions
are and a question which I think should
be addressed by the Iranians rather than
by the United States.
Q. Could you explain how the
United States believes that it will be
possible for you, at one and the same
time, to restore order and continue
liberalization?
A. I think that they are not at all in-
consistent. I think that law and order
can be restored. I think at the same
time one can continue along the course
which the Shah has charted for himself
and for his nation. As you know, he
has set forth a plan which would lead
Department of State Bulletin
to elections in the year 1979: and there
is no inconsistency in reestablishing
stability within the nation and moving
on subsequently to the holding of elec
tions according to his liberal izatior
plan.
Q. Did you get anywhere in youi
talks with Mr. Begin on the disput*
over the thickening of the West Bank
settlements? And I had a relatec
question about settlements. Is tin
United States, in principle —
A. One by one. On the question o
the thickening of the settlements, tha
question has not yet been resolved be
tween ourselves and Israel and remain
a continuing subject of discussion be
tween us.
Q. What is behind the fact that thi
new meeting between you and Mr
Gromyko has not been arranged? Di
you see a new date for a new round'
A. Since I went to Moscow and me
with Foreign Minister Gromyko an«
with President Brezhnev, we have beei
assessing, in an orderly way, the re
suits of the discussions which wer
held in those negotiations. In thi
meantime, the delegations have beei
continuing to meet in Geneva to dis
cuss the matters before them. When w
have completed our assessment, w
will be in touch with the Soviet Unio |fl
either through diplomatic channels c
through direct consultations at variou
levels, including possibly anothe
meeting between myself and th
Foreign Minister. It is proceeding in ajiir
orderly fashion. lis
Q. How do you get an administra ,
tive council — if you don't hav
partners such as Hussein and th
local Palestinians on the West Bank,
think that you said a moment ago
that you could still proceed with (h
process of getting this administratis
council set up. How do you do that i
you don't have the people to talk to'.
A. First of all, as you'll recall in thi
Camp David accords, there is provisioi
for Palestinians from the West Banl
and Gaza to participate as members o
the delegations of the various parties
That would mean that Egypt could in
elude such Palestinians in its delega
tion.
In addition, we would hope that, a.
the discussions get under way, we wil
begin to find people beginning to par
ticipate in a more active way througl
consultation with those who would bt
involved in the negotiations leading u[
to the setting up of the modalities fo
the elections.
There is. 1 think, certainly in m}
judgment, increasing interest on hov J
December 1978
■his process is going to work, and many
jbuestions are being asked about how it
ill be organized and how it will go
forward. So I think there is a real pos-
ibility that we will find more and more
nterest in participation as it goes
orward.
Q. Is the conclusion of the peace
talks between Egypt and Israel, in-
volving the United States, in any way
iependent upon or linked to a res-
)lution of the issue involving Ameri-
an aid for redeployment costs in the
Sinai or a resolution of the settle-
nents issue?
A. It has not been specifically
inked, no. No. They are obviously
questions which have been discussed,
■>ut there has been no direct linkage.
H Q. There have been reports, one,
here were secret talks between the
Jnited States and China on normali-
sation; two, Washington has ac-
cepted Peking's preconditions; and,
hree, normalization will take place
uy the end of President Carter's first
erm. I would like to have your
omment.
A. We stated at the outset of Presi-
lent Carter's Administration that one
i )f our objectives was the normalization
(i)f relations with the People's Republic
i >f China. We have also stated that the
]uestion of timing and modalities was
m issue, or a pair of issues, that would
i lave to be dealt with very carefully
hrough painstaking discussions. We
l ilso pointed out that an important fac-
tor was our concern for the well-being
)f the people of Taiwan.
We have had discussions ever since
jhe beginning of the Administration on
Shese basic issues. No decisions have
iieen made nor can I predict what either
jhe modalities or the timing would be
n reaching such an ultimate objective
is we have set for ourselves.
Q. There has been a very large
iropaganda campaign in the Soviet
doc countries against the develop-
nent of the neutron weapon in this
country. I'd like to ask you if any of
the Soviet bloc countries has ever
nade formal representations to our
government on the subject of the
neutron bomb?
A. I specifically discussed this sub-
ject in Moscow when I was there and
expressed our views as to the question,
and they expressed their views with re-
spect to the issue.
Q. Who started it?
A. I can't remember whether they
did or I did, but it was discussed.
Q. And that was the only time this
has come up in government-to-
government talks?
A. In the past there have been, as
you know, letters written by the Soviet
Union to a number of countries on the
question of the enhanced radiation
weapon.
Q. But to us?
A. We have received in the past a
letter on this, yes.
Q. Yesterday the State Depart-
ment issued a very harsh statement
following the raids into Zambia. Do
you believe that these recent raids
cast serious doubts about the sincer-
ity of the Smith regime to attend an
all-parties conference?
A. Let me say some general words
about the situation in Rhodesia and
then I'll answer specifically your ques-
tion.
I must be very frank with you that
there have been setbacks in trying to
make progress toward the peaceful res-
olution of the problem of Rhodesia.
These setbacks have occurred on both
sides. They are to be seen in such
things as the shooting down of the Vis-
count and the deaths of civilians in
Rhodesia. They have also been re-
flected in the attacks such as those
which you referred to. Both of these
kinds of actions have been a real set-
back to the chance of achieving a
peaceful resolution of this problem.
The basic question is whether or not
the parties have the will to achieve
a peaceful settlement. I don't know the
answer to that question. I can say,
however, that clearly the task has been
made more difficult by such things as
the raids that you have referred to.
Coming to your specific question,
although Mr. Smith stated when he was
here in the United States that he was
prepared to go to an all-parties confer-
ence without preconditions, at the very
same time, raids were being launched
across the border which were an ob-
vious impediment to the holding of any
such talks.
Let me stress, however, that we still
believe very strongly that the door must
be kept open and that we must work
toward trying to find a peaceful solu-
tion to the Rhodesian problem through
the joint efforts of ourselves, the
British, and others. And this would be
done, in our judgment, through free
and fair and independent elections
which would lead to the free choice of
the people of Zimbabwe in determining
who their future leaders should be and
what the form of that government
should be. And we will continue to
support those efforts.
19
Q. Mr. Secretary, Chinese Vice
Premier Teng Hsiao-ping recently vis-
ited Japan, and he said there will be
no war in the Korean Peninsula by
North Korean attack. And both
Prime Minister Fukuda and Teng
Hsiao-ping agreed on the need of re-
sumption of the dialogue between
North and South Korea.
What is your assessment on this
agreement and what is U.S. policy on
the dialogue issue of North and South
Korea?
A. We have encouraged a dialogue
between the South Koreans and the
North Koreans to resolve their differ-
ences. There has been difficulty, as
you know, however, in ever getting
any such a dialogue going or. in the
one occasion where it really started, to
keep it going on the tracks. It petered
out, and it has not been able to go for-
ward. So, therefore, we would encour-
age discussions that could lead to a
peaceful resolution of the differences
between them.
But insofar as we are concerned, we
would not enter into any such discus-
sions, even if invited, unless the South
Koreans were present. We have made
this very, very clear.
Q. There have been a number of
reports to the effect that China and
France are negotiating over the sale
of some antitank and other types of
essentially defensive weapons. The
U.S. policy is that it will not sell
weapons to the People's Republic of
China.
I wonder if you've made any rep-
resentations to the French about
whether you think they should, as a
member of the NATO alliance, sell
weapons to the People's Republic of
China and whether the Soviets have
brought the issue up in your discus-
sions with them, and what they have
said about their feelings about it.
A. As you correctly stated, it is our
strong and unequivocal policy that we
do not intend to, nor will we, sell
military equipment — weapons — to
either the People's Republic of China
or to the Soviet Union.
Insofar as other nations are con-
cerned, this is a matter which each of
them must decide for itself.
Thirdly, with respect to your ques-
tion, has this ever been raised with us
by the Soviet Union, the answer is yes,
it has been raised by the Soviet Union.
This is a matter of great sensitivity to
the Soviet Union, and they have raised
the question of the sale of weapons to
the People's Republic of China not
only with us but with many other
nations.
20
Q. I wonder if you could say what
impact the sentencing of the two
Soviet spies in Newark has had on
Soviet- American relations — whether
there have been any protests, any
threats of retaliation; and whether
the SALT talks are being held a
hostage to that sentencing; and what
the prospects are for release of these
two men before serving their 50-year
terms?
A. The SALT talks are not being
held a hostage to this matter.
Secondly, the question of the two
Soviets who have just been sentenced
has obviously been a subject of discus-
sion between ourselves and the Soviet
Union on a number of occasions. I
think it's inappropriate for me to go
into the substance of the discussions in
a public forum such as this.
Q. You and [Deputy] Secretary
Christopher had a lot to do with the
President's setting up an intervention
fund to support the dollar. Are you
now fully prepared to cooperate with
Chancellor Schmidt's so-called new
European monetary system, since it
also has as its stated goal supporting
the international role of the dollar?
A. Our position with respect to the
European proposal is that in principle
we support the proposal. Insofar as
what the details of the proposal will be.
obviously that's something that we
would like to take a look at when you
get down to fine print; but in principle
we would support it
Q. I understood you said there is
still a disagreement on the West
Bank settlements. I am interested in
exactly where things stand. What did
you say to Mr. Begin? Did you say
that by adding 400 new families to
the settlements he would be going
against the commitment he made at
Camp David?
A. I'm not going to go into the de-
tails of what I said to Mr. Begin. It's
not appropriate that I should do so. He
understands our position very, very
clearly on this.
Q. We don't; I don't.
A. It is not appropriate for me to go
into the details of our conversation.
Q. Just to discuss another issue of
recognition, early on in the Admin-
istration you said that the United
States would be willing to have dip-
lomatic relations with Hanoi so long
as there were no preconditions. It's
been reported that the Vietnamese
are now saying they have no precon-
ditions on diplomatic relations.
Can you predict when you might
actually have an exchange of embas-
sies or something like that, or what's
holding up such a decision?
A. Let me say the answer is no, you
cannot predict. Let me then review
what the situation is.
As you know, last year we had three
sets of meetings, which took place in
Paris, with respect to the overall ques-
tion of normalization. During those
talks, the position of the Vietnamese
was laid out. That position was one
which was unacceptable to the United
States because of the demand for aid.
There has been another meeting re-
cently, as you know, at the United Na-
tions during the General Assembly, at
which there was a general review of the
situation as between our two nations.
The position of the Vietnamese is
somewhat clarified as a result of those
discussions. No decisions, however,
have been made with respect to this
issue. And as I said at the outset, I
cannot make any prediction about if
and when there would be normaliza-
tion.
Q. Could you say whether they
have dropped their demand for aid
as a precondition for normalization?
A. I would interpret what they are
saying now as having dropped that
condition.
Q. With respect to the fighting be-
tween Tanzania and Uganda, as nearly
as you can determine, what is behind
that conflict and what is the United
States doing to help the situation in
view of President Nyerere's
determination — or stated determina-
tion — to pursue the thing militarily?
A. Our information with respect to
the situation is both fragmentary and
sketchy.
I think we do have the general out-
lines, probably, of what is taking place
now. It is quite clear that Ugandan
troops have crossed the border and
penetrated 18 miles, at least, into Tan-
zanian territory. The fighting is going
forward there. Insofar as American
citizens are concerned, who were in the
area, all of those are safe and ac-
counted for.
Our position is very clear on this.
This is a clear violation of the borders
of Tanzania by Uganda. This is totally
in conflict with the principle of the
OAU [Organization of African Unity]
which relates to the territorial integrity
of all of the African states, and we
fully and completely support the posi-
tion of President Nyerere that the
forces of Uganda should be withdrawn
immediately in accordance with the
well-established principles of territorial
Department of State Bulletin^.
integrity. And we will work to support
diplomatically the achievement of that
objective.
Q. Just to clear up one point on
the Middle East, you said early on
that you resolved almost all substan-
tive issues. That came within the
context of your meeting with Mr
Begin. Are there any substantive is
sues that the United States has with
Egypt, or are they all — the few that
remain — with Israel?
A. When I said almost all, I really
mean almost all.
Q. In terms of both sides?
A. Both sides, both sides.
□
Press release 413.
'For texts of the documents agreed to at
Camp David, see Bulletin of Oct. 1978, p. 7.
2 For the full text of this letter and other ac
companying letters, see Bulletin of Oct.
1978. p. 10.
Secretary Vance
to Visit Europe
and the Middle East
On December 5, 1978, Department
spokesman Hodding Carter III an-
nounced that Secretary Vance will visit
London December 8-10 to address the
Royal Institute of International Affairs.
He will then proceed to Cairo on De-
cember 10 and thereafter to Jerusalem
to explore ways of resuming the
Egypt-Israeli discussions with the ob-
jective of concluding the negotiations
which have been conducted on the
basis of the frameworks agreed to at
Camp David. The Secretary's trip fol-
lows our consultations with both gov-
ernments, including the recent talks in
Washington with Prime Minister Khali!
and the exchange of letters between
President Sadat and Prime Minister
Begin. D
:
K
■P
ecember 1978
21
AFRICA: Secretary Vance
Discusses Namibia
With South African Officials
Secretary Vance departed Washing-
n October 13, 1978, for Pretoria,
here he met with South African Gov-
nment officials (October 14-18) to
scuss Namibia. (He then traveled to
eneva before going to Moscow.)
allowing are the texts of the Secre-
ry's news conference held in Geneva
d three statements issued in Pretoria
October 19.
jSCRETARY'S NEWS
CONFERENCE,
ENEVA, OCT. 19'
I think you've all probably had
*'pies handed to you now of the draft
uint statement which was distributed at
12 press conference which was held a
It earlier today in Pretoria by the
,)Uth African Government [text fol-
ws this news conference]. As you
i ve been able to see from the draft
lint statement, it contains certain
ims on which agreement was reached
; d other items on which agreement
'is not reached.
The items on which there was
i reement in principle were those re-
!:ing to issues where there was further
urification required. The first of those
ms the question of the police force.
Isofar as that is concerned it appears
lit that no longer is a problem insofar
1 the South Africans are concerned,
nereas previously they had raised
< estions on that provision of the Sec-
itary General's report and of the
|oposal.
Secondly, insofar as the issue of
(nsultations is concerned, again there,
( the document which was issued ear-
1t says that the South African delega-
l>n felt that the question of consulta-
l»n now can be resolved.
On the question of troops, again
l;re the issue seems to be resolved in
.■ms of principle.
In paragraph 3 of the document — and
might read it because I think it's an
iportant paragraph — it's stated that
:he South African Government and
e five Foreign Ministers accordingly
lieve that it would now be appro-
bate for the Secretary General's spe-
lal representative, Mr. Ahtisaari
larti Ahtisaari of Finland], to resume
s discussion with the South African
dministrator General of Namibia
[Martinus Steyn] within the framework
of Security Council Resolution 435
which endorsed the Secretary General's
report. The aim of these discussions
would be to work out the modalities of
the proposed elections under U.N.
supervision and to fix a date for these
elections."
It goes on then to say "the five
Foreign Ministers, therefore, intend to
recommend to the Secretary General
that he should instruct Mr. Ahtisaari to
proceed to Windhoek as soon as possi-
ble. In addition, it was regarded as ap-
propriate to recommend to the Secre-
tary General that he begin consultations
on the composition of the military
component of UNTAG [U.N. Transi-
tion Assistance Group].
The next two paragraphs indicate a
clear difference of view — a sharp dif-
ference of view — between the two
parties.
Paragraph 4 deals with the position
of the South African Government with
respect to elections which they have
planned for December which they de-
scribe as elections which must be seen
as an internal process to elect leaders.
The five Foreign Ministers state in
the joint statement that with regard to
the unilateral elections in December,
they saw no way of reconciling such
elections with the proposal which they
put forward and which the Security
Council has endorsed. They further
stated that any such unilateral measure
in relation to the electoral process will
be regarded as null and void.
Accordingly, in sum, what you have
is a disagreement on the latter two is-
sues but an agreement in principle on
other important issues which had been
unresolved and a joint recommendation
that Mr. Ahtisaari, the special repre-
sentative of the Secretary General,
should proceed as soon as possible to
Windhoek to resume discussions with
the Administrator General to determine
the modalities for working out the
necessary steps and procedures and the
fixing of a date for elections under
Resolution 435 [see p. 57].
Q. Aren't those two mutually
contradictory in the sense that the
South Africans are saying elections
they're going to hold are legitimate
and at the same time the five Foreign
Ministers and apparently the South
Africans are saying there are going
to be other elections?
A. The South Africans have said in
their unilateral statement that they re-
gard elections which they have planned
for December as elections which are an
internal matter to elect leaders. What
will happen with respect to those elec-
tions, what the function of those lead-
ers would be, whether it would be an
advisory function to the Administrator
General remains to be seen, and it re-
mains to be seen whether indeed, in
fact, the elections themselves will go
forward.
We both agree — both sides — that it
is at the heart of the matter that we go
forward to complete the process of set-
ting up the procedures for elections
pursuant to Security Council Resolu-
tion 435 and that we should get at that
business immediately. So the important
thing is the one election — and the only
election that really counts — namely
that under the resolution enacted by the
Security Council.
Q. That's a rather flat statement,
there's no way of reconciling and yet
when Mr. Botha [South African
Prime Minister Pieter Botha] says he
will use his best efforts to persuade
local leaders elected in December to
go ahead with a later election, do you
still find no air there — no room to
qualify the very flat statement, no
way of reconciling?
A. I think we're going to have to
wait and see what actually does happen
with respect to December elections.
And if they are minimized, that's one
situation. The important thing is to see
the implementation of the action with
respect to the U.N. elections, and that
is the key that we have to take a look at.
Q. I'm sorry, I don't know what
you mean by "minimize."
A. We don't know actually, if such
elections are held, what the function of
the so-called leaders would be. If it
were an advisory function, that would
be one thing, and it would have a
minimal effect; so that I think if they're
talking about that kind of a thing, then
it means one thing. And if they show
that they are determined to go forward
and to work with Mr. Ahtisaari to bring
about final and complete elections
which would lead to an independent
Namibia under the U.N. resolution,
then that's something different.
Q. Is it clear to you whether South
Africa intends to maintain sov-
ereignty over South West Africa after
they have the December elections and
the leaders are chosen, is it clear that
22
they will continue to be responsible
for the actions of those chosen lead-
ers, or is the possibility now being
left open by South Africa that those
leaders will have the right to deter-
mine the course of Southwest Africa
themselves? Is that implicit in saying
they will try to persuade them —
A. No. It is not. South Africa will
retain sovereignty.
Q. It has committed itself to that?
A. That is clear. Yes.
Q. Mr. Botha is being quoted this
morning saying that after the outcome
of the December elections. South Af-
rica will remain in charge of the ter-
ritory, enabling the United Nations to
effectively disregard the poll. Now why
would they have an election and then
enable the United Nations to disregard
the poll?
A. It is up to them to decide how
they want to handle their own internal
affairs. The important thing is, how are
we going to go forward and carry out
the elections under the Security Coun-
cil resolution which will lead to a fair
and independent election pursuant to
which an independent Namibia can
come into being.
Q. Do you have a target date for
elections?
A. We have stated we thought that
elections could be held in May or June,
and one of the important things which
SECRETARY'S STATEMENT,
PRETORIA, OCT. 18*
First on behalf of my colleagues and
myself. 1 wish to express our deep ap-
preciation to our hosts for their very
kind hospitality. We have come many
thousands of miles to engage in these
discussions in the search for a peaceful
resolution of the problem of Namibia.
Our discussions have been intensive.
They have continued, as you know, over
a period of 3 days. During that period
we have put several proposals on the
table Those proposals are still being
considered by the South African Gov-
ernment. Their consideration of these
proposals will continue throughout today
and this evening and tomorrow morning,
and I expect that they will be making an
announcement tomorrow sometime with
respect to their conclusions
Accordingly, we do not believe that it
is appropriate for us to make any com-
ments on the details of any of these pro-
posals until the South African Govern-
ment has reached its conclusions.
♦Press release 394 of Oct. 19, 1978
Mr. Ahtisaari would be discussing
would be the fixing of a date.
Q. These clear sharp differences of
view that you referred to, where do
those differences lead you in refer-
ence to the possibility of the imposi-
tion of sanctions? When you get back
to the States this question is certainly
going to come up at the United
Nations.
A. I think at this point one has to see
what happens with respect to the ques-
tion of Mr. Ahtisaari going out to
Southwest Africa — to Namibia — to
have his discussions with Mr. Steyn —
Judge Steyn. And until we see what
happens there I don't think we get to
the question which you raise.
Q. Do you have a commitment
from the South Africans that Justice
Martinus Steyn will continue to be
the Administrator General after the
December elections?
A. No.
Q. Do you have an agreement on a
date for indpendence?
A. A date for independence? The
date for independence will be depend-
ent upon the procedures set forth in the
proposal. I'll ask Mr. McHenry
[Deputy U.S. Representative to the
U.N. Security Council Donald
McHenry] to speak to that.
A. [Ambassador McHenry]. The
date for independence was left open in
the proposal because much will depend
upon what the constituent assembly de-
cides to do. It could, conceivably, de-
cide that it was agreed upon the nature
of a constitution and turn itself into a
new government, in which case the in-
dependence would be very early.
Or it could decide to draft a con-
stitution, submit that constitution to
another election — that is to approve the
constitution — in which case the date for
independence would be further off. But
it was left open there because one had
to get the views of the constituent
assembly.
Q. This is the constituent assembly
that follows out of the U.N.—
A. U.N. -supervised elections.
Q. Are you in a situation here
which is roughly comparable to
Rhodesia in the sense that once the
internal election is held, then the
other side— SWAPO [South West Af-
rica People's Organization] — will say
that since they have constituted
themselves as a government, that
they are unwilling to come in on the
terms laid down by that government
for elections, very much in the way
Department of State Bullet
that the patriotic front now refusi
to —
v.
to
or
A. No, I don't think that's the casfni
and I certainly don't accept that a
sumption. I think the common aim c
all the parties is to try and move fo
ward to a date at which there can H
final elections to set up an independe
government.
Q. When was the language in l¥
joint communique agreed? What w
the process that occurred after yc||B
left Pretoria? Can you just give us a
outline on that?
A. We made a number of pn
posals which we left with them-
several proposals. I would put it — ai
one of the proposals was a propos
to — in the exact form that we ha'
here. They said that they would want
discuss among themselves and wi
such other people as they would wi
to call in to meet with them the vario'
proposals which we had made and thi
would be in touch with us with respe
to what their determinations were aft
such consultations. We had agreed wi
them in advance that all of the propc
als which we made remain on tl
table so that we would be willing to a
cept any of those proposals includi;
this particular proposal.
Q. Can you tell us what the oth
proposals were?
A. No, I'm not going to go into tf
now.
Q. Have you been in touch with St
retary General Waldheim on this?
A. Yes, I have.
Q. Before the formal stateme
was issued, the things that you s;
here that you're going to recommei
to him you've already talked ov
informally?
A. I talked to him in the most ge
eral terms yesterday about this becau
before there was agreement. I didr
feel it was appropriate to discuss wi
anybody what the various particul
elements of the proposal were. I ha
been in touch with his office th
morning, and I have discussed the sp
h
cific elements with some of his cc
leagues, and I will be talking to hi
directly later on, after this pre
conference.
Q. With Mr. Ahtisaari — have yc
dealt with him directly? n
A. No, I have not— with the Und^tr
Secretaries, yes. ' *
Q. Can you confirm whether i *
not President Carter invited M'
Botha to come to the United Stat 1 t
and what the conditions are?
December 1978
A. No, I don't want to get into any-
ling having to do with the exchange of
orrespondence between the President
nd Prime Minister Botha. As you
now, insofar as personal letters be-
ween heads of government are con-
erned, that's up to the two heads of
overnment to decide whether or not
ley want to make those public, and I
ave no authority at this point to indi-
ate the —
Q. It was said this morning on
IBC that the invitation was
xtended.
A. That's BBC's comment.
Q. Could you give your interpre-
ition of the unilateral South African
tatement? It seems they're talking
bout the U.N. elections, that is a
eally firm commitment to those.
A. On the unilateral statement as you
now, we have issued what we call an
iditional statement of the five in re-
>onse to this unilateral statement, and
ere we point out that it is necessary to
ovide a firm framework for the elec-
ral process and to reduce uncertainty.
We go on to say that insofar as a
ate is concerned, that no one can be
lowed to delay unilaterally the hold-
g of U.N. -supervised elections. And
en we went on to point out that if the
ireed date of the election appeared to
: at risk through acts of violence or
timidation or any other failure to
irry out the provisions of the propos-
s, it would be for the Secretary Gen-
i al to bring the matter immediately to
Security Council and that the gov-
nments of the Western five undertook
support necessary action in the Se-
irity Council.
We then went on to point out further
at the five Western governments also
idertook to maintain observers in
indhoek during the transitional
riod and to do everything possible to
sure the implementation of the pro-
>sals which we have put forward.
We concluded by stating that we
ere confident that the Security Coun-
1 would respond promptly and effec-
/ely to any situation where the agreed
ite of the election appeared to be at
k and would maintain the election
ite and that, therefore, there would be
i) case for any unilateral action. We
ink that that completely answers the
i lil ateral statement issued by the
|j"ime Minister.
Q. Do you have any doubt that
lere will be a U.N. -supervised elec-
9n?
I A. We'll have to see what happens
[(hen we have further conversations
j:tween Mr. Ahtisaari and the Ad-
inistrator General.
Q. To turn it around, there are no
assurances though?
A. There are no assurances at this
point.
Q. Don't you think that the reac-
tion of the United Nations is going to
be that this is much less than satis-
factory?
A. I don't know what the U.N. Se-
curity Council is going to say. I believe
that what has been proposed here is, or
reflects, a step forward. I believe it
clearly reflects a desire on the part of
the parties to see whether we cannot
move forward to complete the process
under Security Council Resolution 435
and that that is a positive sign. There
may be differences of view with re-
spect to this in the Security Council,
and we'll have to see when the discus-
sion of that takes place.
Q. Is it inaccurate to describe this
as a standoff?
A. [Laughter] I don't want to
characterize it as a standoff or use any
other single word to characterize it.
What I would like to say is that I think
that it indicates some progress. We'll
have to wait and see whether or not it
works out.
Q. Have you been in touch with
any of the black African countries
which had earlier talked about seek-
ing economic sanctions if full accept-
ance by South Africa had not come
by next Monday? Have you been in
touch with them on this situation
which has now been developed to see
whether they are intending to con-
tinue to push for sanctions next
Monday?
A. We — the five — have either been
in touch or will be in touch today with
all of those countries. I informed one
of them last night on my way back of
what had happened during the 3 days of
discussions.
Q. At the point of being in touch
simply to explain what happened or
to seek their understanding of wait-
ing a little longer than beyond next
Monday, or what?
A. Our objective is to explain what
has happened, to answer their ques-
tions, and to urge them to let the proc-
ess which we are recommending go
forward.
Q. This is hypothetical and also a
step back a couple of years in time.
In your experience with American
business, and on our needs for cer-
tain manganese and other valuable
imports from South Africa, should
there be sanctions, simply — and
23
maybe simple-mindedly put — would
it hurt South Africa or us more?
A. I really don't want to get into that
question. That is a hypothetical ques-
tion. Obviously, the question of sanc-
tions has been looked at in the past and
evaluations have been made on such is-
sues as you raise but I — the issue is not
before us at this moment, and I prefer
not to bring it up.
Q. Has there been any consultation
with American business leaders
about the possibility or at least the
consideration of sanctions — any in-
formal readings or consultations?
A. The only work which has been
done in this area over the past has been
basically discussions within the gov-
ernment itself.
Q. Had you hoped, before you
went to Pretoria, to be able to talk
the South Africans out of the De-
cember elections?
A. The answer is yes. I had hoped
to, but we were unable to do so.
Q. Are you disappointed?
A. [Laughter] I think the situation
speaks for itself.
Q. We didn't have any details of
what actually went on Monday and
Tuesday. Can you give us any help
on that? What you started in on, how
you proceeded along, just fill in —
A. Yes, I can fill you in briefly on
that. We started in, as you know, with
a meeting with the Prime Minister. The
Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister,
the Secretary of State, and General
Mallan were at the meeting on behalf
of the South African Government, and
the five [Western] Foreign Ministers
were present representing our respective
countries.
We started off with a general discus-
sion of the overall situation, each of us
expressing our views with respect to
the general situation. We then began to
discuss some of the more specific as-
pects of it.
Following that the Prime Minister
turned the meeting over to a discussion
between the Foreign Minister and his
colleagues and ourselves, and from
there on it was a question of discus-
sions and negotiations between the
Foreign Minister and his colleagues
and ourselves.
However, as I pointed out — no, I don't
guess I did — but the fact is that the
Prime Minister joined us from time-
to-time during the 2 days that followed
that first day. He joined us at dinner
where we had a working dinner —
substantive dinner — where we dis-
24
Department of State Bulletit
cussed these issues, and from time-to-
time during our discussions the five of
us together with the Foreign Minister
joined the Prime Minister to discuss the
issues. So he participated in the discus-
sions as well as people at the ministe-
rial level.
Q. At any time during the discus-
sions, did you discuss the South Afri-
can domestic racial problem situa-
tion?
A. I had general discussions cover-
ing a whole variety of issues with the
Prime Minister.
Q. Do you see a successful resolu-
tion of the Namibia conflict as lead-
ing to a more normal relationship
between the United States and South
Africa that would involve implicitly
an attempt by the United States — by
the Carter Administration — to have
greater understanding of South Af-
rica's problems?
A. I think that a satisfactory resolu-
tion of the Namibian problem would
have a beneficial effect not only in
Namibia and in the relationships in the
region in general, but obviously it
would help in terms of the atmosphere
between the United States and the Gov-
ernment of South Africa.
Q. You have spoken in the past of
the relationship between Namibia
and Rhodesia. Does the mixed suc-
cess that you had here retard in any
way your hopes for making progress
on Rhodesia?
A. On the Rhodesian situation, we
will know a little bit more about it
when we have the meetings with Mr.
Smith on Friday in Washington. Again,
the situation is not very clear as to what
the facts actually are, but I hope we'll
have some further clarification as a re-
sult of the meetings on Friday.
I continue to believe that it is very
much in the interest of all of the parties
first, to bring the bloodshed to an end
in Rhodesia; secondly, to move as fast
as possible toward free and fair elec-
tions; and thirdly, in that process, that
this be done by an all-parties confer-
ence. I would certainly agree that any
such all-parties conference must be a
well-prepared conference at which all
the parties could sit down together,
then the chances of arriving at a
peaceful solution — a solution which re-
solved the differences among the vari-
ous parties — is much greater than the
situation we face now where there is
just no conversation between them.
JOINT SOUTH AFRICAN-
WESTERN FIVE STATEMENT,
OCT. 19 2
On 25 April 1978 the South African
Government announced its acceptance
of the proposals of the Western five for
an internationally acceptable settlement
of the Namibia problem. However,
when the U.N. Secretary General pub-
lished his report on the implementation
of the proposals, the South African
Government expressed concern that
certain aspects of the report were not in
accordance with the Western proposal.
The areas of concern were the size of
the military component of UNTAG, the
question of consultations, the proposal
for police monitors, and the date of the
elections. The statement by the Secre-
tary General in the Security Council on
29 September addressed itself to
clarification of these areas of concern.
The five Foreign Ministers and the
South African Government discussed
these clarifications further in order to
establish common ground on the im-
plementation of the report of the Sec-
retary General.
The following main points were
examined.
I. Police Force.
While the South African delegation
considered the number of civilian per-
sonnel envisaged for police-monitoring
responsibilities excessive, it believed
that the Secretary General's explana-
tory statement in the Security Council
had removed South Africa's preoccu-
pation with the character and role of
the personnel concerned. It had become
clear that the functions of the existing
police forces would not be affected.
II. Consultation.
The five intimated their agreement
that they were committed to the princi-
ple of fair consultation, emphasizing
that this had been reaffirmed by the
Secretary General in his introductory
statement of 29 September in the Se-
curity Council. This would cover, inter
alia, the composition and actual size of
the military component of UNTAG.
The five intimated that they would seek
confirmation that their interpretation
coincided with that of the Secretary
General. On that basis the South Afri-
can delegation felt that the question of
consultation could be resolved.
III. Troops.
The composition and the actual total
figure of UNTAG would be determined
by the Secretary General after consul-
tation by his special representative with
the Administrator General in the light
of the prevailing circumstances.
The South African Government and
the five Foreign Ministers accordingly
believe that it would now be appro-
priate for the Secretary General's spe
cial representative, Mr. Ahtisaari, tc
resume his discussion with the Soutr
African Administrator General o:
Namibia within the framework of Se
curity Council Resolution 435 whicr
endorsed the Secretary General's re
port. The aim of these discussion;
would be to work out the modalities o
the proposed elections under U.N
supervision and to fix a date for thest
elections. The five Foreign Ministers
therefore, intend to recommend to th<
Secretary General that he should in
struct Mr. Ahtisaari to proceed to Wind
hoek as soon as possible. In addition
it was regarded as appropriate to rec
ommend to the Secretary General tha
he begin consultations on the composi
tion of the military component o
UNTAG.
The South African Governmen
stated that the planned December elec
tions must be seen as an internal proc
ess to elect leaders.
The South African Government wil
thereafter use its best efforts to per
suade them seriously to consider way
and means of achieving internationa
recognition through the good offices o
the special representative and the Ad
ministrator General.
In the implementation of this goa
the special representative would con
suit with the Administrator General o
all aspects of the Secretary General'
report (including the fixing of a furthe
election date).
The five Foreign Ministers state
with regard to the unilateral election
in December that they saw no way o
reconciling such elections with th
proposal which they put forward am
which the Security Council has en-
dorsed. Any such unilateral measure ii
relation to the electoral process will b<
regarded as null and void.
SOUTH AFRICAN STATEMENT,
OCT. 19
No South African troop reductioi
without peace. Election date not to bi
affected by continuation of violence.
1 . The South African delegatioi
stressed that the reduction of Soutl
African troops in South West Afric;
would only commence if and when ;
complete and a comprehensive cessa
tion of hostilities had been brough
about.
2. A continuation of violence can
therefore, interrupt and delay indefi
nitely the reduction of South Afncai
troops and, therefore, conceivably alsc
the holding of elections.
"(December 1978
3. To prevent any party from unilat-
erally delaying the holding of elec-
tions, it is, therefore, necessary that a
firm election date be fixed. This date
must then be adhered to irrespective of
whether there is a cessation of hos-
tilities and a consequent reduction of
South African troops.
WESTERN FIVE STATEMENT,
OCT. 19 3
25
The fixing of a date is necessary to
provide a firm framework for the elec-
toral process and to reduce uncertainty.
The proposals of the Western five
adopted by the Security Council estab-
ished a number of prerequisites before
a 1the official political campaign starts. In
this connection the South African Gov-
ernment stressed that the withdrawal of
South African troops would only begin
upon cessation of hostilities. The five
oointed out that this would be brought
about following notification to the
Secretary General of an agreed cease-
fire.
No party can be allowed to delay
jnilaterally the holding of U.N. super-
vised elections. If the agreed date of
:he election appeared to be at risk
Jirough acts of violence or intimidation
jr any other failure to carry out the
provisions of the proposals, it would be
or the Secretary General to bring the
natter immediately to the Security
Zouncil and the governments of the
ie Western five undertake to support
accessary action in the Security Coun-
:il. The five Western governments
indertake to maintain observers in
11 Windhoek during the transitional
oeriod and to do everything possible to
nsure the implementation of the pro-
posals leading to elections on the
igreed date.
The five Foreign Ministers are con-
ident that the Security Council would
espond promptly and effectively to
iny situation where the agreed date of
he election appeared to be at risk and
.vould maintain that election date and
hat there will, therefore, be no case
i, 'or any unilateral action. □
•Press release 396 of Oct. 20, 1978.
Mssued in Pretoria (text from USUN press
elease 100 of Oct. 20).
"Issued in Pretoria (text from USUN press
release 101 of Oct. 20)
t .S.. I .It.. Rhodesian
Executive Council Meeting
DEPARTMENT
ANNOUNCEMENT,
OCT. 16"
Members of the Senate Foreign Re-
lations Committee have informed the
Department that on October 12 Ian
Smith told them he was now in favor of
an all-parties conference with no pre-
conditions. On October 14 in San
Diego, Mr. Smith reportedly added that
all members of the Rhodesian Execu-
tive Council shared this view.
After consultation with members of
the Senate Foreign Relations Commit-
tee about their discussion with Mr.
Smith, the Department has invited him
and his colleagues on the Executive
Council to meet in Washington with
senior Department officials and British
representatives at the end of the week
for a further exploration of the views
they have expressed to the Senate
committee.
It is recognized by all that a suc-
cessful all-parties meeting will require
thorough and careful preparation, in-
cluding advance consideration of an
PARTICIPANTS
United States
David D. Newsom, Acting Secretary of
State (Under Secretary for Political
Affairs)
Richard Moose, Assistant Secretary for
African Affairs
Anthony Lake, Director, Policy Plan-
ning Staff
Stephen Low, U.S. Ambassador to Zam-
bia
George Moose, Deputy Director, Office
of South African Affairs
Ann Holloway, Assistant to U.S. Am-
bassador to the U.N. Andrew Young
Mary Ann Spiegel, Member, Policy
Planning Staff
United Kingdom
Peter Jay, Ambassador to the U.S.
Clifford Squire, Counselor, British Em-
bassy
Rhodesian Executive Council
Reverend Ndabanigi Sithole, Current
Chairman
Ian Smith, Member
Bishop Abel Muzorewa, Member
Chief Jeremiah Chirau, Member
John Gaylard, Secretary, Executive
Council
John Snell. Secretary to Mr. Smith
Kenneth Towsey, Director, Rhodesian
Information Office
agenda. It is anticipated, therefore, that
in addition to this further discussion
with Mr. Smith and his associates,
there will be discussions with the other
parties as well.
JOINT U.S.-U.K. STATEMENT,
OCT. 20 2
In the course of discussions today
with representatives of the British and
American Governments, the members
of the Rhodesian Executive Council
confirmed their willingness to attend a
well-prepared all-parties conference
without preconditions.
In that context, the two sides iden-
tified certain broad areas for discussion
between the parties and discussed the
issues to be considered at a conference
and other relevant matters.
The British and American Govern-
ments now plan to hold discussions
with the other parties before proceed-
ing further.
The British and American represen-
tatives reiterated their strong concern
over the escalating cycle of violence in
the area. In particular, they referred to
the raids into Zambia and Mozambique
and the likely impact of these actions
on the negotiating situation. □
'Read to news correspondents by acting De-
partment spokesman Tom Reston.
-Read to news correspondents by acting De-
partment spokesman Tom Reston; also issued
as USUN press release 102.
Rhodesian
Raids
DEPARTMENT STATEMENT,
OCT. 23'
On October 19 the Department con-
demned the reported Rhodesian raids
into Mozambique and Zambia, noting
our concern that this intensification of
the fighting would jeopardize efforts to
bring about a negotiated settlement in
Rhodesia. In his meeting with members
of the Rhodesian Executive Council on
October 20, Acting Secretary of State
David Newsom reiterated these con-
cerns directly to the Salisbury parties.
The Rhodesian attacks now appear to
be among the heaviest and most de-
structive of the war, particularly in
terms of the loss of life. We especially
regret that these attacks were carried
out while the Executive Council was
traveling in the United States em-
phasizing its readiness to negotiate.
This dramatic and untimely escala-
tion will not bring about an end to
conflict; it inflames the attitudes of
other parties and could confound ef-
forts to promote meaningful negotia-
tions. Should these actions continue,
the violence and suffering will be pro-
longed, and a negotiated solution will
become still more difficult to achieve.
The United States has repeatedly
condemned the escalation of violence
by both sides in the Rhodesian conflict.
If there is to be any hope of achieving
an early settlement to this increasingly
brutal and dangerous conflict, then it is
incumbent upon all parties to recognize
and demonstrate the wisdom of re-
straint.
DEPARTMENT STATEMENT,
NOV. 2 2
The Rhodesian military has an-
nounced that its planes have again
bombed targets in Zambia. Initial re-
ports indicate that some of these targets
were in heavily populated areas within
a few miles of the capital of Lusaka.
These attacks constitute a further un-
warranted and deplorable escalation of
the Rhodesian war.
The United States is deeply disturhei
by these actions and strongly deplore;
this latest in a series of recent military
actions which threaten to create ar
even more dangerous situation in
southern Africa.
Such actions can only add to the ten
sions, bitterness, and distrust among
the parties and make it more difficult k
achieve a settlement that will end the
fighting and bloodshed. If there is to be
any hope of bringing this brutal and
dangerous conflict to an end, actions
such as these must cease.
ti
'Read to news correspondents by acting De-
partment spokesman Tom Reston.
-'Read to news correspondents by acting De-
partment spokesman Kenneth Brown.
December 1978
Southern Rhodesia
7 oreign Relations Outline 1
A British colony since 1890,
Uiodesia today is populated by about
!53,00O whites and 6.5 million blacks,
"he white colonists obtained self-
.overnment in 1923, and since that
lime they have severely limited the
lolitical rights and economic opportu-
nities of blacks.
In November 1965, after rejecting
Sritain's insistence that he move to-
ward majority rule. Prime Minister Ian
imith announced a "unilateral decla-
ation of independence" from the
Jnited Kingdom. The U.N. Security
'ouncil, with U.S. support, imposed
imited economic sanctions on
r.hodesia in 1966 and a virtually total
mbargo on trade in 1968. For over 10
lears, the struggle has continued —
irough guerrilla warfare and political
ction — for control of what is to be-
ome independent Zimbabwe.
.frican Nationalism
In the early 1960's, African nation-
Mists in Rhodesia formed two rival
roups — the Zimbabwe African Na-
onal Union (ZANU) and the Zim-
abwe African People's Union
^APU), which advocated black voting
ghts and eventual majority rule. Both
'ere banned and their leaders detained
r forced into exile. They ultimately
lrned to guerrilla warfare from bases
) neighboring countries.
By the early 1970's, regular skir-
lishes with Rhodesian forces had oc-
urred, and since then civilian and
lilitary casualties on both sides have
tcreased substantially. Eventually a
)ose ZAPU-ZANU alliance, known as
te patriotic front, was formed. Inside
.hodesia, other nationalist groups — at
jmes affiliated with the parties con-
tituting the patriotic front — formed
nd reformed but continued to work for
ifrican political rights.
inglo- American Plan
The United Kingdom and the United
itates are working with all parties to
itie conflict to achieve a peaceful, in-
jrnationally recognized settlement. On
ieptember 1, 1977, detailed Anglo-
American proposals for a settlement
vere announced, setting forth basic
irinciples which we and the British
upport. These include:
• An independent Zimbabwe
(Rhodesia);
• A transition period;
• Majority rule;
• Preindependence elections based
on universal suffrage;
• Elections administered by a neu-
tral, impartial authority;
• A democratic constitution with an
integral bill of rights; and
• The formation of an army loyal to
the new government.
Although reactions were mixed, no
party rejected the plan. 2
Internal Solution
Following presentation of the
Anglo-American proposals, the Smith
regime began negotiating with the
internal nationalists on a transfer of
power, and in March 1978 Smith
signed the Salisbury agreement with
three black leaders.
This agreement provided for inde-
pendence by the end of 1978, qualified
majority rule, eventual elections with
universal suffrage, and an interim ad-
ministration headed by an executive
council and a cabinet with black mem-
bership. However, the civil service, the
military, and the judiciary would re-
main unaffected under the Salisbury
agreement during the crucial election
and transition period.
For 10 years, 28 of 100 seats in the
new parliament — a number sufficient to
block constitutional amendments —
would be chosen by Rhodesia's 3%
white population. The external
nationalists refused to participate in the
settlement, mainly because it requires
that they first lay down their arms and
subject themselves during the transition
to the administrative control of the
present authorities.
U.S. Policy
U.S. policy on Rhodesia is to perse-
vere with the United Kingdom in ef-
forts to find a fair solution and to
maintain our position as an honest
broker among the contending parties.
This approach offers the best chance to
reach an acceptable agreement and to
avoid a situation easily exploitable by
the Soviets and the Cubans. Moreover,
demonstrating to other African states
our commitment and concern provides
the strongest counterpoint to Soviet/
27
Cuban use of military power and per-
mits a continued strong U.S. role in
Africa.
Our policy is based on the following
premises.
• The conflict will continue unless a
solution can be found offering a realis-
tic possibility for fair participation in
the transition government and the
electoral process by the main
parties — the Salisbury group and the
patriotic front.
• Soviet and Cuban intervention is a
strong possibility if the conflict con-
tinues, and U.S. interests would suffer.
• A peaceful, internationally recog-
nized solution can be obtained only
through negotiation; the best chance
now appears to lie in engaging all par-
ties in a transition process, with none
having a predominant influence.
• The United States does not favor
one side against the other. Endorsing
either side's negotiating position would
prejudice the political opportunities of
the other and could further inflame the
conflict.
• We believe that the Anglo-
American proposals provide the best
basis for an agreement, but we would
support any other arrangements worked
out by the parties consistent with our
support for principles of democratic
government.
All parties have agreed on the prin-
ciples of independence, majority rule,
universal suffrage, an independent
judiciary, and the broad outlines of a
constitution protecting the rights of all.
The United States hopes they can also
agree on arrangements for the impartial
administration of the country for an
interim period in which all parties can
compete equally in free elections. □
•Taken from a Department of State publica-
tion in the GIST series, released in June 1978.
This outline is designed to be a quick reference
aid on U.S. foreign relations. It is not intended
as a comprehensive U.S. foreign policy state-
ment.
2 For full text of the plan, see Bulletin of
Oct. 3, 1977, p. 424.
Letter
of Credence
On November 16, 1978, Macky
Koreissi Aguibou Tall presented his
credentials to President Carter as the
newly appointed Ambassador from
Mali. □
28
Department of State Bulletin >
EAST ASIA: The Dominoes
That Did Vol Fall
by David D. Newsom
Address before the Far East Council
on Trade and Industry in New York on
October 2, 1978. Mr. Newsom is
Under Secretary for Political Affairs. '
Any pundit looking back on his 4- or
5-year predictions on the course of
events in Southeast Asia can only be
embarrassed. The dominoes which
were to have fallen did not fall. The
nations which were to have emerged
from the war with the strength and de-
termination to take over Southeast Asia
are fighting among themselves.
We were reminded of this dramatic
irony recently in Washington when the
representatives of the five nations of
the Association of South East Asian
Nations (ASEAN)— Thailand, Ma-
laysia, Singapore, Indonesia, and
the Philippines — gathered for their
periodic dialogue with the United
States. Each of these nations last year
had a growth rate better than 6'/f .
Each demonstrated a stability which,
despite problems, gave it confidence
and hope for the future. The area as a
whole has become one of the major
centers for U.S. trade.
Why did our gloomy forecasts not
come true? Why is Southeast Asia
today, despite recognized problems,
one of the most hopeful areas of the
developing world?
It is still not easy to draw conclu-
sions on the nature of the Vietnam war.
Yet, there is much to suggest that the
carrying of the revolution to the states
of Southeast Asia, beyond Indochina,
was not a priority objective in Hanoi.
Their immediate priorities related to
the expulsion of the foreigners, begin-
ning with the French, and to the
reunification of what they considered
their traditional nation.
It is now even clearer that, while
Vietnam had an extraordinary capacity
to wage war on its territory, it was, ba-
sically, a very undeveloped country.
The Vietnamese search for outside help
now is not only a manifestation of their
political requirements and reconstruc-
tion needs; it is also evidence of the
basic underdevelopment of their coun-
try.
To suggest that the threat may not
have been as great as many felt, how-
ever, is not to detract from the accom-
plishments of those nations on the
periphery of Indochina. It is, perhaps,
to suggest greater caution on our part in
our predictions on the course of events
in other societies.
Strengths of ASEAN States
In the nations which now comprise
ASEAN, there was greater strength
than many assumed at the time. This
strength was manifested, first, in the
calmness with which these nations
reacted to the events in Indochina.
Many of the more alarming expressions
were on this side, rather than their side
of the Pacific.
Although resources and productive
capabilities are substantial in some
areas of the region, these are not the
fundamental source of the strength we
now see emerging. Rather the confi-
dence gained from winning and main-
taining their independence and the
strong spirit of nationalism that per-
vades the area have provided the basic
impetus for progress and success.
• Thailand, except for the period of
Japanese occupation, has never been
under foreign domination.
• Malaysia has emerged from the
trials of its postwar emergency and has
been independent since 1957.
• Singapore, a remarkable city state,
has been independent since 1965.
• Indonesia, fully independent after
1949, and the Philippines, in 1946, are
among the two earliest states to become
free in the post-World War II move-
ment.
A second major source of strength
among the ASEAN nations is the ex-
traordinary and pragmatic quality of
the leadership that has emerged. Each
of these nations has in its own way
created cadres of capable people who
are facing squarely the major problems
of each nation.
In Indonesia, well-trained econ-
omists and technicians helped the
military and political leaders turn the
economic shambles, overwhelming
debt, and rampant inflation of the
Sukarno era into effective progress in
Correct
ion
In the An
gust 1978
Hi l i i iin
(P
3).
!he GNP f
igure for
Western
Samoa
should have
been $.045 ($45 mill
ion
) for
1974.
economic development. They also
helped the nation weather the impact of
the Pertamina crisis.
Universities and other institutions of
higher learning in Malaysia and Singa-
pore have provided cadres to meet the
continuing needs for upgrading in the
managerial, technical, and scientific
areas. The growth rate of both coun-
tries is spectacular.
The Filipino economic planners have
parlayed advanced business degrees
obtained in the United States and in-
herent entrepreneurial skills into a
polished mix of free enterprise and
state economic planning. Economic
growth in the range of 6% per annum
has helped ease severe balance-of-pay-
ments problems stemming from the oil
crisis.
Thailand's new generation of eco-
nomic policymakers and managers are:
for the most part Western educated and
understand the market mechanism. We
see them striving to strike a proper bal-
ance between private enterprise and in-
vestment and what they perceive to be
a need for state management of certain
strategic economic sectors.
Regional and International Relations
Nowhere is the confidence of the
ASEAN nations in themselves more
manifested than in their relations witht
each other and with the rest of the
world.
When Americans look at ASEAN,
they sometimes tend to look for mora
dramatic manifestations of the cooper-
ation among these nations than may be
realistic at this stage. We must look at
the starting point. During my time in
Southeast Asia, I was struck by how
little these nations (except for Singa-
pore and Malaysia) knew of each other
until recently. Although geographically
proximate, there is great diversity ire
the region, much of it growing from
barriers erected by different colonial
ties and old disputes which needed to
be overcome and reconciled. Few ofl
the universities in one country even had
courses relating to the cultures of their
neighbors. Malaysia and Indonesia had
been at war during Sukarno's time.
The ASEAN economies were more
competitive than complementary and
the focus of their foreign economic ef-
forts has been outside rather than
within the region. Moreover, these
were not well-developed European na-
tions which could move swiftly into
sophisticated economic relationships. It
took Europe 15 years to create the
European Economic Community
(EEC).
Nonetheless, the ASEAN countries
have perceived the importance of closer
/
December 1978
29
pgional cooperation. They have de-
jeloped an elaborate framework of
onsultation on all major economic is-
jues. These consultations range from
lonthly meetings at the ministerial
pvel to frequent technical-level discus-
lions. ASEAN has begun the process
If abolishing duties on trade and has
|;ached agreement on several hundred
[ems. They are working on the estab-
Ishment of regional industrial projects.
Uninhibited by the political consid-
erations which sometimes make de-
eloping countries hesitate to talk with
Ithers, the states of ASEAN moved
lery quickly after their summit meeting
t Bali in February 1976 to expand
xisting dialogues with the EEC and
.ustralia and to establish dialogues
ith their other major trading
artners — Canada, Japan, and then the
nited States.
' The United States and ASEAN have
nbarked on a series of high-level eco-
I3mic consultations, beginning with
leetings September 1977 in Manila
id August of this year in Washington.
s a consequence of this dialogue,
I .S. economic policy toward Southeast
sia is now being shaped to take
SEAN into account, in addition to
aditional bilateral relationships. As an
<ample, bearing particularly on the
iterests of the business community,
)hn Moore [President and Chairman
w the Export-Import Bank] is leading
i Eximbank team visit to ASEAN.
ustralia, and New Zealand in Oc-
■>ber and November, and about the
lame time Chuck Robinson [former
>eputy Secretary of State] is heading
n investment mission to ASEAN spon-
jred by the Overseas Private Invest-
lent Corporation (OPIC).
Not only did the states of ASEAN
tove to talk to their traditional friends,
Jt they moved also to establish satis-
tctory relationships with their Com-
mnist neighbors. The trend has helped
lute the criticism from both Moscow
;nd Peking which was once leveled at
: lis organization.
On our side, we welcomed the fact
kiat, only 3 years after the end of the
I'ietnam war, these nations feel suffi-
ently strong to extend their hand to
le Communist states of Asia. This is a
'ositive note in the Asian scene. I
ould stress here our own hope that
'ietnam will indeed be a peaceful par-
cipant in Southeast Asia.
'he Future
And now — what of the future? In
lach of the countries — in its own
/ay — development is the priority,
"hroughout the area there is a recogni-
ion that, in the long run, only the suc-
cess of their freer economic systems
will overcome the challenge of the
Communist models to the north. In the
eyes of the ASEAN leaders, this strug-
gle is far more real and significant than
any possible military confrontation.
Indonesia. Indonesia is the poorest
of the five. Its birth as a nation was ac-
companied by war, internal insurrec-
tion, and nationalistic economic
policies which left it on the verge of
bankruptcy. Its island character,
stretching 3,500 miles across the
Pacific, provides a special challenge to
development. Despite oil and natural
gas, its annual per capita income is still
only about $300.
Its food deficit makes it the largest
importer of rice in the world. Its popu-
lation pressures on the islands of Java
and Bali compound the problem of de-
velopment. Yet each of these major
problems is being tackled. A high
priority is being given to irrigation,
fertilizer, and the use of higher yield
strains of rice. Its population program,
particularly in the densely settled areas
of East Java and Bali, is considered
one of the most successful in the
world.
Singapore. At independence, Singa-
pore found itself with a flourishing en-
trepot trade, a good location, and the
skills of its people but few resources.
Within a decade the Government of
Singapore transformed the island into a
significant manufacturing center and
moved away from purely entrepot ac-
tivities to oil refining, electronics, and
ship repair and construction. It is fast
becoming a major financial center for
the region, and with nearly 500 U.S.
corporations having offices there, a
major focus for U.S. firms trading with
the entire region. It now has the second
■highest per capita GNP in Asia (ap-
proximately $2,900 in 1977) and has
maintained growth rates of over 8%
during the past few years, having had
double digit growth the previous
decade.
Malaysia. Rich in rubber, tin, palm
oil, tropical woods, and petroleum,
Malaysia's strategy has been to
maximize earnings from its com-
modities while at the same time de-
veloping a manufacturing sector em-
phasizing high labor-intensive technol-
ogy such as electronics. Its growth
rates which have averaged 8-10% per
annum are expected to continue.
Philippines. Belying the apparent
abundance of land, the 7,000-island
Philippine Archipelago is highly
mountainous and provides limited ara-
ble area. Because of this and the tradi-
tionally high birth rate, primary atten-
tion has been directed at increased pro-
ductivity of foodstuffs and concomitant
efforts at population growth restraint.
Some measurable success has been
achieved in that the population growth
rate has declined from the high of 3.4%
of 1970 to a more acceptable level of
2.85% today. Equally important, for
the past 2 years the Philippines has
been self-sufficient in rice and has even
enjoyed a modest exportable surplus.
The Philippines program for rural
electrification cooperatives has proved
so successful that it is now used as a
model and training ground for other
developing countries.
Thailand. Thailand is predominantly
an agrarian nation characterized by se-
vere regional and rural-urban income
Inns Sales
to Taiwan
DEPARTMENT STATEMENT,
NOV. 6 1
The U.S. Government has consid-
ered a number of requests from the Re-
public of China (R.O.C.) for weapons
purchases. On the basis of an assess-
ment of Taiwan's legitimate defense
needs and the President's policy on
arms transfers, we have decided to
offer for sale to the R.O.C. additional
F-5E interceptor aircraft with improved
weaponry, including precision-guided
munitions and Maverick missiles. We
had earlier informed the R.O.C. that we
would not object to their purchasing the
Israeli KFIR fighter which is equipped
with U.S. components.
We have turned down Taiwan's re-
quest for the F-4, F-16, and F-18 on
the grounds that these would violate the
Administration's arms transfer policy.
In conveying these decisions to the
R.O.C, we did not address their re-
quest for the so-called F-5G since a
decision has not been made to produce
such a follow-on aircraft to the F-5E.
The F-5E which will be offered to
Taiwan, with its improved armament,
will provide an additional capability to
help meet the R.O.C. s defense re-
quirements. The United States will
continue to be responsive to Taiwan's
legitimate defense needs. □
1 Read to news correspondents by acting De-
partment spokeswoman Jill Schuker.
30
disparities. The present government
has announced its plans to redress in-
come disparities and focus its efforts
on rural-based industry, intensification
of land use, and diversification of ag-
riculture. Development of indigenous
gas discoveries should relieve
balance-of-payments problems stem-
ming from imported energy and possi-
bly release needed foreign exchange
earnings for further development of ex-
port oriented agri-based industries.
Economic development has not been
the only problem confronting the na-
tions of Southeast Asia. Each of the
nations of ASEAN emerged into inde-
pendence with problems of internal
friction and the need for stronger
political institutions and cohesion.
Each in its own way has sought to deal
with these problems.
• Thailand has faced rural insurgen-
cies and frequent changes in govern-
ment but has been able to maintain a
high degree of political continuity
under the King.
• The progress in Malaysia's politi-
cal stability was demonstrated by the
recent election. Malays and Chinese
alike supported the victory of Prime
Minister Hussein Onn's party.
• Singapore remains stable and
prosperous under its unique leader,
Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew.
• Indonesia's political institutions
have recently survived the test of
another national election. Its internal
reconciliation has been marked by the
continuing release of those detained
after the 1965 abortive Communist
coup.
• The Philippines is still plagued by
the 300-year-old Muslim insurrection
in the south. President Marcos, after 6
years of martial law, is now seeking
new political institutions through a re-
cently elected interim National Assem-
bly.
In stressing the progress in several
areas of these nations, I do not ignore
the weaknesses and shortcomings that
are common to new nations. But they
are often dwelt upon. For those of you
in business, asking the question of
whether this is an area that merits your
attention, I can properly dwell on the
positive. It is not everywhere in the
world that you can find five developing
countries, with a total population of a
quarter of a billion people, generally
supportive of the free enterprise sys-
tem, welcoming foreign investment,
representing a rapidly growing market
for U.S. goods, and with a reasonable
degree of stability. I well know that
many of you may feel that some of the
policies of these countries raise ques-
tions about their genuine interest in
foreign investment. My impression is
that, while there are frustrations and
differences, the leaders possess in
common a basic desire for an effective
balance between their political neces-
sities and the climate for investment
and trade. Moreover, they are prepared
to talk with foreign representatives
about the problems they may face.
Officially, we see in these countries
a significant indigenous grouping of
nations with which we have much in
common. Their strength lies in the fact
that they are free to associate with
many states of different systems, not
just with us. They can be considered
nonaligned in the best sense of the
word.
With some, such as the Philippines,
we have special ties through a defense
treaty and the presence of our military
bases. But in no sense has this pre-
vented the Philippines from a free and
independent foreign policy.
The dominoes did not fall because
they had inherent strengths and con-
centrated on development of their
economies and effective political in-
stitutions, and because the problems
within Indochina were far greater than
we perceived. It is now in the interest
of all the friends of ASEAN, through
active trade and investment and
through official assistance as required,
to see that their philosophies and their
systems point the way for their peoples
to a bright future. Neither they nor we
want other Asian models to extend or
to prevail. □
Introductory paragraph omitted.
Publications
GPO SALES
Publications ma\ be ordered by catalog or
stock number from the Superintendent oj
Documents, U S Government Priming Office.
Washington, DC. 2<>4()2 A 25 91 discount is
made on orders for 11)1) or more copies Oj any
one publication mailed lo the same address.
Remittances, payable to the Superintendent oj
Documents, must accompany orders Prices
shown below, which unhide domestic postage.
ate subjet l Ui i llange
Kit-ill Secondary and Feeder Roads Project.
Agreement with the Philippines TIAS 8666.
35 pp SI 40 (Cat, No. S9. 10:8666).
Trade in Cotton, Wool, and Man-Made
Fiber Textiles and Textile Products. Agree-
ment with Macau. TIAS 8672 3 pp 60?. (Cat.
No. S9. 10:8672).
Department of State Bulletin
Science and Technology Program. Memoran-
dum of Understanding with the Republic of
Korea. TIAS 8678. 8 pp. 70C. (Cat. No.
S9. 10:8678).
Waterworks Systems. Agreement with the
Philippines. TIAS 8703. 38 pp. $1.40. (Cat. No.
S9. 10:8703.)
Rural Electrification. Agreement with the
Philippines. TIAS 8704. 32 pp. $1.30. (Cat. No.
S9. 10:8704.)
Air Transport Services. Agreement with Sin-
gapore. TIAS 8721. 8 pp. 700. (Cat. No.
S9. 10:8721.)
Economic Assistance. Agreement with the Re-
public of Korea. TIAS 8730. 2 pp. 50?. (Cat.
No. S9. 10:8730.)
Trade in Textiles. Agreements with Thailand,
amending the agreement of December 29,
1975. TIAS 8780. 8pp. 80?. (Cat. No.
S9. 10:8780.)
Express Mail Service. Agreement with Japan.
TIAS 8794. 3 pp. 60? (Cat. No.
S9. 10:8794.)
Express Mail Service. Agreement with Hong
Kong TIAS 8795. 2 pp. 50?. (Cat. No.
S9. 10:8795 )
Integrated Communications System. Agree-
ment with Thailand. TIAS 8837. 7 pp. 80?.
(Cat. No. S9. 10:8837.)
Research Institute of Medical Sciences.
Agreement with Thailand, modifying and
continuing the agreements of December 23
1960 and April I and 25. 1963. TIAS 8840
3 pp 70?. (Cat No. S9 10:8840.)
Military Assistance — Eligibility Require
ments Pursuant to the International Secu
rity Assistance and Arms Export Control
Act of 1976. Agreement with Malaysia
TIAS 8845. 5 pp. 70?. (Cat No
S9. 10:8845.)
Family Planning. Agreement with Indonesia
TIAS 8848 26 pp $1.30. (Cat No.
S9. 10:8848 )
Surakarta Potable Water. Agreement with
Indonesia. TIAS 8849 32 pp. $1.40. (Cat.
No S9. 10:8849.)
Ammunition Storage. Agreement with Thai-
land TIAS 8850. 5 pp. 70?. (Cat. No.
S9 10:8850 |
Whaling — International Observer Scheme.
Agreement with Japan, extending the agree-
ment of May 2. 1975, as extended TIAS
8874. 6 pp. 70?. (Cat. No. S9. 10:8874.)
Trade in Textiles. Agreement with the Philip-
pines, amending and extending the agree-
ment of October 15. 1975. as amended.
TIAS 8880. 5 pp. 70?, (Cat. No.
S9. 10:8880.)
Trade in Textiles. Agreements with the
Philippines, amending ihe agreement of Oc-
tober 15. 1975. as amended and extended.
TIAS 8881 20 pp. $1.10 (Cat No.
S9. 10:8881.)
Air Transport Services. Agreement with
Japan, amending the agreement of August
11, 1952. as amended. TIAS 8882. 4 pp.
70?. (Cat. No. S9. 10:8882.) □
)ecember 1978
31
ECONOMICS: Measures to
Strengthen the Dollar
REMARKS OF THE PRESIDENT
ND TREASURY SECRETARY
[LUMENTHAL, NOV. 1 '
president Carter
I Last week, I pledged my Adminis-
lation to a balanced, concerted, and
Lstained program to fight inflation.
I hat program requires effective
talkies to assure a strong dollar.
I The basic factors that affect the
Irength of the dollar are heading in the
Ight direction. We now have an energy
rogram passed by Congress; our trade
bficit is declining; and last week, I put
i place a strong anti-inflation pro-
ram.
i The continuing decline in the ex-
lange value of the dollar is clearly not
arranted by the fundamental eco-
jmic situation. That decline threatens
:onomic progress at home and abroad
id the success of our anti-inflation
•ogram .
As a major step in the anti-inflation
"ogram, it is now necessary to act to
meet the excessive decline in the
jllar which has recently occurred,
herefore, pursuant to my request that
rong action be taken, the Department
F the Treasury and the Federal Re-
;rve Board are today initiating meas-
■es in both domestic and international
onetary fields to assure the strength
F the dollar.
The international components of this
rogram have been developed with
kther major governments and with
:ntral banks. They intend to cooperate
illy with the United States in attaining
ir mutual objectives.
Secretary Blumenthal and Chairman
fliller are announcing detailed meas-
res immediately.
secretary Blumenthal
In the past few months the United
itates has taken action to correct the
nbalances that have characterized our
:onomy. We have passed an energy
ill which will lead to a reduction of
ur dependence on imported oil. We
ave implemented a program to en-
iance exports as a national priority.
i/e have launched a tough and deter-
liined anti-inflation campaign. We
|ave taken steps to reduce the govern-
ment's preemption of the nation's fi-
ancial resources by cutting dramati-
our budget deficit.
ally
We have also moved decisively to-
ward undoing the overregulation of our
great economy. We have enacted a tax
bill which will enhance capital forma-
tion and improve productivity. More
must and will be done, but the prereq-
uisites for improved economic per-
formance are in place.
Recent moves in the dollar exchange
rates have not only exceeded any de-
cline related to the fundamental factors
but plainly are hampering progress to-
ward the price stability, balance-of-
payments improvement, and enhanced
climate for investment and growth
which these measures are designed to
bring about.
The time has, therefore, come to call
a halt to these developments. At the
President's direction, Chairman [of the
Federal Reserve Board G. William]
Miller and I are today announcing
comprehensive corrective actions.
Effective immediately, the Federal
Reserve is raising the discount rate
from 8V2 to 9'/2% and is imposing a
supplementary reserve requirement
equal to 2 percentage points of time
deposits of $100,000 or more.
In addition to domestic measures
being taken by the