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Full text of "Department of State bulletin"

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rhe Official Monthly Record of United States Foreign Policy / Volunne 79 / Number 2031 



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REFUGEES / 1 
Africa / 18 
SALT II / 25 
Vietnam / 34 
IVIiddle East / 44 



Dvparini4»nt of Si ate 

bulletin 



Volume 79 / Number 2031 / October 1979 



Cover Photo: 

Refugees in Southeast Asia 
{ Black Star photo by Stem ) 



The Department of State Bulletin, 
published by the Office of Public Com- 
munication in the Bureau of Public 
Affairs, is the official record of U.S. 
foreign pohcy. Its purpose is to provide 
the public, the Congress, and govern- 
ment agencies with information on 
developments in U.S. foreign relations 
and the work of the Department of 
State and the Foreign Service. 

The Bulletin's contents include 
major addresses and news conferences 
of the President and the Secretary of 
State; statements made before congres- 
sional committees by the Secretary 
and other senior State Department of- 
ficials; special features and articles on 
international affairs; selected press re- 
leases issued by the White House, the 
Department, and the U.S. Mission to 
the United Nations; and treaties and 
other agreements to which the United 
States is or may become a party. 

The Secretary of State has deter- 
mined that the publication of this peri- 
odical is necessary in the transaction of 
the public business required by law of 
this Department. Use of funds for 
printing this periodical has been ap- 
proved by the Director of the Office 
of Management and Budget through 
January 31, 1981. 

NOTE: Contents of this publication 
are not copyrighted and items con- 
tained herein may be reprinted. Cita- 
tion of the Department of State 
Bulletin as the source will be appre- 
ciated. The Bulletin is indexed in the 
Readers' Guide to Periodical Litera- 
ture. 

For sale by the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Print- 
ing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402 

Price: 

12 issues plus annual index- 
Si 8.00 (domestic) $22.50 (foreign) 

Single copy- 
Si. 40 (domestic) Si. 80 (foreign) 



CYRUS R. VANCE 

Secretary of State 

HOODING CARTER III 

Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs 

JOHN CLARK KIMBALL 
Chief, Editorial Division 

PHYLLIS A. YOUNG 
Editor 

COLLEEN SUSSMAN 
Assistant Editor 



CO]\TEl\TS 



1 U.S. PROGRAM TO ASSIST THE WORLD'S REFUGEES 

(Vice Pretiideiit Motidale) 

Rescue of Refugees at Sea 

The Indochinese Refugee Situation (Secretcn-fi Vance) 

Memorandum of Understanding Between the UNHCR and Vietnam 

Significant Quotes on Refugees (Dick Clark) 
8 Results of Refugee Conference 
8 U.S. Coordinator for Refugees 



THE PRESIDENT 

9 News Conference of July 25 

THE VICE PRESIDENT 

10 Visit to East Asia 



THE SECRETARY 

14 News Conference of September 5 

AFRICA 

18 Report on Southern Rhodesia 

(RichanI M. Moose) 

19 Visit of Bishop Muzorewa of South- 

ern Rhodesia (White House 
Statemeut) 

20 Letters of Credence (Gambia. 

Guinea, Togo) 
20 The U.S. Role in Southern Africa 
(Richard M. Moose) 

22 Uganda (President Carter) 

23 OAU Summit Meeting (WiUiaui C. 

Ha rrop) 

24 U.S. Ambassadors to African Coun- 

tries, September 1979 

ARMS CONTROL 

25 An Evaluation of SALT II (George 

M. Seigiiious II) 
32 SALT II— The Basic Choice (Sec- 
retary Vance) 

EAST ASIA 

34 Vietnam and Indochina (Richard C. 

Holbrooke) 
37 Issue of U.S.-S.R.V. Relations 

(Department Statement) 

39 Continuing Efforts To Account for 

MIA's (Robert B. Oakley) 

40 Famine in Kampuchea (Department 

Statement) 



ECONOMICS 

42 Economic Interdependence in North 
America (Julius L. Katz) 



MIDDLE EAST 

44 Forces of Change in the Middle 

East (Harold H. Saunders) 

45 Kerosene, Fuel Oil Export Licenses 

for Iran (Department Statement) 
47 Middle East Peace Process (Robert 
S. Strauss) 

49 Egyptian Vice President Meets 

With President Carter (White 
House Statonoit) 

50 Violence in Lebanon and Israel 

(Department Statements) 

51 Oil Supply Agreement Signed by 

the U.S. and Israel (Herbert J. 
Hansell. Yaacov Nechushtan) 

52 Military Equipment Programs for 

Egypt and Saudi Arabia (Harold 
H. Saunders) 

52 U.S. Policy Toward Israel (Secre- 

tary Vance) 

53 Western Sahara (Harold H. Saun- 

ders) 



SOUTH ASIA 

54 U.S. Policy Toward Afghanistan 
and Pakistan (Jack C. Miklos) 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 

63 Soviet Combat Troops in Cuba 
(President Carter, Secretary 
Vance, Department Statement) 

63 Letters of Credence (Bolivia, 

Brazil, Peru, Venezuela) 

64 U.S.-Me.xico Cooperation (Julius L. 

Katz) 

65 Emergency Aid to Nicaragua 

(White House Announcement) 

66 Oil Spill in the Gulf of Mexico 

(Robert Krueger) 



TREATIES 

67 Current Actions 

CHRONOLOGY 

68 August 1979 

PRESS RELEASES 

68 Department of State 

69 U.S. U.N. 

PUBLICATIONS 

69 New Foreign Affairs Dictionary 

69 "Foreign Relations" Volume on the 

United Nations Released 

70 GPO Sales 



UNITED NATIONS INDEX 

57 Namibia (Donald F. McHenry) 

60 President Carter's Meeting With 

U.N. Secretary General (White 

,,-^°"^^?'«'^'"^!''^, . . Boston PubUc Ll-zrary 

61 U.S. Policy on Lebanon ( Andre-^^^^^^^^^^^^^^,^ ^^ ^^^^^^^.^^ 

Young) 

62 World Radio Conference (Foreign 

Relations Outline) [^g\/ 5 1979 



DEPOSITORY 



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U.S. PROGRAM TO 
ASSIST THE WORLD'S REFUGEES 



BACKGROUND 

In the 4'/2 years since the collapse of 
the governments of South Vietnam. 
Cambodia (now called Kampuchea), 
and Laos, more than a million In- 
dochinese have fled their homelands to 
seek temporary or permanent asylum 
elsewhere. Some 350.000 refugees 
have resettled in non-Communist 
countries, and about 350,000 remain in 
countries of first asylum in Southeast 
Asia. In addition, an estimated 250,000 
Indochinese have fled to the People's 
Republic of China, and about 150,000 
Kampucheans are in camps in the 
Socialist Republic of Vietnam. 

The exodus from the countries of In- 
dochina initially consisted primarily of 
those who had fought the Communists, 
who had been associated with the pre- 
vious regimes or with the U.S. Gov- 
ernment, or who had opposed the new 
authorities. 

In 1978. however, conditions within 
Indochina began to change radically. 
The Hanoi government instituted 
policies designed to restructure society, 
shift city dwellers to the countryside, 
and eliminate the business and profes- 
sional class. These policies were prin- 
cipally aimed at Vietnam's 1.5 million 
ethnic Chinese, who were seen as a se- 
curity threat at a time of worsening re- 
lations with China. The ethnic Chinese, 
including those who had lived peace- 
fully in the north since 1954, were in- 
creasingly faced with the threat of dis- 
missal from jobs, conscription, or 
transfer to remote areas of the country 
without services, called "new eco- 
nomic zones." 

As a result, by the summer of 1978 
there was a marked increase in both 
the number of people fleeing Indochina 
and the percentage of ethnic Chinese 
among the refugees. Other factors con- 
tributing to the outflow of refugees 
were the war between China and Viet- 
nam, the occupation of areas of Laos 
and Kampuchea by Vietnamese forces, 
military operations against the Hmong 
tribesmen in Laos, deteriorating eco- 
nomic conditions (particularly food 
shortages), and violations of political 
and other rights. In addition, Viet- 
namese authorities began to assist the 
departures of ethnic Chinese and others 
they considered undesirable. 

The number of Indochinese seeking 
asylum in non-Communist countries in 
Southeast Asia jumped from about 



6,000 a month in August 1978 to a 
peak of 65,000 in May 1979. Partially 
as a result of the Vietnamese decision 
announced at the Geneva refugee con- 
ference in July to stem "illegal depar- 
tures" from Vietnam, the arrival rate 
dropped to about 12,000 in August 
1979. These figures reflect only the 
numbers of people who succeed in 
seeking asylum. It is not known how 
many people actually attempt to leave 
Indochina, but there are estimates that 
from 30% to 60% perish before arriv- 
ing at a safe haven. 

Since the beginning of 1979, about 
240,000 Indochinese have joined the 
more than 200,000 refugees who were 
already in camps in first-asylum coun- 
tries awaiting resettlement elsewhere. 
In this period, however, some 75,000 
have been moved from the camps to 
permanent homes in other countries. 

Despite increased international ef- 
forts to resettle the Indochinese, the 
presence of large refugee populations 
in the countries of first-asylum con- 
tinues to be a source of domestic con- 
cern and regional instability. The 
first-asylum countries have resisted 
efforts to resettle any Indochinese 
within their borders because they al- 
ready feel overburdened by their own 
population pressures, economic prob- 
lems, and religious and ethnic tensions, 
and they are concerned about the pos- 
sibility of subversion and insurgency. 
The lack of resettlement opportunities 
in Southeast Asia has increased the 
need for greater international partici- 
pation in the refugee assistance pro- 
gram. The U.N. High Commissioner 
for Refugees (UNHCR) is responsible 
for the protection and care of refugees 
in camps in Southeast Asia until per- 
manent resettlement can be arranged. 

In May and June 1979 the refugee 
situation reached crisis proportions, as 
the countries of first asylum reacted in 
desperation to the mounting refugee 
populations, the increasing arrival 
rates, and the apparently inadequate re- 
spon.se to the problem by the rest of the 
world community. Southeast Asian 
governments began refusing to grant 
asylum to new arrivals — causing death 
to tens of thousands of refugees pushed 
back out to sea or back across land 
borders — and in some cases they 
threatened to expel refugees already 
admitted to U.N. -sponsored camps. As 
a result of the dramatic deterioration of 
the situation, there was widespread 



support for British Prime Minister 
Thatcher's proposal that the United 
Nations convene a special meeting on 
the Indochinese refugee problem. U.N. 
Secretary General Waldheim invited 72 
nations to attend the meeting, which he 
convened in Geneva July 20-21, 1979. 
Vice President Mondale headed the 
U.S. delegation and delivered the fol- 
lowing address on July 21. 



VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE 

Once again the countries of the 
world turn to the United Nations. When 
problems touch the whole human 
communilty, no other forum provides a 
vision more encompassing. When na- 
tional interests conflict and collide, no 
institution convenes us with greater 
moral authority. The United Nations is 
often criticized and sometimes even 
maligned. But the common ground it 
provides us deserves our thanks and 
praise. On behalf of the United States 
— and 1 believe, on behalf of all na- 
tions in the world community — 1 thank 
Secretary General Waldheim and High 
Commissioner Hartling [U.N. High 
Commissioner for Refugees Poul 
Hartling] for their leadership in con- 
vening us here today. 

Some tragedies defy the imagination. 
Some misery so surpasses the grasp of 
reason that language itself breaks be- 
neath the strain. Instead, we gasp for 
metaphors. Instead, we speak the inau- 
dible dialect of the human heart. 

Today we confront such a tragedy. 
In virtually all the world's languages, 
desperate new expressions have been 
born. "A barbed-wire bondage." "An 
archipelago of despair." "A floodtide 
of human misery." With this new 
coinage our language is enriched, and 
our civilization is impoverished. 

"The boat people." "The land 
people." The phrases are new, but 
unfortunately their precedent in the an- 
nals of shame is not. Forty-one years 
ago this very week, another interna- 
tional conference on Lake Geneva con- 
cluded its deliberations. Thirty-two 
"nations of asylum" convened at 
Evian to save the doomed Jews of Nazi 
Germany and Austria. On the eve of 
the conference, Hitler flung the chal- 
lenge in the world's face. He said: "I 
can only hope that the other world, 
which has such deep sympathy for 
these criminals, will at least be gener- 



Department of State Bulletin 



ous enough to convert this sympathy 
into practical aid." We have each 
heard similar arguments about the 
plight of the refugees in Indochina. 

At stake at Evian were both human 
lives and the decency and self-respect 
of the civilized world. If each nation at 
Evian had agreed on that day to take in 
17,000 Jews at once, every Jew in the 
Reich could have been saved. As one 
American observer wrote: "It is 
heartbreaking to think of the . . . des- 
perate human beings . . . waiting in 
suspense for what happens at Evian. 
But the question they underline is not 
simply humanitarian. ... It is a test of 
civilization." 

At Evian, they began with high 
hopes. But they failed the test of civili- 
zation. 

The civilized world hid in the cloak 
of legalisms. Two nations said they had 
reached the saturation point for Jewish 
refugees. Four nations said they would 



Rescue of 

Refugees 

at Sea 



Tradition provides that ship captains 
shall rescue individuals in distress at 
.sea and bring them to the closest port 
for disembarkation. Thousands of In- 
dochinese refugees have been rescued 
on the high seas, but in some cases 
vessels have reportedly ignored distress 
signals. 

In December 1978, the U.N. High 
Commission for Refugees and the 
Inter-Governmental Maritime Consult- 
ative Organization issued a joint appeal 
to governments, shipowners, and ship 
masters to continue the rescue of refu- 
gees on the high seas. Three times 
since mid- 1978 the U.S. Government 
has reminded American line operators 
and their captains of their obligations 
in this regard and has also provided a 
guarantee of resettlement for refugees 
rescued by U.S. -owned or U.S.- 
registered vessels if those refugees are 
not accepted by another country. 

Major maritime nations, for the most 
part, have stated that they have in- 
structed their carriers to rescue refu- 
gees at sea. The major problem appears 
to lie with carriers operating under 
Hags of convenience. Ship masters are 
coming under additional pressure as a 
result of stiffening resistance among 
the ports of the region to the landing of 
refugees without guarantees of reset- 
tlement, n 



accept experienced agricultural workers 
only. One would only accept immi- 
grants who had been baptized. Three 
declared intellectuals and merchants to 
be undesirable new citizens. One na- 
tion feared that an influx of Jews would 
arouse antisemitic feelings. And one 
delegate said this: "As we have no real 
racial problem, we are not desirous of 
importing one." 

As the delegates left Evian, Hitler 
again goaded "the other world" for 
"oozing sympathy for the poor, tor- 
mented people, but remaining hard and 
obdurate when it comes to helping 
them." Days later, the "final solution 
to the Jewish problem" was conceived, 
and soon the night closed in. 

Let us not reenact their error. Let us 
not be the heirs to their shame. 

To alleviate the tragedy in Southeast 
Asia, we all have a part to play. The 
United States is committed to doing its 
share, just as we have done for genera- 
tions. "Mother of Exiles" it says on 
the pedestal of the Statue of Liberty at 
the port of New York. The American 
people have already welcomed over 
200,000 Indochinese. Their talent and 
their energies immeasurably enrich our 
nation. 

We are preparing to welcome an- 
other 168,000 refugees in the coming 
year. The governors and the Members 
of Congress in our delegation — as well 
as outstanding religious and civic lead- 
ers throughout America — are a symbol 
of the enduring commitment of Presi- 
dent Carter and the American people. 

Many nations represented here have 
risen to history's test, accepting sub- 
stantial numbers of refugees. The 
ASEAN states [Association of South 
East Asian Nations], China, and Hong 
Kong have offered safety and asylum to 
over half a million refugees from Viet- 
nam, Laos, and Kampuchea since 
1975. And others have opened their 
doors. 

But the growing exodus from In- 
dochina still outstrips international ef- 
forts. We must work together or the 
suffering will mount. Unless we all do 
more, the risk of fresh contlict will 
arise and the stability of Southeast Asia 
will erode. Unless this conference 
gives birth to new commitments, and 
not simply new metaphors, we will in- 
herit the scorn of Evian. It is a time for 
action, not words. 

I would like to outline seven areas 
where action is needed. 

First and foremost, the fundamental 
responsibility must rest with the au- 
thorities of Indochina, particularly the 
Government of the Socialist Republic 
of Vietnam. That government is failing 
to insure the human rights of its 
people. Its callous and irresponsible 
policies are compelling countless citi- 



zens to forsake everything they treas- 
ure, to risk their lives, and to tlee into 
the unknown. 

There must be an immediate mora- 
torium on the further explusion of 
people from Vietnam. We must stop 
the drownings and establish a humane 
emigration program. The policy of ex- 
pulsion which has led to so many tragic 
deaths must end. It must be replaced by 
a policy which enables those who wish 
to leave their homes to do so — in safety 
and by choice and in an orderly man- 
ner. 

At the same time, we must not forget 
the land people driven from their 
homeland by conflict and foreign inva- 
sion. The nations of the world must 
promote a political settlement in Kam- 
puchea. The survival of a whole people 
is in grave doubt. Neither the Pol Pot 
nor Hang Samrin regimes represents 
the Kampuchean people. The conflict, 
and the human tragedy in its wake, 
must stop. The international commu- 
nity must not tolerate forced expulsion 
of entire populations. 

I call on all governments to allow 
normal free emigration and family 
reunification. My government supports 
efforts to negotiate a program of or- 
derly direct departures from 
Vietnam — but not at the expense of 
those in camps elsewhere in Southeast 
Asia already awaiting resettlement and 
not as part of a program of expulsion of 
ethnic or political groups. 

Second, I urge the countries of first 
asylum to continue to provide tempo- 
rary safe haven to all refugees. The 
compassion these nations have shown 
earns them the respect and admiration 
of the world's community. But these 
nations cannot bear this responsibility 
alone. We call on them to persist in 
their spirit of humanity so that our 
common effort can proceed. 

Therefore, third, the rest of us must 
provide assurances to first-asylum 
countries that the refugees will find 
new homes within a reasonable period 
of time. To meet this objective, we call 
on all nations to double their resettle- 
ment commitment, as the United States 
has already done. Moreover, we must 
all be prepared to commit ourselves to 
multiyear resettlement programs — for 
the problem will not be solved quickly. 
The U.S. Government is now seeking 
that authority. 

Fourth, each of us must make a 
greater contribution to the relief efforts 
of the U.N. High Commissioner for 
Refugees. The UNHCR will need in- 
creased resources now and in the com- 
ing years to care for growing refugee 
populations and to alleviate the misery 
in refugee camps. The UNHCR may 
require an estimated $400 million for 
its Indochina programs in 1980. 



Xtober 1979 



To do our part to help, I am 
iri\ileged to announce today that my 
government will ask our Congress to 
allocate $105 million tor those 
programs — more than double our cur- 
rent effort. We are also ready to assign 
highly qualified Peace Corps volun- 
teers to work in the camps in Southeast 
Asia — to work not only with the indi- 
vidual countries but also in the pro- 
grams of the U.N. High Commissioner. 
We urge other nations to undertake 
similar programs of support. 
j Fifth, it is essential that we relieve 
pressures on existing camps and create 
a network of new transit centers for 
|"efugees destined for permanent reset- 
tlement elsewhere. Given the mag- 
nitude of the refugee population, such 
centers must accommodate at least 
250.000 refugees. My government has 
endorsed the initiative of the ASEAN 
states for U.N. -sponsored refugee 
processing centers. President Carter 
applauds the Government of the Philip- 
pines for the bold and exemplary steps 
it has taken — a model of responsible 
world leadership. Today 1 am espe- 
cially pleased to announce that we are 
requesting more than $20 million from 
the Congress to finance our share of 
such new UNHCR facilities. 

Sixth, we must extend refugee reset- 
tlement to nations which are ready to 
receive them — but which do not have 
the resources to do so. Today, on be- 
half of the U.S. Government, 1 propose 
the creation of an international refugee 
resettlement fund. If other nations join 
us. we will ask our Congress for con- 
tributions to the fund totaling $20 mil- 
lion for the first year. We ask today 
that other nations match us. We rec- 
ommend that the fund be capitalized at 
$200 million. This fund could, for 
example, endow an international cor- 
poration which would help developing 
countries embark on their planning and 
secure additional resources for this 
high humanitarian purpose. 

Seventh, and above all, we must act 
to protect the lives of those who seek 
safety. The United States is acting vig- 
orously to save refugees from exposure 
and starvation and drowning and death 
at sea. 

As Commander in Chief of the mili- 
tary, the President of the United States 
has dramatically strengthened his or- 
ders to our Navy to help the drowning 
and the desperate. Today the President 
has ordered four additional ships from 
the Military Sealift Command to be 
dispatched to the South China Sea — 
where they will be available both to 
transport tens of thousands of refugees 
from camps to refugee processing cen- 
ters and to assist refugees at sea. At the 
same time, the President has also or- 
dered long-range Navy aircraft to fly 







CONTRIBUTIONS TO UNHCR 








FOR INDOCHINESE REFUGEES 








(Million U.S. 


$) 








1975- 


Balance of 




Counlry 




June 30, 1979 


1979 


1980 


Australia 




9.8 


5.0 




Austria 




.04 




.10 


Belgium 




.59 




.73 


Canada 




1.9 


.40 




China 






1.0 




Cyprus 




.001 






Denmark 




5.8 


1.9 




EEC 




8.0 


25 


5.5 


Finland 






1.0 




France 




* 


* 


* 


Gennany. West 


7.0 


3.8 


10.9 


Greece 




.015 






Iran 






.09 




Ireland 




.08 


.4 




Italy 




.78 


.8 




Japan 




23.6 


(50% of future costs) | 


Korea 






4.8 




Mauritius 




.01 






Neitherlands 




3.8 


4.9 




New Zealand 




.36 






Nigeria 






.12 




Norway 




6.0 


2.0 




Philippines 




.03 






Sweden 




3.3 






Switzerland 




1.2 






Taiwan 




** 






U.K. 




5.6 


5.4 


5.4 


US. 




42.9 


34.0 


105.0 


TOTAL 


ntributes 


120.780 
to the overall UNHCR budget 


90.61 
but does not earn 


127.63 
ark contributions for 


* France co 


the Indochina 


program 








**Taiwan i 


■ontributed $500,000 to the International Rescue Committee for assistance to 1 


Indochinese refugees. 









patrols to locate and seek help for refu- 
gee boats in distress. 

And the President is asking our pri- 
vate shipping industry and unions to 
persist with their time-honored efforts 
to help refugees at sea. We appeal to 
other governments to do the same — and 
to accept for resettlement those who are 
picked up. 

In conclusion let me reiterate two 
points. 

First, the international community 
must not tolerate this forced expulsion. 
We call upon Vietnam to cease those 
policies which condemn so many to 
flee. There must be an immediate 
moratorium on expulsions. 

The freedom to emigrate is a funda- 
mental human right. But no nation is 
blind to the difference between free 
emigration and forced exodus. Let us 
impose a moratorium on that exodus. 
Let us have a breathing spell during 
which all of us — governments, volun- 
tary agencies, and private individuals 
alike — mobilize our generosity and re- 
lieve the human misery. And let us 



urge the Government of Vietnam to 
honor the inalienable human rights at 
the core of every civilized society. 

Second, our children will deal 
harshly with us if we fail. The confer- 
ence at Evian 41 years ago took place 
amidst the same comfort and beauty we 
enjoy at our own deliberations today. 
One observer at those proceedings — 
moved by the contrast between the set- 
ting and the task — said this: 

These poor people and these great 
principles seem so far away. To one 
who has attended other conferences on 
Lake Geneva, the most striking thing 
on the eve of this one is that the atmos- 
phere is so much like the others. 

Let us not be like the others. Let us 
renounce that legacy of shame. Let us 
reach beyond metaphor. Let us honor 
the moral principles we inherit. Let us 
do something meaningful — something 
profound — to stem this misery. We 
face a world problem. Let us fashion a 
world solution. History will not forgive 
us if we fail. History will not forget us 
if we succeed. D 



The intloehiitese 
Refugee Situation 



by Secretary Vance 

Statement before the Siihcomtnittee 
on Immigration. Refugees, and Inter- 
national Law of the House Judiciary 
Committee on July 31 , 1979. ' 

I am pleased to have this opportunity 
to discuss the Indochinese refugee 
problem with you. I appreciate the ac- 
tive support and interest members of 
this subcommittee have shown in the 
tragic situation in Southeast Asia and 
in U.S. programs to assist Indochinese 
refugees. In particular, we valued the 
participation of [Congresswoman 
Elizabeth] Holtzman and [Congressman 
Hamilton] Fish, as well as members of 
the Judiciary Committee staff, at the 
recent Geneva meeting. We also value 
the visits that members and staff have 
made to Southeast Asia, including 
Vietnam. The firsthand understanding 
you have obtained of all sides of the 
complex, difficult refugee issue has 
been of great benefit to the executive 
branch as well as to the Congress and 
the public. 

In the weeks ahead, we will need 
your continued support and guidance, 
especially in providing the legislative 
framework we need to deal with refu- 
gee crises of such grave proportions. 

This morning, I would like to bring 
you up to date on the magnitude of the 
Indochina refugee situation, the steps 
that have been taken, and the tasks 
ahead. Ambassador Clark [Dick Clark, 
U.S. Coordinator for Refugee Affairs] 
will go into more detail about the spe- 
cific commitments and proposals that 
were made in Geneva, what we are 
doing to implement them promptly and 
effectively, and what more we must do. 

All of us are aware of the stark di- 
mensions of the problem. Over 
375,000 men, women, and children are 
languishing in refugee camps in South- 
east Asia, awaiting resettlement. 
Thousands of others who fled never 
reached a safe shore. What we face in 
Southeast Asia is first and foremost a 
human tragedy of appalling propor- 
tions. 

It is also a threat to peace in the re- 
gion and to the stability of our friends 
there. 

And as Vice President Mondale 
made very clear, publicly and pri- 
vately, in Geneva, it is a world prob- 
lem which requires a world solution. 
The international communitv cannot 



turn away from the plight of these 
people. 

As the international community has 
begun to grasp the dimensions of the 
problem, the response has been build- 
ing. The United States has been at the 
forefront of this gathering international 
effort. But while there is reason to be 
encouraged by the progress that has 
been made in recent weeks, we cannot 
afford in any way to slacken our ef- 
forts. The situation remains explosive. 
The suffering remains acute. The next 
weeks and months will be critical, we 
must now reinforce the progress that 
has been made and sustain the 
momentum that is building. 

Let me briefly review the events of 
the past several months. 

The situation began to deteriorate 
rapidly last fall when the number of 
refugees arriving in first-asylum coun- 
tries suddenly began to outpace the 
numbers leaving for permanent reset- 
tlement. The camps were quickly 
swamped. The Southeast Asian states 
became increasingly alarmed at the 
prospect of permanently absorbing 
large refugee populations. 

In the face of the challenge in South- 
east Asia, as well as in other areas of 
the world where the United States pro- 
vides refugee assistance, it became 
clear that we would have to strengthen 
our own refugee programs. We created 
the position of U.S. Coordinator for 
Refugee Affairs, a role that Dick Clark 
is filling with great skill and dedica- 
tion. In December, the United States 
took the lead, both in increasing the 



Department of State Bulletin 

number of our Indochinese refugee ad-1 
missions from 25,000 a year to 53.000; 
and in urging others to do more. How-i 
ever, these efforts were soon out- 
stripped by the increasing rate of arriv- 
als, as you saw on your trip to the re- 
gion last February. As a result, in April 
the President approved admissions at a 
rate of 84,000 a year, a figure which, 
together with the cooperation of other 
nations, we then hoped would be 
adequate. 

As you know, however, a funding 
crisis forced us during April and May 
to cut back actual admissions beloW' 
that rate. This raised questions about 
our commitment among first-asylum 
countries, particularly Thailand and 
Malaysia. And, at the same time, the 
refugee crisis exploded. The upsurge in 
arrivals was due in part to the contlicl 
involving Vietnam and China and in 
part to Vietnamese internal conditions 
and policies. 

Some 160,000 refugees arrived ir 
U.S. -sponsored camps in Southeast 
Asia in April through June, while only 
27,500 were resettled. In addition, 
there was a sharp increase in the 
number of refugees fleeing into Thai-i 
land as a result of the Vietnamese inva-i 
sion and occupation of Kampuchea, tha 
continued human rights abuses by the 
Pol Pot forces, and dislocation in the 
Kampuchean economy. 

A rapid hardening of positions in the 
ASEAN countries [Association ol 
South East Asian Nations] followed. 
Their previously generous position ot 
accepting refugees from Indochina was; 
replaced by a trend toward refusing to 
accept new arrivals. Many who had 
already found safety and asylum were 
expelled. 

Once again, the growing crisis called 
for redoubled efforts. At the Tokyo 
summit, we joined with Japan and our 





INDOCHINESE REFUGEE ARRIVALS 






August 1979 










Departures 


Population 


Country 


Arrivals 


for U.S. 


as of Aug. 31 


Thailand 








Land 


3,188 


13.130 


166.218 


Boat 


163 


220 


8.104 


Malaysia 


2.650 


5,015 


55,742 


Hong Kong/Macao 


3,409 


1.024 


70.199 


Indonesia 


813 


1 , 1 85 


45.856 


Philippines 


503 


277 


5,939 


Singapore 


774 


15 


1,399 


Japan 


447 


10 


966 


Others 

TOTAL 


33 


3 


868 


11,980 


10.879 


355.291 



October 1979 



najor European allies in announcing 
Sur intention to increase refugee assist- 
ince significantly." To give substance 
;o our pledge and impetus to a greater 
international commitment, the Presi- 
dent decided that our admissions of In- 
dochinese refugees should be doubled, 
from 7,000 to 14,000 per month. For 
•heir part, the Japanese pledged to un- 
derwrite 50% of the budget of the In- 
dochinese assistance program of the 
U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees 
^UNHCR). This means that the United 
I States will no longer need to pay 50% 
of that budget, as we have in the past. 

In the following days, during the 
ASEAN [Association of South East 
Asian Nations] meeting at Bali, we 
discussed with the Foreign Ministers of 
fhe ASEAN nations, Australia, New 
Zealand, Japan, and Ireland — 
representing the European 
Community — the need to mount a 
global response to all aspects of the 
problem. We also discussed the issue 
with the Chinese. 

The conference earlier this month in 
Geneva, held under the auspices of the 
LInited Nations, was a further step for- 
ward in mobilizing an international 
effort commensurate with the chal- 
lenge. Since Tokyo, the process has 
brought the total number of permanent 
resettlement offers to over 260,000 
refugees and new contributions of 
ibout $190 million to the UNHCR. 
Importantly, the Philippine Govern- 
Tient generously offered to provide a 
site for a new refugee processing center 
[o accommodate up to 50,000 people. 

Dick Clark will report to you in 
greater detail about the actions that 
were taken in Geneva and what we 
must now do to build on this progress. 
Let me simply outline the course which 
the Vice President set forth in Geneva, 
for it is our agenda for action. 

First, we will continue to press for a 
solution to this problem at its source. 
The fundamental responsibility lies 
with the authorities of Indochina. The 
Indochinese authorities must respect 
the human rights of their people and 
put an end to the strife that disrupts the 
peace and displaces people from their 
homes. We are particularly concerned 
about the Kampucheans, who now face 
a serious threat of famine. We hope 
that Vietnam and all other parties will 
cooperate with the international com- 
munity in a program for humanitarian 
relief in Kampuchea. 

At this point, we do not know how 
the Vietnamese plan to implement the 
approach to departures which they dis- 
cussed with Secretary General Wald- 
hemi. Nor do we yet know the extent to 
which they will implement the plan of 
jthe UNHCR to regularize family reun- 



fffetttoratiff iftti of Undersiamting 
Between the U^HCR and Vietnatn 



Following is the text of the memo- 
randum of understanding between the 
U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR) and the Government of the 
Socialist Republic of Vietnam con- 
cerning the orderly departure of per- 
sons who wish to leave Vietnam for 
countries of new residence, agreed to 
May 30. 1979.' 

Following discus.sion held in Hanoi between 
representatives of the Government of the 
Socialist Republic of Viet Nam and a delegation 
of the Office of the United Nations High Com- 
missioner for Refugees (UNHCR) from 26 Feb- 
ruary to 5 March and from 25 May to 30 May 
1979. it is agreed that UNHCR will facilitate the 
implementation of the 12 January announcement 
by the Vietnamese Government to permit the or- 
derly departure of persons who wish to leave 
Viet Nam for countries of new residence. Re- 
garding the programme to implement such or- 
derly departure, it is understood that: 

1. Authorized exit of those people who wish 
to leave Viet Nam and settle in foreign 
countries — family reunion and other humanitar- 
ian cases — will be carried out as soon as possible 
and to the maximum extent. The number of such 
people will depend both on the volume of appli- 
cations for exit from Viet Nam and on receiving 
countries' ability to issue entry visas. 



2. The election ol those people auihon/cil lo 
go abroad under this programme will, when- 
ever possible, be made on the basis ol ihc lists 
prepared by the Vietnamese Government and 
the lists prepared by the receiving countries 
Those persons whose names appear on both 
lists will qualify for exit. As for those persons 
whose name appear on only one list, their cases 
will be subject to di.scussions between IINHCR 
and the Vietnamese Government or the Gov- 
ernments ot the receiving countries, as appro- 
priate 

3. UNHCR will make every effort to enlist 
support for this programme amongst potential 
receiving countries, 

4. The Vietnamese Government and LINHCR 
will each appoint personnel who will closely 
co-operate in the implemcntalion ol this pro- 
gramme , 

5 This personnel will be authorized to oper- 
ate in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City and, as 
necessary, to go to other places to promote exit 
operations, 

6, Exit operations will be effected al regular 
intervals by appropriate means of transport, 

7, The Vietnamese Government will, subject 
to relevant Vietnamese laws, provide UNHCR 
and the receiving countries with every lacility 
to implement this programme D 



'Text from UN, press release REF/800, 



fication. We are prepared to cooperate 
with the High Commissioner and the 
Vietnamese in a program which allows 
Indochinese to seek freedom elsewhere 
without risking their lives in the proc- 
ess. As soon as the UNHCR informs us 
that arrangements have been made with 
Hanoi, we will be prepared to send 
consular officers on temporary duty to 
Vietnam to work in the UNHCR office, 
to speed the processing of such cases. 

But we have also made clear that our 
support for direct departures must not 
downgrade the plight of people who 
have already risked their lives and are 
awaiting resettlement in refugee 
camps. Nor must a direct departure 
program become a means for the forced 
expulsion or discriminatory, harsh 
treatment of ethnic, political, or other 
groups who do not meet their govern- 
ment's favor. 

Second, we will continue to urge the 
countries of first asylum to provide 
safe haven to all refugees. But if these 
countries are to continue to bear this 
burden, the international community 
must provide assurances that the refu- 



gees will find new homes within a rea- 
sonable period of time. 

Therefore, third, to help meet our 
commitment to double our Indochinese 
refugee admissions, the State Depart- 
ment is seeking $202.3 million for fis- 
cal year 19S0 to cover processing, 
transportation to the United States, and 
initial reception and placement grants 
to the voluntary agencies that help re- 
settle these refugees. We are also 
streamlining and accelerating the proc- 
essing of refugees. This will enable us 
to meet, as early as this coming month, 
the President's goal of 14,000 monthly 
admissions, and it will also enable us 
to maintain this rate on a consistent 
basis. We are also taking steps to im- 
prove the medical examination process 
for those coming to the United States. 

Fourth, we must make a greater 
contribution to the relief efforts of the 
UNHCR. The UNHCR may require an 
estimated $400 million in 1980 to care 
for growing refugee populations and to 
alleviate the misery in refugee camps. 
To do our part, we are seeking $105 
million for these programs. We also 



Department of State Bulletin/ 



will be assigning Peace Corps volun- 
teers to UNHCR operations in the 
tield, and we are taking other steps to 
improve the care afforded refugees in 
camps, particularly with regard to 
hygiene, health, and food. 

Fifth, we must relieve the pressure 
i>n existing first-asylum refugee camps 
and create a network of new transit 
centers for refugees destined for per- 
manent resettlement elsewhere. We 
will be requesting $20 million from the 
Congress to finance our share of the 
ccinstruction costs of such new UNHCR 
facilities. 

Sixth, to extend refugee resettlement 
lo nations which are ready to receive 
them but do not have the resources to 
do so, we have proposed the creation of 
an international refugee resettlement 
fund. 

Seventh, we are taking concrete 
steps to enhance our efforts to save the 
lives of refugees in distress on the high 
seas. The 7th Fleet has already picked 
up at least 65 refugees and is also pro- 
viding information from air patrols to 
other ships in the region on refugee 
boats in distress. 

Finally, with the continued coopera- 
tion of this committee, we expect to 
have the refugee act of 1979 in effect 
by the beginning of FY 1980. This vital 
legislation will provide, for the first 
lime, a comprehensive framework for 
responding effectively to refugee crises 
of this gravity. As you are aware, the 
Indochinese Refugee Assistance Act is 
scheduled to expire on September 30. 
Without the new refugee act, we will 
have to seek emergency legislation to 
extend the existing authority to assist 
Indochina refugees in this country. We 
will also have to request that the Attor- 
ney General issue a new parole pro- 
gram to authorize the admission of In- 
dochinese refugees into the United 
States in FY 1980. 

In the weeks immediately ahead, we 
must assure that others live up to the 
commitments they have already made. 
We must also continue to expand the 
circle of nations contributing their full 
share to this international effort. But to 
do these things, we must fulfill our 
own obligations. We must back our 
concern and compassion with our re- 
sources and energies. These efforts will 
be costly. They will be protracted. We 
will not solve this problem, or alleviate 
the suffering, quickly or easily. But I 
have no doubt that the American people 
want us to do our full share. 

We are a nation of refugees. Most of 
us can trace our presence here to the 
turmoil or oppression of another time 
and another place. Our nation has been 
immeasurably enriched by this con- 
tinuing process. We will not turn our 



Siguifivani Quotes on Refugees 



by Dick Clark 

Excerpts from statements before n\o 
Senate and House committees and sub- 
committees and at the opening session 
of the intergovernmental Committee far 
European Migration (ICEM). The full 
texts of these statements tnay be ob- 
tained from the Public Information 
Service. Bureau of Public Affairs, De- 
partment of State. Washington, D.C. 
20520. ' 

MARCH 14, 1979^ 

■". . . refugee programs are an im- 
portant element in our foreign policy. 
The refugee crisis is a pervasive prob- 
lem that strains the resources of the 
international community. In offering 
assistance, we can ease the pressures 
on friendly governments in Southeast 
Asia created by the arrival of refugees 
from Vietnam, Laos, and Kampuchea. 
Elsewhere, our programs support the 
victims of conflicts while the search for 
peace continues. Our aid to refugees 
offers a beacon of hope to people flee- 
ing repression in Eastern Europe, and it 
figures in our relations with the Soviet 
Union. In addition, our aid sets an 
example for other countries and rein- 
forces our position as a nation of lead- 
ership and humanitarian concern. 

"Until now, we have carried out our 
refugee programs through. . . a patch- 
work of different programs that 
evolved in response to specific crises. 
The resulting legislative framework is 
inadequate to cope with the refugee 
problem we face today. . . . 

■"In recent years, we continually 
have seen dramatic conflicts and inter- 
nal developments force new groups of 
people to tiee for their lives. The num- 
bers of refugees are growing on every 
continent. While the plight of the boat 



backs on our traditions. We must meet 
the commitments we have made to 
other nations and to those who are 
suffering. In doing so, we will also be 
renewing our commitments to our 
ideals and to ourselves. D 



'Press release 183. The complete iranscripl 
of the hearings will be published by the com- 
millee and will be available troni the Superin- 
lendenl of Documents. U.S. GovernmenI 
Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. 

^ For text of the joint communique issued 
June 28, 1979, see Bulletin of Aug. 1979. 
p. 5. 



people in Southeast Asia presents to- 
day's most dramatic case, it must not 
blind us to the hardships of refugees 
fleeing oppression and persecution in 
Eastern Europe. Africa, the Middle 
East, and Latin America. To deal suc- 
cessfully with these difficult chal- 
lenges, our policies and programs must, 
recognize that refugee problems uit- 
fortunately have become a regular fea- 
ture of our world. 

"If we are to respond to this un- 
precedented refugee situation, our ref- 
ugee policy must expand the definition 
of refugees beyond the present reliancei 
in immigration law on narrow geo- 
graphic and ideological criteria 
Human suffering recognizes no suchr 
distinctions." 

APRIL 10, 1979^ 

■'. . . Dramatic increases ir> 
worldwide refugee populations havei 
forced us to adjust our requests sub- 
stantially above those we have already- 
submitted. . . for FY 1979 and. 
1980. . . . not only are more people 
fleeing political persecution but in cer- 
tain areas, closed borders and repres- 
sive policies have forced refugees to» 
seek more desperate means of es- 
cape. . . . countries of first asylum are* 
beginning to refuse further aid to refu- 
gees because of overflowing refugeei 
camps, ethnic hostility, and preexisting! 
economic and population problems. 

". . . the State Department is re- 
questing $51.7 million beyond the sup- 
plemental appropriation of $54.3 mil- 
lion that you received in January for- 
FY 1979. This latest increase brings 
our supplemental request to a total of 
$104.9 million — compared with the 
appropriation of $91.5 million that 
Congress has already enacted for this 
fiscal year. These funds will increase 
our contribution to the care and 
maintenance of hundreds of thousands 
of refugees overseas, and they will fi- 
nance the resettlement to the United 
States of 64,000 Indochinese refugees 
and 35,940 Soviet. Eastern European, 
and other refugees. 

"The State Department has also re- 
quested an amendment for FY 1980 of 
$87.1 million beyond the request you 
have already received for $136.9 mil- 
lion. This raises our total appropriation 
request for FY 1980 to $223.9 million. 
This proposed appropriation will fi- 
nance a total of 120,000 refugee reset- 
tlements to this country, or about 



Xtober 1979 



a. 000 from Indochina and 36.000 
Irom the Soviet Union, Eastern 
Europe, and other regions. . . . 

"Finally, the Department of State is 
also requesting a supplemental appro- 
priation of $10 million for the emer- 
gency refugee and migration assistance 
fund for the balance of FY 1979 plus 
an amendment of $25 million for FY 
1980. . . . our total request for the 
fund for FY 1980 is now $40 mil- 
lion. . . . 

"The difficulty of predicting our 
needs for refugee assistance is evident 
in reviewing our recent experiences in 
the areas where we have our largest 
programs — Africa, Southeast Asia, and 
Europe. In each case there have been 
substantial increases in refugee flows 
in the last 9 months. . . . 

". . . in Africa a series of political 
conflicts in recent years has created the 
largest refugee population of any con- 
tuient. The U.N. High Commissioner 
for Refugees (UNHCR) estimates that 
o\er 2 million Africans qualify for ref- 
ugee status, and about half are in need 
of assistance. In addition, the Interna- 
tional Committee of the Red Cross 
(ICRC) assists hundreds of thousands 
of refugees whom the UNHCR is un- 
able to reach, such as those within 
Rhodesia. . . . Since there has been 
little demand for resettlement in the 
United States, our policy has been 
primarily to contribute to the care and 
maintenance of African refugees 
through support for UNHCR and ICRC 
programs. . . . 

". . . in Southeast Asia the refugee 
population has also reached a critical 
point. During the latter part of 1978, 
the number of people fleeing oppres- 
sion in Vietnam. Laos, and Kam- 
puchea. . . at times exceed[ed] 20,000 
a month. . . . there is little hope that 
most of the Indochinese refugees can 
be repatriated or resettled in neighbor- 
ing states. Our approach is. . . to pro- 
vide a combination of relief to refugees 
in camps and resettlement opportunities 
for many in the United States. 

"The third major component of the 
State Department refugee program as- 
sists people fleeing religious and politi- 
cal persecution in Eastern Europe and 
the Soviet Union. ... In the last 6 
months, there has been a dramatic in- 
crease in the number of refugees from 
the Soviet Union, primarily because the 
Soviet Government has liberalized its 
policy on issuing exit visas. . . . our 
present plans are for about 36,000 re- 
settlements each for this year and the 
next two fiscal years. 

MAY 21, 1979* 

"... It is obvious to even the most 
casual observer of world events that the 



refugee problem is more critical than at 
any time since World War 11. Daily we 
see conflicts and internal developments 
forcing new groups of people to flee 
for their lives and their dignity. In dis- 
maying contrast to earlier periods of 
history, the number of refugees has 
grown simultaneously and dramatically 
on every continent. . . . 

"... just as the refugee problem it- 
self is beyond our collective efforts to 
correct totally, our collective 
capabilities to assist refugees effec- 
tively have been outstripped. 

' ' . •. . Clearly, the international 
community has not responded to their 
needs to the extent that common dig- 
nity and decency demand. As a conse- 
quence, the deteriorating refugee situa- 
tion is also creating serious political 
and economic strains on countries of 
first asylum. . . . 

"Let me share with you briefly the 
steps the United States has initiated in 
response to these concerns. . . . Presi- 
dent Carter created the position of am- 
bassador at large and U.S. Coordinator 
for Refugee Affairs. . . [to develop] an 
overall U.S. refugee and resettlement 



policy; [coordinate] all U.S. domestic 
and international refugee and resettle- 
ment programs which this year will ex- 
ceed $500 million; and [represent] the 
United States in discussions and 
negotiations with foreign governments 
and international organizations on ref- 
ugee matters. . . . 

"... the Administration sent to the 
Congress new refugee legisla- 
tion. . . . The President has approved 
refugee admissions of about 108,000 
for this fiscal year and. . . has also 
authorized us to request funds from 
Congress to provide for 120,000 ad- 
missions in FY 1980. . . . 

'". . . The Congress is concerned 
that [multilateral organizations, such as 
ICEM] should be strengthened to per- 
form more effectively the tasks for 
which they were established .... 
Members of Congress believe that there 
must be a more equitable sharing of the 
burden. 

"We feel . . . that we must request 
all governments to reexamine their own 
policies and programs and to make sig- 
nificantly more generous contributions 
to the care and maintenance and reset- 



U.S. COORDINATOR 
FOR REFUGEE AFFAIRS 

Dick Clark was born September 14. 1928, 
on a farm in Linn County. Iowa. He served 
with the U.S. Army in Germany from 1950 
to 1952. He received a bachelor's degree 
from Upper Iowa University (195.^) and a 
master's degree in history from the Univer- 
sity of Iowa (1956). While completing 
course work for a doctorate in history, he 
was a teaching assistant at the University of 
Iowa (1956 to 1959) 

Ambassador Clark was an assistant pro 
fessor of history and political science at 
Upper Iowa University (1959-64) and was 
president of the university faculty in 1962. 
During this period, he also served on sev- 




fciWi 



eral State commissions, including chairman 
of the Iowa Civil Defense Administration 
and the Office of Emergency Planning in 
1963 and 1964. 

From 1965 to 1972, he was the Adminis- 
trative Assistant to Iowa Congressman John 
Culver (now Iowa's senior senator). He 
served as a national political organizer in 
the presidential campaign of the late Sena- 
tor Robert F. Kennedy in 1968, 

Ambassador Clark was elected to the 
U.S. Senate in 1972, after a 1,300-mile 
campaign walk across the State of Iowa. 
While in the Senate, he was a leader in the 
areas of foreign policy, congressional and 
campaign reform, and agriculture. He 
chaired subcommittees on African affairs 
and rural development. He was a U.S. dele- 
gate to the U.N. World Food Conference in 
Rome (1974) and was cochairman of 
African-American Institute conferences in 
Lesotho ( 1976) and Sudan ( 1978). His 1978 
bid for a second Senate term was unsuc- 
cessful. 

Ambassador Clark is a member of the 
American Historical Association, the Con- 
ference on European History, the American 
Association for Advancement of Slavic 
Studies, and the Conference on Slavic and 
East European History. He has been 
awarded honorary degrees by Upper Iowa 
University. Loras College. Parsons College, 
Mt. Mercy College. Cornell College, and 
St. Ambrose College. 

He was sworn in as U.S. Coordinator for 
Refugee Affairs and Ambassador at Large 
on May I, 1979. 



8 

tiement of refugees both in financial 
contributions to international organiza- 
tions and resettlement opportunities. 



JULY 25, 1979' 

". . .the delegations [to the Geneva 
conference on refugees] generally ex- 
pressed support for regularized depar- 
tures from Vietnam directly to reset- 
tlement countries. As you know, the 
UNHCR has negotiated a seven-point 
plan with Hanoi to facilitate legal de- 
partures. We are supporting this plan to 
the extent that it promotes family 
reunification and freedom of emigra- 
tion and to the extent that it does not 
jeopardize efforts to resettle refugees 
who have already risked their lives to 
tlee and are now languishing in camps 
in Southeast Asia. 

"We have notified the High Com- 
missioner that in principle we are pre- 
pared to send U.S. consular officers to 
Vietnam on temporary detail to work 
with UNHCR personnel in screening 
Vietnamese destined for the United 
States under this plan. The details still 
have to be worked out, but we are 
hopeful that this step will permit us to 
accelerate legal departures from Viet- 
nam. Since the first people to come to 
this country in this manner qualify 
under U.S. immigration laws, they are 
considered immigrants rather than ref- 
ugees, and they do not divert refugee 
admissions numbers from the camps in 
Southeast Asia." 



JULY 26, 1979^ 

"One of the major initiatives pro- 
posed by Vice President Mondale at the 
Geneva meeting was the idea of estab- 
lishing an international fund for refu- 
gee resettlement under the auspices of 
the UNHCR. The purpose of this fund 
would be to assist developing countries 
to accept refugees for permanent set- 
tlement. As you know, many countries 
of the developing world have signifi- 
cant potential to open new areas and 
otherwise accept refugees on a perma- 
nent basis in a manner which would 
benefit their own economic develop- 
ment. The fund would facilitate this 
process and relieve the heavy financial 
burden for transportation, training, and 
placement of the refugees. 

"The United States proposed that the 
fund be capitalized at a level of $200 
million, and we indicated our intention 
of seeking $20 million from the Con- 
gress as an initial contribution. Before 
proceeding, however, we will want to 
be sure that other donors will match 
our contribution by at least another 
70% so that our costs will not exceed 
30% of the total. 



"The reaction to the proposal . . . 
was very favorable on the part of po- 
tential donors. The Danes immediately 
pledged an initial contribution of $5 
million; the Australians said they 
looked forward to contributing; and 
Germany, the United Kingdom, and 
others. . . are also likely to contribute. 
The Japanese and other potential 
donors indicated they wanted to have 
more details on the idea from UNHCR 
before committing themselves. U.N. 
High Commissioner [Poul], Hartling 
said he would be developing the con- 
cept and plans to present it to the 
UNHCR Executive Committee for ap- 
proval in October." D 



'The complete transcript of the hearings will 
be published by the committee and will be 
available from the Superintendent of Docu- 
ments, U.S. Government Printing Office. 
Washington, D.C. 20402. 

^Made before the Senate Judiciary Commit- 
tee. 

■'Made before the Subcommittee on Foreign 
Operations of the House Appropriations Com- 
mittee 

^Made at the ICEM council meeting in 
Geneva. 



I/.iS. Coordinator 
tor Refugee Affairs 



President Carter created the Office of 
the U.S. Coordinator in February 1979 
to provide policy guidance and coordi- 
nation for all U.S. refugee programs, 
both international and domestic. Since 
much of the Coordinator's international 
responsibilities involve discussions and 
negotiations with foreign governments 
and international organizations on ref- 
ugee matters, he also has the rank of 
ambassador at large. 

The Coordinator is chairman of the 
Interagency Coordinating Committee 
for Refugee Affairs which consists of 
representatives of all Federal agencies 
involved in U.S. refugee programs, in- 
cluding the Departments of State. Jus- 
tice, and Health, Education and Wel- 
fare, and the Agency for International 
Development. When necessary the 
committee also meets with representa- 
tives of the Office of Management and 
Budget; Immigration and Naturaliza- 
tion Service; National Security Coun- 
cil; Domestic Council; Central Intelli- 
gence Agency; and the Departments of 
Labor, Commerce, and Defense. 

In addition the Coordinator's respon- 
sibilities include developing overall 
U.S. policy on refugee assistance and 
resettlement, guiding the development 



Department of State Bulletin, 

and presentation of budgets for refugee' 
programs, advising the Attorney Gen-: 
eral on admissions policies for refu-i 
gees, and facilitating liaison betweem 
the Federal government and the volun- 
tary agencies and State and local gov- 
ernments concerned with the domestic 
resettlement of refugees. 

The U.S. Coordinator also develops^ 
reorganization plans for refugee pro- 
grams wherever necessary to insure ai 
coordinated refugee effort. As an inter- 
agency coordinator, he serves at the 
direction of both the Secretary of State 
and the President and is assisted by ai 
staff located in the Department of 
State. D 



ResMlls of 
Refugee Conference 



Many have hailed the U.N.- 
sponsored refugee conference, held in 
Geneva July 20-21, 1979, as a success 
because of the many specific offers of 
assistance made at and shortly before 
the conference. 

• The pledges for international re- 
settlement have doubled. At the time of 
the Tokyo summit June 28-29, the 
number of pledges totaled 125,000. By 
the end of the conference, the number 
of pledges had reached 265,000. 

• An additional $200 million has 
been pledged to support the operations 
of the U.N. High Commissioner for 
Refugees, plus the 50% share of the 
budget which Japan has stated it would 
contribute. 

• Significant progress was made to- 
ward the establishment of refugee 
processing centers with the Philippine 
Government offer of a site to accom- 
modate 50,000 refugees. 

There is, however, some unfinished 
business The United States would like 
to get agreement on the establishment 
of additional refugee processing centers 
to accommodate up to 250,000 In- 
dochinese refugees. 

We will continue to seek additional 
resettlement opportunities. We also 
will continue to pursue the idea of an 
international refugee resettlement fund 
as proposed by Vice President Mondale 
at Geneva. 

The key questions still unresolved 
are whether Vietnam is willing to pro- 
vide protection of human rights and 
livelihood for its people as called for in 
the U.N. Charter and the Declaration 
of Human Rights and whether it is 
willing to seek a political, rather than a 
military, solution in Kampuchea. D 



Xtober 1974 



THE PRESIDEI^T: 

]¥ett?s Conference 
of Juiy 25 (Excerpts) 



Q. Are you planning to install any 
oreign exchange controls or capital 
ontrols in order to protect the de- 
line of the dollar, and are you plan- 
ting any further appointments from 
he corporate section? 

A. 1 do not contemplate taking action 
f that tcind. I think the dollar is sound. 
1 the long run. the principles which 
/ill decide the value of the dollar are 
etermined by how et't'ective we are in 
ealing with the energy question, how 
ft'ective we are in dealing with the in- 
lation question, how much we act to 
.esolve the adverse balance of pay- 
ments, how we deal with the Federal 
udget deficit, and so forth. The basic 
nderlying economic factors will be 
»/hat causes the value of the dollar, not 
ome contrived action that I might take 
interfere with the normal operation 
if the international monetary scene. 

I have just announced today that I'm 
ppointing Paul Volcker [to be Chair- 
nan of the Federal Reserve Board], a 
ighly qualified person, internationally 
espected as a knowledgeable man on 
nonetary systems, on whom I can de- 
lend. There's no doubt that he will 
vork harmoniously with me, with Bill 
Vliller, who will be the new Secretary 
)f the Treasury. And I believe that this 
lew team will be very effective. 

I would like to reserve the right to 
nake future appointments from the 
:orporate world or the academic world 
)r the journalistic world or from among 
nayors and Governors or Members of 
he Congress. But I can't exclude the 
;orporate sector. But I can't say now 
Aihere I'll make future appointments 
"rom . 



taking some positive steps to assure 
their safety? 

A. It's a mistake for Americans to 
assume or to claim that every time an 
evolutionary change takes place, or 
even an abrupt change takes place in 
this hemisphere, that somehow it's the 
result of secret, massive Cuban inter- 
vention. The fact in Nicaragua is that 
the incumbent government, the Somoza 
regime, lost the confidence of the 
Nicaraguan people. There was a broad 
range of forces assembled to replace 
Somoza and his regime as the head of 
the Nicaraguan Government. 

We worked as closely as we could 
without intervening in the internal af- 
fairs of Nicaragua with the neighboring 
countries and with the so-called An- 
dean group in the northern part of 
South America to bring about an or- 
derly transition. Our effort was to let 
the people of Nicaragua ultimately 
make a decision on who should be their 
leader, what form of government they 
should have. We also wanted to 
minimize bloodshed and to restore sta- 
bility. That is presently being done. 
We have a good relationship with the 
new government. We hope to improve 
it. We are providing some minimum 
humanitarian aid for the people of 
Nicaragua, who've suffered so much. 

I think that our posture in Nicaragua 
is a proper one. 1 do not attribute at all 
the change in Nicaragua to Cuba. I 
think the people of Nicaragua have got 
enough judgment to make their own 
decisions, and we will use our efforts 
in a proper fashion without interven- 
tionism, to let the Nicaraguans let their 
voice be heard in shaping their own 
affairs. 



on the foreign exchange markets, 
and it's approaching the low levels 
that once before you had to launch a 
dramatic rescue program last 
November. 

In addition to that, you've just 
named Paul Volcker, a conservative 
Republican, to head the Federal Re- 
serve Board. How do the poundings 
that the dollar is undergoing on the 
exchange markets and your naming 
of Mr. Volcker square with your 
earlier description? 

A. I see no incompatibility at all. 
Mr. Volcker, by the way, happens to 
be a Democrat. But he, I think, is a 
conservative in that he believes in con- 
trolling inflation and he believes in 
maintaining a sound dollar. 

I can't guarantee what the exact 
value of the dollar might be in months 
ahead. We don't freeze the value of the 
dollar. That's determined by interna- 
tional monetary considerations. What I 
said was that the basic value of the 
dollar will be determined not by the 
identity of a President or even the 
identity of the Chairman of the Federal 
Reserve; it will be shaped by how ef- 
fectively our nation moves to meet the 
energy challenge. There is some pres- 
ent doubt that the Congress will pass 
the proposals that I have put forward. I 
have no doubt that the dollar will in- 
crease in value when the Congress has 
passed the programs that I proposed. 
And, obviously, the dollar will be ad- 
versely affected if inflation should in- 
crease. 

My prediction is that inflation will 
decrease in the months ahead. And I'm 
sure that the dollar would be adversely 
affected if I abandoned my commit- 
ment to a responsible Federal budget 
and start on wild spending programs 
when they are not needed. 

So, basic decisions made of fiscal 
soundness in our government is a much 
more important factor in shaping the 
value of the dollar than is the identity 
of officials who might serve in a tran- 
sient time. 

. □ 



Q. I wonder, in looking at 

Nicaragua, if we are in danger of Q. You said earlier that you think 

mother Cuba there, and what the that the U.S. dollar is sound. The 

White House plans to do in terms of dollar seems to be taking a pounding 



Text from Weekly Compilation of Presiden- 
tial Documents of July 30. 1979. 



Department of State Bulletin^ 



VICE PRE!$IDEXT: Visit to East Asia 



Vice President Mondale departed Washington. D.C.. August 24, 1979, for a 
trip to the People's Republic of China (August 25-Septemher I ), Hong Kong 
(September 1-3), and Tokyo (September J). He returned to the United States on 
September J . 

While in China, he visited Beijing (Peking — August 25-29), Xi'an (Sian — August 
29-30). and Guangzhou (Canton — August 30-September 1). Following are the 
texts of his address at Beijing University on August 27, which was broadcast on 
radio and television and reprinted in the People' s Daily and local newspapers 
throughout China, his dinner toast made at a welcoming hancpiet in Beijing on 
August 26, and his remarks at the opening of the U.S. Consulate General in 
Guangzhou on August 31 . 



BEIJING UNIVERSITY, 
AUG. 27, 1979 

1 am honored to appear before you, 
and 1 bring you the warm greetings and 
the friendship of the President of the 
United States and the American people. 

For an American of my generation to 
visit the People's Republic of China is 
to touch the pulse of modern political 
history. For nearly three decades our 
nations stood separate and apart, but 
the ancient hunger for community 
unites humanity. It urges us to find 
common ground. As one of your poets 
wrote over a thousand years ago: "We 
widen our view three hundred miles by 
ascending one flight of stairs." We are 
ascending that flight of stairs together. 
Each day we take another step. This 
afternoon, I am privileged to be the 
first American political figure to speak 
directly to the citizens of the People's 
Republic of China. 

And no setting for that speech could 
be more symbolic of our relationship 
than this place of new beginnings. The 
history of modern China is crystallized 
in the story of Beijing University and 
the other distinguished institutions you 
represent. At virtually every turning 
point in 20th century China, Bei-Da has 
been the fulcrum. 

Sixty years ago, it was at Bei-Da that 
the May 4th movement began, launch- 
ing an era of unprecedented intellectual 
ferment. It inaugurated an effort to 
modernize Chinese culture and society. 
It established a new meeting ground for 
eastern and western cultures. And its 
framework of mutual respect sustains 
our own cultural cooperation today. 

Forty-four years ago, Bei-Da was 
where the December 9th movement 
galvanized a student generation to re- 
sist external aggression. And its mes- 
sage of sovereignty and nonaggression 
underpins our own political coopera- 
tion today. 



As China looks to the future, once 
again it is Bei-Da and your other re- 
search centers which are leading the 
drive toward "the four moderniza- 
tions." And the closeness of your de- 
velopment goals to our own interests 
will provide the basis for our continu- 
ing economic cooperation. 

Today we find our two nations at a 
pivotal moment. We have normalized 
our relations. The curtain has parted; 
the mystery is being dispelled. We are 
eager to know more about one another, 
to share the texture of our daily lives, 
to forge the human bonds of friendship. 
That is a rich beginning, but it is only a 
beginning. 

A modern China taking its place in 
the family of nations is engaged in a 
search not only for friendship but also 
for security and development. An 
America deepening its relations with 
China does so not only out of genuine 
sentiment and not only out of natural 
curiosity; it does so out of the same 
combination of principle and self- 
interest that is the engine of mature re- 
lations among all modern states. 

Our job today is to establish the 
basis for an enduring relationship to- 
morrow. We could not have set that 
task without our friendship. But we 
cannot accomplish it with friendship 
alone. On behalf of President Carter, 
this is the message I carry to the people 
of China — a message about America, 
its purposes in the world, and our 
hopes for our relations with you. 

A Message About America 

The Americans are historically con- 
fident people. Our politics are rooted in 
our values. We cherish our fundamen- 
tal beliefs in human rights and compas- 
sion and social justice. We believe that 
our democratic system institutionalizes 
those values. The opportunities avail- 
able to our citizens are incomparable. 



Our debates are vigorous and open. I 
And the differences we air amongc 
ourselves — whether on strategic nu- 
clear policy or on energy — are signs of 
our society's enduring strength. | 

My country is blessed with unsur- 
passed natural resources. Moreover, wei 
also have unparalleled human 
resources — workers and farmers andl 
scientists and engineers and indus- 
trialists and financiers. With their 
genius we are able to transform our 
natural assets into abundance, not only 
for ourselves but for the world. 

Of course we face unsolved prob 
lems. But the high goals we set for 
ourselves — and our determination to 
meet them — are measures of our na- 
tional spirit. In that striving, in that 
restless pursuit of a better life, we feel 
a special affinity for the people ofl 
modern China. I 

In the world community, the United 
States seeks international stability and 
peace. But we have no illusions about! 
the obstacles we face. We know that 
we live in a dangerous world. And we 
are determined to remain militarilyi 
prepared. We are fashioning our de 
tenses from the most advanced tech- 
nology anywhere. We have forged al 
liances in Europe and Asia which growi 
stronger every year. Together with ou: 
Japanese and Western allies, we wi' 
insure that our investment in security i; 
equal to the task of insuring peace — as 
we have for 30 years. 

But we want to be more than a firm 
and reliable partner in world affairs. 
We also believe in a world of diversity. 

For Sino-American relations, that 
means that we respect the distinctive 
qualities which the great Chinese 
people contribute to our relationship. 
And despite the sometimes profound 
differences between our two systems, 
we are committed to joining with you 
to advance our many parallel strategic 
and bilateral interests. Thus any nation 
which seeks to weaken or isolate you in 
world affairs assumes a stance counter 
to American interests. This is why the 
United States normalized relations with 
your country, and that is why we must 
work to broaden and strengthen our 
new friendship. 

We must press forward now to widen 
and give specificity to our relations. 
The fundamental challenges we face 
are to build concrete political ties in the 
context of mutual security, to establish 
broad cultural relations in a framework 



WI 

3 



(Xiober 1979 



11 



of genuine equality, and to forge prac- 
iKiil economic bonds with the goal of 
common benefit. 

As we give substance to our shared 
interests, we are investing in the future 
ot our relationships. The more effec- 
li\ely we advance our agenda, the more 
bonds we build between us — the more 
confident we can be that our relation- 
ship will endure. 

And so what we accomplish today 
lays the groundwork for the decade 
ahead. The 1980's can find us working 
together — and working with other 
nations — to meet world problems. En- 
riching the global economy, containing 
international conflicts, protecting the 
independence of nations — these goals 
must also be pursued from the perspec- 
tive of our bilateral relationship. The 
deeper the relationship, the more suc- 
cessful that worldwide pursuit will be. 

That is the agenda President Carter 
has asked me to come to the People's 
Republic of China to pursue. That is 
the principal message President Carter 
has asked me to bring to you. It is the 
agenda we share for the future. 

Economic Cooperation 

In the 8 months since normalization, 
we have witnessed the rapid expansion 
of Sino- American relations. 

We have reached a settlement on 
claims-assets and signed the trade 
agreement. Trade between our coun- 
tries is expanding. American oil com- 
panies are helping you explore China's 
off-shore oil reserves. Joint commis- 
sions on Sino-American economic re- 
lations and on scientific and technical 
exchange have been established. We 
have exchanged numerous governmen- 
tal delegations, including the visits of 
many heads of our respective ministries 
and departments, and the flow of 
people between our two countries is 
reaching new heights. We have gained 
a cooperative momentum. Together let 
us sustain and strengthen it. For a 
strong and secure and modernizing 
China is also in the American interest 
in the decade ahead. 

In agriculture, your continued de- 
velopment not only provides a better 
life for the Chinese people, it also 
serves our interests — for your gains in 
agriculture will increase limited world 
food supplies. 

In trade, our interests are served by 
your expanding exports of natural re- 
sources and industrial products. And at 
the same time your interests are served 
by the purchases you can finance 
through those exports. 

As you industrialize, you provide a 
higher standard of living for your 
people. And at the same time our inter- 



ests are served — for this will increase 
the flow of trade, narrow the wealth 
gap between the developed and the de- 
veloping world and thus help alleviate 
a major source of global instability. 

Above all, both our political inter- 
ests are served by your growing 
strength in all fields — for it helps deter 
others who might seek to impose them- 
selves on you. 

Efforts in the 1920's and 1930's to 
keep China weak destabilized the entire 
world. For many years, China was a 
flashpoint of great power competition. 
But a confident China can contribute to 
the maintenance of peace in the region. 
Today the unprecedented and friendly 
relations among China. Japan, and the 
United States bring international sta- 
bility to northeast Asia. That is why 
deepening our economic, cultural, and 
political relations is so strategically 
important — not only for your security 
but for the peace of the world commu- 
nity. 

We are taking crucial steps to ad- 
vance our economic relationship. 

First, before the end of the year. 
President Carter will submit for the ap- 
proval of the U.S. Congress the trade 
agreement we reached with you. This 
agreement will extend most-favored- 
nation treatment to China. And its 
submission is not linked to any other 
issue. 

Second. I will be signing an agree- 
ment on development of hydroelectric 
energy in the People's Republic of 
China. U.S. Government agencies are 
now ready to help develop China's hy- 
droelectric power on a compensatory 
basis. 

Third, the United States is prepared 
to establish Export-Import Bank credit 
arrangements for the P.R.C. on a 
case-by-case basis up to a total of $2 
billion over a 5-year period. If the pace 
of development warrants it. we are 
prepared to consider additional credit 
arrangements. We have begun discus- 
sions toward this end. 

Fourth, the Carter Administration 
this year will seek congressional au- 
thority to encourage American busi- 
nesses to invest in China — by provid- 
ing the guarantees and insurance of the 
Overseas Private Investment Corpora- 
tion. 

We also stand ready to work with the 
Chinese Government to reach textile, 
maritime, and civil aviation agreements 
in the shortest possible time. 

Culture and Education 

As we advance our cultural relation- 
ship, universities will again be a cru- 
cial meeting ground between Chinese 
and Americans, just as they were in an 



earlier era. 

Today gifted Chinese scholars study 
in America, and American scholars — 
many of whom I am delighted to see 
here today — study in China. That ex- 
change inherits a distinguished tradi- 
tion. On campuses all across the United 
States, Americans who lectured and 
studied in China in the 1930's and 
I940"s today are invigorating our own 
intellectual life — none of them with 
greater distinction than Professor John 
K. Fairbank. who honors us by joining 
my traveling party. At the same time, 
we are proud that Chinese scholars who 
study American agronomy, engineer- 
ing, and medicine have been able to 
contribute the skills they gained in our 
country to the progress of Chinese so- 
ciety. 

It is a mutual relationship — a true 
reciprocity — we are now engaged in 
building. From us, you will learn as- 
pects of science and technology. Our 
anthropologists and archaeologists have 
tools to share with you as you explore 
your own past. American and Chinese 
social scientists and humanists have in- 
sights to offer each other — a fuller un- 
derstanding of our respective institu- 
tions and values. 

And so with your help, we intend to 
broaden our horizons. Chinese re- 
searchers pioneer in key areas, from 
medical burn therapy to earthquake 
prediction, and we want to learn these 
skills from you. Where the progress of 
science requires global cooperation — in 
astronomy, in oceanography, in 
meteorology — our common efforts can 
benefit the world. And our social sci- 
entists and humanists have hardly 
begun to share your understanding of 
history, of social change, and of human 
potential. 

Strong bilateral relations serve our 
strategic interests. Through them, both 
of us can foster the world community 
we seek — a world that respects diver- 
sity and welcomes constructive change. 

A Just World Order 

Today there are 162 nations in the 
world, most of them poor. Eighty per- 
cent of the world's population live in 
developing countries. Every day, 
people in these nations are lifting their 
heads to demand independence and 
justice. Every day efforts by rulers to 
oppress their people are meeting in- 
creasing resistance. Governments are 
coming to understand not only the 
necessity but also the fundamental wis- 
dom and decency of protecting the 
rights of their people through law. 

When political power is more equi- 
tably shared within nations, when that 
power shifts from the few to the many 



12 



Department of State Bulletin 



among nations, when an era of colo- 
nialism gives way to a more just inter- 
national order — these changes deserve 
worldwide support. 

In the last few years, as the preemi- 
nent military and economic power in 
the world, the United States faced a 
fundamental choice. Were we to resist 
those winds of change, attaining our 
national security by defending the 
status quo? Were we to collude with a 
few other countries in an effort to 
dominate the world? Or were we to 
welcome change, to make the neces- 
sary adjustments and to help shape a 
more just world order? 

Let there be no doubt about the 
choice my country has made. The 
United States believes that any effort 
by one country to dominate another is 
doomed to failure. Neither by relying 
exclusively on an increasing stock of 
arms nor by direct or indirect military 
intervention can any nation hope to at- 
tain lasting security. On the contrary, 
nations which embark on that course 
will find themselves increasingly iso- 
lated and vulnerable. 

And nothing more vividly demon- 
strates our belief in those principles 
than the normalization of Sino- 
American relations. Normalization sig- 
nals our understanding that American 
security in the years ahead will be at- 
tained not by maintaining the status 
quo, not by colluding for purposes of 
domination but by fostering a world of 
independent nations with which we can 
build positive relations. 

That is the world community we 
seek. It is a vision of diversity, of con- 
structive ties, and above all, of peace. 
In a world that hopes to find new 
energy sources, peace is essential. In a 
world that aims to eliminate hunger and 
disparities in wealth, global equilib- 
rium is vital. In a world that is working 
to eradicate communicable diseases and 
to safeguard our environment, interna- 
tional cooperation is crucial. 

To secure that peace, to maintain 
that equilibrium, to promote that coop- 
eration, the United States is totally 
committed. 



A World of Diversity 

During the visit to the United States 
by Vice Premier Deng and Madame 
Zhuo in January, President Carter said 
this: 

We've not entered this new relationship for 
any short-term gains. We have a long-term 
commitment to a world community of di- 
verse. . . and independent nations. We believe 
that a strong and a secure China will play a 
cooperative part in developing that type of world 
community. . . . 



I would like to underscore that point. 
Anyone who seeks to understand 
America is invariably drawn back to 
the idea of diversity. The United States 
is a nation of immigrants, all of whom 
contribute to our society their distinct 
talents and traditions. 

The American people find their 
common heritage not in a single blood- 
line, not in thousands of years of 
shared national history but in their 
shared ideals. And we have a profound 
faith in the very diversity that shapes 
us. We value tolerance and pluralism 
and mutual respect. 

We aim to honor those same princ- 
ples in the conduct of our foreign pol- 
icy in the decade of the 1980"s. For 
Sino-American relations, that does not 
mean we will always agree. But in a 
world that respects diversity, countries 
as different as the United States and 
China can work side by side toward 
common goals. Together, we can en- 
rich our two cultures, strengthen our 
two economies, build better lives for 
both our peoples, and together we can 
help stabilize the world community — 
fostering respect for diversity and 
standing firmly opposed to intolerance 
and domination. 

Last month, China and the United 
States joined many other nations in 
Geneva to confront the agony of the 
Indochinese refugees. The enormity of 
their human tragedy defies the imagi- 
nation. In a world that seeks to alleviate 
such suffering — suffering that tran- 
scends national boundaries — the way of 
conscience is the way of common 
cause. 

Today the world watches us. In a 
sense, we are testing whether a de- 
veloped nation and a developing 
nation — each with different traditions, 
each with different systems — can build 
a broad, enduring, constructive re- 
lationship. Certainly there will be seri- 
ous barriers to overcome. But if we can 
work together, future generations will 
thank us. If we fail, not only will our 
children suffer, the entire world will 
feel the consequences. 

Diversity and stability are not new 
themes in Sino-American relations. 
President Roosevelt once said this: 

It is to the advantage — and not to the 
disadvantage — of other nations, when any nation 
becomes stable and prosperous; able to keep the 
peace within its own borders, and strong enough 
not to invite aggression from without. We heart- 
ily hope for the progress of China. And so far as 
by peaceable and legitimate means we are able, 
we will do our part toward furthering that prog- 
ress. 

It was a bright vision three genera- 
tions ago, and subsequent events only 
postponed the fulfillment of its prom- 



ise. As we look to the future, let us re- 
solve to rekindle the light of its insight. 



DINNER TOAST, 
BEIJING, AUG. 26, 1979 

Mr. Vice Premier [Deng], my wife 
Joan and I were honored to meet you 
and Madame Zhuo 7 months ago on 
your historic visit to the United States. 
Your trip broke through diplomatic 
barriers that had stood high for 30 
years. And you did more than that. In 
Washington, and on your journey 
around the United States, you rekindled 
the friendship and affection of the 
American people for the great people 
of China. 

I look forward to the next few 
days — to my talks with you. Premier 
Hua and other leaders, to my speech at 
Beijing University, and to my visits to 
Xi'an and Guangzhou. But already on 
this visit I have sensed the theme that 
will run through it. For this afternoon 1 
had a brief chance to see Beijing's 
historic Front Gate and to explore some 
city streets. At the Front Gate, I began 
to understand the legacies of your past. 
And on Beijing's streets, in the healthy 
and strong determined faces of the 
people I saw and met, I was moved by 
the enormous potential you have for the 
future. 

Though this is my first visit to 
China, it is not my first trip to Asia. A 
year ago, I visited the ASEAN [As- 
sociation of South East Asian Nations] 
countries and our ANZUS [Australia, 
New Zealand, U.S. pact] allies. They 
all saw the wisdom of the strengthened 
Sino-American relationship which has 
brought me here today. 

Visits at the highest levels have 
marked each milestone in our relation- 
ship. Journeys by two Presidents were 
integral parts of our mutual quest for 
normalization. The visit of Vice Pre- 
mier Deng and Vice premier Fang 
brought that quest to an end and 
launched us into a new era. In the 
months since, we have witnessed a 
profusion of Cabinet-level visits, 
agreement-signings, and new ties at all 
working levels of our governments. We 
have laid the institutional basis for a 
flourishing relationship. And we have 
set the tone of cooperation that will 
mark our ties in the decade ahead. 

The time has now come to insure 
that in the I980's our relationship ful- 
fills its potential. That is the purpose of 
my visit. 

If we strengthen our bilateral ties, 
we can both make dramatic economic 
progress; we can both enrich our cul- 
tures. But above all, an enduring 
Sino-American relationship will pro- 



Jciober 1979 



13 



mote the stable international environ- 
ment we both need to meet our domes- 
,tic challenges and address problems of 
jlobai concern. 

And so what has brought our two 
nations together is this: We both seek a 
world of stability and peace — of inde- 
pendent and diverse nations coopera- 
ting for their common economic prog- 
ress. And we both are opposed to ef- 
forts by any country to dominate 
another. 

The decade of the 1980's will bring 
years of challenge in international af- 
fairs. But let there be no doubt that the 
United States will do everything it must 
to remain as secure and prosperous in 
the future as we have been in the past. 

Through your four modernizations 
you, too, are determined to attain the 
same goal for yourself. The United 
States agrees that the modernized 
China of the future can make an even 
greater contribution to the creation of a 
just international order than the China 
of today. 

We believe that the Sino-American 
relationship can emerge in the 1980's 
as one of the major bulwarks of peace 
and justice in the world. To achieve 
that goal, 1 wish to join you in widen- 
ing our consultations on world 
affairs — and where possible, achieve a 
common purpose through our separate 
action. 

To reach that goal, and to consoli- 
date our friendship, we must widen and 
deepen our bilateral relations. A 
flourishing relationship between us in 
the 1980"s — in commerce, in culture, 
in the sciences and technology — will 
demonstrate to the whole world the 
significance we attach to our common 
purpose — a world of independent na- 
tions, of equilibrium, and of peace. 



U.S. CONSULATE GENERAL, 
GUANGZHOU, AUG. 31, 1979 

Today we take another important 
step in translating normal relations 
between the United States and China 
into concrete reality. In my talks with 
Chinese leaders in Beijing and Xi'an, 
one thread that ran throughout all our 
conversations was the need to deepen 
and broaden our relationship. That is 




Vice President Mandate and Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping shake hands after document-signing 
ceremonw (Pholo courtesy ol the white House) 



more than a polite diplomatic conven- 
tion. It means that our political ties 
must now be accompanied by literally a 
profusion of economic and cultural 
ties. It means that our relations must 
not only join government to govern- 
ment but also forge new Sino-American 
links between scientists, engineers, 
artists, and business leaders. 

This afternoon we advance that ef- 
fort by opening the first American con- 
sulate general in China in 30 years. 
This is not just another ceremony: It is 
a symbol of all we mean by truly nor- 
mal relations. With this step — and with 
the opening of Chinese consulates in 
American cities — we lay the 
groundwork for broader relations be- 
tween citizens of both our countries in 
the 1980's. 

It is appropriate that the first Ameri- 
can consulate be opened in 
Guangzhou. By far the largest portion 
of Chinese-Americans trace their an- 
cestry to this area, as we found out this 
morning. Guangzhou was the historic 
first point of contact between our two 
countries. When George Washington 
was sworn in as President, American 
ships were in Guangzhou harbor. And 
today, as increasing numbers of 



Americans coming to China's trade 
fairs know, Guangzhou is a linchpin of 
China's developing economy. 

No one could do a finer job as 
America's first Consul General in the 
People's Republic of China than 
Richard Williams. Dick is a fine career 
Foreign Service officer who has de- 
voted his whole professional life to 
China, and his broad background in 
economic and commercial affairs will 
be put to good use. We are working to 
set up permanent headquarters for the 
consulate at the earliest possible mo- 
ment. 

Today the United States and China 
are actively negotiating a consular 
treaty which will put our consular rela- 
tions on a firm and permanent footing. 
That treaty will enable us to open addi- 
tional American and Chinese consul- 
ates general beyond the four already 
set for Guangzhou, Shanghai, San 
Francisco, and Houston. 

In the spirit of Sino-American 
friendship, as an important step toward 
making normal relations a concrete re- 
ality, it is my privilege at this moment 
to declare the Guangzhou Consulate 
General of the U.S. Government offi- 
cially opened. D 



14 



Department of State Bulletin 



THE SECRETARY: ]¥eit?s 
Conference oi September 5 



Let me begin with a tew comments 
on the presence ol a Soviet combat 
brigade in Cuba. We regard this as a 
very serious matter attecting our rela- 
tions with the Soviet Union. The pres- 
ence ot this unit runs counter to long- 
held American policies. 

The identification ot this unit as a 
combat force has recently been con- 
firmed by our intelligence community. 
They have now concluded that this 
torce has been in Cuba since at least 
the mid-l97()'s. Reanalysis of the 
older, fragmentary data in the light of 
more recently acquired information 
suggests that elements of a Soviet 
brigade may have been there since the 
early 1970's and possibly before that. 
The process of reanalyzing our earlier 
information continues. 

The unit appears to consist ol 
2.000-3.000 personnel. It includes 
molori/ed rifle ballalu)ns. tank and ar- 
tillery battalions, and combat and 
service support units. These figures are 
separate from the Soviet military ad- 
visory and technical military personnel 
in Cuba, which we now estimate to be 
between 1.500 and 2.000. 

The specific mission of the combat 
unit is unclear. There is no air or sealift 
capability associated with the brigade 
which would give it an assault capabil- 
ity nor is the presence of this unit cov- 
ered by our bilateral understandings 
with the Soviets in 1962 or 1970. 

Nonetheless, the presence of a 
Soviet combat unit in Cuba is a matter 
of serious concern. I will be pursuing 
this matter with the Soviets in the 
coming days. 

I will be discussing this issue with 
the Senate Foreign Relations Commit- 
tee this afternoon and setting forth the 
approach which we plan to take with 
the Soviets. We will keep the press and 
the public informed to the fullest extent 
that we can as we proceed. I know you 
will understand that the interests of our 
country would not be served by my 
now going into the specific nature of 
our approach. 

Q. Have you or will you ask the 
Soviets to remove those troops? 

A. The discussions with the Soviets 
will affect the action which we will 
take. Let me say very simply that I will 
not be satisfied with maintenance of the 
status quo. 



debate on SALT and other aspects of 
U.S. -Soviet relations? 

A. As 1 have indicated, this is a seri- 
ous matter and will be treated as such. 
At the same time. SALT is a matter of 
fundamental importance. 

1 believe that the hearings on SALT 
ratification should proceed. However, 
we will be keeping in close touch with 
the Senate Committee and the Members 
of the Senate as we proceed in our dis- 
cussions with the Soviets. 

Q. How could the Soviets have 
stationed a brigade of this size and 
this caliber in Cuba for several years 
without U.S. intelligence finding out 
about it? 

A. First, the information which has 
been assembled over a period of years 
has been fragmentary and it is very 
difficult to piece together. 

As you know, in evaluating intelli- 
gence information, it is like putting a 
jigsaw puzzle together, and one has to 
continue to examine the various frag- 
ments. And sometimes the fragments 
all fall together and then you can arrive 
at a conclusion. This is what happened 
in this case. 

0- How does the inability of the 
intelligence community to detect this 
Soviet brigade for several years re- 
flect upon its ability to detect small 
differences in Soviet rocket config- 
urations and other SALT related in- 
telligence problems on a much 
broader land area in the Soviet 
Union? 

A. There is a clear difference be- 
tween determining whether a particular 
unit or element of a unit is. when cov- 
ered by photographic intelligence from 
a satellite, a unit which belongs to a 
particular country, such as the Soviet 
Union, as opposed to the Cubans. This 
is much more difficult to monitor than 
monitoring such things as the estab- 
lishment of new missile sites, of re- 
ceiving an analysis of telemetry, and 
the kinds of things which are important 
for SALT monitoring. 

Q. If I may follow up on your re- 
sponse that you will not be satisfied 
with the status quo. Is it the combat 
characteristics of this unit that are so 
disturbing to us or is it the presence of 
the forces? In other words, are you 
or will we call for the removal of the 
forces themselves? 



Q. How will this affect the national A. It is the combat nature of the 



units which is a matter of very serious 
concern to us. We have realized, as^ 
you all know, that there were training 
units and signal units stationed there 
over a considerable period of time. 

Q. Something you said earlier im- 
plied to me at least that you may, 
with time, reconsider the question ofl 
linkage between SALT and whatever' 
action you may request from the 
Soviets regarding the removal or re- 
duction or whatever of these Soviet! 
troops. Am I hearing you wrong? 

A. What I said is that I think that 
the hearings on ratification should gq 
forward because of their fundamental 
importance. I have also said, however, 
because this is a matter of a seriousi 
nature, that we must keep in close 
contact and in discussion with Mem- 
bers of the Senate as we go forward in' 
our discussions with the Soviets. 

Q. Senator Stone recently said thati 
everything is not yet out; there isi 
more to come. Some of us have beeni 
told that the Soviets have constructed 
a military airfield and have beei 
working on a missile boat base and 
that there might be even another 
base with combat troops. Can youi 
address that? 

And, secondly, on the matter of 
the intelligence just becoming 
known, some of us were told last 
month, before you wrote your letter i 
saying to the Senator there was no 
significant Soviet military force other 
than the advisers, we were told that 
there was intelligence, at least ini 
July, to suggest very strongly thatI 
they had combat infantry artillery* 
battalions there. 

A. Let me say at the time that I 
wrote my letter to Senator Stone, I re- 
viewed this within the government withi 
full interagency coordination among alll 
of the intelligence elements of the gov- 
ernment. At that time they concluded! 
that there was not sufficient evidencei 
to conclude that there was a combati 
presence in there. 

I told Senator Stone after I wrote himi 
the letter that we were going to inten- 
sify our investigation and collection 
activities and our analysis of the infor- 
mation as it came in and that as soon as 
we felt that we had additional informa- 
tion which might bear on the subject 
and give us a clearer reading of what> 
the situation was, I would immediately 
make this information available to him, 
to members of the relevant Senate 
Committees and others. And that is just 
what we have done. 

Q. Has the public been told the full 
story of Soviet military activity in 
Cuba? 



October 1979 



15 



A. I think we have told the public 
■verything at this point that is of sig- 
lit'icance. We are continuing to inves- 
ieate other matters as well. And it" we 
:ct information that is of importance, 
A-e will, of course, make it available. 

Q. To move the matter to a slightly 
lifferent area, as we all know, action 
las been taken against the CIA act- 
ng through journalists abroad. But 
' here is another matter of interest, 
vhich is foreign intelligence services 
ising the media in this country. And 
ipecifically I would like to ask if 
mything can or will be done about 
he case of the Mossad working 
hrough certain newspapers, includ- 
ng The New York Times, through 
certain agents, including Roy Cohn 
— and this has all been publicly 
locumented — and through the old 
'ermindex assassination network at 
his point to set up an assassination 
)f presidential candidate Lyndon 
.^aRouche and possibly others as 
Veil? And isn't it time that we 
itarted cleaning up these kinds of 
ather filthy foreign operations? 

A. I think you are leaping to conclu- 
sions on some of the matters that you 
lave referred to. I do not want to en- 
iorse or give any credence to the alle- 
gations which you have made. 

We will continue to pursue our ac- 
ivity in following the activities of any 
oreign intelligence agencies in the 
Jnited States. But there is nothing 
nore that I can add at this point to 
/our statement. 

Q. One, do you consider what the 
Soviets have in Cuba as a base? And, 
wo, I am not quite sure how to ask 
his, but if they had been there for 
several years, have had a combat ca- 
pability or a combat unit there for 
several years, why is it a serious 
matter? 

A. Let me answer the second half of 
/our question first. The presence of 
:ombat troops in Cuba — Soviet combat 
troops — at any time, is a serious mat- 
ter. And if we had known about that 
fact and could have demonstrated that 
fact in the mid-1970's or in the early 
1970's, that would have been a serious 
factor then and would have been raised 
at that time as a serious matter to be 
dealt with. 

With respect to the question of 
whether or not the presence of these 
forces constitute a base, the answer 1 
must give you on that one is a very 
simple and straightforward one: We do 
not know at this time whether it con- 
stitutes a base. Our conversations and 
discussions with the Soviet Union will 
shed light on this, and we will have to 



arrive at our conclusion as we proceed 
with those discussions. 

Q. Early on in this Administra- 
tion, the United States, as a gesture 
of good will to the Cubans, cut off 
surveillance flights, specifically U-2 
flights. 

I am just wondering if you can tell 
us whether these were reinstated 
and, secondly, whether the lack of 
those surveillance flights may have 
contributed to the lack of informa- 
tion that you have had over the past 
couple of years? 

A. No. I don't think so. I think that 
the nights which were conducted have 
been sufficient — as one goes back and 
goes over the take that has come from 
those flights — to, in hindsight, as the 
final pieces fell into place which made 
it possible to come to this conclusion, 
on reanalysis. to take a look at the past 
information and conclude that that 
information — now that we have the 
final piece or two which puts the jig- 
saw together — to give you the conclu- 
sion that we have now arrived at. 

Q. I am wondering on what basis 
you can now be so certain that those 
troops were introduced in the mid- 
or possibly even in the early 1970's 
when for so many years you appar- 
ently did not have sufficient infor- 
mation to even respond. 

A. Because we have corroborating 
evidence of different kinds now that we 
did not have before. 

Q. What I am asking is in response 
to some of the questions that were 
raised in July, both your office and 
that of the Secretary of Defense were 
not even allowing the possibility of 
the presence of Soviet troops. It was 
being flatly denied at that time. 

A. That was the conclusion, at that 
point, of the intelligence community. 
Since then, as I said, additional evi- 
dence has become available, evidence 
which was redundant but backed up 
and corroborated other types of evi- 
dence. And once that pattern was put 
together, then the intelligence commu- 
nity was able to come to a firm conclu- 
sion. 

Q. On that same question, do I 
understand you correctly to be say- 
ing that the 2,000 to"3,000-man 
brigade essentially was in place in 
Cuba before even this Administra- 
tion took office? 

A. A force of approximately that size 
was, yes. That is the conclusion that 
has now been arrived at. 

Q. So all that has happened in the 



last few weeks is that the intelligence 
community has now reached that 
conclusion. The Soviets haven't done 
anything special in the last year or 
two? 

A. That is correct. 

Q. Is there any reason now why 
the 1962 agreement with the Rus- 
sians at the time of the Cuban missile 
crisis could not be made public so 
that people would have a way of 
knowing whether the Russians are 
keeping that agreement or not? 

A. The essence of the 1962 agree- 
ment is generally known to the public, 
and let me give you as much as 1 can 
about it. The 1962 agreement is not 
just a simple piece of paper. It consists 
of an exchange of letters between 
President Kennedy and Chairman 
Khrushchev;' it consists of discussions 
between Russian officials, including 
Minister Kuznetsov, Minister Mi- 
koyan, and individuals in the United 
States and representatives of the U.S. 
Government. It includes discussions 
between officials of the United States 
and Ambassador Dobrynin. So that it is 
a series of both exchanges of letters 
and discussions that make up the total 
agreement. 

Q. Why couldn't that whole pack- 
age be made public now? What is the 
reason that it can't be made public? 
Seventeen years have passed. 

A. This is a matter which 1 think is a 
fair question to ask. We are reviewing 
the situation to determine whether or 
not we can at least put out a full sum- 
mary of what the essense of that 
agreement and the agreement of 1970 is 
as well, and 1 hope that we may be able 
to do so. 

Q. Are there any plans by the U.S. 
Government to reinforce ground 
forces and Air Force units in Guan- 
tanamo at this time? 

A. 1 don't want to go into any ac- 
tions which we might take in the fu- 
ture. Let me say, however, that is not 
to be taken in any way as an indication 
that we are planning to do that. 

Q. Did the reanalysis of the Cuban 
data follow the Nicaraguan — I'm 
sorry, the insurrection in Nicaragua 
by the Cuban-backed — 

A. It was not — 

Q. No correlation? 

A. It was not sparked in any way by 
that. This analysis was going on as a 
result of the reevaluation that we had 
been involved in; and as soon as we got 
the necessary information to arrive at 



16 



the conclusions, we immediately re- 
leased the conclusions. 

Q. Do you have any comment on 
the thesis that this is essentially a 
hand-holding operation for the Cu- 
bans who have forces around the 
world? 

A. There are many different theories 
as to what the purpose of the mainte- 
nance of that battalion or brigade in 
Cuba is. At this point, we do not know 
which of these various hypotheses is 
correct. Obviously, one of the issues 
which we will be discussing with the 
Soviets is the statement by the Soviets 
with respect to the purpose and inten- 
tions which relate to the brigade. 

Q. In view of the fact that another 
U.S. Ambassador had met several 
times with PLO [Palestine Liberation 
Organization] officials, why was 
Ambassador Young singled out for 
holding a session with that group's 
U.N. representative, particularly 
since Young's action could have been 
justified by the fact that he was then 
President of the Security Council? 

A. Insofar as the situation of Ambas- 
sador Young's resignation is con- 
cerned, let me say several things. First, 
the situation has been gone into at 
length. The situation has been reviewed 
time and again by the spokesman for 
the Department, and 1 wish to make 
very clear that 1 stand behind the 
statements of the spokesman with re- 
spect to this matter. 

1 want to also make very clear that 1 
stand fully behind the statement which 
I issued at the time that Andy's resig- 
nation was offered and accepted — 
namely, that Andy has made great 
contributions to the United States and 
to its foreign policy. 

1 think that it would not do any 
good — it would be fruitless, and, in- 
deed, an unwise step — to rehash all 
of this ground again. 

Q. It has now been a full week 
since the Soviet charge d'affaires was 
called in to the State Department and 
informed of American concern over 
the Soviet troops in Cuba. During 
that time, the only public response 
from the Soviets has been a rather 
scoffing one in the press. I under- 
stand further that the Soviet charge's 
response was similar. Do you con- 
sider at this time that the Soviet re- 
sponse has been timely and serious? 

A. I have asked Ambassador Dobry- 
nin to return at the earliest possible 
moment, and I will then be meeting 
with him. 1 do not feel, until 1 have had 
a chance to meet with him, that we will 



have had a serious chance to discuss 
this issue. 

Q. When do you expect that? 

A. 1 don't know exactly. I will get a 
response, 1 hope, today to the message 
which 1 sent to him in regard to his re- 
turn. 

Q. You seemed to imply earlier 
that it is the combat nature of the 
Soviet force that bothers us, and to 
me, at any rate, implied that the men 
can stay if the combat nature of the 
force is removed. Is that what you 
meant to imply? 

A. What I meant to say is that the 
combat nature is of great importance. It 
is of serious concern to us. 1 want to 
have further discussions about this 
whole matter, including the purpose 
and intention of the presence of the 
brigade. 1 don't want to, at this point, 
comment any further than 1 have al- 
ready about the matter of what we will 
do. ■ 

Q. What impact does the presence 
of Soviet troops in Cuba have on 
problems in the Caribbean and in 
Central America? 

A. I don't think we have any evi- 
dence at this point as to what the im- 
pact may or may not be. One can 
speculate on what the impact might be, 
depending upon the situation, the facts, 
and what their purpose is. But it would 
be, I think, fruitless for me to specu- 
late. 

Q. North Korea has rejected the 
joint U.S. and South Korean pro- 
posal for three-way talks. What is 
the next U.S. step toward North 
Korea? 

A. Our position is that we shall 
watch and wait and see what happens. 1 
do not necessarily consider the re- 
sponse which has been given by the 
North Koreans as the final response, 
and, therefore, we will wait and watch 
and see what happens. 

Q. Will the United States recon- 
sider its contacts with the PLO in 
light of [Israeli] Foreign Minister 
Dayan's contacts? Is the United 
States seeking a release from its 
commitments? And, thirdly, is a 
summit on the Middle East planned 
here in the autumn, and if so, why? 

A. There are no plans at this point to 
have a summit here in the autumn. I 
think, as you know. Minister Dayan 
and, I believe, [Egyptian] Minister Ali 
will be coming here later this month to 
discuss with us the situation relating to 
the monitoring force for the withdrawal 



Department of State Bulletim 

from the Sinai. That is the only meeting jjj 
that is planned at this time. 

Turning to Minister Dayan's meet- 
ings, those meetings were with indi- 
viduals located in the West Bank and 
Gaza. It has always been clear from the i 
outset that insofar as discussions with 
Palestinians living on the West Bank 
and Gaza were concerned, both the Is- 
raelis and the United States could have 
discussions with them because this 
would be both helpful and useful in 
connection with the negotiations which 
are going forward with respect to the ' 
autonomy negotiations, or the so-called 
West Bank-Gaza negotiations. 

Q. A series of situations and re- 
ports, since we last met in this room 
several months ago, have raised a 
question about your willingness to 
continue in this job; and some of 
them in recent days have even raised 
questions about your authority to 
continue as the man in charge of 
U.S. foreign policy. I would like toi 
ask you, have you considered re- 
signing, other than this mass resig- 
nation which took place sometime 
ago? And is there any doubt in your 
mind, or have you taken up the 
matter, about your authority overi 
U.S. foreign policy? 

A. 1 had an idea somebody might! 
raise a question like this. 

First, insofar as what 1 have done, 
let me say very clearly that these kinds 
of stories arise time and time again 
with anybody in this job. These kinds 
of stories go with the job. I am not 
losing any sleep about this, and I 
would advise you not to lose any sleep 
about it. L 

On the other question, with respect 
to authority, 1 have the responsibility 
under the President for the develop- 
ment and implementation of the foreign 
policy of the United States, and that in- 
cludes all aspects of that policy. I will 
do just that, and 1 will continue to do 
so. 

Q. Back to the Cuban thing. What 
particularly prompted this reanaly- 
sis? I'm not certain whether Senator 
Stone's charges or what particularly 
came to your attention, and when, 
actually, did this reanalysis take 
place? 

A. The reanalysis was done in the 
early part of July, as I recall it — 
maybe even late June. There was some 
additional information which was again 
fragmentary, and on the basis of that, 
as 1 recall it, it was determined that we 
should do a reanalysis. We, sub- 
sequently, as I recall it, had conversa- 
tions with Senator Stone and with 



October 1979 



17 



others, and we indicated to them that 
we planned to not only do our reanaly- 
sis but to intensify our efforts just to 
make sure that there wasn't something 
that we were missing. That's how the 
process got started and continued. 

Q. What is the matter with the 
United States and Mexico? Why 
can't we get along? We seem to have 
broken down on negotiations on gas 
and illegal aliens and the oil spill. 
What's the matter? 

A. We really haven't broken down 
on negotiations with respect to gas. Let 
me start with that. Mr. Christopher 
[Deputy Secretary of State] went down 
to Mexico recently to continue the 
negotiations — they are very difficult 
negotiations — and in the process of 2 
days of talks, they were able to make 
further progress. However, important 
differences remained. It's a tough 
negotiation; there isn't any doubt about 
it. And just because you can't reach 
agreement in several sessions doesn't 
mean you give up. They are not broken 
off. They are going to continue, and 
they will continue. 

Insofar as the question of undoc- 
umented workers is concerned, those 
discussions are proceeding at a pace 
and in a fashion which is satisfactory to 
both of our countries, and we will be 
continuing to press forward with those. 

Insofar as the oil spill is concerned, 
the problem of the oil spill is one of 
those events that happens in the re- 
lationships between two countries. We, 
quite properly, have raised this ques- 
tion with them. They are considering 
the matter. They have matters which 
they would like to raise of a similar 
nature, going back into the past, with 
respect to some problems that were 
raised from the rivers and waters that 
flowed from the United States into 
Mexico. These are the kinds of prob- 
lems that we, as neighbors and allies 
and friends, will be able to discuss and 
work out; and therefore, I really cannot 
accept your overly alarmist views of a 
breakdown of relations. 

The President and President Lopez 
Portillo will be meeting around the 
28th of September to go forward with 
the meeting which they had planned. 
This is part of a series of meetings. 
They have many things to discuss, and 
1 look forward to, 1 believe, a good and 
constructive meeting. I know that's the 
way we view it, and 1 believe it's the 
way the Mexicans view it. 

Q. On Friday Senator Stone said 
that the presence of the Russian 
troops in Cuba was of the same 
gravity as the 1962 Cuban missile 



crisis confrontation. Number one, do 
you believe that that is a correct as- 
sessment? And number two. if it is, 
is the United States making any con- 
tingency plans for reactions that 
would be of the same gravity as we 
took in 1962? 

A. Let me say 1 wish to repeat that I 
believe this to be a serious matter. 
However, it does not involve, as did 
the 1962 missile crisis, the question of 
offensive nuclear weapons. So there is 
a vast difference between the two. 
However, that does not mean that it is 
not a serious matter. 

Q. In the wake of Ambassador 
Young's resignation, there was a 
sudden rise in tensions between the 
black and Jewish community in the 
United States, and some black lead- 
ers talked about the fact of there 
being a perception in the street that 
either the American Jewish commu- 
nity or Israel was behind the Young 
resignation. I would like to ask you, 
what is the Administration view? 
Was the Young resignation brought 
about in fact by the American Jewish 
community or Israel, or was it 
brought about as a result of his own 
actions, or whatever? 

A. Let me say that in my judgment it 
was not the result of actions by the 
Jewish community. I want to make that 
very clear, and I think that I have spo- 
ken to the rest of the question. 

Q. On the matter of the role of in- 
telligence in forging foreign and na- 
tional security policy, I would like 
your observations. It seems to me 
sometimes we make the policy, and 
then go get the intelligence. I'm 
thinking of North Korea, when the 
army, after the President made his 
policy of withdrawing the troops, the 
army went back on a zero-based in- 
telligence analysis, started from 
scratch, and found out there were a 
hell of a lot more troops there than 
they had thought. We seem to be 
doing the same thing on Cuba. We 
lifted the U-2 or SR-71 aircraft 
flights as a gesture of good will, and 
then a year or so later we discover 
Soviet combat troops. Do you have 
any observation on that? 

A. Yes. 1 think in the case of the 
Korean analysis which was done, the 
analysis was part of a continuing re- 
view process that goes on in the intelli- 
gence community with respect to the 
threat that is posed to our forces and 
the forces of our allies; and this was 
part of an ongoing process that had 
been going for a long period of time. 



And again in that case, as one went 
forward, bits of information, as we 
proceeded over a period of years — 
tarting back before this 
Administration — began to begin to 
build a pattern which was not at all 
clear when you first started picking up 
these bits and pieces of information. 
This is one of the problems particularly 
when you are dealing with ground 
units. It is a lot harder when you're 
dealing with ground units and that type 
of thing than it is dealing with the kind 
of matters which are before you when 
you have to deal with the monitoring of 
a SALT agreement where you have 
large installations, large types of 
equipment like missiles. It is much 
easier to deal with a large missile than it 
is with a tank or even a number of 
tanks. 

Q. As you know. Prime Ministers 
Lynch and Thatcher are meeting 
today. You or the Department re- 
cently suspended arms sales to the 
Royal Ulster Constabulary. In the 
meantime, people like Governor 
Carey have even stepped in to offer 
mediation. My question is, when will 
this study that you are doing now on 
this be completed, and are you con- 
templating suggesting to Mrs. 
Thatcher and the British Govern- 
ment a new political initiative to try 
and solve the problem? 

A. The answer is that we are not 
planning to suggest a new political ini- 
tiative. Our position has been — and 
President Carter stated it very clearly in 
1977 — a position of impartiality. It is a 
position of condemning terrorism and 
violence, and it is a position which 
supports the bringing together of the 
varius factions in an attempt to try and 
move toward a peaceful solution. 

It's an immensely difficult problem, 
as all of us know — one of the most 
difficult of these types of problems that 
exist throughout the world. 

The position which we have taken is 
supported by the British Government, 
by the Irish Government, and by the 
political parties in both Ireland and 
Northern Ireland. For us to intrude our- 
selves at this point into the Irish situa- 
tion, in my judgment, would not be 
wise. I think it would be resented by 
the parties concerned, and they are the 
ones that should deal with this issue. D 



Press release 216. 

'For texts of the letters exchanged between 
President Kennedy and Chairman Khrushchev 
Oct. 22-28, 1962, see Bulletin of Nov. 19, 
1973. 



Department of State Bulletin 



AFRICA: Report on 
Southern Rhodesia 



by Richard M . Moose 

Statement before the Subcommittee 
on African Affairs of the Senate Com- 
mittee on Foreign Relations on July 
23, 1979. Mr. Moose is Assistant Sec- 
retary for African AJfairs.' 

I am pleased to be here this morning 
to brief the subcommittee and other 
interested members on recent develop- 
ments with respect to Zimbabwe- 
Rhodesia. As you will recall, the 
President in his statement of June 7 
1,1979,] promised that the Administra- 
tion would report to and consult with 
the Congress on a monthly basis on 
progress being made toward a solution 
to the Rhodesian problem. He did so in 
the belief that close and continuing 
consultations with the Congress would 
help to establish a policy toward 
Rhodesia that best serves the interests 
of the United States and of the people 
of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. I am here 
today in lulfillment of that commitment 
to close consultations between the Ad- 
ministration and the Congress. 

You will have received by now the 
first in a series of monthly written re- 
ports on developments since June 1, 
when [Prime Minister] Bishop 
Muzorewa's administration was for- 
mally installed. 1 would like to take 
just a moment, before turning to any 
questions you may have, to highlight 
some of the key aspects of that report 
and to bring you up to date on events 
that have taken place subsequently. 

Role of the United Kingdom 

First. I want to emphasize that we 
are continuing to consult closely with 
the British Government on the Rhode- 
sian situation. Those consultations in- 
dicate that the British have embarked 
on a serious effort to resolve the 
Rhodesian problem in a way that satis- 
fies the legitimate aspirations of the 
people of Rhodesia for self- 
determination under a democratic form 
of government that safeguards the 
rights of all citizens. They are also 
consulting extensively with leaders in 
Africa and elsewhere in order to estab- 
lish a basis for bringing Rhodesia to 
legal independence in conditions of 
peace and wide international accepta- 
bility. 

As [U.K. Foreign Secretary] Lord 



Carrington indicated in his July 10 
statement to the House of Lords, there 
is a widespread feeling that a solution 
in Rhodesia must stem from the British 
Government, as the legally responsible 
authority. The British intend to carry 
out that responsibility. And we have 
given our support to their efforts. 

The meetings which President Carter 
and Secretary Vance had with Bishop 
Muzorewa and the other efforts we 
have made to improve our knowledge 
and understanding of developments in 
Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, form a part of our 
effort to assist the British in the search 
for a lasting solution. In those meet- 
ings, the President and the Secretary 
each reiterated our view that a solution 
can be found through the establishment 
of constitutional and administrative 
arrangements that would allow for full 
political participation. We believe that 
this can be done in a way that will 
protect the rights and legitimate con- 
cerns of all elements of the population 
and will enable all to play a role in the 
country's political and economic fu- 
ture. Finally, the President and the 
Secretary urged Bishop Muzorewa to 
work closely with the British Govern- 
ment in seeking solutions to the prob- 
lem of the continuing conflict and of 
international acceptability. 

As Lord Carrington has noted, the 
British intend to continue their consul- 
tations on Rhodesia at the upcoming 
Commonwealth Conference in Lusaka 
beginning August I. Thereafter, they 
hope to put forward proposals which 
will be accepted by all concerned as 
fair and reasonable, and which take ac- 
count of what has already been 
achieved in Rhodesia. It is too early to 
anticipate what precise line those pro- 
posals may take. But we believe that 
they will be developed in close con- 
sultation with the United States and 
others concerned. (We understand that 
Prime Minister Thatcher may address 
this issue further during the July 25 de- 
bate in Parliament.) 

Recent Developments 

Secondly, I would like to say a word 
about the recent developments in 
Zimbabwe-Rhodesia itself. I believe it 
is too early to make definitive judg- 
ments about the direction the new gov- 
ernment intends to take in meeting the 
aspirations of the people of Rhodesia 



for peace and a clear demonstration of 
majority rule. We are deeply mindful 
of the difficult problems which Bishop 
Muzorewa faces in pursuing these ob- 
jectives. Our discussions with him 
here, as well as the discussions which 
Mr. Davidow [Jeffrey Davidow, U.S. 
First Secretary at U.S. Embassy in 
Pretoria] has had with government offi- 
cials and others in Salisbury, have 
given us a better appreciation of these 
problems. Certainly we are not unsym- 
pathetic to the immense difficulties 
facing Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. We have' 
no doubt of Bishop Muzorewa's sincere 
desire to find workable solutions. We 
are hopeful that as he looks to the task 
of assuring Zimbabwe-Rhodesia's fu- 
ture peace, stability, and prosperity, he 
will take fully into account the advice 
which the British Government and 
others are prepared to offer. 



African Attitudes 

Finally, with respect to African at- 
titudes toward the situation in 
Rhodesia, the Organization of African 
Unity (OAU) concluded its annual 
summit conference in Monrovia, 
Liberia, last Saturday. Prior to ad- 
journing, the conference passed a res- 
olution calling upon the international 
community to withhold recognition 
from the Muzorewa government and 
describing the externally based guer- 
rilla groups as the sole representatives 
of the people of Zimbabwe. That action 
was taken despite our approaches and 
those of the British to OAU members 
urging that they refrain from resolu- 
tions that might complicate the search 
for a peaceful solution. 

We do not believe that OAU's pas- 
sage of this resolution will contribute 
to efforts to find a fair solution. 
Nevertheless, we do not believe this 
diminishes the importance of involving 
concerned African states in the search 
for a solution. We believe the resolu- 
tion should be understood in the con- 
text of African concern over what they 
regard as a disposition by Britain and 
the United States to accept the present 
constitutional and political arrange- 
ments in Rhodesia as a basis for recog- 
nition and the lifting of sanctions. 

From our contacts, we know that a 
number of African states, including 
some of the front line, concurred in the 
resolution for that reason. At the same 
time, however, there continues to be 
considerable African interest in and 
support for a further effort to resolve 
the conflict in Rhodesia in a way that 
will insure a clear demonstration of 
majority rule. 



October 1979 



19 



REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON 
DEVELOPMENTS WITH RESPECT TO 
ZIMBABWE-RHODESIA 
JUNE 1-JULY 13, 1979 

During the past month, the United States has 
(I) improved its coinmunication with the 
Muzorewa administration and our ability to 
monitor developments in Rhodesia; and (2) 
given its full encouragement and support lo 
British consultations wiih all concerned aimed 
at developing proposals for bringing Rhodesia 
to legal independence in conditions of peace 
and wide international acceptability. 

Several important steps have been taken to 
improve our knowledge and understanding of 
developments in Rhodesia. Approval was 
granted June 12 for two officials of the 
Muzorewa administration. Prof. James 
Kamusikiri and Mr. Jonathan Maswoswe. to 
come to Washington to prepare for Bishop 
Muzorewa's planned visit to Washington in 
July. They met several times with officials of 
the Department of Slate, including two meet- 
ings with Assistant Secretary Richard Moose. 
As indicated by Secretary Vance on June 7, the 

^ Department announced June 25 the assignment 
as First Secretary to our Embassy in Pretoria of 
Mr. Jeffrey Davidow. who will be making fre- 

iquent and extended visits to Salisbury. The 
first of these visits began with Mr. Davidow's 
arrival in Salisbury July 5. 

On June 24, Secretary Vance responded to an 
earlier message from Bishop Muzorewa and 
expressed his desire to meet with him during 
his visit to Washington. Following his arrival 
in Washington July 9. Bishop Muzorewa met 
July 10 with Secretary Vance and the following 
day with President Carter at Camp David. In 
those meetings, the President and the Secretary 
each reaffirmed the US commitment to a 
peaceful transfer of responsible political au- 
thority to the black majority and their belief 
that an end to the bloodshed can be achieved 
through the establishment of constitutional and 
administrative procedures that are responsive to 
the legitimate aspirations of all citizens of 
Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. They expressed the hope 
that Bishop Muzorewa would work closely with 
the British government, as the legally responsi- 
ble authority, in seeking a peaceful solution to 
the problems of full political participation and 
internationally recognized independence. Fol- 
lowing the meetings. Bishop Muzorewa 
reiterated his appeal for immediate recogni- 
tion and a lifting of sanctions, but reserved 
comment on the substance of the discussions 
pending his talks with Prime Minister Thatcher 
in London. 

U.S. Support for British Initiatives 

There have been close and continuing con- 
sultations with the British government. Assist- 
[ ant Secretary Richard Moose and Policy Plan- 
ning Director Anthony Lake, accompanied by 
Mr. Davidow, traveled lo London June 27-28 
for intensive discussions with British special 



emissary Lord Harlech and other British offi- 
cials. There have been several subsequent ex- 
changes between our two governments. 

The British government is actively pursuing 
a process of consultation with all concerned. In 
June, Lord Harlech visited Botswana, Zambia, 
Malawi, Tanzania, Mozambique, Angola and 
Nigeria for discussions with the leaders of 
these states and with representatives of the ex- 
ternally based Rhodesian parties. Another 
British envoy, Mr. Richard Luce, held discus- 
sions with the leaders of other African states. 
In his July 10 statement in the House of Lords, 
Lord Carrington reported that the consultations 
had been both encouraging and useful and that 
they revealed a willingness on the part of most 
African states to recognize that major changes 
have taken place in the Rhodesian situation. 
Nevertheless, they also indicated widespread 
African criticism of the Rhodesian constitution, 
particularly with respect to the blocking power 
of the white minority over a wide range of 
legislation, and the character of the public 
service commissions. 

The British have also been in close com- 
munication with the Muzorewa administration. 
British Under Secretary Derek Day visited 
Salisbury at the end of May and returned there 
July 5 on his second visit. Lord Harlech also 
visted Salisbury July 2-5 to initiate discussions 
with Bishop Muzorewa and his colleagues of 
issues that were later pursued during the 
Bishop's visit to London (July 12-13). British 
Prime Minister Thatcher and Foreign Secretary 
Lord Carrington held talks with Bishop 
Muzorewa July 13 in London. 

The British will continue their consultations 
at the Commonwealth Heads of Government 
conference in Lusaka beginning August I. As 
Lord Carrington indicated in his July 10 state- 
ment, they are hopeful that once the process is 
completed, they will be able to put forward 
proposals which will be accepted as fair and 
reasonable, and which will provide a basis for 
bringing Rhodesia to legal independence in 
conditions of peace and wide international ac- 
ceptability. The United States has given its full 
encouragement and support to this process of 
consultation. We have contributed to it by 
urging all concerned to cooperate fully with the 
British effort, and by joining with the British in 
asking African states and the Organization of 
African Unity (OAU) to support efforts that 
would facilitate the search for a peaceful solu- 
tion. African leaders at the July 6 opening of 
the OAU Ministerial Meeting in Monrovia, 
Liberia, expressed reservations concerning the 
elections and constitutional arrangements in 
Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, but reaffirmed African 
interest in further settlement efforts. 

Internal Political Developments 

Internal political developments during the 
past month have centered on the installation 
and organization of the new government and 
the activities of the black political parties. 

Bishop Muzorewa was sworn in as Prime 



Minister June I, along with an ethnically- 
balanced, seventeen-member cabinet repre- 
senting on a basis of rough parity the tribal, 
political and racial composition of the new 
parliament. Ian Smith was appointed Minister 
without Portfolio. In his first formal address on 
June 2. Bishop Muzorewa repeated his amnesty 
offer to ZANU and ZAPU [Zimbabwe African 
National Union and Zimbabwe African 
People's Union] and his willingness to attend 
an All-Parties Conference. In a June 6 press 
interview. Ian Smith offered to leave the gov- 
ernment if "official negotiations" would 
thereby be aided: but he said he would not step 
down ""simply to facilitate Zimbabwe- 
Rhodesia's enemies." 



VistI of 
Bishop Iftuzorewa 



Bishop Abel Muzorewa. head of the 
current administration in Salisbury, 
Southern Rhodesia, visited Washing- 
ton. DC. July 9-11. 1979. and met 
with President Carter and other gov- 
ernment officials. Following is a White 
House statement issued on July 11 .^ 

President Carter met with Bishop 
Muzorewa this afternoon because of 
the President's deep personal commit- 
ment to help find a solution for the 
peaceful transfer of responsible politi- 
cal authority from the white minority to 
the black majority in Zimbabwe- 
Rhodesia. 

In a frank exchange of views, the 
President emphasized his sincere desire 
to see an end to the bitterness and 
bloodshed in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. He 
believes this can be accomplished by 
the establishment of a broadly based 
consensus on constitutional procedures 
and administrative processes which are 
responsive to the legitimate political 
aspirations of all the peoples of 
Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. 

The President restated his intention 
to work closely with the Government of 
the United Kingdom, which has the 
primary legal and historic responsibil- 
ity to bring Zimbabwe-Rhodesia to in- 
dependence based on full political par- 
ticipation and human rights guarantees 
for all its citizens. He expressed the 
hope that the Muzorewa administration 
would work closely with the United 
Kingdom in seeking nonmilitary, 
political means to further this goal. D 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of Presi- 
dential Documents of July 16, 1979. 



L 



20 



Reverend Ndabaningi Silhole (head of the 
African National Council/Sithole] and eleven 
others elected on his party's ticket continued 
iheir boycott of parliament. Sithole told report- 
ers June 1 1 he would pursue his court case al- 
leging that the April elections were rigged and 
that officials intimidated black voters. His call 
for new elections under British supervision was 
supported by Chief Jeremiah Chirau, leader of 
the Zimbabwe United People's Organization. 
Fifteen members of Sithole's party were ar- 
rested in two sweeps (June 2 and 5) in connec- 
tion with an alleged plot to assassinate Bishop 
Muzorewa, a charge which Sithole strongly de- 
nied. Sithole's own home was searched June 
29. 

Within Bishop Muzorewa's own party, the 
United African National Congress (UANC), 
First Vice President James Chikerema led a 
walk-out of seven members of parliament (all 
from the same tribal group) who then formed 
the Zimbabwe Democratic Party. On June 28. 
the UANC obtained a temporary injunction 
from the High Court barring the new party's 
members from taking their seats in parliament 
on the grounds that they had been elected on 
the UANC slate. The court began hearing the 
case July 1 1 . 

Following the installation of the new gov- 
ernment, Bishop Muzorewa visited Pretoria 
July 15-18 for discussions of military and eco- 
nomic relations with South African Prime 
Minister P.W. Botha and Foreign Minister R.F. 
Botha. 

The Muzorewa government announced its 
program at the first session of Parliament June 
26, declaring that it would have as its primary 
objectives international recognition and the 
lifting of sanctions. There was no announce- 
ment of proposed new economic and social 
legislation. 

An Amnesty Directorate was established to 
encourage members of the guerrilla forces to lay 
down their arms. The amnesty offered promises 
of a safe return, no interrogation, and food and 
clothing for surrendering guerrillas. Estimates 
of the results to date vary. On July 3, the gov- 
ernment announced the release of 141 persons 
detained under security legislation stemming 
from the state of emergency. The step was de- 
scribed as being in line with the government's 
policy to release all those who were no longer 
considered "a danger to the state." Various 
estimates place the number of persons still in 
detention for political offenses at approxi- 
mately 1,000. In a related development. Bishop 
Muzorewa declared that all missionaries pre- 
viously deported from the country would be 
free to return 



Military and Security Developments 

There has been no change in the pattern of 
military activity over the past month. Accord- 
ing to Rhodesian government statistics, the 
number of deaths resulting from actions inside 
the country in June were 685, down from the 
record level reached in May of 891. Martial 
law remains in effect throughout most of the 



Department of State Bulletip/i 



The U.S. Role in 
Southern Africa 



by Richard M. Moose 

Address before the Southern Africa 
Research Program Symposium on Race 
Conflict in Southern Africa at Yale 
University on April 18, 1979. Mr. 
Moose is Assistant Secretary for Afri- 
can Affairs. 

Within the past 2 years southern Af- 
rica has been propelled into the front 
ranks of U.S. policy concerns. This has 
occurred because the region is under- 
going fundamental, irreversible politi- 
cal change — and the pace is accelerat- 
ing. At the heart of this process is ra- 
cial conflict — the subject of your con- 
ference. 

Stock assumptions, widely held in 
the past, such as the survivability of 
the minority white regimes, have been 
quickly, even suddenly, cast aside. 
With the collapse of the Portuguese 
colonies, the remaining systems of 
minority privilege in southern Africa 
have come under increasing challenge. 



New stresses and strains have appeared I 
or have reinforced earlier ones. These 
strains affect not only the focal points 
of racial conflict — Rhodesia, Namibia, 
and South Africa — but the entire sur- 
rounding region — everything from 
Zaire, south. And, as the momentum of 
nationalism has picked up, so too has 
the tendency of outsiders, for their own 
reasons, to involve themselves in the 
problems of southern Africa. 

The key issue today is not whether 
the changes we now see unfolding will 
be peaceful or violent, but whether 
there is still a chance to render less 
violent the inevitable transition to 
majority rule. 

Why is the U.S. Involved? 

At the outset of this Administration, 
we decided that the United States could 
and should try to play an active and 
positive part in helping to bring about 
the full participation of all races in the 
political life of southern Africa. We 



territory as a result of continued insecurity in 
the countryside. 

In two series of raids on June 26 and July 
1-3, Rhodesian security forces struck at ZAPU 
camps around Lusaka, inflicting substantial 
casualties and loss of materiel on the defend- 
ers. The June 26 strike included an attack on 
the ZAPU intelligence headquarters in the 
populated Roma suburb of Lusaka. ZANU 
staging areas in Mozambique were also hit in 
early June, 

ZANU and ZAPU representatives met during 
June to discuss the coordination of their mili- 
tary activities. On July 4, guerrillas attacked 
the Salisbury residence of the Greek Orthodox 
Archbishop, who apparently was mistaken 
either for his neighbor. General Walls, or for 
Bishop Muzorewa. ZAPU leader Joshua 



Letters 
of Credence 



On May 10, 1979, Mamady Lamine 
Conde of Guinea, Yao Grunitsky of 
Togo, and Ousman Ahmadou Sallah of 
Gambia presented their credentials to 
President Carter as their countries' 
newly appointed Ambassadors to the 
United States. D 



Nkomo announced July 6 that his forces would 
suspend cross-border infiltrations into 
Rhodesia from July 25 to August 10, to coin- 
cide with the Commonwealth Heads of Gov- 
ernment Meeting in Lusaka. Bishop Muzorewa 
publicly stated in Washington July 1 1 that 
Rhodesian forces would not launch attacks in 
the area of the Zambian capital during the 
period of the meeting. 



Economic Developments 

General economic trends do not seem to have 
been significantly affected during the new gov- 
ernment's first month in office. The govern- 
ment has published no official figures on white 
emigration since April, when net white emi- 
gration that month was 1,600. Estimates for 
May and June indicate that white emigration is 
continuing at a rate of over 1 ,000 per month. 

Economic analysts report no evidence of a 
reversal in adverse economic trends in 
Zimbabwe-Rhodesia (GDP declined an average 
of 4 percent per year between 1974 and 1978). 
The agricultural sector in particular is feeling 
the combined effects of insecurity in the coun- 
tryside and the drought which has affected wide 
areas of southern Africa. □ 



' The complete transcript of the hearings will 
be published by the committee and will be 
available from the Superintendent of Docu- 
ments, U.S. Government Printing Office. 
Washington. DC. 20402. 



October 1979 



21 



believe there are sound reasons for this 
policy. 

• We believe it is the right thing to 
do. Concepts of free participation in 
political life, majority rule, and na- 
tional independence are ideals to which 
all of us can subscribe. 

• The promotion of this objective is 
very much in our long-term interest. 
Bringing our policy in line with our 
own values eases a major source of 
conflict with the African and 
nonaligned nations. Relations with 
these governments are of growing im- 
portance to us politically, as trading 
partners and as sources of natural re- 
sources. 

• We believe that over the long term 
our interests are best served by en- 
couraging the emergence of leaders and 
governments reflecting the values of 
the western political tradition — a tradi- 
tion which, as you know, provided the 
impetus behind today's demand for 
change. 

• And, finally, the peaceful resolu- 
tion of conflict offers the best possible 
protection against continued poaching 
in the area by outside powers which 
thrive on violence and disorder. 

In practical terms, our southern Af- 
rica agenda consists of simultaneous 
efforts to find workable formulas 
leading to peaceful solutions of distinct 
— yet interrelated — problems, some of 
them at, or near, the flashpoint. 

We have no rigid formulas to insist 
upon. But we are convinced that only 
by recognizing the role of all political 
elements, and only by seeking to msure 
the political rights of all persons, can 
lasting settlements be found. We are 
seeking progress toward that goal by 
working with the Africans — including 
the South Africans — and with other 
Western governments. 

Because our agenda in Washington 
so closely parallels that of your confer- 
ence, 1 would like to describe briefly 
for you what we are trying to accom- 
plish, what we have done, and where 
we stand. Finally, in each case. 1 
would like to pose some of the ques- 
tions which we currently face in seek- 
ing to implement U.S. policies. 

Namibia 

In Namibia our objective is an inter- 
nationally acceptable settlement cen- 
tered on U.N. -supervised elections 
which would enable Namibians to de- 
cide their own political future. 

We and our four Western partners 
have tried to cut through the legal, 
political, and rhetorical impasse which 
has so long surrounded the Namibian 



issue by crafting a practical settlement 
proposal acceptable to all principal 
parties. 

Front-line cooperation has been in- 
valuable in this effort. Our success in 
obtaining that cooperation has faced 
the U.S.S.R. with a difficult situation. 
Notwithstanding their endorsement of 
the South West Africa People's Or- 
ganization (SWAPO), the front-line 
states have had enough confidence in 
the West to work with us toward a 
peaceful settlement in Namibia. In ef- 
fect they told the Soviets to stay out. 
The U.S.S.R. was obliged to abstain 
on the critical vote in the Security 
Council last July, which approved the 
Namibia settlement. 

As you know. South Africa and 
SWAPO have both officially accepted 
the Western settlement plan. But, un- 
fortunately, the South African Gov- 
ernment, over the past several months, 
has raised a series of objections to the 
manner in which the Secretary General 
proposes to implement it. Most re- 
cently, the South Africans have 
demanded the ouster of any armed 
SWAPO personnel from Namibia after 
the cease-fire. They have also insisted 
that SWAPO bases in Angola and 
Zambia be monitored by the United 
Nations. Neither of these actions is 
called for in the original agreement. 

With SWAPO aboard, and the 
front-line promising its cooperation, 
the chief question now facing us is 
what the South African Government 
will do. While asserting that they favor 
an international settlement, the South 
Africans have also kept open the alter- 
native of an internal settlement. We 
note with concern that key elements of 
that option, such as the so-called Con- 
stituent Assembly, are already in place. 
In the course of the last 3 weeks, we 
have undertaken major diplomatic ef- 
forts to assuage the concerns of the 
Namibian parties and to ascertain South 
Africa's intentions. We are now 
awaiting their reply. 

If South Africa opts for an internal 
settlement in Namibia, the conse- 
quences will be grave, not only for 
South Africa but for the region as a 
whole and for the world community. 

The broader question facing South 
Africa in Namibia, and in Rhodesia as 
well, is one of strategic choice. South 
Africa can have a democratic, interna- 
tionally recognized settlement in 
Namibia if it is willing to cooperate 
with the West and its African neigh- 
bors. Or, South Africa can retreat from 
that challenge and, on the basis of a 
hard-edged, psychologically more 
familiar calculation, rely on its own 
strength in defiance of the world com- 
munity. 



Angola 

Angola will have a crucial role to 
play in any Namibia settlement. Its 
leaders recognize that success in 
Namibia could well open the way to the 
resolution of some of Angola's other 
pressing problems. 

We wish to see an Angola free of 
entanglements involving outsiders with 
its internal conflict peacefully resolved 
and its people able to enter into the full 
enjoyment of their long sought inde- 
pendence. Our policy toward Angola 
has focused in a very practical way on 
security issues along its borders. Act- 
ing in concert with other interested 
governments, we have actively sought 
to help defuse Angola's problems with 
Zaire and South Africa. Although we 
have not recognized the Luanda gov- 
ernment, we have found it possible to 
work constructively with the Angolans 
on regional security problems. Mean- 
while, a number of American business 
concerns have also developed mutually 
beneficial relationships with the An- 
golans. 

For the future, however, one must 
ask how and whether Angola will be 
able to solve peacefully its internal 
difficulties? To what extent are these 
problems inherent in its history and its 
ethnic makeup? To what extent are they 
encouraged or even the product of out- 
side interests? In a more general sense, 
we must consider whether Angola will 
be able to determine its own future, or 
will it, for the moment, remain hostage 
to events beyond its control in neigh- 
boring territories? 



South Africa 

In many ways South Africa seems to 
hold the key to the solution of the 
problems of its region. And yet, as re- 
cent events have shown, its own do- 
mestic problems and the resulting com- 
plexity of its relations with Africa and 
the West make cooperation with them 
exceedingly difficult. 

It has been a basic tenet of our policy 
that there must be change in South Af- 
rica, including an end to the apartheid 
system, and eventual full participation 
by all South Africans in the nation's 
political and economic life. 

Another premi.se of our policy is that 
we will attempt to work with South 
Africa ori solutions to the problems of 
Namibia and Rhodesia. At the same 
time, we have made it clear that prog- 
ress in one of these areas will not be 
traded for forebearance on the others. 

Early in this Administration, Vice 
President Mondale told then Prime 
Minister Vorster that unless there was a 
move away from apartheid, our rela- 



7? 



Department of State Bulletin 



tions would inevitably deteriorate. We 
have reiterated that view in word and 
deeil since then, including our going 
beyond the U.N. mandatory arm.s em- 
bargo following Steve Biko's death 
with our own ban on all exports to the 
South African police and military. 

Llnforlunateiy, as we ail know, there 
has been no significant diminution of 
apartheid in the past 2 years. During 
this lime we have sought to emphasize 
to the Afrikaner leadership that they 
cannot continue to have both apartheid 
and the ties with us to which they seem 
to attach such great importance. Re- 
gardless of what attitude we take to- 
ward South Africa, their problem will 
remain: The hard choices are theirs to 
make. 

While there is more introspection 
and questioning going on among white 
South Africans today than ever before, 
the fundamental question remains 
whether their present system is capable 
of beneficial change and regeneration. 
Until such time as we conclude — God 
forbid — that such change is impos- 
sible, we must continue to seek a ra- 
tional balance between actions which 
may enhance the prospects for change, 
and those which intensify the 
LAAGER instinct. 

Internationally. South Africa is am- 
bivalent on Namibia and Rhodesia. Re- 
cently, we have heard of a South Afri- 



can "grand vision" of a southern Afri- 
can commonwealth of nations stretch- 
ing north from Cape Town to the 
Cunene and the Zambezi. Unless the 
South Africans are able to bring them- 
selves to think about their long-term 
security in a different dimension, their 
choice seems to lie between the greater 
or lesser LAAGER — and our relations 
with them will face the prospect of 
further deterioration. 

Rhodesia 

In early 1977, we and the British 
began an effort to find a formula for a 
peaceful, negotiated settlement for 
Rhodesia. We have sought to fashion a 
plan tor a settlement which would in- 
clude both internal and external groups 
and permit the holding of free and fair 
electuins under international auspices. 

Present prospects for peace are not 
bright. The Salisbury parties are intent 
on an internal settlement. The patriotic 
front is intent on thwarting one. The 
violence on both sides grows. Under 
these inauspicious circumstances, elec- 
tions within Rhodesia have begun. 

Today is the first day of voting in 
Rhodesia for the 72 black seats in the 
100-Member parliament. By any meas- 
ure, this marks a turning point which 
may influence decisively the future 
course of events. Many questions arise. 



• Will there be a greater or lesser ; 
willingness in Salisbury to strive for a I 
settlement embracing all parties to the 
conflict after the elections? 

• Will the attitudes of Rhodesian 
whites toward negotiations differ from 
those of the newly elected black lead- 
ers'? 

• With their growing military confi- 
dence, will the leaders of the patriotic 
front be able, or be willing, to put 
aside their personal rivalries and 
negotiate with Salisbury if such an op- 
portunity can be created? 

The response to these questions will- 
have a profound significance in judging 
whether a peaceful settlement is still 
possible. In terms of our own policy. 
To put the question in a different and 
more ominous manner: We must weigh 
the domestic political costs of an on- 
going U.S. negotiating role against the 
consequences of failure to achieve a 
negotiated settlement. Among the 
costs, if there is no political settlement, 
likely would be: 

• An increasingly destructive impact 
on the surrounding states; 

• Greater Soviet and Cuban in- 
volvement: and 

• An irreversible polarization of the 
southern African problem along racial 
and ideological lines. 



Uganda 



PRESIDENT'S MEMORANDUM, 
MAY 15, 1979' 

Memorandum Jor the Secreliiry of Slate, the 
Secretary of Treasury, the Secretary of Com- 
merce 

Subject: Trade with Uganda 

Pursuant to the authority vested m me hy 
Section .S of Public Law 95-435. I hereby de- 
termine and certify thai: 

The Government of Uganda is no longer 
committing a consistent pattern of gross viola- 
tions of human rights. 

The Secretary of Stale is requested to report 
this determinalion lo the Congress on my be- 
half, as required by law. 

The Secretaries of Treasury and Commerce 
are requested to take the appropriate steps per- 
mitting the immediate resumption of imports 
from and exports to Uganda. 

This determination shall be published in the 
Federal Register. 

Jimmy Carter 



PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT, 
MAY 15, 19792 

All Americans were appalled by evi- 
dence of the truly deplorable human 
rights violations which occurred during 
the Amin regime. While my Adminis- 
tration publicly condemned this situa- 
tion, 1 would particularly like to com- 
mend Senators Hatfield and Weicker 
and Congressmen Pease and Bonker for 
the intense concern which they exhib- 
ited about the human rights situation in 
Uganda. The breaking of the pattern of 
gross violations of human rights 
heralds a brighter day for Ugandans 
and, indeed, for all in the world con- 
cerned with human rights. D 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of Presi- 
dential Documents of May 21. 1979. 

'^Text from Weekly Compilation of Presi- 
dential Documents of May 21, 1979. 



The Front-line and 
Other African States 

Over the past 2 years we have ach- 
ieved some success with the front-line 
and other African states in breaking 
through the barrier of mistrust and mis- 
understanding which grew up in the 
past. We have welcomed them as full 
partners and have demonstrated our 
commitment to racial justice and a 
peaceful settlement in southern Africa. 
At the same time we have made clear 
to the front-line that we will not take 
sides among the nationalist parties. As 
we reject the right of the Salisbury 
parties to determine Zimbabwe's po- 
litical future, so do we reject the claim 
of the patriotic front for dominance in a 
transitional political process. We be- 
lieve that we have made ourselves un- 
derstood on this point — perhaps better 
to the Africans than to our own domes- 
tic audience. 

The potential tragedy of the black 
southern African states is their apparent 
lack of ability to avert the tragedy 
which threatens to engulf them. While 
the leaders of the front-line rightly re- 
fuse to compromise on the central issue 
of racial justice which lies at the heart 
of the Rhodesian question, they see all 
too clearly the consequences of the 
rapidly spreading violence. It is for this 



October 1979 



23 



reason that they have so strongly sup- 
ported, and continue to support, our 
efforts to find a political solution based 
on internationally supervised elections. 
As we approach a crucial period in 
our southern Africa policies we must 
consider the consequences of our deci- 
sions: 

• What more can we do to bring 
about negotiations among parties 
seemingly unwilling to compromise? 

• What choices will remain for the 
front-line states if we simply allow 
events to take their course? 

• How would U.S. interests in Af- 
rica and beyond be affected by an 
abandonment of our present impartial 
stance? 



Conclusion 

I have probably asked more ques- 
tions — and answered fewer — than you 
would have liked. But I did so for a 
purpose. During the coming week, you 
will be examining some of the difficult 
choices this nation faces, or will be 
forced to face, in southern Africa. 

While our real leverage on events in 
southern Africa has always been small, 
it may be further constricted by do- 
mestic perceptions and constraints; 
and, while any kind of active effort to 
resolve peacefully the longstanding 
conflicts in southern Africa would be 
difficult, the task has been made im- 
measurably more onerous by: 

• Our late entry onto the scene; 

• African perceptions (and not a lit- 
tle recent American history) which had 
to be overcome; and 

• The fact that we chose that most 
difficult of negotiating vehicles — 
multilateral diplomacy. 

[U.S. Permanent Representative to 
the U.N.] Andy Young has frequently 
said that since we're getting attacked 
with equal vigor from the right and 
from the left, in this country and in 
Africa, we must be doing something 
right. I agree with this. 

What we are doing right is this. 

• We have enunciated principles 
with which no one — here or there — 
can disagree. 

• We have faithfully applied these 
principles throughout the continuous 
negotiating history of the last 2 years. 

• We firmly believe that these prin- 
ciples can still provide an equitable 
process leading to fair solutions for all 
the people of southern Africa. 

Some may, indeed do, disagree with 
this or that tactic. But no one can 
challenge the principles we have ad- 
vanced. By fealty to these principles — 



OAU Summit Meeting 



by William C. Harrop 

Statement before the Subcommittee 
on African Affairs of the House Com- 
mittee on Foreign Affairs on July 27. 
1979. Mr. Harrop is Deputy Assistant 
Secretary for African Affairs.^ 

I welcome the opportunity to report 
to the Africa subcommittee on the six- 
teenth assembly of heads of state and 
government of the Organization of Af- 
rican Unity (OAU). These delibera- 
tions, which took place in the capital of 
Liberia from July 17-21, were pre- 
ceded by and actually overlapped a 
preparatory meeting of ministers, 
mostly foreign ministers, where a great 
deal of the most important debate ap- 
parently took place. The two meetings 
are now generally referred to together 
as the OAU Monrovia summit. 

This year's OAU summit has been 
characterized in the press as "one of 
the most acrimonious in recent his- 
tory." Although the description fits the 
boos and cheers and walkouts at the 
meeting, 1 believe the spirited tenor of 
the assembly demonstrated that the 
political leaders of Africa showed 
greater willingness this year to confront 
the tough issues openly and to discuss 
the differences which divide them. 

Noteworthy examples were Tan- 
zania's and Libya's military interven- 
tions in Uganda, the status of the 
Western Sahara, and the legitimacy of 
the Government of Chad. Other ques- 
tions engendering lively debate were 
the status to be accorded to the patri- 
otic front and the Middle East peace 
process. 

Although these divisive issues at- 
tracted a great deal of attention, the 
summit was also of special interest be- 



and by a growing recognition that so- 
called unilateral "solutions" will not 
solve southern Africa's worsening 
problems — we shall preserve our abil- 
ity to mediate. That — it's now more 
clear than ever — will be needed some- 
day. We will also preserve a policy, for 
the first time in this part of the world, 
which faithfully reflects ideals as a na- 
tion. 

In the past, our worst problems as a 
people have come when we lost sight 
of these ideals. In the difficult days 
ahead — let me assure you — we will 
not. D 



cause of the broader attention paid for 
the first time to economic matters and 
to human rights. Revision of the OAU 
Charter itself was also discussed. I 
shall summarize briefly the principal 
developments at the summit and offer 
our general appraisal. I will, of course, 
be happy to discuss the summit in 
greater depth as desired by the mem- 
bers. 



Military Intervention in Uganda 
and the OAU Charter 

Tanzania's military intervention in 
Uganda was the subject of severe criti- 
cism, particularly by the outgoing 
OAU chairman. President Nimeiri of 
Sudan, and the Nigerian Chief of State, 
Gen. Obasanjo. President Nyerere of 
Tanzania and President Binaisa of 
Uganda defended the action, said that 
Idi Amin was the original aggressor, 
and drew attention to the Libyan mili- 
tary intervention on the latter's behalf. 
Many attacked Idi Amin's gross viola- 
tion of human rights, and to our knowl- 
edge no one rose to defend Amin. 
Rather, the question was whether such 
violations justified jeopardizing the 
OAU Charter's cardinal principles of 
nonintervention and territorial integ- 
rity. The formal debate was eventually 
closed without any resolutions having 
been introduced. 

Although the issue is unresolved, the 
possibility of revising the OAU Char- 
ter was given considerable attention as 
a result of it. Following President 
Nimeiri's proposal that a council of 
five heads of state be created to inter- 
cede in conflicts — with the power to 
make decisions binding on the 
parties — the summit passed a resolu- 
tion recommending the establishment 
of a committee to review the charter. 



The Western Sahara 

By a close vote, the summit adopted 
the so-called Wisemen's report on the 
Western Sahara and asked that the five 
states composing the ad hoc committee 
(Nigeria, Mali, Ivory Coast, Tanzania, 
Guinea) plus Liberia continue its work. 
The report calls for a referendum in the 
Western Sahara to permit the people to 
exercise the right to self-determination. 
However, a high OAU official has said 
that it would be difficult to hold a ref- 
erendum without the cooperation of 
Morocco, which remains opposed to 



24 



Department of State Bulletin 



the concept of holding a referendum. 
During the proceedings the Moroccan 
delegation walked out. as did the 
Presidents of Senegal and Gabon, two 
strong supporters of Morocco. 



Chad 

The delegation representing the gov- 
ernment presently in Ndjamena was 
excluded early on from the council of 
ministers and, to the best of our knowl- 
edge, it did not then attempt to be 
seated at the assembly of heads of state 
and government. Nigeria and Libya 
actively sought exclusion of the Chad- 
ian delegation. To exclude Chad be- 
cause of the unclear internal political 
situation in the country and the claim 
that the government is unrepresentative 
appears to be unprecedented in OAU 
history. Traditionally, the organization 
has taken the position that it recognizes 
states rather than governments and has 
avoided divisive debate over legiti- 
macy. 



Recognition of the Patriotic Front 

Of particular concern to us were the 
actions taken in reference to 
Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. A resolution was 
voted "reaffirming that the Patriotic 
Front is the sole, legitimate and au- 
thentic representative of the People of 
Zimbabwe."" This degree of recogni- 
tion had not before been accorded by 
the OAU, despite the term "reaffirm- 
ing." There is also language in this 
resolution which criticizes Western, 
and, in particular, "US and UK diplo- 
matic maneuvers to stitTe the struggle 
of the people of Zimbabwe for genuine 
independence."' It also expresses in- 
dignation "at the moves of Britain and 
the USA towards recognition of the il- 
legal regime resulting from the illegal 
elections." There are implied threats in 
the pasage which ''decides that 
member states shall apply effective 
cultural, political, commercial and 
economic sanctions" against any state 
which accords recognition or lifts man- 
datory U.N. sanctions against the 
Muzorewa government. 

We believe — and so informed our 
African friends before the summit — 
that actions such as the resolution 
eventually voted would make more 
difficult the task of achieving a solu- 
tion to the Rhodesian conflict. There is 
considerable evidence that a number of 
African states share this concern: sev- 
eral states entered official reservations 
to parts of the text concerning the 
status of the patriotic front while others 
continue to express their reservations 
less officially. 



In this regard, the Secretary General 
of the OAU, Edem Kodjo, pointed out 
to the press that interest was shown 
during the summit debate in round 
table negotiations. He said explicitly 
that the OAU does not feel that it has 
closed the door on all party talks. We 
are pleased that such assurances were 
made and do, in fact, believe that the 
OAU can be helpful in our efforts to 
get all the parties to negotiate a peace- 
ful political accommodation. We will 
continue to discuss this issue with the 



l],S. Atnhassadors 

to Africait Countries, 

September 1979 



Benin — Vacant 

Botswana — Horace G. Dawson. Jr.' 

Burundi — Thomas J. Corcoran 

Cameroon — Mabel Murphy Smyihe 

Cape Verde — Edward Marks 

Central African Empire — Goodwin Cooke 

Chad—Donald R. Norland 

Comoros — Vacant 

Congo — William Lacy Swing 

Djibouti — Vacant 

Ethiopia — Frederic L. Chapin 

Gabon — Arthur T. Tienken 

Gambia — Herman J. Cohen 

Ghana — Thomas W. M. Smith 

Guinea — Oliver S. Crosby 

Guinea-Bissau — Edward Marks 

Ivory Coast — Nancy V. Rawls 

Kenya — Wilbert John Le Melle 

Lesotho — John R. Clingerman 

Liberia — Robert P. Smith 

Madagascar — Vacant 

Malawi — Harold E. Horan 

Mali — Patricia M. Byrne 

Mauritania — E. Gregory Kryza 

Mauritius — Samuel Rhea Gammon 

Mozambique — Willard A. De Pree 

Niger — James Keough Bishop 

Nigeria — Stephen Low 

Rwanda — Vacant 

Sao Tome and Principe — Arthur T. Tienken 

Senegal — Herman J. Cohen 

Seychelles — Wilbert John Le Melle 

Sierra Leone — John Andrew Linehan 

Somalia — Donald K. Petlerson 

South Africa — William B. Edmondson 

Sudan — Donald Clayton Bergus 

Swaziland — Vacant 

Tanzania — Richard Noyes Viels 

Togo — Marilyn Priscilla Johnson 

Uganda — Vacant 

Upper Volta — Thomas D. Boyatt 

Zaire — Vacant 

Zambia — Frank George Wisner II D 



'Nominated by the President but not yet con- 
firmed by the Senate. 



OAU Chairman, President Tolbert. and 
OAU Secretariat officials. 

Middle East Situation 

It is significant that the suspension 
of Egypt from the OAU did not become 
a serious issue during the conference, 
as had earlier seemed possible. On the 
Egypt-Israel treaty and the Camp David 
process, we understand that the radical 
states held out until very late in the 
summit for condemnatory language, 
but were obliged to fall back when they 
could not assemble the votes. 

The final version of the Middle East 
resolution does not attack either Egypt 
or the treaty itself, although it does 
contain language condemning "all 
partial agreements and separate treaties 
which violate the recognized rights of 
the Palestinian people."" The resolution 
condemns Israel in the strongest terms 
and reaffirms support for the Palestine 
Liberation Organization as the sole 
legitimate representative of the Pales- 
tinian people. I believe it is safe to say, 
however, that the moderate states of 
Africa see the resolution as a very 
favorable compromise. 

Other Issues 

Africa's difficult economic situation 
and its perilous future were focused 
upon and discussed publicly during the 
summit with great realism. The Secre- 
tary General called this a "break- 
through" in the consideration of eco- 
nomic questions. This is a new 
emphasis; although there were no sub- 
stantive decisions, the assembled heads 
of government called for an extraordi- 
nary summit to discuss economic 
integration and development. The 
Secretary General was also directed to 
prepare the groundwork for the estab- 
lishment of an African economic com- 
munity. This recognition of economic 
problems and determination to address 
them collectively is certainly a step in 
the right direction. 

References to human rights were 
made in many of the speeches, perhaps 
most notably in President Tolbert's 
keynote address as OAU chairman for 
the coming year. A resolution reaf- 
firming the need for improved respect 
for human rights, and in particular the 
right to development, was proposed by 
Senegal and Gambia and accepted by 
the summit. This resolution also calls 
upon the Secretary General to organize 
a meeting of experts to prepare a draft 
of an African charter on human rights 
and provides for "the establishment of 
bodies" to protect human rights. One 
high OAU official reporting on the 
proceedings said: "We cannot talk 
about the denial of human rights in 



October 1979 



25 



ARJHS CONTROL: An Evaluation of SALT H 



by George M. Seignious II 

Statement before the Senate Com- 
mittee on Armed Services on July 30, 
\1979. Mr. Seignious is Director of the 
\Arms Control and Disarmament 
\ Agency. ' 

When I speak for SALT, I do not 
speak for good will or for detente or for 
a political party or for trust. I speak in 
favor of an arms control treaty that will 
strengthen the national security of the 
United States. 

Today, equitable and verifiable arms 
control goes hand in hand with a strong 
defense. The cold, hard fact of life in 
) the nuclear age is that we have no other 
practical choice. A strong defense 
makes arms control possible, for it is 
precisely because we are strong and 
intend to remain so that we do not fear 
to negotiate. And arms control, care- 
fully conceived and vigilantly 
negotiated, has defense as its guide and 
security as its result. 

I could not advocate to the President, 
to the Senate, or to the American 
people any form of unilateral disarma- 
ment. Over three decades in the mili- 
tary service of my country have taught 
me that we must first see to the security 
of our nation. 1 could not advocate an 
agreement that ties our hands while the 
Soviets are allowed a free hand. In 



strategic arms we must be ahead of, or 
at least equal to, the Soviet Union, 
never number two. And 1 could not ad- 
vocate an agreement based on trust. 
The very survival of our nation is at 
stake — and trust is not a basis for na- 
tional survival. 

SALT 11 is a careful and major step 
forward to limit strategic offensive nu- 
clear arms. It is a negotiated com- 
promise that compromises neither our 
own security nor the stability of the 
strategic nuclear balance nor the con- 
tinuing quest to limit nuclear arms. 
SALT 11 is a consensus treaty that pro- 
vides progress for the present and hope 
for the future. 

SALT 11 is not a panacea; it is not 
the millenium. Ratification will not 
stop competition or eliminate all the 
challenges we face or guarantee per- 
manent stability. Above all, ratification 
does not mean that we as a nation can 
go to sleep. National security is a con- 
tinuing requirement. It requires na- 
tional will. And it requires vigilance. 

I have studied SALT 11 carefully 
from three professional vantage points 
— as Director of the Joint Staff of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, as the at-large 
member of the SALT delegation, and 
as Director of the U.S. Arms Control 
and Disarmament Agency. 1 want to 
focus the first part of my statement on 



South Africa without insuring that we 
ourselves are the defenders of human 
rights."" 

I find this African interest in pro- 
moting human rights to be entirely 
positive and a reflection of the em- 
phasis the Carter Administration has 
placed upon the issue. It behooves us 
to encourage these African initiatives 
which are so consistent with our own 
human rights policies. 

Summary 

Developments at this year"s OAU 
summit are on balance encouraging. It 
seems safe to expect that President 
Tolbert will play an active role in 
guiding the OAU during the coming 
year and that he will be a force for 
moderation. It should be remembered, 
however, that the OAU was never de- 
signed to be a supranational body, and 
this organization of sovereign states 



will continue to encounter extreme dif- 
ficulty in reaching decisions and en- 
forcing them whenever individual 
states or groups of states refuse to 
compromise. Whatever their views of 
OAU actions and inactions, African 
leaders seem to be unanimous in find- 
ing that OAU summits are excellent 
occasions to push and swap ideas. 

It is in our interest to consult fre- 
quently with President Tolbert and 
senior OAU officials during the coming 
year. We will try to encourage a 
broader appreciation of our positions 
and at the same time, ourselves, to de- 
velop a better understanding of African 
concerns and political dynamics. D 



'The complete transcript of the hearings will 
be published by the committee and will be 
available from the Superintendent of Docu- 
ments, U.S. Government Printing Office. 
Washinglon. D.C. 20402. 



five fundamental standards against 
which 1 have measured SALT 11. 

First. SALT 11 must place limits on 
Soviet forces; 

Second. SALT U must permit us to 
undertake the military programs we 
believe are necessary for our security; 
we must be able to maintain the 
strategic balance under SALT II; 

Third. SALT II must be adequately 
verifiable. 

Fourth. SALT II must not intertere 
with existing patterns of cooperation 
and support for our NATO allies; 

Fifth. SALT II must enhance 
strategic stability and reduce the risk of 
nuclear war. 

SALT 11 meets each and every one of 
these standards. 

Limiting Soviet Strategic Forces 

My first standard — limiting Soviet 
strategic forces — exemplifies a unique 
contribution that SALT II brings to our 
national security. In an arms race with- 
out limits, we can build more but so 
can the Soviets. 1 am concerned about 
the Soviet buildup. We all are. It is 
massive and relentless. I believe we 
should meet it by maintaining military 
forces equivalent to whatever forces 
the Soviets build and by capping the 
Soviet buildup through SALT. We are 
going to have to do both at the same 
time if we want to maintain the 
strategic balance in a realistic, practical 
way. 

The simple fact is that the Soviet 
Union has vast economic resources and 
a national will, no less determined than 
our own, to expend those resources for 
what it perceives to be necessary mili- 
tary purposes. Without arms control 
agreements, we cannot stop the Soviets 
from building as many strategic 
weapons as they wish, and we cannot 
force them to dismantle existing 
weapon systems. We can certainly 
match the Soviets in any nuclear arms 
race, but SALT is the only way 1 know 
to limit the number of Soviet missiles 
and nuclear warheads targeted at our 
country. 

As a former military man, I believe 
that any time you succeed in limiting 
the destructive forces that could be 
marshalled against you by your adver- 
sary, you have accomplished some- 
thing of significance. Let me detail for 
you some specific ways in which the 



26 



Department of State Bulletin • 



SALT II treaty accomplishes this oh- 
jective. 

• Under SALT 11, the Soviets must 
reduce the total ot their central 
strategic systems (launchers ol inter- 
continental ballistic missiles, launch- 
ers ot submarine-launched ballistic 
missiles, and heavy bombers) from 
over 2,500 at present to 2,250 by the 
end of 1981. We estimate that without 
this limit, the Soviets could have as 
many as 3,000 such systems by 1985. 
Thus, what otherwise would probably 
be a 20% increase in Soviet strategic 
systems is converted by SALT 11 to a 
10% decrease. 

• Under SALT 11, the Soviets will 
be limited to 1,200 launchers of ballis- 
tic missiles carrying multiple inde- 
pendently targetable warheads, or 
MIRVs [multiple independently- 
targetable reentry vehicles]. This figure 
is about 600 less than we estimate they 
could have by the end of 1985. 

• Under SALT II, the Soviets will 
be limited to 820 launchers of 
MIRV'ed intercontinental ballistic mis- 
siles — the most threatening part of their 
strategic force. We estimate that they 
could deploy at least 300 more than 
this figure bv the end of 1985 without 
SALT 11. 

• Under SALT II. the Soviets will 



agreed to ban this system to avoid a 
verification problem. The SS-16 ICBM 
appeared to be compatible with the 
launcher for the shorter range SS-20 
which is not limited by SALT II. 

• Under SALT II, rapid reload of 
ICBM launchers and storage of extra 
ICBM's at ICBM launch sites will be 
banned. 

Thus, under SALT 11, there will be 
many hundreds fewer Soviet strategic 
systems and many thousands fewer de- 
liverable strategic warheads in their ar- 
senal than they could have without 
SALT II. 

These limits on Soviet systems are 
not all we would like to see if we could 
dictate to the Soviet Union. But they 
are also not meaningless restraints on 
totals already much too high. 

I need hardly remind this committee 
of the destructive power contained in 
the Soviet systems to be dismantled or 
of the destructive power we would have 
to face if Soviet programs went for- 
ward unimpeded. While some com- 
mentators have attempted to charac- 
terize the Soviet weapons likely to be 
dismantled as obsolescent, 1 want to 
note that the Soviets will be forced to 
select from among nuclear-powered 
submarines with missiles built in the 
early 1970"s, aircraft carrying their 



SALT II is a consensus treaty that provides progress for the present 
and hope for the future. 



be permitted to flight-test and deploy 
only one new type of light ICBM dur- 
ing the treaty period. This means that 
all but one of the fifth generation of 
Soviet ICBM's [intercontinental ballis- 
tic missiles] will be held to small mod- 
ifications of earlier generations which 
will not represent a significant increase 
in militarv capability. 

• Under SALT 11, Soviet ICBM's 
will be limited in the number of 
MIRV'ed warheads per missile to cur- 
rently tested levels. And the one per- 
mitted new type of light ICBM will be 
limited to 10. This "fractionation" 
limit significantly restricts the use the 
Soviets can make of their ICBM 
throw-weight. We estimate that the 
SS-18 could carry 30 warheads instead 
of the 10 SALT II will permit. With 
over 300 SS-18's in their forces in the 
I980's, that means that SALT II re- 
duces the Soviet warhead potential by 
over 6,000 warheads — on just one type 
of missile. 

• Under SALT II. the production, 
testing, and deployment of the SS-16 
ICBM will be banned. The United 
States proposed and the Soviet Union 



largest multimegaton bombs, and 
SS-ll ICBM's. 

Each strategic Soviet system to be 
destroyed is associated with a warhead 
many times more powerful than the one 
that leveled Hiroshima — in the case of 
the aircraft, a thousand times more 
powerful. The 250 systems in question 
could suffice to demolish the 250 
largest American cities. The people of 
Houston or Seattle or Des Moines 
would take little comfort in knowing 
that the missile or bomber carrying a 
nuclear weapon toward their city was 
obsolescent. I believe that any limits 
on Soviet power and capabilities are a 
step in the right direction. 

I also want to take exception to the 
view that SALT II only limits Soviet 
programs to already planned levels or 
that they wouldn't exceed the SALT 11 
levels anyway. This contention is to- 
tally at variance with our intelligence 
estimates, and it does not square with 
the pace and momentum that is causing 
such concern today. Anyone who looks 
at the Soviet buildup today and con- 
cludes that it won't continue unabated 
without SALT II is taking a rosy view 



of the Soviet Union to which 1 cannot 
subscribe. 



U.S. Strategic Forces 

My second standard concerns our 
own forces. We must be able to pre- 
serve the strategic balance under SALT 
II. SALT II will not tie our hands. We 
will be able to proceed under SALT II 
with all of the force options we have 
decided are necessary for our security. 

• We have improved the accuracy 
and explosive yield of our existing 
Minuteman 111 land-based missiles. 
SALT II will not prevent similar im- 
provements in the future. 

• We are about to fit some of our 
existing Poseidon nuclear submarines 
with the longer range Trident I missile 
which means that these submarines can 
patrol and hide in vastly increased 
ocean areas and still hit their Soviet 
targets. They will be even more dif- 
ficult to detect. This program will be 
completed in 1982. SALT II does not 
hinder this in any way. 

• We have just launched the first of 
our Trident nuclear missile submarines, 
each of which can hit about 200 Soviet 
targets. By the end of SALT 11, we 
plan to have seven of these submarines. 
SALT II does not hinder this in any 
way. 

• We are developing and testing 
air-launched cruise missiles for place- 
ment aboard approximately 150 of our 
heavy bombers. We plan to start in- 
stalling these air-launched cruise mis- 
siles in 1981. By late 1985, we expect 
to have nearly 1,500 of these cruise 
missiles deployed. They are highly ac- 
curate and can be launched from out- 
side the range of Soviet air defenses. 
SALT 11 will permit this deployment. 

• We are developing and testing 
long-range ground- and sea-launched 
cruise missiles (GLCM's and 
SLCM's). Deplovment is prohibited by 
SALT 11 until after 1981, but these 
missiles would not be ready for de- 
ployment before this date anyway. 
When these are ready for deployment, 
it will be our decision to make whether 
deployment or negotiated restrictions, 
which also limit the Soviet Union, are 
in our best national security interests. 
During the protocol period, SLCM's 
and GLCM's can be flight-tested to any 
range. 

I should add in this regard that when 
the United States insisted that the pro- 
tocol be of a short, fixed duration, we 
meant percisely that. The protocol ex- 
pires on December 31, 1981; nothing 
could be clearer. Any decision to put 
legal restrictions upon U.S. GLCM's 
and SLCM's after 1981 would require 
an entirely new negotiation and another 



October 1979 

submission to the Senate for your con- 
sent. 

• And SALT II does not prevent us 
from developing a solution to the 
problem of the increasing vulnerability 
of land-based missiles. This vulnera- 
bility is not the result of SALT. It is 
due to the increasing capabilities, par- 
ticularly improving accuracy, of the 
missiles of both nations. Under SALT 
II, we will be able to deploy our new 
ICBM, the MX, in a mobile, surviva- 
ble mode. We have considered a 
number of basing schemes for the MX. 

It is a demonstration of the impor- 
tance of arms control to national secu- 
rity that, with SALT II, the mobile 
missile land-based alternatives that we 
have considered are unquestionably 
more feasible and more economical. 
Without the SALT II limits on numbers 
of Soviet warheads, the Soviets could 
add more warheads over time which 
would necessitate a significantly larger 
number of shelters for our missiles. 

The recent decision to proceed with 
the MX missile is clear, demonstrable 
evidence, for our friends and our ad- 
versaries, that we will proceed with the 
programs necessary for our security. 
Each part of our strategic forces will be 
survivable so that deterrence will never 
be in question. And each part will be 
adequately verifiable, so that confi- 
dence in strategic stability will accrue 
to both our nations. 

1 respect deeply those who are wor- 
ried about present trends in the 
strategic balance, for I am concerned as 
well. But confidence is also vital to our 
freedom in the nuclear world when de- 
terrence is the essence of stability and 
security. We have not built and main- 
tained our strategic forces — at the cost 
of billions — in order to weaken their 
deterrent impact by telling the Russians 
and the world that we are inferior 
when, in fact, we are not. 

There is no doubt that the Soviet 
strategic force is formidable and 
growing rapidly. But there is also no 
doubt that the Soviet Union does not 
have strategic nuclear superiority now, 
and they will not have it in the future if 
the will and determination of the 
United States persist, if we continue to 
modernize our strategic forces, if we 
do what we must do to maintain 
equivalence. 

I want to make one point very clear. 
It is central to the debate over SALT II. 
SALT II will not prohibit us from pro- 
ceedmg with the programs we need to 
maintain the strategic balance. But 
SALT II is not a substitute for national 
will. SALT II permits us to go ahead 
with necessary programs; it does not 
provide the programs themselves. The 
programs we undertake to keep our 



deterrent strong will be determined by 
the American people, their leaders, and 
their representatives. SALT II does not 
foreclose our choice. 

We would be deluding ourselves as a 
nation if we believed that we will not 
have to increase our spending for 
strategic programs, with or without 
SALT II. The scope and pace of Soviet 
strategic programs leave us little choice 
but to modernize our own strategic nu- 
clear forces. But there is no doubt that 
the cost without SALT II would be tens 
of billions of dollars more than it will 
be with SALT II. Within the frame- 
work of SALT II, we can maintain 
strategic equality and a more viable and 
more effective strategic force with less 
risk and at a much more moderate cost. 
Furthermore, the danger of siphoning 
resources away from conventional 
forces is lessened. 



Adequate Verification 

My third standard for SALT II is 
adequate verification. If SALT II did 
not fulfill this requirement, then I 
could not support it. After careful 
study, I have concluded that SALT II is 
adequately verifiable and that it will be 
so from the day the agreement enters 
into force. 

To verify SALT II, we rely on our 
own independent, national intelligence 
capabilities. We survey the Soviet 
Union regularly, thoroughly, and ac- 
curately with a vast array of sophisti- 
cated and powerful intelligence- 
gathering systems, such as photorecon- 
naissance satellites, radars, and other 
monitoring devices in space, on land, 
on sea, and in the air. The result is a 
network of collection systems which 
complement each other and provide us 
with overlapping coverage of the 
Soviet Union. 

We have spent billions of dollars on 
these systems, and it has been money 
well spent. I find our intelligence 
capabilities truly astonishing in their 
technological capacity — especially to a 
soldier who began his career in World 
War II, when we seldom knew what 
was happening 600 yards behind enemy 
lines, let alone 6,000 miles away. 

For example, we know where the 
Soviets build their submarines. It takes 
several years to construct a ballistic 
missile submarine. We carefully ob- 
serve it during this period. We count its 
missile tubes as they are being built, 
and we determine which types of mis- 
siles will be installed in those launch- 
ers. When the Soviets launched their 
latest Delta class strategic missile sub- 
marine, it was no surprise to us. We 
had been aware of its construction for 
years. 



27 



Similarly, we know where Soviet 
ICBM launchers are deployed and what 
types they are. We observe new mis- 
siles as they are flight-tested, and they 
are tested extensively. We know 
whether a missile is tested with one 
warhead or more than one. We can 
count the number of Soviet reentry ve- 
hicles as they reenter the atmosphere. 

We monitor the conversion of older 
Soviet ICBM launchers so they can 
handle new MIRV'ed missiles. Well 
before the conversion is finished and 
the launcher is again operational, we 
know not only whether it is a launcher 
for a MIRV'ed missile but also the type 
of MIRV'ed missile it is designed to 
contain. 

In the case of Soviet heavy bombers, 
we have an adequate count of how 
many bombers there are, where they 
are produced, and where they are 
based. We can observe important mod- 
ifications that are made to these bom- 
bers. 

Several factors help us in verifying 
the provisions of SALT II. 

• One factor is time. Many of the 
systems limited in SALT are very large 
and complex and cannot quickly be 
constructed. For example, it takes 
many months to construct an ICBM 
silo launcher and years to develop and 
deploy a new missile. This gives us 
time to monitor activities. 

• Another is the need for reliability. 
New strategic systems have to be tested 
to have operational reliability. We can 
observe these Soviet tests. 

• And a third factor is support re- 
quirements. Strategic systems need 
personnel to run them and extensive 
logistic and security support. These re- 
quirements compound the task of 
keeping deployments hidden, and they 
increase the chance that we will detect 
them, especially if such activities were 
to take place in significant numbers. 

Some charge that the Soviets could 
stockpile extra missiles and then one 
night change the strategic balance. Let 
me say that it is one thing to produce a 
missile in a factory; it is quite another 
to have the trained personnel, the 
logistics, the large amounts of heavy 
equipment to handle the missiles and 
the launchers themselves — without our 
being able to spot them. 

I might add that the Soviets, if they 
wanted to violate the provisions of 
SALT H, would face another difficulty 
— uncertainty. Our use of multiple in- 
telligence sources complicates any 
Soviet effort to disguise or conceal im- 
portant activities. The Soviets know 
that we have a large, sophisticated in- 
telligence operation, and they know a 



28 

certain amount about how it works. 
They do not, however, know the full 
capabilities of our collection systems 
and analysis techniques. This uncer- 
tainty will further complicate any 
Soviet attempt to conceal an evasion of 
the SALT II limits. 

The question has been asked: "What 
do we do if we discover a Soviet viola- 
tion or if we even suspect one?'" As a 
result of the SALT 1 agreements in 
1972, we established at Geneva a 
U.S. -Soviet Standing Consultative 
Commission (SCO where any com- 
pliance questions, any suspected ac- 
tivities, can be challenged at once. We 



new or modified Soviet strategic mis- 
sile could be completed. 

The limits of SALT II are adequately 
verifiable with our own national tech- 
nical means. By restricting launchers 
and not missiles, by counting rules, we 
have no need for more intrusive meas- 
ures in SALT II. On-site inspection is 
not mandatory for adequate verification 
of SALT II. For example, the SALT II 
MIRV counting rules are a better de- 
vice than on-site inspection for count- 
ing MIRV's. We are able to use these 
rules to count Soviet MIRV's on a 
total, national basis. We will not have 
to rely on inspectors who can be de- 



SALT II will not prohibit us from proceeding with the programs we 
need to maintain the strategic balance. 



thus have an established forum where 
even the slightest suspicion of a viola- 
tion can be raised with the Soviets. 
This forum has worked well under 
SALT I. 

Some also question whether we ac- 
tually would challenge the Soviets if 
they appeared to be in violation of 
SALT II. 1 believe our record under 
SALT I is solid proof that we would. 
We have not been hesitant to challenge 
the Soviets about questions of concern 
to us — eight times. The fact is, how- 
ever, that there is not one outstanding 
challenge that we have made against 
the Soviet Union that has not been re- 
solved to our satisfaction. If a violation 
persisted without correction or if a 
violation threatened our security, then 
we could abrogate the agreement and 
build the forces necessary to meet the 
threat. This would be a very serious 
development, and the Soviets know it. 

In assessing the capabilities of our 
network of collection systems, it is im- 
portant to recognize that intelligence is 
a dynamic process in which our effort 
will need continual improvement. We 
must be prepared to take the necessary 
actions to exploit the new opportunities 
that advancing technology offers us and 
to offset the loss of sources, as happens 
from time to time. The recent loss of 
important intelligence stations in Iran is 
a clear example. Becuase of our exten- 
sive capabilities, we continue to be 
able to monitor adequately the testing 
of Soviet ICBM's, although some un- 
certainties are temporarily larger than 
we would like. 

As you know, we are aggressively 
pursuing a number of alternatives and 
specific programs to collect the infor- 
mation formerly gathered in Iran in 
order to reduce these uncertainties to 
their previous, lower level. We expect 
to do this before a test program for any 



ceived and who cannot watch all of the 
launchers all of the time. 

We would monitor the Soviets even 
if there were no SALT agreement. It is 
essential for us to have good, solid in- 
telligence on Soviet strategic forces, 
totally apart from any arms control 
agreement. In fact, only a portion of 
the total intelligence we collect on 
Soviet strategic forces is related to 
SALT II limits. 

There are specific provisions in 
SALT II, proposed by us and accepted 
by the Soviets, that make the job of 
monitoring the Soviets easier than it 
would be without SALT. 

• Under SALT II, the Soviets will 
not be allowed to interfere with the in- 
telligence systems we use to verify 
SALT II. 

• Under SALT II, deliberate con- 
cealment, including encryption of 
telemetry, which impedes verification 
of compliance is banned. This ban 
applies not only to concealment of con- 
struction and deployment of systems 
limited by SALT but also to conceal- 
ment of testing of those systems be- 
cause some provisions are verified by 
observing testing. Without this ban, the 
Soviets could use any and all means of 
concealment. 

• Under SALT II, neither side is al- 
lowed to conceal the association of a 
missile with its launcher. Without this 
provision, it could be much more dif- 
ficult for us to assess which missile 
goes with each type of launcher. 

These are just some of the SALT II 
verification provisions. Without them, 
it could be much more difficult to col- 
lect needed intelligence on Soviet 
strategic programs. Without the bans 
on concealment and interference, we 
could find it much harder to determine 
how many strategic missiles and bom- 



Department of State Bulletin 

bers they are deploying and what their 
military capabilities and characteristics 
are. The Soviets would be free to take 
steps to complicate our ability to pre- 
dict accurately the size and capability 
of Soviet strategic forces. 

No leader, military or civilian, wants 
to plan with less rather than more in- 
formation about an adversary. I believe 
that in SALT we have used verification 
to good advantage — for our own secu- 
rity, for strategic stability, and to help 
turn uncertainty into confidence. 

That is a clear, specific example of 
the contribution arms control can make 
to our national security. 

Security of NATO Allies 

My fourth standard by which I have 
measured SALT II concerns our NATO 
allies. The NATO alliance, basically, 
looks to the United States to accom- 
plish two tasks: 

• To maintain a strong deterrent and 
a strong defense, and 

• To lead in managing the East-West 
relationship to avoid a war that would 
devastate the nations of Europe as well 
as our own. 

SALT II contributes to both. 

In 1944, I stepped ashore in Europe 
for the first time as a member of the 
10th Armored Division. During the 
Berlin Wall crisis in 1961-63, I com- 
manded a cavalry regiment at the Iron 
Curtain. In 1969, I commanded the 3d 
Infantry Division, and in 1970 I was 
U.S. commander in Berlin. I am con- 
vinced that NATO's basic security 
interests are no different than our 
own — stability, prevention of nuclear 
war, and preservation of the strategic 
and conventional military balance. The 
20th century has taught Europe, as 
much as any other region on Earth, the 
destructiveness of war, the benefits of 
stability, and the necessity for a strong 
defense. 

Stability is particularly important to 
Europe, where potent military forces 
are concentrated only a short distance 
apart, where thousands of nuclear 
weapons are deployed, and where an 
arena of historic confrontation is still 
today of the highest security interest to 
each superpower. The risk of nuclear 
war is as real to Europeans as it is to 
Americans and stability a requirement, 
not a luxury. 

Fundamental to European security is 
the preservation of the U.S. -Soviet 
strategic nuclear balance. SALT II, in 
combination with our own defense pro- 
grams, will enable us to maintain that 
balance. 

Equally fundamental is the preserva- 
tion of the European theater balance. 



October 1979 



29 



NATO IS currently embarked on an 
ambitious and expensive force im- 
provement program. I believe that this 
program — important to European secu- 
rity — would be far more difficult to ac- 
complish if our attention and our re- 
sources were focused instead on an 
unrestrained strategic nuclear arms 
race. 

SALT II in no way handcuffs our 
cooperation with NATO or sells out our 
allies' interests. 

• We have consulted extensively 
with our allies. For example, we have 
had some 40 meetings with the North 
Atlantic Council to discuss SALT II; 
half of these occurred in the last 2 



years. 

• We have taken into account al 



ied 



security concerns m our negotiating 
positions. For example, SALT II places 
no restrictions on the nuclear forces of 
France and Great Britain, and it does 
not limit any of America's many nu- 
clear weapons systems located in 
Europe. 

• SALT II does not interfere with 
traditional patterns of cooperation with 
our allies, including the transfer of 
weapons systems and other sophisti- 
cated technology. The Soviets pro- 
posed a strict nontransfer provision 
early in SALT II. We rejected it and 
similar Soviet proposals. There is no 
nontransfer provision in SALT II. 

• And, as I said before, the protocol 
limits on ground- and sea-launched 
cruise missiles will expire before we 
are ready to deploy them. We will have 
ample time to plan carefully — in con- 
cert with our European allies — how 
best to modernize our theater nuclear 
forces in NATO. And that process is 
already underway. 

After the Vienna summit, I returned 
home by way of the North Atlantic 
Council in Brussels and stopped by as 
well in Geneva and London. At each 
stop I briefed allied officials. I can say 
without exception that all were ex- 
tremely supportive of SALT II. 

The words of Europeans, however, 
speak to this point better than assur- 
ances I can give. In June, Chancellor 
Helmut Schmidt put it simply and 
clearly: 

SALT II is, of course, not only a domestic 
matter for the Americans. For that reason the 
United States Government informed its allies 
on the progress of the talks and also consulted 
with them. This treaty is a piece of world his- 
tory. It is also a piece of world security and a 
piece of my own country's security. For the 
present it is a climax of cooperative arms lim- 
itation. The Federal Republic of Germany sup- 
ports the SALT II treaty and hopes that it will 
soon be ratified by Washington and Moscow. 



Strategic Stability 

My fifth standard for SALT II is that 
it must contribute to strategic stability 
and to reducing the risk of nuclear war. 
Nothing — I repeat nothing — is more 
fundamental to our security and our 
survival. 

SALT II, with its clear ceilings and 
adequate verification, adds an essential 
element of predictability, a way of 
fencing in the threat and limiting un- 
certainty about Soviet programs. 
Neither rational planning nor nuclear 
stability is served by ambiguity. 

We will still have to plan against the 
maximum Soviet capabilities possible 
under SALT II. Entrusted with the de- 
fense of our nation, we would not be 
doing our job if we did otherwise. But 
this is a far cry from the increased 
threat, and the worst case planning, 
that would confront this nation if there 
is no SALT II. 

We have a long way to go in the 
SALT process. Nonetheless, we should 
be — and we are — proud of the accom- 
plishments of SALT II. 

• We have established — for the first 
time — equal ceilings on strategic nu- 
clear forces. 

• We have negotiated equal sub- 
ceilings on MIRV'ed systems. 

• We have begun the long-sought 
process of reductions. 

• We have taken the first steps in 
controlling the technological arms race. 

• We have placed limits on increases 
in three major indices of central 
strategic power — launchers, weapons, 
and throw-weight. 

• We have strengthened verification. 

• We have established a base of 
agreed definitions, counting rules, and 
even force data. 

• We have renewed our commitment 
to the long-term process of strategic 
arms limitation. In crafting a frame- 
work of equality between two different 
strategic forces, SALT II is an essential 
bridge to deeper reductions and further 
qualitative restraints in SALT III. 

Today, on a highly interdependent 
globe, cooperation is often a necessity. 
Ratification of SALT II would rein- 
force our efforts to maintain and en- 
hance adherence to the Nonprolifera- 
tion Treaty and thus help prevent the 
spread of nuclear weapons. In these 
efforts we are joined by 109 other na- 
tions, including the Soviet Union. 
Apart from the collapse of the SALT 
process itself, the most important casu- 
alty of SALT failure could be our vi- 
tally important effort to prevent the 
spread of nuclear weapons. 

As a former strategist for the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, I can tell you that nu- 



clear weapons proliferation would 
create a security nightmare of grave 
dimensions. Terrorism and local con- 
flicts could escalate to threaten the se- 
curity of every American. Those na- 
tions that have forsworn nuclear 
weapons for themselves by adhering to 
the Nonprol iteration Treaty are closely 
watching the two superpowers to see 
whether we are indeed credible in our 
own commitment to reduce the level of 
nuclear weaponry. 

I would not come before you and 
promise that with SALT II we will pre- 
vent nuclear war or state that without 
SALT II the holocaust will surely 
come. Both statements deserve short 
shrift in this debate. I do believe, how- 
ever, that SALT II is an essential step 
toward nuclear stability and reducing 
the risk of war. I cannot comprehend 
how either can be served by rejection 
of SALT II. 

Linkage 

I would like now to shift gears if I 
may and address directly seven ques- 
tions that have arisen during the debate 
over SALT II. 

I want to begin with linkage because 
it's a false argument and an argument 
that if carried to its conclusion would 
diminish, not enhance, our role in the 
world. SALT II has properly been de- 
bated in the context of our foreign pol- 
icy, for SALT is the centerpiece of the 
U.S. -Soviet relationship, and rejection 
of SALT II would have serious conse- 
quences for this relationship and for 
stability elsewhere. But, some would 
link SALT II to every world problem, 
and some would decorate SALT II like 
a Christmas tree with burdens it neither 
merits nor can endure. 

SALT II will in no way hinder our 
ability to compete with the Soviet 
Union where competition is required. 
SALT II, however, will enable us to 
continue the important process of 
cooperation, a process in which, as in 
negotiations, one nation's gain need 
not be the other nation's loss. 

I agree that we cannot quarantine 
SALT entirely from Soviet actions in 
other spheres. But to burden SALT 
with every aspect of the Soviets chal- 
lenge would mean we could settle 
nothing with the Soviets unless we set- 
tled everything. The nuclear threat to 
everyone's security is so overriding 
that we cannot wait until that day. 

The Soviet challenge today is a 
challenge to be met on many fronts. To 
use SALT to meet every aspect of that 
challenge is not only inappropriate, it 
means that we lack the imagination and 
the will to use the many other, more 
effective resources at our disposal. 



30 

For those who would discard SALT 
because ot Soviet activities elsewhere, 
I ask: What would they olter in return? 
What Soviet challenge could they meet 
in the nations of Africa and Asia by 
rejecting SALT? Would we be better 
able to respond to the Soviet buildup in 
Europe while spending even larger 
sums on nuclear rather than conven- 
tional forces? 

A nuclear arms race, with the gloves 
off, would not just mean billions and 
billions more for defense, it would 
focus our attention on strategic military 
rivalry and competition. Our response 
to other pressing problems — such as 
energy and economic problems of our 
own and of our friends — could not 
help but suffer, for strategic security 
would be our first concern. 

A stable world is an arena best 
turned to our advantage. An unre- 
strained and tension-filled nuclear arms 
race is not the recipe for a stable econ- 
omy, and it is not the recipe for a sta- 
ble world. 



Soviet Heavy Missiles 

The second question concerns Soviet 
heavy missiles. In SALT II. the freeze 
on launchers of modern heavy ICBM's 
has been carried over from the SALT I 
Interim Agreement. Thus the Soviets 
can have up to 308 of such launchers 
while the United States will have none. 

The United States has no plans for 
modern heavy ICBM's, and would not 
develop and deploy them even if per- 
mitted under the SALT II treaty. The 
MX missile, which has the same target 
coverage as the SS-18, better serves 
our military requirements. Thus, the 
SALT II limitations on modern heavy 
ICBM launchers have no effect on U.S. 
programs or plans. 

It was in this context that the United 
States gave up the right to modern 
heavy ICBM's in the course of the 
SALT I negotiations and agreed at 
Vladivostok in 1974 to continue this 
situation in SALT II. At Vladivostok, 
President Ford was able to gain impor- 
tant concessions in other areas; in par- 
ticular, the Soviets agreed to drop their 
insistence on limitations on U.S. 
European-based aircraft and on com- 
pensation for the nuclear systems of 
our NATO allies. 

Furthermore, the Soviet right to 
heavy ICBM's only applies to silo- 
based ICBM's, an important consid- 
eration for the future as all fixed land- 
based ICBM's become increasingly 
vulnerable. Neither side is permitted 
mobile launchers of heavy ICBM's, 
heavy SLBM's or their launchers, or 
heavy air-to-surface ballistic missiles 
(ASBM's). We could have retained the 



option to deploy heavy mobile 
ICBM's, since this option was still 
open in the treaty in the fall of 1978. 
However, if such an option had been 
left open, it was possible that the 
Soviets might well have deployed a 
heavy mobile ICBM, while the United 
States almost certainly would not have 
done so. We weighed this issue and, 
with the support of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, proposed to the Soviets that 
mobile launchers of heavy ICBM's, 
heavy SLBM's and their launchers, and 
heavy ASBM's be banned. The Soviets 
accepted this proposal. 

It is also important to recognize that 
the treaty sets a ceiling on the 
maximum number of reentry vehicles, 
on ICBM's, and, in particular, a limit of 
10 on all Soviet heavy ICBM's of the 
SS-18 type. This has two conse- 
quences. First, it will prevent the 
Soviets from developing and deploving 
by 1985, for example, an SS-18 ICBM 
force with 30 or more reentry vehicles 
on each ICBM, which is within their 
capability to do. Second, this fraction- 
ation limit will have the effect of al- 
lowing the United States to build a 
light ICBM of equivalent effectiveness 
to the Soviet heavy ICBM's. The MX 
ICBM will be permitted the same 
maximum number of reentry vehicles, 
10, as the SS-18, and will have better 
accuracy. The MX will be the equiva- 
lent of the SS-18 in both soft and hard 
target kill capability. Thus, the Soviets 
will not be able to exploit the greater 
throw-weight of their heavy ICBM's in 
any meaningful fashion. 

Finally, the problem of the increas- 
ing vulnerability of the U.S. silo-based 
ICBM force does not depend on the 
presence or absence of Soviet heavy 
ICBM's. For example, even if all the 
Soviet heavy ICBM's and their launch- 
ers were banned, and thus subsequently 
dismantled or destroyed, the Soviets 
could deploy enough SS-19's with 
enough hard-target-capable reentry ve- 
hicles to threaten the entire U.S. Min- 
uteman force and will have a large 
number of residual reentry vehicles for 
other missions. Thus, a total ban on all 
Soviet heavy ICBM's would not .solve 
the Minuteman vulnerability problem. 

Soviet Backfire Bomber 

The third question concerns the 
Soviet Backfire bomber. The Soviet 
Union is currently deploying Backfires 
in both their long-range air force and in 
naval aviation units. Close observation 
over a period of years indicates that 
this bomber is being deployed for use 
in a theater or naval strike role and is a 
replacement for older Soviet medium 
bombers. However, this aircraft can 



Department of State Bulletin 

reach the United States from home 
bases on a one-way, high altitude, sub- 
sonic, unrefueled flight. 

The ability to strike the territory of 
the other side is not the criterion for 
determining whether an aircraft is a 
"heavy bomber" and, thus, subject to 
the limitations in SALT II. For exam- 
ple, the United States has 67 FB-1 1 1's 
which are part of our strategic bomber 
force and dedicated to attack on the 
Soviet Union. They are not limited by 
SALT II. We also have over 500 air- 
craft deployed in the European and 
Pacific theaters which have the capa- 
bility to strike Soviet territory. 

The Soviet Union at one time tried to 
get these aircraft included in SALT on 
the grounds that they could strike the 
Soviet Union. With the firm support of 
our allies, we adamantly resisted that 
position on the grounds that these air- 
craft, whatever their theoretical capa- 
bility, are deployed for theater mis- 
sions and, thus, are not subject to 
SALT limitations. The Soviets have 
used this same argument with respect 
to the Backfire. 

Nevertheless, the Soviets agreed to 
make certain important commitments 
concerning the Backfire. At the Vienna 
summit. President Brezhnev handed 
President Carter a written statement in 
which the Soviet Union informed the 
United States that it did not intend to 
give the Backfire bomber the capability 
of operating at intercontinental dis- 
tance, would not increase the radius of 
action of the Backfire in such a way as 
to enable it to strike targets on the ter- 
ritory of the United States, and did not 
intend to give it such a capability in 
any other manner, including by in- 
night refueling. 

This statement also stated that the 
Soviets would not increase the produc- 
tion rate of the Backfire over the cur- 
rent rate. President Brezhnev con- 
firmed that the Backfire production rate 
would not exceed 30 per year. Presi- 
dent Carter, in return, stated that the 
United States enters into the SALT II 
agreement on the basis of the commit- 
ments contained in the Soviet statement 
and that the United States considers the 
carrying out of these commitments to 
be essential to the obligations under the 
treaty. 

These commitments are consistent 
with the U.S. objective of constraining 
the strategic potential of the Backfire 
force, while continuing to exclude our 
own European- and Pacific-based 
theater aircraft from SALT. These 
commitments will inhibit Backfire from 
being given an operational interconti- 
nental role, and they will give us a 
basis for challenge if we should detect 
any evidence that Backfire is being 



October 1979 



31 



given an intercontinental mission. Ad- 
, ditionaliy, limiting the number of 
Backfires available means that Soviet 
diversion of Backfire from its theater 
and naval missions to a strategic role 
would substantially reduce Soviet 
strength in those areas, while adding 
only marginally to overall Soviet 
strategic capability. 

Finally, under SALT 11 we are per- 
mitted to build a bomber comparable to 
Backfire if we decide that it is required 
for our security. Such a bomber would 
not be counted in the overall SALT II 
aggregate limit, and it would be subject 
to none of the restrictions that we have 
gotten the Soviets to accept on Backfire 
in SALT 11. 

Comprehensive Proposal of 1977 

The fourth question concerns 
whether we should have insisted on the 
comprehensive proposal of March 
1977. I want to state at the beginning 
that this was a significant proposal that 
would have substantially limited the 
nuclear arms race. But, as stated re- 
cently during the hearings on SALT, it 
takes two hands to clap. The Soviets 
were simply not ready for this kind of 
sweeping progress. If we had " "stuck to 
our guns" as some have suggested, the 
result would not have been a better 
agreement. It would have been no 
agreement at all. 

March 1977 is not July 1979. In 
March 1977, the potential Soviet threat 
to our Minuteman ICBM's was impre- 
cise; today, Soviet missile accuracy has 
improved to the point that in the 1980"s 
the threat will be much less ambiguous. 
This passage of time demonstrates how 
little we can afford to delay. Technol- 
ogy is a powerful enemy of humanity's 
ability to place rational limits on arms. 
To discard the significant progress we 
have already achieved in SALT II in 
search of an ideal agreement would 
merely deal more time to technology, 
its strongest suit. 

Those who advocate a return to the 
March 1977 comprehensive proposal 
from the reality of July 1979 are being 
unrealistic. Now, in view of the clear 
and imperative need to modernize and 
make more survivable our strategic 
deterrent, a return to the comprehen- 
sive proposal is out of the question. 

• The proposal, particularly the 
heavy missile reduction to 150 and the 
MIRV ICBM reduction to 550, would 
not make it possible to preserve the in- 
vulnerability of Minuteman. Even with 
these deep reductions in Soviet 
ICBM's, the Soviet SS-17 and SS-I9 
could still adequately target our Min- 
uteman. 

• The proposal would ban the de- 



velopment, testing, and deployment of 
mobile ICBM launchers, as well as the 
development, testing, and deployment 
of new ICBM's; thereby, it would kill 
the MX program for both silo and 
mobile basing of any kind. 

• The proposal would keep Backfire 
out of the SALT II aggregate total but 
with no limits on production or upgrade. 

• The proposal would restrict air- 
launched cruise missile range to 2,500 
kilometers, which SALT II does not. 

• The proposal would ban modifica- 



stipulated. Modifications in excess of 
the provision, that might go unde- 
tected, would add little capability. If 
the accusation is that a 5% enhance- 
ment is a new missile, I do not feel that 
it is of military significance. 

Cruise Missile Range 

The sixth question concerns cruise 
missile range verification. During the 
SALT II negotiations, we have also had 
to consider the tradeoff between verifi- 



SALT II will in no way hinder our ability to compete with the Soviet 
Union where competition is required. 



tion of existing ICBM's and therefore 
preclude improvement of Minuteman II 
and III and Titan II. Consequently, this 
restriction might prohibit the MK 12A 
warhead. 



New Types of ICBM's 

The fifth question deals with verifi- 
cation of the limitations on the modern- 
ization of ICBM's, the so-called "new 
types" provisions. One of the major 
problems in arms control is that the 
pace of technology exceeds the rate at 
which we can limit such technology. 
SALT II, however, begins to put 
bounds on the way in which ICBM's — 
the most threatening of all systems — 
can be modernized. 

Our major goal in negotiating the 
ban on new types of ICBM's was to 
force the Soviets to make choices in 
such modernization. The precise point 
at which we drew the line between a 
modernization of an existing type and a 
new type was somewhat arbitrary. 
Nevertheless, we strongly preferred to 
draw the line tightly even though we 
would have higher confidence in 
monitoring a looser but less meaningful 
definition of a new ICBM type. 

The new types provision accom- 
plishes our major goal and is an im- 
portant step in limiting technological 
advance. This provision will, for prac- 
tical purposes, affect only the Soviet 
Union. For example, if they replace the 
SS-11 with a new, larger single- 
reentry vehicle missile, they will not be 
permitted to replace the SS-17 or 
SS-I9 with a new 10-reentry-vehicIe 
missile. They may not do both under 
SALT II. This provision will force 
them to make choices which they 
otherwise would not have to make 
while the United States can go ahead 
with its one new type, the MX. Both 
sides will, of course, be allowed to 
modernize within the 5% constraints 



cation considerations and the need to 
insure that we would be able to take the 
necessary steps under SALT II to 
maintain strategic equality. There are 
uncertainties in verifying the range of 
cruise missiles. Within the limits of 
airframe design, more fuel and a lighter 
warhead could be carried, thus in- 
creasing the range. We do, however, 
have extensive information on current 
Soviet cruise missiles as a result of 
monitoring tests over many years. 

It would be easier to verify a total 
ban on all cruise missiles than it will be 
to verify some of the cruise missile 
provisions in the agreement, such as 
those which temporarily limit the range 
of deployed ground- and sea-launched 
cruise missiles to less than 600 
kilometers, but which permit full de- 
velopment and testing of these mis- 
siles. The Soviets wanted to ban all 
cruise missiles; we did not. 

However, the United States decided 
that, on balance, it was in the interest 
of our national security to be allowed 
to pursue these development and test 
programs, even though allowing the 
Soviets the same options may compli- 
cate verification in the future. Mobile 
ICBM's are an area where we made a 
similar choice, deliberately preferring 
to keep important military options open 
to us after the protocol period, at the 
price of a potentially more difficult 
verification job. 

Value of the SALT Process 

The seventh question concerns value 
of the SALT process as arms control. I 
do not measure the process against an 
ideal we might want to achieve; I do 
judge the process against what would 
have occurred had the process never 
existed at all. Is there anyone who can 
maintain that the arms race would not 
have been significantly greater without 
SALT 1? 



32 

If there is, they overlook the ABM 
[Anti-Ballistic Missile] Treaty which 
has prevented a destabilizing and ex- 
tremely expensive arms race in defen- 
sive systems that would have triggered 
an accelerated offensive arms race as 
well. They overlook the fact that the 
Soviet Union dismantled 209 large, 
older missiles under the SALT I 
Interim Agreement and replaced those 
missiles with smaller, less threatening 
submarine-launched ballistic missiles. 
They overlook the fact that our intelli- 
gence estimated at the time of SALT 1 
that the Soviets were going for a force 
of over 400 heavy ICBM's. not 308. 
They overlook the fact that, after the 
Soviets reached the allowed ceiling on 
ballistic missile submarines and 
submarine-launched ballistic missiles 
near the end of the 5-year term of the 
Interim Agreement, they have con- 
tinued to stay within the terms of the 
Interim Agreement by dismantling 
perfectly good submarine-based 
launchers. These launchers are newer 
than some of those we now have de- 
ployed on our own submarines. 

I have already stated my belief that 
by the end of 1985. without SALT II, 
the Soviets would certainly exceed the 
SALT II limits in enormous numbers. 
For instance, current Soviet programs 
indicate that thev will attain the ceiling 
of 820 MIRV'ed ICBM launchers next 
year — 5 years before the end of the 
treaty. I find it hard to believe that the 
Soviets would stop at 820 unless SALT 
II required them to. 

To be sure, SALT II legalizes high 
limits, but it does limit. It provides 
predictability; it provides a measure of 
mutual confidence through this predic- 
tability and through verification provi- 
sions that enhance our intelligence; and 
it gives us time to modernize our forces 
so that equality and momentum will be 
our companions when SALT II ex- 
pires. 

Conclusion 

I would like to end on a personal 
note, to illustrate a basic point about 
SALT II. 

In 1973 and 1974, I was Director of 
the Joint Staff of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff. Since the first time I had any- 
thing to do with SALT II. one of the 
fundamental goals we had in the Joint 
Chiefs was equal aggregates of stra- 
tegic forces with freedom to mix the 
forces within the aggregates. For us in 
the military, this was practically 
synonymous with SALT — equal totals 
to set the stage for balanced reductions. 
The Soviets strongly pushed to main- 
tain the SALT I assymetry in numbers 
favorable to them. I had a boss at that 



Department of State Bulletin 



SALT n—The Basic Choice 



by Secretary Vance 

Address before the Council on World 
Affairs in St. Louis, on August I. 
1979.' 

I want to spend most of the time we 
have this evening responding to your 
questions. But let me take a few min- 
utes at the outset to talk about an issue 
of fundamental importance to our 
country and our future — the second 
strategic arms limitation treaty, known 
as SALT II. 

I sympathize with the frustration 
many Americans must feel as they lis- 
ten to the SALT debate and try to reach 
an informed judgment. It is an extraor- 
dinarily complex subject. It even has 
its own language. GLCM's and 
SLCM's, MIRVs and MARV's. 
telemetry and throw-weight — it must 
seem at times like a conspiracy to 
obscure. 

The technical detail obviously is ter- 
ribly important. For we all know that 
we are talking about matters that have a 
profound bearing on our nation's secu- 
rity. 

But how does a nonexpert make a 
reasoned judgment? The first step, in 
my view, is to frame the issue clearly: 
not whether the SALT II treaty solves 
all our security problems — because it 
doesn't; not whether it will lull us into 
a false sense of security — because it 
certainly won't; not whether it achieves 
everything we want in the way of arms 
control — because no single agreement 
can. 

The paramount question to be settled 
is this: Is America better off with the 
agreement or without it? 



If the answer to that question is yes, 
then we should ratify the treaty, secure 
the gains we have made, and move on 
to SALT III. If the treaty, as 
negotiated, serves our national interest, 
then there is no good reason to risk 
unraveling it by seeking now to shift 
the bargain more in our favor. 

Viewed from this perspective — 
whether the SALT II treaty helps us or 
hurts us — I believe the answer is clear: 
It will be a substantial help to the 
United States. 

Let me very briefly discuss the 
treaty's contributions to four aspects of 
our nation's security. 

Preserving the Military Balance 

First, the SALT 11 treaty will help us 
to preserve the military balance be- 
tween the United States and the Soviet 
Union. It will do this both by restrain- 
ing the Soviet military buildup and by 
permitting and in fact assisting the 
modernization of our own strategic 
forces. 

• With the treaty, both sides will be 
limited, through 1985, to an equal 
overall number of long-range bombers 
and systems for launching long-range 
missiles. The agreed total — 2,250 — is 
lower than the present Soviet level and 
above our present level. Therefore, to 
comply with the treaty, the Soviets will 
have to destroy or dismantle about 10% 
of their systems. These will be the first 
agreed reductions in the history of nu- 
clear arms. 

Without the treaty, we estimate that 
by the end of 1985, the Soviets could 
have 3,000 of these systems. With the 



time who said over and over that we're 
going to start reductions from equality. 

We got the Soviets to agree to this 
fundamental precept. We got them to 
agree to a lot more. For example, to 
lessen ambiguity, we insisted, against 
strong Soviet objection, on the inclu- 
sion of detailed definitions of systems 
to be limited under SALT. Article II of 
this treaty has a full range of defini- 
tions. It shows how far we've come. 

My point in mentioning these two 
examples is not to maintain that we 
wrote our own treaty. No agreement 
constructed on unilateral gain can long 
endure, even if it was possible to 
achieve in the first place. But we have 



carefully guarded our interests as have 
the Soviets their own. 

The result in SALT II is a complex 
structure of objectives achieved, 
mutual advantage, compromise, and 
tradeoff. But in the world of two 
sovereign nations — achieving what it is 
possible to achieve in negotiations on 
basic issues of national security and 
national survival — SALT II is in our 
favor. D 



'The complete transcript of the hearings will 
be published by the cominitlee and will be 
available from the Superintendent of Docu- 
ments, U.S. Government Printing Office, 
Washington, D.C. 20402. 



October 1979 



33 



treaty, they can have 750 less. That is 
the choice. 

• With the treaty, there will be use- 
ful limits on the number of individual 
weapons those systems can carry. This 
is critically important, because it is in 
this area that the Soviet Union has the 
greatest potential for dramatically ex- 
panding its forces in the years im- 
mediately ahead. 

Under the treaty, no missile will be 
able to carry more warheads than it has 
been tested with already. For example, 
each of the biggest Soviet missiles — 
the SS-18's — could carry 20 or 30 
warheads if they were not restrained. 
The treaty holds them to 10. 

Even with these limits, the number 
of warheads will increase. But the 
treaty means they will have several 
thousand fewer warheads by the end of 
1985 than we estimate they could have 
if there were no limits. That is the 
choice before us. 

• With or without this treaty, we 
will have to modernize our own 
strategic forces. We will increase our 
defense spending to assure that we 
maintain forces equivalent to those of 
the Soviet Union in the 1980's. We 
have underway programs to upgrade 
each component of our strategic 
forces — land. sea. and air. The treaty 
will not interfere with any of these pro- 
grams. In fact, it aids our planning by 
giving us a clearer picture of the mili- 
tary threat we will face in the 1980's 
and by setting boundaries on what the 
Soviets can do. 

Without the treaty, we would have to 
do more than we are already planning, 
because we would have to maintain the 
balance at a higher level. With the 
treaty, therefore, we can buy greater 
security, with more certainty, at less 
expense. 

Assuring Verification 

Turning to a second aspect of our se- 
curity, the treaty will preserve and en- 
hance our access to essential informa- 
tion about Soviet strategic programs. 

Let me emphasize in this connection 
that we will not rely on trust to enforce 
the SALT II treaty. Our own monitor- 
ing systems — our satellites, our radars, 
and our other electronic equipment — 
are fully capable of detecting any vio- 
lations before they could affect the 
strategic balance. 



It is important to understand that 
whether we have an arms control treaty 
or not, we must be able to monitor 
Soviet military activities and programs. 
The more we know about their forces, 
the better we can plan our own. Con- 
stant monitoring is a vital security 
need. 

The treaty will help us fulfill this re- 
quirement. It bans any interference 
with our monitoring system. It also 
prohibits the deliberate concealment of 
strategic forces, so that they cannot be 
hidden from our view. 

With the treaty we will have con- 
tinuous, dependable information on the 
nature of the threat and what we must 
do to meet it. Without the treaty there 
would be no limits on Soviet secretive- 
ness. And that is another element of the 
choice. 



Supporting U.S. Foreign Policy 

A third way in which the SALT II 
treaty contributes to our security is by 
supporting our foreign policies — in 
helping us manage East-West relations, 
in sustaining our alliances, and in en- 
hancing our position of leadereship in 
the world. 

With or without the treaty, our re- 
lationship with the Soviet Union will 
continue to be essentially a competitive 
one. With the treaty, however, we 
strengthen the central element of sta- 
bility in our relationship — the mutual 
effort to control nuclear arms. If the 
treaty fails, we will enter a period of 
greater uncertainty in our relations. 
The prospects for an all-out arms race 
will increase. And each crisis, each 
confrontation could be more dangerous 
for it would take place in a context of 
unregulated military competition. 

Our closest allies have strongly en- 
dorsed ratification of the SALT II 
treaty. They have made it clear that 
they see this as a way to help preserve 
a balance of strategic forces and to help 
stabilize East-West relations. Failure to 
agree on the treaty would shake the 
confidence of our allies in our lead- 
ership. 

We must also be sensitive to the 
connection between this treaty and 
other urgent international concerns 
such as the nonproliferation of nuclear 
weapons. To put it bluntly, our cred- 
ibility is on the line. Other nations with 
the capacity to develop nuclear 



weapons will be watching our decision 
on SALT with particular care — to see 
if we accept restraint for ourselves as 
readily as we urge it upon others. 

If we cannot agree on SALT, the 
authority of our position on a broad 
range of issues, and especially in other 
arms control efforts, would be 
weakened. With SALT, we will 
strengthen our international leadership 
for peace. 

Continuing Arms Control Efforts 

In a fourth, and final, area, the 
SALT 11 treaty builds the framework 
for continued progress to curb nuclear 
arms. 

This treaty is an important milestone 
in itself. For the first time there will be 
agreed reductions in forces. For the 
first time there will be equal limits on 
all basic strategic systems. And there 
will be some first limits on the so- 
called qualitative arms race — the con- 
tinual effort to make existing systems 
even more deadly. 

But 1 agree that the SALT II treaty 
does not go as far as we want in con- 
trolling nuclear arms. That is no rea- 
son, however, to reject the treaty. It 
makes no sense to refuse to take a step 
forward with SALT 11 just because the 
stride is not as long as we would wish. 

The objective of deeper cuts and 
further limits is best served by securing 
the gains we have made in SALT 11 and 
moving on to the next stage in this 
continuing process in SALT III. 

Conclusion 

This then is the choice we face — not 
between this treaty and some other 
agreement we could imagine that would 
accomplish everything. The issue is 
whether we will be in a better or worse 
position, whether our national security 
will be enhanced or harmed by the ap- 
proval of this treaty. 

As you listen to the debate. 1 hope 
you will keep that basic question in 
mind. For 1 believe that if you measure 
the arguments by that standard, you will 
conclude that we should ratify the 
SALT II treaty. That is the choice that 
clearly serves our nation's interest. D 



' Press release 185. 



34 



EAST ASIA: Vic'lfiatfi and 
indochina 



by Richard C. Holbrooke 

Statement before the Siihcommittee 
on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the 
House Committee on Foreign Affairs 
on June 13, 1979. Mr. Holbrooke is 
Assistant Secretary for East Asian and 
Pacific Affairs. ' 

I welcome this opportunity to appear 
before the subcommittee to discuss 
U.S. -Vietnamese negotiations on nor- 
malization of relations as well as to 
provide you with an appraisal of the 
current situation in Indochina. 



Normalizing Relations 
With Vietnam 

To begin with. I believe that it would 
be useful to address brietTy the various 
factors which originally led the Ad- 
ministration to seek improved relations 
with Vietnam. Soon after taking office. 
President Carter noted that it was his 
hope that the United States might 
eventually have normal diplomatic re- 
lations with all countries. 

In a similar spirit, 1 believe, the 
Congress has also addressed the gen- 
eral desirability of diplomatic relations. 
Section 607 of the Foreign Relations 
Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1979, 
states: 

The Congress finds that the conduct ol diplo- 
matic relations with a foreign government has as 
its principal purpose the discussion and negotia- 
tion with that government of outstanding issues 
and, like the recognilion of a foreign govern- 
ment, does not in itself imply approval of that 
government or of the political-economic system 
It represents. 

Hence, it seems clear that the Con- 
gress and the Administration share the 
general view that diplomatic relations 
are a valuable tool for achieving our 
larger purposes and that, in the absence 
of overriding reasons to the contrary, 
the United States should have relations 
with all countries. 

Turning to the specific question of 
establishing relations with Vietnam, 
the Administration's policy was influ- 
enced by several considerations. With a 
population exceeding 50 million, Viet- 
nam is the third most populous Com- 
munist nation and maintains one of the 
world's largest military establishments. 
As recent events in Southeast Asia 
have graphically demonstrated, Viet- 
namese actions toward other nations in 



the region, peaceful or otherwise, are 
of concern to U.S. policy and inevi- 
tably affect our relations with other 
Asian countries. 

We, therefore, wanted to be in the 
best possible position to communicate 
with the Vietnamese and, if possible, 
exert a positive influence on their 
policies and actions. In addition, we 
wanted to be in the best possible posi- 
tion to influence the Vietnamese on 
providing an accounting of our MIA's 
[missing in action], on allowing family 
reunification to move forward, on re- 
solving the refugee situation, and on 
moving toward the observance of inter- 
nationally accepted human rights. 
There is also the possibility of trade 
and opening the way for American 
business to csjmpete. 

Paris Meetings With Vietnamese 

Against this background and fol- 
lowing a report on the MIA situation 
from the Woodcock Commission which 
visited Vietnam in March 1977, Presi- 
dent Carter announced that the United 
States was prepared to enter into 
negotiations with the Vietnamese 
aimed at establishing diplomatic rela- 
tions between our two countries. Ac- 
cordingly, and as the subcommittee is 
aware, a U.S. delegation, which I led, 
met with the Vietnamese in Paris in 
May and June and later in December of 
1977. At each of these meetings, we 
stated the U.S. position that we were 
prepared to normalize relations with 
Vietnam without preconditions: that we 
believed this could be best accom- 
plished by an agreement to establish 
diplomatic relations and exchange em- 
bassies; and that once relations were 
established and embassies in place, we 
would lift the trade embargo we main- 
tain against Vietnam. 

In addition, as Deputy Assistant 
Secretary Robert Oakley made clear 
during his recent testimony before this 
subcommittee, we emphasized that two 
factors would have an important effect 
on the pace and timing of normaliza- 
tion and on the substance of relations 
between us: Vietnamese willingness to 
follow policies supportive of peace and 
stability in the region and continued 
Vietnamese efforts to provide us with 
the fullest possible accounting of our 
missing men. 

The Vietnamese refused to accept 
our position and instead demanded 



Department of State Bulletin 

that, linked to S.R.V. [Socialist Re- 
public of Vietnam] efforts to provide 
an accounting of our MIA's. the United 
States agree to provide direct economic 
assistance as part of any agreement to 
establish relations. This was their in- 
terpretation of the Paris accords. In ad- 
dition the Vietnamese argued that the 
United States should unilaterally lift 
the trade embargo before relations were 
established. In response, we stressed 
that neither the Congress nor the Ad- 
ministration believed the United States 
under any obligation to provide aid or a 
commitment of aid to Vietnam. With 
regard to the trade embargo, we stated 
our position that the interests of all 
parties would be best served when 
commerce could be conducted in the 
context of normal diplomatic relations. 

At the conclusion of the December 
1977 meeting, both sides agreed that 
additional discussions would be useful 
and that they would be scheduled at a 
mutually convenient time and place. As 
you may recall, in January 1978 a 
grand jury named Vietnamese Ambas- 
sador to the United Nations Dinh Ba 
Thi as an unindicted coconspirator in 
an espionage case involving a U.S. 
Government official and a Vietnamese 
resident of this country. Following our 
request that Ambassador Thi leave the 
United States, there was a considerable 
pause in communications from the 
Vietnamese. 

Soon after the conclusion of the es- 
pionage case in May, however, the 
Vietnamese informed us of their will- 
ingness to accept our invitation, ex- 
tended in Paris the previous year, to 
send a team of experts to our MIA 
identification facilities in Hawaii. Fol- 
lowing the successful conclusion of 
this visit in July, the Vietnamese again 
began to indicate a desire to meet with 
U.S. representatives and hinted pub- 
licly and to other governments that they 
might be on the verge of dropping their 
demand that U.S. economic assistance 
be part of an agreement to normalize 
relations. Vietnamese statements in 
this regard were somehwat ambiguous, 
however. There were no official com- 
munications on the subject and a con- 
gressional delegation that visited Hanoi 
in August was unable to elicit a direct 
statement that the Vietnamese were no 
longer demanding an advance commit- 
ment on aid. 



Continuing Discussions 

We next met with the Vietnamese in 
New York for several rounds of infor- 
mal discussions in the fall of last year. 
Initially, the Vietnamese appeared re- 
luctant to abandon their position on aid 
but eventually stated flatly that they 



October 1979 

would no longer demand a U.S. com- 
mitment on bilateral economic assist- 
ance as a quid pro quo for normaliza- 
tion. In addition, the Vietnamese indi- 
cated they would continue to make ef- 
forts to provide us with an MIA ac- 
counting. For our part, we reiterated 
our belief that the Vietnamese should 
be doing more to provide us with an 
accounting of our MIA's. As Bob 
Oakley indicated during his testimony 
last month, when troublesome de- 
velopments of concern to us began to 
appear in Vietnamese actions and 
statements during the fall, we asked the 
Vietnamese for clarification. 

We requested that the Vietnamese 
inform us of their intentions toward 
Kampuchea, given the massive S.R.V. 
troop buildup then underway along 
their border with that country, in- 
creasingly harsh Vietnamese public 
statements attacking the Kampuchean 
Government and calling upon the 
Kampuchean people to rise up in revolt 
against it. and announced Vietnamese 
support for the so-called National Sal- 
vation Front as the preferred replace- 
ment government. In so doing, we 
made clear that we were not taking 
sides in Vietnam's dispute with Kam- 
puchea, that we ourselves had long 
been at the forefront of those nations 
denouncing the Pol Pot government for 
its terrible human rights abuses, and 
that we were not supporting that re- 
gime. We stressed, however, that even 
that regime's unparalleled crimes 
would not justify a Vietnamese military 
violation of Kampuchean sovereignty 
and replacement of the government by 
force. We urged that the dispute be 
settled peacefully. 

In this regard, we repeated that 
Vietnam's willingness to follow 
policies supportive of peace and stabil- 
ity in the region and its attitudes and 
actions toward its neighbors constituted 
an important factor influencing our 
ability to proceed toward normaliza- 
tion. We also asked for clarification of 
the implications of the November 1 
S.R. V. -Soviet Treaty of Peace, 
Friendship and Cooperation in light of 
previous Vietnamese assurances that 
they would follow an "■ independent" 
foreign policy and never allow foreign 
bases on their territory. 

And, we expressed deep concern 
over the growing refugee exodus from 
Vietnam — including reliable reports 
that Vietnamese officials were forcing 
refugees to pay bribes to arrange their 
departure — the resulting costs in human 
suffering and lives, and the massive 
burdens imposed upon other Southeast 
Asian countries. We noted that the 
United States did not want to see 
emigration from Vietnam cease but 
suggested that a more humane approach 



which made provision for regularized 
departures at a rate causing less 
hardship and loss of life would be in 
the interest of all concerned. 

The Vietnamese responded that their 
treaty with Moscow was a natural con- 
sequence of the long friendship be- 
tween the Soviet and Vietnamese 
peoples, that Vietnamese attachment to 
their nation's "independence and 
sovereignty" ruled out any Soviet 
bases on their territory, and that the 
treaty was not directed at any third na- 
tion. 

Regarding their intentions toward 
Kampuchea, they stated that the 
S.R.V, troop buildup was purely de- 
fensive and gave assurances that Hanoi 
had no aggressive plans toward the 
country. The Vietnamese also asserted 
that they were powerless to control the 
flight of "malcontents" who were not 
willing to work to build a new Vietnam 
and denied that government officials 
were facilitating departures in return 
for bribes. In light of these responses, 
movement toward normalization came 
to a halt, as we awaited further de- 
velopments. 

On December 25. the Vietnamese 
mounted a major invasion of Kam- 
puchea and now occupy large areas of 
that country. They have shown no in- 
clination to heed repeated calls by large 
segments of the international commu- 
nity to withdraw their troops and per- 
mit the establishment of a neutral re- 
gime representative of the Kampuchean 
people. 

In addition, they have demonstrated 
no willingness to relent in their harsh 
domestic policies, which have 
prompted ever-increasing numbers of 
their citizens to flee, with heavy loss of 
life, and have imposed heavy burdens 
on the other nations of the region. Over 
60,000 refugees from Vietnam reached 
safehaven in Southeast Asia last 
month — a record. 

As 1 noted earlier, we had repeatedly 
stressed to the Vietnamese that their 
policies and actions toward their 
neighbors would affect the pace and 
timing of our ability to normalize rela- 
tions. The major reason we had sought 
to normalize relations was to enhance 
regional peace and stability. Since re- 
cent events had the opposite effect and 
endangered regional peace and stabil- 
ity, our caution in not moving further 
last fall was justified. It is hard to envi- 
sion progress toward normalization 
under existing circumstances, although 
we do not preclude continuing informal 
discussions from time to time in which 
we exchange views on regional and 
bilateral matters. 

In addition to addressing the record 
of our negotiations with the Viet- 
namese, the subcommittee has asked 



35 



that I provide you with an appraisal of 
certain other aspects of the Indochina 
situation. Before doing so, however, I 
would like to elaborate somewhat on 
my earlier comments regarding Viet- 
namese refugee policies. 



Vietnamese Refugees 

It appears clear that the Vietnamese 
Government has embarked upon a de- 
liberate effort to rid itself of those ele- 
ments of society which it considers un- 
desirable. Refugee reports indicate that 
Vietnamese of Chinese extraction, in- 
cluding those whose families have been 
in Vietnam for generations, have been 
under increasing pressure since the end 
of last year either to depart the country 
or face the prospect of having their 
property confiscated and being shipped 
off to harsh "new economic zones," 
areas which Le Monde has termed the 
"Vietnamese Gulag." 

While the Vietnamese Government 
has increased its pressure on Viet- 
namese of Chinese extraction, Hanoi 
officials have also apparently made it 
easier for this group of people to depart 
the country. Numerous reports indicate 
that officials are registering ethnic 
Chinese, finding them boats, and tow- 
ing them out to sea — all for a fee. 
There appears to be a sliding scale of 
bribes to be paid in order to acquire 
passage on a boat leaving the country, 
with ethnic Chinese eligible for a lesser 
bribe than ethnic Vietnamese. 

You undoubtedly have read recent 
articles out of Hong Kong reporting 
details on the Vietnamese traffic in 
refugees. Our own information con- 
firms such reports. Ethnic Vietnamese 
are also fleeing the country in ever in- 
creasing numbers, with some passing 
themselves off as ethnic Chinese, and 
others taking any opportunity available 
to them — no matter how dangerous. 

So far this year, 131,299 boat refu- 
gees from Vietnam have reached tem- 
porary havens in nations of first 
asylum, compared to 16,078 by this 
time last year. Heretofore this burden 
had largely fallen on Malaysia and 
Thailand, but now this exodus has 
moved eastward as well, and the num- 
bers reaching Hong Kong have leapt 
from some 17,000 in haven in April to 
over 50,000 there today. Although the 
numbers perishing at sea will never be 
known with certainty, they are esti- 
mated in the range of between 40-70%. 

This subcommittee with its close 
scrutiny of the situation is well aware 
of the policies we have followed to 
provide assistance to the countries of 
first asylum and to resettle refugees in 
this country. Of some 300,000 refugees 
resettled since 1975, the United States 



36 



has taken over 200,000, and we are 
currently committed to taking an addi- 
tional 7.000 per month. 

This is not to say that others have not 
shared this burden. They have, and, 
indeed, on a per capita basis, the Aus- 
tralians have resettled more refugees 
than have we. Nevertheless, the stag- 
gering numbers of refugees now 
scrambling ashore in Southeast Asia, 
swelling the numbers already there, re- 
quires all nations to do more. The 
Japanese, for example, have been step- 
ping up their financial contributions to 
the refugee resettlement efforts of the 
UNHCR [U.N. High Commissioner on 
Refugees] and other organizations as 
well as for the newly approved refugee 
resettlement center in Indonesia. They 
have also agreed to resettle their first 
small group of refugees. We are work- 
ing with them, and we hope that they 
will be able to do even more. 

Nations in Europe like France and 
Germany and our Canadian neighbors 
have been forthcoming in their re- 
sponse to this international crisis, but 
we hope that they too can do more. We 
are exploring means to resettle refugees 
in other areas, like Latin America, and 
in particular are looking at the feasibil- 
ity of a suggestion you made, Mr. 
Chairman [Lester L. Wolff of New 
York], about the possibility of interna- 
tional financial institution funds being 
channeled to development projects for 
refugee resettlement in these areas. 

The Vietnamese Government re- 
cently announced that it will permit its 
citizens to depart the country legally 
for family reunification or to "take 
employment abroad." Under this pro- 
posal, up to 10,000 people per month 
would be allowed to leave with 
UNHCR assistance provided their 
names match those on lists submitted 
by other governments. To the extent 
that such a plan would alleviate the 
human suffering of potential refugees 
and the burdens now imposed on other 
countries in its absence, it would be 
welcome. However, it would not solve 
the problem of those already in refugee 
camps, who must receive our im- 
mediate attention. Nor is it likely to 
stem the tide of people who are willing 
to risk the sea on their own rather than 
test the sincerity of the Vietnamese 
Government. 

We are prepared to accept family 
reunification cases directly from Viet- 
nam but we wish to review carefully 
the results of the recent UNHCR mis- 
sion to Hanoi before making any de- 
finitive decision on how to proceed. 
We remain committed as a first priority 
to taking refugees from the countries of 
first asylum. 

To sum up on refugees, we believe 



that the essential reason for the refugee 
flow so dangerous to refugees and so 
upsetting to other countries, is the 
Vietnamese Government's own internal 
policies, its disregard for human rights, 
and its responsibilities to its people 
under the U.N. Charter. We hope that 
the international community will make 
clear to the Vietnamese that it expects 
the S.R.V. to meet its obligations to 
apply humane policies to its own 
people rather than continuing condi- 
tions which force them to flee. 

While it normally might be argued 
that the domestic policies of the Viet- 
namese Government are an internal 
matter, it seems clear that the conse- 
quences of these policies in terms of 
lives lost and burdens unilaterally im- 
posed on Vietnam's neighbors are of 
legitimate concern to all nations. We 
wish to see free emigration from Viet- 
nam but under conditions that are not 
so desperate that people flee knowing 
half of them may die in the attempt. 

Soviet Presence in Vietnam 

I should now like to address those 
other aspects of the present situation in 
the region on which the subcommittee 
has invited my comments. These in- 
clude the Soviet presence in Vietnam, 
Vietnamese-Chinese relations, the situ- 
ation in Kampuchea, and the effect of 
recent events on Thailand. 

In preparing my remarks on these 
subjects, I was struck by the role that 
deep-seated ethnic and historical an- 
tagonisms have had in the current situ- 
ation. In virtually every case, the cur- 
rent conflicts reflect centuries of 
rivalry and hatred, which Communist 
"internationalism" has been unable to 
put to rest. Indeed, the introduction of 
Soviet power and Moscow's rivalry 
with Beijing into the region have made 
this most recent round of Indochina 
conflicts much more difficult to re- 
solve. 

Developments in Vietnam over the 
last 12 months have resulted in the ex- 
pansion of Soviet influence. After a 
lengthy courtship, Hanoi entered 
COMECON, the Communist economic 
organization, last June 1978. In 
November 1978, Vietnam signed a 
Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Coop- 
eration, which stipulated that if either 
country were threatened with attack, 
they would "immediately consult each 
other with a view toward eliminating 
the threat." As events unfolded, this 
treaty provided an important measure 
of security to Hanoi for its Christmas 
invasion of Kampuchea. 

Following the Vietnamese invasion 
of Kampuchea and the Chinese attack 
on Vietnam, the Soviet military pres- 



Department of State Bulletin 

ence in Vietnam has grown rapidly, in- 
cluding large-scale military supply and 
logistics support of Vietnamese Armed 
Forces and use by Soviet ships and air- 
craft of Vietnamese military facilities. 
Soviet personnel support both the de- 
livery of military equipment to Viet- 
nam and the movement of Vietnamese 
personnel and equipment to various 
points throughout Indochina, repre- 
senting a significant new development. 
Use of ports began on April 1 when a 
Soviet destroyer visited Da Nang and, 
most recently, a Soviet diesel subma- 
rine and submarine tender visited Cam 
Ranh Bay. Soviet TU-95's — long 
range reconnaissance aircraft — have 
used Vietnamese facilities at Da Nang 
on at least two occasions. The Soviets 
and the Vietnamese explain these ac- 
tivities as normal aspects of relations 
between the two countries made neces- 
sary by the threat from China. 

Use of Vietnamese territory and 
facilities gives the Soviet an increased 
reconnaissance and intelligence collec- 
tion capability, primarily against China 
but also against U.S. and other military 
forces in the area. This is a source of 
serious concern to us and to most Asian 
countries, not only militarily but be- 
cause of the dangers to the region from 
increased great power rivalry and the 
consequent risk of increasing tensions. 

S.R.V.-P.R.C. Negotiations 

As the subcommittee is aware, the 
Vietnamese and Chinese recently con- 
cluded a first round of negotiations in 
Hanoi aimed at settling their differ- 
ences. We found the agreement to talk 
a hopeful sign, but the talks failed to 
move the two sides toward any sort of 
accommodation. Vietnam has stressed 
limited measures to stabilize the 
border — mutual withdrawal of forces 
from the border region, creation of a 
demilitarized zone, and prisoner 
exchanges — while making only pass- 
ing reference to the broader range of 
S.R.V.-P.R.C. relations. 

The Chinese, for their part, have in- 
sisted instead that "crucial and funda- 
mental problems." such as Vietnamese 
ties to the Soviet Union, Vietnamese 
troops in Kampuchea and Laos, and 
conflicting claims in the Paracels and 
Spratlys, will have to be resolved be- 
fore relations can be improved. Al- 
though discussions are likely to resume 
later this month in Beijing, the under- 
lying differences in the Vietnamese and 
Chinese positions appear to offer little 
hope for rapid resolution. It would ap- 
pear that, over the near term at least, 
Chinese-Vietnamese relations will be 
marked by acrimony, distrust, and in- 
direct combat, such as that taking place 



October 1979 

in Kampuchea, but that a second major 
round of direct fighting across the bor- 
der is probably not imminent. 

Kampuchea 

While talks continue, the Viet- 
namese are showing no sign of waver- 
ing in their determination to eliminate 
remaining Pol Pot resistance forces 
from Kampuchea. Vietnamese forces 
have been able to clear significant areas 
of major resistance concentrations, re- 
lying on their superior mobility and fire 
power to locate and drive major Kam- 
puchean forces into isolated redoubts 
and in some instances across the border 
into Thailand. Kampuchean resistance 
forces appear to have tried to avoid 
contact in order to conserve their 
strength until the rainy season necessi- 
tates a slow-down in Vietnamese of- 
fensive actions. However, resistance 
forces have apparently been able to 
mount limited counterattacks against 
isolated Vietnamese units and to deny 
the Vietnamese unimpeded use of roads 
and highways, especially during the 
hours of darkness. 

With the beginning of the rainy sea- 
son, the Vietnamese now face the task 
of maintaining control over newly won 
areas while at the same time attempting 
to extend admmistrative control beyond 
the main towns and cities where the 
Heng Samrin regime now has a pres- 
ence. In this latter regard, the Viet- 
namese face a formidable challenge, 
given historical Khmer- Vietnamese 
antagonisms and the acute shortage of 
experienced Kampuchean administra- 
tive cadre, many of whom were killed 
by the Pol Pot regime. 

As in all wars, the fighting has 
brought further death, destruction, and 
severe economic dislocation to the 
most unfortunate country of Kam- 
puchea. People moved westward by Pol 
Pot years ago are being trucked back by 
the Vietnamese to eastern regions. 
Urban residents moved to the coun- 
tryside under Pol Pot are trying to re- 
turn to the cities, although the Viet- 
namese appear to be preventing them 
from entering. People caught up in the 
fighting move randomly seeking safety, 
some cross the border into Thailand, 
others to areas where the fighting is 
less intense. 

Obviously, there has been inattention 
to seasonal agricultural tasks. Har- 
vesting early in the year was not com- 
pleted. Planting, in advance of the 
rainy season, may have been only par- 
tially initiated depending upon the re- 
gion. Seed stocks may have been con- 
sumed by migrant refugees or de- 
stroyed by contending forces. As a re- 
sult, certain normally rich agricultural 



areas are beset by problems which 
could mean famine later this year for 
the Kampuchean people in these re- 
gions. We, and other concerned nations 
and international agencies like the 
ICRC [International Committee of the 
Red Cross], UNICEF, and the World 
Food Program, are carefully monitoring 
the situation to determine how great the 
need and how best to respond. 

Any response to a food crisis in 
Kampuchea will have to take into ac- 
count two major factors. First, food 
should be made available to Kampu- 
cheans in all parts of the country — 
those under control of the 
Vietnamese/Heng Samrin forces, those 
in areas controlled by Pol Pot, as well 
as those who remain in contested or 
peaceful areas. This can be assured 
only through some sort of an interna- 
tional presence and monitoring. Should 
a major food shortage develop and 
should these prerequisites be realiza- 
ble, the United States would also have 
to consider what it could do to provide 
appropriate assistance, given the legis- 
lative restrictions on aid to Kam- 
puchea. We are already helping the 
ICRC which is providing essential food 
and medicines to refugees on the Thai 
side of the border. 

Concerning the political situation in 
Kampuchea, the United States has re- 
peatedly made clear that it supports the 
concept of an independent system of 
states in Southeast Asia, that this sys- 
tem should include an independent and 
stable Kampuchea, and that we would 
be ready to support an international 
conference to try to achieve such an 
outcome. At the same time, we have 
stressed that we believe that the people 
of Kampuchea deserve at long last a 
government which is representative of 
their aspirations and which respects 
their human rights. In our view, neither 
the Vietnamese-backed Heng Samrin 
regime nor the Pol Pot government 
satisfy these criteria. 

We remain prepared to support ini- 
tiatives aimed at bringing about an in- 
ternationally facilitated end to the 
fighting. And although the parties di- 
rectly involved have so far demon- 
strated no willingness to accept inter- 
national involvement, the nature of the 
conflict and the dangers which it poses 
to the stability of Southeast Asia as a 
whole make it imperative that we con- 
tinue to work for a solution. We have 
discussed these matters with all the 
governments involved, including China 
and the Soviet Union. 

Thailand 

Of all of the Southeast Asian na- 
tions, Thailand has been the most seri- 



37 

ously affected by the fighting in Kam- 
puchea. During recent months, as a 
direct result of the contlict, Thailand's 
refugee burden has increased by the 
amount of perhaps 100,000 Kampu- 
cheans at various times. Many of these 
are of Chinese origin, deliberately ex- 
pelled by Vietnamese troops. The re- 
sult has been an immense new political 
and economic problem, given the in- 
ability of the international community 
to resettle many of the 200,000 refu- 
gees already in Thailand. Worse, it has 
created a security problem since it is 
most difficult to distinguish between 



Issue of 
1/.S.-S.R.V. 

Reflations 



DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, 
AUG. 9, 1979' 

We have read press reports quoting 
Vietnamese Vice Minister Nguyen Co 
Thach as stating that talks toward nor- 
malization of relations between the 
United States and the Socialist Repub- 
lic of Vietnam (S.R.V.) are now 
underway. 

I want to state that there have been 
no talks, secret or otherwise, on nor- 
malization of relations between the 
United States and Vietnam since last 
fall. As we indicated at that time, 
Vietnam's actions toward its neighbors 
and its policies toward its own people 
resulting in a flood of refugees have 
made it impossible for us to continue 
with normalization. 

We have made this position clear to 
the Vietnamese both publicly and we 
have made it plain to them privately. 
We have had and continue to have 
contacts with Vietnamese officials on 
matters which are not related to the 
question of normalization of relations. 

It is not true, however, that renewed 
movement toward normalization of re- 
lations is underway. Our ultimate ob- 
jective remains unchanged. But in the 
circumstances which prevail in the re- 
gion at the moment and which circum- 
stances prevail because of Vietnam's 
policies and actions, this is not an ap- 
propriate time to move forward on this 
particular matter. D 



'Read to news correspondents by acting De- 
partment spokesman Tom Reston in the name of 
and on behalf of Assistant Secretary for East 
Asian and Pacific Affairs Richard C. Holbrooke. 



38 

Pol Pot forces and supporters on the 
one hand and actual refugees on the 
other. Large concentrations of these 
persons on the border could become a 
provocation for the Vietnamese to send 
tbrces inti> Thailand, expanding the 
war to a dangerous level. 

The lighting in Kampuchea has also 
forced the Royal Thai Government to 
reevaluate its military posture and to 
take steps to upgrade its armed forces. 
Thailand is accordingly increasing its 
purchases i>f military equipment from 
the LInited States and other suppliers. 

The Thai Government has announced 
a policy of neutrality toward the con- 
tending forces in Kampuchea. The task 
is more difficult than might be sup- 
posed in view of the long and, in 
places, rugged Thai border with Kam- 
puchea and the ebb-and-tlow of mili- 
tary operations and refugee migrations 
which either threaten or spillover into 
Thai territory. The tact that the Pol Pot 
forces are generally backed up to the 
Thai border by Vietnamese pressure 
tends to give an appearance of Thai 
partiality. However, when Heng Samrin 
groups are similarly exposed, the Thai 
have followed a consistent policy of 
allowing both to return to Kampuchea 
at a safe point along the border. 

Thailand's relations with China im- 
proved markedly during 1977-78 
well in advance of the Vietnamese in- 
vasion of Kampuchea. This was in 
keeping with the policy of the Thai 
Government to improve its relations 
with all of its neighbors including 
Vietnam, Laos, and Kampuchea. 
Thailand also sought to confirm its re- 
lations with other countries having 
interests in the region and Prime 
Minister Kriangsak visited Tokyo, 
Moscow, and Washington as well as 
Beijing. We believe Prime Minister 
Kriangsak is trying to pursue a policy 
of neutrality in a very difficult situation 
with numerous conflicting pressures. 



We strongly support him in these ef- 
forts. 

In recognition of this situation, as 
well as recognition of our longstanding 
ties by treaty and friendship to Thai- 
land, the President assured Prime 
Minister Kriangsak during his visit to 
Washington last February that the 
United States supports the integrity of 
Thailand as a stable, secure, and 
peaceful nation in Southeast Asia. 

Conclusion 

I would like to stress that the United 
States is committed to a stable, peace- 
ful system of nation states in Southeast 
Asia, Communist or non-Communist. 
We seek improved relations with 
former adversaries in this context and 
in pursuit of this objective. We will 
also continue to support, in this con- 
text, the security and peaceful de- 
velopment of our ASEAN [Association 
of South East Asian Nations] friends, 
particularly that of Thailand. 

The suspicions of the ASEAN states 
over the ultimate intentions of the 
Communist powers in the region, in- 
cluding the Soviet Union, have been 
amplified by the current conflicts. As a 
case in point, the recent overtures made 
by Vietnamese Prime Minister Pham 
Van Dong through a third party 
suggesting nonaggression pacts be- 
tween Vietnam and the ASEAN coun- 
tries were greeted with a substantial 
degree of skepticism. And the agree- 
ment on refugees between Hanoi and 
the UNHCRis greeted with equal 
skepticism in light of its irrelevance to 
the main refugee problem. 

Vietnam is a country rich in natural 
resources with a talented and produc- 
tive population. If the Vietnamese 
people were able to turn their energies 
to developing their economic potential, 
instead of serving policies that bring 
instability and warfare to their 



Department of State Bulletin 

neighbors and provide a foothold for 
Soviet military and political penetration 
of the area, they could begin to share 
the benefits of the extraordinary growth 
that now characterizes most of South- 
east Asia. We, and I believe all of the 
countries in the area, would welcome 
the constructive role that Vietnam can 
play. No one who wishes the peoples 
of Southeast Asia well can have an 
interest in encouraging its division into 
hostile camps. The basic choice is up 
to Hanoi, whose current policies have 
caused massive human suffering for the 
peoples of Indochina and serious prob- 
lems for its non-Communist neighbors. 

The continued emphasis of the 
ASEAN countries on economic and so- 
cial development is the best long-run 
defense against destabilizing influences 
at home or threats from outside. In the 
meantime, they have each undertaken 
in varying degrees to strengthen their 
individual military capabilities as well 
as continuing their economic progress. 
They are also looking to their friends 
for support. 

It is therefore highly significant that 
Secretary Vance will be traveling to the 
region [July 1-3, 1979] to meet with 
the ASEAN foreign ministers next 
month. His presence there will be sym- 
bolic of America's determination that. 
as President Carter said at Georgia 
Tech, we will "". . . stand by our 
friends, we will honor our commit- 
ments, and we will protect the vital 
interests of the United States . . . ." 
No one should doubt that the continued 
stability and prosperity of the ASEAN 
nations is of great importance to us. D 



'The complete transcript of the hearings will 
be published by the commillee and will be avail- 
able from the Superintendent of Documents, 
U.S. Government Printing Office. Washington. 
DC. 20402. 



October 1979 



39 



Continuing Efforts 
To Account for illM's 



by Robert B. Oakley 

Statement before the Subcommittee 
on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the 
House Committee on Foreign Affairs 
on May 7, 1979. Mr. Oakley is Deputy 
Assistant Secretary for East Asian and 
Pacific Affairs. ' 

I appreciate this opportunity to meet 
with the subcommittee to discuss the 
Department of State's role in the Ad- 
ministration's continuing efforts to ob- 
tain an accounting of Americans lost in 
Southeast Asia. 



Woodcock Commission 

From the outset this Administration 
and the Department of State have con- 
sistently followed a policy aimed at 
obtaining the fullest feasible account- 
ing of our missing personnel. In keep- 
ing with this policy and as one of his 
very first foreign policy initiatives after 
taking office. President Carter sent a 
presidential commission to Indochina 
[March 16-20, 1977] to explore di- 
rectly with the Vietnamese and Lao 
how such an accounting might be ob- 
tained. The Commission was headed by 
Mr. Leonard Woodcock and included 
congressional representation. 

In a statement issued by the White 
House March 12, 1977, the President 
noted that in sending the Woodcock 
Commission to Vietnam and Laos, he 
was 

. . hopeful thai this step we are taking will meet 
with a positive response and put in motion a 
process that will obtain the fullest possible ac- 
counting for our men who sacrificed so much for 
their country. At the same time, we recognize 
that information may never be available on many 
of them. Some were lost over water, or over 
heavily forested areas and mountainous terrain, 
where information may never be found or will be 
very slow in developing. So we are not unrealis- 
tic in our expectations. 

On the Commission's return from its 
March 16-20 trip to Vietnam and 
Laos, it issued a report detailing its 
findings and conclusions.^ According 
to the report: "The highlight of the 
Commission's talks in Hanoi was the 
S.R.V.'s [Socialist Republic of Viet- 
nam] formal undertaking to give the 
U.S. all available information on our 
missing men as it is found and to return 
remains as they are recovered and 
exhumed." The report concluded that: 



"In the Commission's view, the best 
hope for obtaining a proper accounting 
for our MIA's lies in the context of 
. . . improved relations" between the 
United States and Vietnam. 

After considering the Commission's 
report, and following a meeting he had 
with Commission members on their 
return to Washington, the President 
stated at a March 23 joint press confer- 
ence with Leonard Woodcock that the 
Vietnamese: 

. . .have promised to set up a permanent study 
mechanism by which the U.S. Government can 
provide information that we have about the po- 
tential whereabouts or identity of servicemen 
who were lost, and the Vietnamese have prom- 
ised to cooperate in pursuing the evidence that 
we might present to them in the future. 

The President then announced that it 
was on this basis that he would respond 
favorably to a Vietnamese proposal 
that our negotiators meet in Paris to 
begin talks on the possibility of nor- 
malizing relations. 

President Carter took the opportunity 
of a March 24 press conference to ex- 
pand on his remarks of the day before. 
The President stated: 

I have always taken the position that when 1 
am convinced that the Vietnamese have done 
their best to account for the service personnel 
who are missing in action, at that point, I would 
favor normalization, the admission of Vietnam 
into the United Nations, and the resumption of 
trade and other relationships with the Viet- 
namese. I believe the response of the Viet- 
namese leaders to the Woodcock Commission 
was very favorable. 

Subsequent Meetings 

As the subcommittee is aware, we 
met with the Vietnamese in Paris on 
three occasions — May, June, and De- 
cember 1977 — to discuss the prospects 
for normalizing relations between our 
countries. At all three meetings, we 
stressed that two factors would have an 
important effect on our ability to pro- 
ceed toward normalization: Vietnamese 
willingness to follow policies support- 
ive of peace and stability in the region 
and continued Vietnamese efforts to 
provide us with the fullest possible ac- 
counting of our missing men. 

Specifically, regarding the MIA 
[missing in action] issue, we stressed 
that we do not consider our missing 
men as something to be bargained over, 
which had been the case on occasion in 



the past between Vietnam and the 
United States, as it had in similar cir- 
cumstances between France and Viet- 
nam. We stated that the United States 
would reject any attempt to link this 
question to aid. We emphasized that 
the Vietnamese have a simple human- 
itarian obligation to help resolve the 
MIA question. 

The Vietnamese refused to accept 
the U.S. position on normalization of 
relations. Instead, they insisted that to- 
gether with Vietnamese efforts to re- 
solve the MIA question the United 
States should accept its "obligations" 
under the Paris accord of 1973 to pro- 
vide economic assistance to Vietnam.^ 

We rejected this approach, noting 
that the Paris accord was no longer 
valid in view of the massive North 
Vietnamese military attack on South 
Vietnam in 1975, that the United States 
was under no obligation to provide aid, 
and that we could not accept Viet- 
namese attempts to link continued 
cooperation on MIA's to the question 
of U.S. economic assistance. 

We next met with the Vietnamese in 
New York for several rounds of unoffi- 
cial discussions during the fall of last 
year. These discussions appeared to 
make some progress, and the Viet- 
namese indicated that they were no 
longer demanding U.S. aid as a quid 
pro quo for normalization or for con- 
tinued progress on MIA's. 

For our part, we reiterated our belief 
that the Vietnamese could and should 
be doing more to resolve the MIA 
question, and referring to recent events 
in the region, asked for clarification on 
three developments of importance to 
us: the implications of the November 3 
Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Coop- 
eration between Vietnam and the 
Soviet Union, Vietnam's intentions 
toward Kampuchea, and the upsurge in 
refugees from Vietnam. With regard to 
the Vietnam-Kampuchea border con- 
flict, we again indicated that peaceful 
Vietnamese intent and actions toward 
its neighbors, even one as universally 
deplored as the Pol Pot regime, would 
affect our ability to normalize relations 
with Vietnam. 

Vietnam of course mounted a major 
invasion of Kampuchea on December 
25 of last year. It now occupies large 
areas of that country and has shown no 
inclination to seek a political rather 
than a military solution or to consider 
an independent Kampuchean Govern- 
ment representative of its own people 
rather than beholden to another coun- 
try. Under the circumstances, there is 
no question of any movement toward 
normalization of relations with Viet- 
nam at this time. 

Thus, throughout our talks with the 



40 

Vietnamese in Paris and elsewhere, 
U.S. negotiators have stressed, in 
keeping with the President's policy 
enunciated at the beginning of his Ad- 
ministration, that Vietnamese good 
faith in helping us to obtain the fullest 
possible accounting for our missing 
men would have a direct bearing on our 
ability to normalize relations with 
them. Vietnamese behavior toward 
their neighbors is also extremely im- 
portant. This remains our policy and 
you can be sure it will be fully re- 
flected whenever we might meet with 
the Vietnamese again for talks on nor- 
malization of relations or any other 
subject. 



Other Initiatives 

Various initiatives and actions by the 
Congress have been extremely helpful 
as a means of demonstrating to the 
Vietnamese that U.S. policy, with re- 
gard to obtaining the fullest possible 
MIA accounting, has the complete sup- 
port of the entire U.S. Government and 
the American people. As recently as 
February of this year. Representatives 
Elizabeth Holtzman and Billy Lee 
Evans visited Hanoi and pressed the 
Vietnamese for MIA results. Last Au- 
gust, in one of the most successful such 
efforts to date. Representative G.V. 
Montgomery led a delegation com- 
posed of six other Congressmen to 
Hanoi and Vientiane, where they were 
able to obtain 15 sets of MIA remains. 

As I have already noted, the Wood- 
cock Commission also included con- 
gressional representation, which no 
doubt increased the respect with which 
it, and the policies it expressed, were 
viewed in Hanoi and Vientiane. And 
there is of course the work of this sub- 
committee, which has clearly demon- 
strated that we as a government — 
Administration and Congress 
combined — will not flag in fulfilling 
the obligations this country owes its 
missing servicemen and their families. 

1 should also note in this regard the 
fine work of the National League of 
Families of American Prisoners and 
Missing in Southeast Asia in insuring 
that the views of the segment of the 
American public most affected by the 
MIA issue — the relatives of our miss- 
ing men — are made known to the Ad- 
ministration so that they can be re- 
flected in our official statements to the 
Vietnamese. In recognition of the 
league's valuable work. Department 
officials have met regularly with its 
representatives so as to keep them in- 
formed regarding the status of U.S.- 
Vietnamese negotiations and the possi- 
bility of normalization, as well as to 
see how we can best work together to 



achieve further progress on MIA mat- 
ters. In addition. Department officials 
have attended league meetings in order 
to respond directly to concerns ex- 
pressed by MIA families and have car- 
ried on extensive correspondence with 
league officers and members. 

Question of Normalizing 
Relations 

It has been asked in connection with 
the question of normalizing relations 
with Vietnam, what assurance does the 
United States have that the S.R.V. will 
cooperate on an accounting of MIA's 
should relations be established. 1 can- 
not state with assurance that this would 
be the case. However, I would simply 
note that it has been our experience that 
the Vietnamese have generally been 
more forthcoming in terms of remains 
returned and information made avail- 
able during periods when prospects for 
normalization appeared more promising 
than when they did not. For example, 
during the period of our talks in Paris 
in 1977, the Vietnamese returned 22 
sets of remains in October of that year. 



Department of State Bulletin 

Last summer, following a pause seem- 
ingly precipitated by U.N. Ambassador 
Dinh Ba Thi's explusion from the 
United States on charges of spying, the 
Vietnamese sent their experts to our 
MIA identification facilities in Hawaii. 
And in early August, when the Viet- 
namese seemed anxious to renew talks 
about normalization. Congressman 
Montgomery and his colleagues from 
the House were able to obtain 1 1 sets 
of remains. 

I would also note that our efforts to 
date to send our MIA experts to 
Vietnam — either to talk to the Viet- 
namese search teams first hand or ac- 
tually conduct searches themselves — 
have been to no avail. Following nor- 
malization, we would be able to place 
people in Hanoi, and perhaps later Ho 
Chi Minh City (Saigon), who could at 
least talk to Vietnamese experts on a 
regular basis. There would also be at 
least a faint hope of actually taking part 
in searches in the field. 

Our experience during the July 1978 
Vietnamese visit to the MIA identifi- 
cation facilities in Hawaii has demon- 
strated that discussions between U.S. 



Famine in Kampuchea 



DEPARTMENT STATEMENT. 
AUG. 9, 1979' 

The United States is deeply con- 
cerned over growing evidence of 
famine in Kampuchea resulting from 
the invasion and occupation of that 
country, and also from prior years of 
despotic rule. 

The United States wholeheartedly 
supports efforts by international or- 
ganizations, private voluntary agen- 
cies, and others which are attempting 
to open channels through which hu- 
manitarian assistance to needy Khmers 
can flow. 

The United States continues to urge 
that this assistance be aimed at meeting 
the basic human needs of the Khmer 
people, irrespective of their location in 
the country or the political authority 
under whose control they fall. 

The United States also believes that 
maximum effort should be exerted to 
assure through effective international 
monitoring that emergency relief 
supplies reach the needy, for whom the 
assistance is intended. 

Thus far, the humanitarian efforts of 
various organizations and nations to 



provide relief supplies to the Khmer 
people have had only limited impact. 
The competing forces in Kampuchea 
have sought to impose political condi- 
tions on these international humanitar- 
ian undertakings. 

The United States deplores the at- 
tempts of the fighting sides in Kam- 
puchea to obtain political advantage 
from these relief efforts. The losers are 
the starving Khmer people. 

It is imperative that all sides in 
Kampuchea cooperate to the fullest 
with international humanitarian relief 
efforts in Kampuchea. No political en- 
tity or government which impedes the 
flow of this emergency humanitarian 
assistance to the Khmer people can lay 
claim to representing their aspirations. 

The United States, for its part, 
stands ready to contribute further 
within the limits of U.S. law to an in- 
ternational relief effort aimed at as- 
sisting all Khmer people in need under 
international supervision. D 



' Read to news correspondents by acting De- 
partment spokesman Tom Reston. 



October 1979 



41 



and Vietnamese experts are decidedly 
more effective when conducted on a 
face-to-face basis. I would not want to 
overstate the usefulness of such direct 
liaison — since actual results will still 
depend on Vietnamese willingness to 
carry out search efforts and on what 
can be located — given the problems of 
terrain, time, and weather. Neverthe- 
less, direct liai.son in Hanoi would pro- 
vide us with at least some capability of 
monitoring Vietnamese MIA efforts — a 
capability which we do not have under 
current circumstances. 

I have discussed the question of 
normalization of relations with Viet- 
nam at some length because 1 fully ap- 
preciate the interest of the subcommit- 
tee in this subject and its relationship to 
our MIA accounting and recovery ef- 
forts. I would now like to address the 
measures which the Department of 
State is and has been undertaking to 
obtain an accounting, irrespective of 
the prospects for normalization. 

One of our most important proce- 
dures in this regard is the MIA liaison 
arrangement in Bangkok which came 
into being as a result of agreements 
reached during the July 1977 Viet- 
namese visit to our MIA identification 
facilities in Hawaii. U.S. personnel re- 
sponsible for MIA matters in Bangkok 
consult on a regular basis with their 
counterparts at the S.R.V. Embassy 
there. As part of these consultations, 
U.S. personnel hand over dossiers 
containing information on specific MIA 
cases for use by the Vietnamese in 
their recovery efforts. 

At the conclusion of hostilities, we 
had provided information to the Viet- 
namese on all of our missing men. The 
dossiers that are passed to the Viet- 
namese in Bangkok, and elsewhere as 
the occasion arises, serve to pinpoint 
those cases where we believe positive 
results would be particularly likely. 
The Vietnamese have acknowledged 
that these procedures are useful. Ap- 
proximately one half of the remains 
returned thus far have been those of in- 
dividuals for whom dossiers had been 
passed to the Vietnamese. 

Another important program involves 
efforts by our embassies and consulates 
in Southeast Asia to obtain information 
from refugees regarding Americans lost 
in Indochina. As part of this program, 
American missions in appropriate 
countries have formally notified the 
various voluntary agencies involved in 
refugee relief and resettlement efforts, 
the local UNHCR [U.N. High Com- 
missioner on Refugees] office, ICEM 
[Intergovernmental Committee for 
European Migration], and the missions 
of France, Canada, and Australia of the 
continuing U.S. interest in acquiring 



all information relating to MIA's and 
have asked them to bring any such in- 
formation to our immediate attention. 
In addition, personnel engaged in 
interviewing refugees have been re- 
quested to be particularly alert for any 
indication of information regarding 
MIA's. Should such information come 
to light, the refugees are immediately 
contacted by MIA specialists for exten- 
sive debriefing sessions. 

Information From Refugees 

Our interest in obtaining information 
on MIA's is well known among the 
refugee camps in Asia. We have taken 
specific steps to insure that this is the 
case including making arrangements 
for the display of posters at refugee 
transit centers overseas. These posters 
in the Lao, Hmong, Khmer, Viet- 
namese, and Chinese languages spe- 
cifically solicit MIA information from 
the refugees and provide instructions 
on how to contact us. 

In addition, UNHCR, ICEM, and 
voluntary agency personnel manning 
transit centers have been alerted to the 
need to direct any refugees with infor- 
mation to us. Once refugees arrive in 
the United States, INS [Immigration 
and Naturalization Service] officials 
have been helpful in obtaining MIA 
information during their interviews. 
Also, the voluntary agencies who help 
to resettle refugees cooperate both with 
the Department of State and with the 
League of Families in seeking infor- 
mation. Since 1975, refugees have 
provided 234 reports on possible 
MIA's or MIA remains, 176 of these 
during the past year. 

I should note that many refugees are 
understandably eager to be accepted for 
resettlement in the United States, and 
we have to be alert to the possibility of 
exaggerated or fabricated reports being 
brought to our attention in the hope of 
gaining favor with U.S. diplomatic or 
immigration officials. Nonetheless, all 
information from whatever source is 
transmitted to the Defense Intelligence 
Agency and Department of Defense 
where it is analyzed and correlated. 

Case of PFC Garwood 

The Garwood case provides a good 
example of how these procedures func- 
tion. As soon as we received a report 
that PFC Garwood was in Hanoi and 
were able to form a positive opinion of 
its reliability. Secretary Vance person- 
ally sent a message to the Vietnamese 
requesting that they provide us at once 
with all possible information on his 
situation and that he be allowed to 
leave Vietnam immediately. In their 



response, the Vietnamese indicated 
that Garwood was indeed living in 
Vietnam and that he was free to leave 
for the United States. We also alerted 
Representatives Elizabeth Holtzman 
and Billie Lee Evans — who were al- 
ready en route to Hanoi at that time — 
and the ICRC [International Committee 
of the Red Cross] to Garwood's situa- 
tion. As you know, we were eventually 
able to arrange through the ICRC for 
his return to this country. 

A similar effort was made with re- 
gard to the information made public by 
the refugee, Ngo Phi Hung, to the ef- 
fect that he had seen and had contact 
with "49" American prisoners in 
South Vietnam during the period 
1975-77. We asked the S.R.V. au- 
thorities for information on this report. 
They replied promptly denying this 
claim and stating that there were no 
American prisoners in Vietnam. 

The Garwood case, in particular, 
highlights again the question we have 
constantly before us of whether there 
are other Americans like PFC Garwood 
in Vietnam, and if so what can we do 
to effect their departure. This possibil- 
ity was raised with the Vietnamese 
during the Woodcock Commission visit 
to Hanoi. At that time, in response to 
numerous direct questions, the Viet- 
namese assured us that all Americans 
who had been taken prisoner and were 
alive had been returned to the United 
States under article 8(a) of the Paris 
accord on Vietnam, and that all Ameri- 
cans who remained in Vietnam after 
April 30, 1975, and who registered 
themselves with Vietnamese authorities 
had been allowed to leave Vietnam. 
This response leaves a loophole which 
can be made to fit a case like Garwood. 
Obviously, we do not consider helpful 
the use of this sort of debating tactic 
rather than a frank, full response. 

In conjunction with our efforts to 
obtain PFC Garwood's departure, we 
again asked the Vietnamese whether 
there were any other Americans living 
in that country, voluntarily or other- 
wise. As you know, they have 
categorically denied the existence of 
any such Americans, dropping the ref- 
erences to categories. Since we take 
nothing on faith in this area, and we 
have no means of directly determining 
whether this latest Vietnamese state- 
ment is accurate, the next step will be 
to evaluate whatever information PFC 
Garwood might have on possible 
Americans in Vietnam. If, as in the 
case of the report that Garwood himself 
was in Vietnam, he is able to provide 
specific information which appears 
credible on MIA remains or living 
Americans, we will again be in a posi- 
tion to approach the Vietnamese with 



42 



Department of State Bulletin , 



the expectation of getting a satisfactory 
response. 

However, before this can be done, 
we will have to await a thorough de- 
briefing of Mr. Garwood, which we 
understand will not occur until his situ- 
ation with the Marine Corps has been 
clarified. In the meantime, we will 
continue to gather information from all 
available sources and, as I have said 
before, if after careful analysis any of 
this information should suggest the ex- 
istence of other Americans in Vietnam, 
we will immediately contact the Viet- 
namese. 



Conclusion 

In concluding, I would like to stress 
again that we believe that the Viet- 
namese could be doing more to resolve 
the MIA issue, which has caused so 
much anguish for so many American 
families for too long. We have reiter- 
ated our position in this regard both 
directly to the Vietnamese and publicly 
to the American people and will con- 
tinue to do so. 

At the same time, it is important to 
keep in mind that past experience has 
demonstrated, unfortunately, that the 
problem of obtaining a full MIA ac- 
counting is never an easy one. Fol- 
lowing the Korean war and World War 
II, for example, we were unable to ac- 
count for approximately 22% of those 
who had been lost. Moreover, in the 
case of World War II we had free ac- 
cess to virtually all of the former 
battlefields to conduct our search oper- 
ations. The corresponding figure for 
personnel unaccounted for following 
the Vietnam conflict is approximately 
4%, despite our lack of access to much 
of Indochina. 

I have cited these figures not with 
any view toward excusing performance 
to date by the S.R.V. on MIA's but to 
illustrate the difficulties inherent in the 
tasks to which we all — in the Congress 
and in the Administration — are com- 
mitted to seeing through to a successful 
conclusion. □ 



ECO]\0]HI€S: interdependence 
in ^orih America 



'The complete transcript of the hearings will 
be published by the committee and will be avail- 
able from the Superintendent of Documents, 
U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 
D.C. 20402. 

^For text, see Bulletin of Apr. 18, 1977, 
p. .^66. 

^For text of Agreement on Ending the War 
and Restoring Peace in Vietnam, see Bulletin 
of Feb. 12, 1979, p. 169. 



by Julius L. Katz 

Statement before the Subcommittee 
on International Trade of the Senate 
Committee on Finance on June 6, 
1979. Mr. Katz is Assistant Secretary 
for Economic and Business Affairs. ' 

I am pleased to respond to the com- 
mittee's invitation to discuss the pros- 
pects for and problems posed by in- 
creased economic interdependence in 
North America and with the Caribbean. 

The economies of this region are in 
many ways complementary and this 
fact is reflected in the rapidly growing 
economic relationship among the 
countries. Trade flows, investment, 
tourism, migration, transportation 
links, and financial ties have all ex- 
panded dramatically in recent years. In 
some sectors and between some of the 
countries integration has proceeded 
rather far. Rapid change brings with it 
opportunities as well as problems of 
adjustment. 

In this statement. I would like to re- 
view briefly some of the recent de- 
velopments in our economic relations 
with our neighbors in North America 
and to discuss both the opportunities 
and problems presented by our growing 
interdependence. Because of the limits 
of time I do not deal directly with the 
Caribbean area in my statement but I 
would be glad to respond to any ques- 
tions the committee may have with re- 
spect to Caribbean countries. 

First, let me review some of the facts 
bearing on our economic relationship 
with our neighbors in North America. 
Two-way trade with Canada has risen 
from $39 billion in 1974 to over $63 
billion last year. Even allowing for in- 
flation, the increase is dramatic. Our 
bilateral trade in the integrated U.S.- 
Canada automotive industry alone in- 
creased by over 15% per annum for the 
past 5 years, or as much as $3-4 billion 
per year. 

The growth of U.S. -Mexican trade, 
on a relative basis, is as impressive. 
U.S. trade with Mexico has increased 
from $6.4 billion in 1974 to almo.st $13 
billion at present. Mexico's rapid eco- 
nomic growth provides U.S. exporters 
with significant expanded opportunities 
to export capital goods and technology. 

Energy Trade 

Energy trade has been and will be an 
important element of trade between the 



three countries. U.S. crude oil imports 
from Canada are well below the peak 
of 1 million barrels per day reached in 
early 1974. At present, our net oil im- 
ports from Canada are only l.'i5,000 
barrels per day. However, we import 
from Canada almost 3 billion cubic feet 
per day of natural gas. or about 4'/2% 
of U.S. consumption. There are now 
pending before Canada's National 
Energy Board additional applications 
for natural gas exports to the United 
States which could eventually amount 
to another billion cubic feet per day. 
We have an extensive electricity ex- 
change with Canada, with the United 
States being a net importer of some 
17.5 million megawatt hours per year. 
Our energy relations with Mexico are 
less extensive than with Canada but 
they are growing. We import more than 
400,000 barrels per day of crude oil, 
and this volume should increase as 
Mexico's crude oil production expands. 
The United States now takes 80% of 
Mexico's crude oil exports. The Mexi- 
can Government has indicated a desire 
to diversify its exports so that Mexico 
might eventually export only 60% of its 
oil to the United States. But in ab.solute 
terms the volume should increase well 
above present levels. We do not now 
import natural gas from Mexico, but. 
as the committee is aware, discussions 
are underway with the Mexican Gov- 
ernment with respect to possible gas 
exports to the United States. We also 
have the potential for growing electric- 
ity exchanges — the United States now 
is a net exporter to Mexico of some 
68,000 megawatt hours annually. 

Investment Flows 

Investment flows are another sub- 
stantial element of our economic re- 
lationship. In 1977, the net book value 
of U.S. investment in Canada was 
more than $35 billion, representing 
about one-fourth of total U.S. direct 
investment abroad. Canadian invest- 
ment in the United States has increased 
markedly in recent years reaching al- 
most $6 billion in 1977. U.S. direct in- 
vestment in Mexico in the same year 
was over $3 billion. With our rapidly 
growing economic relationship has 
come a growing integration of our 
economy with those of Canada and 
Mexico. 

The most dramatic example of this is 
the U.S. -Canadian automotive industry 
which has been substantially ration- 



October 1979 



43 



alized and integrated across the border 
pursuant to the U.S. -Canada automo- 
tive agreement of 1965. As a result of 
this agreement trade in automotive 
products between the two countries has 
grown explosively (from $740 million 
in 1964 to over $21 billion in 1978) 
with great benefits to both countries in 
terms of increased employment oppor- 
tunities, more efficient production, and 
thus benefits to consumers as well as 
investors in the industry. 

Issue of Increasing 
Economic Integration 

As the result of successive trade 
negotiations since World War II a sub- 
stantial part of our trade with Canada is 
presently duty-free both into Canada 
and the United States. In 1978 about 
70% of U.S. imports from Canada en- 
tered free of duty, and 60% of U.S. 
exports to Canada entered duty free. If 
our MTN [multilateral trade nego- 
tiations] offers of duty elimination had 
been in effect last year, 80% of 
Canada's exports to us would have 
been duty-free as would 65% of our 
exports to them. 

Our trade relations with Mexico are 
at a lower volume and the evidences of 
integration fewer. As part of its eco- 
nomic development program Mexico 
has pursued a highly restrictive trade 
policy. Until the recent MTN, Mexico 
abstained from participation in interna- 
tional trade negotiations and did not 
become a member of GATT [General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade]. In 
1977 we signed a small bilateral trade 
agreement with Mexico, the first since 
1942, and have been negotiating a 
fuller MTN agreement with the Mexi- 
can Government, which is now actively 
considering GATT membership. 

The rapid expansion of our economic 
relations with Canada and Mexico and 
the evident benefits derived therefrom 
have raised the question whether we 
should not more actively pursue a de- 
liberate policy of integration of the 
North American economies. Clearly all 
three countries would benefit from the 
freer movement of goods, services, and 
people. Integration of the three 
economies would promote more rapid 
economic growth in the three countries. 
It would promote greater efficiency of 
production and the development of re- 
sources. It is in the latter area that 
many people see particular advantages 
having in mind the potential energy re- 
sources available in Canada and 
Mexico. 

On the other hand, efforts toward 
economic integration confront a num- 
ber of hard realities. First the people of 
Canada and Mexico, not unlike the 
people of the United States, are sensi- 



tive about the development or utiliza- 
tion of their natural resources and par- 
ticularly their energy resources. They 
believe these resources must be used to 
serve their own national interests, 
having in mind the need to conserve 
those resources to the maximum extent 
possible for future generations. Thus 
those who see Canada and Mexico as 
either the salvation or at least a sub- 
stantial answer to our energy problems 
are likely to be severely disappointed. 

This is not to say that we do not have 
the possibility of a substantial and even 
growing energy trade with Canada and 
Mexico. We must, however, recognize 
and be sensitive to the national policy 
concerns of our neighbors to the north 
and south with respect to energy re- 
sources. 

The prospects for increased integra- 
tion of the U.S. economy with those of 
Canada and Mexico exist in a number 
of sectors. To some extent integration 
will progress as our trade in particular 
sectors grows and as our barriers to ex- 
changes between the three countries are 
dismantled. We should recognize at the 
same time that with the benefits of in- 
tegration come some problems. 
Rapidly growing trade in particular 
sectors, particularly sectors that in- 
volve commodities, with established 
producers brings with it problems of 
adjustment. Thus we have found calls 
for protection against rapid imports of 
particular products such as horticul- 
tural imports from Mexico. Also with 
the rapid expansion of trade has come 
resort to various provisions of law 
dealing with unfair competition such as 
antidumping, countervailing duties, 
etc. Frequent resort to such provisions 
have produced considerable irritation in 
our trade relations with our neighbors. 
Such measures are not, of course, lim- 
ited to U.S. producers. Canada and 
Mexico have taken similar actions or 
have resorted to other means to protect 
their domestic producers. 

Notwithstanding the occasional 
problems we have had in our trade re- 
lations with Canada and Mexico, we 
have made significant progress both in 
dealing with these problems and in 
laying the basis for further trade expan- 
sion through the recently concluded 
MTN. With Canada, we have agreed to 
cut tariffs on a bilateral basis by about 
40%. Canada has agreed to adhere to 
the customs valuation code and pro- 
gressively to eliminate valuation prac- 
tices that have irritated American ex- 
porters for many years. Canada has 
also agreed to modify its practice of 
imposing a 15% duty on machinery 
imports when Canada produces 
machinery like that imported. 

The United States, for its part, has 
agreed, in exchange for stricter rules 



on the use of subsidies, to add an in- 
jury test to our countervailing duty 
statute as Canada, among others, had 
requested. The improved dispute set- 
tlement mechanisms under the GATT 
negotiated in the MTN will improve 
our ability to deal with various bilateral 
trade problems. 

Our bilateral negotiations with 
Mexico are not yet concluded. We are 
optimistic that, in the settlement we 
hope to conclude, a basis will be laid 
for a substantial increase in trade be- 
tween our two countries. 

Another element of the growing 
interdependence of the North American 
economies has to do with investment. 
The United States has traditionally fa- 
vored two-way investment flows. In- 
creased investment promotes economic 
growth and employment and contrib- 
utes to expanded international trade. 
On the other hand, investment can be a 
problem when countries or govern- 
mental units compete for investment in 
particular sectors by offering extraordi- 
nary incentives. Such practices can 
distort rational investment decisions 
creating employment opportunities in 
one region at the expense of employ- 
ment in another region. 

The problems arising from invest- 
ment incentives have been a matter of 
growing concern — one that we have 
been discussing not only with our 
neighbors but with our trading partners 
in the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development as well. 
We have undertaken bilateral discus- 
sions with Canada in particular to 
explore means of limiting investment 
incentives in both countries. A bilat- 
eral understanding in this area might 
well build on procedures negotiated in 
other areas in the MTN. 

In conclusion. I have in this brief 
statement tried to reflect the elements 
of our growing interdependence with 
our neighbors in North America, with 
the opportunities that such growing 
interdependence presents to the three 
countries and. finally, to certain of the 
problems that are raised thereby. D 



' The complete transcript of the hearings will 
be published by the committee and will be 
available from the Superintendent of Docu- 
ments. U.S. Government Printing Office. 
Washington. DC. 20402. 



44 



Department of State Bullciin 



miDDLE EAST: Forces oi Change 



by Harold H . Saunders 

Statement before the Subcommittee 
on Europe and the Middle East of the 
House Committee on Foreign Affairs 
on July 26. 1979. Mr. Saunders is As- 
sistant Secretary for Near Eastern and 
South Asian Affairs.' 

The annual review before this sub- 
committee of events in North Africa, 
the Middle East, and Southwestern 
Asia has become a valuable opportu- 
nity for all of us to step back from the 
details of particular situations and to 
seek an overall sense of direction in 
that part of the world. 

A year ago during this review, my 
statement concentrated on defining the 
interests of the United States in this re- 
gion where more important and diverse 
American interests come together than 
in any other region of the developing 
world. I discussed how the energetic 
pursuit of an Arab-Israeli peace is cen- 
tral to pursuit of the full range of 
American interests throughout the re- 
gion. 

In the year since, peace has been 
achieved between Egypt and Israel, but 
the negative reaction in the Arab world 
has demonstrated the validity of our 
premise that there must be a com- 
prehensive peace that achieves accept- 
ance of Israel by all of its neighbors 
and an honorable and secure peace 
between Israel and the Palestinian 
people. The search for peace thus re- 
mains central to our strategy. 

In the year since, we have also wit- 
nessed a revolution in Iran, increasing 
instability in Afghanistan, continued 
internal strife in Lebanon, and threats 
to political and economic stability in 
other countries. How often we hear the 
question; Where will instability strike 
next? 

We have also seen with increasing 
emphasis how the actions of the oil 
producers of this region affect our na- 
tional strength and, indeed, our daily 
lives. 

This year, I would like to focus on 
the forces of change in the region and 
how these forces may affect the pursuit 
of our interests there. I will not dwell 
on the point made with great emphasis 
by the Administration in recent 
weeks — that there is need for dramatic 
change in our own reliance on foreign 
energy if we are to bring our relation- 



ships with this region into healthier 
balance. 



A REGION OF RAPID CHANGE 

This region is among the fastest 
changing in the world. Many of its na- 
tions have had to respond in a rela- 
tively brief period to the impact of 
large accumulations of oil revenues, 
modern education and technology, ac- 
celerating economic growth, and 
growing regional and international 
interdependence. The issue for those of 
us who formulate policy for this region 
is to devise a strategy sensitive to the 
nature of the changes that are taking 
place and not to be misled by imagined 
causes. 

In this connection, I would like to 
cite the speech Secretary of State 
Vance made on May 1 in Chicago on 
meeting the challenge of a changing 
world.- His remarks seem particularly 
appropriate to the complex region we 
are discussing today. Our future, he 
said, will be endangered if we react in 
frustration and use our power to resist 
change in the world or if we employ 
military power when it would do more 
harm than good. If we Americans ap- 
preciate the extraordinary strengths we 
have, he went on, and if we understand 
the nature of the changes taking place 
in the world, then we have every rea- 
son to be confident about our future. 
Our challenge is to use effectively the 
various kinds of power and influence 
we possess in order to insure the 
evolution of these events in the manner 
least disruptive and most congenial to 
our interests. 

I believe our country has the ver- 
satility and breadth — greater than any 
adversary or rival — to adapt to change 
and to influence its course in construc- 
tive directions if we understand it. 
With few exceptions, the peoples of 
North Africa, the Middle East, and 
Southwestern Asia want a good work- 
ing relationship with us. They value 
our know-how, our practicality and in- 
ventiveness, our technology, our edu- 
cational system, and share many of our 
values. They know we respect their 
right to solve their own problems and 
to preserve their own freedom. They 
know that we do not ask them to be 
like us — but only to work with us in a 
shared desire for an orderly and 



peaceful world. Our acceptance of a 
pluralistic world enables us to contrib- 
ute rather than to try to dominate. They 
also know that we have interests of our 
own in the area as well but that we will 
pursue them with respect tor their in- 
tegrity. 

My purpose here today is to encour- 
age a dialogue on the nature of change 
in this area, which can serve as a basis 
for the decisions that will face us in the 
coming year. My simple point is that 
the second critical element in U.S. 
strategy for this region — in which the 
search for an Arab- Israeli peace is a 
principal instrument — is to attune our- 
selves to the nature of change and to 
work with the governments there in 
directing it constructively. In this ap- 
proach, we are leading from our 
strengths. 



THE FACES OF CHANGE 

The Middle East and Southwestern 
Asia have had more than their share of 
the headlines in the past year. In fact, 
rarely has such a variety of develop- 
ments hit one region in such a short 
period of time. 

The Economic Revolution 

Profound economic developments in 
the region have potential consequences 
that are not yet fully understood. To 
elaborate on this point, it would be 
enough for me to present figures on the 
rapidly increasing accumulations of oil 
revenues, per capita income figures, 
and increases in the rates of investment 
for several countries in the region. I 
could go beyond that and speak of the 
impact on these very traditional 
societies of modern technology and 
education and the rapidly rising hori- 
zon of expectations and opportunities. 
The exact impact of such change — all 
in the life of one generation — on the 
social and political futures of these na- 
tions is something that we are actively 
analyzing and will continue to study in 
increasing breadth and depth. 

Similarly, there is much to be said 
about the social and political impact on 
those other nations in the region where 
expectations have risen but where re- 
sources are lacking and the rate of de- 
velopment has not produced visible 
change in the lives of people. 



October 1979 



45 



I wanl lo go beyond these important 
cie\ leopments, however, to make a 
luither point about some ot their et- 
tects on relations within the region and 
on our relationship with the region. 
The point is simply this; At a time 
when some ol the nations of this area 
are just beginning to enjoy the inde- 
pendence and power which their re- 
sources give them, we must learn to- 
gether to manage relationships — both 
among the states ot the region and be- 
tween the United States and these 
states — that are characterized by 
dramatically increasing interdepend- 
ence. 

There is no question that the major 
oil producers enjoy an accretion ot 
power and influence which, while re- 
flecting their macroeconomic strength, 
is disproportionate to their populations 
or military strength. The least de- 
veloped countries of the area, and in- 
deed elsewhere as well, are reluctant to 
offend the oil-rich countries, whose 
economic assistance can partly offset 
skyrocketing tuel bills and the costs of 
development and modernization. At the 
most basic level, food production itself 
depends in many of the developing 
countries on imported petroleum 
products — trom diesel fuel for irriga- 
tion pumps to petrochemical fertilizer. 

On the other hand, the oil boom has 
led to greater interdependence in the 
region, as the demand for labor in the 
booming economies and the availability 
of labor in neighboring countries has 
led to labor migrations of unprec- 
edented proportions. Development in 
the sparsely populated oil-rich states 
depends on skilled and unskilled labor, 
both from poorer states in the area and 
the Indian subcontinent and also from 
more developed states. There are now 
2.5 million foreign workers in the oil- 
exporting countries. Nearly 40% of the 
Yemen labor force is working in Saudi 
Arabia; Egypt has T7c of its labor force 
working abroad; Jordan has 35% of its 
labor force working in the gulf area: 
India and Pakistan together have nearly 
I million workers in the region. 

The remittances which flow back in 
turn now constitute a major portion of 
the foreign exchange earnings of sev- 
eral poorer countries. For example, 
remittances from Indian workers in 
west Asia now exceed $1 billion a 
year, and Pakistani workers send home 
even more. The remitted earnings of all 
these workers in 1977 were over $6 
billion, far exceeding the level of 
foreign aid provided these developing 
countries and clearly their most im- 
portant source of foreign exchange. In 
fact, remittances now dominate any 
analysis of the economies of non-OPEC 



[Organization of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries) Arab states. In addition, 
shortages of technical and managerial 
skills have developed in the labor- 
"sending" countries, but these very 
shortages have created new opportuni- 
ties tor women and other groups not 
previously in the labor force. Economic 
linkages are being created that make 
economic regionalism a necessity. 

One word needs to be said about 
another resource — the scarcity of 
water. Over the next few years, water 
issues will increasingly occupy the at- 
tention of the political leadership of the 
region. The Maqarin Dam and ques- 
tions of water management in the West 
Bank have made the availability of 
water a matter of crucial importance in 
the Arab-Israeli negotiations. How- 
ever, there is an even broader perspec- 
tive. Water has always been a scarce 
resource in the Middle East. As in- 
comes rise and development takes 
place, demand for water for personal 
consumption, agriculture, and industry 
increases. In many areas, however, 
there are few remaining underde- 
veloped water resources. The pressure 
of rising demand for a fixed and lim- 
ited supply of a resource even more 
vital than oil could have far-reaching 
political significance — both as a cause 
of conflict and as an imperative for 
cooperation. 

As interdependence reaches beyond 
the region, the Middle East may be a 
critical case where, however difficult, 
mutual accommodation to an unprec- 
edented degree will become indis- 
pensable if we are to live together in 
peace, prosperity, and civility. 

Whether we Americans like it or not. 
we carry hea\y responsibilities in the 
intensifying relationship between the 
industrial world and both the oil rich 
and the traditionally poor of this re- 
gion. Our NATO allies and Japan share 
our interest in this relationship. 
Therefore, what happens in our rela- 
tions with this region can have a major 
impact on our relations with the indus- 
trialized world, which has traditionally 
been of primary importance to us. As 
these mutually important relationships 
converge, we are living through a great 
historic change: A part of the world we 
once thought remote is on our doorstep 
— and we on theirs. Conducting this 
relationship in mutual respect and in 
imaginative and creative ways will re- 
quire changes in attitude on both sides. 

In the forefront of the public mind 
today is our relationship with the oil- 
producing states of the region. Some of 
these have traditionally sought close 
relations with us while others reflect 
some bias — often ideological — against 



American interests. All. however, ap- 
pear to recognize the need for close 
interaction with the industrial econo- 
mies. While the price of oil may. in the 
final analysis, be determined by the 
market, certain of these countries — 
notably Saudi Arabia — have a special 
impact on the nature of the market. 
They are in an economic position to 
produce below their full capacity, and 
they increasingly appear sensitive to 
arguments that it is in their economic 
self-interest to do so. They have also 
shown, however, that they are respon- 
sive and responsible in recognizing the 
contribution they can make to the sta- 
bility of the global economy by in- 
creasing their production. 

Beyond that, the wealthier of the 
oil-producing states have realized that 



Kerosene^ Fuel Oil 

Export Lieenses 

for iran 



DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, 
AUG. 22. 1979' 

The Department of Commerce on 
August 3 approved two licenses for the 
export of kerosene and #2 fuel oil to 
Iran aggregating $47,040,000. The 
Commerce Department action was con- 
curred in by the Departments of State. 
Defense, and Energy as an exception to 
the normal restriction on the export of 
petroleum products from the United 
States. 

The United States currently imports 
directly and indirectly about' 900.000 
barrels of crude oil and oil products per 
day from Iran. The exporter of the pe- 
troleum products to Iran imports a sub- 
stantial portion of its available crude 
oil from Iran and applied for a license 
to export the above products to Iran on 
an exceptional basis to meet a tempo- 
rary shortage of cooking and heating 
oil there caused by refinery problems. 
Approval of the transaction was based 
both on humanitarian considerations as 
well as our self-interest in assuring a 
continuing supply of crude oil from 
Iran. 

In effect this transaction represents 
the provision of temporary refinery 
service to Iran. The amount exported 
represents the equivalent of about 2-3 
days of oil imports from Iran. D 



' Read to news correspondents by acting De- 
partment spokesman Tom Reston. 



46 



Department of State Bulletin 



their it)ng-term futures — when their oil 
production drops significantly — will 
depend on their developing viable 
economies in the meantime and on the 
soundness of the global economy of 
which they will be a part. Their ability 
to convert oil sold now into invest- 
ments which will help them build for 
the future requires a sound global 
economy. They, in turn, will play an 
increasing role in the search for solu- 
tions to global problems. 



Nationalism 

At a time when nations are facing the 
demands of regional and global eco- 
nomic interdependence, they are also 
confronted by the renewed pressures of 
nationalism from within the region — 
nationalisms that in themselves often 
cut across conventional national bor- 
ders. Interwoven with the problems of 
rapid economic and political evolution 
is the accelerating self-consciousness 
of nations and peoples trying to define 
their identities, interests, and natural 
associations. These problems compli- 
cate the political lives of individual 
countries, the relationships between 
nations, and efforts to achieve peace 
throughout the area. They have played 
a role in generating civil war and inter- 
national terrorism and have the con- 
tinuing potential of leading to war be- 
tween nations. 

The problem takes many forms. 

• Peoples such as the Palestinians 
and those in the Sahara with a new or 
recently intensified sense of nationhood 
have asserted their right to self- 
determination. 

• Nations like Lebanon have discov- 
ered deep fissures in their national 
coherence and are struggling to restore 
unity. 

• Within nations, minorities with a 
particular sense of identity have sought 
greater autonomy. In the past year, 
with a change in the character of cen- 
tral national authority, this has compli- 
cated the tasks of those nations under- 
going political soul-searching or 
change, such as Iran and Pakistan. 

• In some cases, separate nation- 
alisms come into conflict. This is best 
exemplified by the contest between Is- 
raeli nationalism and Palestinian 
nationalism. The general awareness of 
the centrality of this conflict to an 
Arab-Israeli settlement has brought this 
issue to the top of the agenda in the 
continuing peace negotiations. 

• Reflecting the ambivalent charac- 
ter of Middle East nationalism, the 
ideal of pan-Arab nationalism remains 
pervasive, and individual Arab coun- 



tries continue to seek ways of relating 
their particular political systems to a 
larger identity. Arab nationalism again 
came into unusual prominence in the 
wake of the Egyptian/Israeli Peace 
Treaty, although it has not reached the 
dimension of the Nasser years. Moder- 
ate Arab states felt compelled to shift 
the balance between interests which 
had linked them to the West over the 
years and a sense of Arabism which 
found the Egyptian-Israeli treaty more 
dramatic a move than they were able to 
accept. 

Regional Conflicts 

Complicating the lives of many of 
these nations and their efforts to con- 
duct relationships with nations around 
them are familiar regional conflicts. 
The Arab-Israeli dispute affects rela- 
tionships throughout the Middle East 
and the rest of the world. Although 
both countries have made serious ef- 
forts to overcome it, the continuing 
distrust between India and Pakistan 
colors the national policies of both and 
affects the ability of powers outside the 
area to carry on constructive relation- 
ships with those countries. The rivalry 
between Morocco and Algeria — along 
with Saharan nationalism — has so far 
prevented international efforts, which 
are continuing, to resolve the conflict 
over the western Sahara peacefully. 
Other longstanding and short-term 
conflicts affect relationships in the 
region. 

The Search for Security: 
Nuclear Proliferation 

Overshadowing some of these re- 
gional conflicts is the potential of some 
of the nations in this area to move to- 
ward the possession and use of nuclear 
weapons. The motivation for states to 
acquire nuclear weapons can be a com- 
plex mix of concerns for security, re- 
gional preeminence, international pres- 
tige, and domestic impact. Once again, 
technological change has brought to the 
fore a problem which complicates the 
resolution of other relationships. India 
has detonated a nuclear device and 
Pakistan is proceeding on a course that 
will put it in a position to do likewise. 
Israel is believed by some to have nu- 
clear weapons, and some Arab slates 
are believed to have the ambition to 
acquire them. 

Nuclear proliferation in any region 
poses the risk of local nuclear war with 
the potential for catalytic war and 
superpower involvement. In regions of 
historic and continuing hostilities like 
the Middle East and South Asia, pro- 
liferation makes nuclear conflict a 



plausible and predictable if not an in- 
evitable outcome. It is also wasteful of 
resources in countries where govern- 
ments are struggling to provide for the 
basic human needs of their people. The 
global psychological firebreak that now 
separates conventional from nuclear 
war is thus put at risk, with attendant 
consequences for U.S. and interna- 
tional security. 



CONSEQUENCES OF CHANGE 

Against this background, there have 
been two major contemporary reactions 
to change which warrant special dis- 
cussion this year: the reassertion of 
cultural and religious identity, most 
notably in the Islamic context, and the 
pressures of existing political systems. 



Islamic Revival 

The Iranian revolution took place in 
a particular political context, and it 
should not be seen as a harbinger for 
the Moslem world as a whole. How- 
ever, consciousness of Islam is high 
here and abroad, and an analysis is 
necessary. 

For millions in this area, Islam, for 
centuries, has provided a unifying 
world view. Events of the last four to 
five decades, however, have created in 
many countries of the region trends in 
conflict with this long-accepted and 
highly principled value system. Mod- 
ernizing leaders, in their quest for rapid 
development, often with the best in- 
tentions, sought to import and implant 
not only Western technology but West- 
ern political value systems. Frequently, 
an effort was made to push aside Is- 
lamic institutions as an obstacle to 
progress. Widespread acceptance of the 
belief that imported technology and 
culture would dramatically improve the 
quality of individual life sent expecta- 
tions spiraling upward. 

Modernization and development did 
produce for many people a better ma- 
terial life in Western terms, but in 
some cases these were accompanied by 
massive social dislocation and urbani- 
zation as labor forces moved away 
from traditional agricultural pursuits 
and family life in the established Is- 
lamic context. Education and mass 
communications further fed the appe- 
tites. With the passage of time, how- 
ever, it became apparent that for most 
people the gap between expectation and 
fuinilment increased rather than nar- 
rowed. This, in turn, resulted in 
mounting frustration, individual and 
collective — a growing perception that 



October 1979 



47 



middle East Peace Process 



by Robert S. Strauss 

Excerpt from an address before 
the American Bar Association in 
Dallas on August 13. 1979. 



I have been deeply disturbed in 
recent days and weeks by the un- 
fortunate character of debate on the 
Middle East peace process. This 
does not help the peace process, it 
hurts it; it does not help Israel, 
Egypt, or the Palestinians. We must 
do what we can to make possible a 
climate for discussion, debate, and 
negotiation that will move the peace 
process forward and help secure the 
legitimate interests of all the parties. 

The idea that there has been any 
lessening of the U.S. commitment to 
keep Israel strong — so that it will 
remain secure — to promote Israel's 
future, or to fulfill all of our under- 
takings or commitments to Israel is 
false. The idea that we reject or are 
insensitive to the legitimate rights of 
the Palestinian people is equally 
false. 

As the President's personal repre- 
sentative to the Middle East peace 
negotiations, my mandate is Res- 
olutions 242 and 338. and the Camp 
David accords, in their entirety. 
Secretary Vance took the lead in de- 
veloping and fully supports that 
mandate. 

I will work with Egypt and Israel 
under that mandate, as expeditiously 
as possible. But no artificial dead- 
line — no position of the United 
States — will be set that goes beyond 
that mandate. 

In carrying out that mandate, we 
are also doing our utmost to work 
with other parties in the Middle East 
to try to gain their support for the 
peace effort. I have been to Israel 
and Egypt and to other Arab coun- 
tries as well. I want to broaden and 
deepen this effort, within the 
framework of established U.S. pol- 
icy. 

All parties recognize, in the Camp 
David agreements and elsewhere, 
that the Palestinian people have a 
right to participate in determining 
their future. The Camp David 
framework not only affirms this 



right, it commits the parties for the 
first time to a practical program of 
negotiation by which Palestinian 
rights can be translated into concrete 
reality. We must recognize the his- 
torical importance of this achieve- 
ment, and we must be certain that 
we proceed now in a manner that 
does not weaken it. 

In support of these rights we are 
working hard to create a self- 
governing authority that will meet 
the needs of all the parties and give 
the Palestinians a stake in the proc- 
ess and in their future. We would 
like to see the Palestinians in the 
talks now, as the Camp David 
agreement provides. And their ac- 
ceptance of Resolution 242 and of 
Israel's right to exist would be a 
major step along the road to peace. 

The autonomy talks need a chance 
to succeed. Israel, Egypt, and the 
United States need time to make 
them succeed. In our efforts to 
achieve that success, we must and 
we will always have as our absolute 
requirement the security of Israel, 
its borders, and its people. This na- 
tion will never walk away from any 




AMBASSADOR STRAUSS 

Robert S. Strauss was born in Lockhart, 
Texas, October 19, 1918, and was raised in 
Stamford, Texas. He received an LL.B. de- 
gree from the University of Texas in 1941. 
After serving as a special agent of the FBI, 
he entered private law practice in January 
1946. 



of its commitments to Israel. Let me 
reaffirm that today in the clearest 
possible terms. 

Let me assure you that the peace 
process will build on the indestruct- 
ible bonds between our two immi- 
grant nations — nations devoted to 
principles of freedom, democracy, 
and opportunity and nations bound 
together by enduring values that 
give us strength both at home and 
abroad. 

A strong, vital, and independent 
Israel is indispensable to enduring 
peace and stability in the Middle 
East. The solution to the Palestinian 
problem, with the cycle of ter- 
rorism, violence, and destruction it 
has caused, is not only morally es- 
sential, but it, too, is indispensable 
to enduring peace and stability in the 
Middle East. 

President Sadat and Prime Minis- 
ter Begin are both confident that the 
peace process can succeed. We need 
now to build on what they have 
achieved so far, without sacrificing 
any of the principles I have stated 
above. President Carter has in- 
structed me, as his personal repre- 
sentative, to make every construc- 
tive effort to be of assistance to 
them. I expect to discharge that re- 
sponsibility. 



Ambassador Strauss served on the Texas 
Bank Commission (1962-68) and was 
Chairman of the Board of the Valley View 
Bank of Dallas for 6 years. He has also 
served as a Director of Xerox Corporation, 
Braniff Airlines, Columbia Pictures, and 
Wylain Corporation. 

In March 1970 he was elected Treasurer 
of the Democratic National Committee and 
served through the 1972 Democratic con- 
vention. He then became Chairman of the 
National Committee to Reelect a Demo- 
cratic Congress for the 1972 elections. He 
was elected Chairman of the Democratic 
National Committee in December 1972 and 
served in this capacity until January 1977 
when he returned to his private law prac- 
tice. In 1976 he was cochairman of the 
Democratic National Campaign Steering 
Committee. 

On March 30, 1977, Ambassador Strauss 
was sworn in as the President's Special 
Representative for Trade Negotiations; he 
resigned from this position on August 8. 
1979. On April 24, 1979, President Carter 
appointed him as Ambassador at Large with 
special responsibilities for Middle East 
peace negotiations. 



48 



Department ot State Bulletin 



benefits were not being shared equita- 
bly. 

In Iran, collective anger was a sign 
of underlying pervasive psychological 
disorientation, and it expressed itself in 
political agitation. It was natural that 
individuals came to resent the imported 
cause of dislocation and reached for 
comfort in a value system more indig- 
enous and satisfying to their needs. 
The abiding values of Islam were at 
hand, institutionally eroded but never 
eradicated or even basically weakened; 
thus, the "Islamic revival"" of which 
we read so much. As we have seen, it 
was on such a base that the revolution 
in Iran was justified. However, we see 
aspects of the revival, although in more 
moderate form, in practically every Is- 
lamic nation today. 

We believe we will continue to see 
an Islamic aspiration to reassert iden- 
tity and self-esteem through reasserting 
the importance of religion. This need 
not be a basis for contention, however, 
if we in the West evidence better gen- 
eral understanding of what is taking 
place and find appropriate ways to at- 
test our sympathies and our respect for 
their religion. 

Pressures on Political Systems 

Rapid economic and social change 
has obviously had its impact on politi- 
cal institutions. Political instability is a 
fact of life in many countries of the re- 
gion, but its causes vary from country 
to country. 

One major problem is that the con- 
cept of the nation-state — a concept im- 
ported into the region — has only a 
fragile hold in some countries. Central 
governments have difficulty in assert- 
ing authority in countries where the 
basic unit of political identity is the re- 
ligious or ethnic or linguistic subgroup 
or area of the country. 

In Lebanon, the central government 
is trying to reweave the torn fabric of 
Lebanese nationhood in the wake of 
factional strife. In Iran, various tribal 
and ethnic groups have reasserted 
claims to local autonomy in the wake 
of the revolution. In Afghanistan, the 
Marxist government is facing tradi- 
tional tribal and ethnic resistance to 
central government authority. There is 
less strain on countries like Egypt and 
Saudi Arabia with more homogeneous 
populations. Iraq and Syria on the other 
hand, with governments drawn from 
minorities, have promoted in the name 
of national unity a secular ideology — 
Baathism — which formally bans dis- 
tinction among their Sunni, Shi"a, and 
Alawite Arab populations, as well as 
Kurds and Christians. 

Whatever the value system in a 



country, whether radical secular ide- 
ologies or close identification with 
Islam, governments will succeed in the 
long run to the extent that they provide 
a sense of basic social justice and re- 
sponsiveness to their people and basic 
respect for human rights. Each gov- 
ernment makes its own record in this 
regard and the record it makes has 
much to do with its stability over the 
longer term. 



ISRAEL IN THE REGIONAL 
CONTEXT 

Within this regional context it is im- 
portant to look at the significance of 
these forces of change for Israel's place 
in the region. We must do so because 
we have a particularly close relation- 
ship with Israel and a strong commit- 
ment to its security and well-being. 
The United States also has substantial 
interests in the achievement of 
peace — and beyond peace, normal re- 
lations of real comity and cooperation 
— between Israel and other nations of 
the region. 

Israel" s economy — already burdened 
with heavy defense expenditures, a 
very high rate of inflation, and heavy 
balance of payments deficits — is at 
least as much affected by the economic 
problems of energy and their effect on 
the world economy as are the Western 
industrial nations, and for Israel also 
energy supply is a matter of national 
security. In addition, the problem of 
water resources has long been recog- 
nized as critical for Israel. 

Because it and its neighbors must 
ultimately and inescapably find a way 
to live in peace with one another, Israel 
must, as much as we and the other re- 
gional neighbors, come to terms with 
the forces of change in the region. Is- 
rael is already experiencing dramatic 
changes in this regard. The reality of 
peace with Egypt and the real prospect 
of a broader peace in the region have 
had a profound effect in Israel. A fun- 
damental reassessment of policies and 
of goals is taking place within Israel to 
determine how it can move toward 
peace while assuring its security. 



MIDDLE EAST PEACE 
NEGOTIATIONS 

Against this perspective on our re- 
gional interests, I would like to discuss 
at some length the Middle East peace 
process. 

The effort to move steadily toward 
resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict 
remains the principal element in our 
overall design to contribute to con- 



structive change and to secure our 
interests in the Middle East. The peace 
effort itself carries with it dramatic 
potential tor effecting change in the re- 
gion by reducing the causes ot conflict 
and helping people in the region turn 
constructively to other problems. If the 
peace process fails to achieve com- 
prehensive results, we can expect not 
only a continuation of strife in Lebanon 
and the persisting cycle of retaliation 
between Israelis and Palestinians but 
also increased radicalism and the prob- 
ability over time of widened and re- 
newed armed conflict, with all that en- 
tails in squandered human and material 
resources and danger to global peace. 

If on the other hand a durable and 
comprehensive peace is achieved, we 
will have helped prompt a very differ- 
ent kind of change in the region, one 
that supports not only our most critical 
national objectives but also those of the 
Middle East peoples. The degree to 
which a peace settlement will serve 
U.S. interests will depend on its re- 
sponding to the interests of the peoples 
in the Middle East, because a settle- 
ment can be durable only if each party 
has a stake in its durability. One of the 
purposes of this analysis is to encour- 
age an understanding of those interests. 

The year that has passed since our 
last report to this committee has wit- 
nessed developments of momentous 
consequence in the 30-year search for a 
resolution of the Arab-Israel dispute. In 
September 1978 Egypt and Israel 
agreed at Camp David on two "frame- 
work"" documents, the first setting 
forth the principles of a comprehensive 
peace in the Middle East and the basis 
for proceeding with negotiations on the 
West Bank and Gaza where the Pales- 
tinians would participate in determin- 
ing their own future; the second estab- 
lishing the basic terms governing a 
peace treaty between Egypt and Israel.^ 
On March' 26, 1979, President Sadat 
and Prime Minister Begin signed a 
Treaty of Peace between Egypt and Is- 
rael, and simultaneously the two lead- 
ers signed a joint letter addressed to 
President Carter setting forth a time- 
frame for the West Bank-Gaza negotia- 
tions.^ 

After so many years of failed initia- 
tives, false starts, and recurrent out- 
breaks of warfare, the accomplishments 
of last year loom large indeed. With 
the achievement of the Egyptian-Israeli 
Treaty of Peace, there has been a deci- 
sive reduction in the potential for war 
between Israel, the most powerful 
military force in the region, and Egypt, 
traditionally the most influential as 
well as the most populous Arab coun- 
try. 

Equally important, the negotiations 



October 1979 



49 



set in train by President Sadat's trip to 
Jerusalem and Prime Minister Begin's 
return visit to Ismailia have demon- 
strated that the process of negotiation 
can resolve issues that were considered 
intractable only a tew years or even 
months before. The spirit of negotia- 
tion IS intectious. Difficult as the task 
is that the Egyptian and Israeli delega- 
tions are facing in the West Bank-Gaza 
negotiations that have just begun, both 
sides share an underlying assumption 
that negotiation is the only way of re- 
solving the problem and that with suf- 
ficient patience and resourcefulness 
this objective can be reached. 

But it obviously must be of concern 
to us that there is a sizable body of 
opinion in the Arab world that remains 
unconvinced that the course we are 
embarked on is the right one. 1 think it 
is fair to say that we expected a certain 
amount of this. There are a number of 
Arab governments which have been so 
adamantly opposed to President Sadat's 
initiative from the beginning that it 
would not have been realistic to expect 
them to be brought around by our ar- 
guments alone. 

Of more concern to us is that several 
moderate governments of the area — 
ones with which we have maintained 
close relations over the years — have 
perceptions about the peace process 
that seem so different from ours. Tacti- 
cal handling may have had something 
to do with the polarization and misun- 
derstanding among the Arab slates at 
present, but the more basic cause is 
lack of confidence among the skeptics 
that the present format of negotiations 
can produce a result that will be ac- 
ceptable to them. 

The polarization that these first steps 
in the peace process have produced in 
the Arab world is not in the U.S. inter- 
est. It obviously makes more difficult 
the realization of further progress to- 
ward the comprehensive peace that re- 
mains our ultimate goal. It has also 
produced strains in our relations with 
the Arab states whose friendship we 
value and need. Therefore, one of our 
chief policy tasks in the months ahead 
will be to do what we can to lessen this 
division, to increase understanding of 
the peace process, and to ameliorate 
the strains caused in bilateral relations 
with the U.S. 

Of primary importance will be the 
results that can be achieved in the 
negotiations in the next few months. 
Those results can only be achieved by 
negotiation, in which the parties 
painstakingly explore the possibilities 
for accommodation, and by the passage 
of time, during which practical ar- 
rangements leading toward peace can 
be tested and a chance given for un- 



derlying governmental and public at- 
titudes to change. We believe results 
can be achieved by this process — 
indeed, that it is the only way to 
achieve results that are likely to be on 
terms that both sides can ultimately ac- 
cept. President Carter's commitment to 
put the full weight of the United States 
behind these negotiations is clear. 



POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR 
THE U.S. 

Beyond our central continuing effort 
to achieve progress toward resolution 
of the Arab-Israeli conflict, this analy- 
sis of the pressures and interests which 
the governments of this region face, 
and of the real nature of the problems 
we face in pursuing our interests, 
suggests two points to bear in mind for 
the conduct of our policy toward this 
region. 

The leaders of the nations in this re- 
gion are attempting to strengthen ef- 
fective central authority in the face of 
demands for broader political partici- 
pation when they must at the same time 



cope with mounting political and eco- 
nomic pressures that cut across national 
boundaries. They will be dealing with 
problems in this broader context. The 
issue is how we will take into account 
in our decisions their objectives and 
pressures as well as our own. We can 
ask comparable understanding from 
them. 

Our own policies will play a critical 
role in establishing our credentials as 
full and valued partners in the new 
interdependence that is rapidly emer- 
ging between this region and the in- 
dustrialized world. The issue again is 
how to assure that our relationships op- 
erate to the fullest extent possible as a 
two-way street. 

On the political side, this means, for 
instance, that efforts to deal with an 
issue, such as the Palestinian problem, 
must be seen not only in the context of 
the Arab-Israeli negotiations but also in 
the context of the Arab world's need to 
deal honorably with the legitimate 
interests of a Palestinian community 
with sizable and influential numbers in 
the key Arab states. It also means that 
a solution to the problem in Lebanon, 
while requiring new understandings 



Egyptian Vice President 
Meets With President Carter 



WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, 

JUNE II, 1979' 

President Carter and Egyptian Vice 
President Husni Mubarak met in the 
Oval Office for 50 minutes. 

In accepting the special message that 
Vice President Mubarak conveyed on 
behalf of President Sadat, President 
Carter expressed his personal pleasure 
at being able to welcome Vice Presi- 
dent Mubarak again to the White 
House. He reiterated his warm personal 
regard and high esteem for President 
Sadat and welcomed the opportunity to 
continue close consultations with 
Egyptian leaders. 

President Carter and Vice President 
Mubarak reviewed the status of 
Egyptian-American cooperation in a 
number of fields. The President ex- 
pressed great interest in Egypt's prior- 
ity efforts to expand its economic and 
social development. Bilateral military 
relations were also discussed. Citing 
the administration's proposal for $1.5 
billion in foreign military sales credits 
over the next 3 years, the President 
reaffirmed his intention to assist Egypt 



in meeting its legitimate defense needs. 
He also said that they discussed how 
the United States might help to meet 
Egypt's longer term defense needs and 
the desirability of regular and 
systematic consultations toward this 
end. Referring to the Middle East 
peace negotiations, the President 
stressed the Administration's determina- 
tion to help resolve the difficult issues 
that must be addressed so as to achieve a 
comprehensive peace. 

In addition to his meeting with 
President Carter. Vice President 
Mubarak today met separately with 
Secretary Vance. Secretary of Defense 
Brown, and Ambassador Strauss 
[Robert S. Strauss, Ambassador at 
Large with special responsibilities for 
Middle East peace negotiations]. Vice 
President Mubarak will meet with 
members of Congress before he departs 
for London on the evening of June 
13. D 



'List of participants not printed here. Text 
from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Docu- 
ments of June 18, 1979. 



50 



Department of State Bulletin 



among the Lebanese themselves, is in- 
timately related to progress in dealing 
with the Palestinian problem through 
the Arab-Israeli negotiations. 

On the economic side, lor instance, 
regional attitudes on meeting world oil 
demand will be increasingly influenced 
by the perception in the producing 
countries of how effectively we in the 
industrial world are working to check 
the growth of demand for Middle East- 
ern oil by adopting effective measures 
to conserve energy and to find alternate 
sources. 

Another growing influence on these 
oil producers is their sense of how 
meaningful a role they are going to 
play in the wider international economy 
and its institutions, of whether we and 
other industrial nations truly seek an 
economic interdependence with them 
beyond mere access to their energy re- 
sources. This factor touches on a broad 
range of international economic issues 
we will have to face in the coming 
months, including future access for 
producer states to petrochemical mar- 
kets and the quality of their participa- 
tion in international finance and 
investment. A final aspect of the eco- 
nomic relationship with the region is 
how we are perceived as working in 
parallel with them to meet the de- 
velopment needs of the poorer coun- 
tries. 

With regard to nonproliferation is- 
sues, it will mean that we, and other 
governments, will have to increase our 
efforts to meet legitimate technology 
requirements for nuclear energy while 
also addressing underlying security 
concerns which motivate nuclear 
weapons programs. 

In the field of security policy, the 
United States has modestly increased 
the security role it plays in the Middle 
East in the last year, but it has done so 
in response to the requests of friends 
for support. We are making sales of 
arms to meet real defense needs. We 
demonstrated that we could and would 
aid friends quickly when faced by at- 
tack from outside. 

Increased shipments of arms to cer- 
tain governments of the area by the 
Soviet Union, supply of Soviet advis- 
ers, and support for military operations 
had created an impression that the 
United States might be unwilling or 
unable to help its friends and protect its 
interests in the area. This impression 
was mistaken, and the visit of Secre- 
tary [of Defense Harold] Brown to the 
Middle East in February was part of an 
effort to set the record straight. 

We have begun a new arms relation- 
ship with Egypt in support of that 
country's legitimate defense require- 
ments. We responded quickly to the re- 



quests of North Yemen and Saudi 
Arabia for help to meet an invasion 
from South Yemen. We have expanded 
our consultations with other friendly 
governments about security conditions 
and threats in the area, and we have 
decided to increase marginally our 
military presence. 

Our steps threaten no regime in the 
Middle East or beyond. They enhance 
security in the area. They are designed 
to support the peace process. They also 
reflect U.S. strategic interests. The 
steps are limited and measured and 
have been taken in consultation with 
area states. We intend to move deliber- 
ately but intelligently in our security 
efforts. We understand and appreciate 
that a larger U.S. military presence in 
the area would be inimical to the inter- 
ests and desires of our friends. 

In this context, it is important to say 
a word about the region as it relates to 
other, broader U.S. global and stra- 
tegic interests. We hear much about the 
danger to American interests in the 
Middle East from unfriendly outside 
powers, particularly from the Com- 
munist world. About these dangers I 
would make two points. 

First, there is no lack of under- 
standing of the military power our ad- 
versaries can dispose over this region. 
Our security policy is meant to reassure 
our friends and deter adventurism by 
our adversaries. 

Second, however, we have also 
come to realize that military power 
alone or even primarily, will be unable 
to secure and promote anyone's inter- 
ests unless it supports and takes ac- 
count of the indigenous forces for 
change within this region. Indeed it is 
clear that only an approach that permits 
the building of good working relation- 
ships with the governments and peoples 
of the Middle East will insure security 
for the interests of the U.S. and our al- 
lies. 

Finally, we will continue to recog- 
nize the central role that our approach 
to the Arab-Israeli conflict will play in 
determining the ability of the United 
States to pursue its interests throughout 
the area. Because of the close inter- 
weaving of the forces in the area, 
progress on one front affects progress 
on another. 

To sum up, we have the opportunity 
and resources to develop a full and 
mutually beneficial partnership with 
the fastest growing and most rapidly 
changing area of the world today. If 
change produces instability, it will also 
produce opportunity. Our approach will 
be to master the nature and direction of 
change and to collaborate with gov- 
ernments which wish to work with us 
in finding a new balance in their lives 



Vtolettee in 

Lebanon and 

tsraci 



DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, 
JUNE 27, 1979' 

The Syrian-Israeli air battle over 
Lebanon today has been a very serious 
event. It underlines the seriousness of 
the situation in Lebanon which has now 
brought Israel and Syria into confron- 
tation for the first time since 1974. 

For many months fighting between 
Israel, its allies in southern Lebanon, 
and Palestinian forces has thwarted all 
Lebanese and international efforts to 
bring stability to this troubled area. 

The Israelis have been conducting a 
preemptive bombing strategy against 
Palestinian bases and concentrations in 
Lebanon in the wake of an increase in 
terrorist actions. Some of the targets 
have been extremely close to Syrian 
military positions. At the same time, 
the Syrians have been scrambling air- 
craft from time to time in response to 
the Israeli actions. This dangerous 
combination of events culminated in 
the air battle today. 

We call on both Israel and Syria to 
exercise maximum restraint. We are in 
touch with both governments and with 
Lebanon to try to find ways to forestall 
more violence. There must be an end to 
the cycle of challenges, provocations, 
and military actions in Lebanon, which 
have caused so many deaths and in- 
juries to innocent Lebanese. The time 
is overdue for a more responsible at- 
titude on the part of all involved, in- 
cluding the Palestinians, whose ter- 
rorist actions in Israel have sparked off 
so many Israeli actions. 

This air battle over Lebanon clearly 
heightens tensions and endangers the 
current stage of negotiations for Middle 
East peace. This event only reinforces 
our determination to seek a comprehen- 
sive Middle East peace which will 
bring an end to this bloodshed. 

which can contribute to orderly global 
political and economic change. D 



'The complete transcript of the hearings will 
he published by the committee and will be avail- 
able from the Superintendent of Documents, 
U.S. Government Printing Office. Washington, 
D.C. 20402. 

^ For text see Bulletin of June 1979, p. 16. 

■'For te.xts of the frameworks, see Bulletin 
of Oct. 1978. p. 7. 

^For texts of the Peace Treaty and related 
documents, see Bulletin of May 1979. p. 3. 



October 1979 



51 



DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, 
JULY 23, 1979^ 

The United States strongly condemns 
the Israeli air attacks up and down the 
Lebanese coast on July 22, which hit 
targets in one case only 5 miles from 
Beirut. The press reports from Lebanon 
indicate that between 12 and 18 people 
were killed and thai as many as 70 may 
have been wounded. 

The Israeli air attacks were the first 
in 3 weeks, and we had hoped that 
these raids — which take such a toll in 
human life — would not be repeated. 
Recognizing that there is tragic vio- 
lence on both sides, we urge that Israel 
and all other quarters — including the 
Palestinians and Haddad's forces — 
which have contributed to the cycle of 
violence, to exercise maximum re- 
straint so that these tragedies can be 
avoided. 



DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, 
AUG. 22, 1979' 

We are deeply concerned and sad- 
dened by the violence in Lebanon and 
Israel in the past few days. Yesterday, 
bombs exploded in Israel, set by ter- 
rorists. For much of the past 2 days, 
and particularly yesterday, there were 
intense artillery exchanges in southern 
Lebanon. While much of this informa- 
tion has come to us in news reports, it 
appears that the Lebanese militias al- 
lied to Israel did most of the shelling 
but that shelling by Palestinian forces 
on militia positions also was heavy. 

According to Lebanese news reports, 
some militia shells hit a school, killing 
one child and wounding others. There 
have been other casualties elsewhere. 
According to other news reports, the 
barrages have been so heavy that inno- 
cent Lebanese civilians are once again 
fleeing the area in large numbers, 
adding to the already existing exodus 
of many thousands from southern 
Lebanon in recent months. 

Soldiers of the U.N. peacekeeping 
forces reportedly have been wounded 
in these latest exchanges. In addition, 
Israeli aircraft hit targets in the area on 
August 20, as we reported previously. 

The terrible human tragedy is meas- 
ured in innocent lives lost, maimed 
people, the destruction of homes and 
farms, and the flight of people to 
safety. We call on all involved in this 
violence to stop this continuing human 
tragedy. D 



Oil Supply Agreement 
Signed hy the U.S» and israei 



' Read to news correspondents by acling De- 
partment spokesman Tom Reslon. 

^Read to news correspondents by Depart- 
ment spokesman Hodding Carter III. 



The following memorandum of 
agreement was signed by Herbert J. 
Hansell, the Department of State's 
Legal Adviser, and Yaacov Nechush- 
tan. Minister of the Embassy of Israel, 
on June 22. 1979. in Washington. 
DC. 

Pursuant to the Memorandum of Agreement 
between the Governments of the United States 
and Israel signed March 26, 1979,' Israel and 
the United States have entered into the Oil 
Supply Arrangement set forth herein as fol- 
lows; 

1. Israel will make its own independent ar- 
rangements for oil supply to meet its require- 
ments through normal procedures. In the event 
Israel is unable to secure its needs in this way, 
the United States Government, upon noti- 
fication of this fact by the Government of Israel 
will act as follows: 

(a) If the oil Israel needs to meet all its nor- 
mal domestic requirements is unavailable for 
purchase in circumstances where no quantita- 
tive restrictions exist on the ability of the 
United States to procure oil to meet its normal 
requirements, the United States Government 
will promptly make oil available for purchase 
by Israel to meet the shortfall in the aforemen- 
tioned normal requirements of Israel. Oil will 
be made available to Israel as soon as practica- 
ble after notification; the United States will 
make every effort to ensure this period is less 
than 60 days. 

(b) If the oil Israel needs to meet all of its 
normal requirements for domestic consumption 
is unavailable for purchase in circumstances 
where quantitative restrictions through embargo 
or otherwise also prevent the United States from 
procuring oil to meet its normal requirements, 
the United States Government will promptly 
make oil available for purchase by Israel in ac- 
cordance with the International Energy Agency 
conservation and allocation formula as applied 
by the United States Government, in order to 
meet the shortfall in Israel's essential require- 
ments. Oil will be made available to Israel as 
soon as practicable after notification; the United 
States will make every effort to ensure this 
period is less than 60 days. 

(c) If Israel is unable to secure the necessary 
means to transport to Israel oil made available 
pursuant to this Agreement, the United States 
Government will make every effort to help Israel 
secure the necessary means of transport. 

2. Prices paid by Israel for oil provided by the 
United States hereunder shall be comparable to 
world market prices current at the time of trans- 
fer. Israel will, in any event, reimburse the 
United Stales for the costs incurred by the 
United States in providing oil to Israel here- 
under. 



3. Israeli and United States experts will meet 
annually or more frequently at the request of 
either party, to review Israel's continuing oil re- 
quirement and to develop and review any neces- 
sary contingency implementing arrangements. 

4. This Memorandum of Agreement is subject 
to applicable United Stales law. The United 
States administration may seek additional statu- 
tory authorization that may be necessary for full 
implementation of this Memorandum of Agree- 
ment. 

5. This Memorandum of Agreement shall 
enter into force on November 25, 1979 and shall 
terminate on November 25, 1994. The oil supply 
arrangement of September 1, 1975 between the 
Governments of Israel and the United States 
shall be in force during the period from the date 
of this Memorandum of Agreement to November 
25, 1994 and shall be performed and im- 
plemented in accordance with the provisions of 
this Memorandum of Agreement. 

Herbert J Hansell 
For the Government of 
the United States 

Yaacov Nechushtan 
For the Government of 
Israel 



June 22, 1979 

In connection with the Memorandum of 
Agreement being entered into on this dale be- 
tween the Government of Israel and the Gov- 
ernment of the United Slates, Israel and the 
United States understand that: 

Because of the unique security situation of 
Israel its oil reserves are and should be at the 
level equal to six months of Israel's oil con- 
sumption; and in this connection U.S. oil 
supplies should be at such levels that U.S. abil- 
ity to meet its oil requirements will not be ad- 
versely affected. 

For the Government of 
the United Stales 
Herbert J. Hansell 

For the Government of 

Israel 

Yaacov Nechushtan D 



' For text, see Bulletin of May 1979, p. 60. 



52 



Department ol State BLillelin 



IfiUUartf Equiptnt»iti Progrants 
for Egypt and Saudi Arabia 



by Harold H. Saunders 

Statement before the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee on July 20, 1979 . 
Mr. Saunders is Assistant Secretary for 
Near Eastern and South Asian 
Affairs. ' 

I take pleasure in being able to ap- 
pear before you today to discuss certain 
military equipment programs. I under- 
stand you wish to discuss the sale of 
F-4 aircraft to Egypt and the moderni- 
zation program for the Saudi National 
Guard. 



F-4 Aircraft for Egypt 

Under the $1.5 billion package of 
foreign military sales credits we have 
asked the Congress to authorize and 
appropriate in connection with the 
Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty, we 
would plan to sell two squadrons of 
F-4 Phantom aircraft and appropriate 
munitions. Thirty-five aircraft are in- 
volved in all. A list of the other mili- 
tary equipment — including armored 
personnel carriers, destroyers, and im- 
proved Hawk antiaircraft missiles — 
which we might be prepared to sell to 
Egypt has already been shared with 
Congress. 

The question might be posed: Why is 
it that Egypt requires these F-4 aircraft 
when the Peace Treaty between Egypt 
and Israel has significantly reduced 
Egypt's security concerns? The answer 
is that Egypt has legitimate national 
defense requirements even while in a 
state of peace with Israel. The security 
of Egypt's close ally, the Sudan, is a 
major concern. The security of the Nile 
lifeline has always been a major preoc- 
cupation of Egypt. To the north and 
east, Egypt's coastlines, and especially 
the Suez Canal, demand a credible 
military deterrent. 

Elsewhere in the immediate region, 
there are countries which are heavily 
armed with Soviet weaponry, and at 
least one country among them would 
like to derail the peace process and 
cause problems for Egypt. 

While seeking U.S. assistance to 
maintain sufficient military credibility. 
President Sadat continues to take the 
position that economic development 
remains Egypt's highest priority. Over 
the years ahead, as Egypt acquires 
more modern equipment, it should be 
possible to streamline and reduce the 



size of the Egyptian armed forces. 

In the meantime, some of Egypt's 
military inventory is becoming obso- 
lescent, and much of its Soviet-made 
equipment suffers from an absence of 
spare parts and consequent mainte- 
nance problems. Egypt needs a modern 
fighter aircraft for all-weather air de- 
fense and close air support. 

All 35 aircraft will come exclusively 
from our Air Force inventories, but 
they are in good shape. The initial air- 
craft delivered will tly over Cairo dur- 
ing the October 6 Armed Forces Day 
parade. This will be a highly visible 
manifestation of America's readiness to 
cooperate with Egypt in meeting 
promptly some — although not all — of 
Egypt's legitimate self-defense re- 
quirements. 

Saudi National Guard 
Modernization Program 

The Saudi National Guard, in its 
early equivalent, has existed almost 
since the formation of the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia. Its role is the preserva- 
tion of internal security and the protec- 
tion of key urban centers and installa- 
tions, including the oil fields and oil 
facilities. Its strength is 16.000 men, 
but tribal levies can be raised in an 
emergency to bring its total strength to 
about 32,000 men. 

In recent years, to take into account 
evolving security concerns, the Saudis 
decided that the capability of the Guard 
should be improved. It would remain a 
light defense force, but it would be 
more capable of supporting and com- 
plementing the larger and more heavily 
armed Saudi Army in a rapid way. To 
prepare the Guard for this role, it was 
necessary to reorganize it into mod- 
ernized battalions with equipment de- 
signed for mobility and quick reaction. 

The equipment would have to be 
highly mobile, rugged, and relatively 
easy to operate and to maintain. The 
Guard will not have the capability to 
repel a strong attack by regular military 
units but could deter and slow down 
any such attack until such time as the 
regular Army can be deployed to the 
area. 

The United States agreed to be 
helpful. In March 1973, the United 
States and the Saudi Government 
signed a memorandum of understand- 
ing on U.S. cooperation in the mod- 
ernization of the Guard. There will be 



no increase in si/e of the Natioiuil 
Guard. We started out by modern:/mg 
four battalions at a cost of approxi- 
mately $500 million. The units are 
equipped with V-150 armored cars, 
TOW missiles, towed Vulcan antiair- 
craft guns, and towed Howitzers. 
Training and equipping of three bat- 
talions has been completed; the fourth 
is currently in training. 

In the spring of 1978, the Saudis re- 
quested modernization of tour addi- 
tional combat battalions and one logis- 
tics battalion. Information on U.S. as- 
sistance in the training and equipping 
of the logistic battalion was provided to 
the Congress, which posed no objec- 
tions. This logistics battalion begins 
training early in 1980. The estimated 
cost of training and equipping the four 
additional combat battalions is $1.23 
billion, with the increased costs re- 
flecting inflationary pressure on con- 
tractor support arrangements and on 
newer generation equipment. 

We hope to go forward — with the 
support of the Congress — on the mod- 
ernization of the four battalions, a 4-5 
year program which will be completed 
in 1985. This is a reasonable, limited 
program which will help meet Saudi 
Arabia's legitimate internal security 
and self-defense needs without altering 
the regional arms balance. D 



' The complete tran^cript of the hearings will 
be published by the committee and will be 
available from the Superintendent ot Docu- 
ments, U.S. Government Printing Office, 
Washington. D.C, 20402. 



1/.S. Policy 
Toward israei 



SECRETARY'S STATEMENT, 
AUG. 8, 1979 

I have seen Foreign Minister Day- 
an's recent interview in Yediot 
Aharonot in which he says that there 
has been a "turn" in U.S. policy con- 
cerning Israel. I want to state categori- 
cally that there has been no change in 
our policy toward Israel. Our long- 
standing support for the security and 
well-being of Israel is firm and un- 
shakeable. It remains our policy to 
work toward a comprehensive peace 
settlement which is based on U.N. Se- 
curity Council Resolutions 242 and 
338. D 



October 1979 



53 



HWesiem Sahara 



by Harold H. Saunders 

Statement before the Subcommittee 
on Africa of the House Committee on 
Foreign Affairs on July 24. 1979. Mr. 
Saunders is Assistant Secretary for 
Near Eastern and South Asian 
Affairs. ' 

I see this discussion today on U.S. 
policy toward the western Sahara as 
part of a series ot consultations we 
have had with both houses ot Congress 
on this subject beginning almost 2 
years ago. These consultations have 
covered both the broad issue of the 
western Sahara and specific policy 
questions as they have faced the Ad- 
ministration. 

It is important at the outset to put 
U.S. policy toward the western Sahara 
in the context of our policy toward 
northwest Africa in general. 

Since the early days of our inde- 
pendence, this region has been impor- 
tant to us because of its location on the 
southern littoral of the Mediterranean, 
control ing the lower half of the Strait 
of Gibraltar. It is important to us be- 
cause of the role it plays both in Africa 
and in the Middle East. It is important 
because of its natural resources — 
petroleum and phosphates. 

Morocco 

In the modern era, we have had a 
close relationship with Morocco, which 
shared many of our interests, both 
globally and regionally. 

On the strategic side, we had 
Strategic Air Command bases in Mo- 
rocco until 1963, and we maintained 
naval communications bases there until 
we closed them at our initiative last 
year. Morocco continues to permit port 
visits by U.S. naval vessels and to 
allow U.S. military aircraft to transit to 
destinations such as Saudi Arabia. 

Morocco has historically taken a 
moderate position on the Arab-Israel 
question. It has the largest Jewish 
population of any country in the Arab 
world — almost 20,000 — and encour- 
ages the return to Morocco of Jews 
who have migrated to Israel. King Has- 
san was the first Arab leader to favor 
Egyptian President Sadat's trip to 
Jerusalem. While associating himself 
with the majority of Arab countries in 
opposition to the Egypt-Israel treaty. 
King Hassan maintains his personal 



friendship with Sadat and supports the 
principle of a peaceful, negotiated so- 
lution to the Arab-Israel dispute. 

In Africa, Morocco has consistently 
supported moderate forces. Morocco 
twice sent troops in response to re- 
quests from Zaire to maintain stability 
in that country's Shaba Province, it 
opposes Soviet and Cuban intervention 
in Africa. 

Algeria 

While we have not had the same 
similarity of views on regional and in- 
ternational issues with Algeria as we 
have with Morocco, our relations with 
Algeria have been steadily improving 
since we reestablished diplomatic rela- 
tions in 1974. We are Algeria's largest 
trading partner. It supplies us with 
about 9% of our crude oil imports. 
American firms have won $6 billion in 
contracts in Algeria in recent years for 
engineering and construction services. 
These economic relations are only one 
indication of a pragmatic approach of 
the Algerian Government, as a result of 
which we are able to maintain a frank 
and friendly dialogue on a wide variety 
of subjects. 

Western Sahara Dispute 

Into this fabric of bilateral relations 
which I have described there intervened 
in the mid-1970's the western Sahara 
dispute. 

When Spain decided to withdraw 
from the African colony known as 
Spanish Sahara, the Moroccan Gov- 
ernment activated an historic claim to 
the territory. The government's effort 
reflected strong irredentist feelings 
throughout Morocco, which considered 
Spanish Sahara as part of Morocco's 
historic territory and viewed its re- 
acquisition as the continuation of a 
gradual process of decolonization 
which began when the French protec- 
torate regime ended in the Moroccan 
heartland in 1956. After a couple of 
years of intense diplomatic maneuver- 
ing, Spain transferred administrative 
control to Morocco and Mauritania 
under the Madrid agreement of 1975. 

Morocco's quest aroused little sym- 
pathy in the region, particularly in 
Algeria and among some of the tribes 
which traditionally lived in and around 
the Spanish Sahara. The case had been 
referred to the International Court of 



Justice (ICJ) in The Hague, which 
ruled in effect that the disputed terri- 
tory had had historic links to the King- 
dom of Morocco but these did not con- 
stitute ties of sovereignty and that 
sovereignty could be established only 
by determining the will of the inhabit- 
ants. 

Morocco, however, took the ICJ 
ruling as legitimizing its claim to 
sovereignty. It replaced the Spanish 
administration in the northern two- 
thirds of the territory, while Mauritania 
took over the rest. 

The circumstances of the takeover 
were confused. Morocco claims that 
the inhabitants expressed their wishes 
through a vote by those members of the 
Spanish Sahara territorial assembly 
who were available after Morocco had 
entered the territory (a scant majority). 
This event has not been generally rec- 
ognized as constituting an exercise of 
self-determination. 

The United States, along with almost 
all other countries, recognized that 
Morocco and Mauritania had taken 
over administrative control of the ter- 
ritory but continued to believe that the 
question of its ultimate sovereignty re- 
mained unresolved. Tribal and other 
Saharan groups opposed to Moroccan 
control, which had coalesced before the 
Spanish departure into the Polisario 
movement, began a guerrilla movement 
against Moroccan and Mauritanian 
Armed Forces in the territory, with 
arms and sanctuary provided by 
Algeria. 

The Polisario declared a cease-fire 
with Mauritania in July 1978 which it 
ended exactly a year later with a strong 
attack on the Mauritanian post of 
Tichla in the southernmost portion of 
the former Spanish Sahara. Meanwhile. 
Polisario attacks continued in the 
Moroccan portion of the western Sa- 
hara. In addition, the Polisario increased 
its activities in southern Morocco 
proper, with major attacks on January 
28, May 31, June 4, June II. June 27, 
and July 14 of this year. Some of these 
probably involved hundreds of Pol- 
isario troops. 

It is difficult at this point to see how 
either side can win a military victory, 
but a peaceful solution to this dispute 
does not appear at hand. 

Morocco has consistently rejected 
calls for a referendum, arguing that the 
population expressed its will through 
the meeting of the territorial assembly. 
A renewed appeal for a referendum, 
this time by the Organization of Afri- 
can Unity's (OAU) Committee on 
Wisemen. was considered last week at 
the OAU summit meeting in Monrovia. 
A resolution was passed calling for a 
cease-fire and a referendum. The Mo- 



54 



Department of State Bulletin 



roccan Government has not yet re- 
sponded officially but appears willing 
to accept the principle of a cease-fire 
while continuing to reject the idea of a 
referendum. 

A negotiated solution also seems 
distant. Both Morocco and the Pol- 
isario claim sovereignty over the entire 
Moroccan portion of the western Sa- 
hara. Recent information suggests that 
the Polisano may even have begun lo 
lay claim to portions of southern 
Morocco proper. This leaves less room 
for compromise than ever. Moreover. 
Morocco claims that its dispute is with 
Algeria, without whose support the 
Polisario could not survive. It insists 
that negotiation should be directly with 
Algeria. Algeria, for its part, maintains 
that the dispute concerns Morocco and 
the Polisario and that any negotiations 
should be between those parties. 

Many countries and international or- 
ganizations have offered to try to help 
resolve the dispute. Spain, as the 
former colonial power, has discussed 
the problem with both sides, most re- 
cently during the visit of Prime Minis- 
ter Suarez to Algeria in April and of 
King Juan Carlos to Morocco in June. 
France also examines the situation 
periodically with the countries in- 
volved, and Saudi Arabia has tried 
once and possibly twice to help resolve 
the issue. Finally, representatives of 
the OAU Committee of Wisemen 
talked to all concerned within the past 
few months in an effort to find com- 
mon ground for a peaceful solution. 

We favor a peaceful, negotiated so- 
lution which respects the rights of the 
inhabitants and have made this clear to 
all concerned parties. We have not our- 
selves offered to mediate because of 
the number of other countries and or- 
ganizations which are already involved 
and which are better placed than we to 
perform this service. However, we 
have offered to help each of these 
countries and organizations in any way 
that we can. 

U.S. Policy 

This dispute has faced us with dif- 
ficult policy choices. 

Once again the United States lound 
itself on the horns of a dilemma not of 
its own making. The Sahara dispute 
between Morocco and Algeria makes it 
difticult for us to pursue our interests 
in the way we would like to with either 
country, without incurring the suspi- 
cion and even hostility of the other. 

In trying to work our way through 
this tangle of contradictions, we have 
sought to work as closely as possible 
with Congress. We have consistently 
agreed on recognizing Moroccan ad- 



SOUTH ASIA: 

I7.S. Policy Toward 

Afghanistan and Pakistan 



by Jack C. Miklos 

Statement before the Subcommittee 
on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the 
House Committee on Foreign Affairs 
on May 15. 1979. Mr. Miklos is Dep- 
uty Assistant Secretary for Near East- 
ern and South Asian Affairs. ' 

I am pleased to have the opportunity 
to discuss with your subcommittee 
U.S. policies toward Pakistan and Af- 
ghanistan in the context of our regional 
policy toward South Asia. 

The countries in this region have a 
number of characteristics in common as 
well as fundamental differences. 

• Many of the states share a common 
British colonial or protectorate experi- 
ence. 

• All of the states except Nepal and 
Sri Lanka are either overwhelmingly 



Islamic, or like India, have a large 
Moslem population. 

• All the countries share a basic 
geopolitical importance as they are 
situated in proximity to the U.S.S.R., 
the P.R.C., and the Persian Gulf. 

• Several of the states in the area are 
unstable and most have turbulent inter- 
nal political situations. The basic 
causes of instability in the region are 
internal, but the Soviet Union has and 
will continue to try and extend its in- 
fluence where it can. 

• In some parts of the area the de- 
mands of modernization have not been 
met by the pace of modernization and 
the promise of economic development 
remains unfulfilled. Economic frustra- 
tions have fueled political instability. 

• There has been a revival of Islamic 
fundamentalism in the area, alongside 
growing tension and sometimes open 



ministrative control while noting that 
the sovereignty issue remains unre- 
solved. This is a reasonable and credi- 
ble policy shared by most other coun- 
tries: 1 have no intention of suggesting 
today that it should be changed. The 
problem is how we apply it in specific 
cases and most particularly the ques- 
tion of how it affects our relations with 
Morocco. 

We wish to maintain our traditional 
close cooperation with Morocco to the 
extent possible. With congressional 
approval, we are continuing to provide 
financing for Moroccan military pur- 
chases and to furnish military training 
for Moroccan personnel. The President 
received King Hassan in Washington 
last November, and Secretary of Com- 
merce Kreps and then Deputy Secretary 
of Defense Duncan visited Morocco 
this year. We are seeking to expand ac- 
ademic exchanges, technical coopera- 
tion, and trade and investment with 
Morocco. However, in one area — our 
military supply relationship — the con- 
nict between our bilateral interests in 
Morocco and our Sahara policy has 
proven increasingly difficult to resolve. 

In practice, our general policy of 
recognizing Moroccan administrative 
control but not sovereignty over a por- 
tion of the western Sahara has meant a 
willingness to continue our historic role 



ot arms supplier to the Moroccan Gov- 
ernment but only for weapons to be 
used to defend the territory of Morocco 
proper. As you are aware, this policy 
has been easier to enunciate than to 
implement, and at times it has become 
a sticking point in our bilateral rela- 
tions with Morocco. 

Furthermore, since the beginning of 
this year, the situation our policy is de- 
signed to cope with has changed in 
fundamental ways. The most signifi- 
cant new development is probably the 
fact that, as 1 have noted, this year the 
Polisario has been vigorously carrying 
the war into areas within Morocco's 
historic boundaries. Morocco is no 
longer fighting only to pacify a region 
it has annexed; it is also defending it- 
self within its own territory against 
external attack. The Polisario's deci- 
sion to increase the scope and intensity 
of the fighting has made the quest for 
peace more difficult. It has also made it 
more difficult for us to maintain Mo- 
roccan understanding for a U.S. arms 
supply policy of great restraint. D 



'The complete transcript of the hearings will 
be published by the committee and will be avail- 
able from the Superintendent of Documents. 
U.S. Government Printing Office. Washington, 
D.C. 20402. 



October 1979 



55 



clashes between traditionalists and 
forces of change. 

• Governments range from demo- 
cratic to strict authoritarian and from 
nonaligned to pro-Soviet. There are 
fundamental differences among the 
countries in religion, race, social 
structure, economic development, and 
language. 

• In several countries of the region 
there is a sense of political and eco- 
nomic malaise and uncertainty. 

When our respected colleague, the 
late Spike Dubs,^ testified before this 
committee a little over a year ago, the 
situation in the region appeared to be 
far more stable than it is today, and we 
had reason to be relatively sanguine 
about future developments. Pakistan 
and India were making progress to- 
ward resolving their differences and the 
Indian Foreign Minister had just visited 
Islamabad. Pakistan and Afghanistan 
seemed to be moving toward settlement 
of their longstanding border dispute. 
India and Bangladesh had successfully 
negotiated an interim settlement of 
their dispute over the Ganges River 
water. Our policy was to encourage the 
countries of the region to settle their 
disputes among themselves and to keep 
great power involvement in the area to 
a minimum. 

Afghanistan 

Since then there have been dramatic 
changes in Afghanistan and Iran and a 
growing perception of instability in the 
general area. April 1978 saw a bloody 
revolution in Afghanistan which 
brought to power a leftist regime 
promising radical social and political 
reform. This new government, how- 
ever, is now confronted by a growing 
insurgency from tribal and religious 
elements who believe it is atheistic and 
pro-Russian. Rather than attempting to 
ascertain the will of its people, the Af- 
ghan Government has sought to push 
rapidly ahead with its plans and to 
suppress — often brutally — any signs of 
opposition or suspected disloyalty. 

Economically, the Afghan Govern- 
ment has announced major plans for 
land and credit reform. In some areas 
of the country, however, there have 
been strong reactions to such changes 
in this traditional and conservative ag- 
ricultural society, especially since new 
institutions have not been developed to 
replace the former landowners and 
moneylenders. As a result, agricultural 
production has declined and Afghani- 
stan faces a serious shortage of food- 
grains this year. 

During the last year, the Afghan 
Government has increasingly turned to 
the Soviet Union for military and eco- 



nomic support. Similarly, it has 
reoriented its foreign policy so that it is 
almost indistinguishable from that of 
Moscow. 

Our own relations with Afghanistan 
have regrettably deteriorated signifi- 
cantly. As the Soviet Union has be- 
come more directly involved in Af- 
ghanistan, we have detected a corre- 
sponding decline in interest in U.S. 
programs and insensitivity to our con- 
cerns. The Afghan Government's be- 
havior at the time of the tragic and 
senseless death of Ambassador Dubs in 
February has been the most flagrant 
example of this attitude and of what we 
can only conclude is a fundamental 
shift away from Afghanistan's tradi- 
tional nonalignment policy. 

We have tried to make clear to the 
Afghan Government that good relations 
are a two-way street which require 
concrete steps from both sides to dem- 
onstrate their interest in cooperation. It 
distresses us that this is not the case in 
U.S. -Afghan relations, particularly be- 
cause we know that there is still a great 
reservoir of goodwill among the Af- 
ghan people for the United States and 
Americans — as there is for Afghanistan 
in our own country. There are real 
benefits to be gained in our cooperation 
with the people of one of the world's 
poorest countries. 

The poor state of our current re- 
lationship was not our choice. It is the 
inescapable result when one party to a 
relationship shows no interest in giving 
life and substance to those ties. Be- 
cause of this lack of interest we have 
reduced our economic assistance pro- 
gram, terminated our military training 
program, and, for the time being, have 
withdrawn our Peace Corps volunteers 
and staff. The official American pres- 
ence in Afghanistan is necessarily also 
being somewhat reduced. 

We remain ready to listen to any 
ideas the Afghan Government may 
have as to how our relations can be im- 
proved. Certainly we cannot forget the 
humanitarian needs of Afghanistan's 
poor or the important effort which must 
be made to reduce illicit narcotics pro- 
duction and trafficking in that country. 
In addition, we believe there are still 
millions of Afghans who want to hear 
America's message and want a window 
on the world. We sincerely hope that 
the future will see the development of 
better relations between us. We would 
be happy to see some concrete signs 
that the Afghan Government shares this 
desire. 



Pakistan 

With regard to Pakistan, this country 
in a geopolitical sense is a pivot be- 



tween the states of the Indian subconti- 
nent and the oil-rich states of western 
Asia. 

Internally, the most significant 
political development has been the an- 
nouncement by President Zia that na- 
tional elections will be held on No- 
vember 17. We warmly welcome this 
announcment and look forward to the 
restoration of democratic government 
in Pakistan. We expect that the elec- 
tions will be held as scheduled and be- 
lieve the people of Pakistan would be 
disappointed if they were canceled or 
postponed. 

Between now and November we see 
a period of political uncertainty and 
realignment as the various political 
parties and their leaders prepare for 
elections. The months ahead will be 
important for the future of Pakistan. 
President Zia has recently named a 
Cabinet of essentially nonpartisan fig- 
ures to carry on the work of the gov- 
ernment and prepare for the elections. 
We wish Pakistan well in this en- 
deavor. 

In recent years there has been re- 
newed interest in the application of Is- 
lamic tenets to political and economic 
life. President Zia has introduced addi- 
tional Islamic principles into the law 
and provided for the introduction of 
Sharia courts to bring Pakistani law 
into line with these principles. Addi- 
tional measures would revise internal 
taxation and provide for the ultimate 
introduction of interest-free banking. 
Although these measures are generally 
popular and are being prepared with 
care, some foresee that Islamic edicts 
may fall haphazardly and unequally on 
different elements within the society. 

The Islamic resurgence in Pakistan 
and other countries of the region is a 
very important development, and we 
welcome the movement to apply the 
humanitarian and social ideals of this 
great religion. 

As the committee knows, in com- 
pliance with Section 669 of the Foreign 
Assistance Act we are presently wind- 
ing down our development assistance 
programs to Pakistan. However, we 
hope humanitarian assistance in the 
form of PL-480 food aid will continue 
with the support of Congress. 

Our substantial PL-480 program has 
been necessitated by a wheat harvest 
last year that was much lower than ex- 
pected. The crop failure was primarily 
related to natural causes, specifically 
rust. However, the poor harvest rein- 
forced the Pakistan Government's 
anxiety to increase food production to 
achieve self-sufficiency. With our en- 
couragement, the government has taken 
steps to revise policies and is pressing 
forward with programs designed to in- 



56 



crease wheat production. Those meas- 
ures, combined with good growing 
conditions, have resulted in Pakistan's 
farmers now bringing to market what 
appears to be a very good harvest. Our 
PL-480 assistance is designed to help 
the Pakistan Government undertake 
food policy reforms and a comprehen- 
sive agricultural production strategy 
leading to self-sufficiency. 

During the past year the Pakistan 
Government has introduced a number 
of measures to rationalize the economy 
and encourage investment. The re- 
sponse to some of these measures has 
been encouraging. Many companies, 
for example, that were nationalized by 
Mr. Bhutto have been returned to their 
owners. The government has raised the 
procurement price paid to farmers in an 
effort to increase wheat production. 
Recently the government took the 
politically difficult step of increasing 
the price of wheat in the ration shops 
which serve urban dwellers, thus re- 
ducing the highly inflationary govern- 
ment food subsidy. 

However, the country's overall eco- 
nomic performance has been disap- 
pointing and a number of problems 
continue to inhibit rapid economic de- 
velopment. Government subsidies and 
large capital projects, started under the 
previous regime, have contributed to a 
growing budget deficit. Those deficits 
have inflated prices and stimulated im- 
ports. Prospects are for a deterioration 
in the balance of payments during the 
coming year. We and other donors are 
encouraging the Government of Paki- 
stan to undertake a balanced stabiliza- 
tion program that can deal effectively 
with external payments problems that 
have grown apace with the budgetary 
problem. 

Narcotics Control 

It is estimated by the Drug Enforce- 
ment Administration that Afghanistan 
and Pakistan will produce as much as 
800 metric tons of opium during the 
1978-79 growing season, making this 
area the world's single largest source 
of illicit opium. While heroin from this 
source currently comprises only a small 
percentage of the total heroin entering 
the United States, it has begun to enter 
Europe in increasing quantities and is 
readily available to U.S. troops sta- 
tioned in Germany and other European 
countries. 

As you are aware, the political cir- 
cumstances in Afghanistan and Paki- 
stan have permitted little or no direct 
U.S bilateral assistance for narcotics 
control in these two countries. How- 
ever, we are pursuing a determined 
effort to enlist increasing support on 



both a bilateral and multilateral basis 
from industrialized nations for the 
global international narcotics control 
effort. 

In Pakistan, $944,000 of interna- 
tional narcotics control funds were ex- 
pended from FY 1972-78 to support 
law enforcement operations. An addi- 
tional $10,000 has been obligated in 
FY 1979 for the same purpose. In 
addition, the U.N. Fund for Drug 
Abuse Control is operating a pilot rural 
development program in the Buner 
District of Pakistan. In order to extend 
this program beyond the pilot phase, 
additional funds are required. The West 
German Government has expressed 
interest in the program but has not as 
yet committed financial resources. 

While we have not made as much 
progress as we would have liked in this 
area, we shall continue to work with 
the Government of Pakistan and elicit 
the support of other nations to contrib- 
ute to this effort either multilaterally or 
bilaterally. 



Regional Policy 
Toward South Asia 

The situation in India, Bangladesh, 
Nepal, Sri Lanka, and the Maldive Is- 
lands has been relatively calm. Demo- 
cratic elections were successfully held 
in Bangladesh, a new Parliament has 
come into being and martial law lifted. 
We were very pleased by these de- 
velopments. Our relations with India 
are good but troubled by the nuclear 
safeguards issue. 

Despite the changes over the past 
year our general policy toward the re- 
gion remains what it was a year ago. 

• We believe that great power in- 
volvement in the region should be kept 
to a minimum. 

• We believe that countries of the 
region should be encouraged to resolve 
their disputes among themselves with- 
out outside interference. We hope they 
will concentrate on their own internal 
problems and direct their energies to- 
ward fulfilling the economic aspira- 
tions of their people. 

• We hope that the countries of the 
area will not follow policies which will 
encourage outsiders to intervene in re- 
gional affairs. 

• We wish to assist governments in 
the region to meet the economic aspira- 
tions of their people. At the same time 
we are trying to avoid programs which 
stimulate aspirations more rapidly than 
they can be fulfilled. 

• We are also encouraging economic 
reform and wider participation in gov- 
ernment but recognize that change will 
usually be regulated by internal de- 



Department of State Bulletin 

velopments. We sympathize with many 
of the humanitarian and social ideals 
which Islam teaches. 

• We have a major interest in pre- 
venting the development of a nuclear- 
weapons capability in the region. 

• We wish to have assured access 
for U.S. trade and commerce. 

• We have basic concerns regarding 
human rights in the area. 

Nuclear Activities in Pakistan 

I am aware that the committee feels 
that the United States should have a 
coherent policy toward the region 
which does not conflict with the bilat- 
eral concerns between the United States 
and any particular nation. We are all 
concerned that U.S. global concern 
over nuclear nonproliferation policies 
has led to serious difficulties with 
Pakistan and India. 

Pakistan's activities in the nuclear 
field have presented us with a very real 
policy dilemma. Pakistan is important 
to us and to the region, especially 
given the chaotic situation in Iran and 
Soviet activities in Afghanistan. Politi- 
cally Pakistan is a traditional friend of 
the United States, and as one of the 
more moderate states in the Third 
World can contribute to stability in the 
region. We are linked to Pakistan by a 
1959 agreement, and the continuing in- 
dependence and territorial integrity of 
this country is of fundamental impor- 
tance to us. We have accepted the 
Durand Line as being the internation- 
ally recognized border between Paki- 
stan and Afghanistan. 

Pakistan's current nuclear activities, 
however, restrict our ability to assist it 
in meeting its considerable security and 
economic requirements. We have reli- 
able information that Pakistan has been 
acquiring abroad the components of a 
uranium enrichment facility, and we 
have concluded that the Symington 
amendment required us to terminate 
our existing assistance programs in an 
orderly manner. 

We view this matter with the utmost 
seriousness. Should there be prolifera- 
tion of nuclear explosive capability on 
the subcontinent, it would have very 
serious consequences for global secu- 
rity and for our efforts to contain this 
awesome destructive power. We recog- 
nize that many countries with limited 
energy resources wish to develop the 
peaceful potential of the atom. With 
this we have no argument and, indeed, 
are willing to cooperate under condi- 
tions laid down in the Nonproliferation 
Policy Act — which is nondiscrimina- 
tory and applies to all alike. 

We will continue to work to prevent 
the spread of nuclear explosive capa- 



October 1979 



57 



Ul>fITED ]\ATI01\S: ]%amthta 



by Donald F . McHenry 

Statement before the Subcommittee 
on Africa of the House Committee on 
Foreign Affairs on May 7, 1979. Am- 
bassador McHenry is U.S. Deputy 
Representative to the U.N. Security 
Council . ' 

I am pleased to have this opportunity 
to discuss with you today the negotia- 
tions in which the United States has 
been involved during the past 2 years 
on the question of Namibia. Namibia is 
not well known to Americans, but a 
peaceful transition in that country 
could be of critical importance for the 
future of southern Africa. 

Namibia, also known as South West 
Africa, was a German colony and be- 
came a League of Nations" mandate 
under South African administration 
following World War I. After World 
War 1!, South Africa sought to annex 
the territory and, when rebuffed by the 
United Nations, South Africa refused 
to place the territory under the trust- 
eeship system of the United Nations. 
Thus began a long dispute between 
South Africa and the international 
community, involving numerous judg- 
ments of the International Court of 
Justice and even more numerous de- 
bates in the United Nations, culminat- 
ing in the 1966 decision of the U.N. 
General Assembly, with the support of 
the United States, to terminate South 
Africa's mandate, an action subse- 
quently upheld by the International 
Court. 

The International Court of Justice 
ruled that South Africa's presence in 
Namibia was illegal and that South Af- 
rica was obliged to withdraw. South 
Africa again refused to withdraw. In- 



bility and we hope all concerned will 
keep an open mind on solutions to this 
problem. D 



'The complete transcript of the hearings will 
be published by the committee and will be 
available from (he Superintendent of Docu- 
ments, U.S. Government Printing Office, 
Washington. D.C. 20402. 

^U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan Adolph 
Dubs was kidnaped in Kabul on Feb. 14, 
1979. by terrorists and killed the same day 
during an attempt by Afghan police to free him 
from his captors. 



Stead it embarked upon a policy which 
would have transferred power under a 
constitution so formulated as to insure 
the continued disproportionate influ- 
ence of whites and which stood no 
chance of obtaining the necessary 
political consensus which would merit 
either Namibian or international ac- 
ceptability. Nor would it stem the 
guerrilla war which — in opposition to 
South Africa's continued rule and ap- 
plication of apartheid in the territory — 
had gradually developed between South 
Africa and the Namibian nationalists, 
principally the South West Africa 
People's Organization (SWAPO). To 
this day this cycle of violence con- 
tinues to escalate with ominous impli- 
cations for the future of the entire re- 
gion. 

Efforts of the Western Five 

It was against this background that in 
April of 1977. the then five Western 
members of the U.N. Security Council 
— Canada. France, the Federal Repub- 
lic of Germany, the United Kingdom, 
and the United States — ^jointly launched 
an unprecedented effort to find a peace- 
ful solution for the Namibian problem. 
The initiative was possible because we 
were able to build on a set of principles 
unanimously adopted by the U.N. Se- 
curity Council in Resolution 385 in 
January 1976. I might add that the ini- 
tiative was also possible because of the 
goodwill and great expectations which 
greeted President Carter's election and 
his appointment of Ambassador Young 
as U.S. Representative to the United 
Nations. 

From the outset the five nations 
made clear that their goal was to for- 
mulate an internationally acceptable 
method of implementation of the prin- 
ciples contained in Resolution 385 
which called for tree and fair elections 
under U.N. supervision and control. 
The five made clear that they favored 
no particular Namibian political group. 
The five were interested not in the out- 
come of the elections but solely in in- 
suring that all Namibian people would 
have an equal opportunity to freely and 
fairly elect their own government. The 
five also recognized that in order for a 
settlement to be meaningful and lasting 
it would have to be accepted by the two 
parties engaged in the armed conflict — 
the South African Government; and 
SWAPO, which enjoyed substantial 



support within Namibia and interna- 
tionally. 

It is important here to emphasize two 
facts which these negotiations have had 
to take into account. South Africa, un- 
lawfully in occupation of Namibia, was 
nevertheless the de facto governing 
authority there, and its assent was es- 
sential to any settlement. SWAPO, al- 
though only one of several Namibian 
political groups, carried the war effort; 
had the support of a major segment of 
the population; the unanimous support 
of other African governments and the 
majority of non-African members of 
the United Nations. No peaceful set- 
tlement could be achieved without 
SWAPO's participation. 

Finally, we recognized that a suc- 
cessful undertaking must involve the 
cooperation of the front-line states 
(Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, 
Tanzania, and Zambia) and Nigeria in 
helping with the negotiating process, in 
assuring successful implementation of 
an agreement, and, most importantly, 
in assuring respect for the outcome of 
the elections. These states have fully 
supported our efforts. 

Negotiating Problems 

The negotiating process itself has 
been unique and extraordinarily com- 
plex; it could not have been undertaken 
without modern communications. Five 
nations have operated as one negotiat- 
ing team, which has come to be known 
as the contact group. Each step has re- 
quired careful coordination among our 
missions in New York, our capitals, 
our embassies in the front-line states 
and Nigeria and our embassies in South 
Africa. 

In addition to the complexities of 
this five-nation arrangement, those in- 
volving the negotiating procedure have 
been numerous. For example. South 
Africa refuses to meet with SWAPO. 
This has necessitated various forms of 
shuttle diplomacy as well as so-called 
proximity talks in which the two parties 
travel to one city and meet with the 
contact group separately. There also 
have been a number of nations, groups, 
and organizations involved in the proc- 
ess in one capacity or another with 
whom we have maintained regular 
communications. We have met with all 
of the major Namibian political groups 
at each stage of the negotiations in 
order to insure that they were kept in- 
formed and to take their views fully 
into account. U.N. Secretary General 
Waldheim has played an important role 
in carrying the effort forward, as have 
his special representative for Namibia, 
Mr. Marti Ahtisaari of Finland, and 
the Security Council as a whole. 



58 



Department of State Bulletin 



As in any longstanding dispute, the 
current negotiations have been ham- 
pered by attitudinal and political prob- 
lems. First, whatever their ultimate 
motives, both South Africa and 
SWAPO have been anxious to avoid 
being seen internationally as the in- 
transigent party. South Africa may 
have faith only in a so-called internal 
solution, and SWAPO may have faith 
only in a military one. However, 
neither wished to lose what support it 
had in the international community, 
and this desire not to lose support has 
tended to motivate them both toward a 
settlement. 

Second, a constant problem through- 
out the effort has been the pervasive 
presence of distrust: distrust between 
South Africa and SWAPO; the distrust 
which each of them has of the five; 
and the distrust which South Africa has 
for the United Nations. SWAPO be- 
lieves that South Africa aims at con- 
tinued dominance through installation 
of a government favorable to South 
Africa and will only agree to a settle- 
ment which guarantees such an out- 
come. South Africa, for its part, be- 
lieves that SWAPO aims only at the 
seizure of power and will not abide by 
the results of a fair electoral process. 

South Africa and the United Nations 
have been at odds over Namibia since 
the United Nations' inception, and the 
United Nations has also soundly and 
regularly criticized South Africa for its 
policies of apartheid. In addition, the 
General Assembly's endorsement of 
SWAPO is well known. South Africa, 
therefore, views the United Nations not 
as an organization of neutrality but as 
one unalterably hostile. I should note 
in this regard that while the General 
Assembly has endorsed SWAPO as the 
"sole and authentic representative of 
the Namibian people," it is the Secu- 
rity Council working through interna- 
tional civil servants, and not the Gen- 
eral Assembly, which will oversee the 
transition in Namibia, and the Security 
Council has adopted no such position. 
Moreover, the United Nations has an 
excellent record for impartial peace- 
keeping operations. 

The distrust by SWAPO of the five 
stems from its view that South Africa's 
very dominance is dependent upon 
Western economic and political sup- 
port. One manifestation of this distrust 
was SWAPO's initial objection to the 
inclusion of NATO nations in the com- 
position of the proposed U.N. military 
presence in Namibia. 

South Africa, on the other hand, 
fears that the five are susceptible to 
pressure from the Africans. South Af- 
rica's distrust has been dramatized in 
recent weeks by the repeated accusa- 
tions made publicly by the South Afri- 



can Government that the contact group, 
the U.N. Secretariat, and certain U.S. 
officials have during the negotiations 
displayed deceit, doubledealing, and a 
pro-SWAPO bias. 

We have refrained from commenting 
publicly on these accusations, largely 
because we believe that the search for 
peace is best pursued through calm and 
private deliberation and with an ac- 
ceptance of the good faith of all even in 
the presence of sharp disagreement. 
However, this forbearance should not 
be mistaken. There is not a shred of 
truth to South Africa's charges. 

A third problem in the Namibia set- 
tlement effort has been the difficulty, if 
not the impossibility, of separating 
Namibia from the other occurrences in 
the region. It is difficult to isolate 
political developments in Namibia from 
those in Rhodesia; from the internal 
politics and political turmoil in South 
Africa itself; from South Africa's fear 
of being surrounded by radical black 
African states; or from the ultimate 
objectives of outside forces. All of 
these influences play on the prospects 
for a settlement in Namibia and in fact 
hold those prospects hostage. 

A final problem which I would like 
to raise at this point is that neither 
South Africa nor SWAPO is monolithic 
though, publicly at least, each projects 
such an image of itself and of the 
other. Both have factions with differing 
views and different constituencies 
which make the decisionmaking proc- 
esses on each side delicate and fre- 
quently time-consuming. Too fre- 
quently internal politics has prompted 
both sides to make decidedly unhelpful 
public statements which have either 
raised new problems or closed off po- 
tential avenues of accommodation. 

Western Five's Proposal 
for a Settlement 

These, then, are some of the at- 
titudinal and political problems with 
which the five have had to deal in our 
settlement effort. That effort initially 
consisted of determining through 
lengthy discussions with the parties 
their concerns, their demands, and 
their areas of compromise. Agreement 
was quickly reached on a number of 
points. Before long, however, it be- 
came apparent that if the impasse over 
Namibia was to be broken, the five 
would have to develop their own pro- 
posal for a settlement and then try to 
bring about its acceptance. 

On April 10, 1978. the five placed 
their proposal for a settlement before 
the U.N. Security Council.'^ We recog- 
nized that it did not meet all of the de- 
mands of either party. However, we 
believe that it offers a fair and balanced 



solution based on the legitimate con- 
cerns of the parties and reasonably 
bridges the gaps between the parties. 

The proposal submitted to the Secu- 
rity Council is based on the principles 
set down in Security Council Resolu- 
tion 385 and consists of the following 
key elements. 

I) A cessation of all hostile acts by 
all parties and the restriction of South 
African and SWAPO armed forces to 
base. Thereafter a phased withdrawal 
from Namibia of all but 1.500 South 
African troops within 12 weeks and 
prior to the official start of the political 
campaign. The remaining South Afri- 
can force would be restricted to 
Grootfontein or Oshivello or both and 
would be withdrawn after the certifica- 
tion of the election. 

2) A South African-appointed Ad- 
ministrator General would administer 
the territory during the transition period 
leading to the election of a constituent 
assembly. However, all acts affecting 
the political process would be under 
U.N. supervision and control in that 
the U.N. special representative will 
have to satisfy himself at each stage as 
to the fairness and appropriateness of 
all measures affecting the political 
process at all levels of administration 
before such measures take effect. 

3) A U.N. Transition Assistance 
Group (UNTAG). consisting of civilian 
and military elements whose size and 
composition would be determined by 
the Secretary General, would be intro- 
duced in the territory to insure the ob- 
servance of the terms of the settlement. 

4) Primary responsibility for main- 
taining law and order in Namibia dur- 
ing the transition period would rest 
with the existing police forces. How- 
ever, among other things, the Adminis- 
trator General, to the satisfaction of the 
U.N. special representative, would in- 
sure the good conduct of the police 
forces. The special representative 
would make arrangements when appro- 
priate for U.N. personnel to accom- 
pany the police forces in the discharge 
of their duties. 

5) All Namibian political prisoners 
and detainees would be released, exiles 
would be free to return, and conditions 
for free and fair elections would be es- 
tablished (e.g., freedom of speech, 
movement, press, assembly, and the 
repeal of discriminatory or restrictive 
legislation). 

The settlement proposal does not at- 
tempt to spell out all of the details in- 
volved in such a settlement. Some 
points are of necessity general; to try to 
refine them more precisely would have 
entailed years of negotiations. Instead 
the proposal depends heavily on coop- 
eration between the Administrator 



October 1979 



59 



General and the U.N. special repre- 
sentative. 

Reaction to the Proposal 

The settlement proposal of the five 
was not immediately accepted by either 
party, but by the end of July 1978 both 
parties had agreed that the Secretary 
General should be requested to draw up 
his report on how the proposal would 
be implemented. This agreement was 
not reached, however, without first ad- 
dressing a number of contentious is- 
sues, the most notable of which was the 
question of Walvis Bay. Moreover, in 
their public statements each chose to 
emphasize certain aspects of the pro- 
posal while understating or even omit- 
ting counterbalancing provisions. 

When the Secretary General's plans 
for implementation were announced 
they too became the source of con- 
troversy. South Africa, for example, 
objected to the holding of elections 
after December 1978, despite the fact 
that the proposal clearly required a 
7-month process which, given the date 
of acceptance by the parties, could not 
be completed by the end of 1978. 
South Africa also objected to the size 
of the proposed 7,500-man U.N. mili- 
tary presence, despite the formidable 
size and nature of the territory; despite 
South Africa's own concern for secu- 
rity; and despite the fact that the set- 
tlement proposal left the formation of 
UNTAG to the discretion of the Secre- 
tary General. 

These initial objections were re- 
solved through further discussions but 
not before South Africa took another 
step which seemed to be directed to- 
ward an internal settlement. Over our 
strong objection, unilateral elections 
took place in December 1978, and a 
so-called constituent assembly was es- 
tablished. The elections were boycotted 
by several parties, and the resulting as- 
sembly consists almost entirely of the 
Democratic Turnhalle Alliance, the 
party widely assumed to be favored by 
the South African Government. 

The South Africans then advised 
Secretary General Waldheim at the end 
of December that they were prepared to 
cooperate with the implementation of 
the U.N. plan and suggested that the 
Secretary General's special representa- 
tive visit South Africa for discussions. 
These talks took place this past Jan- 
uary, and Mr. Ahtisaari also visited the 
front-line states and met with leaders of 
those countries and of SWAPO. These 
discussions made clear that both parties 
were seeking to obtain advantages in 
the implementation process which they 
were not able to achieve in the negoti- 
ations. For example. South Africa in- 
sisted on the monitoring by UNTAG of 



SWAPO bases outside of Namibia, and 
SWAPO asked for a period of time 
after the ceasefire during which 2,500 
armed SWAPO personnel would be 
moved to five bases to be established 
inside Namibia. 



Secretary General's Report 

Neither of these positions was ac- 
cepted by the Secretary General. In- 
stead the Secretary General issued a re- 
port on the 26th of February which pre- 
sented his proposals for the resolution 
of the few remaining issues. 

In that report Secretary General 
Waldheim stated that, while the settle- 
ment proposal made no specific provi- 
sion for the monitoring by UNTAG of 
SWAPO bases in neighboring coun- 
tries, those countries, nevertheless, had 
been asked to insure that the provisions 
of the transitional arrangements, and 
the outcome of the election, would be 
respected. In addition, the Secretary 
General was seeking the agreement of 
the Governments of Angola, Botswana, 
and Zambia for the establishment of 
UNTAG liaison offices in their coun- 
tries to facilitate cooperation in the im- 
plementation of the proposal. 

The Secretary General also specified 
arrangements for the handling of 
SWAPO armed personnel, carefully 
differentiating between those inside 
Namibia at the time of the ceasefire 
and those outside. Any SWAPO armed 
forces in Namibia at the time of the 
ceasefire would be restricted to desig- 
nated locations inside Namibia. All 
SWAPO armed forces in neighboring 
countries would, on the commencement 
of the ceasefire, be restricted to base in 
those countries. 

South Africa again reacted nega- 
tively to the Secretary General's pro- 
posals, in particular those relating to 
the absence of UNTAG monitoring of 
SWAPO bases in Angola and Zambia 
and to the handling of SWAPO armed 
personnel who are in Namibia at the 
time of the ceasefire. To avert a break- 
down of the initiative over these issues, 
another round of ministerial level 
"proximity talks" was held in New 
York on March 19 and 20 during which 
Secretary Vance and his colleagues 
presented our view to South African 
Foreign Minister Botha that the Secre- 
tary General's report was consistent 
with the original proposal which South 
Africa had accepted. During those 
talks, the SWAPO delegation: 

• Accepted the restriction of their 
own forces outside Namibia to base 
outside Namibia; 

• Accepted the Secretary General's 
proposal for designating locations to 
which any SWAPO armed personnel 



inside Namibia at the start of the 
ceasefire would be restricted and mon- 
itored; 

• Accepted the Secretary General's 
intention to designate only one or two 
such locations; and 

• Stated that they had no intention of 
infiltrating any armed personnel into 
Namibia following the start of the 
ceasefire and that in fact they had no 
intention of infiltrating any armed per- 
sonnel during the period between the 
signing of the ceasefire and the actual 
start of the ceasefire. 

SWAPO has thus accepted the im- 
plementation plans of the Secretary 
General, which the five also fully sup- 
port, and is now prepared to move 
ahead with that implementation. Dur- 
ing these same proximity talks the 
front-line states reiterated their com- 
mitment to scrupulously insure the ob- 
servance of the ceasefire agreement. 



Principal Issues 

Because South Africa's objections 
are still outstanding, I believe it useful 
to examine in greater detail the two 
principal issues which seem to stand in 
the way of South Africa's acceptance. 

First, South Africa has called for 
monitoring by UNTAG of SWAPO 
bases outside Namibia. However de- 
sirable such monitoring might be, 
South Africa was informed prior to its 
acceptance of the five's proposal last 
year that such a provision was unac- 
ceptable to the neighboring states and 
that this element was taken into ac- 
count in determining the size and func- 
tions of UNTAG. Neither we nor the 
United Nations can dictate to sovereign 
nations which are not a party to the 
settlement. As 1 have stated previously, 
the front-line states have committed 
themselves to insuring the scrupulous 
observance of the ceasefire. We accept 
these assurances. 

The second issue, and the one which 
seems now to be South Africa's pri- 
mary objection, is the Secretary Gen- 
eral's proposal that any SWAPO armed 
personnel in Namibia at the start of the 
ceasefire will be restricted and moni- 
tored by the United Nations at desig- 
nated locations inside Namibia. In 
making this proposal the Secretary 
General was faced with a very difficult 
practical question. The Secretary Gen- 
eral decided, and the five support him 
in this decision, that those SWAPO 
armed personnel inside Namibia, esti- 
mated at perhaps several hundred, 
should be indentified and restricted in 
such a way as to facilitate their 
monitoring. 

There were, of course, other alterna- 



60 



Department of State Bulletin 



tives, such as safe passage out of the 
territory or disarming of SWAPO per- 
sonnel. However, the level of SWAPO 
distrust of South Africa's intentions 
was such that SWAPO was not pre- 
pared to take these courses which, of 
course, would allow South Africa to 
gain in the peace that which it could 
not gain in the conflict, i.e., the elimi- 
nation of SWAPO' s armed presence in 
the territory. In this regard. South Af- 
rica's objective is no less objectionable 
than SWAPO's rejected proposal to in- 
troduce a large armed force after the 
ceasefire. 

It is possible to engage in a legalistic 
argument over whether the establish- 
ment of such SWAPO locations was 
envisioned under the settlement pro- 
posal; however, it is only the practical 
problem which must be solved. The 
Secretary General was sensitive to the 
need to insure that the electoral process 
could not be adversely affected by the 
manner in which this issue was han- 
dled. The locations would be, as far as 
practical, away from population cen- 
ters. The SWAPO personnel would be 
restricted to those locations and moni- 
tored closely by the United Nations. 

I might add that two other Namibian 
political groups which had previously 
supported implementation of our set- 
tlement proposal, the SWAPO-Dem- 
ocrats and the Namibia National Front 
(NNF), initially opposed the suggestion 
of a SWAPO armed presence inside 
Namibia, in part because they thought 
that Mr. Waldheim's plan was intended 
to accede to SWAPO proposals which 
had in fact been rejected. This misun- 
derstanding has been corrected, and 
SWAPO-Democrats have now urged 
immediate implementation of the Sec- 
retary General's plan. The NNF is ex- 
pected to announce its position soon. 

There are several lesser issues which 
could be raised to a higher degree of 
importance. These include the com- 
position of the military component of 
UNTAG and the timing of the U.N.- 
supervised elections. Neither SWAPO 
nor South Africa has yet given its for- 
mal agreement to the composition pro- 
posed by Secretary General Waldheim, 
but this should be relatively easily 
achieved once the major issues are re- 
solved. South Africa has not withdrawn 
its earlier insistence on the holding of 
elections by September 30, a date 
which South Africa's delay in accept- 
ing implementation of the settlement 
proposal obviously has made impos- 
sible to meet. While we recognize the 
need to move ahead rapidly and recog- 
nize that deadlines can serve to spur 
events onward, we continue to believe 
that peaceful accommodation through 
free and fair elections is more impor- 
tant than an artificial deadline. 



Conclusion 

In conclusion, let me say that the 
five governments believe our settle- 
ment proposal and the implementation 
plan of Secretary General Waldheim 
offer a balanced and fair settlement of 
the Namibian question and the only vi- 
able settlement available which can 
bring about an independent Namibia 
which enjoys broad international sup- 
port. To be sure, this settlement pack- 
age does not satisfy every demand ol 
everyone involved, but it does in our 
estimation satisfy every legitimate con- 
cern of the parties. 

SWAPO is now prepared to proceed 
with this settlement. So are the five, 
the U.N. Security Council, and the in- 
ternational community generally. South 
Africa has not agreed and has said that 
it must consult with the other Namibian 
political groups before it makes its de- 
cision. We recognize South Africa's 
desire to hold these consultations. But 
it is the South African Government 
which must determine whether or not it 
will cooperate with the United Nations 
in an internationally acceptable settle- 
ment. That responsibility cannot be 
passed off to others. 

Most African members of the United 
Nations are convinced that South Af- 
rica has never had any intention of pro- 
ceeding with an internationally accept- 
able settlement in Namibia. The 
front-line states believe that, since they 
have brought SWAPO to accept the 
settlement, it is now up to the five to 
obtain South Africa's agreement. If 
South Africa does not agree, there will 
be increasingly strong calls at the 
United Nations for us to support our 
own negotiations by exerting real pres- 
sure on South Africa, in other words 
some form of economic sanctions. 

We have continually told the front- 
line states and other African nations 
that negotiation is a real alternative to 
the armed struggle in southern Africa. 
Our inability to obtain South Africa's 
acceptance would almost certainly be 
seen as proof of an ultimate lack of will 
in the West to press South Africa to 
cooperate with a negotiated settlement. 
It would be seen by Africans as proof 
of the ineffectiveness of negotiation for 
peaceful change as a viable alternative 
to long and bloody military solutions. 
It would surely adversely affect the 
prospects for negotiated settlements in 
the rest of southern Africa. 

It would result in an escalation of 
hostilities and chaos and open further 
opportunities for outside forces and 
alien ideologies. 

At the present there are several seri- 
ous developments which further com- 
plicate and even endanger the settle- 
ment effort. Once again South Africa 



has arrested without charge or trial al- 
most the entire internal leadership of 
SWAPO. There are reports of greatly 
increased South African military activ- 
ity. Conversely there are reports of 
heightened SWAPO guerrilla action. 
All of this indicates that the cycle of 
violence is expanding. 

At this stage Namibia is still a rela- 
tively small problem in southern Africa 
— and the one most susceptible to a 
negotiated solution. With time, how- 
ever, it will become increasingly com- 
plex and difficult. 

Bitterness will exceed reason. To- 
day's compromise solution will be 
overshadowed by non-negotiable de- 
mands. For these reasons, we must 
continue to do our utmost not to let the 
opportunity of a peaceful settlement 
pass us by. D 



'Text from U.S. U.N. press release 40. The 
complete transcript of the hearing will be pub- 
lished by the committee and will be available 
from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. 
Government Printing Office. Washington. 
DC 20402. 

^ For text of the proposal for a Namibian set- 
tlement, see Bulletin of June 1978. p. 53. 



President Carter^s 

Jfteeting With 

MJ,]%, Secretary 

General 



WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, 
JULY 30, 1979' 

President Carter met this afternoon 
with U.N. Secretary General Kurt 
Waldheim for 50 minutes in the Cab- 
inet Room. The President congratulated 
Secretary General Waldheim on the re- 
sults of the Geneva meeting on In- 
dochina refugees. The President felt 
the Secretary General's efforts were a 
key factor in the progress made on sub- 
stantially increasing funding pledges 
and commitments from a variety of 
countries to resettle refugees. 

On the Middle East, the President 
discussed U.S. policies for advancing 
the peace process. The two leaders dis- 
cussed the question of a continued 
U.N. presence in the Sinai. The Presi- 
dent told the Secretary General that we 
will be consulting closely with Israel 
and Egypt on this question. The United 
States will remain in close touch with 
the Secretary General and his staff. 

The President urged the Secretary 
General to continue to give top priority 
to his efforts to resolve the problem of 



October 1979 



61 



U.S» Policy On Lebanon 



by Andrew Young 

Statement before the U.N. Seciirltv 
Council on August 29, 1979. Mr. 
Young is U.S. Ambassador to the 
United Nations. ' 

I welcome the opportunity afforded 
by this meeting of the Council to ad- 
dress a problem which has long been a 
matter of grave concern to my govern- 
ment. In recent weeks and months, the 
sorry spectacle of the slaughter of in- 
nocent people through random vio- 
lence, principally in Lebanon but also 
in Israel, has been an affront to the 
conscience of mankind. We are meet- 
ing now at the request of the Govern- 
ment of Lebanon, in response to the re- 
cent upsurge of violence in southern 
Lebanon. 

In recent days alone, thousands of 
Lebanese and Palestinian civilians have 
been forced to flee from their homes, 
and many have been killed and maimed 
by often indiscriminate shelling. This 
situation is intolerable. The people of 
southern Lebanon, Lebanese and Pal- 
estinian alike, and the people of Israel 
as well, deserve relief from the almost 
daily violence and fear of attack with 
which they have been forced to live for 
far too long. They look to us to point 
the way to a solution which will allow 
the people in Lebanon to return to their 
homes and for them and Israeli citizens 
to carry on their lives in freedom from 
fear of attack. We must not fail them. 

U.S. Position 

The U.S. Government's policy on 
Lebanon is well known: We support 
that country's sovereignty, independ- 
ence, unity, and territorial integrity. 
We have special ties of sympathy with 
the people of Lebanon, and we have 
supported the government of President 
Sarkis in its efforts to restore its au- 
thority throughout the country — in- 
cluding throughout southern Lebanon. 
We will continue to do so. 

Let me make absolutely clear the po- 



; Cyprus. He also discussed the Secre- 
' tary General's continuing efforts to 
i find a solution to the Namibian situa- 
\ tion. D 



'List of participants omitted; text from 
, Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents 
of Aug. 6, 1979. 



sition of the United States with regard 
to events in southern Lebanon. In 
doing so. I speak with the full authority 
of the U.S. Government. 

First, we condemn those who boast 
of the murder of an Israeli mother and 
her child, the attack on a bus filled 
with Israeli civilians, or the explosion 
of rockets and bombs in Israeli towns 
and cities. No political objective can 
ever justify such barbarism. 

Second, and just as strongly, we 
condemn the policy of artillery shelling 
and preemptive attacks on Lebanese 
towns, villages, and refugee camps 
which Israel and the armed Lebanese 
groups Israel supports have followed in 
recent months. Let there be no doubt or 
ambiguity about this. We cannot and 
do not agree with Israel's military 
policies in Lebanon as manifested in 
the past few months. They are wrong 
and unacceptable to my government. 
They are painfully at variance with the 
values which Israel has traditionally 
espoused. 

What Must Be Done 

Let me turn to what the U.S. Gov- 
ernment believes must be done to break 
the deadlock of terror and counterterror 
in which both sides seem to be caught. 

First, both sides should cooperate 
fully with UNIFIL [U.N. Interim Force 
in Lebanon] in enabling it to carry out 
its mandate. It is disgraceful that the 
men of UNIFIL have been subjected to 
attack and harassment from both Pales- 
tinian elements and groups supported 
by Israel because they seek to carry out 
the mission entrusted to them by this 
Council. A lasting end to the violence 
in the area can only be brought about 
through scrupulous observance of Se- 
curity Council Resolution 425. UNIFIL 
should thus be allowed to fulfill its 
mandate by functioning in an unim- 
peded fashion throughout all of south- 
ern Lebanon. The objective remains to 
restore the authority and control of the 
Government of Lebanon throughout the 
country. 

Second, Israel should end its policy 
of preemptive strikes on Lebanon soil. 
It should cease its artillery attacks in 
support of Lebanese militia groups and 
use its influence effectively over these 
groups so that random and indiscrimi- 
nate violence can be stopped, espe- 
cially against the men of UNIFIL. 



Third, the Palestinian leadership 
should help heal the wounds of Leba- 
non. It should stop attacks on the 
Lebanese militia groups in southern 
Lebanon and on Israel. It should re- 
nounce the use of Lebanese territory 
for this purpose. It should carry out its 
pledge of June 5 to withdraw its fight- 
ers from southern Lebanese villages 
and towns and remove all its armed 
groups from UNIFIL's area of opera- 
tion. This step should be taken without 
precondition and without delay. There 
is no conceivable justification for the 
continued presence of Palestinian 
armed groups in southern Lebanon if 
the Palestinian leadership is prepared to 
cooperate with the Council and UNIFIL 
in carrying out Security Council Res- 
olution 425. 

Fourth, all parties to the fighting 
should carry out and strictly enforce a 
complete, immediate, and lasting halt 
to all shelling, terrorism, and other acts 
of violence. 

Palestinian Rights 

Members of the Council less than a 
week ago met to consider another as- 
pect of the Middle East situation, the 
critical issue of the rights of the Pales- 
tinian people. If there is a strengthened 
understanding in my country of the im- 
portance of assuring that the legitimate 
rights of the Palestinians are included 
in a comprehensive settlement — and I 
believe there is — then it is time for the 
Palestinian leadership to recognize that 
their objectives cannot be achieved 
through violence and terrorism. In- 
deed, it is time, past time, for wiser 
counsels to prevail on both sides of the 
border between Lebanon and Israel. 

Tribute to UNIFIL 

Finally, I want to pay tribute to Gen- 
eral Erskine and the brave men of 
UNIFIL he commands. Their task has 
been thankless, frustrating, and dan- 
gerous. Subjected to attack in the per- 
formance of their duties, they have 
suffered heavy casualties. Tragically, 
three members of the contingent from 
the small nation of Fiji were killed in a 
recent clash with terrorists. 

In difficult terrain and in a country 
where arms are widely available among 
the population, the men of UNIFIL 
have been subjected to a severe test of 
their steadfastness. They have risen to 
challenges with exemplary determina- 
tion and courage. We all owe them a 
debt of thanks which words cannot 
repay. They can be proud of their con- 
tinued contribution to the cause of 
peace. D 



'Text from U.N. doc. S/PV. 2164 of Aug. 
29, 1979. 



62 



World Radio Conference 



Foreign Relations Outline' 

The 10-week World Administrative 
Radio Conference (WARC), opening in 
September 1979 in Geneva, will influ- 
ence development of radiocommunica- 
tions systems into the 21st century. It 
will review all uses of the radio fre- 
quency spectrum, related technical 
questions, and regulatory procedures. 
The conference is a function of the 
U.N.'s 154-member International Tele- 
communication Union (ITU). Its re- 
sponsibilities include allocation of the 
radio frequency spectrum and registra- 
tion of radio frequency assignments in 
order to avoid harmful interference 
between radio stations of different 
countries. The WARC will be one of 
the largest international conferences in 
which the United States has partici- 
pated, with some 1,500 delegates from 
over 140 countries expected to attend. 



Agenda 

WARC's agenda establishes the 
basis for: 

• New frequency allocations to meet 
changing social and economic needs; 

• Review and possible revision of 
technical standards for use of frequen- 
cies: and 

• Review and possible revision of 
general principles for allocations and 
orbital utilization and of procedures for 
coordination, notification, and regis- 
tration of frequencies. 

U.S. Goals 

We have several major objectives at 
the conference. 

• We seek agreement on necessary, 
incremental changes in frequency allo- 
cations and related regulations in order 
to enhance U.S. economic, social, and 
national security interests. 

• We seek to maintain those proce- 
dures which provide maximum flexi- 
bility and adaptability to changing 
needs. 

• We wish to strengthen ITU's role 
as the international organization re- 



sponsible for implementing WARC de- 
cisions, without adversely affecting 
U.S. sovereign rights. 

• We support changes in allocations 
and related frequency management 
procedures that will accommodate 
other nations" needs — consistent with 
our own requirements — while en- 
deavoring to avoid or limit the impact 
of politically inspired efforts to impede 
fair and efficient use of the spectrum. 

Frequency Bands 

Low and Medium. In the low and 

medium frequency range, the United 
States proposes expanding AM broad- 
casting to accommodate new broadcast 
stations in region 2 (North and South 
America). We also propose changes in 
other services, including improved ac- 
commodation of amateur frequencies 
and changes in radiolocation. 

High. In these bands, the United 
States proposes significant increases in 
international broadcasting and maritime 
mobile services and some increased ac- 
commodation for amateur service. The 
increases will require reducing some of 
the present exclusive allocations for 
fixed service. This will be highly con- 
troversial because of developing coun- 
tries' dependence on fixed service allo- 
cations. 

Ultra High (UHF). In the UHF 

bands, the thrust of U.S. proposals is 
for region 2 to increase allocations for 
land mobile services to be shared with 
the broadcast service. Our objective is 
to accommodate the rapid growth of 
land mobile frequencies by permitting 
sharing in the upper UHF bands now 
allocated exclusively to broadcasting. 
We propose a critically important fre- 
quency allocation to accommodate a 
new satellite navigation system that 
promises to revolutionize radionaviga- 
tion. Also noteworthy are provisions 
for land, maritime, and aeronautical 
mobile satellite systems and for aural 
broadcasting by satellite. In addition, 
we propose to accommodate increased 
needs for amateur, maritime mobile, 
and aeronautical services. 



Department of State Bulletin 

Super High (SHF) and Extremely 
High (EHF). Above the UHF band, we 
have a variety of different service 
needs. A difficult problem has been 
encountered in fixed satellite service, 
where INTELSAT has major require- 
ments; we propose several allocations 
to meet them. INTELSAT, with 102 
member countries, provides most of the 
world's international communications 
via satellite. Also within the fixed 
satellite service, we propose significant 
changes in allocations for both fixed 
service and broadcast satellite service 
frequencies at 12 GHZ (gigahertz) to 
accommodate the growing need for 
those services. We propose allocations 
to meet important requirements for a 
mobile satellite service for civilian and 
government systems. We propose to 
accommodate the growing require- 
ments for future generations of Earth 
exploration and space research satel- 
lites. We envision the need for satellite 
sensing of environmental and Earth re- 
sources throughout the SHF and EHF 
bands. 



Regulatory Procedures 

We anticipate that proposals will be 
made at the conference to revise pres- 
ent procedures giving recognition and 
priority of use to countries which first 
register frequency assignments with the 
ITU. Such proposals — which will have 
to be carefully evaluated — may include 
the establishment of allotment plans for 
distributing frequencies and/or orbital 
space slots on a country-by-country 
basis. While we endorse the principle 
of insuring fair and reasonable access 
by all countries to the radio spectrum, 
we have in the past opposed preas- 
signment allotment plans except in 
limited situations. We are concerned 
that fixed allotment plans which dis- 
tribute frequencies and orbital space to 
countries or areas independent of need 
or ability to utilize may not allow op- 
timal utilization of the spectrum or 
provide adequate incentive for adopting 
spectrum- and orbit-conserving tech- 
nologies and patterns of use. □ 



'Taken from the Department of State publica- 
tion in the GIST series, released Aug. 1979. This 
outline is designed to be a quick reference aid on 
U.S. foreign relations. It is not intended as a 
comprehensive U.S. foreign policy statement. 



October 1979 



63 



WESTERN HEmiSPHERE: 

Soviet Combat Troops in Cuba 



Following are the texts of Secretary 
Vance's letter to Senator Richard 
Stone of July 27, 1979, a Department 
statement of August 31 , and President 
Carter' s remarks to the press on Sep- 
tember 7 . 



SECRETARY'S LETTER 
JULY 27, 1979 

Dear Senator Stone: 

The President has asked me to respond to 
your July 24 letter to him on Soviet military 
presence in Cuba. I very much appreciate your 
calling to our attention reports of a possible 
high ranking Soviet command structure in 
Cuba. 

I wish to reaffirm the President's statement 
to you that it is the policy of the United States 
to oppose any efforts, direct or indirect, by the 
Soviet Union to establish military bases in the 
Western Hemisphere. However, there is no 
evidence of any substantial increase of the 
Soviet military presence in Cuba over the past 
several years or of the presence of a Soviet 
military base. Apart from a military group that 
has been advising the Cuban Armed Forces for 
fifteen years or more our intelligence does not 
warrant the conclusion that there are any other 
significant Soviet forces in Cuba. At the same 
time the President directed that we give in- 
creased attention to the situation and monitor it 
closely. This is being done. The President 
raised the question of the Soviet presence in 
Cuba with President Brezhnev in Vienna and 
made clear to him that a Soviet buildup would 
adversely affect our relationship. 

You have also raised questions on the 1962 
understanding in your letter to the President 
and during the appearances of Secretary Brown 
and myself before the SFRC. The United States 
and the Soviet Union both recognize that an 
understanding on Cuba exists. This under- 
standing is reflected in the Kennedy- 
Khrushchev correspondence of October and 
November, 1962, (particularly the letters of 
October 27 and 28, 1962)' and in communica- 
tions between the two governments in the fall 
of 1970 concerning the establishment of Soviet 
naval bases in Cuba. We have no evidence that 
the Soviets are in violation of this understand- 
ing. 

President Nixon addressed the scope of the 
understanding in 1971, and stated, "in the 
event that nuclear submarines were serviced 
either in Cuba or from Cuba, that would be a 
violation of the understanding." Subsequently, 
in the early I970"s, submarines did make occa- 
sional port calls. According to the understand- 
ing with the Soviet Union such port calls do not 
constitute violations. 



You have asked that we assure the American 
people that they have full knowledge of the un- 
derstanding. The essential understanding is in 
the public record. The Soviets agreed in 1962 
that offensive weapons could not again be in- 
troduced into Cuba. In 1970 it was made clear 
that this understanding included sea-based 
systems. 

Although the October 27 and 28, 1962, let- 
ters and many other documents from this period 
are not classified, there are additional diplo- 
matic exchanges, made in confidence, which 
must remain classified. They are consistent 
with publicly available documents. The princi- 
ple of confidentiality of diplomatic communi- 
cation is respected throughout the international 
community and is carefully applied in our rela- 
tions with the Soviet Union to ensure the free 
flow of communication that is essential to the 
maintenance of world peace. A breach of con- 
fidentially in this context could easily impair 
our ability to deal with the Soviets in the fu- 
ture. 

If you wish any further background, please 
do not hesitate to inform me. 

With best wishes. 

Sincerely, 
Cyrus Vance 



DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, 
AUG. 31, 1979^ 

We have recently confirmed the 
presence in Cuba of what appears to be 
a Soviet combat unit. This is the first 
time we have been able to confirm the 
presence of a Soviet ground forces unit 
on the island. 

Elements of the unit appear to have 
been there since at least 1976. We es- 
timate that it consists of 2,000-3,000 
men. The unit includes armored, artil- 



Letters 
of Credence 



President Carter accepted the letters 
of credence of newly appointed Am- 
bassadors to the United States of 
Roberto Arce Alvarez of Bolivia and 
Alfonso Arias-Schreiber of Peru on 
March 30. 1979, and of Marcial Perez 
Chiriboga of Venezuela and Antonio 
Francisco Azeredo da Silveira of Brazil 
on July 24. D 



lery, and infantry elements. In addi- 
tion, we estimate that the Soviet main- 
tain between 1,500 and 2,000 military 
advisory and technical personnel in 
Cuba. 

As currently configured and sup- 
ported, the unit poses no threat to the 
United States. 

Ground forces per se did not figure 
in our bilateral understandings with the 
Soviets which were directed toward 
offensive weapons systems. Nonethe- 
less, we are concerned about the pres- 
ence of Soviet combat forces in Cuba. 

We have, in recent months, raised 
with the Soviets the issue of the 
Soviet-Cuban military relationship. On 
August 29 we called in the Soviet 
Charge to express our concerns about 
the Soviet ground forces unit. We will 
continue our discussions with them on 
this subject. 

We will, of course, continue to 
monitor all aspects of Soviet military 
activities in Cuba to insure there is no 
threat to the United States. 



PRESIDENT'S REMARKS, 
SEPT. 7, 1979^ 

I want to take a few minutes to speak 
to you about the presence of the Soviet 
combat brigade in Cuba. The facts re- 
lating to this issue have been carefully 
laid out by Secretary Vance, both in 
his public statement and in his tes- 
timony before the Congress. The facts, 
in brief, are as follows. 

We have concluded, as the conse- 
quences of intensified intelligence ef- 
forts, that a Soviet combat unit is cur- 
rently stationed in Cuba. We have 
some evidence to indicate that such a 
unit has been in Cuba for some time, 
perhaps for quite a few years. 

The brigade consists of 2,000-3,000 
troops. It's equipped with conventional 
weapons, such as about 40 tanks and 
some field artillery pieces, and has 
conducted training as an organized 
unit. 

It is not an assault force. It does not 
have airlift or sea-going capabilities 
and does not have weapons capable of 
attacking the United States. 

The purpose of this combat unit is 
not yet clear. However, the Secretary 
of State spoke for me and for our na- 
tion on Wednesday when he said that 
we consider the presence of a Soviet 
combat brigade in Cuba to be a very 
serious matter and that this status quo 
is not acceptable. 

We are confident about our ability to 
defend our country or any of our 
friends from external aggression. The 
issue posed is of a different nature. It 
involves the stationing of Soviet com- 



64 



U»S,'3texico Cooperation 



by Julius L . Katz 

Statement before the Subcommittee 
on Investigations and Oversight of the 
House Committee on Science and 
Technology on August 1, 1979. Mr. 
Katz is Assistant Secretary for Eco- 
nomic and Business Affairs. ' 

I want to thank you tor the opportu- 
nity to appear before this subcommittee 
to discuss certain recommendations it 
has made on U.S. -Mexico relations and 
potentials regarding energy, immigra- 
tion, scientific cooperation, and tech- 
nology transfer. I understand that the 
subcommittee is particularly interested 
in hearing the views of the State De- 
partment on the recommendations in 
the subcommittee report of its May 3-7 
visit to Mexico which propose a long- 
term plan for the export of energy 
technology and critical equipment to 
Mexico based on the import of Mexi- 
can oil. I will, therefore, confine my 
remarks to that specific aspect of the 
committee's report. 

The Department shares the subcom- 
mittee's desire to search for ways to 
promote mutually beneficial coopera- 
tion between Mexico and the United 
States in the critical areas of trade, 
energy, and science and technology 
cooperation. 



Trade 

The Administration indeed is moving 
to strengthen our relations with Mexico 
in all of these areas. We have taken 
steps which we believe will lay the 
basis for a cooperative long-term eco- 
nomic relationship with Mexico. For 
example, in the trade area, our overall 
relations with Mexico are very good, 
and trade flows have expanded 
dramatically in recent years, increasing 
from $6.4 billion in 1974 to almost $13 
billion at present. Mexico's rapid eco- 
nomic growth will continue to provide 
U.S. exporters with significant ex- 
panded opportunities to export capital 
goods and technology. 

Not surprisingly, this rapidly grow- 
ing trade has brought adjustment prob- 
lems with it. Some affected sectors in 
the United States have called for pro- 
tection against rapid imports of par- 
ticular products from Mexico and, in 
some cases, have charged Mexican ex- 
porters with unfair competitive prac- 
tices. 

A further irritant to our trade rela- 
tions has been Mexico's highly restric- 
tive trade policy, an attempt to protect 
its domestic producers. We are encour- 
aged that the present Mexican Admin- 
istration has been moving Mexico in 
the direction of greater openness. 



Cuba (Cont'd) 

bat troops here in the Western Hemi- 
sphere, in a country which acts as a 
Soviet proxy in military adventures in 
other areas of the world, like Africa. 

We do have the right to insist that 
the Soviet Union respect our interests 
and our concerns if the Soviet Union 
expects us to respect their sensibilities 
and their concerns. Otherwise, rela- 
tions between our two countries will 
inevitably be adversely affected. We 
are seriously pursuing this issue with 
the Soviet Union, and we are consult- 
ing closely with the Congress. 

Let me emphasize that this is a sen- 
sitive issue that faces our nation, all of 
us, and our nation as a whole must re- 
spond not only with firmness and 
strength but also with calm and a sense 
of proportion. 

This is a time for firm diplomacy, 
not panic and not exaggeration. As 
Secretary Vance discusses this issue 



with Soviet representatives in the 
coming days, the Congress and the 
American people can help to insure a 
successful outcome of these discus- 
sions and negotiations by preserving an 
atmosphere in which our diplomacy can 
work. 

I know I speak for the leadership in 
Congress, with whom I have met this 
afternoon, as well as for my own Ad- 
ministration, when I express my confi- 
dence that our nation can continue to 
show itself to be calm and steady, as 
well as strong and firm. D 



' For texts of the letters exchanged between 
President Kennedy and Chairman Khrushchev. 
Oct. 22-28, 1962, see Bulletin ot Nov. 19. 
1973, p. 63.S. 

^Read to news correspondents by Depart- 
ment spokesman Hodding Carter III. 

■''Made to reporters assembled in the Briefing 
Room at the White House; text from Weekly 
Compilation of Presidential Documents of 
Sept. 10. 1979. 



Department of State Bulletin 

We have been in the process of 
negotiating a comprehensive trade 
agreement with Mexico within the 
context of the multilateral trade negoti- 
ations. In addition, we and other mem- 
bers of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) are 
negotiating with Mexico for its possi- 
ble accession to the GATT. While our 
negotiations with Mexico are not yet 
concluded, we are optimistic that a 
basis will be laid for a substantial in- 
crease in trade between our two coun- 
tries and for a constructive long-term 
relationship between them. 



Energy 

Our energy relations with Mexico are 
growing rapidly, and cooperative 
mechanisms for discussion and prob- 
lem management are being developed. 
During the visit of President Carter to 
Mexico in February several initiatives 
were taken. The United States-Mexico 
consultative mechanism has been re- 
structured and broadened, and a new 
Energy Working Group, cochaired on 
the U.S. side by the Departments of 
State and Energy, is coordinating 
energy cooperation and problem man- 
agement with Mexico. This working 
group will report to the newly estab- 
lished subcabinet advisory group to the 
consultative mechanism which will re- 
view its progress. 

Discussions concerning possible nat- 
ural gas purchases are continuing, and 
a joint study of electricity exchanges 
has begun. Both governments have re- 
viewed a number of bilateral energy- 
related science and technology propos- 
als, including solar research, geother- 
mal cooperation, and enhanced oil re- 
covery techniques. We fully expect that 
these initial cooperative activities with 
Mexico will prove mutually beneficial. 
We should strive to broaden such ac- 
tivities as our energy relationship ma- 
tures. 

Science and Technology 

With respect to science and technol- 
ogy cooperation, formal cooperation 
with Mexico is based on an agreement 
signed in 1972 which established a 
mixed commission to coordinate bilat- 
eral programs. The importance of this 
cooperation was highlighted by Presi- 
dent Carter during his visit to Mexico 
in February of this year when he and 
President Lopez Portillo signed a fur- 
ther Memorandum of Understanding on 
Scientific and Technological Coopera- 
tion. 

The third meeting of the mixed 
commission was held in Washington in 
June at which time the work program 



October 1979 

for the next 2 years was approved. The 
mixed commission formed working 
groups on: 

• New crops, arid lands, and ag- 
ricultural productivity; 

• Energy research and development: 

• Industrial metrology and in- 
strumentation: 

• Railway research and develop- 
ment: 

• Technical information transfer; 
and 

• Cooperation between the National 
Science Foundation and the National 
Council for Science and Technology of 
Mexico. 

'^ In the area of energy research and 
development, the mixed commission 
agreed on 20 separate cooperative proj- 
ects including solar and geothermal 
energy, uranium exploration, cost and 
planning of alternate sources of energy, 
industrial energy conservation, hy- 
drogen storage, and fossil fuels re- 
search. The fossil fuels project will 
focus on a series of joint seminars cov- 
ering enhanced oil recovery; design, 
construction, and operation of pilot 
plants; certain offshore drilling tech- 
nologies; and other areas of mutual 
interest. 

The outline of recent activities re- 
flects a mutual recognition of the im- 
portance of U.S. technology to 
Mexico's long-term economic de- 
velopment on which depends the de- 



velopment and production of Mexico's 
energy resources. For this reason we 
welcome the committee's interest in 
considering means of furthering tech- 
nological cooperation with Mexico. 
Consideration of technical cooperation 
with Mexico should begin with an 
examination of current availability of 
commercial technology to Mexico as 
well as Mexico's own approach to trade 
and economic development. The vast 
bulk of U.S. industrial technology of 
greatest interest to Mexico is owned or 
controlled by private individuals or 
firms. Mexico presently has access to 
such technology through commercial 
arrangements. We need to consider 
whether and how an intergovernmental 
arrangement might increase that flow. 

Technology 

Flows of technology to Mexico ap- 
pear related less to credit availability or 
supplier restrictions on access, than to 
overall absorptive capacity in terms of 
manpower skills and technology infra- 
structure, as well as to the local cli- 
mate, including regulatory conditions. 

In this regard, Mexico's major in- 
vestment laws limit foreign ownership 
of new investment to a minority posi- 
tion in most industries and prohibit it 
completely in other cases. Since pri- 
vately held technology most frequently 
flows with investment, restrictions on 
investment can act as a disincentive to 



Emergency Aid to Nicaragua 



WHITE HOUSE 
ANNOUNCEMENT 
JULY 27, 1979' 

President Carter is sending a special 
flight to Nicaragua on Saturday, July 
28, to deliver emergency food and 
medical supplies. The U.S. Ambas- 
sador to Nicaragua, Lawrence A. Pez- 
zullo. will return to Managua on Satur- 
day's flight. He will present his cre- 
dentials to the new Government of 
Nicaragua early next week. The Presi- 
dent is sending this special plane as an 
expression of his personal good will to 
the people of Nicaragua and to the new 
government and to symbolize the con- 
cern of Americans for the hunger and 
distress of the Nicaraguan people after 
many months of devastating conflict. 

The United States has already pro- 
vided 732 metric tons of emergency 



food supplies to Nicaragua. Another 
1.000 tons of food from the United 
States is on its way to Nicaragua by 
ship. In addition, the United States is 
providing supplies and financial assist- 
ance for airlifts being carried out by the 
International Committee of the Red 
Cross. Of 9,600 pounds of medical 
supplies purchased by the U.S. Gov- 
ernment for shipment to Nicaragua, 
75% has already been delivered, and 
the remaining 2.500 pounds of U.S.- 
purchased medicines, together with 
3.300 pounds of Red Cross medical 
supplies and 5.200 pounds of baby 
formula, are arriving in Nicaragua this 
weekend on a special flight chartered 
by the Agency for International De- 
velopment. D 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of Presiden- 
tial Documents of July 30. 1979. 



65 



technology transfer. Moreover, the 
price and terms of transfer of technol- 
ogy contracts must be approved by the 
Mexican Government and. as the sub- 
committee report indicates, protection 
afforded by trademarks and patents is 
more limited than in many Western in- 
dustrialized countries. 

Other laws — particularly price con- 
trols and import curbs — can also have 
an adverse effect on foreign investment 
operating in Mexico. The negative ef- 
fect of such controls on the transfer of 
technology have been pointed out dur- 
ing official U.S. -Mexican consultation 
on trade. 

Oil Production 

Let me now turn to Mexico's oil 
production policy. As the committee 
has recognized in its report. Mexican 
production of hydrocarbons is geared to 
that country's own development needs, 
rather than to the energy requirements 
of the United States or of the world 
generally. The Mexican Government 
has shown a concern about developing 
oil revenues at a greater pace than the 
ability of the Mexican economy to ab- 
sorb the proceeds in sound economic 
development. They have seen in other 
countries how unbalanced economic 
growth can cause severe inflation and 
social unrest. These concerns of the 
Mexican Government are understanda- 
ble and must be respected. 

What this means however is that 
Mexican production of oil and gas will 
be expanded in a very deliberate way. 
Mexico plans to increase its oil pro- 
duction from its present level of about 
IVz mmb/d [million barrels per day] to 
about 2.2 mmb/d by the end of 1980 or 
early 1981. This would permit a 
doubling of present Mexican exports of 
about 500.000 b/d. The revenues from 
these exports, along with Mexico's im- 
proved borrowing capacity, enable it to 
purchase whatever capital equipment 
and technology it requires from abroad. 
As its economic development pro- 
gresses. Mexico's foreign exchange re- 
quirements will, of course, grow and 
almost certainly they will wish to ex- 
pand their hydrocarbon production 
from their present planned targets. 

Because of the transportation savings 
and consequent economic benefits to 
Mexico, the largest part of Mexican oil 
exports go to the United States. Cur- 
rently, we take about 80% of Mexican 
oil exports. The Mexican Government 
has indicated a desire to diversify their 
markets and has set as a goal limiting 
U.S. sales to about 60% of total ex- 
ports. With expanded Mexican exports, 
the total volume of our purchases from 
Mexico should, nonetheless, increase 



66 



Department of State Bulletin 



Oil SpUl in 
the Gulf of Mexico 



by Robert Krueger 

Statement made at a special briefing 
for news correspondents in the De- 
partment of State on August 23, 1979. 
Mr. Krueger is Ambassador at Large- 
designate and U.S. Coordinator for 
Mexican Affairs. 

For some time, the Governments of 
Mexico and the U.S.A. and many 
people in each of these countries have 
been working together in an effort to 
minimize the damage to the coastlines 
and coastal waters of our two countries 
from the oil spill in the Bay of Cam- 
peche. I would like today to review 
some of our joint efforts and to respond 
to inquiries about some of our govern- 
ments" current actions. 

If an accident occurs on a freeway, 
the first thing to do is to get any injured 
parties to the hospital, the second is to 
get the freeway open, and the third, 
perhaps, to get the names of the parties 



involved so that later on attorneys and 
insurance companies can get together 
to determine whatever responsibility is 
involved. I'd say that it now appears 
that we are entering that third stage. 

Yesterday afternoon the U.S. Gov- 
ernment sent a cable to the Government 
of Mexico indicating that while it is too 
early to make a definitive assessment 
of the damage that may result to the 
U.S. coastline, we believe that we 
should now begin discussions on vari- 
ous issues related to the oil spill in the 
Bay of Campeche. One matter that we 
suggest be included in that discussion 
is the question of liability and possible 
alternatives for dealing with claims for 
compensation for clean-up costs and 
any damages that may have occurred to 
property and resources. 

We are hopeful that the Mexican 
Government shares our desire to ad- 
dress this matter together, for our two 
countries have thus far cooperated very 
closely in attempting to control this oil 



Mexico (Cont'd) 

even though our share of those exports 
declines from present levels. 

As for natural gas. which is subject 
to regulation in the United States, we 
are, as you know, in the process of dis- 
cussions with the Mexican Government 
aimed at agreement on a framework 
which we could both support for the 
export of Mexican gas to the United 
States. 

We must realize that the people of 
Mexico, not unlike the people in the 
United States, are sensitive about the 
development and utilization of their 
natural resources, and particularly their 
energy resources. We must also recog- 
nize that there is a strong Mexican sen- 
sitivity about their independence and 
about foreign economic domination. 
Thus, U.S. initiatives which link 
energy with other issues will likely be 
viewed with suspicion. In designing 
our policies toward Mexico, we. 



therefore, must take account of this 
fact and the need for the Mexican Gov- 
ernment to demonstrate that any ar- 
rangements with us will not only fur- 
ther Mexican national interests, but 
will be seen as respecting Mexico's 
sovereignty and independence. 

In summary, we need to promote co- 
operative arrangements with Mexico, 
arrangements which will contribute to 
Mexico's own development and to its 
expanded economic relations with the 
United States. The committee's strong 
interest in promoting expanded tech- 
nological cooperation between Mexico 
and the United States is very supportive 
of this general interest and we would 
be pleased to work with the committee 
in realizing its goal. D 



'The complete transcript of the hearings will 
be published by the committee and will be avail- 
able from the Superintendent of Documents. 
U.S. Government Priming Office. Washington. 
D.C. 20402. 



spill. We see these discussions as a 
continuation of the efforts of two 
neighbors to solve this problem jointly, 
for there are many ways in which we 
have cooperated to minimize the dam- 
age from the blowout of IXTOC 1 . 

First, since the well— IXTOC 1 — 
went out of control in June, Pemex 
— the national oil company of Mexico 
— has contracted with various U.S. 
private companies to supply equipment 
and specialized expertise to help in 
controlling the well. 

Second, the U.S. Government has 
been working with the Government of 
Mexico in whatever ways have been 
requested. 

• The United States has provided 
aerial surveillance, and Mexico has 
authorized U.S. planes to use Mexican 
airports. 

• The U.S. national response team 
sent scientific observers to Mexico in 
July with expertise in the areas of biol- 
ogy, dispersants, ecology, and 
clean-up operations to work with 
Mexican officials. 

• Mexico has a liaison officer in 
Corpus Christi, Texas, to assist in 
coordinating the efforts at minimizing 
damage. 

• U.S. ships monitoring the spill 
have been allowed to proceed into 
Mexican waters. 

• Perhaps most immediately impor- 
tant, Mexico is paying the United 
States for two American skimmers that 
are now in operation at the well site, 
gathering approximately 5,000 barrels 
of emulsified oil each day that is then 
pumped into Mexican ships. 

And, in order to address the prob- 
lems of possible future oil spills, repre- 
sentatives of the two governments have 
been meeting for some months in an 
effort to form an agreement on how 
jointly to handle such problems. These 
discussions, in fact, were underway 
before the blowout at IXTOC 1 . 

I have met with Captain Charles 
Corbett, cochairman of the U.S. re- 
sponse team, and with Senor Jorge 
Diaz Serrano, head of Pemex. Both are 
working at maximum effort. And our 
government will continue to do every- 
thing it can to work with the Govern- 
ment of Mexico to lessen inconveni- 
ence and hardship resulting from the oil 
spill. D 



Uctober 1979 



67 



TREATIES: Current Actions 



MULTILATERAL 

Cotton 

Amendment to the articles of agreement of the 
International Institute for Cotton of Jan. 17, 
1966. as amended (TIAS 5964, 6184). 
Adopted by the General Assembly of the In- 
ternational Institute for Cotton at Washington 
July 31, 1979. Entered into force July 31, 
1979. 

Cultural Relations 

Agreement on the importation of educational, 
scientific, and cultural materials, and pro- 
tocol. Done at Lake Success Nov. 22, 1950. 
Entered into force May 21, 1952. TIAS 6129. 
Acceptance deposited: Holy See, Aug. 22, 
1979. 

Defense 

Memorandum of understanding concerning co- 
operative full-scale engineering development 
of an advanced surface-to-air missile system, 
with annexes. Signed May 9 and 18 and July 
6, 1979. Entered into force July 6, 1979 
Signatures: Denmark, May 18, 1979; Federal 

Republic of Germany, May 9, 1979; U.S., 

July 6. 1979. 

Human Rights 

International covenant on civil and political 
rights. Adopted at New York Dec. 16, 1966 
Entered into force Mar. 23, 1976.' 
Ratification deposited: Iceland, Aug. 22. 
1979. 

International covenant on economic, social, and 
cultural rights. Adopted at New York Dec. 16, 
1966. Entered into force Jan. 3, 1976.' 
Ratification deposited: Iceland, Aug. 22, 
1979. 

Law 

Statute of The Hague conference on private in- 
ternational law. Done at The Hague Oct. 
9-31, I95I. Entered into force July 15, 1955; 
for the U.S. Oct. 15. 1964. TIAS 5710. 
Acceptance deposited: Venezuela, July 25, 
1979. 

Maritime Matters 

Amendments to the convention of Mar. 6, 1958, 
as amended (TIAS 4044, 6285, 6490, 8606), 
on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consulta- 
tive Organization. Done at London Nov. 17, 
1977.2 

Acceptance deposited: Barbados, Aug. 20, 
1979. 

Narcotic Drugs 

Convention on psychotropic substances. Done at 
Vienna Feb. 21, 1971. Entered into force 
Aug. 16, 1976.' 

Accession deposited: Guatemala, Aug. 13, 
1979. 

Wheat 

Protocol modifying and further extending the 
wheat trade convention (part of the interna- 



tional wheat agreement). 1971 (TIAS 7144). 
Done at Washington Apr. 25. 1979. Entered 
into force June 23, 1979, with respect to cer- 
tain provisions, July I, 1979, with respect to 
other provisions. 

Ratification deposited: Iraq, Aug. 15, 1979. 
Accession deposited: Trinidad and Tobago, 
Sept. 7, 1979. 

World Heritage 

Convention concerning the protection of the 
world cultural and natural heritage. Done at 
Paris Nov. 23, 1972. Entered into force Dec. 
17, 1975. TIAS 8226. 

Ratification deposited: Denmark, July 25, 
1979.^ 



BILATERAL 

Bermuda 

International express mail agreement, with de- 
tailed regulations. Signed at Hamilton and 
Washington July 31 and Aug. 13, 1979. En- 
tered into force Sept. 1, 1979. 

Agreement amending the agreement of Jan. 15, 
1974 (TIAS 7801) on preclearance for entry 
into the U.S. Effected by exchange of notes at 
Hamilton Aug. 28 and 29, 1979. Entered into 
force Aug. 29, 1979. 

Canada 

International express mail agreement, with de- 
tailed regulations. Signed at Ottawa and 
Washington July 23 and Aug. 14, 1979. En- 
tered into force Aug. 14, 1979; effective Aug. 
I, 1979. 

Denmark and the Faroe Islands 

Agreement concerning fisheries off the coasts of 
the U.S., with annexes and agreed minute. 
Signed at Washington Sept. 5, 1979. Enters 
into force on a date to be mutually agreed by 
exchange of notes, upon the completion of the 
internal procedures of both parties. 

Dominican Republic 

Agreement relating to trade in cotton, wool, and 
manmade fiber textiles and textile products, 
with annexes. Effected by exchange of notes 
at Washington Aug. 7 and 8, 1979. Entered 
into force Aug. 8, 1979; effective June I, 
1979. 

Federal Republic of Germany 

International express mail/datapost agreement, 

with detailed regulations. Signed at Bonn and 

Washington Dec. 15, 1978 and Jan. 22, 1979. 

Entered into force: Aug. 8, 1979; effective 

Feb. 1, 1979. 

German Democratic Republic 

Parcel post agreement, with detailed regulations. 
Signed at Washington May 4, 1979. Entered 
into force provisionally May 4, 1979. 
Entered into force definitively: Aug. 15, 
1979. 



Haiti 

Agreement relating to trade in cotton, wool, and 
manmade fiber textiles and textile products, 
with annexes. Effected by exchange of notes 
at Port-au-Prince Aug. 17, 1979. Entered into 
force Aug. 17. 1979; effective May I, 1979. 

Indonesia 

Agreement amending the agreement of May 17, 
1977, (TIAS 8677) for sales of agricultural 
commodities and the exchange of letters of 
Dec. 16, 1977, (TIAS 8984) concerning de- 
velopment projects. Effected by exchange of 
notes at Jakarta July 19, 1979. Entered into 
force July 19. 1979. 

Korea 

Agreement amending the agreement of Dec 23. 

1977. as amended (TIAS 9039. 9350). relat- 
ing to trade in cotton, wool, and manmade 
fiber textiles and textile products. Effected by 
exchange of notes at Seoul Aug. 24, 1979. 
Entered into force Aug. 24, 1979. 

Mexico 

Agreement amending the agreement of Nov. 9, 
1972, as amended (TIAS 7697), concerning 
frequency modulation broadcasting in the 88 
to 108 MHz band Effected by exchange of 
notes at Mexico and Tlatelolco June 4 and 
Aug. 1, 1979. Entered into force Aug. 1, 
1979. 

Agreement amending the agreement of Aug. 23, 

1978. (TIAS 9254) relating to the provision 
and utilization of aircraft to curb the illegal 
traffic in narcotics. Effected by exchange of 
letters at Mexico July 26, 1979. Entered into 
force July 26, 1979. 

Morocco 

Agreement establishing a Provisional Commis- 
sion on Educational and Cultural Exchange. 
Effected by exchange of notes at Rabat July 
17, 1979. Entered into force July 17, 1979. 

Pakistan 

Agreement amending the agreement of Jan. 4 
and 9, 1978, (TIAS 9050) relating to trade in 
cotton textiles. Effected by exchange of notes 
at Washington Dec. 7, 1978, and July 25, 

1979. Entered into force July 25, 1979. 
Agreement amending the agreement of Jan. 4 

and 9, 1978, as amended (TIAS 9050), relat- 
ing to trade in cotton textiles. Effected by ex- 
change of notes at Washington July 27 and 30, 
1979. Entered into force July 30, 1979. 

Philippines 

Agreement amending the agreement of Aug. 22 
and 24, 1979, (TIAS 9223) relating to trade in 
cotton, wool, and manmade fiber textiles and 
textile products. Effected by exchange of 
notes at Manila Aug. 3 and 16, 1979. Entered 
into force Aug. 16, 1979. 

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, 
relating to the agreement of Aug. 24, 1978, 
(TIAS 9187) with agreed minutes. Signed at 
Manila Aug. 6, 1979. Entered into force Aug. 
6, 1979. 

Portugal 

Agreement relating to jurisdiction over vessels 
utilizing the Louisiana offshore oil port. Ef- 
fected by exchange of notes at Washington 
June 22 and July 1 1, 1979. Entered into force 
July II, 1979. 



68 

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, 
relating to the agreement of Mar. 18, 1976, 
(TIAS 8264) with agreed minutes. Signed at 
Lisbon July 26. 1979. Entered into force July 
26, 1979. 

Romania 

Agreement renewing and amending the agree- 
ment of Dec. 4, 1973. (TIAS 7901) relating to 
civil air transport. Effected by exchange of 
notes at Bucharest Jan. 25 and 30, 1979. 
Entered into force: July 25. 1979. 

Agreement amending the agreement of Jan. 6 
and 25. 1978. as amended (TIAS 9166, 9212), 
relating to trade in cotton textiles. Effected by 
exchange of notes at Washington July 24 and 
Aug. 27, 1979. Entered into force Aug. 27, 
1979. 

Agreement amending and extending the agree- 
ment of June 4, 1976. (TIAS 8254) as ex- 
tended, on maritime transport. Effected by ex- 
change of notes at Washington Aug. 30. 1979. 
Entered into force Aug. 30. 1979. 

Somalia 

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, 
relating to the agreement of Mar. 20, 1978, 
(TIAS 9222) with agreed minutes. Signed at 
Mogadishu July 1 1 , 1979. Entered into force 
July II. 1979. 

United Kingdom 

Convention for the avoidance of double taxation 
and the prevention of fiscal evasion with re- 
spect to taxes on estates of deceased persons 



Department of State Bulletin 



and on gifts. Signed at London Oct. 19. 
1978.2 

Instrument of ratification signed by the Presi- 
dent: Aug. 24. 1979. 
Third protocol further amendmg the convention 
for avoidance of double taxation and the pre- 
vention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes 
on income and capital gains, signed at London 
on 31 Dec. 1975. Signed at London Mar. 15. 
1979.= 

Instrument of ratification signed by the Presi- 
dent: Aug. 24, 1979. 

Zaire 

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, 
relating to the agreement of Mar. 25, 1976 
(TIAS 8403). Signed at Kinshasa July 27. 
1979. Entered into force July 27. 1979. 

Agreement regarding the consolidation and re- 
scheduling of payments due under PL 480 
Title 1 agricultural commodities agreements, 
with annexes. Signed at Washington Aug. I. 
1979. Entered into force Aug. I, 1979. 

Zambia 

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, 
relating to the agreement of Aug. 4, 1978. 
Signed at Lusaka July 19. 1979. Entered into 
force July 19, 1979. D 



' Not in force lor the U.S. 
• Not in force. 
'With declaration. 



CHRONOLOGY: August 1979 



Aug. 1 Maria de Lurdes Pintassilgo is sworn 
in as Prime Minister of Portugal. 
Conference of Commonwealth heads 
of government meets in Lusaka, 
Zambia, Aug. 1-8. 

Aug. 3 A military junta overthrows the gov- 
ernment of President Masie of 
Equatorial Guinea. 

Aug. 5 Francesco Cossiga is sworn in as 
Prime Minister of Italy 
Egypt and Israel hold talks on Pales- 
tinian autonomy Aug. 5-6. 

Aug. 7 Bolivian Congress elects Walter 
Guevara to be provisional President 
until new presidential elections are 
held in 1 year. 

Aug. 8 President Toure of Guinea visits the 
U.S. Aug. 8-15. 

Aug. 9 Secretary Vance visits Ecuador Aug. 
9-12 to attend the inauguration 
ceremonies of President Roldos. 
Mrs. Carter heads the U.S. delega- 
tion. 

Aug. 10 Jaime Roldos Aguilera is sworn in as 
President of Ecuador. 



Aug. 
Aug. 
Aug. 

Aug. 
Aug. 



Aug 
Aug 



II 
15 
20 



24 



Shehu Shagari is elected President of 
Nigeria. 

U.S. Ambassador to the U.N, Andrew 
Young resigns. 

UNCSTD conference meets in Geneva 
Aug. 20-Aug. 31. 

Prime Minister Charan Singh of India 
resigns. 

Soviet ballet dancer Alexandr 
Godunov defects to the U.S. 

U.S. delays departure of U.S.S.R. 
airliner Aug 24-27 to satisfy U.S. 
legal requirements that Mr. 
Godunov's wife. Lyudmila Vla- 
sova, is not returning to the 
U.S.S.R. under duress. 

Vice President Mondale visits China, 
Hong Kong, and Japan Aug. 25- 
Sept. 3. 
31 US, State Department announces that 
the U.S. has confirmed the pres- 
ence in Cuba of what appears to be 
a Soviet combat unit consisting of 
some 2,000-3.000 members and 
has expressed concern over the 
matter to the U.S.S.R. D 



25 



PRESS RELEASES: 

DepartntftU of Statf 



August 17— September 14 

Press releases may be obtained from the Of- 
fice of Press Relations. Department of State, 
Washington. DC. 



No. Date Subject 

*I98 8/17 Advisory Committee on Inter- 
national Investment. Tech- 
nology, and Development, 
Sept. 14. 

*199 8/17 Advisory Committee on Inter- 
national Investment. Tech- 
nology, and Development, 
working group on transbor- 
der data flows. Sept 26. 

*200 8/24 U.S.. Sri Lanka establish tex- 
tile agreement. Mar. 12 and 
23. 

*201 8/17 Conference on the UN. Dec- 
ade for Women. Sept. 12. 

*202 8/17 Shipping Coordinating Com- 
mittee (SCO. Subcommittee 
on Safety of Life at Sea 
(SOLAS), working group on 
radio communications. Sept. 
20. 

*203 8/17 sec. SOLAS, working group 
on subdivision and stability, 
Sept. II. 

*204 8/22 U.S.. Dominican Republic sign 
textile agreement. Aug. 7-8. 

*205 8/22 U.S. Organization of the Inter- 
national Telegraph and Tele- 
phone Committee (CCITT), 
study group 1. Sept. 19. 

*206 8/23 sec. SOLAS, working group 
on subdivision and stability, 
panel on bulk cargoes. Sept. 
13. 

*207 8/27 ACDA Director George M. 
Seignious to address confer- 
ence on U.S. security and 
the Soviet challenge. Hous- 
ton. Sept. 5. 

*208 8/27 U.S.. Japan sign textile agree- 
ment. Aug. 17. 

*209 8/28 US . Japan sign record of dis- 
cussion dealing with trade in 
textile products. Aug. 22. 

*210 8/28 U.S.. Pakistan amend textile 
agreement. Julv 27 and 30. 

*2I1 8/29 CCITT. Sept. 24'. 

*212 9/4 Advisory Committee to the 
U.S. Section of the Inter- 
American Tropical Tuna 
Commission. Oct. 4-5. 

*213 9/4 U.S., Pakistan amend textile 
agreement, Dec. 7, 1978, 
and July 25. 

•214 9/4 State Department and Omaha 
Chamber of Commerce co- 
sponsor conference on U.S. 
security and the Soviet 
challenge, Sept. 18. 

t215 9/5 U.S., Denmark, and Faroe Is- 
lands sign new fisheries 
agreement. 



Dctober 1979 



69 



216 

•217 



*2I8 



*2I9 
220 



*22l 



9/5 
9/5 



9/7 



9/11 
9/10 



9/13 



Vance: news conference. 

Harvey J. Feldman sworn in as 
Ambassador to Papua New 
Guinea and the Solomon Is- 
lands. 

State Department and San An- 
tonio Chamber of Commerce 
to present conference on 
U.S. security and the Soviet 
challenge, Sept. 19. 

sec. Oct. 3. 

'"Foreign Relations of the 
United Slates. 1952-1954: 
Vol. III. United Nations 
Affairs" released. 

Secretary of State's Advisory 
Committee on Private Inter- 
national Law, study group of 



222 


9/12 


223 


9/14 


224 


9/14 



"225 



9/14 



international child abduction 
by one parent, Sept. 29. 

sec. committee on ocean 
dumping. Oct. 10. 

U.S., Colombia sign extradi- 
tion treaty. 

lOth meeting of Antarctic 
treaty consultative parties, 
Sept. 17-Oct. 5. 

Ocean Affairs Advisory Com- 
mittee, Fisheries and Marine 
Science and Technology, 
Nov. 14-15 (closed meet- 
ings) and Nov. 16 (open). D 



♦Not printed in the Bulletin. 
tHeld for a later issue. 



l/JS.l/.]V. 



Press releases may be obtained from the Pub- 
lic Affairs Office, U.S. Mission to the United 
Nations, 799 United Nations Plaza, New York, 
N.Y. 10017 



*64 



*65 



7/20 



7/31 



No. 

*50 


Date 

5/30 


Subject 
Young: statement on behalf of 


*66 

*67 


8/15 
8/15 






the Western five govern- 
ments on Namibia, General 


*68 


8/15 


*51 


5/30 


Assembly. 
Sablan: TTPI, Trusteeship 


*69 


8/23 


*52 


5/30 


Council. 
Petree: TTPI, Trusteeship 
Council. 


*70 


8/24 


*53 


5/30 


Olter: TTPI, Trusteeship 










Council. 






*54 


5/31 


Petree: close of the 33d session 
of the General Assembly. 


*Not 


printed 


*55 


6/1 


Petree: information activities. 







Petree: occupied territories. 
Security Council. 

Young: World Conference on 
Agrarian Reform and Rural 
Development, Rome. 

Statement on Puerto Rico. 

Statement on U.S. contribution 
to UNRWA. 

Statement on U.N. Committee 
of 24 and Puerto Rico. 

Young: Namibia Day, Security 
Council. 

Horbal: voluntary fund. Com- 
mission on the Status of 
Women. ECOSOC. D 



Committee to Review U.N. 
Public Information Policies 
and Activities. 

*56 6/12 Strasser: U.S. Virgin Islands 
and American Samoa. Sub- 
committee on Small Ter- 
ritories of the Special Com- 
mittee on Decolonization. 

*57 6/14 Petree: UNIF in Lebanon. Se- 
curity Council. 

*58 6/15 Wells: UNDP, UNDP Gov- 
erning Council. 

*59 6/15 McHenry: UNFICYP. Security 
Council. 

*60 6/19 Strasser: U.S. Virgin Islands 
and American Samoa, Sub- 
committee on Small Ter- 
ritories of the Special Com- 
mittee on Decolonization. 

*6I 6/20 Hosenball: outer space. Com- 
mittee on the Peaceful Uses 
of Outer Space. 

*62 7/2 Wilkinson: Indian Ocean. 

*63 7/11 Young: developing world, 
ECOSOC, Geneva. 



NEW FOREIGN AFFAIRS 
DICTIONARY 

The State Department Library recently 
published the Inlernalional Relations Dic- 
tionary of words, acronyms, and phrases in 
foreign affairs. The dictionary fully docu- 
ments 165 terms and contains over 250 cross 
references. Some of the terms included are 
"basket three," "the Club of Rome." 
"Group of 77," "MBFR." "new interna- 
tional order." "nonaligned countries," "the 
Nuclear Suppliers Group." "rejection 
front. " "shuttle diplomacy." and the 
"Trilateral Commission." You may order 
the 48-page dictionary (stock no. 044-001- 
01715-6) from the Superintendent of Docu- 
ments, Government Printing Office, Wash- 
ington, D.C. 20402. Please enclose a check 
or money order for $2.30. 



PUBLICATIONS: 

**Foretgti Relations^^ 

Volume on the 

United IMations 

Released 



The Department of State released 
Foreign Relations of the United States, 
1952-1954, Volume 111, United Na- 
tion Affairs' on September 10, 1979. 
The Foreign Relations series has been 
published continuously since 1861 as 
the official record of U.S. foreign pol- 
icy. The volume released September 10 
is the first of 16 volumes for the 
1952-1954 triennium. 

This volume of 1,581 pages presents 
high-level documentation (nearly all of 
which is newly declassified) on the 
policies of the United States in the 
United Nations on such major issues as 
the Chinese representation question, 
preparations for the U.N. Charter Re- 
view Conference, the initiatives of the 
United States to bring about the admis- 
sion of Japan, U.S,-U.K. discussions 
regarding the basis of their U.N. pol- 
icy, and the 1953 change in the draft 
convenants on human rights. 

Papers presented in the volume were 
selected principally from the files of 
the Department of State, the U.S. Mis- 
sion at the United Nations, and other 
U.S. Government agencies. This vol- 
ume, like other forthcoming volumes in 
the triennium for 1952-1954, includes 
a detailed biographical list of persons 
appearing in the volume and a descrip- 
tive list of documentary sources used in 
preparing the volume. 

Foreign Relations. 1952-1954, 
Volume III, was prepared by the Office 
of the Historian, Bureau of Public Af- 
fairs, Department of State. Listed as 
Department of State Publication 8957, 
this volume may be obtained for 
$19.00. Checks or money orders 
should be made out to the Superintend- 
ent of Documents and should be sent 
to the U.S. Government Book Store, 
Department of State, Washington, 
D.C. 20520. D 



Press release 220. 



70 



Department of State Bulletin 



GPO SaU's 



Puhlualuins may he ordered hy catalog or 
stock number from the Superintendent of 
Documents. U.S. Government Printing Office. 
Washington, D.C. 20402. A 25% discount is 
made on orders for 100 or more copies of any 
one publication mailed to the same address. 
Remittances, payable to the Superintendent of 
Documents, must accompany orders. Prices 
shown below, which include domestic postage, 
are subject to change. 



Documents on Disarmament. Series of vol 
umes issued annually. This publication con- 
tains basic documents on arms control and 
disarmament developments in 1976. Pub. 97. 
994 pp. $8.00. (Stock No. 002-000-00060-1.) 

U.S. Participation in the United Nations. An 
nual report hy the President to the Congress 
lor 1977. Pub. S964. International Organiza- 
tions and Conference Series \?<1. 335 pp. 
$4. .SO (Stock No. 044-000-01 7 IS-l.) 

Shipping — Equal Access to Government- 
Controlled Cargoes. Agreement with 
Brazil. TIAS X981. 8 pp. 80C. (Cat. No. 
S9.I0;8981.) 

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with 
Indonesia, amending the agreement of May 
17, 1977. as amended. TIAS 8984. 13 pp. 
90C. (Cat. No. S9. 10:8984.) 

Military Missions. Agreement with Colombia. 
TIAS 8986. 23 pp. $1.30. (Cat. No. 
59.10:8986.) 

Remote Sensing — Global Crop Information. 
Agreement with Canada. TIAS 9007. 18 pp. 
$1.10. (Cat. No. S9. 10:9007.) 

Cooperation in Studies of the World Ocean. 
Agreement with the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics, extending the agree- 
ment of June 19, 1974. TIAS 9008. 5 pp. 
700. (Cat. No. 59.10:9008.) 

Fertilizer Distribution and Marketing. 
Agreement with Bangladesh. TIAS 9009. 32 
pp. $1.40. (Cat. No. 59.10:9009.) 

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. 
Second proces-verbal extending the declara- 
tion of August 9, 1973. on provisional acces- 
sion of ttie Philippines to the general agree- 
ment. TIAS 9010. 9 pp. 80«l. (Cat. No. 
59.10:9010.) 

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with 
Israel. T1A5 9012. 5 pp. 70(Z. (Cat. No. 
519:9012). 

Rural Finance Experimental Project. Agree- 
ment with Bangladesh. TIAS 9013. 34 pp. 
$1.40. (Cat. No. 59.10:9013.) 

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with 
Afghanistan. TIAS 9014. 16 pp. $1 . 10. (Cat. 
No. 59.10:9014.) 

Investment Guaranties. Agreement with 
Haiti, modifying the agreement of March 13 
and April 2, 1953, as modified. TIAS 9018. 
5 pp. 70€. (Cat. No. 5.19:9018.) 



Cultural Relations. Agreement with the 
People s Republic of Bulgaria. TIAS 9020. 
30 pp. $1 .30. (Cat. No. 59. 10:9020. ) 

Provision of Services for Kimpo Interna- 
tional Airport Expansion. Memorandum of 
agreement with the Republic of Korea. TIAS 
9021. 10 pp. 70C (Cat. No. 59.10:9021.) 

Mahaweli Ganga Irrigation. Agreement with 
Sri Lanka. TIAS 9023. 21 pp. 70C. (Cat. No. 
59.10:9023.) 

Trade in Textiles. Agreement with Colombia. 
amending the agreement of May 28, 1975. 
T1A5 9024. 4 pp. 700. (Cat. No. 
59.10:9024.) 

Defense — M-16 Rifle Production Program. 
Memorandum of understanding with the Re- 
public of Korea. TIAS 9026. 15 pp. $1.00 
(Cat. No. 59.10:9026.) 

Natural Gas Pipeline. Agreement with 
Canada. TIAS 9030. 48 pp. $1.80. (Cat. No. 
59.10:9030.) 

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with 
Pakistan. TIAS 9035, 22 pp. $1.10. (Cat. No. 
89,10:9035.) 

Trade and Textiles and Textile Products. 
Agreement with India. TIAS 9036. 29 pp. 
$1.30. (Cat. No. 59.10:9036.) 

Air Transport Services — Low-Cost Fares. 
,^greement with India, modifying the agree- 
ment of February 3. 1956, as amended. TIAS 

9038, 5 pp. 70C. (Cat. No. 59.10:9038.) 
Trade in Textiles and Textile Products. 

Agreement with the Republic ol Korea. TIAS 

9039, 21 pp. $1,10. (Cat, No, 59,10:9039,) 
Trade in Textiles. Agreement with Jamaica. 

TIAS 9041. 12 pp. 90C. (Cat. No. 

59.10:9041.) 
Air Transport Services — Low-Cost Fares. 

Agreement with the Polish People's Republic, 

modifying the agreement of July 19. 1972, as 

amended. 5 pp. 70c. (Cat. No. 59.10:9042.) 
Basic Sanitation. Agreement with Portugal. 

TIAS 9044. 27 pp. $1.30. (Cat. No. 

59,10:9044) 
Commodity Import Loan. Agreement with 

Jamaica. TIAS 9048. 16 pp. $1.10. (Cat. No. 

59.10:9048.) 
Rural Electrification. .Agreement with 

Bangladesh. TIAS 9049. 31 pp. $1,40. (Cat. 

No. 59.10:9049.) 
Trade in Textiles. Agreement with Pakistan. 

TIAS 9050. 16 pp. $1.10. (Cat. No. 

59,10:9050) 
Rural Community Health. Agreement with 

Tunisia, TIAS 9051. 51 pp. $1.80. (Cat. No 

59,10:9051.) 
Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Sr 

Lanka. TIAS 9052. 15 pp. $1.10. (Cat. No 

59.10:9052.) 
Air Transport Services — Low-Cost Fares 

Agreement with Iran, modifying the agree 

meni of February 1, 1973. TIAS 9053. 4 pp 

70?. (Cat. No. 59.10:9053.) 
Defense Areas and Facilities. Agreement with 

Antigua. TIAS 9054. 24 pp. $1.30. (Cat. No. 

59.10:9054.) 
Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with 

Jordan. TIAS 9057. 20 pp. $1.10. (Cat. No. 

59.10:9057.) 



Rural Electrification. Agreement with the 
Philippines. TIAS 9059. 22 pp. $1.10. (Cat.: 
No. 59.10:9059.) ' 

Bicol Integrated Area Development. Agree- 
ment with the Philippines. TIAS 9061. 44 pp, 
$1.70. (Cat. No. 59,10:9061.) 

Integrated Rural Development. Agreement 
with Jamaica. TIAS 9062. 23 pp. $1.30. (Cat. 
No. 59.10:9062.) 

Malaria Control. Agreement with Sri Lanka. 
TIAS 9063. 17 pp. $1.10. (Cat. No. 
59.10:9063.) 

Small Farmer Supervised Credit. Agreement 
with Tunisia. TIAS 9068. 56 pp. $1.90. (Cat. 
No. 59.10:9068.) 

Atomic Energy — Technical Information Ex- 
change and Safety Research. Agreement 
with Brazil. TIAS 9071. 11 pp. 90C. (Cat, 
No. 59.10:9071.) 

Aviation — Preclearance for Entry into the 
United States. Agreement with the Bahamas, 
extending application of the agreement of 
April 23, 1974. TIAS 9072. 2 pp. 600. (Cat, 
No. 59.10:9072.) 

Conservation of Migratory Birds and Their 
Environment. Convention with the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics. TIAS 9073. 41 pp, 
$1.60. (Cat. No. 59.10:9073.) 

Remote Sensing — Acquisition of Satellite 
Data. Memorandum of Understanding with 
India. TIAS 9074. 17 pp. $1.10. (Cat. No, 
59.10:9074.) 

Visa Facilitation. Agreement with the Socialist 
Republic of Romania. TIAS 9075. 4 pp. 700, 
(Cat. No. 59.10:9075.) 

Mapping, Charting and Geodesy. Memoran- 
dum of understanding with Indonesia. TIAS 
9079. 9 pp. 800. (Cat. No. 59.10:9079.) 

Geothermal Energy Research and Develop- 
ment. Agreement with Mexico. TIAS 9080. 
40 pp. $1.60. (Cat. No. 59.10:9080.) 

Air Force Personnel Training. Agreement 
with the Federal Republic of Germany. TIAS 
9081, 12 pp, 900. (Cat. No. 59.10:9081.) 

Agricultural Credit. Agreement with Af 
ghanistan. TIAS 9082. 10 pp. 800. (Cat. No 
59.10:9082.) 

Acquisition of Excess Property. Agreement 
with Guvana. TIAS 9083. 7 pp. 800. (Cat. 
No. 59 10:9083.) 

Trade in Textiles and Textile Products. 
Agreement with Haiti, amending the agree 
ment of March 22 and 23, 1976, as amended. 
TIAS 9084. 14 pp. 900. (Cat. No, 
59,10:9084,) 

Village Development Project. Agreement with 
Jordan, TIAS 9085. 23 pp. $1.20. (Cat. No. 
59.10:9085.) 

Deep Sea Drilling Project. Memorandum of' 
understanding with the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics. TIAS 9087. 11 pp. 900, 
(Cat. No. 59.10:9087.) 

Investment Guaranties. Agreement with 
Bangladesh. TIAS 9089. 9 pp. 800. (Cat, 
No. 59.10:9089.) 

Technical Assistance and Consulting Serv- 
ices. Agreement with Indonesia. TIAS 9092. 
22 pp. $1.10. (Cat. No. 59.10:9092.) 

Health Services. Agreement with Haiti. TIAS 
9094. 35 pp. $1.50. (Cat. No. 59.10:9094.) 



I]>^DEX 



OCTOBER 1979 
VOL. 79, NO. 2031 



Afghanistan. U.S. Policy Toward Af- 
ghanistan and Paliistan (Mililos) 54 

Africa 

OAU Summit Meeting (Harrop) 23 

U.S. Ambas.sadors to African Countries, 

September 1979 24 

Algeria. Western Sahara (Saunders) ... .53 
Angola. The U.S. Role in Southern Africa 

(Moose) , 20 

Arms Control 

An Evaluation of SALT II (Seignious) . .25 

SALT II— The Basic Choice (Vance) ... .32 

Asia 

The Indcjohinese Refugee Situation 

(Vance) 4 

U.S. Program To A.s.sist the World's Refu- 
gees ( Mondale) 1 

Visit to East Asia (Mondale) 10 

Bolivia. Letter of Credence (Arce) 63 

Brazil. Letter of Credence (Silveira) . . .63 
Canada. Economic Interdependence in 

.\'(irth America (Katz) 42 

China 

Vietnam and Indochina (Holbrooke) 34 

Visit to East Asia (Mondale) 10 

Communications. World Radio Conference 

(foreign relations outline) 62 

Congress 

Continuing Efforts To Account for MIA's 

(Oakley) 39 

Economic Interdependence in North 

America ( Katz) 42 

An Evaluation of SALT II (Seignious) . .25 
Forces of Change in the Middle East 

(Saunders) 44 

The Indochinese Refugee Situation 

(Vance) 4 

Military Equipment Programs for Egypt 

and Saudi Arabia (Saunders) 52 

Namibia (McHenry) 57 

OAU Summit Meeting (Harrop) 23 

Report on Southern Rhodesia (Moose) . .18 
Significant Quotes on Refugees (Clark) . . .6 

U.S. -Mexico Cooperation (Katz) 64 

U.S. Policy Toward Afghanistan and Paki- 
stan (Miklos) 54 

Vietnam and Indochina (Holbrooke) 34 

Western Sahara (Saunders) 53 

Cuba 

Secretary Vance's News Conference of 

September 5 14 

Soviet Combat Troops in Cuba (Carter, 

Vance, Department statement) 63 

Economics. Economic Interdependence in 

North America (Katz) 42 

Egypt 

Egyptian Vice President Meets With 
President Carter (White House state- 

* ment) 49 

Forces of Change in the Middle East 

(Saunders) 44 

' Middle East Peace Process (Strauss) ... .47 
Military Equipment Programs for Egypt 

and Saudi Arabia (Saunders) 52 

Foreign Aid. Emergency Aid to Nicaragua 
(White House announcement) 65 



Gambia. Letter of Credence (Sallah). . . .20 

Guinea. Letter of Credence (Conde) ... .20 

Human Rights 

OAU Summit Meeting (Harrop) 23 

Vietnam and Indochina (Holbrooke) 34 

Iran 

Forces of Change in the Middle East 
(Saunders) 44 

Kerosene, Fuel Oil E.xport Licenses for 
Iran (Department statement) 45 

Israel 

Forces of Change in the Middle East 
(Saunders) 44 

Middle East Peace Process (Strauss) ... .47 

Oil Supply Agreement Signed by the U.S. 
and Israel (Hansen, Nechushtan) 51 

U.S. Policy Toward Israel (Vance) 52 

Violence in Lebanon and Israel (Depart- 
ment statements) 5(1 

Kampuchea. Famine in Kampuchea 40 

Korea. Secretary Vance's News Confer- 
ence of September 5 14 

Lebanon 

U.S. Policy on Lebanon (Young) 61 

Violence in Lebanon and Israel (Depart- 
ment statements) 50 

Mauritania. Western Sahara (Saunders). 53 

Mexico 

Economic Interdependence in North 
America (Katz) 42 

Oil Spill in the Gulf of Mexico (Krueger) 66 

U.S. -Mexico Cooperation (Katz) 64 

Middle East 

Forces of Change in the Middle East 
(Saunders) 44 

Secretary Vance's News Conference of 
September 5 14 

Morocco. Western Sahara (Saunders) . . ..53 

Namibia 

Namibia (McHenry) 57 

The U.S. Role in Southern Africa 
(Moose) 20 

Narcotics Control. U.S. Policy Toward 
Afghanistan and Pakistan (Miklos) 54 

Nicaragua 

Emergency Aid to Nicaragua (White House 
announcement) 65 

President Carter's News Conference of 
July 25 (excerpts) 9 

Nuclear Policy. U.S. Policy Toward Af- 
ghanistan and Pakistan (Miklos) 54 

Pakistan. U.S. Policy Toward Afghanistan 
and Pakistan (Miklos) 54 

Peru. Letter of Credence (Arias- 
Schreiber) 63 

Petroleum 

Kerosene, Fuel Oil Export Licenses for 
Iran (Department statement) 45 

Oil Spill in the Gulf of Mexico (Krueger) 66 

Oil Supply Agreement Signed by the U.S. 
and Israel (Hansell, Nechushtan) 51 

Presidential Documents 

President Carter's News Conference of 
July 25 (excerpts) 9 

Uganda 22 

Publications 

"Foreign Relations" Volume on the United 
Nations Released 69 

GPO Sales Publications 70 

New Foreign Affairs Dictionary 69 

Refugees 

The Indochinese Refugee Situation 
(Vance) 4 

Memorandum of Understanding Between 
the UNHCR and Vietnam 5 

Rescue of Refugees at Sea 2 

Results of Refugee Conference 8 

Significant Quotes on Refugees (Clark) . . .6 



U.S. Coordinator for Refugee Affairs ... .8 
U.S. Program To Assist the World's Refu- 
gees ( Mondale) 1 

Vietnam and Indochina (Holbrooke) 34 

Visit to East Asia (Mondale) 10 

Saudi Arabia. Military Equipment Pro- 
grams for Egypt and Saudi Arabia 

(Saunders) ....." ,52 

South Africa 

Namibia (McHenry) 57 

The U.S. Role in Southern Africa 

(Moose) 20 

Southern Rhodesia 

Report on Southern Rhodesia (Moose) ..18 

The U.S. Role in Southern Africa 

(Moo.se) 20 

Visit of Bishop Muzorewa of Southern 
Rhodesia (White House statement) . . .19 
Thailand. Vietnam and Indochina (Hol- 
brooke) 34 

Togo. Letter of Credence (Grunitsky). . .20 

Treaties. Current Actions 67 

Uganda. Uganda (Carter) 22 

U.S.S.R. 

An Evaluation of SALT II (Seignious) ..25 

Soviet Combat Troops in Cuba (Carter, 

Vance, Department statement) 63 

SALT II— The Basic Choice (Vance) ... .32 

United Nations 

"Foreign Relations" Volume on the United 

Nations Released 69 

Memorandum of Understanding Between 

the UNHCR and Vietnam 5 

Namibia (McHenry) 57 

President Carter's Meeting With U.N. 
Secretary General (White House state- 
ment) 60 

Results of Refugee Conference 8 

U.S. Policy on Lebanon (Young) 61 

U.S. Program To Assist the World's Refu- 
gees ( Mondale) 1 

World Radio Conference (foreign relations 

outline) 62 

Venezuela. Letter of Credence (Perez) .63 

Vietnam 

Continuing Efforts To Account for MIA's 

(Oakley) 39 

Issue of U.S.-S.R.V. Relations 37 

Memorandum of Understanding Between 
the UNHCR and Vietnam 5 

Name Index 

Arce Alvarez, Roberto 63 

Arias-Schreiber, Alfonso 63 

Carter, President 9, 22, 63 

Clark, Dick 6 

Conde, Mamady Lamine 20 

Grunitsky, Yao 20 

Hansell, Herbert J 51 

Harrop, William C 23 

Holbrooke, Richard C 34 

Katz, Julius L 42, 64 

Krueger, Robert 66 

McHenry, Donald F 57 

Miklos, jack C 54 

Mondale, Vice President 1, 10 

Moose, Richard M 18, 20 

Nechushtan, Yaacov 51 

Oakley, Robert B 39 

Perez Chiriboga, Marcial 63 

Sallah, Ousman Ahmadou 20 

Saunders, Harold H 44, 52, 53 

Seignious, George M. II 25 

Silveira, Antonio Francisco Azeredo da .63 

Strauss, Robert S 47 

Vance, Secretary 4, 14, 32, .52, 63 

Young, Andrew 61 



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M04*partmvni of Statp 

bulletin 

Volume 79 / Number 2032 / November 1979 



Cover Photo: 

Bronze statue in the north garden of U.N. 
Headquarters, created by Soviet sculptor 
Evgeniy Vuchetich, illustrates the Biblical 
injunction: 

They shall beat their swords into plowshares, 
and their spears into pruninghooks: nation 
shall not lift up sword against nation, neither 
shall they learn war any more. (Isaiah 2:4| 

{Phoio by Ruth Helraich, U.S. Mission lo Ihe U.N.) 



The Department of State Bulletin, 
published by the Office of Public Com- 
munication in the Bureau of Public 
Affairs, is the official record of U.S. 
foreign policy. Its purpose is to provide 
the public, the Congress, and govern- 
ment agencies with information on 
developments in U.S. foreign relations 
and the work of the Department of 
State and the Foreign Service. 

The Bulletin's contents include 
major addresses and news conferences 
of the President and the Secretary of 
State; statements made before congres- 
sional committees by the Secretary 
and other senior State Department of- 
ficials; special features and articles on 
international affairs; selected press re- 
leases issued by the White House, the 
Department, and the U.S. Mission to 
the United Nations; and treaties and 
other agreements to which the United 
States is or may become a party. 

The Secretary of State has deter- 
mined that the publication of this peri- 
odical is necessary in the transaction of 
the public business required by law of 
this Department. Use of funds for 
printing this periodical has been ap- 
proved by the Director of the Office 
of Management and Budget through 
January 31, 1981. 



CYRUS R. VANCE 

Secretary of State 

HOODING CARTER III 

Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs 

JOHN CLARK KIMBALL 

Chief, Editorial Division 

PHYLLIS A. YOUNG 
Editor 

COLLEEN SUSSMAN 
Assistant Editor 



NOTE: Contents of this publication 
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COI\TE]\TS 



UNITED NATIONS 

United Nations Day, 1979 (Proclamation) 

Common Needs in a Diverse World (Secretary Vance) 

U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations (Biographic Data) 

U.S. Delegation to the 34th U.N. General Assembly 

United Nations — A Profile 

The 152 Members of the United Nations 



THE PRESIDENT 

7 Soviet Troops in Cuba and SALT 
9 Background on the Question of Soviet 
Troops in Cuba 

12 News Conference of October 9 

THE SECRETARY 

13 Currents of Change in Latin America 
16 Question-and-Answer Session Follow- 
ing New York Address 

18 Interview on NBC's "Today"" Show 

19 Interview on CBS-TV Morning News 

AFRICA 

20 President Carter Meets With Zairean 
and Liberian Presidents (White 
House Statements) 

ANTARCTICA 

lOth Meeting of the Antarctica Treaty 
Consultative Parties (Lucy Wilson 
Benson, Department Press Release, 
Press Communique) 

ARMS CONTROL 

24 SALT II — A Summation (Secretary 
Vance) 

25 MX Missile System (President Carter) 

CANADA 

26 U.S. -Canada Transboundary Air Qual- 

ity Talks 

j ENVIRONMENT 

,27 The Quiet Crisis (Anthony Lake) 

29 World Forests ( Memorandum from 

President Carter) 
31 Negotiations To Protect Migratory Wild 

Animals 



EUROPE 



32 



35 



39 



41 



NATO"s Fourth Decade — Defense and 
Detente (Vice President Mondale, 
Zbigniew Brzezinski) 
U.S. Commitment to Western Europe 
(Secretary Vance) 
36 Review of U.S. Policy in Europe 
(George S. Vest) 
Fourth Anniversary of the Helsinki 

Final Act (President Carter) 
14th Report on Cyprus (Message to the 
Congress) 
43 Fisheries Agreement With Denmark. 
Faroe Islands 

43 Publications 

MIDDLE EAST 

44 Vision of Peace (Zbigniew Brzezinski) 

45 Saudi Arabian Oil Production (White 

House Statement) 

46 U.S. Ambassadors to Middle East 

Countries, October 1979 

46 Letter of Credence (Saudi Arabia) 

47 Anniversary of the Camp David 

Agreements (President Carter. Sec- 
retary Vance. Menahem Begin, 
Anwar al-Sadat) 

MILITARY AFFAIRS 

48 Defense Budgets for FY 1980 and 1981 

(Message to the Congress) 

NUCLEAR POLICY 

49 Bangladesh Joins Nonproliferation 

Treaty ( Warren Christopher, De- 
partment Announcement) 

49 U.S. -Australia Agreement on Nuclear 

Energy (Message to the Congress) 

OCEANS 

50 Law of the Sea Negotiations (Elliot L. 

Richardson) 



SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 

51 U.N. Conference on Science and Tech- 
nology for Development (President 
Carter, Theodore M. Hesburgh) 

WESTERN HEMISPHERE 

54 Panama Acquires Jurisdiction Over the 

Canal Zone (Vice President Mon- 
dale) 

55 Panama Canal Act of 1979 (President 

Carter) 

56 Nicaragua (Warren Christopher) 

57 Visit of Mexican President Lopez Por- 

tillo (Joint Press Statement) 

58 Agreement With Mexico on Natural 

Gas (President Carter. Joint An- 
nouncement) 

59 U.S. Ambassadors to Western Hemi- 

sphere Countries, October 1979 

TREATIES 

59 Current Actions 

CHRONOLOGY 

61 September 1979 

62 PRESS RELEASES 

62 KAMPUCHEA DONATIONS 






)tPOS' 



,vtoa^ 



UNITED I^ATIOIVS DAY, 1979 



A Proelamatloii 

Thirty-four years after its founding "to save suc- 
ceeding generations of mantcind from the scourge of 
war", the United Nations remains mankind's last best 
hope for building a world community based on justice, 
tolerance for diversity and respect for the rule of law. 

The United Nations has no magic formula for solving 
the increasingly complex problems of our revolutionary 
age. Yet it remains the symbol, and the standard, of 
mankind's desire to turn away from ancient quarrels and 
live in a world in which all people can share in the fruits 
of prosperity and peace. 

More than ever, the international community is chal- 
lenged by problems of global dimension which can be 
solved only through world-wide cooperation and 
dialogue. The 100 new nations which have joined the 
United Nations since its founding are a symbol of the 
increasingly complex and diverse world which the 
United Nations confronts today. 

Protecting international peace and security is still the 
United Nations" greatest contribution and responsibility, 
but that political stability is only the precondition for 
fulfilling the larger aspirations of mankind. For all its 
imperfections, the United Nations remains the principal 
forum for the pivotal dialogue among the nations of the 
world on constructing a more stable, equitable, and pro- 
ductive economic order. It plays a leading role in the 
global management and allocation of vital natural re- 
sources. It offers an increasingly important channel for 
providing development assistance to many nations in the 
world. It offers a forum, and often a timely and effec- 
tive mechanism for protecting basic human rights. The 
leadership of the United Nations in responding to the 
present refugee crisis, and the recent Geneva Meeting 
on that problem, represents one of the proudest exam- 



ples of that world body's ability to harness world coop- 
eration in the cause of human dignity. 

The United States has historically been one of the 
United Nations' most active and dedicated supporters, 
and 1 have been proud to continue and expand on that 
support as President. Not a single day goes by when we 
in the United States do not call upon the United Nations, 
or one of its affiliates, to help deal with a problem of 
global dimensions. I join with many other Americans 
and citizens of all nations in expressing my sincere sup- 
port for this unique world body on the thirty-fourth an- 
niversary of its founding. 

Now, Therefore, I, Jimmy Carter, President of the 
United States of America, do hereby designate Wednes- 
day, October 24, 1979, as United Nations Day. I urge 
all Americans to use this day as an opportunity to better 
acquaint themselves with the activities and accom- 
plishments of the United Nations. 

I have appointed O. Pendleton Thomas to serve as 
1979 United States National Chairman for United Na- 
tions Day, and the United Nations Association of the 
U.S.A. to work with him in celebrating this very special 
day. And I invite all the American people, and people 
everywhere, to join me on this thirty-fourth anniversary 
of the United Nations, in strengthening our common re- 
solve to increase its effectiveness in meeting the global 
challenges and aspirations that we all share. 

In Witness Whereof, I have hereunto set my hand 
this thirteenth day of September, in the year of our Lord 
nineteen hundred and seventy-nine, and of the Inde- 
pendence of the United States of America, the two 
hundred and fourth. 

Jimmy Carter 



No. 4684 (text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents 
of Sept. 17. 1979. 



UNITED ]\ATIO]\S: CO]IOIO]\ 1\EEDS 
r% A DIVERSE WORLD 



by Secretary Vance 

Address before the 34th session of 
'the U.N. General Assemblv in New 
York on September 24. J979? 

We met in this General Assembly on 
the threshold of a new decade. It will 
be a time of complex challenge — a 
period in which, more than ever, co- 
operative endeavors among nations are 
a matter not only of idealism but of 
direct self-interest. 

The decade now drawing to a close 
has been characterized by rapid 
change — far-reaching and fundamental. 

• Awesome technological develop- 
ments are all about us. 

• The assertion of national inde- 
pendence has reshaped the political ge- 
ography of our planet. 

• Within nations, we see an ac- 
celerating rise in individual economic, 
political, and social expectations. 

• The unrelenting hostility of the 
cold war has given way to a more com- 
plex relationship between East and 
West, with elements of both competi- 
tion and cooperation. 

• The simple notion of a bipolar 
world has become obsolete. Increas- 
ingly there is a profusion of different 
systems and allegiances and a diffusion 
of political and military power. 

• The world economic order is also 
undergoing inexorable transformations. 
Many nations, formerly among the dis- 
advantaged, now are achieving global 
economic power. Economic interde- 
pendence has become a daily reality for 
the citizens of every nation. 

These sweeping changes have, for 
the most part, worked in constructive 
directions — changing lives for the bet- 
ter and opening new possibilities for 
collective effort and creative diplo- 
macy. 

But while these developments dem- 
onstrate that progress is possible, they 
by no means demonstrate that it is in- 
evitable. I say this for two reasons. 

First, in a number of areas, the pace 
of current progress is dwarfed by the 
scope of coming challenges. The next 
decade will decide whether we have the 
collective wisdom and the common will 
to surmount a series of imposing and 
mterrelated problems which must be 
dealt with in a comprehensive manner. 

• The need to develop new forms of 



energy will pose a continuing chal- 
lenge. We have entered the difficult 
transition from a petroleum economy to 
one based on other forms of energy. 

• Even without this added burden, 
we face an imposing task in providing 
for the basic needs of people and in 
narrowing the combustible disparity 
between wealth and despair. The food 
shortage facing developing countries, 
for example, was 12 million tons in 
1975. It could be 70-85 million tons by 
1990, unless productivity rises sharply. 

• We must strike a decent balance 
between the burgeoning demands of 
more people for a better life and the in- 
escapable reality of a fragile environ- 
ment. 

• Such prospects carry the seeds of 
future discord. As these seeds ripen, 
and the growth and spread of weapons 
continue, regional conflicts become all 
the more dangerous — in their toll of 
lives and resources and in the height- 
ened risk of wider confrontation. 

• And despite our emergence from 
the days of unrelenting hostility, the 
East-West relationship can deterioriate 
dangerously whenever one side fails to 
respect the security interests of the 
other. 

Our ability to meet these tests de- 
pends on a second issue: Will we con- 
front such challenges together and 
benefit together? Or will we let adver- 
sity divide us and thus conquer? I must 
be frank to say that I am not sure what 
the anwer will be. 

There are some reasons for encour- 
agement. In recent years, the nations 
here represented have found it easier, 
in many different forums, to talk with 
each other rather than at each other. 

East and West have entered into the 
broadest arms control agenda in his- 
tory. The Soviet Union and the United 
States have negotiated significant lim- 
itations on strategic arms in a treaty 
that now awaits ratification. 

North and South have made progress 
on financial, trade, and commodity 
issues — far more progress than has 
been acknowledged. Agreement has 
been reached on a sharp increase in the 
resources of the International Monetary 
Fund. Lending by the multilateral de- 
velopment banks has increased. Ex- 
panded trade opportunities have been 
opened by the recently concluded trade 
negotiations. We have moved ahead on 
other matters such as international debt 
and a common fund for commodities. 



We should recognize such progress and 
build on it. 

We have taken steps as well toward 
the resolution of some deeply imbed- 
ded regional disputes. 

But I am concerned that there are 
also factors at work which could re- 
verse this cooperative trend. The se- 
verity of the problems we face could 
drive nations to the pursuit of their own 
separate advantage at the expense of 
international cooperation. In times of 
economic trouble, even relatively pros- 
perous countries find it more difficult 
to look beyond their internal concerns 
to meet international needs. Indeed, it 
is a vivid lesson of history that 
hardship can breed short-sighted insu- 
larity. It can arouse instincts for self- 
preservation at the expense of others. 
In such times, the voices of economic 
nationalism will be raised in all our 
countries. We must resist them. 

We must resist, as well, the voices 
of international confrontation. In a 
number of international negotiations, 
political as well as economic, we have 
worked our way through to the toughest 
issues involved. We must not react now 
in frustration and unleash a spiral of 
rhetoric which can deepen rather than 
resolve our divisions. 

The challenges of the 1980's can be 
met if each of us here represented 
meets the responsibilities we share. 

Search for Peace 

Our first responsibility is to persist 
in the search for peace, to reduce both 
the danger and the destructiveness of 
war. 

The future of two regions — the Mid- 
dle East and southern Africa — depends 
on specific decisions that will be made 
in the coming months. 

Middle East. We believe the March, 
26, 1979, treaty between Egypt and 
Israel has reduced the dangers inherent 
in the Arab-Israeli conflict and has laid 
the foundation for a settlement that can 
be both durable and just. 

But the dramatic achievement of 
peace between Israel and Egypt and the 
successful implementation of the first 
phases of the Treaty of Peace have not 
obscured the necessity to move toward 
peace between Israel and its other 
neighbors. Indeed, it remains the re- 
solute view of my government that 
further progress toward an overall 
peace is essential. 



Department of State Bulletin 



We know that an ultimate settlement 
must address the legitimate rights of 
the Palestinian people. The Palestinian 
question must be resolved in all of its 
aspects. 

As the peace process continues to 
unfold, it is our deepest desire that 
representatives of the Palestinian 
people and the Governments of Jordan 
and Syria will join in this great quest. 
This is consistent with, indeed it un- 
derscores, our unshakable commitment 
to Israel's security and well-being, now 
and in the future. 

None of the parties involved in this 
difficult negotiation has any illusions 
that resolving the Palestinian issue will 
be easy. But the United States is con- 
vinced that progress will be made to- 
ward this goal. 

Preserving the integrity of Lebanon 
is also critical to peace in the Middle 
East. There is now a cease-fire in 
southern Lebanon, the fragility of 
which is underscored by the events of 



today. We need not only a cease-fire 
but a broader truce. We will be work- 
ing toward such a goal in our discus- 
sions with other interested governments 
here at this Assembly. Lebanon has 
suffered all too much. 

The desire for peace is shared by all 
the peoples of the Middle East. We 
recognize that there are disagreements 
about how best to reach that common 
goal. We believe the course on which 
we are embarked is the right one, in- 
deed the only one that has shown prac- 
tical results. We call on all who 
genuinely seek peace to join us in this 
endeavor. 

Southern Africa. A step toward 
peace has been taken as well on the 
Rhodesian conflict. The parties are 
now engaged in negotiation toward a 
solution that could combine true 
majority rule with essential minority 
rights. The British Government, the 
Commonwealth nations, and the parties 
themselves deserve great credit for this 



AMBASSADOR TO 
THE UNITED NATIONS 

Donald F. McHenry was born in St. 
Louis, Mo., on October 13. 1936. and was 
raised in East St. Louis. Ill, He received his 
B.S. degree from Illinois State University 
(1957) and his M.S. degree from Southern 
Illinois University (1959) where he was a 
graduate teaching assistant (1957-59), He 
taught English at Howard University in 
Washington, D,C,. from 1959 to 1962 At 
the same time, he continued to pursue post- 
graduate studies at Georgetown University, 

Ambassador McHenry joined the Depart- 
ment of State in 1963 as a foreign affairs 
officer in the Dependent Areas Section of 
the Office of U,N, Political Affairs and was 
officer-in-charge of the section from 1965 
to 1968, He was Assistant to the Secretary 
of State-designate and the Secretary of State 
(1968-69) and Special Assistant to the 
Counselor of the Department of State 
(1969-1971), 

During 1971-73. he took a leave of ab- 
sence from the State Department to serve as 
a guest scholar at the Brookings Institution 
and as an international affairs fellow of the 
Council on Foreign Relations, At the same 
time, he was a professorial lecturer in the 
School of Foreign Service at Georgetown 
University, 

Ambassador McHenry resigned from the 
Department of State in 1973 and joined the 
Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace where he directed humanitarian pol- 
icy studies. He served concurrently as a 
professorial lecturer at American Univer- 
sity. 

His international organization experience 
includes serving as an adviser and alternate 




representative to the U.N. Trusteeship 
Council, alternate representative to the 
U,N, Seminar on Apartheid and Racial Dis- 
crimination, delegate to the U,N, Interna- 
tional Conference on Human Rights, and 
consultant to the U,S. congressional dele- 
gation to the Interparliamentary Union in 
1966, 

Ambassador McHenry worked on the 
Carter Administration's State Department 
transition staff. He was appointed US, 
Deputy Representative to the U,N. Security 
Council in 1977 and was chief U,S, 
negotiator on the question of Namibia, as a 
member of the UN, Western five contact 
group. He was sworn in as US, Permanent 
Representative to the United Nations on 
September 23. 1979, 

Ambassador McHenry received the De- 
partment of State's Superior Honor Award 
in 1966, He is the author of Micronesia: 
Trust Betrayed and has had numerous arti- 
cles published in journals and newspapers. 



new Step. Agreement on a fair con- 
stitution and new elections, as called: 
for in the Lusaka communique, could 
end the deepening agony of war. 

We have made substantial progress 
in Namibia. But obstacles remain. The 
contact group [Canada, France, West 
Germany, United Kingdom, United 
States] is working with the parties con- 
cerned to find ways to resolve the few 
outstanding issues. We do not under- 
state the difficulties, but neither should 
any of us underestimate the opportuni 
ties that a settlement would bring for 
all of southern Africa. 

In most negotiations, we can best 
make progress by stages. A knot can 
never be untied from the inside. We 
must begin with the parts we can grasp 
and work our way through to the end of 
the problem. History will judge us se- 
verely if we let our opportunities for 
peace slip away. As negotiations pro- 
ceed, the issues we address become 
progressively more difficult. But we 
must not let future fears or ambitions 
undermine the progress that has been 
made. 

Terrorism. As we work on these 
and other conflicts, let us also squarely 
face the fact that our planet is plagued 
by those who make war on innocents, 
as we saw just weeks ago in the tragic 
death of Lord Mountbatten. We must 
have greater international cooperation 
to combat the barbarous practices of 
the terrorist. The United States strongly 
supports the basic elements of the draft 
convention outlawing the taking of 
hostages. The conclusion of this treaty 
will contribute to a growing consensus 
that terrorism will not be tolerated, re- 
gardless of the political cause its per- 
petrators claim to pursue. 

Arms Control. Finally, the require- 
ment of peace carries with it an inter- 
national responsibility to limit the 
spread and accumulation of arms. 

A particular obligation falls to the 
largest nuclear powers — the United 
States and the Soviet Union — to con- 
tain the competition in strategic 
weapons. The SALT 11 treaty can be a 
major step toward fulfillment of that 
obligation. 

The goal of strategic stability will be 
further served if the Soviet Union, 
Great Britain, and the United States are 
able to agree on a comprehensive test 
ban. 

As the nuclear superpowers seek the 
path toward mutual restraint, all na- 
tions must also recognize the direct 
threat to their security from the spread 
of nuclear weapons. Developments in 
recent years can bring new impetus to ■ 
the nonproliferation effort — including 
progress in the International Nuclear 
Fuel Cycle Evaluation, which can help j 



November 1979 



us find safer ways to develop nuclear 
energy for humanity; the strengthening 
of International Atomic Energy Agency 
safeguards; the substantial increase in 
the number of parties to the Nonprolif- 
eration Treaty (NPT); the entry into 
force of the treaty of Tlatelolco, which 
now finally appears within grasp; and 
the pledge by a number of nuclear 
powers, under specific circumstances, 
to refrain from the use of nuclear 
weapons against nonnuclear states. But 
there have also been serious setbacks — 
further demonstrations of intent to ac- 
quire nuclear weapons, in disregard of 
the inherent dangers for regional and 
international security. The NPT review 
conference next year will be a critical 
time for taking stock and for redou- 
bling our efforts to make progress on 
this urgent international priority. 

Economic Nationalism 

Beyond the search for peace, a sec- 
ond responsibility we share is to be 
sensitive to the international conse- 
quences of our national economic deci- 
sions and resist the temptation to solve 
our economic problems at the expense 
of others. 

The imprudence of economic nation- 
alism has been harshly demonstrated in 
the past. The world depression a half 
century ago was spread, deepened, and 
prolonged by a wave of protectionism. 
That memory has spurred us toward a 
new multilateral trade agreement in- 
tended to open markets and keep them 
open, even in a time of economic 
strain. 

Today, let me address one of those 
issues which most clearly reflect the 
direct connection between national de- 
cisions and global consequences. That 
issue is energy. In almost no area is the 
need for common action more apparent 
or more urgent. It is an issue which 
now threatens to divide us, econom- 
ically and politically. In a future of 
greater scarcity, these divisions could 
weaken the fabric of international 
comity which this Organization em- 
bodies. 

All nations will suffer if all nations 
do not act responsibly — in their con- 
sumption of energy, in its pricing, and 
in its production. Despite a difficult 
prognosis for our energy future, i be- 
lieve the basis may exist for progress. 

Until the 1970's modern industrial 
economies operated on two basic as- 
sumptions, which also governed rela- 
tions between oil importers and 
exporters — that oil was cheap and that 
supplies were unlimited. Now all na- 
tions realize that these assumptions no 
longer hold. 

The commitments made by the major 



industrial countries at the Tokyo sum- 
mit demonstrate this clearly. My gov- 
ernment is taking ambitious action to 
address the energy problem and is 
making efforts to exceed these com- 
mitments. 

• President Carter has committed the 
United States not to import more than 
8.2 million barrels of oil a day in 1979 
and never to exceed the peak level our 
imports reached in 1977. 

• Total U.S. energy research and 
development this year is $3.2 billion. 
We are investing $528 million this 
year — and $600 million next year — in 
the development and use of solar 
energy. 

• We are significantly expanding our 
development of synthetic fuels to take 
advantage of the abundant coal and oil 
shale supplies in our country. 

Much of this new energy technology 
will have application in other countries 
as well. We will seek to make it avail- 
able to others under mutually satisfac- 
tory conditions, for we recognize that 
by helping others resolve their energy 
problems, we help resolve our own. 

Let me indicate some of the ways in 
which we are prepared to work with 
others to meet our common energy 
needs. 

• We have joined other industrial 
nations in agreeing to establish a provi- 
sional international technology group 
which will recommend ways to broaden 
international participation in the com- 
mercial development of alternative 
fuels. 

• I pledged last year that the United 
States would do more to mobilize its 
technical talents in behalf of the de- 
velopment of others. I am pleased to 
report that next month we will establish 
an institute for scientific and techno- 
logical cooperation. This institute will 
work for the goals set by the U.N. 
Conference on Science and Technology 
for Development. It will help the 
people of developing nations benefit 
from our technologies — and help them 
expand their own technological capaci- 
ties. The institute's policy council will 
include experts from developing na- 
tions. Energy development will be 
among its highest priorities. 

• We will participate actively in 
preparations for the 1981 World Con- 
ference on New and Renewable 
Energy. 

• At the recent economic summit 
conference, the World Bank was in- 
vited to take the lead in coordinating 
our assistance to developing nations in 
the field of energy. We suggest that the 
World Bank bring together a group of 
experts to review the question of 



U.S. DELEGATION TO THE 
34TH U.N. GENERAL 
ASSEMBLY* 

Representatives 

Donald F. McHenry 

Benjamin S. Rosenthal. US. Represen- 
tative from the State of New York 

Larry Winn, Jr., U.S. Representative 
from the State of Kansas 

Esther L. Coopersmith 

Alternate Representatives 

Richard W. Petree 
William L. Dunfey 
Howard T. Rosen 



•Text from USUN press release 80 of 
Sept. 18. 1979, which includes bio- 
graphic data on each delegate. 



energy research, development, and 
training in detail. Specifically, it could 
evaluate the work of existing energy 
research and training centers, both na- 
tional and international, in developing 
countries. In addition, it could recom- 
mend how current institutions could be 
strengthened and whether new multilat- 
eral ones should be created. 

• We are supporting expansion of 
the World Bank's program for explora- 
tion and development of mineral fuels. 

• The Bank is also considering 
whether local programs of development 
finance are adequate to support the 
rapid application of solar, small hydro, 
and other renewable energy technol- 
ogies in developing nations. 

• The Inter-American Development 
Bank has proposed creation of a facility 
to provide political risk insurance and 
loan guarantees for private investment 
in energy and minerals projects in its 
region. This could be an effective 
means of stimulating energy develop- 
ment there. We are willing to pursue 
with the Bank its initiative and work 
with other countries to develop an ac- 
ceptable proposal. 

As the industrial countries make 
serious efforts to restrict oil demand 
and to help the developing countries 
meet their energy challenges, the ques- 
tion increasingly becomes whether the 
oil-producing nations are prepared to 
stabilize prices and, to the extent it is 
within their control, insure adequate 
supplies. A failure to do so will con- 
tinue to have harsh consequences for 
the world economy, especially the 
poorer nations. 

We understand the natural desire of 
oil-exporting nations to husband this 
valuable resource for future genera- 



tions. And we accept the fact that oil 
prices must retlect not only the strength 
ot demand but also the long-term scar- 
city of supply — so long as scarcity is 
never contrived to manipulate price. 

But oil producers must understand 
that there is a limit to what the 
economies of the oil-consuming na- 
tions, and the global economy, can 
sustain. We must all proceed with a re- 
sponsible recognition that our national 
energy decisions will have profound 
global effects — and will return either to 
haunt or to help their makers. 

Commitment to Human Welfare 

A third common responsibility is an 
intensified commitment to help im- 

United Nations Headquarters in New York. 



prove the lives of our fellow human 
beings — to provide the necessities of 
life, to afford the chance to progress, to 
assure a voice in decisions which will 
determine their future. 

Human Rights. We have made 
progress in the field of human rights, 
but we must do more. 

In the past year, some nations have 
taken steps to restore legal protections 
and democratic institutions. And we 
have seen the inauguration of an 
Inter- American Court of Human 
Rights, the Organization of African 
Unity's forceful call for the creation of 
regional human rights institutions on 
the continent of Africa, and the activa- 
tion of the U.N. Educational, Scientific 




Department of State Bulletin 

and Cultural Organization's human* 
rights procedures. 

The growing concern for human; 
rights is undeniable. Yet the sad truth 
is that even as we sit here today, men 
and women face torture, death, and op- 
pression for daring to exercise rights 
set forth in the charter of this body 
three decades ago. Our joint challenge 
is to advance the aspirations of all 
peoples for individual human dignity. 

Our commitment must be to eco- 
nomic as well as political and social 
rights — for all are indispensable to 
human dignity. Improvements in eco 
nomic well-being, opportunities for 
participation in the political process, 
and a growing sense of both economic 
and political equity can do much to 
defuse the grievances which can lead to 
national convulsions and international 
tensions. 

Food and Population. To meet this 
commitment to a better life for all 
peoples, we must each strive to move 
the North-South dialogue beyond grand 
themes and on to specific cases — to 
priority areas in which practical de- 
velopment goals can be met. Let me 
discuss in this connection our efforts 
toward a goal we should adopt as a 
matter of simple humanity: that by the 
end of this century, no person on this^ 
bountiful earth should have to go hun- 
gry- 

Last year, I noted that we must nott 
be lulled by good weather and plentiful 
harvests into losing our sense of 
urgency. Since then, poor harvests in a. 
number of countries have substantially 
increased the international demand for 
food. This situation underscores the 
need to accumulate adequate stocks tO' 
support world food security. I assure 
you that the United States will do all it 
can to prevent a global food crisis. 

The American harvest this year will 
be of record size. We have removed all 
restrictions on wheat production for 
next year. We have established farmer- 
owned grain reserves which, through 
accumulation and release of stocks, 
have helped stabilize supplies. 

An International Wheat Agreement 
still eludes our grasp. We should not 
abandon this goal. But we should move 
immediately to complete negotiations 
for a new food aid convention; the 
World Food Council has urged an 
agreement by mid- 1980. We support 
that recommendation. In the meantime 
we are already implementing the higher 
food aid pledge the convention would 
entail. 

At the same time, major emphasis 
must be placed on improving global 
food production. Over half of Ameri- 
can direct development aid now is de- 
voted to agriculture. We will continue 



November 1979 



working to improve the yields of major 
' food crops, to preserve croplands, and 
to expand research on ways to increase 
production of traditional and new 
I crops, especially those grown by poor 
farmers. 

These efforts have received effective 
support from the international agricul- 
tural research centers. We support pro- 
',posals to double the resources contrib- 
uted to those centers and intend to in- 
crease our contribution. We hope addi- 
tional countries will become con- 
tributors. 

We must be aware, however, that in 
the long run these efforts could be viti- 
ated if the world's population is not 
slowed. Half the couples of child- 
bearing age still do not have adequate 
access to family planning services. We 
must strive to make family planning 
services — along with other elements of 
basic health care, adequate food 
supplies, and clean water — available to 
all as rapidly as we can. 

And in the short run, we must be 
prepared to meet emergency needs 
wherever famine afflicts humanity or 
refugees seek haven — in Africa, in 
Latin America, in Southeast Asia, or 
elsewhere. 

Refugees. The proposal made by 
Vice President Mondale at Geneva for 
a refugee resettlement fund reflects our 
belief that the international community 
should deal on a global basis with a 
global and grave refugee crisis. We 

J urge broad participation in this fund. 

' Vigorous and large-scale interna- 
tional action is required to bring relief 
to the starving in Kampuchea, now 
facing one of the great human tragedies 
of modern times. Tens of thousands of 
sick and hungry Khmer are already 
pressing on Thailand's border; hun- 
dreds of thousands may soon follow 

, them. Even more widespread famine 
and disease are in prospect, especially 
in view of recent reports of intensified 
fighting. To avert unthinkable catas- 
trophe, an international program of 
humanitarian relief must be established 
in Kampuchea as soon as possible. In- 
ternational organizations must be able 
to bring a coordinated, massive, and 
adequately monitored program of 
emergency relief to all needy Khmer. 
We would endorse such an effort. 

The food crisis in Kampuchea 
promises both to multiply the flow of 
refugees and to take a terrible toll 
among those who cannot escape. The 
flood of refugees from Vietnam, Laos, 
and Kampuchea already has brought 
great suffering to hundreds of thou- 
sands of innocent people, as well as 
heavy burdens on countries of first 

.; asylum. 



UNITED NATIONS— 
A PROFILE 

ESTABLISHED 

By charter signed in San Francisco. 
California, on June 26, 1945; effective 
October 24. 1945. 

PURPOSES 

To maintain international peace and secu- 
rity; to develop friendly relations among 
nations; to achieve international coopera- 
tion in solving economic, social, cultural, 
and humanitarian problems and in pro- 
moting respect for human rights and fun- 
damental freedoms; to be a center for 
harmonizing the actions of nations in at- 
taining these common ends 

MEMBERSHIP 

152 (for complete list see p. 6). 

BUDGET 

U.N. expenditure budget for 1979 is about 
$578 million. The U.S. share is $137 
million. The total U.N. system budget 
(including the U.N. and specialized agen- 
cies and programs, but not including the 
World Bank) was about $2.5 billion in 
1977. The U.S. share was $600.1 mil- 
lion. 

PRINCIPAL ORGANS 

General Assembly. Membership: All U.N. 
members. President: Elected at the be- 
ginning of each General Assembly ses- 
sion. For this 34th session the President is 
Salim A. Salim of Tanzania Main Com- 
mittees: (First) Political and Security; 
Special Political Committee; (Second) 
Economic and Financial; (Third) Social, 
Humanitarian, and Cultural; (Fourth) 
Trusteeship; (Fifth) Administrative and 
Budgetary; (Sixth) Legal. Many other 
committees address specific issues, in- 
cluding peacekeeping, crime prevention, 
status of women, and U.N. Charter re- 
form. 

Security CounciL Membership: 5 perma- 
nent (China, France. U.S.S.R., U.K., 
U.S.), each with the right to veto, and 10 
nonpermanent elected by the General As- 
sembly for 2-year terms. Five nonperma- 
nent members are elected from Africa and 
Asia, one from Eastern Europe, two from 
Latin America, and two from Western 




Europe and other areas. Nonpermanent 
members are not eligible for immediate 
reelection. For 1979 the nonpermanent 
members are Bangladesh, Bolivia, 
Czechoslovakia, Gabon, Jamaica, 
Kuwait, Nigeria, Norway, Portugal, and 
Zambia. President: Rotates monthly in 
English alphabetical order of members. 

Economic and Social Council. Member- 
ship: 54, of which 18 are elected each 
year by the General Assembly for 3-year 
terms. President: Elected each year. 

Trusteeship Council. Membership: U.S., 
China, France, U.S.S.R., U.K. Presi- 
dent: Elected each year. 

International Court of Justice. Member- 
ship: 15. elected for 9-year terms by the 
General Assembly and the Security Coun- 
cil from nominees of national groups 
under provisions of the ICJ Statute. 

Secretariat. Chief Administrative Officer: 
Secretary General of the United Nations 
appointed to a 5-year term by the General 
Assembly on the recommendation of the 
Security Council. The current Secretary 
General is Kurt Waldheim (Austria) who 
has served since 1972. Staff: A 
worldwide staff of about 14,400 repre- 
senting 150 languages. The Secretary 
General appoints the staff according to 
General Assembly regulations. 



Taken and updated from the Department of 
State's Background Note on the United 
Nations published October 1978. Copies of 
the complete Note may be purchased for 
70(1 from the Superintendent of Documents. 
U.S. Government Printing Office. Washing- 
ton. DC. 20402 (a 25% discount is allowed 
when ordering 100 or more Notes mailed to 
the same address). 



The international community has 
begun to respond. But humanitarian 
steps are not enough. The community 
of nations must make a more active 
effort to restore peace to the region and 
to resolve, by nonmilitary means, the 
problems that developments in In- 
dochina have carried in their wake. 
They pose a threat to the stability of the 
region as a whole. 



Demand for Global Responses 

I believe we can meet the challenges 
before us. But let us not misjudge their 
magnitude. Resolution of regional dis- 
putes and placing new limits on the in- 
struments of war will require new acts 
of national and international will. The 
1980's could portend a prolonged 
energy crisis. It could be a decade of 



Department of State BuUcii 



widespread laiiiine. Unless the swelling 
defieits ot developing countries can be 
managed, many of their economies 
may stagnate; some could be threatened 
with collapse. Global problems like 
these demand global responses. 

This Assembly will decide whether 
to launch a new round of negotiations 
on economic cooperation for develop- 
ment. Let me state today that the 
United States would participate, in the 
Committee of the Whole, in consulta- 
tions to decide the most effective way 
of conducting such negotiations. 

If new global negotiations are to 
succeed, their participants must be 
realistic about the political and eco- 
nomic capabilities of each other. We 
must assign priority to those issues on 
which concrete results are possible. 
And we should avoid duplicating the 
work of existing institutions. In this 
way. the negotiations could help build 
a global consensus for action. 

Many of the issues I have addressed 
are already prominent on the agenda of 
the United Nations. The need for coop- 
eration in addressing them requires that 
we continue to strengthen this institu- 
tion. Financial, procedural, and man- 
agement reforms are urgently neces- 
sary. As a first step, we urge that the 
Secretary General's recommendations, 
now adopted by this Assembly, be fully 
implemented. 

The urgency of the requirements I 
have described calls for something 
more on the part of all members of the 
United Nations. 

The distinctions between North and 
South, as those between East and West, 
reflect differing interests. They have a 
role in defining the issues and in 
clarifying our choices. But we must 
commit ourselves to finding areas 
where our interests converge. 

Each of us has our special values to 
be nurtured, our particular goals to be 
served. I do not suggest it can or 
should be otherwise. The United States 
believes in a world of diversity. But let 
us resolve, here, at this Assembly, to 
find in our common needs and common 
humanity a renewed dedication to the 
search for common ground. D 



'Press release 234. 



THE 152 MEMBERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS' 


Afghanistan (1446) 


German Democratic 


Pakistan (1947) 


Albania (1955) 


Republic (1973) 


Panama 


Algeria (1962) 


Germany, Federal 


Papua New Guinea 


Angola (1976) 


Republic of (1973) 


(1975) 


Argentina 


Ghana (1957) 


Paraguay 


Australia 


Greece 


Peru 


Austria (1955) 


Grenada (1974) 


Philippines 


Bahamas (1973) 


Guatemala 


Poland 


Bahrain (1971) 


Guinea (1958) 


Portugal (1955) 


Bangladesh (1974) 


Guinea-Bissau (1974) 


Qatar (1971) 


Barbados (1966) 


Guyana (1966) 


Romania (1955) 


Belgium 


Haiti 


Rwanda (1962) 


Benin (formerly 


Honduras 


Saint Lucia (1979) 


Dahomey) (1960) 


Hungary (1955) 


Samoa (1976) 


Bhutan (1971) 


Iceland ( 1946) 


Sao Tome and Principe 


Bolivia 


India 


(1975) 


Botswana (1966) 


Indonesia (1950) 


Saudi Arabia 


Brazil 


Iran 


Senegal (1960) 


Bulgaria (1955) 


Iraq 


Seychelles (1976) 


Burma (1948) 


Ireland (1955) 


Sierra Leone (1961) 


Burundi (1962) 


Israel (1949) 


Singapore (1965) 


Byelorussian S,S R. 


Italy (1955) 


Solomon Islands (1978) 


Canada 


Ivory Coast ( 1960) 


Somalia (1960) 


Cape Verde (1975) 


Jamaica (1962) 


South Africa 


Central African 


Japan (1956) 


Spain (1955) 


Republic (1960) 


Jordan (1955) 


Sri Lanka (1955) 


Chad (1960) 


Kenya (1963) 


Sudan (1956) 


Chile 


Kuwait (1963) 


Suriname (1975) 


China'' 


Lao Peoples Democratic 


Swaziland (1968) 


Colombia 


Republic (1955) 


Sweden (1946) 


Comoros (1975) 


Lebanon 


Syria 


Congo (1960) 


Lesotho (1966) 


Thailand (1946) 


Costa Rica 


Liberia 


Togo (1960) 


Cuba 


Libyan Arab 


Trinidad and Tobago 


Cyprus (1960) 


Jamahiriya (1955) 


(1962) 


Czechoslovakia 


Luxembourg 


Tunisia (1956) 


Democratic Kampuchea 


Madagascar (1960) 


Turkey 


(formerly Cambodia) 


Malawi (1964) 


Uganda (1962) 


(1955) 


Malaysia (1957) 


Ukrainian S S R. 


Democratic Yemen 


Maldives ( 1965) 


U.S.S.R. 


(1967) 


Mali (1960) 


United Arab Emirates 


Denmark 


Malta (1964) 


(1971) 


Djibouti (1977) 


Mauritania ( 1961) 


United Kingdom 


Dominica (1978) 


Mauritius (1968) 


United Republic of 


Dominican Republic 


Mexico 


Cameroon (I960) 


Ecuador 


Mongolia (1961) 


United Republic of 


Egypt 


Morocco (1956) 


Tanzania ( 1961 ) 


El Salvador 


Mozambique ( 1975) 


United States of America 


Equatorial Guinea 


Nepal (1955) 


Upper Volta (1960) 


(1968) 


Netherlands 


Uruguay 


Ethiopia 


New Zealand 


Venezuela 


Fiji (1970) 


Nicaragua 


Vietnam (1977) 


Finland (1955) 


Niger (1960) 


Yemen (Sana) (1947) 


France 


Nigeria (I960) 


Yugoslavia 


Gabon (1960) 


Norway 


Zaire (1960) 


Gambia (1965) 


Oman (1971) 


Zambia (1964) 


'Countries are listed with 


names as registered by the United N 


ations. Year in parentheses 


indicates date of admission; 


countries with no date were origina 


1 members in 1945. 


^By Resolution 2758 (XXVI) of Oct. 25. 1971. the General 


Assembly decided "to re- 


store all its rights to the People's Republic of China and to recognize the representatives of 


its Government as the only 


egitimate representatives of China to the United Nations." 



November 1979 



THE PRESIDE]\T: Soviet Troops in Cuba and SALT 



Address to the nation on October I, 
1979.' 



I want to talk with you about the 
subject that is my highest concern, as it 
has been for every President. That 
subject is peace and the security of the 
United States. 

We are at peace tonight, as we have 
been at peace throughout the time of 
my service in this office. The peace we 
enjoy is the peace of the strong. Our 
national defenses are unsurpassed in 
|the world. Those defenses are stronger 
Itonight than they were 2 years ago, and 
they will be stronger 2 years from now 
than they are tonight, because of care- 
fully planned improvements that are 
going forward with your support and 
with the support of the Congress. 

Our program for modernizing and 
strengthening the military forces of the 
NATO alliance is on track, with the 
full cooperation and participation of 
our European allies. Our strategic nu- 
clear forces are powerful enough to de- 
stroy any potential adversary many 
times over, and the invulnerability of 
those forces will soon be further as- 
sured by a new system of powerful 
mobile missiles. These systems are de- 
1 signed for stability and defense. 

Beyond these military defenses, we 
are on the threshold of a great advance 
in the control of nuclear weapons — the 
adoption of the second strategic arms 
limitation treaty. SALT II. 

This evening, I also want to report to 
you about the highly publicized Soviet 
brigade in Cuba and about its bearing 
on the important relationship between 
our nation and the Soviet Union. 

This is not a simple or easy subject. 
The United States and the Soviet Union 
are the two most powerful nations on 
Earth, and the relationship between us 
is complex because it involves strong 
elements of both competition and 
cooperation. 

Our fundamental philosophies con- 
flict; quite often, our national interests 
conflict as well. As two great nations, 
we do have common interests, and we 
share an overwhelming mutual concern 
in preventing a nuclear war. We must 
recognize, therefore, that nuclear arms 
control agreements are vital to both our 
[countries and that we must also exer- 
jcise self-restraint in our relations and 
be sensitive to each other's concerns. 
i Recently, we obtained evidence that 
I a Soviet combat brigade has been in 
Cuba for several years. The presence of 



Soviet combat troops in Cuba is of 
serious concern to us. 

I want to reassure you at the outset 
that we do not face any immediate, 
concrete threat that could escalate into 
war or a major confrontation — but we 
do face a challenge. It is a challenge to 
our wisdom — a challenge to our ability 
to act in a firm, decisive way without 
destroying the basis for cooperation 
that helps to maintain world peace and 
control nuclear weapons. It's a chal- 
lenge to our determination to give a 
measured and effective response to 
Soviet competition and to Cuban mili- 
tary activities around the world. 

Soviet-Cuban Military 
Relationship 

Now, let me explain the specific 
problem of the Soviet brigade and de- 
scribe the more general problem of 
Soviet-Cuban military activism in the 
Third World. 

Here is the background on Soviet 
forces in Cuba: As most of you know, 
17 years ago in the era of the cold war, 
the Soviet Union suddenly attempted to 
introduce offensive nuclear missiles 
and bombers into Cuba. This direct 
threat to the United States ended with 
the Soviet agreement to withdraw those 
nuclear weapons and a commitment not 
to introduce offensive weapons into 
Cuba thereafter. 

At the time of that 1962 missile 
crisis, there were more than 20,000 
Soviet military personnel in Cuba. 
Most of them were withdrawn, and we 
monitored their departure. It was be- 
lieved that those who stayed behind 
were not combat forces but were there 
to advise and train Cubans and to per- 
form intelligence functions. 

Just recently, American intelligence 
obtained persuasive evidence that some 
of these Soviet forces had been or- 
ganized into a combat unit. When at- 
tention was then focused on a careful 
review of past intelligence data, it was 
possible for our experts to conclude 
that this unit had existed for several 
years, probably since the mid-1970's, 
and possibly even longer. 

This unit appears to be a brigade of 
two or three thousand men. It is armed 
with about 40 tanks and other modern 
military equipment. It's been organized 
as a combat unit. Its training exercises 
have been those of a combat unit. 

This is not a large force, nor an as- 
sault force. It presents no direct threat 



to us. It has no airborne or seaborne 
capability. In contrast to the 1962 
crisis, no nuclear threat to the United 
States is involved. 

Nevertheless, this Soviet brigade in 
Cuba is a serious matter. It contributes 
to tension in the Caribbean and the 
Central American region. The delivery 
of modern arms to Cuba and the pres- 
ence of Soviet naval forces in Cuban 
waters have strengthened the Soviet- 
Cuban military relationship. They've 
added to the fears of some countries 
that they may come under Soviet or 
Cuban pressure. 

During the last few years, the 
Soviets have been increasing the deliv- 
ery of military supplies to Cuba. The 
result is that Cuba now has one of the 
largest, best equipped armed forces in 
this region. These military forces are 
used to intrude into other countries in 
Africa and the Middle East. 

There's a special relationship be- 
tween Cuba and the Soviet Union. The 
Cubans get their weapons free; other 
Soviet satellite countries have to pay 
for their military supplies. 

The Communist regime in Cuba is an 
economic failure that cannot sustain it- 
self. The Soviet Union must send to 
Cuba about $8 million in economic aid 
every day. 

Fidel Castro does not pay money for 
Soviet arms; the Cuban people pay a 
much higher price. In every interna- 
tional dispute, on every international 
issue, the Cuban regime automatically 
follows the Soviet line. 

The Soviet brigade is a manifestation 
of Moscow's dominance of Cuba. It 
raises the level of that dominance, and 
it raises the level of responsibility that 
the Soviet Union must take for es- 
calating Cuban military actions abroad. 



What We Are Doing 

Now, I want to report further on 
what we are doing to resolve these 
problems and to counter these ac- 
tivities. 

Over the past 3 weeks, we've dis- 
cussed this issue at great length with 
top Soviet officials. We've made it 
clear that the presence of a Soviet 
combat unit in Cuba is a matter of seri- 
ous concern to us. 

The Soviet Union does not admit that 
the unit in question is a combat unit. 
However, the Soviets have made cer- 
tain statements to us with respect to our 
concern: that the unit in question is a 



8 



Department ot State Bulleti 



training center; that it does nothing 
more than training and can do nothing 
more; that they will not change its 
function or status as a training center. 
We understand this to mean that they 
do not intend to enlarge the unit or to 
give it additional capabilities. 

They have said that the Soviet per- 
sonnel in Cuba are not and will not be a 
threat to the United States or to any 
other nation; that they reaffirm the 
1962 understanding and the mutually 
agreed-upon confirmation in 1970 and 
will abide by it in the future. We, for 
our part, reconfirm this understanding. 

These assurances have been given to 
me from the highest level of the Soviet 
Government. 

Although we have persuasive evi- 
dence that the unit has been a combat 
brigade, the Soviet statements about 
the future noncombat status of the unit 
are significant. However, we shall not 
rest on these Soviet statements alone. 

First, we will monitor the status of 
the Soviet forces by increased surveil- 
lance of Cuba. 

Second, we will assure that no 
Soviet unit in Cuba can be used as a 
combat force to threaten the security of 
the United States or any other nation in 
this hemisphere. Those nations can be 
confident that the United States will act 
in response to a request for assistance 
to meet any such threat from Soviet or 
Cuban forces. 

This policy is consistent with our re- 
sponsibilities as a member of the Or- 
ganization of American States and a 
party to the Rio treaty. It's a 
reaffirmation in new circumstances of 
John F. Kennedy's declaration in 1963 
that we would not permit any troops 
from Cuba to move off the island of 
Cuba in an offensive action against any 
neighboring countries. 

Third, I'm establishing a perma- 
nent, full-time Caribbean joint task 
force headquarters at Key West, 
Florida. I will assign to this headquar- 
ters forces from all the military serv- 
ices responsible tor expanded planning 
and for conducting exercises. This 
headquarters unit will employ desig- 
nated forces for action if required. This 
will substantially improve our capabil- 
ity to monitor and to respond rapidly to 
any attempted military encroachment in 
this region. 

Fourth, we will expand military 
maneuvers in the region. We will con- 
duct these exercises regularly from now 
on. In accordance with existing treaty 
rights, the United States will, of 
course, keep our forces in Guan- 
tanamo. 

Fifth, we will increase our economic 
assistance to alleviate the unmet eco- 



nomic and human needs in the Carib- 
bean region and further to insure the 
ability of troubled peoples to resist so- 
cial turmoil and possible Commun'st 
domination. 

The United States has a worldwide 
interest in peace and stability. Ac- 
cordingly, I have directed the Secretary 
of Defense to further enhance the 
capacity of our rapid deployment forces 
to protect our own interests and to act 
in response to requests for help from 
our allies and friends. We must be able 
to move our ground, sea, and air units 
to distant areas, rapidly and with 
adequate supplies. 

We have reinforced our naval pres- 
ence in the Indian Ocean. 

We are enhancing our intelligence 
capability in order to monitor Soviet 
and Cuban military activities — both in 
Cuba and throughout the world. We 
will increase our efforts to guard 
against damage to our crucial intelli- 
gence sources and our methods of col- 
lection, without impairing civil and 
constitutional rights. 

These steps reflect my determination 
to preserve peace, to strengthen our al- 
liances, and to defend the interests of 
the United States. In developing them. 
I've consulted not only with my own 
advisers but with congressional leaders 
and with a bipartisan group of distin- 
guished American citizens as well. The 
decisions are my own, and I take full 
responsibility for them as President and 
as Commander in Chief. 

I have concluded that the brigade 
issue is certainly no reason for a return 
to the cold war. A confrontation might 
be emotionally satisfying for a few 
days or weeks for some people, but it 
would be destructive to the national 
interest and to the security of the 
United States. 

We must continue the basic policy 
that the United States has followed for 
20 years, under six Administrations of 
both parties, a policy that recognizes 
that we are in competition with the 
Soviet Union in some fields and that 
we seek cooperation in others — notably 
maintaining the peace and controlling 
nuclear arms. 



The Need for Ratifying SALT II 

My fellow Americans, the greatest 
danger to American security tonight is 
certainly not the two or three thousand 
Soviet troops in Cuba. The greatest 
danger to all the nations of the 
world — including the United States 
and the Soviet Union — is the break- 
down of a common effort to preserve 
the peace and the ultimate threat of a 
nuclear war. 

I renew my call to the Senate of the 



United States to ratify the SALT i ■ 
treaty. 

SALT II is a solid treaty. Insurin 
compliance with its terms will not be 
matter of trust. We have highly sophi^ 
ticated, national technical means 
carefully focused on the Soviet Union 
to insure that the treaty is verifiable. 

This treaty is the most important ste 
ever taken to control strategic nude; 
arms. It permits us to strengthen oi 
defense and to preserve the strategi 
balance at lower risk and lower cos 
During the past few years, we hav 
made real increases in our defense e> 
penditures to fulfill the goals of oi 
5-year defense plan. With SALT II, w 
can concentrate these increases in arci 
where our interests are most threatene^d 
and where direct military challenge : 
most likely. 

The rejection of SALT would seiik 
ously compromise our nation's peat n 
and security. 

Of course we have disagreemen 
with the Soviets. Of course we ha\ 
conflicts with them. If we did not ha\ 
these disagreements and conflicts, v 



would not need a treaty to reduce tl 
possibility of nuclear war between us 

If SALT II is rejected, these di 
agreements and conflicts could take c 
a new and ominous dimension. Again 
the background of an uncontrolled ni 
clear arms race, every confrontation ( 
dispute would carry the seeds of a ni 
clear confrontation. 

In addition, SALT II is crucial 
American leadership and to the furthi 
strengthening of the Western alliano 
Obviously, a secure Europe is vital 
our own security. The leaders of oi 
European allies support SALT II- 
unanimously. We've talked to 
number of those leaders in the last fe 
days. I must tell you tonight that if tl 
Senate fails to approve the SAL 
treaty, these leaders and their countri( 
would be confused and deeply alarmedj 
If our allies should lose confidence : f" 
our ability to negotiate successfully ft 
the control of nuclear weapons, the j^ 

Itoi 



1« 



our effort to build a stronger and moi 
united NATO could fail. 

I know that for Members of Coi 
gress this is a troubling and a diffici 
issue, in a troubling and difficult timi 
But the Senate has a tradition of beii 
the greatest deliberative body in tl 
world, and the whole world is watchir 
the Senate today. I'm confident that a 
Senators will perform their high n 
sponsibilities as the national intere 
requires. ' 

Politics and nuclear arsenals do ni 
mix. We must not play politics with tf 
security of the United Slates. We mu 
not play politics with the survival < 
the human race. We must not pla 
politics with SALT II. It is much tc 



of 



k 



to 



November 1979 



Background on the Question of 
Soviet Troops in Cuha 



Following is background informa- 
tion on the question of Soviet troops in 
Cuba, with questions and answers on 
some of the specific points raised dur- 
ing briefings held prior to the Presi- 
dent's broadcast to the nation, Octo- 
ber I, 1979. 

The surveillance of Cuba which was 
being conducted at the time of the 1962 
Cuban missile crisis noted the exist- 
ence of Soviet ground combat units de- 
ployed at four major locations and at 
several sublocations. One of the major 
locations was the same as one at which 
major elements of the combat unit now 
in question have been located. 

In the course of the negotiations that 
took place in 1963, the United States 
called to the attention of the Soviets the 
fact that these ground combat units 
were present. Out of those discussions 
came a commitment on the part of 
Chairman Khrushchev, made to Presi- 
dent Kennedy, that he would ship out 
of Cuba the ground combat units which 
had anything to do with guarding the 
Soviet missile installations and bomber 
bases. 

In 1963 the U.S. Government con- 
ducted extensive surveillance and 
checked, among other things, whether 
or not the ground combat units were 
being removed. 

By 1964 the U.S. intelligence com- 
munity had concluded that the Soviet 
ground combat units had been essen- 
tially withdrawn from Cuba. 

At the same time, there can be no 
question that there was a substantial 



Soviet military presence in Cuba in 
1962 and that there has been a continu- 
ous military presence since then. 

There is also no question that the 
Soviet military presence changed its 
mission in 1963-64 from being there to 
maintain missiles to something else. 

It is clear today that in the postmis- 
sile crisis period, the Soviet forces in 
Cuba did not have enough equipment 
or enough facilities and did not conduct 
enough training activity to be the kind 
of a combat unit that we see there 
today. In short, the mission and the 
structure of this brigade has changed at 
least once more since the change after 
the postmissile crisis in 1962. 

When precisely it reached its present 
form is unclear to us today, but there is 
a high degree of confidence that it is 
not a unit with a primary purpose of 
training Cubans. The observed pattern 
of activity of this unit over the past 
several years does not include any sub- 
stantial involvement with the training 
of Cubans or Cuban ground forces. It 
does not show any pattern of interplay 
between Soviet forces and personnel 
and Cuban forces and people. The pat- 
tern of activity that can be seen is defi- 
nitely similar to the patterns of activity 
of ground combat units inside the 
Soviet Union, carrying out their normal 
combat training. 

The organization of this unit, its 
facilities, and its equipment are not 
those which would logically be there if 
it were going to perform a function of 
training other people. The organiza- 
tion, the facilities, the equipment are 



Cuba (Cont'd) 

important for that — too vital to our 
country, to our allies, and to the cause 
of peace. 

The purpose of the SALT II treaty 
and the purpose of my actions in deal- 
ing with Soviet and Cuban military re- 
lationship are exactly the same — to 
keep our nation secure and to maintain 
a world at peace. 

As a powerful nation, as a super- 
power, we have special responsibilities 
to maintain stability even when there 
are serious disagreements among na- 
tions. 

We've had fundamental differences 
with the Soviet Union since 1917. I 
have no illusions about these differ- 
ences. The best way to deal with them 
successfully is to maintain American 



unity, American will, and American 
strength. That is what I am determined 
to do. 

The struggle for peace — the long, 
hard struggle to make weapons of mass 
destruction under control of human rea- 
son and human law — is a central 
drama of our age. 

At another time of challenge in our 
nation's history. President Abraham 
Lincoln told the American people: 
"We shall nobly save or meanly lose 
the last, best hope of earth." 

We acted wisely then and preserved 
the nation. Let us act wisely now and 
preserve the world. D 



'Broadcast live on radio and television from 
the Oval Office at the While House; text from 
Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents 
of Oct. 8. 1979. 



those which can be seen in Soviet units 
of this type inside the Soviet Union. 

Soviets in military advisory capaci- 
ties elsewhere in the world have not 
performed in this kind of a pattern with 
this kind of an organization, with these 
kinds of facilities and these amounts of 
equipment. 

The conclusion can be drawn — after 
looking at its organization, at its 
facilities, at its equipment, at its per- 
sonnel, and at its training activities — 
that it is not a brigade for training Cu- 
bans but that it is a brigade with a 
combat capability. This can be done 
through thorough intelligence research 
involving not simply detecting whether 
a Soviet military unit exists in Cuba but 
assessing the purpose of a known 
Soviet military presence in Cuba, its 
intentions, and its plans. 

It can be said with confidence that 
the composition of the Soviet units is 
known. It is a brigade. Its organization 
is known: its rank structure, that it has 
three infantry and one tank battalions, 
and that it is commanded by a Soviet 
Army Colonel. Its location is known: 
that it is garrisoned in two sites. Its 
size is known: that it has about 2,600 
people. Its equipment is known: that it 
has 40 tanks, 60 armored personnel 
carriers, and various other pieces of 
hardware. Its training pattern is known: 
that that is similar to combat units in 
the Soviet Union. And it is known that 
it has no observable connections with 
the Cuban military. 

Over a period of about 3 weeks 
negotiations have been condticted with 
the Soviets. The Secretary of State has 
had six negotiating sessions with 
Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin, two with 
Foreign Minister Gromyko, and in ad- 
dition to that there has been an ex- 
change between the two heads of gov- 
ernment. The negotiating sessions with 
Dobrynin have lasted for considerable 
periods of time. In addition to these, 
there have been numerous telephone 
conversations. The two sessions with 
the Foreign Minister in New York were 
reasonably lengthy and exhaustive. 

The serious concern of the United 
States about the presence of this unit 
was made very clear to the Soviets in 
all these discussions. At the end of the 
negotiations the Soviets made certain 
statements, or assurances, which they 
have given to the United States: 

Number one: That the unit in ques- 
tion is a training center; that it does 
nothing more than training, and can do 
nothing more. 

Second: That they will not change 
its function or status as a training cen- 
ter. We understand this to mean that 
they do not intend to enlarge the unit or 
to give it additional capabilities. 



10 



Third: That the Soviet personnel in 
Cuba arc not and will not be a threat to 
the United Slates or to any other na- 
tion. 

Fourth: That they reaffirm the 1962 
understanding and the mutually agreed 
confirmation of that understanding in 
1970 — and that they will abide by it in 
the future. 

The United States, for its part, re- 
confirmed this understanding. 

The assurances have been given to 
the President by the highest levels of 
the Soviet Government. 

As indicated by the President, al- 
though there is persuasive evidence 
that the unit is a combat brigade, the 
Soviet statements about the future non- 
combatant status of the unit are signifi- 
cant. 

Again as the President points out, 
however, the United States will not rest 
on the Soviet statements alone but will 
take a number of steps. 

First, the United States will monitor 
the status of the Soviet forces by in- 
creasing surveillance of Cuba. 

Second, the United States will assure 
that no Soviet unit in Cuba can be used 
as a combat force to threaten the secu- 
rity of the United States or any other 
nation in the hemisphere. 

Third, the President is establishing a 
permanent, full-time Caribbean task 
force headquarters in Key West. 

Fourth, the United States will ex- 
pand military maneuvers in the region 
and conduct them regularly from now 
on. The President also underscores that 
in accordance with existing treaty 
rights, the United Stales will, of 
course, keep its forces in Guantanamo. 

Fifth, the United States will increase 
its economic assistance to alleviate the 
economic and human needs in the re- 
gion. A supplemental appropriation bill 
will be submitted to the Congress in the 
very near future. 

Next, the President has pointed out 
that the United States has a worldwide 
interest in peace and stability and that, 
accordingly, he has directed further 
enhancement of the capacity of the 
rapid deployment force to protect the 
interests of the United States and of its 
friends and allies. 

The President further noted that the 
United States has already reinforced its 
naval presence in the Indian Ocean and 
is enhancing its intelligence capability 
in order to monitor Soviet and Cuban 
military activities both in Cuba and 
throughout the world. These steps re- 
flect, as the President said, the deter- 
mination of the United States to pre- 
serve peace, to strengthen the alliance, 
and to defend the interests of the 
United States. 

The President's speech also stressed: 



First, the very clear conclusion that 
the main issue is no reason to return to 
the cold war. 

Secondly, that the basic policy of the 
United States for 20 years under six 
Administrations will be continued. 
This policy recognizes that while the 
United States is in competition with the 
Soviet Union, it also seeks to cooperate 
in other areas — notably in maintaining 
peace and in controlling nuclear arms. 

The President very clearly called 
upon the Congress to complete the 
work which is necessary for ratification 
of the SALT treaty and to proceed with 
the debate on that treaty. The President 
said it is of critical importance to us 
and to world peace — and to the security 
and well-being of our allies — that this 
must go forward. 

Q. Was the Soviet Union asked to 
remove the forces? 

A. A number of suggestions and 
proposals for resolving this matter were 
sent forward by the United States. 
Suggestions were made by the other 
side as well. At the end of those dis- 
cussions, the assurances, statements, 
clarifications laid out very clearly in 
the President's statement were ad- 
vanced. 

Q. Reference was made to the evi- 
dence based on the facilities, the 
equipment, the organization, and the 
training pattern. The President said 
"... the Soviet statements about 
the future noncombat status of the 
unit are significant." Does that 
suggest that the Soviets have given 
any indication whatsoever that they 
will change either the facilities, the 
equipment, the organization, or the 
training? 

A. Looking at the language itself, it 
says for example; "... the unit in 
question is a training center . . . and 
can do nothing more." It further says 
that "... they will not change its 
function or status as a training center 
.... " and by that they mean not to 
enlarge the unit or give it additional 
capabilities. One of the additional 
capabilities which, obviously, the unit 
does not have now but would be sig- 
nificant is any airlift or sealift. They 
have said that they do not intend to 
enlarge the unit or give it additional 
capabilities. 

Q. Combat status can be both of- 
fensive and defensive. Does it appear 
that the mission of these troops is 
perhaps to guard an installation that 
is important to the Soviets, perhaps a 
monitoring installation or an instal- 
lation attempting to plug into our 
undersea grid? 

A. The Soviets have a large moni- 



Department of State Bulletin 

toring facility in Cuba, and it certainly 
can't be ruled out that one of the func- 
tions of this unit would be to protect it. 

Q. Is there a difference in the way 
we view a brigade that has tanks and 
APC's [armored personnel carriers] 
that are there in sort of a "defen- 
sive" posture to guard a facility — 
and one that we would think is there 
in an offensive posture? 

A. First, the size of the brigade and 
its equipment is inordinate to a func- 
tion of protecting the intelligence- 
collection facility that the Soviets 
maintain in Cuba. 

Secondly, the key question is 
whether or not it has a combat capabil- 
ity which can be projected in a way 
which constitutes a threat to the United 
States or others in the region. 

Q. How has the status quo, which 
was earlier said to be unacceptable, 
been changed? 

A. It has been changed in two ways. 

First, very clearly, the President has 
outlined a number of steps that are 
going to be taken because it is felt they 
are necessary to protect U.S. national 
interests and those of our friends and 
allies. 

Secondly, the Soviets have made 
certain statements. Those statements 
are believed to be significant insofar as 
they relate to the future. So from taking 
a look at those two sets of factors, it 
can be seen that the status quo has been 
altered. 

Q. Why should we take assurances 
about the future seriously when as- 
surances about the past role of this 
brigade are not taken seriously? 

A. By observing and monitoring, by 
increasing collection activities, by what 
is being done; at the same time by tak- 
ing additional steps to strengthen our 
capabilities and to assure that we have 
the capability to protect ourselves and 
our neighbors in the hemisphere from 
any threat to them or to their security. 

Q. Is it really possible, politically, 
in the real world, to separate this se- 
quence of events from what is going 
on in the Senate with the SALT 
treaty? 

A. The Senators obviously will be 
reading very carefully what the Presi- 
dent has to say tonight. We believe 
very deeply that SALT should be 
judged on its own merits. A great many 
of the Senators who are concerned 
about this issue, however, are also very 
concerned about SALT — and feel that 
it should go forward on its own merits. 

And indeed, even in situations of 
tension like this, such as we have had. 



November 1979 



II 



it is all the more important to have 
agreement on such fundamental matters 
as strategic balance, or factors that af- 
fect our two nations. 

Q. Does this training facility, or 
combat headquarters, or whatever it 
is called, constitute a base in the 
sense that the President used that 
word? 

A. We have not come to the conclu- 
sion that this constitutes a "base." We 
will continue to review the matter, but 
we have not come to that conclusion. 

Q. How has this "incident" af- 
fected our overall relationship with 
the Soviets? 

A. Both the Soviets and the United 
States have recognized very clearly that 
this matter, if not satisfactorily re- 
solved, can have a serious effect on the 
relationship between our two countries 
and, therefore, it has been a matter of 
serious concern to both of our nations. 

That is why so much time has been 
given to this, at the highest level, 
starting with those at the head of the 
government, the Foreign Ministers, and 
others. Obviously, this is a matter 
which both countries feel to be of great 
importance to our basic relationship. 

Q. Would you say that its resolu- 
tion has moved us forward, or set us 
back, or are we on an even plane? 

A. It remains to be seen. 

Q. The President referred to as- 
surances from the Soviets' "highest 
levels." Are we to assume, then, 
that this is the text of a message that 
Brezhnev sent to Mr. Carter? 

A. You should make the assumption 
that what has been said precisely re- 
flects statements that were made to us 
at the highest levels. 

Q. Is this the language the Soviets 
used, or is this our summary, or in- 
terpretation of the language they 
used? 

A. This is language which they used. 

Q. Give us your perspective on this 
issue: How long has this brigade been 
there? 

Is it a question of earlier Admin- 
istrations — earlier watches not pick- 
ing up on this brigade down there? 
Deliberately ignoring it? Putting our 
resources elsewhere? Or did we just 
put it together here as of August 17th 
for a variety of reasons? 

A. We cannot tell when it took this 
form and assumed this mission. It was 
at least 3 years ago — maybe somewhat 
longer. 

This is not a condemnation of any 
previous Administration. 



In Cuba there are lots of tanks and 
APC's exactly like those in the Soviet 
unit. What we are trying to find out is, 
what has been the purpose for having 
this particular set of soldiers and 
equipment there. That is not easy, and 
we are pleased that we were able, 
eventually, to put all these pieces to- 
gether. 

Q. Was it our assumption or ex- 
pectation that in due course that unit 
would have been given sealift and 
airlift capability? 

A. We have no evidence of any in- 
tent to do that. 

Q. If we don't know what their 
mission is and how long they have 
been equipped and what they are 
doing, how can one say they are no 
threat to us? 

A. We do know what they're doing. 
We know the kind of training they are 
doing; we know the kind of organiza- 
tion it is there. We don't know why the 
Soviet Union has decided that this is an 
appropriate unit for it to have in Cuba. 

A brigade of Soviet forces is not a 
threat to the United States. We have 
available for use to defend ourselves, 
forces which to this are as a giant to an 
ant. We can deploy forces in the region 
that could swamp any such force. It is, 
therefore, not a threat in those terms to 
the United States. Nevertheless, as the 
President makes plain in his speech, 
the Soviet brigade is, and should be, a 
matter of some concern to the sur- 
rounding nations and, therefore, is to 
us too because it might be used. The 
Cuban forces, which in Cuba amount to 
a much larger force than this Soviet 
brigade, could also be a threat if they 
were used to intervene in surrounding 
areas. 

The actions that we are taking are 
not designed to greatly increase U.S. 
strength. U.S. strength and capability 
in this area already are very large. Our 
actions do serve to remind people that 
the problem is not of a magnitude that 
could threaten us. We have and will 
train and exercise forces which are very 
much larger than this and could, should 
the contingency arise, take care of any 
such situation. 

Q. Are you saying this "beefing 
up" is essentially political rather 
than military? 

A. No. There are two pieces, you 
will recall. One is the establishment of 
a joint task force headquarters at Key 
West whose purpose will be to concen- 
trate on planning and on training and 
on exercises and, as needed, on tactical 
surveillance, and should the need arise, 
conducting contingency operations. 

Q. Will you reactivate the Key 
West Naval Station at Boca Chica? 



A. The Key West Naval Station 
continues to exist. This is only a head- 
quarters organization. It will be 
perhaps 60-100 people. We will, as 
necessary, assign to it forces for the 
functions that have been mentioned; 
that serves a very useful purpose in re- 
minding us of our strength. Should it 
be necessary, it would conduct what- 
ever operations are necessary. 

Q. Are you going to go back and 
do the aerial reconnaissance of Cuba 
which was suspended in 1977? 

A. The President's statement includes 
the statement that we will augment our 
surveillance as necessary; to the degree 
that it is necessary to use such assets, 
we will. 

Q. If there is no real threat, then 
why must any additional action be 
taken? And what could they be set- 
ting out to prevent? 

A. There is not a threat to the im- 
mediate security of the United States. 
This force and the overall Soviet- 
Cuban military relationship, however, 
raise real questions and concerns in the 
minds of other countries in the region. 

Q. Senator Church said several 
weeks ago that as long as the brigade 
as a combat brigade remained in 
Cuba, he saw no likelihood that the 
Senate would ratify SALT. Well, the 
brigade is going to remain appar- 
ently, so what assurance do you have 
now that SALT can be saved? 

A. In talking to a number of Senators 
who have been briefed about the 
speech, in almost every case, the re- 
sponse that we have received is: "We 
believe that the SALT treaty hearings 
should go forward; we believe that it 
should be taken up on its own merits, 
and we are prepared to do that." It is 
our best judgment that that will be the 
case. 

Q. Could you describe the size of 
this task force that is going to be 
down there? 

A. What we are establishing is a task 
force headquarters which will have 
perhaps 60 people, to begin with; it 
might expand to 100. It will be estab- 
lished beginning this week. It will have 
assigned to the headquarters personnel 
from Army, Navy, Air Force, and Ma- 
rines. And it will, depending upon the 
particular things that it happens to be 
supervising at a particular time, have 
assigned to it operational forces from 
each of these services. And that might 
go anywhere from a battalion of Ma- 
rines for some functions to a substan- 
tial Naval task force plus some air 
squadrons in others. D 



12 



l^etvs Conference 
of October 9 (Excerpts) 



Q. Do you think that you have 
diffused the problem or issue of the 
Soviet brigade in Cuba and satisfied 
those who seek a bigger defense 
budget enough now to win SALT 
ratification this year, and if so, how? 

A. I believe SALT will be ratified 
this year basically on its own merits. 
It's obvious to me that the SALT treaty 
is in the best interest of our country. It 
enhances the security of the United 
States, it contributes to world peace, it 
will strengthen our own alliances, it 
will preserve our place as a leader of 
the Western world, it will let it be more 
easy for us to control the spread of nu- 
clear explosives all over the world. 

In my opinion we have answered the 
question of the Soviet combat unit in 
Cuba adequately. I think we've isolated 
any threat from that unit. We'll in- 
crease our surveillance there and I be- 
lieve that this obviously has been an 
important issue for us to address. I be- 
lieve it's been addressed adequately. 

As far as the defense budget is con- 
cerned, that still must be resolved. I'm 
committed to a 3% real growth in our 
defense. I have maintained that posi- 
tion for the last 3 years. It's important 
to us, to our allies, to American 
strength. If I see a need for increased 
defense programs, I would not hesitate 
to recommend them to the Congress. 



Q. What is your reaction to Dr. 
Kissinger's statement that the Soviet 
troops in Cuba are the first or- 
ganized hostile force in this hemi- 
sphere since the Monroe Doctrine 
that we've accepted, and also do you 
feel that the Soviet troops in Cuba 
symbolize the growing expansionism 
of the Russians, the Soviet Union? 

A. The troops in Cuba have been 
there for a long time. I've not read 
Secretary Kissinger's speech. I've read 
news reports of it. Its basic premises 
are compatible with my own, that the 
presence of a Soviet combat unit there 
is a serious matter, which I think we 
have addressed as best we could. 

Secondly, that this is not the most 
important matter of all, that above and 
beyond that, it's important to recognize 
and to do what we can to contain 
Cuban interventionism or adventurism 
around the world. As you know, this 
began primarily with the entrance of 
more than a 10,000 body of troops 



from Cuba into Angola in 1975 before I 
was President. 

We do look upon this as a major 
threat. I have not seen any reports that 
Secretary Kissinger recommended dif- 
ferent moves from the ones that I out- 
lined to the nation on the evening 
of October I . So we do share a 
common concern. I think that our re- 
sponse was measured and appropriate. 
I do not favor the Soviets extending 
their arm of inlluence to the Cubans or 
anyone else around the world. 

This has been part of the history of 
the Soviet Union. We attempt to meet 
them and compete with them ade- 
quately in my opinion on a peaceful 
basis. And in my judgment, if we can 
control the military expenditures and 
have equality, have arms control, in 
my judgment, we can compete with the 
Soviets on a peaceful basis with an ex- 
cellent prospect for victory. 

The Soviets represent a totalitarian 
nation. We are committed to peace and 
freedom and democracy. The Soviets 
subjugate the rights of an individual 
human being to the rights of the state. 
We do just the opposite. The Soviets 
are an atheistic nation. We have deep 
and fundamental religious beliefs. The 
Soviets have a primary emphasis on the 
military aspect of their economy. Ours 
is much more broadly based to give the 
benefits of economic growth to indi- 
vidual human beings. So I believe that 
in addition to that, our raising a stand- 
ard of human rights and the honoring of 
national aspirations, not trying to 
interfere in the internal affairs of other 
countries, gives us an additional ad- 
vantage in a peaceful competition with 
the Soviets. So I don't have any fear of 
or any trepidation about that intense 
competition with the Soviets on a 
peaceful basis. 

I obviously want the same thing that 
President Brezhnev wants; that is, the 
avoidance of a nuclear war. So we have 
some things in common, the avoidance 
of war. We have other things in com- 
mon, a willingness to compete. We've 
got advantages over them that I hope to 
utilize in the future as we have in the 
past. 

Q. . . . will you plan on talking 
to Reverend Jesse Jackson in re- 
sponse to his meetings with Yasir 
Arafat? 

A. I have no plans to talk to Rev- 
erend Jackson. I presume you mean 



Department of State Bulletin 

about his recent trips to the Middle 
East. He has or will make a report to 
Ambassador Strauss, who is our Mid- 
east negotiator. 



Q. In your speech on Cuba the 
other night, you spoke about wanting 
to increase the capabilities of our 
rapid deployment force. 

A. Forces. 

Q. Forces. I wondered if you 
could say under what circumstances 
you would be willing to intervene 
militarily in the Middle East. 

A. I see no prospect at this point for 
our intervention militarily in anyplace 
in the world. That would be a judgment 
that I would only make if I thought the 
security of our country was directly 
threatened. 



Q. Further on the Fed tight money 
policy, figures such as from the 
West German Deutsche Bundesbank 
President Emminger and Democra- 
tic Party presidential candidate Lyn- 
don LaRouche [sic], have charged 
that this is leading us rapidly toward 
the crash of 1979. Will you move to 
stabilize the dollar in the economy 
by collaborating with Europe on 
their moves to demonetize gold as La 
Rouche and others have suggested? 

A. I doubt that that is in prospect, 
certainly not for this year. We do 
cooperate with our allies and friends 
and trade partners in order to stabilize 
the worldwide monetary system, in- 
cluding at times the interrelationship 
between currencies from one country 
and another and sometimes the basic 
metals. I don't see any threat to the 
well-being of any American because of 
a rapidly increasing price of gold, ex- 
cept those who have sold early or 
bought late. But as far as the average 
citizen is concerned, the price of gold, 
whether it is $200 an ounce or $400, 
has very little impact. 

Recently, the Federal Reserve Board 
has decided to raise interest rates and 
take other steps concerning the reserve 
supply of money to be kept on hand by 
banks. This has resulted in a strength- 
ening of the dollar, which had already 
begun to strengthen, and I believe that 
it's well within the bounds of manage- 
ment, it is stable. I noticed an analysis 
that showed that in the last year the 
price of the dollar, the value of the 
dollar, as compared to currencies of all 
our trade partners, has increased sub- 
stantially. Among the OPEC nations 
[Organization of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries] and their trade partners, the 



November 1979 



13 



r 



THE SECRETARY: Currents oi Change 

In Latin America 



Address before the Foreign Policy 
'Association in New York on September 
'7, 1979.' 

I want to talk this noon about a re- 
Jon in which the surface waves have 
;eceived more attention than the deeper 
currents shaping them. I refer to Latin 
kmerica. Beneath the conflict and 
tontroversy, quieter but profound 
thanges are taking place in the hemi- 
sphere. They are leading toward eco- 
nomic growth, toward democracy, and 



toward greater international engage- 
ment. 

These trends are neither uniform nor 
immutable. Distinct crosscurrents are 
also present. The interplay of these and 
other forces may at times produce tur- 
moil. But the broad directions are un- 
mistakable. Economies are expanding, 
democratic values are taking firmer 
hold, and the international role of Latin 
American nations is widening and 
deepening. 

Let me discuss these basic trends in 



the region. What do they mean for the 
countries there and for the United 
States? And, mindful of these changes, 
how are we approaching our relations 
with the other nations of the hemi- 
sphere? 



Latin America Today 

Economic Growth. Over the past 
generation, dramatic economic growth 
has occurred throughout the region. 



value of the dollar, even before we 
made this recent move, had increased 

ifc over the last year. 

So I believe the dollar is stable, I 
believe the world economy is stable, 
and I see no prospect of shifting to a 
rigid price of gold and a gold standard. 



Q. By all accounts, it appears that 
in the coming months, a million or 
more people could die in Kampuchea 
of starvation. I know that you talked 
about this with the Pope the other 
day. What if anything can this gov- 
ernment do in combination with 
other groups? 

A. We have been encouraging the 
humanitarian granting of aid, particu- 
larly food aid to the people of Kam- 
puchea, hundreds of thousands of 
whom, maybe millions of whom are 
starving. We are trying to work out 
with the uncertain leaders of that 
country — uncertain because it's con- 
tested through war — a mechanism by 
which the United Nations primarily, 
the Red Cross, and UNICEF. could get 
food in to those people who are within 
Kampuchea. 

There's also a legal problem in refu- 
gee funds because it hasn't yet been 
determined legally if a person who 
hasn't left the country is still identifi- 
able as a refugee. The fact that the 
country is divided by war creates a 
complication. But we are ready and 
eager to join in with other countries to 
provide humanitarian aid to all the 
people of Kampuchea who are starving, 
and we will move on that without any 
further delay as soon as it's possible to 
join other countries in this effort. 



Q. Going back to your comments 
about competition with the Soviet 



Union with regard to arms, would 
you support NATO deployment of 
the Pershing missile to counter the 
SS-20? And if I could add another 
question there, do you have any 
reaction to President Brezhnev's 
conditional offer, too, on arms re- 
duction in central Europe? 

A. Our allies and we are carefully 
assessing the significance of President 
Brezhnev's statement. However, I'd 
like to point out that what he's offering 
in effect is to continue their own rate of 
modernization as it has been provided, 
we don't modernize at all. 

They have had an actual reduction in 
launchers the last few years. They've 
been replacing the old SS-4's and 
SS-5's with the SS-20, not on a one- 
for-one basis, but the SS-20 has three 
warheads, the old missiles only had 
one warhead. The SS-20 has a much 
greater range. It can reach our Western 
allies" countries as a target even if it's 
located in the central part of Russia. 

It's three to six times as accurate as 
the old missiles which it replaced, and 
in addition to that, it's mobile; that is, 
it can't be located specifically and de- 
stroyed with a preemptive strike if that 
should become a desire on the part of 
allies. 

They also have replaced older air- 
planes with the Backfire bomber. So 
it's not quite as constructive a proposal 
as at first blush it seems to be. I think 
it's an effort designed to disarm the 
willingness or eagerness of our allies 
adequately to defend themselves. 

In my judgment, the decision ought 
to be made to modernize the Western 
allies' military strength and then 
negotiate with full commitment and 
determination mutually to lower arma- 
ments on both sides, the Warsaw Pact 
and the NATO countries, so that we 
can retain equivalency of military 



strength, equity of military strength 
and have a lower overall level of 
armaments. This is what we hope to 
achieve. 

I might point out that Chancellor 
Schmidt said, I believe yesterday or the 
day before, that a prerequisite to a de- 
cision by our NATO allies to take these 
steps which he considers to be vital for 
the security of NATO is the passage of 
SALT II. 

So if we can be successful in con- 
trolling existing strategic Soviet and 
U.S. atomic weapons through SALT II. 
then we'll move in the next step to re- 
ducing the nuclear weapons which 
don't have intercontinental range. And 
along with that, we'll continue with our 
mutual and balanced force reduction 
effort to reduce conventional arms. 

It's an interesting proposal; it's one 
that might show promise. We're as- 
sessing it carefully, but it's not as great 
a step as would ordinarily be judged at 
first. 



Q. A question on the Middle East 
— do you agree with those such as 
former Ambassador Andrew Young 
and George Ball and others who say 
that it is now time to do away with 
the restrictions put on our foreign 
policy by Henry Kissinger and open 
up a dialogue with the Palestinians 
and the PLC [Palestine Liberation 
Organization]? 

A. No, I do not. We will not negoti- 
ate with the PLO. We will not recog- 
nize the PLO until after the PLO rec- 
ognizes Israel's right to exist and en- 
dorses U.N. Resolution 242 as a basis 
for Middle East peace. D 



Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential 
Documents of Oct. 15. p. 1836. 



14 



Department of State Bulletin 



• Since 1960 Latin America's econ- 
omies have expanded rapidly. As a re- 
sult, Latin America's share of world 
trade has grown by more than a third. 

• The region produces and exports a 
growing variety of manufactured goods 
as well as raw materials and oil. 

• A number of the countries of Latin 
America are now among the most in- 
dustrialized and urban in the world. 
Several are emerging as global eco- 
nomic powers. 

This vitality is closely linked to our 
own well-being. To a greater extent 
than ever before, the daily lives of citi- 
zens in New York and Caracas, in 
Mexico City and Los Angeles are in- 
tertv/ined. Social and economic condi- 
tions elsewhere in the hemisphere have 
a direct impact on us in every phase of 
our lives. 

The flow of people and goods, tech- 
nology, and capital — in both direc- 
tions — is at unprecedented levels. 
Three nations — Brazil, Mexico, and 
Venezuela — are among our top dozen, 
and fastest growing, trading partners. 

With Latin America's rapid develop- 
ment has come a shift toward more 
pragmatic economic policies. The 
hemisphere's planners generally have 
discarded dogmatic strategies in favor 
of mixed economies. Governments are 
performing certain essential functions, 
but the private sector also has a vital 
role. The ideological tensions sur- 
rounding private investment have di- 
minished, as both host nations and 
foreign investors have learned to 
negotiate to mutual advantage. These 
are welcome developments for they en- 
able U.S. business to add its dynamism 
to that of Latin America. 

Certainly, many serious economic 
problems remain in the region. Its 
societies feel the consequences of in- 
flation, high energy prices, and the 
economic slowdown around the world. 
Some Caribbean nations are just begin- 
ning the awesome task of translating 
national independence into measurable 
progress for their people. Regional 
fragmentation still hampers develop- 
ment both in the Caribbean and in 
Central America. 

Sharp economic inequities plague the 
region. The fruits of rapid growth, in 
many cases, have not reached the poor 
majority, and the gap widens. For too 
many, each dawn still brings the hard 
reality of want and frustration. 

But despite persistent problems, the 
fact remains that the enormous poten- 
tial of the region is beginning to be 
realized. The challenge for Latin 
America in the 1980's will be to com- 
bine sustained growth with increased 
equity. 

As trade, technology transfers, cap- 



ital flows, migration, fishing rights, 
and other economic issues move to the 
top of the hemispheric agenda, there 
are new opportunities for us — and new 
sources of friction as well. National 
interests will be asserted vigorously on 
all sides. Those interests will some- 
times clash. As competition in trade 
expands, for example, we must con- 
tinue to assure that it takes place in 
ways that are fair to all trading 
partners, and to all Americans. 

But if we all proceed with a realistic 
appreciation of the interest we have in 
each other's well-being, we can find 
common ground. 

The Democratic Resurgence. A 

second dimension of the changes now 
taking place in the region is the 
gradual, uneven but nonetheless dis- 
tinct movement toward greater democ- 
racy and respect for human rights. 

• A year ago, the Dominican Re- 
public transferred power peacefully to 
an elected opposition candidate for the 
first time in this century. 

• Ecuador and Bolivia recently inau- 
gurated constitional governments after 
10 years of military rule. 

• Peru has adopted a new constitu- 
tion and is preparing for national elec- 
tions next year. 

• In Central America Nicaragua is 
attempting to overcome the legacy of 
40 years of dictatorship. Honduras will 
elect a constituent assembly next 
spring. 

• In Latin America as a whole, the 
last 2 years have witnessed many tan- 
gible improvements in respect for the 
rights of the person. We have wel- 
comed and supported this resurgence. 

But the competition between de- 
mocracy and authoritarianism is far 
from over. Injustice, frustration, and 
fear can breed cycles of violent ex- 
tremes, producing polarization within 
countries and in the region. Repres- 
sion, terrorism, or their scars persist, 
even in nations with once proud demo- 
cratic traditions. 

Thus, the prospects for democracy 
and human rights are far from uniform. 
But the currents are moving in favora- 
ble directions. The transition to more 
stable and open systems is underway 
and gaining momentum. 

These moves toward more 
democratic and open societies in Latin 
America are distinctly in our interest. 
The great strength of democracy is its 
flexibility and resilience. It opens op- 
portunities for broadly based political 
and economic participation. By en- 
couraging compromise and accommo- 
dation, it fosters evolutionary change. 

In short, the evolution toward de- 
mocracy serves our interests in a 



dynamic community of nations in this 
hemisphere. ^ 

Greater International Engage- 
ment. A third dimension of change in 
Latin America is the growing role of 
the nations of the hemisphere in shap- 
ing regional and international responses 
to shared problems. 

In the region, Latin American ini- 
tiatives have led to the Tlatelolco 
nuclear-free zone and the newly created 
court for human rights. Last month the 
countries of the Andean pact, drawn 
closer together by their convergence 
toward more democratic systems, is- 
sued the declaration of Quito pledging 
their support for democratization and 
human rights throughout the hemi- 
sphere. The leadership of these South 
American states — together with Mex 
ico, Costa Rica, Panama, and like 
minded countries in the Caribbean — 
enabled the Organization of American 
States (OAS) to play an important rolei 
in support of political change in 
Nicaragua. The OAS has been en 
hanced as a result. 

The nations of Latin America and the; 
Caribbean are also playing an increas 
ingly critical role in global negotiations: 
between North and South. From the 
Law of the Sea negotiations to the cre-i 
ation of UNCTAD [U.N. Conference 
on Trade and Development], the Latin 
Americans are asserting their lead 
ership energetically. 

At times we will differ — even 
strongly — as we do with some of thei 
statements made at the recent meeting 
of the nonaligned movement in 
Havana. But Latin American initiativesi 
are an increasingly important part of 
the global framework within which we 
must work to achieve greater prosperity 
and security for our own people. The 
realization of basic U.S. objectives in 
the world — from structuring a better 
functioning international economy to 
halting the ominous spread of nuclear 
weapons — will depend, more than ever 
before, on our ability to work with our 
friends in the hemisphere. 

Future Relations With Latin 
America 

What does all this mean for future 
relations with our neighbors? 

If we are properly attentive to the re- 
gion, the changes that are taking place 
can lead to more sturdy and durable 
ties. Relations between the United 
States and the nations of Latin America 
continue to be affected by the dis- 
parities of power between us. This pro- 
duces differing perceptions and con- 
flicting approaches on many issues. 
But Latin America's growth is bringing 
new balance. Inter-American relation- 



November 1979 



15 



ships are becoming more open and 
forward looking. 

From the beginning of this Adminis- 
tration, we have made a concerted ef- 
fort to fashion a course that recognizes 
the new realities of the hemisphere and 
the distinctive differences among Latin 
American nations and people. As 
President Carter said last year in his 
address before the Organization of 
American States: 

Slogans [will] no longer suffice to describe 
Ihe diversity of the Americas nor [will] a single 
formula be helpful when our individual and our 
common interests are so clearly global in 
scope The problems . , . require that we in the 
Western Hemisphere think and act more 
broadly. 

From his first days in office. Presi- 
dent Carter made clear his intention to 
conclude a new Panama Canal treaty to 
strengthen the basis on which the canal 
is operated and defended and take ac- 
count of the rights and aspirations of 
the Panamanian people. The new 
treaties go into effect on Monday. 

Just as Americans have been right- 
fully proud of our success in building 
that technological marvel when others 
had failed, so too we should be proud 
of our achievement in building a new 
partnership with Panama. For it points 
to a new direction in our dealings with 
the hemisphere — based on shared re- 
sponsibility, not domination or de- 
pendence; on justice and accommoda- 
tion, not confrontation. 



U.S. Approach Toward 
Latin America 

In a speech a few months ago to the 
National Urban League, I outlined the 
elements of that new approach to the 
developing world in general. Today, let 
me describe this approach as it affects 
our relations with the closest and most 
industrialized part of the developing 
world. 

First, in our economic relations we 
are seeking to increase both the partic- 
ipation — and the responsibilities — of 
developing countries in the interna- 
tional economic system. 

We have made some genuine prog- 
ress in recent years. The International 
Monetary Fund is stronger, better 
capitalized, and becoming more re- 
sponsive to the developing world. The 
new trade rules agreed to earlier this 
year open new opportunities for coun- 
tries entering the world trading system. 
A number of individual agreements 
have been reached to limit damaging 
swings in the price of particular com- 
modities. And we have agreed on the 
elements of a common fund to help 
stabilize the prices of raw materials. 



We are committed to achieving fur- 
ther concrete progress. One issue that 
is of particular concern to the Carib- 
bean and Central America is the Inter- 
national Sugar Agreement that has been 
negotiated. We have not yet been able 
to secure congressional ratification for 
the agreement. It is important, and we 
will continue to work until it is 
approved. 

Continued transformations in the 
world economy will demand continued 
creativity in balancing the interests of 
all countries. Our relations with Mex- 
ico are a prime example. The range and 
diversity of issues in our relations are 
probably greater than with any other 
country in the world. Because we share 
a 2000-mile border, because we share 
democratic perspectives, because our 
economies are both strong and interde- 
pendent, Mexico is one of the most im- 
portant countries in the world for us. 

When President Carter and President 
Lopez Portillo meet tomorrow, they 
will do so with a mutual recognition of 
our common need to continue to 
strengthen the cooperation between us. 
The successful completion last week of 
negotiations on natural gas demon- 
strates the benefits we both can derive. 

Second, we are focusing our atten- 
tion and resources on practical solu- 
tions to concrete development prob- 
lems. 

We are targeting our bilateral aid on 
the pressing daily needs of people in 
the poorer countries. And we are pro- 
viding emergency help for countries 
like the Dominican Republic and 
Nicaragua, struggling to rebuild after 
natural and human disasters. 

We are working through the Inter- 
American Development Bank and other 
international financial institutions to 
increase food and energy production 
and to move toward greater social 
equity throughout the hemisphere. 

At the same time, we are intensify- 
ing our support for subregional inte- 
gration, through the Andean pact and 
the Central American Common Market. 
As a step toward greater cooperation 
among the Caribbean nations, we and 
other donors have joined with them to 
form the Caribbean Group for Cooper- 
ation in Economic Development. 

Most of the continent's poor live in 
countries which, because national per 
capita incomes have risen, no longer 
receive our bilateral assistance. This 
dilemma, although not unique to Latin 
America, affects this region more than 
any other. National decisions will 
primarily determine how the fruits of 
growth are distributed. But the interna- 
tional community must also do a better 
job of reaching all those who are in 
need. 



These varied cooperative endeavors 
not only contribute to Latin America's 
progress, they are fundamental to the 
political and economic cooperation we 
ourselves seek from the countries of the 
region. 

Third, through consistent support 
for human rights, we are seeking to 
help other governments respond to ris- 
ing demands for justice and for full 
participation in the political and eco- 
nomic life of their nations. 

How each society manages change is 
a matter for it to decide. But divergent 
views cannot be permanently excluded 
nor repression maintained in any 
society without sowing the seeds of 
violent convulsion. 

We have seen the consequences of 
authoritarian rule in Nicaragua. Our 
challenge today is to join with others in 
the region to help the Nicaraguan 
people and government succeed in 
building a stable, healthy, democratic 
society out of the debris of dictatorship 
and revolution. The relative absence of 
reprisals against members of the So- 
moza government is a promising be- 
ginning to what we hope will be a 
humane process of social change, in 
close association with the hemisphere's 
democracies. 

By extending our friendship and 
economic assistance, we enhance the 
prospects for democracy in Nicaragua. 
We cannot guarantee that democracy 
will take hold there. But if we turn our 
backs on Nicaragua, we can almost 
guarantee that democracy will fail. 

It may take time for us to overcome 
the legacy of the past and to develop a 
relationship of mutual trust with the 
new government. We must be patient, 
steady, and prepared for inevitable dis- 
agreements. But so long as pluralism 
flourishes in Nicaragua — and we re- 
spect it — I am confident that relations 
will prosper. 

Elsewhere in the region, we will en- 
courage and support constructive 
change before the ties between gov- 
ernment and people irreversibly erode 
and radicalism or repression drive out 
moderate solutions. 

Fourth, we must keep alive in our 
minds the important distinction be- 
tween the social and political changes 
that result from internal factors and 
those that result from outside pressures 
and forces. We must recognize that 
disruption within nations does not 
necessarily mean there is an outside 
hand. But at the same time, we must be 
alert to the reality that internal tensions 
present opportunities for outside inter- 
ference. 

It is in this context that we have in 
the past expressed concern over Cuba's 



Department of State Bulletin ' 



efforts to exploit for its own advantage 
social and political change within its 
neighbors. 

Our concerns are shared by other 
countries in the hemisphere. The na- 
tions of Latin America are firmly 
committed to the proposition that out- 
side interference in their internal affairs 
must be resisted. We fully respect and 
will support that determination on their 
part. 

Cuba's ability to exploit these inter- 
nal tensions is reinforced by its close 
military ties with the Soviet Union. 
The recent confirmation of the presence 
of a Soviet combat unit in Cuba has 
further heightened this concern. We are 
seeking to resolve, by diplomatic 
negotiations with the Soviet Union, 
questions raised by the presence of 
these forces. We have significant inter- 
ests at stake in our total relationship 
with the Soviet Union. We wish to 
keep each part in proper perspective. 
However, we will assure that our inter- 
ests are fully protected. 

The fifth element in our strategy is 
to support regional efforts to resolve 
regional conflicts. Latin America is the 
scene of a number of simmering and 
potentially explosive territorial dis- 
putes. But over the past year, reason- 
able progress has been made on a 
number of them. 

• Fears of conflict in the Andes have 
eased substantially. 

• The Beagle Channel dispute be- 
tween Argentina and Chile, while not 
resolved, is under mediation. 

• El Salvador and Honduras are 
moving closer to resolving their border 
conflict. 

In these and other territorial disputes 
in the region, the underlying issues re- 
main. We will continue to support col- 
lective efforts to preserve the hemi- 
sphere's long tradition of resolving its 
international disputes in peace. 

Sixth and finally, as we pursue this 
strategy, we will work with any nation 
willing to work with us toward practi- 
cal common goals. Latin America is a 
continent of great — and growing — 
diversity. Our interest is not in resist- 
ing diversity but in building upon it for 
our common good. 



Conclusion 

Change and growth — in the United 
States, in Latin America, and in the 
world — create both new opportunities 
and new tensions. They have trans- 
formed inter-American affairs. Today, 
those relationships are more directly 
relevant to our domestic lives than ever 
before. The perplexing dilemmas, the 



Quesiiott'and'Answer Session 
Folio irtttg iVetr York Address 



Q. With the advantage that the 
audience has had in being able to 
listen to your remarks, particularly 
toward the close, I would like to ask a 
question of my own, if I may, at the 
outset. You have spoken of the 
problem of the Soviet combat bri- 
gade in Cuba, and you have said that 
the nations of Latin America join 
with us in rejecting external interfer- 
ence in their affairs, and specifically 
any interference in which Cuba 
might have a quarrel. 

Can you comment on the Latin 
American reaction to the revelation 
of the precise nature — perhaps is the 
way to put it — of the Soviet brigade 
in Cuba, and comment on whether 
there are possibilities for associating 
Latin America with the diplomacy 
that might produce an adjustment of 
this matter? 

A. I do not think it would be wise to 
answer the second half of your ques- 
tion. I will answer the first half of the 
question. Let me say that the reaction 
has been one of caution, one of seeking 
for further information on the part of 
the various nations. Some have ex- 
pressed their views to us in very clear 
terms; others have said that they want 
to further watch and examine the situa- 
tion before they express their views. 
That is the general picture that the dis- 
cussions to date have brought. 

Q. Do private trips, by private in- 
dividuals, to the Middle East en- 
danger official efforts to bring about 
peace there? [Laughter] 

A. Private trips to the Middle East I 
do not believe jeopardize the peace 
process. The peace process is under 
way with the negotiations that are 
going forward with respect to the West 
Bank and Gaza. Insofar as actual par- 



ticipation, that obviously lies in the 
hands of the parties. They are the ones 
who are going to have to make the de- 
cisions on what the future will bring in 
terms of the outcome of the negotia- 
tions. I, for one, am one of those 
people who believe that in any set of 
negotiations, you can do the most ef- 
fective work when you are working to- 
gether quietly discussing the issues 
rather than in the spotlight of the press 
and the television cameras. 

On the other hand, we believe very 
deeply in the right of free speech and 
of people to speak their minds, and, 
therefore, I, for one, would not say that 
people should not be free to speak their 
minds, whether I disagree with them or 
not, or whether they have different 
views from some of the rest of us. 

Q. There are signs of some division 
between some blacks in the United 
States and some Jews in the United 
States. Does this complicate the task 
of the Administration in the Middle 
East? 

A. One of the great tragedies would 
be if the problems of the Middle East 
should cause divisions between blacks 
of the United States and people of the 
Jewish faith. This would be indeed a 
great tragedy, and there should be no 
reason for this, and I want to make 
very clear the situation. 

Because of some stories which have 
been written about Andy Young's res- 
ignation from the government, it has 
been suggested that Andy's decision 
was brought about by pressure from 
either the Jewish community in the 
United States or Israel. Both of these 
are untrue, and I want to make it very 
clear that both are untrue. I have felt 
that from the beginning, and I believe 
this very, very deeply. I know that to 
be the fact, and I think that we must all 
have this very clearly in our minds. 



fresh problems, and the expanding op- 
portunities all require new leadership, 
new initiatives, and new ways to relate 
to each other. 

We are embarked on a course that 
takes account of these new dimensions. 

• We will work to improve the cli- 
mate for equitable growth. 

• We will respect and encourage 
economic and political diversity. 

• We will welcome Latin America's 
growing influence, and we will work 



with its nations in the international 
arena. 

With patience, with the attention that 
the region properly deserves, and with 
a decent respect for the aspirations of 
our fellow citizens of the hemisphere, I 
believe we can see in the coming years 
an increasingly creative and fruitful era 
of cooperation between the United 
States and the nations of Latin 
America. D 



' Press release 238. 



November 1979 



17 



Q. Over the last 6 weeks, the Ad- 
ministration and some of its support- 

< ers in the Senate, as well as some of 
its opponents, have laid down a 
major challenge to the Soviets over 
the alleged role of Soviet troops in 
Cuba. Yet, because of its hesitation 
in releasing to the public the evi- 
dence on which it based these allega- 
tions, it has allowed the impression 
to come forward that its case has 
been less than overwhelming. 

It now appoints a panel of wise 
men — one of them whose name it re- 
leases, the other six of whom it in- 
sists on keeping private — to analyze 
the evidence and to advise it on what 

[ steps it might take in the future. 
Does this not strengthen an 
impression not only in this country 
but also in the camps of our allies 
and our potential adversaries that 
the Administration is vacillating and 
divided and indeed weak? 

A. The answer I think should be a 
clear no. We put out the information 
which we believed was essential and 
which we had at the time that the situ- 
ation arose, and we had the definite 
evidence on which the conclusions of 
the intelligence community were based 
that there was this combat unit in 
Cuba. We laid out the facts in as sim- 
ple form as we could. 

Since then, we have obviously been 
reviewing all the facts, going back 
through the entire period from 1962 of 
. checking and rechecking. We will, at 
the appropriate time, release a full re- 
port. I think that as long as negotia- 
tions are going on between ourselves 
and the Soviet Union, the best thing 
that can be done is to keep those 
negotiations private, to pursue them 
through private diplomacy because 
only through private diplomacy can one 
explore ways of reaching a satisfactory 
resolution to this problem. 

If we were to put out all the infor- 
mation at this time, some of it before it 
is completely hard, 1 think we would be 
doing a disservice to our people and to 
the world, and, therefore, I think that 
our responsibility was to lay the essen- 
tial facts before the people, to then en- 
gage in private discussions — private 
diplomacy — with the Soviet Union, and 
r to pursue those to the end to reach, if 
possible, a satisfactory resolution of 
the problem. 

Q. This question is from the audi- 
ence. It concerns the most prominent 
non-Mexican now resident in Mex- 
ico, and therefore, at least, has a 
i Latin-American angle. But it is a 
' very serious question. Why is it that 
the United States does not let the 
Shah come to our country? Hasn't 



this man been our friend for nearly 
four decades? 

A. I think, as many of you know, 
immediately after the Shah left Iran, 
we invited him to come to the United 
States. He chose not to do so at that 
time and spent several months in Africa 
before he decided that he wished to 
come live in this hemisphere. By that 
time, circumstances had changed in 
terms of the internal situation within 
that country, and we have had to take 
into account the possible dangers to 
American people at this time in that 
country, should we take this action at 
this particular time. 

We will continue to keep the matter 
under review, but I do not think it 
would be to our national interest to do 
so. We have explained this very clearly 
to the Shah, and I think he understands 
clearly what our position is. 

Q. There have been a number of 
questions from the audience having 
to do with the Soviet military units in 
Cuba. I would like to combine two of 
them, if I may. The first one suggests 
that we ourselves have bases and 
troops stationed in various parts of 
the world — how can we, therefore, 
object to the Soviet presence in 
Cuba? 

And the second part of the ques- 
tion: Please respond to Mr. Gromy- 
ko's statement before the General 
Assembly, which was that this was 
an issue artificially created. 

A. I really would prefer to stay away 
from these Cuban issues at this point. I 
am meeting this afternoon at 3:00 with 
Mr. Gromyko, and as I said before, I 
don't think it helps for us to be making 
public statements — neither we nor 
them. 

Q. Is there any sort of deadline in 
your mind and the President's mind 
for the negotiations with the Rus- 
sians on some resolution of this 
matter? 

A. As long as we are making prog- 
ress, as long as the discussions con- 
tinue, we will continue. 

Q. Why is Israel allowed to use 
U.S. aircraft and military equipment 
in Lebanon? That's the first ques- 
tion. And, second, what can the 
United States do about the prospect 
of a further extension of settlements 
on the West Bank which will en- 
danger our hope of expanding the 
Middle East accords into a general 
one? 

A. Let me take the Lebanon question 
first. I think, as all of you know, the 
United States furnishes a wide variety 
of equipment through sales to Israel. 



These include aircraft of various types. 
Under the law which permits these 
sales, it provides that the aircraft can- 
not be used for offensive purposes but 
can be used for defensive purposes. 
This then brings you to the question of 
what happens when there is a terrorist 
attack into Israel? What then is the 
situation with respect to defense, be- 
cause there is nothing that precludes 
the Israelis from defending against 
such attack? This gets one then into 
very complicated situations as to 
whether the response is a dispropor- 
tionate response or an actual response 
in self-defense. 

These present very, very difficult 
situations with which we wrestle al- 
most on a daily basis. We have made it 
very clear to the Israelis that we do not 
agree with many of the actions which 
they have taken recently in south Leba- 
non in terms of some of the responses 
to these raids. But it is a very, very 
difficult situation, as you can see. 

The second question was what? 

Q. — on the settlements on the 
West Bank as endangering the proc- 
ess of expanding the peace into a 
general accord in the Middle East. 

A. The American position has been, 
I think, very clear in this for a long 
time. We believe that the establishment 
of settlements in the West Bank is 
contrary to international law. We be- 
lieve that the establishment of settle- 
ments, particularly as the negotiations 
are going forward, is an obstacle to 
peace. We have stated this publicly; we 
have stated it privately; and we con- 
tinue to urge that this not be done. De- 
spite that fact, some settlements con- 
tinue to be established, but I think that 
our view on this has been and remains 
crystal clear. D 



Text from press release 2 38 A . 



18 



Department of State Bulletin 



interview on 
l^BC^s "Toifaii" Show 



Secretary Vance was interviewed on 
the NBC "Today" Show in New York 
on October 4, 1979, by Tom Brokaw 
and Richard Valeriani. ' 

Q. President Carter has been say- 
ing he thinks the Soviets will eventu- 
ally change the nature of that unit in 
Cuba. Now is that something that's 
based on wishful thinking or does he 
have some positive indications of 
that? 

A. As the President indicated during 
his speech, certain statements or reas- 
surances or assurances were made to 
the United States during the course of 
the discussions between myself and 
Minister Gromyko and the communi- 
cations between the President and 
President Brezhnev. Those dealt with 
future actions with respect to the Soviet 
brigade in question. They indicated as I 
believe most people know and heard 
that insofar as the future is concerned, 
the Soviets say that the status and con- 
dition of the unit will not be changed. 
In other words, the unit will not be in- 
creased in size nor it be given addi- 
tional capabilities. He further indicated 
that the unit and units that exist in that 
area would not be given any capability 
which would constitute a threat to the 
United States or any other nation in the 
hemisphere. 

Q. They have not indicated they 
will change anything that's on the 
ground right now. 

A. Insofar as what's on the ground 
right now, they have stated what I have 
said. I think those words speak for 
themselves. 

Q. If they don't change anything 
that's there now, would that affect 
the chances of getting SALT ratified? 
Some Senators seem to think they 
have to do something a little more 
down the road. 

A. Let me come back to this ques- 
tion of change of the status quo which 
has been discussed quite a bit. Some 
people have said that there has been no 
change in the status quo. There clearly 
has been a change in the status quo. 
Change in the status quo has come 
about in two ways: one, steps which 
the United States has taken. The Presi- 
dent outlined eight different steps that 
the United States is taking; and in ad- 
dition to that, we have assurances 
which the Soviet Union has given to 



the United States. They reflect the fu- 
ture condition, what the future of the 
brigade will be, and the limitations that 
will exist on its capabilities. Namely, 
that it will not constitute a combat 
threat. 

Q. For many Senators and for 
many Americans, the fact of the 
matter is that the combat unit that is 
there now is unacceptable in its pres- 
ent form. When you said and the 
President said that you would not ac- 
cept the status quo, it signaled to a 
lot of people that it could not stay in 
its present form — that it would have 
to be a noncombat force — if it were 
to be acceptable. I gather that you're 
saying that the Russians are going to 
keep it as it is — not take away its 
combat ability. 

A. When I used the words "status 
quo is not acceptable," I chose my 
words very carefully because I realize 
that one can change the status quo in 
several different ways — by actions we 
take, as well as by actions they take. In 
my judgment, as I indicated a moment 
ago, both kinds of actions have been 
taken; therefore, there has been a 
change in the status quo. 

Q. We had Senator Frank Church 
on the other day — chairman of the 
Senate Foreign Relations Com- 
mittee — a key figure in all of this. 
His clear indication was, based on 
what he said on this program, that 
there would be a reduction in the 
combat nature of that brigade, and 
he was tying, really, his future at- 
titude toward SALT in public ap- 
pearance here to that change. Do you 
think that he has been misinformed 
or that he is misreading what you 
were telling him? 

A. No, I don't think that he has been 
misinformed. In terms of what Senator 
Church may offer in terms of a resolu- 
tion or understanding, I don't think this 
has been worked out yet; and we'll 
have to see what Senator Church 
suggests in this regard. 

Q. Would the Administration ac- 
cept a demand from the Senate that 
the President certify in writing that 
this unit in Cuba is, in effect, 
"harmless," in order to get SALT 
passed? 

A. One of the suggestions that has 
been made that some form of certifica- 



tion will be asked of the President, it 
would depend upon the precise wording 
of such a certification; and I do not rule 
out some form of certification. 

Q. Is there now an understanding 
with the Soviet Union that the Soviets 
will not put a combat unit, as they 
understand it, into Cuba — combat 
forces as they understand it? 

A. They say that this is a training 
unit — that it's only function is training, 
and it can do no more. That is the po- 
sition that they assert. As you know, it 
is our conclusion — based upon the in- 
telligence that we have — that it does 
have combat capability. Insofar as the- 
future is concerned, they indicated, 
however, that they do not intend and 
will not give it any additional capabili- 
ties. It has, as you know, no airlift, no 
sealift, and, therefore, it is not a threat 
to the United States or to the other na- 
tions as — 

Q. No, what I'm asking: Is this a 
new understanding to go along with 
the 1962 understanding, 1970 under- 
standing that the Soviets will not put, 
say, another unit in — 

A. I would not call it an under- 
standing. When I say this is a statement 
— a statement from the highest levels 
of the Soviet government. 

Q. But, do you think you have rid 
yourself of the political problems in 
this country that the combat brigade 
represented? 

A. I think they have been put in 
proper perspective now. I'm sure that 
this will be a subject that will continue 
to be discussed; but I hope at a more 
rational and less heated level than it 
has in the past. I think we are now 
clearly going to go forward with the 
completion of SALT ratification; and 
that this issue may come and probably 
will come up and be discussed during 
that. I believe that we can now see this 
in proper perspective since the Presi- 
dent has made his speech, that we will 
be able to go forward and complete the 
SALT ratification process. 

Q. How can you be encouraged by 
the initial reaction from people like 
Senator Church, for example, who 
had been for SALT before the disclo- 
sure or the presence of the Russian 
troops in Cuba, and now are saying 
he wants to add resolutions and he's 
still awaiting the change in the 
character of that brigade? 

A. 1 think it remains to be seen 
exactly what it is Senator Church in- 
tends to suggest. Senator Church be- 
lieves very strongly that SALT is im- 
portant, as all of us do. It's of funda- 



November 1979 



19 



mental importance to our security, and 
it will enhance our security and that of 
our allies. 1 am confident that Senator 
Church shares our views that this is of 
importance to us and to our allies and 
would like to see the treaty ratified. 

Q. May I ask you about the Middle 
East? Do you think the effect of the 
trip of Jesse Jackson is having any 
affect on the prospects for peace 
there? 

A. 1 think that the real negotiations 
have to be conducted by the parties; 
and they will be conducted by the par- 
ties. However, on the other hand, we 
believe very strongly in free speech. 
All individual citizens should be free to 
go and meet with people in the Middle 
East should they choose to do so. But 
the ultimate negotiations have to be 
conducted among the governments and 
parties involved. 

Q. But does he delay the prospects 
for peace? 

A. I don't think so. 

Q. To get back to the Cuba 
episode, how is this going to affect 
overall relations between the United 
States and the Soviet Union? For 
example, there's a story this morning 
that the Defense Department has 
turned down a request for computer 
technology from the Russians. Is this 
punishment for what they've done in 
Cuba? 

A. As you know in selling advance 
technology equipment, we always re- 
view these very carefully, and if there 
is technology which would be of mili- 
tary use, those are usually denied to the 
Soviet Union and to the Chinese. 

I'd like to take the occasion to com- 
ment on another story that appeared 
this morning which indicated that there 
was a study in the Defense Department 
which recommended the selling of arms 
to the Chinese. Let me state flatly and 
categorically that it's nothing more 
than a story. We have no intention of 
changing our policy. We are not going 
to sell arms to the Chinese. 

Q. If we can just wrap up in the 
final moment what we have here, the 
status of the combat brigade in 
Cuba. It will get no larger in your 
judgment but neither will it get any 
smaller, or will it have less combat 
capability? 

A. It will get no larger. It will, in my 
judgment, perhaps shrink in size; but I 
cannot at this point say that I am cer- 
tam that that will happen. D 



Intervieu^ on 
CBS-TV norning l^ews 



Press release 250. 



Secretary Vance was interviewed on 
CBS-TV morning news in New York 
on October 5, 1979. by Bob Schieffer 
and Richard Hottelet. ' 

Q. In summary, the [Senate Select] 
Intelligence Committee had con- 
cluded that the United States did 
have the means to detect Soviet 
cheating on the SALT II treaty. 
Today the committee is reported un- 
able to decide whether it is possible 
to detect some Soviet violations of the 
proposed arms control arrangement. 
A report to that effect is expected to 
go from the committee to the full 
Senate today. Secretary of State 
Vance, of course, is the point man 
for the Administration's effort to get 
Senate approval of the treaty; and 
he's in New York this morning for 
the fall session of the United Nations. 
If I could ask you first if, indeed, this 
report by the Senate intelligence 
committee concludes that we're un- 
able to say for certain whether this 
treaty can be verified, doesn't that 
just about end it for the SALT II 
treaty? 

A. No. First of all, I have not seen 
the report, and I wish to see the report 
and examine it with care before coming 
to any conclusion. I will be testifying 
next week before the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee and also before 
the Armed Services Committee in 
closed session with respect to the 
question of verification. I am confident 
that we can adequately verify the SALT 
treaty. Admiral Turner [Director of the 
Central Intelligence Agency] and I will 
be testifying together when the time 
comes, and I can say that I believe we 
will be able to convince both commit- 
tees of the Congress to which I have 
referred that we do indeed have the 
means to adequately verify the treaty. 

Q. It took American intelligence 
rather a long time it seems, at least 
to an outsider, to locate the Soviet 
combat brigade in Cuba. Doesn't 
that entitle one to ask whether the 
intelligence system could really put 
its finger on violations of SALT so 
much farther away? 

A. No. I think they're entirely dif- 
ferent kinds of problems in terms of 
verification. When you're talking about 
verification of the SALT treaty, you're 
talking about verifying the location and 
the development of missiles — large 



items — that are easy to pick up with 
photography. The question of telemetry 
is important. We have the capability to 
monitor with telemetry and many kinds 
of devices which interact with each 
other. 

On the kind of problem that one was 
dealing with in monitoring whether 
there are certain troops — a small 
number — what kind of equipment they 
have and that type of thing, that is 
much more difficult. Therefore, I think 
that the difficulties that one has in 
monitoring whether a specific ground 
unit has or does not have certain types 
of equipment, particularly when the 
Cuban equipment and the Soviet 
equipment is the same kind of equip- 
ment is a totally different kind of a 
problem from that of monitoring the 
kinds of matters that are necessary for 
adequate SALT verification. 

Q. Now one thing about the Soviet 
brigade issue with Cuba is that it was 
a crisis of confidence, in a way. It 
was suggested sort of a purpose of 
evasion by the Soviet Union. What 
effect is this going to have on Soviet - 
American relations, not only in 
SALT, but in general dealings with 
the Russians if you're entitled to sus- 
pect that they will always seek a little 
advantage somewhere on the fringe 
or somewhere underneath despite 
their given word or despite an under- 
standing that exists between us? 

A. Insofar as verification of the 
SALT agreement is concerned, we are 
not depending upon trust. We are de- 
pending upon our own national techni- 
cal means of verification, so the ques- 
tion of trust does not arise in connec- 
tion with that verification. 

Q. Let me just sneak in with an- 
other question here because that 
raises a point that Senator Glenn 
raised yesterday in an interview with 
Phil Jones on Capitol Hill. He sug- 
gested that much of this verification 
will depend on systems — intelligence 
systems — still in the development 
stages. Can you elaborate at all on 
that? 

A. No. We get into highly classified 
matters when we talk about systems 
which are under development. I think 
the point that I should make is to state 
very clearly that our intelligence which 
is used in verification of a SALT 
agreement is made up of many different 



20 



Department of State Bulletin 



pieces of intelligence gathered from 
different sources. These sources and 
these bits of intelligence overlap to 
form a mosaic and they are redundant, 
and, therefore, back up each other in 
arriving at the ultimate conclusions 
which are necessary for verification. 

Q. You say that your arrange- 
ments on SALT are not going to de- 
pend on good faith, but good faith 
has entered into this Cuban business. 
The President says he has assurances 
that this unit there will not be ex- 
panded, will not be exported to any 
part of Latin America, do these as- 
surances take the form of something 
that you can put on the table, in case 
of a future misunderstanding of this 
type? 

A. The assurances were clearly 
stated in the President's speech. They 
are clear by their terms and I think 
there can be no question as to what 
those assurances are. 

Q. Do you have a piece of paper? 
Do you have a note from Brezhnev or 
from Moscow? 



A. The assurances are derived from 
two sources — conversations which I 
had with Foreign Minister Gromyko 
and from exchange between our two 
heads of government. 

Q. Do you consider the incident 
closed now? 

A. We obviously are going to follow 
the situation as the President said. We 
are going to monitor the situation. And 
in addition to that, we are taking the 
other seven steps which the President 
indicated very clearly in his speech to 
the people. 

Q. In retrospect, was too much 
made of this incident? Was Senator 
Byrd right when he said it was a 
pseudocrisis? 

A. As we indicated, we considered it 
a serious matter, but it'd have to be 
kept in perspective; and I think the 
President's speech has put it in a proper 
perspective. We see that it's a serious 
matter — a matter where certain steps 
had to be taken to make sure that it 
would be in a condition which we 



AFRICA: President Carter 

Meets With Zairean 

and Liherian Presidents 



WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, 
SEPT. 11, 1979' 

The President met this afternoon for 
25 minutes in the Cabinet Room with 
President Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire, 
who is in Washington on a private visit 
connected with meetings of the Inter- 
national Monetary Fund (IMF). 

The two Presidents discussed the 
situation in Zaire. President Mobutu 
informed President Carter of the prog- 
ress that Zaire is making in dealing 
with its economic and security prob- 
lems. President Carter restated our 
strong support for Zaire and the im- 
portance that we attach to the ongoing 
process of reforms in Zaire. He wel- 
comed President Mobutu's description 
of progress that is being made in these 
regards. 

WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, 

OCT. 2, 1979^ 

D^^^-.A^^t /-•„,. ~ . .u- ■ c ' T^"' f''"'" Weekly Compilation of Presi- 

President Carter met this mornmg for d^ntiai Documen.s of' Sep. I7. 1979 (i,s. of 
an hour in the Cabinet Room with participants omitted). 

President William R. Tolbert, Jr. of ' Text from Weekly Compilation of Oct. 8, 

Liberia. They had a warm and com- 1979 (list of participants omitted) 



prehensive exchange of views on bilat- 
eral and regional issues. 

President Carter expressed the im- 
portance of the U.S. special relation- 
ship with Liberia and our desire to en- 
hance and promote it. The two Presi- 
dents agreed to consider the visit of a 
group of distinguished Americans to 
Liberia in the near future. The group 
will work toward strengthening U.S. 
ties with Liberia and focus on eco- 
nomic and development cooperation in 
the public and private sectors. 

The two Presidents had an extensive 
discussion of President Tolbert's role 
as Chairman of the Organization of 
African Unity (OAU) and the OAU 
meeting last July. President Carter 
complimented President Tolbert on his 
leadership as head of the OAU and 
praised President Tolbert's efforts to 
resolve outstanding problems in the re- 
gion, n 



could accept. Those steps are being 
taken. We have received the assurances 
and, therefore, 1 think we can now — 
doing the necessary monitoring, taking 
the steps we're taking — move forward 
and get going on ratification of SALT 
which as the President said is of 
paramount importance and a really 
serious issue that has to be finished up. 

Q. Very briefly, what about Amer- 
ican relations with Cuba? Do you see 
a prospect of improvement there, 
especially if Fidel Castro comes to 
the United Nations next week? Will 
there be contacts? 

A. At this point, I cannot predict that 
there will be an improvement in rela- 
tions. I think as you know at the outset 
of this Administration, we took steps to 
try and normalize relations. We made 
some progress. We entered into a 
maritime treaty. We entered into< 
agreements which led to the establish- 
ment of a diplomatic mission on our| 
part in Havana and one by them in the! 
United States. We started talking about 
the reunification of families and thel 
release of prisoners, and we madei 
progress. However, the adventurism of 
Cuba which took place during the 
period of 1966, '67. '78, etc., led to 
the placing of obstacles in the road of 
moving toward normalization. 

Q. Those obstacles are still there? 

A. They are still there. 

Q. And not likely to be quickiyi 
removed? 

t 
A. I do not think they will be quickly 
removed. D' 



Press release 254, 



November 1979 



21 



A]\T ARCTIC A: 10th Meeting oi 
Treaty Consultative Parties 



The 10th meeting of the Antarctic 
Treaty consultative parties was held in 
the Department of State September 
I7-0ctober 5, 1979. Following are the 
texts of a State Department press re- 
lease issued prior to the meeting: 
opening remarks by Lucy Wilson Ben- 
son, Under Secretary for Security As- 
■ sistance, Science, and Technology, on 
September 17: and the press com- 
munique issued by the chairman of the 
meeting on October 10. 



PRESS RELEASE 224, 
SEPT. 14, 1979 

The United States will host the 10th 
meeting of Antarctic Treaty consulta- 
tive parties from September 17 to Oc- 
tober 5 in Washington, DC, at the 
Department of State. The 10th consul- 
tative meeting will include delegations 
from the treaty's 12 original sig- 
natories — Argentina, Australia, 
Belgium, Chile, France, Japan, New 
Zealand, Norway, South Africa, the 
United Kingdom, the U.S.S.R., and 
the United States — as well as Poland, 
whose consultative status was recog- 
nized in 1977. 

The meeting takes place pursuant to 
provisions of the treaty which provides 
for regular meetings of the consultative 
parties to discuss matters of common 
interest pertaining to Antarctica and to 
develop and recommend to their gov- 
ernments measures in furtherance of 
the principles and objectives of the 
treaty. Meetings of the consultative 
parties have been held at approximately 
2-year intervals since the treaty entered 
into force. 

The 10th consultative meeting will 
mark the 20th anniversary of the Ant- 
arctic Treaty which was signed in 
Washington in 1959. The treaty, in- 
cluding the consultative system it es- 
tablishes, has been an unusually suc- 
cessful example of international coop- 
eration among states with differing 
political systems as well as different 
legal and political perspectives. Seven 
of the consultative parties claim sov- 
ereignty over portions of Antarctica; 
six, including the United States, 
neither assert nor recognize such 
claims. 

Largely through imaginative provi- 
sions under which the parties agree to 
disagree over the issue of territorial 
sovereignty in Antarctica, the treaty 



provides for freedom of scientific re- 
search in Antarctica and establishes a 
basis for international cooperation 
there. The treaty sets aside Antarctica 
and the waters below 60° south latitude 
for peaceful purposes only. It prohibits 
nuclear explosions or the disposal of 
nuclear waste there. It also prohibits 
any measures of a military nature such 
as the establishment of military bases 
and fortifications, the carrying out of 
military maneuvers, or the testing of 
military weapons. Employment of 
military personnel or equipment is 
permitted only in support of scientific 
research in Antarctica. In order to pro- 
mote these objectives and insure the 
observance of the treaty provisions, 
each consultative party has the right to 
designate observers to carry out in- 
spection activities throughout the treaty 
area. 

The Antarctic Treaty defines specific 
objectives and establishes an imagina- 
tive legal and political framework to 
achieve those objectives. However, the 
treaty does not apply to activities in 
Antarctica other than those enumerated 
in it. 

Among those with which the treaty 
does not deal are questions relating to 
Antarctic resources. In the two decades 
since the treaty was concluded, a vari- 
ety of factors — including perceptions 
of possible resource shortages and ac- 
celerated technological developments 
— have directed attention toward the 
possibility of resource activity in Ant- 
arctica, a possibility which seemed 
quite remote in 1959. Therefore, ques- 
tions relating to Antarctic resources, 
both the living resources of the waters 
surrounding Antarctica and Antarctic 
mineral resources, have become major 
items of consideration at recent meet- 
ings of the Antarctic Treaty consulta- 
tive parties. 

These issues will be important sub- 
jects of discussion at the 10th consul- 
tative meeting, along with those mat- 
ters relating to cooperation in scientific 
research and logistic activities in Ant- 
arctica and to controlling the impact of 
human activities in Antarctica which 
have been dealt with at consultative 
meetings since their outset. 

U.S. policy toward Antarctica rests 
upon commitment to the principles and 
purposes of the Antarctic Treaty. The 
pattern of international cooperation and 
collective scientific investigation in 
Antarctica which the treaty and the 



treaty system has sustained is a truly 
remarkable achievement. In the U.S. 
view, the treaty and treaty system con- 
tinue to play a dynamic and construc- 
tive role in international relations. The 
purposes and objectives of the treaty 
remain as valid today as when elabo- 
rated in 1959. 

At the same time, new issues — 
largely relating to Antarctic resources 
— face the consultative parties. Effec- 
tive and imaginative responses to these 
new issues will make important contri- 
butions to the future strength and via- 
bility of the treaty system. 

The United States seeks to work with 
its treaty partners in meeting the chal- 
lenge posed by resource-related issues 
in Antarctica. 

With regard to Antarctic marine liv- 
ing resources, the waters surrounding 
Antarctica appear to be both highly 
productive and vulnerable to unregu- 
lated harvesting. Antarctic krill. which 
occupies a central place in the ecosys- 
tem of these waters, has become the 
object of considerable interest for pos- 
sible commercial fishing. 

For these reasons, the United States 
has taken the lead in seeking an inter- 
national treaty to provide for effective 
conservation of Antarctic marine living 
resources. We recognize that fishing 
will likely take place for these re- 
sources, but we are committed to see- 
ing that such activity is properly regu- 
lated, to insure the health not only of 
harvested populations but also of de- 
pendent and related species, including 
whales, and of the ecosystem as a 
whole. 

It is our objective to insure that an 
effective system for applying necessary 
conservation measures is in place before 
large-scale fishing for krill and other 
Antarctic marine living resources, 
comes a possibility. Major progress has 
been made toward developing such a 
system in the ongoing negotiations on 
the convention on the conservation of 
antarctic marine living resources. 
Though the draft convention will not be 
a formal item on the agenda of the 1 0th 
consultative meeting, the meeting of- 
fers the opportunity to resolve the few 
remaining obstacles to convening the 
diplomatic conference necessary to 
conclude the convention. 

With regard to mineral resources, 
there are insufficient data to determine 
the potential of such resources in Ant- 
arctica, and it is not known if or when 
development of mineral resources in 
Antarctica would become economically 
feasible or environmentally sound. In 
light of interest generated in the possi- 
bility of mineral resource activities, the 
United States believes it is important to 
begin work toward an agreed interna- 



->1 



Department of State Bulletin 



tional system or regime to determine 
whether development of Antarctic min- 
eral resources may be acceptable in the 
future and how to govern mineral re- 
source activities if they were to prove 
acceptable. 

The U.S. approach to this issue re- 
flects several basic principles. 

• It is of basic importance to main- 
tain the Antarctic Treaty system, which 
for nearly two decades has reserved 
Antarctica exclusively for peaceful pur- 
poses and fostered international coop- 
eration, freedom of scientific research, 
and protection of the environment. 

• Conclusion of the convention for 
the conservation of Antarctic marine 
living resources is the most important 
objective presently before the consul- 
tative parties to the Antarctic Treaty, 
and consideration of the mineral re- 
source regime should not detract from 
this goal. 

• Full understanding of the environ- 
mental consequences of any mineral re- 
source development is essential, and 
Antarctic mineral resources, if ever de- 
veloped, must be used wisely and de- 
veloped only under effective environ- 
mental safeguards. 

• The United States should have the 
opportunity to share in nondiscrimina- 
tory fashion in the benefits if such ac- 
tivities were to prove acceptable. 

At the 10th consultative meeting, the 
United States will work toward build- 
ing an effective foundation for dealing 
with the mineral resource issue in a 
timely fashion. 



MRS. BENSON'S REMARKS, 
SEPT. 17, 1979 

It is a pleasure for me on behalf of 
my government to welcome you to 
Washington for the 10th meeting of the 
Antarctic Treaty consultative parties. 

This consultative meeting marks a 
significant milestone. It is the 20th an- 
niversary of the signing of the Antarc- 
tic Treaty. Twenty years ago in this 
city, delegates representing countries 
on six continents completed work on a 
treaty concerning the seventh continent 

— the southernmost, and least known, 
part of our planet. Those delegates 
pledged to reserve this area for peace- 
ful purposes only and to cooperate in 
investigation of this unique scientific 
frontier. 

The world of 1959 — not unlike today 

— was one in which the divisions 
among nations too often seemed to pre- 
dominate. In such circumstances, it 
was no small task for a diverse group 
of nations to recognize that they shared 
a common concern for Antarctica. Yet 



the authors of the treaty were able to 
set aside the problems which divided 
them in order to affirm the interests 
which bound them. 

It was during the International Geo- 
physical Year (IGY) of 1957-58 that 
scientists from the Antarctic Treaty na- 
tions first worked together across the 
vast southern continent to begin un- 
locking its secrets. The realization that 
their efforts during the IGY had just 
begun to bear fruit stimulated the de- 
velopment of a more enduring agree- 
ment among interested parties. 

Those who gathered here 20 years 
ago to work on that international 
agreement realized that to reach that 
common objective, Antarctica must be 
treated in a special fashion. As the 
words of the treaty attest, they recog- 
nized ■". . . that it is in the interest of 
all mankind that Antarctica shall con- 
tinue forever to be used exclusively for 
peaceful purposes and shall not become 
the scene or object of international dis- 
cord. ..." 

This was an impressive commitment, 
indeed. It was not simply an expression 
of common purpose but the basis of the 
operative provisions of the treaty. 

• It underlies the provisions for 
freedom of scientific research in Ant- 
arctica. 

• It underlies the imaginative juridi- 
cal formulation insuring international 
cooperation among the parties on Ant- 
arctica. 

• It underlies provisions for the 
nonmilitarization and nonnuclearization 
of Antarctica and for inspection of sta- 
tions. 

The basic principles and purposes of 
the Antarctic Treaty remain as valid 
and cogent today as in 1959. The 
framers of the treaty understood that to 
give concrete effect to these principles 
and purposes required a mechanism 
through which the treaty could evolve 
to meet new circumstances and de- 
velopments. That mechanism is the 
regular consultative meetings which 
have contributed importantly to the 
continued dynamism and responsive- 
ness of the Antarctic Treaty system. 

The accomplishments of the treaty 
and the consultative mechanism estab- 
lished pursuant to it are impressive. 
Antarctica remains an area reserved ex- 
clusively for peaceful purposes. Inter- 
national cooperation in scientific re- 
search in Antarctica has made major 
contributions to the understanding of 
our planet, its oceans, and its atmos- 
phere. An impressive collection of rec- 
ommendations have been developed to 
insure the protection of the Antarctic 
environment from harmful impacts of 
human activity. Consultative parties 



created a responsive system for con- ' 
trolling the effects of man's presence in : 
Antarctica through the Agreed Meas- 
ures for the Conservation of Antarctica 
Fauna and Flora. The Convention on 
the Conservation of Antarctic Seals, 
which entered into force 2 years ago, 
resulted from other initiatives under- 
taken within the consultative system. 

From the perspective of this meet- 
ing, it is clear to me that the treaty 
parties can look back over the past 20 
years with a sense of accomplishment 
and pride. The Antarctic Treaty has 
served as a model for important inter- 
national initiatives in other areas of the, 
globe. The nuclear free zone and in- 
spection of facilities and activities by 
observers designated by the consulta- 
tive parties are provisions that have 
contributed to the field of arms control. 
The pattern of scientific cooperation 
established under the treaty has served 
as a model for other regional and mul- 
tidisciplinary programs of scientific 
investigation. 

The Antarctic Treaty has proven 
vital and dynamic in a time of rapid 
global change. For these reasons, I be- 
lieve it appropriate that we pay tribute 
to those farsighted scientists and dip- 
lomats who met here 20 years ago and 
whose work and spirit continue to in- 
fuse international cooperation in Ant- 
arctica. We are honored that some of 
these distinguished individuals are with 
us today. 

In commemorating these accom- 
plishments, we must not lose sight of 
the future. We stand at an important 
point in the history of the Antarctic 
Treaty system. New issues and new 
challenges have emerged to engage the 
attention of the consultative parties. In 
large part these new issues stem from 
the potential of new forms of human 
activity in Antarctica, particularly, re- 
source development activities. 

At the ninth consultative meeting in 
London [1977], major attention was 
devoted to the subjects of marine living 
resources and mineral resources. This 
is the proper forum for such consid- 
erations, because satisfactory resolu- 
tion of these issues is key to the con- 
tinued vitality of the Antarctic Treaty 
system. 

Our priority interest is in the de- 
velopment of a regime for Antarctic 
marine living resources. Over the past 
2 years the consultative parties have 
devoted intense effort to the develop- ■ 
ment of a draft convention on the con- 
servation of Antarctic marine living re- 
sources. Indeed, this gathering offers 
the opportunity to reach understandings 
necessary to convene the final diplo- 
matic conference to conclude that con- 
vention. I can think of no more effective 



November 1979 



23 



action to reconfirm our commitment to 
the Antarctic Treaty system and its 
principles and purposes than the con- 
clusion of the Antarctic marine living 
resource convention. 

In the marine living resource negoti- 
ations we have sought to provide the 
basis for wise decisions on resource 
activities before events force ill- 
considered decisions upon us. The 
same objective should be sought in our 
negotiations relating to mineral re- 
sources. The nature of mineral resource 
issues — their complexity and sensitiv- 
ity — will require measured and thor- 
ough examination. However, if we are 
to meet the commitments we have col- 
lectively made to insure the health of 
the Antarctic environment — in the 
ecological and the political sense — it is 
imperative that we achieve continued 
and timely progress toward an agreed 
regime concerning Antarctic mineral 
resources. 

While matters relating to Antarctic 
resources are prominent on our con- 
sultative meeting agenda, we should 
not lose sight of other important mat- 
ters traditionally on the agenda of con- 
sultative meetings. Telecommunica- 
tions, exchange of meteorological data, 
the impact of man's activity on the 
Antarctic environment, tourism, and 
other subjects have continuing impor- 
tance and merit our concerted atten- 
tion. 

The modern world offers many ex- 
amples in which our scientific and 
technological creativity has outpaced 
our political and institutional respon- 
siveness. The international cooperation 
symbolized in the Antarctic Treaty 
stands as a welcome exception. 

We have the chance, I believe, to 
preserve and enrich this example. This 
is a challenge and the opportunity is 
inherent in today's issues regarding the 
Antarctic environment. We have taken 
major steps toward dealing with these 
issues. We must continue to do so 
without shortchanging those areas of 
cooperation in Antarctica traditionally 
dealt with at all consultative meetings. 
If we persevere in the pragmatic and 
imaginative spirit of the authors of the 
treaty, we will have many more occa- 
sions to commemorate our cooperation 
in Antarctica. 



PRESS COMMUNIQUE, 
OCT. 10, 1979' 

The Tenth Antarctic Treaty Consultative 
Meeting completed its work on October 5. At- 
tending were delegations from the thirteen Ant- 
arctic Treaty Consultative Parties (Argentina, 
Australia, Belgium, Chile, France, Japan, New 
Zealand, Norway, Poland, South Africa, the 



U.K., the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.). During the 
three-week meeting held in Washington, D.C., 
there was detailed discussion of a wide range of 
issues relating to Antarctica. 

The Tenth Consultative Meeting marked the 
twentieth anniversary of the Antarctic Treaty 
which was signed in Washington. DC. in 
1959. The Treaty, including the system of Con- 
sultative Meetings it establishes, has been a 
unique example in international cooperation 

One of the most important results of the 
Treaty system is that it has established Antarc- 
tica as a zone of peace. The Treaty provides 
that Antarctica shall be used exclusively for 
peaceful purposes. Military activities, includ- 
ing establishment of military bases and fortifi- 
cations, the carrying out of military maneuvers. 
or the testing of military weapons, are prohib- 
ited in Antarctica. The Antarctic Treaty, 
therefore, represents a landmark development 
in the field of arms control. The Treaty also 
prohibits nuclear explosions or the disposal of 
nuclear waste in Antarctica. 

In addition, the Antarctic Treaty establishes 
a basis for international collaboration in scien- 
tific activities. The record of cooperative sci- 
entific activities and the importance of the re- 
sults in expanding knowledge not only of Ant- 
arctica but of our planet as a whole over the 
past 20 years have more than justified the ef- 
forts of those who designed the Treaty. In the 
political sphere as well, the Antarctic Treaty 
represents a dynamic form of cooperation 
among states with differing legal and political 
perspectives. 

For all of these reasons, the representatives 
participating in the Tenth Consultative Meeting 
believed it both appropriate and important to 
commemorate the success of the first two dec- 
ades in the operation of the Antarctic Treaty 
system, and to rededicate themselves to the 
maintenance of that system and to the continu- 
ing fulfillment of the Treaty's ideals. This re- 
commitment to the Antarctic Treaty system was 
considered particularly relevant at a time when 
new issues relating to resources in Antarctica 
have come to the forefront 

The Consultative Parties start from a com- 
mon position in approaching these difficult and 
complex questions That is the basic impor- 
tance they attach to the principles and purposes 
of the Antarctic Treaty with emphasis upon the 
protection of the Antarctic environment, an 
emphasis of the Consultative Parties since their 
first meeting. 

During the Tenth Consultative Meeting in- 
formal discussion led to important progress to- 
ward fulfillment of the objective, articulated in 
1977, of creating an effective regime for the 
conservation of Antarctic marine living re- 
sources. The Consultative Parties remain com- 
mitted to the prompt establishment of such a 
system. 

The Tenth Consultative Meeting also wit- 
nessed extensive consideration on the subject 
of Antarctic mineral resources. Again the 
shared environmental concern of the Consulta- 
tive Parties formed a major basis of their delib- 
erations. The recommendation adopted on this 



subject represents substantial progress. 

The representatives also recalled that their re- 
sponsibilities for ensuring effective treatment 
of these resource issues are balanced with the 
need to ensure that the interests of all mankind 
in Antarctica are not prejudiced. 

The representatives of the Consultative Par- 
ties also agreed on recommendations dealing 
with operational aspects of their activities in 
Antarctica, including recommendations dealing 
with cooperation in Antarctic telecommunica- 
tions, development of agreed practices and 
guidelines for tourists who may visit there and 
recommendations designed to prevent harmful 
impacts from human activities in the Antarctic 
Treaty area. 

The representatives believed that the nature 
and results of their three weeks of deliberations 
justified continued confidence in the strength 
and responsiveness of the Antarctic Treaty 
system. They reaffirmed their commitment to 
finding imaginative and equitable solutions to 
the evolving issues in Antarctica. To this end, 
they welcomed the invitation extended by the 
Government of Argentina to host the Eleventh 
Consultative Meeting in 1981. D 



' Press release 258. 



24 



Department of State Bulletin 



ARMS COI^TROL: SALT ii— 

A Summation 



by Secretary Vance 

Statement before the Senate Com- 
mittee on Foreign Relations on Oc- 
tober 10. 1979. ' 

I welcome this opportunity — as you 
conclude what has been a thorough and 
intensive set of hearings on the SALT 
II treaty — to offer a brief summation. 
Before turning to your questions, I 
want to address the importance of the 
treaty in the context of four specific 
issues: 

• Whether our national security will 
be better served by the pursuit of both 
defense modernization and arms con- 
trol or by relying on defense programs 
alone; 

• The impact of SALT on our over- 
all position in the world; 

• The risks associated with now 
making changes in the treaty that will 
force renegotiation with the Soviets; 
and 

• Whether approval of the treaty 
should be linked to other issues be- 
tween the United States and the Soviet 
Union. 

We have stressed from the beginning 
that we must simultaneously pursue 
two mutually reinforcing elements of 
national security: the modernization of 
our defenses and the negotiation of 
agreements to limit arms. 

On the military side of the equation, 
we have developed a comprehensive 
and reasoned program to improve our 
defenses in all areas — strategic, theater 
nuclear, and conventional. Over the 
course of these hearings, we have de- 
scribed those programs in detail. Sec- 
retary [of Defense] Brown will discuss 
them further today. Let me just observe 
that we are manifestly not involved in a 
dispute between those who see dangers 
to our security and those who want to 
let down our guard. Clearly, over the 
course of these hearings, we have built 
a broad consensus that our defense 
needs are real and will be met. 

The question is, how will the SALT 
II treaty affect our defenses? Will our 
security be greater with the treaty or 
without it? That is the central question 
before us — not whether the treaty 
solves all our security problems, be- 
cause it doesn't; not whether it will lull 
us into a false sense of security, be- 
cause it cetainly won't; not whether it 



achieves everything we want in the way 
of arms control, because no single 
agreement can. 

I believe these hearings have clearly 
demonstrated that the treaty will en- 
hance our security and that of our 
allies. 

Without the treaty: 

• We would almost certainly be 
faced with several thousand more 
Soviet nuclear warheads and bombs 
than the treaty allows and several 
hundred more systems to deliver those 
weapons; 

• Our ability to monitor Soviet 
strategic forces — and thus assess Soviet 
capabilities — could be impaired, since 
there would be no constraints on delib- 
erate concealment of such forces; 

• Without the boundaries set by the 
treaty through 1985, our ability to pre- 
dict the level and nature of Soviet 
forces into the future would be 
lessened — Our defense planning would 
be more complicated and more costly; 
and 

• We would jeopardize the opportu- 
nity to achieve further limits on nuclear 
forces, and thus a greater measure of 
safety, in the next round of talks. 

These are concrete and important se- 
curity benefits to the United States. We 
should secure these gains now by 
ratifying the treaty, as we move on 
with our defense modernization efforts 
and proceed to SALT III. 

U.S. Capacity for 
Leadership 

Beyond the immediate impact on our 
security, the treaty bears directly on 
America's capacity for leadership — on 
our ability to sustain a sense of com- 
mon purpose with our friends. 

As you know, in conjunction with 
the U.N. General Assembly session in 
New York over the past few weeks, I 
met individually with over 60 foreign 
ministers. Almost without exception, 
they expressed to me their concernwith 
the consequences of defeat or inordi- 
nate delay of the treaty. Our friends 
and allies want this treaty approved. 
They see it as affecting their own se- 
curity as well as ours. 

This is particularly true for NATO. 
As the President said in his television 
address last week: "If our allies lose 
confidence in our ability to negotiate 



successfully for the control of nuclear 
weapons, then our effort to build a 
strong and more united NATO could 
fail." 

It is essential that the alliance move 
forward to improve its conventional 
and theater nuclear forces. The United 
States will do its part; we want the al- 
lies to do theirs. There is no question in 
my mind that failure to place the SALT 
treaty in force in the near future would 
seriously jeopardize the prospect of 
building the necessary consensus on 
these issues within the alliance. 

For the future of the alliance — and 
for our overall international posture — 
SALT II is a benchmark issue. It will 
have a profound impact — for our allies 
see it as directly touching them, and 
nearly all countries sense its effect on 
global stability and peace. 

Question of Changes 
to the Treaty 

Let me briefly turn to the question of 
amendments, reservations, and condi- 
tions. It is indisputable that the Senate 
has the constitutional power to condi- 
tion its advice and consent on changes 
in the treaty regime. But any action 
which requires Soviet acceptance 
necessarily becomes a proposal that the 
negotiations be reopened. 

If negotiations should start again — 
and there is no certainty that they could 
— we would have to expect counter- 
vailing Soviet demands to reopen is- 
sues resolved to our benefit. Seven 
years of delicate negotiations could 
quickly come unraveled, with a spiral 
of demands and counterdemands. 

If the SALT II negotiations are pro- 
longed, the calendar must also be con- 
sidered. SALT I expired just over 2 
years ago. We must contemplate how 
long new systems can be restrained if 
an agreement is not in force. 

We must recognize the reality that 
steps which require renegotiation place 
the entire treaty at risk. And thus I be- 
lieve we must ask ourselves, first, 
whether on balance the treaty as nego- 
tiated serves our interests and, second, 
whether any particular amendment 
warrants risking what we have gained 
in SALT II. 

Linkage to Other 
Soviet Activities 

Finally, let me turn to the question 
of whether support for SALT should be 
made dependent upon Soviet conduct in 
other realms. 

In July, I argued strongly against 
such linkage. Developments since then 
have not changed the logic of that ar- 



November 1979 



25 



ifffX Missile 
System 



PRESIDENT CARTER'S 

REMARKS, 

SEPT. 7, 1979' 

I have a statement to make about the 
new strategic deterrence system which 
I consider to be quite significant. Some 
analysts would equate it with two other 
major decisions made by Presidents in 
this century: the first, to establish the 
Strategic Air Command itself under 
President Truman and the subsequent 
decision by President Kennedy to es- 
tablish the silo-based Minuteman mis- 
sile system. 

For nearly 30 years now our nation 
has deterred attack and has kept the 
peace through a complementary system 
of land, sea, and airborne nuclear 
forces, commonly known as the strate- 
gic triad. By maintaining the special 
strengths and the advantages offered by 
each of the three separate forces, we 
make it impossible for any enemy to 



counter all of them. 

My Administration is now embarked 
on a program to modernize and to im- 
prove the ability of our entire strategic 
triad, all three systems, to survive any 
attack. Our bomber force is being 
strengthened with nuclear-tipped cruise 
missiles. Our strategic submarine force 
is being upgraded by Trident subma- 
rines and Trident missiles. However, as 
a result of increasing accuracy of stra- 
tegic systems, fixed land-based inter- 
continental ballistic missiles, or 
ICBM's, located in silos such as our 
Minuteman, are becoming vulnerable 
to attack. A mobile ICBM system will 
greatly reduce this vulnerability. 
Therefore, I decided earlier this year to 
proceed with full-scale development 
and deployment of a new, large, mo- 
bile ICBM, known as the MX. I made 
this decision to assure our country a se- 
cure strategic deterrent now and in the 
future. 



gument. We signed this treaty because 
it contributes to our national security 
and serves our national interests. It is 
on that basis that it should be judged. 
We should not give up the benefits of 
this treaty because of our differences 
with the Soviets on other matters. 

Indeed, it is precisely because our 
interests and those of the Soviet Union 
differ in many areas that the need to 
bring the most dangerous aspects of our 
relationship — the competition in strate- 
gic arms — is so compelling. 

Let me say a word about the situa- 
tion in Cuba. As the President said, we 
consider the assurances that we have re- 
ceived from the Soviet Union to be sig- 
nificant. But we do not intend to rest 
on these statements alone. 

We are moving ahead swiftly to im- 
plement the steps announced by the 
President. These steps are appropriate. 
They are proportionate to the problem. 
They make unmistakably clear that we 
will assure that no Soviet unit in Cuba 
can be used as a combat force to 
threaten the security of the United 
States or any other nation in the hemi- 
sphere . 

We must not let this issue obscure 
the vital stake that we — and our allies 
' and friends — have in the treaty that is 
before you. Our concern about a stable 
! East- West balance — military and polit- 
ical — should compel us to place the 
treaty, not in limbo but in force. 



Consensus on National Security 

Over the course of these hearings, I 
believe we have begun to rebuild a na- 
tional consensus on the overall direc- 
tion of this nation's security policies. 
We have not had such a consensus in 
this country for a number of years, and 
we have suffered as a result. That 
emerging consensus rests on two 
pillars — each of which is necessary. 

• First, that we are now prepared as 
a nation to move ahead with a com- 
prehensive and reasoned modernization 
of our military defense and 

• Second, that we must continue the 
process of bringing nuclear weapons 
under more sensible control. 

If we knock out one or the other of 
those pillars, I believe we face a future 
of fractious debate. But if we now 
firmly establish our commitment to 
both, we can move ahead as a nation 
united. Thus, whether your principal 
concern is the future of our defense 
posture, or of arms control, of Ameri- 
ca's capacity for effective leadership in 
the alliance and in the world, the SALT 
II treaty serves that end and deserves 
your support. D 



'Press release 257. The complete transcript 
of the hearings will be published by the com- 
mittee and will be available from the Superin- 
tendent of Documents, U.S. Government 
Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. 



The MX will enable us to continue 
with a modernized, unsurpassed, sur- 
vivable strategic deterrent ICBM, sub- 
marine-launched, and heavy bomber 
triad — ICBM's, submarine-launched 
ballistic missiles, and the heavy 
bomber triad, armed with cruise mis- 
siles. Clearly, the way we base the MX 
to enhance its own security from attack 
is vital to the ability it has to defend 
our country. 

At the time that I made the decision 
to build the MX, I established five es- 
sential criteria which the basing system 
would have to meet. 

• First, it must contribute to the 
ability of the strategic forces to survive 
an attack. 

• Second, it must be verifiable so as 
to set a standard which can serve as a 
precedent for the verifiability of mobile 
ICBM systems on both sides. 

• Third, it must minimize the ad- 
verse impact on our own environment. 

• Fourth, its deployment must be at 
a reasonable cost to the American tax- 
payer. 

• Fifth, it must be consistent with 
existing SALT agreements and with our 
SALT III goal of negotiating for sig- 
nificant mutual reductions in strategic 
forces. 

In light of these criteria and after full 
consultation with Secretary of Defense 
Harold Brown and my other principal 
advisers, I've decided upon the fol- 
lowing configuration for basing the 
MX missile system. The MX will be 
based in a sheltered, road-mobile sys- 
tem to be constructed in our western 
deserts, the total exclusive area of 
which will not exceed 25 square miles. 

This system will consist of 200 mis- 
sile transporters or launchers, each 
capable of rapid movement on a special 
roadway connecting approximately 23 
horizontal shelters. 

Let me point out how this meets the 
criteria that I've established. 

First, it increases the survivability 
of our missiles by multiplying the 
number of targets which would have to 
be attacked, because not knowing in 
which of the 23 shelters the missile was 
located, all 23 shelters would have to 
be targeted in order to be sure to attack 
the missile. 

The capacity of the missiles to move 
rapidly insures that no attacker will be 
able to find out ahead of time where the 
missiles might be located and attack 
just those locations only. In fact, the 
missiles would be able to change shel- 
ters during the flight time of an enemy 
ICBM. Moreover, the system is flexi- 
ble enough so that we can adjust the 



26 



Department of State Bulletin 



scale of deployment either up or down 
in response to a future enemy threat or 
to progress on future SALT negotia- 
tions. 

Secondly, the system is adequately 
verifiable. The special roadways will 
be confined to designated areas, and 
the associated missile transporters will 
be incapable of moving other than on 
those designated roadways. 

The shelters will be designed so they 
may be opened in order to demonstrate 
that no extra missiles are hidden within 
them. These and other features will 
make this system adequately verifiable. 

Third, the system minimizes the im- 
pact on the environment. The shelters 
are flush with the ground. The public 
will retain access to the area. Only the 
shelters themselves will be fenced off. 
The entire system, as I said earlier, 
will take only about 25 square miles of 
land out of public use. 

Fourth, the system is affordable. 
The projected cost over the full 10-year 
period, total cost, to develop, to pro- 
duce, and to deploy is $33 billion in 
1980 dollars. While this acquisition 
cost may vary somewhat as the pro- 
gram proceeds, it's important to recog- 
nize that the cost of this system, in 
constant dollar terms, will be no 
greater than the cost of any one of the 
original three legs of our strategic 
triad, either the B-52 force or the 
Polaris-Poseidon force or the Min- 
uteman ICBM system. 

Finally, this system is compatible with 
existing SALT agreements and with our 
objectives for SALT III. Deploying this 
system will make it clear to the Soviet 
Union that they will gain no strategic 
advantage out of continuing the nuclear 
arms race. This is a fundamental pre- 
condition to more effective arms con- 
trol agreements. Equally important, 
this system points in the direction of re- 
ductions of strategic arms because we 
are giving better protection with a force 
of fewer missiles. Without such a 
mobile shelter system, the only way we 
could maintain our deterrent would be 
to increase greatly the number of our 
strategic systems or nuclear missiles. 

In the course of making the series of 
decisions that led to this announce- 
ment, I carefully studied the potential 
threat to our Minuteman force. That 
threat is real. The system I've outlined 
this morning does the best job of 
meeting that threat, while also fulfill- 
ing the conditions that I specified at the 
outset. The system is survivable, it's 
verifiable, it has a minimum impact on 
the environment, it's affordable in 
cost, and it's consistent with our SALT 



CA]\ADA: Transhoundary Air 
QuaUty Talks 



On July 26. 1979. the United States 
and Canada released the following joint 
statement in Ottawa. ' 

Transboundary air quality has be- 
come a matter of increasing concern to 
people in both the United States and 
Canada. This issue has many dimen- 
sions, including the long range trans- 
port of air pollutants and the phenome- 
non of "acid rain". Both Governments 
have recognized the need for close and 
continuing cooperation to protect and 
enhance transboundary air quality. 

Discussions on transboundary air 
quality were initiated through an Ex- 
change of Notes of November 16 and 
17, 1978, in which the United States 
Department of State proposed that 
"representatives of the two Govern- 
ments meet at an early date to discuss 
informally (a) the negotiation of a co- 
operative agreement on preserving and 
enhancing air quality, and (b) other 
steps which might be taken to reduce or 
eliminate the undesirable impacts on 
the two countries resulting from air 
pollution." 

In reply, the Canadian Government 
indicated that it shared United States 
concern about the growing problem of 
transboundary air pollution. In par- 
ticular, it noted the potential environ- 
mental impact, and the transboundary 
significance, of the long range trans- 
port of air pollutants. It therefore 
welcomed the opening of "informal dis- 
cussions . . . with a view to develop- 
ing agreement on principles which rec- 
ognize our shared responsibility not to 
cause transboundary environmental 
damage, and which might lead to co- 



operative measures to reduce or elimi- 
nate environmental damage caused by 
transboundary air pollution." 

Bilateral discussions of an informal 
nature took place on December 15, 
1978, and June 20, 1979, and both 
Governments have exchanged discus- 
sion papers on principles which they 
believe have relevance to transbound- 
ary air pollution. As a result of these 
discussions it has become clear that 
Canada and the United States share a 
growing concern about the actual and 
potential effects of transboundary air 
pollution and are prepared to initiate 
cooperative efforts to address trans- 
boundary air pollution problems. 

There is already a substantial basis 
of obligation, commitment and cooper- 
ative practice in existing environmental 
relations between Canada and the 
United States on which to address 
problems in this area. Both Govern- 
ments are mutually obligated through 
the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909 to( 
ensure that "... boundary waters and 
waters flowing across the boundary 
shall not be polluted on either side to 
the injury of health or property. . . ." 
(Article IV) 

Both Governments have also sup- 
ported Principle 21 of the 1972 Stock- 
holm Declaration on the Human Envi- 
ronment, which proclaims that "... 
States have, in accordance with the) 
Charter of the United Nations and thei 
principles of international law, thei 
sovereign right to exploit their own re 
sources pursuant to their own environ 
mental policies and the responsibility! 
to ensure that activities within their 
jurisdiction or control do not cause 



goal of deep reductions in strategic 
arms. 

In sum, this system will enhance our 
nation's security, both by strengthening 
our strategic deterrent and by offering 
the prospect of more effective arms 
control. This system is not a bargaining 
chip. It's a system that America needs 
and will have for its security. I'm con- 
fident that the American people will 
support its deployment. 

Unhappily, we do not yet live in the 
kind of world that permits us to devote 
all our resources to the works of peace. 
And as President, I have no higher duty 
than to insure that the security of the 
United States will be protected beyond 
doubt. As long as the threat of war per- 



sists, we will do what we must to deter 
that threat to our nation's security. If 
SALT II is ratified and SALT III is 
successful, then the time may come 
when no President will have to make 
this kind of decision again and the MX 
system will be the last weapon system 
of such enormous destructive power 
that we will ever have to build. I fer- 
vently pray for that time, but until it 
comes, we will build what we must, 
even as we continue to work for mutual 
restraint in strategic armaments. D 



'Remarks to reporters at the Old Executive ^ 
Office Building; text from Weekly Compilation ; 
of Presidential Documents of Sept. 10, 1979. ' 



November 1979 



27 



damage to the environment of other 
States or of areas beyond the limits of 
national jurisdiction. . . ." 

A number of cooperative steps have 
been taken to deal with transboundary 
air pollution. In the 1978 Great Lakes 
Water Quality Agreement, both Gov- 
ernments committed themselves to de- 
velop and implement "programs to 
identify pollutant sources and relative 
source contributions . . . for those sub- 
stances which may have significant ad- 
verse effects on environmental quality 
including indirect effects of impairment 
of tributary water quality through at- 
mospheric deposition in drainage ba- 
sins. In cases where significant contri- 
butions to Great Lakes pollution from 
atmospheric sources are identified, the 
Parties agree to consult on remedial 
measures." 

Both Governments have sought to 
implement the principles of notification 
and consultation on activities and proj- 
ects with potential transboundary im- 
pact, and to promote exchanges of sci- 
entific and technical information. In 
1978 the two Governments established 
a Bilateral Research Consultation 
Group on the Long Range Transport of 
Air Pollutants to coordinate research 
efforts in both countries. Both Gov- 
ernments have also engaged the Inter- 
national Joint Commission in some as- 
pects of transboundary air pollution. 
This has been done through References 
under the Boundary Waters Treaty es- 
tablishing the Michigan/Ontario Air 
Pollution Board and the International 
Air Pollution Advisory Board, and 
through the Great Lakes Water Quality 
Agreement of 1978. 

Having regard to these and other rel- 
evant principles and practices recog- 
nized by them, both Canada and the 
United States share a common determi- 
nation to reduce or prevent transbound- 
ary air pollution which injures health 
and property on the other side of the 
boundary. Recognizing the importance 
and urgency of the problem, and be- 
lieving that a basis exists for the de- 
velopment of a cooperative bilateral 
agreement on air quality, the Govern- 
ment of the United States and the Gov- 
ernment of Canada therefore intend to 
move their discussions beyond the in- 
formal stage to develop such an agree- 
ment. Both sides agree that the fol- 
lowing further principles and practices 
should be addressed in the development 
of a bilateral agreement on transbound- 
ary air quality: 

1 . Prevention and reduction of trans- 
boundary air pollution which results in 
deleterious effects of such a nature as 
to endanger human health, harm living 
resources and ecosystems and impair or 



ElWIROI^MEl^fT: 

Crisis 



The Quid 



by Anthony Lake 

Based on an address before the 
Council on Religion and International 
Affairs in New York City on April 25, 
1979. Mr. Lake is Director of the 
Policy Planning Staff. 

Each day, the press of events abroad, 
reflected in newspaper headlines here 
at home, focuses the attention of public 
officials and private citizens alike on 
the crises of the moment — the Middle 
East, Iran, Southeast Asia, southern 
Africa. 

Each of these problems deserves, 
and commands, our immediate atten- 
tion. But today I want to talk with you 
about another crisis — a quiet crisis — 
one that usually escapes daily notice 
but nonetheless will profoundly affect 
the kind of lives we will lead, indeed 
the prospect of life itself, in the dec- 
ades ahead. 

I am referring to the relationship 
between mankind and the planet we in- 
habit: whether we can strike a decent 
balance between the burgeoning de- 
mands of more people for a better life 
and the immutable reality of limited re- 
sources; whether we can manage suc- 
cessfully a steady and more equitable 
rise in standards of living without de- 
stroying our planet — and ourselves — in 
the process. 

A bomb set off by a terrorist in Lon- 
don or Israel makes a shattering noise 
heard around the world. But a precious 
rain forest lost over time in Central 
America, or a slight but ominous rise 
in the temperature of the Earth from the 



introduction of carbon dioxide in the 
atmosphere, or 25,000 more mouths to 
feed in the world each day, these 
gathering signals of tomorrow's crisis 
can go unnoticed. 

In part, that is why this is an ex- 
traordinarily difficult set of issues. 
They are diffuse, deceptively incre- 
mental. They are also technically com- 
plex, sometimes socially sensitive, and 
often politically painful. 

I will not attempt, today, to cover all 
of the aspects of this quiet crisis. But I 
would like to share with you some gen- 
eral thoughts on the kinds of challenges 
and choices we face. Nor will I pretend 
to hold out solutions that are being 
found or even designed. But I will try 
to indicate some of the actions we are 
now taking in key areas. 

Let me begin with a few stark statis- 
tics. Numbers are a shorthand for real- 
ity. We can sometimes give short 
shrift, therefore, to their implications. 
But each of these indicators of what is 
happening now predict, imprecisely but 
certainly, future difficulties for us all. 

• Each year a way must be found to 
feed 70 million more people. Already, 
one out of every five human beings is 
sick or weak from malnutrition. 

• The rate of increase in grain yields 
has slowed. 

• In the last decade, nearly a million 
acres of agricultural land were taken 
for urban use. Additional farmland is 
turning into desert — 250,000 acres a 
year in northern Africa alone. 

• Nearly two-thirds of the ecologi- 
cally vital tropical rain forests in Cen- 



interfere with amenities and other 
legitimate uses of the environment. 

2. Control strategies aimed at pre- 
venting and reducing transboundary air 
pollution including the limitation of 
emissions by the use of control tech- 
nologies for new, substantially mod- 
ified and, as appropriate, existing 
facilities. 

3. Expanded notification and con- 
sultation on matters involving a risk or 
potential risk of transboundary air pol- 
lution. 

4. Expanded exchanges of scientific 
information and increased cooperation 
in research and development concern- 
ing transboundary air pollution proc- 
esses, effects and emission control 
technologies. 



5. Expanded monitoring and evalua- 
tion efforts aimed at understanding of 
the full scope of the transboundary air 
pollution phenomenon. 

6. Cooperative assessment of long- 
term environmental trends and of the 
implications of these trends for trans- 
boundary air pollution problems. 

7. Consideration of such matters as 
institutional arrangements, equal ac- 
cess, non-discrimination and liability 
and compensation, as relevant to an 
agreement. 

8. Consideration of measures to im- 
plement an agreement. D 



' Press release 117. 



28 



Department of State Bulletin/ 



tral America have been destroyed. 
Worldwide tropical rain forests are dis- 
appearing at the rate of more than 50 
acres a minute. 

• While increased amounts of toxic 
substances are introduced into the 
world's water (as well as into our food 
chains), human demand for clean water 
is expected to grow three times by the 
early 21st century. 

• A million tons of oil a year enter 
the oceans from tankers, freighters, 
and offshore drilling. Several million 
more tons of oil and its products find 
their way into the oceans from the 
land. 

• There are now more than a dozen 
nations that could develop a nuclear 
weapon within a few years of a deci- 
sion to do so. 

I could, of course, spend the remain- 
der of our time together ringing such 
statistical alarms. 

But the implication of even these few 
is obvious. If our children are to lead 
decent lives and have the hope of a 
friendly Earth for their children, people 
around the globe must work together 
not only to live in harmony with each 
other but with their environment. 

The political, social, and cultural 
barriers to this kind of cooperation are 
evident and huge. Less evident, I be- 
lieve, is an intellectual hurdle to be 
crossed. It is the tendency toward 
"either/or." 

Most of the problems 1 have cited are 
the consequences of growth. The sci- 
entific and technological advances 
which propel this economic growth 
bring with them new risks and prob- 
lems. Progress can seem perverse. 

The natural reaction of many of us 
can sometimes be a kind of Luddite 
rejection of growth itself. This re- 
sponse may seem sensible to those 
whose own economic welfare is as- 
sured by the benefits they have gained 
from previous economic progress. But 
for the vast numbers of the poor the 
idea of denying or severely limiting 
future growth — for the sake of 
humanity — is a cruel concept. Nor, in- 
deed, could growth and scientific ad- 
vance be limited, even if we wished it. 

What is needed, in our academic 
community, our government, and our 
political processes, is a better synthesis 
of the imperatives of progress and of 
conservation, a discipline of environ- 
mental economics. Certainly, such 
thinkers and planners now exist. We 
need more of them. And all of us who 
are neither economists nor environ- 
mentalists need to think more about 
how our national and global societies 
can shape progress in safe ways rather 
than concentrating solely either on con- 



servation of the environement or on 
material growth. 

Let me illustrate this point by 
discussing two sets of interconnected 
global issues and some of the dilemmas 
they create: first, energy development, 
associated environmental risks, and 
nuclear proliferation; and second, the 
balance among population growth, 
food, and natural resources. 



The Search for Safe Energy 

I need not belabor the critical im- 
portance of addressing, firmly and ur- 
gently, the prospect of growing energy 
shortages. The consequences can be 
severe; inflation and economic disloca- 
tion here and abroad, damage to the 
development of poorer nations, and in- 
creased tensions in the international 
system. 

It is of fundamental importance, 
then, that we increase our own produc- 
tion of energy, including petroleum, 
and significantly reduce our costly re- 
liance on foreign oil. One part of the 
President's energy program is designed 
to do this. 

Inevitably, here and abroad, in- 
creased emphasis on nonpetroleum 
energy resources will mean more re- 
liance on coal (a priority in our own 
plans) and on nuclear energy (which is 
particularly attractive to a number of 
foreign nations). Each raises obvious 
concerns, however. 

The most realistic short-term alter- 
native to our current dependence on oil 
is to increase our coal production. We 
intend to achieve a two-third increase 
in this production by 1985. But there 
are possible longer term penalties 
which we all must also recognize. 

Burning coal and other hydrocar- 
bons, for example, produces carbon 
dioxide. Increased levels of CO2 in the 
atmosphere could produce a "green 
house effect" in which the global cli- 
mate is gradually warmed with unpre- 
dictable effects on climate patterns and 
food production. In fact, a strong body 
of scientific opinion believes the 
Earth's atmosphere is already getting 
warmer. In the past 100 years, CO2 in 
the atmosphere has increased by 12%; 
in the next 50 years it could increase by 
100%. 

In addition, the burning of hydrocar- 
bons, particularly coal, releases sulfur 
dioxide into the atmosphere. The sulfur 
dioxide is in turn washed out of the at- 
mosphere by rain and snow which be- 
comes acidic in the process. This so- 
called acid rain is already an important 
environmental issue in Europe and in 
the eastern U.S. -Canadian border 
areas. Noticeable effects have been de- 



creases in fish populations and a re 
duction of the productivity of forests' 
and agricultural lands. 

We are working on technologies 
which might decrease the CO2 prob- 
lem, and various scrubbing systems 
exist to remove much of the sulfur 
dioxide from hydrocarbon burning. But 
these technologies are expensive, and 
some will take time to develop. 

Nuclear power is much cleaner for 
our atmosphere, and it does not add to 
carbon dioxide buildup. But the poten- 
tial for nuclear accidents, we now 
know, is real. Furthermore, aspects of 
the nuclear fuel cycle raise the specter 
of nuclear-weapons proliferation. And 
we have not yet demonstrated that we 
have a fully acceptable means for the 
disposal of radioactive waste. 

Yet, while we seek to slow the pace 
of new nuclear technologies such as the 
fast-breeder reactor, nuclear energy is 
already a key part of our own energy 
network; up to 13% of our electrical 
power comes from nuclear plants. And 
its continuing development is clearly 
irreversible abroad. 

Energy Conservation. Thus, we 
come back to my central question; How 
do we strike the right balance between 
needed increases in energy production 
and concern for our environment? 

The first and most important answer 
to our dilemma is, of course, energy 
conservation, to slow the growth in 
energy demand. Our energy program 
places great stress on this. As a short - 
run measure, we have agreed with the 
other 19 industrialized members of the 
International Energy Agency (lEA) to 
reduce collective demand on world oil 
markets by 2 million barrels per day. 
For the United States this will mean a. 
cut in demand for oil imports of up to 1 
million barrels a day by the end of 
1979. 

On April 5, President Carter set forth 
specific measures which would meet 
the lEA commitment, as well as ad- 
dress the longer term energy problems 
of the United States. These measures 
focus on reducing consumption of oil 
and gasoline, switching to fuels which 
are more abundant in the United States, 
decontrolling crude oil prices, and pro- 
viding incentives for conservation and 
improving efficiency in energy use. 

Progress can be made. The mileage 
of the U.S. new car fleet has improved 
by 5 miles per gallon since 1974. 
Through careful conservation and 
greater efficiency, we can reduce the 
amount of energy needed to fuel our 
economic growth. In the past, each 1% 
growth in U.S. gross national product n 
has generated an equivalent 1% growth |l 



November 1979 



29 



in our demand for energy. From 1973 
to 1978, this proportional increase in 
energy growth fell to about one half of 
1% for each 1% of growth. By con- 
tinuing to improve the efficiency of 
energy use, we hope to keep at least 
below 0.8% through 1985, while main- 
taining a growing economy. 

International Cooperation. A sec- 
ond response is to help focus greater 
international attention on what are truly 
international problems. Action by the 
United States alone will not resolve our 
dilemmas. For example, even if we 
were to reduce by half the amount of 
CO2 the United States puts in the at- 
mosphere, the best models available 
indicate that such unilateral action 
would extend by only 5 years the time 
it would take for atmospheric CO2 
levels to double. Thus, if real im- 
provement is to take place to address 
environmental problems created by 
energy production, it will require the 
cooperation of other industrialized 
countries and, very importantly, the 
developing world. 

With strong congressional support, 
the Agency for International Develop- 
ment (AID) is rapidly expanding its 
programs to assist developing countries 
cope with their energy and environ- 
mental problems. Such assistance 
ranges from energy assessments of na- 
tional policies to demonstration proj- 
ects of specific technologies, from im- 
proved management of forests used for 
firewood to application of satellite 
photography for understanding the 
overall environmental impact of de- 
velopment programs. And at the cur- 
rent meeting of the U.N. Environment 
Program Governing Council, we are 
suggesting that consideration be given 
to new mechanisms for dealing with the 
international impact of major national 
projects that could degrade the envi- 
ronment. 

We must also devise international 
means for dealing with the question of 
nuclear power and the proliferation of 
nuclear weapons. Over a dozen coun- 
tries now produce and export nuclear 
technology. Many nations with little 
domestic energy capacity are almost 
completely dependent on the OPEC 
[Organization of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries] countries for their energy 
resources. This creates an increased 
demand for nuclear technology, with 
its potential nonproliferation problems. 

To help deal with the proliferation 
risks in nuclear energy development, 
we have organized the International 
Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation to 
search for ways — both technical and 
institutional — to enable nations to pur- 



Worid Forests 



PRESIDENT CARTER'S 
MEMORANDUM TO 
SECRETARY VANCE, 
AUG. 2, 1979' 

In my Environmental Message of August 2. 
1979, I expressed concern about the rapid dis- 
appearance of the earth's forests, especially in 
the tropics and subtropics. I believe there is 
much that the United States can do in coopera- 
tion with other nations to contribute to en- 
vironmentally sound care and management of 
the earth's forests and to the well-being of 
people affected by them. 

I am directing you to give high priority to the 
following matters in your budget and program 
planning: 

• improved monitoring of world forest 
trends, particularly tropical forests, including 
use of satellite observations; 

• research on necessary preservation of nat- 
ural forest ecosystems and their rich complex 
of plant and animal life; 

• research on multiple uses of highly diverse 
tropical forests, including management of nat- 
ural stands, development of ecologically sound 
forest plantations, and combined agriculture 
and forestry; 

• studies on increasing yields in family-scale 
tropical agriculture, to relieve pressures on 
forest lands that are not suitable for cultivation; 

• demonstration of integrated projects for 
reforestation, more efficient fuel-wood use, 
and alternative energy sources; 

• examination of how U.S. citizens and 
U.S. -based corporations may be encouraged to 
support sound forest management practices. 



1 am asking you to ensure that the inter- 
agency task force on tropical forests, chaired 
by the Department of State, submit to me by 
November 1979 its report and recommenda- 
tions on U.S. goals, strategies, and programs to 
help protect and conserve world forests. 

1 am asking you to work with the Department 
of Agriculture, the Council on Environmental 
Quality and other relevant federal agencies, 
and with other nations and international organi- 
zations, to give full support and assistance to 
the international program of activities for con- 
.servation and wise utilization of tropical forests 
to be developed under the sponsorship of the 
United Nations Environment Programme. 

I am also asking you to encourage and sup- 
port high-level international conferences on 
forest problems in regions where forest losses 
are severe, to raise awareness and understand- 
ing both of the complex problems and possible 
solutions. 

Finally, 1 am asking you and the Chairman of 
the Council on Environmental Quality to report 
to me within six months on the best ways to 
designate "ecological and natural resources of 
global importance " under Executive Order 
12114, so that proposals for major federal ac- 
tions significantly affecting these resources 
will be reviewed before a decision is made. 

Please give these assignments your im- 
mediate attention. 

Jimmy Carter D 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of Presiden- 
tial Documents of Aug. 6, 1979 



sue peaceful nuclear energy without 
bringing closer the specter of nuclear- 
weapons proliferation. In addition, the 
Nonproliferation Act of 1978 places 
very strict conditions on nuclear coop- 
eration with other nations. 

Developing Renewable Energy 
Sources. A third — and ultimately the 
most promising — response to the 
energy/environment dilemma is the 
longer term development of the renew- 
able energy sources that can provide us 
with greater energy security and in 
greater safety. 

We are increasing our financial 
commitment to research on renewable 
energy sources. In addition to private 
financing, the Department of Energy 
has budgeted over $600 million this 
year to study, develop, and demon- 
strate renewable energy technology. 
We have asked Congress for more than 



$700 million for these efforts next 
year. 

President Carter and other heads of 
state at the Bonn economic summit last 
July pledged to increase assistance to 
developing countries for harnessing the 
vast energy potential of the sun, the 
wind, the oceans, and other renewable 
resources. These efforts will be re- 
viewed and, we hope, intensified at the 
Tokyo summit in June. 

AID has requested $42 million in FY 
1980 for the actual application of re- 
newable energy technologies in de- 
veloping countries. The energy security 
fund, proposed by the President to be 
funded by the windfall profits tax 
would, in part, finance a further com- 
mitment to the development of alterna- 
tive energy sources and technologies. 

We have proposed a new Institute for 
Scientific and Technological Coopera- 
tion, which would become an important 



30 



Department of State Bulletin , 



element of our foreign assistance pro- 
gram with new energy development as 
a major focus of its work. 

With strong U.S. backing, the 
United Nations will hold a World 
Conference on New and Renewable 
Sources of Energy in 1981. We intend 
to play an active role in that effort. In 
this connection we will also work with 
other nations to determine whether it 
would be useful to support regional 
energy research institutes. These would 
focus particularly on LDC [less de- 
veloped country] energy needs, with 
emphasis on appropriate renewable and 
nonconventional energy sources. And 
we are asking the World Bank to 
undertake a thorough review of how 
best to assure adequate financing for 
developing countries to acquire renew- 
able energy technologies. 

Population and 
Natural Resources 

At the root of the inexorable pres- 
sures on our natural resources lies 
perhaps the single most important 
phenomenon in the world today — the 
population explosion. Its importance 
lies not only in the fact of more and 
more mouths to feed and other human 
needs to be satisfied. It also derives 
from the demographic shape of the 
population changes taking place. 

• By the year 2000, the world's 
population will have increased by about 
50% from 1975 levels — an increase in 
the final quarter of this century equal to 
the entire growth of world population 
from the birth of Christ to the year 
1950. 

• While the rate of increase is de- 
clining in some poorer countries, the 
birth rate there will still be twice as 
high as in industrialized countries. By 
the year 2000, these countries will have 
78% of the world's population. 

• Also by the year 2000 roughly 
17% of the population in industrial 
countries will be over 60 years of age 
(vs. only 7% in the LDC's); in the 
LDC's, 44% of the people will be 
under 19. 

These trends have a number of im- 
portant implications. 

• As time goes on, the industrial 
countries will have an increasingly 
older population profile, with a heavy 
burden of support for the very old. 

• The younger population in the de- 
veloping world will require greatly in- 
creased social services and job oppor- 
tunities, which when combined with 
migration to urban areas, could create 
tremendous social, economic, and 
political stresses. 



• An expanding population is both a 
drag on per capita growth and a stead- 
ily increasing burden on the environ- 
ment. It is a truly vicious circle. With 
expanding numbers of people, we see 
greater deforestation, soil erosion, and 
desertification. These developments 
further erode the ability of the rural 
poor to survive. 

But in the short run, what choice 
does the poor farmer have who needs to 
use what little land he has to grow his 
crops, or whatever firewood he can 
find, to cook today's meal? And with- 
out the hope of a better economic fu- 
ture, what incentive is there for parents 
to limit the number of their children, 
when children are often seen as a hedge 
against an uncertain future? 

As with the dilemmas we face on 
energy, the simple but extraordinarily 
difficult answer is that we have to work 
on a number of fronts at once. Let me 
mention just two of these fronts: limit- 
ing population growth and increasing 
food production. 

Limiting Population Growth. First, 
we must, and will, continue to inten- 
sify our efforts to assist nations in 
dealing with excessive population 
growth. Indeed, in many developing 
countries, there has been a rapidly in- 
creasing level of interest in imple- 
menting family planning programs. 
This year we are providing, under the 
foreign assistance programs of AID, 
some $185 million for such programs, 
focused on helping developing coun- 
tries strengthen and extend the delivery 
of family planning information and 
services. Currently, 26 countries are 
being assisted directly by AID, while 
numerous other countries are receiving 
assistance through private, nongov- 
ernmental organizations which AID 
supports. In addition, the population 
programs of multilateral organizations 
of the United Nations and the World 
Bank are playing a role of growing im- 
portance in the worldwide population 
assistance effort. 

Increasing Food Production. Sec- 
ond, we must focus increasing attention 
on the need to increase the local food 
production capabilities of the develop- 
ing nations. Adequate food is not just 
the basic requirement for survival. 
Proper nutrition, like adequate health 
care, is also needed to sustain the pro- 
ductivity which can lead to a better 
quality of life. Food and nutrition pro- 
grams are thus more than a humanitar- 
ian concern. 

Yet, despite some recent years of 
good harvests, the prospects are that 
we will have greater food deficits in 



developing countries in the future. ' 
World food stocks have declined com- 
pared to the 1960's or very early 
1970's. We are now more vulnerable to 
serious crop failures in the rich food 
growing lands of North America and 
elsewhere. 

We already devote roughly half of 
our bilateral economic development 
assistance — approximately $600 mil- 
lion this year — to agriculture and rural 
development. The $1.4 billion in con- 
cessionary food assistance we will pro- 
vide this year will represent about 
two-thirds of such assistance provided 
by all countries. We have contributed 
$200 million to the International Fund 
for Agricultural Development. And we 
provide over $25 million a year to 
help support the international agricul- 
tural research centers which make 
major contributions to increasing ag- 
ricultural productivity in the develop- 
ing world. 

This summer we expect a report 
from the President's Commission on 
World Hunger, which was launched 
last fall, to suggest further measures 
that might be taken to alleviate world 
hunger. In the meantime, we have 
identified certain areas in which we 
will increase our efforts. They were 
enumerated by Secretary Vance in a re- 
cent speech outlining our approach to 
development issues of the 1980's. 

• We will seek to further food secu- 
rity by doubling our minimum com- 
mitment to food aid in the Food Aid 
Convention and proposing domestic 
legislation for an emergency food re- 
serve to be used to meet such a com- 
mitment. 

• We will support research and de- 
velopment programs geared to in- 
creasing the production of crops tradi- 
tionally grown by poor farmers on 
marginal lands, as well as nontradi- 
tional crops which hold out potential 
for new sources of food and income. 

• We will be seeking ways to cut 
jxjstharvest food losses, which now rob 
the LDC's of some 20% of their food 
production. 

• And, most important of all, we 
will encourage greater world attention 
to the domestic policies developing 
countries take to encourage food pro- 
duction. We will do so through our ac- 
tive participation in the World Confer- 
ence on Agrarian Reform and Rural 
Development and by concentrating our 
food and development assistance on 
countries which pursue such policies. 

Conclusion 

There is, I believe, reason both for 
hope and for deep concern as we look 



November 1979 



31 



at the question of whether mankind can 
learn to live in harmony with our en- 
vironment. 

We have reason for hope when we 
recognize how much our attitudes have 
changed just in the past decade. While 
there have always been lonely voices of 
warning, it has only been in the last 
few years that our collective con- 
sciousness has been awakened to the 
reality of a limited planet and to the 
real costs of wasteful consumption. 
This has been true for the public, as we 
saw in Earth Day some 10 years ago. It 
is true for the Congress, which has 
given far more attention to the envi- 
ronment in the past decade than ever 
before. And it is true for the executive 
branch. In the State Department, for 
example, we now have a bureau which 
has as one of its primary duties work 
on the international environment. This 
is a recognition of the fact that the en- 
vironment is now not one of those 
"other," peripheral issues, but a cen- 
tral concern as we think about the fu- 
ture security of our nation. 

But if this rise in consciousness 
gives some cause to be hopeful, it 
gives no cause to be sanguine. For if 
we are doing more, we are by no means 
doing enough. If we are more aware, 
then we move into the future with our 
eyes open. We cannot claim ignorance 
if we fail to address a gathering global 
crisis. 

The basic question, therefore, is 
whether the United States — itself and 
working with others — can undertake 
the kind of sustained, long-term efforts 
it will require: whether a democracy 
like ours — and a pluralistic interna- 
tional system — can decide now, freely, 
to make the short-term sacrifices 
necessary to secure our future interests, 
whether we can act today to deal with 
tomorrow. 

I have suggested some of the ways in 
which our physical environment can 
shift against us. I suspect that, unless 
we alter the trends, we will face as well 
a harsher political environment. The 
choices we fail to make freely today 
could, under more dire circumstances, 
produce a trend toward more authorita- 
rian regimes that would impose such 
choices. 

What is at stake in the long-term, 
then, is both the quality of our lives 
and the quality of our freedom. The 
character of our democracy's response 
to these challenges will not come all at 
once but in a series of discrete deci- 
sions in the years ahead — in our en- 
vironmental legislation, in the levels 
and priorities of our foreign aid, in the 
strength of our support for international 
environmental programs, in the posi- 



^egotiations To Protect 
Ifiigratory Iftlci Animals 



At the invitation of the Federal Re- 
public of Germany, 63 nations con- 
vened in its capital city Bonn, June 
1 1-23, 1979, in an attempt to negotiate 
a new international treaty to protect 
wild birds and animals which migrate 
across national boundaries. The negoti- 
ations ended Saturday, June 23, with 
22 nations, principally those in Europe 
and Africa, officially signing the Con- 
vention [on the Conservation of Mi- 
gratory Species of Wild Animals]. The 
United States did not sign. 

Though it appears that the conven- 
tion will not be the global convention 
originally envisaged by its sponsors, it 
should prove a particularly valuable in- 
strument in establishing protection for 
birds migrating across the Mediterra- 
nean, and for zebras, wildebeests, im- 
palas, and other animals which migrate 
in Africa. It should also help stimulate 
protective action elsewhere. 

Some countries — among them the 
United States, Canada, Australia, 
Argentina, New Zealand, Japan, and 
the U.S.S.R. — while supporting the 
treaty's objective, believed that the 
treaty as adopted presented serious 
problems. These countries did not vote 
for its adoption and did not sign the 
convention. Most of the above coun- 
tries did not wish the convention to 
apply to all marine species. Others 
were concerned with the possible ad- 
verse effects the treaty might have on 
the effective management of wildlife 
under present federal-state division of 
authority. A few had problems with the 
relation between the treaty and the 
current law of the sea negotiations. 

The countries with federal systems 
(United States, Canada, Australia, 
Switzerland, Austria, Germany) made 
considerable progress toward getting 
the conference as a whole to accept the 
idea that there should be a federal-state 
clause in the convention. Despite in- 
tensive negotiations, it proved impos- 
sible to find treaty language suitable to 
each nation's particular situation. In 
the end it was agreed that it would be 



better to have no clause on this point 
rather than have imprecise language. 

The African and Asian countries, 
with tacit support from the European 
countries, insisted that the treaty apply 
to all migratory species of animals and 
resisted the attempts of various coun- 
tries to exclude certain marine species 
from the treaty. The United States sup- 
ported the inclusion of sea turtles, sea 
birds, and marine mammals. The Japa- 
nese, who were the lone holdouts on 
sea turtles, modified their position 
during the conference and agreed to re- 
consider their position. The U.S. au- 
thorities involved with the protection of 
marine mammals, concerned with the 
possible weakening and certainly the 
complicating aspects of the proposed 
treaty on existing agreements and 
agreements being negotiated to protect 
mammals, set down a stiff set of re- 
quirements to be met before the dele- 
gation could agree not to have marine 
mammals excluded. 

When a week's hard negotiations re- 
sulted in the apparent successful res- 
olution of these points, the U.S. dele- 
gation modified its original position 
and supported the inclusion of marine 
mammals. Treaty coverage of fish and 
shellfish was most contentious, and the 
vote was 49 to 9 in favor of having the 
treaty cover all marine species. The 
reasoning behind the U.S. opposition, 
which was presumably shared by the 
other countries voting with the United 
States, was that the convention could 
have a disruptive and complicating ef- 
fect on the negotiation of a number of 
fisheries agreements which already 
contain conservation aspects. 

The principal outstanding law of the 
sea issue involved adequately describ- 
ing the term "national jurisdictional 
boundaries." The United States be- 
lieved that this term was too ambiguous 
and tried unsuccessfully to modify it 
with a reference to "international 
law." 

The United States and several other 
countries would have preferred a longer 



tions we take at the Law of the Sea 
Conference and other global forums 
where the environment is at issue, and, 
most immediately, in the energy poli- 
cies and programs our nation now 
adopts. 



Each of us has a responsibility — 
those of us in government and those 
outside — to poke, prod, and push for 
action. Not to stop progress. But to 
shape it in ways that offer the promise 
of a decent future. D 



32 



Department of State Bulletin 



EUROPE: iVATO's Fourth Decade-^ 
Defense and Detente 



Following are remarks by Vice 
President Mondale and Zbigniew 
Brzezinski. Assistant to the President 
for National Security Affairs, before 
the 25th assembly of the Atlantic 
Treaty Association on October 10. 
1979, in the Department of State. 

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE 

I am delighted to have this opportu- 
nity and this honor to address this As- 
sociation, whose function is so crucial 
and has been so effective since the cre- 
ation of this Association those many 
years ago. 

1 wish to commend you for the 
superb role that the Atlantic Treaty As- 
sociation plays in the support of North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). 
Today I wish to review the strength and 
constancy of U.S. leadership within 
that treaty organization and emphasize 
how SALT II now pending before the 
U.S. Senate contributes to the safe- 
guarding of the alliance. 

As you know, when I speak on be- 
half of the American commitment to 
NATO, I speak not only on behalf of 
the President of the United States, Mr. 
Carter, but I think the history of our 
country has shown that consistently 
from the beginning and including 
today, the commitment to NATO by 
our nation is a bipartisan American 

Migratory Animals {Cont'd} 

period of negotiation that would have 
permitted taking home a negotiated and 
preliminary agreed text for study and 
consultation with interested domestic 
groups. It was clear, however, that the 
Federal Republic and the majority of 
the countries present were much in 
favor of concluding and signing a con- 
vention at this time. Though the U.S. 
delegation was able to have included in 
the convention a wide range of points, 
the several unresolved issues described 
above, plus the lack of opportunity to 
consult at home, led the U.S. delega- 
tion not to sign the convention. At the 
same time, the U.S. delegation recog- 
nized the benefits the convention 
should bring to areas of the world 
which have less well developed con- 
servation programs than has North 
America. D 



commitment that is permanent and 
lasting and complete in terms of total 
public support. 

In fact, the first mission of the new 
Administration involved my visit 
within hours of our inaugural — the 
first visit on my international journey 
— to the NATO headquarters in Brus- 
sels to underscore immediately the 
commitment of the new Administration 
to the continuation of the strongest 
possible relationship with NATO and 
the strongest possible relationship 
within NATO among its treaty mem- 
bers. In 1977 the President sent me to 
Brussels in that first overseas mission 
to underscore that message. 

In the more than 30 years that have 
passed since the North Atlantic Treaty 
was signed, we have shared with our 
allies three unprecedented decades of 
strength, of peace, and of success. 

The 12 nations which signed the 
NATO treaty in 1949 reaffirmed their 



ened obsolescence and the traumas of 
modernization. 

That the alliance has survived and 
flourished through so much challenge 
offers proof that its charter, like our 
own Constitution, is, in fact, a living 
document, broad enough, universal 
enough, and tested enough to serve as a 
basis for the future. But today, as al- 
lies, we are not and cannot be compla- 
cent. 

If the challenge faced by the alliance 
over the years has changed, it has by 
no means lessened. If the threat to the 
alliance has in some ways become 
more subtle, it is nonetheless formida- 
ble. And if the Soviet Union has be- 
come more open to cooperation with 
the West than it was in 1949, never- 
theless, serious differences and strong 
competition continue to exist between 
East and West. 

I need not describe for this audience 
the long history of the Soviet military 



The President, working with our allies, has increased defense spending 
by 3% a year in real terms .... We will continue that growth and will 
request even more if our defense needs require it. 



Press release 159 of June 27. 1979. 



faith in the purposes and principles of 
the U.N. Charter. They stressed their 
desire to live in peace with all peoples 
and all governments. They have 
pledged to safeguard the principles of 
democracy, individual liberty, and the 
rule of law. And above all, they agreed 
to develop their capacity to resist 
armed attack. An attack against one, 
they agreed, would be considered an 
attack against all. 

It is difficult to realize in our more 
settled and prosperous times, what an 
ambitious, even visionary, act that 
treaty was; how ambitious to speak op- 
timistically of peace when the debris of 
World War II had not yet been fully 
cleared away, and how farsighted to 
join in a collective effort to resist ag- 
gression when so many of the sig- 
natories were individually vulnerable. 

The NATO alliance has shown re- 
markable resilience and nexibility. It 
has surmounted recurring problems 
within and challenges without. It has 
undergone strategic and doctrinal 
changes, from an era of massive retali- 
ation to an era of flexible response. It 
has endured both the pangs of threat- 



buildup of Warsaw Pact forces. That 
history, for many of you, has been a 
daily professional challenge. It is a 
challenge that President Carter has met 
from the beginning of his Administra- 
tion with the shaping of U.S. defense 
forces and with his decision to increase 
real defense spending by 3% annually. 
This is not an effort that we bear alone. 
Each of our allies must participate, if 
together we are to benefit. 

The President has submitted to the 
Congress a request, as you know, for 
$2.7 billion amending the FY 1980 
budget so that despite the increased in- 
flation which vexes us all, we will 
meet that commitment that we have 
made in all seriousness to NATO. 

Visible strength is a deterrent to war. 
Together with our allies, we have 
begun the process of modernizing our 
defenses for the coming decades to 
meet the massive arms buildup of the 
Soviet Union and the East. 

As you know, just this past week, in 
East Berlin, President Brezhnev an- 
nounced unilateral reduction of certain 
Soviet troops, tanks, and other military 
hardware in Eastern Europe. We would 



November 1979 



33 



welcome such a reduction, but it is ab- 
solutely essential that it be seen in 
context, and that context includes the 
following factors. 

First, Soviet forces in Europe today 
vastly outnumber those of the NATO 
alliance, and so, as I said, on behalf of 
the President to the U.N. Special Ses- 
sion on Disarmament on the eve of the 
1978 NATO summit in Washington, 
we in NATO increased our defense 
budgets, not out of preference but out 
of necessity — a necessity imposed 
upon us, for example, by the Warsaw 
Pact's three to one advantage in tanks 
in Europe. 

Second, the Soviet theater nuclear 
forces have been built up. The Backfire 
bomber and now their new SS-20, an 
intermediate range mobile ballistic 
missile, significantly increases Soviet 
military capability against targets not 
only in Europe but also in Asia, Africa, 
and the Middle East. 

And third, it is obviously in the 
Soviet interest to lure NATO away 
from crucial conventional and theater 
nuclear force modernization. 

While we must examine President 
Brezhnev's announcement carefully 
and affirmatively, we must bear in 
mind that the self-restraint in theater 
nuclear forces shown by the NATO al- 
liance over the past two decades has 
not been met by corresponding restraint 
on the part of the Soviets. It is for this 
reason that the work of NATO's groups 
on the theater nuclear forces moderni- 
zation and theater nuclear forces arms 
control is so crucially important, as is 
the decision we will take as an alliance 
leader this year on modernized theater 
nuclear forces capable of countering 
real and existing Soviet theater nuclear 
forces opposed against our alliance. 

While deterrence at the theater level 
is of keen concern to each of us, the 
competition between East and West at 
the strategic nuclear level is central to 
our defense and survival. How we 
manage that competition — literally and 
directly — affects the lives of every 
man, woman, and child through the al- 
liance and, indeed, throughout the 
world. 

This week in Washington, as you 
well know, the Senate Foreign Rela- 
tions Committee has moved into the 
final phase of its hearings on SALT II. 
As the Senate approaches this historic 
decision, let us look at the record of the 
debate and of the hearings before the 
committees. 

Every single provision of SALT II 
has been scrutinized in detail for days 
of hearings. The agreement has stood 
up to every single criticism leveled 



against it. The treaty is verifiable with- 
out any doubt. It is in the alliance's 
interest without any doubt. It strength- 
ens our security, and it is a meaningful 
step toward arms reduction. 

SALT II has withstood partisan at- 
tack. The fact is that when the Presi- 
dent took charge of the strategic arms 
talks, he inherited many provisions of a 
draft agreement negotiated by his pred- 
ecessor. We have not only built on that 
draft, we have improved it — broad- 
ening the scope of the agreement, 
greatly improving the quantitative and 
qualitative limits, and laying the 
groundwork for the negotiation of fur- 
ther limits in our national interests in 
SALT III. 

SALT II has successfully withstood 
determined efforts to link it, to hold it 
hostage to other issues — issues ranging 
from the level of the defense budget to 
the Soviet presence in Cuba, issues im- 
portant in their own right but which 
must not be linked to the pending 
SALT treaty. 

I need not detail for the defense ex- 
perts in this assembly the positive trend 
in the U.S. defense budget since 1977. 
No linkage to SALT is required for that 
trend to continue. The fact is that the 
President, working with our allies, has 
increased defense spending by 3% a 
year in real terms, reversing several 



States to pursue strategic programs to 
strengthen our security while also con- 
straining the arms race. In the same 
way, SALT provides both a foundation 
for the alliance to build a consensus to 
proceed with essential NATO theater 
nuclear force modernization, and it 
also furthers arms control initiatives to 
control the Soviet threat to Europe. 

Thus, when the Senate votes for 
SALT II — and I have confidence the 
Senate will ratify that treaty — it will 
be voting not only for a strong and 
more stable strategic relationship to- 
ward the Soviet Union, it will also be 
giving crucial impetus to a stronger 
NATO and to efforts to reduce the nu- 
clear threat facing our allies in the fu- 
ture. That is why the members of the 
North Altantic alliance have, without 
exception and with great strength, en- 
dorsed SALT II, That is why SALT II 
is so central to continued American 
leadership of this great alliance. 

Earlier this year, soon after the 
signing of the SALT II agreements, I 
visited seven states of our great country 
to discuss SALT with a good cross 
section of the American people. 

Their response was overwhelmingly 
positive. The American people recog- 
nize that strategic arms limitation is 
an issue of vital importance for our na- 
tion and for mankind. They want any 



The U.S. commitment to the security of Europe is unshakable. It is 
organic. It is complete. We view the security of Western Europe as an 
extension of our own security. 



years of previous decline. We will 
continue that growth and will request 
even more if our defense needs require 
it. 

To deal with the Soviet presence in 
Cuba, we have taken a number of steps 
to neutralize the Soviet role, including 
stepping up U.S. surveillance and 
military presence in the Caribbean. We 
will assure that the Soviets in Cuba 
pose no threat to the United States or 
other nations in this region. 

When the President announced these 
measures a week ago, he emphasized 
and I quote, that, ". . .the greatest 
danger to American security. . . is 
certainly not the two or three thousand 
Soviet troops in Cuba. The greatest 
danger to all the nations in the 
world. . . is the breakdown of a com- 
mon effort to preserve peace and the 
ultimate threat of a nuclear war." 

Finally, SALT II is the central ele- 
ment in the alliance's policy of pursu- 
ing both defense and detente. SALT II 
provides a framework for the United 



agreement we enter in to be fair, and 
they believe this treaty is fair. They 
want a treaty to protect our security, 
and they understand that this treaty en- 
hances America's security. They want 
it ratified, and they want us to continue 
our efforts to reduce the threat of nu- 
clear war. 

They understand that SALT does not 
undermine our security. They recog- 
nize that SALT is not based on trust but 
on suspicion and that it can be ade- 
quately verified. They believe we must 
have SALT II if we're to move to 
SALT III. 

If I have received a single message, 
it is that the American people gen- 
uinely believe, as do the President and 
I, that the SALT II agreement is in our 
interest and that it's vastly superior to 
no agreement at all. 

Every day brings more support for 
the treaty. Just last week I received a 
letter from the President of the Na- 
tional Farmers Union representing a 
broad cross section of rural Americans. 



34 



Department of State Bulletin 



In it he stated, and I quote: "The full 
board of directors of the Farmers Union 
concurred unanimously that the Nation 
must make headway towards arms 
control. It would be tragic,'" they con- 
tinued, "'if the whole process were to 
be set back by rejection of the present 
treaty. Approval of SALT II at this ses- 
sion, therefore, is vitally important so 
that the next steps can begin soon and 
hopefully lead to another advance for 
humanity." 

"An advance for humanity." That is 
what the SALT process is all about. 

As you all know, last week America 
welcomed an extraordinary visitor. To 
joyful crowds in cities and farmlands, 
to millions everywhere who saw him 
on television, the Holy Father brought 
a luminous message to mankind and to 
all Americans, a message of love and 
faith and optimism and confidence and 
grace. 

That message struck deep chords 
within us. It unleashed our best and 
most generous sentiments. It opened, 
truly, a window on our soul. It re- 
minded us again what our civilization 
is all about — and what this Association 
was established to protect and has 
served so well throughout the history of 
this Association — what it is about is 
the protection and love of our democ- 
racy, our drive for social justice, our 
hopes for our children. 

In the end, those are the dreams that 
bond our NATO alliance together. 
That's its basic reason. Nuclear holo- 
caust renders those dreams absurd. 
Today, with the decision on SALT II, 
we have a decisive chance to take a fur- 
ther step away from that final madness, 
to take a further step toward reason, 
and I'm confident we'll make the right 
choice. 



DR. BRZEZINKSI 

I welcome this opportunity to meet 
with your 25th annual assembly and to 
share with you some informal remarks 
on the subject of Western security on 
the relationship between defense and 
detente. At this time of unprecedented 
global change, our collective security 
requires that the Unites States suc- 
cessfully maintain a global power 
equilibrium while helping to shape a 
framework for global change. 

These two imperatives — a power 
equilibrium and a framework for 
change — are not slogans. Each repre- 
sents a difficult and vital process, criti- 
cal to our security. The maintenance of 
a power equilibrium by itself would be 
insufficient for it would be unrespon- 
sive to the imperative need to recognize 
that an awakened global population in- 



sists on basic changes in the human 
condition. Shaping a framework for 
global change while disregarding the 
realities of power would contribute to a 
fundamental instability in world affairs; 
it would transform global change from 
a potentially positive process into a 
condition of increasing fragmentation 
and eventual anarchy. 

Since 1945 the United States has 
been the pivotal element in the mainte- 
nance of global stability. Initially our 
primary focus was on the defense of 
Western Europe. Today, Western 
Europe, the Far East, and the Middle 
East represent three interrelated stra- 
tegic zones of central importance to the 
survival of the West as a whole and to 
global economic stability. This is an 
important strategic reality, and it has 
political, as well as military, implica- 
tions. The United States must work 
with the countries in all three zones to 
protect the independence of these 
regions. 

Development of more cooperative 
relationships with a power such as 
China is another important new factor 
in the geopolitical equation, contribut- 
ing to greater global stability. 

Insofar as the strategic nuclear 
equilibrium is concerned, the last 30 
years have seen a shift from a U.S. 
monopoly and supremacy to a much 
more complex situation of mutually as- 
sured destruction. Moreover, the mo- 
mentum of the Soviet nuclear buildup 
does pose the possibility that the Soviet 
Union may be seeking genuine nuclear 
war fighting capability. Accordingly, 
in thinking of the 1980's, we must be 
sensitive to the nuanced psychologi- 
cal-political relationship between the 
effective deterrence and war fighting 
capabilities. Therefore, to maintain 
effective deterrence, we must upgrade 
our own capacity to manage a conflict 
stably and to control nuclear escalation 
effectively. 

Our responsiveness to the increasing 
complexity of deterrence is but one 
element in the global power balance. 
Arms control — a new factor in global 
security — is also significant. Such 
steps as SALT I and SALT II, based on 
the recognition that security cannot be 
obtained by arms alone, thus contribute 
to greater stability and predictability in 
the strategic equation. 

The political awakening of mankind 
and resulting redistribution of power 
worldwide is the overriding reality of 
our time. By the end of this century, 
approximately four-fifths of mankind 
will be living in Asia, Latin America, 
and Africa. As a consequence, the 
West can no longer dominate world 
affairs. The only alternative to that 
domination is wider global cooperation 



based on the acceptance of basic 
changes. Nothing less than that can in- 
sure that global change is not violent, 
chaotic, and increasingly exploited by 
our adversaries. 

It is, therefore, important that the in- 
evitable tensions associated with basic 
sociopolitical change not be exploited 
by major powers either directly or in- 
directly. The export of revolution 
through proxies or by direct military 
power has to be resisted, for otherwise 
global change will become global anar- 
chy. These considerations make it im- 
perative that self-restraint be the guid- 
ing principle for the conduct of the 
major powers in relationship to the 
local conflicts in the more unstable 
parts of the world. 

The key elements of our efforts to 
promote genuine global cooperation, 
designed to create a more equitable 
sharing in global political and eco- 
nomic power, accordingly involve: 

• Close cooperation between the 
United States, Western Europe and 
Japan; 

• The development of more friendly 
relationships with some of the emerg- 
ing regionally and internationally influ- 
ential third world countries, including 
the moderate Arab countries whose in- 
fluence is essential in shaping an eco- 
nomically and politically moderate 
Middle East; and 

• More emphasis has to be placed on 
multilateral and regional organizations 
such as the United Nations, the Organi- 
zation of African Unity, and the As- 
sociation of South East Asian Nations. 
They represent the emerging new 
realities of a more genuinely pluralistic 
world. 

As we fashion together the frame- 
work within which many of these 
changes will be assimilated, NATO's 
role retains vital relevance. The al- 
liance, a guarantor of basic Western 
security, has special meaning for us in 
the context of global strategic equilib- 
rium. Let me say a few words about 
one particularly important aspect of 
that equilibrium. 

Entering its fourth decade, NATO 
now confronts a challenge and a choice 
as critical as any in its past. The chal- 
lenge comes from a resolute, increas- 
ingly powerful Soviet Union. The 
choice, however — whether to acquiesce 
to Soviet ascendency or effectively to 
preclude it — lies with us. Let me speak 
about both. 

First the challenge. It is a fact that 
the Soviet Union has been steadily in- 
creasing its military expenditures over 
the past 15 or even 20 years. The pro- 
jection of Soviet power has gained a 
global capacity; and along with that 



November 1979 



35 



capacity the Soviet Union continues to 
devote major resources to a regional 
military buildup. In no area is this 
buildup more pronounced than in the 
Soviet forces opposite Western Europe. 
This buildup encompasses all facets of 
Soviet military power — conventional 
forces, long-range and shorter range 
theater nuclear forces, and interconti- 
nental forces. 

One part of that buildup — the long- 
range theater nuclear forces — is of par- 
ticular concern. The SS-20 missile 
represents an enormous advance over 
two previous generations of Soviet 
missile weaponry in both quantitative 
and qualitative terms. Compared to the 
older SS-4 and SS-5, the SS-20 is 
three times more accurate than the one 
and six times more accurate than the 
other. And where an earlier generation 
of missiles targeted against NATO 
Europe carried a single warhead, the 
SS-20 carries three. Moreover, the 
mobility of the SS-20, its increased 
range, and the fact that its launcher can 
be quickly reloaded following an initial 
salvo significantly enhance both the 
weapon's destructive force and its 
ability to survive attack. 

In addition to the SS-20 missile, 
the Soviet Union has developed 
a medium-range bomber — the 
Backfire — whose range, greatly ex- 
ceeding that of earlier Soviet aircraft, 
enables it to strike directly at Western 
Europe. 

It is clear to us that the Soviets have 
underway a substantial and sustained 
program to modernize, expand, and 
deploy their theater nuclear forces. 
What this means in practical terms can 
be simply yet soberly expressed: At 
current Soviet deployment rates there is 
one new SS-20 warhead deployed 
roughly every second day. 

Such a sustained effort goes well be- 
yond what could be explained as 
meeting a reasonable defensive need. 
Yet in the same period of time, NATO 
has done virtually nothing to upgrade 
its own long-range theater nuclear 
forces. 

The challenge we now confront is 
not only a military one; I believe that 
we have far more to fear from the pos- 
sibility of political intimidation. 
Should NATO be viewed as unwilling 
or unable to respond to threats of nu- 
clear warfare confined to the European 
area — as the lack of any effective 
theater forces would almost certainly 
make it appear to be — the opportunity 
for Soviet political pressures would be 
correspondingly enlarged. 

That is the challenge. The choice is 
squarely up to us. We can, as an al- 
liance, decide to do nothing to offset 
the substantial modernization in Soviet 



theater nuclear forces; we can sit by, 
hoping we can cope with the conse- 
quence of inequality; we can allow our- 
selves to be lulled into passivity, leav- 
ing the alliance in a situation of in- 
equality and growing vulnerability; or 
we can take effective action now. This 
means, in turn, the deployment of 
strong, theater-based systems capable 
of reaching Soviet territory. 



Such a decision to deploy NATO 
systems would not only keep the cred- 
ibility of our deterrent intact but would 
help promote the conditions under 
which meaningful arms control negoti- 
ations between East and West can pro- 
ceed. In line with our twin goals of 
deterrence and detente, alliance delib- 
erations over the past year have, in 
fact, actively explored meaningful 



[/•^. CommUtncnt 
to Western Europe 



SECRETARY'S STATEMENT, 
SEPT. 10, 1979' 

The security of Western Europe and 
the security of the United States are in- 
divisible. This central fact has been the 
basis of our strategic doctrine and our 
defense planning for four decades or 
more. Our allies believe, as do we, that 
our mutual security requires collective 
effort and that our defense is insepara- 
ble. There should be no question about 
America's commitment to help defend 
Europe with all the means necessary — 
nuclear and conventional. The sub- 
stantial forces we have deployed to 
Europe are not concrete evidence of 
that commitment. 

As President Carter said in his proc- 
lamation on the 30th anniversary of the 
alliance, "... the firm support of 
Congress and the American people for 
NATO reflects their deep conviction 
that NATO is the cornerstone of United 
States foreign policy." 

NATO's basic strategy is one of 
flexible response. President Carter has, 
on several occasions, expressed U.S. 
support for this strategy. There has 
been no change, and we contemplate 
no change. 

The defense efforts now underway 
within NATO demonstrate the collec- 
tive determination of the allies to meet 
new challenges. To improve NATO's 
conventional forces and to make more 
efficient use of combined resources, 
the alliance is proceeding with a 
Long-Term Defense Program. We are 
cooperating in plans to modernize our 
theater nuclear forces. And we are de- 
veloping an agreed alliance position 
regarding future arms control negotia- 
tions. 

At the same time, the United States 
is engaged in a thorough and vigorous 
program to modernize each leg of our 
strategic forces. Our determination to 
maintain the strategic balance is re- 



flected most recently in the President's 
announcement last week that we will 
proceed with full development of the 
new MX missile in a mobile basing 
mode that, while fully verifiable under 
SALT, will assure the long-term sur- 
vivability of our land-based strategic 
forces. 

Our strategic modernization programs 
reflect our determination not only to 
maintain the strategic balance but also 
to hold a capacity for flexible 
response — in terms of size and targets 
of the response — to any attack at any 
level of intensity, against us or our al- 
lies. That has been U.S. policy for 
many years. It continues to be U.S. 
policy. And we will maintain the forces 
necessary to fulfill it. 

This modernization of nuclear and 
conventional forces is being undertaken 
precisely because the allies seek to 
deter aggression by maintaining the 
integrity and credibility of the whole 
spectrum of our response options. To 
deter aggression, NATO must both 
have — and be perceived to have — the 
capability, flexibility, and determina- 
tion to respond as appropriate. Only in 
this way can we demonstrate to the 
Warsaw Pact the costs of embarking 
upon or continuing a contlict and the 
risk that a conventional European re- 
gional conflict would escalate to a gen- 
eral nuclear war. 

The security of the alliance depends 
not only on collective military forces 
and resolve — although these are indis- 
pensable — it depends as well on com- 
mon ties among allied peoples and their 
creativity and vitality in meeting the 
challenges we confront together. We 
are confident of the alliance's con- 
tinued ability to do so. D 



' Made available (o the press by Department 
spokesman Hodding Carter III. 



36 



Department of State Bulletin 



Rcvictv of 
U^S, Policy in Europe 



by George S. Vest 

Statement before the Subcommittee 
on Europe and the Middle East of the 
House Foreign Affairs Committee on 
July 12, 1979.' 

I welcome this opportunity to discuss 
witli you the state of U.S. relations in 
Europe. 1 know that your overriding 
concern is U.S. policy. What are our 
main objectives? What have we 
achieved? What remains to be done? 

It is with an eye to those central is- 
sues that this annual review is ad- 
dressed. The succinct answer to your 
questions is that U.S. -European rela- 
tions are in good shape. 

• We have reaffirmed and reinforced 
our commitment to the traditional prin- 
ciples of U.S. policy and to our trans- 
atlantic partners. 

• We continue to stress items of 
highest priority for the U.S. national 
interest — Western solidarity, the mili- 
tary defense of the West, economic 
well-being, the preservation and de- 



velopment of democratic mstitutions in 
Western Europe, and the promotion of 
constructive relations with the diverse 
countries of Eastern Europe. 

• We are working together with the 
governments of Western Europe and 
Canada on major issues of mutual con- 
cern. They have, for example, ex- 
pressed strong support for SALT II, 
and they recognize the continuing need 
to cooperate on the economic chal- 
lenges before us all. 

To elaborate on these larger themes 
that pervade recent and current U.S. 
policy toward Europe, 1 will start with 
a discussion of our role vis-a-vis the 
major institutions of Europe. I will 
then move to discussion of our bilateral 
ties with the Western European and 
nonaligned nations and Canada. I will 
conclude with a summary of the evolu- 
tion of our relations in Eastern Europe. 

Western Military Security 

Concern for the security of our citi- 
zens remains fundamental to U.S. 
foreign policy. In that regard, the 



Defense and Detente (Cont'd) 
arms control policy along with the need 
to modernize nuclear-capable systems. 
It is no secret that we view both 
paths — effective arms control and 
modernization — as complementary and 
that we look for credible movement 
along both by the end of this year. The 
true test of NATO's purpose lies with 
our allied parliaments and publics. Are 
they willing to pay the political price 
required to avoid the infinitely more 
costly alternative of intimidation at 
best, and even war at worst? 

Let there be no question about our 
commitment nor of our determination 
to help defend Europe by all means 
necessary — nuclear and conventional. 
The U.S. commitment to the security 
of Europe is unshakable. It is organic. 
It is complete. We view the security of 
Western Europe as an extension of our 
own security. We recognize that any 
threat to the security of Western 
Europe is a direct threat to the security 
of the United States. The American 
commitment — nuclear and conven- 
tional — to the defense of Europe is an 
integral part of our own defense pos- 
ture. There are no conceivable circum- 
stances in which we would not react to 
a security threat directed at our allies in 
Europe. 



The danger we could face in the 
1980"s will not be American decou- 
pling from Western Europe; rather, the 
danger will derive from Soviet miscal- 
culation — that is, from the belief that 
the alliance, through failure to keep 
pace with a changing strategic envi- 
ronment, has decoupled from its tradi- 
tional purpose. 

We must remove any possible 
grounds for that miscalculation. It is 
my belief that the decision which 
President Carter made a few weeks ago 
on the MX missile and the decisions 
which NATO must soon make on 
theater nuclear forces are as important 
as any the Western allies will ever 
face. Historically, those decisions rank 
with President Truman's creation of a 
strategic bomber command and Presi- 
dent Kennedy's deployment of inter- 
continental ballistic missiles. Positive 
action now will give us survivable 
systems on both sides of the Atlantic. 
These, in turn, will greatly enhance the 
West's crisis-bargaining capability and 
thus contribute to global stability. 

We are approaching a watershed in 
our alliance. The issue confronting us 
is fundamentally a simple one: We do 
not have to choose between detente and 
defense; we must have both, and — with 
political will — we can. D 



American role in the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO) is central. 
This year we celebrated the 30th an- 
niversary of an alliance which, ac- 
cording to President Carter, has "... 
successfully deterred war and main- 
tained stability in Western Europe and 
North America, thus securing the 
well-being and prosperity of its fifteen 
member states . . . ." 

NATO's main purpose is, in the 
words of the North Atlantic Treaty, 
". . . To safeguard the freedom, com- 
mon heritage and civilization of their 
peoples, founded on the principles of 
democracy, individual liberty and the 
rule of law," and ". . . to promote 
stability and well-being in the North 
Atlantic area." NATO's basic means 
to achieve these goals are to deter war 
in the North Atlantic community and to 
defend its member states, if deterrence 
fails, by sustaining the credibility of 
NATO's strategy of forward defense 
and flexible response based on a triad 
of conventional, tactical nuclear, and 
strategic nuclear forces. 

U.S. policies to carry out this strat- 
egy center, in the first instance, on the 
modernization of theater nuclear and 
conventional forces. These improve- 
ments are required in order to maintain 
the credibility of NATO strategy in the 
face of Soviet theater nuclear and con- 
ventional force improvements over the 
past decade. 

U.S. policies toward NATO, in the 
second instance, aim at restraining 
arms competition in strategic, theater 
nuclear, and conventional armaments. 
We carried out continuous consulta- 
tions with our NATO partners on the 
Strategic Arms Limitations Talks 
(SALT), and we coordinate closely 
with them on mutual and balanced 
force reductions (MBFR) and other 
arms control initiatives. 

Thus, U.S. policy toward NATO 
offers the Soviet Union and its allies an 
alternative to an unrelenting force 
buildup, while NATO force improve- 
ments offer them an incentive to move 
forward on this option. 

Equally important, the United States 
pursues these policies in NATO in a 
way that preserves political cohesion 
among members of the alliance. It is in 
the interest of NATO solidarity that we 
consult continuously with our allies not 
only on the issues of arms control but 
also on global issues where the national 
interests of the United States and its 
allies intersect. 

The impact of U.S. policy on this in- 
stitutional cornerstone of Western se- 
curity is impressive. We held a 
ministerial meeting recently at which 
there was a most useful exchange of 
views. We are confident that our effort 



Niwember 1979 



37 



to help shore up NATO's defenses, re- 
newed after long concentration on 
. Southeast Asia, is making headway. 

• On conventional forces, the NATO 
summit a year ago approved the 
Long-Term Defense Program. It pro- 
vides programmatic remedies for such 
deficiencies in conventional forces as 
antiarmor, reenforcement, reserve 
mobilization, maritime, air defense, 
and logistics. Complementing the pro- 

n gram was the NATO summit's com- 
mitment to the goal of 3% real annual 
increases in members' defense spend- 
ing. Needed improvements could not 
have been made on the basis of existing 
levels of defense expenditure. The 
summit also approved alliance cooper- 
ation in the development and production 
of armaments in order to bring about 
greater standardization and interopera- 
bility of NATO arms and greater effi- 
ciency in the employment of economic 
resources. 

• On theater nuclear forces the 
Long-Term Defense Program gives im- 
petus to consultations with allies on the 
need to modernize. The question has 
taken on particular importance in view 
of the continuing deployment of Soviet 
long-range theater nuclear systems 
targeted on Western Europe, such as 
the SS-20 missile and the Backfire 
bomber. These consultations, carried 
on in the NATO Nuclear Planning 
Group's high level group (which we 
chair), are moving toward recommen- 
dations for theater nuclear force mod- 
ernization. In parallel with this proc- 
ess, we are consulting with our allies 
on theater nuclear arms control meas- 
ures in the special group, which the 
United States also chairs. 

• On strategic arms limitations, we 
have consulted closely with our Euro- 
pean allies and Canada over the course 
of the recent years to insure that the 
SALT II treaty protects and enhances 
their security. The consultations have 
focused on treaty issues of particular 
interest to the allies, such as the pro- 
tocol cruise missile restrictions and the 
noncircumvention provision. European 
leaders made clear their support for 
SALT II at the Guadeloupe summit last 
January, in individual governmental 
statements in the intervening months 
and, most recently, at the NATO 
Foreign and Defense Ministers' meet- 
ings in May and after the NATO Coun- 
cil reviewed the treaty on June 29. 

I could not give a comprehensive re- 
view of our NATO policies without 
touching on the question of enhanced 
radiation warheads, the so-called 
I neutron bomb. This defensive tactical 
nuclear weapon was designed to 
counter an enemy tank assault with a 



nuclear warhead which would cause 
less collateral damage than existing nu- 
clear weapons. The President decided 
in April 1978 to defer production of the 
weapon but to modernize tactical nu- 
clear forces in such a way as to leave 
open the option of adding it at some 
future time, depending on Soviet re- 
straint. 

In addition to the defense side of our 
policy toward NATO, we have, on the 
political side, sustained the vital con- 
sultative process on issues of mutual 
concern. East-West relations, the 
Mideast, China, Southeast Asia, and 
Africa have been prominent among the 
questions of foreign policy we have 
addressed in the NATO Council, often 
with special experts sent from Wash- 
ington for the meetings. 

The need to preserve political cohe- 
sion in NATO, while a truism, can 
never be taken for granted, precisely 
because we are an alliance of 15 
sovereign equals. And, the greatest 
single burden in this respect falls on 
the United States. It is, in part, for that 
reason that President Carter has met 
three times with the North Atlantic 
Council. Our leadership is an impera- 
tive. Further, the manner in which we 
lead influences NATO's cohesiveness 
as well as its effectiveness. 

The fact that NATO's basic fabric is 
strong and resilient in 1979 is a signal 
achievement. It may be a greater ac- 
complishment now than it was in 1959 
or 1969 when we were in the midst of, 
or were just emerging from, the cold 
war. To have preserved the commit- 
ment of NATO's 15 members to the 
alliance has been a difficult challenge 
in an increasingly multipolar world 
where defense and detente have been 
our declared policy since 1967. And, it 
has been all the more difficult for 
NATO to confront collectively the un- 
precedented, broad range of divisive 
issues that face the West today. 

Finally, the very success of our ef- 
forts to preserve Western security be- 
gets new challenges. On the defense 
side, our success in achieving alliance 
agreement on how to respond to the 
Warsaw Pact conventional and theater 
nuclear challenge leaves the need to 
follow through with implementation of 
agreed decisions. 

• On the Long-Range Defense Pro- 
gram, the United States must lead the 
effort for vigorous followthrough on 
the 123 conventional force improve- 
ment measures approved at the NATO 
summit a year ago. 

• On improved cooperation in 
NATO armaments. U.S. leadership 
will require imagination and face hard 
choices, given the economic as well as 



military implications of this issue. The 
executive branch intends to work 
closely with the Congress and with 
U.S. business and industry. 

• Similarly, carrying out the goal of 
a 3% increase in defense expenditures 
will necessitate equally tough choices. 
If we fail to fulfill our commitments, 
our allies are likely to find it impos- 
sible to convince their own publics and 
parliaments of this need. 

• On theater nuclear force moderni- 
zation, we will continue to consult 
closely with allies, looking to NATO 
decisions near the end of the year. 

• Close consultations will be the 
order of the day for SALT III. 

• On the political side, the current 
effectiveness of our intensive consulta- 
tions in NATO does not relieve us of 
the task of maintaining that process. It 
is a primary necessity for NATO, as 
well as for our own foreign and secu- 
rity policies. And, needless to say, we 
in the executive branch attach compa- 
rable importance to the need to continue 
to consult with the Congress as we 
move ahead on issues vital to U.S. se- 
curity. 

Western Economic Well-Being 

There can be no enduring military 
security without a sound basis in eco- 
nomic strength. Recession can imperil 
the defensive underpinnings of the al- 
liance and the political stability of its 
member states. Concern about eco- 
nomic issues in general and energy in 
particular ranks uppermost in the minds 
of Europeans, as much as with most 
Americans. 

How to deal with shared economic 
problems is thus a major consideration 
in U.S. -European relations. Because 
the problems are so great and because 
the need for cooperation is so clear, we 
have put primary emphasis on working 
together. Recognition of the necessity 
for close consultation on shared chal- 
lenges to our economic well-being is 
the basis for holding economic summits 
and it accounts for the special emphasis 
we place on working with two major 
multilateral institutions — the Organi- 
zation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) and the Euro- 
pean Community (EC). 

We have made a concerted and con- 
tinuing effort to underscore the role of 
the OECD as a major forum for coop- 
eration among the industrialized na- 
tions. At the June 13-14 OECD 
ministerial meeting. Deputy Secretary 
of State Warren Christopher, Secretary 
of the Treasury Michael Blumenthal, 
and Council of Economic Advisers 
Chairman Charles Schultze headed the 
U.S. delegation. They focused on the 



38 



need to grapple collectively with such 
problems as sustained noninflationary 
economic growth, payments imbal- 
ances and the international monetary 
situation, energy, the North-South 
dialogue, and structural change brought 
about by changes in technology and 
relative prices, as well as shifting pat- 
terns of world production and trade. 

Using the OECD as the principal 
forum, we have engaged in extensive 
consultations with the EC nine and 
other European countries on North- 
South issues. We have been successful 
in building support for U.S. views and 
in achieving a common position among 
the OECD member countries in meet- 
ings such as the recently concluded 
UNCTAD V [U.N. Conference on 
Trade and Development] session in 
Manila. This time, the industrialized 
countries had a cohesive approach, and 
we avoided acrimonious disputes with 
our allies. 

The International Energy Agency 
(lEA), an independent agency within 
the OECD framework, is the principal 
forum for consumer country coopera- 
tion on energy matters. As recent price 
and supply developments illustrate, 
there is a need to maintain a united 
consumer country position and for 
careful management of the situation. 
The lEA ministerial meeting. May 
21-22, reconfirmed the decision for 
members to adopt measures to reduce 
their collective demand for oil by 2 
million barrels per day, or by about 5% 
of anticipated 1979 lEA demand. The 
ministers decided to continue such ef- 
forts in 1980 and agreed on a set of 
policies and principles for enhancing 
coal utilization, production, and trade. 
France, although not an IE A member, 
has adopted parallel conservation 
measures. The EC is an lEA participant 
and the EC energy program has re- 
flected lEA recommendations. The 
Tokyo summit commitments to limit oil 
imports are based upon the lEA pro- 
gram. 

A substantial package of economic 
assistance for Turkey has been de- 
veloped within the OECD framework, 
with the Federal Republic of Germany 
and OECD Secretary General Van 
Lennep playing key lead roles. A 
pledging session in Paris, May 30, re- 
sulted in commitments in excess of 
$900 million over the next year in the 
form of concessional credits, export 
credits, and grants. The U.S. share is 
approximately $250 million, subject to 
congressional authorization and appro- 
priation. The pledging of these funds 
has facilitated the completion of an 
agreement between the Turkish Gov- 
ernment and the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) on appropriate economic 



policies. We expect to receive formal 
IMF approval later this month. 

U.S. support for the process of 
European integration, exemplified by 
the evolution of the European Commu- 
nity, remains strong. We consider 
progress toward European unity of 
primary importance for Europe, for the 
West, and for the world. At the same 
time, we believe that European unity 
must be achieved by the Europeans 
themselves. It is in that spirit that we 
follow with interest such milestones in 
the move toward European unity as the 
establishment of the European mone- 
tary system, the enlargement of the 
Community to include nations of 
southern Europe, and the holding of 
direct elections to the European Parlia- 
ment. We view these developments 
and others as reflections of the growing 
habit of Europeans to think and act in 
the European context. 

• We welcome the European mone- 
tary system, launched on March 13, 
1979, by all EC members except the 
United Kingdom. It is an effort to 
stabilize intra-EC exchange rates and to 
provide additional resources to counter 
exchange speculation. It is a major 
Franco-German political initiative, de- 
signed to stabilize European currencies 
and, incidentally, to foster European 
ecomonic integration. Its long-term 
success will depend on the member 
states' ability to harmonize their eco- 
nomic policies. 

• We applaud the signing of a treaty 
of accession for Greece on May 28, 
1979. After ratification by all the na- 
tional parliaments, Greece is expected 
to become the 1 0th EC member on 
January I, 1981. Portugal and Spain 
have also applied for membership and 
substantive negotiations are expected to 
begin this fall, with entry into the EC 
as early as 1982-83. The primary 
motivation for EC enlargement is 
political: to bind the newly democratic 
applicants to the more advanced Euro- 
pean democracies and thereby enhance 
their political and economic stability. 

• We consider the first elections to 
the European Parliament, June 7-10, a 
significant step forward for Europe. 
The shift to direct elections will not in- 
crease the limited advisory and over- 
sight powers of the Parliament, but the 
new legislators will adopt a higher 
profile than their appointed predeces- 
sors and will gradually seek to expand 
their influence. We hope that, in due 
course, the present ties between the 
Congress and the European Parliament 
can be strengthened to reflect the sig- 
nificance of the June elections. 

In addition to expanding U.S. activ- 
ity in the OECD and increasing cooper- 
ation with the EC, there are other de- 



Department of State Bulletin ., 

velopments in the economic realm that 
merit mention. We continue to partici- ' 
pate in economic summits as one of ; 
several means to buttress joint action 
for economic well-being. The eco- 
nomic summit in Tokyo was a crucial 
opportunity to focus on such priority 
issues as energy. 

In the area of energy, the most im- 
portant decisions revolved around the 
commitment to set national ceilings for 
oil imports for 1980 and 1985 and to 
insure adequate resources for the de- 
velopment and commercial application 
of technologies for alternative sources 
of energy. Both the OECD, including 
the lEA, and the European Community 
will play a significant role in the fol- 
lowup to the commitments made by the 
summit participants. 

Although energy was the key issue 
discussed at the Tokyo summit, the 
participants also made commitments to 
do more to improve the long-term pro- 
ductive efficiency and flexibility of 
their economies, to implement the 
agreements reached in the Tokyo 
Round of the multilateral trade negoti- 
ations (MTN), to achieve durable ex- 
ternal equilibrium, and to pursue con- 
structive North-South relations. 

After years of arduous bargaining, 
we have achieved the successful con- 
clusion of the MTN. U.S. -EC negotia- 
tions lay at the heart of the MTN be- 
cause of the Community's weight in 
world trade. We have, in consultation 
with the Congress, prepared the neces- 
sary U.S. implementing legislation. 
We will be consulting closely with the 
EC and other European countries to in- 
sure that their implementing regula- 
tions and legislative procedures are a 
comprehensive and accurate reflection 
of the agreements reached at Geneva. 
With ratification, we will have to put 
the new rules into practice through re- 
vised GATT [General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade] procedures and thus 
be able to deal with trade disputes over 
the coming decades. 

Over the past year, we have been 
working closely with our European al- 
lies to arrive at reasonable solutions 
which balance proliferation concerns 
with energy needs. The International 
Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation 
(INFCE) is part of this process. In ad- 
dition, as required by the 1978 Nuclear 
Nonproliferation Act, we are negoti- 
ating a new nuclear cooperation agree- 
ment with the EC and hope to conclude 
a new agreement sometime next year 
after the end of INFCE. We are also 
working with the EC and the Interna- 
tional Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 
in Vienna to accelerate the conclusion 
of facility inspection arrangements 
between the EC and the IAEA. 



November 1979 



39 



Bilateral Relations 

Although the United States places 
significant emphasis on using multilat- 
eral institutions to help foster Western 
military security and economic well- 
being, we must, at the same time, deal 
with our European counterparts and 
nonaligned nations effectively on a 
bilateral basis. Here — as with NATO, 
the OECD, and the EC— we are 
searching together for solutions to 
problems that affect both Europeans 
and Americans. 

We have deepened mutual under- 
standing on bilateral policy issues with 
the Federal Republic of Germany 
through intensified consultations. Of 
particular note during the last year 
were the President's highly successful 
state visit to the F.R.G. in July 1978 
and Chancellor Schmidt's visit to 
Washington last month. The Chancel- 
lor has countered reports of a deterio- 
ration in U.S. -F.R.G. relations in 
major speeches in Germany and during 
his June 1979 visit in the United States. 
In a speech at the University of South 
Carolina, for example, he emphasized 
that firm U.S. -German ties are a reli- 
able feature in today's international 
affairs and that "the focus of our rela- 
tions is no longer on a purely bilateral 
relationship but on the wider tasks and 
responsibilities which we share." 

He has expressed strong support for 
the President's efforts to achieve last- 
ing peace in the Middle East and for 
the prompt conclusion and ratification 
of SALT II. Areas of U.S. -West Ger- 
man relations requiring continued spe- 
cial attention include military-security 
policy, East-West relations, the coor- 
dination of economic measures, and 
policies on nuclear energy and export. 

We continue to have a positive re- 
lationship with France based on 
mutual respect and exemplified by the 
recent Washington visit by French 
Foreign Minister Francois-Poncet and 
effective consultations with the French 
during their term in the EC presidency 
this year. We recognize that, in its role 
as a major power, France has its own 
views on such questions as peace in the 
Middle East, organizing assistance for 
Africa, conventional disarmament in 
Europe, oil price ceilings, and export 
credit competition. All of these ques- 
tions are under extensive discussion, as 
are such questions as nuclear non- 
proliferation where there is now a 
greater identity of view. The impor- 
tant underlying factor in all these ques- 
tions is that French and U.S. basic ob- 
jectives in the world are similar, while 
we sometimes seek their achievement 
along different but parallel paths. 

Since I talked with your committee 
last year, the Conservative Party in 



Great Britian has returned to power. 
Prime Minister Thatcher's victory. 
May 3, has given her party a solid 
working majority in Parliament and a 
strong mandate to try a Tory approach 
to dominant domestic economic issues. 
We expect our close ties with Britain to 
continue, as we work together on 
problems of mutual interest, especially 
those regarding Western security and 
southern Africa. If differences of view 
on some specific issues should emerge 
between us and the new British Gov- 
ernment, we are confident that they 
will be resolved through the close and 
continuing cooperation that has long 
existed between our two countries. The 
Administration's dealings with the new 
British Government got off to an ex- 
cellent start when Secretary Vance vis- 
ited London, May 20-24. The Presi- 
dent and Mrs. Thatcher met in Tokyo 
for the economic summit last month. 

We remain distressed by the con- 
tinuing violence in Northern Ireland 
which, although below the level of 
several years ago, still claims lives 
with tragic regularity and disrupts so- 
cial peace and economic progress. As 
President Carter has said, our policy on 
Northern Ireland is one of impartiality. 



and we recognize that the only perma- 
nent solution must come from the 
people who live there. Given a settle- 
ment acceptable to both parts of the 
community, we would be prepared to 
join with others to see how job-creating 
investment could be encouraged for the 
benefit of all in Northern Ireland. 

We, of course, continue to enjoy 
close ties with the Republic of Ireland 
and are pleased to witness its continu- 
ing economic growth. We welcome 
Ireland's increased activity on the 
world scene, as evidenced by its con- 
tribution of troops to U.N. peacekeep- 
ing efforts in Lebanon and its assump- 
tion of the presidency of the European 
Economic Community for the second 
half of this year. We look forward to 
the visit of Prime Minister Lynch this 
November. That occasion will give us 
the opportunity to consult with him in 
his dual capacity as head of govern- 
ment and president of the Council of 
Ministers of the European Community. 

We have continued our traditionally 
close ties with the nations of the Nordic 
area, an area of growing strategic sig- 
nificance in the light of the steady 
build-up of Soviet forces on the nearby 
Kola Peninsula. Vice President Mon- 



Fourth Anniversary 
of the Helsinki Final Act 



PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT, 
AUG. 1, 1979' 

On this day in 1975, the leaders of 
35 states met in Helsinki to sign the 
Final Act of the Conference on Se- 
curity and Cooperation in Europe 
(CSCE). They pledged to build a future 
of peace and stability in Europe on the 
strong foundation of mutual under- 
standing and respect for fundamental 
human rights. 

In the years since Helsinki, we have 
witnessed conscientious efforts on the 
part of many signatory states to fulfill, 
fully and completely, their obligations 
under the Final Act. We have made 
progress in insuring the freer flow of 
people and ideas. Flagrant abuses of 
human rights no longer go unnoticed 
and unchallenged. 

The Final Act provision which calls 
for notification of large military maneu- 
vers has worked well. The spirit of 
Helsinki is alive. But there have also 
been important setbacks. For example, 
in the German Democratic Republic, 
harsh new laws designed to restrict 



contact with foreigners will take effect 
today, on the anniversary of Helsinki. 
In Czechoslovakia, members of the 
Charter '77 movement remain in 
prison, facing trial for their dedication 
to basic human freedoms. In the Soviet 
Union, organizations established to 
monitor compliance with the Helsinki 
agreement have been harassed and their 
members jailed. Acts like these are to- 
tally inconsistent with pledges made at 
Helsinki. 

On the anniversary of the Helsinki 
accords, I rededicate this Administra- 
tion and this nation to strive tirelessly 
for full implementation of the Final 
Act. We will continue to review our 
own record in preparation for the 
meeting of CSCE states at Madrid in 
1980. And we call upon other signatory 
states to work with us so that we may 
mutually fulfill the obligations under- 
taken at Helsinki to peace, security, 
and human rights. D 



' Text from Weekly Compilation of Presi- 
dential Documents of Aug. 6. 1979. 



40 



Department of State Bulletin 



dale's trip to northern Europe in April 
1979 demonstrated the solidarity of our 
NATO links to Iceland, Norway, and 
Denmark. On the same journey, he vis- 
ited Sweden and Finland as visible 
evidence of our respect for these na- 
tions and their policy of neutrality, 
which also contributes to the stability 
of the northern region. The Vice Presi- 
dent's trip to northern Europe was the 
first undertaken of that scope and at 
that level since Lyndon Johnson visited 
the area as Vice President in 1963. 

Although the Nordic countries have 
differing security policies, they share 
common concerns with each other and 
with the United States on such global 
issues as human rights, East-West re- 
lations, arms control, U.N. peace- 
keeping, the Middle East, and eco- 
nomic development of the Third 
World. Vice President Mondale's trip 
provided an opportunity for high-level 
consultation on these world issues 
where the Nordic countries play a 
leading role and where their advice and 
support are important to us. The visit 
last month to Washington of Norwe- 
gian Prime Minister Nordii was a wel- 
come reaffirmation of this process. 
Both in our talks and in public state- 
ments, Nordii stressed Norway's 
""close commitment" to NATO and 
emphasized that '"SALT is an impor- 
tant element in the evolution of the 
East-West detente." 

Our relations with the Benelux 
countries continue to be excellent and 
largely free of bilateral problems. We 
welcome their contributions to NATO 
defense and to peaceful solutions to 
common problems, both political and 
economic. Examples of these include 
the Belgian contribution to stability in 
Zaire and the Dutch contribution of 
troops for the U.N. forces in Lebanon. 
The Vice President's visit to the 
Netherlands in April underlined the 
importance we attach to that country 
and the rest of the Benelux. 

U.S. policy goals in Spain remain to 
support Spanish democracy and 
Spanish integration with the rest of 
Western Europe and to maintain our 
mutually beneficial security relation- 
ship. Our cooperation under the 1976 
treaty of friendship and cooperation 
contributes to the security of both na- 
tions and makes an important contribu- 
tion to the defense of Western Europe 
and the Mediterranean. 

Spain has made tremendous progress 
in its transition to democracy in the 
face of serious political and economic 
difficulties. Having adopted a new 
democratic constitution and carried out 
both national and local elections since 
December, the country is about to enter 
a challenging post-transition phase of 



political life in which fundamental 
issues — such as economic policy, basic 
implementing legislation, and regional 
autonomy — must be addressed. Of par- 
ticular seriousness is the problem of the 
continued, brutal terrorist campaign to 
destabilize Spanish democracy. 

Our support for Spain, as manifested 
by the Administration and the Con- 
gress, and by our close relationship, 
assists the Spanish people in their ef- 
forts to realize the democratic ideals 
we share. Secretary [of Defense] 
Brown visited Madrid in mid-May. On 
June 1, Secretary Vance cochaired a 
meeting of the U.S. -Spanish Council in 
Madrid and met with the King and the 
Prime Minister. 

U.S. relations with Portugal con- 
tinue to be excellent. Our governments' 
shared goals of democratic consolida- 
tion and professionalization of the 
military were recently highlighted and 
reinforced during visits to Portugal by 
Secretary Brown and Senator Edmund 
Muskie and a meeting between Secre- 
tary Vance and the Portuguese Foreign 
Minister at The Hague. Secretary 
Vance stopped in Lisbon, June 18-19 
to sign the extension of the Azores base 
agreement. 

With the May 30 passage of the 
budget, Portugal can also look forward 
to resuming negotiations with the IMF 
on a third credit tranche standby. The 
fourth constitutional government 
headed by Prime Minister Mota Pinto 
submitted its resignation on June 6 but 
will remain in caretaker status until a 
government is formed or elections are 
held. The debate over the formation of 
any future government is, however, 
distinguished by the continued firm 
commitment to the democratic process 
and by a common willingness to seek a 
reasonable compromise to solve pres- 
ent problems. 

Our important interests in Italy re- 
main what they have been since the 
war. Italy's strategic position in south- 
em Europe and the Mediterranean, its 
willingness to host American military 
bases dedicated to NATO, its nearly 
total support for American foreign 
policy positions, and its status as a 
major U.S. trading partner underscore 
the value of good U.S. -Italian rela- 
tions. 

Over the past year and a half, we 
have tried to reinforce our close re- 
lationship with Italy by pursuing a 
"strategy of cooperation" comprising 
concrete, mutually beneficial projects 
in such diverse fields as energy, health, 
and the environment. The program 
stresses medium- to long-range efforts 
to assist the Italians to solve their seri- 
ous problems, to solidify our relations 
for the future, and to take advantage of 



Italian expertise in areas where they are 
advanced, like solar energy. We have 
also encouraged high-level visits be- 
tween our two countries, the latest 
being that of Secretary Vance less than 
6 weeks ago. 

Elsewhere in the eastern Mediterra- 
nean, the United States continues to 
work for stability in the area, including 
good relations with Greece and Turkey, 
progress toward a Cyprus solution, and 
the general strengthening of democracy 
among the countries of the region. 
During the past year, there have been 
significant developments in all of these 
areas. 

With regard to Cyprus, the Admin- 
istration has been actively engaged 
over the past year in seeking to pro- 
mote an early and effective resumption 
of intercommunal negotiations. The 
centerpiece of this effort was the series 
of substantive suggestions that we 
submitted to the two Cypriot parties 
last November 10, in conjunction with 
the British and Canadian Governments. 
We are gratified that our efforts and the 
initiative undertaken by U.N. Secretary 
General Waldheim resulted in an 
agreement to resume intercommunal 
negotiations June 15. Unfortunately, 
these talks have run into temporary 
difficulties over the agenda and have 
now been recessed. 

We hope, however, that these dif- 
ficulties will be overcome soon and 
that we will see sustained and produc- 
tive negotiations leading to concrete 
progress toward a mutually acceptable 
settlement. As in past months, we will 
work closely with the United Nations, 
the Cypriot parties, and our allies to 
help insure the success of these talks. 

Turkey continues to be plagued by 
serious economic problems. We have 
worked to help solve them by propos- 
ing a substantial U.S. assistance pro- 
gram, as well as by working with other 
countries in a multilateral effort led by 
the Federal Republic of Germany to 
provide Turkey with needed foreign 
exchange so that necessary steps can be 
taken by the Turkish Government to 
start on the road to economic recovery. 
As I noted earlier, the multilateral ef- 
fort is proceeding well. 

Our security relationship with Tur- 
key has also improved. In response to 
the lifting of the arms embargo, the 
Turkish Government, on October 9, 
1978, authorized the resumption of 
U.S. military activities in Turkey. The 
authorization was for a I -year period 
during which a permanent arrangement 
for the operations of the activities is to 
be negotiated. Formal negotiations 
began on January 18, 1979, and are 
continuing. They involve several com- 
plex issues and much work remains to 



November 1979 



41 



be done, but we are confident that we 
will work out a mutually satisfactory 
agreement. 

Discussions are continuing within 
NATO to develop arrangements for the 
reintegration of Greek forces into the 
alliance's integrated military structure. 
As you know, Greece withdrew its 
forces in 1974 at the time of the Cyprus 
events. In the interim, there have been 
command changes on the southern 
flank which make necessary new com- 
mand and control arrangements in the 
sensitive Aegean area. The issue has 
been handled in NATO military chan- 
nels with Gen. [Alexander] Haig play- 
ing a key role in his capacity as Su- 
preme Allied Commander Europe. The 
retirement of Gen. Haig will not halt 
the process. As we have stated re- 
peatedly, we believe it is important to 
secure the return of Greek forces at the 
earliest possible time. 

Greece, in the meantime, is enjoying 
a continuing period of ecomonic vital- 
ity and democratic strength, as demon- 
strated by it signing a treaty of acces- 
sion to the European Communities. 
That development contributes to one of 
our major policy goals — stability in the 
vital eastern Mediterranean area. 

U.S. relations with Canada are ex- 
cellent. We enjoyed close working re- 
lations with the Trudeau government 
and look forward to continuing close 
cooperation with Prime Minister Joe 
Clark. We particularly value the co- 
operative approaches to the energy 
challenge which we have effected with 
the Canadians, as well as cooperation 
on such global concerns as the Cyprus 
dispute, southern Africa, the Mideast 
peace effort, and assistance for In- 
dochinese refugees. 

We are gratified by Prime Minister 
Clark's reaffirmation of Canada's 
commitment to NATO and the North 
American Air Defense Command 
(NORAD) and his indication that 
Canada should increase defense 
spending. Finally, we hope that 
longstanding differences on fisheries 
and boundary issues in the Gulf of 
Maine will be resolved by two treaties 
signed last March, agreements that we 
hope will be considered and approved 
promptly by the Senate. 

Our good relations with Switzerland 
have been bolstered in recent months 
by visits from the Swiss Minister of 
Defense, Gnaegi, and the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, Aubert. Both visits 
went smoothly. While reaffirming their 
own stance of armed neutrality, the 
Swiss have shown support for most as- 
pects of U.S. foreign policy. We have 
a modest but important defense re- 
lationship with them, including co- 



14th Report on Cyprus 



MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS, 
JULY 25, 1979' 

In accordance with the provisions of Public 
Law 95-384, I am submitting the following re- 
port on progress made during the past sixty 
days toward the conclusion of a negotiated so- 
lution of the Cyprus problem. 

In my last report to the Congress on Cyprus, 
dated June 4, I took note of the decision 
reached by President Kyprianou and Turkish 
Cypriot leader Denktash during their May 
18-19 meetings to resume intercommunal 
negotiations on June 15. These negotiations re- 
sumed as scheduled under the chairmanship of 
United Nations Under Secretary General Perez 
de Cuellar. A number of procedural issues were 
settled in the course of the first session. Un- 
fortunately, however, differences soon arose 
over the interpretation of the ten-point com- 
munique agreed upon in Nicosia on May 
18-19. which serves as a broad agenda for the 
talks The Greek Cypriots took the position that 
the Varosha issue should be discussed first in 
accordance with point five of the communique 
which states that "priority will be given to 
reaching agreement on the resettlement of Va- 
rosha." The Turkish Cypriots. on the other 
hand, maintained that point two of the com- 
munique, dealing with the overall basis for the 
talks, should be discussed first. 

When it became clear that these differences 
of approach could not easily be overcome. 
Under Secretary General Perez de Cuellar de- 
cided to recess the negotiations on June 22 and 
to pursue a compromise resolution through in- 
formal consultations with the parties. These 
consultations have now been in progress in 
Nicosia for some four weeks. As of this writ- 



ing, no firm date has been set for reconvening 
the talks, although there have been indications 
of greater flexibility and the elements of a so- 
lution are beginning to emerge. Our assessment 
is that given sufficient determination on the 
part of all concerned a practical way can be 
found out of these current difficulties that will 
permit the negotiators to return to the table 
within a short time. I assure you that this Ad- 
ministration will continue to work closely with 
the United Nations, the Cypriot parties and our 
allies both to overcome the present, hopefully 
temporary, difficulties and to help ensure ulti- 
mate success in the negotiations. 

The Turkish Cypriot side has not yet given 
final endorsement to the procedures worked out 
in Nicosia on May 18-19 concerning the for- 
mation of a joint committee to trace and ac- 
count for missing persons in Cyprus. With the 
assistance of expert organizations such as the 
International Red Cross, the proposed joint 
committee should be in a position to resolve 
this long-standing humanitarian problem. 

I enclose with this report a copy of 
Secretary-General Waldheim's comprehensive 
report on May 31 to the United Nations Secu- 
rity Council on the United Nations operation in 
Cyprus. 

Sincerely. 

Jimmy Carter D 



' Identical letters addressed to Thomas P. 
O'Neill. Jr., Speaker of the House of Repre- 
sentatives, and Frank Church, chairman of the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee (text from 
Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents 
of July 30. 1979). 



production arrangements for some U.S. 
weaponry. 

U.S. relations with Austria are es- 
sentially troublefree. We respect Aus- 
tria's neutrality under the 1955 state 
treaty; at the same time, we admire its 
democratic development and prosper- 
ity. We support the Austrian desire to 
make of Vienna a third U.N. city, and 
we are grateful for Austrian hospitality 
in connection with the summit confer- 
ence held there in June. 

U.S. relations with nonaligned Yu- 
goslavia have continued to improve 
across the board, as both sides have 
demonstrated a conscious effort to re- 
solve differences and to build a climate 
of trust for the present and the future. 
President Tito's state visit to Wash- 
ington in March 1978 provided the op- 
portunity for in-depth discussions. This 



dialogue has continued through a dozen 
or so letters between the two Presidents 
and through frequent consultations. 
Other Yugoslav visitors have included 
Assembly President Markovic and De- 
fense Secretary Ljubicic. From our 
side, several Cabinet-level officials 
have visited Yugoslavia or are planning 
to this year. 

In the economic area, we have made 
significant efforts to increase trade and 
to improve further the climate for U.S. 
business in Yugoslavia. The United 
States is Yugoslavia's fourth largest 
trade partner and is first in the value of 
joint ventures, but we are convinced 
that both trade and investment can be 
increased further. 

In scientific affairs, the two sides re- 
cently reviewed the achievements of 
the joint science and technology pro- 



42 



Department of State Bulletin 



gram over the past 5 years, but the fu- 
ture of this highly successful program 
is clouded by the prospect that the 
United States may be forced to cut its 
contribution to about one-third of the 
level of the past 5 years. 

On the cultural side, Joan Mondale 
recently opened a major exhibit of 
American arts in Belgrade. Mrs. Mon- 
dale also visited the earthquake- 
stricken Republic of Montenegro. Fol- 
lowing the severe earthquake, April 15, 
the United States mobilized a major 
disaster relief effort which resulted in 
the prompt delivery of nearly $1.3 mil- 
lion worth of relief supplies. We are 
currently in the process of working out 
a program of longer term rehabilitation 
and reconstruction assistance. 

All of this activity is in support of a 
policy which has remained consistent 
through every Administration since 
1948: We support Yugoslavia's inde- 
pendence, territorial integrity, and 
unity. But, in addition, we are trying to 
move our relations toward broader in- 
terchange, mutual understanding, and 
confidence. 

Evolution of East- West Relations 

Much that the United States pursues 
with the nations of Western Europe, 
Canada, and Yugoslavia reflects our 
shared interest in fostering improved 
East-West relations. The Carter Ad- 
ministration has devoted substantial 
high-level attention to this area of con- 
cern. Since I understand that you will 
be holding separate hearings on U.S. 
relations with the Soviet Union and 
SALT, I will focus on U.S. policy to- 
ward Eastern Europe. 

We are grateful to this subcommittee 
for your initiative in convening hear- 
ings last year on recent developments 
and trends in Eastern Europe. The 
statement which then Deputy Assistant 
Secretary Luers presented to you, Sep- 
tember 7, remains valid as a com- 
prehensive account of U.S. policy and 
objectives toward the region. As Mr. 
Luers indicated then, we are mindful of 
the increased diversity in Eastern 
Europe and, at the same time, of the 
importance of contributing to the secu- 
rity of all of Europe in pursuing our 
policies. Thus, we intend neither to 
leave our relations with Eastern Europe 
hostage to relations with the Soviet 
Union nor to conduct a policy that is 
reckless and destabilizing. 

In Eastern Europe, we have con- 
tinued to make progress toward more 
normal relations with individual coun- 
tries. We have expanded and inten- 
sified human contacts, trade, cultural 
and scientific exchanges, and discus- 
sions of political and security issues. 



Our approach is designed to recog- 
nize and support the sovereignty and 
individuality of each Eastern European 
nation in its domestic and foreign af- 
fairs. 

During the past 18 months, our rela- 
tions with Romania, Poland, and 
Hungary have been particularly active 
and fruitful. For example, with Ro- 
mania, which pursues an independent 
foreign policy in many respects, we 
have conducted a useful dialogue on a 
broad range of international political 
and economic issues. These discussions 
were given special impetus during 
President Ceausescu's visit here in 
April 1978 and by subsequent visits to 
Romania by Secretaries Blumenthal 
[Treasury] and Kreps [Commerce]. 

With Poland, official and nongov- 
ernmental exchanges continue to de- 
velop, and the level of our two-way 
trade rose to over $1 billion last year. 
Earlier this week, Polish Foreign 
Minister Emil Wojtaszek visited 
Washington for an extensive review of 
bilateral and international issues. And, 
U.S. -Hungarian relations continued to 
improve, as demonstrated by successful 
conclusion last year of a bilateral trade 
agreement extending most favored na- 
tion tariff treatment to the exports of 
both countries. 

With Czechoslovakia our first pri- 
ority continues to be a satisfactory res- 
olution of the nationalization claims of 
U.S. citizens. Following consultations 
with the Congress, we hope to be able 
to initiate new talks on this longstand- 
ing problem in the coming months. 

Our relations with Bulgaria have 
continued to show gradual improve- 
ment, although progress in family 
reunification has been slower than we 
had hoped. 

The United States is continuing to 
try to develop improved relations with 
the German Democratic Republic. 
We recently completed negotiation of a 
consular convention with the G.D.R. in 
which, to our satisfaction and that of 
the F.R.G., we successfully defended 
the position that there is a single Ger- 
man nationality. When the convention 
has been signed, the way will be open 
for some modest development of our 
relations with the G.D.R. For example, 
the G.D.R. will then be allowed to 
open two trade offices in New York. 
We will continue to stress claims, our 
desire for more action on divided fam- 
ily cases, and the need for a general 
improvement in their emigration 
record. 

Of course, we continue to have cer- 
tain fundamental differences with the 
governments of the Eastern European 
countries. We are concerned about the 
lack of democratic institutions, about 



uneven observance of human rights, 
and issues such as divided families and - 
denial of freedom of movement which 
directly affect many American citizens. 
But, it is also clear that the expansion 
of U.S. relations with these countries 
has enhanced our ability to talk can- 
didly with their governments about 
these and other issues. 

During the past months, for exam- 
ple, we have had constructive consul- 
tations with Eastern European govern- 
ments concerning further progress in 
implementing all aspects of the Hel- 
sinki Final Act, and we expect to con- 
tinue to use these bilateral exchanges 
as we approach the Madrid Review 
Conference for the Conference on Se- 
curity and Cooperation in Europe 
(CSCE). 

Indeed, continuing attention to the 
CSCE process has been an integral part 
of U.S. policy in the area of East-West 
relations. Our objective in the CSCE is 
to achieve full implementation of the 
Helsinki Final Act and thereby reduce 
international tensions, improve observ- 
ance of human rights, and solve some 
of the human problems caused by the 
political differences among European 
states. Progress has been slow, and 
there have been many setbacks. Yet, 
we have seen some effort by all sig- 
natories to implement the Final Act and 
thus believe that sustained attention to 
carrying out the commitments undertak- 
en in Helsinki will have a positive 
effect. 

The first meeting for review of im- 
plementation, held in Belgrade, ended 
in March 1978. That meeting achieved 
our major aim of providing a full and 
complete review of the follow-through 
of the Helsinki accords. The time since 
the Belgrade meeting has been devoted 
to a series of experts meetings; to pre- 
pare a scientific forum; to discuss 
peaceful settlement of disputes; and to 
consider economic, cultural, and sci- 
entific cooperation in the Mediterra- 
nean. 

In addition the United States, its al- 
lies, and the other participating states 
in the CSCE have now turned their at- 
tention fully to the review meeting to 
be held in Madrid in 1980. The United 
States has held bilateral consultations, 
using the Final Act as a framework, 
with Austria, Bulgaria, Finland, the 
German Democratic Republic, Hun- 
gary, Poland, Romania, Spain, and 
Switzerland. Consultations were re- 
cently held with Yugoslavia and Swe- 
den. We have also had the first of a 
long series of discussions on the Ma- 
drid meeting in NATO. We anticipate 
that these consultations will continue 
throughout the period leading to 
Madrid. 



November 1979 



43 



At that meeting, the United States 
favors seeking a review of implemen- 
tation of the Final Act and considera- 
tion of a limited number of new pro- 
posals. Any new proposals should be 
balanced to reflect the major concerns 
of the Final Act. We should not favor, 
for example, adopting new proposals in 
the military area without including new 
humanitarian measures. 



Conclusion 

Concern with security and the im- 
portance of the individual brings me 
full circle in this tour d'horizon of 
U.S .-European relations. Several 
points of particular import emerge from 
this summary of Western military se- 
curity. Western economic well-being, 
bilateral relations with individual na- 
tions, and the evolution of East-West 
relations. 

First, U.S. objectives in Europe are 
clear. We have a firm sense of overall 
direction and priority. We consider 
U.S. relations with Europe the cor- 
nerstone of American foreign policy. 
Through pursuit of shared aspirations 
with the nations of Western Europe and 
Canada, we seek to assure strong de- 
fense and fullest possible economic and 
political opportunity for our citizens. 
Through promotion of detente with the 
countries of Eastern Europe and the 
Soviet Union, we try to curtail danger- 
ous competition and expand construc- 
tive cooperation. 

Second, active and sustained pursuit 
of these goals has helped serve impor- 
tant U.S. interests. Relations with the 
nations of Western Europe and Canada 
are sound. Although much of the rest 
of the world is torn by turmoil, there is 
institutional stability and a sense of 
communal progress in the west. Since I 
last met with you for a review of 
U.S. -European relations, there have 
been elections in 10 European coun- 
tries. Transitions have been orderly, 
both in terms of the changing of guard 
from one government to the next and in 
terms of continuing American coopera- 
tion with the new heads of government. 
For the first time in its history, all 
members of NATO are democracies. 
We have resisted retrenchment into na- 
tional reaction to challenges that trans- 
cend borders. We have, instead, 
reached out to work together on mutual 
problems for mutual benefit. It is for 
that reason that NATO is strong and 
growing stronger and that we have re- 
sisted the worst protectionist pressures 
in a generation in order to try together 
to shape a healthier world economy. At 
the same time, we have achieved con- 
tinuing success in building more nor- 
mal relations with Eastern Europe — 



relations that reflect the diversity of the 
area, our interest in security, and our 
concerns with fundamental human 
rights. 

Third, we recognize that, despite 
some achievements to date, much re- 
mains to be done. The problems before 
us — most notably those in the area of 
economics and energy and those in the 
sphere of East-West relations — are 
complex. Bilateral frictions persist. 
Uncertainties exist within some Euro- 
pean nations, especially those in the 
Mediterranean area. We are, however, 
determined to persist in the pursuit of 
vital U.S. objectives. And. we feel 
confident that we can succeed. As 
Secretary Vance stated in his address 
before the Royal Institute of Interna- 
tional Affairs in London on December 
9. 1978: 

We have passed through a particularly dif- 
ficult period during the 1970's. But we have 
navigated these turbulent waters. Although the 
course ahead remains demanding, the progress 
we have made should give us great confidence 
in our future. O 



' The complete transcript of the hearings will 
be published by the committee and will be 
available from the Superintendent of Docu- 
ments, U.S. Government Printing Office, 
Washington, D.C. 20402. 



Fisheries Agreement 
With Dentnark^ 
Faroe Islands 



On September 5, 1979, representa- 
tives of the Government of the United 
States of America on the one part, and 
the Government of Denmark and the 
Home Government of the Faroe Islands 
on the other part, signed a new agree- 
ment relating to fishing activities of the 
Faroe Islands off the coasts of the 
United States. 

The agreement sets out the arrange- 
ments between the countries which will 
govern fishing by Faroese vessels 
within the fishery conservation zone of 
the United States. The agreement will 
come into force after the completion of 
internal procedures by the govern- 
ments. D 



Press release 215 of Sept. 5. 1979. 



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44 



Department of State Bulletin 



MIDDLE EAST: Vision of Poace 



by Zbignk'H' Brzezinski 

Address before the World Jewish 
Congress in New York City on Sep- 
tember 17, 1979. Mr. Brzezinski is As- 
sistant to the President for National 
Security Affairs. ' 

We meet at an historic moment. One 
year ago tonight, President Carter, 
Prime Minister Begin, and President 
Sadat signed the Camp David accords. 
The electrifying meeting in the White 
House East Room culminated 13 days 
of the most intensive diplomatic nego- 
tiation in history. It marked the first 
moment, in 30 years of efforts, when 
people could truly say: Yes, peace is 
possible in the Middle East. 

President Carter spoke that night for 
all Americans: 

We are privileged to witness tonight a sig- 
nificant achievement in the cause of peace, an 
achievement none thought possible a year ago. 
or even a month ago. an achievement that re- 
flects the courage and wisdom of these two 
leaders. 

And I may say, as one privileged to 
have participated at Camp David, that 
none of this would have been possible 
without the courage and wisdom of that 



begun. Last March 26, for the first 
time in its history, Israel at last found 
itself at peace — a real peace — with one 
of its neighbors. I can only tell you that 
nothing I have ever experienced can 
compare with that moment at the air- 
port in Cairo, when President Carter 
lifted the phone to tell Prime Minister 
Begin that peace was finally within 
grasp. It was an extraordinary triumph 
of statesmanship, of personal courage, 
of vision — a triumph shared by Presi- 
dent Carter, Prime Minister Begin, and 
President Sadat. 

I felt deep pride in all three men for 
what they alone, in a long line of lead- 
ers of these three nations, had accom- 
plished for the people of Israel, for the 
people of Egypt, and — I believe — 
ultimately for all the peoples of the 
Middle East. "No more war, no more 
bloodshed, no more bereave- 
ment." — the words of Prime Minister 
Begin at the treaty signing — "Peace 
unto you — shalom, salaam forever." 

Negotiations on 
Palestinian Autonomy 

Yet even as we rejoiced, all of us, at 
the new state of peace between Israel 
and Egypt, we knew that the task was 



The time has come, too, for all Palestinians to accept fully, and in 
good faith, U.N. Resolutions 242 and 338 and Israel's right to exist; 
the time is fast approaching when the Palestinians should enter the 
autonomy negotiations. . . . 



third great leader — the President of the 
United States, Jimmy Carter. 

We are also here tonight because we 
share a common commitment to the 
future of Israel, to its security, and a 
common commitment to peace. The 
United States and Israel share some- 
thing that today is particularly impor- 
tant — a belief that human society must 
be able to devise ways for the peaceful 
resolution of disputes, whether within 
each country, or between them and 
their neighbors. The peoples of both 
countries are passionately committed to 
peace — and there is no higher calling 
in either country than that of 
peacemaker. 

The United States today is at peace; 
Israel has enjoyed but few moments of 
peace. Yet tangible progress has 



not done; that it was important to move 
ahead with the other half of the Camp 
David agreements — a peaceful solution 
for the West Bank and Gaza. 

This task is more difficult than the 
first: the questions it raises are, at first 
glance, more opaque; the stakes for 
Israel, its neighbors, and for a lasting 
peace throughout the region clearly are 
far higher. 

In this process, all the parties are 
challenged to exercise the same wis- 
dom and foresight that brought the 
dramatic visit of President Sadat to 
Jerusalem and led to the Camp David 
accords, with all their hopes for the 
future. The time has come, too, for all 
Palestinians to accept fully, and in 
good faith, U.N. Resolutions 242 and 
338 and Israel's right to exist; the time 



is fast approaching when the Palestin- 
ians should enter the autonomy negoti- 
ations to help determine their own 
future — though their unwillingness to 
enter must not be permitted to delay the 
Israeli-Egyptian-U.S. talks. 

And we all must seek to avoid any 
impediments to peace that lie in the 
way: whether by continued building of 
settlements on the West Bank, which 
plays so directly into the hands of those 
who argue that Israel does not genu- 
inely desire an agreement; or by the use 
of Lebanon for terrorist attacks on Is- 
rael; or by the retaliatory devastation of 
that helpless country. 

Israel, meanwhile, has a right to ar- 
rangements that will guarantee its se- 
curity. Yet, in securing this right, in 
demanding full recognition as a Middle 
East state, Israel also bears a responsi- 
bility to reach out to the Palestinians in 
new and creative ways. The Israeli na- 
tion, which has suffered so much and 
worked so hard to gain acceptance in 
the region, must also be prepared to 
accept legitimate Palestinian rights and 
to interpret the Camp David accords on 
the West Bank and Gaza both gener- 
ously and with wise attention to the 
needs of an enduring peace with the 
Palestinian people; all, of course, with 
due regard for Israel's genuine security 
needs. 

Representatives of the three Camp 
David countries — Minister Burg, Prime 
Minister Khalil, and Ambassador 
Strauss — are striving to make the 
negotiations on autonomy succeed. 
Each carries the mandate of his gov- 
ernment to make them succeed, and 
each carries with him the hopes and 
prayers of his people. 

Bob Strauss has just returned from 
the Middle East to report that those 
talks are progressing on track and 
ahead of schedule. They are full of 
promise, and full of the basic good will 
and mutual trust that are vital to carry- 
ing on the great work of peace. At the 
same time, the Treaty of Peace between 
Israel and Egypt is no longer just 
words. It is turning into facts — facts 
that should prove to all the joint com- 
mitment of these countries to both the 
letter and spirit of the Camp David ac- 
cords, in their entirety. 

Meanwhile, Prime Minister Begin 
and President Sadat are building upon 
their own unique friendship: leaders of 
once bitter enemies who know that to 
build peace is to build for the future of 



November 1979 



45 



their peoples, that '"to the counsellors 
of peace is joy." [Proverbs 12:20] 

I have no doubt that success will 
crown their efforts as they work along- 
side the United States. And I have no 
doubt that these first steps toward res- 
olution of the Palestinian problem will 
be followed by a continuing process of 
peacemaking between Israel and all of 
its other neighbors — with Jordan, with 
Syria, with Lebanon. I can reaffirm to 
you tonight: President Carter is totally 
committed to the attainment of peace in 
the Middle East. There will be peace 
for all; there will be security for all. 

This will take time, it will take vi- 
sion, it will take courage. And it will 
take an understanding of the conse- 
quences if we do not all join together to 
seek a broad, lastmg, and comprehen- 
sive peace in the Middle East. 

No one needs to remind an Israeli 
mother, wife, or child of the legacy of 
conflict: four wars in 30 years; casual- 
ties in a mere 2 weeks of 1973 which in 
proportion nearly equaled U.S. losses 
in all of World War II; and the knowl- 
edge that modern warfare is increas- 
ingly costly, in lives and in living 
standards, whoever the ultimate victor. 

There has been no more touching 
moment than that last May when Prime 
Minister Begin, President Sadat, and 
Secretary Vance stood at El Arish be- 
fore battle-scarred veterans of Middle 
East wars — from both Israel and Egypt. 
This meeting was the surest reminder 
that it must not happen again. And I 
will always remember the moment at 
my table at the White House, at the 
dinner following the peace-signing 
ceremony, when President Sadat's 
daughter embraced the wounded son of 
General Weizman, and the tears that 1 
saw in the General's eyes. 

No one needs to remind the people 
of Israel — or of Egypt or of other Mid- 
dle East states — of the economic and 
human costs of continually having to 
pile arms upon arms, instead of devot- 
ing a greater proportion of precious re- 
sources to the benefit of people. No 
one needs to be reminded of the risks 
of instability in the Middle East that 
are posed by the absence or breakdown 
of an effort to build peace; or of the 
continual risks that outsiders will 
exploit instability for their own ends; 
or of the moral and social conse- 
quences of a failure by each party to 
recognize the full legitimate rights of 
the others. 

The path of peace is not just a way 
chosen from a host of options. It is the 
only way if we — all of us — are to fulfill 
our grave responsibilities both to our 
own people and to others. True, lasting 
security for Israel and for its neighbors 
cannot come from a constant state of 



tension, however well protected by 
strength of arms. True security can 
come only through efforts that set in 
train real and positive changes in the 
hearts of people; changes built not on 
war but on the patient work of politics 
and diplomacy and human wisdom. 

The Objective of Peace 

Today we are all preoccupied with 
the details of building on the Camp 
David agreements, with individual 
steps in diplomacy, or with continuing 
conflict taking place in Lebanon or 
violence which originates from Leba- 
non. The stakes are too high for it to be 
otherwise. But at the same time, we 
must also cast our minds forward, be- 
yond momentary issues, to the pos- 
sibilities that lie ahead. These are the 
possibilities of peace itself. 

I believe that to understand the his- 
toric moment that is before us, in pa- 
tiently and progressively building a 
comprehensive peace in the Middle 
East, we should be guided by a vision 
of what that peace can bring. And in 
developing such a vision, we can better 
understand what we are striving for and 
the need to press onward. 

1 was enormously impressed by what 
Prime Minister Begin told me once 
about his great teacher, Vladimir 
Jabotinski. He said that Jabotinski in- 
sisted that one should always focus on 
the ultimate great objective, define it 
clearly, and never lose sight of it in 
one's actions. Otherwise, one runs the 
risk of becoming absorbed by details, 
preoccupied with the passions of the 
moment, and ultimately diverted from 
one's own great objective. Our objec- 
tive, everyone's objective in the Mid- 
dle East, must be a final and com- 
prehensive peace — perhaps not this 
year, or the next, but surely a peace 
and nothing less. What is our vision of 
it? What will it mean? 

For the people of Israel a final, com- 
prehensive peace will mean not just ac- 
ceptance but friendship from its neigh- 
bors in the Middle East — a goal of 
many decades to rend the walls of this 
modern ghetto, which isolates those 
without as well as those within. 

Peace will mean a chance to turn a 
far higher proportion of Israeli talents 
and energies away from the tasks of se- 
curity to the task of continuing to build 
one of the most creative societies of all 
times — in the words of Isaiah, to 
"make a way in the wilderness, and 
rivers in the desert." [Isaiah 43:19] 
And it will mean an end to anxiety, the 
anxiety that has produced great cour- 
age, but ultimately debilitates a society 
and detracts from the full enjoyment of 
simple human pleasures and the full 



Saudi Arabian 
Oii Production 



WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, 
SEPT. 26, 1979' 

We have received official confirma- 
tion of today's reports that the Gov- 
ernment of Saudi Arabia intends to 
continue production of 9.5 million 
barrels of oil per day — 1 million barrels 
above its established limit — for 3 more 
months. 

President Carter welcomes this deci- 
sion as "a constructive complement to 
the efforts of the oil-importing nations 
to curb consumption and switch to 
other fuels." 

"I hope no one will take this news as 
a signal to relax the effort that each 
citizen must make to ease our demand 
on a limited world supply of oil," the 
President said. 

Continued high production by Saudi 
Arabia and several other countries will 
relieve concern about the adequacy of 
oil supplies this winter. It will permit 
full restoration of oil inventories drawn 
down after Iranian oil exports were 
halted last winter and subsequently re- 
duced to about half their usual volume. 
It should help to stabilize prices in the 
world oil market. D 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of Presi- 
dential Documents of Oct. 1. 1979. 



unleashing of creative human en- 
deavors. 

For the United States in its relations 
with Israel, a final peace will enable us 
to build even further upon the close ties 
that bind us together. Our relations will 
not be punctuated in public discussion 
by the disagreements and doubts that 
from time to time arise. It will be pos- 
sible for us both to concentrate on and 
enhance that genuine relationship 
which is based upon trust, common un- 
derstanding, and shared commitment to 
promote the best that mankind has ever 
had to offer. These two great dem- 
ocratic peoples will be able to see 
each other always for that fact itself; 
instead of too often forgetting what we 
agree upon in momentary concern 
about our differences. 

At the same time, the United States 
will continue to broaden its relations 
and deepen its friendship with Arab 
states, to the benefit of all. It is both in 
the fundamental U.S. national interest 



46 



Department of State Bulletin 



— and also Israel's — that the Arab na- 
tions in the Middle East be moderate, 
friendly to the West, and also secure. 

For Israel, the West Bank, and 
Gaza — all a land of prophecy and of 
the Bible — the vision of peace means 
nothing less than the sharing of a 
hopeful future by two peoples that are, 
in fact, united more by a common past 
than by past hostility; two peoples that 
have suffered so much, that have a 
right to a secure existence that dignifies 
the individual and enshrines their dis- 
tinctive religious and historical tradi- 
tions. It means peace for a land on 
ground undivided by barbed wire, by 
frontier posts, even if colored some- 
what differently on the map; a land in 
which all people can move freely, pray 
wherever they wish, and work without 
prejudice because of their national or 
religious identity. 

As Shimon Peres said in the Knesset, 
while President Carter was there: 

For over 10 years, we and over a million 
Palestinians have lived here side by side. We 
know they do not want us to rule them. They 
should also know that we do not want to rule 
them either. We have learned to appreciate their 
national uniqueness and I hope they have 
learned to appreciate our democracy. We want 
to discuss with them a new future — good 
neighborhood and security for both them and 
us. 

A final peace can also make possible 
the fruition of the shared interests of 
the peoples of the Middle East. Except 
for what is beginning to happen be- 
tween Israel and Egypt, cooperation 
between Israel and its neighbors in the 
development of the region today is im- 
possible. It will not come easily to- 
morrow unless and until there is also a 
fundamental awareness of the basic 
equality and mutual respect that is 
contained in the concept of peace it- 



Lvtter of Credence 



On July 24, 1979, Faisal Alhegelan 
presented his credentials to President 
Carter as the newly appointed Ambas- 
sador from Saudi Arabia. D 



self. But this cooperation can come 
with patience, and effort, and a healing 
of the memories of conflict and past 
grievances. It can unlock the human 
and material wealth of this productive 
region, and provide shared benefits to 
enrich the lives of all its people. 

Peace in the region will then make 
possible genuinely cooperative ven- 
tures designed to enhance regional eco- 
nomic development. The Israelis and 
the Palestinians are among the most 
advanced, best trained peoples of that 
region, and they have much to contrib- 
ute to regional development. The Is- 
raelis and the Palestinians — whatever 
respective arrangements between them 
develop from the peace process — can 
transform their ancient lands into a 
thriving community of economic and 
social interest in the Middle East; into 
a model for others; into nothing less, in 
fact, than the catalyst for creative de- 
velopment, for intellectual and tech- 
nological innovation for a region that is 
bursting with opportunity and that is 
crying for peace. 

And such peace in turn will make 
genuine regional security possible. 
Such security is the rightful require- 
ment of every people living in that re- 
gion. Security for Israel, and also for 
its neighbors, will mean security from 
internal terrorism, security from exter- 
nal terrorism, security from radical 
subversion, and security from foreign 
intervention. With peace, and the 
friendship that it will generate between 
the peoples who live in the Middle East 
and the West, the United States will be 
in an even better position to help pro- 
vide security assurance and effective 
protection from external intervention 
and thereby help all concerned to gain 
both the spiritual and economic bene- 
fits of genuine peace. 

You and I know that there are some 
who fear peace; there are some who 
prefer violence and hatred; there are 
some who see benefits for themselves 
ideologically, and in terms of power 
politics, from continued hostility be- 
tween the Arabs and Israelis. Yet 
progress toward peace can be a source 
of powerful magnetic attraction; and 
peace is clearly an attainable vision, 
however difficult the way there, how- 
ever challenging the problems that will 
inevitably have to be overcome. 



I7J§I. Ambassadors 
to Ifiiddie East 

Countries^ 
October 1979 



Algeria — Ulric St. Clair Haynes. Jr. 

Bahrain — Robert H Pelletreau, Jr. 

Egypt — Alfred L, Atherton. Jr. 

Iran — Vacant 

Israel — Samuel W. Lewis 

Jordan — Nicholas A. Veliotes 

Kuwait — Francois M Dickman 

Lebanon — John Gunther Dean 

Libya — Vacant 

Morocco — Richard B Parker 

Oman— Marshall W Wiley 

Qatar — Andrew I. Killgore 

Saudi Arabia — John C. West 

Syria — Talcott W. Seelye 

Tunisia — Stephen W Bosworth 

United Arab Emirates — William D. Wolle 

Yemen Arab Republic — George M. Lane D 



What I have just sketched is a per- 
sonal vision of what a final peace can 
mean to the region and, indeed, for a 
world removed from the threat of Mid- 
dle East conflicts that can spread to 
other parts of the globe. It should give 
us heart to carry on with the work of 
the moment; with the Camp David ac- 
cords, with the patient and often unre- 
warding work of diplomacy; with plan- 
ning for the future beyond. 

This is a challenge to each of us — to 
those of us who serve in government 
and to members of organizations like 
the World Jewish Congress, with your 
special insights and concerns. None of 
us should have any illusions about the 
work that is ahead of us, the real risks 
for peace that each party to the conflict 
must take; but none of us should ever 
be without hope hope that can lead us 
to our common goal. In the words of 
the Psalm, "peace shall be upon Is- 
rael," and we can add, "and upon its 
neighbors, as well." D 



' Text from White House press release of 
Sept. 17. 1979. 



November 1979 



47 



Anniversary of the 
Camp David Agreements 



PRESIDENT CARTER'S 

STATEMENT, 

SEPT. 17, 1979' 

One year ago today, on vSeptember 
17, 1978, Prime Minister Begin of Is- 
rael, President Sadat of Egypt, and 1 
returned from Camp David with an 
agreement establishing the Framework 
for Peace in the Middle East. We be- 
lieved then that we had reached an 
historic turning point in the bitter his- 
tory of that long-suffering region. One 
short year later, that belief has become 
a firm reality. 

After 30 years of hosility and war, 
Israel is truly at peace with its largest 
Arab neighbor. The relations between 
them are improving daily. The provi- 
sions of the Treaty of Peace are being 
carried out precisely and on schedule. 

This peace is no longer words on 
paper. It is now facts on the ground and 
faith in the hearts of millions of 
people. This remarkable change — from 
war to peace, from hostility to 
friendship — was clearly visible in the 
recent visit by President Sadat to 
Haifa, where he was received with 
genuine warmth and enthusiasm by the 
people and the leaders of Israel. Such 
events, which would have seemed 
amazing — even unthinkable — until the 
very recent past, are now accepted al- 
most as routine. That is itself a meas- 
ure of how far we have traveled along 
the road to peace. 

So it is worth remembering on this 
occasion what an extraordinary change 
in attitudes has taken place. The suc- 
cesses of Egypt and Israel so far in 
overcoming three decades of animosity 
give us renewed confidence in facing 
the difficult tasks which remain. 

Our goal has always been the estab- 
lishment of a comphrehensive peace in 
which Israel could at last live in secu- 
rity and tranquillity with all its neigh- 
bors. The Camp David accords are a 
long step on that path. We do not 
underestimate the difficulties that lie 
ahead, but we knew from the outset 
that the road would be hard and rocky. 
And looking back today at the solid 
achievements of the past year, we are 
justified in keeping our eyes firmly on 
the goal of peace rather than in heeding 
the inevitable cries that say peace can- 
not be achieved. 

The peace process outlined at Camp 
David 1 year ago is alive and well. The 
talks on full autonomy for the West 
Bank and Gaza are proceeding on 



schedule, in an atmosphere of good 
will and serious cooperation. 1 am 
confident those talks will succeed. 
Their progress is a tribute to the vision 
and courage of President Sadat. Prime 
Minister Begin, and the people of their 
two great nations. 

Over the coming months it will be 
our common task to continue demon- 
strating that peace does work and, by 
the evidence of our deeds, to convince 
other nations and leaders to join with 
us in this quest for lasting peace, secu- 
rity, and the opportunity for productive 
lives for all the people of the Middle 
East. 

SECRETARY VANCE'S 
STATEMENT, 
SEPT. 17, 1979 

One year ago today the historic 
agreements between Egypt and Israel 



reached at Camp David were signed in 
the White House by President Sadat 
and Prime Minister Begin and was wit- 
nessed by President Carter. All of us 
who were privileged to participate in 
those negotiations continue to feel a 
deep sense of gratification and admira- 
tion for the three leaders whose vision 
led to that achievement. 

It is important today to reflect on 
how much farther we have come in the 
year since the Camp David accords 
were signed. The commitments made I 
year ago are being carried out scrupu- 
lously. 

The Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty 
has been signed and is being im- 
plemented as agreed with dedication 
and in a spirit of cooperation by both 
sides. The world can see the practical 
results that have been achieved. Israeli 
military forces are being withdrawn — 
zone by zone — and the foundations are 
being laid for normalization of rela- 
tions. 

The relationship between Egypt and 
Israel is beginning to broaden and 
deepen. As this relationship matures, it 
will demonstrate that agreements will 
be kept. It will show not only that 



MESSAGE FROM 

PRIME MINISTER BEGIN^ 

On this the first anniversary of the 
Camp David agreement signed in 
Washington on September 17th I vividly 
recall the wonderful hospitality which 
you and your gracious lady accorded to 
my wife, my colleagues and myself 
during those 1.^ days of the momentous 
conference. I remember well the ses- 
sions, the strong debates, the mutual 
convincing, the difficulties we all had to 
overcome, the weighing of every sen- 
tence and word and ultimately the joy of 
achieving the understanding which be- 
came the basis of an historic agreement. 
Out of it the treaty of peace between 
Egypt and Israel, certainly a turning 
point in the annals of the Middle East 
emerged and the positive concept of full 
autonomy for the Palestinian Arabs, in- 
habitants of Judea, Samaria and Gaza 
District was brought forth. 

You, Mr. President, did your utmost 
by your own hard work to make these 
agreements possible, allow me, there- 
fore, on this memorable anniversary to 
thank you from the heart for the great 
assistance rendered to both Egypt and 
Israel in achieving a rapprochement 
between two countries which for thirty 
one years, were in a state of war, and 
which have now concluded peace, the 
first step towards a general and com- 
prehensive settlement in the Middle 
East. 



There are people who do not yet ap- 
preciate the value of this moral interna- 
tional achievement, but many millions 
of women and men of goodwill will re- 
joice together with us in this accom- 
plishment. Their blessings are our joy 
and the source of satisfaction. 

Accept, Mr. President, my deepest 
gratitude for all you have done with such 
great devotion in the service of peace. 

Yours respectfully and sincerely, 

Menahem Begin 



MESSAGE FROM 
PRESIDENT SADAT^ 

This afternoon I have issued a presi- 
dential statement expressing my views 
on the first anniversary of the signature 
of the Camp David agreements. On this 
occasion I wish to express my deep 
feelings and thanks for your personal 
contribution to this historical event, I am 
confident that these agreements, which 
have been the first steps toward a com- 
prehensive peace, will help bring a so- 
lution to the Palestinian question in all 
its aspects. The role of the U.S. as a full 
partner in the peace process will remain 
a key element in our mutual efforts to 
achieve a just and lasting peace in the 
Middle East. 

Sincerely. 

Anwar al-Sadat 



48 



Department of State Bulletin 



MILITARY AFFAIRS: Deionse 
Btidgets for F\ 1980 and 1981 



MESSAGE TO 
THE CONGRESS, 
SEPT. 11, 1979' 



I am sure you agree with me Ihal we cannot 
effectively safeguard U.S. legitimate interests 
abroad nor pursue safely peace, justice and 
order at home unless our national security is 
protected by adequate defenses. The funda- 
mental responsibility of the President — a re- 
sponsibility shared with Congress — is to maln- 
lam defenses adequate to provide for the na- 
tional security of the United Stales, In meeting 
that responsibility, this Administration moved 
promptly and vigorously to reverse the down- 
ward trend in U.S. defense efforts. This is 
demonstrated by an examination of the trends 
in real defense expenditures since the mid 
1960s. At NATO Summits in May 1977 and 
1978 we persuaded our allies to join with us in 
endorsing a goal three percent real annual 
growth in defense outlays and an ambitious 
Long Term Defense Program for the Alliance. 
Together these represented a turning point, not 
only for the United States, but the whole Al- 
liance 

For our pari, we moved promptly to act on 
this resolve We authorized production of 
XM-1 tanks; we greatly increased the number 
of anti-tank guided missiles; we deployed 
F-I5s and additional F-llls lo Europe, along 
with equipment for additional ground forces. 
We reduced the backlog of ships in overhaul 
and settled contractual disputes thai threatened 
to hall shipbuilding progress. In strategic sys- 



tems, we accelerated development and began 
procurement of long range air-launched cruise 
missiles, began the deployment of Trident I 
missiles, and have begun the modernization of 
our ICBM force with the commitment to deploy 
the MX missile in a survivable basing mode for 
It 

These and other initiatives were the building 
blocks for a determined program to assure that 
the United Sates remains militarily strong. The 
FY 1980 budget submission of last January was 
designed to continue that program. In sub- 
sequent months, however, inflation has run at 
higher levels than those assumed in the cost 
calculations associated with that defense pro- 
gram Accordingly. I plan to send promptly to 
the Congress a defense budget amendment to 
restore enough funds to continue In FY 1980 to 
carry out the Administration's defense program 
based on our current best estimate of the infla- 
tion that will be experienced during the fiscal 
year. Although the detailed calculations needed 
to prepare an amendment are still in progress. I 
expect that the amount of the amendment will 
be about $2.7 billion In Budget Authority 
above the Administration's January 1979 
budget request. 

Correcting for inflation is not enough in it- 
self to assure that we continue an adequate de- 
fense program through FY 1980. We must also 
have the program and the funds authorized and 
appropriated, substantially as they were sub- 
milted. Therefore, in the course of Congres- 
sional consideration of the second budget res- 
olution. I will support ceilings for the National 



Camp David (Cont'd) 

peace can be achieved but that it can 
last. 

The new round of negotiations fore- 
seen at Camp David also began on 
schedule. Today, for the first time in 
the more than 30-year-old Arab-Israeli 
conflict, a mechanism exists for begin- 
ning to resolve issues of concern to the 
Palestinians. These current negotiations 
on an agreement to provide full au- 
tonomy for the inhabitants of the West 
Bank and Gaza are gaining momentum. 

On this anniversary, all of my col- 
leagues and 1 join President Carter in 



committing ourselves to a redoubled 
effort to build further on the solid 
foundation laid at Camp David. We 
call on all who seek and cherish peace 
to join with us. D 



' Text from Weekly Compilation of Presi- 
dential Documents of Sept 24. 1979. which 
also carried the text of remarks by President 
Carter, Egyptian Vice President Mubarak, and 
Israeli Foreign Minister Dayan on the subject 
of the Camp David agreements. 

^ On Sept. 17 the While House announced 
that the President received messages from 
Prime Minister Begin and President Sadat (text 
from Weekly Compilation of Sept. 24). 



Defense Function for FY 1980 of $141.2 bil- 
lion in Budget Authority and $1.^0.6 billion In 
outlays. I will also request that the Congress 
support the Administration's FY 1980 defense 
program and. In particular, that the Appropria- 
tion Committees actually appropriate the funds 
needed to carry it out 

Furthermore, in FY 1981 I plan a further real 
increase In defense spending. The Defense De- 
partment Is working on the details of that 
budget. It would, therefore, be premature to 
describe the features of that budget beyond 
noting that it will continue the broad thrust of 
our defense program, and thai 1 Intend to con- 
tinue to support our mutual commitment with 
our NATO Allies. 

While this defense program is adequate, it is 
clear that we could spend even more and 
thereby gain more military capability. But na- 
tional security involves more than sheer mili- 
tary capability; there are other legitimate de- 
mands on our budget resources. These com- 
peting priorities will always be with us within 
the vast array of budget decisions both the 
Congress and the President are called upon to 
make. Defense outlays are actually lower In 
constant dollars than they were in 1963, and a 
much lower percentage of the gross national 
product (5% compared with 9%). There are 
those that think this has caused a decline In 
.American inllitary might and that the military 
balance has now lipped against us. 1 do not be- 
lieve this to be so, but I am concerned about 
the trends. 1 believe that It Is necessary for us 
lo act now lo reverse these trends. 

The Secretary of Defense will be presenting 
to the Congress over the coming months the 
highlights of our defense program in terms of 
the goals we think we should achieve and the 
Five-Year Defense Program we plan to achieve 
them. In this context he will point out, among 
many other items, how MX and our other 
strategic programs will contribute to the 
maintenance of essential equivalence between 
the central strategic forces of the United States 
and Soviet Union, how we plan to modernize 
theater nuclear forces in cooperation with our 
NATO allies, how our general purpose forces 
programs contribute both lo our military capa- 
bility lo support our NATO allies and rapidly to 
deploy forces lo defend our vital Interests 
elsewhere. That presentation can serve as the 
basis for future discussions (including open 
testimony) that will allow us lo build the na- 
tional consensus that is the fundamental pre- 
requisite of a strong and secure America. 

Jimmy CarterD 



' Text from Weekly Compilation of Presi- 
dential Documents of Sept. 17, 1979. 



Jovember 1979 



J\U€LEAR POLICY: Bangiadesh 
Joins l^onproUfcration Treaty 



Following are the texts of a Depart- 
nent of State press release announcing 
hat, at a ceremony at the Department 
7f State on September 27, 1979, 
Bangladesh had deposited its instru- 
nent of accession to the Nonprolifera- 
ion Treaty and Acting Secretary War- 
'en Christopher' s remarks at that 
eremony. 



STATE DEPARMENT 
PRESS RELEASE' 

Bangladesh is now the 1 1 1th party to 
the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Bangladesh's 
Ambassador to the United States, 
Tabarak Husain, deposited his govern- 
ment's instrument of accession at a 
Department of State ceremony on Sep- 
tember 27, 1979. Participating in the 
ceremony for the U.S. Government 
was Warren Christopher, Acting Sec- 
retary of State. In his remarks, Mr. 
Christopher stated that: "The specter 
af nuclear competition in South Asia is 

major concern to the United States 
. . "He also welcomed Bangla- 
desh's accession and hoped that its ini- 
tiative will spur others in the region to 
follow Bangladesh's lead. Mr. Christo- 
pher then announced that negotiations 
would begin soon on a U.S.- 
Bangladesh nuclear cooperation agree- 
ment. 

The NPT was opened for signature 
on July 1, 1968, and entered into force 
on March 5, 1970, when the United 
States and the Soviet Union became 
parties. Among its provisions, it bans 
the manufacture or acquisition of nu- 

ear explosive devices by parties 
which are non-nuclear-weapon states 
and requires these nations to accept 
international safeguards on all their nu- 
clear facilities. The treaty also seeks to 
insure that all parties facilitate the full- 
est possible exchange of technology for 
the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and 
requires all parties to pursue negotia- 
tions on disarmament measures. 

The United States considers the 
SALT II agreement and the current 
negotiations on banning the testing of 
nuclear weapons to be major examples 
of fulfillment of its obligations under 
tthe treaty. 

In April 1977 President Carter de- 
clared universal adherence to the NPT 
as a U.S. foreign policy objective. A 
major international conference will be 



held in August 1980 in Geneva to re- 
view the operation of the treaty. Re- 
cent parties to the NPT include Sri 
Lanka and Indonesia. 



ACTING SECRETARY 
CHRISTOPHER'S REMARKS 

Since the advent of the nuclear age, 
the nations of the world have wrestled 
with the complex problem of harness- 
ing the enormous power of the atom for 
the good of mankind, rather than for its 
destruction. The Treaty on the Non- 
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is the 
principal means by which the interna- 
tional community has sought to protect 
itself from the dangers inherent in the 
spread of nuclear weapons. In this 



49 



context, the United States welcomes 
the accession of Bangladesh to this im- 
portant treaty. 

The United States takes seriously its 
obligations under the NPT. Article VI 
of the treaty obligates the United States 
and other parties to negotiate in good 
faith on measures to end the nuclear 
arms race. 

Through the SALT negotiations, the 
United States and the Soviet Union 
have attempted, over the past 10 years, 
to limit and ultimately reduce our nu- 
clear arsenals. We are pressing, and we 
will continue to press, for prompt Sen- 
ate ratification of the SALT II agree- 
ment in the belief that it will promote a 
stable strategic balance and that it will 
set the stage for more significant arms 
control measures in the future. 

Similarly, the United States, the 
Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom 
are negotiating to end the testing of nu- 
clear weapons in order to constrain the 
development of new types of nuclear 
arms. 

Article IV of the NPT obligates the 



U ^.'Australia Agreement 
on l^uclear Energy 



MESSAGE TO 
THE CONGRESS 
JULY 27, 1979' 

1 am pleased to transmit to the Congress, 
pursuant to Section 123 d of the Atomic Energy 
Act of 1954, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2153(d)), 
the text of the proposed Agreement Between 
the United States and Australia Concerning 
Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy and accom- 
panying annex and agreed minute; my written 
approval, authorization and determination con- 
cerning the agreement; and the Memorandum of 
the Director of the United States Arms Control 
and Disarmament Agency with the Nuclear 
Proliferation Assessment Statement concerning 
the agreement. The joint memorandum sub- 
mitted to me by the Secretaries of State and 
Energy, which includes a summary analysis of 
the provisions of the agreement, and the views 
of the Members of the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission are also enclosed. 

The proposed agreement with Australia is the 
first such agreement submitted to the Congress 
since enactment of the Nuclear Non- 
Proliferation Act of 1978, which 1 signed into 
law on March 10, 1978 and which, among 
other things, calls upon me to renegotiate 
existing peaceful nuclear cooperation agree- 
ments to obtain the new provisions set forth in 
that Act. In my judgment, the proposed agree- 
ment for cooperation between the United States 



and Australia, together with its agreed minute, 
meets all statutory requirements. 

I am particularly pleased that this first 
agreement is with Australia, a strong supporter 
of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and of interna- 
tional non-proliferation efforts generally. The 
proposed agreement reflects the desire of the 
Government of the United States and the Gov- 
ernment of Australia to update the framework 
for peaceful nuclear cooperation between our 
two countries in a manner which recognizes 
both the shared non-proliferation objectives 
and the close relationship between the United 
States and Australia in the peaceful applica- 
tions of nuclear energy. The proposed agree- 
ment will, in my view, further the non- 
proliferation and other foreign policy interests 
of the United States. 

I have considered the views and recommen- 
dations of the interested agencies in reviewing 
the proposed agreement and have determined 
that its performance will promote, and will not 
constitute an unreasonable risk to. the common 
defense and security. Accordingly, I have ap- 
proved the agreement and authorized its execu- 
tion, and urge that the Congress give it favora- 
ble consideration. 

Jimmy CarterD 



' Text from Weekly Compilation of Presi- 
dential Documents of July 30, 1979. 



50 



Department of State BulletU 



0€EAI\S: Lair of the Sea 
l^egotiations 



by Elliot L. Richardson 



Statement to the press in New York 
City on August 24, 1979. Ambassador 
at Large Richardson is Special Repre- 
sentative of the President for the Law 
of the Sea Conference. 

The successful completion of the 
third U.N. Conference on Law of the 
Sea is now in sight. The conference 
should be able to produce a treaty in 
the next year. 

When we assembled here in New 
York 6 weeks ago, the number of unre- 
solved issues had been reduced to 
something close to 20. There has been 
steady forward movement on most of 
these. The conference cannot now fail: 



It has come too close to a successful 
conclusion to stop or turn back. 

Solid gains have been made in nego- 
tiations on the seabeds, particularly in 
the financial arrangements on both 
sides of the parallel system; the pow- 
ers, functions, and voting procedures 
of the [Executive] Council [of the In- 
ternational Seabed Resource Au- 
thority]; production limitations; and 
dispute settlement. Similar encouraging 
progress has marked negotiations on 
protection of the seabed mining 
environment and the preservation of 
whales. 

Although the conference did not 
issue a second revision to the Informal 
Composite Negotiating Text, the ad- 
vances made in New York are included 
in reports which should provide the 



Bangladesh (Cont'd) 

United States to share the benefits of 
the peaceful uses of the atom with par- 
lies to the treaty. Since we inaugurated 
the Atoms for Peace program in 1953, 
the United States has been in the fore- 
front of those nations that have pro- 
vided nuclear technology to others 
under conditions assuring peaceful 
uses. The United States has agreements 
for cooperation with more than 20 par- 
ties to the NPT and has provided tech- 
nical assistance to these and many 
other countries through the Interna- 
tional Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). 

I am pleased to announce that the 
United States and the Government of 
Bangladesh will soon enter into negoti- 
ations to conclude an agreement for 
cooperation in nuclear research. I am 
also pleased to announce that the 
United States will be in a position to 
assist Bangladesh nuclear projects 
through the IAEA. 

Despite the efforts of many states, 
the struggle to control the spread of nu- 



clear weapons is far from won. The 
specter of nuclear competition in South 
Asia is a major concern to the United 
States, as it must also be to nations of 
the region such as Bangladesh. 

Closer to home, we in the United 
States have been troubled by the recent 
public disclosure of sensitive nuclear 
weapons technology which makes 
available information that would have 
been very difficult to obtain otherwise. 
From these two examples it is clear that 
the struggle to halt proliferation of nu- 
clear weapons must be universal and 
unceasing. If we are complacent, we 
shall not be safe. 

Bangladesh's action today marks a 
significant contribution to the historic 
international effort to eliminate forever 
the threat of nuclear warfare. We 
warmly welcome your accession and 
hope that your initiative will spur 
others in your region and elsewhere to 
follow your lead. D 



' Press release 237. 



basis for the continuation of negotia-f 
tions when the ninth session convenest 
early in 1980. Conference experience 
has been that everything contained in; 
reports of this type invariably holds. 

With respect to the seabeds, perhaps 
the most significant improvement has 
been to bring both sides of the parallel 
system into closer balance. Taxes on 
miners have been scaled down, thus 
making mining ventures more attractive 
to investors. As a counterbalance, 
agreements on financing the Enterprise 
will allow it to compete and mine on an 
equal footing. 

Decisionmaking and voting proce- 
dures of the Council remain vexing is- 
sues for in microcosm they reflect the 
core of the North-South conflict. But 
even here, opposing viewpoints are 
moving closer together. The powers 
and functions of the Council have been 
agreed upon. What is left in essence is 
determination of the number of voteS' 
that will be accorded producers and' 
consumers of seabed minerals so that 
their unique and predominant interests^ 
cannot be overridden arbitrarily. 

Differences have narrowed greatly 
on the thorny question of production 
controls. I believe we are on the verge 
of a final compromise on this question, 
and I believe this compromise will 
emerge in the early weeks of the next 
session. The same prediction applies to 
the negotiations on settlement of dis- 
putes arising from seabed mining. 

Negotiations on the conduct of ma- 
rine scientific research showed signifi- 
cant gains, including a compromise onr 
the right to conduct research on the 
Continental Shelf beyond 200 miles 
without coastal state consent unless the 
research area is undergoing exploita- 
tion by the coastal state. 

Although I am optimistic as to the 
outcome, I do not underestimate the 
difficulties that lie ahead. Serious dif- 
ferences still exist on the handful of is- 
sues which have resisted broadly ac- 
cepted solutions. Yet my sense of the 
situation is that the nations represented 
in the conference have marshaled the 
political will to overcome whatever ob- 
stacles block the road to a treaty. All of 
us have come too far to be deterred. 
We will go the rest of the way. D 



Ncivember 1979 



SCIENCE A]\D TECHNOLOGY: 

17.]¥. Conference on Science 
and Technology for Development 



The U.N. Conference on Science 
and Technology for Development 
(INCSTD) was held in Vienna August 
20-31, 1979. Following are remarks 
made at the opening and closing ses- 
siiins by Ambassador Theodore M. 
Hcsburgh, chairman of the U.S. dele- 
gation, and the text of President Car- 
ter's message to the conference. 



AUG. 20, 1979 

It is only proper that this beautiful 
city by the Danube, a witness of so 
many great historical events, should be 
the site to compose the new contours of 
our future. For centuries Vienna has 
been a center of culture and of far- 
reaching diplomatic decisions. In re- 
membrance of things past — the sieges 
and the symphonies, the genius of 
Sigmund Freud, of Ignaz Semmel- 
weiss, of Conrad Lorenz, of Ernst 
Mach, of Lise Meitner — Vienna recalls 
the vicissitudes of time and the ver- 
satility of man. 

Today, this city is one of the capitals 
of the U.N. system, host for the head- 
quarters of the U.N. Industrial De- 
velopment Organization and of the In- 
ternational Atomic Energy Agency. 
Both are symbols of the potentialities 
of progress, yet both remind us of the 
perils of modernity. The growth of in- 
dustrialization accompanied by un- 
wanted pollution, the search for atomic 
energy for peace haunted by nuclear 
hazards, reveal not only the possibility 
of technology but also its ambivalent 
qualities — hence the uncertainty of re- 
sult, the ambiguity of promise, and the 
necessity of high moral purpose. 

Again, here in Vienna, only 2 
months ago, with the signing of SALT 
II, new evidence emerged that the spirit 
of cooperation for peace may ulti- 
mately prevail over the awesome spec- 
tre of nuclear disaster. The treaty is an 
inspirational witness to a central thesis 
of our times, that defines man first by 
his responsibility toward his brothers 
and toward history. This is the human 
imperative of the modern age. 

This imperative is the only com- 
manding criterion with which we may 
rein the rapid, exponential advances of 
technology, but it is also the human 
imperative that makes these advances 
possible. Science and technology are 



knowledge and power that must find 
their true meaning and direction in the 
total life of mankind. 

Technological progress is more than 
a chronology of inventions. It must be 
an enactment of human rationality in 
history, a portrayal of some vision of 
the good life and the choice of pre- 
ferred means for moving toward it. 

Modern science is changing man's 
view of himself. We no longer see our- 
selves as merely a cog in a Newtonian 
world of determinism with man's role 
reduced to that of an observer — at best 
a beneficiary, often a victim. We view 
this modern world not as static but as 
constantly changing with man and 
woman as free and responsible agents 
affecting that change. Science and 
technology have become a distinctly 
human experience, an adventure and a 
challenge to create a better world. 

We went to the Moon a decade ago. 
The true reward of that endeavor was 
not what we found on the Moon's sur- 
face but rather the view it afforded us 
of our own planet. From that distant 
perspective we were able to recognize, 
for the first time, the delicate fragility 
and beauty of this gemlike spaceship 
that we call home. In fact, we now 
know Earth as more beautiful from afar 
than up close. 

Science and technology are not the 
guarantors of civilization; they only 
guarantee the possibility of civiliza- 
tion. Fast cars or fast breeders, syn- 
thetics or cybernetics do not a civiliza- 
tion make. Unless our existence 
reaches beyond the frivolities of mate- 
rialism and becomes a life enriched 
with meaning, science and technology 
will not be hallmarks of progress; they 
will only be the trappings of moder- 
nity. The pursuit of scientific excel- 
lence must be based upon the pursuit of 
human goals. 

But can we really call ours a civili- 
zation: 

• When one-fourth of this Earth's 
population lives in abject poverty, 
starving, idle, and numbed by igno- 
rance? 

• When in this century alone over 
100 million people have fallen victim 
to wars? 

• When millions today are denied 
their basic human rights because of 
their political convictions, religious 



51 

beliefs, ethnic origin, or economic 
status? 

• When advances through technol- 
ogy often mean in many societies new 
forms of discrimination against 
women? 

Today the world is facing critical 
shortages on many fronts. We live 
under the recurring threat of global 
energy crisis, the depletion of our 
nonrenewable resources, and the de- 
spoilment of our environment. Our 
ecosystem is strained by a dramatic 
population growth, our security 
threatened by the continuing arms race. 
and our well-being jeopardized by in- 
flation and monetary chaos. 

Does this mean that we have reached 
the limits of our growth? Have we, in- 
deed, exhausted the possibilities of sci- 
ence and technology for the benefit of 
mankind or have we exhausted only our 
spirit? I hope this conference will be a 
living testimony that we have ex- 
hausted neither our knowledge nor our 
spirit and that we can turn our collec- 
tive vulnerabilities into a world of 
interdependence — a world of interde- 
pendence among nations as well as 
between man and his ecosystem. 

Indeed, ours is an imperfect world. 
The global economy is not working as 
well as it should for either the poor or 
the rich countries. 

The patterns of worldwide technol- 
ogy generation, diffusion, and utiliza- 
tion lack the cohesion that would in- 
corporate and benefit the majority of 
people. 

We have not yet found the right mix 
between scientific excellence and 
needed technologies. Given the vast 
potential of the developing world, it is 
an anomaly that around 95% of all re- 
search and development is conducted in 
the industrialized world. 

It is even more tragic that only 1% of 
the world's research and development 
on health, agriculture, housing, and in- 
dustrial technology is spent on the 
needs of the poorest half of this Earth's 
population. Nations spend six times as 
much on military research as on energy 
research. Even most developing coun- 
tries spend more on armaments than on 
health and education. 

It is an imperfect world in which sci- 
entists and technicians from the de- 
veloping countries do not partake of the 
latest and the best or the most eco- 
nomical and most appropriate technol- 
ogies. It is a terrible waste that millions 
of illiterates and uneducated cannot 
participate in our technological prog- 
ress either as beneficiaries or creators 
of new implements to make their lives 
better. 

It is an imperfect global economic 
order that does not fully benefit from 



52 



the robust and dynamic role of interna- 
tional business and industry and has not 
yet found the right balance between the 
interests of private enterprise and of the 
developing countries. 

Just as modern science is changing 
man's view of man, so are the new re- 
lationships among nations — between 
North and South — changing our per- 
ceptions of global and national inter- 
ests. This change is healthy, this 
change is good, and we need not fear 
it. As our Secretary of State, Cyrus 
Vance, said: "We cannot let ourselves 
be diverted by the myth that if we en- 
courage change, or deal with the forces 
of change, we only encourage radical- 
ism." We intend to encourage this 
change, to quote the Secretary again, 
with '". . .a positive, long-term 
strategy toward the Third World." So 
let us continue this dialogue for change 
at this conference. 

First, we must work to make the in- 
dustrialized countries more responsive 
to the aspirations of the developing 
countries so that the advances in sci- 
ence and technology in the North will 
be of greater benefit to the South. 

Second, we must increase the 
participation and the stake of the 
developing countries in the world 
economic order, including global tech- 
nology circulation. 

Third, we must create a more equi- 
table relationship between the de- 
veloping countries and international 
private enterprise, so that in the global 
transfer of technology the interest of 
both is enhanced. 

The task of this conference is not one 
of restating the errors of the past but of 
weaving science and technology into 
the fabric of the future, the fabric of 
development. We need collaboration, 
not confrontation. 

The question is not whether we 
should do something, but how will we 
accomplish it? 

• How can we best mobilize the 
imagination and energies of the scien- 
tific community to launch new major 
efforts to eradicate the worst aspects of 
poverty by the year 2000? 

• How can we cooperate in building 
indigenous science and techriology 
capacities in the developing countries 
— without which there is neither self- 
reliant growth nor self-sustaining eco- 
nomic progress? 

• How can we correct current imbal- 
ances in the global market of technol- 
ogy, so that the developing countries 
may select what they need — and reject 
what they do not — from the interna- 
tional supermarket of products and 
processes? 



• How can we best strengthen scien- 
tific and technological cooperation so 
as to ease global pressures on food and 
water supplies, energy sources, and 
raw materials and deal effectively with 
the problems of population growth and 
the deteriorating environment? 

None of these challenges can be met 
by any nation alone. But what we have 
done, individually and collectively, for 
the development of science and tech- 
nology and with science and technol- 
ogy for development is a good begin- 
ning. 

Over the past 30 years, for example, 
the United States has contributed more 
than $100 billion in development as- 
sistance. This year our assistance has 
risen to nearly $7 billion. No element 
of our foreign assistance fails to in- 
volve in some form our sharing of sci- 
entific knowledge, technical skills, or 
technological hardware. 

• The core of U.S. cooperation con- 
tinues to be the application of techno- 
logical know-how to increase food pro- 
duction in the developing countries. 

• We intend to make substantial and 
real increases, over the next 5 years to 
our contribution to the consultative 
group for international agricultural re- 
search. And we invite other nations to 
join us in this effort. 

• Eighty percent of our development 
aid goes to countries where per capita 
income is below $300 a year to give the 
masses of people greater access to pro- 
duction technologies, preventive health 
care, family planning, and basic edu- 
cation. 

• To strengthen the science and 
technology infrastructure in the de- 
veloping countries, we have assisted 
well over 100 universities and more 
than 300 vocational schools. Each year 
we help tens of thousands from the de- 
veloping countries to study in U.S. and 
third-country institutions of higher 
learning. 

We have and will continue to share 
with the developing countries the ad- 
vances we make in our most sophisti- 
cated technologies. 

• The United States foresees invest- 
ing $24 million in a new 6-year 
program to test the effectiveness of 
satellites as a medium of educational 
broadcasting and improved communi- 
cation in remote rural areas. 

• The United States will take the 
initiative to bring together the operators 
of remote sensing satellites, as well as 
the users, to develop an international 
system. We believe that satellites 
should be operated so that all can have 
easy access to the data and so that in- 



Department of State Bulletin 

formation can be collected without un 
necessary duplication and for maxi- 
mum mutual benefit. The objective is 
to insure developing countries improve 
their access to infonnation for the use 
and management of forests, range- 
lands, water supplies, soil preserva- 
tion, and the identification of new min- 
eral and water resources. 

• The United States is significantly 
expanding its renewable energy assist 
ance and is working on cooperative 
methods of applying advanced technol 
ogies, including solar technology, to 
the energy needs of the developing 
countries. 

In the application of science and 
technology for development, foreign 
assistance cannot be a substitute for 
self-reliance. People who are ill fed 
and in ill health, without shelter and 
without jobs, do not need paternalistic 
redemption. They need tools and 
trades, capital and opportunities, help 
to help themselves to meet their own 
basic needs. 

The building of the developing: 
countries' capabilities and their infra- 
structure in science and technology 
must be the first critical step to elimi- 
nate the worst aspects of poverty and to 
elevate the developing countries to full 
partnership in the global scientific and 
technological enterprise. Education at 
all levels is at the core of human de- 
velopment, the key to a higher quality 
of life. 

We have and will, therefore, assist 
in strengthening local scientific and 
technological infrastructures, manage- 
rial, technical and general education 
programs, research institutes, stand- 
ardization activities, extension and in- 
formation services, laboratory supply 
and equipment centers, and training 
activities. 

Technical assistance and the export 
of expertise must rely on local capacity 
to define problems and establish 
priorities. 

In order to respond to the challenge 
of building such indigenous capacity, 
we are establishing, at the personal 
initiative of President Carter, a new in- 
stitute for scientific and technological 
cooperation. The institute's principal 
functions will include: 

• Enlisting developing countries' as- 
sistance in establishing research and 
development priorities; 

• Long-term research and develop- 
ment on critical development problems; 

• Building international cooperative 
linkages within the scientific and tech- 
nological community; 

• Marshaling research and devel- 
opment activities of various U.S. pub- 
lic and private agencies; 

• Facilitating greater attention by 



November 1979 



53 



U.S. scientific and technical institu- 
tions to joint research, training, and 
other cooperative activities; and 

• Involving the private sector in the 
United States in efforts to improve sci- 
ence and technology for development. 

We cannot seriously contemplate 
more just and equitable patterns of sci- 
entific and technological cooperation 
without the developing countries pos- 
sessing the leverage of scientific 
knowledge and information. Substan- 
tial amounts of information residing in 
the public sector have already been 
made available to developing nations. 
In addition, much of the technology in 
the private sector is available through 
public information systems describing 
these technologies or the sources from 
which such technologies can be 
obtained. 

But we should not pretend that all is 
well in the international market of 
technology. Technology is often sold 
as a product that can be least afforded 
by those who most need it. Transferred 
technology is often inappropriate to 
local needs, as well as wasteful and in- 
sensitive to environmental impact. 
Such transfers are bad business. But at 
the same time we cannot ignore that 
private enterprise has always been a 
major source of innovation, a major 
actor in the diffusion of technology, 
and an indispensable factor in the eco- 
nomic growth of the developing coun- 
tries. We must, therefore, continue our 
dialogue about a wide range of meas- 
ures that enhances the negotiating ca- 
pability of the developing countries in 
their acquisition of foreign technol- 
ogies and strengthens their participa- 
tion in the market of technology, not 
only as consumers but also as produc- 
ers. 

Through new initiatives and through 
continuing programs, we must find at 
this conference and in the years ahead 
new grounds and new mechanisms for 
cooperation. President Carter, in his 
message to this conference, spoke of 
science and technology for develop- 
ment as a "joint venture." The awe- 
some challenges that we all face, de- 
veloped and developing countries 
alike, make this joint venture a global 
imperative. The United States notes, 
therefore, with pleasure the declaration 
of Bucharest in which the developing 
countries reaffirmed their willingness 
to work with a sense of urgency to as- 
sure the success of this conference. 

We inhabit a planet with finite re- 
sources, one ecosphere, and one com- 
mon destiny. In this interdependent 
world, we are all developing countries. 
The differences between the North and 
the South, between the East and the 
West, are minimal in contrast to the 



PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE 
TO UNCSTD 

This conference is a new journey toward 
progress. Your endeavor rekindles the spirit 
of adventure in all of us. It dares mankind to 
invent a better future. After many centuries 
of progress we may now explore not only the 
frontiers of knowledge but also the frontiers 
of justice. 

We must not fail this time to respond be- 
yond words to the pressing needs of the de- 
veloping countries. In turn we can all benefit 
from their participation In a new and stronger 
world economic system. 

In the robust spirit of imagination, inven- 
tiveness, and ingenuity, let us dare to re- 
shape the world and elimmate the worst as- 
pects of poverty by the year 2000. Let us use 
our knowledge to create the means to provide 
for the basic needs of all people. Together let 
us invent a more dynamic partnership among 
governments and private institutions to serve 
the common interest of all nations. 

We have awesome challenges to confront. 
Their solution will require a joint venture of 
all nations. 

This venture will inevitably extend free- 
dom, because success will require a free flow 
of information, free access to the mar- 
ketplace of ideas, and the broadest scope for 
scientific imagination and initiative. 

Broad participation should characterize our 
venture, because knowledge unpropagated is 
knowledge wasted. The worldwide diffusion 
of technical knowledge must be a liberating 
venture in which all participate and all will 
profit. 

Our primary task must be to assist in the 
building of scientific and technological 
capabilities in the developing countries. 



Their indigenous capacities to invent and in- 
novate, to choose knowledgeably the right 
technologies, and to bargain on the basis of 
facts and not of fads is the only assured way 
that the global diffusion of technology will 
not become a new system of dependency. 

The United States, for its part, hopes to 
contribute to this common endeavor with an 
institute of scientific and technological coop- 
eration, which we plan to establish this fall. 
The institute is one of our most important in- 
novations to help developing countries who 
so desire create and adapt the technologies 
best suited to their needs. Its work will re- 
ceive my strong personal support. I will in- 
sure that it cooperates closely with similar 
programs and institutions elsewhere in the 
world. 

I am confident that our scientific commu- 
nity, our government agencies, and our pri- 
vate institutions will heighten their involve- 
ment in research and development programs 
so as to address the endemic problems of 
food scarcity, the energy crisis, population 
explosion, and the lack of adequate health 
care that are common concerns of all. 

I pledge our willingness to support all 
practical endeavors that can help us to over- 
come these problems, to create a world in 
which education is within everybody's reach, 
the hungry can feed themselves, millions are 
freed from tropical diseases, economies are 
expanded to provide jobs, and worldwide 
trade assures every nation's progress. 

This conference will test our commitment 
to share worldwide the fruits of scientific 
progress and to master the forces of technol- 
ogy for the benefit of all mankind. To you, 
Madame President, and to all delegates who 
represent this hope and this goal, I extend my 
sincerest wishes for a successful endeavor. 



enormity of the common tasks facing 
mankind. 

We are, therefore, prepared to join 
reasonable ventures that strengthen 
worldwide scientific and technological 
cooperation. We strongly believe that 
this will be a shared effort — where uni- 
versal values are the organizing princi- 
ples for research and development, 
where the value of knowledge and 
technological hardware is measured by 
their contribution to the larger concerns 
of human welfare. 

Science and technology should open 
new frontiers and new opportunities to 
enjoy all of the beauty and boundless 
elements of this planet Earth. Our gen- 
eration must be the guarantors of this 
new tomorrow. It is our task to usher in 
this new age, to tend the soil and plant 
the seed which will bring forth boun- 
tiful fruit. And our harvest will be 
threefold: a new realm of reason, a new 
realm of reality, a new realm of rights. 

Let us invent this realm of reason. 



For the efforts we make are not a zero- 
sum game in which the gains of those 
who seek equality and parity would 
automatically register as a loss for 
those who now possess more. In this 
realm we can prove the mutual benefits 
thesis — that advances in any part of the 
world are for the benefit of all. 

Let us accept the realm of reality. 
This reality dictates that we become 
aware of the coming crises of the 
global commons. While our material 
resources may dwindle, our traditional 
energy sources may run dry, there is 
one inexhaustible and always renewa- 
ble resource: our ingenuity, our imagi- 
nation, our knowledge and technology, 
and especially our common human as- 
pirations that can convert all these into 
a new world. 

And let us, with the aid of science 
and technology, construct a new realm 
of human rights. A new realm: 

• Where the international spirit of 



54 



cooperation places basic rights at the 
centerpiece of our agenda for the 21st 
century; 

• Where freedom is the hallmark, 
equality of men and women will be the 
cornerstone, and justice the watch- 
word; and 

• Where the benefits derived from 
the world's resources know no special 
beneficiary nor will they be confined 
by any national border as long as there 
are people in need. 

So let us make our tomorrow a world 
full of sharing, where the freedom to 
explore, the freedom to create, and the 
opportunity to share in the fruits of our 
labor will be the true hallmarks of 
civilization. 

AUG. 31, 1979 

The U.N. Conference on Science 
and Technology for Development 
opened 1 1 days ago amidst dire warn- 
ings that it would fail and that it would 
contribute little to establishing new and 
effective ways for science and technol- 
ogy to address the great global imbal- 
ances of our times. 

Nonetheless, to the satisfaction of all 
of us, UNCSTD has just concluded 
with the clear promise of a new begin- 
ning. There is significant agreement 
among us both of the principal goals of 
science and technology for develop- 
ment and on major new measures for 
achieving them. 

Much remains to be done, but the 
conference has good reason to feel en- 
couraged. Agreement was reached on 
the following important measures. 

• An intergovernmental committee 
was created — in effect a new world 
forum. Henceforth, all nations will 
have a voice in formulating policies 
and plans for the use of new resources 
in the area of science and technology 
for development. 

• An interim fund was created, 
pending the arrangements for the finan- 
cial system, which will be managed by 
the U.N. Development Program, with a 
target for voluntary contributions, over 
a 2-year period of not less than $250 
million. 

Moreover, the conference has 
reached agreement on a program of ac- 
tion to enhance scientific and techno- 
logical capacity in the developing 
countries and to improve international 
information flows and the commercial 
transfer of science and technology. 

Differences of view still remain, but 
the mutual understanding of these is- 
sues has been expanded, and this 
should facilitate further discussion of 
the unresolved issues in the months 
ahead. 



Department of State Bulletin <i 



WESTER]\ HEMISPHERE: 

Panama Acquires Jurisdiction 

Over the Canal Zone 



Vice President Mondale visited 
Panama September 30-October 2, 
1979, to represent the United States at 
ceremonies when Panama acquired 
jurisdiction over the Panama Canal 
Zone on October I under the terms of 
the Panama Canal Treaty. Following 
are his remarks made October I at Al- 
brook Air Force Base where the cere- 
monies took place. 

This is, indeed, a proud day for the 
people of Panama, and it is a proud day 
for the people of the United States. To- 
gether on this moving occasion, our 
two nations rejoice as we write a new 
chapter in the history of our hemi- 
sphere. 

We meet at the magnificent canal of 
Panama. For 65 years it has stood as a 
triumphant symbol of civilization of 
the engineering, medical, and entre- 
preneurial genius of the 20th century. 
But from this moment forward the 
Panama Canal takes on a second sym- 
bolic meaning. It becomes two success 



stories; both of technology and of 
political ideals; both of engineering 
wizardry and of diplomatic vision; both 
of the conquest of nature and the coop- 
eration of cultures. We now seal a re- 
lationship between two independent 
nations to guarantee the operation and 
defense of one of the world's key wa- 
terways, working together in mutual 
interest and for mutual benefit. The 
United States and Panama can be con- 
fident in our ability to achieve our 
shared objectives. 

I am here today to say that we will 
honor in full the terms of the treaty. 
We will keep the canal operating 
smoothly just as it has been since its 
opening in 1914. It will remain a safe 
and sure route of transit for the com- 
merce of the entire world. 

Today the United States and Panama 
settle more than the future of the canal, 
for as President Carter has said, these 
treaties mark the commitment of the 
United States to the belief that fairness 
and not force should lie at the heart of 



Of equal importance is the agreement 
reached on the three priority goals 
which our newfound cooperation 
should advance: 

• Overcoming the worst aspects of 
poverty; 

• Solution of global problems af- 
fecting most, if not all, nations — food, 
energy, health, overharvesting of seas 
and forests, and the general impairment 
of our human environment; and 

• The progress of developing coun 
tries toward self-reliant growth. 

The conference dared to raise dif- 
ficult questions and contentious issues. 
It did not shirk its responsibilities. The 
conference faced the issues placed be- 
fore it, discussed them for long hours, 
and now should take some satisfaction 
in the results of its work. 

The Chinese have a proverb: every 
journey of a thousand miles requires a 
first step. We have taken that first 
step — to overcome the worst aspects of 
poverty and to create a better world for 
human kind by the year 2000. The 2 
years of preparatory work by govern- 
ments and the scientific and educa- 
tional communities provided the essen- 



tial roadmap for our journey. 

Working together we have achieved 
a momentum which must be sustained 
through the 1980's and beyond, for the 
problems we have addressed are not 
susceptible to quick technological fixes 
but require sustained planning and 
continuing effort. 

President Carter pledged at the be- 
ginning of this conference the willing- 
ness of the United States to support all 
practical endeavors to overcome the 
endemic problems of food scarcity, the 
energy crisis, the population explosion, 
and the lack of adequate health care. 
The United States will work with 
others to fulfill that pledge. 

Let us never forget that it is a pledge 
we make to each other, as brothers and 
sisters on a small planet we share. Let 
us not give way to either discourage- 
ment or cynicism. Let us, rather, re- 
joice at what we have begun, take 
courage at what there is yet to do, and 
looking back some future day at what 
we have launched here in Vienna 
tonight — this last day of August — may 
we say in heartful fellowship together: 
We were present at the new creation, 
and we watched and worked for the 
emergence of a better world. D 



November 1979 



55 



our dealings with the nations of the 
world. Our partnership is the outcome 
not of the politics of confrontation but 
ot a common search for justice — a 
politics not of domination or depend- 
ence but of mutual interest and aspira- 
tion. And other countries of the world 
near and far can draw a meaning of 
what Panama and the United States 
have accomplished, for both our coun- 
tries have acted with restraint and re- 
sponsibility. Both achieved longstand- 
ing goals, and both have strengthened 
their capacity for independent action 
and influence on the global scene. 

Panama has long been a crossroads 
of world commerce. Today Panama 
also stands at the midpoint of a new 
heartland of emerging democracy. In 
Quito, in La Paz, we have just wit- 
nessed free elections and a successful 
transition to civilian rule. In Lima a 
new constitution has been adopted. In 
Santo Domingo elections brought an 
orderly transfer of power for the first 
time in our century. In Managua winds 
of democratic progress are stirring 
where they have long been stifled. In 
Honduras the return to constitutional 
rule and elections is underway. From 
the Dominican Republic to the north, 
from the Andean states to the south, we 
celebrate today a remarkable advance 
toward effective democratic institu- 
tions. 

This move toward more open and 
democratic societies is an indigenous 
process, not a formula imposed from 
elsewhere without regard to the diver- 
sities of the people concerned. It is a 
dynamic and evolving order reflecting 
national diversities alive to aspirations 
for human rights and responsive to the 
drive to participate in the political 
process. 

The progress of the past 2 years re- 
futes the claim that only authoritarian 
methods can provide the social disci- 
pline for well-being and growth. In- 
stead, as the Quito declaration states, 
the best way to guarantee the prosperity 
of people is to provide a climate of 
freedom and enforcement of human 
rights under new forms of social de- 
mocracy. These are the ideals we en- 
shrine in our Panama Canal treaties. 

As 15 years of negotiations reach 
their moment of fulfillment today, let 
us pay tribute to the countless thou- 
sands who have made and still make 
the canal great. To the French pioneers 
who launched its history, to the Ameri- 
cans and Barbadians and Jamaicans and 
people literally from every nation in 
the world who built the canal against 
such overwhelming odds. To the 
Panamanians and Americans whose 
hard work day after day has maintained 
its efficient operation and to those who 



Pananta Canal Act of 1979 



PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT, 
SEPT. 27. 1979' 

I am pleased to sign into law the 
Panama Canal Act of 1979, which im- 
plements the Panama Canal Treaty of 
1977. 

The Panama Canal Treaty and the 
neutrality treaty were the result of 13 
years of careful negotiations. They 
have been hailed throughout this hemi- 
sphere as a model for equitable negoti- 
ations between ourselves and our 
smaller neighbors. As I said when I 
signed the treaties, they express the 
commitment of the United States to the 
belief that fairness, and not force, 
should lie at the heart of our dealings 
with nations of the world. 

The treaties also protect our eco- 
nomic and security interests. We will 
continue to operate the canal until the 
end of the century through the Panama 
Canal Commission, an agency of the 
United States in which Panama will 
have a minority voice. We will main- 
tain military forces in Panama until that 
date. After the year 1999, Panama will 
assume responsibility for operating the 
canal. A regime of permanent neu- 
trality is established under which both 
nations have the right to act against any 
aggression or threat directed against the 
canal. The Panama Canal Act provides 
a framework in which the United States 
can exercise its rights to operate and 
defend the canal in a manner consistent 
with our responsibilities and obliga- 
tions under the treaties. 

I particularly want to thank Senators 
Stennis and Levin and Congressmen 
Murphy, Bowen, and Derwinski for 
their outstanding leadership in resolv- 
ing the many difficult issues embodied 
in this act. 

In signing this act, I want to assure 



Members of Congress and the Govern- 
ment of Panama that this legislation 
will be interpreted and applied by the 
executive branch in strict conformity 
with the terms and the intent of the 
treaties. In this respect, 1 believe that 
certain technicalities in several sections 
of the act require comment. 

Section 1503 requires congressional 
approval for transfers of property to 
Panama. Section 1504 grants such ap- 
proval subject to a 180-day notice re- 
quirement and a prohibition against 
transfer of the canal itself before termi- 
nation of the treaty. It remains the po- 
sition of the Administration that the 
treaty is self-executing with respect to 
the transfer of property, and thus no 
additional legislative authorization is 
required. With regard to the condition 
contained in section 1504(c) concern- 
ing transfer of the canal, 1 note that this 
does not preclude other discretionary 
transfers during the lifetime of the 
treaty, as provided for in article XIII, 
paragraph 2(b) and 2(c) of the treaty. 

Section 1341(e) lists certain costs 
which must be paid prior to any contin- 
gent payment to Panama under para- 
graph 4(c) of article XIII of the treaty. 
It is my understanding that costs listed 
in this section are identical to those 
which will be included in the tolls base 
under section 1602 of the act. These 
costs are related to the operation and 
maintenance of the canal and are thus 
properly considered as "expenditures" 
under paragraph 4(c) of article XIII, to 
be paid before any surplus is due to 
Panama under that provision. D 



'Made on signing H.R. Ill into law (text 
from Weekly Compilation of Presidential 
Documents of Oct I, 1979). As enacted, H.R 
1 1 1 is Public Law 96-70, approved Sept, 27. 
1979. 



will continue that crucial work by 
staying on with the Panama Canal 
Commission. The creation of the canal, 
as its superb historian has written, 
"... was one of the supreme human 
achievements of all time, the culmina- 
tion of a heroic dream of four hundred 
years and of more than twenty years of 
phenomenal effort and sacrifice. The 
fifty miles between the oceans were 
among the hardest ever won by human 
effort and ingenuity and no statistics on 
tonnage or tolls can begin to convey 



the grandeur of what was accomplished 
... the canal is an expression of that 
old and noble desire to bridge the di- 
vide, to bring people together."' 

So today let us celebrate a new 
bridging of the divide. A new drawing 
together. For 65 years the Panama 
Canal has joined the oceans. Now and 
forevermore it will join our ideals. D 



' The Path Between the Seas: The Creation 
of the Panama Canal. 1870-1914 by David 
McCullough. 



56 



Department of State Bulletir 



]%lcaragua 



by Warren Christopher 

Statement before the Subcommittee 
on Foreifjn Operations of the House 
Appropriations Committee on Sep- 
tember II, 1979. Mr. Christopher is 
Deputy Secretary of State. ' 

Thank you for giving me this op- 
portunity to appear before you and this 
subcommittee to support the proposal 
to reprogram $8.5 million of foreign 
assistance from FY 1979 funds for re- 
lief and rehabilitation efforts related to 
the recent Nicaraguan civil strife. In 
my statement today, I would like to de- 
scribe briefly the current situation in 
Nicaragua, outline the circumstances 
that prompted the reprogramming pro- 
posal now before you, and provide 
some additional details on the proposed 
uses of these funds. 

Current Situation 

For both Latin America and the 
United States, the current situation in 
Nicaragua presents a critical challenge 
and a major opportunity. The course of 
events there will influence develop- 
ments in Central America and through- 
out the hemisphere and will have an 
important impact on U.S. -Latin Ameri- 
can relations. 

When the new Government of 
Nicaragua assumed power July 20, the 
country's political, economic, and se- 
curity institutions had all ceased to 
function. Almost half of Nicaragua's 
population was displaced, hungry, or 
unemployed. 

The new government, which was 
initially formed in exile, is a coalition 
of former guerrilla and civic leaders. It 
consists of a five-member junta as the 
executive authority, a 19-member 
Council of Ministers, and a 33-member 
National Council, still in the process of 
formation. While the Sandinista Na- 
tional Directorate, made up of guerrilla 
leaders, wields significant influence, 
so, too, does the Cabinet, which in- 
cludes many moderate leaders. Lines of 
authority within the government are 
still unclear, and there is considerable 
administrative confusion. 

The government's orientation, as re- 
vealed in its initial policies, has been 
generally moderate and pluralistic and 
not Marxist or Cuban. The government 
has restrained reprisals — indeed, I be- 
lieve it has been more successful in 



doing so than any other recent govern- 
ment which has come to power in the 
wake of a violent revolution. The gov- 
ernment has also promulgated a decree 
guaranteeing individual rights and has 
permitted an independent press and 
radio. 

The leadership of the government is 
very diverse. While there are influen- 
tial figures who espouse positions with 
which we strongly disagree — as at the 
recent nonaligned conference in 
Havana — the government as a whole 
has expressed a desire for close and 
friendly relations with us. Over time, 
we hope that Nicaragua will find a bal- 
anced foreign policy. We are encour- 
aged by indications that the Nicara- 
guans are making a genuine effort to 
establish friendly relations with their 
neighbors in Central America. 

The situation in Nicaragua today is 
in a process of evolution. With the 
support of the democratic countries in 
the hemisphere, Nicaragua will have an 
opportunity to revitalize its shattered 
economy and to continue on a moderate 
and pluralistic path. Without adequate 
support for reconstruction, the Nicara- 
guan Government might resort to au- 
thoritarian measures to expedite eco- 
nomic recovery. Our relationship 
would doubtless become more strained 
as a result. We believe that the best ap- 
proach to the situation in Nicaragua is 
for us to adopt an attitude of friendly 
cooperation, including the provision of 
effective and timely assistance. 

U.S. interests will be best served by 
the development in Nicaragua of a truly 
democratic government, within a 
flourishing, pluralistic society. We 
recognize that some elements of the 
present government might prefer a 
closed, Marxist society. We recognize 
as well that Cuba is already providing 
substantial advice and assistance to 
Nicaragua. But the situation in 
Nicaragua remains fluid. 

Reprogramming Proposal 

The moderate outcome we seek will 
not come about if we walk away now. 
Precisely because others are assisting 
Nicaragua and may seek to exploit the 
situation there, we must not turn our 
backs. 

We want to help alleviate human 
suffering in Nicaragua, speed recon- 
struction, foster respect for human 
rights and democracy, and promote re- 



gional development and security. These! 
goals can best be achieved by working; 
with the new government and with 
other nations and international institu- 
tions which share our basic objectives. 
The basic tenets of our policy are 
therefore: 

• To develop a positive relationship 
with the new government in Nicaragua 
based on the principles of noninterven- 
tion, equality, and mutual respect; 

• To support the development of a 
democratic, pluralistic government in 
Nicaragua, by maintaining contact with 
all elements of Nicaraguan society, in- 
cluding the church, the media, and the _ 
private sector, as well as public offi- 
cials; 

• To cooperate with other nations, 
and public and private institutions in 
assisting Nicaragua's economic recov- 
ery; and 

• To help directly with the recon- 
struction effort by interim aid such as> 
we are proposing today and by assess- 
ing and seeking to assist in the longer 
term effort. 



Proposed Uses of Funds 

I now turn to the assistance package 
we are proposing today. We first in- 
formed this committee of our intention 
to reprogram $8.5 million of FY 1979' 
foreign assistance funds by letter of 
August 1, 1979. The committee has 
expressed concern that the letter ar- 
rived just as the August recess was be- 
ginning and thus did not afford the op- 
portunity for study that the proposal 
required before the members departed. 
The timing was the result of the situa- 
tion in Nicaragua. It was only on July 
20 — only 10 days earlier — that the new 
government was sworn in. The Agency 
for International Development (AID) 
officials and Department officers could 
not prepare a reprogramming proposal 
without some assessment of 
Nicaragua's immediate needs, and the 
security situation in Managua and 
throughout the country made any such 
assessment impossible for several days. 
The 10 days between July 20 and Au- 
gust 1 does not seem an unreasonable 
amount of time for this effort. 

The upheaval in Nicaragua has left 
the people of that country in dire cir- 
cumstances, with both severe short- 
term humanitarian needs and serious 
long-term economic recovery require- 
ments. The widespread civil war left 
some 1 million people in need of food, 
40,000 in need of medical services, 
and 250,000 in need of shelter. At the 
height of the conflict, some 150,0001 
Nicaraguans took refuge in nearby 



November 1979 



57 



'Honduras and Costa Rica. 

The prolonged conflict drained 
Nicaragua's financial resources and left 
the economy in shambles. Physical 
damage to many of the urban centers of 
the country has been severe. Even more 

rimportant than the physical damage, 
however, has been the severe disrup- 
tion of economic activity. The country's 
"ranking, commercial, and industrial 
enterprises have suffered extensive 
losses. Inventories have been de- 
stroyed; industrial plants have been 
heavily damaged. Unemployment is 
estimated to be as high as 50% of the 
labor force. Agricultural production 

ihas been sharply reduced, and credit 

jhas dried up. The financial system is 
virtually bankrupt, as loans were not 
repaid and massive amounts of capital 

iwere sent overseas. Gross foreign ex- 
change reserves are virtually nonexist- 
ent. 

Our immediate efforts were focused 
on a humanitarian assistance effort to 
relieve human suffering. As of August 
30 the U.S. Government had com- 
mitted nearly $8 million for human- 
itarian assistance consisting primarily 
of ( 1 ) over 8,500 metric tons of PL 480 
food commodities; (2) grants to assist 
private voluntary organizations (in- 
cluding the Red Cross, CARE, and 
others) in their relief programs; and (3) 
medicines, tents, blankets, and other 
relief items. 

In addition a PL 480, Title II agree- 
ment for $2.9 million to ship food 
commodities to Nicaragua was signed 
on August 30. This agreement will help 
provide a transition from an emergency 
program to one following more normal 
procedures. Together with the food 
commodities already provided, the PL 
480 agreement should meet all of 
Nicaragua's requirements for oil and 
dairy products and 30% of its cereal 
requirements during the next 3-month 
period. 

While the United States has taken the 
lead in averting famine in Nicaragua, 
we have not been alone in this effort. 
Private voluntary agencies operating in 
Nicaragua and in the United States 
have provided some $3.3 million in 

' cash contributions to the relief effort. 
Other nations and international organi- 
zations have also participated gener- 
ously. Seventeen nations have contrib- 
uted so far, and a number of these 

i countries are considering additional as- 
sistance. Venezuela, for example, has 

> made available $20 million of its trust 
funds administered by the Inter- 

'•5 American Development Bank (IDB) for 

/essential imports. Costa Rica and 
Panama have provided food and techni- 
cal advice. The Central American 



Visit of Iftexican 
President Lopez Portillo 



President Jose Lopez Portillo of 
Mexico made an official visit to 
Washington, D.C., September 28-29, 
1979. Following is the text of the joint 
press statement issued on September 
29.' 

President Carter and President Lopez 
Portillo met at the White House Sep- 
tember 28-29 for the third in a series of 
reviews on the status of bilateral rela- 
tions and consideration of regional and 
global issues of mutual interest. 

At their second meeting the Presi- 
dents had agreed to a restructuring of 
the consultative mechanism and had 
requested their Secretaries of State and 
Foreign Relations to report on the 



matter. The first order of business at 
this meeting, accordingly, was to re- 
view that report. The Presidents ex- 
pressed satisfaction with the intensive 
effort made by the working groups of 
the consultative mechanism and the 
substantive progress achieved in those 
groups. They concluded that the mech- 
anism has proven to be an effective ve- 
hicle for coordinating and further de- 
fining bilateral relations. They, there- 
fore, instructed their Administrations to 
continue working through the 
mechanism in the areas of mutual 
interest already identified. 

President Carter and President Lopez 
Portillo reviewed the status of bilateral 
consultations in the energy field and 



Common Market countries have made 
available $10 million in loans. Spain 
has pledged up to $7 million for relief 
and recovery. West Germany is pro- 
viding $1.75 million for relief. 

Looking to the future, we understand 
that three Central American countries 
are arranging a revolving export credit 
fund of up to $75 million to assist 
Nicaragua within the Central American 
Common Market. We also understand 
that the European Economic Commu- 
nity is providing special credit for $9 
million for grain exports to Nicaragua 
and that Germany is arranging an as- 
sistance program totaling some $19 
million. 

We now need to begin to shift our 
efforts from relief to recovery — to as- 
sist the Nicaraguan people to meet their 
own basic needs of food, shelter, and 
medical attention. After reviewing the 
status of our assistance accounts and 
analyzing all possibilities, the Admin- 
istration has concluded that the only 
immediate way to assist is to repro- 
gram: (1) $8 million of Economic Sup- 
port Fund (ESF) funds which had been 
planned for the Maqarin Dam but 
which were not required this fiscal 
year, and (2) $500,000 from AID de- 
velopment assistance. These repro- 
grammed funds will enable us to put 
together an interim repair and rehabili- 
tation program to help meet 
Nicaragua's needs. We are now com- 
pleting an assessment of Nicaragua's 
longer term needs, and we will shortly 
be consulting with Congress on the 
feasibility of a longer term recovery 
program for the country. 



The interim program we are propos- 
ing for the balance of FY 1979 consists 
of the following elements: 

• $6 million to provide the grain 
stabilization institute with the capacity 
to assure purchase of food crop pro- 
duction and stable and reasonable con- 
sumer prices through the next planting 
and harvest cycle; 

• $2 million to assist the Ministry of 
Housing in the repair and rehabilitation 
of low-cost housing; and 

• $500,000 reprogrammed from de- 
velopment assistance to assist a major 
Nicaraguan private voluntary agency to 
restore small businesses and industries. 

In addition to these reprogrammed 
funds, our proposed interim program 
also includes PL 480, Title I sales of 
15,000 tons of wheat, amounting to 
approximately $2.6 million. These 
sales will help the country to feed itself 
and to save precious foreign exchange. 

The interim relief and rehabilitation 
activities 1 have described are needed 
to meet urgent requirements. Although 
the proposed reprogramming is not 
large, it will be an important symbol of 
the traditional and continuing 
friendship between Nicaragua and the 
United States. 1 assure you that the 
focus of the proposed activities will be 
on the people of Nicaragua, who so 
badly need our assistance. D 



'The complete transcript of the hearings will 
be published by the committee and will be avail- 
able from the Superintendent of Documents, 
U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 
D.C. 20402. 



58 



expressed their pleasure at the suc- 
cessful conclusion of governmental 
negotiations for the sale of Mexican 
surplus associated natural gas to the 
United States. They considered this 
agreement advantageous to both coun- 
tries. 

Regarding another energy source, 
the Presidents expressed their hope that 
ongoing negotiations for electric en- 
ergy interchanges along their common 
border may also be satisfactorily con- 
cluded in the near future. 

Both Presidents noted that the com- 
mon border offers unique opportunities 
for close collaboration in many areas. 
They expressed their interest in en- 
hancing the environment along the bor- 
der and preserving the quality of life in 
the region. Presidents Carter and Lopez 
Portillo agreed on the need for both 
countries to prevent events or actions 
on one side of the land or maritime 
boundary from degrading the environ- 
ment on the other side. They also in- 
structed their Administrations to give a 
high priority to such questions. They 
also agreed to work within the consul- 
tative mechanism to determine if it is 
possible or appropriate to conclude 
agreements for measures by both 
countries to lessen or eliminate en- 
vironmental damage in the future. 

The Presidents recalled that last 
February they had instructed the Inter- 
national Boundary and Water Commis- 
sion to recommend measures that might 
be adopted within the context of exist- 
ing agreements to achieve further 
progress toward a permanent solution 
to border sanitation problems. The 
Presidents reviewed the recommenda- 
tions submitted by the commission and 
found them satisfactory as a basic 
agreement for solution of border sani- 
tation problems. The Presidents asked 
the commission to proceed as soon as 
possible to conclude the supplementary 
recommendations for completion of the 
works required to provide the good 
quality water which they had recog- 
nized in February to be so important 
for the health and well-being of the 
citizens of both countries living and 
traveling in the border area. 

The Presidents paid special attention 
to the phenomenon of the migratory 
flow between Mexico and the United 
States, including specific issues that 
arise therefrom on both sides of the 
border. They recognized that, as they 
had agreed last February, it is essential 
to know with greater precision and de- 
tail all aspects of the matter. 

The President of Mexico accordingly 
outlined the purposes and first partial 
results of the national survey of emi- 
gration to the northern border and the 



Department of State Bulletin 



Agreetnent With Btexico 
on l^atural Gas 



PRESIDENT'S REMARKS, 
SEPT. 21, 1979' 

I'm pleased to announce that we 
have just reached an agreement with 
the Government of Mexico which will 
permit the purchase of Mexican natural 
gas by U.S. buyers. 

This is a significant step toward pro- 
viding a new source of energy supplies 
for our country. Just as important, the 
agreement is a breakthrough in building 
the relationship of equity and mutual 
respect which we seek with the gov- 
ernment and the people of our great 
southern neighbor. 

Under the terms of this agreement, 
the U.S. purchasers will be able to buy 
300 million cubic feet of natural gas 
each day. This gas will be in excess of 
Mexico's national demand and will 
meet our own needs, which are not 
covered by our present supplies. The 
price is a fair one for both countries. 

This natural gas agreement repre- 
sents an important first step toward a 



deeper and broader relationship, and it 
will be of great benefit both to the 
people of Mexico and to the people of 
our own country. 

I've expressed to President Lopez 
Portillo today my pleasure that we've 
reached an understanding with respect 
to natural gas sales and that we will 
have a chance to discuss more impor- 
tant issues — other important issues^ 
when we meet in Washington nexti 
week. 



JOINT ANNOUNCEMENT, 
SEPT. 21, 19792 

The Governments of Mexico and the: 
United States of America have reached 
an understanding on a framework for 
the sale of 300 million cubic feet per 
day of natural gas by Petroleos Mexi- 
canos, the Mexican State Oil Com- 
pany, to U.S. purchasers. 

Pursuant to the understanding 
reached, the Governments of the; 



United States, undertaken by the De- 
partment of Labor and Social Welfare. 
This large-scale study, which is in an 
advanced stage, will provide more pre- 
cise information on the size and nature 
of emigration, including data on the 
number of emigrants who annually 
enter the United States, how many re- 
turn to Mexico, their contribution to 
the U.S. and Mexican economies, and 
the degree to which they draw upon 
and contribute to social services in the 
United States. President Carter agreed 
on the importance of statistical consis- 
tency in approaching questions of 
migration and was pleased to learn of 
the progress of the survey. 

President Carter described the steps 
he has taken to insure that all depart- 
ments and agencies of the U.S. Gov- 
ernment give priority to the protection 
of the human rights of all persons in 
the United States, whether or not they 
are American citizens. 

Both Presidents repeated their com- 
mitment to combat the smuggling of 
undocumented persons, which consti- 
tutes a serious threat to human rights. 

Following their review of bilateral 
matters. President Lopez Portillo and 
President Carter discussed recent de- 
velopments in Central America and 
agreed that progress toward a demo- 



cratic government in Nicaragua had 
improved the prospects of peace in the 
region and a greater respect for human 
rights. They committed their govern- 
ments to continue supporting the Nic- 
araguan Government of National Re- 
construction with a view toward as- 
sisting it in the task of economic andi 
social recovery. Both Presidents ex- 
changed points of view on the Carib- 
bean. 

President Carter congratulated Presi- 
dent Lopez Portillo on his proposal to 
the United Nations on rationalized pro- 
duction and consumption of energy, 
both in the industrialized countries and 
the developing countries, saying that it 
was a balanced presentation, positive 
in tone. President Carter also referred 
to the energy plan proposed to the U.S. 
Congress and agreed on the need to de- 
vote increased efforts to alternative 
sources. 

Finally, there was a review of the 
latest developments on the Middle East 
and SALT II treaty. Di 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of Presi- 
dential Documents of Oct. 8. 1979, which also 
carries the exchange of toasts at a state dinner 
on Sept. 28 and the departure remarks on Sept. 
29. 



November 1979 



59 



United States of America and the 
Mexican States have agreed to au- 
thorize and support as a matter of pol- 
icy commercial transactions which are 
within the following framework: 

• The initial volume of natural gas 
deliveries will be 300 million cubic 
feet per day, commencing as soon as 
contracts are signed, regulatory ap- 
provals obtained, and gas is available 
for delivery. 

• The initial price will be $3,625/ 
million btu as of January 1, 1980, This 
initial price is subject to reconsidera- 
tion prior to January 1, 1980, if the 
price for natural gas from comparable 
sources exceeds that amount prior to 
said date. 

• The arrangement shall continue 
without limitation subject to the under- 
standing that the gas to be supplied is 
surplus associated gas in excess of 
Mexican national demand, that the gas 
being purchased is to meet U.S. needs 
not covered from other sources, and 
that therefore the contractual provisions 
will provide that either nation, on the 
basis of its own determination of its 
national interest, taking into account its 
domestic supply and demand for natu- 
ral gas, may cause the termination of 
the arrangement upon 180 days notice 
to the other nation. 

• The initial price will be adjusted 
quarterly by the same percentage as the 
change in world crude oil prices pur- 
suant to a specific formula to be agreed 
apon by the contracting parties. 

The way is now clear for the negoti- 
ation of commercial contracts between 
Petroleos Mexicanos and U.S. pur- 
chasers on terms which both govern- 
ments regard as mutually beneficial. 
Such contracts will be subject to ap- 
propriate governmental approvals in 
each country. 

The two governments will review 
from time to time the terms of this ar- 
rangement as well as other energy is- 
sues of mutual interest. D 



'Made to news correspondents assembled in 
the Briefing Room at the White House (text 
from Weekly Compilation of Presidential 
Documents of Sept. 24, 1979). 

^Text from Weekly Compilation of Sept. 24, 
1979. 



(/JS. Ambassadors 

to Western Hemisphere 

Countries, 

October 1979 



Argentina — Raul H. Castro 

Bahamas — William B, Schwartz. Jr. 

Barbados — Sally Angela Shelton 

Bolivia — Paul H. Boeker 

Brazil — Robert Marion Sayre 

Chile — George W. Landau 

Colombia — Diego C. Asencio 

Costa Rica — Marvin Weissman 

Dominica — Sally Angela Shelton 

Dominican Republic — Robert L. Yost 

Ecuador — Raymond E. Gonzalez 

El Salvador — Frank J. Devine 

Grenada — Sally Angela Shelton 

Guatemala — Frank V. Ortiz. Jr. 

Guyana — George B. Roberts, Jr. 

Haiti — William Bowdoin Jones 

Honduras — Mari-Luci Jaramillo 

Jamaica — Loren E. Lawrence 

Mexico — Vacant 

Nicaragua — Lawrence A. Pezzullo 

Panama — Ambler Holmes Moss, Jr. 

Paraguay — Robert E. White 

Peru — Harry W. Shlaudeman 

Saint Lucia — (Minister) Sally Angela Shelton 

Suriname — Nancy Ostrander 

Trinidad and Tobago — Irving G. Cheslaw 

Uruguay — Lyle Franklin Lane 

Venezuela — William H, Luers D 



TREATIES: 

Current Actions 

MULTILATERAL 

Arbitration 

Convention on the recognition and enforcement 
of foreign arbitral awards. Done at New York 
June 10, 1958. Entered into force June 7, 
1959; for the U.S. Dec. 29, 1970. TIAS 6997. 
Accession deposited: Colombia, Sept. 25, 
1979. 

Antarctic 

Recommendations relating to the furtherance of 
principles and objectives of the Antarctic 
treaty. Adopted at London Oct. 7, 1977, at the 
Ninth Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting.' 
Notification of approval: Chile, Sept. 27, 
1979. 

Aviation 

Convention for the suppression of unlawful acts 
against the safety of civil aviation. Done at 
Montreal Sept. 23, 1971. Entered into force 
Jan. 26, 1973. TIAS 7570. 
Accessions deposited: El Salvador, Sept. 25, 
1979; Sierra Leone, Sept. 20, 1979. 



Protocol on the authentic quadrilingual text of 
the convention on international civil aviation 
(Chicago. 1944) (TIAS 1591), with annex. 
Done at Montreal Sept. 30, 1977.' 
Signature: Spain, Oct. 4, 1979." 
Ratification deposited: Guatemala, Sept. 27. 

1979. 
Acceptances deposited: Peru, Sept. 26, 1979: 
Yugoslavia, Oct. 9, 1979. 

Conservation 

Convention on international trade in endangered 
species of wild fauna and flora, with appen- 
dices. Done at Washington Mar. 3, 1973. En- 
tered into force July 1. 1975. TIAS 8249. 
Ratification deposited: Bolivia. July 6, 1979. 
Accession deposited: Bahamas, June 20, 
1979. 

Environmental Modiflcation 

Convention on the prohibition of military or any 
other hostile use of environmental modifica- 
tion techniques, with annex. Done at Geneva 
May 18, 1977. Entered into force Oct. 5, 
1978.' 

Accessions deposited: Bangladesh, Cape 
Verde, Oct. 3, 1979; Sao Tome and Prin- 
cipe. Oct. 5. 1979. 

Health 

Constitution of the World Health Organization. 
Done at New York July 22. 1946. Entered into 
force Apr. 7. 1948; for the U.S. June 21. 
1948. TIAS 1808. 

Acceptance deposited: Seychelles, Sept. II, 
1979. 

Human Rights 

American convention on human rights. Done at 
San Jose Nov. 22. 1969. Entered into force 
July 18. 1978.3 
Adherence deposited: Bolivia. July 19, 1979. 

Maritime Matters 

Amendments to the convention of Mar. 6, 1948, 
as amended (TIAS 4044, 6285, 6490, 8606), 
on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consulta- 
tive Organization. Done at London Nov. 14. 
1975.' 

Acceptances deposited: Bangladesh. Oct. 8, 
1979; Iraq. Sept. 5, 1979. 

Amendments to the convention of Mar. 6, 1948. 
as amended (TIAS 4044, 6285. 6490. 8606), 
on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consulta- 
tive Organization. Done at London Nov. 17, 
1977.' 

Acceptances deposited: Bangladesh, Oct. 8, 
1979; Iraq, Sept. 5, 1979. 

Marriage 

Convention on consent to marriage, minimum 
age for marriage, and registration of mar- 
riages. Done at New York Dec. 10, 1962. 
Entered into force Dec. 9, 1964.'' 
Accession deposited: Barbados. Oct. 1. 1979. 

Nuclear Weapons — Nonproliferation 

Treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear 
weapons. Done at Washington, London, and 
Moscow July 1, 1968. Entered into force Mar. 
5, 1970. TIAS 6839. 

Accession deposited: Bangladesh, Aug. 31. 
1979. 

Pollution 

Convention on the prevention of marine pollu- 
tion by dumping of wastes and other matter, 
with annexes. Done at London, Mexico City, 
Moscow, and Washington Dec. 29, 1972. 



60 



Enlered into force Aug. 30, 1975 TIAS 8165. 
Ratifications deposited: Argentina. Sept. 12. 
1979; Switzerland, July 'S\. 1979. 

Racial Discrimination 

International convention on the elimination of all 
form.s of racial discrimination. Done at New 
York Dec. 21, 1965 Entered into force Jan. 
4, 1969.-' 

Accession deposited: Cape Verde, Oct. 3, 
1979. 

Reciprocal Assistance 

Protocol of amendment to the inter-American 
treaty of reciprocal assistance (Rio pact). 
Done at San Jose July 26, 1975.' 
Ratification deposited: U.S. (with reserva- 
tion), Sept. 20, 1979. 

Telecommunications 

Final acts of the World Administrative Radio 
Conference for the planning of the broad- 
casting-satellite service in frequency bands 
11.7-12.2 GHz (in regions 2 and 3) and 
11.7-12.5 GHz (in region 1), with annexes. 
Done at Geneva Feb. 13, 1977. Entered into 
force Jan. 1, 1979.' 
Approval deposited: India, Mar. 31, 1979. 

Partial revision of the radio regulations (Geneva, 
1959), as revi.sed (TIAS 4893, 8599), relating 
to the aeronautical mobile (R) service, with 
annexes and final protocol. Done at Geneva 
Mar. 5, 1978. Entered into force Sept 1, 
1979, except for the frequency allotment plan 
for the aeronautical mobile (R) service which 
shall come into force on Feb. 1, 1983.' 
Approval deposited: Canada, June 20, 1979. 

Transportation 

Agreement on the international carriage of 
perishable foodstuffs and on the special 
equipment to be used for such carriage (ATP), 
with annexes. Done at Geneva Sept. 1, 1970. 
Entered into force Nov. 21, 1976.' 
Accessions deposited: Belgium, Oct. I, 1979; 
U.K Oct. 5, 1979. 

United Nations 

Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the 
International Court of Justice. Signed at San 
Francisco June 26, 1945. Entered into force 
Oct. 24, 1945. 59 Stat. 1031. 
Admission to Membership: Saint Lucia, Sept. 
19, 1979. 

Convention on the privileges and immunities of 
the United Nations. Adopted at New York 
Feb. 13, 1946. Entered into force Sept. 17, 
1946; for the U.S. Apr. 29, 1970, (TIAS 
6900). 

Accession deposited: People's Republic of 
China, Sept. II, 1979. 

Weights and Measures 

Convention establishing an International Organi- 
zation of Legal Metrology. Done at Paris Oct. 
12, 1955, and amended January 1968. Entered 
into force May 28. 1958; for the US, Oct. 22. 
1972, 
Accession deposited: Algeria, June 26, 1979. 

Wheat 

Protocol modifying and further extending the 
wheat trade convention (part of the interna- 
tional wheat agreement), 1971 (TIAS 7144). 
Done at Washington Apr. 25, 1979 Entered 
into force June 23. 1979, with respect to cer- 
tain provisions, July 1, 1979, with respect to 
other provisions. 
Ratification deposited: Peru. Sept. 26, 1979. 



BILATERAL 



Colombia 

Extradition treaty, with annex. Signed at Wash- 
ington Sept. 14, 1979, Enters into force on the 
date of the exchange of the instruments of 
ratification. 

France 

Protocol to the convention with respect to taxes 
on income and properly of July 28, 1967, as 
amended by the protocol of Oct. 12, 1970, 
with exchange of notes. Signed at Washington 
Nov. 24, 1978. 
Instruments of ratification exchanged: Sept, 

27, 1979. 
Entr\ into force: Oct. 27, 1979; effective Jan. 
1, 1979. 

Federal Republic of Germany 

Memorandum of understanding relating to coop- 
eration in the development of national air 
traffic control systems, with annex. Signed at 
Washington and Bonn Aug. 8 and 20, 1979. 
Enlered into force Aug. 20, 1979, 

German Democratic Republic 

Consular convention, with exchange of notes. 
Signed at Berlin Sept. 4, 1979. Enters into 
force 30 days following the date of the ex- 
change of instruments of ratification. 

Hungary 

Convention for the avoidance of double taxation 
and the prevention of fiscal evasion with re- 
spect to taxes on income, with exchange of 
notes Signed at Washington Feb. 12, 1979. 
Entry into force: Sept. 18. 1979. 

India 

Agreement amending the agreement of Dec. 30. 
1977, as amended (TIAS 9036, 9232), relat- 
ing to trade in cotton, wool, and manmade 
textiles and textile products. Effected by ex- 
change of notes at Washington Aug. 31 and 
Oct. 4, 1979. Entered into force Oct. 4, 1979. 

Japan 

Arrangement concerning trade in cotton, wool, 
and manmade fiber textiles, with related 
notes. Effected by exchange of notes at 
Washington Aug 17, 1979. Entered into force 
Aug. 17, 1979; effective Jan. 1, 1979. 

Record of discussion relating to trade in textile 
products. Signed at Washington Aug. 22. 
1979. Entered into force Aug. 22, 1979 

Jordan 

Agreement concerning the grant of defense arti- 
cles and services under the military assistance 
program. Effected by exchange of notes at 
Amman Aug. 27, 1979. Entered into force 
Aug 28. 1979. 

Republic of Korea 

Agreement extending the memorandum of un- 
derstanding of Dec. 19. 1975. and Jan, 15. 
1976. as extended (TIAS 8609. 9161). relat- 
ing to the development of the Korea Standards 
Research Institute Effected by exchange of 
letters at Seoul and Washington June 14. July 
13 and Aug. 21. 1979. Entered into force 
Aug. 21. 1979; effective July 31, 1979. 

Convention for the avoidance of double taxation 
and the prevention of fiscal evasion with re- 
spect to taxes on income and the encourage- 
ment of international trade and investment, 
with related notes. Signed at Seoul June 4, 
1976. 



Department of State Bulletin 

Instruments of ratification exchanged: Sept. 

20, 1979, ; 

Entry into force: Oct. 20. 1979. i 

Malaysia 

Agreement amending the agreement of May 17 
and June 8. 1978. as amended (TIAS 9180), 
relating to trade in cotton, wool, and man- 
made fiber textiles and textile products. Ef- 
fected by exchange of letters at Washington 
and New York Sept 10 and 14, 1979. Entered! 
into force Sept. 14, 1979. 

Agreement amending the agreement of May 17 
and June 8, 1978, as amended (TIAS 9180), 
relating to trade in cotton, wool, and man- 
made fiber textiles and textile products. Ef- 
fected by exchange of letters at Washington 
and New York Sept 14 and 28, 1979. Entered 
into force Sept. 28, 1979. 

Mexico 

Minute 261 of the International Boundary and 
Water Commission: Recommendations for the 
solution to the border sanitation problems. 
Signed at El Paso Sept. 24, 1979. Enters into 
force after approval of the two governments. 

Netherlands 

Agreement relating to cooperation between the 
United States and the Netherlands Antilles re- 
garding a hurricane monitoring and forecast- 
ing program for the Caribbean, with memo- 
randum of arrangement. Effected by exchange 
of notes at The Hague July 26. 1979. Enters 
into force on the date on which the Govern- 
ment of the Kingdom of the Netherlands 
notifies the Government of the United States 
that the necessary constitutional procedures 
required in the Kingdom of the Netherlands 
have been complied with. 

Nicaragua 

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities. 
Signed at Managua Aug. 31. 1979. Entered 
into force Aug. 31. 1979. 

Panama 

Convention for the construction of a ship canal. 
Signed at Washington Nov. 18, 1903. Entered 
into force Feb. 26, 1904. 33 Stat. 2234. 
Terminated: Oct, 1, 1979. 

Agreement delimiting the Canal Zone referred to 
in Article II of the convention of Nov. 18, 
1903. Signed at Panama June 15, 1904. En- 
tered into force June 15, 1904. 10 Bevans 
678. 
Terminated: Oct, 1, 1979. 

Boundary convention. Signed at Panama Sept. 
2, 1914. Entered into force Feb, 11, 1915. 38 
Stat. 1893. 
Terminated: Oct. 1, 1979. 

Protocol of an agreement relating to neutrality. 
Signed at Washington Oct. 10. 1914. Entered 
into force Oct. 10. 1914. 38 Stat. 2042. 
Terminated: Oct. 1. 1979. 

Convention modifying the liquor smuggling 
convention of 1924 (43 Stat. 1875). Signed at 
Panama Mar, 14. 1932. Entered into force 
Mar. 25. 1933. 48 Stat. 1488. 
Terminated: Oct. I. 1979. 

Convention with regard to the construction of a 
trans-isthmian highway between the cities of 
Panama and Colon. Signed at Washington 
Mar. 2. 1936. Entered into force July 27, 
1939. 53 Stat. 1869. 
Terminated: Oct. 1. 1979. 

General treaty of friendship and cooperation ac- 
companied by sixteen exchanges of notes em- 



November 1979 



61 



bodying interpretations of the new treaty or 
agreements pursuant thereto. Signed at 
Washington Mar. 2. 1936. Entered into force 
July 27, 1939. 53 Stat. 1807. 
Terminated: Oct. 1, 1979. 

Agreement confirming that the protocol signed 
at Washington on Oct. 10, 1914 (38 Stat. 
2042), is at present in effect. Effected by ex- 
change of notes at Panama Aug. 25, 1939. 54 
Stat. 1811. 
Terminated: Oct. 1, 1979. 

Arrangement providing for a Trans-Isthmian 
Joint Highway Board. Effected by exchange 
of notes at Panama Oct. 19 and 23 and Dec. 
20, 1939, and Jan. 4, 1940. Entered into force 
Jan. 4, 1940. 54 Stat. 2278. 
Terminated: Oct. 1, 1979. 

Agreement supplementing the convention of 
Mar. 2, 1936 (53 Stat. 1869), relating to the 
trans-isthmian highway. Effected by exchange 
of notes at Washington Aug. 31 and Sept. 6, 
1940. Entered into force Sept. 6, 1940. 58 
Stat. 1593. 
Terminated: Oct. 1, 1979. 

General relations agreement. Effected by ex- 
change of notes at Washington May 18, 1942. 
Entered into force May 18, 1942. 59 Slat. 
1289. 
Terminated: Oct. 1, 1979. 

Convention regarding the Colon corridor and 
certain other corridors through the Canal 
Zone. Signed at Panama May 24, 1950. En- 
tered into force Apr. 11, 1955. TIAS 3180. 
Terminated: Oct 1, 1979. 

Treaty of mutual understanding and cooperation 
and memorandum of understandings reached. 
Signed at Panama Jan. 25, 1955. Entered into 
force Aug. 23, 1955. TIAS 3297. 
Terminated: Oct. 1, 1979. 

Agreement providing for reciprocal recognition 
of drivers' licenses issued in Panama and the 
Canal Zone. Effected by exchange of notes at 
Panama Oct. 31, 1960. Entered into force 
Nov. 1, 1960. TIAS 4716 
Terminated: Oct. 1, 1979. 

Philippines 

Agreement concerning the grant of defense arti- 
cles and services under the military assistance 
program. Effected by exchange of notes at 
Manila Aug 23 and 30, 1979. Entered into 
force Aug. 30, 1979. 

Agreement continuing the operations of the U.S. 
Veterans Administration in the Philippines. 
Signed at Manila Sept. 5, 1979. Entered into 
force Sept. 5, 1979; effective Oct. 27, 1978. 

Poland 

Agreement amending the agreement of Jan. 9 
and 12, 1978, as amended (TIAS 9064, 9213), 
relating to trade in cotton, wool, and man- 
made fiber textiles and textile products. Ef- 
fected by exchange of notes at Warsaw May 
10 and Sept. 3, 1979. Entered into force Sept. 
3, 1979. 

Portugal 

Agreement concerning the grant of defense arti- 
cles and services under the military assistance 
program. Effected by exchange of notes at 
Lisbon Aug. 14 and 27, 1979. Entered into 
force Aug. 27, 1979. 

Romania 

Agreement amending the agreement of June 17, 
1977, as amended (TIAS 8833, 9211), relat- 
ing to trade in wool and manmade fiber tex- 



tiles. Effected by exchange of letters at 
Washington and New York July 23 and Sept. 
14, 1979. Entered into force Sept. 14, 1979. 

Sierra Leone 

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, 
relating to the agreement of Aug. 31, 1978 
(TIAS 9210), with memorandum of negotia- 
tions. Signed at Freetown Aug. 23, 1979. 
Entered into force Aug. 23, 1979. 

Singapore 

Agreement amending the air transport agreement 
of Mar. 31, 1978 (TIAS 9001). Effected by 
exchange of notes at Singapore Sept. 14, 
1979. Entered into force Sept. 14, 1979. 

Spain 

Agreement concerning the grant of defense arti- 
cles and services under the military assistance 
program. Effected by exchange of notes at 
Madrid Aug. 30, 1979. Entered into force 
Aug. 30, 1979. 

United Kingdom 

Convention for the avoidance of double taxation 
and the prevention of fiscal evasion with re- 
spect to taxes on estates of deceased persons 
and on gifts. Signed at London Oct. 19, 1978. 
Instruments of ratification exchanged: Oct. 

11, 1979. 
Entry into force: Nov. 11, 1979. 

Western Samoa 

General agreement for special development as- 
sistance. Signed at Apia Sept. 20, 1979. En- 
tered into force Sept. 20, 1979. D 



' Not in force. 

' Without reservation as to acceptance. 

' Not in force for the U.S. 



CHROI\OLOGY: 

September 1979 



Sept. 3 Conference of nonaligned countries 
meets in Havana, Sept. 3-9. 

Sept. 4 Fifth conference of the U.N. World 
Food Council held in Ottawa, 
Canada, Sept. 4-7. 
Egypt and Israel hold talks on Pales- 
tinian autonomy in Haifa, Israel, 
Sept. 4-6. 

Sept. 5 U.S. Ambassador to U.N. Young vis- 
its Africa Sept. 5-20. 

Sept. 10 Constitutional conference on Southern 
Rhodesia begins in London. 
Angolan President Neto dies follow- 
ing surgery in a Moscow hospital. 
Egyptian Vice President Mubarak 

visits U.S. Sept. 10-17. 
President Mobutu of Zaire visits 
Washington. DC, Sept. 10-13. 

Sept. 12 18th Congress of the Universal Postal 
Union held in Rio de Janeiro Sept. 
12-30. 

Sept. 16 Sweden holds parliamentary elections. 
The Moderate, Center, and Liberal 



Parties retain their parliamentary 
majority by a narrow one-seat mar- 
gin. 
President Taraki of Afghanistan is re- 
ported by Kabul radio to have re- 
signed the presidency. Prime 
Minister Amin is named to succeed 
him. 

Sept. 17 10th Antarctic Treaty consultative 
meeting held in the Department of 
State Sept. 17-Oct. 5. 

Sept. 18 34th session of the U.N. General As- 
sembly opens in New York, 

Sept. 20 The Angolan Central Committee of 
the MPLA-Labor Party elects Jose 
Eduardo dos Santos as President. 
Ola Ulsten resigns as Sweden's Prime 
Minister. 

Sept. 21 U.S., Mexico announce agreement on 
Mexico's sale of natural gas (300 
million cubic feet a day) to the U.S. 

UNGA allows ousted Kampuchean re- 
gime of Pol Pot to retain the coun- 
try's seat in the U.N. by a vote of 
71 (U.S.) to 35 with 34 abstentions 
(12 nations were absent) 

David Dacko leads a coup which 
overthrows Emperor Bokassa I of 
the Central African Empire. The 
country is renamed the Central Af- 
rican Republic. 

Sept 23 Donald F. McHenry sworn in as U.S. 
Ambassador to the U.N. 

Sept. 24 Hilla Limann sworn in as President of 
Ghana. 

Sept. 25 U.S. Senate passes the Panama Canal 
Act of 1979 to implement terms of 
the Panama Canal Treaty by a vote 
of 63 to 32. 
Israel returns another section of the 
Sinai Peninsula to Egypt in cere- 
monies at Abu Darba. 

Sept 26 U.S. House passes the Panama Canal 
Act of 1979 by a vote of 232 to 
188. 
Egypt and Israel hold Palestinian au- 
tonomy talks in Alexandria, Egypt, 
Sept. 26-27. 

Sept. 27 President Carter signs into law the 
Panama Canal Act 

Danish Prime Minister Jorgensen re- 
signs. 

World Administrative Radio Confer- 
ence convenes in Geneva. 

Sept. 28 Mexican President Lopez Portillo vis- 
its Washington, DC, Sept. 
28-29. 

Sept. 29 Pope John Paul II visits Ireland and 
the U.S. Sept. 29-Oct. 8. 

Sept. 30 Vice President Mondale visits Panama 
Sept. 30-Oct. 2 to represent the 
U.S. when Panama acquires juris- 
diction over the Panama Canal Zone 
on Oct. 1 under terms of the 
Panama Canal Treaty. D 



62 



Department of State Bulletin 



PRESS RELEASES: 

Departniont ot State 



September l9-()clober 12 

Press releases may be obtained from the Of- 
fice of Press Relations, Department of State. 
Washington. DC. 20520. 



No. 

•226 

*227 



*23l 



237 
238 



Date 

9/19 

9/19 



228 


9/19 


229 


9/19 


230 


9/20 



9/20 



•232 9/20 



•233 


9/21 


234 


9/24 


•235 


9/25 



•236 9/26 



9/27 
9/27 



238A 9/27 



•239 


9/27 


•240 


9/27 


•241 


9/27 


•242 


9/28 



Subject 

U.S.. Philippines amend textile 
agreement. Aug 3 and 16. 

U.S.. Japan confirm record of 
understanding dealing with 
trade m textile issues. Aug. 
17. 

US . Korea amend textile 
agreement. Aug. 24. 

U.S.. Haiti sign textile agree- 
ment. Aug. 17. 

U.S. Organization for the In- 
ternational Radio Consulta- 
tive Committee (CCIR). 
study group 6. Nov. 8. 

Advisory Committee on Inter- 
national Investment, Tech- 
nology, and Development, 
Oct. 4. 

Shipping Coordinating Com- 
mittee (SCO, Subcommittee 
on Safety of Life at Sea 
(SOLAS), working group on 
standards of training and 
watchkeeping, Oct. 10. 

U.S., Hong Kong amend tex- 
tile agreement. May 23. 

Vance: address before U.N. 
General Assembly. 

Program for official visit to 
Washington, DC. of Mexi- 
can President Lopez Portillo, 
Sept. 28-29. 

Ambassador Paul C. Warnke to 
address conference on U.S. 
security and the Soviet 
challenge, Portland, Me., 
Oct 3. 

Bangladesh joins nonprolifera- 
lion treaty. 

Vance; address before Foreign 
Policy Association, New 
York. 

Vance: question-and-answer 
session following address 
before Foreign Policy As- 
sociation. 

sec, Oct. 30. 

see, National Committee for 
the Prevention of Marine 
Pollution, Nov. 20. 

Hispanic-American Foreign 
Policy Conference, Oct. 29. 

Ambassador Warnke to address 
conference on U.S. security 
and the Soviet challenge, 
Portland, Ore., Oct. 11. 



KAMPUCHEA DO]\ATIOI\S 

The authorities in Kampuchea have reached agreement with the 
tH'o international agencies which enter Kampuchea with food and 
medical supplies -U NIC EF and the International Red Cross. If 
you or members of your organization wish to help the people of 
Kampuchea, please send your donations, marked specifically for 
that purpose, to: 

American National Red Cross — Kampuchea Relief 

2025 E Street, N.W. 

Washington, D.C. 20006 

or 

U.S. Committee of UNICEF 
331 East 38th Street 
New York, N.Y. 10016 

Or you may call the U.S. Committee of UNICEF for more infor- 
mation: 800-221-2870 

212-686-5522 (New York State only) 

The U.S. Committee of UNICEF serves as a clearinghouse for 
the International Rescue Committee, Catholic Relief Service, 
American Friends Service Committee, CARE Inc., Church World 
Service. Lutheran World Relief, and O.rfam-America Inc. 



•243 9/29 Kenneth M. Curtis sworn in as 
Ambassador to Canada 
(biographic data). 

•244 10/1 Stephen Low sworn in as Am- 
bassador to Nigeria (biog- 
raphic data). 

•245 10/3 CCIR, study group 7, Oct. 22. 

•246 10/3 Advisory Committee to the 
U.S. National Section of the 
International Commission 
for the Conservation of At- 
lantic Tunas, Oct. 30. 

*247 10/3 Advisory Committee on His- 
torical Diplomatic Docu- 
mentation, Nov. 8. 

•248 10/3 Richard Noyes Viets sworn in 
as Ambassador to Tanzania 
(biographic data). 

•249 10/4 Ambassador Marshall Shulman 
to address conference on 
U.S. security and the Soviet 
challenge. Portland. Ore., 
Oct. II. 
250 10/4 Vance: interview on "Today" 
Show, New York. 

*251 10/4 International Telegraph and 
Telephone Consultative 
Committee (CCITT), study 
group I , Oct. 31. 

•252 10/4 sec, SOLAS, working group 
on radio communication, 
Oct. 18. 



253 


10/4 


254 


10/5 


255 


10/5 



*256 



10/9 



257 10/10 



258 10/10 



»259 10/10 



•260 10/10 



•261 
*262 

*263 



10/11 
10/12 

10/12 



sec, SOLAS, working group 
on fire protection, Oct. 24. 

Vance: interview on CBS-TV 
morning news. New York. 

Jack Richard Perry sworn in as 
Ambassador to Bulgaria 
(biographic data). 

Thomas W. M Smith sworn in 
as Ambassador to Ghana 
(biographic data). 

Vance: statement before the 
executive session of the Sen- 
ate Foreign Relations Com- 
mittee 

Press communique issued by 
the chairman of the 10th 
Antarctic Treaty Consulta- 
tive Meeting. 

John R. Clingerman sworn in 
as Ambassador to Lesotho 
(biographic data). 

Irving G. Cheslaw sworn in as 
Ambassador to Trinidad and 
Tobago (biographic data). 

CCIR, study group 5, Nov. 5. 

Overseas Schools Advisory 
Council, Dec. 13. 

Advisory Committee to U.S. 
Section on the International 
North Pacific Fisheries 
Commission, Oct. 28. D 



* Not printed in the Bulletin. 



I]\DEX 



NOVEMBER 1979 
VOL. 79. NO. 2032 

Africa 

Chronology: September 1979 61 

Common Needs in a Diverse World (Vance) .1 
Antarctica. lOth Meeting of the Antarctica 
Treaty Consulative Parties (Benson, Depart- 
ment press release, press communique) . . .21 
Arms Control 

Bangladesh Joins Nonproliteration Treaty 

(Christopher, Department announcement) .49 

Common Needs in a Diverse World (Vance) .1 

Interview on CBS-TV Morning News 

(Vance) 19 

Interview on NBC's "Today" Show (Vance) 18 

MX Missile System (Carter) 25 

N.XTO's Fourth Decade — Defense and Detente 

(Brzezinski, Mondale) 32 

President Carter's News Conference of October 

M (excerpts) 12 

kiview of U.S. Policy in Europe (Vest) . . . .36 

S ALT II — A Summation ( Vance) 24 

.Soviet Troops in Cuba and SALT (Carter) . . .7 
Australia. U.S. -Australia Agreement on Nu- 
clear Energy (message to the Congress) . .49 
Bangladesh. Bangladesh Joins Nonprolitera- 
tion Treaty (Christopher, Department an- 
nouncement) 49 

Canada. US -Canada Transboundary Air 

Quality Talks 26 

Congress 

Defense Budgets for FY 1980 and 1981 (mes- 

■-age to the Congress) 48 

14th Report on Cyprus (message to the Con- 
gress) 41 

Nicaragua (Christopher) 56 

Review of U.S. Policy in Europe (Vest) . . . .36 

SALT II — A Summation (Vance) 24 

US -Australia Agreement on Nuclear Energy 

(message to the Congress) 49 

Cuba 

Background on the Question of Soviet Troops 

in Cuba 9 

Interview on CBS-TV Morning News 

(Vance) 19 

Interview on NBC's "Today" Show (Vance) 18 
President Carter's News Conference of October 

9 (excerpts) 12 

Question-and-Answer Session Following New 

York Address (Vance) 16 

SALT II — A Summation ( Vance) 24 

Soviet Troops in Cuba and SALT (Carter) . . .7 
Cyprus. I4th Report on Cyprus (message to 

the Congress) 41 

Denmark. Fisheries Agreement With Den- 
mark, Faroe Islands 43 

Department and Foreign Service 

U.S. Ambassadors to Middle East Countries, 

October 1979 46 

U.S. Ambassadors to Western Hemisphere 

Countries, October 1979 59 

Economics 

Currents of Change in Latin America 

(Vance) 13 

Review of U.S. Policy in Europe (Vest) ... .36 

Egypt 

Anniversary of the Camp David Agreements 
(Begin, Carter, Sadat, Vance) 47 



Middle East: Vision of Peace (Brzezinski) . .44 

Energy 

Agreement With Mexico on Natural Gas (Car- 
ter, joint announcement) 58 

Common Needs in a Diverse World (Vance) . 1 

Environment — The Quiet Crisis (Lake) 27 

U.S. -Australia Agreement on Nuclear Energy 
(message to the Congress) 49 

Environment 

Environment — The Quiet Crisis (Lake) 27 

Negotiations To Protect Migratory Wild Ani- 
mals 31 

World Forests (memorandum from President 
Carter) 29 

Europe 

Chionology: September 1979 61 

President Carter's News Conference of October 
9 (excerpts) 12 

Review of U.S. Policy in Europe (Vest) . . . .36 

Fisheries. Fisheries Agreement With Denmark, 
Faroe Islands 43 

Human Rights. Fourth Anniversary of the Hel- 
sinki Final Act (Carter) 39 

Israel 

Anniversary of the Camp David Agreements 
(Begin, Carter, Sadat, Vance) 47 

Middle East: Vision of Peace (Brzezinski) . .44 

Kampuchea 

Kampuchea Donations 62 

President Carter's News Conference of October 
9 (excerpts) 12 

Latin America and the Caribbean 

Chronology: September 1979 61 

Currents of Change in Latin America 
(Vance) 13 

US Ambassadors to Western Hemisphere 
Countries, October 1979 59 

Liberia. President Carter Meets With Zairean 
and Liberian Presidents (White House state- 
ments) 20 

Mexico 

Agreement with Mexico on Natural Gas (Car- 
ter, joint announcement) 58 

Visit of Mexican President Lopez Portillo 
(joint press statement) 57 

Middle East 

Chronology: September 1979 61 

Common Needs in a Diverse World (Vance) . I 

Interview on NBC's "Today" Show (Vance)18 

President Carter's News Conference of October 
9 (excerpts) 12 

Question-and-Answer Session Following New 
York Address (Vance) 16 

U.S. Ambassadors to Middle East Countries, 
October 1979 46 

Military Affairs. Defense Budgets for FY 
1980 and 1981 (message to the Congress) 48 

Monetary Affairs. President Carter's News 
Conference of October 9 (excerpts) 12 

Nicaragua. Nicaragua (Christopher) 56 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

NATO's Fourth Decade — Defense and Detente 
(Brzezinski. Mondale) 32 

Review of US Policy in Europe (Vest) . . . .36 

SALT II — A Summation ( Vance) 24 

U.S. Commitment to Western Europe 
(Vance) 35 

Nuclear Policy 

Bangladesh Joins Nonproliferation Treaty 
(Christopher, Department announcement) .49 

U.S. -Australia Agreement on Nuclear Energy 
(message to the Congress) 49 

Oceans. Law of the Sea Negotiations (Rich- 
ardson) 50 

Panama 

Panama Acquires Jurisdiction Over the Canal 
Zone (Mondale) 54 



Panama Canal Act of 1979 (Carter) 55 

Petroleum. Saudi Arabian Oil Production 

(White House statement) 45 

Presidential Documents 

Agreement With Mexico on Natural Gas. . . .58 

Anniversary of the Camp David Agreements 47 

Defense Budgets for FY 1980 and 1981 48 

14th Report on Cyprus 41 

Fourth Anniversary of the Helsinki Final Act 39 

MX Missile System 25 

Panama Canal Act of 1 979 55 

President Carter's News Conference of October 

9 (excerpts) 12 

Soviet Troops in Cuba and SALT 7 

United Nations Day. 1979 (proclamation) . . ii 
U.S. -Australia Agreement on Nuclear Ener- 

gy '*9 

World Forests 29 

Publications. GPO Sales Publications 43 

Refugees. Common Needs in a Diverse World 
(Vance) I 

Saudi Arabia 

Letter of Credence (Alhegelan) 46 

Saudi Arabian Oil Production (White House 
statement) 45 

Science and Technology. U.N Conference on 
Science and Technology for Development 
(Carter. Hesburgh) 51 

Treaties 

Current Actions 59 

Fisheries Agreement With Denmark, Faroe Is- 
lands 43 

U.S. -Australia Agreement on Nuclear Energy 
(message to the Congress) 49 

U.S.S.R. 

Background on the Question of Soviet Troops 
in Cuba 9 

President Carter's News Conference of October 
9 (excerpts) 12 

Question-and-Answer Session Following New 
York Address ( Vance) 16 

Soviet Troops in Cuba and SALT (Carter) . . .7 

United Nations 

Common Needs in a Diverse World (Vance) . 1 

The 152 Members of the United Nations 6 

United Nations — A Profile 5 

UN. Conference on Science and Technology 
for Development (Carter. Hesburgh) 51 

United Nations Day. 1979 (proclamation) . . .ii 

U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations (bio- 
graphic data) 2 

U.S. Delegation to the 34th U.N. General As- 
sembly 3 

Zaire. President Carter Meets With Zairean 
and Liberian Presidents (White House state- 
ments) 20 



Name Index 

Alhegelan. Faisal 46 

Begin. Menahem 47 

Benson. Lucy Wilson 21 

Brzezinski. Zbigniew 32, 44 

Carter, President ii, 7, 12, 25 

29, 39, 41, 47, 48, 51, 55, 58 

Christopher. Warren 49, 56 

Hesburgh. Theodore M 51 

Lake. Anthony 27 

Mondale, Vice President 32, 54 

Richardson. Elliot L 50 

Sadat, Anwar al- 47 

Vance, Secretary 1, 13, 16, 18, 19, 24, 35, 47 
Vest , George S 36 



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Department 
of State 



-m of state ^-g J ^ 

bulletin 



December 19 79 



Record of United States Foreign Policy /Volume 79 / Nunnber 2033 




Departntpnt of State 

bulletin 



Volume 79 / Number 2033 / December 1979 



Cover: 

Art by Juanita Adams, 
assistant editor. 
Department of State Bulletin 



The Department of State Bulletin, 
published by the Office of Public Com- 
munication in the Bureau of Public 
Affairs, is the official record of U.S. 
foreign policy. Its purpose is to provide 
the public, the Congress, and govern- 
ment agencies with information on 
developments in U.S. foreign relations 
and the work of the Department of 
State and the Foreign Service. 

The Blilletin's contents include 
major addresses and news conferences 
of the President and the Secretary of 
State; statements made before congres- 
sional committees by the Secretary 
and other senior State Department of- 
ficials; special features and articles on 
international affairs; selected press re- 
leases issued by the White House, the 
Department, and the U.S. Mission to 
the United Nations; and treaties and 
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States is or may become a party. 

The Secretary of State has deter- 
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January 31, 1981. 

NOTE: Contents of this publication 
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CYRUS R. VANCE 

Secretary of State 

HOODING CARTER III 

Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs 

JOHN CLARK KIMBALL 

Chief, Editorial Division 

PHYLLIS A. YOUNG 
Editor 

JUANITA ADAMS 
Assistant Editor 



CO]\TE]\TS 



REFUGEES 

1 Kampuchean Refugees: Urgent Need for Worldwide Relief (Matthew Nimetz) 

4 Senators' Report on Refugees (Max Baucus. President Carter. John C. Danforth. 

James R. Sasser) 
7 U.S. Relief Efforts for Kampuchea (President Carter) 

10 U.N. Pledging Conference for Khmer Refugees (Secretary Vance) 

1 I Refugees — An International Obligation (Harry F. Young] 



THE PRESIDENT 

18 Iran and Energy 

THE SECRETARY 

21 Where We Stand With SALT II 

23 Question-and-Answer Session in 

Gainesville 
25 News Conference of October 3 1 

AFRICA 

29 Communism in Africa (David D. 
Newsom) 

ARMS CONTROL 

32 Senate Report on SALT 11 Verification 

( White House Statement) 

EAST ASIA 

33 U.S. -China Trade Agreement (Mes- 

sage to the Congress. Proclamation. 
Text of Agreement) 

ECONOMICS 

35 Opportunities and Challenges From the 
MTN (Julius L. Katz) 

ENERGY 

38 Crude Oil Transportation Arrangements 

(Julius L. Katz) 

39 Publications 

EUROPE 

40 An Overview of U.S. -Soviet Relations 

(Marshall D. Shulman) 

41 Northern Ireland (Department State- 

ment) 

42 Visit of His Holiness Pope John Paul II 

(White House Statement) 

43 15th Report on Cyprus (Message to the 

Congress) 

44 Czechoslovak Dissidents (Department 

Statement) 

GENERAL 

45 U.S. Foreign Policy Achievements 

(Matthew Nimetz) 



MIDDLE EAST 

49 Situation in Iran (President Carter. 

Secretary Vance. While House An- 
nouncements) 

50 Israelis and Palestinians (Donald F. 

McHenrx) 

52 Eighth Report on the Sinai Support 

Mission (Message to the Congress) 

SOUTH ASIA 

53 Situation in Afghanistan (Harold H. 

Saunders) 

54 Afghan Refugees (Harold H. Saun- 

ders) 

54 Publications 

UNITED NATIONS 

55 Economic Dialogue — A Challenge to 

Our Times (Donald F. McHenry) 

57 Kampuchean Credentials (Richard W. 

Pelree) 

58 Current State of the World Economy 

(Robert D. H or mats) 

59 Venda Homeland (Herbert K. Reis) 

63 U.N. Reforms (Charles William 
Maynes) 

WESTERN HEMISPHERE 

65 OAS General Assembly Convenes 
(Secretary Vance) 



TREATIES 

67 Current Actions 

CHRONOLOGY 

69 October 1979 

69 PRESS RELEASES 

PUBLICATIONS 

70 GPO Sales 

INDEX 



DEC 29 

DEPOSITORY 





Clockwise from left: 

A pair of undernourished Kampuchean girts at the Sa Keo 
refugee center in Thailand wait their turn for a bath at a 
pond in the camp. 

A Kampuchean refugee eats rice gruel at the Klong Kai 
Tueng temporary camp in Kampuchea near the Thai- 
Kampuchea border. 

Kampuchean refugees seek some rest in a crude shelter at 
the Klong Kai Tueng temporary camp. 




KAMPIJCHEA]\ REFUGEES: URGE]\T ]\EED 
FOR WORLDWIDE RELIEF 



by Matthew Nimetz 

Statement before the Subcommittee 
on Arms Control. Oceans, Interna- 
tional Operations and Environment of 
the Senate Foreign Relations Commit- 
tee on November 8, 1979.^ 

We meet today at a time of extraor- 
dinary urgency. Famine, dislocation, 
and warfare in Kampuchea threaten the 
lives of the Khmer people. Of a popu- 
lation that numbered between 7 and 8 
million in 1975, perhaps a third have 
died in the last 4 years. Many more 
will die in the coming months unless 
action is taken now to end this sense- 
less inhumanity. An effective 
worldwide relief effort can save hun- 
dreds of thousands who would other- 
wise die. Worldwide indignation at the 
death and suffering in Kampuchea has 
contributed to a climate in which such 
a program can be pursued. 

Successful relief activities require 
the active support of all the political 
authorities in Kampuchea, as well as 
action by the world community in 
coordinating contributions and dis- 
tribution of relief supplies. And clearly 
the U.S. role in this essential human- 
itarian cause will depend on close 
cooperation among the Administration, 
the Congress, and private voluntary 
agencies. 

The Administration is committed to 
this urgent humanitarian task. The 
presence of the First Lady, Rosalynn 
Carter, in Thailand today, to view the 
situation firsthand, is a manifestation 
of the President and Mrs. Carter's per- 
sonal concern for the Kampuchean 
tragedy. On Tuesday, Mrs. Carter will 
be meeting with representatives of vol- 
untary agencies to discuss her trip and 
plans for future relief efforts. 

Mr. Chairman [Claiborne Pell of 
Rhode Island], we also welcome your 
personal efforts on behalf of this effort, 
including your participation in the 
delegation to the U.N. pledging con- 
ference on Kampuchean refugees ear- 
lier this week. 1 am honored to be a 
part of this group of concerned organi- 
zations and individuals, and I welcome 
your ideas on ways we can improve 
U.S. and international contributions to 
the survival of the Khmer people. 

U.S. Policy 

Before I outline relief efforts to date 
I and options for assuring that assistance 



gets to those in need, let me just say 
that the Administration's policy is sim- 
ple: We will do everything possible to 
support international organization and 
voluntary agency efforts in providing 
humanitarian assistance to the be- 
leaguered and starving Khmer people. 
Our purpose is to save lives. 

Since the moment we began to re- 
ceive indications of impending famine, 
we have sought to alert the interna- 
tional community to the dimensions of 
the potential tragedy. We have un- 
ceasingly supported relief agencies 
most likely to work out arrangements 
with the Kampuchean authorities for 
the necessary delivery and distribution 
of food and medical supplies to all 
Khmer, regardless of political affilia- 
tion. We will work closely with the 
Congress to insure that the United 
States contributes a generous share of 
the required funds, food commodities, 
supplies, and logistical support. In this 
respect, we are gratified that the Con- 
gress is moving expeditiously to au- 
thorize and appropriate funds for 
Khmer relief. We are also encouraged 
by the response of other governments 
at the U.N. pledging conference in 
New York on Monday, at which an 
aggregate of $210 million was pledged. 



It is all the more important to accel- 
erate our joint efforts now that we have 
a clearer idea of both the needs of the 
Khmer people and the political and 
logistical problems of providing hu- 
manitarian assistance in a country with 
contested authorities and a war-ravaged 
infrastructure. The worst predictions 
have been realized. 

The picture of a new holocaust is all 
too graphic and horrifying from media 
coverage and reports of delegations of 
Members of Congress, governors. Ad- 
ministration officials, and representa- 
tives of private groups. The vulnerable 
younger and older generations of 
Khmer are already decimated, and 
there appear to be few resources within 
Kampuchea to sustain those who have 
so far escaped starvation and disease. 
At the same time, however, a concerted 
international relief program is under- 
way. I should like to review briefly 
what has been done to date and then 
look at the challenge ahead. 

Situation to Date 

The U.S. Government has been con- 
cerned about the possibility of mass 
starvation among the Khmer people 
since Vietnam's invasion and occupa- 



COUNSELOR AND 

ACTING U.S. COORDINATOR 

FOR REFUGEE AFFAIRS 

Matthew Nimetz was born June 17, 1939, 
in New York and received degrees from Wil- 
liams College and the Harvard Law School 
At Williams he was President of Phi Beta 
Kappa and valedictorian of his class. At Har- 
vard he was President of the Harvard Law 
Review. He also has an MA from Balliol 
College, Oxford University, where he was a 
Rhodes Scholar. 

Mr. Nimetz was a partner in the New York 
law firm of Simpson Thacher & Bartlett. He 
was also a commissioner of the Port Author- 
ity of New York and New Jersey and a 
member of the Health Advisory Council of 
the State of New York. He served as the 
Executive Diector of Governor-elect Hugh L. 
Carey's transition council (1974). 

Mr. Nimetz was a law clerk to Supreme 
Court Justice John M. Harlan (1965-67) and 
was a staff assistant to President Johnson 
(July 1967-January 1969). 

He was sworn in as Counselor of the De- 




partment of State on April 8, 1977. and in 
this capacity serves as a senior adviser to the 
Secretary of State on a wide range of foreign 
policy matters. He has been actively involved 
in issues concerning the eastern Mediterra- 
nean, European, and East-West relations, 
SALT, and Mexican affairs. 

Secretary Vance named Mr. Nimetz Act- 
ing U.S. Coordinator for Refugee Affairs on 
November 1, 1979. 



tion of Kampuchea began in December 
of last year. The invasion followed al- 
most 4 years of despotic and brutal rule 
by the Pol Pot regime. As a result of 
the regime's savagery against its own 
people, 2-3 million Khmer may have 
perished — out of the country's esti- 
mated 1975 population of 7 to 8 mil- 
lion. 

The timing of the Vietnamese inva- 
sion at the height of the rice harvest 
aggravated the situation. Most of the 
rice crop was lost because both the 
Vietnamese and the forces under Pol 
Pot tried to limit each other's effec- 
tiveness through food-denial and crop- 
destruction tactics. 

In addition, to avoid fighting or 
harassment in the countryside, the 
population clustered along lines of 
communication and around troop con- 
centrations which had the effect of re- 
ducing the numbers of people available 
to cultivate the land. Competing mili- 
tary forces sought to restrict move- 
ments of the people into areas where 
they would be subject to the other 
side's control, thus restricting normal 
agricultural activity. As a result, we 
estimate that only a minimal percentage 
of the spring crop was planted, and 
persistent warfare is now impairing the 
principal December harvest once again. 
Moreover, hungry and desperate people 
have eaten most of the seed intended 
for the next crop. 

The tragic consequence is that wide- 
spead famine is already evident. Its 
victims have little resistance against 
disease, and many of them may not 
even have the energy to seek food or 
medical care. We hear reports that 
many people are too weak even to lift 
food cartons off relief trucks. A whole 
generation of Khmer children faces 
death, and Khmer women are so mal- 
nourished that few children survive the 
first days of life. The fortunate few 
with the strength to make the journey 
through ravaged and often hostile ter- 
ritory to Thailand in search of food and 
safety are so weakened that they are 
close to starvation by the end of their 
journey. 

As the Khmer are moved away from 
the border area to camps like Sa Keo, 
where they can receive medical treat- 
ment and food on a regular basis, the 
death rate has dropped from 40 per day 
to about 25 per day. We hope that these 
numbers will continue to fall, but the 
resistance of these people to disease 
has been severely weakened by the ab- 
sence of an adequate diet. 

The political consequences of this 
tragedy are equally troubling. Cur- 
rently 35,000 Khmer are located in a 
new Thai holding center at Sa Keo, and 
another 200,000 are poised along the 



border. New groups are fleeing the 
interior of Kampuchea in search of 
food and safety from the warring fac- 
tions. They will probably move into 
Thailand at the first sign of increased 
Vietnamese pressure. The Thai and the 
United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR) are preparing for 
another influx — which may occur very 
soon — of those on the border plus 
others from the interior that could lead 
to a total of 300.000-400,000 refu- 
gees. We are grateful that the Thai 
Government has established a policy of 
accepting the Khmer refugees, making 
contingency plans for the difficult days 
ahead and cooperating with concerned 
governments and international relief 
organizations. 

But the new surge of Khmer refugees 
will certainly add to Thailand's exist- 
ing burden of sheltering 150,000 refu- 
gees from Laos and Vietnam and from 
earlier waves of migration from Kam- 
puchea. The prospects of continued 
Vietnamese military operations and a 
burgeoning refugee population consti- 
tute a threat to Thailand and remain a 
seriously destabilizing factor in the re- 
gion and a source of great concern for 
the United States and the Association 
of South East Asian Nations. 



Relief Efforts 

Let me review briefly the relief ef- 
fort that is underway. Negotiations 
began in June between the International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) 
and UNICEF and the Phnom Penh au- 
thorities. We initiated diplomatic de- 
marches in over 30 countries in late 
August to urge them to reinforce our 
efforts with the Soviets. Vietnamese, 
and Chinese to permit an international 
relief effort in Kampuchea. Finally, on 
September 26. ICRC/UNICEF received 
permission to send a joint operating 
team into Kampuchea. On October 13, 
ICRC and UNICEF established their 
mission in Phnom Penh and initiated a 
daily airlift to Phnom Penh of about 14 
metric tons of foodstuffs and other 
supplies. 

On October 19, the ICRC and UNI- 
CEF announced that the estimated 
needs for their relief program would be 
$111 million for the first 6 months, as- 
suming cooperation with the Kam- 
puchean authorities on delivery and 
monitoring of distribution. This esti- 
mate was calculated on the basis of 
providing some 165,000 tons of rice, 
15,000 tons of sugar, and 8,000 tons of 
edible oils over that 6-month period. 
The Phnom Penh authorities calculated 
that these quantities were necessary to 
provide food for some 2Vi million 
people whom they stated were facing 
serious food shortages. 



Department of State Bulletin, 

In addition, by October 31. thei 
ICRC and UNICEF (working with the, 
World Food Program) as well as pri-| 
vate agencies, principally Oxfam, 
had also been able to land about 9.400 
metric tons of foodstuffs at the port of 
Kampong Som. These agencies expect 
to double that tonnage into the port in 
November, and in December they hope 
to meet the estimated need of 30,000 
tons per month using all means of 
delivery — sea. air. and land. However, 
when the level of 30.000 tons per 
month is realized in December, the in- 
ternational agencies must still make up 
for the long period prior to that date 
when they were delivering far less than 
the needed 1,000 tons per day. 

To meet the urgent need, and to fol- 
low up the work of the Geneva confer- 
ence [on refugees July 20-21, 1979] 
Secretary General Waldheim convened 
a pledging conference for humanitarian 
relief to Kampuchea on November 5. 
Seventy-five countries and observer 
delegations participated. ICRC/ 
UNICEF sought $250 million for a 
year's program for IVi million people 
in Kampuchea, and UNHCR sought 
$60 million for 8 months of operations 
to care for 300.000 Khmer fleeing to 
Thailand. At the conclusion of the 
conference. Secretary General Wald- 
heim announced that approximately 
$210 million in cash and commodities 
had been pledged. The U.S. pledge, a 
reiteration of President Carter's Oc- 
tober 24 announcement, was an aggre- 
gate of $69 million, including $30 mil- 
lion in cash and commodities for Kam- 
puchean relief, the Administration's 
support of congressional efforts to pro- 
vide an additional $30 million for 
Kampucheans. and $9 million for thei 
care of Khmer refugees in Thailand. 

Adequate funding for the initial 
phase of the ICRC/UNICEF relief ef- 
fort thus appears to be available, al- 
though the ICRC/UNICEF operation: 
has an immediate need for more cash 
The major difficulty facing us now is toiil 
assure the delivery and distribution ofli 
essential food and other supplies withinlif 
Kampuchea. Supplies reportedly areJn 
already arriving in the port of Kam-I 
pong Som and Phnom Penh faster thanlj 
they can be unloaded and distributed. |ii 
Political restrictions on relief opera- 
tions have limited efforts to a 100- 
kilometer radius around Phnom Penh. 
Food and medical relief have, there- 
fore, not been getting to large areas of 
the country, particularly to western 
Kampuchea where they are most des- 
perately needed. 

We were gratified to learn on Tues- 
day that there are signs that some ofBn 
these obstacles are being overcome. 
The Phnom Penh authorities are appar- 
ently becoming more receptive toBj 



December 1979 

cooperating with tiie international relief 
.leencies. in particular, we are in- 
tormed that they have approved multi- 
ple flights a day into Phnom Penh and 
that they are setting up their own relief 
committee to serve as a liaison with 
ICRC and UNICEF officials and to 
coordinate distributio.n. They have also 
a|iparently agreed to allow two truck 
convoys beyond the original 100- 
kiiometer radius around Phnom Penh to 
which they have so far been restricted. 
Just prior to the U.N. pledging confer- 
ence, the Vietnamese also announced 
that the Mekong River would be 
opened to shipments of relief supplies. 
Wc sincerely hope that the political 
authorities in Phnom Penh will follow 
these steps with further moves to in- 
crease and facilitate relief activities. 



Proposals 

Several proposals have been made to 
break what has appeared until this 
week to be a stalemate between those 
who wish to speed aid to all needy 
Khmer and the competing Kampuchean 
authorities who want to prevent diver- 
sion to forces under each other's con- 
trol. As you know. Senators Sasser. 
Danforth, and Baucus, during their re- 
cent trip to Kampuchea, urged au- 
thorities in Phnom Penh to permit a 
"land bridge" to bring supplies to 
population centers in Kampuchea by 
truck convoy from Thailand. 

We are disappointed that the Phnom 
Penh authorities have so far not ac- 
cepted this idea. The limited capacity 
of the unloading facilities and railway 
service from the port of Kampong 
Som. as well as the logistical and fi- 
nancial burden of air shipments into 
Phnom Penh, preclude delivery of more 
than half of the estimated 30,000 met- 
ric tons needed each month. Even with 
the addition of the Mekong route, ex- 
perts believe that there will only be an 
additional 8,000 tons per month avail- 
able by this means. Thus, without 
using the land route, we can at best 
realize only 21,000-23.000 tons per 
month of the 30,000 ton goal. 

The truck-route concept also has the 
advantage of permitting supplies com- 
ing in from Thailand to be distributed 
to cities and population centers along 
the way to Phnom Penh. These supplies 
would still remain under the supervi- 
sion of the ICRC and UNICEF and 
would be distributed with the agree- 
ment of the Phnom Penh authorities. 
On their return trip to Thailand for ad- 
ditional supplies, the trucks could 
again be used to redistribute com- 
! modifies delivered to Phnom Penh via 
r the other air, sea. and river routes. 

We hope the Phnom Penh authorities 
, will reconsider their initial reaction to 



the "land bridge" proposal. I would 
like to point out. however, that our 
continued support for ICRC/UNICEF 
operations on behalf of Khmer is not 
contingent on acceptance of the "land 
bridge" proposal. We support all av- 
enues of relief — sea, river, air, and 
land. 

We are also well aware of your own 
proposal that the United States, unilat- 
erally or in concert with other nations, 
launch a massive airdrop of relief 
supplies into Kampuchea. We share 
your concern for expediting aid to the 
Khmer, and we certainly have not 
eliminated any possible means of 
responding to this challenge. Your 
recommendation is receiving serious 
consideration. However, we should 
recognize that neither the U.S. Gov- 
ernment nor the international relief 
agencies control the Kampuchean 
airspace, and there is at present no 
guarantee that planes or helicopters 
carrying such supplies would not en- 
counter hostile fire. 

In the coming days and weeks, we 
will be working with ICRC and UNI- 
CEF and other groups involved in 
Kampuchean relief to explore all means 
of assuring that relief reaches those 
who need it. Starvation, disease, and 
dislocation will obviously be of such 
magnitude that a successful program 
will require delivery and distribution 
by a wide range of means. Among the 
possible measures to be taken are the 
following: 

• Maximizing use of the Mekong 
River route; 

• Encouraging the French proposal 
to repair the railway system in Kam- 
puchea; 

• Seeking an increase in the number 
of ICRC/UNICEF and voluntary 
agency personnel in Kampuchea; 

• Increasing the number of planes 
resupplying Phnom Penh; 

• Seeking permission to use airports 
in addition to the one at Phnom Penh 
for delivery of supplies so as to estab- 
lish new centers for distribution; 

• Expediting delivery of sorely 
needed trucks to Kampuchea; 

• Urging the Soviets and the Viet- 
namese to work with us to obtain per- 
mission for increased access by all 
routes — land. sea. river, and air; 

• Increasing support to the UNHCR 
and other relief organizations for as- 
sistance to the hundreds of thousands 
of Khmer presently in or likely to seek 
refuge in Thailand; 

• Seeking methods for delivering 
humanitarian supplies to those in need 
who cannot be reached by truck from 
Phnom Penh, including those living in 
areas controlled by Pol Pot and other 
forces; 



• Consulting with other concerned 
governments in an effort to form a con- 
sortium of countries to respond to 
ICRC/UNICEF requests for support; 
and 

• Encouraging and supporting Amer- 
ican voluntary agencies in bringing 
personnel and supplies to camps along 
the border in Thailand. 

We will also be working with the 
Congress to make sure that we are able 
to fulfill our pledges. The ICRC and 
UNICEF are currently hampered by the 
lack of ready cash since most contribu- 
tions have not yet been handed over to 
them. We are planning to provide them 
with an advance of cash so that rice can 
be purchased in Thailand for immediate 
shipment to Kampuchea. 

We are pleased that the House and 
Senate have moved quickly to pass au- 
thorizing legislation for this program 
and have also quickly reconciled the 
differences between the two versions of 
the bill. We are looking forward to 
passage of this legislation in the next 
few days. The Administration is also 
impressed with the speed with which 
House and Senate conferees have 
moved to include $30 million in new 
funding for relief to victims of the 
famine in Kampuchea in the conference 
committee report on the Foreign As- 
sistance Appropriations Act. We hope 
that the Congress will keep in mind the 
urgent need for contributions in cash. 
We also hope the Congress will provide 
the Administration sufficient authority 
to respond immediately to emergency 
requests. 

The American response will ob- 
viously not be purely a governmental 
one. Voluntary agencies are taking a 
major role in organizing contributions 
and programs for Kampuchea relief. 
The President, in his October 24th an- 
nouncement, called upon all Americans 
to match the government effort by sup- 
porting the work of these agencies. 

The Congress has worked effectively 
with the Administration in dramatizing 
the Kampuchean tragedy to American 
and world opinion and in providing a 
generous share of the resources neces- 
sary for an effective relief operation. 
We are gratified that so many Members 
of Congress share our belief that this 
unfolding human calamity compels us 
to show our compassion by taking 
whatever action is required to avert the 
destruction of the Khmer people. D 



' The complete transcript of the hearings will 
be published by the committee and will be avail- 
able from the Superintendent of Documents, 
U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 
D.C. 20402. 



Department of State Bulletin 



Senators^ Report 
oil Refugees 



At the direction of President Carter 
and the leadership of the Senate, Sen- 
ators James R. Sasser (Tennessee). 
John C. Danforth (Missouri), and Max 
Bauciis (Montana) went on a human- 
itarian mission to Southeast Asia Oc- 
tober 19-26, 1979. Following are re- 
marks by President Carter, a press 
briefing the three Senators held in the 
White House, and the te.xt of their re- 
port, "The Refugee Situation in Thai- 
land and Cambodia," released on Oc- 
tober 26. 



PRESIDENT'S REMARKS, 
OCT. 26, 1979' 

My first comment to the press and to 
the American people is one of thanks 
and appreciation on behalf of all of our 
country to Senators Sasser, Baucus, 
and Danforth, who have just returned 
from a visit to Thailand and Kam- 
puchea to represent our nation in the 
analysis of what can be done to al- 
leviate the tragedy that is taking place 
in that country. 

It's been estimated that almost half 
the people of Kampuchea have lost 
their lives in the last few years. And at 
the present time, hundreds of thousands 
of people in that unfortunate country, 
and some refugees that have crossed 
the Thai border, are now at the point of 
death because of starvation. 

Our country has been encouraging — 
through the United Nations and also 
through the International Red Cross — a 
means by which we could get food to 
those people, over the obstacles created 
by the Vietnamese and the Kampu- 
chean authorities of all kinds. We have 
discussed this matter in the last few 
minutes. Senators Sasser and Baucus 
and Danforth have given me a report of 
what they observed there. They will 
answer questions for you in a few min- 
utes. 

We are prepared as a nation — my 
own Administration and the Congress 
— to proceed expeditiously in every 
possible way to alleviate the extant 
suffering. I will ask Dick Clark, former 
Senator now in charge of our refugee 
prograiTi. to represent me directly. The 
State Department and I will give him 
full authority and support throughout 
all the agencies of government to make 
his administration of relief to those 
people effective. As the Senators have 
just described to me, it's mandatory for 
effectiveness to deal with the starving 



people and deliver aid through the 
United Nations and also through the 
Red Cross, not on a unilateral basis. 

We have had some discouraging 
word from the officials in Phnom Penh. 
We hope that this is a temporary cir- 
cumstance and that because of world 
concern, that they would modify their 
positions and permit a land bridge to be 
formed so that food can be brought in 
through Thailand, over the border, to 
the people who are suffering so greatly, 
primarily by truck. 

I might add one other thing: that 1 
have agreed with the Senators that it 
would be important for them to talk 
directly to Secretary General Waldheim 
of the United Nations, to give him a 
first-hand report and also to seek his 
continuing support for the effort that all 
of us are joining in helping. 

I want to say that the Thai Govern- 
ment has performed nobly in preparing 
and permitting a haven for the starving 
Kampucheans and are cooperating in 
every possible way to get food to the 
refugees who now are living on the 
borderline of death in their own coun- 
try. 

I'd like to turn the podium over to 
Senator Sasser, who was the leader of 
this group, and let him make a report to 
you, and then he and Senators Baucus 
and Danforth will answer questions that 
you might have. 



PRESS BRIEFING, 
OCT. 26, 1979^ 

Senator Sasser: As many of you 
know. Senator Danforth and Senator 
Baucus and I, at the request of the 
majority and minority leadership of the 
U.S. Senate and also at the request of 
President Carter, journeyed to South- 
east Asia some 6 days ago. Ours was a 
humanitarian mission, an effort to find 
some way to bring relief to the suffer- 
ing people of Indochina and Southeast 
Asia. 

We saw on our arrival in Thailand 
three refugee concentration areas. Here 
we saw people in make-shift hospitals 
lying on the ground covered only by a 
plastic sheeting held up by poles, with 
the living and the dying and the dead 
all together. 

We were told that malaria was in 
epidemic proportions. The only noise 
you heard in the refugee concentration 
areas was the cough of children with 
tuberculosis. There was no laughter; 



there was no crying among the chil. 
dren. There were emaciated people ir. 
final stages of malnutrition. 

We journeyed to Phnom Penh ant 
there discussed with the authorities tht 
possibility of opening up an overlanc 
land route from Thailand into Cam 
bodia. We have been told by the repre 
sentatives of the International Rec 
Cross and also by UNICEF and b) 
others that this is the only practicable 
means to deliver the total amount ol 
foodstuffs and medicines which have 
been calculated to, I think, 30,000 tons 
a month. This is the only practicable 
way to deliver this amount of food anc 
this amount of medicine. 

We made our proposal in Phnom 
Penh. We were told the proposal would 
be seriously considered and seriousl)] 
studied. The authorities there in Phnom 
Penh admitted that they did not havq 
the capacity to feed 2,250,000 of theiil 
population of slightly over 4 millioni 
They admitted to us that malaria was 
raging at epidemic proportions. They 
admitted to us that they needed some 
help. 

We and the other countries of the 
world are offering this help, and the 
only way to deliver it is by land rout0 
from Thailand into Cambodia. We'r^ 
agreeable to it. The Vietnamese sa)| 
they will protect the trucks and the 
convoys and the drivers. So it's only 
the regime in Phnom Penh whicH 
stands in the way, and they are the onesi 
who must say "yes," and if the) 
don't, tens of thousands of people, wd 
believe, will die and perish over tha 
next 30-60-90 days. 

Q. Haven't thev already said "no" 
today? 

Senator Sasser: At first blush, this 
would appear to be a "no," but we'rQ 
going to persevere in our efforts to get 
a "yes." Senator Danforth and Senatoii 
Baucus and I are going to meet with thai 
Secretary General of the United Na- 
tions, and we're going to maintain th^ 
pressure. We're advised by those ex^ 
perienced in these matters that on occa-i 
sion a "no" has come to mean aJ 
"yes" in a short period of time. ' 

Q. What kind of time are you 
talking about? How long can you 
wait? 

Senator Sasser: I'll let Senator 
Danforth answer that. 

Senator Danforth: Thank you. Let 
me just say this. The situation that we 
saw on the border between Thailand 
and Cambodia was absolutely dreadful. 
It defies the ability of a person with 
words to describe it. and. therefore, we 
took some slides and showed them to 
the President. 



December 1979 



When people see in a news magazine 
a picture of a starving child, they think 
that's one starving child. But when you 
spend hour after hour looking at people 
who are dying, when you see little 
babies who are wizened up like little 
old men, when you see people who are 
so weak that they can't even travel a 
hundred yards to get a little medical 
attention, you realize what a desperate 
situation it is. And we understand that 
the situation within Cambodia, par- 
ticularly in the rural areas, is even 
worse than what we saw, because at 
least the people who got out were able 
to walk out. There are those who are 
even weaker within Cambodia. 

Hundreds of thousands, maybe mil- 
lions, of people face death in a country 
v\here, as the President said, almost 
half of the population has already died. 
There is absolutely no reason on earth 
why this dreadful situation has to con- 
, tinue. There is a way to solve it. and 
I that is by a land route from Thailand to 
i Cambodia. 

Every expert with whom we spoke — 

I the International Red Cross. UNICEF, 

the United States, logistics experts — all 

i agreed that the land route was the way 

. and that within 3-5 days after receiving 

notice, truck convoys could begin to 

travel across the highways — highway 5 

and highway 6 — set up distribution 

centers, and start feeding people. 

We presented that concept to the 
Vietnamese. We presented it, again, to 
the regime in Phnom Penh. We asked 
them to agree to it. We're waiting for a 
favorable response. Now the word we 
got today, it's doubtful that it was a 
favorable response. It seems very 
negative. But our view is this: We can- 
not accept the possibility that a gov- 
ernment or an alleged government is 
going to willfully consign hundreds of 
thousands of its own citizens to a 

(needless death. 
Q. At the risk of asking a naive 
question, Cambodia is a small coun- 
try lightly defended, without air 
cover. Why don't you just fly C- 
130's down route 5 and drop the 
stuff out the back? 

Senator Baucus: The problem is 
that there are so many people — this is 
from mformation given to us by inter- 
national organizations which are on the 
spot. International Red Cross, UNI- 
CEF, Oxfam. World Vision, all the or- 
ganizations there which are basically 
there to help people, but they have no 
vested interest in one form of govern- 
ment or another — the problem is there 
are just so many people within the 
country who just haven't the strength to 
get up to get the food or to get the 
medical attention. You have to have 
trucks within the country, too, to dis- 



tribute the food and the medical sup- 
plies once it's within the countries. An 
air drop has all the glamor and the 
glory, and it's visual and it sounds 
good. The fact of the matter is, ac- 
cording to the people we talked to on 
the spot, by far the most practical way 
to get the attention to the people is with 
a truck system, to get the trucks, foods, 
and supplies out to distribution points, 
and also personnel on the ground to 
pick up the people who are almost 
dead, bring them to makeshift hospi- 
tals, which really only amount to rows 
of people on the ground, and to get 
some medical attention and some food. 

Q. Can you explain to us in your 
words why the Phnom Penh govern- 
ment is not accepting this offer now? 

Senator Baucus: I frankly don't 
know why. When we flew over to 
Thailand and into Phnom Penh, we 
tried to stay out of political entangle- 
ments and political considerations. For 
one thing, we're not experts on South- 
east Asia. But more important than 
that, there is one overriding human- 
itarian goal, that's just to get food and 
aid to people. 

I can't tell you, I can't read the 
minds of Heng Samrin authorities or 
the Vietnamese associates as to why 
they made the statement. But one 
thing, I will say this: It's premised on 
an incorrect assumption. One of their 
assumptions is we made the proposal 
and said that American aid is con- 
ditioned upon opening up a land 
bridge. That is absolutely incorrect. 
We did not make any condition at all. 
We just said we suggest the best thing 
to do is to open up the land bridge. 

Q. You said a minute ago the Viet- 
namese are prepared to protect the 
convoys, but the regime in Phnom 
Penh will not accept this procedure. 
Are you trying to say there is a dis- 
tinction here between what the Viet- 
namese are willing to do and what 
the Heng Samrin government is pre- 
pared to do? 

Senator Sasser: No, I am not saying 
that. What I am relating to you is what 
the Minister of State of Foreign Affairs 
for Vietnam told us. He indicated that 
guaranteeing the security of trucks, the 
drivers, the cargo was no problem. We 
assumed that this security will be 
guaranteed by forces of the Vietnamese 
army, since they are operating, we are 
told, up and down routes 5 and 6. This 
was repeated to us — that security 
would not be a problem — by the au- 
thorities in Phnom Penh. 

If I might respond to an earlier ques- 
tion. There is air cover in Cambodia. 
We saw MiGs in the Phnom Penh air- 
port. They put on a little show for our 



pilots, and they are pretty good with 
them. We saw about, I would guess, 
20, either MiG-19's, or Zl's. I can't 
tell the difference. 

Senator Danforth: Can I just also 
add to that? I think it's important to 
focus attention on what can practically 
be done. I think that it's very important 
not to divert attention to something 
which has superficial appeal and to 
chase some will-o'-the-wisp idea which 
sounds sensational. 

The fact of the matter is. there is 
only one practical matter to solve this 
problem, only one, and that is by 
truck. That is the only practical way to 
deliver the tonnage. Air transportation 
cannot deliver the kind of tonnage 
that's needed. It can't put it in the right 
place. It doesn't provide the kind of 
trucks to move it to the countryside. It 
doesn't provide the kind of infrastruc- 
ture to move food and to dispense 
medical supplies and to tell people 
what to do with the medical supplies 
once they get them. The trucks are the 
only available method of doing that. 

Q. I understand that, but still how 
long do you wait for the Phnom Penh 
government to give you permission to 
drive the trucks in there? 

Senator Danforth: I'm saying the 
position is that the ball is in their court 
and that they have the life and death 
decision. Nobody else has that, and 
they have to assume the responsibility. 
They have to face up to the fact that by 
saying no or by making no answer at 
all, they are consigning their people to 
death. 

Q. Do you suspect that in saying 
no, they are making that decision, 
that they have chosen this path to 
allow this mass starvation to take 
place, as a matter of policy? 

Senator Danforth: It is so insane 
that I just can't accept that, and I don't 
think any of the three of us can. It is 
our understanding that sometimes they 
will take one position one day and one 
the next. 

Just before we left Bangkok, we re- 
ceived a message from the Foreign 
Minister, at least a transcript of his 
comments, which looked as though he 
was really opening the door to the pos- 
sibility of the land route. That's the 
way we construed that message. So I 
just don't read one particular statement 
as being all that definitive. 

Q. But do you think sanity prevails 
in that land today? 

Senator Baucus: In some sense, 
every country is sensitive to world 
opinion — I don't care what the country 
is — to some degree. And it is our hope 



that more people in the world begin to 
understand what is happening in Cam- 
bodia. 

Therefore, the Heng Samrin au- 
thorities and Vietnam will begin to be 
more receptive to the kinds of propos- 
als we are making. 1 don't know. I 
can't predict with absolute certainty, 
and none of us here can, as to what 
they are or are not going to do. But 
certainly, the more and more people 
realize what is happening in the world 
and, therefore, begin to focus on Cam- 
bodia, their chances are better. 

Q. You made it sound like there 
are only two possibilities — one air 
and the other trucks from the Thai 
border. Can you discuss the third 
possibility, Kompong Som or bring- 
ing stuff up the Mekong River? 

Senator Baucus: That is a third pos- 
sibility now in the sense both — Her- 
cules, through the British, are being 
flown in, one aircraft, roughly, a day 
into Phnom Penh, combined with the 
seaport and barge traffic up the 
Mekong River. But that's not enough. 

It takes a long period of time. And 
not only that, once you get the supplies 
into Phnom Penh — and virtually that's 
where it all ends up — you have to go 
out of Phnom Penh out in the country, 
and that's where you need the trucks. 

Q. Can't you bring trucks into 
Kompong Som or up the river? The 
Americans did it between 1970 and 
1975. I don't understand why you 
are just not discussing that possibil- 
ity also. 

Senator Danforth: Can I say, on the 
day that we were in Phnom Penh, a 
logistics expert from a U.N. organiza- 
tion was also in Phnom Penh studying 
the logistics of delivering the food. It 
was his judgment, as an expert in the 
field, that under optimum conditions, 
the present modes of delivery — to wit, 
by plane into Phnom Penh and by ship 
into Kompong Som — were capable of 
delivering about 13 to 15,000 tons a 
month, when the real needs were about 
27 to 30,000 tons a month. 

So the fact of the matter is that those 
two methods, which are now in use, 
even operating under optimum condi- 
tions, are capable of only handling half 
of the tonnage. Further, the distribu- 
tion, once you get north, is weakened 
by the fact that there are very few 
trucks within the country. 

The situation can be improved by 
shipping into Phnom Penh up the 
Mekong. But even when that is going 
full force ahead, there will still be a 
very substantial shortfall to the tune of 
about 10,000 tons a month. 

Therefore, the only solution is the 
truck solution. Furthermore, all of 



these arrangements for ships — putting 
it on the ships, taking it off, getting the 
equipment to take it off — take a lot of 
time. 

The trucks are ready to go between 3 
and 5 days. They can go between 3 and 
5 days. That is why it's so important to 
focus world attention on the truck 
route — on the land bridge — and to call 
attention to the fact that the decision is 
Phnom Penh's to make and that deci- 
sion will not be made in the dark; it 
will be made under the full spotlight of 
Dublic attention. 

Q. So what do you do next? What 
do you do to get them to turn around 
the "no"? Do you hold news confer- 
ences, try to build up the world 
opinion? Do you do something dip- 
lomatic? 

Senator Baucus: We are going to 
meet with Secretary General Kurt 
Waldheim Monday or Tuesday of next 
week. That is one avenue. In addition 
to that, we will speak out as imagina- 
tively as we can, talk to as many 
people as we can. 

Q. Where does the money for this 
come from, what fund? 

Senator Sasser: This is an interna- 
tional effort. It's been calculated that 
$110 million will be needed over the 
next 6 months. The United States will 
contribute, I'm told, slightly over 
one-third of that. There are specific 
appropriations bills which are moving 
through the Congress now, and there's 
emergency relief available. 

Q. This is all for this specific oper- 
ation, or is it for resettlement? 

Senator Sasser: It's for the whole 
operation. That includes helping supply 
the refugee camps on the Thai border, 
for some resettlement, and for some of 
the foodstuffs and medicines going in 
now by ship and by air through the In- 
ternational Red Cross and UNICEF. 

Q. My understanding is the bulk 
of this money may be for resettle- 
ment, as opposed to maybe a tenth of 
the money the United States is sup- 
plying going specifically to feed these 
people immediately. Can you clarify 
that? 

Senator Sasser: No, I really can't. I 
haven't had the opportunity to — we just 
got back in the country last night late, 
and I have not had an opportunity to 
study how the funds are being allo- 
cated. 

Let me make one point here. Laying 
aside humanitarian reasons for a mo- 
ment, one reason it's so important that 
these people be fed and given medical 
attention inside their own country is to 
stop this massive hemorrhage of refu- 



Department of State Bulletin 

gees across the border into Thailand. | 
Once they get into Thailand, something 
has to be done, something has to be '■ 
done with them. And if we can get the ' 
food and the medicine into their own 
country, then we have reason to be- 
lieve, and rational people would think, 
they would stay there rather than mov- 
ing into Thailand and then having to be 
dealt with there. 

Q. What do you think would hap- 
pen if you just started a convoy into 
that country flying Red Cross and 
UNICEF flags without waiting for 
the people in Phnom Penh to come 
down on one side of this thing or 
another? 

Senator Sasser: That's speculation. 
You'd have to speculate as to what 
would happen with that. Quite frankly, 
I would approach that prospect with 
some trepidation. In other words, 
you're moving into an area with hard- 
ened Vietnamese combat troops there. 
You are also moving through an area 
which, in some places, the Pol Pot 
guerrillas are operating. They are very 
short on supplies, and we're told that 
the Vietnamese are not oversupplied. I 
think it would be very risky business. 

Q. What role, if any, does the 
Soviet Union have in this process? 

Senator Danforth: What the United 
States is doing is to appeal to the offi- 
cials of Phnom Penh and the Viet- 
namese to allow the trucks to come in, 
and I would hope the Soviet Union 
would take the same position. The re- 
gime in Phnom Penh and the Viet- 
namese are certainly within the sphere 
of influence of the Soviet Union, and, 
therefore, the Soviet Union has a very 
definite role to play. I would hope it 
would take the same humanitarian po- 
sition that we would take and that it 
would use all of its authority to inter- 
cede with the appropriate officials. 

Senator Baucus: I think the Soviet 
Union would be very agreeable to all 
this. I'll tell you one simple reason. 
Look at all the wheat that they are 
buying now from the United States, 
and when we were in Phnom Penh, we 
saw a lot of, at least a significant 
amount of, rice from Russia. It seemed 
to me the more that other organiza- 
tions, other countries are supplying 
foodstuffs to Cambodia, it would take 
some of the pressure off the Soviet 
Union. I'd think they'd like it. 

Q. Why haven't they done any- 
thing yet? 

Senator Baucus: I can't answer that. 

Senator Danforth: Ask them. I 
think you should ask them. 

Q. Why don't you ask them? 



December 1979 



Senator Danforth: We might. 

Q. From what you three saw over 
there, is what this government is 
doing and is committed to do suffi- 
cient, is it adequate, or is there more 
that we could be doing even under 
present circumstances? 

Senator Danforth: I think, first of 
all. the $70 million is really a step in 
the right direction and that that's a very 
substantial commitment. It may be that 
during the next 6 months — and all the 
projections that have been made are for 
6 months — that we might want to con- 
sider some other things that we could 
use specifically with respect to logis- 
tics, trucks, and the like. I think that 
deserves further analysis. 

It's not realistic to think that the 
situation in Cambodia is going to be 
turned around on the dime in a 6-month 
period of time. The country is really in 
bad shape. In Phnom Penh, no traffic, 
very few cars on the streets, some army 
trucks, derelict buildings. I mean it is 
really a devastating sight in Cambodia. 
Therefore, I think there's going to be a 
very long-term problem in turning that 
country around. 

So I don't think that it's realistic to 
think that a $110 million multinational 
program over a 6-month period of time 
is going to bring them to — 

Q. We should be prepared to do 
much more beyond the 6-month 
period. 

Senator Baucus: Yes, I think we 
could certainly help probably a little bit 
more, but the bigger problem now is 
Cambodia. It's not so much the ques- 
tion of dollars in aid and medical 
supplies now as it is Cambodia opening 
up its borders. That's what we have to 
do so we can get that land bridge 
across. 



SENATORS' REPORT 

We went on this humanitarian mis- 
sion at the direction of the leadership 
of the Senate and the President of the 
United States. We went to see first- 
hand the nature of the refugee problem, 
to learn what more should be done, and 
to report our findings. 

Over the past few days, we have 
witnessed a human tragedy of enor- 
mous and unfathomable proportions. 
Without a massive and prompt interna- 
tional relief effort, the situation will 
continue to deteriorate. Inside Cam- 
bodia today, and in refugee camps lo- 
cated in Thailand near the Cambodian 
border, hundreds of thousands of Cam- 
bodians face death by starvation and 



UJS. Relief Efforts 
for Kampuchea 



PRESIDENT'S ANNOUNCEMENT, 
OCT. 24. 1979' 

Thirty-seven years ago. a holocaust 
began which was to take the lives of 
more than 6 million human beings. The 
world stood by silently, in a moral 
lapse whose enormity still numbs the 
human mind. 

We now face, once again, the threat 
of avoidable death and avoidable suf- 
fering for literally millions of people, 
and this time we must act swiftly to 
save the men. women, and children 
who are our brothers and sisters in 
God's family. 

Five days ago, the International 
Committee of the Red Cross and the 
U.N. Children's Fund appealed jointly 
for $111 million in aid to help the 
millions of Kampucheans — formerly 
known as Cambodians — who are facing 
death from starvation during the next 6 
months. We must respond to this ap- 
peal, and we must also help the related 
need for food and medicine and shelter 
for refugees who are fleeing from 
Kampuchea to Thailand. 

I'm urgently asking the Congress to 
enact a supplemental Food for Peace 
appropriation that will make available 
$20 million in commodities for use in 
Kampuchea, subject only to assurances 
that it will reach its destination; that is. 
the human beings who are suffering. 
This is in addition to the $5 million in 
food that I pledged for this purpose last 
week. 

Today, I'm also directing that $9 
million in U.S. refugee assistance 
funds go to meet about one-third of the 
total cost of Thailand's program to help 
starving refugees who are entering 
Thailand from Kampuchea. I commend 
the Thai Government on its decision to 
admit more refugees. They have al- 
ready received tens of thousands of 
them. 

Third, I've told Chairman Zablocki 
[Congressman Clement J. Zablocki, 
chairman of the House Subcommittee 
on Foreign Affairs] in the House, and 
cosponsors. that the Administration 
supports their proposal to authorize $30 
million for the next phase of relief in 
Kampuchea. This would enable us. as a 
total, to raise our contributions to the 
continuing program for the alleviation 
of suffering in Kampuchea as high as 
$70 million. 

The dimensions of the Kampuchean 
tragedy are immense, and more aid will 



almost certainly be needed. And I'm 
also asking my Commission on World 
Hunger, headed by Sol Linowitz, to 
recommend to me the next steps that 
we must take to meet worldwide hun- 
ger needs. 

I'm certain that the American peo- 
ple, in addition to their government, 
will want to be part of this urgent hu- 
manitarian effort. It's absolutely too 
important to be left to government 
alone. 

Standing behind me on the platform 
are representatives of religious and 
other groups who have already pledged 
to help in this effort, who've called on 
me to do what I'm announcing now, 
and who, I believe, sincerely said that 
they would match the government ef- 
fort. Several voluntary agencies have 
been working all along to meet the 
needs of increasing numbers of refu- 
gees, and I call upon all Americans to 
support this work. I ask specifically 
that every Saturday and Sunday in the 
month of November, up until 
Thanksgiving, be set aside as days for 
Americans in their synagogues and 
churches, and otherwise, to give 
generously to help alleviate this 
suffering. 

I'm confident that Americans' re- 
sponses will be matched abroad. Many 
governments and international volun- 
tary agencies are already coming for- 
ward with their pledges. The human 
family, those of us who have been 
blessed so highly with food and a rela- 
tive absence of suffering, must not be 
found wanting in our response to al- 
leviate this almost unprecedented mass 
human suffering. 

If a tragedy of genocidal proportions 
is to be avoided in Kampuchea, we 
must all help, both nations and gov- 
ernments and individuals alike. D 



'Made to reporters assembled in the Briefing 
Room at the White House (text from Weekly 
Compilation of Presidential Documents of Oct. 
29, 1979). Prior to the President's announce- 
ment, he met with religious leaders and repre- 
sentatives of various humanitarian organiza- 
tions to discuss the situation in Kampuchea. 
Following the President's announcement. Rev. 
Theodore M. Hesburgh, Chairman of the Select 
Commission on Immigration and Refugee Pol- 
icy and chairman of the board of the Overseas 
Development Corporation, and Ambassador 
Henry D. Owens, Special Representative of the 
President for International Economic Summits, 
answered reporters' questions. Their question- 
and-answer session was issued as a White 
House press release on Oct. 24. 



8 



disease. The survival of the Khmer 
race is in jeopardy. 

At three refugee camps on the Thai- 
Cambt)dian border, we saw human 
suffering of a kind so deep and perva- 
sive as to defy our ability to describe it 
adequately. 

We walked through encampments of 
thousands of Khmer who stared at us in 
silence. No one smiled, and no one 
laughed. Indeed, they seldom spoke to 
each other. We saw the swollen bellies 
and stick-like legs of children suffering 
from acute malnutrition. Even at the 
hospital, areas where physical suffering 
was greatest, they didn't cry. We saw 
people protected from the elements by 
only a plastic sheet strung up on sticks. 

In makeshift hospitals, we walked 
among hundreds of comatose patients, 
crawling with flies. The people were 
suffering from prolonged malnutrition 
and malaria. We were told by those to 
whom we talked that conditions were 
even worse on the Cambodian side of 
the border. Only the strongest survive 
the trip across the border. 

Yet amidst this appalling scene of 
human suffering, we had reason to feel 
a degree of encouragement. The Gov- 
ernment of Thailand has magnani- 
mously promised to permit entry to all 
refugees who arrive at the border. The 
relief efforts by international organiza- 
tions are beginning to provide food, 
medical supplies, and personnel. The 
international relief agencies are making 
a valiant effort to bring aid to those in 
need of assistance, but their efforts are 
still inadequate. The voluntary agen- 
cies stand ready to increase their assist- 
ance as soon as it is possible. 

We are absolutely convinced that a 
practical means exists to provide the 
food and medical supplies needed to 
save hundreds of thousands of lives; 
that means is the immediate establish- 
ment of an overland route — a "land 
bridge" linking Cambodia to relief 
supplies in Thailand. The international 
relief agencies estimate that as many as 
2.25 million Cambodians face serious 
food shortages. They estimate that 
nearly 30,000 tons of food and medical 
supplies are required to meet this need 
each month. Currently only 12,000 
tons can be brought in by sea, and 300 
by air per month. This is less than half 
the estimated need. The establishment 
of an overland route could, within 3-5 
days, more than double the current 
capacity. 

During our visit, we devoted much 
of our energies seeking to establish this 
land bridge. We discussed it with 
Thailand's Prime Minister Kriangsak, 
with Vietnamese Vice Foreign Minister 
Thach, and with representatives of the 
international relief agencies. We trav- 
eled to Phnom Penh to discuss the land 



bridge with the authorities there. We 
were encouraged by what we heard. 
The challenge now is to open the over- 
land route. The decision currently rests 
with the Phnom Penh authorities. We 
are committed to prepare to pursue this 
goal anywhere and on an urgent basis. 
To delay is to prolong the suffering and 
loss of life we have seen. 

A more detailed description of our 
experiences, our findings, and our rec- 
ommendations follows. 

Conditions in the Refugee Camps 

We visited three refugee areas lo- 
cated at Khiong Gai Thuen, Tap Phrik. 
and Nong Samet. More than 150,000 
people were in those areas and esti- 
mates are that another 100,000- 
200,000 are concentrated just inside 
the Cambodian border. Persons of all 
descriptions, including some former 
combatants, wander across the border 
into the areas. Intensified fighting or 
continued lack of food may force addi- 
tional Cambodians across the border in 
the days and weeks ahead. 

In the areas visited, we saw children 
near death from acute malnutrition and 
disease. We saw men and women lying 
on the ground in makeshift "hospi- 
tals." We saw people too weak to walk 
the last 100 yards to food distribution 
points. The eerie quiet strikes a visitor. 
Emaciated and sick people lay on the 
ground in a silence interrupted only by 
the coughs of those with tuberculosis. 

These areas are not "camps." They 
are places where people stopped run- 
ning from war and deprivation inside 
Cambodia. They have no sanitary 
facilities, little water, and little shelter. 
"Hospitals" are placed where the very 
ill and the dying lie on the ground. We 
were told that 5-10% of the people in 
the hospital die every day. A large 
portion are beyond help, and some of 
those we saw last Monday are not alive 
today. 

Food distribution points, operated by 
a variety of relief agencies, are scat- 
tered through the areas. Those strong 
enough to walk to the distribution 
points are fed. Those who cannot, go 
hungry, unless relatives or friends 
help. The social order among these 
people has so deteriorated that they are 
not helping those outside their im- 
mediate family group. 

The principal constraint in the effort 
to aid the refugees in the areas we vis- 
ited is insufficient staff. We were told 
by physicians in the camps that they 
had adequate medical supplies and food 
but they did not have enough people to 
distribute either. Without adequate 
staff, there is no organized system for 
allocating and distributing supplies of 
food or medicine. 



Department of State Bulletin 

Conditions in Cambodia 

Our 9-hour visit to Cambodia en- ; 
abled us to observe the rice planting 
situation around the capital, to see the 
condition of the city, and to test the 
reaction of both government cadre and 
ordinary people to discussions with a 
delegation of Americans. In addition 
we met with the Heng Samrin regime's 
Foreign Minister to make a specific 
proposal that Phnom Penh permit the 
International Committee of the Red 
Cross (ICRC) and the U.N. Children's 
Fund (UNICEF) to truck emergency 
food and medical supplies from Thai- 
land to Cambodia. 

Phnom Penh authorities received us 
courteously and hospitably. Our guide 
for the day was a middle-level Foreign 
Ministry official. On the streets we 
were met with curiosity, friendliness, 
and a few suspicious looks. 

The shambles that was Phnom Penh 
can hardly be called a city. The run- 
down condition of this once-graceful 
city betrays both the neglect of the past 
4 years and deliberate destruction by 
the previous regime; both the national 
bank and the Roman Catholic cathedral 
were destroyed, presumably for politi- 
cal reasons. Phnom Penh residents es- 
timate that its population is between 
30,000 and 70.000. A few vehicles 
travel the deserted streets. Whole sec- 
tions of the town are still barricaded 
shut. We saw few foreigners. 

Rice is scarce. In the capital, in the 
absence of currency, a small can of rice 
acts as the medium of exchange for the 
few street hawkers we saw. No or- 
ganized central market exists. Food is 
distributed through local street mar- 
kets. The former central market area 
has been planted in coconuts. Our brief 
aerial view of agricultural areas around 
Phnom Penh showed small plots of 
vegetables and many fields of rice. A 
large number of paddies remain fallow. 
This, combined with the comments of 
more knowledgeable international offi- 
cials and short interviews with 
passers-by during our tour of the city, 
leads us to conclude that the govern- 
ment's claim that 2 million acres of 
rice have been planted is too optimis- 
tic. 

ICRC/UNICEF officials in Phnom 
Penh confirmed the desperate food 
situation of the country. To date their 
programs have dealt successfully with 
hospital and supplementary feeding. 
Only very recently have the two agen- 
cies been faced with the logistical 
problems created by bulk arrivals of 
rice. 

There was general agreement that 
approximately 30,000 tons of rice per 
month are needed inside Cambodia. 
The best estimate we heard was that 



December 1979 



under current circumstances only 
13,000-15.000 tons of foodstuffs could 
be moved inside Cambodia. Transpor- 
tation within Cambodia is the major 
■ problem. Less than 5.000 tons of food 
per month can now be moved from the 
port of Kompong Som. The port of 
Phnom Penh has the potential to handle 
an additional 8,000 tons if inland 
transportation is available. The present 
airlift to Phnom Penh adds only frac- 
tionally to available supplies. 

Conclusions 

Our principal conclusion is that 
thiiusands of Cambodians will die un- 
less a massive expansion of relief ef- 
forts proceeds on an emergency basis. 

This finding is based on our personal 
observation of refugees, our discus- 
sions with the international relief agen- 
cies, and our discussions with the 
Phnom Penh authorities. 

Our interviews indicated that as 
many as two-thirds of those who try to 
reach Thailand from Cambodia may not 
make it. They die along the way from 
starvation and disease. Given the con- 
ditions in Cambodia, we expect the 
flow of refugees to continue into Thai- 
land. The need to provide assistance 
will accelerate in the months to come. 

The refugee problem is compounded 
by the arrival of large numbers of Lao 
who further flood the refugee camps. 
Reports of an extensive shortfall of 
food in Laos will undoubtedly increase 
the refugee flow from there unless re- 
lief is available at the source. 

The most serious problem inside 
Cambodia and along the border with 
Thailand is the lack of sufficient food 
and medical supplies. Under the best 
circumstances, the shortfall in total 
supplies is about 15,000 tons per 
month. The current situation is even 
worse and not likely to improve much 
in the near future. 

We have concluded that this condi- 
tion need not exist. There is a practical 
, solution which can be implemented 
immediately. An all-land route can be 
opened between the Thai border and 
Phnom Penh along highways 5 and 6. 

This plan could increase transport 
capacity by as much as 1 ,000 tons per 
day within 3-5 days of the opening of 
the route into Cambodia. 

The essential considerations for 
, opening such a route were, first, secu- 
rity of the shipments and, second, au- 
I thorization and cooperation from the 
authorities involved (i.e., the interna- 
tional agencies, the Thai Government, 
the authorities in Phnom Penh, and the 
Vietnamese). 

In an effort to open up the land route 
to Cambodia, we met with the head of 
government of the Thai Kingdom, a 



representative of the Socialist Republic 
of Vietnam, representatives of the 
Phnom Penh authorities, and represen- 
tatives of the international agencies. 

Meetings with the 
Voluntary Agencies 

We met with representatives of 
UNICEF. the ICRC. and World Food 
Program (WPP). They agreed unani- 
mously that the key to solving the situa- 
tion inside Cambodia and on the Thai 
border was to establish a land bridge. 
They stand ready in every way to im- 
plement the planning and shipment of 
the needed supplies. Other aspects of 
those meetings appear throughout the 
report as appropriate. 

Meeting With Thailand's 
Prime Minister Kriangsak 

At the time of our meeting, we were 
just beginning to explore the pos- 
sibilities of a land bridge to Cambodia 
via the road from Aranyaprathet near 
the Thai-Cambodian border. The Prime 
Minister was totally supportive of the 
idea. 

He felt that adequate quantities of 
most of the needed supplies were avail- 
able in Thailand. He also expressed the 
view that there were enough trucks in 
Thailand to send convoys in im- 
mediately. 

The dominant subject of our meeting 
was the desperate situation of the Cam- 
bodian refugees. The day before our 
meeting with the Prime Minister, he 
had taken a trip to the border and had 
witnessed first-hand the suffermg. He 
said he had been touched by this ex- 
perience and had decided to open the 
border to admit all refugees from Cam- 
bodia. This was an unpopular decision, 
he said, because it would result in the 
displacement of 60.000 Thais. 

The Prime Minister told us that he 
was planning to move the refugees 
from the border to a nearby holding 
area. In fact, the movement of the ref- 
ugees began before we left Thailand. It 
should be noted that the Prime Minister 
made it clear to us that the fleeing 
Cambodians would be granted only 
temporary status. 

He expressed hope that it would be 
possible for the Khmer to return home 
when conditions improve. He was not 
optimistic that this would occur soon. 
He told us that he welcomed the grow- 
ing involvement and support of the in- 
ternational relief agencies. He stressed 
the importance of close coordination of 
that effort. 

We expressed our appreciation and 
gratitude for the Prime Minister's hu- 
manitarian policy toward the refugees. 



notably his decision to allow unlimited 
entry to the Khmer. 

Meeting With Nguyen Co Thach 
of Vietnam 

At the Vietnamese Embassy in 
Bangkok we met with Secretary of 
State for Foreign Affairs Nguyen Co 
Thach. We explained that we did not 
want to raise political questions. We 
expressed our appreciation for his help 
in obtaining a favorable reply to our 
request to visit Phnom Penh. We noted 
that our purpose for wanting to visit 
Phnom Penh was to meet with repre- 
sentatives of the international relief 
agencies and get a more complete view 
of the problems of refugees. We em- 
phasized in our discussions that U.S. 
assistance to needy Cambodians would 
be provided through the international 
organizations. 

We asked Mr. Thach if his govern- 
ment would cooperate in providing se- 
curity for truck convoys on an overland 
route between Thailand and Cambodia. 
He replied first by saying that he could 
not speak for the Cambodian people. 
But, he added: "If the Cambodian 
people or the Cambodian Government 
asked us for help we will agree. There 
is no problem on this. You can be sure 
any humanitarian actions without ul- 
terior motives we will welcome."" 

Mr. Thach emphasized that the truck 
convoy proposal was no problem for 
his government but was a question that 
had to be addressed by Phnom Penh. 
He said that Vietnamese troops would 
not fire on trucks that were on human- 
itarian missions. 

Meeting With Officials 
in Phnom Penh 

We presented the proposal for a land 
route to Phnom Penh's Foreign Minis- 
ter, emphasizing the humanitarian need 
and our desire to make political consid- 
erations secondary to the fundamental 
problems of life and death. With regard 
to the security of food convoys, he 
agreed that Phnom Penh could insure 
security for the shipments and drivers. 
He said that he would take the proposal 
to the Central Committee for decision. 
In the meantime, relief supply by sea 
and air should continue. We urged him 
to recommend the speedy and favorable 
decision. We pointed out that to delay 
is to prolong the human suffering. 

Subsequently Hun Sen issued the fol- 
lowing statement to the press: "In case 
of a substantial increase in the aid, we 
are ready to study with the two organi- 
zations the improvement of our means 
of reception and transportation and to 
think about other access routes in case 
of need." We view his statement as a 



10 



Department ol State Bulletin 



l7.iV. Pledging Conference 
for Khmer Refugees 



U.N. Secretary General Kurt Wald- 
heim called for the U.N. General As- 
sembly to hold a pledging conference 
to encourage member nations to com- 
mit funds for humanitarian relief for 
Khmer refugees. That conference was 
held in New York November 5, 1979. 
Following is a statement Secretary 
Vance made at that session . ' 

Mr. Secretary General, let me thank 
you for your initiative in calling this 
conference and your leadership in ad- 
dressing this crisis. I will be brief, for 
we are here, today, to act. We are here 
to make, through our individual contri- 
butions, an international commitment 
to deal with a human tragedy of almost 
unfathomable proportions. 

We need no other call to action than 
the grim facts in Kampuchea. 

• A nation of 7 million has been 
ravaged by famine and disease, brutal- 
ity and war. Some 2 million have 
perished. 

• Death has struck hardest at the 
children. An entire generation of Kam- 
pucheans may have been lost. 



• The meager food available has be- 
come a booty of war. 

• Malaria is rampant. Anthrax has 
appeared. Minimal health care is virtu- 
ally nonexistent. 

Even these are only fragments of the 
tragedy. Statistics are only a shadow of 
the reality. The reality of Kampuchea, 
of a people on the verge of extinction, 
is most powerfully conveyed by the 
images of suffering carried in our daily 
newspapers. The silent grief of a young 
Khmer mother cradling her dead baby 
in her arms, a victim of starvation, or 
the vacant gaze of an infant beyond 
help and hope in a makeshift orphanage 
in Phnom Penh. 

We are here as diplomats, as repre- 
sentatives of our governments, to ad- 
dress this reality. But first of all, we 
are here as human beings. Our presence 
reflects the concern of millions of 
human beings in all our nations who 
care about this suffering. Some issues 
transcend politics. This is one of them. 

Clearly, there are differences among 
governments on the political situation 
in Kampuchea. But all of us must put 



those differences aside as we ask all the 
authorities involved in Kampuchea U) 
turn away from calculations of political 
and military advantage and turn to the 
overwhelming human issue before us. 

In this connection. 1 want to single 
out the Government of Thailand for its 
courageous and correct decision to 
allow into its country large numbers of 
people tleeing famine and disease. The 
burden this places on the Thai Gov- 
ernment is immense, and we in the in- 
ternational community owe Thailand 
not only our admiration but also our 
full support. 

So let us get to the business at hand. 
I am here today on behalf of the Presi- 
dent of the United States to place sub- 
stantial material resources behind a 
major humanitarian effort. 

• President Carter has committed the 
United States to a contribution during 
the next 6 months of $30 million for 
international relief efforts in Kam- 
puchea and $9 million for Khmer who 
have recently fled to Thailand. 

• Our Congress is approving $30 
million of additional funds for the next 
phase of relief efforts. This is in addi- 
tion to our already substantial contri- 
butions to the refugee program in the 
same area. 

• And we will give our full sup- 
port, in any way that will be helpful, to 
the efforts of the United Nations, 



Senators (Cont'd) 

positive reference to the land bridge 
because the only way practical of sub- 
stantially increasing aid is by a truck 
route along highways 5 and 6. 

Our Ambassador in Bangkok has 
been in contact with officials of 
ICRC/UNICEF requesting that they 
follow through on this directly with the 
officials in Phnom Penh. 

Recommendations 

1 . The United States should provide 
strong support for the creation of a 
"land bridge" operated by the ICRC 
and UNICEF to bring food and medi- 
cine into Cambodia. We should strive 
to do the following: 

• Achieve agreement to permit up to 
1 ,000 tons of food and medical sup- 
plies to be carried daily by truck into 
Cambodia from Thailand; 

• Acquire by lease or purchase a 
sufficient number of trucks to establish 
the necessary distribution network (one 
international relief official believes a 
total of 500 trucks is needed); 

• Assure the security of the truck 
convoys; and 

• Establish storage centers at re- 



gional distribution points on the main 
highways between the border and 
Phnom Penh. 

2. In order to develop an interna- 
tional program of food relief for In- 
dochinese refugees, the United States 
should: 

• Expedite implementation of the 
full $69 million 6-month aid package 
announced by President Carter on Oc- 
tober 24; 

• Assess funding requirements for a 
longer range program of food and 
medical relief; 

• Name a senior-level White House 
coordinator with specific respon- 
sibilities for implementation of the 
food and medical relief program in 
Cambodia; and 

• Utilize emergency relief funds to 
provide sufficient logistic support to 
the ICRC and UNICEF to get food and 
medicine to where it is needed. 

3. The President should call on other 
nations and American citizens to sup- 
port the efforts of international organi- 
zations and voluntary agencies. Both 
money and volunteers are needed. 

4. The U.S. Government should 
make diplomatic efforts and mobilize 



world opinion in support of the opening 
of the land bridge to Cambodia. The 
role of the Secretary General of the 
United Nations is critical to the success 
of this effort. 

5. The United States should assist 
the international relief agencies as ap- 
propriate to: 

• Increase and regulate distribution 
of food and medicine on the border 
areas; 

• Increase immediately the staff in 
the border areas; 

• Increase capacity of the ports to 
handle shipments by sea; 

• Provide air transportation for criti- 
cally needed items; 

• Establish a system for equitable 
distribution from central storage 
facilities to local areas inside Cam- 
bodia; and 

• Secure agreement that the interna- 
tional agencies have staff and access to 
insure that food is used effectively. D 



'Made to reporters assembled in the Briefing 
Room at the White House (text from Weekly 
Compilation of Presidential Documents of Oct. 
29, 1979). 

^Text from White House press release of 
Oct. 26. 



December 1979 



11 



Refugees - 
An internationai Ohligation 



by Harry F. Young 

This article on the world refugee 
situation since World War II was 
written especially for the Bulletin. 
' Dr. Young is the senior writer in the 
Editorial Division, Office of Public 
Communication, Bureau of Public Af- 
fairs . 

It is often said, and justly, that the 
20th century is the age of the refugee. 
Of course, it is many other things as 
well, and refugees are not only a 20th- 
century phenomenon. The word "refu- 
gee" has been part of the English vo- 
cabulary since the end of the 17th cen- 
tury when it was first used for the 
Huguenots who had found refuge in 
England after their expulsion from 
France. It was available for use on 
other occasions in the 18th and 19th 
centuries. But it was not until com- 
paratively recent times that "refugee" 
became a common word conveying an 
image of many people in flight or dri- 
ven from their homes because of their 
race, religion, or political opinion. 

The White Russians 

Refugee history in our time begins 
with the Russian revolution of 1917. In 
that great upheaval, I '/2 million 
'White" Russians fled their homeland 
and sought refuge abroad. These were a 
new type of migrants, unlike the Euro- 
peans who crossed the oceans in the 
previous century to North America and 
Australia. Most of the latter had left 
home of their own accord for a new 



UNICEF, the International Committee 
of the Red Cross, and private voluntary 
groups as they continue the enormous 
task they have now begun. 

We must pursue every avenue and 
use every means to bring relief supplies 
to people desperately in need. Whether 
through Thailand, through Vietnam, or 
by sea, whether by truck — as we have 
recently urged — by airlift, or by river 
transport, food and medicine, in suffi- 
cient measure, must be delivered. The 
international relief agencies must be 
allowed to do their jobs, to see that 
help gets to the people so desperately 
in need. 

This is a compelling moment. Our 
common humanity calls us to action. D 



'Press release 291 . 



country of their own choosing and with 
the intention of starting life anew. The 
White Russians, on the other hand, had 
fled their homeland, and where they 
landed (at first, in any case) made very 
little difference. They did not arrive as 
laborers needed in an expanding econ- 
omy but as unexpected political fugi- 
tives who, for the most part, became a 
public burden. 

League Efforts 

The White Russians were the first 
refugees assisted by an official interna- 
tional agency. Private relief organiza- 
tions, finding their resources over- 
strained, asked the League of Nations 
to take the matter in hand as "an obli- 
gation of international justice." In 
1921 the League set up a High Com- 
mission for refugees headed by a noted 
humanitarian, the Norwegian explorer 
Fridtjof Nansen. The main task was to 
secure civil status to the Russians who 
were scattered throughout Europe 
without legal protection and represen- 
tation. The High Commissioner intro- 
duced an identity document known as 
the Nansen Passport which gained wide 
acceptance and was later extended to 
Armenian and other refugees. But be- 
yond this progress was minimal. 

Refugees, as the League discovered, 
were an issue that had none of the 
simplicity of world health or the sup- 
pression of slavery. Legal questions 
and political concerns clouded what 
might seem to be a purely humanitarian 
issue. Shortly after Hitler came to 
power and Nazi persecution began, the 
League created a High Commissioner 
for Refugees Coming From Germany. 
But this agency had little positive ef- 
fect, for there was no European gov- 
ernment that was prepared to let a pos- 
sibly temporary issue complicate its 
relations with powerful Germany. The 
32 governments that met on the Ger- 
man refugee question at Evian-les- 
Bains, in France, in 1938, at President 
Roosevelt's suggestion, also could 
provide no effective relief. In an at- 
tempt to bring order to the German ref- 
ugee outflow, they created the Inter- 
Governmental Committee on Refugees, 
which survived the war and was active 
until 1947. In the fall of 1938 the 
League also amalgamated the Nansen 
commission and the commission for 
German refugees, bringing all League 
refugee work under one head. But 
within less than a year Europe was at 



war, and the refugee question was 
transformed beyond all recognition. 

World War II 

World War II set in motion far- 
reaching political forces. At the time, 
however, no one could foresee how 
difficult the refugee problem would be- 
come. What was clear was that the 
German war machine had uprooted tens 
of millions of people from across the 
whole continent and that those who 
were still alive at war's end would be 
left stranded far from their homes. And 
so the Allied powers in 1943 charged 
the United Nations Relief and Re- 
habilitation Administration (UNRRA) 
"to prepare and undertake measures for 
the return of prisoners and exiles to 
their country of origin." All agreed 
that the solution was to transport the 
displaced persons (DP's) home as 
rapidly as possible. The German armies 
surrendered in May 1945. By October 
Allied authorities had repatriated some 
7 million persons. 

Soon, however, it was clear that the 
DP problem was not to be solved so 
easily. Many Eastern Europeans did 
not want to go back to their country of 
origin. Jews aspired to a new homeland 
in Palestine, and others were afraid to 
go back to lands that had fallen under 
Soviet control or influence. Thus, at 
the end of 1945, the DP camps were 
still sheltering a million persons, who 
were joined by early 1946 by another 
million so-called new refugees, also 
from Eastern Europe. 

U.N. Efforts 

The DP and refugee problems came 
before the United Nations. In 1946 the 
General Assembly created the Interna- 
tional Refugee Organization (IRO) as a 
temporary specialized agency with 
wide authority to deal with European 
DP's and refugees. A distinction was 
made between these two types of 
homeless persons. A DP was someone 
who had been deported as forced labor 
or for racial or political reasons, while 
the refugee was someone outside his or 
her homeland because of prewar fascist 
persecution or — and this made it pos- 
sible to extend the protection to anti- 
Communists — due to later events and 
was unwilling or unable to avail them- 
selves of the protection of their home 
government. The statute was a com- 
promise between the Soviet bloc and 
Western countries. Although the IRO 
was to promote repatriation by all pos- 
sible means (as desired by the Soviet 
bloc), each eligible person was free to 
decide against repatriation and for re- 
settlement somewhere else. It was the 



12 



Department of State Bulletin 



U.N.'s hope that the IRO would pro- 
vide a permanent solution within a few 
years. 

But the IRO proved to be a begin- 
ning rather than an end. In Europe the 
problem defied a permanent solution. 
In 4'/2 years of operation, the IRO 
moved 1 million persons (including 
73.000 repatriates). But there remained 
a hard core of the aged and infirm and 
others who were not "emigrable. " ' 
And in the meantime new refugees 
continued to arrive. In IRO's last year. 
195 1 , between 1 .000 and 1 .500 Eastern 
Europeans crossed the borders into 
non-Communist countries each month 
(not including Germans leaving the 
Soviet Zone who were the responsibil- 
ity of the West German Government). 

At the same time, urgent refugee 
problems had arisen in the Middle and 
Far East. In the turmoil surrounding 
Israel's birth in 1948. over 770.000 
Palestinians fled into neighboring 
countries. And in China the Communist 
victory over the Kuomintang started a 
flow of refugees pouring into Hong 
Kong. The Korean war also created a 
serious DP and refugee problem on that 
peninsula. 

The United Nations took up each of 
these problems separately. They did 
not come within the mandate of the 
IRO which was confined to existing 
groups of Europeans. In 1950 the Gen- 
eral Assembly, building on an emer- 
gency organization created earlier, es- 
tablished the U.N. Relief and Works 
Agency (UNRWA) for Palestinians in 
the Near East. But it found no way to 
set up a fund to assist the Chinese in 
Hong Kong. Hong Kong's long estab- 
lished policy was to treat all Chinese 
who found haven there not as refugees 
but as immigrants, and as immigrants 
they could not qualify for assistance 
from regular U.N. refugee programs. 
What help they received came from 
British authorities, private donations 
through voluntary agencies, and the 
U.S. Far Eastern Refugee Program 
(FERP). begun in 1954. The United 
Nations also designed a separate pro- 
gram for Korea, the U.N. Korean Re- 
construction Agency (UNKRA). 

The year 1951 saw several decisive 
steps to improve the status of refugees. 
It was now clear that refugees were 
going to be a chronic problem of this 
age and would need continuing protec- 
tion. First the General Assembly 
created a refugee agency of almost 
global responsibility, the U.N. High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). 
The UNHCR did not succeed to all of 
IRO's duties, for it was not intended to 
be an operating agency. It was not to 
run camps or arrange for transportation 
or resettlement or care for the refugee's 



physical needs. Its main purpose, un- 
changed over the years, was to provide 
legal protection. As the advocate of 
refugee rights it was to use its good of- 
fices to induce governments to meet 
their obligations toward refugees. 
Within a few years, however, it gained 
the authority to dispense the material 
assistance that at first was to be pro- 
vided by other agencies. 

UNHCR's main support has been the 
Inter-Governmental Committee for 
European Migration (ICEM). Founded 
at U.S. suggestion in 1951, it absorbed 
some of the IRO facilities and staff, 
although it is not a U.N. agency. Its 
original purpose was to relieve the 
pressure of overpopulation in Europe 
by supplying low-cost transportation to 
emigrants, including refugees. Later it 
took on responsibilities in other conti- 
nents, and now it is working closely 
with the UNHCR in assisting refugees 
in Southeast Asia. 

Refugee Magna Carta 

Also completed in 1951 (though not 
put into effect until 1954) was the U.N. 
Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees, known as the refugee Magna 
Carta. The purpose of the convention 
was to secure to stateless refugees a 
body of rights in international law. No 
real progress had been made on this 
issue, despite the League's concern, in 
the period between the wars. A refu- 
gee's legal standing still depended en- 
tirely upon the obligations toward him 
or her that the country of asylum had 
voluntarily assumed. The convention 
established the rule that a refugee was 
not to be penalized for illegal entry (if 
coming directly from the country he or 
she had fled) and was not to be expel- 
led to the frontiers of the country where 
his or her life was threatened. The con- 
vention guaranteed continuing personal 
status to refugees, particularly in re- 
gard to the rights attached to marriage, 
in accordance with the law of the 
country of asylum. Refugees were en- 
titled to administrative or consular 
services, such as issuance of a travel 
document. In public education, social 
security, public welfare, and other 
matters they were to be no less 
privileged than the nationals of the 
host country, and in employment, ac- 
quiring property, and admittance to 
studies and professions they were to 
enjoy treatment no less favorable than 
that accorded to other aliens generally. 

U.N. Definition of Refugees 

The first article of the 1951 conven- 
tion contained a definition of the refu- 
gee. Who was eligible for international 



protection and assistance as a refugee 
was a question of vital importance, and 
one for which there had been, up to 
now, no general answer. Of course, all 
refugee agencies, since the Nansen 
Commission, had been concerned with 
the political fugitive, that is, the victim 
of government policy, and not persons 
fleeing from a natural catastrophe. But 
each agency had been designed to serve 
a particular body of persons — Rus- 
sians, Germans, DP's. or Palestini- 
ans — and the first international agency 
with a mandate broad enough to permit 
a definition of the refugee in the 
abstract was the UNHCR. 

The convention took over and 
slightly expanded the UNHCR defini- 
tion. A refugee was a person who was 
outside his or her country of nationality 
or habitual residence because of 
well-founded fear of persecution on ac- 
count of race, religion, nationality, 
membership in a particular social 
group, or political opinion, who was 
unwilling, because of such fear, to 
avail himself or herself of the protec- 
tion of his or her country of origin or to 
return to the country of habitual resi- 
dence. Such, in essence, were the 
qualities of the political refugee. 

But there was more to the definition: 
It was hedged in by limitations on 
place and time not contained in the 
UNHCR statute. For, as always when 
refugee rights were debated, many 
countries were not prepared to accept 
an open-ended responsibility and pre- 
ferred to handle emergencies as they 
arose and as needs could best be 
judged. And so the terms of the con- 
vention were to apply to existing 
groups of refugees, namely those who 
owed their status to events occurring 
before January 1, 1951. What was 
more, signatories could, by declara- 
tion, limit their responsibility to refu- 
gees from events that had taken place 
in Europe. 

The cutoff date was removed by a 
U.N. Protocol Relating to the Status of 
Refugees, completed in 1967. By this 
time most states had concluded that the 
time limitation gave them little protec- 
tion. In the modern world, refugee 
problems were, by nature, international 
and could not be ignored, even if they 
occurred in faraway places, if only for 
humanitarian reasons. This was appar- 
ent in the fall of 1956 when 200,000 
Hungarians, within a period of a 
month, fled into Austria and Yugo- 
slavia. In spite of the time limitation, 
the U.N. agencies and Western gov- 
ernments came to the rescue without 
any hesitation. 

What made the cutoff date in a uni- 
versal convention even more unrealistic 
was the situation in Africa. In this 



December 1979 



13 



continent of new and struggling states 
and of residual colonialism, refugees 
became a permanent feature in numbers 
unknown in Europe or Asia since the 
uprooting that took place during World 
War II. It was difficult (though not im- 
possible) to derive African situations 
from events prior to 1951 . 

U.S. Aid to Refugees 

No country has played such a deci- 
sive role in world refugee affairs as the 
United States. Assuming a large share 
of the costs of most international refu- 
gee programs since the UNRRA, it has 
also maintained extensive programs of 
its own supported wholly by U.S. 
funds. These include the U.S. Refugee 
Program (USRP) for Eastern European 
refugees (started as the U.S. Escapee 
Program in 1952), the FERP for Chi- 
nese in Hong Kong and Macao, educa- 
tional aid for young refugees from 
southern Africa, assistance to refugees 
in South Vietnam and Laos, food al- 
lotments under PL 480 (Food for Peace 
program), and special programs of 
domestic assistance for those who have 
fled directly to the United States, 
namely, Cubans after 1959 and In- 
dochinese since 1975. Like the U.N. 
programs, each had its own mandate 
and separate organization. Initially 
there was no unified administration or 
central policy guidance for refugees as 
a whole. Refugee programs were con- 
sidered to be part of the foreign aid 
program. 

In the 1960's, however. Congress 
provided a coherent financial authority. 
The Migration and Refugee Assistance 
Act of 1962 authorized appropriations 
to cover U.S. contributions to the 
UNHCR and to the ICEM, the costs of 
the USRP and the FERP and to meet 
new refugee needs. It also provided 
authority to assist Cuban refugees in 
the United States, and Congress used 
its authorities to provide assistance to 
Indochinese refugees after the fall of 
Saigon in 1975. 

The United States has also been the 
leading country of resettlement. Since 
1945 close to 2 million refugees have 
found a new home in the United States. 
While Canada and Australia have a 
better per-capita record, these vast un- 
derpopulated countries at first selected 
refugees primarily for their economic 
value. Australia insisted on a 2-year 
work contract and gave strong prefer- 
ence to single males from Baltic coun- 
tries, while Canada asked for those 
willing to do heavy manual labor. (In- 
teresting for comparison are the two 
special cases of Israel and West Ger- 
many where immigration has been a 
dominant fact of national life. The 



Jewish population of Israel of about 3 
million has more than quadrupled since 
1948, with two-thirds of the increase 
due to immigration. The West German 
population of about 60 million includes 
about 12 million refugees and expel- 
lees, all of German extraction.) 

U.S. Immigration Law 

Until 1965 U.S. permanent immi- 
gration law made no explicit provision 
for the refugee. All immigration is reg- 
ulated by the Immigration and Nation- 
ality Act of 1952, as amended (most 
recently in 1978). The predecessor to 
the 1952 act set a ceiling on immigra- 
tion and established a system of dis- 
tributing visas by nationality (defined 
in most cases by the country of birth). 
The number, or quota, of visas allotted 
to each nationality corresponded to the 
share it had already contributed to the 
U.S. ethnic make-up. This resulted in a 
large quota for the United Kingdom 
and small quotas for southern and East- 
ern Europe. While the large German 
quota enabled many refugees from the 
Hitler regime to enter the United States 
as regular immigrants, postwar DP's 
and refugees from Eastern Europe who 
wished to come to the United States 
had no choice but to wait or accept the 
terms offered by other countries of 
immigration. 

At first the United States, responding 
to this need, tried to speed up DP ad- 
missions without changing the quota 
system. About 80,000 Poles, Baits, 
and southern Europeans (about half of 
them refugees) were admitted under a 
December 1945 directive by President 
Truman to use the quota numbers ac- 
cumulated during the war. And the 
215,000 DP's admitted under the Dis- 
placed Persons Act of 1948 were to be 
charged against the quotas of future 
years. It was only with the Refugee 
Relief Act of 1953 that the United 
States went outside the quota system by 
authorizing distribution of 215,000 
special nonquota immigrant visas to a 
number of eligible groups of Europeans 
and Chinese. The McCarran- Walter act 
of 1952, amending the immigration and 
nationality law, had eliminated the 
clause excluding Asians as immigrants 
but had retained the quota system. 

Refugees were first mentioned ex- 
plicitly in the general immigration law 
in the amendments passed in 1965. The 
law abolished the national origins 
quota system and set up in its place a 
hierarchy of preferences for visa dis- 
tribution based on personal qualities; 
that is, relationship with U.S. citizens, 
accomplishments, labor skills, and so 
forth. First preference went to the sons 
and daughters of U.S. citizens; the 



ASYLUM AND RESETTLEMENT 

The right of polilical asylum is well- 
established in international law, but con- 
trary to common belief it is a right not of 
the person seeking haven but of the slate 
thai is granting it. The theory is that 
every state, by virtue of its sovereignty, 
has an absolute right to determine who 
shall be admitted to its territory 
Nevertheless, states that are party to the 
1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the 
Status of Refugees accept the obligation 
not to expel refugees "to the frontiers of 
territories where Itheir] life or freedom 
would be threatened," 

Refugee doctrine distinguishes between 
a state of first asylum and a state of sec- 
ond asylum (or resettlement state). A 
country that has received, but cannot as- 
similate, large numbers of refugees com- 
ing directly from their homelands is a 
state of first asylum, whereas a country 
that accepts for permanent resettlement a 
refugee already granted asylum in another 
country is a state of second asylum. The 
main states of second asylum for In- 
dochinese refugees have been the United 
States, France, Canada, and Australia. 



seventh (and last) to refugees. Hemi- 
spheric immigration ceilings established 
by this law were put together in 1978 to 
form a worldwide ceiling of 290,000 
immigrants per year. Refugees received 
6% of this ceiling, or 17,400. Refu- 
gees, however, do not enter the country 
on the same terms as others. They are 
conditional entrants and must wait 2 
years before they can apply for status 
as immigrants. 

There was a definition of the refugee 
given in the 1965 law; it was narrower 
than that of the 1951 U.N. convention. 
Refugee programs dependent upon 
American initiative and funds spanned 
the globe. And yet the U.S. immigra- 
tion law of 1965, following the practice 
of the 1950's, continued to tie refugee 
status to communism and turmoil in the 
Middle East. Thus, under the 1965 
law, refugees are persons who "be- 
cause of persecution on account of 
race, religion, or political opinion . . . 
have fled from any communist or 
communist-dominated country or area, 
or from any country in the general area 
of the Middle East, and are unable or 
unwilling to return to such country on 
account of race, religion, or political 
opinion." 

The United States was not a party to 
the 1951 Convention Relating to the 
Status of Refugees (which gave rise to 
certain legal doubts). But it did sign 
the 1967 U.N. protocol abolishing the 
cutoff date in the 1951 convention, and 
this meant accepting a definition of the 



14 



refugee at variance with the one given 
in U.S. domestic law for immigration 
purposes. The term as used in the 1962 
Migration and Refugee A.ssistance Act 
was not defined, however, and in ap- 
plication is broader than the immigra- 
tion definition. 

The Parole 

Thus limited by its immigration 
laws, the United States could not have 
admitted as many refugees as it has in 
the past 14 years if the executive 
branch had not had use of a special 
authority known as the parole. Insti- 
tuted by the McCarran-Walter act of 
1952, the parole clause authorized the 
Attorney General to admit to the 
United States temporarily, for '"emer- 
gent reasons" or for reasons deemed in 
the national interest, any alien apply- 
ing for admission. Referring to the use 
of the parole to admit over 30,000 
Hungarian refugees between 1956 and 
1958, Congressman Walter said: "We 
never anticipated anything of this mag- 
nitude, but we did know this sort of 
situation would arise. That is why the 
provision was put in the law." The 
parole enabled the United States to 
admit refugees from non-Communist 
countries, such as Chile, after 1973. 
And in the absence of other authority, 
the executive branch has had to resort 
to the parole to admit large numbers of 
refugees in emergency situations. 

The parole was used extensively to 
admit anti-Castro Cubans in the 
1960's. Of the some 800,000 Cubans 
who have gone into exile in the 20 
years that Castro has ruled their island, 
some 650,000 have found refuge in 
the United States. The Federal Gov- 
ernment opened a reception center for 
Cuban refugees in 1960 and created a 
special assistance program in 1961. 
The largest number of refugee Cubans 
processed into the United States in a 
single year, 1962, was 78,000. By 
comparison, in the 8 months of 1975 
following the fall of Saigon, the United 
States took in and found homes for 
135,000 refugees from Indochina. 

The 1975 Indochinese Exodus 

The flow of Indochinese refugees 
started with the fall of Saigon in April 
1975. Preparations began when the 
outcome of the fighting was no longer 
in doubt. Alerting the UNHCR and 
ICEM to an impending refugee crisis, 
the United States invoked the parole 
authority to admit into the country per- 
sons whose lives were believed to be in 
danger. Within a few days at the end of 
April, some 130,000 Vietnamese, with 
a smaller number of Laotians and 



Cambodians, had quit their country and 
were on their way to the United States, 
Many had been evacuated by air from 
staging sites in Saigon while others left 
by sea either in U.S. vessels or under 
U.S. naval escort for transit centers in 
Guam and the Philippines. 

An interagency task force, supported 
by private voluntary organizations, set 
about the work of resettlement. Recep- 
tion centers were quickly opened at 
military bases in California, Florida, 
Arkansas, and Pennsylvania. The job 
that lay before them was without any 
real precedent