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rhe  Official  Monthly  Record  of  United  States  Foreign  Policy  /  Volunne  79  /  Number  2031 


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REFUGEES  /  1 
Africa  /  18 
SALT  II  /  25 
Vietnam  /  34 
IVIiddle  East  /  44 


Dvparini4»nt  of  Si  ate 

bulletin 


Volume  79  /  Number  2031  /  October  1979 


Cover  Photo: 

Refugees  in  Southeast  Asia 
{  Black  Star  photo  by  Stem  ) 


The  Department  of  State  Bulletin, 
published  by  the  Office  of  Public  Com- 
munication in  the  Bureau  of  Public 
Affairs,  is  the  official  record  of  U.S. 
foreign  pohcy.  Its  purpose  is  to  provide 
the  public,  the  Congress,  and  govern- 
ment agencies  with  information  on 
developments  in  U.S.  foreign  relations 
and  the  work  of  the  Department  of 
State  and  the  Foreign  Service. 

The  Bulletin's  contents  include 
major  addresses  and  news  conferences 
of  the  President  and  the  Secretary  of 
State;  statements  made  before  congres- 
sional committees  by  the  Secretary 
and  other  senior  State  Department  of- 
ficials; special  features  and  articles  on 
international  affairs;  selected  press  re- 
leases issued  by  the  White  House,  the 
Department,  and  the  U.S.  Mission  to 
the  United  Nations;  and  treaties  and 
other  agreements  to  which  the  United 
States  is  or  may  become  a  party. 

The  Secretary  of  State  has  deter- 
mined that  the  publication  of  this  peri- 
odical is  necessary  in  the  transaction  of 
the  public  business  required  by  law  of 
this  Department.  Use  of  funds  for 
printing  this  periodical  has  been  ap- 
proved by  the  Director  of  the  Office 
of  Management  and  Budget  through 
January  31,  1981. 

NOTE:  Contents  of  this  publication 
are  not  copyrighted  and  items  con- 
tained herein  may  be  reprinted.  Cita- 
tion of  the  Department  of  State 
Bulletin  as  the  source  will  be  appre- 
ciated. The  Bulletin  is  indexed  in  the 
Readers'  Guide  to  Periodical  Litera- 
ture. 

For  sale  by  the  Superintendent  of 
Documents,  U.S.  Government  Print- 
ing Office,  Washington,  D.C.  20402 

Price: 

12  issues  plus  annual  index- 
Si  8.00  (domestic)  $22.50  (foreign) 

Single  copy- 
Si. 40  (domestic)  Si. 80  (foreign) 


CYRUS  R.  VANCE 

Secretary  of  State 

HOODING  CARTER  III 

Assistant  Secretary  for  Public  Affairs 

JOHN  CLARK  KIMBALL 
Chief,  Editorial  Division 

PHYLLIS  A.  YOUNG 
Editor 

COLLEEN  SUSSMAN 
Assistant  Editor 


CO]\TEl\TS 


1  U.S.  PROGRAM  TO  ASSIST  THE  WORLD'S  REFUGEES 

(Vice  Pretiideiit  Motidale) 

Rescue  of  Refugees  at  Sea 

The  Indochinese  Refugee  Situation  (Secretcn-fi  Vance) 

Memorandum  of  Understanding  Between  the  UNHCR  and  Vietnam 

Significant  Quotes  on  Refugees  (Dick  Clark) 
8  Results  of  Refugee  Conference 
8  U.S.  Coordinator  for  Refugees 


THE  PRESIDENT 

9  News  Conference  of  July  25 

THE  VICE  PRESIDENT 

10  Visit  to  East  Asia 


THE  SECRETARY 

14  News  Conference  of  September  5 

AFRICA 

18  Report   on   Southern   Rhodesia 

(RichanI  M.  Moose) 

19  Visit  of  Bishop  Muzorewa  of  South- 

ern  Rhodesia   (White  House 
Statemeut) 

20  Letters  of  Credence   (Gambia. 

Guinea,  Togo) 
20  The  U.S.  Role  in  Southern  Africa 
(Richard  M.  Moose) 

22  Uganda  (President  Carter) 

23  OAU  Summit  Meeting  (WiUiaui  C. 

Ha  rrop) 

24  U.S.  Ambassadors  to  African  Coun- 

tries, September  1979 

ARMS  CONTROL 

25  An  Evaluation  of  SALT  II  (George 

M.  Seigiiious  II) 
32  SALT  II— The  Basic  Choice  (Sec- 
retary Vance) 

EAST  ASIA 

34  Vietnam  and  Indochina  (Richard  C. 

Holbrooke) 
37  Issue  of  U.S.-S.R.V.   Relations 

(Department  Statement) 

39  Continuing  Efforts  To  Account  for 

MIA's  (Robert  B.  Oakley) 

40  Famine  in  Kampuchea  (Department 

Statement) 


ECONOMICS 

42  Economic  Interdependence  in  North 
America  (Julius  L.  Katz) 


MIDDLE  EAST 

44  Forces  of  Change  in  the  Middle 

East  (Harold  H.  Saunders) 

45  Kerosene,  Fuel  Oil  Export  Licenses 

for  Iran  (Department  Statement) 
47  Middle  East  Peace  Process  (Robert 
S.  Strauss) 

49  Egyptian  Vice  President  Meets 

With  President  Carter  (White 
House  Statonoit) 

50  Violence  in  Lebanon  and  Israel 

(Department  Statements) 

51  Oil  Supply  Agreement  Signed  by 

the  U.S.  and  Israel  (Herbert  J. 
Hansell.  Yaacov  Nechushtan) 

52  Military  Equipment  Programs  for 

Egypt  and  Saudi  Arabia  (Harold 
H.  Saunders) 

52  U.S.  Policy  Toward  Israel  (Secre- 

tary Vance) 

53  Western  Sahara  (Harold  H.  Saun- 

ders) 


SOUTH  ASIA 

54  U.S.  Policy  Toward  Afghanistan 
and  Pakistan  (Jack  C.  Miklos) 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 

63  Soviet  Combat  Troops  in  Cuba 
(President  Carter,  Secretary 
Vance,  Department  Statement) 

63  Letters  of  Credence   (Bolivia, 

Brazil,  Peru,  Venezuela) 

64  U.S.-Me.xico  Cooperation  (Julius  L. 

Katz) 

65  Emergency   Aid   to    Nicaragua 

(White  House  Announcement) 

66  Oil  Spill  in  the  Gulf  of  Mexico 

(Robert  Krueger) 


TREATIES 

67  Current  Actions 

CHRONOLOGY 

68  August  1979 

PRESS  RELEASES 

68  Department  of  State 

69  U.S. U.N. 

PUBLICATIONS 

69  New  Foreign  Affairs  Dictionary 

69  "Foreign  Relations"  Volume  on  the 

United  Nations  Released 

70  GPO  Sales 


UNITED  NATIONS  INDEX 

57   Namibia  (Donald  F.  McHenry) 

60  President  Carter's  Meeting  With 

U.N.   Secretary  General  (White 

,,-^°"^^?'«'^'"^!''^,  .    .  Boston  PubUc  Ll-zrary 

61  U.S.  Policy  on  Lebanon  ( Andre-^^^^^^^^^^^^^^,^  ^^  ^^^^^^^.^^ 

Young) 

62  World  Radio  Conference  (Foreign 

Relations  Outline)  [^g\/       5  1979 


DEPOSITORY 


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U.S.  PROGRAM  TO 
ASSIST  THE  WORLD'S  REFUGEES 


BACKGROUND 

In  the  4'/2  years  since  the  collapse  of 
the  governments  of  South  Vietnam. 
Cambodia  (now  called  Kampuchea), 
and  Laos,  more  than  a  million  In- 
dochinese  have  fled  their  homelands  to 
seek  temporary  or  permanent  asylum 
elsewhere.  Some  350.000  refugees 
have  resettled  in  non-Communist 
countries,  and  about  350,000  remain  in 
countries  of  first  asylum  in  Southeast 
Asia.  In  addition,  an  estimated  250,000 
Indochinese  have  fled  to  the  People's 
Republic  of  China,  and  about  150,000 
Kampucheans  are  in  camps  in  the 
Socialist  Republic  of  Vietnam. 

The  exodus  from  the  countries  of  In- 
dochina initially  consisted  primarily  of 
those  who  had  fought  the  Communists, 
who  had  been  associated  with  the  pre- 
vious regimes  or  with  the  U.S.  Gov- 
ernment, or  who  had  opposed  the  new 
authorities. 

In  1978.  however,  conditions  within 
Indochina  began  to  change  radically. 
The  Hanoi  government  instituted 
policies  designed  to  restructure  society, 
shift  city  dwellers  to  the  countryside, 
and  eliminate  the  business  and  profes- 
sional class.  These  policies  were  prin- 
cipally aimed  at  Vietnam's  1.5  million 
ethnic  Chinese,  who  were  seen  as  a  se- 
curity threat  at  a  time  of  worsening  re- 
lations with  China.  The  ethnic  Chinese, 
including  those  who  had  lived  peace- 
fully in  the  north  since  1954,  were  in- 
creasingly faced  with  the  threat  of  dis- 
missal from  jobs,  conscription,  or 
transfer  to  remote  areas  of  the  country 
without  services,  called  "new  eco- 
nomic zones." 

As  a  result,  by  the  summer  of  1978 
there  was  a  marked  increase  in  both 
the  number  of  people  fleeing  Indochina 
and  the  percentage  of  ethnic  Chinese 
among  the  refugees.  Other  factors  con- 
tributing to  the  outflow  of  refugees 
were  the  war  between  China  and  Viet- 
nam, the  occupation  of  areas  of  Laos 
and  Kampuchea  by  Vietnamese  forces, 
military  operations  against  the  Hmong 
tribesmen  in  Laos,  deteriorating  eco- 
nomic conditions  (particularly  food 
shortages),  and  violations  of  political 
and  other  rights.  In  addition,  Viet- 
namese authorities  began  to  assist  the 
departures  of  ethnic  Chinese  and  others 
they  considered  undesirable. 

The  number  of  Indochinese  seeking 
asylum  in  non-Communist  countries  in 
Southeast  Asia  jumped  from  about 


6,000  a  month  in  August  1978  to  a 
peak  of  65,000  in  May  1979.  Partially 
as  a  result  of  the  Vietnamese  decision 
announced  at  the  Geneva  refugee  con- 
ference in  July  to  stem  "illegal  depar- 
tures" from  Vietnam,  the  arrival  rate 
dropped  to  about  12,000  in  August 
1979.  These  figures  reflect  only  the 
numbers  of  people  who  succeed  in 
seeking  asylum.  It  is  not  known  how 
many  people  actually  attempt  to  leave 
Indochina,  but  there  are  estimates  that 
from  30%  to  60%  perish  before  arriv- 
ing at  a  safe  haven. 

Since  the  beginning  of  1979,  about 
240,000  Indochinese  have  joined  the 
more  than  200,000  refugees  who  were 
already  in  camps  in  first-asylum  coun- 
tries awaiting  resettlement  elsewhere. 
In  this  period,  however,  some  75,000 
have  been  moved  from  the  camps  to 
permanent  homes  in  other  countries. 

Despite  increased  international  ef- 
forts to  resettle  the  Indochinese,  the 
presence  of  large  refugee  populations 
in  the  countries  of  first-asylum  con- 
tinues to  be  a  source  of  domestic  con- 
cern and  regional  instability.  The 
first-asylum  countries  have  resisted 
efforts  to  resettle  any  Indochinese 
within  their  borders  because  they  al- 
ready feel  overburdened  by  their  own 
population  pressures,  economic  prob- 
lems, and  religious  and  ethnic  tensions, 
and  they  are  concerned  about  the  pos- 
sibility of  subversion  and  insurgency. 
The  lack  of  resettlement  opportunities 
in  Southeast  Asia  has  increased  the 
need  for  greater  international  partici- 
pation in  the  refugee  assistance  pro- 
gram. The  U.N.  High  Commissioner 
for  Refugees  (UNHCR)  is  responsible 
for  the  protection  and  care  of  refugees 
in  camps  in  Southeast  Asia  until  per- 
manent resettlement  can  be  arranged. 

In  May  and  June  1979  the  refugee 
situation  reached  crisis  proportions,  as 
the  countries  of  first  asylum  reacted  in 
desperation  to  the  mounting  refugee 
populations,  the  increasing  arrival 
rates,  and  the  apparently  inadequate  re- 
spon.se  to  the  problem  by  the  rest  of  the 
world  community.  Southeast  Asian 
governments  began  refusing  to  grant 
asylum  to  new  arrivals — causing  death 
to  tens  of  thousands  of  refugees  pushed 
back  out  to  sea  or  back  across  land 
borders  —  and  in  some  cases  they 
threatened  to  expel  refugees  already 
admitted  to  U.N. -sponsored  camps.  As 
a  result  of  the  dramatic  deterioration  of 
the  situation,  there  was  widespread 


support  for  British  Prime  Minister 
Thatcher's  proposal  that  the  United 
Nations  convene  a  special  meeting  on 
the  Indochinese  refugee  problem.  U.N. 
Secretary  General  Waldheim  invited  72 
nations  to  attend  the  meeting,  which  he 
convened  in  Geneva  July  20-21,  1979. 
Vice  President  Mondale  headed  the 
U.S.  delegation  and  delivered  the  fol- 
lowing address  on  July  21. 


VICE  PRESIDENT  MONDALE 

Once  again  the  countries  of  the 
world  turn  to  the  United  Nations.  When 
problems  touch  the  whole  human 
communilty,  no  other  forum  provides  a 
vision  more  encompassing.  When  na- 
tional interests  conflict  and  collide,  no 
institution  convenes  us  with  greater 
moral  authority.  The  United  Nations  is 
often  criticized  and  sometimes  even 
maligned.  But  the  common  ground  it 
provides  us  deserves  our  thanks  and 
praise.  On  behalf  of  the  United  States 
—  and  1  believe,  on  behalf  of  all  na- 
tions in  the  world  community — 1  thank 
Secretary  General  Waldheim  and  High 
Commissioner  Hartling  [U.N.  High 
Commissioner  for  Refugees  Poul 
Hartling]  for  their  leadership  in  con- 
vening us  here  today. 

Some  tragedies  defy  the  imagination. 
Some  misery  so  surpasses  the  grasp  of 
reason  that  language  itself  breaks  be- 
neath the  strain.  Instead,  we  gasp  for 
metaphors.  Instead,  we  speak  the  inau- 
dible dialect  of  the  human  heart. 

Today  we  confront  such  a  tragedy. 
In  virtually  all  the  world's  languages, 
desperate  new  expressions  have  been 
born.  "A  barbed-wire  bondage."  "An 
archipelago  of  despair."  "A  floodtide 
of  human  misery."  With  this  new 
coinage  our  language  is  enriched,  and 
our  civilization  is  impoverished. 

"The  boat  people."  "The  land 
people."  The  phrases  are  new,  but 
unfortunately  their  precedent  in  the  an- 
nals of  shame  is  not.  Forty-one  years 
ago  this  very  week,  another  interna- 
tional conference  on  Lake  Geneva  con- 
cluded its  deliberations.  Thirty-two 
"nations  of  asylum"  convened  at 
Evian  to  save  the  doomed  Jews  of  Nazi 
Germany  and  Austria.  On  the  eve  of 
the  conference,  Hitler  flung  the  chal- 
lenge in  the  world's  face.  He  said:  "I 
can  only  hope  that  the  other  world, 
which  has  such  deep  sympathy  for 
these  criminals,  will  at  least  be  gener- 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


ous  enough  to  convert  this  sympathy 
into  practical  aid."  We  have  each 
heard  similar  arguments  about  the 
plight  of  the  refugees  in  Indochina. 

At  stake  at  Evian  were  both  human 
lives  and  the  decency  and  self-respect 
of  the  civilized  world.  If  each  nation  at 
Evian  had  agreed  on  that  day  to  take  in 
17,000  Jews  at  once,  every  Jew  in  the 
Reich  could  have  been  saved.  As  one 
American  observer  wrote:  "It  is 
heartbreaking  to  think  of  the  .  .  .  des- 
perate human  beings  .  .  .  waiting  in 
suspense  for  what  happens  at  Evian. 
But  the  question  they  underline  is  not 
simply  humanitarian.  ...  It  is  a  test  of 
civilization." 

At  Evian,  they  began  with  high 
hopes.  But  they  failed  the  test  of  civili- 
zation. 

The  civilized  world  hid  in  the  cloak 
of  legalisms.  Two  nations  said  they  had 
reached  the  saturation  point  for  Jewish 
refugees.  Four  nations  said  they  would 


Rescue  of 

Refugees 

at  Sea 


Tradition  provides  that  ship  captains 
shall  rescue  individuals  in  distress  at 
.sea  and  bring  them  to  the  closest  port 
for  disembarkation.  Thousands  of  In- 
dochinese  refugees  have  been  rescued 
on  the  high  seas,  but  in  some  cases 
vessels  have  reportedly  ignored  distress 
signals. 

In  December  1978,  the  U.N.  High 
Commission  for  Refugees  and  the 
Inter-Governmental  Maritime  Consult- 
ative Organization  issued  a  joint  appeal 
to  governments,  shipowners,  and  ship 
masters  to  continue  the  rescue  of  refu- 
gees on  the  high  seas.  Three  times 
since  mid- 1978  the  U.S.  Government 
has  reminded  American  line  operators 
and  their  captains  of  their  obligations 
in  this  regard  and  has  also  provided  a 
guarantee  of  resettlement  for  refugees 
rescued  by  U.S. -owned  or  U.S.- 
registered  vessels  if  those  refugees  are 
not  accepted  by  another  country. 

Major  maritime  nations,  for  the  most 
part,  have  stated  that  they  have  in- 
structed their  carriers  to  rescue  refu- 
gees at  sea.  The  major  problem  appears 
to  lie  with  carriers  operating  under 
Hags  of  convenience.  Ship  masters  are 
coming  under  additional  pressure  as  a 
result  of  stiffening  resistance  among 
the  ports  of  the  region  to  the  landing  of 
refugees  without  guarantees  of  reset- 
tlement, n 


accept  experienced  agricultural  workers 
only.  One  would  only  accept  immi- 
grants who  had  been  baptized.  Three 
declared  intellectuals  and  merchants  to 
be  undesirable  new  citizens.  One  na- 
tion feared  that  an  influx  of  Jews  would 
arouse  antisemitic  feelings.  And  one 
delegate  said  this:  "As  we  have  no  real 
racial  problem,  we  are  not  desirous  of 
importing  one." 

As  the  delegates  left  Evian,  Hitler 
again  goaded  "the  other  world"  for 
"oozing  sympathy  for  the  poor,  tor- 
mented people,  but  remaining  hard  and 
obdurate  when  it  comes  to  helping 
them."  Days  later,  the  "final  solution 
to  the  Jewish  problem"  was  conceived, 
and  soon  the  night  closed  in. 

Let  us  not  reenact  their  error.  Let  us 
not  be  the  heirs  to  their  shame. 

To  alleviate  the  tragedy  in  Southeast 
Asia,  we  all  have  a  part  to  play.  The 
United  States  is  committed  to  doing  its 
share,  just  as  we  have  done  for  genera- 
tions. "Mother  of  Exiles"  it  says  on 
the  pedestal  of  the  Statue  of  Liberty  at 
the  port  of  New  York.  The  American 
people  have  already  welcomed  over 
200,000  Indochinese.  Their  talent  and 
their  energies  immeasurably  enrich  our 
nation. 

We  are  preparing  to  welcome  an- 
other 168,000  refugees  in  the  coming 
year.  The  governors  and  the  Members 
of  Congress  in  our  delegation  —  as  well 
as  outstanding  religious  and  civic  lead- 
ers throughout  America — are  a  symbol 
of  the  enduring  commitment  of  Presi- 
dent Carter  and  the  American  people. 

Many  nations  represented  here  have 
risen  to  history's  test,  accepting  sub- 
stantial numbers  of  refugees.  The 
ASEAN  states  [Association  of  South 
East  Asian  Nations],  China,  and  Hong 
Kong  have  offered  safety  and  asylum  to 
over  half  a  million  refugees  from  Viet- 
nam, Laos,  and  Kampuchea  since 
1975.  And  others  have  opened  their 
doors. 

But  the  growing  exodus  from  In- 
dochina still  outstrips  international  ef- 
forts. We  must  work  together  or  the 
suffering  will  mount.  Unless  we  all  do 
more,  the  risk  of  fresh  contlict  will 
arise  and  the  stability  of  Southeast  Asia 
will  erode.  Unless  this  conference 
gives  birth  to  new  commitments,  and 
not  simply  new  metaphors,  we  will  in- 
herit the  scorn  of  Evian.  It  is  a  time  for 
action,  not  words. 

I  would  like  to  outline  seven  areas 
where  action  is  needed. 

First  and  foremost,  the  fundamental 
responsibility  must  rest  with  the  au- 
thorities of  Indochina,  particularly  the 
Government  of  the  Socialist  Republic 
of  Vietnam.  That  government  is  failing 
to  insure  the  human  rights  of  its 
people.  Its  callous  and  irresponsible 
policies  are  compelling  countless  citi- 


zens to  forsake  everything  they  treas- 
ure, to  risk  their  lives,  and  to  tlee  into 
the  unknown. 

There  must  be  an  immediate  mora- 
torium on  the  further  explusion  of 
people  from  Vietnam.  We  must  stop 
the  drownings  and  establish  a  humane 
emigration  program.  The  policy  of  ex- 
pulsion which  has  led  to  so  many  tragic 
deaths  must  end.  It  must  be  replaced  by 
a  policy  which  enables  those  who  wish 
to  leave  their  homes  to  do  so — in  safety 
and  by  choice  and  in  an  orderly  man- 
ner. 

At  the  same  time,  we  must  not  forget 
the  land  people  driven  from  their 
homeland  by  conflict  and  foreign  inva- 
sion. The  nations  of  the  world  must 
promote  a  political  settlement  in  Kam- 
puchea. The  survival  of  a  whole  people 
is  in  grave  doubt.  Neither  the  Pol  Pot 
nor  Hang  Samrin  regimes  represents 
the  Kampuchean  people.  The  conflict, 
and  the  human  tragedy  in  its  wake, 
must  stop.  The  international  commu- 
nity must  not  tolerate  forced  expulsion 
of  entire  populations. 

I  call  on  all  governments  to  allow 
normal  free  emigration  and  family 
reunification.  My  government  supports 
efforts  to  negotiate  a  program  of  or- 
derly direct  departures  from 
Vietnam — but  not  at  the  expense  of 
those  in  camps  elsewhere  in  Southeast 
Asia  already  awaiting  resettlement  and 
not  as  part  of  a  program  of  expulsion  of 
ethnic  or  political  groups. 

Second,  I  urge  the  countries  of  first 
asylum  to  continue  to  provide  tempo- 
rary safe  haven  to  all  refugees.  The 
compassion  these  nations  have  shown 
earns  them  the  respect  and  admiration 
of  the  world's  community.  But  these 
nations  cannot  bear  this  responsibility 
alone.  We  call  on  them  to  persist  in 
their  spirit  of  humanity  so  that  our 
common  effort  can  proceed. 

Therefore,  third,  the  rest  of  us  must 
provide  assurances  to  first-asylum 
countries  that  the  refugees  will  find 
new  homes  within  a  reasonable  period 
of  time.  To  meet  this  objective,  we  call 
on  all  nations  to  double  their  resettle- 
ment commitment,  as  the  United  States 
has  already  done.  Moreover,  we  must 
all  be  prepared  to  commit  ourselves  to 
multiyear  resettlement  programs — for 
the  problem  will  not  be  solved  quickly. 
The  U.S.  Government  is  now  seeking 
that  authority. 

Fourth,  each  of  us  must  make  a 
greater  contribution  to  the  relief  efforts 
of  the  U.N.  High  Commissioner  for 
Refugees.  The  UNHCR  will  need  in- 
creased resources  now  and  in  the  com- 
ing years  to  care  for  growing  refugee 
populations  and  to  alleviate  the  misery 
in  refugee  camps.  The  UNHCR  may 
require  an  estimated  $400  million  for 
its  Indochina  programs  in  1980. 


Xtober  1979 


To  do  our  part  to  help,  I  am 
iri\ileged  to  announce  today  that  my 
government  will  ask  our  Congress  to 
allocate  $105  million  tor  those 
programs — more  than  double  our  cur- 
rent effort.  We  are  also  ready  to  assign 
highly  qualified  Peace  Corps  volun- 
teers to  work  in  the  camps  in  Southeast 
Asia — to  work  not  only  with  the  indi- 
vidual countries  but  also  in  the  pro- 
grams of  the  U.N.  High  Commissioner. 
We  urge  other  nations  to  undertake 
similar  programs  of  support. 
j  Fifth,  it  is  essential  that  we  relieve 
pressures  on  existing  camps  and  create 
a  network  of  new  transit  centers  for 
|"efugees  destined  for  permanent  reset- 
tlement elsewhere.  Given  the  mag- 
nitude of  the  refugee  population,  such 
centers  must  accommodate  at  least 
250.000  refugees.  My  government  has 
endorsed  the  initiative  of  the  ASEAN 
states  for  U.N. -sponsored  refugee 
processing  centers.  President  Carter 
applauds  the  Government  of  the  Philip- 
pines for  the  bold  and  exemplary  steps 
it  has  taken — a  model  of  responsible 
world  leadership.  Today  1  am  espe- 
cially pleased  to  announce  that  we  are 
requesting  more  than  $20  million  from 
the  Congress  to  finance  our  share  of 
such  new  UNHCR  facilities. 

Sixth,  we  must  extend  refugee  reset- 
tlement to  nations  which  are  ready  to 
receive  them — but  which  do  not  have 
the  resources  to  do  so.  Today,  on  be- 
half of  the  U.S.  Government,  1  propose 
the  creation  of  an  international  refugee 
resettlement  fund.  If  other  nations  join 
us.  we  will  ask  our  Congress  for  con- 
tributions to  the  fund  totaling  $20  mil- 
lion for  the  first  year.  We  ask  today 
that  other  nations  match  us.  We  rec- 
ommend that  the  fund  be  capitalized  at 
$200  million.  This  fund  could,  for 
example,  endow  an  international  cor- 
poration which  would  help  developing 
countries  embark  on  their  planning  and 
secure  additional  resources  for  this 
high  humanitarian  purpose. 

Seventh,  and  above  all,  we  must  act 
to  protect  the  lives  of  those  who  seek 
safety.  The  United  States  is  acting  vig- 
orously to  save  refugees  from  exposure 
and  starvation  and  drowning  and  death 
at  sea. 

As  Commander  in  Chief  of  the  mili- 
tary, the  President  of  the  United  States 
has  dramatically  strengthened  his  or- 
ders to  our  Navy  to  help  the  drowning 
and  the  desperate.  Today  the  President 
has  ordered  four  additional  ships  from 
the  Military  Sealift  Command  to  be 
dispatched  to  the  South  China  Sea — 
where  they  will  be  available  both  to 
transport  tens  of  thousands  of  refugees 
from  camps  to  refugee  processing  cen- 
ters and  to  assist  refugees  at  sea.  At  the 
same  time,  the  President  has  also  or- 
dered long-range  Navy  aircraft  to  fly 


CONTRIBUTIONS  TO  UNHCR 

FOR  INDOCHINESE  REFUGEES 

(Million  U.S. 

$) 

1975- 

Balance  of 

Counlry 

June  30,  1979 

1979 

1980 

Australia 

9.8 

5.0 

Austria 

.04 

.10 

Belgium 

.59 

.73 

Canada 

1.9 

.40 

China 

1.0 

Cyprus 

.001 

Denmark 

5.8 

1.9 

EEC 

8.0 

25 

5.5 

Finland 

1.0 

France 

* 

* 

* 

Gennany.  West 

7.0 

3.8 

10.9 

Greece 

.015 

Iran 

.09 

Ireland 

.08 

.4 

Italy 

.78 

.8 

Japan 

23.6 

(50%  of  future  costs)                   | 

Korea 

4.8 

Mauritius 

.01 

Neitherlands 

3.8 

4.9 

New  Zealand 

.36 

Nigeria 

.12 

Norway 

6.0 

2.0 

Philippines 

.03 

Sweden 

3.3 

Switzerland 

1.2 

Taiwan 

** 

U.K. 

5.6 

5.4 

5.4 

US. 

42.9 

34.0 

105.0 

TOTAL 

ntributes 

120.780 
to  the  overall  UNHCR  budget 

90.61 
but  does  not  earn 

127.63 
ark  contributions  for 

*  France  co 

the  Indochina 

program 

**Taiwan  i 

■ontributed  $500,000  to  the  International  Rescue  Committee  for  assistance  to      1 

Indochinese  refugees. 

patrols  to  locate  and  seek  help  for  refu- 
gee boats  in  distress. 

And  the  President  is  asking  our  pri- 
vate shipping  industry  and  unions  to 
persist  with  their  time-honored  efforts 
to  help  refugees  at  sea.  We  appeal  to 
other  governments  to  do  the  same — and 
to  accept  for  resettlement  those  who  are 
picked  up. 

In  conclusion  let  me  reiterate  two 
points. 

First,  the  international  community 
must  not  tolerate  this  forced  expulsion. 
We  call  upon  Vietnam  to  cease  those 
policies  which  condemn  so  many  to 
flee.  There  must  be  an  immediate 
moratorium  on  expulsions. 

The  freedom  to  emigrate  is  a  funda- 
mental human  right.  But  no  nation  is 
blind  to  the  difference  between  free 
emigration  and  forced  exodus.  Let  us 
impose  a  moratorium  on  that  exodus. 
Let  us  have  a  breathing  spell  during 
which  all  of  us — governments,  volun- 
tary agencies,  and  private  individuals 
alike — mobilize  our  generosity  and  re- 
lieve the  human  misery.    And  let  us 


urge  the  Government  of  Vietnam  to 
honor  the  inalienable  human  rights  at 
the  core  of  every  civilized  society. 

Second,  our  children  will  deal 
harshly  with  us  if  we  fail.  The  confer- 
ence at  Evian  41  years  ago  took  place 
amidst  the  same  comfort  and  beauty  we 
enjoy  at  our  own  deliberations  today. 
One  observer  at  those  proceedings — 
moved  by  the  contrast  between  the  set- 
ting and  the  task — said  this: 

These  poor  people  and  these  great 
principles  seem  so  far  away.  To  one 
who  has  attended  other  conferences  on 
Lake  Geneva,  the  most  striking  thing 
on  the  eve  of  this  one  is  that  the  atmos- 
phere is  so  much  like  the  others. 

Let  us  not  be  like  the  others.  Let  us 
renounce  that  legacy  of  shame.  Let  us 
reach  beyond  metaphor.  Let  us  honor 
the  moral  principles  we  inherit.  Let  us 
do  something  meaningful — something 
profound — to  stem  this  misery.  We 
face  a  world  problem.  Let  us  fashion  a 
world  solution.  History  will  not  forgive 
us  if  we  fail.  History  will  not  forget  us 
if  we  succeed.  D 


The  intloehiitese 
Refugee  Situation 


by  Secretary  Vance 

Statement  before  the  Siihcomtnittee 
on  Immigration.  Refugees,  and  Inter- 
national Law  of  the  House  Judiciary 
Committee  on  July  31 ,  1979. ' 

I  am  pleased  to  have  this  opportunity 
to  discuss  the  Indochinese  refugee 
problem  with  you.  I  appreciate  the  ac- 
tive support  and  interest  members  of 
this  subcommittee  have  shown  in  the 
tragic  situation  in  Southeast  Asia  and 
in  U.S.  programs  to  assist  Indochinese 
refugees.  In  particular,  we  valued  the 
participation  of  [Congresswoman 
Elizabeth]  Holtzman  and  [Congressman 
Hamilton]  Fish,  as  well  as  members  of 
the  Judiciary  Committee  staff,  at  the 
recent  Geneva  meeting.  We  also  value 
the  visits  that  members  and  staff  have 
made  to  Southeast  Asia,  including 
Vietnam.  The  firsthand  understanding 
you  have  obtained  of  all  sides  of  the 
complex,  difficult  refugee  issue  has 
been  of  great  benefit  to  the  executive 
branch  as  well  as  to  the  Congress  and 
the  public. 

In  the  weeks  ahead,  we  will  need 
your  continued  support  and  guidance, 
especially  in  providing  the  legislative 
framework  we  need  to  deal  with  refu- 
gee crises  of  such  grave  proportions. 

This  morning,  I  would  like  to  bring 
you  up  to  date  on  the  magnitude  of  the 
Indochina  refugee  situation,  the  steps 
that  have  been  taken,  and  the  tasks 
ahead.  Ambassador  Clark  [Dick  Clark, 
U.S.  Coordinator  for  Refugee  Affairs] 
will  go  into  more  detail  about  the  spe- 
cific commitments  and  proposals  that 
were  made  in  Geneva,  what  we  are 
doing  to  implement  them  promptly  and 
effectively,  and  what  more  we  must  do. 

All  of  us  are  aware  of  the  stark  di- 
mensions of  the  problem.  Over 
375,000  men,  women,  and  children  are 
languishing  in  refugee  camps  in  South- 
east Asia,  awaiting  resettlement. 
Thousands  of  others  who  fled  never 
reached  a  safe  shore.  What  we  face  in 
Southeast  Asia  is  first  and  foremost  a 
human  tragedy  of  appalling  propor- 
tions. 

It  is  also  a  threat  to  peace  in  the  re- 
gion and  to  the  stability  of  our  friends 
there. 

And  as  Vice  President  Mondale 
made  very  clear,  publicly  and  pri- 
vately, in  Geneva,  it  is  a  world  prob- 
lem which  requires  a  world  solution. 
The   international  communitv  cannot 


turn  away  from  the  plight  of  these 
people. 

As  the  international  community  has 
begun  to  grasp  the  dimensions  of  the 
problem,  the  response  has  been  build- 
ing. The  United  States  has  been  at  the 
forefront  of  this  gathering  international 
effort.  But  while  there  is  reason  to  be 
encouraged  by  the  progress  that  has 
been  made  in  recent  weeks,  we  cannot 
afford  in  any  way  to  slacken  our  ef- 
forts. The  situation  remains  explosive. 
The  suffering  remains  acute.  The  next 
weeks  and  months  will  be  critical,  we 
must  now  reinforce  the  progress  that 
has  been  made  and  sustain  the 
momentum  that  is  building. 

Let  me  briefly  review  the  events  of 
the  past  several  months. 

The  situation  began  to  deteriorate 
rapidly  last  fall  when  the  number  of 
refugees  arriving  in  first-asylum  coun- 
tries suddenly  began  to  outpace  the 
numbers  leaving  for  permanent  reset- 
tlement. The  camps  were  quickly 
swamped.  The  Southeast  Asian  states 
became  increasingly  alarmed  at  the 
prospect  of  permanently  absorbing 
large  refugee  populations. 

In  the  face  of  the  challenge  in  South- 
east Asia,  as  well  as  in  other  areas  of 
the  world  where  the  United  States  pro- 
vides refugee  assistance,  it  became 
clear  that  we  would  have  to  strengthen 
our  own  refugee  programs.  We  created 
the  position  of  U.S.  Coordinator  for 
Refugee  Affairs,  a  role  that  Dick  Clark 
is  filling  with  great  skill  and  dedica- 
tion. In  December,  the  United  States 
took  the  lead,   both   in   increasing  the 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 

number  of  our  Indochinese  refugee  ad-1 
missions  from  25,000  a  year  to  53.000; 
and  in  urging  others  to  do  more.  How-i 
ever,  these  efforts  were  soon  out- 
stripped by  the  increasing  rate  of  arriv- 
als, as  you  saw  on  your  trip  to  the  re- 
gion last  February.  As  a  result,  in  April 
the  President  approved  admissions  at  a 
rate  of  84,000  a  year,  a  figure  which, 
together  with  the  cooperation  of  other 
nations,  we  then  hoped  would  be 
adequate. 

As  you  know,  however,  a  funding 
crisis  forced  us  during  April  and  May 
to  cut  back  actual  admissions  beloW' 
that  rate.  This  raised  questions  about 
our  commitment  among  first-asylum 
countries,  particularly  Thailand  and 
Malaysia.  And,  at  the  same  time,  the 
refugee  crisis  exploded.  The  upsurge  in 
arrivals  was  due  in  part  to  the  contlicl 
involving  Vietnam  and  China  and  in 
part  to  Vietnamese  internal  conditions 
and  policies. 

Some  160,000  refugees  arrived  ir 
U.S. -sponsored  camps  in  Southeast 
Asia  in  April  through  June,  while  only 
27,500  were  resettled.  In  addition, 
there  was  a  sharp  increase  in  the 
number  of  refugees  fleeing  into  Thai-i 
land  as  a  result  of  the  Vietnamese  inva-i 
sion  and  occupation  of  Kampuchea,  tha 
continued  human  rights  abuses  by  the 
Pol  Pot  forces,  and  dislocation  in  the 
Kampuchean  economy. 

A  rapid  hardening  of  positions  in  the 
ASEAN  countries  [Association  ol 
South  East  Asian  Nations]  followed. 
Their  previously  generous  position  ot 
accepting  refugees  from  Indochina  was; 
replaced  by  a  trend  toward  refusing  to 
accept  new  arrivals.  Many  who  had 
already  found  safety  and  asylum  were 
expelled. 

Once  again,  the  growing  crisis  called 
for  redoubled  efforts.  At  the  Tokyo 
summit,  we  joined  with  Japan  and  our 


INDOCHINESE  REFUGEE  ARRIVALS 

August  1979 

Departures 

Population 

Country 

Arrivals 

for  U.S. 

as  of  Aug.  31 

Thailand 

Land 

3,188 

13.130 

166.218 

Boat 

163 

220 

8.104 

Malaysia 

2.650 

5,015 

55,742 

Hong  Kong/Macao 

3,409 

1.024 

70.199 

Indonesia 

813 

1 , 1 85 

45.856 

Philippines 

503 

277 

5,939 

Singapore 

774 

15 

1,399 

Japan 

447 

10 

966 

Others 

TOTAL 

33 

3 

868 

11,980 

10.879 

355.291 

October  1979 


najor  European  allies  in  announcing 
Sur  intention  to  increase  refugee  assist- 
ince  significantly."  To  give  substance 
;o  our  pledge  and  impetus  to  a  greater 
international  commitment,  the  Presi- 
dent decided  that  our  admissions  of  In- 
dochinese  refugees  should  be  doubled, 
from  7,000  to  14,000  per  month.  For 
•heir  part,  the  Japanese  pledged  to  un- 
derwrite 50%  of  the  budget  of  the  In- 
dochinese  assistance  program  of  the 
U.N.  High  Commissioner  for  Refugees 
^UNHCR).  This  means  that  the  United 
I  States  will  no  longer  need  to  pay  50% 
of  that  budget,  as  we  have  in  the  past. 

In  the  following  days,  during  the 
ASEAN  [Association  of  South  East 
Asian  Nations]  meeting  at  Bali,  we 
discussed  with  the  Foreign  Ministers  of 
fhe  ASEAN  nations,  Australia,  New 
Zealand,  Japan,  and  Ireland  — 
representing  the  European 
Community — the  need  to  mount  a 
global  response  to  all  aspects  of  the 
problem.  We  also  discussed  the  issue 
with  the  Chinese. 

The  conference  earlier  this  month  in 
Geneva,  held  under  the  auspices  of  the 
LInited  Nations,  was  a  further  step  for- 
ward in  mobilizing  an  international 
effort  commensurate  with  the  chal- 
lenge. Since  Tokyo,  the  process  has 
brought  the  total  number  of  permanent 
resettlement  offers  to  over  260,000 
refugees  and  new  contributions  of 
ibout  $190  million  to  the  UNHCR. 
Importantly,  the  Philippine  Govern- 
Tient  generously  offered  to  provide  a 
site  for  a  new  refugee  processing  center 
[o  accommodate  up  to  50,000  people. 

Dick  Clark  will  report  to  you  in 
greater  detail  about  the  actions  that 
were  taken  in  Geneva  and  what  we 
must  now  do  to  build  on  this  progress. 
Let  me  simply  outline  the  course  which 
the  Vice  President  set  forth  in  Geneva, 
for  it  is  our  agenda  for  action. 

First,  we  will  continue  to  press  for  a 
solution  to  this  problem  at  its  source. 
The  fundamental  responsibility  lies 
with  the  authorities  of  Indochina.  The 
Indochinese  authorities  must  respect 
the  human  rights  of  their  people  and 
put  an  end  to  the  strife  that  disrupts  the 
peace  and  displaces  people  from  their 
homes.  We  are  particularly  concerned 
about  the  Kampucheans,  who  now  face 
a  serious  threat  of  famine.  We  hope 
that  Vietnam  and  all  other  parties  will 
cooperate  with  the  international  com- 
munity in  a  program  for  humanitarian 
relief  in  Kampuchea. 

At  this  point,  we  do  not  know  how 
the  Vietnamese  plan  to  implement  the 
approach  to  departures  which  they  dis- 
cussed with  Secretary  General  Wald- 
hemi.  Nor  do  we  yet  know  the  extent  to 
which  they  will  implement  the  plan  of 
jthe  UNHCR  to  regularize  family  reun- 


fffetttoratiff iftti  of  Undersiamting 
Between  the  U^HCR  and  Vietnatn 


Following  is  the  text  of  the  memo- 
randum of  understanding  between  the 
U.N.  High  Commissioner  for  Refugees 
(UNHCR)  and  the  Government  of  the 
Socialist  Republic  of  Vietnam  con- 
cerning the  orderly  departure  of  per- 
sons who  wish  to  leave  Vietnam  for 
countries  of  new  residence,  agreed  to 
May  30.  1979.' 

Following  discus.sion  held  in  Hanoi  between 
representatives  of  the  Government  of  the 
Socialist  Republic  of  Viet  Nam  and  a  delegation 
of  the  Office  of  the  United  Nations  High  Com- 
missioner for  Refugees  (UNHCR)  from  26  Feb- 
ruary to  5  March  and  from  25  May  to  30  May 
1979.  it  is  agreed  that  UNHCR  will  facilitate  the 
implementation  of  the  12  January  announcement 
by  the  Vietnamese  Government  to  permit  the  or- 
derly departure  of  persons  who  wish  to  leave 
Viet  Nam  for  countries  of  new  residence.  Re- 
garding the  programme  to  implement  such  or- 
derly departure,  it  is  understood  that: 

1.  Authorized  exit  of  those  people  who  wish 
to  leave  Viet  Nam  and  settle  in  foreign 
countries — family  reunion  and  other  humanitar- 
ian cases — will  be  carried  out  as  soon  as  possible 
and  to  the  maximum  extent.  The  number  of  such 
people  will  depend  both  on  the  volume  of  appli- 
cations for  exit  from  Viet  Nam  and  on  receiving 
countries'  ability  to  issue  entry  visas. 


2.  The  election  ol  those  people  auihon/cil  lo 
go  abroad  under  this  programme  will,  when- 
ever possible,  be  made  on  the  basis  ol  ihc  lists 
prepared  by  the  Vietnamese  Government  and 
the  lists  prepared  by  the  receiving  countries 
Those  persons  whose  names  appear  on  both 
lists  will  qualify  for  exit.  As  for  those  persons 
whose  name  appear  on  only  one  list,  their  cases 
will  be  subject  to  di.scussions  between  IINHCR 
and  the  Vietnamese  Government  or  the  Gov- 
ernments ot  the  receiving  countries,  as  appro- 
priate 

3.  UNHCR  will  make  every  effort  to  enlist 
support  for  this  programme  amongst  potential 
receiving  countries, 

4.  The  Vietnamese  Government  and  LINHCR 
will  each  appoint  personnel  who  will  closely 
co-operate  in  the  implemcntalion  ol  this  pro- 
gramme , 

5  This  personnel  will  be  authorized  to  oper- 
ate in  Hanoi  and  Ho  Chi  Minh  City  and,  as 
necessary,  to  go  to  other  places  to  promote  exit 
operations, 

6,  Exit  operations  will  be  effected  al  regular 
intervals  by  appropriate  means  of  transport, 

7,  The  Vietnamese  Government  will,  subject 
to  relevant  Vietnamese  laws,  provide  UNHCR 
and  the  receiving  countries  with  every  lacility 
to  implement  this  programme  D 


'Text  from  UN,  press  release  REF/800, 


fication.  We  are  prepared  to  cooperate 
with  the  High  Commissioner  and  the 
Vietnamese  in  a  program  which  allows 
Indochinese  to  seek  freedom  elsewhere 
without  risking  their  lives  in  the  proc- 
ess. As  soon  as  the  UNHCR  informs  us 
that  arrangements  have  been  made  with 
Hanoi,  we  will  be  prepared  to  send 
consular  officers  on  temporary  duty  to 
Vietnam  to  work  in  the  UNHCR  office, 
to  speed  the  processing  of  such  cases. 

But  we  have  also  made  clear  that  our 
support  for  direct  departures  must  not 
downgrade  the  plight  of  people  who 
have  already  risked  their  lives  and  are 
awaiting  resettlement  in  refugee 
camps.  Nor  must  a  direct  departure 
program  become  a  means  for  the  forced 
expulsion  or  discriminatory,  harsh 
treatment  of  ethnic,  political,  or  other 
groups  who  do  not  meet  their  govern- 
ment's favor. 

Second,  we  will  continue  to  urge  the 
countries  of  first  asylum  to  provide 
safe  haven  to  all  refugees.  But  if  these 
countries  are  to  continue  to  bear  this 
burden,  the  international  community 
must  provide  assurances  that  the  refu- 


gees will  find  new  homes  within  a  rea- 
sonable period  of  time. 

Therefore,  third,  to  help  meet  our 
commitment  to  double  our  Indochinese 
refugee  admissions,  the  State  Depart- 
ment is  seeking  $202.3  million  for  fis- 
cal year  19S0  to  cover  processing, 
transportation  to  the  United  States,  and 
initial  reception  and  placement  grants 
to  the  voluntary  agencies  that  help  re- 
settle these  refugees.  We  are  also 
streamlining  and  accelerating  the  proc- 
essing of  refugees.  This  will  enable  us 
to  meet,  as  early  as  this  coming  month, 
the  President's  goal  of  14,000  monthly 
admissions,  and  it  will  also  enable  us 
to  maintain  this  rate  on  a  consistent 
basis.  We  are  also  taking  steps  to  im- 
prove the  medical  examination  process 
for  those  coming  to  the  United  States. 

Fourth,  we  must  make  a  greater 
contribution  to  the  relief  efforts  of  the 
UNHCR.  The  UNHCR  may  require  an 
estimated  $400  million  in  1980  to  care 
for  growing  refugee  populations  and  to 
alleviate  the  misery  in  refugee  camps. 
To  do  our  part,  we  are  seeking  $105 
million  for  these  programs.  We  also 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/ 


will  be  assigning  Peace  Corps  volun- 
teers to  UNHCR  operations  in  the 
tield,  and  we  are  taking  other  steps  to 
improve  the  care  afforded  refugees  in 
camps,  particularly  with  regard  to 
hygiene,  health,  and  food. 

Fifth,  we  must  relieve  the  pressure 
i>n  existing  first-asylum  refugee  camps 
and  create  a  network  of  new  transit 
centers  for  refugees  destined  for  per- 
manent resettlement  elsewhere.  We 
will  be  requesting  $20  million  from  the 
Congress  to  finance  our  share  of  the 
ccinstruction  costs  of  such  new  UNHCR 
facilities. 

Sixth,  to  extend  refugee  resettlement 
lo  nations  which  are  ready  to  receive 
them  but  do  not  have  the  resources  to 
do  so,  we  have  proposed  the  creation  of 
an  international  refugee  resettlement 
fund. 

Seventh,  we  are  taking  concrete 
steps  to  enhance  our  efforts  to  save  the 
lives  of  refugees  in  distress  on  the  high 
seas.  The  7th  Fleet  has  already  picked 
up  at  least  65  refugees  and  is  also  pro- 
viding information  from  air  patrols  to 
other  ships  in  the  region  on  refugee 
boats  in  distress. 

Finally,  with  the  continued  coopera- 
tion of  this  committee,  we  expect  to 
have  the  refugee  act  of  1979  in  effect 
by  the  beginning  of  FY  1980.  This  vital 
legislation  will  provide,  for  the  first 
lime,  a  comprehensive  framework  for 
responding  effectively  to  refugee  crises 
of  this  gravity.  As  you  are  aware,  the 
Indochinese  Refugee  Assistance  Act  is 
scheduled  to  expire  on  September  30. 
Without  the  new  refugee  act,  we  will 
have  to  seek  emergency  legislation  to 
extend  the  existing  authority  to  assist 
Indochina  refugees  in  this  country.  We 
will  also  have  to  request  that  the  Attor- 
ney General  issue  a  new  parole  pro- 
gram to  authorize  the  admission  of  In- 
dochinese refugees  into  the  United 
States  in  FY  1980. 

In  the  weeks  immediately  ahead,  we 
must  assure  that  others  live  up  to  the 
commitments  they  have  already  made. 
We  must  also  continue  to  expand  the 
circle  of  nations  contributing  their  full 
share  to  this  international  effort.  But  to 
do  these  things,  we  must  fulfill  our 
own  obligations.  We  must  back  our 
concern  and  compassion  with  our  re- 
sources and  energies.  These  efforts  will 
be  costly.  They  will  be  protracted.  We 
will  not  solve  this  problem,  or  alleviate 
the  suffering,  quickly  or  easily.  But  I 
have  no  doubt  that  the  American  people 
want  us  to  do  our  full  share. 

We  are  a  nation  of  refugees.  Most  of 
us  can  trace  our  presence  here  to  the 
turmoil  or  oppression  of  another  time 
and  another  place.  Our  nation  has  been 
immeasurably  enriched  by  this  con- 
tinuing process.  We  will  not  turn  our 


Siguifivani  Quotes  on  Refugees 


by  Dick  Clark 

Excerpts  from  statements  before  n\o 
Senate  and  House  committees  and  sub- 
committees and  at  the  opening  session 
of  the  intergovernmental  Committee  far 
European  Migration  (ICEM).  The  full 
texts  of  these  statements  tnay  be  ob- 
tained from  the  Public  Information 
Service.  Bureau  of  Public  Affairs,  De- 
partment of  State.  Washington,  D.C. 
20520. ' 

MARCH  14,  1979^ 

■".  .  .  refugee  programs  are  an  im- 
portant element  in  our  foreign  policy. 
The  refugee  crisis  is  a  pervasive  prob- 
lem that  strains  the  resources  of  the 
international  community.  In  offering 
assistance,  we  can  ease  the  pressures 
on  friendly  governments  in  Southeast 
Asia  created  by  the  arrival  of  refugees 
from  Vietnam,  Laos,  and  Kampuchea. 
Elsewhere,  our  programs  support  the 
victims  of  conflicts  while  the  search  for 
peace  continues.  Our  aid  to  refugees 
offers  a  beacon  of  hope  to  people  flee- 
ing repression  in  Eastern  Europe,  and  it 
figures  in  our  relations  with  the  Soviet 
Union.  In  addition,  our  aid  sets  an 
example  for  other  countries  and  rein- 
forces our  position  as  a  nation  of  lead- 
ership and  humanitarian  concern. 

"Until  now,  we  have  carried  out  our 
refugee  programs  through.  .  .  a  patch- 
work of  different  programs  that 
evolved  in  response  to  specific  crises. 
The  resulting  legislative  framework  is 
inadequate  to  cope  with  the  refugee 
problem  we  face  today.  .  .  . 

■"In  recent  years,  we  continually 
have  seen  dramatic  conflicts  and  inter- 
nal developments  force  new  groups  of 
people  to  tiee  for  their  lives.  The  num- 
bers of  refugees  are  growing  on  every 
continent.  While  the  plight  of  the  boat 


backs  on  our  traditions.  We  must  meet 
the  commitments  we  have  made  to 
other  nations  and  to  those  who  are 
suffering.  In  doing  so,  we  will  also  be 
renewing  our  commitments  to  our 
ideals  and  to  ourselves.  D 


'Press  release  183.  The  complete  iranscripl 
of  the  hearings  will  be  published  by  the  com- 
millee  and  will  be  available  troni  the  Superin- 
lendenl  of  Documents.  U.S.  GovernmenI 
Printing  Office,  Washington,  D.C.  20402. 

^  For  text  of  the  joint  communique  issued 
June  28,  1979,  see  Bulletin  of  Aug.  1979. 
p. 5. 


people  in  Southeast  Asia  presents  to- 
day's most  dramatic  case,  it  must  not 
blind  us  to  the  hardships  of  refugees 
fleeing  oppression  and  persecution  in 
Eastern  Europe.  Africa,  the  Middle 
East,  and  Latin  America.  To  deal  suc- 
cessfully with  these  difficult  chal- 
lenges, our  policies  and  programs  must, 
recognize  that  refugee  problems  uit- 
fortunately  have  become  a  regular  fea- 
ture of  our  world. 

"If  we  are  to  respond  to  this  un- 
precedented refugee  situation,  our  ref- 
ugee policy  must  expand  the  definition 
of  refugees  beyond  the  present  reliancei 
in  immigration  law  on  narrow  geo- 
graphic and  ideological  criteria 
Human  suffering  recognizes  no  suchr 
distinctions." 

APRIL  10,  1979^ 

■'.  .  .  Dramatic  increases  ir> 
worldwide  refugee  populations  havei 
forced  us  to  adjust  our  requests  sub- 
stantially above  those  we  have  already- 
submitted.  .  .  for  FY  1979  and. 
1980.  .  .  .  not  only  are  more  people 
fleeing  political  persecution  but  in  cer- 
tain areas,  closed  borders  and  repres- 
sive policies  have  forced  refugees  to» 
seek  more  desperate  means  of  es- 
cape. .  .  .  countries  of  first  asylum  are* 
beginning  to  refuse  further  aid  to  refu- 
gees because  of  overflowing  refugeei 
camps,  ethnic  hostility,  and  preexisting! 
economic  and  population  problems. 

".  .  .  the  State  Department  is  re- 
questing $51.7  million  beyond  the  sup- 
plemental appropriation  of  $54.3  mil- 
lion that  you  received  in  January  for- 
FY  1979.  This  latest  increase  brings 
our  supplemental  request  to  a  total  of 
$104.9  million — compared  with  the 
appropriation  of  $91.5  million  that 
Congress  has  already  enacted  for  this 
fiscal  year.  These  funds  will  increase 
our  contribution  to  the  care  and 
maintenance  of  hundreds  of  thousands 
of  refugees  overseas,  and  they  will  fi- 
nance the  resettlement  to  the  United 
States  of  64,000  Indochinese  refugees 
and  35,940  Soviet.  Eastern  European, 
and  other  refugees. 

"The  State  Department  has  also  re- 
quested an  amendment  for  FY  1980  of 
$87.1  million  beyond  the  request  you 
have  already  received  for  $136.9  mil- 
lion. This  raises  our  total  appropriation 
request  for  FY  1980  to  $223.9  million. 
This  proposed  appropriation  will  fi- 
nance a  total  of  120,000  refugee  reset- 
tlements  to   this   country,   or  about 


Xtober  1979 


a. 000  from  Indochina  and  36.000 
Irom  the  Soviet  Union,  Eastern 
Europe,  and  other  regions.  .  .  . 

"Finally,  the  Department  of  State  is 
also  requesting  a  supplemental  appro- 
priation of  $10  million  for  the  emer- 
gency refugee  and  migration  assistance 
fund  for  the  balance  of  FY  1979  plus 
an  amendment  of  $25  million  for  FY 
1980.  .  .  .  our  total  request  for  the 
fund  for  FY  1980  is  now  $40  mil- 
lion. .  .  . 

"The  difficulty  of  predicting  our 
needs  for  refugee  assistance  is  evident 
in  reviewing  our  recent  experiences  in 
the  areas  where  we  have  our  largest 
programs — Africa,  Southeast  Asia,  and 
Europe.  In  each  case  there  have  been 
substantial  increases  in  refugee  flows 
in  the  last  9  months.  .  .  . 

".  .  .  in  Africa  a  series  of  political 
conflicts  in  recent  years  has  created  the 
largest  refugee  population  of  any  con- 
tuient.  The  U.N.  High  Commissioner 
for  Refugees  (UNHCR)  estimates  that 
o\er  2  million  Africans  qualify  for  ref- 
ugee status,  and  about  half  are  in  need 
of  assistance.  In  addition,  the  Interna- 
tional Committee  of  the  Red  Cross 
(ICRC)  assists  hundreds  of  thousands 
of  refugees  whom  the  UNHCR  is  un- 
able to  reach,  such  as  those  within 
Rhodesia.  .  .  .  Since  there  has  been 
little  demand  for  resettlement  in  the 
United  States,  our  policy  has  been 
primarily  to  contribute  to  the  care  and 
maintenance  of  African  refugees 
through  support  for  UNHCR  and  ICRC 
programs.  .  .  . 

".  .  .  in  Southeast  Asia  the  refugee 
population  has  also  reached  a  critical 
point.  During  the  latter  part  of  1978, 
the  number  of  people  fleeing  oppres- 
sion in  Vietnam.  Laos,  and  Kam- 
puchea. .  .  at  times  exceed[ed]  20,000 
a  month.  .  .  .  there  is  little  hope  that 
most  of  the  Indochinese  refugees  can 
be  repatriated  or  resettled  in  neighbor- 
ing states.  Our  approach  is.  .  .  to  pro- 
vide a  combination  of  relief  to  refugees 
in  camps  and  resettlement  opportunities 
for  many  in  the  United  States. 

"The  third  major  component  of  the 
State  Department  refugee  program  as- 
sists people  fleeing  religious  and  politi- 
cal persecution  in  Eastern  Europe  and 
the  Soviet  Union.  ...  In  the  last  6 
months,  there  has  been  a  dramatic  in- 
crease in  the  number  of  refugees  from 
the  Soviet  Union,  primarily  because  the 
Soviet  Government  has  liberalized  its 
policy  on  issuing  exit  visas.  .  .  .  our 
present  plans  are  for  about  36,000  re- 
settlements each  for  this  year  and  the 
next  two  fiscal  years. 

MAY  21,  1979* 

"...  It  is  obvious  to  even  the  most 
casual  observer  of  world  events  that  the 


refugee  problem  is  more  critical  than  at 
any  time  since  World  War  11.  Daily  we 
see  conflicts  and  internal  developments 
forcing  new  groups  of  people  to  flee 
for  their  lives  and  their  dignity.  In  dis- 
maying contrast  to  earlier  periods  of 
history,  the  number  of  refugees  has 
grown  simultaneously  and  dramatically 
on  every  continent.  .  .  . 

"...  just  as  the  refugee  problem  it- 
self is  beyond  our  collective  efforts  to 
correct  totally,  our  collective 
capabilities  to  assist  refugees  effec- 
tively have  been  outstripped. 

' ' .  •.  .  Clearly,  the  international 
community  has  not  responded  to  their 
needs  to  the  extent  that  common  dig- 
nity and  decency  demand.  As  a  conse- 
quence, the  deteriorating  refugee  situa- 
tion is  also  creating  serious  political 
and  economic  strains  on  countries  of 
first  asylum.  .  .  . 

"Let  me  share  with  you  briefly  the 
steps  the  United  States  has  initiated  in 
response  to  these  concerns.  .  .  .  Presi- 
dent Carter  created  the  position  of  am- 
bassador at  large  and  U.S.  Coordinator 
for  Refugee  Affairs.  .  .  [to  develop]  an 
overall  U.S.   refugee  and  resettlement 


policy;  [coordinate]  all  U.S.  domestic 
and  international  refugee  and  resettle- 
ment programs  which  this  year  will  ex- 
ceed $500  million;  and  [represent]  the 
United  States  in  discussions  and 
negotiations  with  foreign  governments 
and  international  organizations  on  ref- 
ugee matters.  .  .  . 

"...  the  Administration  sent  to  the 
Congress  new  refugee  legisla- 
tion. .  .  .  The  President  has  approved 
refugee  admissions  of  about  108,000 
for  this  fiscal  year  and.  .  .  has  also 
authorized  us  to  request  funds  from 
Congress  to  provide  for  120,000  ad- 
missions in  FY  1980.  .  .  . 

'".  .  .  The  Congress  is  concerned 
that  [multilateral  organizations,  such  as 
ICEM]  should  be  strengthened  to  per- 
form more  effectively  the  tasks  for 
which  they  were  established  .... 
Members  of  Congress  believe  that  there 
must  be  a  more  equitable  sharing  of  the 
burden. 

"We  feel  .  .  .  that  we  must  request 
all  governments  to  reexamine  their  own 
policies  and  programs  and  to  make  sig- 
nificantly more  generous  contributions 
to  the  care  and  maintenance  and  reset- 


U.S.  COORDINATOR 
FOR  REFUGEE  AFFAIRS 

Dick  Clark  was  born  September  14.  1928, 
on  a  farm  in  Linn  County.  Iowa.  He  served 
with  the  U.S.  Army  in  Germany  from  1950 
to  1952.  He  received  a  bachelor's  degree 
from  Upper  Iowa  University  (195.^)  and  a 
master's  degree  in  history  from  the  Univer- 
sity of  Iowa  (1956).  While  completing 
course  work  for  a  doctorate  in  history,  he 
was  a  teaching  assistant  at  the  University  of 
Iowa  (1956  to  1959) 

Ambassador  Clark  was  an  assistant  pro 
fessor  of  history  and   political  science  at 
Upper  Iowa  University  (1959-64)  and  was 
president  of  the  university  faculty  in   1962. 
During  this  period,  he  also  served  on  sev- 


fciWi 


eral  State  commissions,  including  chairman 
of  the  Iowa  Civil  Defense  Administration 
and  the  Office  of  Emergency  Planning  in 
1963  and  1964. 

From  1965  to  1972,  he  was  the  Adminis- 
trative Assistant  to  Iowa  Congressman  John 
Culver  (now  Iowa's  senior  senator).  He 
served  as  a  national  political  organizer  in 
the  presidential  campaign  of  the  late  Sena- 
tor Robert  F.  Kennedy  in  1968, 

Ambassador  Clark  was  elected  to  the 
U.S.  Senate  in  1972,  after  a  1,300-mile 
campaign  walk  across  the  State  of  Iowa. 
While  in  the  Senate,  he  was  a  leader  in  the 
areas  of  foreign  policy,  congressional  and 
campaign  reform,  and  agriculture.  He 
chaired  subcommittees  on  African  affairs 
and  rural  development.  He  was  a  U.S.  dele- 
gate to  the  U.N.  World  Food  Conference  in 
Rome  (1974)  and  was  cochairman  of 
African-American  Institute  conferences  in 
Lesotho  ( 1976)  and  Sudan  ( 1978).  His  1978 
bid  for  a  second  Senate  term  was  unsuc- 
cessful. 

Ambassador  Clark  is  a  member  of  the 
American  Historical  Association,  the  Con- 
ference on  European  History,  the  American 
Association  for  Advancement  of  Slavic 
Studies,  and  the  Conference  on  Slavic  and 
East  European  History.  He  has  been 
awarded  honorary  degrees  by  Upper  Iowa 
University.  Loras  College.  Parsons  College, 
Mt.  Mercy  College.  Cornell  College,  and 
St.  Ambrose  College. 

He  was  sworn  in  as  U.S.  Coordinator  for 
Refugee  Affairs  and  Ambassador  at  Large 
on  May  I,  1979. 


8 

tiement  of  refugees  both  in  financial 
contributions  to  international  organiza- 
tions and  resettlement  opportunities. 


JULY  25,  1979' 

".  .  .the  delegations  [to  the  Geneva 
conference  on  refugees]  generally  ex- 
pressed support  for  regularized  depar- 
tures from  Vietnam  directly  to  reset- 
tlement countries.  As  you  know,  the 
UNHCR  has  negotiated  a  seven-point 
plan  with  Hanoi  to  facilitate  legal  de- 
partures. We  are  supporting  this  plan  to 
the  extent  that  it  promotes  family 
reunification  and  freedom  of  emigra- 
tion and  to  the  extent  that  it  does  not 
jeopardize  efforts  to  resettle  refugees 
who  have  already  risked  their  lives  to 
tlee  and  are  now  languishing  in  camps 
in  Southeast  Asia. 

"We  have  notified  the  High  Com- 
missioner that  in  principle  we  are  pre- 
pared to  send  U.S.  consular  officers  to 
Vietnam  on  temporary  detail  to  work 
with  UNHCR  personnel  in  screening 
Vietnamese  destined  for  the  United 
States  under  this  plan.  The  details  still 
have  to  be  worked  out,  but  we  are 
hopeful  that  this  step  will  permit  us  to 
accelerate  legal  departures  from  Viet- 
nam. Since  the  first  people  to  come  to 
this  country  in  this  manner  qualify 
under  U.S.  immigration  laws,  they  are 
considered  immigrants  rather  than  ref- 
ugees, and  they  do  not  divert  refugee 
admissions  numbers  from  the  camps  in 
Southeast  Asia." 


JULY  26,  1979^ 

"One  of  the  major  initiatives  pro- 
posed by  Vice  President  Mondale  at  the 
Geneva  meeting  was  the  idea  of  estab- 
lishing an  international  fund  for  refu- 
gee resettlement  under  the  auspices  of 
the  UNHCR.  The  purpose  of  this  fund 
would  be  to  assist  developing  countries 
to  accept  refugees  for  permanent  set- 
tlement. As  you  know,  many  countries 
of  the  developing  world  have  signifi- 
cant potential  to  open  new  areas  and 
otherwise  accept  refugees  on  a  perma- 
nent basis  in  a  manner  which  would 
benefit  their  own  economic  develop- 
ment. The  fund  would  facilitate  this 
process  and  relieve  the  heavy  financial 
burden  for  transportation,  training,  and 
placement  of  the  refugees. 

"The  United  States  proposed  that  the 
fund  be  capitalized  at  a  level  of  $200 
million,  and  we  indicated  our  intention 
of  seeking  $20  million  from  the  Con- 
gress as  an  initial  contribution.  Before 
proceeding,  however,  we  will  want  to 
be  sure  that  other  donors  will  match 
our  contribution  by  at  least  another 
70%  so  that  our  costs  will  not  exceed 
30%  of  the  total. 


"The  reaction  to  the  proposal  .  .  . 
was  very  favorable  on  the  part  of  po- 
tential donors.  The  Danes  immediately 
pledged  an  initial  contribution  of  $5 
million;  the  Australians  said  they 
looked  forward  to  contributing;  and 
Germany,  the  United  Kingdom,  and 
others.  .  .  are  also  likely  to  contribute. 
The  Japanese  and  other  potential 
donors  indicated  they  wanted  to  have 
more  details  on  the  idea  from  UNHCR 
before  committing  themselves.  U.N. 
High  Commissioner  [Poul],  Hartling 
said  he  would  be  developing  the  con- 
cept and  plans  to  present  it  to  the 
UNHCR  Executive  Committee  for  ap- 
proval in  October."  D 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the  hearings  will 
be  published  by  the  committee  and  will  be 
available  from  the  Superintendent  of  Docu- 
ments, U.S.  Government  Printing  Office. 
Washington,  D.C.  20402. 

^Made  before  the  Senate  Judiciary  Commit- 
tee. 

■'Made  before  the  Subcommittee  on  Foreign 
Operations  of  the  House  Appropriations  Com- 
mittee 

^Made  at  the  ICEM  council  meeting  in 
Geneva. 


I/.iS.  Coordinator 
tor  Refugee  Affairs 


President  Carter  created  the  Office  of 
the  U.S.  Coordinator  in  February  1979 
to  provide  policy  guidance  and  coordi- 
nation for  all  U.S.  refugee  programs, 
both  international  and  domestic.  Since 
much  of  the  Coordinator's  international 
responsibilities  involve  discussions  and 
negotiations  with  foreign  governments 
and  international  organizations  on  ref- 
ugee matters,  he  also  has  the  rank  of 
ambassador  at  large. 

The  Coordinator  is  chairman  of  the 
Interagency  Coordinating  Committee 
for  Refugee  Affairs  which  consists  of 
representatives  of  all  Federal  agencies 
involved  in  U.S.  refugee  programs,  in- 
cluding the  Departments  of  State.  Jus- 
tice, and  Health,  Education  and  Wel- 
fare, and  the  Agency  for  International 
Development.  When  necessary  the 
committee  also  meets  with  representa- 
tives of  the  Office  of  Management  and 
Budget;  Immigration  and  Naturaliza- 
tion Service;  National  Security  Coun- 
cil; Domestic  Council;  Central  Intelli- 
gence Agency;  and  the  Departments  of 
Labor,  Commerce,  and  Defense. 

In  addition  the  Coordinator's  respon- 
sibilities include  developing  overall 
U.S.  policy  on  refugee  assistance  and 
resettlement,  guiding  the  development 


Department  of  State  Bulletin, 

and  presentation  of  budgets  for  refugee' 
programs,  advising  the  Attorney  Gen-: 
eral  on  admissions  policies  for  refu-i 
gees,  and  facilitating  liaison  betweem 
the  Federal  government  and  the  volun- 
tary agencies  and  State  and  local  gov- 
ernments concerned  with  the  domestic 
resettlement  of  refugees. 

The  U.S.  Coordinator  also  develops^ 
reorganization  plans  for  refugee  pro- 
grams wherever  necessary  to  insure  ai 
coordinated  refugee  effort.  As  an  inter- 
agency coordinator,  he  serves  at  the 
direction  of  both  the  Secretary  of  State 
and  the  President  and  is  assisted  by  ai 
staff  located  in  the  Department  of 
State.  D 


ResMlls  of 
Refugee  Conference 


Many  have  hailed  the  U.N.- 
sponsored  refugee  conference,  held  in 
Geneva  July  20-21,  1979,  as  a  success 
because  of  the  many  specific  offers  of 
assistance  made  at  and  shortly  before 
the  conference. 

•  The  pledges  for  international  re- 
settlement have  doubled.  At  the  time  of 
the  Tokyo  summit  June  28-29,  the 
number  of  pledges  totaled  125,000.  By 
the  end  of  the  conference,  the  number 
of  pledges  had  reached  265,000. 

•  An  additional  $200  million  has 
been  pledged  to  support  the  operations 
of  the  U.N.  High  Commissioner  for 
Refugees,  plus  the  50%  share  of  the 
budget  which  Japan  has  stated  it  would 
contribute. 

•  Significant  progress  was  made  to- 
ward the  establishment  of  refugee 
processing  centers  with  the  Philippine 
Government  offer  of  a  site  to  accom- 
modate 50,000  refugees. 

There  is,  however,  some  unfinished 
business  The  United  States  would  like 
to  get  agreement  on  the  establishment 
of  additional  refugee  processing  centers 
to  accommodate  up  to  250,000  In- 
dochinese  refugees. 

We  will  continue  to  seek  additional 
resettlement  opportunities.  We  also 
will  continue  to  pursue  the  idea  of  an 
international  refugee  resettlement  fund 
as  proposed  by  Vice  President  Mondale 
at  Geneva. 

The  key  questions  still  unresolved 
are  whether  Vietnam  is  willing  to  pro- 
vide protection  of  human  rights  and 
livelihood  for  its  people  as  called  for  in 
the  U.N.  Charter  and  the  Declaration 
of  Human  Rights  and  whether  it  is 
willing  to  seek  a  political,  rather  than  a 
military,  solution  in  Kampuchea.        D 


Xtober  1974 


THE  PRESIDEI^T: 

]¥ett?s  Conference 
of  Juiy  25  (Excerpts) 


Q.  Are  you  planning  to  install  any 
oreign  exchange  controls  or  capital 
ontrols  in  order  to  protect  the  de- 
line  of  the  dollar,  and  are  you  plan- 
ting any  further  appointments  from 
he  corporate  section? 

A.  1  do  not  contemplate  taking  action 
f  that  tcind.  I  think  the  dollar  is  sound. 
1  the  long  run.  the  principles  which 
/ill  decide  the  value  of  the  dollar  are 
etermined  by  how  et't'ective  we  are  in 
ealing  with  the  energy  question,  how 
ft'ective  we  are  in  dealing  with  the  in- 
lation  question,  how  much  we  act  to 
.esolve  the  adverse  balance  of  pay- 
ments, how  we  deal  with  the  Federal 
udget  deficit,  and  so  forth.  The  basic 
nderlying  economic  factors  will  be 
»/hat  causes  the  value  of  the  dollar,  not 
ome  contrived  action  that  I  might  take 
0  interfere  with  the  normal  operation 
if  the  international  monetary  scene. 

I  have  just  announced  today  that  I'm 
ppointing  Paul  Volcker  [to  be  Chair- 
nan  of  the  Federal  Reserve  Board],  a 
ighly  qualified  person,  internationally 
espected  as  a  knowledgeable  man  on 
nonetary  systems,  on  whom  I  can  de- 
lend.  There's  no  doubt  that  he  will 
vork  harmoniously  with  me,  with  Bill 
Vliller,  who  will  be  the  new  Secretary 
)f  the  Treasury.  And  I  believe  that  this 
lew  team  will  be  very  effective. 

I  would  like  to  reserve  the  right  to 
nake  future  appointments  from  the 
:orporate  world  or  the  academic  world 
)r  the  journalistic  world  or  from  among 
nayors  and  Governors  or  Members  of 
he  Congress.  But  I  can't  exclude  the 
;orporate  sector.  But  I  can't  say  now 
Aihere  I'll  make  future  appointments 
"rom . 


taking  some  positive  steps  to  assure 
their  safety? 

A.  It's  a  mistake  for  Americans  to 
assume  or  to  claim  that  every  time  an 
evolutionary  change  takes  place,  or 
even  an  abrupt  change  takes  place  in 
this  hemisphere,  that  somehow  it's  the 
result  of  secret,  massive  Cuban  inter- 
vention. The  fact  in  Nicaragua  is  that 
the  incumbent  government,  the  Somoza 
regime,  lost  the  confidence  of  the 
Nicaraguan  people.  There  was  a  broad 
range  of  forces  assembled  to  replace 
Somoza  and  his  regime  as  the  head  of 
the  Nicaraguan  Government. 

We  worked  as  closely  as  we  could 
without  intervening  in  the  internal  af- 
fairs of  Nicaragua  with  the  neighboring 
countries  and  with  the  so-called  An- 
dean group  in  the  northern  part  of 
South  America  to  bring  about  an  or- 
derly transition.  Our  effort  was  to  let 
the  people  of  Nicaragua  ultimately 
make  a  decision  on  who  should  be  their 
leader,  what  form  of  government  they 
should  have.  We  also  wanted  to 
minimize  bloodshed  and  to  restore  sta- 
bility. That  is  presently  being  done. 
We  have  a  good  relationship  with  the 
new  government.  We  hope  to  improve 
it.  We  are  providing  some  minimum 
humanitarian  aid  for  the  people  of 
Nicaragua,  who've  suffered  so  much. 

I  think  that  our  posture  in  Nicaragua 
is  a  proper  one.  1  do  not  attribute  at  all 
the  change  in  Nicaragua  to  Cuba.  I 
think  the  people  of  Nicaragua  have  got 
enough  judgment  to  make  their  own 
decisions,  and  we  will  use  our  efforts 
in  a  proper  fashion  without  interven- 
tionism,  to  let  the  Nicaraguans  let  their 
voice  be  heard  in  shaping  their  own 
affairs. 


on  the  foreign  exchange  markets, 
and  it's  approaching  the  low  levels 
that  once  before  you  had  to  launch  a 
dramatic  rescue  program  last 
November. 

In  addition  to  that,  you've  just 
named  Paul  Volcker,  a  conservative 
Republican,  to  head  the  Federal  Re- 
serve Board.  How  do  the  poundings 
that  the  dollar  is  undergoing  on  the 
exchange  markets  and  your  naming 
of  Mr.  Volcker  square  with  your 
earlier  description? 

A.  I  see  no  incompatibility  at  all. 
Mr.  Volcker,  by  the  way,  happens  to 
be  a  Democrat.  But  he,  I  think,  is  a 
conservative  in  that  he  believes  in  con- 
trolling inflation  and  he  believes  in 
maintaining  a  sound  dollar. 

I  can't  guarantee  what  the  exact 
value  of  the  dollar  might  be  in  months 
ahead.  We  don't  freeze  the  value  of  the 
dollar.  That's  determined  by  interna- 
tional monetary  considerations.  What  I 
said  was  that  the  basic  value  of  the 
dollar  will  be  determined  not  by  the 
identity  of  a  President  or  even  the 
identity  of  the  Chairman  of  the  Federal 
Reserve;  it  will  be  shaped  by  how  ef- 
fectively our  nation  moves  to  meet  the 
energy  challenge.  There  is  some  pres- 
ent doubt  that  the  Congress  will  pass 
the  proposals  that  I  have  put  forward.  I 
have  no  doubt  that  the  dollar  will  in- 
crease in  value  when  the  Congress  has 
passed  the  programs  that  I  proposed. 
And,  obviously,  the  dollar  will  be  ad- 
versely affected  if  inflation  should  in- 
crease. 

My  prediction  is  that  inflation  will 
decrease  in  the  months  ahead.  And  I'm 
sure  that  the  dollar  would  be  adversely 
affected  if  I  abandoned  my  commit- 
ment to  a  responsible  Federal  budget 
and  start  on  wild  spending  programs 
when  they  are  not  needed. 

So,  basic  decisions  made  of  fiscal 
soundness  in  our  government  is  a  much 
more  important  factor  in  shaping  the 
value  of  the  dollar  than  is  the  identity 
of  officials  who  might  serve  in  a  tran- 
sient time. 

.  □ 


Q.    I    wonder,    in    looking    at 

Nicaragua,  if  we  are  in  danger  of  Q.  You  said  earlier  that  you  think 

mother  Cuba  there,  and  what  the  that  the  U.S.  dollar  is  sound.  The 

White  House  plans  to  do  in  terms  of  dollar  seems  to  be  taking  a  pounding 


Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of  Presiden- 
tial Documents  of  July  30.  1979. 


Department  of  State  Bulletin^ 


VICE  PRE!$IDEXT:         Visit  to  East  Asia 


Vice  President  Mondale  departed  Washington.  D.C..  August  24,  1979,  for  a 
trip  to  the  People's  Republic  of  China  (August  25-Septemher  I ),  Hong  Kong 
(September  1-3),  and  Tokyo  (September  J).  He  returned  to  the  United  States  on 
September  J . 

While  in  China,  he  visited  Beijing  (Peking — August  25-29),  Xi'an  (Sian — August 
29-30).  and  Guangzhou  (Canton — August  30-September  1).  Following  are  the 
texts  of  his  address  at  Beijing  University  on  August  27,  which  was  broadcast  on 
radio  and  television  and  reprinted  in  the  People' s  Daily  and  local  newspapers 
throughout  China,  his  dinner  toast  made  at  a  welcoming  hancpiet  in  Beijing  on 
August  26,  and  his  remarks  at  the  opening  of  the  U.S.  Consulate  General  in 
Guangzhou  on  August  31 . 


BEIJING  UNIVERSITY, 
AUG.  27,  1979 

1  am  honored  to  appear  before  you, 
and  1  bring  you  the  warm  greetings  and 
the  friendship  of  the  President  of  the 
United  States  and  the  American  people. 

For  an  American  of  my  generation  to 
visit  the  People's  Republic  of  China  is 
to  touch  the  pulse  of  modern  political 
history.  For  nearly  three  decades  our 
nations  stood  separate  and  apart,  but 
the  ancient  hunger  for  community 
unites  humanity.  It  urges  us  to  find 
common  ground.  As  one  of  your  poets 
wrote  over  a  thousand  years  ago:  "We 
widen  our  view  three  hundred  miles  by 
ascending  one  flight  of  stairs."  We  are 
ascending  that  flight  of  stairs  together. 
Each  day  we  take  another  step.  This 
afternoon,  I  am  privileged  to  be  the 
first  American  political  figure  to  speak 
directly  to  the  citizens  of  the  People's 
Republic  of  China. 

And  no  setting  for  that  speech  could 
be  more  symbolic  of  our  relationship 
than  this  place  of  new  beginnings.  The 
history  of  modern  China  is  crystallized 
in  the  story  of  Beijing  University  and 
the  other  distinguished  institutions  you 
represent.  At  virtually  every  turning 
point  in  20th  century  China,  Bei-Da  has 
been  the  fulcrum. 

Sixty  years  ago,  it  was  at  Bei-Da  that 
the  May  4th  movement  began,  launch- 
ing an  era  of  unprecedented  intellectual 
ferment.  It  inaugurated  an  effort  to 
modernize  Chinese  culture  and  society. 
It  established  a  new  meeting  ground  for 
eastern  and  western  cultures.  And  its 
framework  of  mutual  respect  sustains 
our  own  cultural  cooperation  today. 

Forty-four  years  ago,  Bei-Da  was 
where  the  December  9th  movement 
galvanized  a  student  generation  to  re- 
sist external  aggression.  And  its  mes- 
sage of  sovereignty  and  nonaggression 
underpins  our  own  political  coopera- 
tion today. 


As  China  looks  to  the  future,  once 
again  it  is  Bei-Da  and  your  other  re- 
search centers  which  are  leading  the 
drive  toward  "the  four  moderniza- 
tions." And  the  closeness  of  your  de- 
velopment goals  to  our  own  interests 
will  provide  the  basis  for  our  continu- 
ing economic  cooperation. 

Today  we  find  our  two  nations  at  a 
pivotal  moment.  We  have  normalized 
our  relations.  The  curtain  has  parted; 
the  mystery  is  being  dispelled.  We  are 
eager  to  know  more  about  one  another, 
to  share  the  texture  of  our  daily  lives, 
to  forge  the  human  bonds  of  friendship. 
That  is  a  rich  beginning,  but  it  is  only  a 
beginning. 

A  modern  China  taking  its  place  in 
the  family  of  nations  is  engaged  in  a 
search  not  only  for  friendship  but  also 
for  security  and  development.  An 
America  deepening  its  relations  with 
China  does  so  not  only  out  of  genuine 
sentiment  and  not  only  out  of  natural 
curiosity;  it  does  so  out  of  the  same 
combination  of  principle  and  self- 
interest  that  is  the  engine  of  mature  re- 
lations among  all  modern  states. 

Our  job  today  is  to  establish  the 
basis  for  an  enduring  relationship  to- 
morrow. We  could  not  have  set  that 
task  without  our  friendship.  But  we 
cannot  accomplish  it  with  friendship 
alone.  On  behalf  of  President  Carter, 
this  is  the  message  I  carry  to  the  people 
of  China — a  message  about  America, 
its  purposes  in  the  world,  and  our 
hopes  for  our  relations  with  you. 

A  Message  About  America 

The  Americans  are  historically  con- 
fident people.  Our  politics  are  rooted  in 
our  values.  We  cherish  our  fundamen- 
tal beliefs  in  human  rights  and  compas- 
sion and  social  justice.  We  believe  that 
our  democratic  system  institutionalizes 
those  values.  The  opportunities  avail- 
able to  our  citizens  are  incomparable. 


Our  debates  are  vigorous  and  open.  I 
And   the  differences   we   air  amongc 
ourselves — whether  on   strategic   nu- 
clear policy  or  on  energy — are  signs  of 
our  society's  enduring  strength.  | 

My  country  is  blessed  with  unsur- 
passed natural  resources.  Moreover,  wei 
also  have  unparalleled  human 
resources — workers  and  farmers  andl 
scientists  and  engineers  and  indus- 
trialists and  financiers.  With  their 
genius  we  are  able  to  transform  our 
natural  assets  into  abundance,  not  only 
for  ourselves  but  for  the  world. 

Of  course  we  face  unsolved  prob 
lems.  But  the  high  goals  we  set  for 
ourselves — and  our  determination  to 
meet  them — are  measures  of  our  na- 
tional spirit.  In  that  striving,  in  that 
restless  pursuit  of  a  better  life,  we  feel 
a  special  affinity  for  the  people  ofl 
modern  China.  I 

In  the  world  community,  the  United 
States  seeks  international  stability  and 
peace.  But  we  have  no  illusions  about! 
the  obstacles  we  face.  We  know  that 
we  live  in  a  dangerous  world.  And  we 
are  determined  to  remain  militarilyi 
prepared.  We  are  fashioning  our  de 
tenses  from  the  most  advanced  tech- 
nology anywhere.  We  have  forged  al 
liances  in  Europe  and  Asia  which  growi 
stronger  every  year.  Together  with  ou: 
Japanese  and  Western  allies,  we  wi' 
insure  that  our  investment  in  security  i; 
equal  to  the  task  of  insuring  peace — as 
we  have  for  30  years. 

But  we  want  to  be  more  than  a  firm 
and  reliable  partner  in  world  affairs. 
We  also  believe  in  a  world  of  diversity. 

For  Sino-American  relations,  that 
means  that  we  respect  the  distinctive 
qualities  which  the  great  Chinese 
people  contribute  to  our  relationship. 
And  despite  the  sometimes  profound 
differences  between  our  two  systems, 
we  are  committed  to  joining  with  you 
to  advance  our  many  parallel  strategic 
and  bilateral  interests.  Thus  any  nation 
which  seeks  to  weaken  or  isolate  you  in 
world  affairs  assumes  a  stance  counter 
to  American  interests.  This  is  why  the 
United  States  normalized  relations  with 
your  country,  and  that  is  why  we  must 
work  to  broaden  and  strengthen  our 
new  friendship. 

We  must  press  forward  now  to  widen 
and  give  specificity  to  our  relations. 
The  fundamental  challenges  we  face 
are  to  build  concrete  political  ties  in  the 
context  of  mutual  security,  to  establish 
broad  cultural  relations  in  a  framework 


WI 

3 


(Xiober  1979 


11 


of  genuine  equality,  and  to  forge  prac- 
iKiil  economic  bonds  with  the  goal  of 
common  benefit. 

As  we  give  substance  to  our  shared 
interests,  we  are  investing  in  the  future 
ot  our  relationships.  The  more  effec- 
li\ely  we  advance  our  agenda,  the  more 
bonds  we  build  between  us — the  more 
confident  we  can  be  that  our  relation- 
ship will  endure. 

And  so  what  we  accomplish  today 
lays  the  groundwork  for  the  decade 
ahead.  The  1980's  can  find  us  working 
together — and  working  with  other 
nations — to  meet  world  problems.  En- 
riching the  global  economy,  containing 
international  conflicts,  protecting  the 
independence  of  nations — these  goals 
must  also  be  pursued  from  the  perspec- 
tive of  our  bilateral  relationship.  The 
deeper  the  relationship,  the  more  suc- 
cessful that  worldwide  pursuit  will  be. 

That  is  the  agenda  President  Carter 
has  asked  me  to  come  to  the  People's 
Republic  of  China  to  pursue.  That  is 
the  principal  message  President  Carter 
has  asked  me  to  bring  to  you.  It  is  the 
agenda  we  share  for  the  future. 

Economic  Cooperation 

In  the  8  months  since  normalization, 
we  have  witnessed  the  rapid  expansion 
of  Sino- American  relations. 

We  have  reached  a  settlement  on 
claims-assets  and  signed  the  trade 
agreement.  Trade  between  our  coun- 
tries is  expanding.  American  oil  com- 
panies are  helping  you  explore  China's 
off-shore  oil  reserves.  Joint  commis- 
sions on  Sino-American  economic  re- 
lations and  on  scientific  and  technical 
exchange  have  been  established.  We 
have  exchanged  numerous  governmen- 
tal delegations,  including  the  visits  of 
many  heads  of  our  respective  ministries 
and  departments,  and  the  flow  of 
people  between  our  two  countries  is 
reaching  new  heights.  We  have  gained 
a  cooperative  momentum.  Together  let 
us  sustain  and  strengthen  it.  For  a 
strong  and  secure  and  modernizing 
China  is  also  in  the  American  interest 
in  the  decade  ahead. 

In  agriculture,  your  continued  de- 
velopment not  only  provides  a  better 
life  for  the  Chinese  people,  it  also 
serves  our  interests — for  your  gains  in 
agriculture  will  increase  limited  world 
food  supplies. 

In  trade,  our  interests  are  served  by 
your  expanding  exports  of  natural  re- 
sources and  industrial  products.  And  at 
the  same  time  your  interests  are  served 
by  the  purchases  you  can  finance 
through  those  exports. 

As  you  industrialize,  you  provide  a 
higher  standard  of  living  for  your 
people.  And  at  the  same  time  our  inter- 


ests are  served — for  this  will  increase 
the  flow  of  trade,  narrow  the  wealth 
gap  between  the  developed  and  the  de- 
veloping world  and  thus  help  alleviate 
a  major  source  of  global  instability. 

Above  all,  both  our  political  inter- 
ests are  served  by  your  growing 
strength  in  all  fields — for  it  helps  deter 
others  who  might  seek  to  impose  them- 
selves on  you. 

Efforts  in  the  1920's  and  1930's  to 
keep  China  weak  destabilized  the  entire 
world.  For  many  years,  China  was  a 
flashpoint  of  great  power  competition. 
But  a  confident  China  can  contribute  to 
the  maintenance  of  peace  in  the  region. 
Today  the  unprecedented  and  friendly 
relations  among  China.  Japan,  and  the 
United  States  bring  international  sta- 
bility to  northeast  Asia.  That  is  why 
deepening  our  economic,  cultural,  and 
political  relations  is  so  strategically 
important — not  only  for  your  security 
but  for  the  peace  of  the  world  commu- 
nity. 

We  are  taking  crucial  steps  to  ad- 
vance our  economic  relationship. 

First,  before  the  end  of  the  year. 
President  Carter  will  submit  for  the  ap- 
proval of  the  U.S.  Congress  the  trade 
agreement  we  reached  with  you.  This 
agreement  will  extend  most-favored- 
nation  treatment  to  China.  And  its 
submission  is  not  linked  to  any  other 
issue. 

Second.  I  will  be  signing  an  agree- 
ment on  development  of  hydroelectric 
energy  in  the  People's  Republic  of 
China.  U.S.  Government  agencies  are 
now  ready  to  help  develop  China's  hy- 
droelectric power  on  a  compensatory 
basis. 

Third,  the  United  States  is  prepared 
to  establish  Export-Import  Bank  credit 
arrangements  for  the  P.R.C.  on  a 
case-by-case  basis  up  to  a  total  of  $2 
billion  over  a  5-year  period.  If  the  pace 
of  development  warrants  it.  we  are 
prepared  to  consider  additional  credit 
arrangements.  We  have  begun  discus- 
sions toward  this  end. 

Fourth,  the  Carter  Administration 
this  year  will  seek  congressional  au- 
thority to  encourage  American  busi- 
nesses to  invest  in  China — by  provid- 
ing the  guarantees  and  insurance  of  the 
Overseas  Private  Investment  Corpora- 
tion. 

We  also  stand  ready  to  work  with  the 
Chinese  Government  to  reach  textile, 
maritime,  and  civil  aviation  agreements 
in  the  shortest  possible  time. 

Culture  and  Education 

As  we  advance  our  cultural  relation- 
ship, universities  will  again  be  a  cru- 
cial meeting  ground  between  Chinese 
and  Americans,  just  as  they  were  in  an 


earlier  era. 

Today  gifted  Chinese  scholars  study 
in  America,  and  American  scholars — 
many  of  whom  I  am  delighted  to  see 
here  today — study  in  China.  That  ex- 
change inherits  a  distinguished  tradi- 
tion. On  campuses  all  across  the  United 
States,  Americans  who  lectured  and 
studied  in  China  in  the  1930's  and 
I940"s  today  are  invigorating  our  own 
intellectual  life — none  of  them  with 
greater  distinction  than  Professor  John 
K.  Fairbank.  who  honors  us  by  joining 
my  traveling  party.  At  the  same  time, 
we  are  proud  that  Chinese  scholars  who 
study  American  agronomy,  engineer- 
ing, and  medicine  have  been  able  to 
contribute  the  skills  they  gained  in  our 
country  to  the  progress  of  Chinese  so- 
ciety. 

It  is  a  mutual  relationship — a  true 
reciprocity — we  are  now  engaged  in 
building.  From  us,  you  will  learn  as- 
pects of  science  and  technology.  Our 
anthropologists  and  archaeologists  have 
tools  to  share  with  you  as  you  explore 
your  own  past.  American  and  Chinese 
social  scientists  and  humanists  have  in- 
sights to  offer  each  other — a  fuller  un- 
derstanding of  our  respective  institu- 
tions and  values. 

And  so  with  your  help,  we  intend  to 
broaden  our  horizons.  Chinese  re- 
searchers pioneer  in  key  areas,  from 
medical  burn  therapy  to  earthquake 
prediction,  and  we  want  to  learn  these 
skills  from  you.  Where  the  progress  of 
science  requires  global  cooperation — in 
astronomy,  in  oceanography,  in 
meteorology — our  common  efforts  can 
benefit  the  world.  And  our  social  sci- 
entists and  humanists  have  hardly 
begun  to  share  your  understanding  of 
history,  of  social  change,  and  of  human 
potential. 

Strong  bilateral  relations  serve  our 
strategic  interests.  Through  them,  both 
of  us  can  foster  the  world  community 
we  seek — a  world  that  respects  diver- 
sity and  welcomes  constructive  change. 

A  Just  World  Order 

Today  there  are  162  nations  in  the 
world,  most  of  them  poor.  Eighty  per- 
cent of  the  world's  population  live  in 
developing  countries.  Every  day, 
people  in  these  nations  are  lifting  their 
heads  to  demand  independence  and 
justice.  Every  day  efforts  by  rulers  to 
oppress  their  people  are  meeting  in- 
creasing resistance.  Governments  are 
coming  to  understand  not  only  the 
necessity  but  also  the  fundamental  wis- 
dom and  decency  of  protecting  the 
rights  of  their  people  through  law. 

When  political  power  is  more  equi- 
tably shared  within  nations,  when  that 
power  shifts  from  the  few  to  the  many 


12 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


among  nations,  when  an  era  of  colo- 
nialism gives  way  to  a  more  just  inter- 
national order — these  changes  deserve 
worldwide  support. 

In  the  last  few  years,  as  the  preemi- 
nent military  and  economic  power  in 
the  world,  the  United  States  faced  a 
fundamental  choice.  Were  we  to  resist 
those  winds  of  change,  attaining  our 
national  security  by  defending  the 
status  quo?  Were  we  to  collude  with  a 
few  other  countries  in  an  effort  to 
dominate  the  world?  Or  were  we  to 
welcome  change,  to  make  the  neces- 
sary adjustments  and  to  help  shape  a 
more  just  world  order? 

Let  there  be  no  doubt  about  the 
choice  my  country  has  made.  The 
United  States  believes  that  any  effort 
by  one  country  to  dominate  another  is 
doomed  to  failure.  Neither  by  relying 
exclusively  on  an  increasing  stock  of 
arms  nor  by  direct  or  indirect  military 
intervention  can  any  nation  hope  to  at- 
tain lasting  security.  On  the  contrary, 
nations  which  embark  on  that  course 
will  find  themselves  increasingly  iso- 
lated and  vulnerable. 

And  nothing  more  vividly  demon- 
strates our  belief  in  those  principles 
than  the  normalization  of  Sino- 
American  relations.  Normalization  sig- 
nals our  understanding  that  American 
security  in  the  years  ahead  will  be  at- 
tained not  by  maintaining  the  status 
quo,  not  by  colluding  for  purposes  of 
domination  but  by  fostering  a  world  of 
independent  nations  with  which  we  can 
build  positive  relations. 

That  is  the  world  community  we 
seek.  It  is  a  vision  of  diversity,  of  con- 
structive ties,  and  above  all,  of  peace. 
In  a  world  that  hopes  to  find  new 
energy  sources,  peace  is  essential.  In  a 
world  that  aims  to  eliminate  hunger  and 
disparities  in  wealth,  global  equilib- 
rium is  vital.  In  a  world  that  is  working 
to  eradicate  communicable  diseases  and 
to  safeguard  our  environment,  interna- 
tional cooperation  is  crucial. 

To  secure  that  peace,  to  maintain 
that  equilibrium,  to  promote  that  coop- 
eration, the  United  States  is  totally 
committed. 


A  World  of  Diversity 

During  the  visit  to  the  United  States 
by  Vice  Premier  Deng  and  Madame 
Zhuo  in  January,  President  Carter  said 
this: 

We've  not  entered  this  new  relationship  for 
any  short-term  gains.  We  have  a  long-term 
commitment  to  a  world  community  of  di- 
verse. .  .  and  independent  nations.  We  believe 
that  a  strong  and  a  secure  China  will  play  a 
cooperative  part  in  developing  that  type  of  world 
community.  .  .  . 


I  would  like  to  underscore  that  point. 
Anyone  who  seeks  to  understand 
America  is  invariably  drawn  back  to 
the  idea  of  diversity.  The  United  States 
is  a  nation  of  immigrants,  all  of  whom 
contribute  to  our  society  their  distinct 
talents  and  traditions. 

The  American  people  find  their 
common  heritage  not  in  a  single  blood- 
line, not  in  thousands  of  years  of 
shared  national  history  but  in  their 
shared  ideals.  And  we  have  a  profound 
faith  in  the  very  diversity  that  shapes 
us.  We  value  tolerance  and  pluralism 
and  mutual  respect. 

We  aim  to  honor  those  same  princ- 
ples  in  the  conduct  of  our  foreign  pol- 
icy in  the  decade  of  the  1980"s.  For 
Sino-American  relations,  that  does  not 
mean  we  will  always  agree.  But  in  a 
world  that  respects  diversity,  countries 
as  different  as  the  United  States  and 
China  can  work  side  by  side  toward 
common  goals.  Together,  we  can  en- 
rich our  two  cultures,  strengthen  our 
two  economies,  build  better  lives  for 
both  our  peoples,  and  together  we  can 
help  stabilize  the  world  community — 
fostering  respect  for  diversity  and 
standing  firmly  opposed  to  intolerance 
and  domination. 

Last  month,  China  and  the  United 
States  joined  many  other  nations  in 
Geneva  to  confront  the  agony  of  the 
Indochinese  refugees.  The  enormity  of 
their  human  tragedy  defies  the  imagi- 
nation. In  a  world  that  seeks  to  alleviate 
such  suffering — suffering  that  tran- 
scends national  boundaries — the  way  of 
conscience  is  the  way  of  common 
cause. 

Today  the  world  watches  us.  In  a 
sense,  we  are  testing  whether  a  de- 
veloped nation  and  a  developing 
nation — each  with  different  traditions, 
each  with  different  systems — can  build 
a  broad,  enduring,  constructive  re- 
lationship. Certainly  there  will  be  seri- 
ous barriers  to  overcome.  But  if  we  can 
work  together,  future  generations  will 
thank  us.  If  we  fail,  not  only  will  our 
children  suffer,  the  entire  world  will 
feel  the  consequences. 

Diversity  and  stability  are  not  new 
themes  in  Sino-American  relations. 
President  Roosevelt  once  said  this: 

It  is  to  the  advantage  —  and  not  to  the 
disadvantage — of  other  nations,  when  any  nation 
becomes  stable  and  prosperous;  able  to  keep  the 
peace  within  its  own  borders,  and  strong  enough 
not  to  invite  aggression  from  without.  We  heart- 
ily hope  for  the  progress  of  China.  And  so  far  as 
by  peaceable  and  legitimate  means  we  are  able, 
we  will  do  our  part  toward  furthering  that  prog- 
ress. 

It  was  a  bright  vision  three  genera- 
tions ago,  and  subsequent  events  only 
postponed  the  fulfillment  of  its  prom- 


ise. As  we  look  to  the  future,  let  us  re- 
solve to  rekindle  the  light  of  its  insight. 


DINNER  TOAST, 
BEIJING,  AUG.  26,  1979 

Mr.  Vice  Premier  [Deng],  my  wife 
Joan  and  I  were  honored  to  meet  you 
and  Madame  Zhuo  7  months  ago  on 
your  historic  visit  to  the  United  States. 
Your  trip  broke  through  diplomatic 
barriers  that  had  stood  high  for  30 
years.  And  you  did  more  than  that.  In 
Washington,  and  on  your  journey 
around  the  United  States,  you  rekindled 
the  friendship  and  affection  of  the 
American  people  for  the  great  people 
of  China. 

I  look  forward  to  the  next  few 
days — to  my  talks  with  you.  Premier 
Hua  and  other  leaders,  to  my  speech  at 
Beijing  University,  and  to  my  visits  to 
Xi'an  and  Guangzhou.  But  already  on 
this  visit  I  have  sensed  the  theme  that 
will  run  through  it.  For  this  afternoon  1 
had  a  brief  chance  to  see  Beijing's 
historic  Front  Gate  and  to  explore  some 
city  streets.  At  the  Front  Gate,  I  began 
to  understand  the  legacies  of  your  past. 
And  on  Beijing's  streets,  in  the  healthy 
and  strong  determined  faces  of  the 
people  I  saw  and  met,  I  was  moved  by 
the  enormous  potential  you  have  for  the 
future. 

Though  this  is  my  first  visit  to 
China,  it  is  not  my  first  trip  to  Asia.  A 
year  ago,  I  visited  the  ASEAN  [As- 
sociation of  South  East  Asian  Nations] 
countries  and  our  ANZUS  [Australia, 
New  Zealand,  U.S.  pact]  allies.  They 
all  saw  the  wisdom  of  the  strengthened 
Sino-American  relationship  which  has 
brought  me  here  today. 

Visits  at  the  highest  levels  have 
marked  each  milestone  in  our  relation- 
ship. Journeys  by  two  Presidents  were 
integral  parts  of  our  mutual  quest  for 
normalization.  The  visit  of  Vice  Pre- 
mier Deng  and  Vice  premier  Fang 
brought  that  quest  to  an  end  and 
launched  us  into  a  new  era.  In  the 
months  since,  we  have  witnessed  a 
profusion  of  Cabinet-level  visits, 
agreement-signings,  and  new  ties  at  all 
working  levels  of  our  governments.  We 
have  laid  the  institutional  basis  for  a 
flourishing  relationship.  And  we  have 
set  the  tone  of  cooperation  that  will 
mark  our  ties  in  the  decade  ahead. 

The  time  has  now  come  to  insure 
that  in  the  I980's  our  relationship  ful- 
fills its  potential.  That  is  the  purpose  of 
my  visit. 

If  we  strengthen  our  bilateral  ties, 
we  can  both  make  dramatic  economic 
progress;  we  can  both  enrich  our  cul- 
tures. But  above  all,  an  enduring 
Sino-American  relationship  will   pro- 


Jciober  1979 


13 


mote  the  stable  international  environ- 
ment we  both  need  to  meet  our  domes- 
,tic  challenges  and  address  problems  of 
jlobai  concern. 

And  so  what  has  brought  our  two 
nations  together  is  this:  We  both  seek  a 
world  of  stability  and  peace — of  inde- 
pendent and  diverse  nations  coopera- 
ting for  their  common  economic  prog- 
ress. And  we  both  are  opposed  to  ef- 
forts by  any  country  to  dominate 
another. 

The  decade  of  the  1980's  will  bring 
years  of  challenge  in  international  af- 
fairs. But  let  there  be  no  doubt  that  the 
United  States  will  do  everything  it  must 
to  remain  as  secure  and  prosperous  in 
the  future  as  we  have  been  in  the  past. 

Through  your  four  modernizations 
you,  too,  are  determined  to  attain  the 
same  goal  for  yourself.  The  United 
States  agrees  that  the  modernized 
China  of  the  future  can  make  an  even 
greater  contribution  to  the  creation  of  a 
just  international  order  than  the  China 
of  today. 

We  believe  that  the  Sino-American 
relationship  can  emerge  in  the  1980's 
as  one  of  the  major  bulwarks  of  peace 
and  justice  in  the  world.  To  achieve 
that  goal,  1  wish  to  join  you  in  widen- 
ing our  consultations  on  world 
affairs — and  where  possible,  achieve  a 
common  purpose  through  our  separate 
action. 

To  reach  that  goal,  and  to  consoli- 
date our  friendship,  we  must  widen  and 
deepen  our  bilateral  relations.  A 
flourishing  relationship  between  us  in 
the  1980"s — in  commerce,  in  culture, 
in  the  sciences  and  technology — will 
demonstrate  to  the  whole  world  the 
significance  we  attach  to  our  common 
purpose — a  world  of  independent  na- 
tions, of  equilibrium,  and  of  peace. 


U.S.  CONSULATE  GENERAL, 
GUANGZHOU,  AUG.  31,  1979 

Today  we  take  another  important 
step  in  translating  normal  relations 
between  the  United  States  and  China 
into  concrete  reality.  In  my  talks  with 
Chinese  leaders  in  Beijing  and  Xi'an, 
one  thread  that  ran  throughout  all  our 
conversations  was  the  need  to  deepen 
and  broaden  our  relationship.   That  is 


Vice  President  Mandate  and  Vice  Premier  Deng  Xiaoping  shake  hands  after  document-signing 
ceremonw   (Pholo  courtesy  ol  the  white  House) 


more  than  a  polite  diplomatic  conven- 
tion. It  means  that  our  political  ties 
must  now  be  accompanied  by  literally  a 
profusion  of  economic  and  cultural 
ties.  It  means  that  our  relations  must 
not  only  join  government  to  govern- 
ment but  also  forge  new  Sino-American 
links  between  scientists,  engineers, 
artists,  and  business  leaders. 

This  afternoon  we  advance  that  ef- 
fort by  opening  the  first  American  con- 
sulate general  in  China  in  30  years. 
This  is  not  just  another  ceremony:  It  is 
a  symbol  of  all  we  mean  by  truly  nor- 
mal relations.  With  this  step — and  with 
the  opening  of  Chinese  consulates  in 
American  cities — we  lay  the 
groundwork  for  broader  relations  be- 
tween citizens  of  both  our  countries  in 
the  1980's. 

It  is  appropriate  that  the  first  Ameri- 
can consulate  be  opened  in 
Guangzhou.  By  far  the  largest  portion 
of  Chinese-Americans  trace  their  an- 
cestry to  this  area,  as  we  found  out  this 
morning.  Guangzhou  was  the  historic 
first  point  of  contact  between  our  two 
countries.  When  George  Washington 
was  sworn  in  as  President,  American 
ships  were  in  Guangzhou  harbor.  And 
today,    as   increasing   numbers   of 


Americans  coming  to  China's  trade 
fairs  know,  Guangzhou  is  a  linchpin  of 
China's  developing  economy. 

No  one  could  do  a  finer  job  as 
America's  first  Consul  General  in  the 
People's  Republic  of  China  than 
Richard  Williams.  Dick  is  a  fine  career 
Foreign  Service  officer  who  has  de- 
voted his  whole  professional  life  to 
China,  and  his  broad  background  in 
economic  and  commercial  affairs  will 
be  put  to  good  use.  We  are  working  to 
set  up  permanent  headquarters  for  the 
consulate  at  the  earliest  possible  mo- 
ment. 

Today  the  United  States  and  China 
are  actively  negotiating  a  consular 
treaty  which  will  put  our  consular  rela- 
tions on  a  firm  and  permanent  footing. 
That  treaty  will  enable  us  to  open  addi- 
tional American  and  Chinese  consul- 
ates general  beyond  the  four  already 
set  for  Guangzhou,  Shanghai,  San 
Francisco,  and  Houston. 

In  the  spirit  of  Sino-American 
friendship,  as  an  important  step  toward 
making  normal  relations  a  concrete  re- 
ality, it  is  my  privilege  at  this  moment 
to  declare  the  Guangzhou  Consulate 
General  of  the  U.S.  Government  offi- 
cially opened.  D 


14 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


THE  SECRETARY:        ]¥eit?s 
Conference  oi  September  5 


Let  me  begin  with  a  tew  comments 
on  the  presence  ol  a  Soviet  combat 
brigade  in  Cuba.  We  regard  this  as  a 
very  serious  matter  attecting  our  rela- 
tions with  the  Soviet  Union.  The  pres- 
ence ot  this  unit  runs  counter  to  long- 
held  American  policies. 

The  identification  ot  this  unit  as  a 
combat  force  has  recently  been  con- 
firmed by  our  intelligence  community. 
They  have  now  concluded  that  this 
torce  has  been  in  Cuba  since  at  least 
the  mid-l97()'s.  Reanalysis  of  the 
older,  fragmentary  data  in  the  light  of 
more  recently  acquired  information 
suggests  that  elements  of  a  Soviet 
brigade  may  have  been  there  since  the 
early  1970's  and  possibly  before  that. 
The  process  of  reanalyzing  our  earlier 
information  continues. 

The  unit  appears  to  consist  ol 
2.000-3.000  personnel.  It  includes 
molori/ed  rifle  ballalu)ns.  tank  and  ar- 
tillery battalions,  and  combat  and 
service  support  units.  These  figures  are 
separate  from  the  Soviet  military  ad- 
visory and  technical  military  personnel 
in  Cuba,  which  we  now  estimate  to  be 
between  1.500  and  2.000. 

The  specific  mission  of  the  combat 
unit  is  unclear.  There  is  no  air  or  sealift 
capability  associated  with  the  brigade 
which  would  give  it  an  assault  capabil- 
ity nor  is  the  presence  of  this  unit  cov- 
ered by  our  bilateral  understandings 
with  the  Soviets  in  1962  or  1970. 

Nonetheless,  the  presence  of  a 
Soviet  combat  unit  in  Cuba  is  a  matter 
of  serious  concern.  I  will  be  pursuing 
this  matter  with  the  Soviets  in  the 
coming  days. 

I  will  be  discussing  this  issue  with 
the  Senate  Foreign  Relations  Commit- 
tee this  afternoon  and  setting  forth  the 
approach  which  we  plan  to  take  with 
the  Soviets.  We  will  keep  the  press  and 
the  public  informed  to  the  fullest  extent 
that  we  can  as  we  proceed.  I  know  you 
will  understand  that  the  interests  of  our 
country  would  not  be  served  by  my 
now  going  into  the  specific  nature  of 
our  approach. 

Q.  Have  you  or  will  you  ask  the 
Soviets  to  remove  those  troops? 

A.  The  discussions  with  the  Soviets 
will  affect  the  action  which  we  will 
take.  Let  me  say  very  simply  that  I  will 
not  be  satisfied  with  maintenance  of  the 
status  quo. 


debate  on  SALT  and  other  aspects  of 
U.S. -Soviet  relations? 

A.  As  1  have  indicated,  this  is  a  seri- 
ous matter  and  will  be  treated  as  such. 
At  the  same  time.  SALT  is  a  matter  of 
fundamental  importance. 

1  believe  that  the  hearings  on  SALT 
ratification  should  proceed.  However, 
we  will  be  keeping  in  close  touch  with 
the  Senate  Committee  and  the  Members 
of  the  Senate  as  we  proceed  in  our  dis- 
cussions with  the  Soviets. 

Q.  How  could  the  Soviets  have 
stationed  a  brigade  of  this  size  and 
this  caliber  in  Cuba  for  several  years 
without  U.S.  intelligence  finding  out 
about  it? 

A.  First,  the  information  which  has 
been  assembled  over  a  period  of  years 
has  been  fragmentary  and  it  is  very 
difficult  to  piece  together. 

As  you  know,  in  evaluating  intelli- 
gence information,  it  is  like  putting  a 
jigsaw  puzzle  together,  and  one  has  to 
continue  to  examine  the  various  frag- 
ments. And  sometimes  the  fragments 
all  fall  together  and  then  you  can  arrive 
at  a  conclusion.  This  is  what  happened 
in  this  case. 

0-  How  does  the  inability  of  the 
intelligence  community  to  detect  this 
Soviet  brigade  for  several  years  re- 
flect upon  its  ability  to  detect  small 
differences  in  Soviet  rocket  config- 
urations and  other  SALT  related  in- 
telligence problems  on  a  much 
broader  land  area  in  the  Soviet 
Union? 

A.  There  is  a  clear  difference  be- 
tween determining  whether  a  particular 
unit  or  element  of  a  unit  is.  when  cov- 
ered by  photographic  intelligence  from 
a  satellite,  a  unit  which  belongs  to  a 
particular  country,  such  as  the  Soviet 
Union,  as  opposed  to  the  Cubans.  This 
is  much  more  difficult  to  monitor  than 
monitoring  such  things  as  the  estab- 
lishment of  new  missile  sites,  of  re- 
ceiving an  analysis  of  telemetry,  and 
the  kinds  of  things  which  are  important 
for  SALT  monitoring. 

Q.  If  I  may  follow  up  on  your  re- 
sponse that  you  will  not  be  satisfied 
with  the  status  quo.  Is  it  the  combat 
characteristics  of  this  unit  that  are  so 
disturbing  to  us  or  is  it  the  presence  of 
the  forces?  In  other  words,  are  you 
or  will  we  call  for  the  removal  of  the 
forces  themselves? 


Q.  How  will  this  affect  the  national         A.  It  is  the  combat  nature  of  the 


units  which  is  a  matter  of  very  serious 
concern  to  us.  We  have  realized,  as^ 
you  all  know,  that  there  were  training 
units  and  signal  units  stationed  there 
over  a  considerable  period  of  time. 

Q.  Something  you  said  earlier  im- 
plied to  me  at  least  that  you  may, 
with  time,  reconsider  the  question  ofl 
linkage  between  SALT  and  whatever' 
action  you  may  request  from  the 
Soviets  regarding  the  removal  or  re- 
duction or  whatever  of  these  Soviet! 
troops.  Am  I  hearing  you  wrong? 

A.  What  I  said  is  that  I  think  that 
the  hearings  on  ratification  should  gq 
forward  because  of  their  fundamental 
importance.  I  have  also  said,  however, 
because  this  is  a  matter  of  a  seriousi 
nature,  that  we  must  keep  in  close 
contact  and  in  discussion  with  Mem- 
bers of  the  Senate  as  we  go  forward  in' 
our  discussions  with  the  Soviets. 

Q.  Senator  Stone  recently  said  thati 
everything  is  not  yet  out;  there  isi 
more  to  come.  Some  of  us  have  beeni 
told  that  the  Soviets  have  constructed 
a  military  airfield  and  have  beei 
working  on  a  missile  boat  base  and 
that  there  might  be  even  another 
base  with  combat  troops.  Can  youi 
address  that? 

And,  secondly,  on  the  matter  of 
the  intelligence  just  becoming 
known,  some  of  us  were  told  last 
month,  before  you  wrote  your  letter i 
saying  to  the  Senator  there  was  no 
significant  Soviet  military  force  other 
than  the  advisers,  we  were  told  that 
there  was  intelligence,  at  least  ini 
July,  to  suggest  very  strongly  thatI 
they  had  combat  infantry  artillery* 
battalions  there. 

A.  Let  me  say  at  the  time  that  I 
wrote  my  letter  to  Senator  Stone,  I  re- 
viewed this  within  the  government  withi 
full  interagency  coordination  among  alll 
of  the  intelligence  elements  of  the  gov- 
ernment. At  that  time  they  concluded! 
that  there  was  not  sufficient  evidencei 
to  conclude  that  there  was  a  combati 
presence  in  there. 

I  told  Senator  Stone  after  I  wrote  himi 
the  letter  that  we  were  going  to  inten- 
sify our  investigation  and  collection 
activities  and  our  analysis  of  the  infor- 
mation as  it  came  in  and  that  as  soon  as 
we  felt  that  we  had  additional  informa- 
tion which  might  bear  on  the  subject 
and  give  us  a  clearer  reading  of  what> 
the  situation  was,  I  would  immediately 
make  this  information  available  to  him, 
to  members  of  the  relevant  Senate 
Committees  and  others.  And  that  is  just 
what  we  have  done. 

Q.  Has  the  public  been  told  the  full 
story  of  Soviet  military  activity  in 
Cuba? 


October  1979 


15 


A.  I  think  we  have  told  the  public 
■verything  at  this  point  that  is  of  sig- 
lit'icance.  We  are  continuing  to  inves- 
ieate  other  matters  as  well.  And  it"  we 
:ct  information  that  is  of  importance, 
A-e  will,  of  course,  make  it  available. 

Q.  To  move  the  matter  to  a  slightly 
lifferent  area,  as  we  all  know,  action 
las  been  taken  against  the  CIA  act- 
ng  through  journalists  abroad.  But 
'  here  is  another  matter  of  interest, 
vhich  is  foreign  intelligence  services 
ising  the  media  in  this  country.  And 
ipecifically  I  would  like  to  ask  if 
mything  can  or  will  be  done  about 
he  case  of  the  Mossad  working 
hrough  certain  newspapers,  includ- 
ng  The  New  York  Times,  through 
certain  agents,  including  Roy  Cohn 
—  and  this  has  all  been  publicly 
locumented  —  and  through  the  old 
'ermindex  assassination  network  at 
his  point  to  set  up  an  assassination 
)f  presidential  candidate  Lyndon 
.^aRouche  and  possibly  others  as 
Veil?  And  isn't  it  time  that  we 
itarted  cleaning  up  these  kinds  of 
ather  filthy  foreign  operations? 

A.  I  think  you  are  leaping  to  conclu- 
sions on  some  of  the  matters  that  you 
lave  referred  to.  I  do  not  want  to  en- 
iorse  or  give  any  credence  to  the  alle- 
gations which  you  have  made. 

We  will  continue  to  pursue  our  ac- 
ivity  in  following  the  activities  of  any 
oreign  intelligence  agencies  in  the 
Jnited  States.  But  there  is  nothing 
nore  that  I  can  add  at  this  point  to 
/our  statement. 

Q.  One,  do  you  consider  what  the 
Soviets  have  in  Cuba  as  a  base?  And, 
wo,  I  am  not  quite  sure  how  to  ask 
his,  but  if  they  had  been  there  for 
several  years,  have  had  a  combat  ca- 
pability or  a  combat  unit  there  for 
several  years,  why  is  it  a  serious 
matter? 

A.  Let  me  answer  the  second  half  of 
/our  question  first.  The  presence  of 
:ombat  troops  in  Cuba — Soviet  combat 
troops — at  any  time,  is  a  serious  mat- 
ter. And  if  we  had  known  about  that 
fact  and  could  have  demonstrated  that 
fact  in  the  mid-1970's  or  in  the  early 
1970's,  that  would  have  been  a  serious 
factor  then  and  would  have  been  raised 
at  that  time  as  a  serious  matter  to  be 
dealt  with. 

With  respect  to  the  question  of 
whether  or  not  the  presence  of  these 
forces  constitute  a  base,  the  answer  1 
must  give  you  on  that  one  is  a  very 
simple  and  straightforward  one:  We  do 
not  know  at  this  time  whether  it  con- 
stitutes a  base.  Our  conversations  and 
discussions  with  the  Soviet  Union  will 
shed  light  on  this,  and  we  will  have  to 


arrive  at  our  conclusion  as  we  proceed 
with  those  discussions. 

Q.  Early  on  in  this  Administra- 
tion, the  United  States,  as  a  gesture 
of  good  will  to  the  Cubans,  cut  off 
surveillance  flights,  specifically  U-2 
flights. 

I  am  just  wondering  if  you  can  tell 
us  whether  these  were  reinstated 
and,  secondly,  whether  the  lack  of 
those  surveillance  flights  may  have 
contributed  to  the  lack  of  informa- 
tion that  you  have  had  over  the  past 
couple  of  years? 

A.  No.  I  don't  think  so.  I  think  that 
the  nights  which  were  conducted  have 
been  sufficient — as  one  goes  back  and 
goes  over  the  take  that  has  come  from 
those  flights — to,  in  hindsight,  as  the 
final  pieces  fell  into  place  which  made 
it  possible  to  come  to  this  conclusion, 
on  reanalysis.  to  take  a  look  at  the  past 
information  and  conclude  that  that 
information — now  that  we  have  the 
final  piece  or  two  which  puts  the  jig- 
saw together — to  give  you  the  conclu- 
sion that  we  have  now  arrived  at. 

Q.  I  am  wondering  on  what  basis 
you  can  now  be  so  certain  that  those 
troops  were  introduced  in  the  mid- 
or  possibly  even  in  the  early  1970's 
when  for  so  many  years  you  appar- 
ently did  not  have  sufficient  infor- 
mation to  even  respond. 

A.  Because  we  have  corroborating 
evidence  of  different  kinds  now  that  we 
did  not  have  before. 

Q.  What  I  am  asking  is  in  response 
to  some  of  the  questions  that  were 
raised  in  July,  both  your  office  and 
that  of  the  Secretary  of  Defense  were 
not  even  allowing  the  possibility  of 
the  presence  of  Soviet  troops.  It  was 
being  flatly  denied  at  that  time. 

A.  That  was  the  conclusion,  at  that 
point,  of  the  intelligence  community. 
Since  then,  as  I  said,  additional  evi- 
dence has  become  available,  evidence 
which  was  redundant  but  backed  up 
and  corroborated  other  types  of  evi- 
dence. And  once  that  pattern  was  put 
together,  then  the  intelligence  commu- 
nity was  able  to  come  to  a  firm  conclu- 
sion. 

Q.  On  that  same  question,  do  I 
understand  you  correctly  to  be  say- 
ing that  the  2,000  to"3,000-man 
brigade  essentially  was  in  place  in 
Cuba  before  even  this  Administra- 
tion took  office? 

A.  A  force  of  approximately  that  size 
was,  yes.  That  is  the  conclusion  that 
has  now  been  arrived  at. 

Q.  So  all  that  has  happened  in  the 


last  few  weeks  is  that  the  intelligence 
community  has  now  reached  that 
conclusion.  The  Soviets  haven't  done 
anything  special  in  the  last  year  or 
two? 

A.  That  is  correct. 

Q.  Is  there  any  reason  now  why 
the  1962  agreement  with  the  Rus- 
sians at  the  time  of  the  Cuban  missile 
crisis  could  not  be  made  public  so 
that  people  would  have  a  way  of 
knowing  whether  the  Russians  are 
keeping  that  agreement  or  not? 

A.  The  essence  of  the  1962  agree- 
ment is  generally  known  to  the  public, 
and  let  me  give  you  as  much  as  1  can 
about  it.  The  1962  agreement  is  not 
just  a  simple  piece  of  paper.  It  consists 
of  an  exchange  of  letters  between 
President  Kennedy  and  Chairman 
Khrushchev;'  it  consists  of  discussions 
between  Russian  officials,  including 
Minister  Kuznetsov,  Minister  Mi- 
koyan,  and  individuals  in  the  United 
States  and  representatives  of  the  U.S. 
Government.  It  includes  discussions 
between  officials  of  the  United  States 
and  Ambassador  Dobrynin.  So  that  it  is 
a  series  of  both  exchanges  of  letters 
and  discussions  that  make  up  the  total 
agreement. 

Q.  Why  couldn't  that  whole  pack- 
age be  made  public  now?  What  is  the 
reason  that  it  can't  be  made  public? 
Seventeen  years  have  passed. 

A.  This  is  a  matter  which  1  think  is  a 
fair  question  to  ask.  We  are  reviewing 
the  situation  to  determine  whether  or 
not  we  can  at  least  put  out  a  full  sum- 
mary of  what  the  essense  of  that 
agreement  and  the  agreement  of  1970  is 
as  well,  and  1  hope  that  we  may  be  able 
to  do  so. 

Q.  Are  there  any  plans  by  the  U.S. 
Government  to  reinforce  ground 
forces  and  Air  Force  units  in  Guan- 
tanamo  at  this  time? 

A.  1  don't  want  to  go  into  any  ac- 
tions which  we  might  take  in  the  fu- 
ture. Let  me  say,  however,  that  is  not 
to  be  taken  in  any  way  as  an  indication 
that  we  are  planning  to  do  that. 

Q.  Did  the  reanalysis  of  the  Cuban 
data  follow  the  Nicaraguan  —  I'm 
sorry,  the  insurrection  in  Nicaragua 
by  the  Cuban-backed — 

A.  It  was  not  — 

Q.  No  correlation? 

A.  It  was  not  sparked  in  any  way  by 
that.  This  analysis  was  going  on  as  a 
result  of  the  reevaluation  that  we  had 
been  involved  in;  and  as  soon  as  we  got 
the  necessary  information  to  arrive  at 


16 


the  conclusions,  we  immediately  re- 
leased the  conclusions. 

Q.  Do  you  have  any  comment  on 
the  thesis  that  this  is  essentially  a 
hand-holding  operation  for  the  Cu- 
bans who  have  forces  around  the 
world? 

A.  There  are  many  different  theories 
as  to  what  the  purpose  of  the  mainte- 
nance of  that  battalion  or  brigade  in 
Cuba  is.  At  this  point,  we  do  not  know 
which  of  these  various  hypotheses  is 
correct.  Obviously,  one  of  the  issues 
which  we  will  be  discussing  with  the 
Soviets  is  the  statement  by  the  Soviets 
with  respect  to  the  purpose  and  inten- 
tions which  relate  to  the  brigade. 

Q.  In  view  of  the  fact  that  another 
U.S.  Ambassador  had  met  several 
times  with  PLO  [Palestine  Liberation 
Organization]  officials,  why  was 
Ambassador  Young  singled  out  for 
holding  a  session  with  that  group's 
U.N.  representative,  particularly 
since  Young's  action  could  have  been 
justified  by  the  fact  that  he  was  then 
President  of  the  Security  Council? 

A.  Insofar  as  the  situation  of  Ambas- 
sador Young's  resignation  is  con- 
cerned, let  me  say  several  things.  First, 
the  situation  has  been  gone  into  at 
length.  The  situation  has  been  reviewed 
time  and  again  by  the  spokesman  for 
the  Department,  and  1  wish  to  make 
very  clear  that  1  stand  behind  the 
statements  of  the  spokesman  with  re- 
spect to  this  matter. 

1  want  to  also  make  very  clear  that  1 
stand  fully  behind  the  statement  which 
I  issued  at  the  time  that  Andy's  resig- 
nation was  offered  and  accepted  — 
namely,  that  Andy  has  made  great 
contributions  to  the  United  States  and 
to  its  foreign  policy. 

1  think  that  it  would  not  do  any 
good  —  it  would  be  fruitless,  and,  in- 
deed, an  unwise  step — to  rehash  all 
of  this  ground  again. 

Q.  It  has  now  been  a  full  week 
since  the  Soviet  charge  d'affaires  was 
called  in  to  the  State  Department  and 
informed  of  American  concern  over 
the  Soviet  troops  in  Cuba.  During 
that  time,  the  only  public  response 
from  the  Soviets  has  been  a  rather 
scoffing  one  in  the  press.  I  under- 
stand further  that  the  Soviet  charge's 
response  was  similar.  Do  you  con- 
sider at  this  time  that  the  Soviet  re- 
sponse has  been  timely  and  serious? 

A.  I  have  asked  Ambassador  Dobry- 
nin  to  return  at  the  earliest  possible 
moment,  and  I  will  then  be  meeting 
with  him.  1  do  not  feel,  until  1  have  had 
a  chance  to  meet  with  him,  that  we  will 


have  had  a  serious  chance  to  discuss 
this  issue. 

Q.  When  do  you  expect  that? 

A.  1  don't  know  exactly.  I  will  get  a 
response,  1  hope,  today  to  the  message 
which  1  sent  to  him  in  regard  to  his  re- 
turn. 

Q.  You  seemed  to  imply  earlier 
that  it  is  the  combat  nature  of  the 
Soviet  force  that  bothers  us,  and  to 
me,  at  any  rate,  implied  that  the  men 
can  stay  if  the  combat  nature  of  the 
force  is  removed.  Is  that  what  you 
meant  to  imply? 

A.  What  I  meant  to  say  is  that  the 
combat  nature  is  of  great  importance.  It 
is  of  serious  concern  to  us.  1  want  to 
have  further  discussions  about  this 
whole  matter,  including  the  purpose 
and  intention  of  the  presence  of  the 
brigade.  1  don't  want  to,  at  this  point, 
comment  any  further  than  1  have  al- 
ready about  the  matter  of  what  we  will 
do.  ■ 

Q.  What  impact  does  the  presence 
of  Soviet  troops  in  Cuba  have  on 
problems  in  the  Caribbean  and  in 
Central  America? 

A.  I  don't  think  we  have  any  evi- 
dence at  this  point  as  to  what  the  im- 
pact may  or  may  not  be.  One  can 
speculate  on  what  the  impact  might  be, 
depending  upon  the  situation,  the  facts, 
and  what  their  purpose  is.  But  it  would 
be,  I  think,  fruitless  for  me  to  specu- 
late. 

Q.  North  Korea  has  rejected  the 
joint  U.S.  and  South  Korean  pro- 
posal for  three-way  talks.  What  is 
the  next  U.S.  step  toward  North 
Korea? 

A.  Our  position  is  that  we  shall 
watch  and  wait  and  see  what  happens.  1 
do  not  necessarily  consider  the  re- 
sponse which  has  been  given  by  the 
North  Koreans  as  the  final  response, 
and,  therefore,  we  will  wait  and  watch 
and  see  what  happens. 

Q.  Will  the  United  States  recon- 
sider its  contacts  with  the  PLO  in 
light  of  [Israeli]  Foreign  Minister 
Dayan's  contacts?  Is  the  United 
States  seeking  a  release  from  its 
commitments?  And,  thirdly,  is  a 
summit  on  the  Middle  East  planned 
here  in  the  autumn,  and  if  so,  why? 

A.  There  are  no  plans  at  this  point  to 
have  a  summit  here  in  the  autumn.  I 
think,  as  you  know.  Minister  Dayan 
and,  I  believe,  [Egyptian]  Minister  Ali 
will  be  coming  here  later  this  month  to 
discuss  with  us  the  situation  relating  to 
the  monitoring  force  for  the  withdrawal 


Department  of  State  Bulletim 

from  the  Sinai.  That  is  the  only  meeting jjj 
that  is  planned  at  this  time. 

Turning  to  Minister  Dayan's  meet- 
ings, those  meetings  were  with  indi- 
viduals located  in  the  West  Bank  and 
Gaza.  It  has  always  been  clear  from  the  i 
outset  that  insofar  as  discussions  with 
Palestinians  living  on  the  West  Bank 
and  Gaza  were  concerned,  both  the  Is- 
raelis and  the  United  States  could  have 
discussions  with  them  because  this 
would  be  both  helpful  and  useful  in 
connection  with  the  negotiations  which 
are  going  forward  with  respect  to  the  ' 
autonomy  negotiations,  or  the  so-called 
West  Bank-Gaza  negotiations. 

Q.  A  series  of  situations  and  re- 
ports, since  we  last  met  in  this  room 
several  months  ago,  have  raised  a 
question  about  your  willingness  to 
continue  in  this  job;  and  some  of 
them  in  recent  days  have  even  raised 
questions  about  your  authority  to 
continue  as  the  man  in  charge  of 
U.S.  foreign  policy.  I  would  like  toi 
ask  you,  have  you  considered  re- 
signing, other  than  this  mass  resig- 
nation which  took  place  sometime 
ago?  And  is  there  any  doubt  in  your 
mind,  or  have  you  taken  up  the 
matter,  about  your  authority  overi 
U.S.  foreign  policy? 

A.   1   had  an  idea  somebody  might! 
raise  a  question  like  this. 

First,  insofar  as  what  1  have  done, 
let  me  say  very  clearly  that  these  kinds 
of  stories  arise  time  and  time  again 
with  anybody  in  this  job.  These  kinds 
of  stories  go  with  the  job.  I  am  not 
losing  any  sleep  about  this,  and  I 
would  advise  you  not  to  lose  any  sleep 
about  it.  L 

On  the  other  question,  with  respect 
to  authority,  1  have  the  responsibility 
under  the  President  for  the  develop- 
ment and  implementation  of  the  foreign 
policy  of  the  United  States,  and  that  in- 
cludes all  aspects  of  that  policy.  I  will 
do  just  that,  and  1  will  continue  to  do 
so. 

Q.  Back  to  the  Cuban  thing.  What 
particularly  prompted  this  reanaly- 
sis?  I'm  not  certain  whether  Senator 
Stone's  charges  or  what  particularly 
came  to  your  attention,  and  when, 
actually,  did  this  reanalysis  take 
place? 

A.  The  reanalysis  was  done  in  the 
early  part  of  July,  as  I  recall  it  — 
maybe  even  late  June.  There  was  some 
additional  information  which  was  again 
fragmentary,  and  on  the  basis  of  that, 
as  1  recall  it,  it  was  determined  that  we 
should  do  a  reanalysis.  We,  sub- 
sequently, as  I  recall  it,  had  conversa- 
tions with  Senator  Stone  and  with 


October  1979 


17 


others,  and  we  indicated  to  them  that 
we  planned  to  not  only  do  our  reanaly- 
sis  but  to  intensify  our  efforts  just  to 
make  sure  that  there  wasn't  something 
that  we  were  missing.  That's  how  the 
process  got  started  and  continued. 

Q.  What  is  the  matter  with  the 
United  States  and  Mexico?  Why 
can't  we  get  along?  We  seem  to  have 
broken  down  on  negotiations  on  gas 
and  illegal  aliens  and  the  oil  spill. 
What's  the  matter? 

A.  We  really  haven't  broken  down 
on  negotiations  with  respect  to  gas.  Let 
me  start  with  that.  Mr.  Christopher 
[Deputy  Secretary  of  State]  went  down 
to  Mexico  recently  to  continue  the 
negotiations  —  they  are  very  difficult 
negotiations — and  in  the  process  of  2 
days  of  talks,  they  were  able  to  make 
further  progress.  However,  important 
differences  remained.  It's  a  tough 
negotiation;  there  isn't  any  doubt  about 
it.  And  just  because  you  can't  reach 
agreement  in  several  sessions  doesn't 
mean  you  give  up.  They  are  not  broken 
off.  They  are  going  to  continue,  and 
they  will  continue. 

Insofar  as  the  question  of  undoc- 
umented workers  is  concerned,  those 
discussions  are  proceeding  at  a  pace 
and  in  a  fashion  which  is  satisfactory  to 
both  of  our  countries,  and  we  will  be 
continuing  to  press  forward  with  those. 

Insofar  as  the  oil  spill  is  concerned, 
the  problem  of  the  oil  spill  is  one  of 
those  events  that  happens  in  the  re- 
lationships between  two  countries.  We, 
quite  properly,  have  raised  this  ques- 
tion with  them.  They  are  considering 
the  matter.  They  have  matters  which 
they  would  like  to  raise  of  a  similar 
nature,  going  back  into  the  past,  with 
respect  to  some  problems  that  were 
raised  from  the  rivers  and  waters  that 
flowed  from  the  United  States  into 
Mexico.  These  are  the  kinds  of  prob- 
lems that  we,  as  neighbors  and  allies 
and  friends,  will  be  able  to  discuss  and 
work  out;  and  therefore,  I  really  cannot 
accept  your  overly  alarmist  views  of  a 
breakdown  of  relations. 

The  President  and  President  Lopez 
Portillo  will  be  meeting  around  the 
28th  of  September  to  go  forward  with 
the  meeting  which  they  had  planned. 
This  is  part  of  a  series  of  meetings. 
They  have  many  things  to  discuss,  and 
1  look  forward  to,  1  believe,  a  good  and 
constructive  meeting.  I  know  that's  the 
way  we  view  it,  and  1  believe  it's  the 
way  the  Mexicans  view  it. 

Q.  On  Friday  Senator  Stone  said 
that  the  presence  of  the  Russian 
troops  in  Cuba  was  of  the  same 
gravity  as  the   1962  Cuban  missile 


crisis  confrontation.  Number  one,  do 
you  believe  that  that  is  a  correct  as- 
sessment? And  number  two.  if  it  is, 
is  the  United  States  making  any  con- 
tingency plans  for  reactions  that 
would  be  of  the  same  gravity  as  we 
took  in  1962? 

A.  Let  me  say  1  wish  to  repeat  that  I 
believe  this  to  be  a  serious  matter. 
However,  it  does  not  involve,  as  did 
the  1962  missile  crisis,  the  question  of 
offensive  nuclear  weapons.  So  there  is 
a  vast  difference  between  the  two. 
However,  that  does  not  mean  that  it  is 
not  a  serious  matter. 

Q.  In  the  wake  of  Ambassador 
Young's  resignation,  there  was  a 
sudden  rise  in  tensions  between  the 
black  and  Jewish  community  in  the 
United  States,  and  some  black  lead- 
ers talked  about  the  fact  of  there 
being  a  perception  in  the  street  that 
either  the  American  Jewish  commu- 
nity or  Israel  was  behind  the  Young 
resignation.  I  would  like  to  ask  you, 
what  is  the  Administration  view? 
Was  the  Young  resignation  brought 
about  in  fact  by  the  American  Jewish 
community  or  Israel,  or  was  it 
brought  about  as  a  result  of  his  own 
actions,  or  whatever? 

A.  Let  me  say  that  in  my  judgment  it 
was  not  the  result  of  actions  by  the 
Jewish  community.  I  want  to  make  that 
very  clear,  and  I  think  that  I  have  spo- 
ken to  the  rest  of  the  question. 

Q.  On  the  matter  of  the  role  of  in- 
telligence in  forging  foreign  and  na- 
tional security  policy,  I  would  like 
your  observations.  It  seems  to  me 
sometimes  we  make  the  policy,  and 
then  go  get  the  intelligence.  I'm 
thinking  of  North  Korea,  when  the 
army,  after  the  President  made  his 
policy  of  withdrawing  the  troops,  the 
army  went  back  on  a  zero-based  in- 
telligence analysis,  started  from 
scratch,  and  found  out  there  were  a 
hell  of  a  lot  more  troops  there  than 
they  had  thought.  We  seem  to  be 
doing  the  same  thing  on  Cuba.  We 
lifted  the  U-2  or  SR-71  aircraft 
flights  as  a  gesture  of  good  will,  and 
then  a  year  or  so  later  we  discover 
Soviet  combat  troops.  Do  you  have 
any  observation  on  that? 

A.  Yes.  1  think  in  the  case  of  the 
Korean  analysis  which  was  done,  the 
analysis  was  part  of  a  continuing  re- 
view process  that  goes  on  in  the  intelli- 
gence community  with  respect  to  the 
threat  that  is  posed  to  our  forces  and 
the  forces  of  our  allies;  and  this  was 
part  of  an  ongoing  process  that  had 
been  going  for  a  long  period  of  time. 


And  again  in  that  case,  as  one  went 
forward,  bits  of  information,  as  we 
proceeded  over  a  period  of  years — 
tarting  back  before  this 
Administration  —  began  to  begin  to 
build  a  pattern  which  was  not  at  all 
clear  when  you  first  started  picking  up 
these  bits  and  pieces  of  information. 
This  is  one  of  the  problems  particularly 
when  you  are  dealing  with  ground 
units.  It  is  a  lot  harder  when  you're 
dealing  with  ground  units  and  that  type 
of  thing  than  it  is  dealing  with  the  kind 
of  matters  which  are  before  you  when 
you  have  to  deal  with  the  monitoring  of 
a  SALT  agreement  where  you  have 
large  installations,  large  types  of 
equipment  like  missiles.  It  is  much 
easier  to  deal  with  a  large  missile  than  it 
is  with  a  tank  or  even  a  number  of 
tanks. 

Q.  As  you  know.  Prime  Ministers 
Lynch  and  Thatcher  are  meeting 
today.  You  or  the  Department  re- 
cently suspended  arms  sales  to  the 
Royal  Ulster  Constabulary.  In  the 
meantime,  people  like  Governor 
Carey  have  even  stepped  in  to  offer 
mediation.  My  question  is,  when  will 
this  study  that  you  are  doing  now  on 
this  be  completed,  and  are  you  con- 
templating suggesting  to  Mrs. 
Thatcher  and  the  British  Govern- 
ment a  new  political  initiative  to  try 
and  solve  the  problem? 

A.  The  answer  is  that  we  are  not 
planning  to  suggest  a  new  political  ini- 
tiative. Our  position  has  been — and 
President  Carter  stated  it  very  clearly  in 
1977 — a  position  of  impartiality.  It  is  a 
position  of  condemning  terrorism  and 
violence,  and  it  is  a  position  which 
supports  the  bringing  together  of  the 
varius  factions  in  an  attempt  to  try  and 
move  toward  a  peaceful  solution. 

It's  an  immensely  difficult  problem, 
as  all  of  us  know — one  of  the  most 
difficult  of  these  types  of  problems  that 
exist  throughout  the  world. 

The  position  which  we  have  taken  is 
supported  by  the  British  Government, 
by  the  Irish  Government,  and  by  the 
political  parties  in  both  Ireland  and 
Northern  Ireland.  For  us  to  intrude  our- 
selves at  this  point  into  the  Irish  situa- 
tion, in  my  judgment,  would  not  be 
wise.  I  think  it  would  be  resented  by 
the  parties  concerned,  and  they  are  the 
ones  that  should  deal  with  this  issue.  D 


Press  release  216. 

'For  texts  of  the  letters  exchanged  between 
President  Kennedy  and  Chairman  Khrushchev 
Oct.  22-28,  1962,  see  Bulletin  of  Nov.  19, 
1973. 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


AFRICA:        Report  on 
Southern  Rhodesia 


by  Richard  M .  Moose 

Statement  before  the  Subcommittee 
on  African  Affairs  of  the  Senate  Com- 
mittee on  Foreign  Relations  on  July 
23,  1979.  Mr.  Moose  is  Assistant  Sec- 
retary for  African  AJfairs.' 

I  am  pleased  to  be  here  this  morning 
to  brief  the  subcommittee  and  other 
interested  members  on  recent  develop- 
ments with  respect  to  Zimbabwe- 
Rhodesia.  As  you  will  recall,  the 
President  in  his  statement  of  June  7 
1,1979,]  promised  that  the  Administra- 
tion would  report  to  and  consult  with 
the  Congress  on  a  monthly  basis  on 
progress  being  made  toward  a  solution 
to  the  Rhodesian  problem.  He  did  so  in 
the  belief  that  close  and  continuing 
consultations  with  the  Congress  would 
help  to  establish  a  policy  toward 
Rhodesia  that  best  serves  the  interests 
of  the  United  States  and  of  the  people 
of  Zimbabwe-Rhodesia.  I  am  here 
today  in  lulfillment  of  that  commitment 
to  close  consultations  between  the  Ad- 
ministration and  the  Congress. 

You  will  have  received  by  now  the 
first  in  a  series  of  monthly  written  re- 
ports on  developments  since  June  1, 
when  [Prime  Minister]  Bishop 
Muzorewa's  administration  was  for- 
mally installed.  1  would  like  to  take 
just  a  moment,  before  turning  to  any 
questions  you  may  have,  to  highlight 
some  of  the  key  aspects  of  that  report 
and  to  bring  you  up  to  date  on  events 
that  have  taken  place  subsequently. 

Role  of  the  United  Kingdom 

First.  I  want  to  emphasize  that  we 
are  continuing  to  consult  closely  with 
the  British  Government  on  the  Rhode- 
sian situation.  Those  consultations  in- 
dicate that  the  British  have  embarked 
on  a  serious  effort  to  resolve  the 
Rhodesian  problem  in  a  way  that  satis- 
fies the  legitimate  aspirations  of  the 
people  of  Rhodesia  for  self- 
determination  under  a  democratic  form 
of  government  that  safeguards  the 
rights  of  all  citizens.  They  are  also 
consulting  extensively  with  leaders  in 
Africa  and  elsewhere  in  order  to  estab- 
lish a  basis  for  bringing  Rhodesia  to 
legal  independence  in  conditions  of 
peace  and  wide  international  accepta- 
bility. 

As  [U.K.   Foreign  Secretary]   Lord 


Carrington  indicated  in  his  July  10 
statement  to  the  House  of  Lords,  there 
is  a  widespread  feeling  that  a  solution 
in  Rhodesia  must  stem  from  the  British 
Government,  as  the  legally  responsible 
authority.  The  British  intend  to  carry 
out  that  responsibility.  And  we  have 
given  our  support  to  their  efforts. 

The  meetings  which  President  Carter 
and  Secretary  Vance  had  with  Bishop 
Muzorewa  and  the  other  efforts  we 
have  made  to  improve  our  knowledge 
and  understanding  of  developments  in 
Zimbabwe-Rhodesia,  form  a  part  of  our 
effort  to  assist  the  British  in  the  search 
for  a  lasting  solution.  In  those  meet- 
ings, the  President  and  the  Secretary 
each  reiterated  our  view  that  a  solution 
can  be  found  through  the  establishment 
of  constitutional  and  administrative 
arrangements  that  would  allow  for  full 
political  participation.  We  believe  that 
this  can  be  done  in  a  way  that  will 
protect  the  rights  and  legitimate  con- 
cerns of  all  elements  of  the  population 
and  will  enable  all  to  play  a  role  in  the 
country's  political  and  economic  fu- 
ture. Finally,  the  President  and  the 
Secretary  urged  Bishop  Muzorewa  to 
work  closely  with  the  British  Govern- 
ment in  seeking  solutions  to  the  prob- 
lem of  the  continuing  conflict  and  of 
international  acceptability. 

As  Lord  Carrington  has  noted,  the 
British  intend  to  continue  their  consul- 
tations on  Rhodesia  at  the  upcoming 
Commonwealth  Conference  in  Lusaka 
beginning  August  I.  Thereafter,  they 
hope  to  put  forward  proposals  which 
will  be  accepted  by  all  concerned  as 
fair  and  reasonable,  and  which  take  ac- 
count of  what  has  already  been 
achieved  in  Rhodesia.  It  is  too  early  to 
anticipate  what  precise  line  those  pro- 
posals may  take.  But  we  believe  that 
they  will  be  developed  in  close  con- 
sultation with  the  United  States  and 
others  concerned.  (We  understand  that 
Prime  Minister  Thatcher  may  address 
this  issue  further  during  the  July  25  de- 
bate in  Parliament.) 

Recent  Developments 

Secondly,  I  would  like  to  say  a  word 
about  the  recent  developments  in 
Zimbabwe-Rhodesia  itself.  I  believe  it 
is  too  early  to  make  definitive  judg- 
ments about  the  direction  the  new  gov- 
ernment intends  to  take  in  meeting  the 
aspirations  of  the  people  of  Rhodesia 


for  peace  and  a  clear  demonstration  of 
majority  rule.  We  are  deeply  mindful 
of  the  difficult  problems  which  Bishop 
Muzorewa  faces  in  pursuing  these  ob- 
jectives. Our  discussions  with  him 
here,  as  well  as  the  discussions  which 
Mr.  Davidow  [Jeffrey  Davidow,  U.S. 
First  Secretary  at  U.S.  Embassy  in 
Pretoria]  has  had  with  government  offi- 
cials and  others  in  Salisbury,  have 
given  us  a  better  appreciation  of  these 
problems.  Certainly  we  are  not  unsym- 
pathetic to  the  immense  difficulties 
facing  Zimbabwe-Rhodesia.  We  have' 
no  doubt  of  Bishop  Muzorewa's  sincere 
desire  to  find  workable  solutions.  We 
are  hopeful  that  as  he  looks  to  the  task 
of  assuring  Zimbabwe-Rhodesia's  fu- 
ture peace,  stability,  and  prosperity,  he 
will  take  fully  into  account  the  advice 
which  the  British  Government  and 
others  are  prepared  to  offer. 


African  Attitudes 

Finally,  with  respect  to  African  at- 
titudes toward  the  situation  in 
Rhodesia,  the  Organization  of  African 
Unity  (OAU)  concluded  its  annual 
summit  conference  in  Monrovia, 
Liberia,  last  Saturday.  Prior  to  ad- 
journing, the  conference  passed  a  res- 
olution calling  upon  the  international 
community  to  withhold  recognition 
from  the  Muzorewa  government  and 
describing  the  externally  based  guer- 
rilla groups  as  the  sole  representatives 
of  the  people  of  Zimbabwe.  That  action 
was  taken  despite  our  approaches  and 
those  of  the  British  to  OAU  members 
urging  that  they  refrain  from  resolu- 
tions that  might  complicate  the  search 
for  a  peaceful  solution. 

We  do  not  believe  that  OAU's  pas- 
sage of  this  resolution  will  contribute 
to  efforts  to  find  a  fair  solution. 
Nevertheless,  we  do  not  believe  this 
diminishes  the  importance  of  involving 
concerned  African  states  in  the  search 
for  a  solution.  We  believe  the  resolu- 
tion should  be  understood  in  the  con- 
text of  African  concern  over  what  they 
regard  as  a  disposition  by  Britain  and 
the  United  States  to  accept  the  present 
constitutional  and  political  arrange- 
ments in  Rhodesia  as  a  basis  for  recog- 
nition and  the  lifting  of  sanctions. 

From  our  contacts,  we  know  that  a 
number  of  African  states,  including 
some  of  the  front  line,  concurred  in  the 
resolution  for  that  reason.  At  the  same 
time,  however,  there  continues  to  be 
considerable  African  interest  in  and 
support  for  a  further  effort  to  resolve 
the  conflict  in  Rhodesia  in  a  way  that 
will  insure  a  clear  demonstration  of 
majority  rule. 


October  1979 


19 


REPORT  TO  THE  CONGRESS  ON 
DEVELOPMENTS  WITH  RESPECT  TO 
ZIMBABWE-RHODESIA 
JUNE  1-JULY  13,  1979 

During  the  past  month,  the  United  States  has 
(I)  improved  its  coinmunication  with  the 
Muzorewa  administration  and  our  ability  to 
monitor  developments  in  Rhodesia;  and  (2) 
given  its  full  encouragement  and  support  lo 
British  consultations  wiih  all  concerned  aimed 
at  developing  proposals  for  bringing  Rhodesia 
to  legal  independence  in  conditions  of  peace 
and  wide  international  acceptability. 

Several  important  steps  have  been  taken  to 
improve  our  knowledge  and  understanding  of 
developments  in  Rhodesia.  Approval  was 
granted  June  12  for  two  officials  of  the 
Muzorewa  administration.  Prof.  James 
Kamusikiri  and  Mr.  Jonathan  Maswoswe.  to 
come  to  Washington  to  prepare  for  Bishop 
Muzorewa's  planned  visit  to  Washington  in 
July.  They  met  several  times  with  officials  of 
the  Department  of  Slate,  including  two  meet- 
ings with  Assistant  Secretary  Richard  Moose. 
As  indicated  by  Secretary  Vance  on  June  7,  the 

^  Department  announced  June  25  the  assignment 
as  First  Secretary  to  our  Embassy  in  Pretoria  of 
Mr.  Jeffrey  Davidow.  who  will  be  making  fre- 

iquent  and  extended  visits  to  Salisbury.  The 
first  of  these  visits  began  with  Mr.  Davidow's 
arrival  in  Salisbury  July  5. 

On  June  24,  Secretary  Vance  responded  to  an 
earlier  message  from  Bishop  Muzorewa  and 
expressed  his  desire  to  meet  with  him  during 
his  visit  to  Washington.  Following  his  arrival 
in  Washington  July  9.  Bishop  Muzorewa  met 
July  10  with  Secretary  Vance  and  the  following 
day  with  President  Carter  at  Camp  David.  In 
those  meetings,  the  President  and  the  Secretary 
each  reaffirmed  the  US  commitment  to  a 
peaceful  transfer  of  responsible  political  au- 
thority to  the  black  majority  and  their  belief 
that  an  end  to  the  bloodshed  can  be  achieved 
through  the  establishment  of  constitutional  and 
administrative  procedures  that  are  responsive  to 
the  legitimate  aspirations  of  all  citizens  of 
Zimbabwe-Rhodesia.  They  expressed  the  hope 
that  Bishop  Muzorewa  would  work  closely  with 
the  British  government,  as  the  legally  responsi- 
ble authority,  in  seeking  a  peaceful  solution  to 
the  problems  of  full  political  participation  and 
internationally  recognized  independence.  Fol- 
lowing the  meetings.  Bishop  Muzorewa 
reiterated  his  appeal  for  immediate  recogni- 
tion and  a  lifting  of  sanctions,  but  reserved 
comment  on  the  substance  of  the  discussions 
pending  his  talks  with  Prime  Minister  Thatcher 
in  London. 

U.S.  Support  for  British  Initiatives 

There  have  been  close  and  continuing  con- 
sultations with  the  British  government.  Assist- 
[  ant  Secretary  Richard  Moose  and  Policy  Plan- 
ning Director  Anthony  Lake,  accompanied  by 
Mr.  Davidow,  traveled  lo  London  June  27-28 
for  intensive  discussions   with   British  special 


emissary  Lord  Harlech  and  other  British  offi- 
cials. There  have  been  several  subsequent  ex- 
changes between  our  two  governments. 

The  British  government  is  actively  pursuing 
a  process  of  consultation  with  all  concerned.  In 
June,  Lord  Harlech  visited  Botswana,  Zambia, 
Malawi,  Tanzania,  Mozambique,  Angola  and 
Nigeria  for  discussions  with  the  leaders  of 
these  states  and  with  representatives  of  the  ex- 
ternally based  Rhodesian  parties.  Another 
British  envoy,  Mr.  Richard  Luce,  held  discus- 
sions with  the  leaders  of  other  African  states. 
In  his  July  10  statement  in  the  House  of  Lords, 
Lord  Carrington  reported  that  the  consultations 
had  been  both  encouraging  and  useful  and  that 
they  revealed  a  willingness  on  the  part  of  most 
African  states  to  recognize  that  major  changes 
have  taken  place  in  the  Rhodesian  situation. 
Nevertheless,  they  also  indicated  widespread 
African  criticism  of  the  Rhodesian  constitution, 
particularly  with  respect  to  the  blocking  power 
of  the  white  minority  over  a  wide  range  of 
legislation,  and  the  character  of  the  public 
service  commissions. 

The  British  have  also  been  in  close  com- 
munication with  the  Muzorewa  administration. 
British  Under  Secretary  Derek  Day  visited 
Salisbury  at  the  end  of  May  and  returned  there 
July  5  on  his  second  visit.  Lord  Harlech  also 
visted  Salisbury  July  2-5  to  initiate  discussions 
with  Bishop  Muzorewa  and  his  colleagues  of 
issues  that  were  later  pursued  during  the 
Bishop's  visit  to  London  (July  12-13).  British 
Prime  Minister  Thatcher  and  Foreign  Secretary 
Lord  Carrington  held  talks  with  Bishop 
Muzorewa  July  13  in  London. 

The  British  will  continue  their  consultations 
at  the  Commonwealth  Heads  of  Government 
conference  in  Lusaka  beginning  August  I.  As 
Lord  Carrington  indicated  in  his  July  10  state- 
ment, they  are  hopeful  that  once  the  process  is 
completed,  they  will  be  able  to  put  forward 
proposals  which  will  be  accepted  as  fair  and 
reasonable,  and  which  will  provide  a  basis  for 
bringing  Rhodesia  to  legal  independence  in 
conditions  of  peace  and  wide  international  ac- 
ceptability. The  United  States  has  given  its  full 
encouragement  and  support  to  this  process  of 
consultation.  We  have  contributed  to  it  by 
urging  all  concerned  to  cooperate  fully  with  the 
British  effort,  and  by  joining  with  the  British  in 
asking  African  states  and  the  Organization  of 
African  Unity  (OAU)  to  support  efforts  that 
would  facilitate  the  search  for  a  peaceful  solu- 
tion. African  leaders  at  the  July  6  opening  of 
the  OAU  Ministerial  Meeting  in  Monrovia, 
Liberia,  expressed  reservations  concerning  the 
elections  and  constitutional  arrangements  in 
Zimbabwe-Rhodesia,  but  reaffirmed  African 
interest  in  further  settlement  efforts. 

Internal  Political  Developments 

Internal  political  developments  during  the 
past  month  have  centered  on  the  installation 
and  organization  of  the  new  government  and 
the  activities  of  the  black  political  parties. 

Bishop  Muzorewa  was  sworn  in  as  Prime 


Minister  June  I,  along  with  an  ethnically- 
balanced,  seventeen-member  cabinet  repre- 
senting on  a  basis  of  rough  parity  the  tribal, 
political  and  racial  composition  of  the  new 
parliament.  Ian  Smith  was  appointed  Minister 
without  Portfolio.  In  his  first  formal  address  on 
June  2.  Bishop  Muzorewa  repeated  his  amnesty 
offer  to  ZANU  and  ZAPU  [Zimbabwe  African 
National  Union  and  Zimbabwe  African 
People's  Union]  and  his  willingness  to  attend 
an  All-Parties  Conference.  In  a  June  6  press 
interview.  Ian  Smith  offered  to  leave  the  gov- 
ernment if  "official  negotiations"  would 
thereby  be  aided:  but  he  said  he  would  not  step 
down  ""simply  to  facilitate  Zimbabwe- 
Rhodesia's  enemies." 


VistI  of 
Bishop  Iftuzorewa 


Bishop  Abel  Muzorewa.  head  of  the 
current  administration  in  Salisbury, 
Southern  Rhodesia,  visited  Washing- 
ton. DC.  July  9-11.  1979.  and  met 
with  President  Carter  and  other  gov- 
ernment officials.  Following  is  a  White 
House  statement  issued  on  July  11  .^ 

President  Carter  met  with  Bishop 
Muzorewa  this  afternoon  because  of 
the  President's  deep  personal  commit- 
ment to  help  find  a  solution  for  the 
peaceful  transfer  of  responsible  politi- 
cal authority  from  the  white  minority  to 
the  black  majority  in  Zimbabwe- 
Rhodesia. 

In  a  frank  exchange  of  views,  the 
President  emphasized  his  sincere  desire 
to  see  an  end  to  the  bitterness  and 
bloodshed  in  Zimbabwe-Rhodesia.  He 
believes  this  can  be  accomplished  by 
the  establishment  of  a  broadly  based 
consensus  on  constitutional  procedures 
and  administrative  processes  which  are 
responsive  to  the  legitimate  political 
aspirations  of  all  the  peoples  of 
Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. 

The  President  restated  his  intention 
to  work  closely  with  the  Government  of 
the  United  Kingdom,  which  has  the 
primary  legal  and  historic  responsibil- 
ity to  bring  Zimbabwe-Rhodesia  to  in- 
dependence based  on  full  political  par- 
ticipation and  human  rights  guarantees 
for  all  its  citizens.  He  expressed  the 
hope  that  the  Muzorewa  administration 
would  work  closely  with  the  United 
Kingdom  in  seeking  nonmilitary, 
political  means  to  further  this  goal.    D 


'Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of  Presi- 
dential Documents  of  July  16,  1979. 


L 


20 


Reverend  Ndabaningi  Silhole  (head  of  the 
African  National  Council/Sithole]  and  eleven 
others  elected  on  his  party's  ticket  continued 
iheir  boycott  of  parliament.  Sithole  told  report- 
ers June  1 1  he  would  pursue  his  court  case  al- 
leging that  the  April  elections  were  rigged  and 
that  officials  intimidated  black  voters.  His  call 
for  new  elections  under  British  supervision  was 
supported  by  Chief  Jeremiah  Chirau,  leader  of 
the  Zimbabwe  United  People's  Organization. 
Fifteen  members  of  Sithole's  party  were  ar- 
rested in  two  sweeps  (June  2  and  5)  in  connec- 
tion with  an  alleged  plot  to  assassinate  Bishop 
Muzorewa,  a  charge  which  Sithole  strongly  de- 
nied. Sithole's  own  home  was  searched  June 
29. 

Within  Bishop  Muzorewa's  own  party,  the 
United  African  National  Congress  (UANC), 
First  Vice  President  James  Chikerema  led  a 
walk-out  of  seven  members  of  parliament  (all 
from  the  same  tribal  group)  who  then  formed 
the  Zimbabwe  Democratic  Party.  On  June  28. 
the  UANC  obtained  a  temporary  injunction 
from  the  High  Court  barring  the  new  party's 
members  from  taking  their  seats  in  parliament 
on  the  grounds  that  they  had  been  elected  on 
the  UANC  slate.  The  court  began  hearing  the 
case  July  1 1 . 

Following  the  installation  of  the  new  gov- 
ernment, Bishop  Muzorewa  visited  Pretoria 
July  15-18  for  discussions  of  military  and  eco- 
nomic relations  with  South  African  Prime 
Minister  P.W.  Botha  and  Foreign  Minister  R.F. 
Botha. 

The  Muzorewa  government  announced  its 
program  at  the  first  session  of  Parliament  June 
26,  declaring  that  it  would  have  as  its  primary 
objectives  international  recognition  and  the 
lifting  of  sanctions.  There  was  no  announce- 
ment of  proposed  new  economic  and  social 
legislation. 

An  Amnesty  Directorate  was  established  to 
encourage  members  of  the  guerrilla  forces  to  lay 
down  their  arms.  The  amnesty  offered  promises 
of  a  safe  return,  no  interrogation,  and  food  and 
clothing  for  surrendering  guerrillas.  Estimates 
of  the  results  to  date  vary.  On  July  3,  the  gov- 
ernment announced  the  release  of  141  persons 
detained  under  security  legislation  stemming 
from  the  state  of  emergency.  The  step  was  de- 
scribed as  being  in  line  with  the  government's 
policy  to  release  all  those  who  were  no  longer 
considered  "a  danger  to  the  state."  Various 
estimates  place  the  number  of  persons  still  in 
detention  for  political  offenses  at  approxi- 
mately 1,000.  In  a  related  development.  Bishop 
Muzorewa  declared  that  all  missionaries  pre- 
viously deported  from  the  country  would  be 
free  to  return 


Military  and  Security  Developments 

There  has  been  no  change  in  the  pattern  of 
military  activity  over  the  past  month.  Accord- 
ing to  Rhodesian  government  statistics,  the 
number  of  deaths  resulting  from  actions  inside 
the  country  in  June  were  685,  down  from  the 
record  level  reached  in  May  of  891.  Martial 
law  remains   in  effect  throughout  most  of  the 


Department  of  State  Bulletip/i 


The  U.S.  Role  in 
Southern  Africa 


by  Richard  M.  Moose 

Address  before  the  Southern  Africa 
Research  Program  Symposium  on  Race 
Conflict  in  Southern  Africa  at  Yale 
University  on  April  18,  1979.  Mr. 
Moose  is  Assistant  Secretary  for  Afri- 
can Affairs. 

Within  the  past  2  years  southern  Af- 
rica has  been  propelled  into  the  front 
ranks  of  U.S.  policy  concerns.  This  has 
occurred  because  the  region  is  under- 
going fundamental,  irreversible  politi- 
cal change  —  and  the  pace  is  accelerat- 
ing. At  the  heart  of  this  process  is  ra- 
cial conflict — the  subject  of  your  con- 
ference. 

Stock  assumptions,  widely  held  in 
the  past,  such  as  the  survivability  of 
the  minority  white  regimes,  have  been 
quickly,  even  suddenly,  cast  aside. 
With  the  collapse  of  the  Portuguese 
colonies,  the  remaining  systems  of 
minority  privilege  in  southern  Africa 
have  come  under  increasing  challenge. 


New  stresses  and  strains  have  appeared  I 
or  have  reinforced  earlier  ones.  These 
strains  affect  not  only  the  focal  points 
of  racial  conflict — Rhodesia,  Namibia, 
and  South  Africa — but  the  entire  sur- 
rounding region  —  everything  from 
Zaire,  south.  And,  as  the  momentum  of 
nationalism  has  picked  up,  so  too  has 
the  tendency  of  outsiders,  for  their  own 
reasons,  to  involve  themselves  in  the 
problems  of  southern  Africa. 

The  key  issue  today  is  not  whether 
the  changes  we  now  see  unfolding  will 
be  peaceful  or  violent,  but  whether 
there  is  still  a  chance  to  render  less 
violent  the  inevitable  transition  to 
majority  rule. 

Why  is  the  U.S.  Involved? 

At  the  outset  of  this  Administration, 
we  decided  that  the  United  States  could 
and  should  try  to  play  an  active  and 
positive  part  in  helping  to  bring  about 
the  full  participation  of  all  races  in  the 
political   life  of  southern   Africa.   We 


territory  as  a  result  of  continued  insecurity  in 
the  countryside. 

In  two  series  of  raids  on  June  26  and  July 
1-3,  Rhodesian  security  forces  struck  at  ZAPU 
camps  around  Lusaka,  inflicting  substantial 
casualties  and  loss  of  materiel  on  the  defend- 
ers. The  June  26  strike  included  an  attack  on 
the  ZAPU  intelligence  headquarters  in  the 
populated  Roma  suburb  of  Lusaka.  ZANU 
staging  areas  in  Mozambique  were  also  hit  in 
early  June, 

ZANU  and  ZAPU  representatives  met  during 
June  to  discuss  the  coordination  of  their  mili- 
tary activities.  On  July  4,  guerrillas  attacked 
the  Salisbury  residence  of  the  Greek  Orthodox 
Archbishop,  who  apparently  was  mistaken 
either  for  his  neighbor.  General  Walls,  or  for 
Bishop   Muzorewa.   ZAPU   leader  Joshua 


Letters 
of  Credence 


On  May  10,  1979,  Mamady  Lamine 
Conde  of  Guinea,  Yao  Grunitsky  of 
Togo,  and  Ousman  Ahmadou  Sallah  of 
Gambia  presented  their  credentials  to 
President  Carter  as  their  countries' 
newly  appointed  Ambassadors  to  the 
United  States.  D 


Nkomo  announced  July  6  that  his  forces  would 
suspend  cross-border  infiltrations  into 
Rhodesia  from  July  25  to  August  10,  to  coin- 
cide with  the  Commonwealth  Heads  of  Gov- 
ernment Meeting  in  Lusaka.  Bishop  Muzorewa 
publicly  stated  in  Washington  July  1  1  that 
Rhodesian  forces  would  not  launch  attacks  in 
the  area  of  the  Zambian  capital  during  the 
period  of  the  meeting. 


Economic  Developments 

General  economic  trends  do  not  seem  to  have 
been  significantly  affected  during  the  new  gov- 
ernment's first  month  in  office.  The  govern- 
ment has  published  no  official  figures  on  white 
emigration  since  April,  when  net  white  emi- 
gration that  month  was  1,600.  Estimates  for 
May  and  June  indicate  that  white  emigration  is 
continuing  at  a  rate  of  over  1 ,000  per  month. 

Economic  analysts  report  no  evidence  of  a 
reversal  in  adverse  economic  trends  in 
Zimbabwe-Rhodesia  (GDP  declined  an  average 
of  4  percent  per  year  between  1974  and  1978). 
The  agricultural  sector  in  particular  is  feeling 
the  combined  effects  of  insecurity  in  the  coun- 
tryside and  the  drought  which  has  affected  wide 
areas  of  southern  Africa.  □ 


'  The  complete  transcript  of  the  hearings  will 
be  published  by  the  committee  and  will  be 
available  from  the  Superintendent  of  Docu- 
ments, U.S.  Government  Printing  Office. 
Washington.  DC.  20402. 


October  1979 


21 


believe  there  are  sound  reasons  for  this 
policy. 

•  We  believe  it  is  the  right  thing  to 
do.  Concepts  of  free  participation  in 
political  life,  majority  rule,  and  na- 
tional independence  are  ideals  to  which 
all  of  us  can  subscribe. 

•  The  promotion  of  this  objective  is 
very  much  in  our  long-term  interest. 
Bringing  our  policy  in  line  with  our 
own  values  eases  a  major  source  of 
conflict  with  the  African  and 
nonaligned  nations.  Relations  with 
these  governments  are  of  growing  im- 
portance to  us  politically,  as  trading 
partners  and  as  sources  of  natural  re- 
sources. 

•  We  believe  that  over  the  long  term 
our  interests  are  best  served  by  en- 
couraging the  emergence  of  leaders  and 
governments  reflecting  the  values  of 
the  western  political  tradition — a  tradi- 
tion which,  as  you  know,  provided  the 
impetus  behind  today's  demand  for 
change. 

•  And,  finally,  the  peaceful  resolu- 
tion of  conflict  offers  the  best  possible 
protection  against  continued  poaching 
in  the  area  by  outside  powers  which 
thrive  on  violence  and  disorder. 

In  practical  terms,  our  southern  Af- 
rica agenda  consists  of  simultaneous 
efforts  to  find  workable  formulas 
leading  to  peaceful  solutions  of  distinct 
— yet  interrelated — problems,  some  of 
them  at,  or  near,  the  flashpoint. 

We  have  no  rigid  formulas  to  insist 
upon.  But  we  are  convinced  that  only 
by  recognizing  the  role  of  all  political 
elements,  and  only  by  seeking  to  msure 
the  political  rights  of  all  persons,  can 
lasting  settlements  be  found.  We  are 
seeking  progress  toward  that  goal  by 
working  with  the  Africans — including 
the  South  Africans — and  with  other 
Western  governments. 

Because  our  agenda  in  Washington 
so  closely  parallels  that  of  your  confer- 
ence, 1  would  like  to  describe  briefly 
for  you  what  we  are  trying  to  accom- 
plish, what  we  have  done,  and  where 
we  stand.  Finally,  in  each  case.  1 
would  like  to  pose  some  of  the  ques- 
tions which  we  currently  face  in  seek- 
ing to  implement  U.S.  policies. 

Namibia 

In  Namibia  our  objective  is  an  inter- 
nationally acceptable  settlement  cen- 
tered on  U.N. -supervised  elections 
which  would  enable  Namibians  to  de- 
cide their  own  political  future. 

We  and  our  four  Western  partners 
have  tried  to  cut  through  the  legal, 
political,  and  rhetorical  impasse  which 
has  so  long  surrounded  the  Namibian 


issue  by  crafting  a  practical  settlement 
proposal  acceptable  to  all  principal 
parties. 

Front-line  cooperation  has  been  in- 
valuable in  this  effort.  Our  success  in 
obtaining  that  cooperation  has  faced 
the  U.S.S.R.  with  a  difficult  situation. 
Notwithstanding  their  endorsement  of 
the  South  West  Africa  People's  Or- 
ganization (SWAPO),  the  front-line 
states  have  had  enough  confidence  in 
the  West  to  work  with  us  toward  a 
peaceful  settlement  in  Namibia.  In  ef- 
fect they  told  the  Soviets  to  stay  out. 
The  U.S.S.R.  was  obliged  to  abstain 
on  the  critical  vote  in  the  Security 
Council  last  July,  which  approved  the 
Namibia  settlement. 

As  you  know.  South  Africa  and 
SWAPO  have  both  officially  accepted 
the  Western  settlement  plan.  But,  un- 
fortunately, the  South  African  Gov- 
ernment, over  the  past  several  months, 
has  raised  a  series  of  objections  to  the 
manner  in  which  the  Secretary  General 
proposes  to  implement  it.  Most  re- 
cently, the  South  Africans  have 
demanded  the  ouster  of  any  armed 
SWAPO  personnel  from  Namibia  after 
the  cease-fire.  They  have  also  insisted 
that  SWAPO  bases  in  Angola  and 
Zambia  be  monitored  by  the  United 
Nations.  Neither  of  these  actions  is 
called  for  in  the  original  agreement. 

With  SWAPO  aboard,  and  the 
front-line  promising  its  cooperation, 
the  chief  question  now  facing  us  is 
what  the  South  African  Government 
will  do.  While  asserting  that  they  favor 
an  international  settlement,  the  South 
Africans  have  also  kept  open  the  alter- 
native of  an  internal  settlement.  We 
note  with  concern  that  key  elements  of 
that  option,  such  as  the  so-called  Con- 
stituent Assembly,  are  already  in  place. 
In  the  course  of  the  last  3  weeks,  we 
have  undertaken  major  diplomatic  ef- 
forts to  assuage  the  concerns  of  the 
Namibian  parties  and  to  ascertain  South 
Africa's  intentions.  We  are  now 
awaiting  their  reply. 

If  South  Africa  opts  for  an  internal 
settlement  in  Namibia,  the  conse- 
quences will  be  grave,  not  only  for 
South  Africa  but  for  the  region  as  a 
whole  and  for  the  world  community. 

The  broader  question  facing  South 
Africa  in  Namibia,  and  in  Rhodesia  as 
well,  is  one  of  strategic  choice.  South 
Africa  can  have  a  democratic,  interna- 
tionally recognized  settlement  in 
Namibia  if  it  is  willing  to  cooperate 
with  the  West  and  its  African  neigh- 
bors. Or,  South  Africa  can  retreat  from 
that  challenge  and,  on  the  basis  of  a 
hard-edged,  psychologically  more 
familiar  calculation,  rely  on  its  own 
strength  in  defiance  of  the  world  com- 
munity. 


Angola 

Angola  will  have  a  crucial  role  to 
play  in  any  Namibia  settlement.  Its 
leaders  recognize  that  success  in 
Namibia  could  well  open  the  way  to  the 
resolution  of  some  of  Angola's  other 
pressing  problems. 

We  wish  to  see  an  Angola  free  of 
entanglements  involving  outsiders  with 
its  internal  conflict  peacefully  resolved 
and  its  people  able  to  enter  into  the  full 
enjoyment  of  their  long  sought  inde- 
pendence. Our  policy  toward  Angola 
has  focused  in  a  very  practical  way  on 
security  issues  along  its  borders.  Act- 
ing in  concert  with  other  interested 
governments,  we  have  actively  sought 
to  help  defuse  Angola's  problems  with 
Zaire  and  South  Africa.  Although  we 
have  not  recognized  the  Luanda  gov- 
ernment, we  have  found  it  possible  to 
work  constructively  with  the  Angolans 
on  regional  security  problems.  Mean- 
while, a  number  of  American  business 
concerns  have  also  developed  mutually 
beneficial  relationships  with  the  An- 
golans. 

For  the  future,  however,  one  must 
ask  how  and  whether  Angola  will  be 
able  to  solve  peacefully  its  internal 
difficulties?  To  what  extent  are  these 
problems  inherent  in  its  history  and  its 
ethnic  makeup?  To  what  extent  are  they 
encouraged  or  even  the  product  of  out- 
side interests?  In  a  more  general  sense, 
we  must  consider  whether  Angola  will 
be  able  to  determine  its  own  future,  or 
will  it,  for  the  moment,  remain  hostage 
to  events  beyond  its  control  in  neigh- 
boring territories? 


South  Africa 

In  many  ways  South  Africa  seems  to 
hold  the  key  to  the  solution  of  the 
problems  of  its  region.  And  yet,  as  re- 
cent events  have  shown,  its  own  do- 
mestic problems  and  the  resulting  com- 
plexity of  its  relations  with  Africa  and 
the  West  make  cooperation  with  them 
exceedingly  difficult. 

It  has  been  a  basic  tenet  of  our  policy 
that  there  must  be  change  in  South  Af- 
rica, including  an  end  to  the  apartheid 
system,  and  eventual  full  participation 
by  all  South  Africans  in  the  nation's 
political  and  economic  life. 

Another  premi.se  of  our  policy  is  that 
we  will  attempt  to  work  with  South 
Africa  ori  solutions  to  the  problems  of 
Namibia  and  Rhodesia.  At  the  same 
time,  we  have  made  it  clear  that  prog- 
ress in  one  of  these  areas  will  not  be 
traded  for  forebearance  on  the  others. 

Early  in  this  Administration,  Vice 
President  Mondale  told  then  Prime 
Minister  Vorster  that  unless  there  was  a 
move  away  from  apartheid,  our  rela- 


7? 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


tions  would  inevitably  deteriorate.  We 
have  reiterated  that  view  in  word  and 
deeil  since  then,  including  our  going 
beyond  the  U.N.  mandatory  arm.s  em- 
bargo following  Steve  Biko's  death 
with  our  own  ban  on  all  exports  to  the 
South  African  police  and  military. 

Llnforlunateiy,  as  we  ail  know,  there 
has  been  no  significant  diminution  of 
apartheid  in  the  past  2  years.  During 
this  lime  we  have  sought  to  emphasize 
to  the  Afrikaner  leadership  that  they 
cannot  continue  to  have  both  apartheid 
and  the  ties  with  us  to  which  they  seem 
to  attach  such  great  importance.  Re- 
gardless of  what  attitude  we  take  to- 
ward South  Africa,  their  problem  will 
remain:  The  hard  choices  are  theirs  to 
make. 

While  there  is  more  introspection 
and  questioning  going  on  among  white 
South  Africans  today  than  ever  before, 
the  fundamental  question  remains 
whether  their  present  system  is  capable 
of  beneficial  change  and  regeneration. 
Until  such  time  as  we  conclude — God 
forbid  —  that  such  change  is  impos- 
sible, we  must  continue  to  seek  a  ra- 
tional balance  between  actions  which 
may  enhance  the  prospects  for  change, 
and  those  which  intensify  the 
LAAGER  instinct. 

Internationally.  South  Africa  is  am- 
bivalent on  Namibia  and  Rhodesia.  Re- 
cently, we  have  heard  of  a  South  Afri- 


can "grand  vision"  of  a  southern  Afri- 
can commonwealth  of  nations  stretch- 
ing north  from  Cape  Town  to  the 
Cunene  and  the  Zambezi.  Unless  the 
South  Africans  are  able  to  bring  them- 
selves to  think  about  their  long-term 
security  in  a  different  dimension,  their 
choice  seems  to  lie  between  the  greater 
or  lesser  LAAGER — and  our  relations 
with  them  will  face  the  prospect  of 
further  deterioration. 

Rhodesia 

In  early  1977,  we  and  the  British 
began  an  effort  to  find  a  formula  for  a 
peaceful,  negotiated  settlement  for 
Rhodesia.  We  have  sought  to  fashion  a 
plan  tor  a  settlement  which  would  in- 
clude both  internal  and  external  groups 
and  permit  the  holding  of  free  and  fair 
electuins  under  international  auspices. 

Present  prospects  for  peace  are  not 
bright.  The  Salisbury  parties  are  intent 
on  an  internal  settlement.  The  patriotic 
front  is  intent  on  thwarting  one.  The 
violence  on  both  sides  grows.  Under 
these  inauspicious  circumstances,  elec- 
tions within  Rhodesia  have  begun. 

Today  is  the  first  day  of  voting  in 
Rhodesia  for  the  72  black  seats  in  the 
100-Member  parliament.  By  any  meas- 
ure, this  marks  a  turning  point  which 
may  influence  decisively  the  future 
course  of  events.  Many  questions  arise. 


•  Will   there   be  a  greater  or  lesser  ; 
willingness  in  Salisbury  to  strive  for  a  I 
settlement  embracing  all  parties  to  the 
conflict  after  the  elections? 

•  Will  the  attitudes  of  Rhodesian 
whites  toward  negotiations  differ  from 
those  of  the  newly  elected  black  lead- 
ers'? 

•  With  their  growing  military  confi- 
dence, will  the  leaders  of  the  patriotic 
front  be  able,  or  be  willing,  to  put 
aside  their  personal  rivalries  and 
negotiate  with  Salisbury  if  such  an  op- 
portunity can  be  created? 

The  response  to  these  questions  will- 
have  a  profound  significance  in  judging 
whether  a  peaceful  settlement  is  still 
possible.  In  terms  of  our  own  policy. 
To  put  the  question  in  a  different  and 
more  ominous  manner:  We  must  weigh 
the  domestic  political  costs  of  an  on- 
going U.S.  negotiating  role  against  the 
consequences  of  failure  to  achieve  a 
negotiated  settlement.  Among  the 
costs,  if  there  is  no  political  settlement, 
likely  would  be: 

•  An  increasingly  destructive  impact 
on  the  surrounding  states; 

•  Greater  Soviet  and  Cuban  in- 
volvement: and 

•  An  irreversible  polarization  of  the 
southern  African  problem  along  racial 
and  ideological  lines. 


Uganda 


PRESIDENT'S  MEMORANDUM, 
MAY  15,  1979' 

Memorandum  Jor  the  Secreliiry  of  Slate,  the 
Secretary  of  Treasury,  the  Secretary  of  Com- 
merce 

Subject:   Trade  with  Uganda 

Pursuant  to  the  authority  vested  m  me  hy 
Section  .S  of  Public  Law  95-435.  I  hereby  de- 
termine and  certify  thai: 

The  Government  of  Uganda  is  no  longer 
committing  a  consistent  pattern  of  gross  viola- 
tions of  human  rights. 

The  Secretary  of  Stale  is  requested  to  report 
this  determinalion  lo  the  Congress  on  my  be- 
half, as  required  by  law. 

The  Secretaries  of  Treasury  and  Commerce 
are  requested  to  take  the  appropriate  steps  per- 
mitting the  immediate  resumption  of  imports 
from  and  exports  to  Uganda. 

This  determination  shall  be  published  in  the 
Federal  Register. 

Jimmy  Carter 


PRESIDENT'S  STATEMENT, 
MAY  15,  19792 

All  Americans  were  appalled  by  evi- 
dence of  the  truly  deplorable  human 
rights  violations  which  occurred  during 
the  Amin  regime.  While  my  Adminis- 
tration publicly  condemned  this  situa- 
tion, 1  would  particularly  like  to  com- 
mend Senators  Hatfield  and  Weicker 
and  Congressmen  Pease  and  Bonker  for 
the  intense  concern  which  they  exhib- 
ited about  the  human  rights  situation  in 
Uganda.  The  breaking  of  the  pattern  of 
gross  violations  of  human  rights 
heralds  a  brighter  day  for  Ugandans 
and,  indeed,  for  all  in  the  world  con- 
cerned with  human  rights.  D 


'Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of  Presi- 
dential Documents  of  May  21.  1979. 

'^Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of  Presi- 
dential Documents  of  May  21,  1979. 


The  Front-line  and 
Other  African  States 

Over  the  past  2  years  we  have  ach- 
ieved some  success  with  the  front-line 
and  other  African  states  in  breaking 
through  the  barrier  of  mistrust  and  mis- 
understanding which  grew  up  in  the 
past.  We  have  welcomed  them  as  full 
partners  and  have  demonstrated  our 
commitment  to  racial  justice  and  a 
peaceful  settlement  in  southern  Africa. 
At  the  same  time  we  have  made  clear 
to  the  front-line  that  we  will  not  take 
sides  among  the  nationalist  parties.  As 
we  reject  the  right  of  the  Salisbury 
parties  to  determine  Zimbabwe's  po- 
litical future,  so  do  we  reject  the  claim 
of  the  patriotic  front  for  dominance  in  a 
transitional  political  process.  We  be- 
lieve that  we  have  made  ourselves  un- 
derstood on  this  point — perhaps  better 
to  the  Africans  than  to  our  own  domes- 
tic audience. 

The  potential  tragedy  of  the  black 
southern  African  states  is  their  apparent 
lack  of  ability  to  avert  the  tragedy 
which  threatens  to  engulf  them.  While 
the  leaders  of  the  front-line  rightly  re- 
fuse to  compromise  on  the  central  issue 
of  racial  justice  which  lies  at  the  heart 
of  the  Rhodesian  question,  they  see  all 
too  clearly  the  consequences  of  the 
rapidly  spreading  violence.  It  is  for  this 


October  1979 


23 


reason  that  they  have  so  strongly  sup- 
ported, and  continue  to  support,  our 
efforts  to  find  a  political  solution  based 
on  internationally  supervised  elections. 
As  we  approach  a  crucial  period  in 
our  southern  Africa  policies  we  must 
consider  the  consequences  of  our  deci- 
sions: 

•  What  more  can  we  do  to  bring 
about  negotiations  among  parties 
seemingly  unwilling  to  compromise? 

•  What  choices  will  remain  for  the 
front-line  states  if  we  simply  allow 
events  to  take  their  course? 

•  How  would  U.S.  interests  in  Af- 
rica and  beyond  be  affected  by  an 
abandonment  of  our  present  impartial 
stance? 


Conclusion 

I  have  probably  asked  more  ques- 
tions—  and  answered  fewer — than  you 
would  have  liked.  But  I  did  so  for  a 
purpose.  During  the  coming  week,  you 
will  be  examining  some  of  the  difficult 
choices  this  nation  faces,  or  will  be 
forced  to  face,  in  southern  Africa. 

While  our  real  leverage  on  events  in 
southern  Africa  has  always  been  small, 
it  may  be  further  constricted  by  do- 
mestic perceptions  and  constraints; 
and,  while  any  kind  of  active  effort  to 
resolve  peacefully  the  longstanding 
conflicts  in  southern  Africa  would  be 
difficult,  the  task  has  been  made  im- 
measurably more  onerous  by: 

•  Our  late  entry  onto  the  scene; 

•  African  perceptions  (and  not  a  lit- 
tle recent  American  history)  which  had 
to  be  overcome;  and 

•  The  fact  that  we  chose  that  most 
difficult  of  negotiating  vehicles — 
multilateral  diplomacy. 

[U.S.  Permanent  Representative  to 
the  U.N.]  Andy  Young  has  frequently 
said  that  since  we're  getting  attacked 
with  equal  vigor  from  the  right  and 
from  the  left,  in  this  country  and  in 
Africa,  we  must  be  doing  something 
right.  I  agree  with  this. 

What  we  are  doing  right  is  this. 

•  We  have  enunciated  principles 
with  which  no  one — here  or  there — 
can  disagree. 

•  We  have  faithfully  applied  these 
principles  throughout  the  continuous 
negotiating  history  of  the  last  2  years. 

•  We  firmly  believe  that  these  prin- 
ciples can  still  provide  an  equitable 
process  leading  to  fair  solutions  for  all 
the  people  of  southern  Africa. 

Some  may,  indeed  do,  disagree  with 
this  or  that  tactic.  But  no  one  can 
challenge  the  principles  we  have  ad- 
vanced. By  fealty  to  these  principles — 


OAU  Summit  Meeting 


by  William  C.  Harrop 

Statement  before  the  Subcommittee 
on  African  Affairs  of  the  House  Com- 
mittee on  Foreign  Affairs  on  July  27. 
1979.  Mr.  Harrop  is  Deputy  Assistant 
Secretary  for  African  Affairs.^ 

I  welcome  the  opportunity  to  report 
to  the  Africa  subcommittee  on  the  six- 
teenth assembly  of  heads  of  state  and 
government  of  the  Organization  of  Af- 
rican Unity  (OAU).  These  delibera- 
tions, which  took  place  in  the  capital  of 
Liberia  from  July  17-21,  were  pre- 
ceded by  and  actually  overlapped  a 
preparatory  meeting  of  ministers, 
mostly  foreign  ministers,  where  a  great 
deal  of  the  most  important  debate  ap- 
parently took  place.  The  two  meetings 
are  now  generally  referred  to  together 
as  the  OAU  Monrovia  summit. 

This  year's  OAU  summit  has  been 
characterized  in  the  press  as  "one  of 
the  most  acrimonious  in  recent  his- 
tory." Although  the  description  fits  the 
boos  and  cheers  and  walkouts  at  the 
meeting,  1  believe  the  spirited  tenor  of 
the  assembly  demonstrated  that  the 
political  leaders  of  Africa  showed 
greater  willingness  this  year  to  confront 
the  tough  issues  openly  and  to  discuss 
the  differences  which  divide  them. 

Noteworthy  examples  were  Tan- 
zania's and  Libya's  military  interven- 
tions in  Uganda,  the  status  of  the 
Western  Sahara,  and  the  legitimacy  of 
the  Government  of  Chad.  Other  ques- 
tions engendering  lively  debate  were 
the  status  to  be  accorded  to  the  patri- 
otic front  and  the  Middle  East  peace 
process. 

Although  these  divisive  issues  at- 
tracted a  great  deal  of  attention,  the 
summit  was  also  of  special  interest  be- 


and  by  a  growing  recognition  that  so- 
called  unilateral  "solutions"  will  not 
solve  southern  Africa's  worsening 
problems  —  we  shall  preserve  our  abil- 
ity to  mediate.  That — it's  now  more 
clear  than  ever — will  be  needed  some- 
day. We  will  also  preserve  a  policy,  for 
the  first  time  in  this  part  of  the  world, 
which  faithfully  reflects  ideals  as  a  na- 
tion. 

In  the  past,  our  worst  problems  as  a 
people  have  come  when  we  lost  sight 
of  these  ideals.  In  the  difficult  days 
ahead — let  me  assure  you — we  will 
not.  D 


cause  of  the  broader  attention  paid  for 
the  first  time  to  economic  matters  and 
to  human  rights.  Revision  of  the  OAU 
Charter  itself  was  also  discussed.  I 
shall  summarize  briefly  the  principal 
developments  at  the  summit  and  offer 
our  general  appraisal.  I  will,  of  course, 
be  happy  to  discuss  the  summit  in 
greater  depth  as  desired  by  the  mem- 
bers. 


Military  Intervention  in  Uganda 
and  the  OAU  Charter 

Tanzania's  military  intervention  in 
Uganda  was  the  subject  of  severe  criti- 
cism, particularly  by  the  outgoing 
OAU  chairman.  President  Nimeiri  of 
Sudan,  and  the  Nigerian  Chief  of  State, 
Gen.  Obasanjo.  President  Nyerere  of 
Tanzania  and  President  Binaisa  of 
Uganda  defended  the  action,  said  that 
Idi  Amin  was  the  original  aggressor, 
and  drew  attention  to  the  Libyan  mili- 
tary intervention  on  the  latter's  behalf. 
Many  attacked  Idi  Amin's  gross  viola- 
tion of  human  rights,  and  to  our  knowl- 
edge no  one  rose  to  defend  Amin. 
Rather,  the  question  was  whether  such 
violations  justified  jeopardizing  the 
OAU  Charter's  cardinal  principles  of 
nonintervention  and  territorial  integ- 
rity. The  formal  debate  was  eventually 
closed  without  any  resolutions  having 
been  introduced. 

Although  the  issue  is  unresolved,  the 
possibility  of  revising  the  OAU  Char- 
ter was  given  considerable  attention  as 
a  result  of  it.  Following  President 
Nimeiri's  proposal  that  a  council  of 
five  heads  of  state  be  created  to  inter- 
cede in  conflicts — with  the  power  to 
make  decisions  binding  on  the 
parties  —  the  summit  passed  a  resolu- 
tion recommending  the  establishment 
of  a  committee  to  review  the  charter. 


The  Western  Sahara 

By  a  close  vote,  the  summit  adopted 
the  so-called  Wisemen's  report  on  the 
Western  Sahara  and  asked  that  the  five 
states  composing  the  ad  hoc  committee 
(Nigeria,  Mali,  Ivory  Coast,  Tanzania, 
Guinea)  plus  Liberia  continue  its  work. 
The  report  calls  for  a  referendum  in  the 
Western  Sahara  to  permit  the  people  to 
exercise  the  right  to  self-determination. 
However,  a  high  OAU  official  has  said 
that  it  would  be  difficult  to  hold  a  ref- 
erendum without  the  cooperation  of 
Morocco,  which  remains  opposed  to 


24 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


the  concept  of  holding  a  referendum. 
During  the  proceedings  the  Moroccan 
delegation  walked  out.  as  did  the 
Presidents  of  Senegal  and  Gabon,  two 
strong  supporters  of  Morocco. 


Chad 

The  delegation  representing  the  gov- 
ernment presently  in  Ndjamena  was 
excluded  early  on  from  the  council  of 
ministers  and,  to  the  best  of  our  knowl- 
edge, it  did  not  then  attempt  to  be 
seated  at  the  assembly  of  heads  of  state 
and  government.  Nigeria  and  Libya 
actively  sought  exclusion  of  the  Chad- 
ian  delegation.  To  exclude  Chad  be- 
cause of  the  unclear  internal  political 
situation  in  the  country  and  the  claim 
that  the  government  is  unrepresentative 
appears  to  be  unprecedented  in  OAU 
history.  Traditionally,  the  organization 
has  taken  the  position  that  it  recognizes 
states  rather  than  governments  and  has 
avoided  divisive  debate  over  legiti- 
macy. 


Recognition  of  the  Patriotic  Front 

Of  particular  concern  to  us  were  the 
actions  taken  in  reference  to 
Zimbabwe-Rhodesia.  A  resolution  was 
voted  "reaffirming  that  the  Patriotic 
Front  is  the  sole,  legitimate  and  au- 
thentic representative  of  the  People  of 
Zimbabwe.""  This  degree  of  recogni- 
tion had  not  before  been  accorded  by 
the  OAU,  despite  the  term  "reaffirm- 
ing." There  is  also  language  in  this 
resolution  which  criticizes  Western, 
and,  in  particular,  "US  and  UK  diplo- 
matic maneuvers  to  stitTe  the  struggle 
of  the  people  of  Zimbabwe  for  genuine 
independence."'  It  also  expresses  in- 
dignation "at  the  moves  of  Britain  and 
the  USA  towards  recognition  of  the  il- 
legal regime  resulting  from  the  illegal 
elections."  There  are  implied  threats  in 
the  pasage  which  ''decides  that 
member  states  shall  apply  effective 
cultural,  political,  commercial  and 
economic  sanctions"  against  any  state 
which  accords  recognition  or  lifts  man- 
datory U.N.  sanctions  against  the 
Muzorewa  government. 

We  believe  —  and  so  informed  our 
African  friends  before  the  summit  — 
that  actions  such  as  the  resolution 
eventually  voted  would  make  more 
difficult  the  task  of  achieving  a  solu- 
tion to  the  Rhodesian  conflict.  There  is 
considerable  evidence  that  a  number  of 
African  states  share  this  concern:  sev- 
eral states  entered  official  reservations 
to  parts  of  the  text  concerning  the 
status  of  the  patriotic  front  while  others 
continue  to  express  their  reservations 
less  officially. 


In  this  regard,  the  Secretary  General 
of  the  OAU,  Edem  Kodjo,  pointed  out 
to  the  press  that  interest  was  shown 
during  the  summit  debate  in  round 
table  negotiations.  He  said  explicitly 
that  the  OAU  does  not  feel  that  it  has 
closed  the  door  on  all  party  talks.  We 
are  pleased  that  such  assurances  were 
made  and  do,  in  fact,  believe  that  the 
OAU  can  be  helpful  in  our  efforts  to 
get  all  the  parties  to  negotiate  a  peace- 
ful political  accommodation.  We  will 
continue  to  discuss  this  issue  with  the 


l],S.  Atnhassadors 

to  Africait  Countries, 

September  1979 


Benin —  Vacant 

Botswana — Horace  G.  Dawson.  Jr.' 

Burundi  —  Thomas  J.  Corcoran 

Cameroon  —  Mabel  Murphy  Smyihe 

Cape  Verde  —  Edward  Marks 

Central  African  Empire  —  Goodwin  Cooke 

Chad—Donald  R.  Norland 

Comoros —  Vacant 

Congo  —  William  Lacy  Swing 

Djibouti  —  Vacant 

Ethiopia — Frederic  L.  Chapin 

Gabon  —  Arthur  T.  Tienken 

Gambia — Herman  J.  Cohen 

Ghana — Thomas  W.  M.  Smith 

Guinea — Oliver  S.  Crosby 

Guinea-Bissau  —  Edward  Marks 

Ivory  Coast — Nancy  V.  Rawls 

Kenya  —  Wilbert  John  Le  Melle 

Lesotho — John  R.  Clingerman 

Liberia  —  Robert  P.  Smith 

Madagascar —  Vacant 

Malawi  —  Harold  E.  Horan 

Mali  —  Patricia  M.  Byrne 

Mauritania — E.  Gregory  Kryza 

Mauritius — Samuel  Rhea  Gammon 

Mozambique  —  Willard  A.  De  Pree 

Niger — James  Keough  Bishop 

Nigeria — Stephen  Low 

Rwanda —  Vacant 

Sao  Tome  and  Principe  —  Arthur  T.  Tienken 

Senegal  —  Herman  J.  Cohen 

Seychelles  —  Wilbert  John  Le  Melle 

Sierra  Leone  —  John  Andrew  Linehan 

Somalia — Donald  K.  Petlerson 

South  Africa  —  William  B.  Edmondson 

Sudan  —  Donald  Clayton  Bergus 

Swaziland —  Vacant 

Tanzania — Richard  Noyes  Viels 

Togo  —  Marilyn  Priscilla  Johnson 

Uganda —  Vacant 

Upper  Volta — Thomas  D.  Boyatt 

Zaire —  Vacant 

Zambia — Frank  George  Wisner  II  D 


'Nominated  by  the  President  but  not  yet  con- 
firmed by  the  Senate. 


OAU  Chairman,  President  Tolbert.  and 
OAU  Secretariat  officials. 

Middle  East  Situation 

It  is  significant  that  the  suspension 
of  Egypt  from  the  OAU  did  not  become 
a  serious  issue  during  the  conference, 
as  had  earlier  seemed  possible.  On  the 
Egypt-Israel  treaty  and  the  Camp  David 
process,  we  understand  that  the  radical 
states  held  out  until  very  late  in  the 
summit  for  condemnatory  language, 
but  were  obliged  to  fall  back  when  they 
could  not  assemble  the  votes. 

The  final  version  of  the  Middle  East 
resolution  does  not  attack  either  Egypt 
or  the  treaty  itself,  although  it  does 
contain  language  condemning  "all 
partial  agreements  and  separate  treaties 
which  violate  the  recognized  rights  of 
the  Palestinian  people.""  The  resolution 
condemns  Israel  in  the  strongest  terms 
and  reaffirms  support  for  the  Palestine 
Liberation  Organization  as  the  sole 
legitimate  representative  of  the  Pales- 
tinian people.  I  believe  it  is  safe  to  say, 
however,  that  the  moderate  states  of 
Africa  see  the  resolution  as  a  very 
favorable  compromise. 

Other  Issues 

Africa's  difficult  economic  situation 
and  its  perilous  future  were  focused 
upon  and  discussed  publicly  during  the 
summit  with  great  realism.  The  Secre- 
tary General  called  this  a  "break- 
through" in  the  consideration  of  eco- 
nomic questions.  This  is  a  new 
emphasis;  although  there  were  no  sub- 
stantive decisions,  the  assembled  heads 
of  government  called  for  an  extraordi- 
nary summit  to  discuss  economic 
integration  and  development.  The 
Secretary  General  was  also  directed  to 
prepare  the  groundwork  for  the  estab- 
lishment of  an  African  economic  com- 
munity. This  recognition  of  economic 
problems  and  determination  to  address 
them  collectively  is  certainly  a  step  in 
the  right  direction. 

References  to  human  rights  were 
made  in  many  of  the  speeches,  perhaps 
most  notably  in  President  Tolbert's 
keynote  address  as  OAU  chairman  for 
the  coming  year.  A  resolution  reaf- 
firming the  need  for  improved  respect 
for  human  rights,  and  in  particular  the 
right  to  development,  was  proposed  by 
Senegal  and  Gambia  and  accepted  by 
the  summit.  This  resolution  also  calls 
upon  the  Secretary  General  to  organize 
a  meeting  of  experts  to  prepare  a  draft 
of  an  African  charter  on  human  rights 
and  provides  for  "the  establishment  of 
bodies"  to  protect  human  rights.  One 
high  OAU  official  reporting  on  the 
proceedings  said:  "We  cannot  talk 
about  the  denial  of  human  rights  in 


October  1979 


25 


ARJHS  CONTROL:      An  Evaluation  of  SALT  H 


by  George  M.  Seignious  II 

Statement  before  the  Senate  Com- 
mittee on  Armed  Services  on  July  30, 
\1979.  Mr.  Seignious  is  Director  of  the 
\Arms  Control  and  Disarmament 
\  Agency. ' 

When  I  speak  for  SALT,  I  do  not 
speak  for  good  will  or  for  detente  or  for 
a  political  party  or  for  trust.  I  speak  in 
favor  of  an  arms  control  treaty  that  will 
strengthen  the  national  security  of  the 
United  States. 

Today,  equitable  and  verifiable  arms 
control  goes  hand  in  hand  with  a  strong 
defense.  The  cold,  hard  fact  of  life  in 
)  the  nuclear  age  is  that  we  have  no  other 
practical  choice.  A  strong  defense 
makes  arms  control  possible,  for  it  is 
precisely  because  we  are  strong  and 
intend  to  remain  so  that  we  do  not  fear 
to  negotiate.  And  arms  control,  care- 
fully conceived  and  vigilantly 
negotiated,  has  defense  as  its  guide  and 
security  as  its  result. 

I  could  not  advocate  to  the  President, 
to  the  Senate,  or  to  the  American 
people  any  form  of  unilateral  disarma- 
ment. Over  three  decades  in  the  mili- 
tary service  of  my  country  have  taught 
me  that  we  must  first  see  to  the  security 
of  our  nation.  1  could  not  advocate  an 
agreement  that  ties  our  hands  while  the 
Soviets  are  allowed  a  free  hand.    In 


strategic  arms  we  must  be  ahead  of,  or 
at  least  equal  to,  the  Soviet  Union, 
never  number  two.  And  1  could  not  ad- 
vocate an  agreement  based  on  trust. 
The  very  survival  of  our  nation  is  at 
stake  —  and  trust  is  not  a  basis  for  na- 
tional survival. 

SALT  11  is  a  careful  and  major  step 
forward  to  limit  strategic  offensive  nu- 
clear arms.  It  is  a  negotiated  com- 
promise that  compromises  neither  our 
own  security  nor  the  stability  of  the 
strategic  nuclear  balance  nor  the  con- 
tinuing quest  to  limit  nuclear  arms. 
SALT  11  is  a  consensus  treaty  that  pro- 
vides progress  for  the  present  and  hope 
for  the  future. 

SALT  11  is  not  a  panacea;  it  is  not 
the  millenium.  Ratification  will  not 
stop  competition  or  eliminate  all  the 
challenges  we  face  or  guarantee  per- 
manent stability.  Above  all,  ratification 
does  not  mean  that  we  as  a  nation  can 
go  to  sleep.  National  security  is  a  con- 
tinuing requirement.  It  requires  na- 
tional will.  And  it  requires  vigilance. 

I  have  studied  SALT  11  carefully 
from  three  professional  vantage  points 
—  as  Director  of  the  Joint  Staff  of  the 
Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff,  as  the  at-large 
member  of  the  SALT  delegation,  and 
as  Director  of  the  U.S.  Arms  Control 
and  Disarmament  Agency.  1  want  to 
focus  the  first  part  of  my  statement  on 


South  Africa  without  insuring  that  we 
ourselves  are  the  defenders  of  human 
rights."" 

I  find  this  African  interest  in  pro- 
moting human  rights  to  be  entirely 
positive  and  a  reflection  of  the  em- 
phasis the  Carter  Administration  has 
placed  upon  the  issue.  It  behooves  us 
to  encourage  these  African  initiatives 
which  are  so  consistent  with  our  own 
human  rights  policies. 

Summary 

Developments  at  this  year"s  OAU 
summit  are  on  balance  encouraging.  It 
seems  safe  to  expect  that  President 
Tolbert  will  play  an  active  role  in 
guiding  the  OAU  during  the  coming 
year  and  that  he  will  be  a  force  for 
moderation.  It  should  be  remembered, 
however,  that  the  OAU  was  never  de- 
signed to  be  a  supranational  body,  and 
this  organization  of  sovereign  states 


will  continue  to  encounter  extreme  dif- 
ficulty in  reaching  decisions  and  en- 
forcing them  whenever  individual 
states  or  groups  of  states  refuse  to 
compromise.  Whatever  their  views  of 
OAU  actions  and  inactions,  African 
leaders  seem  to  be  unanimous  in  find- 
ing that  OAU  summits  are  excellent 
occasions  to  push  and  swap  ideas. 

It  is  in  our  interest  to  consult  fre- 
quently with  President  Tolbert  and 
senior  OAU  officials  during  the  coming 
year.  We  will  try  to  encourage  a 
broader  appreciation  of  our  positions 
and  at  the  same  time,  ourselves,  to  de- 
velop a  better  understanding  of  African 
concerns  and  political  dynamics.         D 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the  hearings  will 
be  published  by  the  committee  and  will  be 
available  from  the  Superintendent  of  Docu- 
ments, U.S.  Government  Printing  Office. 
Washinglon.  D.C.  20402. 


five   fundamental   standards  against 
which  1  have  measured  SALT  11. 

First.  SALT  11  must  place  limits  on 
Soviet  forces; 

Second.  SALT  U  must  permit  us  to 
undertake  the  military  programs  we 
believe  are  necessary  for  our  security; 
we  must  be  able  to  maintain  the 
strategic  balance  under  SALT  II; 

Third.  SALT  II  must  be  adequately 
verifiable. 

Fourth.  SALT  II  must  not  intertere 
with  existing  patterns  of  cooperation 
and  support  for  our  NATO  allies; 

Fifth.  SALT  II  must  enhance 
strategic  stability  and  reduce  the  risk  of 
nuclear  war. 

SALT  11  meets  each  and  every  one  of 
these  standards. 

Limiting  Soviet  Strategic  Forces 

My  first  standard — limiting  Soviet 
strategic  forces  —  exemplifies  a  unique 
contribution  that  SALT  II  brings  to  our 
national  security.  In  an  arms  race  with- 
out limits,  we  can  build  more  but  so 
can  the  Soviets.  1  am  concerned  about 
the  Soviet  buildup.  We  all  are.  It  is 
massive  and  relentless.  I  believe  we 
should  meet  it  by  maintaining  military 
forces  equivalent  to  whatever  forces 
the  Soviets  build  and  by  capping  the 
Soviet  buildup  through  SALT.  We  are 
going  to  have  to  do  both  at  the  same 
time  if  we  want  to  maintain  the 
strategic  balance  in  a  realistic,  practical 
way. 

The  simple  fact  is  that  the  Soviet 
Union  has  vast  economic  resources  and 
a  national  will,  no  less  determined  than 
our  own,  to  expend  those  resources  for 
what  it  perceives  to  be  necessary  mili- 
tary purposes.  Without  arms  control 
agreements,  we  cannot  stop  the  Soviets 
from  building  as  many  strategic 
weapons  as  they  wish,  and  we  cannot 
force  them  to  dismantle  existing 
weapon  systems.  We  can  certainly 
match  the  Soviets  in  any  nuclear  arms 
race,  but  SALT  is  the  only  way  1  know 
to  limit  the  number  of  Soviet  missiles 
and  nuclear  warheads  targeted  at  our 
country. 

As  a  former  military  man,  I  believe 
that  any  time  you  succeed  in  limiting 
the  destructive  forces  that  could  be 
marshalled  against  you  by  your  adver- 
sary, you  have  accomplished  some- 
thing of  significance.  Let  me  detail  for 
you  some  specific  ways  in  which  the 


26 


Department  of  State  Bulletin  • 


SALT  II   treaty  accomplishes  this  oh- 
jective. 

•  Under  SALT  11,  the  Soviets  must 
reduce  the  total  ot  their  central 
strategic  systems  (launchers  ol  inter- 
continental ballistic  missiles,  launch- 
ers ot  submarine-launched  ballistic 
missiles,  and  heavy  bombers)  from 
over  2,500  at  present  to  2,250  by  the 
end  of  1981.  We  estimate  that  without 
this  limit,  the  Soviets  could  have  as 
many  as  3,000  such  systems  by  1985. 
Thus,  what  otherwise  would  probably 
be  a  20%  increase  in  Soviet  strategic 
systems  is  converted  by  SALT  11  to  a 
10%  decrease. 

•  Under  SALT  11,  the  Soviets  will 
be  limited  to  1,200  launchers  of  ballis- 
tic missiles  carrying  multiple  inde- 
pendently targetable  warheads,  or 
MIRVs  [multiple  independently- 
targetable  reentry  vehicles].  This  figure 
is  about  600  less  than  we  estimate  they 
could  have  by  the  end  of  1985. 

•  Under  SALT  II,  the  Soviets  will 
be  limited  to  820  launchers  of 
MIRV'ed  intercontinental  ballistic  mis- 
siles— the  most  threatening  part  of  their 
strategic  force.  We  estimate  that  they 
could  deploy  at  least  300  more  than 
this  figure  bv  the  end  of  1985  without 
SALT  11. 

•  Under  SALT  II.   the  Soviets  will 


agreed  to  ban  this  system  to  avoid  a 
verification  problem.  The  SS-16  ICBM 
appeared  to  be  compatible  with  the 
launcher  for  the  shorter  range  SS-20 
which  is  not  limited  by  SALT  II. 

•  Under  SALT  II,  rapid  reload  of 
ICBM  launchers  and  storage  of  extra 
ICBM's  at  ICBM  launch  sites  will  be 
banned. 

Thus,  under  SALT  11,  there  will  be 
many  hundreds  fewer  Soviet  strategic 
systems  and  many  thousands  fewer  de- 
liverable strategic  warheads  in  their  ar- 
senal than  they  could  have  without 
SALT  II. 

These  limits  on  Soviet  systems  are 
not  all  we  would  like  to  see  if  we  could 
dictate  to  the  Soviet  Union.  But  they 
are  also  not  meaningless  restraints  on 
totals  already  much  too  high. 

I  need  hardly  remind  this  committee 
of  the  destructive  power  contained  in 
the  Soviet  systems  to  be  dismantled  or 
of  the  destructive  power  we  would  have 
to  face  if  Soviet  programs  went  for- 
ward unimpeded.  While  some  com- 
mentators have  attempted  to  charac- 
terize the  Soviet  weapons  likely  to  be 
dismantled  as  obsolescent,  1  want  to 
note  that  the  Soviets  will  be  forced  to 
select  from  among  nuclear-powered 
submarines  with  missiles  built  in  the 
early    1970"s,   aircraft  carrying  their 


SALT  II  is  a  consensus  treaty  that  provides  progress  for  the  present 
and  hope  for  the  future. 


be  permitted  to  flight-test  and  deploy 
only  one  new  type  of  light  ICBM  dur- 
ing the  treaty  period.  This  means  that 
all  but  one  of  the  fifth  generation  of 
Soviet  ICBM's  [intercontinental  ballis- 
tic missiles]  will  be  held  to  small  mod- 
ifications of  earlier  generations  which 
will  not  represent  a  significant  increase 
in  militarv  capability. 

•  Under  SALT  11,  Soviet  ICBM's 
will  be  limited  in  the  number  of 
MIRV'ed  warheads  per  missile  to  cur- 
rently tested  levels.  And  the  one  per- 
mitted new  type  of  light  ICBM  will  be 
limited  to  10.  This  "fractionation" 
limit  significantly  restricts  the  use  the 
Soviets  can  make  of  their  ICBM 
throw-weight.  We  estimate  that  the 
SS-18  could  carry  30  warheads  instead 
of  the  10  SALT  II  will  permit.  With 
over  300  SS-18's  in  their  forces  in  the 
I980's,  that  means  that  SALT  II  re- 
duces the  Soviet  warhead  potential  by 
over  6,000  warheads — on  just  one  type 
of  missile. 

•  Under  SALT  II.  the  production, 
testing,  and  deployment  of  the  SS-16 
ICBM  will  be  banned.  The  United 
States  proposed  and  the  Soviet  Union 


largest  multimegaton  bombs,  and 
SS-ll  ICBM's. 

Each  strategic  Soviet  system  to  be 
destroyed  is  associated  with  a  warhead 
many  times  more  powerful  than  the  one 
that  leveled  Hiroshima — in  the  case  of 
the  aircraft,  a  thousand  times  more 
powerful.  The  250  systems  in  question 
could  suffice  to  demolish  the  250 
largest  American  cities.  The  people  of 
Houston  or  Seattle  or  Des  Moines 
would  take  little  comfort  in  knowing 
that  the  missile  or  bomber  carrying  a 
nuclear  weapon  toward  their  city  was 
obsolescent.  I  believe  that  any  limits 
on  Soviet  power  and  capabilities  are  a 
step  in  the  right  direction. 

I  also  want  to  take  exception  to  the 
view  that  SALT  II  only  limits  Soviet 
programs  to  already  planned  levels  or 
that  they  wouldn't  exceed  the  SALT  11 
levels  anyway.  This  contention  is  to- 
tally at  variance  with  our  intelligence 
estimates,  and  it  does  not  square  with 
the  pace  and  momentum  that  is  causing 
such  concern  today.  Anyone  who  looks 
at  the  Soviet  buildup  today  and  con- 
cludes that  it  won't  continue  unabated 
without  SALT  II  is  taking  a  rosy  view 


of  the  Soviet  Union  to  which  1  cannot 
subscribe. 


U.S.  Strategic  Forces 

My  second  standard  concerns  our 
own  forces.  We  must  be  able  to  pre- 
serve the  strategic  balance  under  SALT 
II.  SALT  II  will  not  tie  our  hands.  We 
will  be  able  to  proceed  under  SALT  II 
with  all  of  the  force  options  we  have 
decided  are  necessary  for  our  security. 

•  We  have  improved  the  accuracy 
and  explosive  yield  of  our  existing 
Minuteman  111  land-based  missiles. 
SALT  II  will  not  prevent  similar  im- 
provements in  the  future. 

•  We  are  about  to  fit  some  of  our 
existing  Poseidon  nuclear  submarines 
with  the  longer  range  Trident  I  missile 
which  means  that  these  submarines  can 
patrol  and  hide  in  vastly  increased 
ocean  areas  and  still  hit  their  Soviet 
targets.  They  will  be  even  more  dif- 
ficult to  detect.  This  program  will  be 
completed  in  1982.  SALT  II  does  not 
hinder  this  in  any  way. 

•  We  have  just  launched  the  first  of 
our  Trident  nuclear  missile  submarines, 
each  of  which  can  hit  about  200  Soviet 
targets.  By  the  end  of  SALT  11,  we 
plan  to  have  seven  of  these  submarines. 
SALT  II  does  not  hinder  this  in  any 
way. 

•  We  are  developing  and  testing 
air-launched  cruise  missiles  for  place- 
ment aboard  approximately  150  of  our 
heavy  bombers.  We  plan  to  start  in- 
stalling these  air-launched  cruise  mis- 
siles in  1981.  By  late  1985,  we  expect 
to  have  nearly  1,500  of  these  cruise 
missiles  deployed.  They  are  highly  ac- 
curate and  can  be  launched  from  out- 
side the  range  of  Soviet  air  defenses. 
SALT  11  will  permit  this  deployment. 

•  We  are  developing  and  testing 
long-range  ground-  and  sea-launched 
cruise  missiles  (GLCM's  and 
SLCM's).  Deplovment  is  prohibited  by 
SALT  11  until  after  1981,  but  these 
missiles  would  not  be  ready  for  de- 
ployment before  this  date  anyway. 
When  these  are  ready  for  deployment, 
it  will  be  our  decision  to  make  whether 
deployment  or  negotiated  restrictions, 
which  also  limit  the  Soviet  Union,  are 
in  our  best  national  security  interests. 
During  the  protocol  period,  SLCM's 
and  GLCM's  can  be  flight-tested  to  any 
range. 

I  should  add  in  this  regard  that  when 
the  United  States  insisted  that  the  pro- 
tocol be  of  a  short,  fixed  duration,  we 
meant  percisely  that.  The  protocol  ex- 
pires on  December  31,  1981;  nothing 
could  be  clearer.  Any  decision  to  put 
legal  restrictions  upon  U.S.  GLCM's 
and  SLCM's  after  1981  would  require 
an  entirely  new  negotiation  and  another 


October  1979 

submission  to  the  Senate  for  your  con- 
sent. 

•  And  SALT  II  does  not  prevent  us 
from  developing  a  solution  to  the 
problem  of  the  increasing  vulnerability 
of  land-based  missiles.  This  vulnera- 
bility is  not  the  result  of  SALT.  It  is 
due  to  the  increasing  capabilities,  par- 
ticularly improving  accuracy,  of  the 
missiles  of  both  nations.  Under  SALT 
II,  we  will  be  able  to  deploy  our  new 
ICBM,  the  MX,  in  a  mobile,  surviva- 
ble  mode.  We  have  considered  a 
number  of  basing  schemes  for  the  MX. 

It  is  a  demonstration  of  the  impor- 
tance of  arms  control  to  national  secu- 
rity that,  with  SALT  II,  the  mobile 
missile  land-based  alternatives  that  we 
have  considered  are  unquestionably 
more  feasible  and  more  economical. 
Without  the  SALT  II  limits  on  numbers 
of  Soviet  warheads,  the  Soviets  could 
add  more  warheads  over  time  which 
would  necessitate  a  significantly  larger 
number  of  shelters  for  our  missiles. 

The  recent  decision  to  proceed  with 
the  MX  missile  is  clear,  demonstrable 
evidence,  for  our  friends  and  our  ad- 
versaries, that  we  will  proceed  with  the 
programs  necessary  for  our  security. 
Each  part  of  our  strategic  forces  will  be 
survivable  so  that  deterrence  will  never 
be  in  question.  And  each  part  will  be 
adequately  verifiable,  so  that  confi- 
dence in  strategic  stability  will  accrue 
to  both  our  nations. 

1  respect  deeply  those  who  are  wor- 
ried about  present  trends  in  the 
strategic  balance,  for  I  am  concerned  as 
well.  But  confidence  is  also  vital  to  our 
freedom  in  the  nuclear  world  when  de- 
terrence is  the  essence  of  stability  and 
security.  We  have  not  built  and  main- 
tained our  strategic  forces — at  the  cost 
of  billions — in  order  to  weaken  their 
deterrent  impact  by  telling  the  Russians 
and  the  world  that  we  are  inferior 
when,  in  fact,  we  are  not. 

There  is  no  doubt  that  the  Soviet 
strategic  force  is  formidable  and 
growing  rapidly.  But  there  is  also  no 
doubt  that  the  Soviet  Union  does  not 
have  strategic  nuclear  superiority  now, 
and  they  will  not  have  it  in  the  future  if 
the  will  and  determination  of  the 
United  States  persist,  if  we  continue  to 
modernize  our  strategic  forces,  if  we 
do  what  we  must  do  to  maintain 
equivalence. 

I  want  to  make  one  point  very  clear. 
It  is  central  to  the  debate  over  SALT  II. 
SALT  II  will  not  prohibit  us  from  pro- 
ceedmg  with  the  programs  we  need  to 
maintain  the  strategic  balance.  But 
SALT  II  is  not  a  substitute  for  national 
will.  SALT  II  permits  us  to  go  ahead 
with  necessary  programs;  it  does  not 
provide  the  programs  themselves.  The 
programs  we  undertake  to  keep  our 


deterrent  strong  will  be  determined  by 
the  American  people,  their  leaders,  and 
their  representatives.  SALT  II  does  not 
foreclose  our  choice. 

We  would  be  deluding  ourselves  as  a 
nation  if  we  believed  that  we  will  not 
have  to  increase  our  spending  for 
strategic  programs,  with  or  without 
SALT  II.  The  scope  and  pace  of  Soviet 
strategic  programs  leave  us  little  choice 
but  to  modernize  our  own  strategic  nu- 
clear forces.  But  there  is  no  doubt  that 
the  cost  without  SALT  II  would  be  tens 
of  billions  of  dollars  more  than  it  will 
be  with  SALT  II.  Within  the  frame- 
work of  SALT  II,  we  can  maintain 
strategic  equality  and  a  more  viable  and 
more  effective  strategic  force  with  less 
risk  and  at  a  much  more  moderate  cost. 
Furthermore,  the  danger  of  siphoning 
resources  away  from  conventional 
forces  is  lessened. 


Adequate  Verification 

My  third  standard  for  SALT  II  is 
adequate  verification.  If  SALT  II  did 
not  fulfill  this  requirement,  then  I 
could  not  support  it.  After  careful 
study,  I  have  concluded  that  SALT  II  is 
adequately  verifiable  and  that  it  will  be 
so  from  the  day  the  agreement  enters 
into  force. 

To  verify  SALT  II,  we  rely  on  our 
own  independent,  national  intelligence 
capabilities.  We  survey  the  Soviet 
Union  regularly,  thoroughly,  and  ac- 
curately with  a  vast  array  of  sophisti- 
cated and  powerful  intelligence- 
gathering  systems,  such  as  photorecon- 
naissance  satellites,  radars,  and  other 
monitoring  devices  in  space,  on  land, 
on  sea,  and  in  the  air.  The  result  is  a 
network  of  collection  systems  which 
complement  each  other  and  provide  us 
with  overlapping  coverage  of  the 
Soviet  Union. 

We  have  spent  billions  of  dollars  on 
these  systems,  and  it  has  been  money 
well  spent.  I  find  our  intelligence 
capabilities  truly  astonishing  in  their 
technological  capacity  —  especially  to  a 
soldier  who  began  his  career  in  World 
War  II,  when  we  seldom  knew  what 
was  happening  600  yards  behind  enemy 
lines,  let  alone  6,000  miles  away. 

For  example,  we  know  where  the 
Soviets  build  their  submarines.  It  takes 
several  years  to  construct  a  ballistic 
missile  submarine.  We  carefully  ob- 
serve it  during  this  period.  We  count  its 
missile  tubes  as  they  are  being  built, 
and  we  determine  which  types  of  mis- 
siles will  be  installed  in  those  launch- 
ers. When  the  Soviets  launched  their 
latest  Delta  class  strategic  missile  sub- 
marine, it  was  no  surprise  to  us.  We 
had  been  aware  of  its  construction  for 
years. 


27 


Similarly,  we  know  where  Soviet 
ICBM  launchers  are  deployed  and  what 
types  they  are.  We  observe  new  mis- 
siles as  they  are  flight-tested,  and  they 
are  tested  extensively.  We  know 
whether  a  missile  is  tested  with  one 
warhead  or  more  than  one.  We  can 
count  the  number  of  Soviet  reentry  ve- 
hicles as  they  reenter  the  atmosphere. 

We  monitor  the  conversion  of  older 
Soviet  ICBM  launchers  so  they  can 
handle  new  MIRV'ed  missiles.  Well 
before  the  conversion  is  finished  and 
the  launcher  is  again  operational,  we 
know  not  only  whether  it  is  a  launcher 
for  a  MIRV'ed  missile  but  also  the  type 
of  MIRV'ed  missile  it  is  designed  to 
contain. 

In  the  case  of  Soviet  heavy  bombers, 
we  have  an  adequate  count  of  how 
many  bombers  there  are,  where  they 
are  produced,  and  where  they  are 
based.  We  can  observe  important  mod- 
ifications that  are  made  to  these  bom- 
bers. 

Several  factors  help  us  in  verifying 
the  provisions  of  SALT  II. 

•  One  factor  is  time.  Many  of  the 
systems  limited  in  SALT  are  very  large 
and  complex  and  cannot  quickly  be 
constructed.  For  example,  it  takes 
many  months  to  construct  an  ICBM 
silo  launcher  and  years  to  develop  and 
deploy  a  new  missile.  This  gives  us 
time  to  monitor  activities. 

•  Another  is  the  need  for  reliability. 
New  strategic  systems  have  to  be  tested 
to  have  operational  reliability.  We  can 
observe  these  Soviet  tests. 

•  And  a  third  factor  is  support  re- 
quirements. Strategic  systems  need 
personnel  to  run  them  and  extensive 
logistic  and  security  support.  These  re- 
quirements compound  the  task  of 
keeping  deployments  hidden,  and  they 
increase  the  chance  that  we  will  detect 
them,  especially  if  such  activities  were 
to  take  place  in  significant  numbers. 

Some  charge  that  the  Soviets  could 
stockpile  extra  missiles  and  then  one 
night  change  the  strategic  balance.  Let 
me  say  that  it  is  one  thing  to  produce  a 
missile  in  a  factory;  it  is  quite  another 
to  have  the  trained  personnel,  the 
logistics,  the  large  amounts  of  heavy 
equipment  to  handle  the  missiles  and 
the  launchers  themselves — without  our 
being  able  to  spot  them. 

I  might  add  that  the  Soviets,  if  they 
wanted  to  violate  the  provisions  of 
SALT  H,  would  face  another  difficulty 
—  uncertainty.  Our  use  of  multiple  in- 
telligence sources  complicates  any 
Soviet  effort  to  disguise  or  conceal  im- 
portant activities.  The  Soviets  know 
that  we  have  a  large,  sophisticated  in- 
telligence operation,  and  they  know  a 


28 

certain  amount  about  how  it  works. 
They  do  not,  however,  know  the  full 
capabilities  of  our  collection  systems 
and  analysis  techniques.  This  uncer- 
tainty will  further  complicate  any 
Soviet  attempt  to  conceal  an  evasion  of 
the  SALT  II  limits. 

The  question  has  been  asked:  "What 
do  we  do  if  we  discover  a  Soviet  viola- 
tion or  if  we  even  suspect  one?'"  As  a 
result  of  the  SALT  1  agreements  in 
1972,  we  established  at  Geneva  a 
U.S. -Soviet  Standing  Consultative 
Commission  (SCO  where  any  com- 
pliance questions,  any  suspected  ac- 
tivities, can  be  challenged  at  once.  We 


new  or  modified  Soviet  strategic  mis- 
sile could  be  completed. 

The  limits  of  SALT  II  are  adequately 
verifiable  with  our  own  national  tech- 
nical means.  By  restricting  launchers 
and  not  missiles,  by  counting  rules,  we 
have  no  need  for  more  intrusive  meas- 
ures in  SALT  II.  On-site  inspection  is 
not  mandatory  for  adequate  verification 
of  SALT  II.  For  example,  the  SALT  II 
MIRV  counting  rules  are  a  better  de- 
vice than  on-site  inspection  for  count- 
ing MIRV's.  We  are  able  to  use  these 
rules  to  count  Soviet  MIRV's  on  a 
total,  national  basis.  We  will  not  have 
to  rely  on  inspectors  who  can  be  de- 


SALT  II  will  not  prohibit  us  from  proceeding  with  the  programs  we 
need  to  maintain  the  strategic  balance. 


thus  have  an  established  forum  where 
even  the  slightest  suspicion  of  a  viola- 
tion can  be  raised  with  the  Soviets. 
This  forum  has  worked  well  under 
SALT  I. 

Some  also  question  whether  we  ac- 
tually would  challenge  the  Soviets  if 
they  appeared  to  be  in  violation  of 
SALT  II.  1  believe  our  record  under 
SALT  I  is  solid  proof  that  we  would. 
We  have  not  been  hesitant  to  challenge 
the  Soviets  about  questions  of  concern 
to  us — eight  times.  The  fact  is,  how- 
ever, that  there  is  not  one  outstanding 
challenge  that  we  have  made  against 
the  Soviet  Union  that  has  not  been  re- 
solved to  our  satisfaction.  If  a  violation 
persisted  without  correction  or  if  a 
violation  threatened  our  security,  then 
we  could  abrogate  the  agreement  and 
build  the  forces  necessary  to  meet  the 
threat.  This  would  be  a  very  serious 
development,  and  the  Soviets  know  it. 

In  assessing  the  capabilities  of  our 
network  of  collection  systems,  it  is  im- 
portant to  recognize  that  intelligence  is 
a  dynamic  process  in  which  our  effort 
will  need  continual  improvement.  We 
must  be  prepared  to  take  the  necessary 
actions  to  exploit  the  new  opportunities 
that  advancing  technology  offers  us  and 
to  offset  the  loss  of  sources,  as  happens 
from  time  to  time.  The  recent  loss  of 
important  intelligence  stations  in  Iran  is 
a  clear  example.  Becuase  of  our  exten- 
sive capabilities,  we  continue  to  be 
able  to  monitor  adequately  the  testing 
of  Soviet  ICBM's,  although  some  un- 
certainties are  temporarily  larger  than 
we  would  like. 

As  you  know,  we  are  aggressively 
pursuing  a  number  of  alternatives  and 
specific  programs  to  collect  the  infor- 
mation formerly  gathered  in  Iran  in 
order  to  reduce  these  uncertainties  to 
their  previous,  lower  level.  We  expect 
to  do  this  before  a  test  program  for  any 


ceived  and  who  cannot  watch  all  of  the 
launchers  all  of  the  time. 

We  would  monitor  the  Soviets  even 
if  there  were  no  SALT  agreement.  It  is 
essential  for  us  to  have  good,  solid  in- 
telligence on  Soviet  strategic  forces, 
totally  apart  from  any  arms  control 
agreement.  In  fact,  only  a  portion  of 
the  total  intelligence  we  collect  on 
Soviet  strategic  forces  is  related  to 
SALT  II  limits. 

There  are  specific  provisions  in 
SALT  II,  proposed  by  us  and  accepted 
by  the  Soviets,  that  make  the  job  of 
monitoring  the  Soviets  easier  than  it 
would  be  without  SALT. 

•  Under  SALT  II,  the  Soviets  will 
not  be  allowed  to  interfere  with  the  in- 
telligence systems  we  use  to  verify 
SALT  II. 

•  Under  SALT  II,  deliberate  con- 
cealment, including  encryption  of 
telemetry,  which  impedes  verification 
of  compliance  is  banned.  This  ban 
applies  not  only  to  concealment  of  con- 
struction and  deployment  of  systems 
limited  by  SALT  but  also  to  conceal- 
ment of  testing  of  those  systems  be- 
cause some  provisions  are  verified  by 
observing  testing.  Without  this  ban,  the 
Soviets  could  use  any  and  all  means  of 
concealment. 

•  Under  SALT  II,  neither  side  is  al- 
lowed to  conceal  the  association  of  a 
missile  with  its  launcher.  Without  this 
provision,  it  could  be  much  more  dif- 
ficult for  us  to  assess  which  missile 
goes  with  each  type  of  launcher. 

These  are  just  some  of  the  SALT  II 
verification  provisions.  Without  them, 
it  could  be  much  more  difficult  to  col- 
lect needed  intelligence  on  Soviet 
strategic  programs.  Without  the  bans 
on  concealment  and  interference,  we 
could  find  it  much  harder  to  determine 
how  many  strategic  missiles  and  bom- 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 

bers  they  are  deploying  and  what  their 
military  capabilities  and  characteristics 
are.  The  Soviets  would  be  free  to  take 
steps  to  complicate  our  ability  to  pre- 
dict accurately  the  size  and  capability 
of  Soviet  strategic  forces. 

No  leader,  military  or  civilian,  wants 
to  plan  with  less  rather  than  more  in- 
formation about  an  adversary.  I  believe 
that  in  SALT  we  have  used  verification 
to  good  advantage  —  for  our  own  secu- 
rity, for  strategic  stability,  and  to  help 
turn  uncertainty  into  confidence. 

That  is  a  clear,  specific  example  of 
the  contribution  arms  control  can  make 
to  our  national  security. 

Security  of  NATO  Allies 

My  fourth  standard  by  which  I  have 
measured  SALT  II  concerns  our  NATO 
allies.  The  NATO  alliance,  basically, 
looks  to  the  United  States  to  accom- 
plish two  tasks: 

•  To  maintain  a  strong  deterrent  and 
a  strong  defense,  and 

•  To  lead  in  managing  the  East-West 
relationship  to  avoid  a  war  that  would 
devastate  the  nations  of  Europe  as  well 
as  our  own. 

SALT  II  contributes  to  both. 

In  1944,  I  stepped  ashore  in  Europe 
for  the  first  time  as  a  member  of  the 
10th  Armored  Division.  During  the 
Berlin  Wall  crisis  in  1961-63,  I  com- 
manded a  cavalry  regiment  at  the  Iron 
Curtain.  In  1969,  I  commanded  the  3d 
Infantry  Division,  and  in  1970  I  was 
U.S.  commander  in  Berlin.  I  am  con- 
vinced that  NATO's  basic  security 
interests  are  no  different  than  our 
own — stability,  prevention  of  nuclear 
war,  and  preservation  of  the  strategic 
and  conventional  military  balance.  The 
20th  century  has  taught  Europe,  as 
much  as  any  other  region  on  Earth,  the 
destructiveness  of  war,  the  benefits  of 
stability,  and  the  necessity  for  a  strong 
defense. 

Stability  is  particularly  important  to 
Europe,  where  potent  military  forces 
are  concentrated  only  a  short  distance 
apart,  where  thousands  of  nuclear 
weapons  are  deployed,  and  where  an 
arena  of  historic  confrontation  is  still 
today  of  the  highest  security  interest  to 
each  superpower.  The  risk  of  nuclear 
war  is  as  real  to  Europeans  as  it  is  to 
Americans  and  stability  a  requirement, 
not  a  luxury. 

Fundamental  to  European  security  is 
the  preservation  of  the  U.S. -Soviet 
strategic  nuclear  balance.  SALT  II,  in 
combination  with  our  own  defense  pro- 
grams, will  enable  us  to  maintain  that 
balance. 

Equally  fundamental  is  the  preserva- 
tion of  the  European  theater  balance. 


October  1979 


29 


NATO  IS  currently  embarked  on  an 
ambitious  and  expensive  force  im- 
provement program.  I  believe  that  this 
program — important  to  European  secu- 
rity— would  be  far  more  difficult  to  ac- 
complish if  our  attention  and  our  re- 
sources were  focused  instead  on  an 
unrestrained  strategic  nuclear  arms 
race. 

SALT  II  in  no  way  handcuffs  our 
cooperation  with  NATO  or  sells  out  our 
allies'  interests. 

•  We  have  consulted  extensively 
with  our  allies.  For  example,  we  have 
had  some  40  meetings  with  the  North 
Atlantic  Council  to  discuss  SALT  II; 
half  of  these  occurred   in   the  last  2 


years. 

•  We  have  taken  into  account  al 


ied 


security  concerns  m  our  negotiating 
positions.  For  example,  SALT  II  places 
no  restrictions  on  the  nuclear  forces  of 
France  and  Great  Britain,  and  it  does 
not  limit  any  of  America's  many  nu- 
clear weapons  systems  located  in 
Europe. 

•  SALT  II  does  not  interfere  with 
traditional  patterns  of  cooperation  with 
our  allies,  including  the  transfer  of 
weapons  systems  and  other  sophisti- 
cated technology.  The  Soviets  pro- 
posed a  strict  nontransfer  provision 
early  in  SALT  II.  We  rejected  it  and 
similar  Soviet  proposals.  There  is  no 
nontransfer  provision  in  SALT  II. 

•  And,  as  I  said  before,  the  protocol 
limits  on  ground-  and  sea-launched 
cruise  missiles  will  expire  before  we 
are  ready  to  deploy  them.  We  will  have 
ample  time  to  plan  carefully  —  in  con- 
cert with  our  European  allies  —  how 
best  to  modernize  our  theater  nuclear 
forces  in  NATO.  And  that  process  is 
already  underway. 

After  the  Vienna  summit,  I  returned 
home  by  way  of  the  North  Atlantic 
Council  in  Brussels  and  stopped  by  as 
well  in  Geneva  and  London.  At  each 
stop  I  briefed  allied  officials.  I  can  say 
without  exception  that  all  were  ex- 
tremely supportive  of  SALT  II. 

The  words  of  Europeans,  however, 
speak  to  this  point  better  than  assur- 
ances I  can  give.  In  June,  Chancellor 
Helmut  Schmidt  put  it  simply  and 
clearly: 

SALT  II  is,  of  course,  not  only  a  domestic 
matter  for  the  Americans.  For  that  reason  the 
United  States  Government  informed  its  allies 
on  the  progress  of  the  talks  and  also  consulted 
with  them.  This  treaty  is  a  piece  of  world  his- 
tory. It  is  also  a  piece  of  world  security  and  a 
piece  of  my  own  country's  security.  For  the 
present  it  is  a  climax  of  cooperative  arms  lim- 
itation. The  Federal  Republic  of  Germany  sup- 
ports the  SALT  II  treaty  and  hopes  that  it  will 
soon  be  ratified  by  Washington  and  Moscow. 


Strategic  Stability 

My  fifth  standard  for  SALT  II  is  that 
it  must  contribute  to  strategic  stability 
and  to  reducing  the  risk  of  nuclear  war. 
Nothing — I  repeat  nothing — is  more 
fundamental  to  our  security  and  our 
survival. 

SALT  II,  with  its  clear  ceilings  and 
adequate  verification,  adds  an  essential 
element  of  predictability,  a  way  of 
fencing  in  the  threat  and  limiting  un- 
certainty about  Soviet  programs. 
Neither  rational  planning  nor  nuclear 
stability  is  served  by  ambiguity. 

We  will  still  have  to  plan  against  the 
maximum  Soviet  capabilities  possible 
under  SALT  II.  Entrusted  with  the  de- 
fense of  our  nation,  we  would  not  be 
doing  our  job  if  we  did  otherwise.  But 
this  is  a  far  cry  from  the  increased 
threat,  and  the  worst  case  planning, 
that  would  confront  this  nation  if  there 
is  no  SALT  II. 

We  have  a  long  way  to  go  in  the 
SALT  process.  Nonetheless,  we  should 
be — and  we  are  —  proud  of  the  accom- 
plishments of  SALT  II. 

•  We  have  established — for  the  first 
time  —  equal  ceilings  on  strategic  nu- 
clear forces. 

•  We  have  negotiated  equal  sub- 
ceilings  on  MIRV'ed  systems. 

•  We  have  begun  the  long-sought 
process  of  reductions. 

•  We  have  taken  the  first  steps  in 
controlling  the  technological  arms  race. 

•  We  have  placed  limits  on  increases 
in  three  major  indices  of  central 
strategic  power — launchers,  weapons, 
and  throw-weight. 

•  We  have  strengthened  verification. 

•  We  have  established  a  base  of 
agreed  definitions,  counting  rules,  and 
even  force  data. 

•  We  have  renewed  our  commitment 
to  the  long-term  process  of  strategic 
arms  limitation.  In  crafting  a  frame- 
work of  equality  between  two  different 
strategic  forces,  SALT  II  is  an  essential 
bridge  to  deeper  reductions  and  further 
qualitative  restraints  in  SALT  III. 

Today,  on  a  highly  interdependent 
globe,  cooperation  is  often  a  necessity. 
Ratification  of  SALT  II  would  rein- 
force our  efforts  to  maintain  and  en- 
hance adherence  to  the  Nonprolifera- 
tion  Treaty  and  thus  help  prevent  the 
spread  of  nuclear  weapons.  In  these 
efforts  we  are  joined  by  109  other  na- 
tions, including  the  Soviet  Union. 
Apart  from  the  collapse  of  the  SALT 
process  itself,  the  most  important  casu- 
alty of  SALT  failure  could  be  our  vi- 
tally important  effort  to  prevent  the 
spread  of  nuclear  weapons. 

As  a  former  strategist  for  the  Joint 
Chiefs  of  Staff,  I  can  tell  you  that  nu- 


clear weapons  proliferation  would 
create  a  security  nightmare  of  grave 
dimensions.  Terrorism  and  local  con- 
flicts could  escalate  to  threaten  the  se- 
curity of  every  American.  Those  na- 
tions that  have  forsworn  nuclear 
weapons  for  themselves  by  adhering  to 
the  Nonprol iteration  Treaty  are  closely 
watching  the  two  superpowers  to  see 
whether  we  are  indeed  credible  in  our 
own  commitment  to  reduce  the  level  of 
nuclear  weaponry. 

I  would  not  come  before  you  and 
promise  that  with  SALT  II  we  will  pre- 
vent nuclear  war  or  state  that  without 
SALT  II  the  holocaust  will  surely 
come.  Both  statements  deserve  short 
shrift  in  this  debate.  I  do  believe,  how- 
ever, that  SALT  II  is  an  essential  step 
toward  nuclear  stability  and  reducing 
the  risk  of  war.  I  cannot  comprehend 
how  either  can  be  served  by  rejection 
of  SALT  II. 

Linkage 

I  would  like  now  to  shift  gears  if  I 
may  and  address  directly  seven  ques- 
tions that  have  arisen  during  the  debate 
over  SALT  II. 

I  want  to  begin  with  linkage  because 
it's  a  false  argument  and  an  argument 
that  if  carried  to  its  conclusion  would 
diminish,  not  enhance,  our  role  in  the 
world.  SALT  II  has  properly  been  de- 
bated in  the  context  of  our  foreign  pol- 
icy, for  SALT  is  the  centerpiece  of  the 
U.S. -Soviet  relationship,  and  rejection 
of  SALT  II  would  have  serious  conse- 
quences for  this  relationship  and  for 
stability  elsewhere.  But,  some  would 
link  SALT  II  to  every  world  problem, 
and  some  would  decorate  SALT  II  like 
a  Christmas  tree  with  burdens  it  neither 
merits  nor  can  endure. 

SALT  II  will  in  no  way  hinder  our 
ability  to  compete  with  the  Soviet 
Union  where  competition  is  required. 
SALT  II,  however,  will  enable  us  to 
continue  the  important  process  of 
cooperation,  a  process  in  which,  as  in 
negotiations,  one  nation's  gain  need 
not  be  the  other  nation's  loss. 

I  agree  that  we  cannot  quarantine 
SALT  entirely  from  Soviet  actions  in 
other  spheres.  But  to  burden  SALT 
with  every  aspect  of  the  Soviets  chal- 
lenge would  mean  we  could  settle 
nothing  with  the  Soviets  unless  we  set- 
tled everything.  The  nuclear  threat  to 
everyone's  security  is  so  overriding 
that  we  cannot  wait  until  that  day. 

The  Soviet  challenge  today  is  a 
challenge  to  be  met  on  many  fronts.  To 
use  SALT  to  meet  every  aspect  of  that 
challenge  is  not  only  inappropriate,  it 
means  that  we  lack  the  imagination  and 
the  will  to  use  the  many  other,  more 
effective  resources  at  our  disposal. 


30 

For  those  who  would  discard  SALT 
because  ot  Soviet  activities  elsewhere, 
I  ask:  What  would  they  olter  in  return? 
What  Soviet  challenge  could  they  meet 
in  the  nations  of  Africa  and  Asia  by 
rejecting  SALT?  Would  we  be  better 
able  to  respond  to  the  Soviet  buildup  in 
Europe  while  spending  even  larger 
sums  on  nuclear  rather  than  conven- 
tional forces? 

A  nuclear  arms  race,  with  the  gloves 
off,  would  not  just  mean  billions  and 
billions  more  for  defense,  it  would 
focus  our  attention  on  strategic  military 
rivalry  and  competition.  Our  response 
to  other  pressing  problems  —  such  as 
energy  and  economic  problems  of  our 
own  and  of  our  friends  —  could  not 
help  but  suffer,  for  strategic  security 
would  be  our  first  concern. 

A  stable  world  is  an  arena  best 
turned  to  our  advantage.  An  unre- 
strained and  tension-filled  nuclear  arms 
race  is  not  the  recipe  for  a  stable  econ- 
omy, and  it  is  not  the  recipe  for  a  sta- 
ble world. 


Soviet  Heavy  Missiles 

The  second  question  concerns  Soviet 
heavy  missiles.  In  SALT  II.  the  freeze 
on  launchers  of  modern  heavy  ICBM's 
has  been  carried  over  from  the  SALT  I 
Interim  Agreement.  Thus  the  Soviets 
can  have  up  to  308  of  such  launchers 
while  the  United  States  will  have  none. 

The  United  States  has  no  plans  for 
modern  heavy  ICBM's,  and  would  not 
develop  and  deploy  them  even  if  per- 
mitted under  the  SALT  II  treaty.  The 
MX  missile,  which  has  the  same  target 
coverage  as  the  SS-18,  better  serves 
our  military  requirements.  Thus,  the 
SALT  II  limitations  on  modern  heavy 
ICBM  launchers  have  no  effect  on  U.S. 
programs  or  plans. 

It  was  in  this  context  that  the  United 
States  gave  up  the  right  to  modern 
heavy  ICBM's  in  the  course  of  the 
SALT  I  negotiations  and  agreed  at 
Vladivostok  in  1974  to  continue  this 
situation  in  SALT  II.  At  Vladivostok, 
President  Ford  was  able  to  gain  impor- 
tant concessions  in  other  areas;  in  par- 
ticular, the  Soviets  agreed  to  drop  their 
insistence  on  limitations  on  U.S. 
European-based  aircraft  and  on  com- 
pensation for  the  nuclear  systems  of 
our  NATO  allies. 

Furthermore,  the  Soviet  right  to 
heavy  ICBM's  only  applies  to  silo- 
based  ICBM's,  an  important  consid- 
eration for  the  future  as  all  fixed  land- 
based  ICBM's  become  increasingly 
vulnerable.  Neither  side  is  permitted 
mobile  launchers  of  heavy  ICBM's, 
heavy  SLBM's  or  their  launchers,  or 
heavy  air-to-surface  ballistic  missiles 
(ASBM's).  We  could  have  retained  the 


option  to  deploy  heavy  mobile 
ICBM's,  since  this  option  was  still 
open  in  the  treaty  in  the  fall  of  1978. 
However,  if  such  an  option  had  been 
left  open,  it  was  possible  that  the 
Soviets  might  well  have  deployed  a 
heavy  mobile  ICBM,  while  the  United 
States  almost  certainly  would  not  have 
done  so.  We  weighed  this  issue  and, 
with  the  support  of  the  Joint  Chiefs  of 
Staff,  proposed  to  the  Soviets  that 
mobile  launchers  of  heavy  ICBM's, 
heavy  SLBM's  and  their  launchers,  and 
heavy  ASBM's  be  banned.  The  Soviets 
accepted  this  proposal. 

It  is  also  important  to  recognize  that 
the  treaty  sets  a  ceiling  on  the 
maximum  number  of  reentry  vehicles, 
on  ICBM's,  and,  in  particular,  a  limit  of 
10  on  all  Soviet  heavy  ICBM's  of  the 
SS-18  type.  This  has  two  conse- 
quences. First,  it  will  prevent  the 
Soviets  from  developing  and  deploving 
by  1985,  for  example,  an  SS-18  ICBM 
force  with  30  or  more  reentry  vehicles 
on  each  ICBM,  which  is  within  their 
capability  to  do.  Second,  this  fraction- 
ation limit  will  have  the  effect  of  al- 
lowing the  United  States  to  build  a 
light  ICBM  of  equivalent  effectiveness 
to  the  Soviet  heavy  ICBM's.  The  MX 
ICBM  will  be  permitted  the  same 
maximum  number  of  reentry  vehicles, 
10,  as  the  SS-18,  and  will  have  better 
accuracy.  The  MX  will  be  the  equiva- 
lent of  the  SS-18  in  both  soft  and  hard 
target  kill  capability.  Thus,  the  Soviets 
will  not  be  able  to  exploit  the  greater 
throw-weight  of  their  heavy  ICBM's  in 
any  meaningful  fashion. 

Finally,  the  problem  of  the  increas- 
ing vulnerability  of  the  U.S.  silo-based 
ICBM  force  does  not  depend  on  the 
presence  or  absence  of  Soviet  heavy 
ICBM's.  For  example,  even  if  all  the 
Soviet  heavy  ICBM's  and  their  launch- 
ers were  banned,  and  thus  subsequently 
dismantled  or  destroyed,  the  Soviets 
could  deploy  enough  SS-19's  with 
enough  hard-target-capable  reentry  ve- 
hicles to  threaten  the  entire  U.S.  Min- 
uteman  force  and  will  have  a  large 
number  of  residual  reentry  vehicles  for 
other  missions.  Thus,  a  total  ban  on  all 
Soviet  heavy  ICBM's  would  not  .solve 
the  Minuteman  vulnerability  problem. 

Soviet  Backfire  Bomber 

The  third  question  concerns  the 
Soviet  Backfire  bomber.  The  Soviet 
Union  is  currently  deploying  Backfires 
in  both  their  long-range  air  force  and  in 
naval  aviation  units.  Close  observation 
over  a  period  of  years  indicates  that 
this  bomber  is  being  deployed  for  use 
in  a  theater  or  naval  strike  role  and  is  a 
replacement  for  older  Soviet  medium 
bombers.  However,  this  aircraft  can 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 

reach  the  United  States  from  home 
bases  on  a  one-way,  high  altitude,  sub- 
sonic, unrefueled  flight. 

The  ability  to  strike  the  territory  of 
the  other  side  is  not  the  criterion  for 
determining  whether  an  aircraft  is  a 
"heavy  bomber"  and,  thus,  subject  to 
the  limitations  in  SALT  II.  For  exam- 
ple, the  United  States  has  67  FB-1 1 1's 
which  are  part  of  our  strategic  bomber 
force  and  dedicated  to  attack  on  the 
Soviet  Union.  They  are  not  limited  by 
SALT  II.  We  also  have  over  500  air- 
craft deployed  in  the  European  and 
Pacific  theaters  which  have  the  capa- 
bility to  strike  Soviet  territory. 

The  Soviet  Union  at  one  time  tried  to 
get  these  aircraft  included  in  SALT  on 
the  grounds  that  they  could  strike  the 
Soviet  Union.  With  the  firm  support  of 
our  allies,  we  adamantly  resisted  that 
position  on  the  grounds  that  these  air- 
craft, whatever  their  theoretical  capa- 
bility, are  deployed  for  theater  mis- 
sions and,  thus,  are  not  subject  to 
SALT  limitations.  The  Soviets  have 
used  this  same  argument  with  respect 
to  the  Backfire. 

Nevertheless,  the  Soviets  agreed  to 
make  certain  important  commitments 
concerning  the  Backfire.  At  the  Vienna 
summit.  President  Brezhnev  handed 
President  Carter  a  written  statement  in 
which  the  Soviet  Union  informed  the 
United  States  that  it  did  not  intend  to 
give  the  Backfire  bomber  the  capability 
of  operating  at  intercontinental  dis- 
tance, would  not  increase  the  radius  of 
action  of  the  Backfire  in  such  a  way  as 
to  enable  it  to  strike  targets  on  the  ter- 
ritory of  the  United  States,  and  did  not 
intend  to  give  it  such  a  capability  in 
any  other  manner,  including  by  in- 
night  refueling. 

This  statement  also  stated  that  the 
Soviets  would  not  increase  the  produc- 
tion rate  of  the  Backfire  over  the  cur- 
rent rate.  President  Brezhnev  con- 
firmed that  the  Backfire  production  rate 
would  not  exceed  30  per  year.  Presi- 
dent Carter,  in  return,  stated  that  the 
United  States  enters  into  the  SALT  II 
agreement  on  the  basis  of  the  commit- 
ments contained  in  the  Soviet  statement 
and  that  the  United  States  considers  the 
carrying  out  of  these  commitments  to 
be  essential  to  the  obligations  under  the 
treaty. 

These  commitments  are  consistent 
with  the  U.S.  objective  of  constraining 
the  strategic  potential  of  the  Backfire 
force,  while  continuing  to  exclude  our 
own  European-  and  Pacific-based 
theater  aircraft  from  SALT.  These 
commitments  will  inhibit  Backfire  from 
being  given  an  operational  interconti- 
nental role,  and  they  will  give  us  a 
basis  for  challenge  if  we  should  detect 
any  evidence  that  Backfire  is  being 


October  1979 


31 


given  an  intercontinental  mission.  Ad- 
,  ditionaliy,  limiting  the  number  of 
Backfires  available  means  that  Soviet 
diversion  of  Backfire  from  its  theater 
and  naval  missions  to  a  strategic  role 
would  substantially  reduce  Soviet 
strength  in  those  areas,  while  adding 
only  marginally  to  overall  Soviet 
strategic  capability. 

Finally,  under  SALT  11  we  are  per- 
mitted to  build  a  bomber  comparable  to 
Backfire  if  we  decide  that  it  is  required 
for  our  security.  Such  a  bomber  would 
not  be  counted  in  the  overall  SALT  II 
aggregate  limit,  and  it  would  be  subject 
to  none  of  the  restrictions  that  we  have 
gotten  the  Soviets  to  accept  on  Backfire 
in  SALT  11. 

Comprehensive  Proposal  of  1977 

The  fourth  question  concerns 
whether  we  should  have  insisted  on  the 
comprehensive  proposal  of  March 
1977.  I  want  to  state  at  the  beginning 
that  this  was  a  significant  proposal  that 
would  have  substantially  limited  the 
nuclear  arms  race.  But,  as  stated  re- 
cently during  the  hearings  on  SALT,  it 
takes  two  hands  to  clap.  The  Soviets 
were  simply  not  ready  for  this  kind  of 
sweeping  progress.  If  we  had  "  "stuck  to 
our  guns"  as  some  have  suggested,  the 
result  would  not  have  been  a  better 
agreement.  It  would  have  been  no 
agreement  at  all. 

March  1977  is  not  July  1979.  In 
March  1977,  the  potential  Soviet  threat 
to  our  Minuteman  ICBM's  was  impre- 
cise; today,  Soviet  missile  accuracy  has 
improved  to  the  point  that  in  the  1980"s 
the  threat  will  be  much  less  ambiguous. 
This  passage  of  time  demonstrates  how 
little  we  can  afford  to  delay.  Technol- 
ogy is  a  powerful  enemy  of  humanity's 
ability  to  place  rational  limits  on  arms. 
To  discard  the  significant  progress  we 
have  already  achieved  in  SALT  II  in 
search  of  an  ideal  agreement  would 
merely  deal  more  time  to  technology, 
its  strongest  suit. 

Those  who  advocate  a  return  to  the 
March  1977  comprehensive  proposal 
from  the  reality  of  July  1979  are  being 
unrealistic.  Now,  in  view  of  the  clear 
and  imperative  need  to  modernize  and 
make  more  survivable  our  strategic 
deterrent,  a  return  to  the  comprehen- 
sive proposal  is  out  of  the  question. 

•  The  proposal,  particularly  the 
heavy  missile  reduction  to  150  and  the 
MIRV  ICBM  reduction  to  550,  would 
not  make  it  possible  to  preserve  the  in- 
vulnerability of  Minuteman.  Even  with 
these  deep  reductions  in  Soviet 
ICBM's,  the  Soviet  SS-17  and  SS-I9 
could  still  adequately  target  our  Min- 
uteman. 

•  The  proposal  would  ban  the  de- 


velopment, testing,  and  deployment  of 
mobile  ICBM  launchers,  as  well  as  the 
development,  testing,  and  deployment 
of  new  ICBM's;  thereby,  it  would  kill 
the  MX  program  for  both  silo  and 
mobile  basing  of  any  kind. 

•  The  proposal  would  keep  Backfire 
out  of  the  SALT  II  aggregate  total  but 
with  no  limits  on  production  or  upgrade. 

•  The  proposal  would  restrict  air- 
launched  cruise  missile  range  to  2,500 
kilometers,  which  SALT  II  does  not. 

•  The  proposal  would  ban  modifica- 


stipulated.  Modifications  in  excess  of 
the  provision,  that  might  go  unde- 
tected, would  add  little  capability.  If 
the  accusation  is  that  a  5%  enhance- 
ment is  a  new  missile,  I  do  not  feel  that 
it  is  of  military  significance. 

Cruise  Missile  Range 

The  sixth  question  concerns  cruise 
missile  range  verification.  During  the 
SALT  II  negotiations,  we  have  also  had 
to  consider  the  tradeoff  between  verifi- 


SALT  II  will  in  no  way  hinder  our  ability  to  compete  with  the  Soviet 
Union  where  competition  is  required. 


tion  of  existing  ICBM's  and  therefore 
preclude  improvement  of  Minuteman  II 
and  III  and  Titan  II.  Consequently,  this 
restriction  might  prohibit  the  MK  12A 
warhead. 


New  Types  of  ICBM's 

The  fifth  question  deals  with  verifi- 
cation of  the  limitations  on  the  modern- 
ization of  ICBM's,  the  so-called  "new 
types"  provisions.  One  of  the  major 
problems  in  arms  control  is  that  the 
pace  of  technology  exceeds  the  rate  at 
which  we  can  limit  such  technology. 
SALT  II,  however,  begins  to  put 
bounds  on  the  way  in  which  ICBM's — 
the  most  threatening  of  all  systems  — 
can  be  modernized. 

Our  major  goal  in  negotiating  the 
ban  on  new  types  of  ICBM's  was  to 
force  the  Soviets  to  make  choices  in 
such  modernization.  The  precise  point 
at  which  we  drew  the  line  between  a 
modernization  of  an  existing  type  and  a 
new  type  was  somewhat  arbitrary. 
Nevertheless,  we  strongly  preferred  to 
draw  the  line  tightly  even  though  we 
would  have  higher  confidence  in 
monitoring  a  looser  but  less  meaningful 
definition  of  a  new  ICBM  type. 

The  new  types  provision  accom- 
plishes our  major  goal  and  is  an  im- 
portant step  in  limiting  technological 
advance.  This  provision  will,  for  prac- 
tical purposes,  affect  only  the  Soviet 
Union.  For  example,  if  they  replace  the 
SS-11  with  a  new,  larger  single- 
reentry  vehicle  missile,  they  will  not  be 
permitted  to  replace  the  SS-17  or 
SS-I9  with  a  new  10-reentry-vehicIe 
missile.  They  may  not  do  both  under 
SALT  II.  This  provision  will  force 
them  to  make  choices  which  they 
otherwise  would  not  have  to  make 
while  the  United  States  can  go  ahead 
with  its  one  new  type,  the  MX.  Both 
sides  will,  of  course,  be  allowed  to 
modernize  within  the  5%  constraints 


cation  considerations  and  the  need  to 
insure  that  we  would  be  able  to  take  the 
necessary  steps  under  SALT  II  to 
maintain  strategic  equality.  There  are 
uncertainties  in  verifying  the  range  of 
cruise  missiles.  Within  the  limits  of 
airframe  design,  more  fuel  and  a  lighter 
warhead  could  be  carried,  thus  in- 
creasing the  range.  We  do,  however, 
have  extensive  information  on  current 
Soviet  cruise  missiles  as  a  result  of 
monitoring  tests  over  many  years. 

It  would  be  easier  to  verify  a  total 
ban  on  all  cruise  missiles  than  it  will  be 
to  verify  some  of  the  cruise  missile 
provisions  in  the  agreement,  such  as 
those  which  temporarily  limit  the  range 
of  deployed  ground-  and  sea-launched 
cruise  missiles  to  less  than  600 
kilometers,  but  which  permit  full  de- 
velopment and  testing  of  these  mis- 
siles. The  Soviets  wanted  to  ban  all 
cruise  missiles;  we  did  not. 

However,  the  United  States  decided 
that,  on  balance,  it  was  in  the  interest 
of  our  national  security  to  be  allowed 
to  pursue  these  development  and  test 
programs,  even  though  allowing  the 
Soviets  the  same  options  may  compli- 
cate verification  in  the  future.  Mobile 
ICBM's  are  an  area  where  we  made  a 
similar  choice,  deliberately  preferring 
to  keep  important  military  options  open 
to  us  after  the  protocol  period,  at  the 
price  of  a  potentially  more  difficult 
verification  job. 

Value  of  the  SALT  Process 

The  seventh  question  concerns  value 
of  the  SALT  process  as  arms  control.  I 
do  not  measure  the  process  against  an 
ideal  we  might  want  to  achieve;  I  do 
judge  the  process  against  what  would 
have  occurred  had  the  process  never 
existed  at  all.  Is  there  anyone  who  can 
maintain  that  the  arms  race  would  not 
have  been  significantly  greater  without 
SALT  1? 


32 

If  there  is,  they  overlook  the  ABM 
[Anti-Ballistic  Missile]  Treaty  which 
has  prevented  a  destabilizing  and  ex- 
tremely expensive  arms  race  in  defen- 
sive systems  that  would  have  triggered 
an  accelerated  offensive  arms  race  as 
well.  They  overlook  the  fact  that  the 
Soviet  Union  dismantled  209  large, 
older  missiles  under  the  SALT  I 
Interim  Agreement  and  replaced  those 
missiles  with  smaller,  less  threatening 
submarine-launched  ballistic  missiles. 
They  overlook  the  fact  that  our  intelli- 
gence estimated  at  the  time  of  SALT  1 
that  the  Soviets  were  going  for  a  force 
of  over  400  heavy  ICBM's.  not  308. 
They  overlook  the  fact  that,  after  the 
Soviets  reached  the  allowed  ceiling  on 
ballistic  missile  submarines  and 
submarine-launched  ballistic  missiles 
near  the  end  of  the  5-year  term  of  the 
Interim  Agreement,  they  have  con- 
tinued to  stay  within  the  terms  of  the 
Interim  Agreement  by  dismantling 
perfectly  good  submarine-based 
launchers.  These  launchers  are  newer 
than  some  of  those  we  now  have  de- 
ployed on  our  own  submarines. 

I  have  already  stated  my  belief  that 
by  the  end  of  1985.  without  SALT  II, 
the  Soviets  would  certainly  exceed  the 
SALT  II  limits  in  enormous  numbers. 
For  instance,  current  Soviet  programs 
indicate  that  thev  will  attain  the  ceiling 
of  820  MIRV'ed  ICBM  launchers  next 
year — 5  years  before  the  end  of  the 
treaty.  I  find  it  hard  to  believe  that  the 
Soviets  would  stop  at  820  unless  SALT 
II  required  them  to. 

To  be  sure,  SALT  II  legalizes  high 
limits,  but  it  does  limit.  It  provides 
predictability;  it  provides  a  measure  of 
mutual  confidence  through  this  predic- 
tability and  through  verification  provi- 
sions that  enhance  our  intelligence;  and 
it  gives  us  time  to  modernize  our  forces 
so  that  equality  and  momentum  will  be 
our  companions  when  SALT  II  ex- 
pires. 

Conclusion 

I  would  like  to  end  on  a  personal 
note,  to  illustrate  a  basic  point  about 
SALT  II. 

In  1973  and  1974,  I  was  Director  of 
the  Joint  Staff  of  the  Joint  Chiefs  of 
Staff.  Since  the  first  time  I  had  any- 
thing to  do  with  SALT  II.  one  of  the 
fundamental  goals  we  had  in  the  Joint 
Chiefs  was  equal  aggregates  of  stra- 
tegic forces  with  freedom  to  mix  the 
forces  within  the  aggregates.  For  us  in 
the  military,  this  was  practically 
synonymous  with  SALT — equal  totals 
to  set  the  stage  for  balanced  reductions. 
The  Soviets  strongly  pushed  to  main- 
tain the  SALT  I  assymetry  in  numbers 
favorable  to  them.  I  had  a  boss  at  that 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


SALT  n—The  Basic  Choice 


by  Secretary  Vance 

Address  before  the  Council  on  World 
Affairs  in  St.  Louis,  on  August  I. 
1979.' 

I  want  to  spend  most  of  the  time  we 
have  this  evening  responding  to  your 
questions.  But  let  me  take  a  few  min- 
utes at  the  outset  to  talk  about  an  issue 
of  fundamental  importance  to  our 
country  and  our  future  —  the  second 
strategic  arms  limitation  treaty,  known 
as  SALT  II. 

I  sympathize  with  the  frustration 
many  Americans  must  feel  as  they  lis- 
ten to  the  SALT  debate  and  try  to  reach 
an  informed  judgment.  It  is  an  extraor- 
dinarily complex  subject.  It  even  has 
its  own  language.  GLCM's  and 
SLCM's,  MIRVs  and  MARV's. 
telemetry  and  throw-weight — it  must 
seem  at  times  like  a  conspiracy  to 
obscure. 

The  technical  detail  obviously  is  ter- 
ribly important.  For  we  all  know  that 
we  are  talking  about  matters  that  have  a 
profound  bearing  on  our  nation's  secu- 
rity. 

But  how  does  a  nonexpert  make  a 
reasoned  judgment?  The  first  step,  in 
my  view,  is  to  frame  the  issue  clearly: 
not  whether  the  SALT  II  treaty  solves 
all  our  security  problems  —  because  it 
doesn't;  not  whether  it  will  lull  us  into 
a  false  sense  of  security  —  because  it 
certainly  won't;  not  whether  it  achieves 
everything  we  want  in  the  way  of  arms 
control  —  because  no  single  agreement 
can. 

The  paramount  question  to  be  settled 
is  this:  Is  America  better  off  with  the 
agreement  or  without  it? 


If  the  answer  to  that  question  is  yes, 
then  we  should  ratify  the  treaty,  secure 
the  gains  we  have  made,  and  move  on 
to  SALT  III.  If  the  treaty,  as 
negotiated,  serves  our  national  interest, 
then  there  is  no  good  reason  to  risk 
unraveling  it  by  seeking  now  to  shift 
the  bargain  more  in  our  favor. 

Viewed  from  this  perspective  — 
whether  the  SALT  II  treaty  helps  us  or 
hurts  us — I  believe  the  answer  is  clear: 
It  will  be  a  substantial  help  to  the 
United  States. 

Let  me  very  briefly  discuss  the 
treaty's  contributions  to  four  aspects  of 
our  nation's  security. 

Preserving  the  Military  Balance 

First,  the  SALT  11  treaty  will  help  us 
to  preserve  the  military  balance  be- 
tween the  United  States  and  the  Soviet 
Union.  It  will  do  this  both  by  restrain- 
ing the  Soviet  military  buildup  and  by 
permitting  and  in  fact  assisting  the 
modernization  of  our  own  strategic 
forces. 

•  With  the  treaty,  both  sides  will  be 
limited,  through  1985,  to  an  equal 
overall  number  of  long-range  bombers 
and  systems  for  launching  long-range 
missiles.  The  agreed  total  —  2,250 — is 
lower  than  the  present  Soviet  level  and 
above  our  present  level.  Therefore,  to 
comply  with  the  treaty,  the  Soviets  will 
have  to  destroy  or  dismantle  about  10% 
of  their  systems.  These  will  be  the  first 
agreed  reductions  in  the  history  of  nu- 
clear arms. 

Without  the  treaty,  we  estimate  that 
by  the  end  of  1985,  the  Soviets  could 
have  3,000  of  these  systems.  With  the 


time  who  said  over  and  over  that  we're 
going  to  start  reductions  from  equality. 

We  got  the  Soviets  to  agree  to  this 
fundamental  precept.  We  got  them  to 
agree  to  a  lot  more.  For  example,  to 
lessen  ambiguity,  we  insisted,  against 
strong  Soviet  objection,  on  the  inclu- 
sion of  detailed  definitions  of  systems 
to  be  limited  under  SALT.  Article  II  of 
this  treaty  has  a  full  range  of  defini- 
tions. It  shows  how  far  we've  come. 

My  point  in  mentioning  these  two 
examples  is  not  to  maintain  that  we 
wrote  our  own  treaty.  No  agreement 
constructed  on  unilateral  gain  can  long 
endure,  even  if  it  was  possible  to 
achieve  in  the  first  place.  But  we  have 


carefully  guarded  our  interests  as  have 
the  Soviets  their  own. 

The  result  in  SALT  II  is  a  complex 
structure  of  objectives  achieved, 
mutual  advantage,  compromise,  and 
tradeoff.  But  in  the  world  of  two 
sovereign  nations — achieving  what  it  is 
possible  to  achieve  in  negotiations  on 
basic  issues  of  national  security  and 
national  survival — SALT  II  is  in  our 
favor.  D 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the  hearings  will 
be  published  by  the  cominitlee  and  will  be 
available  from  the  Superintendent  of  Docu- 
ments, U.S.  Government  Printing  Office, 
Washington,  D.C.  20402. 


October  1979 


33 


treaty,  they  can  have  750  less.  That  is 
the  choice. 

•  With  the  treaty,  there  will  be  use- 
ful limits  on  the  number  of  individual 
weapons  those  systems  can  carry.  This 
is  critically  important,  because  it  is  in 
this  area  that  the  Soviet  Union  has  the 
greatest  potential  for  dramatically  ex- 
panding its  forces  in  the  years  im- 
mediately ahead. 

Under  the  treaty,  no  missile  will  be 
able  to  carry  more  warheads  than  it  has 
been  tested  with  already.  For  example, 
each  of  the  biggest  Soviet  missiles  — 
the  SS-18's  — could  carry  20  or  30 
warheads  if  they  were  not  restrained. 
The  treaty  holds  them  to  10. 

Even  with  these  limits,  the  number 
of  warheads  will  increase.  But  the 
treaty  means  they  will  have  several 
thousand  fewer  warheads  by  the  end  of 
1985  than  we  estimate  they  could  have 
if  there  were  no  limits.  That  is  the 
choice  before  us. 

•  With  or  without  this  treaty,  we 
will  have  to  modernize  our  own 
strategic  forces.  We  will  increase  our 
defense  spending  to  assure  that  we 
maintain  forces  equivalent  to  those  of 
the  Soviet  Union  in  the  1980's.  We 
have  underway  programs  to  upgrade 
each  component  of  our  strategic 
forces — land.  sea.  and  air.  The  treaty 
will  not  interfere  with  any  of  these  pro- 
grams. In  fact,  it  aids  our  planning  by 
giving  us  a  clearer  picture  of  the  mili- 
tary threat  we  will  face  in  the  1980's 
and  by  setting  boundaries  on  what  the 
Soviets  can  do. 

Without  the  treaty,  we  would  have  to 
do  more  than  we  are  already  planning, 
because  we  would  have  to  maintain  the 
balance  at  a  higher  level.  With  the 
treaty,  therefore,  we  can  buy  greater 
security,  with  more  certainty,  at  less 
expense. 

Assuring  Verification 

Turning  to  a  second  aspect  of  our  se- 
curity, the  treaty  will  preserve  and  en- 
hance our  access  to  essential  informa- 
tion about  Soviet  strategic  programs. 

Let  me  emphasize  in  this  connection 
that  we  will  not  rely  on  trust  to  enforce 
the  SALT  II  treaty.  Our  own  monitor- 
ing systems — our  satellites,  our  radars, 
and  our  other  electronic  equipment  — 
are  fully  capable  of  detecting  any  vio- 
lations before  they  could  affect  the 
strategic  balance. 


It  is  important  to  understand  that 
whether  we  have  an  arms  control  treaty 
or  not,  we  must  be  able  to  monitor 
Soviet  military  activities  and  programs. 
The  more  we  know  about  their  forces, 
the  better  we  can  plan  our  own.  Con- 
stant monitoring  is  a  vital  security 
need. 

The  treaty  will  help  us  fulfill  this  re- 
quirement. It  bans  any  interference 
with  our  monitoring  system.  It  also 
prohibits  the  deliberate  concealment  of 
strategic  forces,  so  that  they  cannot  be 
hidden  from  our  view. 

With  the  treaty  we  will  have  con- 
tinuous, dependable  information  on  the 
nature  of  the  threat  and  what  we  must 
do  to  meet  it.  Without  the  treaty  there 
would  be  no  limits  on  Soviet  secretive- 
ness.  And  that  is  another  element  of  the 
choice. 


Supporting  U.S.  Foreign  Policy 

A  third  way  in  which  the  SALT  II 
treaty  contributes  to  our  security  is  by 
supporting  our  foreign  policies — in 
helping  us  manage  East-West  relations, 
in  sustaining  our  alliances,  and  in  en- 
hancing our  position  of  leadereship  in 
the  world. 

With  or  without  the  treaty,  our  re- 
lationship with  the  Soviet  Union  will 
continue  to  be  essentially  a  competitive 
one.  With  the  treaty,  however,  we 
strengthen  the  central  element  of  sta- 
bility in  our  relationship  —  the  mutual 
effort  to  control  nuclear  arms.  If  the 
treaty  fails,  we  will  enter  a  period  of 
greater  uncertainty  in  our  relations. 
The  prospects  for  an  all-out  arms  race 
will  increase.  And  each  crisis,  each 
confrontation  could  be  more  dangerous 
for  it  would  take  place  in  a  context  of 
unregulated  military  competition. 

Our  closest  allies  have  strongly  en- 
dorsed ratification  of  the  SALT  II 
treaty.  They  have  made  it  clear  that 
they  see  this  as  a  way  to  help  preserve 
a  balance  of  strategic  forces  and  to  help 
stabilize  East-West  relations.  Failure  to 
agree  on  the  treaty  would  shake  the 
confidence  of  our  allies  in  our  lead- 
ership. 

We  must  also  be  sensitive  to  the 
connection  between  this  treaty  and 
other  urgent  international  concerns 
such  as  the  nonproliferation  of  nuclear 
weapons.  To  put  it  bluntly,  our  cred- 
ibility is  on  the  line.  Other  nations  with 
the   capacity   to   develop   nuclear 


weapons  will  be  watching  our  decision 
on  SALT  with  particular  care  —  to  see 
if  we  accept  restraint  for  ourselves  as 
readily  as  we  urge  it  upon  others. 

If  we  cannot  agree  on  SALT,  the 
authority  of  our  position  on  a  broad 
range  of  issues,  and  especially  in  other 
arms  control  efforts,  would  be 
weakened.  With  SALT,  we  will 
strengthen  our  international  leadership 
for  peace. 

Continuing  Arms  Control  Efforts 

In  a  fourth,  and  final,  area,  the 
SALT  11  treaty  builds  the  framework 
for  continued  progress  to  curb  nuclear 
arms. 

This  treaty  is  an  important  milestone 
in  itself.  For  the  first  time  there  will  be 
agreed  reductions  in  forces.  For  the 
first  time  there  will  be  equal  limits  on 
all  basic  strategic  systems.  And  there 
will  be  some  first  limits  on  the  so- 
called  qualitative  arms  race  —  the  con- 
tinual effort  to  make  existing  systems 
even  more  deadly. 

But  1  agree  that  the  SALT  II  treaty 
does  not  go  as  far  as  we  want  in  con- 
trolling nuclear  arms.  That  is  no  rea- 
son, however,  to  reject  the  treaty.  It 
makes  no  sense  to  refuse  to  take  a  step 
forward  with  SALT  11  just  because  the 
stride  is  not  as  long  as  we  would  wish. 

The  objective  of  deeper  cuts  and 
further  limits  is  best  served  by  securing 
the  gains  we  have  made  in  SALT  11  and 
moving  on  to  the  next  stage  in  this 
continuing  process  in  SALT  III. 

Conclusion 

This  then  is  the  choice  we  face — not 
between  this  treaty  and  some  other 
agreement  we  could  imagine  that  would 
accomplish  everything.  The  issue  is 
whether  we  will  be  in  a  better  or  worse 
position,  whether  our  national  security 
will  be  enhanced  or  harmed  by  the  ap- 
proval of  this  treaty. 

As  you  listen  to  the  debate.  1  hope 
you  will  keep  that  basic  question  in 
mind.  For  1  believe  that  if  you  measure 
the  arguments  by  that  standard,  you  will 
conclude  that  we  should  ratify  the 
SALT  II  treaty.  That  is  the  choice  that 
clearly  serves  our  nation's  interest.     D 


'  Press  release  185. 


34 


EAST  ASIA:        Vic'lfiatfi  and 
indochina 


by  Richard  C.  Holbrooke 

Statement  before  the  Siihcommittee 
on  Asian  and  Pacific  Affairs  of  the 
House  Committee  on  Foreign  Affairs 
on  June  13,  1979.  Mr.  Holbrooke  is 
Assistant  Secretary  for  East  Asian  and 
Pacific  Affairs. ' 

I  welcome  this  opportunity  to  appear 
before  the  subcommittee  to  discuss 
U.S. -Vietnamese  negotiations  on  nor- 
malization of  relations  as  well  as  to 
provide  you  with  an  appraisal  of  the 
current  situation  in  Indochina. 


Normalizing  Relations 
With  Vietnam 

To  begin  with.  I  believe  that  it  would 
be  useful  to  address  brietTy  the  various 
factors  which  originally  led  the  Ad- 
ministration to  seek  improved  relations 
with  Vietnam.  Soon  after  taking  office. 
President  Carter  noted  that  it  was  his 
hope  that  the  United  States  might 
eventually  have  normal  diplomatic  re- 
lations with  all  countries. 

In  a  similar  spirit,  1  believe,  the 
Congress  has  also  addressed  the  gen- 
eral desirability  of  diplomatic  relations. 
Section  607  of  the  Foreign  Relations 
Authorization  Act,  Fiscal  Year  1979, 
states: 

The  Congress  finds  that  the  conduct  ol  diplo- 
matic relations  with  a  foreign  government  has  as 
its  principal  purpose  the  discussion  and  negotia- 
tion with  that  government  of  outstanding  issues 
and,  like  the  recognilion  of  a  foreign  govern- 
ment, does  not  in  itself  imply  approval  of  that 
government  or  of  the  political-economic  system 
It  represents. 

Hence,  it  seems  clear  that  the  Con- 
gress and  the  Administration  share  the 
general  view  that  diplomatic  relations 
are  a  valuable  tool  for  achieving  our 
larger  purposes  and  that,  in  the  absence 
of  overriding  reasons  to  the  contrary, 
the  United  States  should  have  relations 
with  all  countries. 

Turning  to  the  specific  question  of 
establishing  relations  with  Vietnam, 
the  Administration's  policy  was  influ- 
enced by  several  considerations.  With  a 
population  exceeding  50  million,  Viet- 
nam is  the  third  most  populous  Com- 
munist nation  and  maintains  one  of  the 
world's  largest  military  establishments. 
As  recent  events  in  Southeast  Asia 
have  graphically  demonstrated,  Viet- 
namese actions  toward  other  nations  in 


the  region,  peaceful  or  otherwise,  are 
of  concern  to  U.S.  policy  and  inevi- 
tably affect  our  relations  with  other 
Asian  countries. 

We,  therefore,  wanted  to  be  in  the 
best  possible  position  to  communicate 
with  the  Vietnamese  and,  if  possible, 
exert  a  positive  influence  on  their 
policies  and  actions.  In  addition,  we 
wanted  to  be  in  the  best  possible  posi- 
tion to  influence  the  Vietnamese  on 
providing  an  accounting  of  our  MIA's 
[missing  in  action],  on  allowing  family 
reunification  to  move  forward,  on  re- 
solving the  refugee  situation,  and  on 
moving  toward  the  observance  of  inter- 
nationally accepted  human  rights. 
There  is  also  the  possibility  of  trade 
and  opening  the  way  for  American 
business  to  csjmpete. 

Paris  Meetings  With  Vietnamese 

Against  this  background  and  fol- 
lowing a  report  on  the  MIA  situation 
from  the  Woodcock  Commission  which 
visited  Vietnam  in  March  1977,  Presi- 
dent Carter  announced  that  the  United 
States  was  prepared  to  enter  into 
negotiations  with  the  Vietnamese 
aimed  at  establishing  diplomatic  rela- 
tions between  our  two  countries.  Ac- 
cordingly, and  as  the  subcommittee  is 
aware,  a  U.S.  delegation,  which  I  led, 
met  with  the  Vietnamese  in  Paris  in 
May  and  June  and  later  in  December  of 
1977.  At  each  of  these  meetings,  we 
stated  the  U.S.  position  that  we  were 
prepared  to  normalize  relations  with 
Vietnam  without  preconditions:  that  we 
believed  this  could  be  best  accom- 
plished by  an  agreement  to  establish 
diplomatic  relations  and  exchange  em- 
bassies; and  that  once  relations  were 
established  and  embassies  in  place,  we 
would  lift  the  trade  embargo  we  main- 
tain against  Vietnam. 

In  addition,  as  Deputy  Assistant 
Secretary  Robert  Oakley  made  clear 
during  his  recent  testimony  before  this 
subcommittee,  we  emphasized  that  two 
factors  would  have  an  important  effect 
on  the  pace  and  timing  of  normaliza- 
tion and  on  the  substance  of  relations 
between  us:  Vietnamese  willingness  to 
follow  policies  supportive  of  peace  and 
stability  in  the  region  and  continued 
Vietnamese  efforts  to  provide  us  with 
the  fullest  possible  accounting  of  our 
missing  men. 

The  Vietnamese  refused  to  accept 
our  position   and   instead  demanded 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 

that,  linked  to  S.R.V.  [Socialist  Re- 
public of  Vietnam]  efforts  to  provide 
an  accounting  of  our  MIA's.  the  United 
States  agree  to  provide  direct  economic 
assistance  as  part  of  any  agreement  to 
establish  relations.  This  was  their  in- 
terpretation of  the  Paris  accords.  In  ad- 
dition the  Vietnamese  argued  that  the 
United  States  should  unilaterally  lift 
the  trade  embargo  before  relations  were 
established.  In  response,  we  stressed 
that  neither  the  Congress  nor  the  Ad- 
ministration believed  the  United  States 
under  any  obligation  to  provide  aid  or  a 
commitment  of  aid  to  Vietnam.  With 
regard  to  the  trade  embargo,  we  stated 
our  position  that  the  interests  of  all 
parties  would  be  best  served  when 
commerce  could  be  conducted  in  the 
context  of  normal  diplomatic  relations. 

At  the  conclusion  of  the  December 
1977  meeting,  both  sides  agreed  that 
additional  discussions  would  be  useful 
and  that  they  would  be  scheduled  at  a 
mutually  convenient  time  and  place.  As 
you  may  recall,  in  January  1978  a 
grand  jury  named  Vietnamese  Ambas- 
sador to  the  United  Nations  Dinh  Ba 
Thi  as  an  unindicted  coconspirator  in 
an  espionage  case  involving  a  U.S. 
Government  official  and  a  Vietnamese 
resident  of  this  country.  Following  our 
request  that  Ambassador  Thi  leave  the 
United  States,  there  was  a  considerable 
pause  in  communications  from  the 
Vietnamese. 

Soon  after  the  conclusion  of  the  es- 
pionage case  in  May,  however,  the 
Vietnamese  informed  us  of  their  will- 
ingness to  accept  our  invitation,  ex- 
tended in  Paris  the  previous  year,  to 
send  a  team  of  experts  to  our  MIA 
identification  facilities  in  Hawaii.  Fol- 
lowing the  successful  conclusion  of 
this  visit  in  July,  the  Vietnamese  again 
began  to  indicate  a  desire  to  meet  with 
U.S.  representatives  and  hinted  pub- 
licly and  to  other  governments  that  they 
might  be  on  the  verge  of  dropping  their 
demand  that  U.S.  economic  assistance 
be  part  of  an  agreement  to  normalize 
relations.  Vietnamese  statements  in 
this  regard  were  somehwat  ambiguous, 
however.  There  were  no  official  com- 
munications on  the  subject  and  a  con- 
gressional delegation  that  visited  Hanoi 
in  August  was  unable  to  elicit  a  direct 
statement  that  the  Vietnamese  were  no 
longer  demanding  an  advance  commit- 
ment on  aid. 


Continuing  Discussions 

We  next  met  with  the  Vietnamese  in 
New  York  for  several  rounds  of  infor- 
mal discussions  in  the  fall  of  last  year. 
Initially,  the  Vietnamese  appeared  re- 
luctant to  abandon  their  position  on  aid 
but  eventually  stated  flatly  that  they 


October  1979 

would  no  longer  demand  a  U.S.  com- 
mitment on  bilateral  economic  assist- 
ance as  a  quid  pro  quo  for  normaliza- 
tion. In  addition,  the  Vietnamese  indi- 
cated they  would  continue  to  make  ef- 
forts to  provide  us  with  an  MIA  ac- 
counting. For  our  part,  we  reiterated 
our  belief  that  the  Vietnamese  should 
be  doing  more  to  provide  us  with  an 
accounting  of  our  MIA's.  As  Bob 
Oakley  indicated  during  his  testimony 
last  month,  when  troublesome  de- 
velopments of  concern  to  us  began  to 
appear  in  Vietnamese  actions  and 
statements  during  the  fall,  we  asked  the 
Vietnamese  for  clarification. 

We  requested  that  the  Vietnamese 
inform  us  of  their  intentions  toward 
Kampuchea,  given  the  massive  S.R.V. 
troop  buildup  then  underway  along 
their  border  with  that  country,  in- 
creasingly harsh  Vietnamese  public 
statements  attacking  the  Kampuchean 
Government  and  calling  upon  the 
Kampuchean  people  to  rise  up  in  revolt 
against  it.  and  announced  Vietnamese 
support  for  the  so-called  National  Sal- 
vation Front  as  the  preferred  replace- 
ment government.  In  so  doing,  we 
made  clear  that  we  were  not  taking 
sides  in  Vietnam's  dispute  with  Kam- 
puchea, that  we  ourselves  had  long 
been  at  the  forefront  of  those  nations 
denouncing  the  Pol  Pot  government  for 
its  terrible  human  rights  abuses,  and 
that  we  were  not  supporting  that  re- 
gime. We  stressed,  however,  that  even 
that  regime's  unparalleled  crimes 
would  not  justify  a  Vietnamese  military 
violation  of  Kampuchean  sovereignty 
and  replacement  of  the  government  by 
force.  We  urged  that  the  dispute  be 
settled  peacefully. 

In  this  regard,  we  repeated  that 
Vietnam's  willingness  to  follow 
policies  supportive  of  peace  and  stabil- 
ity in  the  region  and  its  attitudes  and 
actions  toward  its  neighbors  constituted 
an  important  factor  influencing  our 
ability  to  proceed  toward  normaliza- 
tion. We  also  asked  for  clarification  of 
the  implications  of  the  November  1 
S.R.  V. -Soviet  Treaty  of  Peace, 
Friendship  and  Cooperation  in  light  of 
previous  Vietnamese  assurances  that 
they  would  follow  an  "■  independent" 
foreign  policy  and  never  allow  foreign 
bases  on  their  territory. 

And,  we  expressed  deep  concern 
over  the  growing  refugee  exodus  from 
Vietnam — including  reliable  reports 
that  Vietnamese  officials  were  forcing 
refugees  to  pay  bribes  to  arrange  their 
departure — the  resulting  costs  in  human 
suffering  and  lives,  and  the  massive 
burdens  imposed  upon  other  Southeast 
Asian  countries.  We  noted  that  the 
United  States  did  not  want  to  see 
emigration  from  Vietnam  cease  but 
suggested  that  a  more  humane  approach 


which  made  provision  for  regularized 
departures  at  a  rate  causing  less 
hardship  and  loss  of  life  would  be  in 
the  interest  of  all  concerned. 

The  Vietnamese  responded  that  their 
treaty  with  Moscow  was  a  natural  con- 
sequence of  the  long  friendship  be- 
tween the  Soviet  and  Vietnamese 
peoples,  that  Vietnamese  attachment  to 
their  nation's  "independence  and 
sovereignty"  ruled  out  any  Soviet 
bases  on  their  territory,  and  that  the 
treaty  was  not  directed  at  any  third  na- 
tion. 

Regarding  their  intentions  toward 
Kampuchea,  they  stated  that  the 
S.R.V,  troop  buildup  was  purely  de- 
fensive and  gave  assurances  that  Hanoi 
had  no  aggressive  plans  toward  the 
country.  The  Vietnamese  also  asserted 
that  they  were  powerless  to  control  the 
flight  of  "malcontents"  who  were  not 
willing  to  work  to  build  a  new  Vietnam 
and  denied  that  government  officials 
were  facilitating  departures  in  return 
for  bribes.  In  light  of  these  responses, 
movement  toward  normalization  came 
to  a  halt,  as  we  awaited  further  de- 
velopments. 

On  December  25.  the  Vietnamese 
mounted  a  major  invasion  of  Kam- 
puchea and  now  occupy  large  areas  of 
that  country.  They  have  shown  no  in- 
clination to  heed  repeated  calls  by  large 
segments  of  the  international  commu- 
nity to  withdraw  their  troops  and  per- 
mit the  establishment  of  a  neutral  re- 
gime representative  of  the  Kampuchean 
people. 

In  addition,  they  have  demonstrated 
no  willingness  to  relent  in  their  harsh 
domestic  policies,  which  have 
prompted  ever-increasing  numbers  of 
their  citizens  to  flee,  with  heavy  loss  of 
life,  and  have  imposed  heavy  burdens 
on  the  other  nations  of  the  region.  Over 
60,000  refugees  from  Vietnam  reached 
safehaven  in  Southeast  Asia  last 
month — a  record. 

As  1  noted  earlier,  we  had  repeatedly 
stressed  to  the  Vietnamese  that  their 
policies  and  actions  toward  their 
neighbors  would  affect  the  pace  and 
timing  of  our  ability  to  normalize  rela- 
tions. The  major  reason  we  had  sought 
to  normalize  relations  was  to  enhance 
regional  peace  and  stability.  Since  re- 
cent events  had  the  opposite  effect  and 
endangered  regional  peace  and  stabil- 
ity, our  caution  in  not  moving  further 
last  fall  was  justified.  It  is  hard  to  envi- 
sion progress  toward  normalization 
under  existing  circumstances,  although 
we  do  not  preclude  continuing  informal 
discussions  from  time  to  time  in  which 
we  exchange  views  on  regional  and 
bilateral  matters. 

In  addition  to  addressing  the  record 
of  our  negotiations  with  the  Viet- 
namese, the  subcommittee  has  asked 


35 


that  I  provide  you  with  an  appraisal  of 
certain  other  aspects  of  the  Indochina 
situation.  Before  doing  so,  however,  I 
would  like  to  elaborate  somewhat  on 
my  earlier  comments  regarding  Viet- 
namese refugee  policies. 


Vietnamese  Refugees 

It  appears  clear  that  the  Vietnamese 
Government  has  embarked  upon  a  de- 
liberate effort  to  rid  itself  of  those  ele- 
ments of  society  which  it  considers  un- 
desirable. Refugee  reports  indicate  that 
Vietnamese  of  Chinese  extraction,  in- 
cluding those  whose  families  have  been 
in  Vietnam  for  generations,  have  been 
under  increasing  pressure  since  the  end 
of  last  year  either  to  depart  the  country 
or  face  the  prospect  of  having  their 
property  confiscated  and  being  shipped 
off  to  harsh  "new  economic  zones," 
areas  which  Le  Monde  has  termed  the 
"Vietnamese  Gulag." 

While  the  Vietnamese  Government 
has  increased  its  pressure  on  Viet- 
namese of  Chinese  extraction,  Hanoi 
officials  have  also  apparently  made  it 
easier  for  this  group  of  people  to  depart 
the  country.  Numerous  reports  indicate 
that  officials  are  registering  ethnic 
Chinese,  finding  them  boats,  and  tow- 
ing them  out  to  sea — all  for  a  fee. 
There  appears  to  be  a  sliding  scale  of 
bribes  to  be  paid  in  order  to  acquire 
passage  on  a  boat  leaving  the  country, 
with  ethnic  Chinese  eligible  for  a  lesser 
bribe  than  ethnic  Vietnamese. 

You  undoubtedly  have  read  recent 
articles  out  of  Hong  Kong  reporting 
details  on  the  Vietnamese  traffic  in 
refugees.  Our  own  information  con- 
firms such  reports.  Ethnic  Vietnamese 
are  also  fleeing  the  country  in  ever  in- 
creasing numbers,  with  some  passing 
themselves  off  as  ethnic  Chinese,  and 
others  taking  any  opportunity  available 
to  them — no  matter  how  dangerous. 

So  far  this  year,  131,299  boat  refu- 
gees from  Vietnam  have  reached  tem- 
porary havens  in  nations  of  first 
asylum,  compared  to  16,078  by  this 
time  last  year.  Heretofore  this  burden 
had  largely  fallen  on  Malaysia  and 
Thailand,  but  now  this  exodus  has 
moved  eastward  as  well,  and  the  num- 
bers reaching  Hong  Kong  have  leapt 
from  some  17,000  in  haven  in  April  to 
over  50,000  there  today.  Although  the 
numbers  perishing  at  sea  will  never  be 
known  with  certainty,  they  are  esti- 
mated in  the  range  of  between  40-70%. 

This  subcommittee  with  its  close 
scrutiny  of  the  situation  is  well  aware 
of  the  policies  we  have  followed  to 
provide  assistance  to  the  countries  of 
first  asylum  and  to  resettle  refugees  in 
this  country.  Of  some  300,000  refugees 
resettled  since  1975,  the  United  States 


36 


has  taken  over  200,000,  and  we  are 
currently  committed  to  taking  an  addi- 
tional 7.000  per  month. 

This  is  not  to  say  that  others  have  not 
shared  this  burden.  They  have,  and, 
indeed,  on  a  per  capita  basis,  the  Aus- 
tralians have  resettled  more  refugees 
than  have  we.  Nevertheless,  the  stag- 
gering numbers  of  refugees  now 
scrambling  ashore  in  Southeast  Asia, 
swelling  the  numbers  already  there,  re- 
quires all  nations  to  do  more.  The 
Japanese,  for  example,  have  been  step- 
ping up  their  financial  contributions  to 
the  refugee  resettlement  efforts  of  the 
UNHCR  [U.N.  High  Commissioner  on 
Refugees]  and  other  organizations  as 
well  as  for  the  newly  approved  refugee 
resettlement  center  in  Indonesia.  They 
have  also  agreed  to  resettle  their  first 
small  group  of  refugees.  We  are  work- 
ing with  them,  and  we  hope  that  they 
will  be  able  to  do  even  more. 

Nations  in  Europe  like  France  and 
Germany  and  our  Canadian  neighbors 
have  been  forthcoming  in  their  re- 
sponse to  this  international  crisis,  but 
we  hope  that  they  too  can  do  more.  We 
are  exploring  means  to  resettle  refugees 
in  other  areas,  like  Latin  America,  and 
in  particular  are  looking  at  the  feasibil- 
ity of  a  suggestion  you  made,  Mr. 
Chairman  [Lester  L.  Wolff  of  New 
York],  about  the  possibility  of  interna- 
tional financial  institution  funds  being 
channeled  to  development  projects  for 
refugee  resettlement  in  these  areas. 

The  Vietnamese  Government  re- 
cently announced  that  it  will  permit  its 
citizens  to  depart  the  country  legally 
for  family  reunification  or  to  "take 
employment  abroad."  Under  this  pro- 
posal, up  to  10,000  people  per  month 
would  be  allowed  to  leave  with 
UNHCR  assistance  provided  their 
names  match  those  on  lists  submitted 
by  other  governments.  To  the  extent 
that  such  a  plan  would  alleviate  the 
human  suffering  of  potential  refugees 
and  the  burdens  now  imposed  on  other 
countries  in  its  absence,  it  would  be 
welcome.  However,  it  would  not  solve 
the  problem  of  those  already  in  refugee 
camps,  who  must  receive  our  im- 
mediate attention.  Nor  is  it  likely  to 
stem  the  tide  of  people  who  are  willing 
to  risk  the  sea  on  their  own  rather  than 
test  the  sincerity  of  the  Vietnamese 
Government. 

We  are  prepared  to  accept  family 
reunification  cases  directly  from  Viet- 
nam but  we  wish  to  review  carefully 
the  results  of  the  recent  UNHCR  mis- 
sion to  Hanoi  before  making  any  de- 
finitive decision  on  how  to  proceed. 
We  remain  committed  as  a  first  priority 
to  taking  refugees  from  the  countries  of 
first  asylum. 

To  sum  up  on  refugees,  we  believe 


that  the  essential  reason  for  the  refugee 
flow  so  dangerous  to  refugees  and  so 
upsetting  to  other  countries,  is  the 
Vietnamese  Government's  own  internal 
policies,  its  disregard  for  human  rights, 
and  its  responsibilities  to  its  people 
under  the  U.N.  Charter.  We  hope  that 
the  international  community  will  make 
clear  to  the  Vietnamese  that  it  expects 
the  S.R.V.  to  meet  its  obligations  to 
apply  humane  policies  to  its  own 
people  rather  than  continuing  condi- 
tions which  force  them  to  flee. 

While  it  normally  might  be  argued 
that  the  domestic  policies  of  the  Viet- 
namese Government  are  an  internal 
matter,  it  seems  clear  that  the  conse- 
quences of  these  policies  in  terms  of 
lives  lost  and  burdens  unilaterally  im- 
posed on  Vietnam's  neighbors  are  of 
legitimate  concern  to  all  nations.  We 
wish  to  see  free  emigration  from  Viet- 
nam but  under  conditions  that  are  not 
so  desperate  that  people  flee  knowing 
half  of  them  may  die  in  the  attempt. 

Soviet  Presence  in  Vietnam 

I  should  now  like  to  address  those 
other  aspects  of  the  present  situation  in 
the  region  on  which  the  subcommittee 
has  invited  my  comments.  These  in- 
clude the  Soviet  presence  in  Vietnam, 
Vietnamese-Chinese  relations,  the  situ- 
ation in  Kampuchea,  and  the  effect  of 
recent  events  on  Thailand. 

In  preparing  my  remarks  on  these 
subjects,  I  was  struck  by  the  role  that 
deep-seated  ethnic  and  historical  an- 
tagonisms have  had  in  the  current  situ- 
ation. In  virtually  every  case,  the  cur- 
rent conflicts  reflect  centuries  of 
rivalry  and  hatred,  which  Communist 
"internationalism"  has  been  unable  to 
put  to  rest.  Indeed,  the  introduction  of 
Soviet  power  and  Moscow's  rivalry 
with  Beijing  into  the  region  have  made 
this  most  recent  round  of  Indochina 
conflicts  much  more  difficult  to  re- 
solve. 

Developments  in  Vietnam  over  the 
last  12  months  have  resulted  in  the  ex- 
pansion of  Soviet  influence.  After  a 
lengthy  courtship,  Hanoi  entered 
COMECON,  the  Communist  economic 
organization,  last  June  1978.  In 
November  1978,  Vietnam  signed  a 
Treaty  of  Peace,  Friendship  and  Coop- 
eration, which  stipulated  that  if  either 
country  were  threatened  with  attack, 
they  would  "immediately  consult  each 
other  with  a  view  toward  eliminating 
the  threat."  As  events  unfolded,  this 
treaty  provided  an  important  measure 
of  security  to  Hanoi  for  its  Christmas 
invasion  of  Kampuchea. 

Following  the  Vietnamese  invasion 
of  Kampuchea  and  the  Chinese  attack 
on   Vietnam,  the  Soviet  military  pres- 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 

ence  in  Vietnam  has  grown  rapidly,  in- 
cluding large-scale  military  supply  and 
logistics  support  of  Vietnamese  Armed 
Forces  and  use  by  Soviet  ships  and  air- 
craft of  Vietnamese  military  facilities. 
Soviet  personnel  support  both  the  de- 
livery of  military  equipment  to  Viet- 
nam and  the  movement  of  Vietnamese 
personnel  and  equipment  to  various 
points  throughout  Indochina,  repre- 
senting a  significant  new  development. 
Use  of  ports  began  on  April  1  when  a 
Soviet  destroyer  visited  Da  Nang  and, 
most  recently,  a  Soviet  diesel  subma- 
rine and  submarine  tender  visited  Cam 
Ranh  Bay.  Soviet  TU-95's  —  long 
range  reconnaissance  aircraft  —  have 
used  Vietnamese  facilities  at  Da  Nang 
on  at  least  two  occasions.  The  Soviets 
and  the  Vietnamese  explain  these  ac- 
tivities as  normal  aspects  of  relations 
between  the  two  countries  made  neces- 
sary by  the  threat  from  China. 

Use  of  Vietnamese  territory  and 
facilities  gives  the  Soviet  an  increased 
reconnaissance  and  intelligence  collec- 
tion capability,  primarily  against  China 
but  also  against  U.S.  and  other  military 
forces  in  the  area.  This  is  a  source  of 
serious  concern  to  us  and  to  most  Asian 
countries,  not  only  militarily  but  be- 
cause of  the  dangers  to  the  region  from 
increased  great  power  rivalry  and  the 
consequent  risk  of  increasing  tensions. 

S.R.V.-P.R.C.  Negotiations 

As  the  subcommittee  is  aware,  the 
Vietnamese  and  Chinese  recently  con- 
cluded a  first  round  of  negotiations  in 
Hanoi  aimed  at  settling  their  differ- 
ences. We  found  the  agreement  to  talk 
a  hopeful  sign,  but  the  talks  failed  to 
move  the  two  sides  toward  any  sort  of 
accommodation.  Vietnam  has  stressed 
limited  measures  to  stabilize  the 
border — mutual  withdrawal  of  forces 
from  the  border  region,  creation  of  a 
demilitarized  zone,  and  prisoner 
exchanges — while  making  only  pass- 
ing reference  to  the  broader  range  of 
S.R.V.-P.R.C.  relations. 

The  Chinese,  for  their  part,  have  in- 
sisted instead  that  "crucial  and  funda- 
mental problems."  such  as  Vietnamese 
ties  to  the  Soviet  Union,  Vietnamese 
troops  in  Kampuchea  and  Laos,  and 
conflicting  claims  in  the  Paracels  and 
Spratlys,  will  have  to  be  resolved  be- 
fore relations  can  be  improved.  Al- 
though discussions  are  likely  to  resume 
later  this  month  in  Beijing,  the  under- 
lying differences  in  the  Vietnamese  and 
Chinese  positions  appear  to  offer  little 
hope  for  rapid  resolution.  It  would  ap- 
pear that,  over  the  near  term  at  least, 
Chinese-Vietnamese  relations  will  be 
marked  by  acrimony,  distrust,  and  in- 
direct combat,  such  as  that  taking  place 


October  1979 

in  Kampuchea,  but  that  a  second  major 
round  of  direct  fighting  across  the  bor- 
der is  probably  not  imminent. 

Kampuchea 

While  talks  continue,  the  Viet- 
namese are  showing  no  sign  of  waver- 
ing in  their  determination  to  eliminate 
remaining  Pol  Pot  resistance  forces 
from  Kampuchea.  Vietnamese  forces 
have  been  able  to  clear  significant  areas 
of  major  resistance  concentrations,  re- 
lying on  their  superior  mobility  and  fire 
power  to  locate  and  drive  major  Kam- 
puchean  forces  into  isolated  redoubts 
and  in  some  instances  across  the  border 
into  Thailand.  Kampuchean  resistance 
forces  appear  to  have  tried  to  avoid 
contact  in  order  to  conserve  their 
strength  until  the  rainy  season  necessi- 
tates a  slow-down  in  Vietnamese  of- 
fensive actions.  However,  resistance 
forces  have  apparently  been  able  to 
mount  limited  counterattacks  against 
isolated  Vietnamese  units  and  to  deny 
the  Vietnamese  unimpeded  use  of  roads 
and  highways,  especially  during  the 
hours  of  darkness. 

With  the  beginning  of  the  rainy  sea- 
son, the  Vietnamese  now  face  the  task 
of  maintaining  control  over  newly  won 
areas  while  at  the  same  time  attempting 
to  extend  admmistrative  control  beyond 
the  main  towns  and  cities  where  the 
Heng  Samrin  regime  now  has  a  pres- 
ence. In  this  latter  regard,  the  Viet- 
namese face  a  formidable  challenge, 
given  historical  Khmer- Vietnamese 
antagonisms  and  the  acute  shortage  of 
experienced  Kampuchean  administra- 
tive cadre,  many  of  whom  were  killed 
by  the  Pol  Pot  regime. 

As  in  all  wars,  the  fighting  has 
brought  further  death,  destruction,  and 
severe  economic  dislocation  to  the 
most  unfortunate  country  of  Kam- 
puchea. People  moved  westward  by  Pol 
Pot  years  ago  are  being  trucked  back  by 
the  Vietnamese  to  eastern  regions. 
Urban  residents  moved  to  the  coun- 
tryside under  Pol  Pot  are  trying  to  re- 
turn to  the  cities,  although  the  Viet- 
namese appear  to  be  preventing  them 
from  entering.  People  caught  up  in  the 
fighting  move  randomly  seeking  safety, 
some  cross  the  border  into  Thailand, 
others  to  areas  where  the  fighting  is 
less  intense. 

Obviously,  there  has  been  inattention 
to  seasonal  agricultural  tasks.  Har- 
vesting early  in  the  year  was  not  com- 
pleted. Planting,  in  advance  of  the 
rainy  season,  may  have  been  only  par- 
tially initiated  depending  upon  the  re- 
gion. Seed  stocks  may  have  been  con- 
sumed by  migrant  refugees  or  de- 
stroyed by  contending  forces.  As  a  re- 
sult, certain  normally  rich  agricultural 


areas  are  beset  by  problems  which 
could  mean  famine  later  this  year  for 
the  Kampuchean  people  in  these  re- 
gions. We,  and  other  concerned  nations 
and  international  agencies  like  the 
ICRC  [International  Committee  of  the 
Red  Cross],  UNICEF,  and  the  World 
Food  Program,  are  carefully  monitoring 
the  situation  to  determine  how  great  the 
need  and  how  best  to  respond. 

Any  response  to  a  food  crisis  in 
Kampuchea  will  have  to  take  into  ac- 
count two  major  factors.  First,  food 
should  be  made  available  to  Kampu- 
cheans  in  all  parts  of  the  country  — 
those  under  control  of  the 
Vietnamese/Heng  Samrin  forces,  those 
in  areas  controlled  by  Pol  Pot,  as  well 
as  those  who  remain  in  contested  or 
peaceful  areas.  This  can  be  assured 
only  through  some  sort  of  an  interna- 
tional presence  and  monitoring.  Should 
a  major  food  shortage  develop  and 
should  these  prerequisites  be  realiza- 
ble, the  United  States  would  also  have 
to  consider  what  it  could  do  to  provide 
appropriate  assistance,  given  the  legis- 
lative restrictions  on  aid  to  Kam- 
puchea. We  are  already  helping  the 
ICRC  which  is  providing  essential  food 
and  medicines  to  refugees  on  the  Thai 
side  of  the  border. 

Concerning  the  political  situation  in 
Kampuchea,  the  United  States  has  re- 
peatedly made  clear  that  it  supports  the 
concept  of  an  independent  system  of 
states  in  Southeast  Asia,  that  this  sys- 
tem should  include  an  independent  and 
stable  Kampuchea,  and  that  we  would 
be  ready  to  support  an  international 
conference  to  try  to  achieve  such  an 
outcome.  At  the  same  time,  we  have 
stressed  that  we  believe  that  the  people 
of  Kampuchea  deserve  at  long  last  a 
government  which  is  representative  of 
their  aspirations  and  which  respects 
their  human  rights.  In  our  view,  neither 
the  Vietnamese-backed  Heng  Samrin 
regime  nor  the  Pol  Pot  government 
satisfy  these  criteria. 

We  remain  prepared  to  support  ini- 
tiatives aimed  at  bringing  about  an  in- 
ternationally facilitated  end  to  the 
fighting.  And  although  the  parties  di- 
rectly involved  have  so  far  demon- 
strated no  willingness  to  accept  inter- 
national involvement,  the  nature  of  the 
conflict  and  the  dangers  which  it  poses 
to  the  stability  of  Southeast  Asia  as  a 
whole  make  it  imperative  that  we  con- 
tinue to  work  for  a  solution.  We  have 
discussed  these  matters  with  all  the 
governments  involved,  including  China 
and  the  Soviet  Union. 

Thailand 

Of  all  of  the  Southeast  Asian  na- 
tions, Thailand  has  been  the  most  seri- 


37 

ously  affected  by  the  fighting  in  Kam- 
puchea. During  recent  months,  as  a 
direct  result  of  the  contlict,  Thailand's 
refugee  burden  has  increased  by  the 
amount  of  perhaps  100,000  Kampu- 
cheans  at  various  times.  Many  of  these 
are  of  Chinese  origin,  deliberately  ex- 
pelled by  Vietnamese  troops.  The  re- 
sult has  been  an  immense  new  political 
and  economic  problem,  given  the  in- 
ability of  the  international  community 
to  resettle  many  of  the  200,000  refu- 
gees already  in  Thailand.  Worse,  it  has 
created  a  security  problem  since  it  is 
most  difficult   to  distinguish   between 


Issue  of 
1/.S.-S.R.V. 

Reflations 


DEPARTMENT  STATEMENT, 
AUG.  9,  1979' 

We  have  read  press  reports  quoting 
Vietnamese  Vice  Minister  Nguyen  Co 
Thach  as  stating  that  talks  toward  nor- 
malization of  relations  between  the 
United  States  and  the  Socialist  Repub- 
lic of  Vietnam  (S.R.V.)  are  now 
underway. 

I  want  to  state  that  there  have  been 
no  talks,  secret  or  otherwise,  on  nor- 
malization of  relations  between  the 
United  States  and  Vietnam  since  last 
fall.  As  we  indicated  at  that  time, 
Vietnam's  actions  toward  its  neighbors 
and  its  policies  toward  its  own  people 
resulting  in  a  flood  of  refugees  have 
made  it  impossible  for  us  to  continue 
with  normalization. 

We  have  made  this  position  clear  to 
the  Vietnamese  both  publicly  and  we 
have  made  it  plain  to  them  privately. 
We  have  had  and  continue  to  have 
contacts  with  Vietnamese  officials  on 
matters  which  are  not  related  to  the 
question  of  normalization  of  relations. 

It  is  not  true,  however,  that  renewed 
movement  toward  normalization  of  re- 
lations is  underway.  Our  ultimate  ob- 
jective remains  unchanged.  But  in  the 
circumstances  which  prevail  in  the  re- 
gion at  the  moment  and  which  circum- 
stances prevail  because  of  Vietnam's 
policies  and  actions,  this  is  not  an  ap- 
propriate time  to  move  forward  on  this 
particular  matter.  D 


'Read  to  news  correspondents  by  acting  De- 
partment spokesman  Tom  Reston  in  the  name  of 
and  on  behalf  of  Assistant  Secretary  for  East 
Asian  and  Pacific  Affairs  Richard  C.  Holbrooke. 


38 

Pol  Pot  forces  and  supporters  on  the 
one  hand  and  actual  refugees  on  the 
other.  Large  concentrations  of  these 
persons  on  the  border  could  become  a 
provocation  for  the  Vietnamese  to  send 
tbrces  inti>  Thailand,  expanding  the 
war  to  a  dangerous  level. 

The  lighting  in  Kampuchea  has  also 
forced  the  Royal  Thai  Government  to 
reevaluate  its  military  posture  and  to 
take  steps  to  upgrade  its  armed  forces. 
Thailand  is  accordingly  increasing  its 
purchases  i>f  military  equipment  from 
the  LInited  States  and  other  suppliers. 

The  Thai  Government  has  announced 
a  policy  of  neutrality  toward  the  con- 
tending forces  in  Kampuchea.  The  task 
is  more  difficult  than  might  be  sup- 
posed in  view  of  the  long  and,  in 
places,  rugged  Thai  border  with  Kam- 
puchea and  the  ebb-and-tlow  of  mili- 
tary operations  and  refugee  migrations 
which  either  threaten  or  spillover  into 
Thai  territory.  The  tact  that  the  Pol  Pot 
forces  are  generally  backed  up  to  the 
Thai  border  by  Vietnamese  pressure 
tends  to  give  an  appearance  of  Thai 
partiality.  However,  when  Heng  Samrin 
groups  are  similarly  exposed,  the  Thai 
have  followed  a  consistent  policy  of 
allowing  both  to  return  to  Kampuchea 
at  a  safe  point  along  the  border. 

Thailand's  relations  with  China  im- 
proved markedly  during  1977-78 
well  in  advance  of  the  Vietnamese  in- 
vasion of  Kampuchea.  This  was  in 
keeping  with  the  policy  of  the  Thai 
Government  to  improve  its  relations 
with  all  of  its  neighbors  including 
Vietnam,  Laos,  and  Kampuchea. 
Thailand  also  sought  to  confirm  its  re- 
lations with  other  countries  having 
interests  in  the  region  and  Prime 
Minister  Kriangsak  visited  Tokyo, 
Moscow,  and  Washington  as  well  as 
Beijing.  We  believe  Prime  Minister 
Kriangsak  is  trying  to  pursue  a  policy 
of  neutrality  in  a  very  difficult  situation 
with   numerous  conflicting  pressures. 


We  strongly  support  him   in  these  ef- 
forts. 

In  recognition  of  this  situation,  as 
well  as  recognition  of  our  longstanding 
ties  by  treaty  and  friendship  to  Thai- 
land, the  President  assured  Prime 
Minister  Kriangsak  during  his  visit  to 
Washington  last  February  that  the 
United  States  supports  the  integrity  of 
Thailand  as  a  stable,  secure,  and 
peaceful  nation  in  Southeast  Asia. 

Conclusion 

I  would  like  to  stress  that  the  United 
States  is  committed  to  a  stable,  peace- 
ful system  of  nation  states  in  Southeast 
Asia,  Communist  or  non-Communist. 
We  seek  improved  relations  with 
former  adversaries  in  this  context  and 
in  pursuit  of  this  objective.  We  will 
also  continue  to  support,  in  this  con- 
text, the  security  and  peaceful  de- 
velopment of  our  ASEAN  [Association 
of  South  East  Asian  Nations]  friends, 
particularly  that  of  Thailand. 

The  suspicions  of  the  ASEAN  states 
over  the  ultimate  intentions  of  the 
Communist  powers  in  the  region,  in- 
cluding the  Soviet  Union,  have  been 
amplified  by  the  current  conflicts.  As  a 
case  in  point,  the  recent  overtures  made 
by  Vietnamese  Prime  Minister  Pham 
Van  Dong  through  a  third  party 
suggesting  nonaggression  pacts  be- 
tween Vietnam  and  the  ASEAN  coun- 
tries were  greeted  with  a  substantial 
degree  of  skepticism.  And  the  agree- 
ment on  refugees  between  Hanoi  and 
the  UNHCRis  greeted  with  equal 
skepticism  in  light  of  its  irrelevance  to 
the  main  refugee  problem. 

Vietnam  is  a  country  rich  in  natural 
resources  with  a  talented  and  produc- 
tive population.  If  the  Vietnamese 
people  were  able  to  turn  their  energies 
to  developing  their  economic  potential, 
instead  of  serving  policies  that  bring 
instability    and    warfare    to   their 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 

neighbors  and  provide  a  foothold  for 
Soviet  military  and  political  penetration 
of  the  area,  they  could  begin  to  share 
the  benefits  of  the  extraordinary  growth 
that  now  characterizes  most  of  South- 
east Asia.  We,  and  I  believe  all  of  the 
countries  in  the  area,  would  welcome 
the  constructive  role  that  Vietnam  can 
play.  No  one  who  wishes  the  peoples 
of  Southeast  Asia  well  can  have  an 
interest  in  encouraging  its  division  into 
hostile  camps.  The  basic  choice  is  up 
to  Hanoi,  whose  current  policies  have 
caused  massive  human  suffering  for  the 
peoples  of  Indochina  and  serious  prob- 
lems for  its  non-Communist  neighbors. 

The  continued  emphasis  of  the 
ASEAN  countries  on  economic  and  so- 
cial development  is  the  best  long-run 
defense  against  destabilizing  influences 
at  home  or  threats  from  outside.  In  the 
meantime,  they  have  each  undertaken 
in  varying  degrees  to  strengthen  their 
individual  military  capabilities  as  well 
as  continuing  their  economic  progress. 
They  are  also  looking  to  their  friends 
for  support. 

It  is  therefore  highly  significant  that 
Secretary  Vance  will  be  traveling  to  the 
region  [July  1-3,  1979]  to  meet  with 
the  ASEAN  foreign  ministers  next 
month.  His  presence  there  will  be  sym- 
bolic of  America's  determination  that. 
as  President  Carter  said  at  Georgia 
Tech,  we  will  "".  .  .  stand  by  our 
friends,  we  will  honor  our  commit- 
ments, and  we  will  protect  the  vital 
interests  of  the  United  States  .  .  .  ." 
No  one  should  doubt  that  the  continued 
stability  and  prosperity  of  the  ASEAN 
nations  is  of  great  importance  to  us.  D 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the  hearings  will 
be  published  by  the  commillee  and  will  be  avail- 
able from  the  Superintendent  of  Documents, 
U.S.  Government  Printing  Office.  Washington. 
DC.  20402. 


October  1979 


39 


Continuing  Efforts 
To  Account  for  illM's 


by  Robert  B.  Oakley 

Statement  before  the  Subcommittee 
on  Asian  and  Pacific  Affairs  of  the 
House  Committee  on  Foreign  Affairs 
on  May  7,  1979.  Mr.  Oakley  is  Deputy 
Assistant  Secretary  for  East  Asian  and 
Pacific  Affairs. ' 

I  appreciate  this  opportunity  to  meet 
with  the  subcommittee  to  discuss  the 
Department  of  State's  role  in  the  Ad- 
ministration's continuing  efforts  to  ob- 
tain an  accounting  of  Americans  lost  in 
Southeast  Asia. 


Woodcock  Commission 

From  the  outset  this  Administration 
and  the  Department  of  State  have  con- 
sistently followed  a  policy  aimed  at 
obtaining  the  fullest  feasible  account- 
ing of  our  missing  personnel.  In  keep- 
ing with  this  policy  and  as  one  of  his 
very  first  foreign  policy  initiatives  after 
taking  office.  President  Carter  sent  a 
presidential  commission  to  Indochina 
[March  16-20,  1977]  to  explore  di- 
rectly with  the  Vietnamese  and  Lao 
how  such  an  accounting  might  be  ob- 
tained. The  Commission  was  headed  by 
Mr.  Leonard  Woodcock  and  included 
congressional  representation. 

In  a  statement  issued  by  the  White 
House  March  12,  1977,  the  President 
noted  that  in  sending  the  Woodcock 
Commission  to  Vietnam  and  Laos,  he 
was 

.  .  hopeful  thai  this  step  we  are  taking  will  meet 
with  a  positive  response  and  put  in  motion  a 
process  that  will  obtain  the  fullest  possible  ac- 
counting for  our  men  who  sacrificed  so  much  for 
their  country.  At  the  same  time,  we  recognize 
that  information  may  never  be  available  on  many 
of  them.  Some  were  lost  over  water,  or  over 
heavily  forested  areas  and  mountainous  terrain, 
where  information  may  never  be  found  or  will  be 
very  slow  in  developing.  So  we  are  not  unrealis- 
tic in  our  expectations. 

On  the  Commission's  return  from  its 
March  16-20  trip  to  Vietnam  and 
Laos,  it  issued  a  report  detailing  its 
findings  and  conclusions.^  According 
to  the  report:  "The  highlight  of  the 
Commission's  talks  in  Hanoi  was  the 
S.R.V.'s  [Socialist  Republic  of  Viet- 
nam] formal  undertaking  to  give  the 
U.S.  all  available  information  on  our 
missing  men  as  it  is  found  and  to  return 
remains  as  they  are  recovered  and 
exhumed."  The  report  concluded  that: 


"In  the  Commission's  view,  the  best 
hope  for  obtaining  a  proper  accounting 
for  our  MIA's  lies  in  the  context  of 
.  .  .  improved  relations"  between  the 
United  States  and  Vietnam. 

After  considering  the  Commission's 
report,  and  following  a  meeting  he  had 
with  Commission  members  on  their 
return  to  Washington,  the  President 
stated  at  a  March  23  joint  press  confer- 
ence with  Leonard  Woodcock  that  the 
Vietnamese: 

.  .  .have  promised  to  set  up  a  permanent  study 
mechanism  by  which  the  U.S.  Government  can 
provide  information  that  we  have  about  the  po- 
tential whereabouts  or  identity  of  servicemen 
who  were  lost,  and  the  Vietnamese  have  prom- 
ised to  cooperate  in  pursuing  the  evidence  that 
we  might  present  to  them  in  the  future. 

The  President  then  announced  that  it 
was  on  this  basis  that  he  would  respond 
favorably  to  a  Vietnamese  proposal 
that  our  negotiators  meet  in  Paris  to 
begin  talks  on  the  possibility  of  nor- 
malizing relations. 

President  Carter  took  the  opportunity 
of  a  March  24  press  conference  to  ex- 
pand on  his  remarks  of  the  day  before. 
The  President  stated: 

I  have  always  taken  the  position  that  when  1 
am  convinced  that  the  Vietnamese  have  done 
their  best  to  account  for  the  service  personnel 
who  are  missing  in  action,  at  that  point,  I  would 
favor  normalization,  the  admission  of  Vietnam 
into  the  United  Nations,  and  the  resumption  of 
trade  and  other  relationships  with  the  Viet- 
namese. I  believe  the  response  of  the  Viet- 
namese leaders  to  the  Woodcock  Commission 
was  very  favorable. 

Subsequent  Meetings 

As  the  subcommittee  is  aware,  we 
met  with  the  Vietnamese  in  Paris  on 
three  occasions — May,  June,  and  De- 
cember 1977 — to  discuss  the  prospects 
for  normalizing  relations  between  our 
countries.  At  all  three  meetings,  we 
stressed  that  two  factors  would  have  an 
important  effect  on  our  ability  to  pro- 
ceed toward  normalization:  Vietnamese 
willingness  to  follow  policies  support- 
ive of  peace  and  stability  in  the  region 
and  continued  Vietnamese  efforts  to 
provide  us  with  the  fullest  possible  ac- 
counting of  our  missing  men. 

Specifically,  regarding  the  MIA 
[missing  in  action]  issue,  we  stressed 
that  we  do  not  consider  our  missing 
men  as  something  to  be  bargained  over, 
which  had  been  the  case  on  occasion  in 


the  past  between  Vietnam  and  the 
United  States,  as  it  had  in  similar  cir- 
cumstances between  France  and  Viet- 
nam. We  stated  that  the  United  States 
would  reject  any  attempt  to  link  this 
question  to  aid.  We  emphasized  that 
the  Vietnamese  have  a  simple  human- 
itarian obligation  to  help  resolve  the 
MIA  question. 

The  Vietnamese  refused  to  accept 
the  U.S.  position  on  normalization  of 
relations.  Instead,  they  insisted  that  to- 
gether with  Vietnamese  efforts  to  re- 
solve the  MIA  question  the  United 
States  should  accept  its  "obligations" 
under  the  Paris  accord  of  1973  to  pro- 
vide economic  assistance  to  Vietnam.^ 

We  rejected  this  approach,  noting 
that  the  Paris  accord  was  no  longer 
valid  in  view  of  the  massive  North 
Vietnamese  military  attack  on  South 
Vietnam  in  1975,  that  the  United  States 
was  under  no  obligation  to  provide  aid, 
and  that  we  could  not  accept  Viet- 
namese attempts  to  link  continued 
cooperation  on  MIA's  to  the  question 
of  U.S.  economic  assistance. 

We  next  met  with  the  Vietnamese  in 
New  York  for  several  rounds  of  unoffi- 
cial discussions  during  the  fall  of  last 
year.  These  discussions  appeared  to 
make  some  progress,  and  the  Viet- 
namese indicated  that  they  were  no 
longer  demanding  U.S.  aid  as  a  quid 
pro  quo  for  normalization  or  for  con- 
tinued progress  on  MIA's. 

For  our  part,  we  reiterated  our  belief 
that  the  Vietnamese  could  and  should 
be  doing  more  to  resolve  the  MIA 
question,  and  referring  to  recent  events 
in  the  region,  asked  for  clarification  on 
three  developments  of  importance  to 
us:  the  implications  of  the  November  3 
Treaty  of  Peace,  Friendship  and  Coop- 
eration between  Vietnam  and  the 
Soviet  Union,  Vietnam's  intentions 
toward  Kampuchea,  and  the  upsurge  in 
refugees  from  Vietnam.  With  regard  to 
the  Vietnam-Kampuchea  border  con- 
flict, we  again  indicated  that  peaceful 
Vietnamese  intent  and  actions  toward 
its  neighbors,  even  one  as  universally 
deplored  as  the  Pol  Pot  regime,  would 
affect  our  ability  to  normalize  relations 
with  Vietnam. 

Vietnam  of  course  mounted  a  major 
invasion  of  Kampuchea  on  December 
25  of  last  year.  It  now  occupies  large 
areas  of  that  country  and  has  shown  no 
inclination  to  seek  a  political  rather 
than  a  military  solution  or  to  consider 
an  independent  Kampuchean  Govern- 
ment representative  of  its  own  people 
rather  than  beholden  to  another  coun- 
try. Under  the  circumstances,  there  is 
no  question  of  any  movement  toward 
normalization  of  relations  with  Viet- 
nam at  this  time. 

Thus,  throughout  our  talks  with  the 


40 

Vietnamese  in  Paris  and  elsewhere, 
U.S.  negotiators  have  stressed,  in 
keeping  with  the  President's  policy 
enunciated  at  the  beginning  of  his  Ad- 
ministration, that  Vietnamese  good 
faith  in  helping  us  to  obtain  the  fullest 
possible  accounting  for  our  missing 
men  would  have  a  direct  bearing  on  our 
ability  to  normalize  relations  with 
them.  Vietnamese  behavior  toward 
their  neighbors  is  also  extremely  im- 
portant. This  remains  our  policy  and 
you  can  be  sure  it  will  be  fully  re- 
flected whenever  we  might  meet  with 
the  Vietnamese  again  for  talks  on  nor- 
malization of  relations  or  any  other 
subject. 


Other  Initiatives 

Various  initiatives  and  actions  by  the 
Congress  have  been  extremely  helpful 
as  a  means  of  demonstrating  to  the 
Vietnamese  that  U.S.  policy,  with  re- 
gard to  obtaining  the  fullest  possible 
MIA  accounting,  has  the  complete  sup- 
port of  the  entire  U.S.  Government  and 
the  American  people.  As  recently  as 
February  of  this  year.  Representatives 
Elizabeth  Holtzman  and  Billy  Lee 
Evans  visited  Hanoi  and  pressed  the 
Vietnamese  for  MIA  results.  Last  Au- 
gust, in  one  of  the  most  successful  such 
efforts  to  date.  Representative  G.V. 
Montgomery  led  a  delegation  com- 
posed of  six  other  Congressmen  to 
Hanoi  and  Vientiane,  where  they  were 
able  to  obtain  15  sets  of  MIA  remains. 

As  I  have  already  noted,  the  Wood- 
cock Commission  also  included  con- 
gressional representation,  which  no 
doubt  increased  the  respect  with  which 
it,  and  the  policies  it  expressed,  were 
viewed  in  Hanoi  and  Vientiane.  And 
there  is  of  course  the  work  of  this  sub- 
committee, which  has  clearly  demon- 
strated that  we  as  a  government — 
Administration  and  Congress 
combined — will  not  flag  in  fulfilling 
the  obligations  this  country  owes  its 
missing  servicemen  and  their  families. 

1  should  also  note  in  this  regard  the 
fine  work  of  the  National  League  of 
Families  of  American  Prisoners  and 
Missing  in  Southeast  Asia  in  insuring 
that  the  views  of  the  segment  of  the 
American  public  most  affected  by  the 
MIA  issue — the  relatives  of  our  miss- 
ing men — are  made  known  to  the  Ad- 
ministration so  that  they  can  be  re- 
flected in  our  official  statements  to  the 
Vietnamese.  In  recognition  of  the 
league's  valuable  work.  Department 
officials  have  met  regularly  with  its 
representatives  so  as  to  keep  them  in- 
formed regarding  the  status  of  U.S.- 
Vietnamese negotiations  and  the  possi- 
bility of  normalization,  as  well  as  to 
see  how  we  can  best  work  together  to 


achieve  further  progress  on  MIA  mat- 
ters. In  addition.  Department  officials 
have  attended  league  meetings  in  order 
to  respond  directly  to  concerns  ex- 
pressed by  MIA  families  and  have  car- 
ried on  extensive  correspondence  with 
league  officers  and  members. 

Question  of  Normalizing 
Relations 

It  has  been  asked  in  connection  with 
the  question  of  normalizing  relations 
with  Vietnam,  what  assurance  does  the 
United  States  have  that  the  S.R.V.  will 
cooperate  on  an  accounting  of  MIA's 
should  relations  be  established.  1  can- 
not state  with  assurance  that  this  would 
be  the  case.  However,  I  would  simply 
note  that  it  has  been  our  experience  that 
the  Vietnamese  have  generally  been 
more  forthcoming  in  terms  of  remains 
returned  and  information  made  avail- 
able during  periods  when  prospects  for 
normalization  appeared  more  promising 
than  when  they  did  not.  For  example, 
during  the  period  of  our  talks  in  Paris 
in  1977,  the  Vietnamese  returned  22 
sets  of  remains  in  October  of  that  year. 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 

Last  summer,  following  a  pause  seem- 
ingly precipitated  by  U.N.  Ambassador 
Dinh  Ba  Thi's  explusion  from  the 
United  States  on  charges  of  spying,  the 
Vietnamese  sent  their  experts  to  our 
MIA  identification  facilities  in  Hawaii. 
And  in  early  August,  when  the  Viet- 
namese seemed  anxious  to  renew  talks 
about  normalization.  Congressman 
Montgomery  and  his  colleagues  from 
the  House  were  able  to  obtain  1 1  sets 
of  remains. 

I  would  also  note  that  our  efforts  to 
date  to  send  our  MIA  experts  to 
Vietnam — either  to  talk  to  the  Viet- 
namese search  teams  first  hand  or  ac- 
tually conduct  searches  themselves — 
have  been  to  no  avail.  Following  nor- 
malization, we  would  be  able  to  place 
people  in  Hanoi,  and  perhaps  later  Ho 
Chi  Minh  City  (Saigon),  who  could  at 
least  talk  to  Vietnamese  experts  on  a 
regular  basis.  There  would  also  be  at 
least  a  faint  hope  of  actually  taking  part 
in  searches  in  the  field. 

Our  experience  during  the  July  1978 
Vietnamese  visit  to  the  MIA  identifi- 
cation facilities  in  Hawaii  has  demon- 
strated  that  discussions  between   U.S. 


Famine  in  Kampuchea 


DEPARTMENT  STATEMENT. 
AUG.  9,  1979' 

The  United  States  is  deeply  con- 
cerned over  growing  evidence  of 
famine  in  Kampuchea  resulting  from 
the  invasion  and  occupation  of  that 
country,  and  also  from  prior  years  of 
despotic  rule. 

The  United  States  wholeheartedly 
supports  efforts  by  international  or- 
ganizations, private  voluntary  agen- 
cies, and  others  which  are  attempting 
to  open  channels  through  which  hu- 
manitarian assistance  to  needy  Khmers 
can  flow. 

The  United  States  continues  to  urge 
that  this  assistance  be  aimed  at  meeting 
the  basic  human  needs  of  the  Khmer 
people,  irrespective  of  their  location  in 
the  country  or  the  political  authority 
under  whose  control  they  fall. 

The  United  States  also  believes  that 
maximum  effort  should  be  exerted  to 
assure  through  effective  international 
monitoring  that  emergency  relief 
supplies  reach  the  needy,  for  whom  the 
assistance  is  intended. 

Thus  far,  the  humanitarian  efforts  of 
various  organizations  and  nations  to 


provide  relief  supplies  to  the  Khmer 
people  have  had  only  limited  impact. 
The  competing  forces  in  Kampuchea 
have  sought  to  impose  political  condi- 
tions on  these  international  humanitar- 
ian undertakings. 

The  United  States  deplores  the  at- 
tempts of  the  fighting  sides  in  Kam- 
puchea to  obtain  political  advantage 
from  these  relief  efforts.  The  losers  are 
the  starving  Khmer  people. 

It  is  imperative  that  all  sides  in 
Kampuchea  cooperate  to  the  fullest 
with  international  humanitarian  relief 
efforts  in  Kampuchea.  No  political  en- 
tity or  government  which  impedes  the 
flow  of  this  emergency  humanitarian 
assistance  to  the  Khmer  people  can  lay 
claim  to  representing  their  aspirations. 

The  United  States,  for  its  part, 
stands  ready  to  contribute  further 
within  the  limits  of  U.S.  law  to  an  in- 
ternational relief  effort  aimed  at  as- 
sisting all  Khmer  people  in  need  under 
international  supervision.  D 


'  Read  to  news  correspondents  by  acting  De- 
partment spokesman  Tom  Reston. 


October  1979 


41 


and  Vietnamese  experts  are  decidedly 
more  effective  when  conducted  on  a 
face-to-face  basis.  I  would  not  want  to 
overstate  the  usefulness  of  such  direct 
liaison — since  actual  results  will  still 
depend  on  Vietnamese  willingness  to 
carry  out  search  efforts  and  on  what 
can  be  located — given  the  problems  of 
terrain,  time,  and  weather.  Neverthe- 
less, direct  liai.son  in  Hanoi  would  pro- 
vide us  with  at  least  some  capability  of 
monitoring  Vietnamese  MIA  efforts — a 
capability  which  we  do  not  have  under 
current  circumstances. 

I  have  discussed  the  question  of 
normalization  of  relations  with  Viet- 
nam at  some  length  because  1  fully  ap- 
preciate the  interest  of  the  subcommit- 
tee in  this  subject  and  its  relationship  to 
our  MIA  accounting  and  recovery  ef- 
forts. I  would  now  like  to  address  the 
measures  which  the  Department  of 
State  is  and  has  been  undertaking  to 
obtain  an  accounting,  irrespective  of 
the  prospects  for  normalization. 

One  of  our  most  important  proce- 
dures in  this  regard  is  the  MIA  liaison 
arrangement  in  Bangkok  which  came 
into  being  as  a  result  of  agreements 
reached  during  the  July  1977  Viet- 
namese visit  to  our  MIA  identification 
facilities  in  Hawaii.  U.S.  personnel  re- 
sponsible for  MIA  matters  in  Bangkok 
consult  on  a  regular  basis  with  their 
counterparts  at  the  S.R.V.  Embassy 
there.  As  part  of  these  consultations, 
U.S.  personnel  hand  over  dossiers 
containing  information  on  specific  MIA 
cases  for  use  by  the  Vietnamese  in 
their  recovery  efforts. 

At  the  conclusion  of  hostilities,  we 
had  provided  information  to  the  Viet- 
namese on  all  of  our  missing  men.  The 
dossiers  that  are  passed  to  the  Viet- 
namese in  Bangkok,  and  elsewhere  as 
the  occasion  arises,  serve  to  pinpoint 
those  cases  where  we  believe  positive 
results  would  be  particularly  likely. 
The  Vietnamese  have  acknowledged 
that  these  procedures  are  useful.  Ap- 
proximately one  half  of  the  remains 
returned  thus  far  have  been  those  of  in- 
dividuals for  whom  dossiers  had  been 
passed  to  the  Vietnamese. 

Another  important  program  involves 
efforts  by  our  embassies  and  consulates 
in  Southeast  Asia  to  obtain  information 
from  refugees  regarding  Americans  lost 
in  Indochina.  As  part  of  this  program, 
American  missions  in  appropriate 
countries  have  formally  notified  the 
various  voluntary  agencies  involved  in 
refugee  relief  and  resettlement  efforts, 
the  local  UNHCR  [U.N.  High  Com- 
missioner on  Refugees]  office,  ICEM 
[Intergovernmental  Committee  for 
European  Migration],  and  the  missions 
of  France,  Canada,  and  Australia  of  the 
continuing  U.S.   interest  in  acquiring 


all  information  relating  to  MIA's  and 
have  asked  them  to  bring  any  such  in- 
formation to  our  immediate  attention. 
In  addition,  personnel  engaged  in 
interviewing  refugees  have  been  re- 
quested to  be  particularly  alert  for  any 
indication  of  information  regarding 
MIA's.  Should  such  information  come 
to  light,  the  refugees  are  immediately 
contacted  by  MIA  specialists  for  exten- 
sive debriefing  sessions. 

Information  From  Refugees 

Our  interest  in  obtaining  information 
on  MIA's  is  well  known  among  the 
refugee  camps  in  Asia.  We  have  taken 
specific  steps  to  insure  that  this  is  the 
case  including  making  arrangements 
for  the  display  of  posters  at  refugee 
transit  centers  overseas.  These  posters 
in  the  Lao,  Hmong,  Khmer,  Viet- 
namese, and  Chinese  languages  spe- 
cifically solicit  MIA  information  from 
the  refugees  and  provide  instructions 
on  how  to  contact  us. 

In  addition,  UNHCR,  ICEM,  and 
voluntary  agency  personnel  manning 
transit  centers  have  been  alerted  to  the 
need  to  direct  any  refugees  with  infor- 
mation to  us.  Once  refugees  arrive  in 
the  United  States,  INS  [Immigration 
and  Naturalization  Service]  officials 
have  been  helpful  in  obtaining  MIA 
information  during  their  interviews. 
Also,  the  voluntary  agencies  who  help 
to  resettle  refugees  cooperate  both  with 
the  Department  of  State  and  with  the 
League  of  Families  in  seeking  infor- 
mation. Since  1975,  refugees  have 
provided  234  reports  on  possible 
MIA's  or  MIA  remains,  176  of  these 
during  the  past  year. 

I  should  note  that  many  refugees  are 
understandably  eager  to  be  accepted  for 
resettlement  in  the  United  States,  and 
we  have  to  be  alert  to  the  possibility  of 
exaggerated  or  fabricated  reports  being 
brought  to  our  attention  in  the  hope  of 
gaining  favor  with  U.S.  diplomatic  or 
immigration  officials.  Nonetheless,  all 
information  from  whatever  source  is 
transmitted  to  the  Defense  Intelligence 
Agency  and  Department  of  Defense 
where  it  is  analyzed  and  correlated. 

Case  of  PFC  Garwood 

The  Garwood  case  provides  a  good 
example  of  how  these  procedures  func- 
tion. As  soon  as  we  received  a  report 
that  PFC  Garwood  was  in  Hanoi  and 
were  able  to  form  a  positive  opinion  of 
its  reliability.  Secretary  Vance  person- 
ally sent  a  message  to  the  Vietnamese 
requesting  that  they  provide  us  at  once 
with  all  possible  information  on  his 
situation  and  that  he  be  allowed  to 
leave   Vietnam  immediately.   In  their 


response,  the  Vietnamese  indicated 
that  Garwood  was  indeed  living  in 
Vietnam  and  that  he  was  free  to  leave 
for  the  United  States.  We  also  alerted 
Representatives  Elizabeth  Holtzman 
and  Billie  Lee  Evans — who  were  al- 
ready en  route  to  Hanoi  at  that  time — 
and  the  ICRC  [International  Committee 
of  the  Red  Cross]  to  Garwood's  situa- 
tion. As  you  know,  we  were  eventually 
able  to  arrange  through  the  ICRC  for 
his  return  to  this  country. 

A  similar  effort  was  made  with  re- 
gard to  the  information  made  public  by 
the  refugee,  Ngo  Phi  Hung,  to  the  ef- 
fect that  he  had  seen  and  had  contact 
with  "49"  American  prisoners  in 
South  Vietnam  during  the  period 
1975-77.  We  asked  the  S.R.V.  au- 
thorities for  information  on  this  report. 
They  replied  promptly  denying  this 
claim  and  stating  that  there  were  no 
American  prisoners  in  Vietnam. 

The  Garwood  case,  in  particular, 
highlights  again  the  question  we  have 
constantly  before  us  of  whether  there 
are  other  Americans  like  PFC  Garwood 
in  Vietnam,  and  if  so  what  can  we  do 
to  effect  their  departure.  This  possibil- 
ity was  raised  with  the  Vietnamese 
during  the  Woodcock  Commission  visit 
to  Hanoi.  At  that  time,  in  response  to 
numerous  direct  questions,  the  Viet- 
namese assured  us  that  all  Americans 
who  had  been  taken  prisoner  and  were 
alive  had  been  returned  to  the  United 
States  under  article  8(a)  of  the  Paris 
accord  on  Vietnam,  and  that  all  Ameri- 
cans who  remained  in  Vietnam  after 
April  30,  1975,  and  who  registered 
themselves  with  Vietnamese  authorities 
had  been  allowed  to  leave  Vietnam. 
This  response  leaves  a  loophole  which 
can  be  made  to  fit  a  case  like  Garwood. 
Obviously,  we  do  not  consider  helpful 
the  use  of  this  sort  of  debating  tactic 
rather  than  a  frank,  full  response. 

In  conjunction  with  our  efforts  to 
obtain  PFC  Garwood's  departure,  we 
again  asked  the  Vietnamese  whether 
there  were  any  other  Americans  living 
in  that  country,  voluntarily  or  other- 
wise. As  you  know,  they  have 
categorically  denied  the  existence  of 
any  such  Americans,  dropping  the  ref- 
erences to  categories.  Since  we  take 
nothing  on  faith  in  this  area,  and  we 
have  no  means  of  directly  determining 
whether  this  latest  Vietnamese  state- 
ment is  accurate,  the  next  step  will  be 
to  evaluate  whatever  information  PFC 
Garwood  might  have  on  possible 
Americans  in  Vietnam.  If,  as  in  the 
case  of  the  report  that  Garwood  himself 
was  in  Vietnam,  he  is  able  to  provide 
specific  information  which  appears 
credible  on  MIA  remains  or  living 
Americans,  we  will  again  be  in  a  posi- 
tion to  approach  the  Vietnamese  with 


42 


Department  of  State  Bulletin    , 


the  expectation  of  getting  a  satisfactory 
response. 

However,  before  this  can  be  done, 
we  will  have  to  await  a  thorough  de- 
briefing of  Mr.  Garwood,  which  we 
understand  will  not  occur  until  his  situ- 
ation with  the  Marine  Corps  has  been 
clarified.  In  the  meantime,  we  will 
continue  to  gather  information  from  all 
available  sources  and,  as  I  have  said 
before,  if  after  careful  analysis  any  of 
this  information  should  suggest  the  ex- 
istence of  other  Americans  in  Vietnam, 
we  will  immediately  contact  the  Viet- 
namese. 


Conclusion 

In  concluding,  I  would  like  to  stress 
again  that  we  believe  that  the  Viet- 
namese could  be  doing  more  to  resolve 
the  MIA  issue,  which  has  caused  so 
much  anguish  for  so  many  American 
families  for  too  long.  We  have  reiter- 
ated our  position  in  this  regard  both 
directly  to  the  Vietnamese  and  publicly 
to  the  American  people  and  will  con- 
tinue to  do  so. 

At  the  same  time,  it  is  important  to 
keep  in  mind  that  past  experience  has 
demonstrated,  unfortunately,  that  the 
problem  of  obtaining  a  full  MIA  ac- 
counting is  never  an  easy  one.  Fol- 
lowing the  Korean  war  and  World  War 
II,  for  example,  we  were  unable  to  ac- 
count for  approximately  22%  of  those 
who  had  been  lost.  Moreover,  in  the 
case  of  World  War  II  we  had  free  ac- 
cess to  virtually  all  of  the  former 
battlefields  to  conduct  our  search  oper- 
ations. The  corresponding  figure  for 
personnel  unaccounted  for  following 
the  Vietnam  conflict  is  approximately 
4%,  despite  our  lack  of  access  to  much 
of  Indochina. 

I  have  cited  these  figures  not  with 
any  view  toward  excusing  performance 
to  date  by  the  S.R.V.  on  MIA's  but  to 
illustrate  the  difficulties  inherent  in  the 
tasks  to  which  we  all — in  the  Congress 
and  in  the  Administration — are  com- 
mitted to  seeing  through  to  a  successful 
conclusion.  □ 


ECO]\0]HI€S:     interdependence 
in  ^orih  America 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the  hearings  will 
be  published  by  the  committee  and  will  be  avail- 
able from  the  Superintendent  of  Documents, 
U.S.  Government  Printing  Office,  Washington, 
D.C.  20402. 

^For  text,  see  Bulletin  of  Apr.  18,  1977, 
p.  .^66. 

^For  text  of  Agreement  on  Ending  the  War 
and  Restoring  Peace  in  Vietnam,  see  Bulletin 
of  Feb.   12,  1979,  p.   169. 


by  Julius  L.  Katz 

Statement  before  the  Subcommittee 
on  International  Trade  of  the  Senate 
Committee  on  Finance  on  June  6, 
1979.  Mr.  Katz  is  Assistant  Secretary 
for  Economic  and  Business  Affairs. ' 

I  am  pleased  to  respond  to  the  com- 
mittee's invitation  to  discuss  the  pros- 
pects for  and  problems  posed  by  in- 
creased economic  interdependence  in 
North  America  and  with  the  Caribbean. 

The  economies  of  this  region  are  in 
many  ways  complementary  and  this 
fact  is  reflected  in  the  rapidly  growing 
economic  relationship  among  the 
countries.  Trade  flows,  investment, 
tourism,  migration,  transportation 
links,  and  financial  ties  have  all  ex- 
panded dramatically  in  recent  years.  In 
some  sectors  and  between  some  of  the 
countries  integration  has  proceeded 
rather  far.  Rapid  change  brings  with  it 
opportunities  as  well  as  problems  of 
adjustment. 

In  this  statement.  I  would  like  to  re- 
view briefly  some  of  the  recent  de- 
velopments in  our  economic  relations 
with  our  neighbors  in  North  America 
and  to  discuss  both  the  opportunities 
and  problems  presented  by  our  growing 
interdependence.  Because  of  the  limits 
of  time  I  do  not  deal  directly  with  the 
Caribbean  area  in  my  statement  but  I 
would  be  glad  to  respond  to  any  ques- 
tions the  committee  may  have  with  re- 
spect to  Caribbean  countries. 

First,  let  me  review  some  of  the  facts 
bearing  on  our  economic  relationship 
with  our  neighbors  in  North  America. 
Two-way  trade  with  Canada  has  risen 
from  $39  billion  in  1974  to  over  $63 
billion  last  year.  Even  allowing  for  in- 
flation, the  increase  is  dramatic.  Our 
bilateral  trade  in  the  integrated  U.S.- 
Canada automotive  industry  alone  in- 
creased by  over  15%  per  annum  for  the 
past  5  years,  or  as  much  as  $3-4  billion 
per  year. 

The  growth  of  U.S. -Mexican  trade, 
on  a  relative  basis,  is  as  impressive. 
U.S.  trade  with  Mexico  has  increased 
from  $6.4  billion  in  1974  to  almo.st  $13 
billion  at  present.  Mexico's  rapid  eco- 
nomic growth  provides  U.S.  exporters 
with  significant  expanded  opportunities 
to  export  capital  goods  and  technology. 

Energy  Trade 

Energy  trade  has  been  and  will  be  an 
important  element  of  trade  between  the 


three  countries.  U.S.  crude  oil  imports 
from  Canada  are  well  below  the  peak 
of  1  million  barrels  per  day  reached  in 
early  1974.  At  present,  our  net  oil  im- 
ports from  Canada  are  only  l.'i5,000 
barrels  per  day.  However,  we  import 
from  Canada  almost  3  billion  cubic  feet 
per  day  of  natural  gas.  or  about  4'/2% 
of  U.S.  consumption.  There  are  now 
pending  before  Canada's  National 
Energy  Board  additional  applications 
for  natural  gas  exports  to  the  United 
States  which  could  eventually  amount 
to  another  billion  cubic  feet  per  day. 
We  have  an  extensive  electricity  ex- 
change with  Canada,  with  the  United 
States  being  a  net  importer  of  some 
17.5  million  megawatt  hours  per  year. 
Our  energy  relations  with  Mexico  are 
less  extensive  than  with  Canada  but 
they  are  growing.  We  import  more  than 
400,000  barrels  per  day  of  crude  oil, 
and  this  volume  should  increase  as 
Mexico's  crude  oil  production  expands. 
The  United  States  now  takes  80%  of 
Mexico's  crude  oil  exports.  The  Mexi- 
can Government  has  indicated  a  desire 
to  diversify  its  exports  so  that  Mexico 
might  eventually  export  only  60%  of  its 
oil  to  the  United  States.  But  in  ab.solute 
terms  the  volume  should  increase  well 
above  present  levels.  We  do  not  now 
import  natural  gas  from  Mexico,  but. 
as  the  committee  is  aware,  discussions 
are  underway  with  the  Mexican  Gov- 
ernment with  respect  to  possible  gas 
exports  to  the  United  States.  We  also 
have  the  potential  for  growing  electric- 
ity exchanges — the  United  States  now 
is  a  net  exporter  to  Mexico  of  some 
68,000  megawatt  hours  annually. 

Investment  Flows 

Investment  flows  are  another  sub- 
stantial element  of  our  economic  re- 
lationship. In  1977,  the  net  book  value 
of  U.S.  investment  in  Canada  was 
more  than  $35  billion,  representing 
about  one-fourth  of  total  U.S.  direct 
investment  abroad.  Canadian  invest- 
ment in  the  United  States  has  increased 
markedly  in  recent  years  reaching  al- 
most $6  billion  in  1977.  U.S.  direct  in- 
vestment in  Mexico  in  the  same  year 
was  over  $3  billion.  With  our  rapidly 
growing  economic  relationship  has 
come  a  growing  integration  of  our 
economy  with  those  of  Canada  and 
Mexico. 

The  most  dramatic  example  of  this  is 
the  U.S. -Canadian  automotive  industry 
which  has  been  substantially  ration- 


October  1979 


43 


alized  and  integrated  across  the  border 
pursuant  to  the  U.S. -Canada  automo- 
tive agreement  of  1965.  As  a  result  of 
this  agreement  trade  in  automotive 
products  between  the  two  countries  has 
grown  explosively  (from  $740  million 
in  1964  to  over  $21  billion  in  1978) 
with  great  benefits  to  both  countries  in 
terms  of  increased  employment  oppor- 
tunities, more  efficient  production,  and 
thus  benefits  to  consumers  as  well  as 
investors  in  the  industry. 

Issue  of  Increasing 
Economic  Integration 

As  the  result  of  successive  trade 
negotiations  since  World  War  II  a  sub- 
stantial part  of  our  trade  with  Canada  is 
presently  duty-free  both  into  Canada 
and  the  United  States.  In  1978  about 
70%  of  U.S.  imports  from  Canada  en- 
tered free  of  duty,  and  60%  of  U.S. 
exports  to  Canada  entered  duty  free.  If 
our  MTN  [multilateral  trade  nego- 
tiations] offers  of  duty  elimination  had 
been  in  effect  last  year,  80%  of 
Canada's  exports  to  us  would  have 
been  duty-free  as  would  65%  of  our 
exports  to  them. 

Our  trade  relations  with  Mexico  are 
at  a  lower  volume  and  the  evidences  of 
integration  fewer.  As  part  of  its  eco- 
nomic development  program  Mexico 
has  pursued  a  highly  restrictive  trade 
policy.  Until  the  recent  MTN,  Mexico 
abstained  from  participation  in  interna- 
tional trade  negotiations  and  did  not 
become  a  member  of  GATT  [General 
Agreement  on  Tariffs  and  Trade].  In 
1977  we  signed  a  small  bilateral  trade 
agreement  with  Mexico,  the  first  since 
1942,  and  have  been  negotiating  a 
fuller  MTN  agreement  with  the  Mexi- 
can Government,  which  is  now  actively 
considering  GATT  membership. 

The  rapid  expansion  of  our  economic 
relations  with  Canada  and  Mexico  and 
the  evident  benefits  derived  therefrom 
have  raised  the  question  whether  we 
should  not  more  actively  pursue  a  de- 
liberate policy  of  integration  of  the 
North  American  economies.  Clearly  all 
three  countries  would  benefit  from  the 
freer  movement  of  goods,  services,  and 
people.  Integration  of  the  three 
economies  would  promote  more  rapid 
economic  growth  in  the  three  countries. 
It  would  promote  greater  efficiency  of 
production  and  the  development  of  re- 
sources. It  is  in  the  latter  area  that 
many  people  see  particular  advantages 
having  in  mind  the  potential  energy  re- 
sources available  in  Canada  and 
Mexico. 

On  the  other  hand,  efforts  toward 
economic  integration  confront  a  num- 
ber of  hard  realities.  First  the  people  of 
Canada  and  Mexico,  not  unlike  the 
people  of  the  United  States,  are  sensi- 


tive about  the  development  or  utiliza- 
tion of  their  natural  resources  and  par- 
ticularly their  energy  resources.  They 
believe  these  resources  must  be  used  to 
serve  their  own  national  interests, 
having  in  mind  the  need  to  conserve 
those  resources  to  the  maximum  extent 
possible  for  future  generations.  Thus 
those  who  see  Canada  and  Mexico  as 
either  the  salvation  or  at  least  a  sub- 
stantial answer  to  our  energy  problems 
are  likely  to  be  severely  disappointed. 

This  is  not  to  say  that  we  do  not  have 
the  possibility  of  a  substantial  and  even 
growing  energy  trade  with  Canada  and 
Mexico.  We  must,  however,  recognize 
and  be  sensitive  to  the  national  policy 
concerns  of  our  neighbors  to  the  north 
and  south  with  respect  to  energy  re- 
sources. 

The  prospects  for  increased  integra- 
tion of  the  U.S.  economy  with  those  of 
Canada  and  Mexico  exist  in  a  number 
of  sectors.  To  some  extent  integration 
will  progress  as  our  trade  in  particular 
sectors  grows  and  as  our  barriers  to  ex- 
changes between  the  three  countries  are 
dismantled.  We  should  recognize  at  the 
same  time  that  with  the  benefits  of  in- 
tegration come  some  problems. 
Rapidly  growing  trade  in  particular 
sectors,  particularly  sectors  that  in- 
volve commodities,  with  established 
producers  brings  with  it  problems  of 
adjustment.  Thus  we  have  found  calls 
for  protection  against  rapid  imports  of 
particular  products  such  as  horticul- 
tural imports  from  Mexico.  Also  with 
the  rapid  expansion  of  trade  has  come 
resort  to  various  provisions  of  law 
dealing  with  unfair  competition  such  as 
antidumping,  countervailing  duties, 
etc.  Frequent  resort  to  such  provisions 
have  produced  considerable  irritation  in 
our  trade  relations  with  our  neighbors. 
Such  measures  are  not,  of  course,  lim- 
ited to  U.S.  producers.  Canada  and 
Mexico  have  taken  similar  actions  or 
have  resorted  to  other  means  to  protect 
their  domestic  producers. 

Notwithstanding  the  occasional 
problems  we  have  had  in  our  trade  re- 
lations with  Canada  and  Mexico,  we 
have  made  significant  progress  both  in 
dealing  with  these  problems  and  in 
laying  the  basis  for  further  trade  expan- 
sion through  the  recently  concluded 
MTN.  With  Canada,  we  have  agreed  to 
cut  tariffs  on  a  bilateral  basis  by  about 
40%.  Canada  has  agreed  to  adhere  to 
the  customs  valuation  code  and  pro- 
gressively to  eliminate  valuation  prac- 
tices that  have  irritated  American  ex- 
porters for  many  years.  Canada  has 
also  agreed  to  modify  its  practice  of 
imposing  a  15%  duty  on  machinery 
imports  when  Canada  produces 
machinery  like  that  imported. 

The  United  States,  for  its  part,  has 
agreed,   in  exchange  for  stricter  rules 


on  the  use  of  subsidies,  to  add  an  in- 
jury test  to  our  countervailing  duty 
statute  as  Canada,  among  others,  had 
requested.  The  improved  dispute  set- 
tlement mechanisms  under  the  GATT 
negotiated  in  the  MTN  will  improve 
our  ability  to  deal  with  various  bilateral 
trade  problems. 

Our  bilateral  negotiations  with 
Mexico  are  not  yet  concluded.  We  are 
optimistic  that,  in  the  settlement  we 
hope  to  conclude,  a  basis  will  be  laid 
for  a  substantial  increase  in  trade  be- 
tween our  two  countries. 

Another  element  of  the  growing 
interdependence  of  the  North  American 
economies  has  to  do  with  investment. 
The  United  States  has  traditionally  fa- 
vored two-way  investment  flows.  In- 
creased investment  promotes  economic 
growth  and  employment  and  contrib- 
utes to  expanded  international  trade. 
On  the  other  hand,  investment  can  be  a 
problem  when  countries  or  govern- 
mental units  compete  for  investment  in 
particular  sectors  by  offering  extraordi- 
nary incentives.  Such  practices  can 
distort  rational  investment  decisions 
creating  employment  opportunities  in 
one  region  at  the  expense  of  employ- 
ment in  another  region. 

The  problems  arising  from  invest- 
ment incentives  have  been  a  matter  of 
growing  concern — one  that  we  have 
been  discussing  not  only  with  our 
neighbors  but  with  our  trading  partners 
in  the  Organization  for  Economic 
Cooperation  and  Development  as  well. 
We  have  undertaken  bilateral  discus- 
sions with  Canada  in  particular  to 
explore  means  of  limiting  investment 
incentives  in  both  countries.  A  bilat- 
eral understanding  in  this  area  might 
well  build  on  procedures  negotiated  in 
other  areas  in  the  MTN. 

In  conclusion.  I  have  in  this  brief 
statement  tried  to  reflect  the  elements 
of  our  growing  interdependence  with 
our  neighbors  in  North  America,  with 
the  opportunities  that  such  growing 
interdependence  presents  to  the  three 
countries  and.  finally,  to  certain  of  the 
problems  that  are  raised  thereby.         D 


'  The  complete  transcript  of  the  hearings  will 
be  published  by  the  committee  and  will  be 
available  from  the  Superintendent  of  Docu- 
ments. U.S.  Government  Printing  Office. 
Washington.  DC.  20402. 


44 


Department  of  State  Bullciin 


miDDLE  EAST:        Forces  oi  Change 


by  Harold  H .  Saunders 

Statement  before  the  Subcommittee 
on  Europe  and  the  Middle  East  of  the 
House  Committee  on  Foreign  Affairs 
on  July  26.  1979.  Mr.  Saunders  is  As- 
sistant Secretary  for  Near  Eastern  and 
South  Asian  Affairs.' 

The  annual  review  before  this  sub- 
committee of  events  in  North  Africa, 
the  Middle  East,  and  Southwestern 
Asia  has  become  a  valuable  opportu- 
nity for  all  of  us  to  step  back  from  the 
details  of  particular  situations  and  to 
seek  an  overall  sense  of  direction  in 
that  part  of  the  world. 

A  year  ago  during  this  review,  my 
statement  concentrated  on  defining  the 
interests  of  the  United  States  in  this  re- 
gion where  more  important  and  diverse 
American  interests  come  together  than 
in  any  other  region  of  the  developing 
world.  I  discussed  how  the  energetic 
pursuit  of  an  Arab-Israeli  peace  is  cen- 
tral to  pursuit  of  the  full  range  of 
American  interests  throughout  the  re- 
gion. 

In  the  year  since,  peace  has  been 
achieved  between  Egypt  and  Israel,  but 
the  negative  reaction  in  the  Arab  world 
has  demonstrated  the  validity  of  our 
premise  that  there  must  be  a  com- 
prehensive peace  that  achieves  accept- 
ance of  Israel  by  all  of  its  neighbors 
and  an  honorable  and  secure  peace 
between  Israel  and  the  Palestinian 
people.  The  search  for  peace  thus  re- 
mains central  to  our  strategy. 

In  the  year  since,  we  have  also  wit- 
nessed a  revolution  in  Iran,  increasing 
instability  in  Afghanistan,  continued 
internal  strife  in  Lebanon,  and  threats 
to  political  and  economic  stability  in 
other  countries.  How  often  we  hear  the 
question;  Where  will  instability  strike 
next? 

We  have  also  seen  with  increasing 
emphasis  how  the  actions  of  the  oil 
producers  of  this  region  affect  our  na- 
tional strength  and,  indeed,  our  daily 
lives. 

This  year,  I  would  like  to  focus  on 
the  forces  of  change  in  the  region  and 
how  these  forces  may  affect  the  pursuit 
of  our  interests  there.  I  will  not  dwell 
on  the  point  made  with  great  emphasis 
by  the  Administration  in  recent 
weeks — that  there  is  need  for  dramatic 
change  in  our  own  reliance  on  foreign 
energy  if  we  are  to  bring  our  relation- 


ships  with   this  region   into  healthier 
balance. 


A  REGION  OF  RAPID  CHANGE 

This  region  is  among  the  fastest 
changing  in  the  world.  Many  of  its  na- 
tions have  had  to  respond  in  a  rela- 
tively brief  period  to  the  impact  of 
large  accumulations  of  oil  revenues, 
modern  education  and  technology,  ac- 
celerating economic  growth,  and 
growing  regional  and  international 
interdependence.  The  issue  for  those  of 
us  who  formulate  policy  for  this  region 
is  to  devise  a  strategy  sensitive  to  the 
nature  of  the  changes  that  are  taking 
place  and  not  to  be  misled  by  imagined 
causes. 

In  this  connection,  I  would  like  to 
cite  the  speech  Secretary  of  State 
Vance  made  on  May  1  in  Chicago  on 
meeting  the  challenge  of  a  changing 
world.-  His  remarks  seem  particularly 
appropriate  to  the  complex  region  we 
are  discussing  today.  Our  future,  he 
said,  will  be  endangered  if  we  react  in 
frustration  and  use  our  power  to  resist 
change  in  the  world  or  if  we  employ 
military  power  when  it  would  do  more 
harm  than  good.  If  we  Americans  ap- 
preciate the  extraordinary  strengths  we 
have,  he  went  on,  and  if  we  understand 
the  nature  of  the  changes  taking  place 
in  the  world,  then  we  have  every  rea- 
son to  be  confident  about  our  future. 
Our  challenge  is  to  use  effectively  the 
various  kinds  of  power  and  influence 
we  possess  in  order  to  insure  the 
evolution  of  these  events  in  the  manner 
least  disruptive  and  most  congenial  to 
our  interests. 

I  believe  our  country  has  the  ver- 
satility and  breadth — greater  than  any 
adversary  or  rival — to  adapt  to  change 
and  to  influence  its  course  in  construc- 
tive directions  if  we  understand  it. 
With  few  exceptions,  the  peoples  of 
North  Africa,  the  Middle  East,  and 
Southwestern  Asia  want  a  good  work- 
ing relationship  with  us.  They  value 
our  know-how,  our  practicality  and  in- 
ventiveness, our  technology,  our  edu- 
cational system,  and  share  many  of  our 
values.  They  know  we  respect  their 
right  to  solve  their  own  problems  and 
to  preserve  their  own  freedom.  They 
know  that  we  do  not  ask  them  to  be 
like  us — but  only  to  work  with  us  in  a 
shared   desire   for  an   orderly   and 


peaceful  world.  Our  acceptance  of  a 
pluralistic  world  enables  us  to  contrib- 
ute rather  than  to  try  to  dominate.  They 
also  know  that  we  have  interests  of  our 
own  in  the  area  as  well  but  that  we  will 
pursue  them  with  respect  tor  their  in- 
tegrity. 

My  purpose  here  today  is  to  encour- 
age a  dialogue  on  the  nature  of  change 
in  this  area,  which  can  serve  as  a  basis 
for  the  decisions  that  will  face  us  in  the 
coming  year.  My  simple  point  is  that 
the  second  critical  element  in  U.S. 
strategy  for  this  region — in  which  the 
search  for  an  Arab- Israeli  peace  is  a 
principal  instrument — is  to  attune  our- 
selves to  the  nature  of  change  and  to 
work  with  the  governments  there  in 
directing  it  constructively.  In  this  ap- 
proach, we  are  leading  from  our 
strengths. 


THE  FACES  OF  CHANGE 

The  Middle  East  and  Southwestern 
Asia  have  had  more  than  their  share  of 
the  headlines  in  the  past  year.  In  fact, 
rarely  has  such  a  variety  of  develop- 
ments hit  one  region  in  such  a  short 
period  of  time. 

The  Economic  Revolution 

Profound  economic  developments  in 
the  region  have  potential  consequences 
that  are  not  yet  fully  understood.  To 
elaborate  on  this  point,  it  would  be 
enough  for  me  to  present  figures  on  the 
rapidly  increasing  accumulations  of  oil 
revenues,  per  capita  income  figures, 
and  increases  in  the  rates  of  investment 
for  several  countries  in  the  region.  I 
could  go  beyond  that  and  speak  of  the 
impact  on  these  very  traditional 
societies  of  modern  technology  and 
education  and  the  rapidly  rising  hori- 
zon of  expectations  and  opportunities. 
The  exact  impact  of  such  change — all 
in  the  life  of  one  generation — on  the 
social  and  political  futures  of  these  na- 
tions is  something  that  we  are  actively 
analyzing  and  will  continue  to  study  in 
increasing  breadth  and  depth. 

Similarly,  there  is  much  to  be  said 
about  the  social  and  political  impact  on 
those  other  nations  in  the  region  where 
expectations  have  risen  but  where  re- 
sources are  lacking  and  the  rate  of  de- 
velopment has  not  produced  visible 
change  in  the  lives  of  people. 


October  1979 


45 


I  wanl  lo  go  beyond  these  important 
cie\  leopments,  however,  to  make  a 
luither  point  about  some  ot  their  et- 
tects  on  relations  within  the  region  and 
on  our  relationship  with  the  region. 
The  point  is  simply  this;  At  a  time 
when  some  ol  the  nations  of  this  area 
are  just  beginning  to  enjoy  the  inde- 
pendence and  power  which  their  re- 
sources give  them,  we  must  learn  to- 
gether to  manage  relationships — both 
among  the  states  ot  the  region  and  be- 
tween the  United  States  and  these 
states — that  are  characterized  by 
dramatically  increasing  interdepend- 
ence. 

There  is  no  question  that  the  major 
oil  producers  enjoy  an  accretion  ot 
power  and  influence  which,  while  re- 
flecting their  macroeconomic  strength, 
is  disproportionate  to  their  populations 
or  military  strength.  The  least  de- 
veloped countries  of  the  area,  and  in- 
deed elsewhere  as  well,  are  reluctant  to 
offend  the  oil-rich  countries,  whose 
economic  assistance  can  partly  offset 
skyrocketing  tuel  bills  and  the  costs  of 
development  and  modernization.  At  the 
most  basic  level,  food  production  itself 
depends  in  many  of  the  developing 
countries  on  imported  petroleum 
products — trom  diesel  fuel  for  irriga- 
tion pumps  to  petrochemical  fertilizer. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  oil  boom  has 
led  to  greater  interdependence  in  the 
region,  as  the  demand  for  labor  in  the 
booming  economies  and  the  availability 
of  labor  in  neighboring  countries  has 
led  to  labor  migrations  of  unprec- 
edented proportions.  Development  in 
the  sparsely  populated  oil-rich  states 
depends  on  skilled  and  unskilled  labor, 
both  from  poorer  states  in  the  area  and 
the  Indian  subcontinent  and  also  from 
more  developed  states.  There  are  now 
2.5  million  foreign  workers  in  the  oil- 
exporting  countries.  Nearly  40%  of  the 
Yemen  labor  force  is  working  in  Saudi 
Arabia;  Egypt  has  T7c  of  its  labor  force 
working  abroad;  Jordan  has  35%  of  its 
labor  force  working  in  the  gulf  area: 
India  and  Pakistan  together  have  nearly 
I  million  workers  in  the  region. 

The  remittances  which  flow  back  in 
turn  now  constitute  a  major  portion  of 
the  foreign  exchange  earnings  of  sev- 
eral poorer  countries.  For  example, 
remittances  from  Indian  workers  in 
west  Asia  now  exceed  $1  billion  a 
year,  and  Pakistani  workers  send  home 
even  more.  The  remitted  earnings  of  all 
these  workers  in  1977  were  over  $6 
billion,  far  exceeding  the  level  of 
foreign  aid  provided  these  developing 
countries  and  clearly  their  most  im- 
portant source  of  foreign  exchange.  In 
fact,  remittances  now  dominate  any 
analysis  of  the  economies  of  non-OPEC 


[Organization  of  Petroleum  Exporting 
Countries)  Arab  states.  In  addition, 
shortages  of  technical  and  managerial 
skills  have  developed  in  the  labor- 
"sending"  countries,  but  these  very 
shortages  have  created  new  opportuni- 
ties tor  women  and  other  groups  not 
previously  in  the  labor  force.  Economic 
linkages  are  being  created  that  make 
economic  regionalism  a  necessity. 

One  word  needs  to  be  said  about 
another  resource — the  scarcity  of 
water.  Over  the  next  few  years,  water 
issues  will  increasingly  occupy  the  at- 
tention of  the  political  leadership  of  the 
region.  The  Maqarin  Dam  and  ques- 
tions of  water  management  in  the  West 
Bank  have  made  the  availability  of 
water  a  matter  of  crucial  importance  in 
the  Arab-Israeli  negotiations.  How- 
ever, there  is  an  even  broader  perspec- 
tive. Water  has  always  been  a  scarce 
resource  in  the  Middle  East.  As  in- 
comes rise  and  development  takes 
place,  demand  for  water  for  personal 
consumption,  agriculture,  and  industry 
increases.  In  many  areas,  however, 
there  are  few  remaining  underde- 
veloped water  resources.  The  pressure 
of  rising  demand  for  a  fixed  and  lim- 
ited supply  of  a  resource  even  more 
vital  than  oil  could  have  far-reaching 
political  significance — both  as  a  cause 
of  conflict  and  as  an  imperative  for 
cooperation. 

As  interdependence  reaches  beyond 
the  region,  the  Middle  East  may  be  a 
critical  case  where,  however  difficult, 
mutual  accommodation  to  an  unprec- 
edented degree  will  become  indis- 
pensable if  we  are  to  live  together  in 
peace,  prosperity,  and  civility. 

Whether  we  Americans  like  it  or  not. 
we  carry  hea\y  responsibilities  in  the 
intensifying  relationship  between  the 
industrial  world  and  both  the  oil  rich 
and  the  traditionally  poor  of  this  re- 
gion. Our  NATO  allies  and  Japan  share 
our  interest  in  this  relationship. 
Therefore,  what  happens  in  our  rela- 
tions with  this  region  can  have  a  major 
impact  on  our  relations  with  the  indus- 
trialized world,  which  has  traditionally 
been  of  primary  importance  to  us.  As 
these  mutually  important  relationships 
converge,  we  are  living  through  a  great 
historic  change:  A  part  of  the  world  we 
once  thought  remote  is  on  our  doorstep 
—  and  we  on  theirs.  Conducting  this 
relationship  in  mutual  respect  and  in 
imaginative  and  creative  ways  will  re- 
quire changes  in  attitude  on  both  sides. 

In  the  forefront  of  the  public  mind 
today  is  our  relationship  with  the  oil- 
producing  states  of  the  region.  Some  of 
these  have  traditionally  sought  close 
relations  with  us  while  others  reflect 
some  bias — often   ideological — against 


American  interests.  All.  however,  ap- 
pear to  recognize  the  need  for  close 
interaction  with  the  industrial  econo- 
mies. While  the  price  of  oil  may.  in  the 
final  analysis,  be  determined  by  the 
market,  certain  of  these  countries  — 
notably  Saudi  Arabia — have  a  special 
impact  on  the  nature  of  the  market. 
They  are  in  an  economic  position  to 
produce  below  their  full  capacity,  and 
they  increasingly  appear  sensitive  to 
arguments  that  it  is  in  their  economic 
self-interest  to  do  so.  They  have  also 
shown,  however,  that  they  are  respon- 
sive and  responsible  in  recognizing  the 
contribution  they  can  make  to  the  sta- 
bility of  the  global  economy  by  in- 
creasing their  production. 

Beyond   that,   the  wealthier  of  the 
oil-producing  states  have  realized  that 


Kerosene^  Fuel  Oil 

Export  Lieenses 

for  iran 


DEPARTMENT  STATEMENT, 
AUG.  22.  1979' 

The  Department  of  Commerce  on 
August  3  approved  two  licenses  for  the 
export  of  kerosene  and  #2  fuel  oil  to 
Iran  aggregating  $47,040,000.  The 
Commerce  Department  action  was  con- 
curred in  by  the  Departments  of  State. 
Defense,  and  Energy  as  an  exception  to 
the  normal  restriction  on  the  export  of 
petroleum  products  from  the  United 
States. 

The  United  States  currently  imports 
directly  and  indirectly  about'  900.000 
barrels  of  crude  oil  and  oil  products  per 
day  from  Iran.  The  exporter  of  the  pe- 
troleum products  to  Iran  imports  a  sub- 
stantial portion  of  its  available  crude 
oil  from  Iran  and  applied  for  a  license 
to  export  the  above  products  to  Iran  on 
an  exceptional  basis  to  meet  a  tempo- 
rary shortage  of  cooking  and  heating 
oil  there  caused  by  refinery  problems. 
Approval  of  the  transaction  was  based 
both  on  humanitarian  considerations  as 
well  as  our  self-interest  in  assuring  a 
continuing  supply  of  crude  oil  from 
Iran. 

In  effect  this  transaction  represents 
the  provision  of  temporary  refinery 
service  to  Iran.  The  amount  exported 
represents  the  equivalent  of  about  2-3 
days  of  oil  imports  from  Iran.  D 


'  Read  to  news  correspondents  by  acting  De- 
partment spokesman  Tom  Reston. 


46 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


their  it)ng-term  futures — when  their  oil 
production  drops  significantly — will 
depend  on  their  developing  viable 
economies  in  the  meantime  and  on  the 
soundness  of  the  global  economy  of 
which  they  will  be  a  part.  Their  ability 
to  convert  oil  sold  now  into  invest- 
ments which  will  help  them  build  for 
the  future  requires  a  sound  global 
economy.  They,  in  turn,  will  play  an 
increasing  role  in  the  search  for  solu- 
tions to  global  problems. 


Nationalism 

At  a  time  when  nations  are  facing  the 
demands  of  regional  and  global  eco- 
nomic interdependence,  they  are  also 
confronted  by  the  renewed  pressures  of 
nationalism  from  within  the  region — 
nationalisms  that  in  themselves  often 
cut  across  conventional  national  bor- 
ders. Interwoven  with  the  problems  of 
rapid  economic  and  political  evolution 
is  the  accelerating  self-consciousness 
of  nations  and  peoples  trying  to  define 
their  identities,  interests,  and  natural 
associations.  These  problems  compli- 
cate the  political  lives  of  individual 
countries,  the  relationships  between 
nations,  and  efforts  to  achieve  peace 
throughout  the  area.  They  have  played 
a  role  in  generating  civil  war  and  inter- 
national terrorism  and  have  the  con- 
tinuing potential  of  leading  to  war  be- 
tween nations. 

The  problem  takes  many  forms. 

•  Peoples  such  as  the  Palestinians 
and  those  in  the  Sahara  with  a  new  or 
recently  intensified  sense  of  nationhood 
have  asserted  their  right  to  self- 
determination. 

•  Nations  like  Lebanon  have  discov- 
ered deep  fissures  in  their  national 
coherence  and  are  struggling  to  restore 
unity. 

•  Within  nations,  minorities  with  a 
particular  sense  of  identity  have  sought 
greater  autonomy.  In  the  past  year, 
with  a  change  in  the  character  of  cen- 
tral national  authority,  this  has  compli- 
cated the  tasks  of  those  nations  under- 
going political  soul-searching  or 
change,  such  as  Iran  and  Pakistan. 

•  In  some  cases,  separate  nation- 
alisms come  into  conflict.  This  is  best 
exemplified  by  the  contest  between  Is- 
raeli nationalism  and  Palestinian 
nationalism.  The  general  awareness  of 
the  centrality  of  this  conflict  to  an 
Arab-Israeli  settlement  has  brought  this 
issue  to  the  top  of  the  agenda  in  the 
continuing  peace  negotiations. 

•  Reflecting  the  ambivalent  charac- 
ter of  Middle  East  nationalism,  the 
ideal  of  pan-Arab  nationalism  remains 
pervasive,  and  individual  Arab  coun- 


tries continue  to  seek  ways  of  relating 
their  particular  political  systems  to  a 
larger  identity.  Arab  nationalism  again 
came  into  unusual  prominence  in  the 
wake  of  the  Egyptian/Israeli  Peace 
Treaty,  although  it  has  not  reached  the 
dimension  of  the  Nasser  years.  Moder- 
ate Arab  states  felt  compelled  to  shift 
the  balance  between  interests  which 
had  linked  them  to  the  West  over  the 
years  and  a  sense  of  Arabism  which 
found  the  Egyptian-Israeli  treaty  more 
dramatic  a  move  than  they  were  able  to 
accept. 

Regional  Conflicts 

Complicating  the  lives  of  many  of 
these  nations  and  their  efforts  to  con- 
duct relationships  with  nations  around 
them  are  familiar  regional  conflicts. 
The  Arab-Israeli  dispute  affects  rela- 
tionships throughout  the  Middle  East 
and  the  rest  of  the  world.  Although 
both  countries  have  made  serious  ef- 
forts to  overcome  it,  the  continuing 
distrust  between  India  and  Pakistan 
colors  the  national  policies  of  both  and 
affects  the  ability  of  powers  outside  the 
area  to  carry  on  constructive  relation- 
ships with  those  countries.  The  rivalry 
between  Morocco  and  Algeria — along 
with  Saharan  nationalism — has  so  far 
prevented  international  efforts,  which 
are  continuing,  to  resolve  the  conflict 
over  the  western  Sahara  peacefully. 
Other  longstanding  and  short-term 
conflicts  affect  relationships  in  the 
region. 

The  Search  for  Security: 
Nuclear  Proliferation 

Overshadowing  some  of  these  re- 
gional conflicts  is  the  potential  of  some 
of  the  nations  in  this  area  to  move  to- 
ward the  possession  and  use  of  nuclear 
weapons.  The  motivation  for  states  to 
acquire  nuclear  weapons  can  be  a  com- 
plex mix  of  concerns  for  security,  re- 
gional preeminence,  international  pres- 
tige, and  domestic  impact.  Once  again, 
technological  change  has  brought  to  the 
fore  a  problem  which  complicates  the 
resolution  of  other  relationships.  India 
has  detonated  a  nuclear  device  and 
Pakistan  is  proceeding  on  a  course  that 
will  put  it  in  a  position  to  do  likewise. 
Israel  is  believed  by  some  to  have  nu- 
clear weapons,  and  some  Arab  slates 
are  believed  to  have  the  ambition  to 
acquire  them. 

Nuclear  proliferation  in  any  region 
poses  the  risk  of  local  nuclear  war  with 
the  potential  for  catalytic  war  and 
superpower  involvement.  In  regions  of 
historic  and  continuing  hostilities  like 
the  Middle  East  and  South  Asia,  pro- 
liferation makes  nuclear  conflict  a 


plausible  and  predictable  if  not  an  in- 
evitable outcome.  It  is  also  wasteful  of 
resources  in  countries  where  govern- 
ments are  struggling  to  provide  for  the 
basic  human  needs  of  their  people.  The 
global  psychological  firebreak  that  now 
separates  conventional  from  nuclear 
war  is  thus  put  at  risk,  with  attendant 
consequences  for  U.S.  and  interna- 
tional security. 


CONSEQUENCES  OF  CHANGE 

Against  this  background,  there  have 
been  two  major  contemporary  reactions 
to  change  which  warrant  special  dis- 
cussion this  year:  the  reassertion  of 
cultural  and  religious  identity,  most 
notably  in  the  Islamic  context,  and  the 
pressures  of  existing  political  systems. 


Islamic  Revival 

The  Iranian  revolution  took  place  in 
a  particular  political  context,  and  it 
should  not  be  seen  as  a  harbinger  for 
the  Moslem  world  as  a  whole.  How- 
ever, consciousness  of  Islam  is  high 
here  and  abroad,  and  an  analysis  is 
necessary. 

For  millions  in  this  area,  Islam,  for 
centuries,  has  provided  a  unifying 
world  view.  Events  of  the  last  four  to 
five  decades,  however,  have  created  in 
many  countries  of  the  region  trends  in 
conflict  with  this  long-accepted  and 
highly  principled  value  system.  Mod- 
ernizing leaders,  in  their  quest  for  rapid 
development,  often  with  the  best  in- 
tentions, sought  to  import  and  implant 
not  only  Western  technology  but  West- 
ern political  value  systems.  Frequently, 
an  effort  was  made  to  push  aside  Is- 
lamic institutions  as  an  obstacle  to 
progress.  Widespread  acceptance  of  the 
belief  that  imported  technology  and 
culture  would  dramatically  improve  the 
quality  of  individual  life  sent  expecta- 
tions spiraling  upward. 

Modernization  and  development  did 
produce  for  many  people  a  better  ma- 
terial life  in  Western  terms,  but  in 
some  cases  these  were  accompanied  by 
massive  social  dislocation  and  urbani- 
zation as  labor  forces  moved  away 
from  traditional  agricultural  pursuits 
and  family  life  in  the  established  Is- 
lamic context.  Education  and  mass 
communications  further  fed  the  appe- 
tites. With  the  passage  of  time,  how- 
ever, it  became  apparent  that  for  most 
people  the  gap  between  expectation  and 
fuinilment  increased  rather  than  nar- 
rowed. This,  in  turn,  resulted  in 
mounting  frustration,  individual  and 
collective — a  growing  perception  that 


October  1979 


47 


middle  East  Peace  Process 


by  Robert  S.  Strauss 

Excerpt  from  an  address  before 
the  American  Bar  Association  in 
Dallas  on  August  13.  1979. 


I  have  been  deeply  disturbed  in 
recent  days  and  weeks  by  the  un- 
fortunate character  of  debate  on  the 
Middle  East  peace  process.  This 
does  not  help  the  peace  process,  it 
hurts  it;  it  does  not  help  Israel, 
Egypt,  or  the  Palestinians.  We  must 
do  what  we  can  to  make  possible  a 
climate  for  discussion,  debate,  and 
negotiation  that  will  move  the  peace 
process  forward  and  help  secure  the 
legitimate  interests  of  all  the  parties. 

The  idea  that  there  has  been  any 
lessening  of  the  U.S.  commitment  to 
keep  Israel  strong — so  that  it  will 
remain  secure — to  promote  Israel's 
future,  or  to  fulfill  all  of  our  under- 
takings or  commitments  to  Israel  is 
false.  The  idea  that  we  reject  or  are 
insensitive  to  the  legitimate  rights  of 
the  Palestinian  people  is  equally 
false. 

As  the  President's  personal  repre- 
sentative to  the  Middle  East  peace 
negotiations,  my  mandate  is  Res- 
olutions 242  and  338.  and  the  Camp 
David  accords,  in  their  entirety. 
Secretary  Vance  took  the  lead  in  de- 
veloping and  fully  supports  that 
mandate. 

I  will  work  with  Egypt  and  Israel 
under  that  mandate,  as  expeditiously 
as  possible.  But  no  artificial  dead- 
line—  no  position  of  the  United 
States — will  be  set  that  goes  beyond 
that  mandate. 

In  carrying  out  that  mandate,  we 
are  also  doing  our  utmost  to  work 
with  other  parties  in  the  Middle  East 
to  try  to  gain  their  support  for  the 
peace  effort.  I  have  been  to  Israel 
and  Egypt  and  to  other  Arab  coun- 
tries as  well.  I  want  to  broaden  and 
deepen  this  effort,  within  the 
framework  of  established  U.S.  pol- 
icy. 

All  parties  recognize,  in  the  Camp 
David  agreements  and  elsewhere, 
that  the  Palestinian  people  have  a 
right  to  participate  in  determining 
their  future.  The  Camp  David 
framework  not  only  affirms  this 


right,  it  commits  the  parties  for  the 
first  time  to  a  practical  program  of 
negotiation  by  which  Palestinian 
rights  can  be  translated  into  concrete 
reality.  We  must  recognize  the  his- 
torical importance  of  this  achieve- 
ment, and  we  must  be  certain  that 
we  proceed  now  in  a  manner  that 
does  not  weaken  it. 

In  support  of  these  rights  we  are 
working  hard  to  create  a  self- 
governing  authority  that  will  meet 
the  needs  of  all  the  parties  and  give 
the  Palestinians  a  stake  in  the  proc- 
ess and  in  their  future.  We  would 
like  to  see  the  Palestinians  in  the 
talks  now,  as  the  Camp  David 
agreement  provides.  And  their  ac- 
ceptance of  Resolution  242  and  of 
Israel's  right  to  exist  would  be  a 
major  step  along  the  road  to  peace. 

The  autonomy  talks  need  a  chance 
to  succeed.  Israel,  Egypt,  and  the 
United  States  need  time  to  make 
them  succeed.  In  our  efforts  to 
achieve  that  success,  we  must  and 
we  will  always  have  as  our  absolute 
requirement  the  security  of  Israel, 
its  borders,  and  its  people.  This  na- 
tion will  never  walk  away  from  any 


AMBASSADOR  STRAUSS 

Robert  S.  Strauss  was  born  in  Lockhart, 
Texas,  October  19,  1918,  and  was  raised  in 
Stamford,  Texas.  He  received  an  LL.B.  de- 
gree from  the  University  of  Texas  in  1941. 
After  serving  as  a  special  agent  of  the  FBI, 
he  entered  private  law  practice  in  January 
1946. 


of  its  commitments  to  Israel.  Let  me 
reaffirm  that  today  in  the  clearest 
possible  terms. 

Let  me  assure  you  that  the  peace 
process  will  build  on  the  indestruct- 
ible bonds  between  our  two  immi- 
grant nations — nations  devoted  to 
principles  of  freedom,  democracy, 
and  opportunity  and  nations  bound 
together  by  enduring  values  that 
give  us  strength  both  at  home  and 
abroad. 

A  strong,  vital,  and  independent 
Israel  is  indispensable  to  enduring 
peace  and  stability  in  the  Middle 
East.  The  solution  to  the  Palestinian 
problem,  with  the  cycle  of  ter- 
rorism, violence,  and  destruction  it 
has  caused,  is  not  only  morally  es- 
sential, but  it,  too,  is  indispensable 
to  enduring  peace  and  stability  in  the 
Middle  East. 

President  Sadat  and  Prime  Minis- 
ter Begin  are  both  confident  that  the 
peace  process  can  succeed.  We  need 
now  to  build  on  what  they  have 
achieved  so  far,  without  sacrificing 
any  of  the  principles  I  have  stated 
above.  President  Carter  has  in- 
structed me,  as  his  personal  repre- 
sentative, to  make  every  construc- 
tive effort  to  be  of  assistance  to 
them.  I  expect  to  discharge  that  re- 
sponsibility. 


Ambassador  Strauss  served  on  the  Texas 
Bank  Commission  (1962-68)  and  was 
Chairman  of  the  Board  of  the  Valley  View 
Bank  of  Dallas  for  6  years.  He  has  also 
served  as  a  Director  of  Xerox  Corporation, 
Braniff  Airlines,  Columbia  Pictures,  and 
Wylain  Corporation. 

In  March  1970  he  was  elected  Treasurer 
of  the  Democratic  National  Committee  and 
served  through  the  1972  Democratic  con- 
vention. He  then  became  Chairman  of  the 
National  Committee  to  Reelect  a  Demo- 
cratic Congress  for  the  1972  elections.  He 
was  elected  Chairman  of  the  Democratic 
National  Committee  in  December  1972  and 
served  in  this  capacity  until  January  1977 
when  he  returned  to  his  private  law  prac- 
tice. In  1976  he  was  cochairman  of  the 
Democratic  National  Campaign  Steering 
Committee. 

On  March  30,  1977,  Ambassador  Strauss 
was  sworn  in  as  the  President's  Special 
Representative  for  Trade  Negotiations;  he 
resigned  from  this  position  on  August  8. 
1979.  On  April  24,  1979,  President  Carter 
appointed  him  as  Ambassador  at  Large  with 
special  responsibilities  for  Middle  East 
peace  negotiations. 


48 


Department  ot  State  Bulletin 


benefits  were  not  being  shared  equita- 
bly. 

In  Iran,  collective  anger  was  a  sign 
of  underlying  pervasive  psychological 
disorientation,  and  it  expressed  itself  in 
political  agitation.  It  was  natural  that 
individuals  came  to  resent  the  imported 
cause  of  dislocation  and  reached  for 
comfort  in  a  value  system  more  indig- 
enous and  satisfying  to  their  needs. 
The  abiding  values  of  Islam  were  at 
hand,  institutionally  eroded  but  never 
eradicated  or  even  basically  weakened; 
thus,  the  "Islamic  revival""  of  which 
we  read  so  much.  As  we  have  seen,  it 
was  on  such  a  base  that  the  revolution 
in  Iran  was  justified.  However,  we  see 
aspects  of  the  revival,  although  in  more 
moderate  form,  in  practically  every  Is- 
lamic nation  today. 

We  believe  we  will  continue  to  see 
an  Islamic  aspiration  to  reassert  iden- 
tity and  self-esteem  through  reasserting 
the  importance  of  religion.  This  need 
not  be  a  basis  for  contention,  however, 
if  we  in  the  West  evidence  better  gen- 
eral understanding  of  what  is  taking 
place  and  find  appropriate  ways  to  at- 
test our  sympathies  and  our  respect  for 
their  religion. 

Pressures  on  Political  Systems 

Rapid  economic  and  social  change 
has  obviously  had  its  impact  on  politi- 
cal institutions.  Political  instability  is  a 
fact  of  life  in  many  countries  of  the  re- 
gion, but  its  causes  vary  from  country 
to  country. 

One  major  problem  is  that  the  con- 
cept of  the  nation-state — a  concept  im- 
ported into  the  region — has  only  a 
fragile  hold  in  some  countries.  Central 
governments  have  difficulty  in  assert- 
ing authority  in  countries  where  the 
basic  unit  of  political  identity  is  the  re- 
ligious or  ethnic  or  linguistic  subgroup 
or  area  of  the  country. 

In  Lebanon,  the  central  government 
is  trying  to  reweave  the  torn  fabric  of 
Lebanese  nationhood  in  the  wake  of 
factional  strife.  In  Iran,  various  tribal 
and  ethnic  groups  have  reasserted 
claims  to  local  autonomy  in  the  wake 
of  the  revolution.  In  Afghanistan,  the 
Marxist  government  is  facing  tradi- 
tional tribal  and  ethnic  resistance  to 
central  government  authority.  There  is 
less  strain  on  countries  like  Egypt  and 
Saudi  Arabia  with  more  homogeneous 
populations.  Iraq  and  Syria  on  the  other 
hand,  with  governments  drawn  from 
minorities,  have  promoted  in  the  name 
of  national  unity  a  secular  ideology  — 
Baathism  —  which  formally  bans  dis- 
tinction among  their  Sunni,  Shi"a,  and 
Alawite  Arab  populations,  as  well  as 
Kurds  and  Christians. 

Whatever  the   value   system   in   a 


country,  whether  radical  secular  ide- 
ologies or  close  identification  with 
Islam,  governments  will  succeed  in  the 
long  run  to  the  extent  that  they  provide 
a  sense  of  basic  social  justice  and  re- 
sponsiveness to  their  people  and  basic 
respect  for  human  rights.  Each  gov- 
ernment makes  its  own  record  in  this 
regard  and  the  record  it  makes  has 
much  to  do  with  its  stability  over  the 
longer  term. 


ISRAEL  IN  THE  REGIONAL 
CONTEXT 

Within  this  regional  context  it  is  im- 
portant to  look  at  the  significance  of 
these  forces  of  change  for  Israel's  place 
in  the  region.  We  must  do  so  because 
we  have  a  particularly  close  relation- 
ship with  Israel  and  a  strong  commit- 
ment to  its  security  and  well-being. 
The  United  States  also  has  substantial 
interests  in  the  achievement  of 
peace — and  beyond  peace,  normal  re- 
lations of  real  comity  and  cooperation 
—  between  Israel  and  other  nations  of 
the  region. 

Israel" s  economy — already  burdened 
with  heavy  defense  expenditures,  a 
very  high  rate  of  inflation,  and  heavy 
balance  of  payments  deficits — is  at 
least  as  much  affected  by  the  economic 
problems  of  energy  and  their  effect  on 
the  world  economy  as  are  the  Western 
industrial  nations,  and  for  Israel  also 
energy  supply  is  a  matter  of  national 
security.  In  addition,  the  problem  of 
water  resources  has  long  been  recog- 
nized as  critical  for  Israel. 

Because  it  and  its  neighbors  must 
ultimately  and  inescapably  find  a  way 
to  live  in  peace  with  one  another,  Israel 
must,  as  much  as  we  and  the  other  re- 
gional neighbors,  come  to  terms  with 
the  forces  of  change  in  the  region.  Is- 
rael is  already  experiencing  dramatic 
changes  in  this  regard.  The  reality  of 
peace  with  Egypt  and  the  real  prospect 
of  a  broader  peace  in  the  region  have 
had  a  profound  effect  in  Israel.  A  fun- 
damental reassessment  of  policies  and 
of  goals  is  taking  place  within  Israel  to 
determine  how  it  can  move  toward 
peace  while  assuring  its  security. 


MIDDLE  EAST  PEACE 
NEGOTIATIONS 

Against  this  perspective  on  our  re- 
gional interests,  I  would  like  to  discuss 
at  some  length  the  Middle  East  peace 
process. 

The  effort  to  move  steadily  toward 
resolution  of  the  Arab-Israeli  conflict 
remains  the  principal  element  in  our 
overall   design  to  contribute  to  con- 


structive change  and  to  secure  our 
interests  in  the  Middle  East.  The  peace 
effort  itself  carries  with  it  dramatic 
potential  tor  effecting  change  in  the  re- 
gion by  reducing  the  causes  ot  conflict 
and  helping  people  in  the  region  turn 
constructively  to  other  problems.  If  the 
peace  process  fails  to  achieve  com- 
prehensive results,  we  can  expect  not 
only  a  continuation  of  strife  in  Lebanon 
and  the  persisting  cycle  of  retaliation 
between  Israelis  and  Palestinians  but 
also  increased  radicalism  and  the  prob- 
ability over  time  of  widened  and  re- 
newed armed  conflict,  with  all  that  en- 
tails in  squandered  human  and  material 
resources  and  danger  to  global  peace. 

If  on  the  other  hand  a  durable  and 
comprehensive  peace  is  achieved,  we 
will  have  helped  prompt  a  very  differ- 
ent kind  of  change  in  the  region,  one 
that  supports  not  only  our  most  critical 
national  objectives  but  also  those  of  the 
Middle  East  peoples.  The  degree  to 
which  a  peace  settlement  will  serve 
U.S.  interests  will  depend  on  its  re- 
sponding to  the  interests  of  the  peoples 
in  the  Middle  East,  because  a  settle- 
ment can  be  durable  only  if  each  party 
has  a  stake  in  its  durability.  One  of  the 
purposes  of  this  analysis  is  to  encour- 
age an  understanding  of  those  interests. 

The  year  that  has  passed  since  our 
last  report  to  this  committee  has  wit- 
nessed developments  of  momentous 
consequence  in  the  30-year  search  for  a 
resolution  of  the  Arab-Israel  dispute.  In 
September  1978  Egypt  and  Israel 
agreed  at  Camp  David  on  two  "frame- 
work"" documents,  the  first  setting 
forth  the  principles  of  a  comprehensive 
peace  in  the  Middle  East  and  the  basis 
for  proceeding  with  negotiations  on  the 
West  Bank  and  Gaza  where  the  Pales- 
tinians would  participate  in  determin- 
ing their  own  future;  the  second  estab- 
lishing the  basic  terms  governing  a 
peace  treaty  between  Egypt  and  Israel.^ 
On  March' 26,  1979,  President  Sadat 
and  Prime  Minister  Begin  signed  a 
Treaty  of  Peace  between  Egypt  and  Is- 
rael, and  simultaneously  the  two  lead- 
ers signed  a  joint  letter  addressed  to 
President  Carter  setting  forth  a  time- 
frame for  the  West  Bank-Gaza  negotia- 
tions.^ 

After  so  many  years  of  failed  initia- 
tives, false  starts,  and  recurrent  out- 
breaks of  warfare,  the  accomplishments 
of  last  year  loom  large  indeed.  With 
the  achievement  of  the  Egyptian-Israeli 
Treaty  of  Peace,  there  has  been  a  deci- 
sive reduction  in  the  potential  for  war 
between  Israel,  the  most  powerful 
military  force  in  the  region,  and  Egypt, 
traditionally  the  most  influential  as 
well  as  the  most  populous  Arab  coun- 
try. 

Equally  important,   the  negotiations 


October  1979 


49 


set  in  train  by  President  Sadat's  trip  to 
Jerusalem  and  Prime  Minister  Begin's 
return  visit  to  Ismailia  have  demon- 
strated that  the  process  of  negotiation 
can  resolve  issues  that  were  considered 
intractable  only  a  tew  years  or  even 
months  before.  The  spirit  of  negotia- 
tion IS  intectious.  Difficult  as  the  task 
is  that  the  Egyptian  and  Israeli  delega- 
tions are  facing  in  the  West  Bank-Gaza 
negotiations  that  have  just  begun,  both 
sides  share  an  underlying  assumption 
that  negotiation  is  the  only  way  of  re- 
solving the  problem  and  that  with  suf- 
ficient patience  and  resourcefulness 
this  objective  can  be  reached. 

But  it  obviously  must  be  of  concern 
to  us  that  there  is  a  sizable  body  of 
opinion  in  the  Arab  world  that  remains 
unconvinced  that  the  course  we  are 
embarked  on  is  the  right  one.  1  think  it 
is  fair  to  say  that  we  expected  a  certain 
amount  of  this.  There  are  a  number  of 
Arab  governments  which  have  been  so 
adamantly  opposed  to  President  Sadat's 
initiative  from  the  beginning  that  it 
would  not  have  been  realistic  to  expect 
them  to  be  brought  around  by  our  ar- 
guments alone. 

Of  more  concern  to  us  is  that  several 
moderate  governments  of  the  area — 
ones  with  which  we  have  maintained 
close  relations  over  the  years — have 
perceptions  about  the  peace  process 
that  seem  so  different  from  ours.  Tacti- 
cal handling  may  have  had  something 
to  do  with  the  polarization  and  misun- 
derstanding among  the  Arab  slates  at 
present,  but  the  more  basic  cause  is 
lack  of  confidence  among  the  skeptics 
that  the  present  format  of  negotiations 
can  produce  a  result  that  will  be  ac- 
ceptable to  them. 

The  polarization  that  these  first  steps 
in  the  peace  process  have  produced  in 
the  Arab  world  is  not  in  the  U.S.  inter- 
est. It  obviously  makes  more  difficult 
the  realization  of  further  progress  to- 
ward the  comprehensive  peace  that  re- 
mains our  ultimate  goal.  It  has  also 
produced  strains  in  our  relations  with 
the  Arab  states  whose  friendship  we 
value  and  need.  Therefore,  one  of  our 
chief  policy  tasks  in  the  months  ahead 
will  be  to  do  what  we  can  to  lessen  this 
division,  to  increase  understanding  of 
the  peace  process,  and  to  ameliorate 
the  strains  caused  in  bilateral  relations 
with  the  U.S. 

Of  primary  importance  will  be  the 
results  that  can  be  achieved  in  the 
negotiations  in  the  next  few  months. 
Those  results  can  only  be  achieved  by 
negotiation,  in  which  the  parties 
painstakingly  explore  the  possibilities 
for  accommodation,  and  by  the  passage 
of  time,  during  which  practical  ar- 
rangements leading  toward  peace  can 
be  tested  and  a  chance  given  for  un- 


derlying governmental  and  public  at- 
titudes to  change.  We  believe  results 
can  be  achieved  by  this  process — 
indeed,  that  it  is  the  only  way  to 
achieve  results  that  are  likely  to  be  on 
terms  that  both  sides  can  ultimately  ac- 
cept. President  Carter's  commitment  to 
put  the  full  weight  of  the  United  States 
behind  these  negotiations  is  clear. 


POLICY  IMPLICATIONS  FOR 
THE  U.S. 

Beyond  our  central  continuing  effort 
to  achieve  progress  toward  resolution 
of  the  Arab-Israeli  conflict,  this  analy- 
sis of  the  pressures  and  interests  which 
the  governments  of  this  region  face, 
and  of  the  real  nature  of  the  problems 
we  face  in  pursuing  our  interests, 
suggests  two  points  to  bear  in  mind  for 
the  conduct  of  our  policy  toward  this 
region. 

The  leaders  of  the  nations  in  this  re- 
gion are  attempting  to  strengthen  ef- 
fective central  authority  in  the  face  of 
demands  for  broader  political  partici- 
pation when  they  must  at  the  same  time 


cope  with  mounting  political  and  eco- 
nomic pressures  that  cut  across  national 
boundaries.  They  will  be  dealing  with 
problems  in  this  broader  context.  The 
issue  is  how  we  will  take  into  account 
in  our  decisions  their  objectives  and 
pressures  as  well  as  our  own.  We  can 
ask  comparable  understanding  from 
them. 

Our  own  policies  will  play  a  critical 
role  in  establishing  our  credentials  as 
full  and  valued  partners  in  the  new 
interdependence  that  is  rapidly  emer- 
ging between  this  region  and  the  in- 
dustrialized world.  The  issue  again  is 
how  to  assure  that  our  relationships  op- 
erate to  the  fullest  extent  possible  as  a 
two-way  street. 

On  the  political  side,  this  means,  for 
instance,  that  efforts  to  deal  with  an 
issue,  such  as  the  Palestinian  problem, 
must  be  seen  not  only  in  the  context  of 
the  Arab-Israeli  negotiations  but  also  in 
the  context  of  the  Arab  world's  need  to 
deal  honorably  with  the  legitimate 
interests  of  a  Palestinian  community 
with  sizable  and  influential  numbers  in 
the  key  Arab  states.  It  also  means  that 
a  solution  to  the  problem  in  Lebanon, 
while  requiring   new   understandings 


Egyptian  Vice  President 
Meets  With  President  Carter 


WHITE  HOUSE  STATEMENT, 

JUNE  II,  1979' 

President  Carter  and  Egyptian  Vice 
President  Husni  Mubarak  met  in  the 
Oval  Office  for  50  minutes. 

In  accepting  the  special  message  that 
Vice  President  Mubarak  conveyed  on 
behalf  of  President  Sadat,  President 
Carter  expressed  his  personal  pleasure 
at  being  able  to  welcome  Vice  Presi- 
dent Mubarak  again  to  the  White 
House.  He  reiterated  his  warm  personal 
regard  and  high  esteem  for  President 
Sadat  and  welcomed  the  opportunity  to 
continue  close  consultations  with 
Egyptian  leaders. 

President  Carter  and  Vice  President 
Mubarak  reviewed  the  status  of 
Egyptian-American  cooperation  in  a 
number  of  fields.  The  President  ex- 
pressed great  interest  in  Egypt's  prior- 
ity efforts  to  expand  its  economic  and 
social  development.  Bilateral  military 
relations  were  also  discussed.  Citing 
the  administration's  proposal  for  $1.5 
billion  in  foreign  military  sales  credits 
over  the  next  3  years,  the  President 
reaffirmed  his  intention  to  assist  Egypt 


in  meeting  its  legitimate  defense  needs. 
He  also  said  that  they  discussed  how 
the  United  States  might  help  to  meet 
Egypt's  longer  term  defense  needs  and 
the  desirability  of  regular  and 
systematic  consultations  toward  this 
end.  Referring  to  the  Middle  East 
peace  negotiations,  the  President 
stressed  the  Administration's  determina- 
tion to  help  resolve  the  difficult  issues 
that  must  be  addressed  so  as  to  achieve  a 
comprehensive  peace. 

In  addition  to  his  meeting  with 
President  Carter.  Vice  President 
Mubarak  today  met  separately  with 
Secretary  Vance.  Secretary  of  Defense 
Brown,  and  Ambassador  Strauss 
[Robert  S.  Strauss,  Ambassador  at 
Large  with  special  responsibilities  for 
Middle  East  peace  negotiations].  Vice 
President  Mubarak  will  meet  with 
members  of  Congress  before  he  departs 
for  London  on  the  evening  of  June 
13.  D 


'List  of  participants  not  printed  here.  Text 
from  Weekly  Compilation  of  Presidential  Docu- 
ments of  June  18,  1979. 


50 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


among  the  Lebanese  themselves,  is  in- 
timately related  to  progress  in  dealing 
with  the  Palestinian  problem  through 
the  Arab-Israeli  negotiations. 

On  the  economic  side,  lor  instance, 
regional  attitudes  on  meeting  world  oil 
demand  will  be  increasingly  influenced 
by  the  perception  in  the  producing 
countries  of  how  effectively  we  in  the 
industrial  world  are  working  to  check 
the  growth  of  demand  for  Middle  East- 
ern oil  by  adopting  effective  measures 
to  conserve  energy  and  to  find  alternate 
sources. 

Another  growing  influence  on  these 
oil  producers  is  their  sense  of  how 
meaningful  a  role  they  are  going  to 
play  in  the  wider  international  economy 
and  its  institutions,  of  whether  we  and 
other  industrial  nations  truly  seek  an 
economic  interdependence  with  them 
beyond  mere  access  to  their  energy  re- 
sources. This  factor  touches  on  a  broad 
range  of  international  economic  issues 
we  will  have  to  face  in  the  coming 
months,  including  future  access  for 
producer  states  to  petrochemical  mar- 
kets and  the  quality  of  their  participa- 
tion in  international  finance  and 
investment.  A  final  aspect  of  the  eco- 
nomic relationship  with  the  region  is 
how  we  are  perceived  as  working  in 
parallel  with  them  to  meet  the  de- 
velopment needs  of  the  poorer  coun- 
tries. 

With  regard  to  nonproliferation  is- 
sues, it  will  mean  that  we,  and  other 
governments,  will  have  to  increase  our 
efforts  to  meet  legitimate  technology 
requirements  for  nuclear  energy  while 
also  addressing  underlying  security 
concerns  which  motivate  nuclear 
weapons  programs. 

In  the  field  of  security  policy,  the 
United  States  has  modestly  increased 
the  security  role  it  plays  in  the  Middle 
East  in  the  last  year,  but  it  has  done  so 
in  response  to  the  requests  of  friends 
for  support.  We  are  making  sales  of 
arms  to  meet  real  defense  needs.  We 
demonstrated  that  we  could  and  would 
aid  friends  quickly  when  faced  by  at- 
tack from  outside. 

Increased  shipments  of  arms  to  cer- 
tain governments  of  the  area  by  the 
Soviet  Union,  supply  of  Soviet  advis- 
ers, and  support  for  military  operations 
had  created  an  impression  that  the 
United  States  might  be  unwilling  or 
unable  to  help  its  friends  and  protect  its 
interests  in  the  area.  This  impression 
was  mistaken,  and  the  visit  of  Secre- 
tary [of  Defense  Harold]  Brown  to  the 
Middle  East  in  February  was  part  of  an 
effort  to  set  the  record  straight. 

We  have  begun  a  new  arms  relation- 
ship with  Egypt  in  support  of  that 
country's  legitimate  defense  require- 
ments. We  responded  quickly  to  the  re- 


quests of  North  Yemen  and  Saudi 
Arabia  for  help  to  meet  an  invasion 
from  South  Yemen.  We  have  expanded 
our  consultations  with  other  friendly 
governments  about  security  conditions 
and  threats  in  the  area,  and  we  have 
decided  to  increase  marginally  our 
military  presence. 

Our  steps  threaten  no  regime  in  the 
Middle  East  or  beyond.  They  enhance 
security  in  the  area.  They  are  designed 
to  support  the  peace  process.  They  also 
reflect  U.S.  strategic  interests.  The 
steps  are  limited  and  measured  and 
have  been  taken  in  consultation  with 
area  states.  We  intend  to  move  deliber- 
ately but  intelligently  in  our  security 
efforts.  We  understand  and  appreciate 
that  a  larger  U.S.  military  presence  in 
the  area  would  be  inimical  to  the  inter- 
ests and  desires  of  our  friends. 

In  this  context,  it  is  important  to  say 
a  word  about  the  region  as  it  relates  to 
other,  broader  U.S.  global  and  stra- 
tegic interests.  We  hear  much  about  the 
danger  to  American  interests  in  the 
Middle  East  from  unfriendly  outside 
powers,  particularly  from  the  Com- 
munist world.  About  these  dangers  I 
would  make  two  points. 

First,  there  is  no  lack  of  under- 
standing of  the  military  power  our  ad- 
versaries can  dispose  over  this  region. 
Our  security  policy  is  meant  to  reassure 
our  friends  and  deter  adventurism  by 
our  adversaries. 

Second,  however,  we  have  also 
come  to  realize  that  military  power 
alone  or  even  primarily,  will  be  unable 
to  secure  and  promote  anyone's  inter- 
ests unless  it  supports  and  takes  ac- 
count of  the  indigenous  forces  for 
change  within  this  region.  Indeed  it  is 
clear  that  only  an  approach  that  permits 
the  building  of  good  working  relation- 
ships with  the  governments  and  peoples 
of  the  Middle  East  will  insure  security 
for  the  interests  of  the  U.S.  and  our  al- 
lies. 

Finally,  we  will  continue  to  recog- 
nize the  central  role  that  our  approach 
to  the  Arab-Israeli  conflict  will  play  in 
determining  the  ability  of  the  United 
States  to  pursue  its  interests  throughout 
the  area.  Because  of  the  close  inter- 
weaving of  the  forces  in  the  area, 
progress  on  one  front  affects  progress 
on  another. 

To  sum  up,  we  have  the  opportunity 
and  resources  to  develop  a  full  and 
mutually  beneficial  partnership  with 
the  fastest  growing  and  most  rapidly 
changing  area  of  the  world  today.  If 
change  produces  instability,  it  will  also 
produce  opportunity.  Our  approach  will 
be  to  master  the  nature  and  direction  of 
change  and  to  collaborate  with  gov- 
ernments which  wish  to  work  with  us 
in  finding  a  new  balance  in  their  lives 


Vtolettee  in 

Lebanon  and 

tsraci 


DEPARTMENT  STATEMENT, 
JUNE  27,  1979' 

The  Syrian-Israeli  air  battle  over 
Lebanon  today  has  been  a  very  serious 
event.  It  underlines  the  seriousness  of 
the  situation  in  Lebanon  which  has  now 
brought  Israel  and  Syria  into  confron- 
tation for  the  first  time  since  1974. 

For  many  months  fighting  between 
Israel,  its  allies  in  southern  Lebanon, 
and  Palestinian  forces  has  thwarted  all 
Lebanese  and  international  efforts  to 
bring  stability  to  this  troubled  area. 

The  Israelis  have  been  conducting  a 
preemptive  bombing  strategy  against 
Palestinian  bases  and  concentrations  in 
Lebanon  in  the  wake  of  an  increase  in 
terrorist  actions.  Some  of  the  targets 
have  been  extremely  close  to  Syrian 
military  positions.  At  the  same  time, 
the  Syrians  have  been  scrambling  air- 
craft from  time  to  time  in  response  to 
the  Israeli  actions.  This  dangerous 
combination  of  events  culminated  in 
the  air  battle  today. 

We  call  on  both  Israel  and  Syria  to 
exercise  maximum  restraint.  We  are  in 
touch  with  both  governments  and  with 
Lebanon  to  try  to  find  ways  to  forestall 
more  violence.  There  must  be  an  end  to 
the  cycle  of  challenges,  provocations, 
and  military  actions  in  Lebanon,  which 
have  caused  so  many  deaths  and  in- 
juries to  innocent  Lebanese.  The  time 
is  overdue  for  a  more  responsible  at- 
titude on  the  part  of  all  involved,  in- 
cluding the  Palestinians,  whose  ter- 
rorist actions  in  Israel  have  sparked  off 
so  many  Israeli  actions. 

This  air  battle  over  Lebanon  clearly 
heightens  tensions  and  endangers  the 
current  stage  of  negotiations  for  Middle 
East  peace.  This  event  only  reinforces 
our  determination  to  seek  a  comprehen- 
sive Middle  East  peace  which  will 
bring  an  end  to  this  bloodshed. 

which  can  contribute  to  orderly  global 
political  and  economic  change.  D 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the  hearings  will 
he  published  by  the  committee  and  will  be  avail- 
able from  the  Superintendent  of  Documents, 
U.S.  Government  Printing  Office.  Washington, 
D.C.  20402. 

^  For  text  see  Bulletin  of  June  1979,  p.  16. 

■'For  te.xts  of  the  frameworks,  see  Bulletin 
of  Oct.  1978.  p.  7. 

^For  texts  of  the  Peace  Treaty  and  related 
documents,  see  Bulletin  of  May  1979.  p.  3. 


October  1979 


51 


DEPARTMENT  STATEMENT, 
JULY  23,  1979^ 

The  United  States  strongly  condemns 
the  Israeli  air  attacks  up  and  down  the 
Lebanese  coast  on  July  22,  which  hit 
targets  in  one  case  only  5  miles  from 
Beirut.  The  press  reports  from  Lebanon 
indicate  that  between  12  and  18  people 
were  killed  and  thai  as  many  as  70  may 
have  been  wounded. 

The  Israeli  air  attacks  were  the  first 
in  3  weeks,  and  we  had  hoped  that 
these  raids — which  take  such  a  toll  in 
human  life — would  not  be  repeated. 
Recognizing  that  there  is  tragic  vio- 
lence on  both  sides,  we  urge  that  Israel 
and  all  other  quarters — including  the 
Palestinians  and  Haddad's  forces — 
which  have  contributed  to  the  cycle  of 
violence,  to  exercise  maximum  re- 
straint so  that  these  tragedies  can  be 
avoided. 


DEPARTMENT  STATEMENT, 
AUG.  22,  1979' 

We  are  deeply  concerned  and  sad- 
dened by  the  violence  in  Lebanon  and 
Israel  in  the  past  few  days.  Yesterday, 
bombs  exploded  in  Israel,  set  by  ter- 
rorists. For  much  of  the  past  2  days, 
and  particularly  yesterday,  there  were 
intense  artillery  exchanges  in  southern 
Lebanon.  While  much  of  this  informa- 
tion has  come  to  us  in  news  reports,  it 
appears  that  the  Lebanese  militias  al- 
lied to  Israel  did  most  of  the  shelling 
but  that  shelling  by  Palestinian  forces 
on  militia  positions  also  was  heavy. 

According  to  Lebanese  news  reports, 
some  militia  shells  hit  a  school,  killing 
one  child  and  wounding  others.  There 
have  been  other  casualties  elsewhere. 
According  to  other  news  reports,  the 
barrages  have  been  so  heavy  that  inno- 
cent Lebanese  civilians  are  once  again 
fleeing  the  area  in  large  numbers, 
adding  to  the  already  existing  exodus 
of  many  thousands  from  southern 
Lebanon  in  recent  months. 

Soldiers  of  the  U.N.  peacekeeping 
forces  reportedly  have  been  wounded 
in  these  latest  exchanges.  In  addition, 
Israeli  aircraft  hit  targets  in  the  area  on 
August  20,  as  we  reported  previously. 

The  terrible  human  tragedy  is  meas- 
ured in  innocent  lives  lost,  maimed 
people,  the  destruction  of  homes  and 
farms,  and  the  flight  of  people  to 
safety.  We  call  on  all  involved  in  this 
violence  to  stop  this  continuing  human 
tragedy.  D 


Oil  Supply  Agreement 
Signed  hy  the  U.S»  and  israei 


'  Read  to  news  correspondents  by  acling  De- 
partment spokesman  Tom  Reslon. 

^Read  to  news  correspondents  by  Depart- 
ment spokesman  Hodding  Carter  III. 


The  following  memorandum  of 
agreement  was  signed  by  Herbert  J. 
Hansell,  the  Department  of  State's 
Legal  Adviser,  and  Yaacov  Nechush- 
tan.  Minister  of  the  Embassy  of  Israel, 
on  June  22.  1979.  in  Washington. 
DC. 

Pursuant  to  the  Memorandum  of  Agreement 
between  the  Governments  of  the  United  States 
and  Israel  signed  March  26,  1979,'  Israel  and 
the  United  States  have  entered  into  the  Oil 
Supply  Arrangement  set  forth  herein  as  fol- 
lows; 

1.  Israel  will  make  its  own  independent  ar- 
rangements for  oil  supply  to  meet  its  require- 
ments through  normal  procedures.  In  the  event 
Israel  is  unable  to  secure  its  needs  in  this  way, 
the  United  States  Government,  upon  noti- 
fication of  this  fact  by  the  Government  of  Israel 
will  act  as  follows: 

(a)  If  the  oil  Israel  needs  to  meet  all  its  nor- 
mal domestic  requirements  is  unavailable  for 
purchase  in  circumstances  where  no  quantita- 
tive restrictions  exist  on  the  ability  of  the 
United  States  to  procure  oil  to  meet  its  normal 
requirements,  the  United  States  Government 
will  promptly  make  oil  available  for  purchase 
by  Israel  to  meet  the  shortfall  in  the  aforemen- 
tioned normal  requirements  of  Israel.  Oil  will 
be  made  available  to  Israel  as  soon  as  practica- 
ble after  notification;  the  United  States  will 
make  every  effort  to  ensure  this  period  is  less 
than  60  days. 

(b)  If  the  oil  Israel  needs  to  meet  all  of  its 
normal  requirements  for  domestic  consumption 
is  unavailable  for  purchase  in  circumstances 
where  quantitative  restrictions  through  embargo 
or  otherwise  also  prevent  the  United  States  from 
procuring  oil  to  meet  its  normal  requirements, 
the  United  States  Government  will  promptly 
make  oil  available  for  purchase  by  Israel  in  ac- 
cordance with  the  International  Energy  Agency 
conservation  and  allocation  formula  as  applied 
by  the  United  States  Government,  in  order  to 
meet  the  shortfall  in  Israel's  essential  require- 
ments. Oil  will  be  made  available  to  Israel  as 
soon  as  practicable  after  notification;  the  United 
States  will  make  every  effort  to  ensure  this 
period  is  less  than  60  days. 

(c)  If  Israel  is  unable  to  secure  the  necessary 
means  to  transport  to  Israel  oil  made  available 
pursuant  to  this  Agreement,  the  United  States 
Government  will  make  every  effort  to  help  Israel 
secure  the  necessary  means  of  transport. 

2.  Prices  paid  by  Israel  for  oil  provided  by  the 
United  States  hereunder  shall  be  comparable  to 
world  market  prices  current  at  the  time  of  trans- 
fer. Israel  will,  in  any  event,  reimburse  the 
United  Stales  for  the  costs  incurred  by  the 
United  States  in  providing  oil  to  Israel  here- 
under. 


3.  Israeli  and  United  States  experts  will  meet 
annually  or  more  frequently  at  the  request  of 
either  party,  to  review  Israel's  continuing  oil  re- 
quirement and  to  develop  and  review  any  neces- 
sary contingency  implementing  arrangements. 

4.  This  Memorandum  of  Agreement  is  subject 
to  applicable  United  Stales  law.  The  United 
States  administration  may  seek  additional  statu- 
tory authorization  that  may  be  necessary  for  full 
implementation  of  this  Memorandum  of  Agree- 
ment. 

5.  This  Memorandum  of  Agreement  shall 
enter  into  force  on  November  25,  1979  and  shall 
terminate  on  November  25,  1994.  The  oil  supply 
arrangement  of  September  1,  1975  between  the 
Governments  of  Israel  and  the  United  States 
shall  be  in  force  during  the  period  from  the  date 
of  this  Memorandum  of  Agreement  to  November 
25,  1994  and  shall  be  performed  and  im- 
plemented in  accordance  with  the  provisions  of 
this  Memorandum  of  Agreement. 

Herbert  J    Hansell 
For  the  Government  of 
the  United  States 

Yaacov  Nechushtan 
For  the  Government  of 
Israel 


June  22,  1979 

In  connection  with  the  Memorandum  of 
Agreement  being  entered  into  on  this  dale  be- 
tween the  Government  of  Israel  and  the  Gov- 
ernment of  the  United  Slates,  Israel  and  the 
United  States  understand  that: 

Because  of  the  unique  security  situation  of 
Israel  its  oil  reserves  are  and  should  be  at  the 
level  equal  to  six  months  of  Israel's  oil  con- 
sumption; and  in  this  connection  U.S.  oil 
supplies  should  be  at  such  levels  that  U.S.  abil- 
ity to  meet  its  oil  requirements  will  not  be  ad- 
versely affected. 

For  the  Government  of 
the  United  Stales 
Herbert  J.  Hansell 

For  the  Government  of 

Israel 

Yaacov  Nechushtan  D 


'  For  text,  see  Bulletin  of  May  1979,  p.  60. 


52 


Department  ol  State  BLillelin 


IfiUUartf  Equiptnt»iti  Progrants 
for  Egypt  and  Saudi  Arabia 


by  Harold  H.  Saunders 

Statement  before  the  Senate  Foreign 
Relations  Committee  on  July  20,  1979 . 
Mr.  Saunders  is  Assistant  Secretary  for 
Near  Eastern  and  South  Asian 
Affairs. ' 

I  take  pleasure  in  being  able  to  ap- 
pear before  you  today  to  discuss  certain 
military  equipment  programs.  I  under- 
stand you  wish  to  discuss  the  sale  of 
F-4  aircraft  to  Egypt  and  the  moderni- 
zation program  for  the  Saudi  National 
Guard. 


F-4  Aircraft  for  Egypt 

Under  the  $1.5  billion  package  of 
foreign  military  sales  credits  we  have 
asked  the  Congress  to  authorize  and 
appropriate  in  connection  with  the 
Egyptian-Israeli  Peace  Treaty,  we 
would  plan  to  sell  two  squadrons  of 
F-4  Phantom  aircraft  and  appropriate 
munitions.  Thirty-five  aircraft  are  in- 
volved in  all.  A  list  of  the  other  mili- 
tary equipment — including  armored 
personnel  carriers,  destroyers,  and  im- 
proved Hawk  antiaircraft  missiles  — 
which  we  might  be  prepared  to  sell  to 
Egypt  has  already  been  shared  with 
Congress. 

The  question  might  be  posed:  Why  is 
it  that  Egypt  requires  these  F-4  aircraft 
when  the  Peace  Treaty  between  Egypt 
and  Israel  has  significantly  reduced 
Egypt's  security  concerns?  The  answer 
is  that  Egypt  has  legitimate  national 
defense  requirements  even  while  in  a 
state  of  peace  with  Israel.  The  security 
of  Egypt's  close  ally,  the  Sudan,  is  a 
major  concern.  The  security  of  the  Nile 
lifeline  has  always  been  a  major  preoc- 
cupation of  Egypt.  To  the  north  and 
east,  Egypt's  coastlines,  and  especially 
the  Suez  Canal,  demand  a  credible 
military  deterrent. 

Elsewhere  in  the  immediate  region, 
there  are  countries  which  are  heavily 
armed  with  Soviet  weaponry,  and  at 
least  one  country  among  them  would 
like  to  derail  the  peace  process  and 
cause  problems  for  Egypt. 

While  seeking  U.S.  assistance  to 
maintain  sufficient  military  credibility. 
President  Sadat  continues  to  take  the 
position  that  economic  development 
remains  Egypt's  highest  priority.  Over 
the  years  ahead,  as  Egypt  acquires 
more  modern  equipment,  it  should  be 
possible  to  streamline  and  reduce  the 


size  of  the  Egyptian  armed  forces. 

In  the  meantime,  some  of  Egypt's 
military  inventory  is  becoming  obso- 
lescent, and  much  of  its  Soviet-made 
equipment  suffers  from  an  absence  of 
spare  parts  and  consequent  mainte- 
nance problems.  Egypt  needs  a  modern 
fighter  aircraft  for  all-weather  air  de- 
fense and  close  air  support. 

All  35  aircraft  will  come  exclusively 
from  our  Air  Force  inventories,  but 
they  are  in  good  shape.  The  initial  air- 
craft delivered  will  tly  over  Cairo  dur- 
ing the  October  6  Armed  Forces  Day 
parade.  This  will  be  a  highly  visible 
manifestation  of  America's  readiness  to 
cooperate  with  Egypt  in  meeting 
promptly  some — although  not  all  —  of 
Egypt's  legitimate  self-defense  re- 
quirements. 

Saudi  National  Guard 
Modernization  Program 

The  Saudi  National  Guard,  in  its 
early  equivalent,  has  existed  almost 
since  the  formation  of  the  Kingdom  of 
Saudi  Arabia.  Its  role  is  the  preserva- 
tion of  internal  security  and  the  protec- 
tion of  key  urban  centers  and  installa- 
tions, including  the  oil  fields  and  oil 
facilities.  Its  strength  is  16.000  men, 
but  tribal  levies  can  be  raised  in  an 
emergency  to  bring  its  total  strength  to 
about  32,000  men. 

In  recent  years,  to  take  into  account 
evolving  security  concerns,  the  Saudis 
decided  that  the  capability  of  the  Guard 
should  be  improved.  It  would  remain  a 
light  defense  force,  but  it  would  be 
more  capable  of  supporting  and  com- 
plementing the  larger  and  more  heavily 
armed  Saudi  Army  in  a  rapid  way.  To 
prepare  the  Guard  for  this  role,  it  was 
necessary  to  reorganize  it  into  mod- 
ernized battalions  with  equipment  de- 
signed for  mobility  and  quick  reaction. 

The  equipment  would  have  to  be 
highly  mobile,  rugged,  and  relatively 
easy  to  operate  and  to  maintain.  The 
Guard  will  not  have  the  capability  to 
repel  a  strong  attack  by  regular  military 
units  but  could  deter  and  slow  down 
any  such  attack  until  such  time  as  the 
regular  Army  can  be  deployed  to  the 
area. 

The  United  States  agreed  to  be 
helpful.  In  March  1973,  the  United 
States  and  the  Saudi  Government 
signed  a  memorandum  of  understand- 
ing on  U.S.  cooperation  in  the  mod- 
ernization of  the  Guard.  There  will  be 


no  increase  in  si/e  of  the  Natioiuil 
Guard.  We  started  out  by  modern:/mg 
four  battalions  at  a  cost  of  approxi- 
mately $500  million.  The  units  are 
equipped  with  V-150  armored  cars, 
TOW  missiles,  towed  Vulcan  antiair- 
craft guns,  and  towed  Howitzers. 
Training  and  equipping  of  three  bat- 
talions has  been  completed;  the  fourth 
is  currently  in  training. 

In  the  spring  of  1978,  the  Saudis  re- 
quested modernization  of  tour  addi- 
tional combat  battalions  and  one  logis- 
tics battalion.  Information  on  U.S.  as- 
sistance in  the  training  and  equipping 
of  the  logistic  battalion  was  provided  to 
the  Congress,  which  posed  no  objec- 
tions. This  logistics  battalion  begins 
training  early  in  1980.  The  estimated 
cost  of  training  and  equipping  the  four 
additional  combat  battalions  is  $1.23 
billion,  with  the  increased  costs  re- 
flecting inflationary  pressure  on  con- 
tractor support  arrangements  and  on 
newer  generation  equipment. 

We  hope  to  go  forward — with  the 
support  of  the  Congress — on  the  mod- 
ernization of  the  four  battalions,  a  4-5 
year  program  which  will  be  completed 
in  1985.  This  is  a  reasonable,  limited 
program  which  will  help  meet  Saudi 
Arabia's  legitimate  internal  security 
and  self-defense  needs  without  altering 
the  regional  arms  balance.  D 


'  The  complete  tran^cript  of  the  hearings  will 
be  published  by  the  committee  and  will  be 
available  from  the  Superintendent  ot  Docu- 
ments, U.S.  Government  Printing  Office, 
Washington.  D.C,  20402. 


1/.S.  Policy 
Toward  israei 


SECRETARY'S  STATEMENT, 
AUG.  8,  1979 

I  have  seen  Foreign  Minister  Day- 
an's  recent  interview  in  Yediot 
Aharonot  in  which  he  says  that  there 
has  been  a  "turn"  in  U.S.  policy  con- 
cerning Israel.  I  want  to  state  categori- 
cally that  there  has  been  no  change  in 
our  policy  toward  Israel.  Our  long- 
standing support  for  the  security  and 
well-being  of  Israel  is  firm  and  un- 
shakeable.  It  remains  our  policy  to 
work  toward  a  comprehensive  peace 
settlement  which  is  based  on  U.N.  Se- 
curity Council  Resolutions  242  and 
338.  D 


October  1979 


53 


HWesiem  Sahara 


by  Harold  H.  Saunders 

Statement  before  the  Subcommittee 
on  Africa  of  the  House  Committee  on 
Foreign  Affairs  on  July  24.  1979.  Mr. 
Saunders  is  Assistant  Secretary  for 
Near  Eastern  and  South  Asian 
Affairs. ' 

I  see  this  discussion  today  on  U.S. 
policy  toward  the  western  Sahara  as 
part  of  a  series  ot  consultations  we 
have  had  with  both  houses  ot  Congress 
on  this  subject  beginning  almost  2 
years  ago.  These  consultations  have 
covered  both  the  broad  issue  of  the 
western  Sahara  and  specific  policy 
questions  as  they  have  faced  the  Ad- 
ministration. 

It  is  important  at  the  outset  to  put 
U.S.  policy  toward  the  western  Sahara 
in  the  context  of  our  policy  toward 
northwest  Africa  in  general. 

Since  the  early  days  of  our  inde- 
pendence, this  region  has  been  impor- 
tant to  us  because  of  its  location  on  the 
southern  littoral  of  the  Mediterranean, 
control ing  the  lower  half  of  the  Strait 
of  Gibraltar.  It  is  important  to  us  be- 
cause of  the  role  it  plays  both  in  Africa 
and  in  the  Middle  East.  It  is  important 
because  of  its  natural  resources — 
petroleum  and  phosphates. 

Morocco 

In  the  modern  era,  we  have  had  a 
close  relationship  with  Morocco,  which 
shared  many  of  our  interests,  both 
globally  and  regionally. 

On  the  strategic  side,  we  had 
Strategic  Air  Command  bases  in  Mo- 
rocco until  1963,  and  we  maintained 
naval  communications  bases  there  until 
we  closed  them  at  our  initiative  last 
year.  Morocco  continues  to  permit  port 
visits  by  U.S.  naval  vessels  and  to 
allow  U.S.  military  aircraft  to  transit  to 
destinations  such  as  Saudi  Arabia. 

Morocco  has  historically  taken  a 
moderate  position  on  the  Arab-Israel 
question.  It  has  the  largest  Jewish 
population  of  any  country  in  the  Arab 
world — almost  20,000 — and  encour- 
ages the  return  to  Morocco  of  Jews 
who  have  migrated  to  Israel.  King  Has- 
san was  the  first  Arab  leader  to  favor 
Egyptian  President  Sadat's  trip  to 
Jerusalem.  While  associating  himself 
with  the  majority  of  Arab  countries  in 
opposition  to  the  Egypt-Israel  treaty. 
King   Hassan   maintains  his   personal 


friendship  with  Sadat  and  supports  the 
principle  of  a  peaceful,  negotiated  so- 
lution to  the  Arab-Israel  dispute. 

In  Africa,  Morocco  has  consistently 
supported  moderate  forces.  Morocco 
twice  sent  troops  in  response  to  re- 
quests from  Zaire  to  maintain  stability 
in  that  country's  Shaba  Province,  it 
opposes  Soviet  and  Cuban  intervention 
in  Africa. 

Algeria 

While  we  have  not  had  the  same 
similarity  of  views  on  regional  and  in- 
ternational issues  with  Algeria  as  we 
have  with  Morocco,  our  relations  with 
Algeria  have  been  steadily  improving 
since  we  reestablished  diplomatic  rela- 
tions in  1974.  We  are  Algeria's  largest 
trading  partner.  It  supplies  us  with 
about  9%  of  our  crude  oil  imports. 
American  firms  have  won  $6  billion  in 
contracts  in  Algeria  in  recent  years  for 
engineering  and  construction  services. 
These  economic  relations  are  only  one 
indication  of  a  pragmatic  approach  of 
the  Algerian  Government,  as  a  result  of 
which  we  are  able  to  maintain  a  frank 
and  friendly  dialogue  on  a  wide  variety 
of  subjects. 

Western  Sahara  Dispute 

Into  this  fabric  of  bilateral  relations 
which  I  have  described  there  intervened 
in  the  mid-1970's  the  western  Sahara 
dispute. 

When  Spain  decided  to  withdraw 
from  the  African  colony  known  as 
Spanish  Sahara,  the  Moroccan  Gov- 
ernment activated  an  historic  claim  to 
the  territory.  The  government's  effort 
reflected  strong  irredentist  feelings 
throughout  Morocco,  which  considered 
Spanish  Sahara  as  part  of  Morocco's 
historic  territory  and  viewed  its  re- 
acquisition  as  the  continuation  of  a 
gradual  process  of  decolonization 
which  began  when  the  French  protec- 
torate regime  ended  in  the  Moroccan 
heartland  in  1956.  After  a  couple  of 
years  of  intense  diplomatic  maneuver- 
ing, Spain  transferred  administrative 
control  to  Morocco  and  Mauritania 
under  the  Madrid  agreement  of  1975. 

Morocco's  quest  aroused  little  sym- 
pathy in  the  region,  particularly  in 
Algeria  and  among  some  of  the  tribes 
which  traditionally  lived  in  and  around 
the  Spanish  Sahara.  The  case  had  been 
referred  to  the   International  Court  of 


Justice  (ICJ)  in  The  Hague,  which 
ruled  in  effect  that  the  disputed  terri- 
tory had  had  historic  links  to  the  King- 
dom of  Morocco  but  these  did  not  con- 
stitute ties  of  sovereignty  and  that 
sovereignty  could  be  established  only 
by  determining  the  will  of  the  inhabit- 
ants. 

Morocco,  however,  took  the  ICJ 
ruling  as  legitimizing  its  claim  to 
sovereignty.  It  replaced  the  Spanish 
administration  in  the  northern  two- 
thirds  of  the  territory,  while  Mauritania 
took  over  the  rest. 

The  circumstances  of  the  takeover 
were  confused.  Morocco  claims  that 
the  inhabitants  expressed  their  wishes 
through  a  vote  by  those  members  of  the 
Spanish  Sahara  territorial  assembly 
who  were  available  after  Morocco  had 
entered  the  territory  (a  scant  majority). 
This  event  has  not  been  generally  rec- 
ognized as  constituting  an  exercise  of 
self-determination. 

The  United  States,  along  with  almost 
all  other  countries,  recognized  that 
Morocco  and  Mauritania  had  taken 
over  administrative  control  of  the  ter- 
ritory but  continued  to  believe  that  the 
question  of  its  ultimate  sovereignty  re- 
mained unresolved.  Tribal  and  other 
Saharan  groups  opposed  to  Moroccan 
control,  which  had  coalesced  before  the 
Spanish  departure  into  the  Polisario 
movement,  began  a  guerrilla  movement 
against  Moroccan  and  Mauritanian 
Armed  Forces  in  the  territory,  with 
arms  and  sanctuary  provided  by 
Algeria. 

The  Polisario  declared  a  cease-fire 
with  Mauritania  in  July  1978  which  it 
ended  exactly  a  year  later  with  a  strong 
attack  on  the  Mauritanian  post  of 
Tichla  in  the  southernmost  portion  of 
the  former  Spanish  Sahara.  Meanwhile. 
Polisario  attacks  continued  in  the 
Moroccan  portion  of  the  western  Sa- 
hara. In  addition,  the  Polisario  increased 
its  activities  in  southern  Morocco 
proper,  with  major  attacks  on  January 
28,  May  31,  June  4,  June  II.  June  27, 
and  July  14  of  this  year.  Some  of  these 
probably  involved  hundreds  of  Pol- 
isario troops. 

It  is  difficult  at  this  point  to  see  how 
either  side  can  win  a  military  victory, 
but  a  peaceful  solution  to  this  dispute 
does  not  appear  at  hand. 

Morocco  has  consistently  rejected 
calls  for  a  referendum,  arguing  that  the 
population  expressed  its  will  through 
the  meeting  of  the  territorial  assembly. 
A  renewed  appeal  for  a  referendum, 
this  time  by  the  Organization  of  Afri- 
can Unity's  (OAU)  Committee  on 
Wisemen.  was  considered  last  week  at 
the  OAU  summit  meeting  in  Monrovia. 
A  resolution  was  passed  calling  for  a 
cease-fire  and  a  referendum.  The  Mo- 


54 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


roccan  Government  has  not  yet  re- 
sponded officially  but  appears  willing 
to  accept  the  principle  of  a  cease-fire 
while  continuing  to  reject  the  idea  of  a 
referendum. 

A  negotiated  solution  also  seems 
distant.  Both  Morocco  and  the  Pol- 
isario  claim  sovereignty  over  the  entire 
Moroccan  portion  of  the  western  Sa- 
hara. Recent  information  suggests  that 
the  Polisano  may  even  have  begun  lo 
lay  claim  to  portions  of  southern 
Morocco  proper.  This  leaves  less  room 
for  compromise  than  ever.  Moreover. 
Morocco  claims  that  its  dispute  is  with 
Algeria,  without  whose  support  the 
Polisario  could  not  survive.  It  insists 
that  negotiation  should  be  directly  with 
Algeria.  Algeria,  for  its  part,  maintains 
that  the  dispute  concerns  Morocco  and 
the  Polisario  and  that  any  negotiations 
should  be  between  those  parties. 

Many  countries  and  international  or- 
ganizations have  offered  to  try  to  help 
resolve  the  dispute.  Spain,  as  the 
former  colonial  power,  has  discussed 
the  problem  with  both  sides,  most  re- 
cently during  the  visit  of  Prime  Minis- 
ter Suarez  to  Algeria  in  April  and  of 
King  Juan  Carlos  to  Morocco  in  June. 
France  also  examines  the  situation 
periodically  with  the  countries  in- 
volved, and  Saudi  Arabia  has  tried 
once  and  possibly  twice  to  help  resolve 
the  issue.  Finally,  representatives  of 
the  OAU  Committee  of  Wisemen 
talked  to  all  concerned  within  the  past 
few  months  in  an  effort  to  find  com- 
mon ground  for  a  peaceful  solution. 

We  favor  a  peaceful,  negotiated  so- 
lution which  respects  the  rights  of  the 
inhabitants  and  have  made  this  clear  to 
all  concerned  parties.  We  have  not  our- 
selves offered  to  mediate  because  of 
the  number  of  other  countries  and  or- 
ganizations which  are  already  involved 
and  which  are  better  placed  than  we  to 
perform  this  service.  However,  we 
have  offered  to  help  each  of  these 
countries  and  organizations  in  any  way 
that  we  can. 

U.S.  Policy 

This  dispute  has  faced  us  with  dif- 
ficult policy  choices. 

Once  again  the  United  States  lound 
itself  on  the  horns  of  a  dilemma  not  of 
its  own  making.  The  Sahara  dispute 
between  Morocco  and  Algeria  makes  it 
difticult  for  us  to  pursue  our  interests 
in  the  way  we  would  like  to  with  either 
country,  without  incurring  the  suspi- 
cion and  even  hostility  of  the  other. 

In  trying  to  work  our  way  through 
this  tangle  of  contradictions,  we  have 
sought  to  work  as  closely  as  possible 
with  Congress.  We  have  consistently 
agreed  on  recognizing  Moroccan  ad- 


SOUTH  ASIA: 

I7.S.  Policy  Toward 

Afghanistan  and  Pakistan 


by  Jack  C.  Miklos 

Statement  before  the  Subcommittee 
on  Asian  and  Pacific  Affairs  of  the 
House  Committee  on  Foreign  Affairs 
on  May  15.  1979.  Mr.  Miklos  is  Dep- 
uty Assistant  Secretary  for  Near  East- 
ern and  South  Asian  Affairs. ' 

I  am  pleased  to  have  the  opportunity 
to  discuss  with  your  subcommittee 
U.S.  policies  toward  Pakistan  and  Af- 
ghanistan in  the  context  of  our  regional 
policy  toward  South  Asia. 

The  countries  in  this  region  have  a 
number  of  characteristics  in  common  as 
well  as  fundamental  differences. 

•  Many  of  the  states  share  a  common 
British  colonial  or  protectorate  experi- 
ence. 

•  All  of  the  states  except  Nepal  and 
Sri  Lanka  are  either  overwhelmingly 


Islamic,   or  like   India,   have   a  large 
Moslem  population. 

•  All  the  countries  share  a  basic 
geopolitical  importance  as  they  are 
situated  in  proximity  to  the  U.S.S.R., 
the  P.R.C.,  and  the  Persian  Gulf. 

•  Several  of  the  states  in  the  area  are 
unstable  and  most  have  turbulent  inter- 
nal political  situations.  The  basic 
causes  of  instability  in  the  region  are 
internal,  but  the  Soviet  Union  has  and 
will  continue  to  try  and  extend  its  in- 
fluence where  it  can. 

•  In  some  parts  of  the  area  the  de- 
mands of  modernization  have  not  been 
met  by  the  pace  of  modernization  and 
the  promise  of  economic  development 
remains  unfulfilled.  Economic  frustra- 
tions have  fueled  political  instability. 

•  There  has  been  a  revival  of  Islamic 
fundamentalism  in  the  area,  alongside 
growing  tension  and  sometimes  open 


ministrative  control  while  noting  that 
the  sovereignty  issue  remains  unre- 
solved. This  is  a  reasonable  and  credi- 
ble policy  shared  by  most  other  coun- 
tries: 1  have  no  intention  of  suggesting 
today  that  it  should  be  changed.  The 
problem  is  how  we  apply  it  in  specific 
cases  and  most  particularly  the  ques- 
tion of  how  it  affects  our  relations  with 
Morocco. 

We  wish  to  maintain  our  traditional 
close  cooperation  with  Morocco  to  the 
extent  possible.  With  congressional 
approval,  we  are  continuing  to  provide 
financing  for  Moroccan  military  pur- 
chases and  to  furnish  military  training 
for  Moroccan  personnel.  The  President 
received  King  Hassan  in  Washington 
last  November,  and  Secretary  of  Com- 
merce Kreps  and  then  Deputy  Secretary 
of  Defense  Duncan  visited  Morocco 
this  year.  We  are  seeking  to  expand  ac- 
ademic exchanges,  technical  coopera- 
tion, and  trade  and  investment  with 
Morocco.  However,  in  one  area — our 
military  supply  relationship — the  con- 
nict  between  our  bilateral  interests  in 
Morocco  and  our  Sahara  policy  has 
proven  increasingly  difficult  to  resolve. 

In  practice,  our  general  policy  of 
recognizing  Moroccan  administrative 
control  but  not  sovereignty  over  a  por- 
tion of  the  western  Sahara  has  meant  a 
willingness  to  continue  our  historic  role 


ot  arms  supplier  to  the  Moroccan  Gov- 
ernment but  only  for  weapons  to  be 
used  to  defend  the  territory  of  Morocco 
proper.  As  you  are  aware,  this  policy 
has  been  easier  to  enunciate  than  to 
implement,  and  at  times  it  has  become 
a  sticking  point  in  our  bilateral  rela- 
tions with  Morocco. 

Furthermore,  since  the  beginning  of 
this  year,  the  situation  our  policy  is  de- 
signed to  cope  with  has  changed  in 
fundamental  ways.  The  most  signifi- 
cant new  development  is  probably  the 
fact  that,  as  1  have  noted,  this  year  the 
Polisario  has  been  vigorously  carrying 
the  war  into  areas  within  Morocco's 
historic  boundaries.  Morocco  is  no 
longer  fighting  only  to  pacify  a  region 
it  has  annexed;  it  is  also  defending  it- 
self within  its  own  territory  against 
external  attack.  The  Polisario's  deci- 
sion to  increase  the  scope  and  intensity 
of  the  fighting  has  made  the  quest  for 
peace  more  difficult.  It  has  also  made  it 
more  difficult  for  us  to  maintain  Mo- 
roccan understanding  for  a  U.S.  arms 
supply  policy  of  great  restraint.  D 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the  hearings  will 
be  published  by  the  committee  and  will  be  avail- 
able from  the  Superintendent  of  Documents. 
U.S.  Government  Printing  Office.  Washington, 
D.C.  20402. 


October  1979 


55 


clashes   between  traditionalists   and 
forces  of  change. 

•  Governments  range  from  demo- 
cratic to  strict  authoritarian  and  from 
nonaligned  to  pro-Soviet.  There  are 
fundamental  differences  among  the 
countries  in  religion,  race,  social 
structure,  economic  development,  and 
language. 

•  In  several  countries  of  the  region 
there  is  a  sense  of  political  and  eco- 
nomic malaise  and  uncertainty. 

When  our  respected  colleague,  the 
late  Spike  Dubs,^  testified  before  this 
committee  a  little  over  a  year  ago,  the 
situation  in  the  region  appeared  to  be 
far  more  stable  than  it  is  today,  and  we 
had  reason  to  be  relatively  sanguine 
about  future  developments.  Pakistan 
and  India  were  making  progress  to- 
ward resolving  their  differences  and  the 
Indian  Foreign  Minister  had  just  visited 
Islamabad.  Pakistan  and  Afghanistan 
seemed  to  be  moving  toward  settlement 
of  their  longstanding  border  dispute. 
India  and  Bangladesh  had  successfully 
negotiated  an  interim  settlement  of 
their  dispute  over  the  Ganges  River 
water.  Our  policy  was  to  encourage  the 
countries  of  the  region  to  settle  their 
disputes  among  themselves  and  to  keep 
great  power  involvement  in  the  area  to 
a  minimum. 

Afghanistan 

Since  then  there  have  been  dramatic 
changes  in  Afghanistan  and  Iran  and  a 
growing  perception  of  instability  in  the 
general  area.  April  1978  saw  a  bloody 
revolution  in  Afghanistan  which 
brought  to  power  a  leftist  regime 
promising  radical  social  and  political 
reform.  This  new  government,  how- 
ever, is  now  confronted  by  a  growing 
insurgency  from  tribal  and  religious 
elements  who  believe  it  is  atheistic  and 
pro-Russian.  Rather  than  attempting  to 
ascertain  the  will  of  its  people,  the  Af- 
ghan Government  has  sought  to  push 
rapidly  ahead  with  its  plans  and  to 
suppress — often  brutally — any  signs  of 
opposition  or  suspected  disloyalty. 

Economically,  the  Afghan  Govern- 
ment has  announced  major  plans  for 
land  and  credit  reform.  In  some  areas 
of  the  country,  however,  there  have 
been  strong  reactions  to  such  changes 
in  this  traditional  and  conservative  ag- 
ricultural society,  especially  since  new 
institutions  have  not  been  developed  to 
replace  the  former  landowners  and 
moneylenders.  As  a  result,  agricultural 
production  has  declined  and  Afghani- 
stan faces  a  serious  shortage  of  food- 
grains  this  year. 

During  the  last  year,  the  Afghan 
Government  has  increasingly  turned  to 
the  Soviet  Union  for  military  and  eco- 


nomic support.  Similarly,  it  has 
reoriented  its  foreign  policy  so  that  it  is 
almost  indistinguishable  from  that  of 
Moscow. 

Our  own  relations  with  Afghanistan 
have  regrettably  deteriorated  signifi- 
cantly. As  the  Soviet  Union  has  be- 
come more  directly  involved  in  Af- 
ghanistan, we  have  detected  a  corre- 
sponding decline  in  interest  in  U.S. 
programs  and  insensitivity  to  our  con- 
cerns. The  Afghan  Government's  be- 
havior at  the  time  of  the  tragic  and 
senseless  death  of  Ambassador  Dubs  in 
February  has  been  the  most  flagrant 
example  of  this  attitude  and  of  what  we 
can  only  conclude  is  a  fundamental 
shift  away  from  Afghanistan's  tradi- 
tional nonalignment  policy. 

We  have  tried  to  make  clear  to  the 
Afghan  Government  that  good  relations 
are  a  two-way  street  which  require 
concrete  steps  from  both  sides  to  dem- 
onstrate their  interest  in  cooperation.  It 
distresses  us  that  this  is  not  the  case  in 
U.S. -Afghan  relations,  particularly  be- 
cause we  know  that  there  is  still  a  great 
reservoir  of  goodwill  among  the  Af- 
ghan people  for  the  United  States  and 
Americans — as  there  is  for  Afghanistan 
in  our  own  country.  There  are  real 
benefits  to  be  gained  in  our  cooperation 
with  the  people  of  one  of  the  world's 
poorest  countries. 

The  poor  state  of  our  current  re- 
lationship was  not  our  choice.  It  is  the 
inescapable  result  when  one  party  to  a 
relationship  shows  no  interest  in  giving 
life  and  substance  to  those  ties.  Be- 
cause of  this  lack  of  interest  we  have 
reduced  our  economic  assistance  pro- 
gram, terminated  our  military  training 
program,  and,  for  the  time  being,  have 
withdrawn  our  Peace  Corps  volunteers 
and  staff.  The  official  American  pres- 
ence in  Afghanistan  is  necessarily  also 
being  somewhat  reduced. 

We  remain  ready  to  listen  to  any 
ideas  the  Afghan  Government  may 
have  as  to  how  our  relations  can  be  im- 
proved. Certainly  we  cannot  forget  the 
humanitarian  needs  of  Afghanistan's 
poor  or  the  important  effort  which  must 
be  made  to  reduce  illicit  narcotics  pro- 
duction and  trafficking  in  that  country. 
In  addition,  we  believe  there  are  still 
millions  of  Afghans  who  want  to  hear 
America's  message  and  want  a  window 
on  the  world.  We  sincerely  hope  that 
the  future  will  see  the  development  of 
better  relations  between  us.  We  would 
be  happy  to  see  some  concrete  signs 
that  the  Afghan  Government  shares  this 
desire. 


Pakistan 

With  regard  to  Pakistan,  this  country 
in  a  geopolitical  sense  is  a  pivot  be- 


tween the  states  of  the  Indian  subconti- 
nent and  the  oil-rich  states  of  western 
Asia. 

Internally,  the  most  significant 
political  development  has  been  the  an- 
nouncement by  President  Zia  that  na- 
tional elections  will  be  held  on  No- 
vember 17.  We  warmly  welcome  this 
announcment  and  look  forward  to  the 
restoration  of  democratic  government 
in  Pakistan.  We  expect  that  the  elec- 
tions will  be  held  as  scheduled  and  be- 
lieve the  people  of  Pakistan  would  be 
disappointed  if  they  were  canceled  or 
postponed. 

Between  now  and  November  we  see 
a  period  of  political  uncertainty  and 
realignment  as  the  various  political 
parties  and  their  leaders  prepare  for 
elections.  The  months  ahead  will  be 
important  for  the  future  of  Pakistan. 
President  Zia  has  recently  named  a 
Cabinet  of  essentially  nonpartisan  fig- 
ures to  carry  on  the  work  of  the  gov- 
ernment and  prepare  for  the  elections. 
We  wish  Pakistan  well  in  this  en- 
deavor. 

In  recent  years  there  has  been  re- 
newed interest  in  the  application  of  Is- 
lamic tenets  to  political  and  economic 
life.  President  Zia  has  introduced  addi- 
tional Islamic  principles  into  the  law 
and  provided  for  the  introduction  of 
Sharia  courts  to  bring  Pakistani  law 
into  line  with  these  principles.  Addi- 
tional measures  would  revise  internal 
taxation  and  provide  for  the  ultimate 
introduction  of  interest-free  banking. 
Although  these  measures  are  generally 
popular  and  are  being  prepared  with 
care,  some  foresee  that  Islamic  edicts 
may  fall  haphazardly  and  unequally  on 
different  elements  within  the  society. 

The  Islamic  resurgence  in  Pakistan 
and  other  countries  of  the  region  is  a 
very  important  development,  and  we 
welcome  the  movement  to  apply  the 
humanitarian  and  social  ideals  of  this 
great  religion. 

As  the  committee  knows,  in  com- 
pliance with  Section  669  of  the  Foreign 
Assistance  Act  we  are  presently  wind- 
ing down  our  development  assistance 
programs  to  Pakistan.  However,  we 
hope  humanitarian  assistance  in  the 
form  of  PL-480  food  aid  will  continue 
with  the  support  of  Congress. 

Our  substantial  PL-480  program  has 
been  necessitated  by  a  wheat  harvest 
last  year  that  was  much  lower  than  ex- 
pected. The  crop  failure  was  primarily 
related  to  natural  causes,  specifically 
rust.  However,  the  poor  harvest  rein- 
forced the  Pakistan  Government's 
anxiety  to  increase  food  production  to 
achieve  self-sufficiency.  With  our  en- 
couragement, the  government  has  taken 
steps  to  revise  policies  and  is  pressing 
forward  with  programs  designed  to  in- 


56 


crease  wheat  production.  Those  meas- 
ures, combined  with  good  growing 
conditions,  have  resulted  in  Pakistan's 
farmers  now  bringing  to  market  what 
appears  to  be  a  very  good  harvest.  Our 
PL-480  assistance  is  designed  to  help 
the  Pakistan  Government  undertake 
food  policy  reforms  and  a  comprehen- 
sive agricultural  production  strategy 
leading  to  self-sufficiency. 

During  the  past  year  the  Pakistan 
Government  has  introduced  a  number 
of  measures  to  rationalize  the  economy 
and  encourage  investment.  The  re- 
sponse to  some  of  these  measures  has 
been  encouraging.  Many  companies, 
for  example,  that  were  nationalized  by 
Mr.  Bhutto  have  been  returned  to  their 
owners.  The  government  has  raised  the 
procurement  price  paid  to  farmers  in  an 
effort  to  increase  wheat  production. 
Recently  the  government  took  the 
politically  difficult  step  of  increasing 
the  price  of  wheat  in  the  ration  shops 
which  serve  urban  dwellers,  thus  re- 
ducing the  highly  inflationary  govern- 
ment food  subsidy. 

However,  the  country's  overall  eco- 
nomic performance  has  been  disap- 
pointing and  a  number  of  problems 
continue  to  inhibit  rapid  economic  de- 
velopment. Government  subsidies  and 
large  capital  projects,  started  under  the 
previous  regime,  have  contributed  to  a 
growing  budget  deficit.  Those  deficits 
have  inflated  prices  and  stimulated  im- 
ports. Prospects  are  for  a  deterioration 
in  the  balance  of  payments  during  the 
coming  year.  We  and  other  donors  are 
encouraging  the  Government  of  Paki- 
stan to  undertake  a  balanced  stabiliza- 
tion program  that  can  deal  effectively 
with  external  payments  problems  that 
have  grown  apace  with  the  budgetary 
problem. 

Narcotics  Control 

It  is  estimated  by  the  Drug  Enforce- 
ment Administration  that  Afghanistan 
and  Pakistan  will  produce  as  much  as 
800  metric  tons  of  opium  during  the 
1978-79  growing  season,  making  this 
area  the  world's  single  largest  source 
of  illicit  opium.  While  heroin  from  this 
source  currently  comprises  only  a  small 
percentage  of  the  total  heroin  entering 
the  United  States,  it  has  begun  to  enter 
Europe  in  increasing  quantities  and  is 
readily  available  to  U.S.  troops  sta- 
tioned in  Germany  and  other  European 
countries. 

As  you  are  aware,  the  political  cir- 
cumstances in  Afghanistan  and  Paki- 
stan have  permitted  little  or  no  direct 
U.S  bilateral  assistance  for  narcotics 
control  in  these  two  countries.  How- 
ever, we  are  pursuing  a  determined 
effort  to  enlist  increasing  support  on 


both  a  bilateral  and  multilateral  basis 
from  industrialized  nations  for  the 
global  international  narcotics  control 
effort. 

In  Pakistan,  $944,000  of  interna- 
tional narcotics  control  funds  were  ex- 
pended from  FY  1972-78  to  support 
law  enforcement  operations.  An  addi- 
tional $10,000  has  been  obligated  in 
FY  1979  for  the  same  purpose.  In 
addition,  the  U.N.  Fund  for  Drug 
Abuse  Control  is  operating  a  pilot  rural 
development  program  in  the  Buner 
District  of  Pakistan.  In  order  to  extend 
this  program  beyond  the  pilot  phase, 
additional  funds  are  required.  The  West 
German  Government  has  expressed 
interest  in  the  program  but  has  not  as 
yet  committed  financial  resources. 

While  we  have  not  made  as  much 
progress  as  we  would  have  liked  in  this 
area,  we  shall  continue  to  work  with 
the  Government  of  Pakistan  and  elicit 
the  support  of  other  nations  to  contrib- 
ute to  this  effort  either  multilaterally  or 
bilaterally. 


Regional  Policy 
Toward  South  Asia 

The  situation  in  India,  Bangladesh, 
Nepal,  Sri  Lanka,  and  the  Maldive  Is- 
lands has  been  relatively  calm.  Demo- 
cratic elections  were  successfully  held 
in  Bangladesh,  a  new  Parliament  has 
come  into  being  and  martial  law  lifted. 
We  were  very  pleased  by  these  de- 
velopments. Our  relations  with  India 
are  good  but  troubled  by  the  nuclear 
safeguards  issue. 

Despite  the  changes  over  the  past 
year  our  general  policy  toward  the  re- 
gion remains  what  it  was  a  year  ago. 

•  We  believe  that  great  power  in- 
volvement in  the  region  should  be  kept 
to  a  minimum. 

•  We  believe  that  countries  of  the 
region  should  be  encouraged  to  resolve 
their  disputes  among  themselves  with- 
out outside  interference.  We  hope  they 
will  concentrate  on  their  own  internal 
problems  and  direct  their  energies  to- 
ward fulfilling  the  economic  aspira- 
tions of  their  people. 

•  We  hope  that  the  countries  of  the 
area  will  not  follow  policies  which  will 
encourage  outsiders  to  intervene  in  re- 
gional affairs. 

•  We  wish  to  assist  governments  in 
the  region  to  meet  the  economic  aspira- 
tions of  their  people.  At  the  same  time 
we  are  trying  to  avoid  programs  which 
stimulate  aspirations  more  rapidly  than 
they  can  be  fulfilled. 

•  We  are  also  encouraging  economic 
reform  and  wider  participation  in  gov- 
ernment but  recognize  that  change  will 
usually  be  regulated  by  internal  de- 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 

velopments.  We  sympathize  with  many 
of  the  humanitarian  and  social  ideals 
which  Islam  teaches. 

•  We  have  a  major  interest  in  pre- 
venting the  development  of  a  nuclear- 
weapons  capability  in  the  region. 

•  We  wish  to  have  assured  access 
for  U.S.  trade  and  commerce. 

•  We  have  basic  concerns  regarding 
human  rights  in  the  area. 

Nuclear  Activities  in  Pakistan 

I  am  aware  that  the  committee  feels 
that  the  United  States  should  have  a 
coherent  policy  toward  the  region 
which  does  not  conflict  with  the  bilat- 
eral concerns  between  the  United  States 
and  any  particular  nation.  We  are  all 
concerned  that  U.S.  global  concern 
over  nuclear  nonproliferation  policies 
has  led  to  serious  difficulties  with 
Pakistan  and  India. 

Pakistan's  activities  in  the  nuclear 
field  have  presented  us  with  a  very  real 
policy  dilemma.  Pakistan  is  important 
to  us  and  to  the  region,  especially 
given  the  chaotic  situation  in  Iran  and 
Soviet  activities  in  Afghanistan.  Politi- 
cally Pakistan  is  a  traditional  friend  of 
the  United  States,  and  as  one  of  the 
more  moderate  states  in  the  Third 
World  can  contribute  to  stability  in  the 
region.  We  are  linked  to  Pakistan  by  a 
1959  agreement,  and  the  continuing  in- 
dependence and  territorial  integrity  of 
this  country  is  of  fundamental  impor- 
tance to  us.  We  have  accepted  the 
Durand  Line  as  being  the  internation- 
ally recognized  border  between  Paki- 
stan and  Afghanistan. 

Pakistan's  current  nuclear  activities, 
however,  restrict  our  ability  to  assist  it 
in  meeting  its  considerable  security  and 
economic  requirements.  We  have  reli- 
able information  that  Pakistan  has  been 
acquiring  abroad  the  components  of  a 
uranium  enrichment  facility,  and  we 
have  concluded  that  the  Symington 
amendment  required  us  to  terminate 
our  existing  assistance  programs  in  an 
orderly  manner. 

We  view  this  matter  with  the  utmost 
seriousness.  Should  there  be  prolifera- 
tion of  nuclear  explosive  capability  on 
the  subcontinent,  it  would  have  very 
serious  consequences  for  global  secu- 
rity and  for  our  efforts  to  contain  this 
awesome  destructive  power.  We  recog- 
nize that  many  countries  with  limited 
energy  resources  wish  to  develop  the 
peaceful  potential  of  the  atom.  With 
this  we  have  no  argument  and,  indeed, 
are  willing  to  cooperate  under  condi- 
tions laid  down  in  the  Nonproliferation 
Policy  Act — which  is  nondiscrimina- 
tory and  applies  to  all  alike. 

We  will  continue  to  work  to  prevent 
the  spread  of  nuclear  explosive  capa- 


October  1979 


57 


Ul>fITED  ]\ATI01\S:        ]%amthta 


by  Donald  F .  McHenry 

Statement  before  the  Subcommittee 
on  Africa  of  the  House  Committee  on 
Foreign  Affairs  on  May  7,  1979.  Am- 
bassador McHenry  is  U.S.  Deputy 
Representative  to  the  U.N.  Security 
Council . ' 

I  am  pleased  to  have  this  opportunity 
to  discuss  with  you  today  the  negotia- 
tions in  which  the  United  States  has 
been  involved  during  the  past  2  years 
on  the  question  of  Namibia.  Namibia  is 
not  well  known  to  Americans,  but  a 
peaceful  transition  in  that  country 
could  be  of  critical  importance  for  the 
future  of  southern  Africa. 

Namibia,  also  known  as  South  West 
Africa,  was  a  German  colony  and  be- 
came a  League  of  Nations"  mandate 
under  South  African  administration 
following  World  War  I.  After  World 
War  1!,  South  Africa  sought  to  annex 
the  territory  and,  when  rebuffed  by  the 
United  Nations,  South  Africa  refused 
to  place  the  territory  under  the  trust- 
eeship system  of  the  United  Nations. 
Thus  began  a  long  dispute  between 
South  Africa  and  the  international 
community,  involving  numerous  judg- 
ments of  the  International  Court  of 
Justice  and  even  more  numerous  de- 
bates in  the  United  Nations,  culminat- 
ing in  the  1966  decision  of  the  U.N. 
General  Assembly,  with  the  support  of 
the  United  States,  to  terminate  South 
Africa's  mandate,  an  action  subse- 
quently upheld  by  the  International 
Court. 

The  International  Court  of  Justice 
ruled  that  South  Africa's  presence  in 
Namibia  was  illegal  and  that  South  Af- 
rica was  obliged  to  withdraw.  South 
Africa  again  refused  to  withdraw.   In- 


bility  and  we  hope  all  concerned  will 
keep  an  open  mind  on  solutions  to  this 
problem.  D 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the  hearings  will 
be  published  by  the  committee  and  will  be 
available  from  (he  Superintendent  of  Docu- 
ments, U.S.  Government  Printing  Office, 
Washington.  D.C.  20402. 

^U.S.  Ambassador  to  Afghanistan  Adolph 
Dubs  was  kidnaped  in  Kabul  on  Feb.  14, 
1979.  by  terrorists  and  killed  the  same  day 
during  an  attempt  by  Afghan  police  to  free  him 
from  his  captors. 


Stead  it  embarked  upon  a  policy  which 
would  have  transferred  power  under  a 
constitution  so  formulated  as  to  insure 
the  continued  disproportionate  influ- 
ence of  whites  and  which  stood  no 
chance  of  obtaining  the  necessary 
political  consensus  which  would  merit 
either  Namibian  or  international  ac- 
ceptability. Nor  would  it  stem  the 
guerrilla  war  which — in  opposition  to 
South  Africa's  continued  rule  and  ap- 
plication of  apartheid  in  the  territory — 
had  gradually  developed  between  South 
Africa  and  the  Namibian  nationalists, 
principally  the  South  West  Africa 
People's  Organization  (SWAPO).  To 
this  day  this  cycle  of  violence  con- 
tinues to  escalate  with  ominous  impli- 
cations for  the  future  of  the  entire  re- 
gion. 

Efforts  of  the  Western  Five 

It  was  against  this  background  that  in 
April  of  1977.  the  then  five  Western 
members  of  the  U.N.  Security  Council 
— Canada.  France,  the  Federal  Repub- 
lic of  Germany,  the  United  Kingdom, 
and  the  United  States — ^jointly  launched 
an  unprecedented  effort  to  find  a  peace- 
ful solution  for  the  Namibian  problem. 
The  initiative  was  possible  because  we 
were  able  to  build  on  a  set  of  principles 
unanimously  adopted  by  the  U.N.  Se- 
curity Council  in  Resolution  385  in 
January  1976.  I  might  add  that  the  ini- 
tiative was  also  possible  because  of  the 
goodwill  and  great  expectations  which 
greeted  President  Carter's  election  and 
his  appointment  of  Ambassador  Young 
as  U.S.  Representative  to  the  United 
Nations. 

From  the  outset  the  five  nations 
made  clear  that  their  goal  was  to  for- 
mulate an  internationally  acceptable 
method  of  implementation  of  the  prin- 
ciples contained  in  Resolution  385 
which  called  for  tree  and  fair  elections 
under  U.N.  supervision  and  control. 
The  five  made  clear  that  they  favored 
no  particular  Namibian  political  group. 
The  five  were  interested  not  in  the  out- 
come of  the  elections  but  solely  in  in- 
suring that  all  Namibian  people  would 
have  an  equal  opportunity  to  freely  and 
fairly  elect  their  own  government.  The 
five  also  recognized  that  in  order  for  a 
settlement  to  be  meaningful  and  lasting 
it  would  have  to  be  accepted  by  the  two 
parties  engaged  in  the  armed  conflict — 
the  South  African  Government;  and 
SWAPO,  which  enjoyed  substantial 


support  within  Namibia  and  interna- 
tionally. 

It  is  important  here  to  emphasize  two 
facts  which  these  negotiations  have  had 
to  take  into  account.  South  Africa,  un- 
lawfully in  occupation  of  Namibia,  was 
nevertheless  the  de  facto  governing 
authority  there,  and  its  assent  was  es- 
sential to  any  settlement.  SWAPO,  al- 
though only  one  of  several  Namibian 
political  groups,  carried  the  war  effort; 
had  the  support  of  a  major  segment  of 
the  population;  the  unanimous  support 
of  other  African  governments  and  the 
majority  of  non-African  members  of 
the  United  Nations.  No  peaceful  set- 
tlement could  be  achieved  without 
SWAPO's  participation. 

Finally,  we  recognized  that  a  suc- 
cessful undertaking  must  involve  the 
cooperation  of  the  front-line  states 
(Angola,  Botswana,  Mozambique, 
Tanzania,  and  Zambia)  and  Nigeria  in 
helping  with  the  negotiating  process,  in 
assuring  successful  implementation  of 
an  agreement,  and,  most  importantly, 
in  assuring  respect  for  the  outcome  of 
the  elections.  These  states  have  fully 
supported  our  efforts. 

Negotiating  Problems 

The  negotiating  process  itself  has 
been  unique  and  extraordinarily  com- 
plex; it  could  not  have  been  undertaken 
without  modern  communications.  Five 
nations  have  operated  as  one  negotiat- 
ing team,  which  has  come  to  be  known 
as  the  contact  group.  Each  step  has  re- 
quired careful  coordination  among  our 
missions  in  New  York,  our  capitals, 
our  embassies  in  the  front-line  states 
and  Nigeria  and  our  embassies  in  South 
Africa. 

In  addition  to  the  complexities  of 
this  five-nation  arrangement,  those  in- 
volving the  negotiating  procedure  have 
been  numerous.  For  example.  South 
Africa  refuses  to  meet  with  SWAPO. 
This  has  necessitated  various  forms  of 
shuttle  diplomacy  as  well  as  so-called 
proximity  talks  in  which  the  two  parties 
travel  to  one  city  and  meet  with  the 
contact  group  separately.  There  also 
have  been  a  number  of  nations,  groups, 
and  organizations  involved  in  the  proc- 
ess in  one  capacity  or  another  with 
whom  we  have  maintained  regular 
communications.  We  have  met  with  all 
of  the  major  Namibian  political  groups 
at  each  stage  of  the  negotiations  in 
order  to  insure  that  they  were  kept  in- 
formed and  to  take  their  views  fully 
into  account.  U.N.  Secretary  General 
Waldheim  has  played  an  important  role 
in  carrying  the  effort  forward,  as  have 
his  special  representative  for  Namibia, 
Mr.  Marti  Ahtisaari  of  Finland,  and 
the  Security  Council  as  a  whole. 


58 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


As  in  any  longstanding  dispute,  the 
current  negotiations  have  been  ham- 
pered by  attitudinal  and  political  prob- 
lems. First,  whatever  their  ultimate 
motives,  both  South  Africa  and 
SWAPO  have  been  anxious  to  avoid 
being  seen  internationally  as  the  in- 
transigent party.  South  Africa  may 
have  faith  only  in  a  so-called  internal 
solution,  and  SWAPO  may  have  faith 
only  in  a  military  one.  However, 
neither  wished  to  lose  what  support  it 
had  in  the  international  community, 
and  this  desire  not  to  lose  support  has 
tended  to  motivate  them  both  toward  a 
settlement. 

Second,  a  constant  problem  through- 
out the  effort  has  been  the  pervasive 
presence  of  distrust:  distrust  between 
South  Africa  and  SWAPO;  the  distrust 
which  each  of  them  has  of  the  five; 
and  the  distrust  which  South  Africa  has 
for  the  United  Nations.  SWAPO  be- 
lieves that  South  Africa  aims  at  con- 
tinued dominance  through  installation 
of  a  government  favorable  to  South 
Africa  and  will  only  agree  to  a  settle- 
ment which  guarantees  such  an  out- 
come. South  Africa,  for  its  part,  be- 
lieves that  SWAPO  aims  only  at  the 
seizure  of  power  and  will  not  abide  by 
the  results  of  a  fair  electoral  process. 

South  Africa  and  the  United  Nations 
have  been  at  odds  over  Namibia  since 
the  United  Nations'  inception,  and  the 
United  Nations  has  also  soundly  and 
regularly  criticized  South  Africa  for  its 
policies  of  apartheid.  In  addition,  the 
General  Assembly's  endorsement  of 
SWAPO  is  well  known.  South  Africa, 
therefore,  views  the  United  Nations  not 
as  an  organization  of  neutrality  but  as 
one  unalterably  hostile.  I  should  note 
in  this  regard  that  while  the  General 
Assembly  has  endorsed  SWAPO  as  the 
"sole  and  authentic  representative  of 
the  Namibian  people,"  it  is  the  Secu- 
rity Council  working  through  interna- 
tional civil  servants,  and  not  the  Gen- 
eral Assembly,  which  will  oversee  the 
transition  in  Namibia,  and  the  Security 
Council  has  adopted  no  such  position. 
Moreover,  the  United  Nations  has  an 
excellent  record  for  impartial  peace- 
keeping operations. 

The  distrust  by  SWAPO  of  the  five 
stems  from  its  view  that  South  Africa's 
very  dominance  is  dependent  upon 
Western  economic  and  political  sup- 
port. One  manifestation  of  this  distrust 
was  SWAPO's  initial  objection  to  the 
inclusion  of  NATO  nations  in  the  com- 
position of  the  proposed  U.N.  military 
presence  in  Namibia. 

South  Africa,  on  the  other  hand, 
fears  that  the  five  are  susceptible  to 
pressure  from  the  Africans.  South  Af- 
rica's distrust  has  been  dramatized  in 
recent  weeks  by  the  repeated  accusa- 
tions made  publicly  by  the  South  Afri- 


can Government  that  the  contact  group, 
the  U.N.  Secretariat,  and  certain  U.S. 
officials  have  during  the  negotiations 
displayed  deceit,  doubledealing,  and  a 
pro-SWAPO  bias. 

We  have  refrained  from  commenting 
publicly  on  these  accusations,  largely 
because  we  believe  that  the  search  for 
peace  is  best  pursued  through  calm  and 
private  deliberation  and  with  an  ac- 
ceptance of  the  good  faith  of  all  even  in 
the  presence  of  sharp  disagreement. 
However,  this  forbearance  should  not 
be  mistaken.  There  is  not  a  shred  of 
truth  to  South  Africa's  charges. 

A  third  problem  in  the  Namibia  set- 
tlement effort  has  been  the  difficulty,  if 
not  the  impossibility,  of  separating 
Namibia  from  the  other  occurrences  in 
the  region.  It  is  difficult  to  isolate 
political  developments  in  Namibia  from 
those  in  Rhodesia;  from  the  internal 
politics  and  political  turmoil  in  South 
Africa  itself;  from  South  Africa's  fear 
of  being  surrounded  by  radical  black 
African  states;  or  from  the  ultimate 
objectives  of  outside  forces.  All  of 
these  influences  play  on  the  prospects 
for  a  settlement  in  Namibia  and  in  fact 
hold  those  prospects  hostage. 

A  final  problem  which  I  would  like 
to  raise  at  this  point  is  that  neither 
South  Africa  nor  SWAPO  is  monolithic 
though,  publicly  at  least,  each  projects 
such  an  image  of  itself  and  of  the 
other.  Both  have  factions  with  differing 
views  and  different  constituencies 
which  make  the  decisionmaking  proc- 
esses on  each  side  delicate  and  fre- 
quently time-consuming.  Too  fre- 
quently internal  politics  has  prompted 
both  sides  to  make  decidedly  unhelpful 
public  statements  which  have  either 
raised  new  problems  or  closed  off  po- 
tential avenues  of  accommodation. 

Western  Five's  Proposal 
for  a  Settlement 

These,  then,  are  some  of  the  at- 
titudinal and  political  problems  with 
which  the  five  have  had  to  deal  in  our 
settlement  effort.  That  effort  initially 
consisted  of  determining  through 
lengthy  discussions  with  the  parties 
their  concerns,  their  demands,  and 
their  areas  of  compromise.  Agreement 
was  quickly  reached  on  a  number  of 
points.  Before  long,  however,  it  be- 
came apparent  that  if  the  impasse  over 
Namibia  was  to  be  broken,  the  five 
would  have  to  develop  their  own  pro- 
posal for  a  settlement  and  then  try  to 
bring  about  its  acceptance. 

On  April  10,  1978.  the  five  placed 
their  proposal  for  a  settlement  before 
the  U.N.  Security  Council.'^  We  recog- 
nized that  it  did  not  meet  all  of  the  de- 
mands of  either  party.  However,  we 
believe  that  it  offers  a  fair  and  balanced 


solution  based  on  the  legitimate  con- 
cerns of  the  parties  and  reasonably 
bridges  the  gaps  between  the  parties. 

The  proposal  submitted  to  the  Secu- 
rity Council  is  based  on  the  principles 
set  down  in  Security  Council  Resolu- 
tion 385  and  consists  of  the  following 
key  elements. 

I)  A  cessation  of  all  hostile  acts  by 
all  parties  and  the  restriction  of  South 
African  and  SWAPO  armed  forces  to 
base.  Thereafter  a  phased  withdrawal 
from  Namibia  of  all  but  1.500  South 
African  troops  within  12  weeks  and 
prior  to  the  official  start  of  the  political 
campaign.  The  remaining  South  Afri- 
can force  would  be  restricted  to 
Grootfontein  or  Oshivello  or  both  and 
would  be  withdrawn  after  the  certifica- 
tion of  the  election. 

2)  A  South  African-appointed  Ad- 
ministrator General  would  administer 
the  territory  during  the  transition  period 
leading  to  the  election  of  a  constituent 
assembly.  However,  all  acts  affecting 
the  political  process  would  be  under 
U.N.  supervision  and  control  in  that 
the  U.N.  special  representative  will 
have  to  satisfy  himself  at  each  stage  as 
to  the  fairness  and  appropriateness  of 
all  measures  affecting  the  political 
process  at  all  levels  of  administration 
before  such  measures  take  effect. 

3)  A  U.N.  Transition  Assistance 
Group  (UNTAG).  consisting  of  civilian 
and  military  elements  whose  size  and 
composition  would  be  determined  by 
the  Secretary  General,  would  be  intro- 
duced in  the  territory  to  insure  the  ob- 
servance of  the  terms  of  the  settlement. 

4)  Primary  responsibility  for  main- 
taining law  and  order  in  Namibia  dur- 
ing the  transition  period  would  rest 
with  the  existing  police  forces.  How- 
ever, among  other  things,  the  Adminis- 
trator General,  to  the  satisfaction  of  the 
U.N.  special  representative,  would  in- 
sure the  good  conduct  of  the  police 
forces.  The  special  representative 
would  make  arrangements  when  appro- 
priate for  U.N.  personnel  to  accom- 
pany the  police  forces  in  the  discharge 
of  their  duties. 

5)  All  Namibian  political  prisoners 
and  detainees  would  be  released,  exiles 
would  be  free  to  return,  and  conditions 
for  free  and  fair  elections  would  be  es- 
tablished (e.g.,  freedom  of  speech, 
movement,  press,  assembly,  and  the 
repeal  of  discriminatory  or  restrictive 
legislation). 

The  settlement  proposal  does  not  at- 
tempt to  spell  out  all  of  the  details  in- 
volved in  such  a  settlement.  Some 
points  are  of  necessity  general;  to  try  to 
refine  them  more  precisely  would  have 
entailed  years  of  negotiations.  Instead 
the  proposal  depends  heavily  on  coop- 
eration between  the   Administrator 


October  1979 


59 


General   and  the   U.N.   special   repre- 
sentative. 

Reaction  to  the  Proposal 

The  settlement  proposal  of  the  five 
was  not  immediately  accepted  by  either 
party,  but  by  the  end  of  July  1978  both 
parties  had  agreed  that  the  Secretary 
General  should  be  requested  to  draw  up 
his  report  on  how  the  proposal  would 
be  implemented.  This  agreement  was 
not  reached,  however,  without  first  ad- 
dressing a  number  of  contentious  is- 
sues, the  most  notable  of  which  was  the 
question  of  Walvis  Bay.  Moreover,  in 
their  public  statements  each  chose  to 
emphasize  certain  aspects  of  the  pro- 
posal while  understating  or  even  omit- 
ting counterbalancing  provisions. 

When  the  Secretary  General's  plans 
for  implementation  were  announced 
they  too  became  the  source  of  con- 
troversy. South  Africa,  for  example, 
objected  to  the  holding  of  elections 
after  December  1978,  despite  the  fact 
that  the  proposal  clearly  required  a 
7-month  process  which,  given  the  date 
of  acceptance  by  the  parties,  could  not 
be  completed  by  the  end  of  1978. 
South  Africa  also  objected  to  the  size 
of  the  proposed  7,500-man  U.N.  mili- 
tary presence,  despite  the  formidable 
size  and  nature  of  the  territory;  despite 
South  Africa's  own  concern  for  secu- 
rity; and  despite  the  fact  that  the  set- 
tlement proposal  left  the  formation  of 
UNTAG  to  the  discretion  of  the  Secre- 
tary General. 

These  initial  objections  were  re- 
solved through  further  discussions  but 
not  before  South  Africa  took  another 
step  which  seemed  to  be  directed  to- 
ward an  internal  settlement.  Over  our 
strong  objection,  unilateral  elections 
took  place  in  December  1978,  and  a 
so-called  constituent  assembly  was  es- 
tablished. The  elections  were  boycotted 
by  several  parties,  and  the  resulting  as- 
sembly consists  almost  entirely  of  the 
Democratic  Turnhalle  Alliance,  the 
party  widely  assumed  to  be  favored  by 
the  South  African  Government. 

The  South  Africans  then  advised 
Secretary  General  Waldheim  at  the  end 
of  December  that  they  were  prepared  to 
cooperate  with  the  implementation  of 
the  U.N.  plan  and  suggested  that  the 
Secretary  General's  special  representa- 
tive visit  South  Africa  for  discussions. 
These  talks  took  place  this  past  Jan- 
uary, and  Mr.  Ahtisaari  also  visited  the 
front-line  states  and  met  with  leaders  of 
those  countries  and  of  SWAPO.  These 
discussions  made  clear  that  both  parties 
were  seeking  to  obtain  advantages  in 
the  implementation  process  which  they 
were  not  able  to  achieve  in  the  negoti- 
ations. For  example.  South  Africa  in- 
sisted on  the  monitoring  by  UNTAG  of 


SWAPO  bases  outside  of  Namibia,  and 
SWAPO  asked  for  a  period  of  time 
after  the  ceasefire  during  which  2,500 
armed  SWAPO  personnel  would  be 
moved  to  five  bases  to  be  established 
inside  Namibia. 


Secretary  General's  Report 

Neither  of  these  positions  was  ac- 
cepted by  the  Secretary  General.  In- 
stead the  Secretary  General  issued  a  re- 
port on  the  26th  of  February  which  pre- 
sented his  proposals  for  the  resolution 
of  the  few  remaining  issues. 

In  that  report  Secretary  General 
Waldheim  stated  that,  while  the  settle- 
ment proposal  made  no  specific  provi- 
sion for  the  monitoring  by  UNTAG  of 
SWAPO  bases  in  neighboring  coun- 
tries, those  countries,  nevertheless,  had 
been  asked  to  insure  that  the  provisions 
of  the  transitional  arrangements,  and 
the  outcome  of  the  election,  would  be 
respected.  In  addition,  the  Secretary 
General  was  seeking  the  agreement  of 
the  Governments  of  Angola,  Botswana, 
and  Zambia  for  the  establishment  of 
UNTAG  liaison  offices  in  their  coun- 
tries to  facilitate  cooperation  in  the  im- 
plementation of  the  proposal. 

The  Secretary  General  also  specified 
arrangements  for  the  handling  of 
SWAPO  armed  personnel,  carefully 
differentiating  between  those  inside 
Namibia  at  the  time  of  the  ceasefire 
and  those  outside.  Any  SWAPO  armed 
forces  in  Namibia  at  the  time  of  the 
ceasefire  would  be  restricted  to  desig- 
nated locations  inside  Namibia.  All 
SWAPO  armed  forces  in  neighboring 
countries  would,  on  the  commencement 
of  the  ceasefire,  be  restricted  to  base  in 
those  countries. 

South  Africa  again  reacted  nega- 
tively to  the  Secretary  General's  pro- 
posals, in  particular  those  relating  to 
the  absence  of  UNTAG  monitoring  of 
SWAPO  bases  in  Angola  and  Zambia 
and  to  the  handling  of  SWAPO  armed 
personnel  who  are  in  Namibia  at  the 
time  of  the  ceasefire.  To  avert  a  break- 
down of  the  initiative  over  these  issues, 
another  round  of  ministerial  level 
"proximity  talks"  was  held  in  New 
York  on  March  19  and  20  during  which 
Secretary  Vance  and  his  colleagues 
presented  our  view  to  South  African 
Foreign  Minister  Botha  that  the  Secre- 
tary General's  report  was  consistent 
with  the  original  proposal  which  South 
Africa  had  accepted.  During  those 
talks,  the  SWAPO  delegation: 

•  Accepted  the  restriction  of  their 
own  forces  outside  Namibia  to  base 
outside  Namibia; 

•  Accepted  the  Secretary  General's 
proposal  for  designating  locations  to 
which  any  SWAPO  armed  personnel 


inside  Namibia  at  the  start  of  the 
ceasefire  would  be  restricted  and  mon- 
itored; 

•  Accepted  the  Secretary  General's 
intention  to  designate  only  one  or  two 
such  locations;  and 

•  Stated  that  they  had  no  intention  of 
infiltrating  any  armed  personnel  into 
Namibia  following  the  start  of  the 
ceasefire  and  that  in  fact  they  had  no 
intention  of  infiltrating  any  armed  per- 
sonnel during  the  period  between  the 
signing  of  the  ceasefire  and  the  actual 
start  of  the  ceasefire. 

SWAPO  has  thus  accepted  the  im- 
plementation plans  of  the  Secretary 
General,  which  the  five  also  fully  sup- 
port, and  is  now  prepared  to  move 
ahead  with  that  implementation.  Dur- 
ing these  same  proximity  talks  the 
front-line  states  reiterated  their  com- 
mitment to  scrupulously  insure  the  ob- 
servance of  the  ceasefire  agreement. 


Principal  Issues 

Because  South  Africa's  objections 
are  still  outstanding,  I  believe  it  useful 
to  examine  in  greater  detail  the  two 
principal  issues  which  seem  to  stand  in 
the  way  of  South  Africa's  acceptance. 

First,  South  Africa  has  called  for 
monitoring  by  UNTAG  of  SWAPO 
bases  outside  Namibia.  However  de- 
sirable such  monitoring  might  be, 
South  Africa  was  informed  prior  to  its 
acceptance  of  the  five's  proposal  last 
year  that  such  a  provision  was  unac- 
ceptable to  the  neighboring  states  and 
that  this  element  was  taken  into  ac- 
count in  determining  the  size  and  func- 
tions of  UNTAG.  Neither  we  nor  the 
United  Nations  can  dictate  to  sovereign 
nations  which  are  not  a  party  to  the 
settlement.  As  1  have  stated  previously, 
the  front-line  states  have  committed 
themselves  to  insuring  the  scrupulous 
observance  of  the  ceasefire.  We  accept 
these  assurances. 

The  second  issue,  and  the  one  which 
seems  now  to  be  South  Africa's  pri- 
mary objection,  is  the  Secretary  Gen- 
eral's proposal  that  any  SWAPO  armed 
personnel  in  Namibia  at  the  start  of  the 
ceasefire  will  be  restricted  and  moni- 
tored by  the  United  Nations  at  desig- 
nated locations  inside  Namibia.  In 
making  this  proposal  the  Secretary 
General  was  faced  with  a  very  difficult 
practical  question.  The  Secretary  Gen- 
eral decided,  and  the  five  support  him 
in  this  decision,  that  those  SWAPO 
armed  personnel  inside  Namibia,  esti- 
mated at  perhaps  several  hundred, 
should  be  indentified  and  restricted  in 
such  a  way  as  to  facilitate  their 
monitoring. 

There  were,  of  course,  other  alterna- 


60 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


tives,  such  as  safe  passage  out  of  the 
territory  or  disarming  of  SWAPO  per- 
sonnel. However,  the  level  of  SWAPO 
distrust  of  South  Africa's  intentions 
was  such  that  SWAPO  was  not  pre- 
pared to  take  these  courses  which,  of 
course,  would  allow  South  Africa  to 
gain  in  the  peace  that  which  it  could 
not  gain  in  the  conflict,  i.e.,  the  elimi- 
nation of  SWAPO' s  armed  presence  in 
the  territory.  In  this  regard.  South  Af- 
rica's objective  is  no  less  objectionable 
than  SWAPO's  rejected  proposal  to  in- 
troduce a  large  armed  force  after  the 
ceasefire. 

It  is  possible  to  engage  in  a  legalistic 
argument  over  whether  the  establish- 
ment of  such  SWAPO  locations  was 
envisioned  under  the  settlement  pro- 
posal; however,  it  is  only  the  practical 
problem  which  must  be  solved.  The 
Secretary  General  was  sensitive  to  the 
need  to  insure  that  the  electoral  process 
could  not  be  adversely  affected  by  the 
manner  in  which  this  issue  was  han- 
dled. The  locations  would  be,  as  far  as 
practical,  away  from  population  cen- 
ters. The  SWAPO  personnel  would  be 
restricted  to  those  locations  and  moni- 
tored closely  by  the  United  Nations. 

I  might  add  that  two  other  Namibian 
political  groups  which  had  previously 
supported  implementation  of  our  set- 
tlement proposal,  the  SWAPO-Dem- 
ocrats  and  the  Namibia  National  Front 
(NNF),  initially  opposed  the  suggestion 
of  a  SWAPO  armed  presence  inside 
Namibia,  in  part  because  they  thought 
that  Mr.  Waldheim's  plan  was  intended 
to  accede  to  SWAPO  proposals  which 
had  in  fact  been  rejected.  This  misun- 
derstanding has  been  corrected,  and 
SWAPO-Democrats  have  now  urged 
immediate  implementation  of  the  Sec- 
retary General's  plan.  The  NNF  is  ex- 
pected to  announce  its  position  soon. 

There  are  several  lesser  issues  which 
could  be  raised  to  a  higher  degree  of 
importance.  These  include  the  com- 
position of  the  military  component  of 
UNTAG  and  the  timing  of  the  U.N.- 
supervised  elections.  Neither  SWAPO 
nor  South  Africa  has  yet  given  its  for- 
mal agreement  to  the  composition  pro- 
posed by  Secretary  General  Waldheim, 
but  this  should  be  relatively  easily 
achieved  once  the  major  issues  are  re- 
solved. South  Africa  has  not  withdrawn 
its  earlier  insistence  on  the  holding  of 
elections  by  September  30,  a  date 
which  South  Africa's  delay  in  accept- 
ing implementation  of  the  settlement 
proposal  obviously  has  made  impos- 
sible to  meet.  While  we  recognize  the 
need  to  move  ahead  rapidly  and  recog- 
nize that  deadlines  can  serve  to  spur 
events  onward,  we  continue  to  believe 
that  peaceful  accommodation  through 
free  and  fair  elections  is  more  impor- 
tant than  an  artificial  deadline. 


Conclusion 

In  conclusion,  let  me  say  that  the 
five  governments  believe  our  settle- 
ment proposal  and  the  implementation 
plan  of  Secretary  General  Waldheim 
offer  a  balanced  and  fair  settlement  of 
the  Namibian  question  and  the  only  vi- 
able settlement  available  which  can 
bring  about  an  independent  Namibia 
which  enjoys  broad  international  sup- 
port. To  be  sure,  this  settlement  pack- 
age does  not  satisfy  every  demand  ol 
everyone  involved,  but  it  does  in  our 
estimation  satisfy  every  legitimate  con- 
cern of  the  parties. 

SWAPO  is  now  prepared  to  proceed 
with  this  settlement.  So  are  the  five, 
the  U.N.  Security  Council,  and  the  in- 
ternational community  generally.  South 
Africa  has  not  agreed  and  has  said  that 
it  must  consult  with  the  other  Namibian 
political  groups  before  it  makes  its  de- 
cision. We  recognize  South  Africa's 
desire  to  hold  these  consultations.  But 
it  is  the  South  African  Government 
which  must  determine  whether  or  not  it 
will  cooperate  with  the  United  Nations 
in  an  internationally  acceptable  settle- 
ment. That  responsibility  cannot  be 
passed  off  to  others. 

Most  African  members  of  the  United 
Nations  are  convinced  that  South  Af- 
rica has  never  had  any  intention  of  pro- 
ceeding with  an  internationally  accept- 
able settlement  in  Namibia.  The 
front-line  states  believe  that,  since  they 
have  brought  SWAPO  to  accept  the 
settlement,  it  is  now  up  to  the  five  to 
obtain  South  Africa's  agreement.  If 
South  Africa  does  not  agree,  there  will 
be  increasingly  strong  calls  at  the 
United  Nations  for  us  to  support  our 
own  negotiations  by  exerting  real  pres- 
sure on  South  Africa,  in  other  words 
some  form  of  economic  sanctions. 

We  have  continually  told  the  front- 
line states  and  other  African  nations 
that  negotiation  is  a  real  alternative  to 
the  armed  struggle  in  southern  Africa. 
Our  inability  to  obtain  South  Africa's 
acceptance  would  almost  certainly  be 
seen  as  proof  of  an  ultimate  lack  of  will 
in  the  West  to  press  South  Africa  to 
cooperate  with  a  negotiated  settlement. 
It  would  be  seen  by  Africans  as  proof 
of  the  ineffectiveness  of  negotiation  for 
peaceful  change  as  a  viable  alternative 
to  long  and  bloody  military  solutions. 
It  would  surely  adversely  affect  the 
prospects  for  negotiated  settlements  in 
the  rest  of  southern  Africa. 

It  would  result  in  an  escalation  of 
hostilities  and  chaos  and  open  further 
opportunities  for  outside  forces  and 
alien  ideologies. 

At  the  present  there  are  several  seri- 
ous developments  which  further  com- 
plicate and  even  endanger  the  settle- 
ment effort.  Once  again  South  Africa 


has  arrested  without  charge  or  trial  al- 
most the  entire  internal  leadership  of 
SWAPO.  There  are  reports  of  greatly 
increased  South  African  military  activ- 
ity. Conversely  there  are  reports  of 
heightened  SWAPO  guerrilla  action. 
All  of  this  indicates  that  the  cycle  of 
violence  is  expanding. 

At  this  stage  Namibia  is  still  a  rela- 
tively small  problem  in  southern  Africa 
—  and  the  one  most  susceptible  to  a 
negotiated  solution.  With  time,  how- 
ever, it  will  become  increasingly  com- 
plex and  difficult. 

Bitterness  will  exceed  reason.  To- 
day's compromise  solution  will  be 
overshadowed  by  non-negotiable  de- 
mands. For  these  reasons,  we  must 
continue  to  do  our  utmost  not  to  let  the 
opportunity  of  a  peaceful  settlement 
pass  us  by.  D 


'Text  from  U.S. U.N.  press  release  40.  The 
complete  transcript  of  the  hearing  will  be  pub- 
lished by  the  committee  and  will  be  available 
from  the  Superintendent  of  Documents,  U.S. 
Government  Printing  Office.  Washington. 
DC    20402. 

^  For  text  of  the  proposal  for  a  Namibian  set- 
tlement, see  Bulletin  of  June  1978.  p.  53. 


President  Carter^s 

Jfteeting  With 

MJ,]%,  Secretary 

General 


WHITE  HOUSE  STATEMENT, 
JULY  30,  1979' 

President  Carter  met  this  afternoon 
with  U.N.  Secretary  General  Kurt 
Waldheim  for  50  minutes  in  the  Cab- 
inet Room.  The  President  congratulated 
Secretary  General  Waldheim  on  the  re- 
sults of  the  Geneva  meeting  on  In- 
dochina refugees.  The  President  felt 
the  Secretary  General's  efforts  were  a 
key  factor  in  the  progress  made  on  sub- 
stantially increasing  funding  pledges 
and  commitments  from  a  variety  of 
countries  to  resettle  refugees. 

On  the  Middle  East,  the  President 
discussed  U.S.  policies  for  advancing 
the  peace  process.  The  two  leaders  dis- 
cussed the  question  of  a  continued 
U.N.  presence  in  the  Sinai.  The  Presi- 
dent told  the  Secretary  General  that  we 
will  be  consulting  closely  with  Israel 
and  Egypt  on  this  question.  The  United 
States  will  remain  in  close  touch  with 
the  Secretary  General  and  his  staff. 

The  President  urged  the  Secretary 
General  to  continue  to  give  top  priority 
to  his  efforts  to  resolve  the  problem  of 


October  1979 


61 


U.S»  Policy  On  Lebanon 


by  Andrew  Young 

Statement  before  the  U.N.  Seciirltv 
Council  on  August  29,  1979.  Mr. 
Young  is  U.S.  Ambassador  to  the 
United  Nations. ' 

I  welcome  the  opportunity  afforded 
by  this  meeting  of  the  Council  to  ad- 
dress a  problem  which  has  long  been  a 
matter  of  grave  concern  to  my  govern- 
ment. In  recent  weeks  and  months,  the 
sorry  spectacle  of  the  slaughter  of  in- 
nocent people  through  random  vio- 
lence, principally  in  Lebanon  but  also 
in  Israel,  has  been  an  affront  to  the 
conscience  of  mankind.  We  are  meet- 
ing now  at  the  request  of  the  Govern- 
ment of  Lebanon,  in  response  to  the  re- 
cent upsurge  of  violence  in  southern 
Lebanon. 

In  recent  days  alone,  thousands  of 
Lebanese  and  Palestinian  civilians  have 
been  forced  to  flee  from  their  homes, 
and  many  have  been  killed  and  maimed 
by  often  indiscriminate  shelling.  This 
situation  is  intolerable.  The  people  of 
southern  Lebanon,  Lebanese  and  Pal- 
estinian alike,  and  the  people  of  Israel 
as  well,  deserve  relief  from  the  almost 
daily  violence  and  fear  of  attack  with 
which  they  have  been  forced  to  live  for 
far  too  long.  They  look  to  us  to  point 
the  way  to  a  solution  which  will  allow 
the  people  in  Lebanon  to  return  to  their 
homes  and  for  them  and  Israeli  citizens 
to  carry  on  their  lives  in  freedom  from 
fear  of  attack.  We  must  not  fail  them. 

U.S.  Position 

The  U.S.  Government's  policy  on 
Lebanon  is  well  known:  We  support 
that  country's  sovereignty,  independ- 
ence, unity,  and  territorial  integrity. 
We  have  special  ties  of  sympathy  with 
the  people  of  Lebanon,  and  we  have 
supported  the  government  of  President 
Sarkis  in  its  efforts  to  restore  its  au- 
thority throughout  the  country — in- 
cluding throughout  southern  Lebanon. 
We  will  continue  to  do  so. 

Let  me  make  absolutely  clear  the  po- 


;  Cyprus.  He  also  discussed  the  Secre- 
'  tary  General's  continuing  efforts  to 
i  find  a  solution  to  the  Namibian  situa- 
\  tion.  D 


'List  of  participants  omitted;   text  from 
,  Weekly  Compilation  of  Presidential  Documents 
of  Aug.  6,  1979. 


sition  of  the  United  States  with  regard 
to  events  in  southern  Lebanon.  In 
doing  so.  I  speak  with  the  full  authority 
of  the  U.S.  Government. 

First,  we  condemn  those  who  boast 
of  the  murder  of  an  Israeli  mother  and 
her  child,  the  attack  on  a  bus  filled 
with  Israeli  civilians,  or  the  explosion 
of  rockets  and  bombs  in  Israeli  towns 
and  cities.  No  political  objective  can 
ever  justify  such  barbarism. 

Second,  and  just  as  strongly,  we 
condemn  the  policy  of  artillery  shelling 
and  preemptive  attacks  on  Lebanese 
towns,  villages,  and  refugee  camps 
which  Israel  and  the  armed  Lebanese 
groups  Israel  supports  have  followed  in 
recent  months.  Let  there  be  no  doubt  or 
ambiguity  about  this.  We  cannot  and 
do  not  agree  with  Israel's  military 
policies  in  Lebanon  as  manifested  in 
the  past  few  months.  They  are  wrong 
and  unacceptable  to  my  government. 
They  are  painfully  at  variance  with  the 
values  which  Israel  has  traditionally 
espoused. 

What  Must  Be  Done 

Let  me  turn  to  what  the  U.S.  Gov- 
ernment believes  must  be  done  to  break 
the  deadlock  of  terror  and  counterterror 
in  which  both  sides  seem  to  be  caught. 

First,  both  sides  should  cooperate 
fully  with  UNIFIL  [U.N.  Interim  Force 
in  Lebanon]  in  enabling  it  to  carry  out 
its  mandate.  It  is  disgraceful  that  the 
men  of  UNIFIL  have  been  subjected  to 
attack  and  harassment  from  both  Pales- 
tinian elements  and  groups  supported 
by  Israel  because  they  seek  to  carry  out 
the  mission  entrusted  to  them  by  this 
Council.  A  lasting  end  to  the  violence 
in  the  area  can  only  be  brought  about 
through  scrupulous  observance  of  Se- 
curity Council  Resolution  425.  UNIFIL 
should  thus  be  allowed  to  fulfill  its 
mandate  by  functioning  in  an  unim- 
peded fashion  throughout  all  of  south- 
ern Lebanon.  The  objective  remains  to 
restore  the  authority  and  control  of  the 
Government  of  Lebanon  throughout  the 
country. 

Second,  Israel  should  end  its  policy 
of  preemptive  strikes  on  Lebanon  soil. 
It  should  cease  its  artillery  attacks  in 
support  of  Lebanese  militia  groups  and 
use  its  influence  effectively  over  these 
groups  so  that  random  and  indiscrimi- 
nate violence  can  be  stopped,  espe- 
cially against  the  men  of  UNIFIL. 


Third,  the  Palestinian  leadership 
should  help  heal  the  wounds  of  Leba- 
non. It  should  stop  attacks  on  the 
Lebanese  militia  groups  in  southern 
Lebanon  and  on  Israel.  It  should  re- 
nounce the  use  of  Lebanese  territory 
for  this  purpose.  It  should  carry  out  its 
pledge  of  June  5  to  withdraw  its  fight- 
ers from  southern  Lebanese  villages 
and  towns  and  remove  all  its  armed 
groups  from  UNIFIL's  area  of  opera- 
tion. This  step  should  be  taken  without 
precondition  and  without  delay.  There 
is  no  conceivable  justification  for  the 
continued  presence  of  Palestinian 
armed  groups  in  southern  Lebanon  if 
the  Palestinian  leadership  is  prepared  to 
cooperate  with  the  Council  and  UNIFIL 
in  carrying  out  Security  Council  Res- 
olution 425. 

Fourth,  all  parties  to  the  fighting 
should  carry  out  and  strictly  enforce  a 
complete,  immediate,  and  lasting  halt 
to  all  shelling,  terrorism,  and  other  acts 
of  violence. 

Palestinian  Rights 

Members  of  the  Council  less  than  a 
week  ago  met  to  consider  another  as- 
pect of  the  Middle  East  situation,  the 
critical  issue  of  the  rights  of  the  Pales- 
tinian people.  If  there  is  a  strengthened 
understanding  in  my  country  of  the  im- 
portance of  assuring  that  the  legitimate 
rights  of  the  Palestinians  are  included 
in  a  comprehensive  settlement — and  I 
believe  there  is — then  it  is  time  for  the 
Palestinian  leadership  to  recognize  that 
their  objectives  cannot  be  achieved 
through  violence  and  terrorism.  In- 
deed, it  is  time,  past  time,  for  wiser 
counsels  to  prevail  on  both  sides  of  the 
border  between  Lebanon  and  Israel. 

Tribute  to  UNIFIL 

Finally,  I  want  to  pay  tribute  to  Gen- 
eral Erskine  and  the  brave  men  of 
UNIFIL  he  commands.  Their  task  has 
been  thankless,  frustrating,  and  dan- 
gerous. Subjected  to  attack  in  the  per- 
formance of  their  duties,  they  have 
suffered  heavy  casualties.  Tragically, 
three  members  of  the  contingent  from 
the  small  nation  of  Fiji  were  killed  in  a 
recent  clash  with  terrorists. 

In  difficult  terrain  and  in  a  country 
where  arms  are  widely  available  among 
the  population,  the  men  of  UNIFIL 
have  been  subjected  to  a  severe  test  of 
their  steadfastness.  They  have  risen  to 
challenges  with  exemplary  determina- 
tion and  courage.  We  all  owe  them  a 
debt  of  thanks  which  words  cannot 
repay.  They  can  be  proud  of  their  con- 
tinued contribution  to  the  cause  of 
peace.  D 


'Text  from  U.N.   doc.   S/PV.   2164  of  Aug. 
29,  1979. 


62 


World  Radio  Conference 


Foreign  Relations  Outline' 

The  10-week  World  Administrative 
Radio  Conference  (WARC),  opening  in 
September  1979  in  Geneva,  will  influ- 
ence development  of  radiocommunica- 
tions  systems  into  the  21st  century.  It 
will  review  all  uses  of  the  radio  fre- 
quency spectrum,  related  technical 
questions,  and  regulatory  procedures. 
The  conference  is  a  function  of  the 
U.N.'s  154-member  International  Tele- 
communication Union  (ITU).  Its  re- 
sponsibilities include  allocation  of  the 
radio  frequency  spectrum  and  registra- 
tion of  radio  frequency  assignments  in 
order  to  avoid  harmful  interference 
between  radio  stations  of  different 
countries.  The  WARC  will  be  one  of 
the  largest  international  conferences  in 
which  the  United  States  has  partici- 
pated, with  some  1,500  delegates  from 
over  140  countries  expected  to  attend. 


Agenda 

WARC's  agenda  establishes  the 
basis  for: 

•  New  frequency  allocations  to  meet 
changing  social  and  economic  needs; 

•  Review  and  possible  revision  of 
technical  standards  for  use  of  frequen- 
cies: and 

•  Review  and  possible  revision  of 
general  principles  for  allocations  and 
orbital  utilization  and  of  procedures  for 
coordination,  notification,  and  regis- 
tration of  frequencies. 

U.S.  Goals 

We  have  several  major  objectives  at 
the  conference. 

•  We  seek  agreement  on  necessary, 
incremental  changes  in  frequency  allo- 
cations and  related  regulations  in  order 
to  enhance  U.S.  economic,  social,  and 
national  security  interests. 

•  We  seek  to  maintain  those  proce- 
dures which  provide  maximum  flexi- 
bility and  adaptability  to  changing 
needs. 

•  We  wish  to  strengthen  ITU's  role 
as  the   international  organization   re- 


sponsible for  implementing  WARC  de- 
cisions, without  adversely  affecting 
U.S.  sovereign  rights. 

•  We  support  changes  in  allocations 
and  related  frequency  management 
procedures  that  will  accommodate 
other  nations"  needs — consistent  with 
our  own  requirements — while  en- 
deavoring to  avoid  or  limit  the  impact 
of  politically  inspired  efforts  to  impede 
fair  and  efficient  use  of  the  spectrum. 

Frequency  Bands 

Low  and  Medium.  In  the  low  and 

medium  frequency  range,  the  United 
States  proposes  expanding  AM  broad- 
casting to  accommodate  new  broadcast 
stations  in  region  2  (North  and  South 
America).  We  also  propose  changes  in 
other  services,  including  improved  ac- 
commodation of  amateur  frequencies 
and  changes  in  radiolocation. 

High.  In  these  bands,  the  United 
States  proposes  significant  increases  in 
international  broadcasting  and  maritime 
mobile  services  and  some  increased  ac- 
commodation for  amateur  service.  The 
increases  will  require  reducing  some  of 
the  present  exclusive  allocations  for 
fixed  service.  This  will  be  highly  con- 
troversial because  of  developing  coun- 
tries' dependence  on  fixed  service  allo- 
cations. 

Ultra   High   (UHF).  In  the  UHF 

bands,  the  thrust  of  U.S.  proposals  is 
for  region  2  to  increase  allocations  for 
land  mobile  services  to  be  shared  with 
the  broadcast  service.  Our  objective  is 
to  accommodate  the  rapid  growth  of 
land  mobile  frequencies  by  permitting 
sharing  in  the  upper  UHF  bands  now 
allocated  exclusively  to  broadcasting. 
We  propose  a  critically  important  fre- 
quency allocation  to  accommodate  a 
new  satellite  navigation  system  that 
promises  to  revolutionize  radionaviga- 
tion.  Also  noteworthy  are  provisions 
for  land,  maritime,  and  aeronautical 
mobile  satellite  systems  and  for  aural 
broadcasting  by  satellite.  In  addition, 
we  propose  to  accommodate  increased 
needs  for  amateur,  maritime  mobile, 
and  aeronautical  services. 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 

Super  High  (SHF)  and  Extremely 
High  (EHF).  Above  the  UHF  band,  we 
have  a  variety  of  different  service 
needs.  A  difficult  problem  has  been 
encountered  in  fixed  satellite  service, 
where  INTELSAT  has  major  require- 
ments; we  propose  several  allocations 
to  meet  them.  INTELSAT,  with  102 
member  countries,  provides  most  of  the 
world's  international  communications 
via  satellite.  Also  within  the  fixed 
satellite  service,  we  propose  significant 
changes  in  allocations  for  both  fixed 
service  and  broadcast  satellite  service 
frequencies  at  12  GHZ  (gigahertz)  to 
accommodate  the  growing  need  for 
those  services.  We  propose  allocations 
to  meet  important  requirements  for  a 
mobile  satellite  service  for  civilian  and 
government  systems.  We  propose  to 
accommodate  the  growing  require- 
ments for  future  generations  of  Earth 
exploration  and  space  research  satel- 
lites. We  envision  the  need  for  satellite 
sensing  of  environmental  and  Earth  re- 
sources throughout  the  SHF  and  EHF 
bands. 


Regulatory  Procedures 

We  anticipate  that  proposals  will  be 
made  at  the  conference  to  revise  pres- 
ent procedures  giving  recognition  and 
priority  of  use  to  countries  which  first 
register  frequency  assignments  with  the 
ITU.  Such  proposals — which  will  have 
to  be  carefully  evaluated — may  include 
the  establishment  of  allotment  plans  for 
distributing  frequencies  and/or  orbital 
space  slots  on  a  country-by-country 
basis.  While  we  endorse  the  principle 
of  insuring  fair  and  reasonable  access 
by  all  countries  to  the  radio  spectrum, 
we  have  in  the  past  opposed  preas- 
signment  allotment  plans  except  in 
limited  situations.  We  are  concerned 
that  fixed  allotment  plans  which  dis- 
tribute frequencies  and  orbital  space  to 
countries  or  areas  independent  of  need 
or  ability  to  utilize  may  not  allow  op- 
timal utilization  of  the  spectrum  or 
provide  adequate  incentive  for  adopting 
spectrum-  and  orbit-conserving  tech- 
nologies and  patterns  of  use.  □ 


'Taken  from  the  Department  of  State  publica- 
tion in  the  GIST  series,  released  Aug.  1979.  This 
outline  is  designed  to  be  a  quick  reference  aid  on 
U.S.  foreign  relations.  It  is  not  intended  as  a 
comprehensive  U.S.  foreign  policy  statement. 


October  1979 


63 


WESTERN  HEmiSPHERE: 

Soviet  Combat  Troops  in  Cuba 


Following  are  the  texts  of  Secretary 
Vance's  letter  to  Senator  Richard 
Stone  of  July  27,  1979,  a  Department 
statement  of  August  31 ,  and  President 
Carter' s  remarks  to  the  press  on  Sep- 
tember 7 . 


SECRETARY'S  LETTER 
JULY  27,  1979 

Dear  Senator  Stone: 

The  President  has  asked  me  to  respond  to 
your  July  24  letter  to  him  on  Soviet  military 
presence  in  Cuba.  I  very  much  appreciate  your 
calling  to  our  attention  reports  of  a  possible 
high  ranking  Soviet  command  structure  in 
Cuba. 

I  wish  to  reaffirm  the  President's  statement 
to  you  that  it  is  the  policy  of  the  United  States 
to  oppose  any  efforts,  direct  or  indirect,  by  the 
Soviet  Union  to  establish  military  bases  in  the 
Western  Hemisphere.  However,  there  is  no 
evidence  of  any  substantial  increase  of  the 
Soviet  military  presence  in  Cuba  over  the  past 
several  years  or  of  the  presence  of  a  Soviet 
military  base.  Apart  from  a  military  group  that 
has  been  advising  the  Cuban  Armed  Forces  for 
fifteen  years  or  more  our  intelligence  does  not 
warrant  the  conclusion  that  there  are  any  other 
significant  Soviet  forces  in  Cuba.  At  the  same 
time  the  President  directed  that  we  give  in- 
creased attention  to  the  situation  and  monitor  it 
closely.  This  is  being  done.  The  President 
raised  the  question  of  the  Soviet  presence  in 
Cuba  with  President  Brezhnev  in  Vienna  and 
made  clear  to  him  that  a  Soviet  buildup  would 
adversely  affect  our  relationship. 

You  have  also  raised  questions  on  the  1962 
understanding  in  your  letter  to  the  President 
and  during  the  appearances  of  Secretary  Brown 
and  myself  before  the  SFRC.  The  United  States 
and  the  Soviet  Union  both  recognize  that  an 
understanding  on  Cuba  exists.  This  under- 
standing is  reflected  in  the  Kennedy- 
Khrushchev  correspondence  of  October  and 
November,  1962,  (particularly  the  letters  of 
October  27  and  28,  1962)'  and  in  communica- 
tions between  the  two  governments  in  the  fall 
of  1970  concerning  the  establishment  of  Soviet 
naval  bases  in  Cuba.  We  have  no  evidence  that 
the  Soviets  are  in  violation  of  this  understand- 
ing. 

President  Nixon  addressed  the  scope  of  the 
understanding  in  1971,  and  stated,  "in  the 
event  that  nuclear  submarines  were  serviced 
either  in  Cuba  or  from  Cuba,  that  would  be  a 
violation  of  the  understanding."  Subsequently, 
in  the  early  I970"s,  submarines  did  make  occa- 
sional port  calls.  According  to  the  understand- 
ing with  the  Soviet  Union  such  port  calls  do  not 
constitute  violations. 


You  have  asked  that  we  assure  the  American 
people  that  they  have  full  knowledge  of  the  un- 
derstanding. The  essential  understanding  is  in 
the  public  record.  The  Soviets  agreed  in  1962 
that  offensive  weapons  could  not  again  be  in- 
troduced into  Cuba.  In  1970  it  was  made  clear 
that  this  understanding  included  sea-based 
systems. 

Although  the  October  27  and  28,  1962,  let- 
ters and  many  other  documents  from  this  period 
are  not  classified,  there  are  additional  diplo- 
matic exchanges,  made  in  confidence,  which 
must  remain  classified.  They  are  consistent 
with  publicly  available  documents.  The  princi- 
ple of  confidentiality  of  diplomatic  communi- 
cation is  respected  throughout  the  international 
community  and  is  carefully  applied  in  our  rela- 
tions with  the  Soviet  Union  to  ensure  the  free 
flow  of  communication  that  is  essential  to  the 
maintenance  of  world  peace.  A  breach  of  con- 
fidentially in  this  context  could  easily  impair 
our  ability  to  deal  with  the  Soviets  in  the  fu- 
ture. 

If  you  wish  any  further  background,  please 
do  not  hesitate  to  inform  me. 

With  best  wishes. 

Sincerely, 
Cyrus  Vance 


DEPARTMENT  STATEMENT, 
AUG.  31,  1979^ 

We  have  recently  confirmed  the 
presence  in  Cuba  of  what  appears  to  be 
a  Soviet  combat  unit.  This  is  the  first 
time  we  have  been  able  to  confirm  the 
presence  of  a  Soviet  ground  forces  unit 
on  the  island. 

Elements  of  the  unit  appear  to  have 
been  there  since  at  least  1976.  We  es- 
timate that  it  consists  of  2,000-3,000 
men.  The  unit  includes  armored,  artil- 


Letters 
of  Credence 


President  Carter  accepted  the  letters 
of  credence  of  newly  appointed  Am- 
bassadors to  the  United  States  of 
Roberto  Arce  Alvarez  of  Bolivia  and 
Alfonso  Arias-Schreiber  of  Peru  on 
March  30.  1979,  and  of  Marcial  Perez 
Chiriboga  of  Venezuela  and  Antonio 
Francisco  Azeredo  da  Silveira  of  Brazil 
on  July  24.  D 


lery,  and  infantry  elements.  In  addi- 
tion, we  estimate  that  the  Soviet  main- 
tain between  1,500  and  2,000  military 
advisory  and  technical  personnel  in 
Cuba. 

As  currently  configured  and  sup- 
ported, the  unit  poses  no  threat  to  the 
United  States. 

Ground  forces  per  se  did  not  figure 
in  our  bilateral  understandings  with  the 
Soviets  which  were  directed  toward 
offensive  weapons  systems.  Nonethe- 
less, we  are  concerned  about  the  pres- 
ence of  Soviet  combat  forces  in  Cuba. 

We  have,  in  recent  months,  raised 
with  the  Soviets  the  issue  of  the 
Soviet-Cuban  military  relationship.  On 
August  29  we  called  in  the  Soviet 
Charge  to  express  our  concerns  about 
the  Soviet  ground  forces  unit.  We  will 
continue  our  discussions  with  them  on 
this  subject. 

We  will,  of  course,  continue  to 
monitor  all  aspects  of  Soviet  military 
activities  in  Cuba  to  insure  there  is  no 
threat  to  the  United  States. 


PRESIDENT'S  REMARKS, 
SEPT.  7,  1979^ 

I  want  to  take  a  few  minutes  to  speak 
to  you  about  the  presence  of  the  Soviet 
combat  brigade  in  Cuba.  The  facts  re- 
lating to  this  issue  have  been  carefully 
laid  out  by  Secretary  Vance,  both  in 
his  public  statement  and  in  his  tes- 
timony before  the  Congress.  The  facts, 
in  brief,  are  as  follows. 

We  have  concluded,  as  the  conse- 
quences of  intensified  intelligence  ef- 
forts, that  a  Soviet  combat  unit  is  cur- 
rently stationed  in  Cuba.  We  have 
some  evidence  to  indicate  that  such  a 
unit  has  been  in  Cuba  for  some  time, 
perhaps  for  quite  a  few  years. 

The  brigade  consists  of  2,000-3,000 
troops.  It's  equipped  with  conventional 
weapons,  such  as  about  40  tanks  and 
some  field  artillery  pieces,  and  has 
conducted  training  as  an  organized 
unit. 

It  is  not  an  assault  force.  It  does  not 
have  airlift  or  sea-going  capabilities 
and  does  not  have  weapons  capable  of 
attacking  the  United  States. 

The  purpose  of  this  combat  unit  is 
not  yet  clear.  However,  the  Secretary 
of  State  spoke  for  me  and  for  our  na- 
tion on  Wednesday  when  he  said  that 
we  consider  the  presence  of  a  Soviet 
combat  brigade  in  Cuba  to  be  a  very 
serious  matter  and  that  this  status  quo 
is  not  acceptable. 

We  are  confident  about  our  ability  to 
defend  our  country  or  any  of  our 
friends  from  external  aggression.  The 
issue  posed  is  of  a  different  nature.  It 
involves  the  stationing  of  Soviet  com- 


64 


U»S,'3texico  Cooperation 


by  Julius  L .  Katz 

Statement  before  the  Subcommittee 
on  Investigations  and  Oversight  of  the 
House  Committee  on  Science  and 
Technology  on  August  1,  1979.  Mr. 
Katz  is  Assistant  Secretary  for  Eco- 
nomic and  Business  Affairs. ' 

I  want  to  thank  you  tor  the  opportu- 
nity to  appear  before  this  subcommittee 
to  discuss  certain  recommendations  it 
has  made  on  U.S. -Mexico  relations  and 
potentials  regarding  energy,  immigra- 
tion, scientific  cooperation,  and  tech- 
nology transfer.  I  understand  that  the 
subcommittee  is  particularly  interested 
in  hearing  the  views  of  the  State  De- 
partment on  the  recommendations  in 
the  subcommittee  report  of  its  May  3-7 
visit  to  Mexico  which  propose  a  long- 
term  plan  for  the  export  of  energy 
technology  and  critical  equipment  to 
Mexico  based  on  the  import  of  Mexi- 
can oil.  I  will,  therefore,  confine  my 
remarks  to  that  specific  aspect  of  the 
committee's  report. 

The  Department  shares  the  subcom- 
mittee's desire  to  search  for  ways  to 
promote  mutually  beneficial  coopera- 
tion between  Mexico  and  the  United 
States  in  the  critical  areas  of  trade, 
energy,  and  science  and  technology 
cooperation. 


Trade 

The  Administration  indeed  is  moving 
to  strengthen  our  relations  with  Mexico 
in  all  of  these  areas.  We  have  taken 
steps  which  we  believe  will  lay  the 
basis  for  a  cooperative  long-term  eco- 
nomic relationship  with  Mexico.  For 
example,  in  the  trade  area,  our  overall 
relations  with  Mexico  are  very  good, 
and  trade  flows  have  expanded 
dramatically  in  recent  years,  increasing 
from  $6.4  billion  in  1974  to  almost  $13 
billion  at  present.  Mexico's  rapid  eco- 
nomic growth  will  continue  to  provide 
U.S.  exporters  with  significant  ex- 
panded opportunities  to  export  capital 
goods  and  technology. 

Not  surprisingly,  this  rapidly  grow- 
ing trade  has  brought  adjustment  prob- 
lems with  it.  Some  affected  sectors  in 
the  United  States  have  called  for  pro- 
tection against  rapid  imports  of  par- 
ticular products  from  Mexico  and,  in 
some  cases,  have  charged  Mexican  ex- 
porters with  unfair  competitive  prac- 
tices. 

A  further  irritant  to  our  trade  rela- 
tions has  been  Mexico's  highly  restric- 
tive trade  policy,  an  attempt  to  protect 
its  domestic  producers.  We  are  encour- 
aged that  the  present  Mexican  Admin- 
istration has  been  moving  Mexico  in 
the  direction  of  greater  openness. 


Cuba  (Cont'd) 

bat  troops  here  in  the  Western  Hemi- 
sphere, in  a  country  which  acts  as  a 
Soviet  proxy  in  military  adventures  in 
other  areas  of  the  world,  like  Africa. 

We  do  have  the  right  to  insist  that 
the  Soviet  Union  respect  our  interests 
and  our  concerns  if  the  Soviet  Union 
expects  us  to  respect  their  sensibilities 
and  their  concerns.  Otherwise,  rela- 
tions between  our  two  countries  will 
inevitably  be  adversely  affected.  We 
are  seriously  pursuing  this  issue  with 
the  Soviet  Union,  and  we  are  consult- 
ing closely  with  the  Congress. 

Let  me  emphasize  that  this  is  a  sen- 
sitive issue  that  faces  our  nation,  all  of 
us,  and  our  nation  as  a  whole  must  re- 
spond not  only  with  firmness  and 
strength  but  also  with  calm  and  a  sense 
of  proportion. 

This  is  a  time  for  firm  diplomacy, 
not  panic  and  not  exaggeration.  As 
Secretary   Vance  discusses  this  issue 


with  Soviet  representatives  in  the 
coming  days,  the  Congress  and  the 
American  people  can  help  to  insure  a 
successful  outcome  of  these  discus- 
sions and  negotiations  by  preserving  an 
atmosphere  in  which  our  diplomacy  can 
work. 

I  know  I  speak  for  the  leadership  in 
Congress,  with  whom  I  have  met  this 
afternoon,  as  well  as  for  my  own  Ad- 
ministration, when  I  express  my  confi- 
dence that  our  nation  can  continue  to 
show  itself  to  be  calm  and  steady,  as 
well  as  strong  and  firm.  D 


'  For  texts  of  the  letters  exchanged  between 
President  Kennedy  and  Chairman  Khrushchev. 
Oct.  22-28,  1962,  see  Bulletin  ot  Nov.  19. 
1973,  p.  63.S. 

^Read  to  news  correspondents  by  Depart- 
ment spokesman  Hodding  Carter  III. 

■''Made  to  reporters  assembled  in  the  Briefing 
Room  at  the  White  House;  text  from  Weekly 
Compilation  of  Presidential  Documents  of 
Sept.   10.  1979. 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 

We  have  been  in  the  process  of 
negotiating  a  comprehensive  trade 
agreement  with  Mexico  within  the 
context  of  the  multilateral  trade  negoti- 
ations. In  addition,  we  and  other  mem- 
bers of  the  General  Agreement  on 
Tariffs  and  Trade  (GATT)  are 
negotiating  with  Mexico  for  its  possi- 
ble accession  to  the  GATT.  While  our 
negotiations  with  Mexico  are  not  yet 
concluded,  we  are  optimistic  that  a 
basis  will  be  laid  for  a  substantial  in- 
crease in  trade  between  our  two  coun- 
tries and  for  a  constructive  long-term 
relationship  between  them. 


Energy 

Our  energy  relations  with  Mexico  are 
growing  rapidly,  and  cooperative 
mechanisms  for  discussion  and  prob- 
lem management  are  being  developed. 
During  the  visit  of  President  Carter  to 
Mexico  in  February  several  initiatives 
were  taken.  The  United  States-Mexico 
consultative  mechanism  has  been  re- 
structured and  broadened,  and  a  new 
Energy  Working  Group,  cochaired  on 
the  U.S.  side  by  the  Departments  of 
State  and  Energy,  is  coordinating 
energy  cooperation  and  problem  man- 
agement with  Mexico.  This  working 
group  will  report  to  the  newly  estab- 
lished subcabinet  advisory  group  to  the 
consultative  mechanism  which  will  re- 
view its  progress. 

Discussions  concerning  possible  nat- 
ural gas  purchases  are  continuing,  and 
a  joint  study  of  electricity  exchanges 
has  begun.  Both  governments  have  re- 
viewed a  number  of  bilateral  energy- 
related  science  and  technology  propos- 
als, including  solar  research,  geother- 
mal  cooperation,  and  enhanced  oil  re- 
covery techniques.  We  fully  expect  that 
these  initial  cooperative  activities  with 
Mexico  will  prove  mutually  beneficial. 
We  should  strive  to  broaden  such  ac- 
tivities as  our  energy  relationship  ma- 
tures. 

Science  and  Technology 

With  respect  to  science  and  technol- 
ogy cooperation,  formal  cooperation 
with  Mexico  is  based  on  an  agreement 
signed  in  1972  which  established  a 
mixed  commission  to  coordinate  bilat- 
eral programs.  The  importance  of  this 
cooperation  was  highlighted  by  Presi- 
dent Carter  during  his  visit  to  Mexico 
in  February  of  this  year  when  he  and 
President  Lopez  Portillo  signed  a  fur- 
ther Memorandum  of  Understanding  on 
Scientific  and  Technological  Coopera- 
tion. 

The  third  meeting  of  the  mixed 
commission  was  held  in  Washington  in 
June  at  which  time  the  work  program 


October  1979 

for  the  next  2  years  was  approved.  The 
mixed  commission  formed  working 
groups  on: 

•  New  crops,  arid  lands,  and  ag- 
ricultural productivity; 

•  Energy  research  and  development: 

•  Industrial  metrology  and  in- 
strumentation: 

•  Railway  research  and  develop- 
ment: 

•  Technical  information  transfer; 
and 

•  Cooperation  between  the  National 
Science  Foundation  and  the  National 
Council  for  Science  and  Technology  of 
Mexico. 

'^  In  the  area  of  energy  research  and 
development,  the  mixed  commission 
agreed  on  20  separate  cooperative  proj- 
ects including  solar  and  geothermal 
energy,  uranium  exploration,  cost  and 
planning  of  alternate  sources  of  energy, 
industrial  energy  conservation,  hy- 
drogen storage,  and  fossil  fuels  re- 
search. The  fossil  fuels  project  will 
focus  on  a  series  of  joint  seminars  cov- 
ering enhanced  oil  recovery;  design, 
construction,  and  operation  of  pilot 
plants;  certain  offshore  drilling  tech- 
nologies; and  other  areas  of  mutual 
interest. 

The  outline  of  recent  activities  re- 
flects a  mutual  recognition  of  the  im- 
portance of  U.S.  technology  to 
Mexico's  long-term  economic  de- 
velopment on   which  depends  the  de- 


velopment and  production  of  Mexico's 
energy  resources.  For  this  reason  we 
welcome  the  committee's  interest  in 
considering  means  of  furthering  tech- 
nological cooperation  with  Mexico. 
Consideration  of  technical  cooperation 
with  Mexico  should  begin  with  an 
examination  of  current  availability  of 
commercial  technology  to  Mexico  as 
well  as  Mexico's  own  approach  to  trade 
and  economic  development.  The  vast 
bulk  of  U.S.  industrial  technology  of 
greatest  interest  to  Mexico  is  owned  or 
controlled  by  private  individuals  or 
firms.  Mexico  presently  has  access  to 
such  technology  through  commercial 
arrangements.  We  need  to  consider 
whether  and  how  an  intergovernmental 
arrangement  might  increase  that  flow. 

Technology 

Flows  of  technology  to  Mexico  ap- 
pear related  less  to  credit  availability  or 
supplier  restrictions  on  access,  than  to 
overall  absorptive  capacity  in  terms  of 
manpower  skills  and  technology  infra- 
structure, as  well  as  to  the  local  cli- 
mate, including  regulatory  conditions. 

In  this  regard,  Mexico's  major  in- 
vestment laws  limit  foreign  ownership 
of  new  investment  to  a  minority  posi- 
tion in  most  industries  and  prohibit  it 
completely  in  other  cases.  Since  pri- 
vately held  technology  most  frequently 
flows  with  investment,  restrictions  on 
investment  can  act  as  a  disincentive  to 


Emergency  Aid  to  Nicaragua 


WHITE  HOUSE 
ANNOUNCEMENT 
JULY  27,  1979' 

President  Carter  is  sending  a  special 
flight  to  Nicaragua  on  Saturday,  July 
28,  to  deliver  emergency  food  and 
medical  supplies.  The  U.S.  Ambas- 
sador to  Nicaragua,  Lawrence  A.  Pez- 
zullo.  will  return  to  Managua  on  Satur- 
day's flight.  He  will  present  his  cre- 
dentials to  the  new  Government  of 
Nicaragua  early  next  week.  The  Presi- 
dent is  sending  this  special  plane  as  an 
expression  of  his  personal  good  will  to 
the  people  of  Nicaragua  and  to  the  new 
government  and  to  symbolize  the  con- 
cern of  Americans  for  the  hunger  and 
distress  of  the  Nicaraguan  people  after 
many  months  of  devastating  conflict. 

The  United  States  has  already  pro- 
vided 732  metric  tons  of  emergency 


food  supplies  to  Nicaragua.  Another 
1.000  tons  of  food  from  the  United 
States  is  on  its  way  to  Nicaragua  by 
ship.  In  addition,  the  United  States  is 
providing  supplies  and  financial  assist- 
ance for  airlifts  being  carried  out  by  the 
International  Committee  of  the  Red 
Cross.  Of  9,600  pounds  of  medical 
supplies  purchased  by  the  U.S.  Gov- 
ernment for  shipment  to  Nicaragua, 
75%  has  already  been  delivered,  and 
the  remaining  2.500  pounds  of  U.S.- 
purchased  medicines,  together  with 
3.300  pounds  of  Red  Cross  medical 
supplies  and  5.200  pounds  of  baby 
formula,  are  arriving  in  Nicaragua  this 
weekend  on  a  special  flight  chartered 
by  the  Agency  for  International  De- 
velopment. D 


'Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of  Presiden- 
tial Documents  of  July  30.  1979. 


65 


technology  transfer.  Moreover,  the 
price  and  terms  of  transfer  of  technol- 
ogy contracts  must  be  approved  by  the 
Mexican  Government  and.  as  the  sub- 
committee report  indicates,  protection 
afforded  by  trademarks  and  patents  is 
more  limited  than  in  many  Western  in- 
dustrialized countries. 

Other  laws — particularly  price  con- 
trols and  import  curbs — can  also  have 
an  adverse  effect  on  foreign  investment 
operating  in  Mexico.  The  negative  ef- 
fect of  such  controls  on  the  transfer  of 
technology  have  been  pointed  out  dur- 
ing official  U.S. -Mexican  consultation 
on  trade. 

Oil  Production 

Let  me  now  turn  to  Mexico's  oil 
production  policy.  As  the  committee 
has  recognized  in  its  report.  Mexican 
production  of  hydrocarbons  is  geared  to 
that  country's  own  development  needs, 
rather  than  to  the  energy  requirements 
of  the  United  States  or  of  the  world 
generally.  The  Mexican  Government 
has  shown  a  concern  about  developing 
oil  revenues  at  a  greater  pace  than  the 
ability  of  the  Mexican  economy  to  ab- 
sorb the  proceeds  in  sound  economic 
development.  They  have  seen  in  other 
countries  how  unbalanced  economic 
growth  can  cause  severe  inflation  and 
social  unrest.  These  concerns  of  the 
Mexican  Government  are  understanda- 
ble and  must  be  respected. 

What  this  means  however  is  that 
Mexican  production  of  oil  and  gas  will 
be  expanded  in  a  very  deliberate  way. 
Mexico  plans  to  increase  its  oil  pro- 
duction from  its  present  level  of  about 
IVz  mmb/d  [million  barrels  per  day]  to 
about  2.2  mmb/d  by  the  end  of  1980  or 
early  1981.  This  would  permit  a 
doubling  of  present  Mexican  exports  of 
about  500.000  b/d.  The  revenues  from 
these  exports,  along  with  Mexico's  im- 
proved borrowing  capacity,  enable  it  to 
purchase  whatever  capital  equipment 
and  technology  it  requires  from  abroad. 
As  its  economic  development  pro- 
gresses. Mexico's  foreign  exchange  re- 
quirements will,  of  course,  grow  and 
almost  certainly  they  will  wish  to  ex- 
pand their  hydrocarbon  production 
from  their  present  planned  targets. 

Because  of  the  transportation  savings 
and  consequent  economic  benefits  to 
Mexico,  the  largest  part  of  Mexican  oil 
exports  go  to  the  United  States.  Cur- 
rently, we  take  about  80%  of  Mexican 
oil  exports.  The  Mexican  Government 
has  indicated  a  desire  to  diversify  their 
markets  and  has  set  as  a  goal  limiting 
U.S.  sales  to  about  60%  of  total  ex- 
ports. With  expanded  Mexican  exports, 
the  total  volume  of  our  purchases  from 
Mexico  should,   nonetheless,  increase 


66 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


Oil  SpUl  in 
the  Gulf  of  Mexico 


by  Robert  Krueger 

Statement  made  at  a  special  briefing 
for  news  correspondents  in  the  De- 
partment of  State  on  August  23,  1979. 
Mr.  Krueger  is  Ambassador  at  Large- 
designate  and  U.S.  Coordinator  for 
Mexican  Affairs. 

For  some  time,  the  Governments  of 
Mexico  and  the  U.S.A.  and  many 
people  in  each  of  these  countries  have 
been  working  together  in  an  effort  to 
minimize  the  damage  to  the  coastlines 
and  coastal  waters  of  our  two  countries 
from  the  oil  spill  in  the  Bay  of  Cam- 
peche.  I  would  like  today  to  review 
some  of  our  joint  efforts  and  to  respond 
to  inquiries  about  some  of  our  govern- 
ments" current  actions. 

If  an  accident  occurs  on  a  freeway, 
the  first  thing  to  do  is  to  get  any  injured 
parties  to  the  hospital,  the  second  is  to 
get  the  freeway  open,  and  the  third, 
perhaps,  to  get  the  names  of  the  parties 


involved  so  that  later  on  attorneys  and 
insurance  companies  can  get  together 
to  determine  whatever  responsibility  is 
involved.  I'd  say  that  it  now  appears 
that  we  are  entering  that  third  stage. 

Yesterday  afternoon  the  U.S.  Gov- 
ernment sent  a  cable  to  the  Government 
of  Mexico  indicating  that  while  it  is  too 
early  to  make  a  definitive  assessment 
of  the  damage  that  may  result  to  the 
U.S.  coastline,  we  believe  that  we 
should  now  begin  discussions  on  vari- 
ous issues  related  to  the  oil  spill  in  the 
Bay  of  Campeche.  One  matter  that  we 
suggest  be  included  in  that  discussion 
is  the  question  of  liability  and  possible 
alternatives  for  dealing  with  claims  for 
compensation  for  clean-up  costs  and 
any  damages  that  may  have  occurred  to 
property  and  resources. 

We  are  hopeful  that  the  Mexican 
Government  shares  our  desire  to  ad- 
dress this  matter  together,  for  our  two 
countries  have  thus  far  cooperated  very 
closely  in  attempting  to  control  this  oil 


Mexico  (Cont'd) 

even  though  our  share  of  those  exports 
declines  from  present  levels. 

As  for  natural  gas.  which  is  subject 
to  regulation  in  the  United  States,  we 
are,  as  you  know,  in  the  process  of  dis- 
cussions with  the  Mexican  Government 
aimed  at  agreement  on  a  framework 
which  we  could  both  support  for  the 
export  of  Mexican  gas  to  the  United 
States. 

We  must  realize  that  the  people  of 
Mexico,  not  unlike  the  people  in  the 
United  States,  are  sensitive  about  the 
development  and  utilization  of  their 
natural  resources,  and  particularly  their 
energy  resources.  We  must  also  recog- 
nize that  there  is  a  strong  Mexican  sen- 
sitivity about  their  independence  and 
about  foreign  economic  domination. 
Thus,  U.S.  initiatives  which  link 
energy  with  other  issues  will  likely  be 
viewed  with  suspicion.  In  designing 
our  policies   toward   Mexico,    we. 


therefore,  must  take  account  of  this 
fact  and  the  need  for  the  Mexican  Gov- 
ernment to  demonstrate  that  any  ar- 
rangements with  us  will  not  only  fur- 
ther Mexican  national  interests,  but 
will  be  seen  as  respecting  Mexico's 
sovereignty  and  independence. 

In  summary,  we  need  to  promote  co- 
operative arrangements  with  Mexico, 
arrangements  which  will  contribute  to 
Mexico's  own  development  and  to  its 
expanded  economic  relations  with  the 
United  States.  The  committee's  strong 
interest  in  promoting  expanded  tech- 
nological cooperation  between  Mexico 
and  the  United  States  is  very  supportive 
of  this  general  interest  and  we  would 
be  pleased  to  work  with  the  committee 
in  realizing  its  goal.  D 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the  hearings  will 
be  published  by  the  committee  and  will  be  avail- 
able from  the  Superintendent  of  Documents. 
U.S.  Government  Priming  Office.  Washington. 
D.C.  20402. 


spill.  We  see  these  discussions  as  a 
continuation  of  the  efforts  of  two 
neighbors  to  solve  this  problem  jointly, 
for  there  are  many  ways  in  which  we 
have  cooperated  to  minimize  the  dam- 
age from  the  blowout  of  IXTOC  1 . 

First,  since  the  well— IXTOC  1  — 
went  out  of  control  in  June,  Pemex 
— the  national  oil  company  of  Mexico 
—  has  contracted  with  various  U.S. 
private  companies  to  supply  equipment 
and  specialized  expertise  to  help  in 
controlling  the  well. 

Second,  the  U.S.  Government  has 
been  working  with  the  Government  of 
Mexico  in  whatever  ways  have  been 
requested. 

•  The  United  States  has  provided 
aerial  surveillance,  and  Mexico  has 
authorized  U.S.  planes  to  use  Mexican 
airports. 

•  The  U.S.  national  response  team 
sent  scientific  observers  to  Mexico  in 
July  with  expertise  in  the  areas  of  biol- 
ogy, dispersants,  ecology,  and 
clean-up  operations  to  work  with 
Mexican  officials. 

•  Mexico  has  a  liaison  officer  in 
Corpus  Christi,  Texas,  to  assist  in 
coordinating  the  efforts  at  minimizing 
damage. 

•  U.S.  ships  monitoring  the  spill 
have  been  allowed  to  proceed  into 
Mexican  waters. 

•  Perhaps  most  immediately  impor- 
tant, Mexico  is  paying  the  United 
States  for  two  American  skimmers  that 
are  now  in  operation  at  the  well  site, 
gathering  approximately  5,000  barrels 
of  emulsified  oil  each  day  that  is  then 
pumped  into  Mexican  ships. 

And,  in  order  to  address  the  prob- 
lems of  possible  future  oil  spills,  repre- 
sentatives of  the  two  governments  have 
been  meeting  for  some  months  in  an 
effort  to  form  an  agreement  on  how 
jointly  to  handle  such  problems.  These 
discussions,  in  fact,  were  underway 
before  the  blowout  at  IXTOC  1 . 

I  have  met  with  Captain  Charles 
Corbett,  cochairman  of  the  U.S.  re- 
sponse team,  and  with  Senor  Jorge 
Diaz  Serrano,  head  of  Pemex.  Both  are 
working  at  maximum  effort.  And  our 
government  will  continue  to  do  every- 
thing it  can  to  work  with  the  Govern- 
ment of  Mexico  to  lessen  inconveni- 
ence and  hardship  resulting  from  the  oil 
spill.  D 


Uctober  1979 


67 


TREATIES:    Current  Actions 


MULTILATERAL 

Cotton 

Amendment  to  the  articles  of  agreement  of  the 
International  Institute  for  Cotton  of  Jan.  17, 
1966.  as  amended  (TIAS  5964,  6184). 
Adopted  by  the  General  Assembly  of  the  In- 
ternational Institute  for  Cotton  at  Washington 
July  31,  1979.  Entered  into  force  July  31, 
1979. 

Cultural  Relations 

Agreement  on  the  importation  of  educational, 
scientific,  and  cultural  materials,  and  pro- 
tocol. Done  at  Lake  Success  Nov.  22,  1950. 
Entered  into  force  May  21,  1952.  TIAS  6129. 
Acceptance  deposited:  Holy  See,  Aug.  22, 
1979. 

Defense 

Memorandum  of  understanding  concerning  co- 
operative full-scale  engineering  development 
of  an  advanced  surface-to-air  missile  system, 
with  annexes.  Signed  May  9  and  18  and  July 
6,  1979.  Entered  into  force  July  6,  1979 
Signatures:  Denmark,  May  18,  1979;  Federal 

Republic  of  Germany,  May  9,  1979;  U.S., 

July  6.  1979. 

Human  Rights 

International  covenant  on  civil  and  political 
rights.  Adopted  at  New  York  Dec.   16,  1966 
Entered  into  force  Mar.  23,  1976.' 
Ratification  deposited:   Iceland,   Aug.   22. 
1979. 

International  covenant  on  economic,  social,  and 
cultural  rights.  Adopted  at  New  York  Dec.  16, 
1966.  Entered  into  force  Jan.  3,  1976.' 
Ratification  deposited:   Iceland,   Aug.   22, 
1979. 

Law 

Statute  of  The  Hague  conference  on  private  in- 
ternational law.  Done  at  The  Hague  Oct. 
9-31,  I95I.  Entered  into  force  July  15,  1955; 
for  the  U.S.  Oct.  15.  1964.  TIAS  5710. 
Acceptance  deposited:  Venezuela,  July  25, 
1979. 

Maritime  Matters 

Amendments  to  the  convention  of  Mar.  6,  1958, 
as  amended  (TIAS  4044,  6285,  6490,  8606), 
on  the  Intergovernmental  Maritime  Consulta- 
tive Organization.  Done  at  London  Nov.  17, 
1977.2 

Acceptance  deposited:    Barbados,   Aug.    20, 
1979. 

Narcotic  Drugs 

Convention  on  psychotropic  substances.  Done  at 
Vienna  Feb.  21,  1971.  Entered  into  force 
Aug.   16,  1976.' 

Accession  deposited:   Guatemala,   Aug.    13, 
1979. 

Wheat 

Protocol  modifying  and  further  extending  the 
wheat  trade  convention  (part  of  the   interna- 


tional wheat  agreement).  1971  (TIAS  7144). 
Done  at  Washington  Apr.  25.  1979.  Entered 
into  force  June  23,  1979,  with  respect  to  cer- 
tain provisions,  July  I,  1979,  with  respect  to 
other  provisions. 

Ratification  deposited:  Iraq,  Aug.   15,   1979. 
Accession  deposited:   Trinidad  and  Tobago, 
Sept.  7,  1979. 

World  Heritage 

Convention  concerning  the  protection  of  the 
world  cultural  and  natural  heritage.  Done  at 
Paris  Nov.  23,  1972.  Entered  into  force  Dec. 
17,  1975.  TIAS  8226. 

Ratification  deposited:    Denmark,  July   25, 
1979.^ 


BILATERAL 

Bermuda 

International  express  mail  agreement,  with  de- 
tailed regulations.  Signed  at  Hamilton  and 
Washington  July  31  and  Aug.  13,  1979.  En- 
tered into  force  Sept.  1,  1979. 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of  Jan.  15, 
1974  (TIAS  7801)  on  preclearance  for  entry 
into  the  U.S.  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at 
Hamilton  Aug.  28  and  29,  1979.  Entered  into 
force  Aug.  29,  1979. 

Canada 

International  express  mail  agreement,  with  de- 
tailed regulations.  Signed  at  Ottawa  and 
Washington  July  23  and  Aug.  14,  1979.  En- 
tered into  force  Aug.  14,  1979;  effective  Aug. 
I,  1979. 

Denmark  and  the  Faroe  Islands 

Agreement  concerning  fisheries  off  the  coasts  of 
the  U.S.,  with  annexes  and  agreed  minute. 
Signed  at  Washington  Sept.  5,  1979.  Enters 
into  force  on  a  date  to  be  mutually  agreed  by 
exchange  of  notes,  upon  the  completion  of  the 
internal  procedures  of  both  parties. 

Dominican  Republic 

Agreement  relating  to  trade  in  cotton,  wool,  and 
manmade  fiber  textiles  and  textile  products, 
with  annexes.  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes 
at  Washington  Aug.  7  and  8,  1979.  Entered 
into  force  Aug.  8,  1979;  effective  June  I, 
1979. 

Federal  Republic  of  Germany 

International  express  mail/datapost  agreement, 

with  detailed  regulations.  Signed  at  Bonn  and 

Washington  Dec.  15,  1978  and  Jan.  22,  1979. 

Entered  into  force:   Aug.   8,    1979;  effective 

Feb.  1,  1979. 

German  Democratic  Republic 

Parcel  post  agreement,  with  detailed  regulations. 
Signed  at  Washington  May  4,   1979.  Entered 
into  force  provisionally  May  4,  1979. 
Entered  into  force  definitively:    Aug.    15, 
1979. 


Haiti 

Agreement  relating  to  trade  in  cotton,  wool,  and 
manmade  fiber  textiles  and  textile  products, 
with  annexes.  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes 
at  Port-au-Prince  Aug.  17,  1979.  Entered  into 
force  Aug.  17.  1979;  effective  May  I,  1979. 

Indonesia 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of  May  17, 
1977,  (TIAS  8677)  for  sales  of  agricultural 
commodities  and  the  exchange  of  letters  of 
Dec.  16,  1977,  (TIAS  8984)  concerning  de- 
velopment projects.  Effected  by  exchange  of 
notes  at  Jakarta  July  19,  1979.  Entered  into 
force  July  19.  1979. 

Korea 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of  Dec    23. 

1977.  as  amended  (TIAS  9039.  9350).  relat- 
ing to  trade  in  cotton,  wool,  and  manmade 
fiber  textiles  and  textile  products.  Effected  by 
exchange  of  notes  at  Seoul  Aug.  24,  1979. 
Entered  into  force  Aug.  24,  1979. 

Mexico 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of  Nov.  9, 
1972,  as  amended  (TIAS  7697),  concerning 
frequency  modulation  broadcasting  in  the  88 
to  108  MHz  band  Effected  by  exchange  of 
notes  at  Mexico  and  Tlatelolco  June  4  and 
Aug.  1,  1979.  Entered  into  force  Aug.  1, 
1979. 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of  Aug.  23, 

1978.  (TIAS  9254)  relating  to  the  provision 
and  utilization  of  aircraft  to  curb  the  illegal 
traffic  in  narcotics.  Effected  by  exchange  of 
letters  at  Mexico  July  26,  1979.  Entered  into 
force  July  26,  1979. 

Morocco 

Agreement  establishing  a  Provisional  Commis- 
sion on  Educational  and  Cultural  Exchange. 
Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  Rabat  July 
17,  1979.  Entered  into  force  July  17,  1979. 

Pakistan 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of  Jan.  4 
and  9,  1978,  (TIAS  9050)  relating  to  trade  in 
cotton  textiles.  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes 
at   Washington   Dec.   7,    1978,   and  July  25, 

1979.  Entered  into  force  July  25,  1979. 
Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of  Jan.  4 

and  9,  1978,  as  amended  (TIAS  9050),  relat- 
ing to  trade  in  cotton  textiles.  Effected  by  ex- 
change of  notes  at  Washington  July  27  and  30, 
1979.  Entered  into  force  July  30,  1979. 

Philippines 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of  Aug.  22 
and  24,  1979,  (TIAS  9223)  relating  to  trade  in 
cotton,  wool,  and  manmade  fiber  textiles  and 
textile  products.  Effected  by  exchange  of 
notes  at  Manila  Aug.  3  and  16,  1979.  Entered 
into  force  Aug.   16,  1979. 

Agreement  for  sales  of  agricultural  commodities, 
relating  to  the  agreement  of  Aug.  24,  1978, 
(TIAS  9187)  with  agreed  minutes.  Signed  at 
Manila  Aug.  6,  1979.  Entered  into  force  Aug. 
6,  1979. 

Portugal 

Agreement  relating  to  jurisdiction  over  vessels 
utilizing  the  Louisiana  offshore  oil  port.  Ef- 
fected by  exchange  of  notes  at  Washington 
June  22  and  July  1 1,  1979.  Entered  into  force 
July  II,  1979. 


68 

Agreement  for  sales  of  agricultural  commodities, 
relating  to  the  agreement  of  Mar.  18,  1976, 
(TIAS  8264)  with  agreed  minutes.  Signed  at 
Lisbon  July  26.  1979.  Entered  into  force  July 
26,  1979. 

Romania 

Agreement  renewing  and  amending  the  agree- 
ment of  Dec.  4,  1973.  (TIAS  7901)  relating  to 
civil  air  transport.   Effected  by  exchange  of 
notes  at  Bucharest  Jan.  25  and  30,  1979. 
Entered  into  force:  July  25.  1979. 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of  Jan.  6 
and  25.  1978.  as  amended  (TIAS  9166,  9212), 
relating  to  trade  in  cotton  textiles.  Effected  by 
exchange  of  notes  at  Washington  July  24  and 
Aug.  27,  1979.  Entered  into  force  Aug.  27, 
1979. 

Agreement  amending  and  extending  the  agree- 
ment of  June  4,  1976.  (TIAS  8254)  as  ex- 
tended, on  maritime  transport.  Effected  by  ex- 
change of  notes  at  Washington  Aug.  30.  1979. 
Entered  into  force  Aug.  30.  1979. 

Somalia 

Agreement  for  sales  of  agricultural  commodities, 
relating  to  the  agreement  of  Mar.  20,  1978, 
(TIAS  9222)  with  agreed  minutes.  Signed  at 
Mogadishu  July  1  1 ,  1979.  Entered  into  force 
July  II.  1979. 

United  Kingdom 

Convention  for  the  avoidance  of  double  taxation 
and  the  prevention  of  fiscal  evasion  with  re- 
spect to  taxes  on  estates  of  deceased  persons 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


and   on   gifts.    Signed   at   London   Oct.    19. 
1978.2 

Instrument  of  ratification  signed  by  the  Presi- 
dent: Aug.  24.  1979. 
Third  protocol  further  amendmg  the  convention 
for  avoidance  of  double  taxation  and  the  pre- 
vention of  fiscal  evasion  with  respect  to  taxes 
on  income  and  capital  gains,  signed  at  London 
on  31  Dec.  1975.  Signed  at  London  Mar.  15. 
1979.= 

Instrument  of  ratification  signed  by  the  Presi- 
dent: Aug.  24,  1979. 

Zaire 

Agreement  for  sales  of  agricultural  commodities, 
relating  to  the  agreement  of  Mar.  25,  1976 
(TIAS  8403).  Signed  at  Kinshasa  July  27. 
1979.  Entered  into  force  July  27.  1979. 

Agreement  regarding  the  consolidation  and  re- 
scheduling of  payments  due  under  PL  480 
Title  1  agricultural  commodities  agreements, 
with  annexes.  Signed  at  Washington  Aug.  I. 
1979.  Entered  into  force  Aug.  I,  1979. 

Zambia 

Agreement  for  sales  of  agricultural  commodities, 
relating  to  the  agreement  of  Aug.  4,  1978. 
Signed  at  Lusaka  July  19.  1979.  Entered  into 
force  July  19,  1979.  D 


'  Not  in  force  lor  the  U.S. 
•  Not  in  force. 
'With  declaration. 


CHRONOLOGY:  August  1979 


Aug.  1       Maria  de  Lurdes  Pintassilgo  is  sworn 
in  as  Prime  Minister  of  Portugal. 
Conference  of  Commonwealth  heads 
of  government  meets  in  Lusaka, 
Zambia,  Aug.   1-8. 

Aug.  3  A  military  junta  overthrows  the  gov- 
ernment of  President  Masie  of 
Equatorial  Guinea. 

Aug.  5       Francesco  Cossiga   is   sworn   in   as 
Prime  Minister  of  Italy 
Egypt  and  Israel  hold  talks  on  Pales- 
tinian autonomy  Aug.  5-6. 

Aug.  7  Bolivian  Congress  elects  Walter 
Guevara  to  be  provisional  President 
until  new  presidential  elections  are 
held  in  1  year. 

Aug.  8  President  Toure  of  Guinea  visits  the 
U.S.  Aug.  8-15. 

Aug.  9  Secretary  Vance  visits  Ecuador  Aug. 
9-12  to  attend  the  inauguration 
ceremonies  of  President  Roldos. 
Mrs.  Carter  heads  the  U.S.  delega- 
tion. 

Aug.  10  Jaime  Roldos  Aguilera  is  sworn  in  as 
President  of  Ecuador. 


Aug. 
Aug. 
Aug. 

Aug. 
Aug. 


Aug 
Aug 


II 
15 
20 


24 


Shehu  Shagari  is  elected  President  of 
Nigeria. 

U.S.  Ambassador  to  the  U.N,  Andrew 
Young  resigns. 

UNCSTD  conference  meets  in  Geneva 
Aug.  20-Aug.  31. 

Prime  Minister  Charan  Singh  of  India 
resigns. 

Soviet  ballet  dancer  Alexandr 
Godunov  defects  to  the  U.S. 

U.S.  delays  departure  of  U.S.S.R. 
airliner  Aug  24-27  to  satisfy  U.S. 
legal  requirements  that  Mr. 
Godunov's  wife.  Lyudmila  Vla- 
sova,  is  not  returning  to  the 
U.S.S.R.  under  duress. 

Vice  President  Mondale  visits  China, 
Hong  Kong,  and  Japan  Aug.  25- 
Sept.  3. 
31  US,  State  Department  announces  that 
the  U.S.  has  confirmed  the  pres- 
ence in  Cuba  of  what  appears  to  be 
a  Soviet  combat  unit  consisting  of 
some  2,000-3.000  members  and 
has  expressed  concern  over  the 
matter  to  the  U.S.S.R.  D 


25 


PRESS  RELEASES: 

DepartntftU  of  Statf 


August  17— September  14 

Press  releases  may  be  obtained  from  the  Of- 
fice of  Press  Relations.  Department  of  State, 
Washington.  DC. 


No.  Date  Subject 

*I98  8/17  Advisory  Committee  on  Inter- 
national Investment.  Tech- 
nology, and  Development, 
Sept.  14. 

*199  8/17  Advisory  Committee  on  Inter- 
national Investment.  Tech- 
nology, and  Development, 
working  group  on  transbor- 
der  data  flows.  Sept    26. 

*200  8/24  U.S..  Sri  Lanka  establish  tex- 
tile agreement.  Mar.  12  and 
23. 

*201  8/17  Conference  on  the  UN.  Dec- 
ade for  Women.  Sept.  12. 

*202  8/17  Shipping  Coordinating  Com- 
mittee (SCO.  Subcommittee 
on  Safety  of  Life  at  Sea 
(SOLAS),  working  group  on 
radio  communications.  Sept. 
20. 

*203  8/17  sec.  SOLAS,  working  group 
on  subdivision  and  stability, 
Sept.  II. 

*204  8/22  U.S..  Dominican  Republic  sign 
textile  agreement.  Aug.  7-8. 

*205  8/22  U.S.  Organization  of  the  Inter- 
national Telegraph  and  Tele- 
phone Committee  (CCITT), 
study  group  1.  Sept.   19. 

*206  8/23  sec.  SOLAS,  working  group 
on  subdivision  and  stability, 
panel  on  bulk  cargoes.  Sept. 
13. 

*207  8/27  ACDA  Director  George  M. 
Seignious  to  address  confer- 
ence on  U.S.  security  and 
the  Soviet  challenge.  Hous- 
ton. Sept.  5. 

*208  8/27  U.S..  Japan  sign  textile  agree- 
ment. Aug.  17. 

*209  8/28  US  .  Japan  sign  record  of  dis- 
cussion dealing  with  trade  in 
textile  products.  Aug.  22. 

*210  8/28  U.S..  Pakistan  amend  textile 
agreement.  Julv  27  and  30. 

*2I1        8/29    CCITT.  Sept.  24'. 

*212  9/4  Advisory  Committee  to  the 
U.S.  Section  of  the  Inter- 
American  Tropical  Tuna 
Commission.  Oct.  4-5. 

*213  9/4  U.S.,  Pakistan  amend  textile 
agreement,  Dec.  7,  1978, 
and  July  25. 

•214  9/4  State  Department  and  Omaha 
Chamber  of  Commerce  co- 
sponsor  conference  on  U.S. 
security  and  the  Soviet 
challenge,  Sept.  18. 

t215  9/5  U.S.,  Denmark,  and  Faroe  Is- 
lands sign  new  fisheries 
agreement. 


Dctober  1979 


69 


216 

•217 


*2I8 


*2I9 
220 


*22l 


9/5 
9/5 


9/7 


9/11 
9/10 


9/13 


Vance:  news  conference. 

Harvey  J.  Feldman  sworn  in  as 
Ambassador  to  Papua  New 
Guinea  and  the  Solomon  Is- 
lands. 

State  Department  and  San  An- 
tonio Chamber  of  Commerce 
to  present  conference  on 
U.S.  security  and  the  Soviet 
challenge,  Sept.   19. 

sec.  Oct.  3. 

'"Foreign  Relations  of  the 
United  Slates.  1952-1954: 
Vol.  III.  United  Nations 
Affairs"  released. 

Secretary  of  State's  Advisory 
Committee  on  Private  Inter- 
national Law,  study  group  of 


222 

9/12 

223 

9/14 

224 

9/14 

"225 


9/14 


international  child  abduction 
by  one  parent,  Sept.  29. 

sec.  committee  on  ocean 
dumping.  Oct.  10. 

U.S.,  Colombia  sign  extradi- 
tion treaty. 

lOth  meeting  of  Antarctic 
treaty  consultative  parties, 
Sept.  17-Oct.  5. 

Ocean  Affairs  Advisory  Com- 
mittee, Fisheries  and  Marine 
Science  and  Technology, 
Nov.  14-15  (closed  meet- 
ings) and  Nov.  16  (open).  D 


♦Not  printed  in  the  Bulletin. 
tHeld  for  a  later  issue. 


l/JS.l/.]V. 


Press  releases  may  be  obtained  from  the  Pub- 
lic Affairs  Office,  U.S.  Mission  to  the  United 
Nations,  799  United  Nations  Plaza,  New  York, 
N.Y.   10017 


*64 


*65 


7/20 


7/31 


No. 

*50 

Date 

5/30 

Subject 
Young:  statement  on  behalf  of 

*66 

*67 

8/15 
8/15 

the  Western  five  govern- 
ments on  Namibia,  General 

*68 

8/15 

*51 

5/30 

Assembly. 
Sablan:   TTPI,   Trusteeship 

*69 

8/23 

*52 

5/30 

Council. 
Petree:   TTPI,   Trusteeship 
Council. 

*70 

8/24 

*53 

5/30 

Olter:    TTPI,    Trusteeship 

Council. 

*54 

5/31 

Petree:  close  of  the  33d  session 
of  the  General  Assembly. 

*Not 

printed 

*55 

6/1 

Petree:   information  activities. 

Petree:  occupied  territories. 
Security  Council. 

Young:  World  Conference  on 
Agrarian  Reform  and  Rural 
Development,  Rome. 

Statement  on  Puerto  Rico. 

Statement  on  U.S.  contribution 
to  UNRWA. 

Statement  on  U.N.  Committee 
of  24  and  Puerto  Rico. 

Young:  Namibia  Day,  Security 
Council. 

Horbal:  voluntary  fund.  Com- 
mission on  the  Status  of 
Women.  ECOSOC.  D 


Committee  to  Review  U.N. 
Public  Information  Policies 
and  Activities. 

*56  6/12  Strasser:  U.S.  Virgin  Islands 
and  American  Samoa.  Sub- 
committee on  Small  Ter- 
ritories of  the  Special  Com- 
mittee on  Decolonization. 

*57  6/14  Petree:  UNIF  in  Lebanon.  Se- 
curity Council. 

*58  6/15  Wells:  UNDP,  UNDP  Gov- 
erning Council. 

*59  6/15  McHenry:  UNFICYP.  Security 
Council. 

*60  6/19  Strasser:  U.S.  Virgin  Islands 
and  American  Samoa,  Sub- 
committee on  Small  Ter- 
ritories of  the  Special  Com- 
mittee on  Decolonization. 

*6I  6/20  Hosenball:  outer  space.  Com- 
mittee on  the  Peaceful  Uses 
of  Outer  Space. 

*62         7/2     Wilkinson:  Indian  Ocean. 

*63  7/11  Young:  developing  world, 
ECOSOC,  Geneva. 


NEW  FOREIGN  AFFAIRS 
DICTIONARY 

The  State  Department  Library  recently 
published  the  Inlernalional  Relations  Dic- 
tionary of  words,  acronyms,  and  phrases  in 
foreign  affairs.  The  dictionary  fully  docu- 
ments 165  terms  and  contains  over  250  cross 
references.  Some  of  the  terms  included  are 
"basket  three,"  "the  Club  of  Rome." 
"Group  of  77,"  "MBFR."  "new  interna- 
tional order."  "nonaligned  countries,"  "the 
Nuclear  Suppliers  Group."  "rejection 
front.  "  "shuttle  diplomacy."  and  the 
"Trilateral  Commission."  You  may  order 
the  48-page  dictionary  (stock  no.  044-001- 
01715-6)  from  the  Superintendent  of  Docu- 
ments, Government  Printing  Office,  Wash- 
ington, D.C.  20402.  Please  enclose  a  check 
or  money  order  for  $2.30. 


PUBLICATIONS: 

**Foretgti  Relations^^ 

Volume  on  the 

United  IMations 

Released 


The  Department  of  State  released 
Foreign  Relations  of  the  United  States, 
1952-1954,  Volume  111,  United  Na- 
tion Affairs'  on  September  10,  1979. 
The  Foreign  Relations  series  has  been 
published  continuously  since  1861  as 
the  official  record  of  U.S.  foreign  pol- 
icy. The  volume  released  September  10 
is  the  first  of  16  volumes  for  the 
1952-1954  triennium. 

This  volume  of  1,581  pages  presents 
high-level  documentation  (nearly  all  of 
which  is  newly  declassified)  on  the 
policies  of  the  United  States  in  the 
United  Nations  on  such  major  issues  as 
the  Chinese  representation  question, 
preparations  for  the  U.N.  Charter  Re- 
view Conference,  the  initiatives  of  the 
United  States  to  bring  about  the  admis- 
sion of  Japan,  U.S,-U.K.  discussions 
regarding  the  basis  of  their  U.N.  pol- 
icy, and  the  1953  change  in  the  draft 
convenants  on  human  rights. 

Papers  presented  in  the  volume  were 
selected  principally  from  the  files  of 
the  Department  of  State,  the  U.S.  Mis- 
sion at  the  United  Nations,  and  other 
U.S.  Government  agencies.  This  vol- 
ume, like  other  forthcoming  volumes  in 
the  triennium  for  1952-1954,  includes 
a  detailed  biographical  list  of  persons 
appearing  in  the  volume  and  a  descrip- 
tive list  of  documentary  sources  used  in 
preparing  the  volume. 

Foreign  Relations.  1952-1954, 
Volume  III,  was  prepared  by  the  Office 
of  the  Historian,  Bureau  of  Public  Af- 
fairs, Department  of  State.  Listed  as 
Department  of  State  Publication  8957, 
this  volume  may  be  obtained  for 
$19.00.  Checks  or  money  orders 
should  be  made  out  to  the  Superintend- 
ent of  Documents  and  should  be  sent 
to  the  U.S.  Government  Book  Store, 
Department  of  State,  Washington, 
D.C.  20520.  D 


Press  release  220. 


70 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


GPO  SaU's 


Puhlualuins  may  he  ordered  hy  catalog  or 
stock  number  from  the  Superintendent  of 
Documents.  U.S.  Government  Printing  Office. 
Washington,  D.C.  20402.  A  25%  discount  is 
made  on  orders  for  100  or  more  copies  of  any 
one  publication  mailed  to  the  same  address. 
Remittances,  payable  to  the  Superintendent  of 
Documents,  must  accompany  orders.  Prices 
shown  below,  which  include  domestic  postage, 
are  subject  to  change. 


Documents  on   Disarmament.   Series  of  vol 
umes  issued   annually.   This  publication  con- 
tains basic  documents  on  arms  control   and 
disarmament  developments  in   1976.  Pub.  97. 
994  pp.  $8.00.  (Stock  No.  002-000-00060-1.) 

U.S.  Participation  in  the  United  Nations.  An 
nual  report  hy   the  President  to  the  Congress 
lor  1977.   Pub.  S964.   International  Organiza- 
tions  and  Conference   Series    \?<1.    335   pp. 
$4. .SO  (Stock  No.  044-000-01  7 IS-l.) 

Shipping — Equal  Access  to  Government- 
Controlled  Cargoes.  Agreement  with 
Brazil.  TIAS  X981.  8  pp.  80C.  (Cat.  No. 
S9.I0;8981.) 

Agricultural  Commodities.  Agreement  with 
Indonesia,  amending  the  agreement  of  May 
17,  1977.  as  amended.  TIAS  8984.  13  pp. 
90C.  (Cat.  No.  S9. 10:8984.) 

Military  Missions.  Agreement  with  Colombia. 
TIAS  8986.  23  pp.  $1.30.  (Cat.  No. 
59.10:8986.) 

Remote  Sensing — Global  Crop  Information. 
Agreement  with  Canada.  TIAS  9007.  18  pp. 
$1.10.  (Cat.  No.  S9. 10:9007.) 

Cooperation  in  Studies  of  the  World  Ocean. 
Agreement  with  the  Union  of  Soviet 
Socialist  Republics,  extending  the  agree- 
ment of  June  19,  1974.  TIAS  9008.  5  pp. 
700.  (Cat.  No.  59.10:9008.) 

Fertilizer  Distribution  and  Marketing. 
Agreement  with  Bangladesh.  TIAS  9009.  32 
pp.  $1.40.  (Cat.  No.  59.10:9009.) 

General  Agreement  on  Tariffs  and  Trade. 
Second  proces-verbal  extending  the  declara- 
tion of  August  9,  1973.  on  provisional  acces- 
sion of  ttie  Philippines  to  the  general  agree- 
ment. TIAS  9010.  9  pp.  80«l.  (Cat.  No. 
59.10:9010.) 

Agricultural  Commodities.  Agreement  with 
Israel.  T1A5  9012.  5  pp.  70(Z.  (Cat.  No. 
519:9012). 

Rural  Finance  Experimental  Project.  Agree- 
ment with  Bangladesh.  TIAS  9013.  34  pp. 
$1.40.  (Cat.  No.  59.10:9013.) 

Agricultural  Commodities.  Agreement  with 
Afghanistan.  TIAS  9014.  16  pp.  $1 .  10.  (Cat. 
No.  59.10:9014.) 

Investment  Guaranties.  Agreement  with 
Haiti,  modifying  the  agreement  of  March  13 
and  April  2,  1953,  as  modified.  TIAS  9018. 
5  pp.  70€.  (Cat.  No.  5.19:9018.) 


Cultural  Relations.  Agreement  with  the 
People  s  Republic  of  Bulgaria.  TIAS  9020. 
30  pp.  $1 .30.  (Cat.  No.  59. 10:9020. ) 

Provision  of  Services  for  Kimpo  Interna- 
tional Airport  Expansion.  Memorandum  of 
agreement  with  the  Republic  of  Korea.  TIAS 
9021.   10  pp.  70C    (Cat.  No.  59.10:9021.) 

Mahaweli  Ganga  Irrigation.  Agreement  with 
Sri  Lanka.  TIAS  9023.  21  pp.  70C.  (Cat.  No. 
59.10:9023.) 

Trade  in  Textiles.  Agreement  with  Colombia. 
amending  the  agreement  of  May  28,  1975. 
T1A5  9024.  4  pp.  700.  (Cat.  No. 
59.10:9024.) 

Defense — M-16  Rifle  Production  Program. 
Memorandum  of  understanding  with  the  Re- 
public of  Korea.  TIAS  9026.  15  pp.  $1.00 
(Cat.  No.  59.10:9026.) 

Natural  Gas  Pipeline.  Agreement  with 
Canada.  TIAS  9030.  48  pp.  $1.80.  (Cat.  No. 
59.10:9030.) 

Agricultural  Commodities.  Agreement  with 
Pakistan.  TIAS  9035,  22  pp.  $1.10.  (Cat.  No. 
89,10:9035.) 

Trade  and  Textiles  and  Textile  Products. 
Agreement  with  India.  TIAS  9036.  29  pp. 
$1.30.  (Cat.  No.  59.10:9036.) 

Air  Transport  Services — Low-Cost  Fares. 
,^greement  with  India,  modifying  the  agree- 
ment of  February  3.  1956,  as  amended.  TIAS 

9038,  5  pp.  70C.  (Cat.  No.  59.10:9038.) 
Trade   in   Textiles  and   Textile   Products. 

Agreement  with  the  Republic  ol  Korea.  TIAS 

9039,  21  pp.  $1,10.  (Cat,  No,  59,10:9039,) 
Trade  in  Textiles.   Agreement  with  Jamaica. 

TIAS    9041.     12    pp.    90C.    (Cat.     No. 

59.10:9041.) 
Air  Transport   Services — Low-Cost   Fares. 

Agreement  with  the  Polish  People's  Republic, 

modifying  the  agreement  of  July  19.   1972,  as 

amended.  5  pp.  70c.  (Cat.  No.  59.10:9042.) 
Basic  Sanitation.   Agreement  with  Portugal. 

TIAS    9044.    27    pp.    $1.30.    (Cat.    No. 

59,10:9044) 
Commodity   Import   Loan.   Agreement   with 

Jamaica.  TIAS  9048.  16  pp.  $1.10.  (Cat.  No. 

59.10:9048.) 
Rural   Electrification.    .Agreement   with 

Bangladesh.  TIAS  9049.  31   pp.  $1,40.  (Cat. 

No.  59.10:9049.) 
Trade  in  Textiles.   Agreement  with  Pakistan. 

TIAS    9050.     16    pp.    $1.10.    (Cat.    No. 

59,10:9050) 
Rural   Community   Health.   Agreement   with 

Tunisia,  TIAS  9051.  51  pp.  $1.80.  (Cat.  No 

59,10:9051.) 
Agricultural  Commodities.  Agreement  with  Sr 

Lanka.  TIAS  9052.    15  pp.  $1.10.   (Cat.   No 

59.10:9052.) 
Air  Transport   Services — Low-Cost   Fares 

Agreement  with  Iran,  modifying  the  agree 

meni  of  February   1,   1973.  TIAS  9053.  4  pp 

70?.  (Cat.  No.  59.10:9053.) 
Defense  Areas  and  Facilities.  Agreement  with 

Antigua.  TIAS  9054.  24  pp.  $1.30.  (Cat.  No. 

59.10:9054.) 
Agricultural  Commodities.   Agreement  with 

Jordan.  TIAS  9057.  20  pp.  $1.10.  (Cat.  No. 

59.10:9057.) 


Rural   Electrification.    Agreement   with  the 
Philippines.  TIAS  9059.  22  pp.  $1.10.  (Cat.: 
No.  59.10:9059.)  ' 

Bicol  Integrated  Area  Development.  Agree- 
ment with  the  Philippines.  TIAS  9061.  44  pp, 
$1.70.  (Cat.  No.  59,10:9061.) 

Integrated  Rural  Development.  Agreement 
with  Jamaica.  TIAS  9062.  23  pp.  $1.30.  (Cat. 
No.  59.10:9062.) 

Malaria  Control.  Agreement  with  Sri  Lanka. 
TIAS  9063.  17  pp.  $1.10.  (Cat.  No. 
59.10:9063.) 

Small  Farmer  Supervised  Credit.  Agreement 
with  Tunisia.  TIAS  9068.  56  pp.  $1.90.  (Cat. 
No.  59.10:9068.) 

Atomic  Energy — Technical  Information  Ex- 
change and  Safety  Research.  Agreement 
with  Brazil.  TIAS  9071.  11  pp.  90C.  (Cat, 
No.  59.10:9071.) 

Aviation — Preclearance  for  Entry  into  the 
United  States.  Agreement  with  the  Bahamas, 
extending  application  of  the  agreement  of 
April  23,  1974.  TIAS  9072.  2  pp.  600.  (Cat, 
No.  59.10:9072.) 

Conservation  of  Migratory  Birds  and  Their 
Environment.  Convention  with  the  Union  of 
Soviet  Socialist  Republics.  TIAS  9073.  41  pp, 
$1.60.  (Cat.  No.  59.10:9073.) 

Remote  Sensing — Acquisition  of  Satellite 
Data.  Memorandum  of  Understanding  with 
India.  TIAS  9074.  17  pp.  $1.10.  (Cat.  No, 
59.10:9074.) 

Visa  Facilitation.  Agreement  with  the  Socialist 
Republic  of  Romania.  TIAS  9075.  4  pp.  700, 
(Cat.  No.  59.10:9075.) 

Mapping,  Charting  and  Geodesy.  Memoran- 
dum of  understanding  with  Indonesia.  TIAS 
9079.  9  pp.  800.  (Cat.  No.  59.10:9079.) 

Geothermal  Energy  Research  and  Develop- 
ment. Agreement  with  Mexico.  TIAS  9080. 
40  pp.  $1.60.  (Cat.  No.  59.10:9080.) 

Air  Force  Personnel  Training.  Agreement 
with  the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany.  TIAS 
9081,   12  pp,  900.  (Cat.  No.  59.10:9081.) 

Agricultural  Credit.  Agreement  with  Af 
ghanistan.  TIAS  9082.  10  pp.  800.  (Cat.  No 
59.10:9082.) 

Acquisition  of  Excess  Property.  Agreement 
with  Guvana.  TIAS  9083.  7  pp.  800.  (Cat. 
No.  59  10:9083.) 

Trade  in  Textiles  and  Textile  Products. 
Agreement  with  Haiti,  amending  the  agree 
ment  of  March  22  and  23,  1976,  as  amended. 
TIAS  9084.  14  pp.  900.  (Cat.  No, 
59,10:9084,) 

Village  Development  Project.  Agreement  with 
Jordan,  TIAS  9085.  23  pp.  $1.20.  (Cat.  No. 
59.10:9085.) 

Deep  Sea   Drilling   Project.   Memorandum  of' 
understanding   with   the   Union   of  Soviet 
Socialist  Republics.  TIAS  9087.   11  pp.  900, 
(Cat.  No.  59.10:9087.) 

Investment  Guaranties.  Agreement  with 
Bangladesh.  TIAS  9089.  9  pp.  800.  (Cat, 
No.  59.10:9089.) 

Technical  Assistance  and  Consulting  Serv- 
ices. Agreement  with  Indonesia.  TIAS  9092. 
22  pp.  $1.10.  (Cat.  No.  59.10:9092.) 

Health  Services.  Agreement  with  Haiti.  TIAS 
9094.  35  pp.  $1.50.  (Cat.  No.  59.10:9094.) 


I]>^DEX 


OCTOBER  1979 
VOL.  79,  NO.  2031 


Afghanistan.    U.S.    Policy  Toward   Af- 
ghanistan and  Paliistan  (Mililos)  54 

Africa 

OAU  Summit  Meeting  (Harrop) 23 

U.S.   Ambas.sadors  to  African   Countries, 

September  1979 24 

Algeria.  Western  Sahara  (Saunders)  ...  .53 
Angola.  The  U.S.  Role  in  Southern  Africa 

(Moose) , 20 

Arms  Control 

An  Evaluation  of  SALT  II  (Seignious)  .  .25 

SALT  II— The  Basic  Choice  (Vance)  ...  .32 

Asia 

The    Indcjohinese    Refugee    Situation 

(Vance) 4 

U.S.  Program  To  A.s.sist  the  World's  Refu- 
gees ( Mondale) 1 

Visit  to  East  Asia  (Mondale) 10 

Bolivia.  Letter  of  Credence  (Arce)  63 

Brazil.  Letter  of  Credence  (Silveira)  . .  .63 
Canada.   Economic  Interdependence  in 

.\'(irth  America  (Katz)  42 

China 

Vietnam  and  Indochina  (Holbrooke) 34 

Visit  to  East  Asia  (Mondale) 10 

Communications.  World  Radio  Conference 

(foreign  relations  outline)   62 

Congress 

Continuing  Efforts  To  Account  for  MIA's 

(Oakley)  39 

Economic   Interdependence   in   North 

America  ( Katz) 42 

An  Evaluation  of  SALT  II  (Seignious)  .  .25 
Forces  of  Change  in  the  Middle  East 

(Saunders) 44 

The    Indochinese    Refugee    Situation 

(Vance)  4 

Military  Equipment  Programs  for  Egypt 

and  Saudi  Arabia  (Saunders) 52 

Namibia  (McHenry)  57 

OAU  Summit  Meeting  (Harrop) 23 

Report  on  Southern  Rhodesia  (Moose)   .  .18 
Significant  Quotes  on  Refugees  (Clark) . .  .6 

U.S. -Mexico  Cooperation  (Katz)  64 

U.S.  Policy  Toward  Afghanistan  and  Paki- 
stan (Miklos) 54 

Vietnam  and  Indochina  (Holbrooke) 34 

Western  Sahara  (Saunders) 53 

Cuba 

Secretary  Vance's   News  Conference   of 

September  5  14 

Soviet  Combat  Troops  in  Cuba  (Carter, 

Vance,  Department  statement)  63 

Economics.  Economic  Interdependence  in 

North  America  (Katz) 42 

Egypt 

Egyptian   Vice  President   Meets   With 
President  Carter  (White  House  state- 

*     ment) 49 

Forces  of  Change  in  the  Middle  East 

(Saunders) 44 

'  Middle  East  Peace  Process  (Strauss)  ...  .47 
Military   Equipment  Programs  for  Egypt 

and  Saudi  Arabia  (Saunders) 52 

Foreign  Aid.  Emergency  Aid  to  Nicaragua 
(White  House  announcement) 65 


Gambia.  Letter  of  Credence  (Sallah). . .  .20 

Guinea.  Letter  of  Credence  (Conde)  ...  .20 

Human  Rights 

OAU  Summit  Meeting  (Harrop) 23 

Vietnam  and  Indochina  (Holbrooke) 34 

Iran 

Forces  of  Change   in  the   Middle  East 
(Saunders) 44 

Kerosene,   Fuel  Oil  E.xport  Licenses  for 
Iran  (Department  statement) 45 

Israel 

Forces  of  Change  in  the  Middle  East 
(Saunders) 44 

Middle  East  Peace  Process  (Strauss) ...  .47 

Oil  Supply  Agreement  Signed  by  the  U.S. 
and  Israel  (Hansen,  Nechushtan)  51 

U.S.  Policy  Toward  Israel  (Vance) 52 

Violence  in  Lebanon  and  Israel  (Depart- 
ment statements) 5(1 

Kampuchea.  Famine  in  Kampuchea 40 

Korea.   Secretary  Vance's  News  Confer- 
ence of  September  5 14 

Lebanon 

U.S.  Policy  on  Lebanon  (Young) 61 

Violence  in  Lebanon  and  Israel  (Depart- 
ment statements) 50 

Mauritania.  Western  Sahara  (Saunders). 53 

Mexico 

Economic   Interdependence  in   North 
America  (Katz) 42 

Oil  Spill  in  the  Gulf  of  Mexico  (Krueger)  66 

U.S. -Mexico  Cooperation  (Katz)  64 

Middle  East 

Forces  of  Change  in  the  Middle  East 
(Saunders) 44 

Secretary  Vance's   News  Conference   of 
September  5  14 

Morocco.  Western  Sahara  (Saunders) . .  ..53 

Namibia 

Namibia  (McHenry)  57 

The    U.S.    Role    in    Southern    Africa 
(Moose) 20 

Narcotics  Control.   U.S.   Policy  Toward 
Afghanistan  and  Pakistan  (Miklos) 54 

Nicaragua 

Emergency  Aid  to  Nicaragua  (White  House 
announcement) 65 

President   Carter's  News  Conference  of 
July  25  (excerpts)  9 

Nuclear  Policy.  U.S.  Policy  Toward  Af- 
ghanistan and  Pakistan  (Miklos)  54 

Pakistan.  U.S.  Policy  Toward  Afghanistan 
and  Pakistan  (Miklos)   54 

Peru.     Letter    of    Credence    (Arias- 
Schreiber)  63 

Petroleum 

Kerosene,   Fuel  Oil  Export  Licenses  for 
Iran  (Department  statement) 45 

Oil  Spill  in  the  Gulf  of  Mexico  (Krueger)  66 

Oil  Supply  Agreement  Signed  by  the  U.S. 
and  Israel  (Hansell,  Nechushtan)  51 

Presidential  Documents 

President  Carter's  News  Conference  of 
July  25  (excerpts)  9 

Uganda 22 

Publications 

"Foreign  Relations"  Volume  on  the  United 
Nations  Released 69 

GPO  Sales  Publications 70 

New  Foreign  Affairs  Dictionary  69 

Refugees 

The    Indochinese    Refugee    Situation 
(Vance) 4 

Memorandum  of  Understanding  Between 
the  UNHCR  and  Vietnam  5 

Rescue  of  Refugees  at  Sea 2 

Results  of  Refugee  Conference   8 

Significant  Quotes  on  Refugees  (Clark) . .  .6 


U.S.  Coordinator  for  Refugee  Affairs  ...  .8 
U.S.  Program  To  Assist  the  World's  Refu- 
gees ( Mondale) 1 

Vietnam  and  Indochina  (Holbrooke) 34 

Visit  to  East  Asia  (Mondale) 10 

Saudi  Arabia.  Military  Equipment  Pro- 
grams for   Egypt  and   Saudi  Arabia 

(Saunders)  ....." ,52 

South  Africa 

Namibia  (McHenry)  57 

The    U.S.    Role    in    Southern    Africa 

(Moose) 20 

Southern  Rhodesia 

Report  on  Southern  Rhodesia  (Moose)   ..18 

The    U.S.    Role    in    Southern    Africa 

(Moo.se) 20 

Visit  of  Bishop  Muzorewa  of  Southern 
Rhodesia  (White  House  statement)   .  .  .19 
Thailand.  Vietnam  and  Indochina  (Hol- 
brooke)   34 

Togo.  Letter  of  Credence  (Grunitsky). .  .20 

Treaties.  Current  Actions 67 

Uganda.  Uganda  (Carter)  22 

U.S.S.R. 

An  Evaluation  of  SALT  II  (Seignious)  ..25 

Soviet  Combat  Troops  in  Cuba  (Carter, 

Vance,  Department  statement) 63 

SALT  II— The  Basic  Choice  (Vance)  ...  .32 

United  Nations 

"Foreign  Relations"  Volume  on  the  United 

Nations  Released 69 

Memorandum  of  Understanding  Between 

the  UNHCR  and  Vietnam  5 

Namibia  (McHenry)  57 

President  Carter's  Meeting  With  U.N. 
Secretary  General  (White  House  state- 
ment)   60 

Results  of  Refugee  Conference   8 

U.S.  Policy  on  Lebanon  (Young) 61 

U.S.  Program  To  Assist  the  World's  Refu- 
gees ( Mondale) 1 

World  Radio  Conference  (foreign  relations 

outline) 62 

Venezuela.  Letter  of  Credence  (Perez)  .63 

Vietnam 

Continuing  Efforts  To  Account  for  MIA's 

(Oakley)  39 

Issue  of  U.S.-S.R.V.  Relations 37 

Memorandum  of  Understanding  Between 
the  UNHCR  and  Vietnam  5 

Name  Index 

Arce  Alvarez,  Roberto 63 

Arias-Schreiber,  Alfonso  63 

Carter,  President 9,  22,  63 

Clark,  Dick  6 

Conde,  Mamady  Lamine 20 

Grunitsky,  Yao 20 

Hansell,  Herbert  J  51 

Harrop,  William  C   23 

Holbrooke,  Richard  C  34 

Katz,  Julius  L  42,  64 

Krueger,  Robert 66 

McHenry,  Donald  F 57 

Miklos,  jack  C  54 

Mondale,  Vice  President 1,  10 

Moose,  Richard  M  18,  20 

Nechushtan,  Yaacov 51 

Oakley,  Robert  B  39 

Perez  Chiriboga,  Marcial 63 

Sallah,  Ousman  Ahmadou 20 

Saunders,  Harold  H 44,  52,  53 

Seignious,  George  M.  II 25 

Silveira,  Antonio  Francisco  Azeredo  da  .63 

Strauss,  Robert  S 47 

Vance,  Secretary   4,  14,  32,  .52,  63 

Young,  Andrew 61 


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Kampuchea  Donations  /  62 

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bulletin 

Volume  79  /  Number  2032  /  November  1979 


Cover  Photo: 

Bronze  statue  in  the  north  garden  of  U.N. 
Headquarters,  created  by  Soviet  sculptor 
Evgeniy  Vuchetich,  illustrates  the  Biblical 
injunction: 

They  shall  beat  their  swords  into  plowshares, 
and  their  spears  into  pruninghooks:  nation 
shall  not  lift  up  sword  against  nation,  neither 
shall  they  learn  war  any  more.    (Isaiah  2:4| 

{Phoio  by  Ruth  Helraich,  U.S.  Mission  lo  Ihe  U.N.) 


The  Department  of  State  Bulletin, 
published  by  the  Office  of  Public  Com- 
munication in  the  Bureau  of  Public 
Affairs,  is  the  official  record  of  U.S. 
foreign  policy.  Its  purpose  is  to  provide 
the  public,  the  Congress,  and  govern- 
ment agencies  with  information  on 
developments  in  U.S.  foreign  relations 
and  the  work  of  the  Department  of 
State  and  the  Foreign  Service. 

The  Bulletin's  contents  include 
major  addresses  and  news  conferences 
of  the  President  and  the  Secretary  of 
State;  statements  made  before  congres- 
sional committees  by  the  Secretary 
and  other  senior  State  Department  of- 
ficials; special  features  and  articles  on 
international  affairs;  selected  press  re- 
leases issued  by  the  White  House,  the 
Department,  and  the  U.S.  Mission  to 
the  United  Nations;  and  treaties  and 
other  agreements  to  which  the  United 
States  is  or  may  become  a  party. 

The  Secretary  of  State  has  deter- 
mined that  the  publication  of  this  peri- 
odical is  necessary  in  the  transaction  of 
the  public  business  required  by  law  of 
this  Department.  Use  of  funds  for 
printing  this  periodical  has  been  ap- 
proved by  the  Director  of  the  Office 
of  Management  and  Budget  through 
January  31,  1981. 


CYRUS  R.  VANCE 

Secretary  of  State 

HOODING  CARTER  III 

Assistant  Secretary  for  Public  Affairs 

JOHN  CLARK  KIMBALL 

Chief,  Editorial  Division 

PHYLLIS  A.  YOUNG 
Editor 

COLLEEN  SUSSMAN 
Assistant  Editor 


NOTE:  Contents  of  this  publication 
are  not  copyrighted  and  items  con- 
tained herein  may  be  reprinted.  Cita- 
tion of  the  Departmhnt  of  State 
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ciated. The  Bulletin  is  indexed  in  the 
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ture. 

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COI\TE]\TS 


UNITED  NATIONS 

United  Nations  Day,  1979  (Proclamation) 

Common  Needs  in  a  Diverse  World  (Secretary  Vance) 

U.S.  Ambassador  to  the  United  Nations  (Biographic  Data) 

U.S.  Delegation  to  the  34th  U.N.  General  Assembly 

United  Nations — A  Profile 

The  152  Members  of  the  United  Nations 


THE  PRESIDENT 

7  Soviet  Troops  in  Cuba  and  SALT 
9  Background  on  the  Question  of  Soviet 
Troops  in  Cuba 

12  News  Conference  of  October  9 

THE  SECRETARY 

13  Currents  of  Change  in  Latin  America 
16  Question-and-Answer  Session  Follow- 
ing New  York  Address 

18  Interview  on  NBC's  "Today""  Show 

19  Interview  on  CBS-TV  Morning  News 

AFRICA 

20  President  Carter  Meets  With  Zairean 
and  Liberian  Presidents  (White 
House  Statements) 

ANTARCTICA 

lOth  Meeting  of  the  Antarctica  Treaty 
Consultative  Parties  (Lucy  Wilson 
Benson,  Department  Press  Release, 
Press  Communique) 

ARMS  CONTROL 

24  SALT  II  —  A  Summation  (Secretary 
Vance) 

25  MX  Missile  System  (President  Carter) 

CANADA 

26  U.S. -Canada  Transboundary  Air  Qual- 

ity Talks 

j      ENVIRONMENT 

,27  The  Quiet  Crisis  (Anthony  Lake) 

29  World   Forests    ( Memorandum  from 

President  Carter) 
31  Negotiations  To  Protect  Migratory  Wild 

Animals 


EUROPE 


32 


35 


39 


41 


NATO"s  Fourth  Decade — Defense  and 
Detente   (Vice  President   Mondale, 
Zbigniew  Brzezinski) 
U.S.   Commitment  to  Western  Europe 
(Secretary  Vance) 
36  Review   of  U.S.    Policy   in   Europe 
(George  S.  Vest) 
Fourth   Anniversary  of  the  Helsinki 

Final  Act  (President  Carter) 
14th  Report  on  Cyprus  (Message  to  the 
Congress) 
43   Fisheries  Agreement  With  Denmark. 
Faroe  Islands 

43  Publications 

MIDDLE  EAST 

44  Vision  of  Peace  (Zbigniew  Brzezinski) 

45  Saudi  Arabian  Oil  Production  (White 

House  Statement) 

46  U.S.    Ambassadors   to   Middle   East 

Countries,  October  1979 

46  Letter  of  Credence  (Saudi  Arabia) 

47  Anniversary   of   the    Camp    David 

Agreements  (President  Carter.  Sec- 
retary Vance.  Menahem  Begin, 
Anwar  al-Sadat) 

MILITARY  AFFAIRS 

48  Defense  Budgets  for  FY  1980  and  1981 

(Message  to  the  Congress) 

NUCLEAR  POLICY 

49  Bangladesh   Joins   Nonproliferation 

Treaty  ( Warren  Christopher,  De- 
partment Announcement) 

49  U.S. -Australia  Agreement  on  Nuclear 

Energy  (Message  to  the  Congress) 

OCEANS 

50  Law  of  the  Sea  Negotiations  (Elliot  L. 

Richardson) 


SCIENCE  AND  TECHNOLOGY 

51  U.N.  Conference  on  Science  and  Tech- 
nology for  Development  (President 
Carter,  Theodore  M.  Hesburgh) 

WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 

54  Panama  Acquires  Jurisdiction  Over  the 

Canal   Zone   (Vice  President   Mon- 
dale) 

55  Panama  Canal  Act  of  1979  (President 

Carter) 

56  Nicaragua  (Warren  Christopher) 

57  Visit  of  Mexican  President  Lopez  Por- 

tillo  (Joint  Press  Statement) 

58  Agreement   With   Mexico  on   Natural 

Gas   (President  Carter.   Joint  An- 
nouncement) 

59  U.S.   Ambassadors  to  Western  Hemi- 

sphere Countries,  October  1979 

TREATIES 

59  Current  Actions 

CHRONOLOGY 

61  September  1979 

62  PRESS  RELEASES 

62  KAMPUCHEA  DONATIONS 


)tPOS' 


,vtoa^ 


UNITED  I^ATIOIVS  DAY,  1979 


A  Proelamatloii 

Thirty-four  years  after  its  founding  "to  save  suc- 
ceeding generations  of  mantcind  from  the  scourge  of 
war",  the  United  Nations  remains  mankind's  last  best 
hope  for  building  a  world  community  based  on  justice, 
tolerance  for  diversity  and  respect  for  the  rule  of  law. 

The  United  Nations  has  no  magic  formula  for  solving 
the  increasingly  complex  problems  of  our  revolutionary 
age.  Yet  it  remains  the  symbol,  and  the  standard,  of 
mankind's  desire  to  turn  away  from  ancient  quarrels  and 
live  in  a  world  in  which  all  people  can  share  in  the  fruits 
of  prosperity  and  peace. 

More  than  ever,  the  international  community  is  chal- 
lenged by  problems  of  global  dimension  which  can  be 
solved  only  through  world-wide  cooperation  and 
dialogue.  The  100  new  nations  which  have  joined  the 
United  Nations  since  its  founding  are  a  symbol  of  the 
increasingly  complex  and  diverse  world  which  the 
United  Nations  confronts  today. 

Protecting  international  peace  and  security  is  still  the 
United  Nations"  greatest  contribution  and  responsibility, 
but  that  political  stability  is  only  the  precondition  for 
fulfilling  the  larger  aspirations  of  mankind.  For  all  its 
imperfections,  the  United  Nations  remains  the  principal 
forum  for  the  pivotal  dialogue  among  the  nations  of  the 
world  on  constructing  a  more  stable,  equitable,  and  pro- 
ductive economic  order.  It  plays  a  leading  role  in  the 
global  management  and  allocation  of  vital  natural  re- 
sources. It  offers  an  increasingly  important  channel  for 
providing  development  assistance  to  many  nations  in  the 
world.  It  offers  a  forum,  and  often  a  timely  and  effec- 
tive mechanism  for  protecting  basic  human  rights.  The 
leadership  of  the  United  Nations  in  responding  to  the 
present  refugee  crisis,  and  the  recent  Geneva  Meeting 
on  that  problem,  represents  one  of  the  proudest  exam- 


ples of  that  world  body's  ability  to  harness  world  coop- 
eration in  the  cause  of  human  dignity. 

The  United  States  has  historically  been  one  of  the 
United  Nations'  most  active  and  dedicated  supporters, 
and  1  have  been  proud  to  continue  and  expand  on  that 
support  as  President.  Not  a  single  day  goes  by  when  we 
in  the  United  States  do  not  call  upon  the  United  Nations, 
or  one  of  its  affiliates,  to  help  deal  with  a  problem  of 
global  dimensions.  I  join  with  many  other  Americans 
and  citizens  of  all  nations  in  expressing  my  sincere  sup- 
port for  this  unique  world  body  on  the  thirty-fourth  an- 
niversary of  its  founding. 

Now,  Therefore,  I,  Jimmy  Carter,  President  of  the 
United  States  of  America,  do  hereby  designate  Wednes- 
day, October  24,  1979,  as  United  Nations  Day.  I  urge 
all  Americans  to  use  this  day  as  an  opportunity  to  better 
acquaint  themselves  with  the  activities  and  accom- 
plishments of  the  United  Nations. 

I  have  appointed  O.  Pendleton  Thomas  to  serve  as 
1979  United  States  National  Chairman  for  United  Na- 
tions Day,  and  the  United  Nations  Association  of  the 
U.S.A.  to  work  with  him  in  celebrating  this  very  special 
day.  And  I  invite  all  the  American  people,  and  people 
everywhere,  to  join  me  on  this  thirty-fourth  anniversary 
of  the  United  Nations,  in  strengthening  our  common  re- 
solve to  increase  its  effectiveness  in  meeting  the  global 
challenges  and  aspirations  that  we  all  share. 

In  Witness  Whereof,  I  have  hereunto  set  my  hand 
this  thirteenth  day  of  September,  in  the  year  of  our  Lord 
nineteen  hundred  and  seventy-nine,  and  of  the  Inde- 
pendence of  the  United  States  of  America,  the  two 
hundred  and  fourth. 

Jimmy  Carter 


No.  4684  (text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of  Presidential  Documents 
of  Sept.  17.  1979. 


UNITED  ]\ATIO]\S:         CO]IOIO]\  1\EEDS 
r%  A  DIVERSE  WORLD 


by  Secretary  Vance 

Address  before  the  34th  session  of 
'the   U.N.   General  Assemblv  in   New 
York  on  September  24.  J979? 

We  met  in  this  General  Assembly  on 
the  threshold  of  a  new  decade.  It  will 
be  a  time  of  complex  challenge — a 
period  in  which,  more  than  ever,  co- 
operative endeavors  among  nations  are 
a  matter  not  only  of  idealism  but  of 
direct  self-interest. 

The  decade  now  drawing  to  a  close 
has  been  characterized  by  rapid 
change — far-reaching  and  fundamental. 

•  Awesome  technological  develop- 
ments are  all  about  us. 

•  The  assertion  of  national  inde- 
pendence has  reshaped  the  political  ge- 
ography of  our  planet. 

•  Within  nations,  we  see  an  ac- 
celerating rise  in  individual  economic, 
political,  and  social  expectations. 

•  The  unrelenting  hostility  of  the 
cold  war  has  given  way  to  a  more  com- 
plex relationship  between  East  and 
West,  with  elements  of  both  competi- 
tion and  cooperation. 

•  The  simple  notion  of  a  bipolar 
world  has  become  obsolete.  Increas- 
ingly there  is  a  profusion  of  different 
systems  and  allegiances  and  a  diffusion 
of  political  and  military  power. 

•  The  world  economic  order  is  also 
undergoing  inexorable  transformations. 
Many  nations,  formerly  among  the  dis- 
advantaged, now  are  achieving  global 
economic  power.  Economic  interde- 
pendence has  become  a  daily  reality  for 
the  citizens  of  every  nation. 

These  sweeping  changes  have,  for 
the  most  part,  worked  in  constructive 
directions — changing  lives  for  the  bet- 
ter and  opening  new  possibilities  for 
collective  effort  and  creative  diplo- 
macy. 

But  while  these  developments  dem- 
onstrate that  progress  is  possible,  they 
by  no  means  demonstrate  that  it  is  in- 
evitable. I  say  this  for  two  reasons. 

First,  in  a  number  of  areas,  the  pace 
of  current  progress  is  dwarfed  by  the 
scope  of  coming  challenges.  The  next 
decade  will  decide  whether  we  have  the 
collective  wisdom  and  the  common  will 
to  surmount  a  series  of  imposing  and 
mterrelated  problems  which  must  be 
dealt  with  in  a  comprehensive  manner. 

•  The  need  to  develop  new  forms  of 


energy  will  pose  a  continuing  chal- 
lenge. We  have  entered  the  difficult 
transition  from  a  petroleum  economy  to 
one  based  on  other  forms  of  energy. 

•  Even  without  this  added  burden, 
we  face  an  imposing  task  in  providing 
for  the  basic  needs  of  people  and  in 
narrowing  the  combustible  disparity 
between  wealth  and  despair.  The  food 
shortage  facing  developing  countries, 
for  example,  was  12  million  tons  in 
1975.  It  could  be  70-85  million  tons  by 
1990,  unless  productivity  rises  sharply. 

•  We  must  strike  a  decent  balance 
between  the  burgeoning  demands  of 
more  people  for  a  better  life  and  the  in- 
escapable reality  of  a  fragile  environ- 
ment. 

•  Such  prospects  carry  the  seeds  of 
future  discord.  As  these  seeds  ripen, 
and  the  growth  and  spread  of  weapons 
continue,  regional  conflicts  become  all 
the  more  dangerous — in  their  toll  of 
lives  and  resources  and  in  the  height- 
ened risk  of  wider  confrontation. 

•  And  despite  our  emergence  from 
the  days  of  unrelenting  hostility,  the 
East-West  relationship  can  deterioriate 
dangerously  whenever  one  side  fails  to 
respect  the  security  interests  of  the 
other. 

Our  ability  to  meet  these  tests  de- 
pends on  a  second  issue:  Will  we  con- 
front such  challenges  together  and 
benefit  together?  Or  will  we  let  adver- 
sity divide  us  and  thus  conquer?  I  must 
be  frank  to  say  that  I  am  not  sure  what 
the  anwer  will  be. 

There  are  some  reasons  for  encour- 
agement. In  recent  years,  the  nations 
here  represented  have  found  it  easier, 
in  many  different  forums,  to  talk  with 
each  other  rather  than  at  each  other. 

East  and  West  have  entered  into  the 
broadest  arms  control  agenda  in  his- 
tory. The  Soviet  Union  and  the  United 
States  have  negotiated  significant  lim- 
itations on  strategic  arms  in  a  treaty 
that  now  awaits  ratification. 

North  and  South  have  made  progress 
on  financial,  trade,  and  commodity 
issues — far  more  progress  than  has 
been  acknowledged.  Agreement  has 
been  reached  on  a  sharp  increase  in  the 
resources  of  the  International  Monetary 
Fund.  Lending  by  the  multilateral  de- 
velopment banks  has  increased.  Ex- 
panded trade  opportunities  have  been 
opened  by  the  recently  concluded  trade 
negotiations.  We  have  moved  ahead  on 
other  matters  such  as  international  debt 
and  a  common  fund  for  commodities. 


We  should  recognize  such  progress  and 
build  on  it. 

We  have  taken  steps  as  well  toward 
the  resolution  of  some  deeply  imbed- 
ded regional  disputes. 

But  I  am  concerned  that  there  are 
also  factors  at  work  which  could  re- 
verse this  cooperative  trend.  The  se- 
verity of  the  problems  we  face  could 
drive  nations  to  the  pursuit  of  their  own 
separate  advantage  at  the  expense  of 
international  cooperation.  In  times  of 
economic  trouble,  even  relatively  pros- 
perous countries  find  it  more  difficult 
to  look  beyond  their  internal  concerns 
to  meet  international  needs.  Indeed,  it 
is  a  vivid  lesson  of  history  that 
hardship  can  breed  short-sighted  insu- 
larity. It  can  arouse  instincts  for  self- 
preservation  at  the  expense  of  others. 
In  such  times,  the  voices  of  economic 
nationalism  will  be  raised  in  all  our 
countries.  We  must  resist  them. 

We  must  resist,  as  well,  the  voices 
of  international  confrontation.  In  a 
number  of  international  negotiations, 
political  as  well  as  economic,  we  have 
worked  our  way  through  to  the  toughest 
issues  involved.  We  must  not  react  now 
in  frustration  and  unleash  a  spiral  of 
rhetoric  which  can  deepen  rather  than 
resolve  our  divisions. 

The  challenges  of  the  1980's  can  be 
met  if  each  of  us  here  represented 
meets  the  responsibilities  we  share. 

Search  for  Peace 

Our  first  responsibility  is  to  persist 
in  the  search  for  peace,  to  reduce  both 
the  danger  and  the  destructiveness  of 
war. 

The  future  of  two  regions — the  Mid- 
dle East  and  southern  Africa — depends 
on  specific  decisions  that  will  be  made 
in  the  coming  months. 

Middle  East.  We  believe  the  March, 
26,  1979,  treaty  between  Egypt  and 
Israel  has  reduced  the  dangers  inherent 
in  the  Arab-Israeli  conflict  and  has  laid 
the  foundation  for  a  settlement  that  can 
be  both  durable  and  just. 

But  the  dramatic  achievement  of 
peace  between  Israel  and  Egypt  and  the 
successful  implementation  of  the  first 
phases  of  the  Treaty  of  Peace  have  not 
obscured  the  necessity  to  move  toward 
peace  between  Israel  and  its  other 
neighbors.  Indeed,  it  remains  the  re- 
solute view  of  my  government  that 
further  progress  toward  an  overall 
peace  is  essential. 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


We  know  that  an  ultimate  settlement 
must  address  the  legitimate  rights  of 
the  Palestinian  people.  The  Palestinian 
question  must  be  resolved  in  all  of  its 
aspects. 

As  the  peace  process  continues  to 
unfold,  it  is  our  deepest  desire  that 
representatives  of  the  Palestinian 
people  and  the  Governments  of  Jordan 
and  Syria  will  join  in  this  great  quest. 
This  is  consistent  with,  indeed  it  un- 
derscores, our  unshakable  commitment 
to  Israel's  security  and  well-being,  now 
and  in  the  future. 

None  of  the  parties  involved  in  this 
difficult  negotiation  has  any  illusions 
that  resolving  the  Palestinian  issue  will 
be  easy.  But  the  United  States  is  con- 
vinced that  progress  will  be  made  to- 
ward this  goal. 

Preserving  the  integrity  of  Lebanon 
is  also  critical  to  peace  in  the  Middle 
East.  There  is  now  a  cease-fire  in 
southern  Lebanon,  the  fragility  of 
which  is  underscored  by  the  events  of 


today.  We  need  not  only  a  cease-fire 
but  a  broader  truce.  We  will  be  work- 
ing toward  such  a  goal  in  our  discus- 
sions with  other  interested  governments 
here  at  this  Assembly.  Lebanon  has 
suffered  all  too  much. 

The  desire  for  peace  is  shared  by  all 
the  peoples  of  the  Middle  East.  We 
recognize  that  there  are  disagreements 
about  how  best  to  reach  that  common 
goal.  We  believe  the  course  on  which 
we  are  embarked  is  the  right  one,  in- 
deed the  only  one  that  has  shown  prac- 
tical results.  We  call  on  all  who 
genuinely  seek  peace  to  join  us  in  this 
endeavor. 

Southern  Africa.  A  step  toward 
peace  has  been  taken  as  well  on  the 
Rhodesian  conflict.  The  parties  are 
now  engaged  in  negotiation  toward  a 
solution  that  could  combine  true 
majority  rule  with  essential  minority 
rights.  The  British  Government,  the 
Commonwealth  nations,  and  the  parties 
themselves  deserve  great  credit  for  this 


AMBASSADOR  TO 
THE  UNITED  NATIONS 

Donald  F.  McHenry  was  born  in  St. 
Louis,  Mo.,  on  October  13.  1936.  and  was 
raised  in  East  St.  Louis.  Ill,  He  received  his 
B.S.  degree  from  Illinois  State  University 
(1957)  and  his  M.S.  degree  from  Southern 
Illinois  University  (1959)  where  he  was  a 
graduate  teaching  assistant  (1957-59),  He 
taught  English  at  Howard  University  in 
Washington,  D,C,.  from  1959  to  1962  At 
the  same  time,  he  continued  to  pursue  post- 
graduate studies  at  Georgetown  University, 

Ambassador  McHenry  joined  the  Depart- 
ment of  State  in  1963  as  a  foreign  affairs 
officer  in  the  Dependent  Areas  Section  of 
the  Office  of  U,N,  Political  Affairs  and  was 
officer-in-charge  of  the  section  from  1965 
to  1968,  He  was  Assistant  to  the  Secretary 
of  State-designate  and  the  Secretary  of  State 
(1968-69)  and  Special  Assistant  to  the 
Counselor  of  the  Department  of  State 
(1969-1971), 

During  1971-73.  he  took  a  leave  of  ab- 
sence from  the  State  Department  to  serve  as 
a  guest  scholar  at  the  Brookings  Institution 
and  as  an  international  affairs  fellow  of  the 
Council  on  Foreign  Relations,  At  the  same 
time,  he  was  a  professorial  lecturer  in  the 
School  of  Foreign  Service  at  Georgetown 
University, 

Ambassador  McHenry  resigned  from  the 
Department  of  State  in  1973  and  joined  the 
Carnegie  Endowment  for  International 
Peace  where  he  directed  humanitarian  pol- 
icy studies.  He  served  concurrently  as  a 
professorial  lecturer  at  American  Univer- 
sity. 

His  international  organization  experience 
includes  serving  as  an  adviser  and  alternate 


representative  to  the  U.N.  Trusteeship 
Council,  alternate  representative  to  the 
U,N,  Seminar  on  Apartheid  and  Racial  Dis- 
crimination, delegate  to  the  U,N,  Interna- 
tional Conference  on  Human  Rights,  and 
consultant  to  the  U,S.  congressional  dele- 
gation to  the  Interparliamentary  Union  in 
1966, 

Ambassador  McHenry  worked  on  the 
Carter  Administration's  State  Department 
transition  staff.  He  was  appointed  US, 
Deputy  Representative  to  the  U,N.  Security 
Council  in  1977  and  was  chief  U,S, 
negotiator  on  the  question  of  Namibia,  as  a 
member  of  the  UN,  Western  five  contact 
group.  He  was  sworn  in  as  US,  Permanent 
Representative  to  the  United  Nations  on 
September  23.  1979, 

Ambassador  McHenry  received  the  De- 
partment of  State's  Superior  Honor  Award 
in  1966,  He  is  the  author  of  Micronesia: 
Trust  Betrayed  and  has  had  numerous  arti- 
cles published  in  journals  and  newspapers. 


new  Step.  Agreement  on  a  fair  con- 
stitution and  new  elections,  as  called: 
for  in  the  Lusaka  communique,  could 
end  the  deepening  agony  of  war. 

We  have  made  substantial  progress 
in  Namibia.  But  obstacles  remain.  The 
contact  group  [Canada,  France,  West 
Germany,  United  Kingdom,  United 
States]  is  working  with  the  parties  con- 
cerned to  find  ways  to  resolve  the  few 
outstanding  issues.  We  do  not  under- 
state the  difficulties,  but  neither  should 
any  of  us  underestimate  the  opportuni 
ties  that  a  settlement  would  bring  for 
all  of  southern  Africa. 

In  most  negotiations,  we  can  best 
make  progress  by  stages.  A  knot  can 
never  be  untied  from  the  inside.  We 
must  begin  with  the  parts  we  can  grasp 
and  work  our  way  through  to  the  end  of 
the  problem.  History  will  judge  us  se- 
verely if  we  let  our  opportunities  for 
peace  slip  away.  As  negotiations  pro- 
ceed, the  issues  we  address  become 
progressively  more  difficult.  But  we 
must  not  let  future  fears  or  ambitions 
undermine  the  progress  that  has  been 
made. 

Terrorism.  As  we  work  on  these 
and  other  conflicts,  let  us  also  squarely 
face  the  fact  that  our  planet  is  plagued 
by  those  who  make  war  on  innocents, 
as  we  saw  just  weeks  ago  in  the  tragic 
death  of  Lord  Mountbatten.  We  must 
have  greater  international  cooperation 
to  combat  the  barbarous  practices  of 
the  terrorist.  The  United  States  strongly 
supports  the  basic  elements  of  the  draft 
convention  outlawing  the  taking  of 
hostages.  The  conclusion  of  this  treaty 
will  contribute  to  a  growing  consensus 
that  terrorism  will  not  be  tolerated,  re- 
gardless of  the  political  cause  its  per- 
petrators claim  to  pursue. 

Arms  Control.  Finally,  the  require- 
ment of  peace  carries  with  it  an  inter- 
national responsibility  to  limit  the 
spread  and  accumulation  of  arms. 

A  particular  obligation  falls  to  the 
largest  nuclear  powers — the  United 
States  and  the  Soviet  Union — to  con- 
tain the  competition  in  strategic 
weapons.  The  SALT  11  treaty  can  be  a 
major  step  toward  fulfillment  of  that 
obligation. 

The  goal  of  strategic  stability  will  be 
further  served  if  the  Soviet  Union, 
Great  Britain,  and  the  United  States  are 
able  to  agree  on  a  comprehensive  test 
ban. 

As  the  nuclear  superpowers  seek  the 
path  toward  mutual  restraint,  all  na- 
tions must  also  recognize  the  direct 
threat  to  their  security  from  the  spread 
of  nuclear  weapons.  Developments  in 
recent  years  can  bring  new  impetus  to  ■ 
the  nonproliferation  effort — including 
progress  in  the  International  Nuclear 
Fuel  Cycle  Evaluation,  which  can  help  j 


November  1979 


us  find  safer  ways  to  develop  nuclear 
energy  for  humanity;  the  strengthening 
of  International  Atomic  Energy  Agency 
safeguards;  the  substantial  increase  in 
the  number  of  parties  to  the  Nonprolif- 
eration  Treaty  (NPT);  the  entry  into 
force  of  the  treaty  of  Tlatelolco,  which 
now  finally  appears  within  grasp;  and 
the  pledge  by  a  number  of  nuclear 
powers,  under  specific  circumstances, 
to  refrain  from  the  use  of  nuclear 
weapons  against  nonnuclear  states.  But 
there  have  also  been  serious  setbacks — 
further  demonstrations  of  intent  to  ac- 
quire nuclear  weapons,  in  disregard  of 
the  inherent  dangers  for  regional  and 
international  security.  The  NPT  review 
conference  next  year  will  be  a  critical 
time  for  taking  stock  and  for  redou- 
bling our  efforts  to  make  progress  on 
this  urgent  international  priority. 

Economic  Nationalism 

Beyond  the  search  for  peace,  a  sec- 
ond responsibility  we  share  is  to  be 
sensitive  to  the  international  conse- 
quences of  our  national  economic  deci- 
sions and  resist  the  temptation  to  solve 
our  economic  problems  at  the  expense 
of  others. 

The  imprudence  of  economic  nation- 
alism has  been  harshly  demonstrated  in 
the  past.  The  world  depression  a  half 
century  ago  was  spread,  deepened,  and 
prolonged  by  a  wave  of  protectionism. 
That  memory  has  spurred  us  toward  a 
new  multilateral  trade  agreement  in- 
tended to  open  markets  and  keep  them 
open,  even  in  a  time  of  economic 
strain. 

Today,  let  me  address  one  of  those 
issues  which  most  clearly  reflect  the 
direct  connection  between  national  de- 
cisions and  global  consequences.  That 
issue  is  energy.  In  almost  no  area  is  the 
need  for  common  action  more  apparent 
or  more  urgent.  It  is  an  issue  which 
now  threatens  to  divide  us,  econom- 
ically and  politically.  In  a  future  of 
greater  scarcity,  these  divisions  could 
weaken  the  fabric  of  international 
comity  which  this  Organization  em- 
bodies. 

All  nations  will  suffer  if  all  nations 
do  not  act  responsibly — in  their  con- 
sumption of  energy,  in  its  pricing,  and 
in  its  production.  Despite  a  difficult 
prognosis  for  our  energy  future,  i  be- 
lieve the  basis  may  exist  for  progress. 

Until  the  1970's  modern  industrial 
economies  operated  on  two  basic  as- 
sumptions, which  also  governed  rela- 
tions between  oil  importers  and 
exporters — that  oil  was  cheap  and  that 
supplies  were  unlimited.  Now  all  na- 
tions realize  that  these  assumptions  no 
longer  hold. 

The  commitments  made  by  the  major 


industrial  countries  at  the  Tokyo  sum- 
mit demonstrate  this  clearly.  My  gov- 
ernment is  taking  ambitious  action  to 
address  the  energy  problem  and  is 
making  efforts  to  exceed  these  com- 
mitments. 

•  President  Carter  has  committed  the 
United  States  not  to  import  more  than 
8.2  million  barrels  of  oil  a  day  in  1979 
and  never  to  exceed  the  peak  level  our 
imports  reached  in  1977. 

•  Total  U.S.  energy  research  and 
development  this  year  is  $3.2  billion. 
We  are  investing  $528  million  this 
year — and  $600  million  next  year — in 
the  development  and  use  of  solar 
energy. 

•  We  are  significantly  expanding  our 
development  of  synthetic  fuels  to  take 
advantage  of  the  abundant  coal  and  oil 
shale  supplies  in  our  country. 

Much  of  this  new  energy  technology 
will  have  application  in  other  countries 
as  well.  We  will  seek  to  make  it  avail- 
able to  others  under  mutually  satisfac- 
tory conditions,  for  we  recognize  that 
by  helping  others  resolve  their  energy 
problems,  we  help  resolve  our  own. 

Let  me  indicate  some  of  the  ways  in 
which  we  are  prepared  to  work  with 
others  to  meet  our  common  energy 
needs. 

•  We  have  joined  other  industrial 
nations  in  agreeing  to  establish  a  provi- 
sional international  technology  group 
which  will  recommend  ways  to  broaden 
international  participation  in  the  com- 
mercial development  of  alternative 
fuels. 

•  I  pledged  last  year  that  the  United 
States  would  do  more  to  mobilize  its 
technical  talents  in  behalf  of  the  de- 
velopment of  others.  I  am  pleased  to 
report  that  next  month  we  will  establish 
an  institute  for  scientific  and  techno- 
logical cooperation.  This  institute  will 
work  for  the  goals  set  by  the  U.N. 
Conference  on  Science  and  Technology 
for  Development.  It  will  help  the 
people  of  developing  nations  benefit 
from  our  technologies — and  help  them 
expand  their  own  technological  capaci- 
ties. The  institute's  policy  council  will 
include  experts  from  developing  na- 
tions. Energy  development  will  be 
among  its  highest  priorities. 

•  We  will  participate  actively  in 
preparations  for  the  1981  World  Con- 
ference on  New  and  Renewable 
Energy. 

•  At  the  recent  economic  summit 
conference,  the  World  Bank  was  in- 
vited to  take  the  lead  in  coordinating 
our  assistance  to  developing  nations  in 
the  field  of  energy.  We  suggest  that  the 
World  Bank  bring  together  a  group  of 
experts   to   review   the   question  of 


U.S.  DELEGATION  TO  THE 
34TH  U.N.  GENERAL 
ASSEMBLY* 

Representatives 

Donald  F.  McHenry 

Benjamin  S.  Rosenthal.  US.  Represen- 
tative from  the  State  of  New  York 

Larry  Winn,  Jr.,  U.S.  Representative 
from  the  State  of  Kansas 

Esther  L.  Coopersmith 

Alternate  Representatives 

Richard  W.  Petree 
William  L.  Dunfey 
Howard  T.  Rosen 


•Text  from  USUN  press  release  80  of 
Sept.  18.  1979,  which  includes  bio- 
graphic data  on  each  delegate. 


energy  research,  development,  and 
training  in  detail.  Specifically,  it  could 
evaluate  the  work  of  existing  energy 
research  and  training  centers,  both  na- 
tional and  international,  in  developing 
countries.  In  addition,  it  could  recom- 
mend how  current  institutions  could  be 
strengthened  and  whether  new  multilat- 
eral ones  should  be  created. 

•  We  are  supporting  expansion  of 
the  World  Bank's  program  for  explora- 
tion and  development  of  mineral  fuels. 

•  The  Bank  is  also  considering 
whether  local  programs  of  development 
finance  are  adequate  to  support  the 
rapid  application  of  solar,  small  hydro, 
and  other  renewable  energy  technol- 
ogies in  developing  nations. 

•  The  Inter-American  Development 
Bank  has  proposed  creation  of  a  facility 
to  provide  political  risk  insurance  and 
loan  guarantees  for  private  investment 
in  energy  and  minerals  projects  in  its 
region.  This  could  be  an  effective 
means  of  stimulating  energy  develop- 
ment there.  We  are  willing  to  pursue 
with  the  Bank  its  initiative  and  work 
with  other  countries  to  develop  an  ac- 
ceptable proposal. 

As  the  industrial  countries  make 
serious  efforts  to  restrict  oil  demand 
and  to  help  the  developing  countries 
meet  their  energy  challenges,  the  ques- 
tion increasingly  becomes  whether  the 
oil-producing  nations  are  prepared  to 
stabilize  prices  and,  to  the  extent  it  is 
within  their  control,  insure  adequate 
supplies.  A  failure  to  do  so  will  con- 
tinue to  have  harsh  consequences  for 
the  world  economy,  especially  the 
poorer  nations. 

We  understand  the  natural  desire  of 
oil-exporting  nations  to  husband  this 
valuable  resource  for  future  genera- 


tions.  And  we  accept  the  fact  that  oil 
prices  must  retlect  not  only  the  strength 
ot  demand  but  also  the  long-term  scar- 
city of  supply — so  long  as  scarcity  is 
never  contrived  to  manipulate  price. 

But  oil  producers  must  understand 
that  there  is  a  limit  to  what  the 
economies  of  the  oil-consuming  na- 
tions, and  the  global  economy,  can 
sustain.  We  must  all  proceed  with  a  re- 
sponsible recognition  that  our  national 
energy  decisions  will  have  profound 
global  effects — and  will  return  either  to 
haunt  or  to  help  their  makers. 

Commitment  to  Human  Welfare 

A  third  common  responsibility  is  an 
intensified  commitment  to  help   im- 

United  Nations  Headquarters  in  New  York. 


prove  the  lives  of  our  fellow  human 
beings — to  provide  the  necessities  of 
life,  to  afford  the  chance  to  progress,  to 
assure  a  voice  in  decisions  which  will 
determine  their  future. 

Human  Rights.  We  have  made 
progress  in  the  field  of  human  rights, 
but  we  must  do  more. 

In  the  past  year,  some  nations  have 
taken  steps  to  restore  legal  protections 
and  democratic  institutions.  And  we 
have  seen  the  inauguration  of  an 
Inter- American  Court  of  Human 
Rights,  the  Organization  of  African 
Unity's  forceful  call  for  the  creation  of 
regional  human  rights  institutions  on 
the  continent  of  Africa,  and  the  activa- 
tion of  the  U.N.  Educational,  Scientific 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 

and  Cultural   Organization's  human* 
rights  procedures. 

The  growing  concern  for  human; 
rights  is  undeniable.  Yet  the  sad  truth 
is  that  even  as  we  sit  here  today,  men 
and  women  face  torture,  death,  and  op- 
pression for  daring  to  exercise  rights 
set  forth  in  the  charter  of  this  body 
three  decades  ago.  Our  joint  challenge 
is  to  advance  the  aspirations  of  all 
peoples  for  individual  human  dignity. 

Our  commitment  must  be  to  eco- 
nomic as  well  as  political  and  social 
rights — for  all  are  indispensable  to 
human  dignity.  Improvements  in  eco 
nomic  well-being,  opportunities  for 
participation  in  the  political  process, 
and  a  growing  sense  of  both  economic 
and  political  equity  can  do  much  to 
defuse  the  grievances  which  can  lead  to 
national  convulsions  and  international 
tensions. 

Food  and  Population.  To  meet  this 
commitment  to  a  better  life  for  all 
peoples,  we  must  each  strive  to  move 
the  North-South  dialogue  beyond  grand 
themes  and  on  to  specific  cases — to 
priority  areas  in  which  practical  de- 
velopment goals  can  be  met.  Let  me 
discuss  in  this  connection  our  efforts 
toward  a  goal  we  should  adopt  as  a 
matter  of  simple  humanity:  that  by  the 
end  of  this  century,  no  person  on  this^ 
bountiful  earth  should  have  to  go  hun- 
gry- 

Last  year,  I  noted  that  we  must  nott 
be  lulled  by  good  weather  and  plentiful 
harvests  into  losing  our  sense  of 
urgency.  Since  then,  poor  harvests  in  a. 
number  of  countries  have  substantially 
increased  the  international  demand  for 
food.  This  situation  underscores  the 
need  to  accumulate  adequate  stocks  tO' 
support  world  food  security.  I  assure 
you  that  the  United  States  will  do  all  it 
can  to  prevent  a  global  food  crisis. 

The  American  harvest  this  year  will 
be  of  record  size.  We  have  removed  all 
restrictions  on  wheat  production  for 
next  year.  We  have  established  farmer- 
owned  grain  reserves  which,  through 
accumulation  and  release  of  stocks, 
have  helped  stabilize  supplies. 

An  International  Wheat  Agreement 
still  eludes  our  grasp.  We  should  not 
abandon  this  goal.  But  we  should  move 
immediately  to  complete  negotiations 
for  a  new  food  aid  convention;  the 
World  Food  Council  has  urged  an 
agreement  by  mid- 1980.  We  support 
that  recommendation.  In  the  meantime 
we  are  already  implementing  the  higher 
food  aid  pledge  the  convention  would 
entail. 

At  the  same  time,  major  emphasis 
must  be  placed  on  improving  global 
food  production.  Over  half  of  Ameri- 
can direct  development  aid  now  is  de- 
voted to  agriculture.  We  will  continue 


November  1979 


working  to  improve  the  yields  of  major 
'  food  crops,  to  preserve  croplands,  and 
to  expand  research  on  ways  to  increase 
production  of  traditional  and  new 
I  crops,  especially  those  grown  by  poor 
farmers. 

These  efforts  have  received  effective 
support  from  the  international  agricul- 
tural research  centers.  We  support  pro- 
',posals  to  double  the  resources  contrib- 
uted to  those  centers  and  intend  to  in- 
crease our  contribution.  We  hope  addi- 
tional countries  will  become  con- 
tributors. 

We  must  be  aware,  however,  that  in 
the  long  run  these  efforts  could  be  viti- 
ated if  the  world's  population  is  not 
slowed.  Half  the  couples  of  child- 
bearing  age  still  do  not  have  adequate 
access  to  family  planning  services.  We 
must  strive  to  make  family  planning 
services — along  with  other  elements  of 
basic  health  care,  adequate  food 
supplies,  and  clean  water — available  to 
all  as  rapidly  as  we  can. 

And  in  the  short  run,  we  must  be 
prepared  to  meet  emergency  needs 
wherever  famine  afflicts  humanity  or 
refugees  seek  haven — in  Africa,  in 
Latin  America,  in  Southeast  Asia,  or 
elsewhere. 

Refugees.  The  proposal  made  by 
Vice  President  Mondale  at  Geneva  for 
a  refugee  resettlement  fund  reflects  our 
belief  that  the  international  community 
should  deal  on  a  global  basis  with  a 
global   and  grave  refugee  crisis.   We 

J  urge  broad  participation  in  this  fund. 

'  Vigorous  and  large-scale  interna- 
tional action  is  required  to  bring  relief 
to  the  starving  in  Kampuchea,  now 
facing  one  of  the  great  human  tragedies 
of  modern  times.  Tens  of  thousands  of 
sick  and  hungry  Khmer  are  already 
pressing  on  Thailand's  border;  hun- 
dreds of  thousands  may  soon  follow 

,  them.  Even  more  widespread  famine 
and  disease  are  in  prospect,  especially 
in  view  of  recent  reports  of  intensified 
fighting.  To  avert  unthinkable  catas- 
trophe, an  international  program  of 
humanitarian  relief  must  be  established 
in  Kampuchea  as  soon  as  possible.  In- 
ternational organizations  must  be  able 
to  bring  a  coordinated,  massive,  and 
adequately  monitored  program  of 
emergency  relief  to  all  needy  Khmer. 
We  would  endorse  such  an  effort. 

The  food  crisis  in  Kampuchea 
promises  both  to  multiply  the  flow  of 
refugees  and  to  take  a  terrible  toll 
among  those  who  cannot  escape.  The 
flood  of  refugees  from  Vietnam,  Laos, 
and  Kampuchea  already  has  brought 
great  suffering  to  hundreds  of  thou- 
sands of  innocent  people,  as  well  as 
heavy  burdens  on  countries  of  first 

.;  asylum. 


UNITED  NATIONS— 
A  PROFILE 

ESTABLISHED 

By  charter  signed  in  San  Francisco. 
California,  on  June  26,  1945;  effective 
October  24.  1945. 

PURPOSES 

To  maintain  international  peace  and  secu- 
rity; to  develop  friendly  relations  among 
nations;  to  achieve  international  coopera- 
tion in  solving  economic,  social,  cultural, 
and  humanitarian  problems  and  in  pro- 
moting respect  for  human  rights  and  fun- 
damental freedoms;  to  be  a  center  for 
harmonizing  the  actions  of  nations  in  at- 
taining these  common  ends 

MEMBERSHIP 

152  (for  complete  list  see  p.  6). 

BUDGET 

U.N.  expenditure  budget  for  1979  is  about 
$578  million.  The  U.S.  share  is  $137 
million.  The  total  U.N.  system  budget 
(including  the  U.N.  and  specialized  agen- 
cies and  programs,  but  not  including  the 
World  Bank)  was  about  $2.5  billion  in 
1977.  The  U.S.  share  was  $600.1  mil- 
lion. 

PRINCIPAL  ORGANS 

General  Assembly.  Membership:  All  U.N. 
members.  President:  Elected  at  the  be- 
ginning of  each  General  Assembly  ses- 
sion. For  this  34th  session  the  President  is 
Salim  A.  Salim  of  Tanzania  Main  Com- 
mittees: (First)  Political  and  Security; 
Special  Political  Committee;  (Second) 
Economic  and  Financial;  (Third)  Social, 
Humanitarian,  and  Cultural;  (Fourth) 
Trusteeship;  (Fifth)  Administrative  and 
Budgetary;  (Sixth)  Legal.  Many  other 
committees  address  specific  issues,  in- 
cluding peacekeeping,  crime  prevention, 
status  of  women,  and  U.N.  Charter  re- 
form. 

Security  CounciL  Membership:  5  perma- 
nent (China,  France.  U.S.S.R.,  U.K., 
U.S.),  each  with  the  right  to  veto,  and  10 
nonpermanent  elected  by  the  General  As- 
sembly for  2-year  terms.  Five  nonperma- 
nent members  are  elected  from  Africa  and 
Asia,  one  from  Eastern  Europe,  two  from 
Latin  America,  and  two  from  Western 


Europe  and  other  areas.  Nonpermanent 
members  are  not  eligible  for  immediate 
reelection.  For  1979  the  nonpermanent 
members  are  Bangladesh,  Bolivia, 
Czechoslovakia,  Gabon,  Jamaica, 
Kuwait,  Nigeria,  Norway,  Portugal,  and 
Zambia.  President:  Rotates  monthly  in 
English  alphabetical  order  of  members. 

Economic  and  Social  Council.  Member- 
ship: 54,  of  which  18  are  elected  each 
year  by  the  General  Assembly  for  3-year 
terms.  President:  Elected  each  year. 

Trusteeship  Council.  Membership:  U.S., 
China,  France,  U.S.S.R.,  U.K.  Presi- 
dent: Elected  each  year. 

International  Court  of  Justice.  Member- 
ship: 15.  elected  for  9-year  terms  by  the 
General  Assembly  and  the  Security  Coun- 
cil from  nominees  of  national  groups 
under  provisions  of  the  ICJ  Statute. 

Secretariat.  Chief  Administrative  Officer: 
Secretary  General  of  the  United  Nations 
appointed  to  a  5-year  term  by  the  General 
Assembly  on  the  recommendation  of  the 
Security  Council.  The  current  Secretary 
General  is  Kurt  Waldheim  (Austria)  who 
has  served  since  1972.  Staff:  A 
worldwide  staff  of  about  14,400  repre- 
senting 150  languages.  The  Secretary 
General  appoints  the  staff  according  to 
General  Assembly  regulations. 


Taken  and  updated  from  the  Department  of 
State's  Background  Note  on  the  United 
Nations  published  October  1978.  Copies  of 
the  complete  Note  may  be  purchased  for 
70(1  from  the  Superintendent  of  Documents. 
U.S.  Government  Printing  Office.  Washing- 
ton. DC.  20402  (a  25%  discount  is  allowed 
when  ordering  100  or  more  Notes  mailed  to 
the  same  address). 


The  international  community  has 
begun  to  respond.  But  humanitarian 
steps  are  not  enough.  The  community 
of  nations  must  make  a  more  active 
effort  to  restore  peace  to  the  region  and 
to  resolve,  by  nonmilitary  means,  the 
problems  that  developments  in  In- 
dochina have  carried  in  their  wake. 
They  pose  a  threat  to  the  stability  of  the 
region  as  a  whole. 


Demand  for  Global  Responses 

I  believe  we  can  meet  the  challenges 
before  us.  But  let  us  not  misjudge  their 
magnitude.  Resolution  of  regional  dis- 
putes and  placing  new  limits  on  the  in- 
struments of  war  will  require  new  acts 
of  national  and  international  will.  The 
1980's  could  portend  a  prolonged 
energy  crisis.  It  could  be  a  decade  of 


Department  of  State  BuUcii 


widespread  laiiiine.  Unless  the  swelling 
defieits  ot  developing  countries  can  be 
managed,  many  of  their  economies 
may  stagnate;  some  could  be  threatened 
with  collapse.  Global  problems  like 
these  demand  global  responses. 

This  Assembly  will  decide  whether 
to  launch  a  new  round  of  negotiations 
on  economic  cooperation  for  develop- 
ment. Let  me  state  today  that  the 
United  States  would  participate,  in  the 
Committee  of  the  Whole,  in  consulta- 
tions to  decide  the  most  effective  way 
of  conducting  such  negotiations. 

If  new  global  negotiations  are  to 
succeed,  their  participants  must  be 
realistic  about  the  political  and  eco- 
nomic capabilities  of  each  other.  We 
must  assign  priority  to  those  issues  on 
which  concrete  results  are  possible. 
And  we  should  avoid  duplicating  the 
work  of  existing  institutions.  In  this 
way.  the  negotiations  could  help  build 
a  global  consensus  for  action. 

Many  of  the  issues  I  have  addressed 
are  already  prominent  on  the  agenda  of 
the  United  Nations.  The  need  for  coop- 
eration in  addressing  them  requires  that 
we  continue  to  strengthen  this  institu- 
tion. Financial,  procedural,  and  man- 
agement reforms  are  urgently  neces- 
sary. As  a  first  step,  we  urge  that  the 
Secretary  General's  recommendations, 
now  adopted  by  this  Assembly,  be  fully 
implemented. 

The  urgency  of  the  requirements  I 
have  described  calls  for  something 
more  on  the  part  of  all  members  of  the 
United  Nations. 

The  distinctions  between  North  and 
South,  as  those  between  East  and  West, 
reflect  differing  interests.  They  have  a 
role  in  defining  the  issues  and  in 
clarifying  our  choices.  But  we  must 
commit  ourselves  to  finding  areas 
where  our  interests  converge. 

Each  of  us  has  our  special  values  to 
be  nurtured,  our  particular  goals  to  be 
served.  I  do  not  suggest  it  can  or 
should  be  otherwise.  The  United  States 
believes  in  a  world  of  diversity.  But  let 
us  resolve,  here,  at  this  Assembly,  to 
find  in  our  common  needs  and  common 
humanity  a  renewed  dedication  to  the 
search  for  common  ground.  D 


'Press  release  234. 


THE  152  MEMBERS  OF  THE  UNITED  NATIONS' 

Afghanistan  (1446) 

German  Democratic 

Pakistan  (1947) 

Albania  (1955) 

Republic  (1973) 

Panama 

Algeria  (1962) 

Germany,  Federal 

Papua  New  Guinea 

Angola  (1976) 

Republic  of  (1973) 

(1975) 

Argentina 

Ghana  (1957) 

Paraguay 

Australia 

Greece 

Peru 

Austria  (1955) 

Grenada  (1974) 

Philippines 

Bahamas  (1973) 

Guatemala 

Poland 

Bahrain  (1971) 

Guinea  (1958) 

Portugal  (1955) 

Bangladesh  (1974) 

Guinea-Bissau  (1974) 

Qatar  (1971) 

Barbados  (1966) 

Guyana  (1966) 

Romania  (1955) 

Belgium 

Haiti 

Rwanda  (1962) 

Benin  (formerly 

Honduras 

Saint  Lucia  (1979) 

Dahomey)  (1960) 

Hungary  (1955) 

Samoa  (1976) 

Bhutan  (1971) 

Iceland  (  1946) 

Sao  Tome  and  Principe 

Bolivia 

India 

(1975) 

Botswana  (1966) 

Indonesia  (1950) 

Saudi  Arabia 

Brazil 

Iran 

Senegal  (1960) 

Bulgaria  (1955) 

Iraq 

Seychelles  (1976) 

Burma  (1948) 

Ireland  (1955) 

Sierra  Leone  (1961) 

Burundi  (1962) 

Israel  (1949) 

Singapore  (1965) 

Byelorussian  S,S  R. 

Italy  (1955) 

Solomon  Islands  (1978) 

Canada 

Ivory  Coast  (  1960) 

Somalia  (1960) 

Cape  Verde  (1975) 

Jamaica  (1962) 

South  Africa 

Central  African 

Japan  (1956) 

Spain  (1955) 

Republic  (1960) 

Jordan  (1955) 

Sri  Lanka  (1955) 

Chad  (1960) 

Kenya  (1963) 

Sudan  (1956) 

Chile 

Kuwait  (1963) 

Suriname  (1975) 

China'' 

Lao  Peoples  Democratic 

Swaziland  (1968) 

Colombia 

Republic  (1955) 

Sweden  (1946) 

Comoros  (1975) 

Lebanon 

Syria 

Congo  (1960) 

Lesotho  (1966) 

Thailand  (1946) 

Costa  Rica 

Liberia 

Togo  (1960) 

Cuba 

Libyan  Arab 

Trinidad  and  Tobago 

Cyprus  (1960) 

Jamahiriya  (1955) 

(1962) 

Czechoslovakia 

Luxembourg 

Tunisia  (1956) 

Democratic  Kampuchea 

Madagascar  (1960) 

Turkey 

(formerly  Cambodia) 

Malawi  (1964) 

Uganda  (1962) 

(1955) 

Malaysia  (1957) 

Ukrainian  S  S  R. 

Democratic  Yemen 

Maldives  (  1965) 

U.S.S.R. 

(1967) 

Mali  (1960) 

United  Arab  Emirates 

Denmark 

Malta  (1964) 

(1971) 

Djibouti  (1977) 

Mauritania  ( 1961) 

United  Kingdom 

Dominica  (1978) 

Mauritius  (1968) 

United  Republic  of 

Dominican  Republic 

Mexico 

Cameroon  (I960) 

Ecuador 

Mongolia  (1961) 

United  Republic  of 

Egypt 

Morocco  (1956) 

Tanzania  ( 1961 ) 

El  Salvador 

Mozambique  ( 1975) 

United  States  of  America 

Equatorial  Guinea 

Nepal  (1955) 

Upper  Volta  (1960) 

(1968) 

Netherlands 

Uruguay 

Ethiopia 

New  Zealand 

Venezuela 

Fiji  (1970) 

Nicaragua 

Vietnam  (1977) 

Finland  (1955) 

Niger (1960) 

Yemen  (Sana)  (1947) 

France 

Nigeria  (I960) 

Yugoslavia 

Gabon  (1960) 

Norway 

Zaire  (1960) 

Gambia  (1965) 

Oman  (1971) 

Zambia  (1964) 

'Countries  are  listed  with 

names  as  registered  by  the  United  N 

ations.  Year  in  parentheses 

indicates  date  of  admission; 

countries  with  no  date  were  origina 

1  members  in  1945. 

^By  Resolution  2758  (XXVI)  of  Oct.  25.   1971.  the  General 

Assembly  decided  "to  re- 

store  all  its  rights  to  the  People's  Republic  of  China  and  to  recognize  the  representatives  of 

its  Government  as  the  only 

egitimate  representatives  of  China  to  the  United  Nations." 

November  1979 


THE  PRESIDE]\T:      Soviet  Troops  in  Cuba  and  SALT 


Address  to  the  nation  on  October  I, 
1979.' 


I  want  to  talk  with  you  about  the 
subject  that  is  my  highest  concern,  as  it 
has  been  for  every  President.  That 
subject  is  peace  and  the  security  of  the 
United  States. 

We  are  at  peace  tonight,  as  we  have 
been  at  peace  throughout  the  time  of 
my  service  in  this  office.  The  peace  we 
enjoy  is  the  peace  of  the  strong.  Our 
national  defenses  are  unsurpassed  in 
|the  world.  Those  defenses  are  stronger 
Itonight  than  they  were  2  years  ago,  and 
they  will  be  stronger  2  years  from  now 
than  they  are  tonight,  because  of  care- 
fully planned  improvements  that  are 
going  forward  with  your  support  and 
with  the  support  of  the  Congress. 

Our  program  for  modernizing  and 
strengthening  the  military  forces  of  the 
NATO  alliance  is  on  track,  with  the 
full  cooperation  and  participation  of 
our  European  allies.  Our  strategic  nu- 
clear forces  are  powerful  enough  to  de- 
stroy any  potential  adversary  many 
times  over,  and  the  invulnerability  of 
those  forces  will  soon  be  further  as- 
sured by  a  new  system  of  powerful 
mobile  missiles.  These  systems  are  de- 
1  signed  for  stability  and  defense. 

Beyond  these  military  defenses,  we 
are  on  the  threshold  of  a  great  advance 
in  the  control  of  nuclear  weapons  —  the 
adoption  of  the  second  strategic  arms 
limitation  treaty.  SALT  II. 

This  evening,  I  also  want  to  report  to 
you  about  the  highly  publicized  Soviet 
brigade  in  Cuba  and  about  its  bearing 
on  the  important  relationship  between 
our  nation  and  the  Soviet  Union. 

This  is  not  a  simple  or  easy  subject. 
The  United  States  and  the  Soviet  Union 
are  the  two  most  powerful  nations  on 
Earth,  and  the  relationship  between  us 
is  complex  because  it  involves  strong 
elements  of  both  competition  and 
cooperation. 

Our  fundamental  philosophies  con- 
flict; quite  often,  our  national  interests 
conflict  as  well.  As  two  great  nations, 
we  do  have  common  interests,  and  we 
share  an  overwhelming  mutual  concern 
in  preventing  a  nuclear  war.  We  must 
recognize,  therefore,  that  nuclear  arms 
control  agreements  are  vital  to  both  our 
[countries  and  that  we  must  also  exer- 
jcise  self-restraint  in  our  relations  and 
be  sensitive  to  each  other's  concerns. 
i     Recently,  we  obtained  evidence  that 
I  a  Soviet  combat  brigade  has  been  in 
Cuba  for  several  years.  The  presence  of 


Soviet  combat  troops  in  Cuba  is  of 
serious  concern  to  us. 

I  want  to  reassure  you  at  the  outset 
that  we  do  not  face  any  immediate, 
concrete  threat  that  could  escalate  into 
war  or  a  major  confrontation  —  but  we 
do  face  a  challenge.  It  is  a  challenge  to 
our  wisdom  —  a  challenge  to  our  ability 
to  act  in  a  firm,  decisive  way  without 
destroying  the  basis  for  cooperation 
that  helps  to  maintain  world  peace  and 
control  nuclear  weapons.  It's  a  chal- 
lenge to  our  determination  to  give  a 
measured  and  effective  response  to 
Soviet  competition  and  to  Cuban  mili- 
tary activities  around  the  world. 

Soviet-Cuban  Military 
Relationship 

Now,  let  me  explain  the  specific 
problem  of  the  Soviet  brigade  and  de- 
scribe the  more  general  problem  of 
Soviet-Cuban  military  activism  in  the 
Third  World. 

Here  is  the  background  on  Soviet 
forces  in  Cuba:  As  most  of  you  know, 
17  years  ago  in  the  era  of  the  cold  war, 
the  Soviet  Union  suddenly  attempted  to 
introduce  offensive  nuclear  missiles 
and  bombers  into  Cuba.  This  direct 
threat  to  the  United  States  ended  with 
the  Soviet  agreement  to  withdraw  those 
nuclear  weapons  and  a  commitment  not 
to  introduce  offensive  weapons  into 
Cuba  thereafter. 

At  the  time  of  that  1962  missile 
crisis,  there  were  more  than  20,000 
Soviet  military  personnel  in  Cuba. 
Most  of  them  were  withdrawn,  and  we 
monitored  their  departure.  It  was  be- 
lieved that  those  who  stayed  behind 
were  not  combat  forces  but  were  there 
to  advise  and  train  Cubans  and  to  per- 
form intelligence  functions. 

Just  recently,  American  intelligence 
obtained  persuasive  evidence  that  some 
of  these  Soviet  forces  had  been  or- 
ganized into  a  combat  unit.  When  at- 
tention was  then  focused  on  a  careful 
review  of  past  intelligence  data,  it  was 
possible  for  our  experts  to  conclude 
that  this  unit  had  existed  for  several 
years,  probably  since  the  mid-1970's, 
and  possibly  even  longer. 

This  unit  appears  to  be  a  brigade  of 
two  or  three  thousand  men.  It  is  armed 
with  about  40  tanks  and  other  modern 
military  equipment.  It's  been  organized 
as  a  combat  unit.  Its  training  exercises 
have  been  those  of  a  combat  unit. 

This  is  not  a  large  force,  nor  an  as- 
sault force.  It  presents  no  direct  threat 


to  us.  It  has  no  airborne  or  seaborne 
capability.  In  contrast  to  the  1962 
crisis,  no  nuclear  threat  to  the  United 
States  is  involved. 

Nevertheless,  this  Soviet  brigade  in 
Cuba  is  a  serious  matter.  It  contributes 
to  tension  in  the  Caribbean  and  the 
Central  American  region.  The  delivery 
of  modern  arms  to  Cuba  and  the  pres- 
ence of  Soviet  naval  forces  in  Cuban 
waters  have  strengthened  the  Soviet- 
Cuban  military  relationship.  They've 
added  to  the  fears  of  some  countries 
that  they  may  come  under  Soviet  or 
Cuban  pressure. 

During  the  last  few  years,  the 
Soviets  have  been  increasing  the  deliv- 
ery of  military  supplies  to  Cuba.  The 
result  is  that  Cuba  now  has  one  of  the 
largest,  best  equipped  armed  forces  in 
this  region.  These  military  forces  are 
used  to  intrude  into  other  countries  in 
Africa  and  the  Middle  East. 

There's  a  special  relationship  be- 
tween Cuba  and  the  Soviet  Union.  The 
Cubans  get  their  weapons  free;  other 
Soviet  satellite  countries  have  to  pay 
for  their  military  supplies. 

The  Communist  regime  in  Cuba  is  an 
economic  failure  that  cannot  sustain  it- 
self. The  Soviet  Union  must  send  to 
Cuba  about  $8  million  in  economic  aid 
every  day. 

Fidel  Castro  does  not  pay  money  for 
Soviet  arms;  the  Cuban  people  pay  a 
much  higher  price.  In  every  interna- 
tional dispute,  on  every  international 
issue,  the  Cuban  regime  automatically 
follows  the  Soviet  line. 

The  Soviet  brigade  is  a  manifestation 
of  Moscow's  dominance  of  Cuba.  It 
raises  the  level  of  that  dominance,  and 
it  raises  the  level  of  responsibility  that 
the  Soviet  Union  must  take  for  es- 
calating Cuban  military  actions  abroad. 


What  We  Are  Doing 

Now,  I  want  to  report  further  on 
what  we  are  doing  to  resolve  these 
problems  and  to  counter  these  ac- 
tivities. 

Over  the  past  3  weeks,  we've  dis- 
cussed this  issue  at  great  length  with 
top  Soviet  officials.  We've  made  it 
clear  that  the  presence  of  a  Soviet 
combat  unit  in  Cuba  is  a  matter  of  seri- 
ous concern  to  us. 

The  Soviet  Union  does  not  admit  that 
the  unit  in  question  is  a  combat  unit. 
However,  the  Soviets  have  made  cer- 
tain statements  to  us  with  respect  to  our 
concern:  that  the  unit  in  question  is  a 


8 


Department  ot  State  Bulleti 


training  center;  that  it  does  nothing 
more  than  training  and  can  do  nothing 
more;  that  they  will  not  change  its 
function  or  status  as  a  training  center. 
We  understand  this  to  mean  that  they 
do  not  intend  to  enlarge  the  unit  or  to 
give  it  additional  capabilities. 

They  have  said  that  the  Soviet  per- 
sonnel in  Cuba  are  not  and  will  not  be  a 
threat  to  the  United  States  or  to  any 
other  nation;  that  they  reaffirm  the 
1962  understanding  and  the  mutually 
agreed-upon  confirmation  in  1970  and 
will  abide  by  it  in  the  future.  We,  for 
our  part,  reconfirm  this  understanding. 

These  assurances  have  been  given  to 
me  from  the  highest  level  of  the  Soviet 
Government. 

Although  we  have  persuasive  evi- 
dence that  the  unit  has  been  a  combat 
brigade,  the  Soviet  statements  about 
the  future  noncombat  status  of  the  unit 
are  significant.  However,  we  shall  not 
rest  on  these  Soviet  statements  alone. 

First,  we  will  monitor  the  status  of 
the  Soviet  forces  by  increased  surveil- 
lance of  Cuba. 

Second,  we  will  assure  that  no 
Soviet  unit  in  Cuba  can  be  used  as  a 
combat  force  to  threaten  the  security  of 
the  United  States  or  any  other  nation  in 
this  hemisphere.  Those  nations  can  be 
confident  that  the  United  States  will  act 
in  response  to  a  request  for  assistance 
to  meet  any  such  threat  from  Soviet  or 
Cuban  forces. 

This  policy  is  consistent  with  our  re- 
sponsibilities as  a  member  of  the  Or- 
ganization of  American  States  and  a 
party  to  the  Rio  treaty.  It's  a 
reaffirmation  in  new  circumstances  of 
John  F.  Kennedy's  declaration  in  1963 
that  we  would  not  permit  any  troops 
from  Cuba  to  move  off  the  island  of 
Cuba  in  an  offensive  action  against  any 
neighboring  countries. 

Third,  I'm  establishing  a  perma- 
nent, full-time  Caribbean  joint  task 
force  headquarters  at  Key  West, 
Florida.  I  will  assign  to  this  headquar- 
ters forces  from  all  the  military  serv- 
ices responsible  tor  expanded  planning 
and  for  conducting  exercises.  This 
headquarters  unit  will  employ  desig- 
nated forces  for  action  if  required.  This 
will  substantially  improve  our  capabil- 
ity to  monitor  and  to  respond  rapidly  to 
any  attempted  military  encroachment  in 
this  region. 

Fourth,  we  will  expand  military 
maneuvers  in  the  region.  We  will  con- 
duct these  exercises  regularly  from  now 
on.  In  accordance  with  existing  treaty 
rights,  the  United  States  will,  of 
course,  keep  our  forces  in  Guan- 
tanamo. 

Fifth,  we  will  increase  our  economic 
assistance  to  alleviate  the  unmet  eco- 


nomic and  human  needs  in  the  Carib- 
bean region  and  further  to  insure  the 
ability  of  troubled  peoples  to  resist  so- 
cial turmoil  and  possible  Commun'st 
domination. 

The  United  States  has  a  worldwide 
interest  in  peace  and  stability.  Ac- 
cordingly, I  have  directed  the  Secretary 
of  Defense  to  further  enhance  the 
capacity  of  our  rapid  deployment  forces 
to  protect  our  own  interests  and  to  act 
in  response  to  requests  for  help  from 
our  allies  and  friends.  We  must  be  able 
to  move  our  ground,  sea,  and  air  units 
to  distant  areas,  rapidly  and  with 
adequate  supplies. 

We  have  reinforced  our  naval  pres- 
ence in  the  Indian  Ocean. 

We  are  enhancing  our  intelligence 
capability  in  order  to  monitor  Soviet 
and  Cuban  military  activities  —  both  in 
Cuba  and  throughout  the  world.  We 
will  increase  our  efforts  to  guard 
against  damage  to  our  crucial  intelli- 
gence sources  and  our  methods  of  col- 
lection, without  impairing  civil  and 
constitutional  rights. 

These  steps  reflect  my  determination 
to  preserve  peace,  to  strengthen  our  al- 
liances, and  to  defend  the  interests  of 
the  United  States.  In  developing  them. 
I've  consulted  not  only  with  my  own 
advisers  but  with  congressional  leaders 
and  with  a  bipartisan  group  of  distin- 
guished American  citizens  as  well.  The 
decisions  are  my  own,  and  I  take  full 
responsibility  for  them  as  President  and 
as  Commander  in  Chief. 

I  have  concluded  that  the  brigade 
issue  is  certainly  no  reason  for  a  return 
to  the  cold  war.  A  confrontation  might 
be  emotionally  satisfying  for  a  few 
days  or  weeks  for  some  people,  but  it 
would  be  destructive  to  the  national 
interest  and  to  the  security  of  the 
United  States. 

We  must  continue  the  basic  policy 
that  the  United  States  has  followed  for 
20  years,  under  six  Administrations  of 
both  parties,  a  policy  that  recognizes 
that  we  are  in  competition  with  the 
Soviet  Union  in  some  fields  and  that 
we  seek  cooperation  in  others — notably 
maintaining  the  peace  and  controlling 
nuclear  arms. 


The  Need  for  Ratifying  SALT  II 

My  fellow  Americans,  the  greatest 
danger  to  American  security  tonight  is 
certainly  not  the  two  or  three  thousand 
Soviet  troops  in  Cuba.  The  greatest 
danger  to  all  the  nations  of  the 
world  —  including  the  United  States 
and  the  Soviet  Union  —  is  the  break- 
down of  a  common  effort  to  preserve 
the  peace  and  the  ultimate  threat  of  a 
nuclear  war. 

I  renew  my  call  to  the  Senate  of  the 


United  States  to  ratify  the  SALT  i  ■ 
treaty. 

SALT  II  is  a  solid  treaty.  Insurin 
compliance  with  its  terms  will  not  be 
matter  of  trust.  We  have  highly  sophi^ 
ticated,  national  technical  means 
carefully  focused  on  the  Soviet  Union 
to  insure  that  the  treaty  is  verifiable. 

This  treaty  is  the  most  important  ste 
ever  taken  to  control  strategic  nude; 
arms.  It  permits  us  to  strengthen  oi 
defense  and  to  preserve  the  strategi 
balance  at  lower  risk  and  lower  cos 
During  the  past  few  years,  we  hav 
made  real  increases  in  our  defense  e> 
penditures  to  fulfill  the  goals  of  oi 
5-year  defense  plan.  With  SALT  II,  w 
can  concentrate  these  increases  in  arci 
where  our  interests  are  most  threatene^d 
and  where  direct  military  challenge  : 
most  likely. 

The  rejection  of  SALT  would  seiik 
ously  compromise  our  nation's  peat  n 
and  security. 

Of  course  we  have  disagreemen 
with  the  Soviets.  Of  course  we  ha\ 
conflicts  with  them.  If  we  did  not  ha\ 
these  disagreements  and  conflicts,  v 


would  not  need  a  treaty  to  reduce  tl 
possibility  of  nuclear  war  between  us 

If  SALT  II  is  rejected,  these  di 
agreements  and  conflicts  could  take  c 
a  new  and  ominous  dimension.  Again 
the  background  of  an  uncontrolled  ni 
clear  arms  race,  every  confrontation  ( 
dispute  would  carry  the  seeds  of  a  ni 
clear  confrontation. 

In  addition,  SALT  II  is  crucial 
American  leadership  and  to  the  furthi 
strengthening  of  the  Western  alliano 
Obviously,  a  secure  Europe  is  vital 
our  own  security.  The  leaders  of  oi 
European  allies  support  SALT  II- 
unanimously.  We've  talked  to 
number  of  those  leaders  in  the  last  fe 
days.  I  must  tell  you  tonight  that  if  tl 
Senate  fails  to  approve  the  SAL 
treaty,  these  leaders  and  their  countri( 
would  be  confused  and  deeply  alarmedj 
If  our  allies  should  lose  confidence  :  f" 
our  ability  to  negotiate  successfully  ft 
the  control  of  nuclear  weapons,  the  j^ 

Itoi 


1« 


our  effort  to  build  a  stronger  and  moi 
united  NATO  could  fail. 

I  know  that  for  Members  of  Coi 
gress  this  is  a  troubling  and  a  diffici 
issue,  in  a  troubling  and  difficult  timi 
But  the  Senate  has  a  tradition  of  beii 
the  greatest  deliberative  body  in  tl 
world,  and  the  whole  world  is  watchir 
the  Senate  today.  I'm  confident  that  a 
Senators  will  perform  their  high  n 
sponsibilities  as  the  national  intere 
requires.  ' 

Politics  and  nuclear  arsenals  do  ni 
mix.  We  must  not  play  politics  with  tf 
security  of  the  United  Slates.  We  mu 
not  play  politics  with  the  survival  < 
the  human  race.  We  must  not  pla 
politics  with  SALT  II.  It  is  much  tc 


of 


k 


to 


November  1979 


Background  on  the  Question  of 
Soviet  Troops  in  Cuha 


Following  is  background  informa- 
tion on  the  question  of  Soviet  troops  in 
Cuba,  with  questions  and  answers  on 
some  of  the  specific  points  raised  dur- 
ing briefings  held  prior  to  the  Presi- 
dent's broadcast  to  the  nation,  Octo- 
ber I,  1979. 

The  surveillance  of  Cuba  which  was 
being  conducted  at  the  time  of  the  1962 
Cuban  missile  crisis  noted  the  exist- 
ence of  Soviet  ground  combat  units  de- 
ployed at  four  major  locations  and  at 
several  sublocations.  One  of  the  major 
locations  was  the  same  as  one  at  which 
major  elements  of  the  combat  unit  now 
in  question  have  been  located. 

In  the  course  of  the  negotiations  that 
took  place  in  1963,  the  United  States 
called  to  the  attention  of  the  Soviets  the 
fact  that  these  ground  combat  units 
were  present.  Out  of  those  discussions 
came  a  commitment  on  the  part  of 
Chairman  Khrushchev,  made  to  Presi- 
dent Kennedy,  that  he  would  ship  out 
of  Cuba  the  ground  combat  units  which 
had  anything  to  do  with  guarding  the 
Soviet  missile  installations  and  bomber 
bases. 

In  1963  the  U.S.  Government  con- 
ducted extensive  surveillance  and 
checked,  among  other  things,  whether 
or  not  the  ground  combat  units  were 
being  removed. 

By  1964  the  U.S.  intelligence  com- 
munity had  concluded  that  the  Soviet 
ground  combat  units  had  been  essen- 
tially withdrawn  from  Cuba. 

At  the  same  time,  there  can  be  no 
question  that  there  was  a  substantial 


Soviet  military  presence  in  Cuba  in 
1962  and  that  there  has  been  a  continu- 
ous military  presence  since  then. 

There  is  also  no  question  that  the 
Soviet  military  presence  changed  its 
mission  in  1963-64  from  being  there  to 
maintain  missiles  to  something  else. 

It  is  clear  today  that  in  the  postmis- 
sile  crisis  period,  the  Soviet  forces  in 
Cuba  did  not  have  enough  equipment 
or  enough  facilities  and  did  not  conduct 
enough  training  activity  to  be  the  kind 
of  a  combat  unit  that  we  see  there 
today.  In  short,  the  mission  and  the 
structure  of  this  brigade  has  changed  at 
least  once  more  since  the  change  after 
the  postmissile  crisis  in  1962. 

When  precisely  it  reached  its  present 
form  is  unclear  to  us  today,  but  there  is 
a  high  degree  of  confidence  that  it  is 
not  a  unit  with  a  primary  purpose  of 
training  Cubans.  The  observed  pattern 
of  activity  of  this  unit  over  the  past 
several  years  does  not  include  any  sub- 
stantial involvement  with  the  training 
of  Cubans  or  Cuban  ground  forces.  It 
does  not  show  any  pattern  of  interplay 
between  Soviet  forces  and  personnel 
and  Cuban  forces  and  people.  The  pat- 
tern of  activity  that  can  be  seen  is  defi- 
nitely similar  to  the  patterns  of  activity 
of  ground  combat  units  inside  the 
Soviet  Union,  carrying  out  their  normal 
combat  training. 

The  organization  of  this  unit,  its 
facilities,  and  its  equipment  are  not 
those  which  would  logically  be  there  if 
it  were  going  to  perform  a  function  of 
training  other  people.  The  organiza- 
tion, the  facilities,  the  equipment  are 


Cuba  (Cont'd) 

important  for  that  —  too  vital  to  our 
country,  to  our  allies,  and  to  the  cause 
of  peace. 

The  purpose  of  the  SALT  II  treaty 
and  the  purpose  of  my  actions  in  deal- 
ing with  Soviet  and  Cuban  military  re- 
lationship are  exactly  the  same  —  to 
keep  our  nation  secure  and  to  maintain 
a  world  at  peace. 

As  a  powerful  nation,  as  a  super- 
power, we  have  special  responsibilities 
to  maintain  stability  even  when  there 
are  serious  disagreements  among  na- 
tions. 

We've  had  fundamental  differences 
with  the  Soviet  Union  since  1917.  I 
have  no  illusions  about  these  differ- 
ences. The  best  way  to  deal  with  them 
successfully  is  to  maintain  American 


unity,  American  will,  and  American 
strength.  That  is  what  I  am  determined 
to  do. 

The  struggle  for  peace  —  the  long, 
hard  struggle  to  make  weapons  of  mass 
destruction  under  control  of  human  rea- 
son and  human  law  —  is  a  central 
drama  of  our  age. 

At  another  time  of  challenge  in  our 
nation's  history.  President  Abraham 
Lincoln  told  the  American  people: 
"We  shall  nobly  save  or  meanly  lose 
the  last,  best  hope  of  earth." 

We  acted  wisely  then  and  preserved 
the  nation.  Let  us  act  wisely  now  and 
preserve  the  world.  D 


'Broadcast  live  on  radio  and  television  from 
the  Oval  Office  at  the  While  House;  text  from 
Weekly  Compilation  of  Presidential  Documents 
of  Oct.  8.  1979. 


those  which  can  be  seen  in  Soviet  units 
of  this  type  inside  the  Soviet  Union. 

Soviets  in  military  advisory  capaci- 
ties elsewhere  in  the  world  have  not 
performed  in  this  kind  of  a  pattern  with 
this  kind  of  an  organization,  with  these 
kinds  of  facilities  and  these  amounts  of 
equipment. 

The  conclusion  can  be  drawn — after 
looking  at  its  organization,  at  its 
facilities,  at  its  equipment,  at  its  per- 
sonnel, and  at  its  training  activities — 
that  it  is  not  a  brigade  for  training  Cu- 
bans but  that  it  is  a  brigade  with  a 
combat  capability.  This  can  be  done 
through  thorough  intelligence  research 
involving  not  simply  detecting  whether 
a  Soviet  military  unit  exists  in  Cuba  but 
assessing  the  purpose  of  a  known 
Soviet  military  presence  in  Cuba,  its 
intentions,  and  its  plans. 

It  can  be  said  with  confidence  that 
the  composition  of  the  Soviet  units  is 
known.  It  is  a  brigade.  Its  organization 
is  known:  its  rank  structure,  that  it  has 
three  infantry  and  one  tank  battalions, 
and  that  it  is  commanded  by  a  Soviet 
Army  Colonel.  Its  location  is  known: 
that  it  is  garrisoned  in  two  sites.  Its 
size  is  known:  that  it  has  about  2,600 
people.  Its  equipment  is  known:  that  it 
has  40  tanks,  60  armored  personnel 
carriers,  and  various  other  pieces  of 
hardware.  Its  training  pattern  is  known: 
that  that  is  similar  to  combat  units  in 
the  Soviet  Union.  And  it  is  known  that 
it  has  no  observable  connections  with 
the  Cuban  military. 

Over  a  period  of  about  3  weeks 
negotiations  have  been  condticted  with 
the  Soviets.  The  Secretary  of  State  has 
had  six  negotiating  sessions  with 
Soviet  Ambassador  Dobrynin,  two  with 
Foreign  Minister  Gromyko,  and  in  ad- 
dition to  that  there  has  been  an  ex- 
change between  the  two  heads  of  gov- 
ernment. The  negotiating  sessions  with 
Dobrynin  have  lasted  for  considerable 
periods  of  time.  In  addition  to  these, 
there  have  been  numerous  telephone 
conversations.  The  two  sessions  with 
the  Foreign  Minister  in  New  York  were 
reasonably  lengthy  and  exhaustive. 

The  serious  concern  of  the  United 
States  about  the  presence  of  this  unit 
was  made  very  clear  to  the  Soviets  in 
all  these  discussions.  At  the  end  of  the 
negotiations  the  Soviets  made  certain 
statements,  or  assurances,  which  they 
have  given  to  the  United  States: 

Number  one:  That  the  unit  in  ques- 
tion is  a  training  center;  that  it  does 
nothing  more  than  training,  and  can  do 
nothing  more. 

Second:  That  they  will  not  change 
its  function  or  status  as  a  training  cen- 
ter. We  understand  this  to  mean  that 
they  do  not  intend  to  enlarge  the  unit  or 
to  give  it  additional  capabilities. 


10 


Third:  That  the  Soviet  personnel  in 
Cuba  arc  not  and  will  not  be  a  threat  to 
the  United  Slates  or  to  any  other  na- 
tion. 

Fourth:  That  they  reaffirm  the  1962 
understanding  and  the  mutually  agreed 
confirmation  of  that  understanding  in 
1970 — and  that  they  will  abide  by  it  in 
the  future. 

The  United  States,  for  its  part,  re- 
confirmed this  understanding. 

The  assurances  have  been  given  to 
the  President  by  the  highest  levels  of 
the  Soviet  Government. 

As  indicated  by  the  President,  al- 
though there  is  persuasive  evidence 
that  the  unit  is  a  combat  brigade,  the 
Soviet  statements  about  the  future  non- 
combatant  status  of  the  unit  are  signifi- 
cant. 

Again  as  the  President  points  out, 
however,  the  United  States  will  not  rest 
on  the  Soviet  statements  alone  but  will 
take  a  number  of  steps. 

First,  the  United  States  will  monitor 
the  status  of  the  Soviet  forces  by  in- 
creasing surveillance  of  Cuba. 

Second,  the  United  States  will  assure 
that  no  Soviet  unit  in  Cuba  can  be  used 
as  a  combat  force  to  threaten  the  secu- 
rity of  the  United  States  or  any  other 
nation  in  the  hemisphere. 

Third,  the  President  is  establishing  a 
permanent,  full-time  Caribbean  task 
force  headquarters  in  Key  West. 

Fourth,  the  United  States  will  ex- 
pand military  maneuvers  in  the  region 
and  conduct  them  regularly  from  now 
on.  The  President  also  underscores  that 
in  accordance  with  existing  treaty 
rights,  the  United  Stales  will,  of 
course,  keep  its  forces  in  Guantanamo. 

Fifth,  the  United  States  will  increase 
its  economic  assistance  to  alleviate  the 
economic  and  human  needs  in  the  re- 
gion. A  supplemental  appropriation  bill 
will  be  submitted  to  the  Congress  in  the 
very  near  future. 

Next,  the  President  has  pointed  out 
that  the  United  States  has  a  worldwide 
interest  in  peace  and  stability  and  that, 
accordingly,  he  has  directed  further 
enhancement  of  the  capacity  of  the 
rapid  deployment  force  to  protect  the 
interests  of  the  United  States  and  of  its 
friends  and  allies. 

The  President  further  noted  that  the 
United  States  has  already  reinforced  its 
naval  presence  in  the  Indian  Ocean  and 
is  enhancing  its  intelligence  capability 
in  order  to  monitor  Soviet  and  Cuban 
military  activities  both  in  Cuba  and 
throughout  the  world.  These  steps  re- 
flect, as  the  President  said,  the  deter- 
mination of  the  United  States  to  pre- 
serve peace,  to  strengthen  the  alliance, 
and  to  defend  the  interests  of  the 
United  States. 

The  President's  speech  also  stressed: 


First,  the  very  clear  conclusion  that 
the  main  issue  is  no  reason  to  return  to 
the  cold  war. 

Secondly,  that  the  basic  policy  of  the 
United  States  for  20  years  under  six 
Administrations  will  be  continued. 
This  policy  recognizes  that  while  the 
United  States  is  in  competition  with  the 
Soviet  Union,  it  also  seeks  to  cooperate 
in  other  areas — notably  in  maintaining 
peace  and  in  controlling  nuclear  arms. 

The  President  very  clearly  called 
upon  the  Congress  to  complete  the 
work  which  is  necessary  for  ratification 
of  the  SALT  treaty  and  to  proceed  with 
the  debate  on  that  treaty.  The  President 
said  it  is  of  critical  importance  to  us 
and  to  world  peace — and  to  the  security 
and  well-being  of  our  allies — that  this 
must  go  forward. 

Q.  Was  the  Soviet  Union  asked  to 
remove  the  forces? 

A.  A  number  of  suggestions  and 
proposals  for  resolving  this  matter  were 
sent  forward  by  the  United  States. 
Suggestions  were  made  by  the  other 
side  as  well.  At  the  end  of  those  dis- 
cussions, the  assurances,  statements, 
clarifications  laid  out  very  clearly  in 
the  President's  statement  were  ad- 
vanced. 

Q.  Reference  was  made  to  the  evi- 
dence based  on  the  facilities,  the 
equipment,  the  organization,  and  the 
training  pattern.  The  President  said 
"...  the  Soviet  statements  about 
the  future  noncombat  status  of  the 
unit  are  significant."  Does  that 
suggest  that  the  Soviets  have  given 
any  indication  whatsoever  that  they 
will  change  either  the  facilities,  the 
equipment,  the  organization,  or  the 
training? 

A.  Looking  at  the  language  itself,  it 
says  for  example;  "...  the  unit  in 
question  is  a  training  center  .  .  .  and 
can  do  nothing  more."  It  further  says 
that  "...  they  will  not  change  its 
function  or  status  as  a  training  center 
....  "  and  by  that  they  mean  not  to 
enlarge  the  unit  or  give  it  additional 
capabilities.  One  of  the  additional 
capabilities  which,  obviously,  the  unit 
does  not  have  now  but  would  be  sig- 
nificant is  any  airlift  or  sealift.  They 
have  said  that  they  do  not  intend  to 
enlarge  the  unit  or  give  it  additional 
capabilities. 

Q.  Combat  status  can  be  both  of- 
fensive and  defensive.  Does  it  appear 
that  the  mission  of  these  troops  is 
perhaps  to  guard  an  installation  that 
is  important  to  the  Soviets,  perhaps  a 
monitoring  installation  or  an  instal- 
lation attempting  to  plug  into  our 
undersea  grid? 

A.  The  Soviets  have  a  large  moni- 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 

toring  facility  in  Cuba,  and  it  certainly 
can't  be  ruled  out  that  one  of  the  func- 
tions of  this  unit  would  be  to  protect  it. 

Q.  Is  there  a  difference  in  the  way 
we  view  a  brigade  that  has  tanks  and 
APC's  [armored  personnel  carriers] 
that  are  there  in  sort  of  a  "defen- 
sive" posture  to  guard  a  facility — 
and  one  that  we  would  think  is  there 
in  an  offensive  posture? 

A.  First,  the  size  of  the  brigade  and 
its  equipment  is  inordinate  to  a  func- 
tion of  protecting  the  intelligence- 
collection  facility  that  the  Soviets 
maintain  in  Cuba. 

Secondly,  the  key  question  is 
whether  or  not  it  has  a  combat  capabil- 
ity which  can  be  projected  in  a  way 
which  constitutes  a  threat  to  the  United 
States  or  others  in  the  region. 

Q.  How  has  the  status  quo,  which 
was  earlier  said  to  be  unacceptable, 
been  changed? 

A.  It  has  been  changed  in  two  ways. 

First,  very  clearly,  the  President  has 
outlined  a  number  of  steps  that  are 
going  to  be  taken  because  it  is  felt  they 
are  necessary  to  protect  U.S.  national 
interests  and  those  of  our  friends  and 
allies. 

Secondly,  the  Soviets  have  made 
certain  statements.  Those  statements 
are  believed  to  be  significant  insofar  as 
they  relate  to  the  future.  So  from  taking 
a  look  at  those  two  sets  of  factors,  it 
can  be  seen  that  the  status  quo  has  been 
altered. 

Q.  Why  should  we  take  assurances 
about  the  future  seriously  when  as- 
surances about  the  past  role  of  this 
brigade  are  not  taken  seriously? 

A.  By  observing  and  monitoring,  by 
increasing  collection  activities,  by  what 
is  being  done;  at  the  same  time  by  tak- 
ing additional  steps  to  strengthen  our 
capabilities  and  to  assure  that  we  have 
the  capability  to  protect  ourselves  and 
our  neighbors  in  the  hemisphere  from 
any  threat  to  them  or  to  their  security. 

Q.  Is  it  really  possible,  politically, 
in  the  real  world,  to  separate  this  se- 
quence of  events  from  what  is  going 
on  in  the  Senate  with  the  SALT 
treaty? 

A.  The  Senators  obviously  will  be 
reading  very  carefully  what  the  Presi- 
dent has  to  say  tonight.  We  believe 
very  deeply  that  SALT  should  be 
judged  on  its  own  merits.  A  great  many 
of  the  Senators  who  are  concerned 
about  this  issue,  however,  are  also  very 
concerned  about  SALT — and  feel  that 
it  should  go  forward  on  its  own  merits. 

And  indeed,  even  in  situations  of 
tension  like  this,  such  as  we  have  had. 


November  1979 


II 


it  is  all  the  more  important  to  have 
agreement  on  such  fundamental  matters 
as  strategic  balance,  or  factors  that  af- 
fect our  two  nations. 

Q.  Does  this  training  facility,  or 
combat  headquarters,  or  whatever  it 
is  called,  constitute  a  base  in  the 
sense  that  the  President  used  that 
word? 

A.  We  have  not  come  to  the  conclu- 
sion that  this  constitutes  a  "base."  We 
will  continue  to  review  the  matter,  but 
we  have  not  come  to  that  conclusion. 

Q.  How  has  this  "incident"  af- 
fected our  overall  relationship  with 
the  Soviets? 

A.  Both  the  Soviets  and  the  United 
States  have  recognized  very  clearly  that 
this  matter,  if  not  satisfactorily  re- 
solved, can  have  a  serious  effect  on  the 
relationship  between  our  two  countries 
and,  therefore,  it  has  been  a  matter  of 
serious  concern  to  both  of  our  nations. 

That  is  why  so  much  time  has  been 
given  to  this,  at  the  highest  level, 
starting  with  those  at  the  head  of  the 
government,  the  Foreign  Ministers,  and 
others.  Obviously,  this  is  a  matter 
which  both  countries  feel  to  be  of  great 
importance  to  our  basic  relationship. 

Q.  Would  you  say  that  its  resolu- 
tion has  moved  us  forward,  or  set  us 
back,  or  are  we  on  an  even  plane? 

A.  It  remains  to  be  seen. 

Q.  The  President  referred  to  as- 
surances from  the  Soviets'  "highest 
levels."  Are  we  to  assume,  then, 
that  this  is  the  text  of  a  message  that 
Brezhnev  sent  to  Mr.  Carter? 

A.  You  should  make  the  assumption 
that  what  has  been  said  precisely  re- 
flects statements  that  were  made  to  us 
at  the  highest  levels. 

Q.  Is  this  the  language  the  Soviets 
used,  or  is  this  our  summary,  or  in- 
terpretation of  the  language  they 
used? 

A.  This  is  language  which  they  used. 

Q.  Give  us  your  perspective  on  this 
issue:  How  long  has  this  brigade  been 
there? 

Is  it  a  question  of  earlier  Admin- 
istrations— earlier  watches  not  pick- 
ing up  on  this  brigade  down  there? 
Deliberately  ignoring  it?  Putting  our 
resources  elsewhere?  Or  did  we  just 
put  it  together  here  as  of  August  17th 
for  a  variety  of  reasons? 

A.  We  cannot  tell  when  it  took  this 
form  and  assumed  this  mission.  It  was 
at  least  3  years  ago — maybe  somewhat 
longer. 

This  is  not  a  condemnation  of  any 
previous  Administration. 


In  Cuba  there  are  lots  of  tanks  and 
APC's  exactly  like  those  in  the  Soviet 
unit.  What  we  are  trying  to  find  out  is, 
what  has  been  the  purpose  for  having 
this  particular  set  of  soldiers  and 
equipment  there.  That  is  not  easy,  and 
we  are  pleased  that  we  were  able, 
eventually,  to  put  all  these  pieces  to- 
gether. 

Q.  Was  it  our  assumption  or  ex- 
pectation that  in  due  course  that  unit 
would  have  been  given  sealift  and 
airlift  capability? 

A.  We  have  no  evidence  of  any  in- 
tent to  do  that. 

Q.  If  we  don't  know  what  their 
mission  is  and  how  long  they  have 
been  equipped  and  what  they  are 
doing,  how  can  one  say  they  are  no 
threat  to  us? 

A.  We  do  know  what  they're  doing. 
We  know  the  kind  of  training  they  are 
doing;  we  know  the  kind  of  organiza- 
tion it  is  there.  We  don't  know  why  the 
Soviet  Union  has  decided  that  this  is  an 
appropriate  unit  for  it  to  have  in  Cuba. 

A  brigade  of  Soviet  forces  is  not  a 
threat  to  the  United  States.  We  have 
available  for  use  to  defend  ourselves, 
forces  which  to  this  are  as  a  giant  to  an 
ant.  We  can  deploy  forces  in  the  region 
that  could  swamp  any  such  force.  It  is, 
therefore,  not  a  threat  in  those  terms  to 
the  United  States.  Nevertheless,  as  the 
President  makes  plain  in  his  speech, 
the  Soviet  brigade  is,  and  should  be,  a 
matter  of  some  concern  to  the  sur- 
rounding nations  and,  therefore,  is  to 
us  too  because  it  might  be  used.  The 
Cuban  forces,  which  in  Cuba  amount  to 
a  much  larger  force  than  this  Soviet 
brigade,  could  also  be  a  threat  if  they 
were  used  to  intervene  in  surrounding 
areas. 

The  actions  that  we  are  taking  are 
not  designed  to  greatly  increase  U.S. 
strength.  U.S.  strength  and  capability 
in  this  area  already  are  very  large.  Our 
actions  do  serve  to  remind  people  that 
the  problem  is  not  of  a  magnitude  that 
could  threaten  us.  We  have  and  will 
train  and  exercise  forces  which  are  very 
much  larger  than  this  and  could,  should 
the  contingency  arise,  take  care  of  any 
such  situation. 

Q.  Are  you  saying  this  "beefing 
up"  is  essentially  political  rather 
than  military? 

A.  No.  There  are  two  pieces,  you 
will  recall.  One  is  the  establishment  of 
a  joint  task  force  headquarters  at  Key 
West  whose  purpose  will  be  to  concen- 
trate on  planning  and  on  training  and 
on  exercises  and,  as  needed,  on  tactical 
surveillance,  and  should  the  need  arise, 
conducting  contingency  operations. 

Q.  Will  you  reactivate  the  Key 
West  Naval  Station  at  Boca  Chica? 


A.  The  Key  West  Naval  Station 
continues  to  exist.  This  is  only  a  head- 
quarters organization.  It  will  be 
perhaps  60-100  people.  We  will,  as 
necessary,  assign  to  it  forces  for  the 
functions  that  have  been  mentioned; 
that  serves  a  very  useful  purpose  in  re- 
minding us  of  our  strength.  Should  it 
be  necessary,  it  would  conduct  what- 
ever operations  are  necessary. 

Q.  Are  you  going  to  go  back  and 
do  the  aerial  reconnaissance  of  Cuba 
which  was  suspended  in  1977? 

A.  The  President's  statement  includes 
the  statement  that  we  will  augment  our 
surveillance  as  necessary;  to  the  degree 
that  it  is  necessary  to  use  such  assets, 
we  will. 

Q.  If  there  is  no  real  threat,  then 
why  must  any  additional  action  be 
taken?  And  what  could  they  be  set- 
ting out  to  prevent? 

A.  There  is  not  a  threat  to  the  im- 
mediate security  of  the  United  States. 
This  force  and  the  overall  Soviet- 
Cuban  military  relationship,  however, 
raise  real  questions  and  concerns  in  the 
minds  of  other  countries  in  the  region. 

Q.  Senator  Church  said  several 
weeks  ago  that  as  long  as  the  brigade 
as  a  combat  brigade  remained  in 
Cuba,  he  saw  no  likelihood  that  the 
Senate  would  ratify  SALT.  Well,  the 
brigade  is  going  to  remain  appar- 
ently, so  what  assurance  do  you  have 
now  that  SALT  can  be  saved? 

A.  In  talking  to  a  number  of  Senators 
who  have  been  briefed  about  the 
speech,  in  almost  every  case,  the  re- 
sponse that  we  have  received  is:  "We 
believe  that  the  SALT  treaty  hearings 
should  go  forward;  we  believe  that  it 
should  be  taken  up  on  its  own  merits, 
and  we  are  prepared  to  do  that."  It  is 
our  best  judgment  that  that  will  be  the 
case. 

Q.  Could  you  describe  the  size  of 
this  task  force  that  is  going  to  be 
down  there? 

A.  What  we  are  establishing  is  a  task 
force  headquarters  which  will  have 
perhaps  60  people,  to  begin  with;  it 
might  expand  to  100.  It  will  be  estab- 
lished beginning  this  week.  It  will  have 
assigned  to  the  headquarters  personnel 
from  Army,  Navy,  Air  Force,  and  Ma- 
rines. And  it  will,  depending  upon  the 
particular  things  that  it  happens  to  be 
supervising  at  a  particular  time,  have 
assigned  to  it  operational  forces  from 
each  of  these  services.  And  that  might 
go  anywhere  from  a  battalion  of  Ma- 
rines for  some  functions  to  a  substan- 
tial Naval  task  force  plus  some  air 
squadrons  in  others.  D 


12 


l^etvs  Conference 
of  October  9  (Excerpts) 


Q.  Do  you  think  that  you  have 
diffused  the  problem  or  issue  of  the 
Soviet  brigade  in  Cuba  and  satisfied 
those  who  seek  a  bigger  defense 
budget  enough  now  to  win  SALT 
ratification  this  year,  and  if  so,  how? 

A.  I  believe  SALT  will  be  ratified 
this  year  basically  on  its  own  merits. 
It's  obvious  to  me  that  the  SALT  treaty 
is  in  the  best  interest  of  our  country.  It 
enhances  the  security  of  the  United 
States,  it  contributes  to  world  peace,  it 
will  strengthen  our  own  alliances,  it 
will  preserve  our  place  as  a  leader  of 
the  Western  world,  it  will  let  it  be  more 
easy  for  us  to  control  the  spread  of  nu- 
clear explosives  all  over  the  world. 

In  my  opinion  we  have  answered  the 
question  of  the  Soviet  combat  unit  in 
Cuba  adequately.  I  think  we've  isolated 
any  threat  from  that  unit.  We'll  in- 
crease our  surveillance  there  and  I  be- 
lieve that  this  obviously  has  been  an 
important  issue  for  us  to  address.  I  be- 
lieve it's  been  addressed  adequately. 

As  far  as  the  defense  budget  is  con- 
cerned, that  still  must  be  resolved.  I'm 
committed  to  a  3%  real  growth  in  our 
defense.  I  have  maintained  that  posi- 
tion for  the  last  3  years.  It's  important 
to  us,  to  our  allies,  to  American 
strength.  If  I  see  a  need  for  increased 
defense  programs,  I  would  not  hesitate 
to  recommend  them  to  the  Congress. 


Q.  What  is  your  reaction  to  Dr. 
Kissinger's  statement  that  the  Soviet 
troops  in  Cuba  are  the  first  or- 
ganized hostile  force  in  this  hemi- 
sphere since  the  Monroe  Doctrine 
that  we've  accepted,  and  also  do  you 
feel  that  the  Soviet  troops  in  Cuba 
symbolize  the  growing  expansionism 
of  the  Russians,  the  Soviet  Union? 

A.  The  troops  in  Cuba  have  been 
there  for  a  long  time.  I've  not  read 
Secretary  Kissinger's  speech.  I've  read 
news  reports  of  it.  Its  basic  premises 
are  compatible  with  my  own,  that  the 
presence  of  a  Soviet  combat  unit  there 
is  a  serious  matter,  which  I  think  we 
have  addressed  as  best  we  could. 

Secondly,  that  this  is  not  the  most 
important  matter  of  all,  that  above  and 
beyond  that,  it's  important  to  recognize 
and  to  do  what  we  can  to  contain 
Cuban  interventionism  or  adventurism 
around  the  world.  As  you  know,  this 
began  primarily  with  the  entrance  of 
more  than  a    10,000  body  of  troops 


from  Cuba  into  Angola  in  1975  before  I 
was  President. 

We  do  look  upon  this  as  a  major 
threat.  I  have  not  seen  any  reports  that 
Secretary  Kissinger  recommended  dif- 
ferent moves  from  the  ones  that  I  out- 
lined to  the  nation  on  the  evening 
of  October  I  .  So  we  do  share  a 
common  concern.  I  think  that  our  re- 
sponse was  measured  and  appropriate. 
I  do  not  favor  the  Soviets  extending 
their  arm  of  inlluence  to  the  Cubans  or 
anyone  else  around  the  world. 

This  has  been  part  of  the  history  of 
the  Soviet  Union.  We  attempt  to  meet 
them  and  compete  with  them  ade- 
quately in  my  opinion  on  a  peaceful 
basis.  And  in  my  judgment,  if  we  can 
control  the  military  expenditures  and 
have  equality,  have  arms  control,  in 
my  judgment,  we  can  compete  with  the 
Soviets  on  a  peaceful  basis  with  an  ex- 
cellent prospect  for  victory. 

The  Soviets  represent  a  totalitarian 
nation.  We  are  committed  to  peace  and 
freedom  and  democracy.  The  Soviets 
subjugate  the  rights  of  an  individual 
human  being  to  the  rights  of  the  state. 
We  do  just  the  opposite.  The  Soviets 
are  an  atheistic  nation.  We  have  deep 
and  fundamental  religious  beliefs.  The 
Soviets  have  a  primary  emphasis  on  the 
military  aspect  of  their  economy.  Ours 
is  much  more  broadly  based  to  give  the 
benefits  of  economic  growth  to  indi- 
vidual human  beings.  So  I  believe  that 
in  addition  to  that,  our  raising  a  stand- 
ard of  human  rights  and  the  honoring  of 
national  aspirations,  not  trying  to 
interfere  in  the  internal  affairs  of  other 
countries,  gives  us  an  additional  ad- 
vantage in  a  peaceful  competition  with 
the  Soviets.  So  I  don't  have  any  fear  of 
or  any  trepidation  about  that  intense 
competition  with  the  Soviets  on  a 
peaceful  basis. 

I  obviously  want  the  same  thing  that 
President  Brezhnev  wants;  that  is,  the 
avoidance  of  a  nuclear  war.  So  we  have 
some  things  in  common,  the  avoidance 
of  war.  We  have  other  things  in  com- 
mon, a  willingness  to  compete.  We've 
got  advantages  over  them  that  I  hope  to 
utilize  in  the  future  as  we  have  in  the 
past. 

Q.  .  .  .  will  you  plan  on  talking 
to  Reverend  Jesse  Jackson  in  re- 
sponse to  his  meetings  with  Yasir 
Arafat? 

A.  I  have  no  plans  to  talk  to  Rev- 
erend Jackson.   I  presume  you  mean 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 

about  his  recent  trips  to  the  Middle 
East.  He  has  or  will  make  a  report  to 
Ambassador  Strauss,  who  is  our  Mid- 
east negotiator. 


Q.  In  your  speech  on  Cuba  the 
other  night,  you  spoke  about  wanting 
to  increase  the  capabilities  of  our 
rapid  deployment  force. 

A.  Forces. 

Q.  Forces.  I  wondered  if  you 
could  say  under  what  circumstances 
you  would  be  willing  to  intervene 
militarily  in  the  Middle  East. 

A.  I  see  no  prospect  at  this  point  for 
our  intervention  militarily  in  anyplace 
in  the  world.  That  would  be  a  judgment 
that  I  would  only  make  if  I  thought  the 
security  of  our  country  was  directly 
threatened. 


Q.  Further  on  the  Fed  tight  money 
policy,  figures  such  as  from  the 
West  German  Deutsche  Bundesbank 
President  Emminger  and  Democra- 
tic Party  presidential  candidate  Lyn- 
don LaRouche  [sic],  have  charged 
that  this  is  leading  us  rapidly  toward 
the  crash  of  1979.  Will  you  move  to 
stabilize  the  dollar  in  the  economy 
by  collaborating  with  Europe  on 
their  moves  to  demonetize  gold  as  La 
Rouche  and  others  have  suggested? 

A.  I  doubt  that  that  is  in  prospect, 
certainly  not  for  this  year.  We  do 
cooperate  with  our  allies  and  friends 
and  trade  partners  in  order  to  stabilize 
the  worldwide  monetary  system,  in- 
cluding at  times  the  interrelationship 
between  currencies  from  one  country 
and  another  and  sometimes  the  basic 
metals.  I  don't  see  any  threat  to  the 
well-being  of  any  American  because  of 
a  rapidly  increasing  price  of  gold,  ex- 
cept those  who  have  sold  early  or 
bought  late.  But  as  far  as  the  average 
citizen  is  concerned,  the  price  of  gold, 
whether  it  is  $200  an  ounce  or  $400, 
has  very  little  impact. 

Recently,  the  Federal  Reserve  Board 
has  decided  to  raise  interest  rates  and 
take  other  steps  concerning  the  reserve 
supply  of  money  to  be  kept  on  hand  by 
banks.  This  has  resulted  in  a  strength- 
ening of  the  dollar,  which  had  already 
begun  to  strengthen,  and  I  believe  that 
it's  well  within  the  bounds  of  manage- 
ment, it  is  stable.  I  noticed  an  analysis 
that  showed  that  in  the  last  year  the 
price  of  the  dollar,  the  value  of  the 
dollar,  as  compared  to  currencies  of  all 
our  trade  partners,  has  increased  sub- 
stantially. Among  the  OPEC  nations 
[Organization  of  Petroleum  Exporting 
Countries]  and  their  trade  partners,  the 


November  1979 


13 


r 


THE  SECRETARY:        Currents  oi  Change 

In  Latin  America 


Address  before  the  Foreign  Policy 
'Association  in  New  York  on  September 
'7,  1979.' 

I  want  to  talk  this  noon  about  a  re- 
Jon  in  which  the  surface  waves  have 
;eceived  more  attention  than  the  deeper 
currents  shaping  them.  I  refer  to  Latin 
kmerica.  Beneath  the  conflict  and 
tontroversy,  quieter  but  profound 
thanges  are  taking  place  in  the  hemi- 
sphere. They  are  leading  toward  eco- 
nomic growth,  toward  democracy,  and 


toward  greater  international  engage- 
ment. 

These  trends  are  neither  uniform  nor 
immutable.  Distinct  crosscurrents  are 
also  present.  The  interplay  of  these  and 
other  forces  may  at  times  produce  tur- 
moil. But  the  broad  directions  are  un- 
mistakable. Economies  are  expanding, 
democratic  values  are  taking  firmer 
hold,  and  the  international  role  of  Latin 
American  nations  is  widening  and 
deepening. 

Let  me  discuss  these  basic  trends  in 


the  region.  What  do  they  mean  for  the 
countries  there  and  for  the  United 
States?  And,  mindful  of  these  changes, 
how  are  we  approaching  our  relations 
with  the  other  nations  of  the  hemi- 
sphere? 


Latin  America  Today 

Economic  Growth.  Over  the  past 
generation,  dramatic  economic  growth 
has  occurred  throughout  the  region. 


value  of  the  dollar,  even  before  we 
made  this  recent  move,  had  increased 

ifc  over  the  last  year. 

So  I  believe  the  dollar  is  stable,  I 
believe  the  world  economy  is  stable, 
and  I  see  no  prospect  of  shifting  to  a 
rigid  price  of  gold  and  a  gold  standard. 


Q.  By  all  accounts,  it  appears  that 
in  the  coming  months,  a  million  or 
more  people  could  die  in  Kampuchea 
of  starvation.  I  know  that  you  talked 
about  this  with  the  Pope  the  other 
day.  What  if  anything  can  this  gov- 
ernment do  in  combination  with 
other  groups? 

A.  We  have  been  encouraging  the 
humanitarian  granting  of  aid,  particu- 
larly food  aid  to  the  people  of  Kam- 
puchea, hundreds  of  thousands  of 
whom,  maybe  millions  of  whom  are 
starving.  We  are  trying  to  work  out 
with  the  uncertain  leaders  of  that 
country — uncertain  because  it's  con- 
tested through  war — a  mechanism  by 
which  the  United  Nations  primarily, 
the  Red  Cross,  and  UNICEF.  could  get 
food  in  to  those  people  who  are  within 
Kampuchea. 

There's  also  a  legal  problem  in  refu- 
gee funds  because  it  hasn't  yet  been 
determined  legally  if  a  person  who 
hasn't  left  the  country  is  still  identifi- 
able as  a  refugee.  The  fact  that  the 
country  is  divided  by  war  creates  a 
complication.  But  we  are  ready  and 
eager  to  join  in  with  other  countries  to 
provide  humanitarian  aid  to  all  the 
people  of  Kampuchea  who  are  starving, 
and  we  will  move  on  that  without  any 
further  delay  as  soon  as  it's  possible  to 
join  other  countries  in  this  effort. 


Q.  Going  back  to  your  comments 
about  competition  with  the  Soviet 


Union  with  regard  to  arms,  would 
you  support  NATO  deployment  of 
the  Pershing  missile  to  counter  the 
SS-20?  And  if  I  could  add  another 
question  there,  do  you  have  any 
reaction  to  President  Brezhnev's 
conditional  offer,  too,  on  arms  re- 
duction in  central  Europe? 

A.  Our  allies  and  we  are  carefully 
assessing  the  significance  of  President 
Brezhnev's  statement.  However,  I'd 
like  to  point  out  that  what  he's  offering 
in  effect  is  to  continue  their  own  rate  of 
modernization  as  it  has  been  provided, 
we  don't  modernize  at  all. 

They  have  had  an  actual  reduction  in 
launchers  the  last  few  years.  They've 
been  replacing  the  old  SS-4's  and 
SS-5's  with  the  SS-20,  not  on  a  one- 
for-one  basis,  but  the  SS-20  has  three 
warheads,  the  old  missiles  only  had 
one  warhead.  The  SS-20  has  a  much 
greater  range.  It  can  reach  our  Western 
allies"  countries  as  a  target  even  if  it's 
located  in  the  central  part  of  Russia. 

It's  three  to  six  times  as  accurate  as 
the  old  missiles  which  it  replaced,  and 
in  addition  to  that,  it's  mobile;  that  is, 
it  can't  be  located  specifically  and  de- 
stroyed with  a  preemptive  strike  if  that 
should  become  a  desire  on  the  part  of 
allies. 

They  also  have  replaced  older  air- 
planes with  the  Backfire  bomber.  So 
it's  not  quite  as  constructive  a  proposal 
as  at  first  blush  it  seems  to  be.  I  think 
it's  an  effort  designed  to  disarm  the 
willingness  or  eagerness  of  our  allies 
adequately  to  defend  themselves. 

In  my  judgment,  the  decision  ought 
to  be  made  to  modernize  the  Western 
allies'  military  strength  and  then 
negotiate  with  full  commitment  and 
determination  mutually  to  lower  arma- 
ments on  both  sides,  the  Warsaw  Pact 
and  the  NATO  countries,  so  that  we 
can   retain   equivalency   of  military 


strength,  equity  of  military  strength 
and  have  a  lower  overall  level  of 
armaments.  This  is  what  we  hope  to 
achieve. 

I  might  point  out  that  Chancellor 
Schmidt  said,  I  believe  yesterday  or  the 
day  before,  that  a  prerequisite  to  a  de- 
cision by  our  NATO  allies  to  take  these 
steps  which  he  considers  to  be  vital  for 
the  security  of  NATO  is  the  passage  of 
SALT  II. 

So  if  we  can  be  successful  in  con- 
trolling existing  strategic  Soviet  and 
U.S.  atomic  weapons  through  SALT  II. 
then  we'll  move  in  the  next  step  to  re- 
ducing the  nuclear  weapons  which 
don't  have  intercontinental  range.  And 
along  with  that,  we'll  continue  with  our 
mutual  and  balanced  force  reduction 
effort  to  reduce  conventional  arms. 

It's  an  interesting  proposal;  it's  one 
that  might  show  promise.  We're  as- 
sessing it  carefully,  but  it's  not  as  great 
a  step  as  would  ordinarily  be  judged  at 
first. 


Q.  A  question  on  the  Middle  East 
—  do  you  agree  with  those  such  as 
former  Ambassador  Andrew  Young 
and  George  Ball  and  others  who  say 
that  it  is  now  time  to  do  away  with 
the  restrictions  put  on  our  foreign 
policy  by  Henry  Kissinger  and  open 
up  a  dialogue  with  the  Palestinians 
and  the  PLC  [Palestine  Liberation 
Organization]? 

A.  No,  I  do  not.  We  will  not  negoti- 
ate with  the  PLO.  We  will  not  recog- 
nize the  PLO  until  after  the  PLO  rec- 
ognizes Israel's  right  to  exist  and  en- 
dorses U.N.  Resolution  242  as  a  basis 
for  Middle  East  peace.  D 


Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of  Presidential 
Documents  of  Oct.  15.  p.  1836. 


14 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


•  Since  1960  Latin  America's  econ- 
omies have  expanded  rapidly.  As  a  re- 
sult, Latin  America's  share  of  world 
trade  has  grown  by  more  than  a  third. 

•  The  region  produces  and  exports  a 
growing  variety  of  manufactured  goods 
as  well  as  raw  materials  and  oil. 

•  A  number  of  the  countries  of  Latin 
America  are  now  among  the  most  in- 
dustrialized and  urban  in  the  world. 
Several  are  emerging  as  global  eco- 
nomic powers. 

This  vitality  is  closely  linked  to  our 
own  well-being.  To  a  greater  extent 
than  ever  before,  the  daily  lives  of  citi- 
zens in  New  York  and  Caracas,  in 
Mexico  City  and  Los  Angeles  are  in- 
tertv/ined.  Social  and  economic  condi- 
tions elsewhere  in  the  hemisphere  have 
a  direct  impact  on  us  in  every  phase  of 
our  lives. 

The  flow  of  people  and  goods,  tech- 
nology, and  capital — in  both  direc- 
tions—  is  at  unprecedented  levels. 
Three  nations — Brazil,  Mexico,  and 
Venezuela — are  among  our  top  dozen, 
and  fastest  growing,  trading  partners. 

With  Latin  America's  rapid  develop- 
ment has  come  a  shift  toward  more 
pragmatic  economic  policies.  The 
hemisphere's  planners  generally  have 
discarded  dogmatic  strategies  in  favor 
of  mixed  economies.  Governments  are 
performing  certain  essential  functions, 
but  the  private  sector  also  has  a  vital 
role.  The  ideological  tensions  sur- 
rounding private  investment  have  di- 
minished, as  both  host  nations  and 
foreign  investors  have  learned  to 
negotiate  to  mutual  advantage.  These 
are  welcome  developments  for  they  en- 
able U.S.  business  to  add  its  dynamism 
to  that  of  Latin  America. 

Certainly,  many  serious  economic 
problems  remain  in  the  region.  Its 
societies  feel  the  consequences  of  in- 
flation, high  energy  prices,  and  the 
economic  slowdown  around  the  world. 
Some  Caribbean  nations  are  just  begin- 
ning the  awesome  task  of  translating 
national  independence  into  measurable 
progress  for  their  people.  Regional 
fragmentation  still  hampers  develop- 
ment both  in  the  Caribbean  and  in 
Central  America. 

Sharp  economic  inequities  plague  the 
region.  The  fruits  of  rapid  growth,  in 
many  cases,  have  not  reached  the  poor 
majority,  and  the  gap  widens.  For  too 
many,  each  dawn  still  brings  the  hard 
reality  of  want  and  frustration. 

But  despite  persistent  problems,  the 
fact  remains  that  the  enormous  poten- 
tial of  the  region  is  beginning  to  be 
realized.  The  challenge  for  Latin 
America  in  the  1980's  will  be  to  com- 
bine sustained  growth  with  increased 
equity. 

As  trade,  technology  transfers,  cap- 


ital flows,  migration,  fishing  rights, 
and  other  economic  issues  move  to  the 
top  of  the  hemispheric  agenda,  there 
are  new  opportunities  for  us — and  new 
sources  of  friction  as  well.  National 
interests  will  be  asserted  vigorously  on 
all  sides.  Those  interests  will  some- 
times clash.  As  competition  in  trade 
expands,  for  example,  we  must  con- 
tinue to  assure  that  it  takes  place  in 
ways  that  are  fair  to  all  trading 
partners,  and  to  all  Americans. 

But  if  we  all  proceed  with  a  realistic 
appreciation  of  the  interest  we  have  in 
each  other's  well-being,  we  can  find 
common  ground. 

The  Democratic   Resurgence.   A 

second  dimension  of  the  changes  now 
taking  place  in  the  region  is  the 
gradual,  uneven  but  nonetheless  dis- 
tinct movement  toward  greater  democ- 
racy and  respect  for  human  rights. 

•  A  year  ago,  the  Dominican  Re- 
public transferred  power  peacefully  to 
an  elected  opposition  candidate  for  the 
first  time  in  this  century. 

•  Ecuador  and  Bolivia  recently  inau- 
gurated constitional  governments  after 
10  years  of  military  rule. 

•  Peru  has  adopted  a  new  constitu- 
tion and  is  preparing  for  national  elec- 
tions next  year. 

•  In  Central  America  Nicaragua  is 
attempting  to  overcome  the  legacy  of 
40  years  of  dictatorship.  Honduras  will 
elect  a  constituent  assembly  next 
spring. 

•  In  Latin  America  as  a  whole,  the 
last  2  years  have  witnessed  many  tan- 
gible improvements  in  respect  for  the 
rights  of  the  person.  We  have  wel- 
comed and  supported  this  resurgence. 

But  the  competition  between  de- 
mocracy and  authoritarianism  is  far 
from  over.  Injustice,  frustration,  and 
fear  can  breed  cycles  of  violent  ex- 
tremes, producing  polarization  within 
countries  and  in  the  region.  Repres- 
sion, terrorism,  or  their  scars  persist, 
even  in  nations  with  once  proud  demo- 
cratic traditions. 

Thus,  the  prospects  for  democracy 
and  human  rights  are  far  from  uniform. 
But  the  currents  are  moving  in  favora- 
ble directions.  The  transition  to  more 
stable  and  open  systems  is  underway 
and  gaining  momentum. 

These  moves  toward  more 
democratic  and  open  societies  in  Latin 
America  are  distinctly  in  our  interest. 
The  great  strength  of  democracy  is  its 
flexibility  and  resilience.  It  opens  op- 
portunities for  broadly  based  political 
and  economic  participation.  By  en- 
couraging compromise  and  accommo- 
dation, it  fosters  evolutionary  change. 

In  short,  the  evolution  toward  de- 
mocracy  serves   our   interests   in   a 


dynamic  community  of  nations  in  this 
hemisphere.  ^ 

Greater  International  Engage- 
ment. A  third  dimension  of  change  in 
Latin  America  is  the  growing  role  of 
the  nations  of  the  hemisphere  in  shap- 
ing regional  and  international  responses 
to  shared  problems. 

In  the  region,  Latin  American  ini- 
tiatives have  led  to  the  Tlatelolco 
nuclear-free  zone  and  the  newly  created 
court  for  human  rights.  Last  month  the 
countries  of  the  Andean  pact,  drawn 
closer  together  by  their  convergence 
toward  more  democratic  systems,  is- 
sued the  declaration  of  Quito  pledging 
their  support  for  democratization  and 
human  rights  throughout  the  hemi- 
sphere. The  leadership  of  these  South 
American  states — together  with  Mex 
ico,  Costa  Rica,  Panama,  and  like 
minded  countries  in  the  Caribbean  — 
enabled  the  Organization  of  American 
States  (OAS)  to  play  an  important  rolei 
in  support  of  political  change  in 
Nicaragua.  The  OAS  has  been  en 
hanced  as  a  result. 

The  nations  of  Latin  America  and  the; 
Caribbean  are  also  playing  an  increas 
ingly  critical  role  in  global  negotiations: 
between  North  and  South.  From  the 
Law  of  the  Sea  negotiations  to  the  cre-i 
ation  of  UNCTAD  [U.N.  Conference 
on  Trade  and  Development],  the  Latin 
Americans  are  asserting  their  lead 
ership  energetically. 

At  times  we  will  differ — even 
strongly — as  we  do  with  some  of  thei 
statements  made  at  the  recent  meeting 
of  the  nonaligned  movement  in 
Havana.  But  Latin  American  initiativesi 
are  an  increasingly  important  part  of 
the  global  framework  within  which  we 
must  work  to  achieve  greater  prosperity 
and  security  for  our  own  people.  The 
realization  of  basic  U.S.  objectives  in 
the  world — from  structuring  a  better 
functioning  international  economy  to 
halting  the  ominous  spread  of  nuclear 
weapons — will  depend,  more  than  ever 
before,  on  our  ability  to  work  with  our 
friends  in  the  hemisphere. 

Future  Relations  With  Latin 
America 

What  does  all  this  mean  for  future 
relations  with  our  neighbors? 

If  we  are  properly  attentive  to  the  re- 
gion, the  changes  that  are  taking  place 
can  lead  to  more  sturdy  and  durable 
ties.  Relations  between  the  United 
States  and  the  nations  of  Latin  America 
continue  to  be  affected  by  the  dis- 
parities of  power  between  us.  This  pro- 
duces differing  perceptions  and  con- 
flicting approaches  on  many  issues. 
But  Latin  America's  growth  is  bringing 
new  balance.  Inter-American  relation- 


November  1979 


15 


ships  are   becoming   more  open  and 
forward  looking. 

From  the  beginning  of  this  Adminis- 
tration, we  have  made  a  concerted  ef- 
fort to  fashion  a  course  that  recognizes 
the  new  realities  of  the  hemisphere  and 
the  distinctive  differences  among  Latin 
American  nations  and  people.  As 
President  Carter  said  last  year  in  his 
address  before  the  Organization  of 
American  States: 

Slogans  [will]  no  longer  suffice  to  describe 
Ihe  diversity  of  the  Americas  nor  [will]  a  single 
formula  be  helpful  when  our  individual  and  our 
common  interests  are  so  clearly  global  in 
scope  The  problems  .  ,  .  require  that  we  in  the 
Western  Hemisphere  think  and  act  more 
broadly. 

From  his  first  days  in  office.  Presi- 
dent Carter  made  clear  his  intention  to 
conclude  a  new  Panama  Canal  treaty  to 
strengthen  the  basis  on  which  the  canal 
is  operated  and  defended  and  take  ac- 
count of  the  rights  and  aspirations  of 
the  Panamanian  people.  The  new 
treaties  go  into  effect  on  Monday. 

Just  as  Americans  have  been  right- 
fully proud  of  our  success  in  building 
that  technological  marvel  when  others 
had  failed,  so  too  we  should  be  proud 
of  our  achievement  in  building  a  new 
partnership  with  Panama.  For  it  points 
to  a  new  direction  in  our  dealings  with 
the  hemisphere — based  on  shared  re- 
sponsibility, not  domination  or  de- 
pendence; on  justice  and  accommoda- 
tion, not  confrontation. 


U.S.  Approach  Toward 
Latin  America 

In  a  speech  a  few  months  ago  to  the 
National  Urban  League,  I  outlined  the 
elements  of  that  new  approach  to  the 
developing  world  in  general.  Today,  let 
me  describe  this  approach  as  it  affects 
our  relations  with  the  closest  and  most 
industrialized  part  of  the  developing 
world. 

First,  in  our  economic  relations  we 
are  seeking  to  increase  both  the  partic- 
ipation— and  the  responsibilities — of 
developing  countries  in  the  interna- 
tional economic  system. 

We  have  made  some  genuine  prog- 
ress in  recent  years.  The  International 
Monetary  Fund  is  stronger,  better 
capitalized,  and  becoming  more  re- 
sponsive to  the  developing  world.  The 
new  trade  rules  agreed  to  earlier  this 
year  open  new  opportunities  for  coun- 
tries entering  the  world  trading  system. 
A  number  of  individual  agreements 
have  been  reached  to  limit  damaging 
swings  in  the  price  of  particular  com- 
modities. And  we  have  agreed  on  the 
elements  of  a  common  fund  to  help 
stabilize  the  prices  of  raw  materials. 


We  are  committed  to  achieving  fur- 
ther concrete  progress.  One  issue  that 
is  of  particular  concern  to  the  Carib- 
bean and  Central  America  is  the  Inter- 
national Sugar  Agreement  that  has  been 
negotiated.  We  have  not  yet  been  able 
to  secure  congressional  ratification  for 
the  agreement.  It  is  important,  and  we 
will  continue  to  work  until  it  is 
approved. 

Continued  transformations  in  the 
world  economy  will  demand  continued 
creativity  in  balancing  the  interests  of 
all  countries.  Our  relations  with  Mex- 
ico are  a  prime  example.  The  range  and 
diversity  of  issues  in  our  relations  are 
probably  greater  than  with  any  other 
country  in  the  world.  Because  we  share 
a  2000-mile  border,  because  we  share 
democratic  perspectives,  because  our 
economies  are  both  strong  and  interde- 
pendent, Mexico  is  one  of  the  most  im- 
portant countries  in  the  world  for  us. 

When  President  Carter  and  President 
Lopez  Portillo  meet  tomorrow,  they 
will  do  so  with  a  mutual  recognition  of 
our  common  need  to  continue  to 
strengthen  the  cooperation  between  us. 
The  successful  completion  last  week  of 
negotiations  on  natural  gas  demon- 
strates the  benefits  we  both  can  derive. 

Second,  we  are  focusing  our  atten- 
tion and  resources  on  practical  solu- 
tions to  concrete  development  prob- 
lems. 

We  are  targeting  our  bilateral  aid  on 
the  pressing  daily  needs  of  people  in 
the  poorer  countries.  And  we  are  pro- 
viding emergency  help  for  countries 
like  the  Dominican  Republic  and 
Nicaragua,  struggling  to  rebuild  after 
natural  and  human  disasters. 

We  are  working  through  the  Inter- 
American  Development  Bank  and  other 
international  financial  institutions  to 
increase  food  and  energy  production 
and  to  move  toward  greater  social 
equity  throughout  the  hemisphere. 

At  the  same  time,  we  are  intensify- 
ing our  support  for  subregional  inte- 
gration, through  the  Andean  pact  and 
the  Central  American  Common  Market. 
As  a  step  toward  greater  cooperation 
among  the  Caribbean  nations,  we  and 
other  donors  have  joined  with  them  to 
form  the  Caribbean  Group  for  Cooper- 
ation in  Economic  Development. 

Most  of  the  continent's  poor  live  in 
countries  which,  because  national  per 
capita  incomes  have  risen,  no  longer 
receive  our  bilateral  assistance.  This 
dilemma,  although  not  unique  to  Latin 
America,  affects  this  region  more  than 
any  other.  National  decisions  will 
primarily  determine  how  the  fruits  of 
growth  are  distributed.  But  the  interna- 
tional community  must  also  do  a  better 
job  of  reaching  all  those  who  are  in 
need. 


These  varied  cooperative  endeavors 
not  only  contribute  to  Latin  America's 
progress,  they  are  fundamental  to  the 
political  and  economic  cooperation  we 
ourselves  seek  from  the  countries  of  the 
region. 

Third,  through  consistent  support 
for  human  rights,  we  are  seeking  to 
help  other  governments  respond  to  ris- 
ing demands  for  justice  and  for  full 
participation  in  the  political  and  eco- 
nomic life  of  their  nations. 

How  each  society  manages  change  is 
a  matter  for  it  to  decide.  But  divergent 
views  cannot  be  permanently  excluded 
nor  repression  maintained  in  any 
society  without  sowing  the  seeds  of 
violent  convulsion. 

We  have  seen  the  consequences  of 
authoritarian  rule  in  Nicaragua.  Our 
challenge  today  is  to  join  with  others  in 
the  region  to  help  the  Nicaraguan 
people  and  government  succeed  in 
building  a  stable,  healthy,  democratic 
society  out  of  the  debris  of  dictatorship 
and  revolution.  The  relative  absence  of 
reprisals  against  members  of  the  So- 
moza  government  is  a  promising  be- 
ginning to  what  we  hope  will  be  a 
humane  process  of  social  change,  in 
close  association  with  the  hemisphere's 
democracies. 

By  extending  our  friendship  and 
economic  assistance,  we  enhance  the 
prospects  for  democracy  in  Nicaragua. 
We  cannot  guarantee  that  democracy 
will  take  hold  there.  But  if  we  turn  our 
backs  on  Nicaragua,  we  can  almost 
guarantee  that  democracy  will  fail. 

It  may  take  time  for  us  to  overcome 
the  legacy  of  the  past  and  to  develop  a 
relationship  of  mutual  trust  with  the 
new  government.  We  must  be  patient, 
steady,  and  prepared  for  inevitable  dis- 
agreements. But  so  long  as  pluralism 
flourishes  in  Nicaragua — and  we  re- 
spect it — I  am  confident  that  relations 
will  prosper. 

Elsewhere  in  the  region,  we  will  en- 
courage and  support  constructive 
change  before  the  ties  between  gov- 
ernment and  people  irreversibly  erode 
and  radicalism  or  repression  drive  out 
moderate  solutions. 

Fourth,  we  must  keep  alive  in  our 
minds  the  important  distinction  be- 
tween the  social  and  political  changes 
that  result  from  internal  factors  and 
those  that  result  from  outside  pressures 
and  forces.  We  must  recognize  that 
disruption  within  nations  does  not 
necessarily  mean  there  is  an  outside 
hand.  But  at  the  same  time,  we  must  be 
alert  to  the  reality  that  internal  tensions 
present  opportunities  for  outside  inter- 
ference. 

It  is  in  this  context  that  we  have  in 
the  past  expressed  concern  over  Cuba's 


Department  of  State  Bulletin  ' 


efforts  to  exploit  for  its  own  advantage 
social  and  political  change  within  its 
neighbors. 

Our  concerns  are  shared  by  other 
countries  in  the  hemisphere.  The  na- 
tions of  Latin  America  are  firmly 
committed  to  the  proposition  that  out- 
side interference  in  their  internal  affairs 
must  be  resisted.  We  fully  respect  and 
will  support  that  determination  on  their 
part. 

Cuba's  ability  to  exploit  these  inter- 
nal tensions  is  reinforced  by  its  close 
military  ties  with  the  Soviet  Union. 
The  recent  confirmation  of  the  presence 
of  a  Soviet  combat  unit  in  Cuba  has 
further  heightened  this  concern.  We  are 
seeking  to  resolve,  by  diplomatic 
negotiations  with  the  Soviet  Union, 
questions  raised  by  the  presence  of 
these  forces.  We  have  significant  inter- 
ests at  stake  in  our  total  relationship 
with  the  Soviet  Union.  We  wish  to 
keep  each  part  in  proper  perspective. 
However,  we  will  assure  that  our  inter- 
ests are  fully  protected. 

The  fifth  element  in  our  strategy  is 
to  support  regional  efforts  to  resolve 
regional  conflicts.  Latin  America  is  the 
scene  of  a  number  of  simmering  and 
potentially  explosive  territorial  dis- 
putes. But  over  the  past  year,  reason- 
able progress  has  been  made  on  a 
number  of  them. 

•  Fears  of  conflict  in  the  Andes  have 
eased  substantially. 

•  The  Beagle  Channel  dispute  be- 
tween Argentina  and  Chile,  while  not 
resolved,  is  under  mediation. 

•  El  Salvador  and  Honduras  are 
moving  closer  to  resolving  their  border 
conflict. 

In  these  and  other  territorial  disputes 
in  the  region,  the  underlying  issues  re- 
main. We  will  continue  to  support  col- 
lective efforts  to  preserve  the  hemi- 
sphere's long  tradition  of  resolving  its 
international  disputes  in  peace. 

Sixth  and  finally,  as  we  pursue  this 
strategy,  we  will  work  with  any  nation 
willing  to  work  with  us  toward  practi- 
cal common  goals.  Latin  America  is  a 
continent  of  great — and  growing — 
diversity.  Our  interest  is  not  in  resist- 
ing diversity  but  in  building  upon  it  for 
our  common  good. 


Conclusion 

Change  and  growth — in  the  United 
States,  in  Latin  America,  and  in  the 
world — create  both  new  opportunities 
and  new  tensions.  They  have  trans- 
formed inter-American  affairs.  Today, 
those  relationships  are  more  directly 
relevant  to  our  domestic  lives  than  ever 
before.  The  perplexing  dilemmas,  the 


Quesiiott'and'Answer  Session 
Folio irtttg  iVetr  York  Address 


Q.  With  the  advantage  that  the 
audience  has  had  in  being  able  to 
listen  to  your  remarks,  particularly 
toward  the  close,  I  would  like  to  ask  a 
question  of  my  own,  if  I  may,  at  the 
outset.  You  have  spoken  of  the 
problem  of  the  Soviet  combat  bri- 
gade in  Cuba,  and  you  have  said  that 
the  nations  of  Latin  America  join 
with  us  in  rejecting  external  interfer- 
ence in  their  affairs,  and  specifically 
any  interference  in  which  Cuba 
might  have  a  quarrel. 

Can  you  comment  on  the  Latin 
American  reaction  to  the  revelation 
of  the  precise  nature — perhaps  is  the 
way  to  put  it — of  the  Soviet  brigade 
in  Cuba,  and  comment  on  whether 
there  are  possibilities  for  associating 
Latin  America  with  the  diplomacy 
that  might  produce  an  adjustment  of 
this  matter? 

A.  I  do  not  think  it  would  be  wise  to 
answer  the  second  half  of  your  ques- 
tion. I  will  answer  the  first  half  of  the 
question.  Let  me  say  that  the  reaction 
has  been  one  of  caution,  one  of  seeking 
for  further  information  on  the  part  of 
the  various  nations.  Some  have  ex- 
pressed their  views  to  us  in  very  clear 
terms;  others  have  said  that  they  want 
to  further  watch  and  examine  the  situa- 
tion before  they  express  their  views. 
That  is  the  general  picture  that  the  dis- 
cussions to  date  have  brought. 

Q.  Do  private  trips,  by  private  in- 
dividuals, to  the  Middle  East  en- 
danger official  efforts  to  bring  about 
peace  there?  [Laughter] 

A.  Private  trips  to  the  Middle  East  I 
do  not  believe  jeopardize  the  peace 
process.  The  peace  process  is  under 
way  with  the  negotiations  that  are 
going  forward  with  respect  to  the  West 
Bank  and  Gaza.  Insofar  as  actual  par- 


ticipation, that  obviously  lies  in  the 
hands  of  the  parties.  They  are  the  ones 
who  are  going  to  have  to  make  the  de- 
cisions on  what  the  future  will  bring  in 
terms  of  the  outcome  of  the  negotia- 
tions. I,  for  one,  am  one  of  those 
people  who  believe  that  in  any  set  of 
negotiations,  you  can  do  the  most  ef- 
fective work  when  you  are  working  to- 
gether quietly  discussing  the  issues 
rather  than  in  the  spotlight  of  the  press 
and  the  television  cameras. 

On  the  other  hand,  we  believe  very 
deeply  in  the  right  of  free  speech  and 
of  people  to  speak  their  minds,  and, 
therefore,  I,  for  one,  would  not  say  that 
people  should  not  be  free  to  speak  their 
minds,  whether  I  disagree  with  them  or 
not,  or  whether  they  have  different 
views  from  some  of  the  rest  of  us. 

Q.  There  are  signs  of  some  division 
between  some  blacks  in  the  United 
States  and  some  Jews  in  the  United 
States.  Does  this  complicate  the  task 
of  the  Administration  in  the  Middle 
East? 

A.  One  of  the  great  tragedies  would 
be  if  the  problems  of  the  Middle  East 
should  cause  divisions  between  blacks 
of  the  United  States  and  people  of  the 
Jewish  faith.  This  would  be  indeed  a 
great  tragedy,  and  there  should  be  no 
reason  for  this,  and  I  want  to  make 
very  clear  the  situation. 

Because  of  some  stories  which  have 
been  written  about  Andy  Young's  res- 
ignation from  the  government,  it  has 
been  suggested  that  Andy's  decision 
was  brought  about  by  pressure  from 
either  the  Jewish  community  in  the 
United  States  or  Israel.  Both  of  these 
are  untrue,  and  I  want  to  make  it  very 
clear  that  both  are  untrue.  I  have  felt 
that  from  the  beginning,  and  I  believe 
this  very,  very  deeply.  I  know  that  to 
be  the  fact,  and  I  think  that  we  must  all 
have  this  very  clearly  in  our  minds. 


fresh  problems,  and  the  expanding  op- 
portunities all  require  new  leadership, 
new  initiatives,  and  new  ways  to  relate 
to  each  other. 

We  are  embarked  on  a  course  that 
takes  account  of  these  new  dimensions. 

•  We  will  work  to  improve  the  cli- 
mate for  equitable  growth. 

•  We  will  respect  and  encourage 
economic  and  political  diversity. 

•  We  will  welcome  Latin  America's 
growing  influence,   and  we  will   work 


with  its  nations  in  the  international 
arena. 

With  patience,  with  the  attention  that 
the  region  properly  deserves,  and  with 
a  decent  respect  for  the  aspirations  of 
our  fellow  citizens  of  the  hemisphere,  I 
believe  we  can  see  in  the  coming  years 
an  increasingly  creative  and  fruitful  era 
of  cooperation  between  the  United 
States  and  the  nations  of  Latin 
America.  D 


'  Press  release  238. 


November  1979 


17 


Q.  Over  the  last  6  weeks,  the  Ad- 
ministration and  some  of  its  support- 

<  ers  in  the  Senate,  as  well  as  some  of 
its  opponents,  have  laid  down  a 
major  challenge  to  the  Soviets  over 
the  alleged  role  of  Soviet  troops  in 
Cuba.  Yet,  because  of  its  hesitation 
in  releasing  to  the  public  the  evi- 
dence on  which  it  based  these  allega- 
tions, it  has  allowed  the  impression 
to  come  forward  that  its  case  has 
been  less  than  overwhelming. 

It  now  appoints  a  panel  of  wise 
men — one  of  them  whose  name  it  re- 
leases, the  other  six  of  whom  it  in- 
sists on  keeping  private — to  analyze 
the  evidence  and  to  advise  it  on  what 

[  steps  it  might  take  in  the  future. 
Does  this  not  strengthen  an 
impression  not  only  in  this  country 
but  also  in  the  camps  of  our  allies 
and  our  potential  adversaries  that 
the  Administration  is  vacillating  and 
divided  and  indeed  weak? 

A.  The  answer  I  think  should  be  a 
clear  no.  We  put  out  the  information 
which  we  believed  was  essential  and 
which  we  had  at  the  time  that  the  situ- 
ation arose,  and  we  had  the  definite 
evidence  on  which  the  conclusions  of 
the  intelligence  community  were  based 
that  there  was  this  combat  unit  in 
Cuba.  We  laid  out  the  facts  in  as  sim- 
ple form  as  we  could. 

Since  then,  we  have  obviously  been 
reviewing  all  the  facts,  going  back 
through  the  entire  period  from  1962  of 
.  checking  and  rechecking.  We  will,  at 
the  appropriate  time,  release  a  full  re- 
port. I  think  that  as  long  as  negotia- 
tions are  going  on  between  ourselves 
and  the  Soviet  Union,  the  best  thing 
that  can  be  done  is  to  keep  those 
negotiations  private,  to  pursue  them 
through  private  diplomacy  because 
only  through  private  diplomacy  can  one 
explore  ways  of  reaching  a  satisfactory 
resolution  to  this  problem. 

If  we  were  to  put  out  all  the  infor- 
mation at  this  time,  some  of  it  before  it 
is  completely  hard,  1  think  we  would  be 
doing  a  disservice  to  our  people  and  to 
the  world,  and,  therefore,  I  think  that 
our  responsibility  was  to  lay  the  essen- 
tial facts  before  the  people,  to  then  en- 
gage in  private  discussions — private 
diplomacy — with  the  Soviet  Union,  and 
r  to  pursue  those  to  the  end  to  reach,  if 
possible,  a  satisfactory  resolution  of 
the  problem. 

Q.  This  question  is  from  the  audi- 
ence. It  concerns  the  most  prominent 
non-Mexican  now  resident  in  Mex- 
ico, and  therefore,  at  least,  has  a 
i  Latin-American  angle.  But  it  is  a 
'  very  serious  question.  Why  is  it  that 
the  United  States  does  not  let  the 
Shah  come  to  our  country?  Hasn't 


this  man  been  our  friend  for  nearly 
four  decades? 

A.  I  think,  as  many  of  you  know, 
immediately  after  the  Shah  left  Iran, 
we  invited  him  to  come  to  the  United 
States.  He  chose  not  to  do  so  at  that 
time  and  spent  several  months  in  Africa 
before  he  decided  that  he  wished  to 
come  live  in  this  hemisphere.  By  that 
time,  circumstances  had  changed  in 
terms  of  the  internal  situation  within 
that  country,  and  we  have  had  to  take 
into  account  the  possible  dangers  to 
American  people  at  this  time  in  that 
country,  should  we  take  this  action  at 
this  particular  time. 

We  will  continue  to  keep  the  matter 
under  review,  but  I  do  not  think  it 
would  be  to  our  national  interest  to  do 
so.  We  have  explained  this  very  clearly 
to  the  Shah,  and  I  think  he  understands 
clearly  what  our  position  is. 

Q.  There  have  been  a  number  of 
questions  from  the  audience  having 
to  do  with  the  Soviet  military  units  in 
Cuba.  I  would  like  to  combine  two  of 
them,  if  I  may.  The  first  one  suggests 
that  we  ourselves  have  bases  and 
troops  stationed  in  various  parts  of 
the  world — how  can  we,  therefore, 
object  to  the  Soviet  presence  in 
Cuba? 

And  the  second  part  of  the  ques- 
tion: Please  respond  to  Mr.  Gromy- 
ko's  statement  before  the  General 
Assembly,  which  was  that  this  was 
an  issue  artificially  created. 

A.  I  really  would  prefer  to  stay  away 
from  these  Cuban  issues  at  this  point.  I 
am  meeting  this  afternoon  at  3:00  with 
Mr.  Gromyko,  and  as  I  said  before,  I 
don't  think  it  helps  for  us  to  be  making 
public  statements — neither  we  nor 
them. 

Q.  Is  there  any  sort  of  deadline  in 
your  mind  and  the  President's  mind 
for  the  negotiations  with  the  Rus- 
sians on  some  resolution  of  this 
matter? 

A.  As  long  as  we  are  making  prog- 
ress, as  long  as  the  discussions  con- 
tinue, we  will  continue. 

Q.  Why  is  Israel  allowed  to  use 
U.S.  aircraft  and  military  equipment 
in  Lebanon?  That's  the  first  ques- 
tion. And,  second,  what  can  the 
United  States  do  about  the  prospect 
of  a  further  extension  of  settlements 
on  the  West  Bank  which  will  en- 
danger our  hope  of  expanding  the 
Middle  East  accords  into  a  general 
one? 

A.  Let  me  take  the  Lebanon  question 
first.  I  think,  as  all  of  you  know,  the 
United  States  furnishes  a  wide  variety 
of  equipment  through  sales  to  Israel. 


These  include  aircraft  of  various  types. 
Under  the  law  which  permits  these 
sales,  it  provides  that  the  aircraft  can- 
not be  used  for  offensive  purposes  but 
can  be  used  for  defensive  purposes. 
This  then  brings  you  to  the  question  of 
what  happens  when  there  is  a  terrorist 
attack  into  Israel?  What  then  is  the 
situation  with  respect  to  defense,  be- 
cause there  is  nothing  that  precludes 
the  Israelis  from  defending  against 
such  attack?  This  gets  one  then  into 
very  complicated  situations  as  to 
whether  the  response  is  a  dispropor- 
tionate response  or  an  actual  response 
in  self-defense. 

These  present  very,  very  difficult 
situations  with  which  we  wrestle  al- 
most on  a  daily  basis.  We  have  made  it 
very  clear  to  the  Israelis  that  we  do  not 
agree  with  many  of  the  actions  which 
they  have  taken  recently  in  south  Leba- 
non in  terms  of  some  of  the  responses 
to  these  raids.  But  it  is  a  very,  very 
difficult  situation,  as  you  can  see. 

The  second  question  was  what? 

Q.  — on  the  settlements  on  the 
West  Bank  as  endangering  the  proc- 
ess of  expanding  the  peace  into  a 
general  accord  in  the  Middle  East. 

A.  The  American  position  has  been, 
I  think,  very  clear  in  this  for  a  long 
time.  We  believe  that  the  establishment 
of  settlements  in  the  West  Bank  is 
contrary  to  international  law.  We  be- 
lieve that  the  establishment  of  settle- 
ments, particularly  as  the  negotiations 
are  going  forward,  is  an  obstacle  to 
peace.  We  have  stated  this  publicly;  we 
have  stated  it  privately;  and  we  con- 
tinue to  urge  that  this  not  be  done.  De- 
spite that  fact,  some  settlements  con- 
tinue to  be  established,  but  I  think  that 
our  view  on  this  has  been  and  remains 
crystal  clear.  D 


Text  from  press  release  2 38 A . 


18 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


interview  on 
l^BC^s  "Toifaii"  Show 


Secretary  Vance  was  interviewed  on 
the  NBC  "Today"  Show  in  New  York 
on  October  4,  1979,  by  Tom  Brokaw 
and  Richard  Valeriani. ' 

Q.  President  Carter  has  been  say- 
ing he  thinks  the  Soviets  will  eventu- 
ally change  the  nature  of  that  unit  in 
Cuba.  Now  is  that  something  that's 
based  on  wishful  thinking  or  does  he 
have  some  positive  indications  of 
that? 

A.  As  the  President  indicated  during 
his  speech,  certain  statements  or  reas- 
surances or  assurances  were  made  to 
the  United  States  during  the  course  of 
the  discussions  between  myself  and 
Minister  Gromyko  and  the  communi- 
cations between  the  President  and 
President  Brezhnev.  Those  dealt  with 
future  actions  with  respect  to  the  Soviet 
brigade  in  question.  They  indicated  as  I 
believe  most  people  know  and  heard 
that  insofar  as  the  future  is  concerned, 
the  Soviets  say  that  the  status  and  con- 
dition of  the  unit  will  not  be  changed. 
In  other  words,  the  unit  will  not  be  in- 
creased in  size  nor  it  be  given  addi- 
tional capabilities.  He  further  indicated 
that  the  unit  and  units  that  exist  in  that 
area  would  not  be  given  any  capability 
which  would  constitute  a  threat  to  the 
United  States  or  any  other  nation  in  the 
hemisphere. 

Q.  They  have  not  indicated  they 
will  change  anything  that's  on  the 
ground  right  now. 

A.  Insofar  as  what's  on  the  ground 
right  now,  they  have  stated  what  I  have 
said.  I  think  those  words  speak  for 
themselves. 

Q.  If  they  don't  change  anything 
that's  there  now,  would  that  affect 
the  chances  of  getting  SALT  ratified? 
Some  Senators  seem  to  think  they 
have  to  do  something  a  little  more 
down  the  road. 

A.  Let  me  come  back  to  this  ques- 
tion of  change  of  the  status  quo  which 
has  been  discussed  quite  a  bit.  Some 
people  have  said  that  there  has  been  no 
change  in  the  status  quo.  There  clearly 
has  been  a  change  in  the  status  quo. 
Change  in  the  status  quo  has  come 
about  in  two  ways:  one,  steps  which 
the  United  States  has  taken.  The  Presi- 
dent outlined  eight  different  steps  that 
the  United  States  is  taking;  and  in  ad- 
dition to  that,  we  have  assurances 
which  the  Soviet  Union  has  given  to 


the  United  States.  They  reflect  the  fu- 
ture condition,  what  the  future  of  the 
brigade  will  be,  and  the  limitations  that 
will  exist  on  its  capabilities.  Namely, 
that  it  will  not  constitute  a  combat 
threat. 

Q.  For  many  Senators  and  for 
many  Americans,  the  fact  of  the 
matter  is  that  the  combat  unit  that  is 
there  now  is  unacceptable  in  its  pres- 
ent form.  When  you  said  and  the 
President  said  that  you  would  not  ac- 
cept the  status  quo,  it  signaled  to  a 
lot  of  people  that  it  could  not  stay  in 
its  present  form — that  it  would  have 
to  be  a  noncombat  force — if  it  were 
to  be  acceptable.  I  gather  that  you're 
saying  that  the  Russians  are  going  to 
keep  it  as  it  is — not  take  away  its 
combat  ability. 

A.  When  I  used  the  words  "status 
quo  is  not  acceptable,"  I  chose  my 
words  very  carefully  because  I  realize 
that  one  can  change  the  status  quo  in 
several  different  ways — by  actions  we 
take,  as  well  as  by  actions  they  take.  In 
my  judgment,  as  I  indicated  a  moment 
ago,  both  kinds  of  actions  have  been 
taken;  therefore,  there  has  been  a 
change  in  the  status  quo. 

Q.  We  had  Senator  Frank  Church 
on  the  other  day — chairman  of  the 
Senate  Foreign  Relations  Com- 
mittee— a  key  figure  in  all  of  this. 
His  clear  indication  was,  based  on 
what  he  said  on  this  program,  that 
there  would  be  a  reduction  in  the 
combat  nature  of  that  brigade,  and 
he  was  tying,  really,  his  future  at- 
titude toward  SALT  in  public  ap- 
pearance here  to  that  change.  Do  you 
think  that  he  has  been  misinformed 
or  that  he  is  misreading  what  you 
were  telling  him? 

A.  No,  I  don't  think  that  he  has  been 
misinformed.  In  terms  of  what  Senator 
Church  may  offer  in  terms  of  a  resolu- 
tion or  understanding,  I  don't  think  this 
has  been  worked  out  yet;  and  we'll 
have  to  see  what  Senator  Church 
suggests  in  this  regard. 

Q.  Would  the  Administration  ac- 
cept a  demand  from  the  Senate  that 
the  President  certify  in  writing  that 
this  unit  in  Cuba  is,  in  effect, 
"harmless,"  in  order  to  get  SALT 
passed? 

A.  One  of  the  suggestions  that  has 
been  made  that  some  form  of  certifica- 


tion will  be  asked  of  the  President,  it 
would  depend  upon  the  precise  wording 
of  such  a  certification;  and  I  do  not  rule 
out  some  form  of  certification. 

Q.  Is  there  now  an  understanding 
with  the  Soviet  Union  that  the  Soviets 
will  not  put  a  combat  unit,  as  they 
understand  it,  into  Cuba — combat 
forces  as  they  understand  it? 

A.  They  say  that  this  is  a  training 
unit — that  it's  only  function  is  training, 
and  it  can  do  no  more.  That  is  the  po- 
sition that  they  assert.  As  you  know,  it 
is  our  conclusion — based  upon  the  in- 
telligence that  we  have — that  it  does 
have  combat  capability.  Insofar  as  the- 
future  is  concerned,  they  indicated, 
however,  that  they  do  not  intend  and 
will  not  give  it  any  additional  capabili- 
ties. It  has,  as  you  know,  no  airlift,  no 
sealift,  and,  therefore,  it  is  not  a  threat 
to  the  United  States  or  to  the  other  na- 
tions as — 

Q.  No,  what  I'm  asking:  Is  this  a 
new  understanding  to  go  along  with 
the  1962  understanding,  1970  under- 
standing that  the  Soviets  will  not  put, 
say,  another  unit  in — 

A.  I  would  not  call  it  an  under- 
standing. When  I  say  this  is  a  statement 
—  a  statement  from  the  highest  levels 
of  the  Soviet  government. 

Q.  But,  do  you  think  you  have  rid 
yourself  of  the  political  problems  in 
this  country  that  the  combat  brigade 
represented? 

A.  I  think  they  have  been  put  in 
proper  perspective  now.  I'm  sure  that 
this  will  be  a  subject  that  will  continue 
to  be  discussed;  but  I  hope  at  a  more 
rational  and  less  heated  level  than  it 
has  in  the  past.  I  think  we  are  now 
clearly  going  to  go  forward  with  the 
completion  of  SALT  ratification;  and 
that  this  issue  may  come  and  probably 
will  come  up  and  be  discussed  during 
that.  I  believe  that  we  can  now  see  this 
in  proper  perspective  since  the  Presi- 
dent has  made  his  speech,  that  we  will 
be  able  to  go  forward  and  complete  the 
SALT  ratification  process. 

Q.  How  can  you  be  encouraged  by 
the  initial  reaction  from  people  like 
Senator  Church,  for  example,  who 
had  been  for  SALT  before  the  disclo- 
sure or  the  presence  of  the  Russian 
troops  in  Cuba,  and  now  are  saying 
he  wants  to  add  resolutions  and  he's 
still  awaiting  the  change  in  the 
character  of  that  brigade? 

A.  1  think  it  remains  to  be  seen 
exactly  what  it  is  Senator  Church  in- 
tends to  suggest.  Senator  Church  be- 
lieves very  strongly  that  SALT  is  im- 
portant, as  all  of  us  do.  It's  of  funda- 


November  1979 


19 


mental  importance  to  our  security,  and 
it  will  enhance  our  security  and  that  of 
our  allies.  1  am  confident  that  Senator 
Church  shares  our  views  that  this  is  of 
importance  to  us  and  to  our  allies  and 
would  like  to  see  the  treaty  ratified. 

Q.  May  I  ask  you  about  the  Middle 
East?  Do  you  think  the  effect  of  the 
trip  of  Jesse  Jackson  is  having  any 
affect  on  the  prospects  for  peace 
there? 

A.  1  think  that  the  real  negotiations 
have  to  be  conducted  by  the  parties; 
and  they  will  be  conducted  by  the  par- 
ties. However,  on  the  other  hand,  we 
believe  very  strongly  in  free  speech. 
All  individual  citizens  should  be  free  to 
go  and  meet  with  people  in  the  Middle 
East  should  they  choose  to  do  so.  But 
the  ultimate  negotiations  have  to  be 
conducted  among  the  governments  and 
parties  involved. 

Q.  But  does  he  delay  the  prospects 
for  peace? 

A.  I  don't  think  so. 

Q.  To  get  back  to  the  Cuba 
episode,  how  is  this  going  to  affect 
overall  relations  between  the  United 
States  and  the  Soviet  Union?  For 
example,  there's  a  story  this  morning 
that  the  Defense  Department  has 
turned  down  a  request  for  computer 
technology  from  the  Russians.  Is  this 
punishment  for  what  they've  done  in 
Cuba? 

A.  As  you  know  in  selling  advance 
technology  equipment,  we  always  re- 
view these  very  carefully,  and  if  there 
is  technology  which  would  be  of  mili- 
tary use,  those  are  usually  denied  to  the 
Soviet  Union  and  to  the  Chinese. 

I'd  like  to  take  the  occasion  to  com- 
ment on  another  story  that  appeared 
this  morning  which  indicated  that  there 
was  a  study  in  the  Defense  Department 
which  recommended  the  selling  of  arms 
to  the  Chinese.  Let  me  state  flatly  and 
categorically  that  it's  nothing  more 
than  a  story.  We  have  no  intention  of 
changing  our  policy.  We  are  not  going 
to  sell  arms  to  the  Chinese. 

Q.  If  we  can  just  wrap  up  in  the 
final  moment  what  we  have  here,  the 
status  of  the  combat  brigade  in 
Cuba.  It  will  get  no  larger  in  your 
judgment  but  neither  will  it  get  any 
smaller,  or  will  it  have  less  combat 
capability? 

A.  It  will  get  no  larger.  It  will,  in  my 
judgment,  perhaps  shrink  in  size;  but  I 
cannot  at  this  point  say  that  I  am  cer- 
tam  that  that  will  happen.  D 


Intervieu^  on 
CBS-TV  norning  l^ews 


Press  release  250. 


Secretary  Vance  was  interviewed  on 
CBS-TV  morning  news  in  New  York 
on  October  5,  1979.  by  Bob  Schieffer 
and  Richard  Hottelet. ' 

Q.  In  summary,  the  [Senate  Select] 
Intelligence  Committee  had  con- 
cluded that  the  United  States  did 
have  the  means  to  detect  Soviet 
cheating  on  the  SALT  II  treaty. 
Today  the  committee  is  reported  un- 
able to  decide  whether  it  is  possible 
to  detect  some  Soviet  violations  of  the 
proposed  arms  control  arrangement. 
A  report  to  that  effect  is  expected  to 
go  from  the  committee  to  the  full 
Senate  today.  Secretary  of  State 
Vance,  of  course,  is  the  point  man 
for  the  Administration's  effort  to  get 
Senate  approval  of  the  treaty;  and 
he's  in  New  York  this  morning  for 
the  fall  session  of  the  United  Nations. 
If  I  could  ask  you  first  if,  indeed,  this 
report  by  the  Senate  intelligence 
committee  concludes  that  we're  un- 
able to  say  for  certain  whether  this 
treaty  can  be  verified,  doesn't  that 
just  about  end  it  for  the  SALT  II 
treaty? 

A.  No.  First  of  all,  I  have  not  seen 
the  report,  and  I  wish  to  see  the  report 
and  examine  it  with  care  before  coming 
to  any  conclusion.  I  will  be  testifying 
next  week  before  the  Senate  Foreign 
Relations  Committee  and  also  before 
the  Armed  Services  Committee  in 
closed  session  with  respect  to  the 
question  of  verification.  I  am  confident 
that  we  can  adequately  verify  the  SALT 
treaty.  Admiral  Turner  [Director  of  the 
Central  Intelligence  Agency]  and  I  will 
be  testifying  together  when  the  time 
comes,  and  I  can  say  that  I  believe  we 
will  be  able  to  convince  both  commit- 
tees of  the  Congress  to  which  I  have 
referred  that  we  do  indeed  have  the 
means  to  adequately  verify  the  treaty. 

Q.  It  took  American  intelligence 
rather  a  long  time  it  seems,  at  least 
to  an  outsider,  to  locate  the  Soviet 
combat  brigade  in  Cuba.  Doesn't 
that  entitle  one  to  ask  whether  the 
intelligence  system  could  really  put 
its  finger  on  violations  of  SALT  so 
much  farther  away? 

A.  No.  I  think  they're  entirely  dif- 
ferent kinds  of  problems  in  terms  of 
verification.  When  you're  talking  about 
verification  of  the  SALT  treaty,  you're 
talking  about  verifying  the  location  and 
the  development  of  missiles — large 


items — that  are  easy  to  pick  up  with 
photography.  The  question  of  telemetry 
is  important.  We  have  the  capability  to 
monitor  with  telemetry  and  many  kinds 
of  devices  which  interact  with  each 
other. 

On  the  kind  of  problem  that  one  was 
dealing  with  in  monitoring  whether 
there  are  certain  troops — a  small 
number — what  kind  of  equipment  they 
have  and  that  type  of  thing,  that  is 
much  more  difficult.  Therefore,  I  think 
that  the  difficulties  that  one  has  in 
monitoring  whether  a  specific  ground 
unit  has  or  does  not  have  certain  types 
of  equipment,  particularly  when  the 
Cuban  equipment  and  the  Soviet 
equipment  is  the  same  kind  of  equip- 
ment is  a  totally  different  kind  of  a 
problem  from  that  of  monitoring  the 
kinds  of  matters  that  are  necessary  for 
adequate  SALT  verification. 

Q.  Now  one  thing  about  the  Soviet 
brigade  issue  with  Cuba  is  that  it  was 
a  crisis  of  confidence,  in  a  way.  It 
was  suggested  sort  of  a  purpose  of 
evasion  by  the  Soviet  Union.  What 
effect  is  this  going  to  have  on  Soviet - 
American  relations,  not  only  in 
SALT,  but  in  general  dealings  with 
the  Russians  if  you're  entitled  to  sus- 
pect that  they  will  always  seek  a  little 
advantage  somewhere  on  the  fringe 
or  somewhere  underneath  despite 
their  given  word  or  despite  an  under- 
standing that  exists  between  us? 

A.  Insofar  as  verification  of  the 
SALT  agreement  is  concerned,  we  are 
not  depending  upon  trust.  We  are  de- 
pending upon  our  own  national  techni- 
cal means  of  verification,  so  the  ques- 
tion of  trust  does  not  arise  in  connec- 
tion with  that  verification. 

Q.  Let  me  just  sneak  in  with  an- 
other question  here  because  that 
raises  a  point  that  Senator  Glenn 
raised  yesterday  in  an  interview  with 
Phil  Jones  on  Capitol  Hill.  He  sug- 
gested that  much  of  this  verification 
will  depend  on  systems — intelligence 
systems — still  in  the  development 
stages.  Can  you  elaborate  at  all  on 
that? 

A.  No.  We  get  into  highly  classified 
matters  when  we  talk  about  systems 
which  are  under  development.  I  think 
the  point  that  I  should  make  is  to  state 
very  clearly  that  our  intelligence  which 
is  used  in  verification  of  a  SALT 
agreement  is  made  up  of  many  different 


20 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


pieces  of  intelligence  gathered  from 
different  sources.  These  sources  and 
these  bits  of  intelligence  overlap  to 
form  a  mosaic  and  they  are  redundant, 
and,  therefore,  back  up  each  other  in 
arriving  at  the  ultimate  conclusions 
which  are  necessary  for  verification. 

Q.  You  say  that  your  arrange- 
ments on  SALT  are  not  going  to  de- 
pend on  good  faith,  but  good  faith 
has  entered  into  this  Cuban  business. 
The  President  says  he  has  assurances 
that  this  unit  there  will  not  be  ex- 
panded, will  not  be  exported  to  any 
part  of  Latin  America,  do  these  as- 
surances take  the  form  of  something 
that  you  can  put  on  the  table,  in  case 
of  a  future  misunderstanding  of  this 
type? 

A.  The  assurances  were  clearly 
stated  in  the  President's  speech.  They 
are  clear  by  their  terms  and  I  think 
there  can  be  no  question  as  to  what 
those  assurances  are. 

Q.  Do  you  have  a  piece  of  paper? 
Do  you  have  a  note  from  Brezhnev  or 
from  Moscow? 


A.  The  assurances  are  derived  from 
two  sources — conversations  which  I 
had  with  Foreign  Minister  Gromyko 
and  from  exchange  between  our  two 
heads  of  government. 

Q.  Do  you  consider  the  incident 
closed  now? 

A.  We  obviously  are  going  to  follow 
the  situation  as  the  President  said.  We 
are  going  to  monitor  the  situation.  And 
in  addition  to  that,  we  are  taking  the 
other  seven  steps  which  the  President 
indicated  very  clearly  in  his  speech  to 
the  people. 

Q.  In  retrospect,  was  too  much 
made  of  this  incident?  Was  Senator 
Byrd  right  when  he  said  it  was  a 
pseudocrisis? 

A.  As  we  indicated,  we  considered  it 
a  serious  matter,  but  it'd  have  to  be 
kept  in  perspective;  and  I  think  the 
President's  speech  has  put  it  in  a  proper 
perspective.  We  see  that  it's  a  serious 
matter — a  matter  where  certain  steps 
had  to  be  taken  to  make  sure  that  it 
would   be   in   a  condition   which   we 


AFRICA:        President  Carter 

Meets  With  Zairean 

and  Liherian  Presidents 


WHITE  HOUSE  STATEMENT, 
SEPT.  11,  1979' 

The  President  met  this  afternoon  for 
25  minutes  in  the  Cabinet  Room  with 
President  Mobutu  Sese  Seko  of  Zaire, 
who  is  in  Washington  on  a  private  visit 
connected  with  meetings  of  the  Inter- 
national Monetary  Fund  (IMF). 

The  two  Presidents  discussed  the 
situation  in  Zaire.  President  Mobutu 
informed  President  Carter  of  the  prog- 
ress that  Zaire  is  making  in  dealing 
with  its  economic  and  security  prob- 
lems. President  Carter  restated  our 
strong  support  for  Zaire  and  the  im- 
portance that  we  attach  to  the  ongoing 
process  of  reforms  in  Zaire.  He  wel- 
comed President  Mobutu's  description 
of  progress  that  is  being  made  in  these 
regards. 

WHITE  HOUSE  STATEMENT, 

OCT.  2,  1979^  

D^^^-.A^^t  /-•„,.      ~   .  .u-  ■       c  '  T^"'  f''"'"  Weekly  Compilation  of  Presi- 

President  Carter  met  this  mornmg  for     d^ntiai  Documen.s  of' Sep.    I7.  1979  (i,s.  of 
an  hour  in  the  Cabinet  Room  with     participants  omitted). 

President    William    R.    Tolbert,    Jr.    of  '  Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of  Oct.   8, 

Liberia.   They  had  a  warm  and  com-      1979  (list  of  participants  omitted) 


prehensive  exchange  of  views  on  bilat- 
eral and  regional  issues. 

President  Carter  expressed  the  im- 
portance of  the  U.S.  special  relation- 
ship with  Liberia  and  our  desire  to  en- 
hance and  promote  it.  The  two  Presi- 
dents agreed  to  consider  the  visit  of  a 
group  of  distinguished  Americans  to 
Liberia  in  the  near  future.  The  group 
will  work  toward  strengthening  U.S. 
ties  with  Liberia  and  focus  on  eco- 
nomic and  development  cooperation  in 
the  public  and  private  sectors. 

The  two  Presidents  had  an  extensive 
discussion  of  President  Tolbert's  role 
as  Chairman  of  the  Organization  of 
African  Unity  (OAU)  and  the  OAU 
meeting  last  July.  President  Carter 
complimented  President  Tolbert  on  his 
leadership  as  head  of  the  OAU  and 
praised  President  Tolbert's  efforts  to 
resolve  outstanding  problems  in  the  re- 
gion, n 


could  accept.  Those  steps  are  being 
taken.  We  have  received  the  assurances 
and,  therefore,  1  think  we  can  now — 
doing  the  necessary  monitoring,  taking 
the  steps  we're  taking — move  forward 
and  get  going  on  ratification  of  SALT 
which  as  the  President  said  is  of 
paramount  importance  and  a  really 
serious  issue  that  has  to  be  finished  up. 

Q.  Very  briefly,  what  about  Amer- 
ican relations  with  Cuba?  Do  you  see 
a  prospect  of  improvement  there, 
especially  if  Fidel  Castro  comes  to 
the  United  Nations  next  week?  Will 
there  be  contacts? 

A.  At  this  point,  I  cannot  predict  that 
there  will  be  an  improvement  in  rela- 
tions. I  think  as  you  know  at  the  outset 
of  this  Administration,  we  took  steps  to 
try  and  normalize  relations.  We  made 
some   progress.    We  entered   into  a 
maritime   treaty.    We   entered    into< 
agreements  which  led  to  the  establish- 
ment of  a  diplomatic  mission  on  our| 
part  in  Havana  and  one  by  them  in  the! 
United  States.  We  started  talking  about 
the  reunification  of  families  and  thel 
release  of  prisoners,   and   we   madei 
progress.  However,  the  adventurism  of 
Cuba  which  took  place  during  the 
period  of  1966,   '67.   '78,  etc.,   led  to 
the  placing  of  obstacles  in  the  road  of 
moving  toward  normalization. 

Q.  Those  obstacles  are  still  there? 

A.  They  are  still  there. 

Q.  And  not  likely  to  be  quickiyi 
removed? 

t 
A.  I  do  not  think  they  will  be  quickly 
removed.  D' 


Press  release  254, 


November  1979 


21 


A]\T  ARCTIC  A:        10th  Meeting  oi 
Treaty  Consultative  Parties 


The  10th  meeting  of  the  Antarctic 
Treaty  consultative  parties  was  held  in 
the  Department  of  State  September 
I7-0ctober  5,  1979.  Following  are  the 
texts  of  a  State  Department  press  re- 
lease issued  prior  to  the  meeting: 
opening  remarks  by  Lucy  Wilson  Ben- 
son, Under  Secretary  for  Security  As- 
■  sistance,  Science,  and  Technology,  on 
September  17:  and  the  press  com- 
munique issued  by  the  chairman  of  the 
meeting  on  October  10. 


PRESS  RELEASE  224, 
SEPT.  14,  1979 

The  United  States  will  host  the  10th 
meeting  of  Antarctic  Treaty  consulta- 
tive parties  from  September  17  to  Oc- 
tober 5  in  Washington,  DC,  at  the 
Department  of  State.  The  10th  consul- 
tative meeting  will  include  delegations 
from  the  treaty's  12  original  sig- 
natories—  Argentina,  Australia, 
Belgium,  Chile,  France,  Japan,  New 
Zealand,  Norway,  South  Africa,  the 
United  Kingdom,  the  U.S.S.R.,  and 
the  United  States — as  well  as  Poland, 
whose  consultative  status  was  recog- 
nized in  1977. 

The  meeting  takes  place  pursuant  to 
provisions  of  the  treaty  which  provides 
for  regular  meetings  of  the  consultative 
parties  to  discuss  matters  of  common 
interest  pertaining  to  Antarctica  and  to 
develop  and  recommend  to  their  gov- 
ernments measures  in  furtherance  of 
the  principles  and  objectives  of  the 
treaty.  Meetings  of  the  consultative 
parties  have  been  held  at  approximately 
2-year  intervals  since  the  treaty  entered 
into  force. 

The  10th  consultative  meeting  will 
mark  the  20th  anniversary  of  the  Ant- 
arctic Treaty  which  was  signed  in 
Washington  in  1959.  The  treaty,  in- 
cluding the  consultative  system  it  es- 
tablishes, has  been  an  unusually  suc- 
cessful example  of  international  coop- 
eration among  states  with  differing 
political  systems  as  well  as  different 
legal  and  political  perspectives.  Seven 
of  the  consultative  parties  claim  sov- 
ereignty over  portions  of  Antarctica; 
six,  including  the  United  States, 
neither  assert  nor  recognize  such 
claims. 

Largely  through  imaginative  provi- 
sions under  which  the  parties  agree  to 
disagree  over  the  issue  of  territorial 
sovereignty  in  Antarctica,  the  treaty 


provides  for  freedom  of  scientific  re- 
search in  Antarctica  and  establishes  a 
basis  for  international  cooperation 
there.  The  treaty  sets  aside  Antarctica 
and  the  waters  below  60°  south  latitude 
for  peaceful  purposes  only.  It  prohibits 
nuclear  explosions  or  the  disposal  of 
nuclear  waste  there.  It  also  prohibits 
any  measures  of  a  military  nature  such 
as  the  establishment  of  military  bases 
and  fortifications,  the  carrying  out  of 
military  maneuvers,  or  the  testing  of 
military  weapons.  Employment  of 
military  personnel  or  equipment  is 
permitted  only  in  support  of  scientific 
research  in  Antarctica.  In  order  to  pro- 
mote these  objectives  and  insure  the 
observance  of  the  treaty  provisions, 
each  consultative  party  has  the  right  to 
designate  observers  to  carry  out  in- 
spection activities  throughout  the  treaty 
area. 

The  Antarctic  Treaty  defines  specific 
objectives  and  establishes  an  imagina- 
tive legal  and  political  framework  to 
achieve  those  objectives.  However,  the 
treaty  does  not  apply  to  activities  in 
Antarctica  other  than  those  enumerated 
in  it. 

Among  those  with  which  the  treaty 
does  not  deal  are  questions  relating  to 
Antarctic  resources.  In  the  two  decades 
since  the  treaty  was  concluded,  a  vari- 
ety of  factors — including  perceptions 
of  possible  resource  shortages  and  ac- 
celerated technological  developments 
—  have  directed  attention  toward  the 
possibility  of  resource  activity  in  Ant- 
arctica, a  possibility  which  seemed 
quite  remote  in  1959.  Therefore,  ques- 
tions relating  to  Antarctic  resources, 
both  the  living  resources  of  the  waters 
surrounding  Antarctica  and  Antarctic 
mineral  resources,  have  become  major 
items  of  consideration  at  recent  meet- 
ings of  the  Antarctic  Treaty  consulta- 
tive parties. 

These  issues  will  be  important  sub- 
jects of  discussion  at  the  10th  consul- 
tative meeting,  along  with  those  mat- 
ters relating  to  cooperation  in  scientific 
research  and  logistic  activities  in  Ant- 
arctica and  to  controlling  the  impact  of 
human  activities  in  Antarctica  which 
have  been  dealt  with  at  consultative 
meetings  since  their  outset. 

U.S.  policy  toward  Antarctica  rests 
upon  commitment  to  the  principles  and 
purposes  of  the  Antarctic  Treaty.  The 
pattern  of  international  cooperation  and 
collective  scientific  investigation  in 
Antarctica  which  the   treaty  and   the 


treaty  system  has  sustained  is  a  truly 
remarkable  achievement.  In  the  U.S. 
view,  the  treaty  and  treaty  system  con- 
tinue to  play  a  dynamic  and  construc- 
tive role  in  international  relations.  The 
purposes  and  objectives  of  the  treaty 
remain  as  valid  today  as  when  elabo- 
rated in  1959. 

At  the  same  time,  new  issues — 
largely  relating  to  Antarctic  resources 
—  face  the  consultative  parties.  Effec- 
tive and  imaginative  responses  to  these 
new  issues  will  make  important  contri- 
butions to  the  future  strength  and  via- 
bility of  the  treaty  system. 

The  United  States  seeks  to  work  with 
its  treaty  partners  in  meeting  the  chal- 
lenge posed  by  resource-related  issues 
in  Antarctica. 

With  regard  to  Antarctic  marine  liv- 
ing resources,  the  waters  surrounding 
Antarctica  appear  to  be  both  highly 
productive  and  vulnerable  to  unregu- 
lated harvesting.  Antarctic  krill.  which 
occupies  a  central  place  in  the  ecosys- 
tem of  these  waters,  has  become  the 
object  of  considerable  interest  for  pos- 
sible commercial  fishing. 

For  these  reasons,  the  United  States 
has  taken  the  lead  in  seeking  an  inter- 
national treaty  to  provide  for  effective 
conservation  of  Antarctic  marine  living 
resources.  We  recognize  that  fishing 
will  likely  take  place  for  these  re- 
sources, but  we  are  committed  to  see- 
ing that  such  activity  is  properly  regu- 
lated, to  insure  the  health  not  only  of 
harvested  populations  but  also  of  de- 
pendent and  related  species,  including 
whales,  and  of  the  ecosystem  as  a 
whole. 

It  is  our  objective  to  insure  that  an 
effective  system  for  applying  necessary 
conservation  measures  is  in  place  before 
large-scale  fishing  for  krill  and  other 
Antarctic  marine  living  resources, 
comes  a  possibility.  Major  progress  has 
been  made  toward  developing  such  a 
system  in  the  ongoing  negotiations  on 
the  convention  on  the  conservation  of 
antarctic  marine  living  resources. 
Though  the  draft  convention  will  not  be 
a  formal  item  on  the  agenda  of  the  1 0th 
consultative  meeting,  the  meeting  of- 
fers the  opportunity  to  resolve  the  few 
remaining  obstacles  to  convening  the 
diplomatic  conference  necessary  to 
conclude  the  convention. 

With  regard  to  mineral  resources, 
there  are  insufficient  data  to  determine 
the  potential  of  such  resources  in  Ant- 
arctica, and  it  is  not  known  if  or  when 
development  of  mineral  resources  in 
Antarctica  would  become  economically 
feasible  or  environmentally  sound.  In 
light  of  interest  generated  in  the  possi- 
bility of  mineral  resource  activities,  the 
United  States  believes  it  is  important  to 
begin  work  toward  an  agreed  interna- 


->1 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


tional  system  or  regime  to  determine 
whether  development  of  Antarctic  min- 
eral resources  may  be  acceptable  in  the 
future  and  how  to  govern  mineral  re- 
source activities  if  they  were  to  prove 
acceptable. 

The  U.S.  approach  to  this  issue  re- 
flects several  basic  principles. 

•  It  is  of  basic  importance  to  main- 
tain the  Antarctic  Treaty  system,  which 
for  nearly  two  decades  has  reserved 
Antarctica  exclusively  for  peaceful  pur- 
poses and  fostered  international  coop- 
eration, freedom  of  scientific  research, 
and  protection  of  the  environment. 

•  Conclusion  of  the  convention  for 
the  conservation  of  Antarctic  marine 
living  resources  is  the  most  important 
objective  presently  before  the  consul- 
tative parties  to  the  Antarctic  Treaty, 
and  consideration  of  the  mineral  re- 
source regime  should  not  detract  from 
this  goal. 

•  Full  understanding  of  the  environ- 
mental consequences  of  any  mineral  re- 
source development  is  essential,  and 
Antarctic  mineral  resources,  if  ever  de- 
veloped, must  be  used  wisely  and  de- 
veloped only  under  effective  environ- 
mental safeguards. 

•  The  United  States  should  have  the 
opportunity  to  share  in  nondiscrimina- 
tory fashion  in  the  benefits  if  such  ac- 
tivities were  to  prove  acceptable. 

At  the  10th  consultative  meeting,  the 
United  States  will  work  toward  build- 
ing an  effective  foundation  for  dealing 
with  the  mineral  resource  issue  in  a 
timely  fashion. 


MRS.  BENSON'S  REMARKS, 
SEPT.  17,  1979 

It  is  a  pleasure  for  me  on  behalf  of 
my  government  to  welcome  you  to 
Washington  for  the  10th  meeting  of  the 
Antarctic  Treaty  consultative  parties. 

This  consultative  meeting  marks  a 
significant  milestone.  It  is  the  20th  an- 
niversary of  the  signing  of  the  Antarc- 
tic Treaty.  Twenty  years  ago  in  this 
city,  delegates  representing  countries 
on  six  continents  completed  work  on  a 
treaty  concerning  the  seventh  continent 

—  the  southernmost,  and  least  known, 
part  of  our  planet.  Those  delegates 
pledged  to  reserve  this  area  for  peace- 
ful purposes  only  and  to  cooperate  in 
investigation  of  this  unique  scientific 
frontier. 

The  world  of  1959 — not  unlike  today 

—  was  one  in  which  the  divisions 
among  nations  too  often  seemed  to  pre- 
dominate. In  such  circumstances,  it 
was  no  small  task  for  a  diverse  group 
of  nations  to  recognize  that  they  shared 
a  common  concern  for  Antarctica.  Yet 


the  authors  of  the  treaty  were  able  to 
set  aside  the  problems  which  divided 
them  in  order  to  affirm  the  interests 
which  bound  them. 

It  was  during  the  International  Geo- 
physical Year  (IGY)  of  1957-58  that 
scientists  from  the  Antarctic  Treaty  na- 
tions first  worked  together  across  the 
vast  southern  continent  to  begin  un- 
locking its  secrets.  The  realization  that 
their  efforts  during  the  IGY  had  just 
begun  to  bear  fruit  stimulated  the  de- 
velopment of  a  more  enduring  agree- 
ment among  interested  parties. 

Those  who  gathered  here  20  years 
ago  to  work  on  that  international 
agreement  realized  that  to  reach  that 
common  objective,  Antarctica  must  be 
treated  in  a  special  fashion.  As  the 
words  of  the  treaty  attest,  they  recog- 
nized ■".  .  .  that  it  is  in  the  interest  of 
all  mankind  that  Antarctica  shall  con- 
tinue forever  to  be  used  exclusively  for 
peaceful  purposes  and  shall  not  become 
the  scene  or  object  of  international  dis- 
cord. ..." 

This  was  an  impressive  commitment, 
indeed.  It  was  not  simply  an  expression 
of  common  purpose  but  the  basis  of  the 
operative  provisions  of  the  treaty. 

•  It  underlies  the  provisions  for 
freedom  of  scientific  research  in  Ant- 
arctica. 

•  It  underlies  the  imaginative  juridi- 
cal formulation  insuring  international 
cooperation  among  the  parties  on  Ant- 
arctica. 

•  It  underlies  provisions  for  the 
nonmilitarization  and  nonnuclearization 
of  Antarctica  and  for  inspection  of  sta- 
tions. 

The  basic  principles  and  purposes  of 
the  Antarctic  Treaty  remain  as  valid 
and  cogent  today  as  in  1959.  The 
framers  of  the  treaty  understood  that  to 
give  concrete  effect  to  these  principles 
and  purposes  required  a  mechanism 
through  which  the  treaty  could  evolve 
to  meet  new  circumstances  and  de- 
velopments. That  mechanism  is  the 
regular  consultative  meetings  which 
have  contributed  importantly  to  the 
continued  dynamism  and  responsive- 
ness of  the  Antarctic  Treaty  system. 

The  accomplishments  of  the  treaty 
and  the  consultative  mechanism  estab- 
lished pursuant  to  it  are  impressive. 
Antarctica  remains  an  area  reserved  ex- 
clusively for  peaceful  purposes.  Inter- 
national cooperation  in  scientific  re- 
search in  Antarctica  has  made  major 
contributions  to  the  understanding  of 
our  planet,  its  oceans,  and  its  atmos- 
phere. An  impressive  collection  of  rec- 
ommendations have  been  developed  to 
insure  the  protection  of  the  Antarctic 
environment  from  harmful  impacts  of 
human   activity.   Consultative   parties 


created  a  responsive  system  for  con-  ' 
trolling  the  effects  of  man's  presence  in  : 
Antarctica  through  the  Agreed  Meas- 
ures for  the  Conservation  of  Antarctica 
Fauna  and  Flora.  The  Convention  on 
the  Conservation  of  Antarctic  Seals, 
which  entered  into  force  2  years  ago, 
resulted  from  other  initiatives  under- 
taken within  the  consultative  system. 

From  the  perspective  of  this  meet- 
ing, it  is  clear  to  me  that  the  treaty 
parties  can  look  back  over  the  past  20 
years  with  a  sense  of  accomplishment 
and  pride.  The  Antarctic  Treaty  has 
served  as  a  model  for  important  inter- 
national initiatives  in  other  areas  of  the, 
globe.  The  nuclear  free  zone  and  in- 
spection of  facilities  and  activities  by 
observers  designated  by  the  consulta- 
tive parties  are  provisions  that  have 
contributed  to  the  field  of  arms  control. 
The  pattern  of  scientific  cooperation 
established  under  the  treaty  has  served 
as  a  model  for  other  regional  and  mul- 
tidisciplinary  programs  of  scientific 
investigation. 

The  Antarctic  Treaty  has  proven 
vital  and  dynamic  in  a  time  of  rapid 
global  change.  For  these  reasons,  I  be- 
lieve it  appropriate  that  we  pay  tribute 
to  those  farsighted  scientists  and  dip- 
lomats who  met  here  20  years  ago  and 
whose  work  and  spirit  continue  to  in- 
fuse international  cooperation  in  Ant- 
arctica. We  are  honored  that  some  of 
these  distinguished  individuals  are  with 
us  today. 

In  commemorating  these  accom- 
plishments, we  must  not  lose  sight  of 
the  future.  We  stand  at  an  important 
point  in  the  history  of  the  Antarctic 
Treaty  system.  New  issues  and  new 
challenges  have  emerged  to  engage  the 
attention  of  the  consultative  parties.  In 
large  part  these  new  issues  stem  from 
the  potential  of  new  forms  of  human 
activity  in  Antarctica,  particularly,  re- 
source development  activities. 

At  the  ninth  consultative  meeting  in 
London  [1977],  major  attention  was 
devoted  to  the  subjects  of  marine  living 
resources  and  mineral  resources.  This 
is  the  proper  forum  for  such  consid- 
erations, because  satisfactory  resolu- 
tion of  these  issues  is  key  to  the  con- 
tinued vitality  of  the  Antarctic  Treaty 
system. 

Our  priority  interest  is  in  the  de- 
velopment of  a  regime  for  Antarctic 
marine  living  resources.  Over  the  past 
2  years  the  consultative  parties  have 
devoted  intense  effort  to  the  develop-  ■ 
ment  of  a  draft  convention  on  the  con- 
servation of  Antarctic  marine  living  re- 
sources. Indeed,  this  gathering  offers 
the  opportunity  to  reach  understandings 
necessary  to  convene  the  final  diplo- 
matic conference  to  conclude  that  con- 
vention. I  can  think  of  no  more  effective 


November  1979 


23 


action  to  reconfirm  our  commitment  to 
the  Antarctic  Treaty  system  and  its 
principles  and  purposes  than  the  con- 
clusion of  the  Antarctic  marine  living 
resource  convention. 

In  the  marine  living  resource  negoti- 
ations we  have  sought  to  provide  the 
basis  for  wise  decisions  on  resource 
activities  before  events  force  ill- 
considered  decisions  upon  us.  The 
same  objective  should  be  sought  in  our 
negotiations  relating  to  mineral  re- 
sources. The  nature  of  mineral  resource 
issues — their  complexity  and  sensitiv- 
ity—  will  require  measured  and  thor- 
ough examination.  However,  if  we  are 
to  meet  the  commitments  we  have  col- 
lectively made  to  insure  the  health  of 
the  Antarctic  environment — in  the 
ecological  and  the  political  sense — it  is 
imperative  that  we  achieve  continued 
and  timely  progress  toward  an  agreed 
regime  concerning  Antarctic  mineral 
resources. 

While  matters  relating  to  Antarctic 
resources  are  prominent  on  our  con- 
sultative meeting  agenda,  we  should 
not  lose  sight  of  other  important  mat- 
ters traditionally  on  the  agenda  of  con- 
sultative meetings.  Telecommunica- 
tions, exchange  of  meteorological  data, 
the  impact  of  man's  activity  on  the 
Antarctic  environment,  tourism,  and 
other  subjects  have  continuing  impor- 
tance and  merit  our  concerted  atten- 
tion. 

The  modern  world  offers  many  ex- 
amples in  which  our  scientific  and 
technological  creativity  has  outpaced 
our  political  and  institutional  respon- 
siveness. The  international  cooperation 
symbolized  in  the  Antarctic  Treaty 
stands  as  a  welcome  exception. 

We  have  the  chance,  I  believe,  to 
preserve  and  enrich  this  example.  This 
is  a  challenge  and  the  opportunity  is 
inherent  in  today's  issues  regarding  the 
Antarctic  environment.  We  have  taken 
major  steps  toward  dealing  with  these 
issues.  We  must  continue  to  do  so 
without  shortchanging  those  areas  of 
cooperation  in  Antarctica  traditionally 
dealt  with  at  all  consultative  meetings. 
If  we  persevere  in  the  pragmatic  and 
imaginative  spirit  of  the  authors  of  the 
treaty,  we  will  have  many  more  occa- 
sions to  commemorate  our  cooperation 
in  Antarctica. 


PRESS  COMMUNIQUE, 
OCT.  10,  1979' 

The  Tenth  Antarctic  Treaty  Consultative 
Meeting  completed  its  work  on  October  5.  At- 
tending were  delegations  from  the  thirteen  Ant- 
arctic Treaty  Consultative  Parties  (Argentina, 
Australia,  Belgium,  Chile,  France,  Japan,  New 
Zealand,   Norway,  Poland,   South  Africa,  the 


U.K.,  the  U.S.S.R.  and  the  U.S.).  During  the 
three-week  meeting  held  in  Washington,  D.C., 
there  was  detailed  discussion  of  a  wide  range  of 
issues  relating  to  Antarctica. 

The  Tenth  Consultative  Meeting  marked  the 
twentieth  anniversary  of  the  Antarctic  Treaty 
which  was  signed  in  Washington.  DC.  in 
1959.  The  Treaty,  including  the  system  of  Con- 
sultative Meetings  it  establishes,  has  been  a 
unique  example  in  international  cooperation 

One  of  the  most  important  results  of  the 
Treaty  system  is  that  it  has  established  Antarc- 
tica as  a  zone  of  peace.  The  Treaty  provides 
that  Antarctica  shall  be  used  exclusively  for 
peaceful  purposes.  Military  activities,  includ- 
ing establishment  of  military  bases  and  fortifi- 
cations, the  carrying  out  of  military  maneuvers. 
or  the  testing  of  military  weapons,  are  prohib- 
ited in  Antarctica.  The  Antarctic  Treaty, 
therefore,  represents  a  landmark  development 
in  the  field  of  arms  control.  The  Treaty  also 
prohibits  nuclear  explosions  or  the  disposal  of 
nuclear  waste  in  Antarctica. 

In  addition,  the  Antarctic  Treaty  establishes 
a  basis  for  international  collaboration  in  scien- 
tific activities.  The  record  of  cooperative  sci- 
entific activities  and  the  importance  of  the  re- 
sults in  expanding  knowledge  not  only  of  Ant- 
arctica but  of  our  planet  as  a  whole  over  the 
past  20  years  have  more  than  justified  the  ef- 
forts of  those  who  designed  the  Treaty.  In  the 
political  sphere  as  well,  the  Antarctic  Treaty 
represents  a  dynamic  form  of  cooperation 
among  states  with  differing  legal  and  political 
perspectives. 

For  all  of  these  reasons,  the  representatives 
participating  in  the  Tenth  Consultative  Meeting 
believed  it  both  appropriate  and  important  to 
commemorate  the  success  of  the  first  two  dec- 
ades in  the  operation  of  the  Antarctic  Treaty 
system,  and  to  rededicate  themselves  to  the 
maintenance  of  that  system  and  to  the  continu- 
ing fulfillment  of  the  Treaty's  ideals.  This  re- 
commitment to  the  Antarctic  Treaty  system  was 
considered  particularly  relevant  at  a  time  when 
new  issues  relating  to  resources  in  Antarctica 
have  come  to  the  forefront 

The  Consultative  Parties  start  from  a  com- 
mon position  in  approaching  these  difficult  and 
complex  questions  That  is  the  basic  impor- 
tance they  attach  to  the  principles  and  purposes 
of  the  Antarctic  Treaty  with  emphasis  upon  the 
protection  of  the  Antarctic  environment,  an 
emphasis  of  the  Consultative  Parties  since  their 
first  meeting. 

During  the  Tenth  Consultative  Meeting  in- 
formal discussion  led  to  important  progress  to- 
ward fulfillment  of  the  objective,  articulated  in 
1977,  of  creating  an  effective  regime  for  the 
conservation  of  Antarctic  marine  living  re- 
sources. The  Consultative  Parties  remain  com- 
mitted to  the  prompt  establishment  of  such  a 
system. 

The  Tenth  Consultative  Meeting  also  wit- 
nessed extensive  consideration  on  the  subject 
of  Antarctic  mineral  resources.  Again  the 
shared  environmental  concern  of  the  Consulta- 
tive Parties  formed  a  major  basis  of  their  delib- 
erations. The  recommendation  adopted  on  this 


subject  represents  substantial  progress. 

The  representatives  also  recalled  that  their  re- 
sponsibilities for  ensuring  effective  treatment 
of  these  resource  issues  are  balanced  with  the 
need  to  ensure  that  the  interests  of  all  mankind 
in  Antarctica  are  not  prejudiced. 

The  representatives  of  the  Consultative  Par- 
ties also  agreed  on  recommendations  dealing 
with  operational  aspects  of  their  activities  in 
Antarctica,  including  recommendations  dealing 
with  cooperation  in  Antarctic  telecommunica- 
tions, development  of  agreed  practices  and 
guidelines  for  tourists  who  may  visit  there  and 
recommendations  designed  to  prevent  harmful 
impacts  from  human  activities  in  the  Antarctic 
Treaty  area. 

The  representatives  believed  that  the  nature 
and  results  of  their  three  weeks  of  deliberations 
justified  continued  confidence  in  the  strength 
and  responsiveness  of  the  Antarctic  Treaty 
system.  They  reaffirmed  their  commitment  to 
finding  imaginative  and  equitable  solutions  to 
the  evolving  issues  in  Antarctica.  To  this  end, 
they  welcomed  the  invitation  extended  by  the 
Government  of  Argentina  to  host  the  Eleventh 
Consultative  Meeting  in  1981.  D 


'  Press  release  258. 


24 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


ARMS  COI^TROL:        SALT  ii— 

A  Summation 


by  Secretary  Vance 

Statement  before  the  Senate  Com- 
mittee on  Foreign  Relations  on  Oc- 
tober 10.  1979. ' 

I  welcome  this  opportunity — as  you 
conclude  what  has  been  a  thorough  and 
intensive  set  of  hearings  on  the  SALT 
II  treaty — to  offer  a  brief  summation. 
Before  turning  to  your  questions,  I 
want  to  address  the  importance  of  the 
treaty  in  the  context  of  four  specific 
issues: 

•  Whether  our  national  security  will 
be  better  served  by  the  pursuit  of  both 
defense  modernization  and  arms  con- 
trol or  by  relying  on  defense  programs 
alone; 

•  The  impact  of  SALT  on  our  over- 
all position  in  the  world; 

•  The  risks  associated  with  now 
making  changes  in  the  treaty  that  will 
force  renegotiation  with  the  Soviets; 
and 

•  Whether  approval  of  the  treaty 
should  be  linked  to  other  issues  be- 
tween the  United  States  and  the  Soviet 
Union. 

We  have  stressed  from  the  beginning 
that  we  must  simultaneously  pursue 
two  mutually  reinforcing  elements  of 
national  security:  the  modernization  of 
our  defenses  and  the  negotiation  of 
agreements  to  limit  arms. 

On  the  military  side  of  the  equation, 
we  have  developed  a  comprehensive 
and  reasoned  program  to  improve  our 
defenses  in  all  areas — strategic,  theater 
nuclear,  and  conventional.  Over  the 
course  of  these  hearings,  we  have  de- 
scribed those  programs  in  detail.  Sec- 
retary [of  Defense]  Brown  will  discuss 
them  further  today.  Let  me  just  observe 
that  we  are  manifestly  not  involved  in  a 
dispute  between  those  who  see  dangers 
to  our  security  and  those  who  want  to 
let  down  our  guard.  Clearly,  over  the 
course  of  these  hearings,  we  have  built 
a  broad  consensus  that  our  defense 
needs  are  real  and  will  be  met. 

The  question  is,  how  will  the  SALT 
II  treaty  affect  our  defenses?  Will  our 
security  be  greater  with  the  treaty  or 
without  it?  That  is  the  central  question 
before  us — not  whether  the  treaty 
solves  all  our  security  problems,  be- 
cause it  doesn't;  not  whether  it  will  lull 
us  into  a  false  sense  of  security,  be- 
cause it  cetainly  won't;  not  whether  it 


achieves  everything  we  want  in  the  way 
of  arms  control,  because  no  single 
agreement  can. 

I  believe  these  hearings  have  clearly 
demonstrated  that  the  treaty  will  en- 
hance our  security  and  that  of  our 
allies. 

Without  the  treaty: 

•  We  would  almost  certainly  be 
faced  with  several  thousand  more 
Soviet  nuclear  warheads  and  bombs 
than  the  treaty  allows  and  several 
hundred  more  systems  to  deliver  those 
weapons; 

•  Our  ability  to  monitor  Soviet 
strategic  forces — and  thus  assess  Soviet 
capabilities — could  be  impaired,  since 
there  would  be  no  constraints  on  delib- 
erate concealment  of  such  forces; 

•  Without  the  boundaries  set  by  the 
treaty  through  1985,  our  ability  to  pre- 
dict the  level  and  nature  of  Soviet 
forces  into  the  future  would  be 
lessened — Our  defense  planning  would 
be  more  complicated  and  more  costly; 
and 

•  We  would  jeopardize  the  opportu- 
nity to  achieve  further  limits  on  nuclear 
forces,  and  thus  a  greater  measure  of 
safety,  in  the  next  round  of  talks. 

These  are  concrete  and  important  se- 
curity benefits  to  the  United  States.  We 
should  secure  these  gains  now  by 
ratifying  the  treaty,  as  we  move  on 
with  our  defense  modernization  efforts 
and  proceed  to  SALT  III. 

U.S.  Capacity  for 
Leadership 

Beyond  the  immediate  impact  on  our 
security,  the  treaty  bears  directly  on 
America's  capacity  for  leadership — on 
our  ability  to  sustain  a  sense  of  com- 
mon purpose  with  our  friends. 

As  you  know,  in  conjunction  with 
the  U.N.  General  Assembly  session  in 
New  York  over  the  past  few  weeks,  I 
met  individually  with  over  60  foreign 
ministers.  Almost  without  exception, 
they  expressed  to  me  their  concernwith 
the  consequences  of  defeat  or  inordi- 
nate delay  of  the  treaty.  Our  friends 
and  allies  want  this  treaty  approved. 
They  see  it  as  affecting  their  own  se- 
curity as  well  as  ours. 

This  is  particularly  true  for  NATO. 
As  the  President  said  in  his  television 
address  last  week:  "If  our  allies  lose 
confidence  in  our  ability  to  negotiate 


successfully  for  the  control  of  nuclear 
weapons,  then  our  effort  to  build  a 
strong  and  more  united  NATO  could 
fail." 

It  is  essential  that  the  alliance  move 
forward  to  improve  its  conventional 
and  theater  nuclear  forces.  The  United 
States  will  do  its  part;  we  want  the  al- 
lies to  do  theirs.  There  is  no  question  in 
my  mind  that  failure  to  place  the  SALT 
treaty  in  force  in  the  near  future  would 
seriously  jeopardize  the  prospect  of 
building  the  necessary  consensus  on 
these  issues  within  the  alliance. 

For  the  future  of  the  alliance — and 
for  our  overall  international  posture — 
SALT  II  is  a  benchmark  issue.  It  will 
have  a  profound  impact — for  our  allies 
see  it  as  directly  touching  them,  and 
nearly  all  countries  sense  its  effect  on 
global  stability  and  peace. 

Question  of  Changes 
to  the  Treaty 

Let  me  briefly  turn  to  the  question  of 
amendments,  reservations,  and  condi- 
tions. It  is  indisputable  that  the  Senate 
has  the  constitutional  power  to  condi- 
tion its  advice  and  consent  on  changes 
in  the  treaty  regime.  But  any  action 
which  requires  Soviet  acceptance 
necessarily  becomes  a  proposal  that  the 
negotiations  be  reopened. 

If  negotiations  should  start  again  — 
and  there  is  no  certainty  that  they  could 
—  we  would  have  to  expect  counter- 
vailing Soviet  demands  to  reopen  is- 
sues resolved  to  our  benefit.  Seven 
years  of  delicate  negotiations  could 
quickly  come  unraveled,  with  a  spiral 
of  demands  and  counterdemands. 

If  the  SALT  II  negotiations  are  pro- 
longed, the  calendar  must  also  be  con- 
sidered. SALT  I  expired  just  over  2 
years  ago.  We  must  contemplate  how 
long  new  systems  can  be  restrained  if 
an  agreement  is  not  in  force. 

We  must  recognize  the  reality  that 
steps  which  require  renegotiation  place 
the  entire  treaty  at  risk.  And  thus  I  be- 
lieve we  must  ask  ourselves,  first, 
whether  on  balance  the  treaty  as  nego- 
tiated serves  our  interests  and,  second, 
whether  any  particular  amendment 
warrants  risking  what  we  have  gained 
in  SALT  II. 

Linkage  to  Other 
Soviet  Activities 

Finally,  let  me  turn  to  the  question 
of  whether  support  for  SALT  should  be 
made  dependent  upon  Soviet  conduct  in 
other  realms. 

In  July,  I  argued  strongly  against 
such  linkage.  Developments  since  then 
have  not  changed  the  logic  of  that  ar- 


November  1979 


25 


ifffX  Missile 
System 


PRESIDENT  CARTER'S 

REMARKS, 

SEPT.  7,  1979' 

I  have  a  statement  to  make  about  the 
new  strategic  deterrence  system  which 
I  consider  to  be  quite  significant.  Some 
analysts  would  equate  it  with  two  other 
major  decisions  made  by  Presidents  in 
this  century:  the  first,  to  establish  the 
Strategic  Air  Command  itself  under 
President  Truman  and  the  subsequent 
decision  by  President  Kennedy  to  es- 
tablish the  silo-based  Minuteman  mis- 
sile system. 

For  nearly  30  years  now  our  nation 
has  deterred  attack  and  has  kept  the 
peace  through  a  complementary  system 
of  land,  sea,  and  airborne  nuclear 
forces,  commonly  known  as  the  strate- 
gic triad.  By  maintaining  the  special 
strengths  and  the  advantages  offered  by 
each  of  the  three  separate  forces,  we 
make  it  impossible  for  any  enemy  to 


counter  all  of  them. 

My  Administration  is  now  embarked 
on  a  program  to  modernize  and  to  im- 
prove the  ability  of  our  entire  strategic 
triad,  all  three  systems,  to  survive  any 
attack.  Our  bomber  force  is  being 
strengthened  with  nuclear-tipped  cruise 
missiles.  Our  strategic  submarine  force 
is  being  upgraded  by  Trident  subma- 
rines and  Trident  missiles.  However,  as 
a  result  of  increasing  accuracy  of  stra- 
tegic systems,  fixed  land-based  inter- 
continental ballistic  missiles,  or 
ICBM's,  located  in  silos  such  as  our 
Minuteman,  are  becoming  vulnerable 
to  attack.  A  mobile  ICBM  system  will 
greatly  reduce  this  vulnerability. 
Therefore,  I  decided  earlier  this  year  to 
proceed  with  full-scale  development 
and  deployment  of  a  new,  large,  mo- 
bile ICBM,  known  as  the  MX.  I  made 
this  decision  to  assure  our  country  a  se- 
cure strategic  deterrent  now  and  in  the 
future. 


gument.  We  signed  this  treaty  because 
it  contributes  to  our  national  security 
and  serves  our  national  interests.  It  is 
on  that  basis  that  it  should  be  judged. 
We  should  not  give  up  the  benefits  of 
this  treaty  because  of  our  differences 
with  the  Soviets  on  other  matters. 

Indeed,  it  is  precisely  because  our 
interests  and  those  of  the  Soviet  Union 
differ  in  many  areas  that  the  need  to 
bring  the  most  dangerous  aspects  of  our 
relationship — the  competition  in  strate- 
gic arms — is  so  compelling. 

Let  me  say  a  word  about  the  situa- 
tion in  Cuba.  As  the  President  said,  we 
consider  the  assurances  that  we  have  re- 
ceived from  the  Soviet  Union  to  be  sig- 
nificant. But  we  do  not  intend  to  rest 
on  these  statements  alone. 

We  are  moving  ahead  swiftly  to  im- 
plement the  steps  announced  by  the 
President.  These  steps  are  appropriate. 
They  are  proportionate  to  the  problem. 
They  make  unmistakably  clear  that  we 
will  assure  that  no  Soviet  unit  in  Cuba 
can  be  used  as  a  combat  force  to 
threaten  the  security  of  the  United 
States  or  any  other  nation  in  the  hemi- 
sphere . 

We  must  not  let  this  issue  obscure 
the  vital  stake  that  we — and  our  allies 
'  and  friends — have  in  the  treaty  that  is 
before  you.  Our  concern  about  a  stable 
!  East- West  balance — military  and  polit- 
ical —  should  compel  us  to  place  the 
treaty,  not  in  limbo  but  in  force. 


Consensus  on  National  Security 

Over  the  course  of  these  hearings,  I 
believe  we  have  begun  to  rebuild  a  na- 
tional consensus  on  the  overall  direc- 
tion of  this  nation's  security  policies. 
We  have  not  had  such  a  consensus  in 
this  country  for  a  number  of  years,  and 
we  have  suffered  as  a  result.  That 
emerging  consensus  rests  on  two 
pillars — each  of  which  is  necessary. 

•  First,  that  we  are  now  prepared  as 
a  nation  to  move  ahead  with  a  com- 
prehensive and  reasoned  modernization 
of  our  military  defense  and 

•  Second,  that  we  must  continue  the 
process  of  bringing  nuclear  weapons 
under  more  sensible  control. 

If  we  knock  out  one  or  the  other  of 
those  pillars,  I  believe  we  face  a  future 
of  fractious  debate.  But  if  we  now 
firmly  establish  our  commitment  to 
both,  we  can  move  ahead  as  a  nation 
united.  Thus,  whether  your  principal 
concern  is  the  future  of  our  defense 
posture,  or  of  arms  control,  of  Ameri- 
ca's capacity  for  effective  leadership  in 
the  alliance  and  in  the  world,  the  SALT 
II  treaty  serves  that  end  and  deserves 
your  support.  D 


'Press  release  257.  The  complete  transcript 
of  the  hearings  will  be  published  by  the  com- 
mittee and  will  be  available  from  the  Superin- 
tendent of  Documents,  U.S.  Government 
Printing  Office,  Washington,  D.C.  20402. 


The  MX  will  enable  us  to  continue 
with  a  modernized,  unsurpassed,  sur- 
vivable  strategic  deterrent  ICBM,  sub- 
marine-launched, and  heavy  bomber 
triad — ICBM's,  submarine-launched 
ballistic  missiles,  and  the  heavy 
bomber  triad,  armed  with  cruise  mis- 
siles. Clearly,  the  way  we  base  the  MX 
to  enhance  its  own  security  from  attack 
is  vital  to  the  ability  it  has  to  defend 
our  country. 

At  the  time  that  I  made  the  decision 
to  build  the  MX,  I  established  five  es- 
sential criteria  which  the  basing  system 
would  have  to  meet. 

•  First,  it  must  contribute  to  the 
ability  of  the  strategic  forces  to  survive 
an  attack. 

•  Second,  it  must  be  verifiable  so  as 
to  set  a  standard  which  can  serve  as  a 
precedent  for  the  verifiability  of  mobile 
ICBM  systems  on  both  sides. 

•  Third,  it  must  minimize  the  ad- 
verse impact  on  our  own  environment. 

•  Fourth,  its  deployment  must  be  at 
a  reasonable  cost  to  the  American  tax- 
payer. 

•  Fifth,  it  must  be  consistent  with 
existing  SALT  agreements  and  with  our 
SALT  III  goal  of  negotiating  for  sig- 
nificant mutual  reductions  in  strategic 
forces. 

In  light  of  these  criteria  and  after  full 
consultation  with  Secretary  of  Defense 
Harold  Brown  and  my  other  principal 
advisers,  I've  decided  upon  the  fol- 
lowing configuration  for  basing  the 
MX  missile  system.  The  MX  will  be 
based  in  a  sheltered,  road-mobile  sys- 
tem to  be  constructed  in  our  western 
deserts,  the  total  exclusive  area  of 
which  will  not  exceed  25  square  miles. 

This  system  will  consist  of  200  mis- 
sile transporters  or  launchers,  each 
capable  of  rapid  movement  on  a  special 
roadway  connecting  approximately  23 
horizontal  shelters. 

Let  me  point  out  how  this  meets  the 
criteria  that  I've  established. 

First,  it  increases  the  survivability 
of  our  missiles  by  multiplying  the 
number  of  targets  which  would  have  to 
be  attacked,  because  not  knowing  in 
which  of  the  23  shelters  the  missile  was 
located,  all  23  shelters  would  have  to 
be  targeted  in  order  to  be  sure  to  attack 
the  missile. 

The  capacity  of  the  missiles  to  move 
rapidly  insures  that  no  attacker  will  be 
able  to  find  out  ahead  of  time  where  the 
missiles  might  be  located  and  attack 
just  those  locations  only.  In  fact,  the 
missiles  would  be  able  to  change  shel- 
ters during  the  flight  time  of  an  enemy 
ICBM.  Moreover,  the  system  is  flexi- 
ble enough  so  that  we  can  adjust  the 


26 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


scale  of  deployment  either  up  or  down 
in  response  to  a  future  enemy  threat  or 
to  progress  on  future  SALT  negotia- 
tions. 

Secondly,  the  system  is  adequately 
verifiable.  The  special  roadways  will 
be  confined  to  designated  areas,  and 
the  associated  missile  transporters  will 
be  incapable  of  moving  other  than  on 
those  designated  roadways. 

The  shelters  will  be  designed  so  they 
may  be  opened  in  order  to  demonstrate 
that  no  extra  missiles  are  hidden  within 
them.  These  and  other  features  will 
make  this  system  adequately  verifiable. 

Third,  the  system  minimizes  the  im- 
pact on  the  environment.  The  shelters 
are  flush  with  the  ground.  The  public 
will  retain  access  to  the  area.  Only  the 
shelters  themselves  will  be  fenced  off. 
The  entire  system,  as  I  said  earlier, 
will  take  only  about  25  square  miles  of 
land  out  of  public  use. 

Fourth,  the  system  is  affordable. 
The  projected  cost  over  the  full  10-year 
period,  total  cost,  to  develop,  to  pro- 
duce, and  to  deploy  is  $33  billion  in 
1980  dollars.  While  this  acquisition 
cost  may  vary  somewhat  as  the  pro- 
gram proceeds,  it's  important  to  recog- 
nize that  the  cost  of  this  system,  in 
constant  dollar  terms,  will  be  no 
greater  than  the  cost  of  any  one  of  the 
original  three  legs  of  our  strategic 
triad,  either  the  B-52  force  or  the 
Polaris-Poseidon  force  or  the  Min- 
uteman  ICBM  system. 

Finally,  this  system  is  compatible  with 
existing  SALT  agreements  and  with  our 
objectives  for  SALT  III.  Deploying  this 
system  will  make  it  clear  to  the  Soviet 
Union  that  they  will  gain  no  strategic 
advantage  out  of  continuing  the  nuclear 
arms  race.  This  is  a  fundamental  pre- 
condition to  more  effective  arms  con- 
trol agreements.  Equally  important, 
this  system  points  in  the  direction  of  re- 
ductions of  strategic  arms  because  we 
are  giving  better  protection  with  a  force 
of  fewer  missiles.  Without  such  a 
mobile  shelter  system,  the  only  way  we 
could  maintain  our  deterrent  would  be 
to  increase  greatly  the  number  of  our 
strategic  systems  or  nuclear  missiles. 

In  the  course  of  making  the  series  of 
decisions  that  led  to  this  announce- 
ment, I  carefully  studied  the  potential 
threat  to  our  Minuteman  force.  That 
threat  is  real.  The  system  I've  outlined 
this  morning  does  the  best  job  of 
meeting  that  threat,  while  also  fulfill- 
ing the  conditions  that  I  specified  at  the 
outset.  The  system  is  survivable,  it's 
verifiable,  it  has  a  minimum  impact  on 
the  environment,  it's  affordable  in 
cost,  and  it's  consistent  with  our  SALT 


CA]\ADA:         Transhoundary  Air 
QuaUty  Talks 


On  July  26.  1979.  the  United  States 
and  Canada  released  the  following  joint 
statement  in  Ottawa. ' 

Transboundary  air  quality  has  be- 
come a  matter  of  increasing  concern  to 
people  in  both  the  United  States  and 
Canada.  This  issue  has  many  dimen- 
sions, including  the  long  range  trans- 
port of  air  pollutants  and  the  phenome- 
non of  "acid  rain".  Both  Governments 
have  recognized  the  need  for  close  and 
continuing  cooperation  to  protect  and 
enhance  transboundary  air  quality. 

Discussions  on  transboundary  air 
quality  were  initiated  through  an  Ex- 
change of  Notes  of  November  16  and 
17,  1978,  in  which  the  United  States 
Department  of  State  proposed  that 
"representatives  of  the  two  Govern- 
ments meet  at  an  early  date  to  discuss 
informally  (a)  the  negotiation  of  a  co- 
operative agreement  on  preserving  and 
enhancing  air  quality,  and  (b)  other 
steps  which  might  be  taken  to  reduce  or 
eliminate  the  undesirable  impacts  on 
the  two  countries  resulting  from  air 
pollution." 

In  reply,  the  Canadian  Government 
indicated  that  it  shared  United  States 
concern  about  the  growing  problem  of 
transboundary  air  pollution.  In  par- 
ticular, it  noted  the  potential  environ- 
mental impact,  and  the  transboundary 
significance,  of  the  long  range  trans- 
port of  air  pollutants.  It  therefore 
welcomed  the  opening  of  "informal  dis- 
cussions .  .  .  with  a  view  to  develop- 
ing agreement  on  principles  which  rec- 
ognize our  shared  responsibility  not  to 
cause  transboundary  environmental 
damage,  and  which  might  lead  to  co- 


operative measures  to  reduce  or  elimi- 
nate environmental  damage  caused  by 
transboundary  air  pollution." 

Bilateral  discussions  of  an  informal 
nature  took  place  on  December  15, 
1978,  and  June  20,  1979,  and  both 
Governments  have  exchanged  discus- 
sion papers  on  principles  which  they 
believe  have  relevance  to  transbound- 
ary air  pollution.  As  a  result  of  these 
discussions  it  has  become  clear  that 
Canada  and  the  United  States  share  a 
growing  concern  about  the  actual  and 
potential  effects  of  transboundary  air 
pollution  and  are  prepared  to  initiate 
cooperative  efforts  to  address  trans- 
boundary air  pollution  problems. 

There  is  already  a  substantial  basis 
of  obligation,  commitment  and  cooper- 
ative practice  in  existing  environmental 
relations  between  Canada  and  the 
United  States  on  which  to  address 
problems  in  this  area.  Both  Govern- 
ments are  mutually  obligated  through 
the  Boundary  Waters  Treaty  of  1909  to( 
ensure  that  "...  boundary  waters  and 
waters  flowing  across  the  boundary 
shall  not  be  polluted  on  either  side  to 
the  injury  of  health  or  property.  .  .  ." 
(Article  IV) 

Both  Governments  have  also  sup- 
ported Principle  21  of  the  1972  Stock- 
holm Declaration  on  the  Human  Envi- 
ronment,  which  proclaims  that   "... 
States  have,  in  accordance  with  the) 
Charter  of  the  United  Nations  and  thei 
principles  of  international   law,  thei 
sovereign  right  to  exploit  their  own  re 
sources  pursuant  to  their  own  environ 
mental  policies  and  the  responsibility! 
to  ensure  that   activities  within  their 
jurisdiction  or  control  do  not  cause 


goal  of  deep  reductions  in  strategic 
arms. 

In  sum,  this  system  will  enhance  our 
nation's  security,  both  by  strengthening 
our  strategic  deterrent  and  by  offering 
the  prospect  of  more  effective  arms 
control.  This  system  is  not  a  bargaining 
chip.  It's  a  system  that  America  needs 
and  will  have  for  its  security.  I'm  con- 
fident that  the  American  people  will 
support  its  deployment. 

Unhappily,  we  do  not  yet  live  in  the 
kind  of  world  that  permits  us  to  devote 
all  our  resources  to  the  works  of  peace. 
And  as  President,  I  have  no  higher  duty 
than  to  insure  that  the  security  of  the 
United  States  will  be  protected  beyond 
doubt.  As  long  as  the  threat  of  war  per- 


sists, we  will  do  what  we  must  to  deter 
that  threat  to  our  nation's  security.  If 
SALT  II  is  ratified  and  SALT  III  is 
successful,  then  the  time  may  come 
when  no  President  will  have  to  make 
this  kind  of  decision  again  and  the  MX 
system  will  be  the  last  weapon  system 
of  such  enormous  destructive  power 
that  we  will  ever  have  to  build.  I  fer- 
vently pray  for  that  time,  but  until  it 
comes,  we  will  build  what  we  must, 
even  as  we  continue  to  work  for  mutual 
restraint  in  strategic  armaments.  D 


'Remarks  to  reporters  at  the  Old  Executive  ^ 
Office  Building;  text  from  Weekly  Compilation  ; 
of  Presidential  Documents  of  Sept.  10,  1979.       ' 


November  1979 


27 


damage  to  the  environment  of  other 
States  or  of  areas  beyond  the  limits  of 
national  jurisdiction.  .  .  ." 

A  number  of  cooperative  steps  have 
been  taken  to  deal  with  transboundary 
air  pollution.  In  the  1978  Great  Lakes 
Water  Quality  Agreement,  both  Gov- 
ernments committed  themselves  to  de- 
velop and  implement  "programs  to 
identify  pollutant  sources  and  relative 
source  contributions  .  .  .  for  those  sub- 
stances which  may  have  significant  ad- 
verse effects  on  environmental  quality 
including  indirect  effects  of  impairment 
of  tributary  water  quality  through  at- 
mospheric deposition  in  drainage  ba- 
sins. In  cases  where  significant  contri- 
butions to  Great  Lakes  pollution  from 
atmospheric  sources  are  identified,  the 
Parties  agree  to  consult  on  remedial 
measures." 

Both  Governments  have  sought  to 
implement  the  principles  of  notification 
and  consultation  on  activities  and  proj- 
ects with  potential  transboundary  im- 
pact, and  to  promote  exchanges  of  sci- 
entific and  technical  information.  In 
1978  the  two  Governments  established 
a  Bilateral  Research  Consultation 
Group  on  the  Long  Range  Transport  of 
Air  Pollutants  to  coordinate  research 
efforts  in  both  countries.  Both  Gov- 
ernments have  also  engaged  the  Inter- 
national Joint  Commission  in  some  as- 
pects of  transboundary  air  pollution. 
This  has  been  done  through  References 
under  the  Boundary  Waters  Treaty  es- 
tablishing the  Michigan/Ontario  Air 
Pollution  Board  and  the  International 
Air  Pollution  Advisory  Board,  and 
through  the  Great  Lakes  Water  Quality 
Agreement  of  1978. 

Having  regard  to  these  and  other  rel- 
evant principles  and  practices  recog- 
nized by  them,  both  Canada  and  the 
United  States  share  a  common  determi- 
nation to  reduce  or  prevent  transbound- 
ary air  pollution  which  injures  health 
and  property  on  the  other  side  of  the 
boundary.  Recognizing  the  importance 
and  urgency  of  the  problem,  and  be- 
lieving that  a  basis  exists  for  the  de- 
velopment of  a  cooperative  bilateral 
agreement  on  air  quality,  the  Govern- 
ment of  the  United  States  and  the  Gov- 
ernment of  Canada  therefore  intend  to 
move  their  discussions  beyond  the  in- 
formal stage  to  develop  such  an  agree- 
ment. Both  sides  agree  that  the  fol- 
lowing further  principles  and  practices 
should  be  addressed  in  the  development 
of  a  bilateral  agreement  on  transbound- 
ary air  quality: 

1 .  Prevention  and  reduction  of  trans- 
boundary air  pollution  which  results  in 
deleterious  effects  of  such  a  nature  as 
to  endanger  human  health,  harm  living 
resources  and  ecosystems  and  impair  or 


ElWIROI^MEl^fT: 

Crisis 


The  Quid 


by  Anthony  Lake 

Based  on  an  address  before  the 
Council  on  Religion  and  International 
Affairs  in  New  York  City  on  April  25, 
1979.  Mr.  Lake  is  Director  of  the 
Policy  Planning  Staff. 

Each  day,  the  press  of  events  abroad, 
reflected  in  newspaper  headlines  here 
at  home,  focuses  the  attention  of  public 
officials  and  private  citizens  alike  on 
the  crises  of  the  moment — the  Middle 
East,  Iran,  Southeast  Asia,  southern 
Africa. 

Each  of  these  problems  deserves, 
and  commands,  our  immediate  atten- 
tion. But  today  I  want  to  talk  with  you 
about  another  crisis — a  quiet  crisis — 
one  that  usually  escapes  daily  notice 
but  nonetheless  will  profoundly  affect 
the  kind  of  lives  we  will  lead,  indeed 
the  prospect  of  life  itself,  in  the  dec- 
ades ahead. 

I  am  referring  to  the  relationship 
between  mankind  and  the  planet  we  in- 
habit: whether  we  can  strike  a  decent 
balance  between  the  burgeoning  de- 
mands of  more  people  for  a  better  life 
and  the  immutable  reality  of  limited  re- 
sources; whether  we  can  manage  suc- 
cessfully a  steady  and  more  equitable 
rise  in  standards  of  living  without  de- 
stroying our  planet — and  ourselves — in 
the  process. 

A  bomb  set  off  by  a  terrorist  in  Lon- 
don or  Israel  makes  a  shattering  noise 
heard  around  the  world.  But  a  precious 
rain  forest  lost  over  time  in  Central 
America,  or  a  slight  but  ominous  rise 
in  the  temperature  of  the  Earth  from  the 


introduction  of  carbon  dioxide  in  the 
atmosphere,  or  25,000  more  mouths  to 
feed  in  the  world  each  day,  these 
gathering  signals  of  tomorrow's  crisis 
can  go  unnoticed. 

In  part,  that  is  why  this  is  an  ex- 
traordinarily difficult  set  of  issues. 
They  are  diffuse,  deceptively  incre- 
mental. They  are  also  technically  com- 
plex, sometimes  socially  sensitive,  and 
often  politically  painful. 

I  will  not  attempt,  today,  to  cover  all 
of  the  aspects  of  this  quiet  crisis.  But  I 
would  like  to  share  with  you  some  gen- 
eral thoughts  on  the  kinds  of  challenges 
and  choices  we  face.  Nor  will  I  pretend 
to  hold  out  solutions  that  are  being 
found  or  even  designed.  But  I  will  try 
to  indicate  some  of  the  actions  we  are 
now  taking  in  key  areas. 

Let  me  begin  with  a  few  stark  statis- 
tics. Numbers  are  a  shorthand  for  real- 
ity. We  can  sometimes  give  short 
shrift,  therefore,  to  their  implications. 
But  each  of  these  indicators  of  what  is 
happening  now  predict,  imprecisely  but 
certainly,  future  difficulties  for  us  all. 

•  Each  year  a  way  must  be  found  to 
feed  70  million  more  people.  Already, 
one  out  of  every  five  human  beings  is 
sick  or  weak  from  malnutrition. 

•  The  rate  of  increase  in  grain  yields 
has  slowed. 

•  In  the  last  decade,  nearly  a  million 
acres  of  agricultural  land  were  taken 
for  urban  use.  Additional  farmland  is 
turning  into  desert — 250,000  acres  a 
year  in  northern  Africa  alone. 

•  Nearly  two-thirds  of  the  ecologi- 
cally vital  tropical  rain  forests  in  Cen- 


interfere  with  amenities  and  other 
legitimate  uses  of  the  environment. 

2.  Control  strategies  aimed  at  pre- 
venting and  reducing  transboundary  air 
pollution  including  the  limitation  of 
emissions  by  the  use  of  control  tech- 
nologies for  new,  substantially  mod- 
ified and,  as  appropriate,  existing 
facilities. 

3.  Expanded  notification  and  con- 
sultation on  matters  involving  a  risk  or 
potential  risk  of  transboundary  air  pol- 
lution. 

4.  Expanded  exchanges  of  scientific 
information  and  increased  cooperation 
in  research  and  development  concern- 
ing transboundary  air  pollution  proc- 
esses, effects  and  emission  control 
technologies. 


5.  Expanded  monitoring  and  evalua- 
tion efforts  aimed  at  understanding  of 
the  full  scope  of  the  transboundary  air 
pollution  phenomenon. 

6.  Cooperative  assessment  of  long- 
term  environmental  trends  and  of  the 
implications  of  these  trends  for  trans- 
boundary air  pollution  problems. 

7.  Consideration  of  such  matters  as 
institutional  arrangements,  equal  ac- 
cess, non-discrimination  and  liability 
and  compensation,  as  relevant  to  an 
agreement. 

8.  Consideration  of  measures  to  im- 
plement an  agreement.  D 


'  Press  release  117. 


28 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/ 


tral  America  have  been  destroyed. 
Worldwide  tropical  rain  forests  are  dis- 
appearing at  the  rate  of  more  than  50 
acres  a  minute. 

•  While  increased  amounts  of  toxic 
substances  are  introduced  into  the 
world's  water  (as  well  as  into  our  food 
chains),  human  demand  for  clean  water 
is  expected  to  grow  three  times  by  the 
early  21st  century. 

•  A  million  tons  of  oil  a  year  enter 
the  oceans  from  tankers,  freighters, 
and  offshore  drilling.  Several  million 
more  tons  of  oil  and  its  products  find 
their  way  into  the  oceans  from  the 
land. 

•  There  are  now  more  than  a  dozen 
nations  that  could  develop  a  nuclear 
weapon  within  a  few  years  of  a  deci- 
sion to  do  so. 

I  could,  of  course,  spend  the  remain- 
der of  our  time  together  ringing  such 
statistical  alarms. 

But  the  implication  of  even  these  few 
is  obvious.  If  our  children  are  to  lead 
decent  lives  and  have  the  hope  of  a 
friendly  Earth  for  their  children,  people 
around  the  globe  must  work  together 
not  only  to  live  in  harmony  with  each 
other  but  with  their  environment. 

The  political,  social,  and  cultural 
barriers  to  this  kind  of  cooperation  are 
evident  and  huge.  Less  evident,  I  be- 
lieve, is  an  intellectual  hurdle  to  be 
crossed.  It  is  the  tendency  toward 
"either/or." 

Most  of  the  problems  1  have  cited  are 
the  consequences  of  growth.  The  sci- 
entific and  technological  advances 
which  propel  this  economic  growth 
bring  with  them  new  risks  and  prob- 
lems. Progress  can  seem  perverse. 

The  natural  reaction  of  many  of  us 
can  sometimes  be  a  kind  of  Luddite 
rejection  of  growth  itself.  This  re- 
sponse may  seem  sensible  to  those 
whose  own  economic  welfare  is  as- 
sured by  the  benefits  they  have  gained 
from  previous  economic  progress.  But 
for  the  vast  numbers  of  the  poor  the 
idea  of  denying  or  severely  limiting 
future  growth  —  for  the  sake  of 
humanity — is  a  cruel  concept.  Nor,  in- 
deed, could  growth  and  scientific  ad- 
vance be  limited,  even  if  we  wished  it. 

What  is  needed,  in  our  academic 
community,  our  government,  and  our 
political  processes,  is  a  better  synthesis 
of  the  imperatives  of  progress  and  of 
conservation,  a  discipline  of  environ- 
mental economics.  Certainly,  such 
thinkers  and  planners  now  exist.  We 
need  more  of  them.  And  all  of  us  who 
are  neither  economists  nor  environ- 
mentalists need  to  think  more  about 
how  our  national  and  global  societies 
can  shape  progress  in  safe  ways  rather 
than  concentrating  solely  either  on  con- 


servation of  the  environement  or  on 
material  growth. 

Let  me  illustrate  this  point  by 
discussing  two  sets  of  interconnected 
global  issues  and  some  of  the  dilemmas 
they  create:  first,  energy  development, 
associated  environmental  risks,  and 
nuclear  proliferation;  and  second,  the 
balance  among  population  growth, 
food,  and  natural  resources. 


The  Search  for  Safe  Energy 

I  need  not  belabor  the  critical  im- 
portance of  addressing,  firmly  and  ur- 
gently, the  prospect  of  growing  energy 
shortages.  The  consequences  can  be 
severe;  inflation  and  economic  disloca- 
tion here  and  abroad,  damage  to  the 
development  of  poorer  nations,  and  in- 
creased tensions  in  the  international 
system. 

It  is  of  fundamental  importance, 
then,  that  we  increase  our  own  produc- 
tion of  energy,  including  petroleum, 
and  significantly  reduce  our  costly  re- 
liance on  foreign  oil.  One  part  of  the 
President's  energy  program  is  designed 
to  do  this. 

Inevitably,  here  and  abroad,  in- 
creased emphasis  on  nonpetroleum 
energy  resources  will  mean  more  re- 
liance on  coal  (a  priority  in  our  own 
plans)  and  on  nuclear  energy  (which  is 
particularly  attractive  to  a  number  of 
foreign  nations).  Each  raises  obvious 
concerns,  however. 

The  most  realistic  short-term  alter- 
native to  our  current  dependence  on  oil 
is  to  increase  our  coal  production.  We 
intend  to  achieve  a  two-third  increase 
in  this  production  by  1985.  But  there 
are  possible  longer  term  penalties 
which  we  all  must  also  recognize. 

Burning  coal  and  other  hydrocar- 
bons, for  example,  produces  carbon 
dioxide.  Increased  levels  of  CO2  in  the 
atmosphere  could  produce  a  "green 
house  effect"  in  which  the  global  cli- 
mate is  gradually  warmed  with  unpre- 
dictable effects  on  climate  patterns  and 
food  production.  In  fact,  a  strong  body 
of  scientific  opinion  believes  the 
Earth's  atmosphere  is  already  getting 
warmer.  In  the  past  100  years,  CO2  in 
the  atmosphere  has  increased  by  12%; 
in  the  next  50  years  it  could  increase  by 
100%. 

In  addition,  the  burning  of  hydrocar- 
bons, particularly  coal,  releases  sulfur 
dioxide  into  the  atmosphere.  The  sulfur 
dioxide  is  in  turn  washed  out  of  the  at- 
mosphere by  rain  and  snow  which  be- 
comes acidic  in  the  process.  This  so- 
called  acid  rain  is  already  an  important 
environmental  issue  in  Europe  and  in 
the  eastern  U.S. -Canadian  border 
areas.  Noticeable  effects  have  been  de- 


creases in  fish  populations  and  a  re 
duction  of  the  productivity  of  forests' 
and  agricultural  lands. 

We  are  working  on  technologies 
which  might  decrease  the  CO2  prob- 
lem, and  various  scrubbing  systems 
exist  to  remove  much  of  the  sulfur 
dioxide  from  hydrocarbon  burning.  But 
these  technologies  are  expensive,  and 
some  will  take  time  to  develop. 

Nuclear  power  is  much  cleaner  for 
our  atmosphere,  and  it  does  not  add  to 
carbon  dioxide  buildup.  But  the  poten- 
tial for  nuclear  accidents,  we  now 
know,  is  real.  Furthermore,  aspects  of 
the  nuclear  fuel  cycle  raise  the  specter 
of  nuclear-weapons  proliferation.  And 
we  have  not  yet  demonstrated  that  we 
have  a  fully  acceptable  means  for  the 
disposal  of  radioactive  waste. 

Yet,  while  we  seek  to  slow  the  pace 
of  new  nuclear  technologies  such  as  the 
fast-breeder  reactor,  nuclear  energy  is 
already  a  key  part  of  our  own  energy 
network;  up  to  13%  of  our  electrical 
power  comes  from  nuclear  plants.  And 
its  continuing  development  is  clearly 
irreversible  abroad. 

Energy  Conservation.  Thus,  we 
come  back  to  my  central  question;  How 
do  we  strike  the  right  balance  between 
needed  increases  in  energy  production 
and  concern  for  our  environment? 

The  first  and  most  important  answer 
to  our  dilemma  is,  of  course,  energy 
conservation,  to  slow  the  growth  in 
energy  demand.  Our  energy  program 
places  great  stress  on  this.  As  a  short - 
run  measure,  we  have  agreed  with  the 
other  19  industrialized  members  of  the 
International  Energy  Agency  (lEA)  to 
reduce  collective  demand  on  world  oil 
markets  by  2  million  barrels  per  day. 
For  the  United  States  this  will  mean  a. 
cut  in  demand  for  oil  imports  of  up  to  1 
million  barrels  a  day  by  the  end  of 
1979. 

On  April  5,  President  Carter  set  forth 
specific  measures  which  would  meet 
the  lEA  commitment,  as  well  as  ad- 
dress the  longer  term  energy  problems 
of  the  United  States.  These  measures 
focus  on  reducing  consumption  of  oil 
and  gasoline,  switching  to  fuels  which 
are  more  abundant  in  the  United  States, 
decontrolling  crude  oil  prices,  and  pro- 
viding incentives  for  conservation  and 
improving  efficiency  in  energy  use. 

Progress  can  be  made.  The  mileage 
of  the  U.S.  new  car  fleet  has  improved 
by  5  miles  per  gallon  since  1974. 
Through  careful  conservation  and 
greater  efficiency,  we  can  reduce  the 
amount  of  energy  needed  to  fuel  our 
economic  growth.  In  the  past,  each  1% 
growth  in  U.S.  gross  national  product  n 
has  generated  an  equivalent  1%  growth  |l 


November  1979 


29 


in  our  demand  for  energy.  From  1973 
to  1978,  this  proportional  increase  in 
energy  growth  fell  to  about  one  half  of 
1%  for  each  1%  of  growth.  By  con- 
tinuing to  improve  the  efficiency  of 
energy  use,  we  hope  to  keep  at  least 
below  0.8%  through  1985,  while  main- 
taining a  growing  economy. 

International  Cooperation.  A  sec- 
ond response  is  to  help  focus  greater 
international  attention  on  what  are  truly 
international  problems.  Action  by  the 
United  States  alone  will  not  resolve  our 
dilemmas.  For  example,  even  if  we 
were  to  reduce  by  half  the  amount  of 
CO2  the  United  States  puts  in  the  at- 
mosphere, the  best  models  available 
indicate  that  such  unilateral  action 
would  extend  by  only  5  years  the  time 
it  would  take  for  atmospheric  CO2 
levels  to  double.  Thus,  if  real  im- 
provement is  to  take  place  to  address 
environmental  problems  created  by 
energy  production,  it  will  require  the 
cooperation  of  other  industrialized 
countries  and,  very  importantly,  the 
developing  world. 

With  strong  congressional  support, 
the  Agency  for  International  Develop- 
ment (AID)  is  rapidly  expanding  its 
programs  to  assist  developing  countries 
cope  with  their  energy  and  environ- 
mental problems.  Such  assistance 
ranges  from  energy  assessments  of  na- 
tional policies  to  demonstration  proj- 
ects of  specific  technologies,  from  im- 
proved management  of  forests  used  for 
firewood  to  application  of  satellite 
photography  for  understanding  the 
overall  environmental  impact  of  de- 
velopment programs.  And  at  the  cur- 
rent meeting  of  the  U.N.  Environment 
Program  Governing  Council,  we  are 
suggesting  that  consideration  be  given 
to  new  mechanisms  for  dealing  with  the 
international  impact  of  major  national 
projects  that  could  degrade  the  envi- 
ronment. 

We  must  also  devise  international 
means  for  dealing  with  the  question  of 
nuclear  power  and  the  proliferation  of 
nuclear  weapons.  Over  a  dozen  coun- 
tries now  produce  and  export  nuclear 
technology.  Many  nations  with  little 
domestic  energy  capacity  are  almost 
completely  dependent  on  the  OPEC 
[Organization  of  Petroleum  Exporting 
Countries]  countries  for  their  energy 
resources.  This  creates  an  increased 
demand  for  nuclear  technology,  with 
its  potential  nonproliferation  problems. 

To  help  deal  with  the  proliferation 
risks  in  nuclear  energy  development, 
we  have  organized  the  International 
Nuclear  Fuel  Cycle  Evaluation  to 
search  for  ways — both  technical  and 
institutional — to  enable  nations  to  pur- 


Worid  Forests 


PRESIDENT  CARTER'S 
MEMORANDUM  TO 
SECRETARY  VANCE, 
AUG.  2,  1979' 

In  my  Environmental  Message  of  August  2. 
1979,  I  expressed  concern  about  the  rapid  dis- 
appearance of  the  earth's  forests,  especially  in 
the  tropics  and  subtropics.  I  believe  there  is 
much  that  the  United  States  can  do  in  coopera- 
tion with  other  nations  to  contribute  to  en- 
vironmentally sound  care  and  management  of 
the  earth's  forests  and  to  the  well-being  of 
people  affected  by  them. 

I  am  directing  you  to  give  high  priority  to  the 
following  matters  in  your  budget  and  program 
planning: 

•  improved  monitoring  of  world  forest 
trends,  particularly  tropical  forests,  including 
use  of  satellite  observations; 

•  research  on  necessary  preservation  of  nat- 
ural forest  ecosystems  and  their  rich  complex 
of  plant  and  animal  life; 

•  research  on  multiple  uses  of  highly  diverse 
tropical  forests,  including  management  of  nat- 
ural stands,  development  of  ecologically  sound 
forest  plantations,  and  combined  agriculture 
and  forestry; 

•  studies  on  increasing  yields  in  family-scale 
tropical  agriculture,  to  relieve  pressures  on 
forest  lands  that  are  not  suitable  for  cultivation; 

•  demonstration  of  integrated  projects  for 
reforestation,  more  efficient  fuel-wood  use, 
and  alternative  energy  sources; 

•  examination  of  how  U.S.  citizens  and 
U.S. -based  corporations  may  be  encouraged  to 
support  sound  forest  management  practices. 


1  am  asking  you  to  ensure  that  the  inter- 
agency task  force  on  tropical  forests,  chaired 
by  the  Department  of  State,  submit  to  me  by 
November  1979  its  report  and  recommenda- 
tions on  U.S.  goals,  strategies,  and  programs  to 
help  protect  and  conserve  world  forests. 

1  am  asking  you  to  work  with  the  Department 
of  Agriculture,  the  Council  on  Environmental 
Quality  and  other  relevant  federal  agencies, 
and  with  other  nations  and  international  organi- 
zations, to  give  full  support  and  assistance  to 
the  international  program  of  activities  for  con- 
.servation  and  wise  utilization  of  tropical  forests 
to  be  developed  under  the  sponsorship  of  the 
United  Nations  Environment  Programme. 

I  am  also  asking  you  to  encourage  and  sup- 
port high-level  international  conferences  on 
forest  problems  in  regions  where  forest  losses 
are  severe,  to  raise  awareness  and  understand- 
ing both  of  the  complex  problems  and  possible 
solutions. 

Finally,  1  am  asking  you  and  the  Chairman  of 
the  Council  on  Environmental  Quality  to  report 
to  me  within  six  months  on  the  best  ways  to 
designate  "ecological  and  natural  resources  of 
global  importance  "  under  Executive  Order 
12114,  so  that  proposals  for  major  federal  ac- 
tions significantly  affecting  these  resources 
will  be  reviewed  before  a  decision  is  made. 

Please  give  these  assignments  your  im- 
mediate attention. 

Jimmy  Carter  D 


'Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of  Presiden- 
tial Documents  of  Aug.  6,  1979 


sue  peaceful  nuclear  energy  without 
bringing  closer  the  specter  of  nuclear- 
weapons  proliferation.  In  addition,  the 
Nonproliferation  Act  of  1978  places 
very  strict  conditions  on  nuclear  coop- 
eration with  other  nations. 

Developing  Renewable  Energy 
Sources.  A  third — and  ultimately  the 
most  promising — response  to  the 
energy/environment  dilemma  is  the 
longer  term  development  of  the  renew- 
able energy  sources  that  can  provide  us 
with  greater  energy  security  and  in 
greater  safety. 

We  are  increasing  our  financial 
commitment  to  research  on  renewable 
energy  sources.  In  addition  to  private 
financing,  the  Department  of  Energy 
has  budgeted  over  $600  million  this 
year  to  study,  develop,  and  demon- 
strate renewable  energy  technology. 
We  have  asked  Congress  for  more  than 


$700  million  for  these  efforts  next 
year. 

President  Carter  and  other  heads  of 
state  at  the  Bonn  economic  summit  last 
July  pledged  to  increase  assistance  to 
developing  countries  for  harnessing  the 
vast  energy  potential  of  the  sun,  the 
wind,  the  oceans,  and  other  renewable 
resources.  These  efforts  will  be  re- 
viewed and,  we  hope,  intensified  at  the 
Tokyo  summit  in  June. 

AID  has  requested  $42  million  in  FY 
1980  for  the  actual  application  of  re- 
newable energy  technologies  in  de- 
veloping countries.  The  energy  security 
fund,  proposed  by  the  President  to  be 
funded  by  the  windfall  profits  tax 
would,  in  part,  finance  a  further  com- 
mitment to  the  development  of  alterna- 
tive energy  sources  and  technologies. 

We  have  proposed  a  new  Institute  for 
Scientific  and  Technological  Coopera- 
tion, which  would  become  an  important 


30 


Department  of  State  Bulletin  , 


element  of  our  foreign  assistance  pro- 
gram with  new  energy  development  as 
a  major  focus  of  its  work. 

With  strong  U.S.  backing,  the 
United  Nations  will  hold  a  World 
Conference  on  New  and  Renewable 
Sources  of  Energy  in  1981.  We  intend 
to  play  an  active  role  in  that  effort.  In 
this  connection  we  will  also  work  with 
other  nations  to  determine  whether  it 
would  be  useful  to  support  regional 
energy  research  institutes.  These  would 
focus  particularly  on  LDC  [less  de- 
veloped country]  energy  needs,  with 
emphasis  on  appropriate  renewable  and 
nonconventional  energy  sources.  And 
we  are  asking  the  World  Bank  to 
undertake  a  thorough  review  of  how 
best  to  assure  adequate  financing  for 
developing  countries  to  acquire  renew- 
able energy  technologies. 

Population  and 
Natural  Resources 

At  the  root  of  the  inexorable  pres- 
sures on  our  natural  resources  lies 
perhaps  the  single  most  important 
phenomenon  in  the  world  today — the 
population  explosion.  Its  importance 
lies  not  only  in  the  fact  of  more  and 
more  mouths  to  feed  and  other  human 
needs  to  be  satisfied.  It  also  derives 
from  the  demographic  shape  of  the 
population  changes  taking  place. 

•  By  the  year  2000,  the  world's 
population  will  have  increased  by  about 
50%  from  1975  levels — an  increase  in 
the  final  quarter  of  this  century  equal  to 
the  entire  growth  of  world  population 
from  the  birth  of  Christ  to  the  year 
1950. 

•  While  the  rate  of  increase  is  de- 
clining in  some  poorer  countries,  the 
birth  rate  there  will  still  be  twice  as 
high  as  in  industrialized  countries.  By 
the  year  2000,  these  countries  will  have 
78%  of  the  world's  population. 

•  Also  by  the  year  2000  roughly 
17%  of  the  population  in  industrial 
countries  will  be  over  60  years  of  age 
(vs.  only  7%  in  the  LDC's);  in  the 
LDC's,  44%  of  the  people  will  be 
under  19. 

These  trends  have  a  number  of  im- 
portant implications. 

•  As  time  goes  on,  the  industrial 
countries  will  have  an  increasingly 
older  population  profile,  with  a  heavy 
burden  of  support  for  the  very  old. 

•  The  younger  population  in  the  de- 
veloping world  will  require  greatly  in- 
creased social  services  and  job  oppor- 
tunities, which  when  combined  with 
migration  to  urban  areas,  could  create 
tremendous  social,  economic,  and 
political  stresses. 


•  An  expanding  population  is  both  a 
drag  on  per  capita  growth  and  a  stead- 
ily increasing  burden  on  the  environ- 
ment. It  is  a  truly  vicious  circle.  With 
expanding  numbers  of  people,  we  see 
greater  deforestation,  soil  erosion,  and 
desertification.  These  developments 
further  erode  the  ability  of  the  rural 
poor  to  survive. 

But  in  the  short  run,  what  choice 
does  the  poor  farmer  have  who  needs  to 
use  what  little  land  he  has  to  grow  his 
crops,  or  whatever  firewood  he  can 
find,  to  cook  today's  meal?  And  with- 
out the  hope  of  a  better  economic  fu- 
ture, what  incentive  is  there  for  parents 
to  limit  the  number  of  their  children, 
when  children  are  often  seen  as  a  hedge 
against  an  uncertain  future? 

As  with  the  dilemmas  we  face  on 
energy,  the  simple  but  extraordinarily 
difficult  answer  is  that  we  have  to  work 
on  a  number  of  fronts  at  once.  Let  me 
mention  just  two  of  these  fronts:  limit- 
ing population  growth  and  increasing 
food  production. 

Limiting  Population  Growth.  First, 
we  must,  and  will,  continue  to  inten- 
sify our  efforts  to  assist  nations  in 
dealing  with  excessive  population 
growth.  Indeed,  in  many  developing 
countries,  there  has  been  a  rapidly  in- 
creasing level  of  interest  in  imple- 
menting family  planning  programs. 
This  year  we  are  providing,  under  the 
foreign  assistance  programs  of  AID, 
some  $185  million  for  such  programs, 
focused  on  helping  developing  coun- 
tries strengthen  and  extend  the  delivery 
of  family  planning  information  and 
services.  Currently,  26  countries  are 
being  assisted  directly  by  AID,  while 
numerous  other  countries  are  receiving 
assistance  through  private,  nongov- 
ernmental organizations  which  AID 
supports.  In  addition,  the  population 
programs  of  multilateral  organizations 
of  the  United  Nations  and  the  World 
Bank  are  playing  a  role  of  growing  im- 
portance in  the  worldwide  population 
assistance  effort. 

Increasing  Food  Production.  Sec- 
ond, we  must  focus  increasing  attention 
on  the  need  to  increase  the  local  food 
production  capabilities  of  the  develop- 
ing nations.  Adequate  food  is  not  just 
the  basic  requirement  for  survival. 
Proper  nutrition,  like  adequate  health 
care,  is  also  needed  to  sustain  the  pro- 
ductivity which  can  lead  to  a  better 
quality  of  life.  Food  and  nutrition  pro- 
grams are  thus  more  than  a  humanitar- 
ian concern. 

Yet,  despite  some  recent  years  of 
good  harvests,  the  prospects  are  that 
we  will  have  greater  food  deficits  in 


developing  countries  in  the  future.  ' 
World  food  stocks  have  declined  com- 
pared to  the  1960's  or  very  early 
1970's.  We  are  now  more  vulnerable  to 
serious  crop  failures  in  the  rich  food 
growing  lands  of  North  America  and 
elsewhere. 

We  already  devote  roughly  half  of 
our  bilateral  economic  development 
assistance — approximately  $600  mil- 
lion this  year — to  agriculture  and  rural 
development.  The  $1.4  billion  in  con- 
cessionary food  assistance  we  will  pro- 
vide this  year  will  represent  about 
two-thirds  of  such  assistance  provided 
by  all  countries.  We  have  contributed 
$200  million  to  the  International  Fund 
for  Agricultural  Development.  And  we 
provide  over  $25  million  a  year  to 
help  support  the  international  agricul- 
tural research  centers  which  make 
major  contributions  to  increasing  ag- 
ricultural productivity  in  the  develop- 
ing world. 

This  summer  we  expect  a  report 
from  the  President's  Commission  on 
World  Hunger,  which  was  launched 
last  fall,  to  suggest  further  measures 
that  might  be  taken  to  alleviate  world 
hunger.  In  the  meantime,  we  have 
identified  certain  areas  in  which  we 
will  increase  our  efforts.  They  were 
enumerated  by  Secretary  Vance  in  a  re- 
cent speech  outlining  our  approach  to 
development  issues  of  the  1980's. 

•  We  will  seek  to  further  food  secu- 
rity by  doubling  our  minimum  com- 
mitment to  food  aid  in  the  Food  Aid 
Convention  and  proposing  domestic 
legislation  for  an  emergency  food  re- 
serve to  be  used  to  meet  such  a  com- 
mitment. 

•  We  will  support  research  and  de- 
velopment programs  geared  to  in- 
creasing the  production  of  crops  tradi- 
tionally grown  by  poor  farmers  on 
marginal  lands,  as  well  as  nontradi- 
tional  crops  which  hold  out  potential 
for  new  sources  of  food  and  income. 

•  We  will  be  seeking  ways  to  cut 
jxjstharvest  food  losses,  which  now  rob 
the  LDC's  of  some  20%  of  their  food 
production. 

•  And,  most  important  of  all,  we 
will  encourage  greater  world  attention 
to  the  domestic  policies  developing 
countries  take  to  encourage  food  pro- 
duction. We  will  do  so  through  our  ac- 
tive participation  in  the  World  Confer- 
ence on  Agrarian  Reform  and  Rural 
Development  and  by  concentrating  our 
food  and  development  assistance  on 
countries  which  pursue  such  policies. 

Conclusion 

There  is,  I  believe,  reason  both  for 
hope  and  for  deep  concern  as  we  look 


November  1979 


31 


at  the  question  of  whether  mankind  can 
learn  to  live  in  harmony  with  our  en- 
vironment. 

We  have  reason  for  hope  when  we 
recognize  how  much  our  attitudes  have 
changed  just  in  the  past  decade.  While 
there  have  always  been  lonely  voices  of 
warning,  it  has  only  been  in  the  last 
few  years  that  our  collective  con- 
sciousness has  been  awakened  to  the 
reality  of  a  limited  planet  and  to  the 
real  costs  of  wasteful  consumption. 
This  has  been  true  for  the  public,  as  we 
saw  in  Earth  Day  some  10  years  ago.  It 
is  true  for  the  Congress,  which  has 
given  far  more  attention  to  the  envi- 
ronment in  the  past  decade  than  ever 
before.  And  it  is  true  for  the  executive 
branch.  In  the  State  Department,  for 
example,  we  now  have  a  bureau  which 
has  as  one  of  its  primary  duties  work 
on  the  international  environment.  This 
is  a  recognition  of  the  fact  that  the  en- 
vironment is  now  not  one  of  those 
"other,"  peripheral  issues,  but  a  cen- 
tral concern  as  we  think  about  the  fu- 
ture security  of  our  nation. 

But  if  this  rise  in  consciousness 
gives  some  cause  to  be  hopeful,  it 
gives  no  cause  to  be  sanguine.  For  if 
we  are  doing  more,  we  are  by  no  means 
doing  enough.  If  we  are  more  aware, 
then  we  move  into  the  future  with  our 
eyes  open.  We  cannot  claim  ignorance 
if  we  fail  to  address  a  gathering  global 
crisis. 

The  basic  question,  therefore,  is 
whether  the  United  States — itself  and 
working  with  others — can  undertake 
the  kind  of  sustained,  long-term  efforts 
it  will  require:  whether  a  democracy 
like  ours — and  a  pluralistic  interna- 
tional system — can  decide  now,  freely, 
to  make  the  short-term  sacrifices 
necessary  to  secure  our  future  interests, 
whether  we  can  act  today  to  deal  with 
tomorrow. 

I  have  suggested  some  of  the  ways  in 
which  our  physical  environment  can 
shift  against  us.  I  suspect  that,  unless 
we  alter  the  trends,  we  will  face  as  well 
a  harsher  political  environment.  The 
choices  we  fail  to  make  freely  today 
could,  under  more  dire  circumstances, 
produce  a  trend  toward  more  authorita- 
rian regimes  that  would  impose  such 
choices. 

What  is  at  stake  in  the  long-term, 
then,  is  both  the  quality  of  our  lives 
and  the  quality  of  our  freedom.  The 
character  of  our  democracy's  response 
to  these  challenges  will  not  come  all  at 
once  but  in  a  series  of  discrete  deci- 
sions in  the  years  ahead — in  our  en- 
vironmental legislation,  in  the  levels 
and  priorities  of  our  foreign  aid,  in  the 
strength  of  our  support  for  international 
environmental   programs,   in  the  posi- 


^egotiations  To  Protect 
Ifiigratory  Iftlci  Animals 


At  the  invitation  of  the  Federal  Re- 
public of  Germany,  63  nations  con- 
vened in  its  capital  city  Bonn,  June 
1 1-23,  1979,  in  an  attempt  to  negotiate 
a  new  international  treaty  to  protect 
wild  birds  and  animals  which  migrate 
across  national  boundaries.  The  negoti- 
ations ended  Saturday,  June  23,  with 
22  nations,  principally  those  in  Europe 
and  Africa,  officially  signing  the  Con- 
vention [on  the  Conservation  of  Mi- 
gratory Species  of  Wild  Animals].  The 
United  States  did  not  sign. 

Though  it  appears  that  the  conven- 
tion will  not  be  the  global  convention 
originally  envisaged  by  its  sponsors,  it 
should  prove  a  particularly  valuable  in- 
strument in  establishing  protection  for 
birds  migrating  across  the  Mediterra- 
nean, and  for  zebras,  wildebeests,  im- 
palas,  and  other  animals  which  migrate 
in  Africa.  It  should  also  help  stimulate 
protective  action  elsewhere. 

Some  countries — among  them  the 
United  States,  Canada,  Australia, 
Argentina,  New  Zealand,  Japan,  and 
the  U.S.S.R. — while  supporting  the 
treaty's  objective,  believed  that  the 
treaty  as  adopted  presented  serious 
problems.  These  countries  did  not  vote 
for  its  adoption  and  did  not  sign  the 
convention.  Most  of  the  above  coun- 
tries did  not  wish  the  convention  to 
apply  to  all  marine  species.  Others 
were  concerned  with  the  possible  ad- 
verse effects  the  treaty  might  have  on 
the  effective  management  of  wildlife 
under  present  federal-state  division  of 
authority.  A  few  had  problems  with  the 
relation  between  the  treaty  and  the 
current  law  of  the  sea  negotiations. 

The  countries  with  federal  systems 
(United  States,  Canada,  Australia, 
Switzerland,  Austria,  Germany)  made 
considerable  progress  toward  getting 
the  conference  as  a  whole  to  accept  the 
idea  that  there  should  be  a  federal-state 
clause  in  the  convention.  Despite  in- 
tensive negotiations,  it  proved  impos- 
sible to  find  treaty  language  suitable  to 
each  nation's  particular  situation.  In 
the  end  it  was  agreed  that  it  would  be 


better  to  have  no  clause  on  this  point 
rather  than  have  imprecise  language. 

The  African  and  Asian  countries, 
with  tacit  support  from  the  European 
countries,  insisted  that  the  treaty  apply 
to  all  migratory  species  of  animals  and 
resisted  the  attempts  of  various  coun- 
tries to  exclude  certain  marine  species 
from  the  treaty.  The  United  States  sup- 
ported the  inclusion  of  sea  turtles,  sea 
birds,  and  marine  mammals.  The  Japa- 
nese, who  were  the  lone  holdouts  on 
sea  turtles,  modified  their  position 
during  the  conference  and  agreed  to  re- 
consider their  position.  The  U.S.  au- 
thorities involved  with  the  protection  of 
marine  mammals,  concerned  with  the 
possible  weakening  and  certainly  the 
complicating  aspects  of  the  proposed 
treaty  on  existing  agreements  and 
agreements  being  negotiated  to  protect 
mammals,  set  down  a  stiff  set  of  re- 
quirements to  be  met  before  the  dele- 
gation could  agree  not  to  have  marine 
mammals  excluded. 

When  a  week's  hard  negotiations  re- 
sulted in  the  apparent  successful  res- 
olution of  these  points,  the  U.S.  dele- 
gation modified  its  original  position 
and  supported  the  inclusion  of  marine 
mammals.  Treaty  coverage  of  fish  and 
shellfish  was  most  contentious,  and  the 
vote  was  49  to  9  in  favor  of  having  the 
treaty  cover  all  marine  species.  The 
reasoning  behind  the  U.S.  opposition, 
which  was  presumably  shared  by  the 
other  countries  voting  with  the  United 
States,  was  that  the  convention  could 
have  a  disruptive  and  complicating  ef- 
fect on  the  negotiation  of  a  number  of 
fisheries  agreements  which  already 
contain  conservation  aspects. 

The  principal  outstanding  law  of  the 
sea  issue  involved  adequately  describ- 
ing the  term  "national  jurisdictional 
boundaries."  The  United  States  be- 
lieved that  this  term  was  too  ambiguous 
and  tried  unsuccessfully  to  modify  it 
with  a  reference  to  "international 
law." 

The  United  States  and  several  other 
countries  would  have  preferred  a  longer 


tions  we  take  at  the  Law  of  the  Sea 
Conference  and  other  global  forums 
where  the  environment  is  at  issue,  and, 
most  immediately,  in  the  energy  poli- 
cies and  programs  our  nation  now 
adopts. 


Each  of  us  has  a  responsibility — 
those  of  us  in  government  and  those 
outside — to  poke,  prod,  and  push  for 
action.  Not  to  stop  progress.  But  to 
shape  it  in  ways  that  offer  the  promise 
of  a  decent  future.  D 


32 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


EUROPE:        iVATO's  Fourth  Decade-^ 
Defense  and  Detente 


Following  are  remarks  by  Vice 
President  Mondale  and  Zbigniew 
Brzezinski.  Assistant  to  the  President 
for  National  Security  Affairs,  before 
the  25th  assembly  of  the  Atlantic 
Treaty  Association  on  October  10. 
1979,  in  the  Department  of  State. 

VICE  PRESIDENT  MONDALE 

I  am  delighted  to  have  this  opportu- 
nity and  this  honor  to  address  this  As- 
sociation, whose  function  is  so  crucial 
and  has  been  so  effective  since  the  cre- 
ation of  this  Association  those  many 
years  ago. 

1  wish  to  commend  you  for  the 
superb  role  that  the  Atlantic  Treaty  As- 
sociation plays  in  the  support  of  North 
Atlantic  Treaty  Organization  (NATO). 
Today  I  wish  to  review  the  strength  and 
constancy  of  U.S.  leadership  within 
that  treaty  organization  and  emphasize 
how  SALT  II  now  pending  before  the 
U.S.  Senate  contributes  to  the  safe- 
guarding of  the  alliance. 

As  you  know,  when  I  speak  on  be- 
half of  the  American  commitment  to 
NATO,  I  speak  not  only  on  behalf  of 
the  President  of  the  United  States,  Mr. 
Carter,  but  I  think  the  history  of  our 
country  has  shown  that  consistently 
from  the  beginning  and  including 
today,  the  commitment  to  NATO  by 
our  nation  is  a  bipartisan  American 

Migratory  Animals  {Cont'd} 

period  of  negotiation  that  would  have 
permitted  taking  home  a  negotiated  and 
preliminary  agreed  text  for  study  and 
consultation  with  interested  domestic 
groups.  It  was  clear,  however,  that  the 
Federal  Republic  and  the  majority  of 
the  countries  present  were  much  in 
favor  of  concluding  and  signing  a  con- 
vention at  this  time.  Though  the  U.S. 
delegation  was  able  to  have  included  in 
the  convention  a  wide  range  of  points, 
the  several  unresolved  issues  described 
above,  plus  the  lack  of  opportunity  to 
consult  at  home,  led  the  U.S.  delega- 
tion not  to  sign  the  convention.  At  the 
same  time,  the  U.S.  delegation  recog- 
nized the  benefits  the  convention 
should  bring  to  areas  of  the  world 
which  have  less  well  developed  con- 
servation programs  than  has  North 
America.  D 


commitment  that  is  permanent  and 
lasting  and  complete  in  terms  of  total 
public  support. 

In  fact,  the  first  mission  of  the  new 
Administration  involved  my  visit 
within  hours  of  our  inaugural  —  the 
first  visit  on  my  international  journey 
—  to  the  NATO  headquarters  in  Brus- 
sels to  underscore  immediately  the 
commitment  of  the  new  Administration 
to  the  continuation  of  the  strongest 
possible  relationship  with  NATO  and 
the  strongest  possible  relationship 
within  NATO  among  its  treaty  mem- 
bers. In  1977  the  President  sent  me  to 
Brussels  in  that  first  overseas  mission 
to  underscore  that  message. 

In  the  more  than  30  years  that  have 
passed  since  the  North  Atlantic  Treaty 
was  signed,  we  have  shared  with  our 
allies  three  unprecedented  decades  of 
strength,  of  peace,  and  of  success. 

The  12  nations  which  signed  the 
NATO  treaty  in  1949  reaffirmed  their 


ened  obsolescence  and  the  traumas  of 
modernization. 

That  the  alliance  has  survived  and 
flourished  through  so  much  challenge 
offers  proof  that  its  charter,  like  our 
own  Constitution,  is,  in  fact,  a  living 
document,  broad  enough,  universal 
enough,  and  tested  enough  to  serve  as  a 
basis  for  the  future.  But  today,  as  al- 
lies, we  are  not  and  cannot  be  compla- 
cent. 

If  the  challenge  faced  by  the  alliance 
over  the  years  has  changed,  it  has  by 
no  means  lessened.  If  the  threat  to  the 
alliance  has  in  some  ways  become 
more  subtle,  it  is  nonetheless  formida- 
ble. And  if  the  Soviet  Union  has  be- 
come more  open  to  cooperation  with 
the  West  than  it  was  in  1949,  never- 
theless, serious  differences  and  strong 
competition  continue  to  exist  between 
East  and  West. 

I  need  not  describe  for  this  audience 
the  long  history  of  the  Soviet  military 


The  President,  working  with  our  allies,  has  increased  defense  spending 
by  3%  a  year  in  real  terms  ....  We  will  continue  that  growth  and  will 
request  even  more  if  our  defense  needs  require  it. 


Press  release  159  of  June  27.  1979. 


faith  in  the  purposes  and  principles  of 
the  U.N.  Charter.  They  stressed  their 
desire  to  live  in  peace  with  all  peoples 
and  all  governments.  They  have 
pledged  to  safeguard  the  principles  of 
democracy,  individual  liberty,  and  the 
rule  of  law.  And  above  all,  they  agreed 
to  develop  their  capacity  to  resist 
armed  attack.  An  attack  against  one, 
they  agreed,  would  be  considered  an 
attack  against  all. 

It  is  difficult  to  realize  in  our  more 
settled  and  prosperous  times,  what  an 
ambitious,  even  visionary,  act  that 
treaty  was;  how  ambitious  to  speak  op- 
timistically of  peace  when  the  debris  of 
World  War  II  had  not  yet  been  fully 
cleared  away,  and  how  farsighted  to 
join  in  a  collective  effort  to  resist  ag- 
gression when  so  many  of  the  sig- 
natories were  individually  vulnerable. 

The  NATO  alliance  has  shown  re- 
markable resilience  and  nexibility.  It 
has  surmounted  recurring  problems 
within  and  challenges  without.  It  has 
undergone  strategic  and  doctrinal 
changes,  from  an  era  of  massive  retali- 
ation to  an  era  of  flexible  response.  It 
has  endured  both  the  pangs  of  threat- 


buildup  of  Warsaw  Pact  forces.  That 
history,  for  many  of  you,  has  been  a 
daily  professional  challenge.  It  is  a 
challenge  that  President  Carter  has  met 
from  the  beginning  of  his  Administra- 
tion with  the  shaping  of  U.S.  defense 
forces  and  with  his  decision  to  increase 
real  defense  spending  by  3%  annually. 
This  is  not  an  effort  that  we  bear  alone. 
Each  of  our  allies  must  participate,  if 
together  we  are  to  benefit. 

The  President  has  submitted  to  the 
Congress  a  request,  as  you  know,  for 
$2.7  billion  amending  the  FY  1980 
budget  so  that  despite  the  increased  in- 
flation which  vexes  us  all,  we  will 
meet  that  commitment  that  we  have 
made  in  all  seriousness  to  NATO. 

Visible  strength  is  a  deterrent  to  war. 
Together  with  our  allies,  we  have 
begun  the  process  of  modernizing  our 
defenses  for  the  coming  decades  to 
meet  the  massive  arms  buildup  of  the 
Soviet  Union  and  the  East. 

As  you  know,  just  this  past  week,  in 
East  Berlin,  President  Brezhnev  an- 
nounced unilateral  reduction  of  certain 
Soviet  troops,  tanks,  and  other  military 
hardware  in  Eastern  Europe.  We  would 


November  1979 


33 


welcome  such  a  reduction,  but  it  is  ab- 
solutely essential  that  it  be  seen  in 
context,  and  that  context  includes  the 
following  factors. 

First,  Soviet  forces  in  Europe  today 
vastly  outnumber  those  of  the  NATO 
alliance,  and  so,  as  I  said,  on  behalf  of 
the  President  to  the  U.N.  Special  Ses- 
sion on  Disarmament  on  the  eve  of  the 
1978  NATO  summit  in  Washington, 
we  in  NATO  increased  our  defense 
budgets,  not  out  of  preference  but  out 
of  necessity  —  a  necessity  imposed 
upon  us,  for  example,  by  the  Warsaw 
Pact's  three  to  one  advantage  in  tanks 
in  Europe. 

Second,  the  Soviet  theater  nuclear 
forces  have  been  built  up.  The  Backfire 
bomber  and  now  their  new  SS-20,  an 
intermediate  range  mobile  ballistic 
missile,  significantly  increases  Soviet 
military  capability  against  targets  not 
only  in  Europe  but  also  in  Asia,  Africa, 
and  the  Middle  East. 

And  third,  it  is  obviously  in  the 
Soviet  interest  to  lure  NATO  away 
from  crucial  conventional  and  theater 
nuclear  force  modernization. 

While  we  must  examine  President 
Brezhnev's  announcement  carefully 
and  affirmatively,  we  must  bear  in 
mind  that  the  self-restraint  in  theater 
nuclear  forces  shown  by  the  NATO  al- 
liance over  the  past  two  decades  has 
not  been  met  by  corresponding  restraint 
on  the  part  of  the  Soviets.  It  is  for  this 
reason  that  the  work  of  NATO's  groups 
on  the  theater  nuclear  forces  moderni- 
zation and  theater  nuclear  forces  arms 
control  is  so  crucially  important,  as  is 
the  decision  we  will  take  as  an  alliance 
leader  this  year  on  modernized  theater 
nuclear  forces  capable  of  countering 
real  and  existing  Soviet  theater  nuclear 
forces  opposed  against  our  alliance. 

While  deterrence  at  the  theater  level 
is  of  keen  concern  to  each  of  us,  the 
competition  between  East  and  West  at 
the  strategic  nuclear  level  is  central  to 
our  defense  and  survival.  How  we 
manage  that  competition  —  literally  and 
directly  —  affects  the  lives  of  every 
man,  woman,  and  child  through  the  al- 
liance and,  indeed,  throughout  the 
world. 

This  week  in  Washington,  as  you 
well  know,  the  Senate  Foreign  Rela- 
tions Committee  has  moved  into  the 
final  phase  of  its  hearings  on  SALT  II. 
As  the  Senate  approaches  this  historic 
decision,  let  us  look  at  the  record  of  the 
debate  and  of  the  hearings  before  the 
committees. 

Every  single  provision  of  SALT  II 
has  been  scrutinized  in  detail  for  days 
of  hearings.  The  agreement  has  stood 
up  to  every  single  criticism  leveled 


against  it.  The  treaty  is  verifiable  with- 
out any  doubt.  It  is  in  the  alliance's 
interest  without  any  doubt.  It  strength- 
ens our  security,  and  it  is  a  meaningful 
step  toward  arms  reduction. 

SALT  II  has  withstood  partisan  at- 
tack. The  fact  is  that  when  the  Presi- 
dent took  charge  of  the  strategic  arms 
talks,  he  inherited  many  provisions  of  a 
draft  agreement  negotiated  by  his  pred- 
ecessor. We  have  not  only  built  on  that 
draft,  we  have  improved  it  —  broad- 
ening the  scope  of  the  agreement, 
greatly  improving  the  quantitative  and 
qualitative  limits,  and  laying  the 
groundwork  for  the  negotiation  of  fur- 
ther limits  in  our  national  interests  in 
SALT  III. 

SALT  II  has  successfully  withstood 
determined  efforts  to  link  it,  to  hold  it 
hostage  to  other  issues — issues  ranging 
from  the  level  of  the  defense  budget  to 
the  Soviet  presence  in  Cuba,  issues  im- 
portant in  their  own  right  but  which 
must  not  be  linked  to  the  pending 
SALT  treaty. 

I  need  not  detail  for  the  defense  ex- 
perts in  this  assembly  the  positive  trend 
in  the  U.S.  defense  budget  since  1977. 
No  linkage  to  SALT  is  required  for  that 
trend  to  continue.  The  fact  is  that  the 
President,  working  with  our  allies,  has 
increased  defense  spending  by  3%  a 
year  in  real  terms,  reversing  several 


States  to  pursue  strategic  programs  to 
strengthen  our  security  while  also  con- 
straining the  arms  race.  In  the  same 
way,  SALT  provides  both  a  foundation 
for  the  alliance  to  build  a  consensus  to 
proceed  with  essential  NATO  theater 
nuclear  force  modernization,  and  it 
also  furthers  arms  control  initiatives  to 
control  the  Soviet  threat  to  Europe. 

Thus,  when  the  Senate  votes  for 
SALT  II  —  and  I  have  confidence  the 
Senate  will  ratify  that  treaty  —  it  will 
be  voting  not  only  for  a  strong  and 
more  stable  strategic  relationship  to- 
ward the  Soviet  Union,  it  will  also  be 
giving  crucial  impetus  to  a  stronger 
NATO  and  to  efforts  to  reduce  the  nu- 
clear threat  facing  our  allies  in  the  fu- 
ture. That  is  why  the  members  of  the 
North  Altantic  alliance  have,  without 
exception  and  with  great  strength,  en- 
dorsed SALT  II,  That  is  why  SALT  II 
is  so  central  to  continued  American 
leadership  of  this  great  alliance. 

Earlier  this  year,  soon  after  the 
signing  of  the  SALT  II  agreements,  I 
visited  seven  states  of  our  great  country 
to  discuss  SALT  with  a  good  cross 
section  of  the  American  people. 

Their  response  was  overwhelmingly 
positive.  The  American  people  recog- 
nize that  strategic  arms  limitation  is 
an  issue  of  vital  importance  for  our  na- 
tion and  for  mankind.  They  want  any 


The  U.S.  commitment  to  the  security  of  Europe  is  unshakable.  It  is 
organic.  It  is  complete.  We  view  the  security  of  Western  Europe  as  an 
extension  of  our  own  security. 


years  of  previous  decline.  We  will 
continue  that  growth  and  will  request 
even  more  if  our  defense  needs  require 
it. 

To  deal  with  the  Soviet  presence  in 
Cuba,  we  have  taken  a  number  of  steps 
to  neutralize  the  Soviet  role,  including 
stepping  up  U.S.  surveillance  and 
military  presence  in  the  Caribbean.  We 
will  assure  that  the  Soviets  in  Cuba 
pose  no  threat  to  the  United  States  or 
other  nations  in  this  region. 

When  the  President  announced  these 
measures  a  week  ago,  he  emphasized 
and  I  quote,  that,  ".  .  .the  greatest 
danger  to  American  security.  .  .  is 
certainly  not  the  two  or  three  thousand 
Soviet  troops  in  Cuba.  The  greatest 
danger  to  all  the  nations  in  the 
world.  .  .  is  the  breakdown  of  a  com- 
mon effort  to  preserve  peace  and  the 
ultimate  threat  of  a  nuclear  war." 

Finally,  SALT  II  is  the  central  ele- 
ment in  the  alliance's  policy  of  pursu- 
ing both  defense  and  detente.  SALT  II 
provides  a  framework  for  the  United 


agreement  we  enter  in  to  be  fair,  and 
they  believe  this  treaty  is  fair.  They 
want  a  treaty  to  protect  our  security, 
and  they  understand  that  this  treaty  en- 
hances America's  security.  They  want 
it  ratified,  and  they  want  us  to  continue 
our  efforts  to  reduce  the  threat  of  nu- 
clear war. 

They  understand  that  SALT  does  not 
undermine  our  security.  They  recog- 
nize that  SALT  is  not  based  on  trust  but 
on  suspicion  and  that  it  can  be  ade- 
quately verified.  They  believe  we  must 
have  SALT  II  if  we're  to  move  to 
SALT  III. 

If  I  have  received  a  single  message, 
it  is  that  the  American  people  gen- 
uinely believe,  as  do  the  President  and 
I,  that  the  SALT  II  agreement  is  in  our 
interest  and  that  it's  vastly  superior  to 
no  agreement  at  all. 

Every  day  brings  more  support  for 
the  treaty.  Just  last  week  I  received  a 
letter  from  the  President  of  the  Na- 
tional Farmers  Union  representing  a 
broad  cross  section  of  rural  Americans. 


34 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


In  it  he  stated,  and  I  quote:  "The  full 
board  of  directors  of  the  Farmers  Union 
concurred  unanimously  that  the  Nation 
must  make  headway  towards  arms 
control.  It  would  be  tragic,'"  they  con- 
tinued, "'if  the  whole  process  were  to 
be  set  back  by  rejection  of  the  present 
treaty.  Approval  of  SALT  II  at  this  ses- 
sion, therefore,  is  vitally  important  so 
that  the  next  steps  can  begin  soon  and 
hopefully  lead  to  another  advance  for 
humanity." 

"An  advance  for  humanity."  That  is 
what  the  SALT  process  is  all  about. 

As  you  all  know,  last  week  America 
welcomed  an  extraordinary  visitor.  To 
joyful  crowds  in  cities  and  farmlands, 
to  millions  everywhere  who  saw  him 
on  television,  the  Holy  Father  brought 
a  luminous  message  to  mankind  and  to 
all  Americans,  a  message  of  love  and 
faith  and  optimism  and  confidence  and 
grace. 

That  message  struck  deep  chords 
within  us.  It  unleashed  our  best  and 
most  generous  sentiments.  It  opened, 
truly,  a  window  on  our  soul.  It  re- 
minded us  again  what  our  civilization 
is  all  about — and  what  this  Association 
was  established  to  protect  and  has 
served  so  well  throughout  the  history  of 
this  Association  —  what  it  is  about  is 
the  protection  and  love  of  our  democ- 
racy, our  drive  for  social  justice,  our 
hopes  for  our  children. 

In  the  end,  those  are  the  dreams  that 
bond  our  NATO  alliance  together. 
That's  its  basic  reason.  Nuclear  holo- 
caust renders  those  dreams  absurd. 
Today,  with  the  decision  on  SALT  II, 
we  have  a  decisive  chance  to  take  a  fur- 
ther step  away  from  that  final  madness, 
to  take  a  further  step  toward  reason, 
and  I'm  confident  we'll  make  the  right 
choice. 


DR.  BRZEZINKSI 

I  welcome  this  opportunity  to  meet 
with  your  25th  annual  assembly  and  to 
share  with  you  some  informal  remarks 
on  the  subject  of  Western  security  on 
the  relationship  between  defense  and 
detente.  At  this  time  of  unprecedented 
global  change,  our  collective  security 
requires  that  the  Unites  States  suc- 
cessfully maintain  a  global  power 
equilibrium  while  helping  to  shape  a 
framework  for  global  change. 

These  two  imperatives  —  a  power 
equilibrium  and  a  framework  for 
change — are  not  slogans.  Each  repre- 
sents a  difficult  and  vital  process,  criti- 
cal to  our  security.  The  maintenance  of 
a  power  equilibrium  by  itself  would  be 
insufficient  for  it  would  be  unrespon- 
sive to  the  imperative  need  to  recognize 
that  an  awakened  global  population  in- 


sists on  basic  changes  in  the  human 
condition.  Shaping  a  framework  for 
global  change  while  disregarding  the 
realities  of  power  would  contribute  to  a 
fundamental  instability  in  world  affairs; 
it  would  transform  global  change  from 
a  potentially  positive  process  into  a 
condition  of  increasing  fragmentation 
and  eventual  anarchy. 

Since  1945  the  United  States  has 
been  the  pivotal  element  in  the  mainte- 
nance of  global  stability.  Initially  our 
primary  focus  was  on  the  defense  of 
Western  Europe.  Today,  Western 
Europe,  the  Far  East,  and  the  Middle 
East  represent  three  interrelated  stra- 
tegic zones  of  central  importance  to  the 
survival  of  the  West  as  a  whole  and  to 
global  economic  stability.  This  is  an 
important  strategic  reality,  and  it  has 
political,  as  well  as  military,  implica- 
tions. The  United  States  must  work 
with  the  countries  in  all  three  zones  to 
protect  the  independence  of  these 
regions. 

Development  of  more  cooperative 
relationships  with  a  power  such  as 
China  is  another  important  new  factor 
in  the  geopolitical  equation,  contribut- 
ing to  greater  global  stability. 

Insofar  as  the  strategic  nuclear 
equilibrium  is  concerned,  the  last  30 
years  have  seen  a  shift  from  a  U.S. 
monopoly  and  supremacy  to  a  much 
more  complex  situation  of  mutually  as- 
sured destruction.  Moreover,  the  mo- 
mentum of  the  Soviet  nuclear  buildup 
does  pose  the  possibility  that  the  Soviet 
Union  may  be  seeking  genuine  nuclear 
war  fighting  capability.  Accordingly, 
in  thinking  of  the  1980's,  we  must  be 
sensitive  to  the  nuanced  psychologi- 
cal-political relationship  between  the 
effective  deterrence  and  war  fighting 
capabilities.  Therefore,  to  maintain 
effective  deterrence,  we  must  upgrade 
our  own  capacity  to  manage  a  conflict 
stably  and  to  control  nuclear  escalation 
effectively. 

Our  responsiveness  to  the  increasing 
complexity  of  deterrence  is  but  one 
element  in  the  global  power  balance. 
Arms  control  —  a  new  factor  in  global 
security  —  is  also  significant.  Such 
steps  as  SALT  I  and  SALT  II,  based  on 
the  recognition  that  security  cannot  be 
obtained  by  arms  alone,  thus  contribute 
to  greater  stability  and  predictability  in 
the  strategic  equation. 

The  political  awakening  of  mankind 
and  resulting  redistribution  of  power 
worldwide  is  the  overriding  reality  of 
our  time.  By  the  end  of  this  century, 
approximately  four-fifths  of  mankind 
will  be  living  in  Asia,  Latin  America, 
and  Africa.  As  a  consequence,  the 
West  can  no  longer  dominate  world 
affairs.  The  only  alternative  to  that 
domination  is  wider  global  cooperation 


based  on  the  acceptance  of  basic 
changes.  Nothing  less  than  that  can  in- 
sure that  global  change  is  not  violent, 
chaotic,  and  increasingly  exploited  by 
our  adversaries. 

It  is,  therefore,  important  that  the  in- 
evitable tensions  associated  with  basic 
sociopolitical  change  not  be  exploited 
by  major  powers  either  directly  or  in- 
directly. The  export  of  revolution 
through  proxies  or  by  direct  military 
power  has  to  be  resisted,  for  otherwise 
global  change  will  become  global  anar- 
chy. These  considerations  make  it  im- 
perative that  self-restraint  be  the  guid- 
ing principle  for  the  conduct  of  the 
major  powers  in  relationship  to  the 
local  conflicts  in  the  more  unstable 
parts  of  the  world. 

The  key  elements  of  our  efforts  to 
promote  genuine  global  cooperation, 
designed  to  create  a  more  equitable 
sharing  in  global  political  and  eco- 
nomic power,  accordingly  involve: 

•  Close  cooperation  between  the 
United  States,  Western  Europe  and 
Japan; 

•  The  development  of  more  friendly 
relationships  with  some  of  the  emerg- 
ing regionally  and  internationally  influ- 
ential third  world  countries,  including 
the  moderate  Arab  countries  whose  in- 
fluence is  essential  in  shaping  an  eco- 
nomically and  politically  moderate 
Middle  East;  and 

•  More  emphasis  has  to  be  placed  on 
multilateral  and  regional  organizations 
such  as  the  United  Nations,  the  Organi- 
zation of  African  Unity,  and  the  As- 
sociation of  South  East  Asian  Nations. 
They  represent  the  emerging  new 
realities  of  a  more  genuinely  pluralistic 
world. 

As  we  fashion  together  the  frame- 
work within  which  many  of  these 
changes  will  be  assimilated,  NATO's 
role  retains  vital  relevance.  The  al- 
liance, a  guarantor  of  basic  Western 
security,  has  special  meaning  for  us  in 
the  context  of  global  strategic  equilib- 
rium. Let  me  say  a  few  words  about 
one  particularly  important  aspect  of 
that  equilibrium. 

Entering  its  fourth  decade,  NATO 
now  confronts  a  challenge  and  a  choice 
as  critical  as  any  in  its  past.  The  chal- 
lenge comes  from  a  resolute,  increas- 
ingly powerful  Soviet  Union.  The 
choice,  however — whether  to  acquiesce 
to  Soviet  ascendency  or  effectively  to 
preclude  it — lies  with  us.  Let  me  speak 
about  both. 

First  the  challenge.  It  is  a  fact  that 
the  Soviet  Union  has  been  steadily  in- 
creasing its  military  expenditures  over 
the  past  15  or  even  20  years.  The  pro- 
jection of  Soviet  power  has  gained  a 
global  capacity;  and  along  with  that 


November  1979 


35 


capacity  the  Soviet  Union  continues  to 
devote  major  resources  to  a  regional 
military  buildup.  In  no  area  is  this 
buildup  more  pronounced  than  in  the 
Soviet  forces  opposite  Western  Europe. 
This  buildup  encompasses  all  facets  of 
Soviet  military  power — conventional 
forces,  long-range  and  shorter  range 
theater  nuclear  forces,  and  interconti- 
nental forces. 

One  part  of  that  buildup — the  long- 
range  theater  nuclear  forces — is  of  par- 
ticular concern.  The  SS-20  missile 
represents  an  enormous  advance  over 
two  previous  generations  of  Soviet 
missile  weaponry  in  both  quantitative 
and  qualitative  terms.  Compared  to  the 
older  SS-4  and  SS-5,  the  SS-20  is 
three  times  more  accurate  than  the  one 
and  six  times  more  accurate  than  the 
other.  And  where  an  earlier  generation 
of  missiles  targeted  against  NATO 
Europe  carried  a  single  warhead,  the 
SS-20  carries  three.  Moreover,  the 
mobility  of  the  SS-20,  its  increased 
range,  and  the  fact  that  its  launcher  can 
be  quickly  reloaded  following  an  initial 
salvo  significantly  enhance  both  the 
weapon's  destructive  force  and  its 
ability  to  survive  attack. 

In  addition  to  the  SS-20  missile, 
the  Soviet  Union  has  developed 
a  medium-range  bomber  —  the 
Backfire — whose  range,  greatly  ex- 
ceeding that  of  earlier  Soviet  aircraft, 
enables  it  to  strike  directly  at  Western 
Europe. 

It  is  clear  to  us  that  the  Soviets  have 
underway  a  substantial  and  sustained 
program  to  modernize,  expand,  and 
deploy  their  theater  nuclear  forces. 
What  this  means  in  practical  terms  can 
be  simply  yet  soberly  expressed:  At 
current  Soviet  deployment  rates  there  is 
one  new  SS-20  warhead  deployed 
roughly  every  second  day. 

Such  a  sustained  effort  goes  well  be- 
yond what  could  be  explained  as 
meeting  a  reasonable  defensive  need. 
Yet  in  the  same  period  of  time,  NATO 
has  done  virtually  nothing  to  upgrade 
its  own  long-range  theater  nuclear 
forces. 

The  challenge  we  now  confront  is 
not  only  a  military  one;  I  believe  that 
we  have  far  more  to  fear  from  the  pos- 
sibility of  political  intimidation. 
Should  NATO  be  viewed  as  unwilling 
or  unable  to  respond  to  threats  of  nu- 
clear warfare  confined  to  the  European 
area — as  the  lack  of  any  effective 
theater  forces  would  almost  certainly 
make  it  appear  to  be — the  opportunity 
for  Soviet  political  pressures  would  be 
correspondingly  enlarged. 

That  is  the  challenge.  The  choice  is 
squarely  up  to  us.  We  can,  as  an  al- 
liance, decide  to  do  nothing  to  offset 
the  substantial  modernization  in  Soviet 


theater  nuclear  forces;  we  can  sit  by, 
hoping  we  can  cope  with  the  conse- 
quence of  inequality;  we  can  allow  our- 
selves to  be  lulled  into  passivity,  leav- 
ing the  alliance  in  a  situation  of  in- 
equality and  growing  vulnerability;  or 
we  can  take  effective  action  now.  This 
means,  in  turn,  the  deployment  of 
strong,  theater-based  systems  capable 
of  reaching  Soviet  territory. 


Such  a  decision  to  deploy  NATO 
systems  would  not  only  keep  the  cred- 
ibility of  our  deterrent  intact  but  would 
help  promote  the  conditions  under 
which  meaningful  arms  control  negoti- 
ations between  East  and  West  can  pro- 
ceed. In  line  with  our  twin  goals  of 
deterrence  and  detente,  alliance  delib- 
erations over  the  past  year  have,  in 
fact,   actively   explored   meaningful 


[/•^.  CommUtncnt 
to  Western  Europe 


SECRETARY'S  STATEMENT, 
SEPT.  10,  1979' 

The  security  of  Western  Europe  and 
the  security  of  the  United  States  are  in- 
divisible. This  central  fact  has  been  the 
basis  of  our  strategic  doctrine  and  our 
defense  planning  for  four  decades  or 
more.  Our  allies  believe,  as  do  we,  that 
our  mutual  security  requires  collective 
effort  and  that  our  defense  is  insepara- 
ble. There  should  be  no  question  about 
America's  commitment  to  help  defend 
Europe  with  all  the  means  necessary — 
nuclear  and  conventional.  The  sub- 
stantial forces  we  have  deployed  to 
Europe  are  not  concrete  evidence  of 
that  commitment. 

As  President  Carter  said  in  his  proc- 
lamation on  the  30th  anniversary  of  the 
alliance,  "...  the  firm  support  of 
Congress  and  the  American  people  for 
NATO  reflects  their  deep  conviction 
that  NATO  is  the  cornerstone  of  United 
States  foreign  policy." 

NATO's  basic  strategy  is  one  of 
flexible  response.  President  Carter  has, 
on  several  occasions,  expressed  U.S. 
support  for  this  strategy.  There  has 
been  no  change,  and  we  contemplate 
no  change. 

The  defense  efforts  now  underway 
within  NATO  demonstrate  the  collec- 
tive determination  of  the  allies  to  meet 
new  challenges.  To  improve  NATO's 
conventional  forces  and  to  make  more 
efficient  use  of  combined  resources, 
the  alliance  is  proceeding  with  a 
Long-Term  Defense  Program.  We  are 
cooperating  in  plans  to  modernize  our 
theater  nuclear  forces.  And  we  are  de- 
veloping an  agreed  alliance  position 
regarding  future  arms  control  negotia- 
tions. 

At  the  same  time,  the  United  States 
is  engaged  in  a  thorough  and  vigorous 
program  to  modernize  each  leg  of  our 
strategic  forces.  Our  determination  to 
maintain  the   strategic  balance  is  re- 


flected most  recently  in  the  President's 
announcement  last  week  that  we  will 
proceed  with  full  development  of  the 
new  MX  missile  in  a  mobile  basing 
mode  that,  while  fully  verifiable  under 
SALT,  will  assure  the  long-term  sur- 
vivability of  our  land-based  strategic 
forces. 

Our  strategic  modernization  programs 
reflect  our  determination  not  only  to 
maintain  the  strategic  balance  but  also 
to  hold  a  capacity  for  flexible 
response — in  terms  of  size  and  targets 
of  the  response  —  to  any  attack  at  any 
level  of  intensity,  against  us  or  our  al- 
lies. That  has  been  U.S.  policy  for 
many  years.  It  continues  to  be  U.S. 
policy.  And  we  will  maintain  the  forces 
necessary  to  fulfill  it. 

This  modernization  of  nuclear  and 
conventional  forces  is  being  undertaken 
precisely  because  the  allies  seek  to 
deter  aggression  by  maintaining  the 
integrity  and  credibility  of  the  whole 
spectrum  of  our  response  options.  To 
deter  aggression,  NATO  must  both 
have — and  be  perceived  to  have — the 
capability,  flexibility,  and  determina- 
tion to  respond  as  appropriate.  Only  in 
this  way  can  we  demonstrate  to  the 
Warsaw  Pact  the  costs  of  embarking 
upon  or  continuing  a  contlict  and  the 
risk  that  a  conventional  European  re- 
gional conflict  would  escalate  to  a  gen- 
eral nuclear  war. 

The  security  of  the  alliance  depends 
not  only  on  collective  military  forces 
and  resolve — although  these  are  indis- 
pensable—  it  depends  as  well  on  com- 
mon ties  among  allied  peoples  and  their 
creativity  and  vitality  in  meeting  the 
challenges  we  confront  together.  We 
are  confident  of  the  alliance's  con- 
tinued ability  to  do  so.  D 


'  Made  available  (o  the  press  by  Department 
spokesman  Hodding  Carter  III. 


36 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


Rcvictv  of 
U^S,  Policy  in  Europe 


by  George  S.  Vest 

Statement  before  the  Subcommittee 
on  Europe  and  the  Middle  East  of  the 
House  Foreign  Affairs  Committee  on 
July  12,  1979.' 

I  welcome  this  opportunity  to  discuss 
witli  you  the  state  of  U.S.  relations  in 
Europe.  1  know  that  your  overriding 
concern  is  U.S.  policy.  What  are  our 
main  objectives?  What  have  we 
achieved?  What  remains  to  be  done? 

It  is  with  an  eye  to  those  central  is- 
sues that  this  annual  review  is  ad- 
dressed. The  succinct  answer  to  your 
questions  is  that  U.S. -European  rela- 
tions are  in  good  shape. 

•  We  have  reaffirmed  and  reinforced 
our  commitment  to  the  traditional  prin- 
ciples of  U.S.  policy  and  to  our  trans- 
atlantic partners. 

•  We  continue  to  stress  items  of 
highest  priority  for  the  U.S.  national 
interest — Western  solidarity,  the  mili- 
tary defense  of  the  West,  economic 
well-being,  the  preservation  and  de- 


velopment of  democratic  mstitutions  in 
Western  Europe,  and  the  promotion  of 
constructive  relations  with  the  diverse 
countries  of  Eastern  Europe. 

•  We  are  working  together  with  the 
governments  of  Western  Europe  and 
Canada  on  major  issues  of  mutual  con- 
cern. They  have,  for  example,  ex- 
pressed strong  support  for  SALT  II, 
and  they  recognize  the  continuing  need 
to  cooperate  on  the  economic  chal- 
lenges before  us  all. 

To  elaborate  on  these  larger  themes 
that  pervade  recent  and  current  U.S. 
policy  toward  Europe,  1  will  start  with 
a  discussion  of  our  role  vis-a-vis  the 
major  institutions  of  Europe.  I  will 
then  move  to  discussion  of  our  bilateral 
ties  with  the  Western  European  and 
nonaligned  nations  and  Canada.  I  will 
conclude  with  a  summary  of  the  evolu- 
tion of  our  relations  in  Eastern  Europe. 

Western  Military  Security 

Concern  for  the  security  of  our  citi- 
zens remains  fundamental  to  U.S. 
foreign  policy.   In  that  regard,   the 


Defense  and  Detente  (Cont'd) 
arms  control  policy  along  with  the  need 
to  modernize  nuclear-capable  systems. 
It  is  no  secret  that  we  view  both 
paths — effective  arms  control  and 
modernization — as  complementary  and 
that  we  look  for  credible  movement 
along  both  by  the  end  of  this  year.  The 
true  test  of  NATO's  purpose  lies  with 
our  allied  parliaments  and  publics.  Are 
they  willing  to  pay  the  political  price 
required  to  avoid  the  infinitely  more 
costly  alternative  of  intimidation  at 
best,  and  even  war  at  worst? 

Let  there  be  no  question  about  our 
commitment  nor  of  our  determination 
to  help  defend  Europe  by  all  means 
necessary — nuclear  and  conventional. 
The  U.S.  commitment  to  the  security 
of  Europe  is  unshakable.  It  is  organic. 
It  is  complete.  We  view  the  security  of 
Western  Europe  as  an  extension  of  our 
own  security.  We  recognize  that  any 
threat  to  the  security  of  Western 
Europe  is  a  direct  threat  to  the  security 
of  the  United  States.  The  American 
commitment — nuclear  and  conven- 
tional—  to  the  defense  of  Europe  is  an 
integral  part  of  our  own  defense  pos- 
ture. There  are  no  conceivable  circum- 
stances in  which  we  would  not  react  to 
a  security  threat  directed  at  our  allies  in 
Europe. 


The  danger  we  could  face  in  the 
1980"s  will  not  be  American  decou- 
pling from  Western  Europe;  rather,  the 
danger  will  derive  from  Soviet  miscal- 
culation—  that  is,  from  the  belief  that 
the  alliance,  through  failure  to  keep 
pace  with  a  changing  strategic  envi- 
ronment, has  decoupled  from  its  tradi- 
tional purpose. 

We  must  remove  any  possible 
grounds  for  that  miscalculation.  It  is 
my  belief  that  the  decision  which 
President  Carter  made  a  few  weeks  ago 
on  the  MX  missile  and  the  decisions 
which  NATO  must  soon  make  on 
theater  nuclear  forces  are  as  important 
as  any  the  Western  allies  will  ever 
face.  Historically,  those  decisions  rank 
with  President  Truman's  creation  of  a 
strategic  bomber  command  and  Presi- 
dent Kennedy's  deployment  of  inter- 
continental ballistic  missiles.  Positive 
action  now  will  give  us  survivable 
systems  on  both  sides  of  the  Atlantic. 
These,  in  turn,  will  greatly  enhance  the 
West's  crisis-bargaining  capability  and 
thus  contribute  to  global  stability. 

We  are  approaching  a  watershed  in 
our  alliance.  The  issue  confronting  us 
is  fundamentally  a  simple  one:  We  do 
not  have  to  choose  between  detente  and 
defense;  we  must  have  both,  and — with 
political  will — we  can.  D 


American  role  in  the  North  Atlantic 
Treaty  Organization  (NATO)  is  central. 
This  year  we  celebrated  the  30th  an- 
niversary of  an  alliance  which,  ac- 
cording to  President  Carter,  has  "... 
successfully  deterred  war  and  main- 
tained stability  in  Western  Europe  and 
North  America,  thus  securing  the 
well-being  and  prosperity  of  its  fifteen 
member  states  .  .  .  ." 

NATO's  main  purpose  is,  in  the 
words  of  the  North  Atlantic  Treaty, 
".  .  .  To  safeguard  the  freedom,  com- 
mon heritage  and  civilization  of  their 
peoples,  founded  on  the  principles  of 
democracy,  individual  liberty  and  the 
rule  of  law,"  and  ".  .  .  to  promote 
stability  and  well-being  in  the  North 
Atlantic  area."  NATO's  basic  means 
to  achieve  these  goals  are  to  deter  war 
in  the  North  Atlantic  community  and  to 
defend  its  member  states,  if  deterrence 
fails,  by  sustaining  the  credibility  of 
NATO's  strategy  of  forward  defense 
and  flexible  response  based  on  a  triad 
of  conventional,  tactical  nuclear,  and 
strategic  nuclear  forces. 

U.S.  policies  to  carry  out  this  strat- 
egy center,  in  the  first  instance,  on  the 
modernization  of  theater  nuclear  and 
conventional  forces.  These  improve- 
ments are  required  in  order  to  maintain 
the  credibility  of  NATO  strategy  in  the 
face  of  Soviet  theater  nuclear  and  con- 
ventional force  improvements  over  the 
past  decade. 

U.S.  policies  toward  NATO,  in  the 
second  instance,  aim  at  restraining 
arms  competition  in  strategic,  theater 
nuclear,  and  conventional  armaments. 
We  carried  out  continuous  consulta- 
tions with  our  NATO  partners  on  the 
Strategic  Arms  Limitations  Talks 
(SALT),  and  we  coordinate  closely 
with  them  on  mutual  and  balanced 
force  reductions  (MBFR)  and  other 
arms  control  initiatives. 

Thus,  U.S.  policy  toward  NATO 
offers  the  Soviet  Union  and  its  allies  an 
alternative  to  an  unrelenting  force 
buildup,  while  NATO  force  improve- 
ments offer  them  an  incentive  to  move 
forward  on  this  option. 

Equally  important,  the  United  States 
pursues  these  policies  in  NATO  in  a 
way  that  preserves  political  cohesion 
among  members  of  the  alliance.  It  is  in 
the  interest  of  NATO  solidarity  that  we 
consult  continuously  with  our  allies  not 
only  on  the  issues  of  arms  control  but 
also  on  global  issues  where  the  national 
interests  of  the  United  States  and  its 
allies  intersect. 

The  impact  of  U.S.  policy  on  this  in- 
stitutional cornerstone  of  Western  se- 
curity is  impressive.  We  held  a 
ministerial  meeting  recently  at  which 
there  was  a  most  useful  exchange  of 
views.  We  are  confident  that  our  effort 


Niwember  1979 


37 


to  help  shore  up  NATO's  defenses,  re- 
newed  after  long  concentration  on 
.  Southeast  Asia,  is  making  headway. 

•  On  conventional  forces,  the  NATO 
summit  a  year  ago  approved  the 
Long-Term  Defense  Program.  It  pro- 
vides programmatic  remedies  for  such 
deficiencies  in  conventional  forces  as 
antiarmor,  reenforcement,  reserve 
mobilization,  maritime,  air  defense, 
and  logistics.  Complementing  the  pro- 

n  gram  was  the  NATO  summit's  com- 
mitment to  the  goal  of  3%  real  annual 
increases  in  members'  defense  spend- 
ing. Needed  improvements  could  not 
have  been  made  on  the  basis  of  existing 
levels  of  defense  expenditure.  The 
summit  also  approved  alliance  cooper- 
ation in  the  development  and  production 
of  armaments  in  order  to  bring  about 
greater  standardization  and  interopera- 
bility of  NATO  arms  and  greater  effi- 
ciency in  the  employment  of  economic 
resources. 

•  On  theater  nuclear  forces  the 
Long-Term  Defense  Program  gives  im- 
petus to  consultations  with  allies  on  the 
need  to  modernize.  The  question  has 
taken  on  particular  importance  in  view 
of  the  continuing  deployment  of  Soviet 
long-range  theater  nuclear  systems 
targeted  on  Western  Europe,  such  as 
the  SS-20  missile  and  the  Backfire 
bomber.  These  consultations,  carried 
on  in  the  NATO  Nuclear  Planning 
Group's  high  level  group  (which  we 
chair),  are  moving  toward  recommen- 
dations for  theater  nuclear  force  mod- 
ernization. In  parallel  with  this  proc- 
ess, we  are  consulting  with  our  allies 
on  theater  nuclear  arms  control  meas- 
ures in  the  special  group,  which  the 
United  States  also  chairs. 

•  On  strategic  arms  limitations,  we 
have  consulted  closely  with  our  Euro- 
pean allies  and  Canada  over  the  course 
of  the  recent  years  to  insure  that  the 
SALT  II  treaty  protects  and  enhances 
their  security.  The  consultations  have 
focused  on  treaty  issues  of  particular 
interest  to  the  allies,  such  as  the  pro- 
tocol cruise  missile  restrictions  and  the 
noncircumvention  provision.  European 
leaders  made  clear  their  support  for 
SALT  II  at  the  Guadeloupe  summit  last 
January,  in  individual  governmental 
statements  in  the  intervening  months 
and,  most  recently,  at  the  NATO 
Foreign  and  Defense  Ministers'  meet- 
ings in  May  and  after  the  NATO  Coun- 
cil reviewed  the  treaty  on  June  29. 

I  could  not  give  a  comprehensive  re- 
view of  our  NATO  policies  without 
touching  on  the  question  of  enhanced 
radiation  warheads,  the  so-called 
I  neutron  bomb.  This  defensive  tactical 
nuclear  weapon  was  designed  to 
counter  an  enemy  tank  assault  with  a 


nuclear  warhead  which  would  cause 
less  collateral  damage  than  existing  nu- 
clear weapons.  The  President  decided 
in  April  1978  to  defer  production  of  the 
weapon  but  to  modernize  tactical  nu- 
clear forces  in  such  a  way  as  to  leave 
open  the  option  of  adding  it  at  some 
future  time,  depending  on  Soviet  re- 
straint. 

In  addition  to  the  defense  side  of  our 
policy  toward  NATO,  we  have,  on  the 
political  side,  sustained  the  vital  con- 
sultative process  on  issues  of  mutual 
concern.  East-West  relations,  the 
Mideast,  China,  Southeast  Asia,  and 
Africa  have  been  prominent  among  the 
questions  of  foreign  policy  we  have 
addressed  in  the  NATO  Council,  often 
with  special  experts  sent  from  Wash- 
ington for  the  meetings. 

The  need  to  preserve  political  cohe- 
sion in  NATO,  while  a  truism,  can 
never  be  taken  for  granted,  precisely 
because  we  are  an  alliance  of  15 
sovereign  equals.  And,  the  greatest 
single  burden  in  this  respect  falls  on 
the  United  States.  It  is,  in  part,  for  that 
reason  that  President  Carter  has  met 
three  times  with  the  North  Atlantic 
Council.  Our  leadership  is  an  impera- 
tive. Further,  the  manner  in  which  we 
lead  influences  NATO's  cohesiveness 
as  well  as  its  effectiveness. 

The  fact  that  NATO's  basic  fabric  is 
strong  and  resilient  in  1979  is  a  signal 
achievement.  It  may  be  a  greater  ac- 
complishment now  than  it  was  in  1959 
or  1969  when  we  were  in  the  midst  of, 
or  were  just  emerging  from,  the  cold 
war.  To  have  preserved  the  commit- 
ment of  NATO's  15  members  to  the 
alliance  has  been  a  difficult  challenge 
in  an  increasingly  multipolar  world 
where  defense  and  detente  have  been 
our  declared  policy  since  1967.  And,  it 
has  been  all  the  more  difficult  for 
NATO  to  confront  collectively  the  un- 
precedented, broad  range  of  divisive 
issues  that  face  the  West  today. 

Finally,  the  very  success  of  our  ef- 
forts to  preserve  Western  security  be- 
gets new  challenges.  On  the  defense 
side,  our  success  in  achieving  alliance 
agreement  on  how  to  respond  to  the 
Warsaw  Pact  conventional  and  theater 
nuclear  challenge  leaves  the  need  to 
follow  through  with  implementation  of 
agreed  decisions. 

•  On  the  Long-Range  Defense  Pro- 
gram, the  United  States  must  lead  the 
effort  for  vigorous  followthrough  on 
the  123  conventional  force  improve- 
ment measures  approved  at  the  NATO 
summit  a  year  ago. 

•  On  improved  cooperation  in 
NATO  armaments.  U.S.  leadership 
will  require  imagination  and  face  hard 
choices,  given  the  economic  as  well  as 


military  implications  of  this  issue.  The 
executive  branch  intends  to  work 
closely  with  the  Congress  and  with 
U.S.  business  and  industry. 

•  Similarly,  carrying  out  the  goal  of 
a  3%  increase  in  defense  expenditures 
will  necessitate  equally  tough  choices. 
If  we  fail  to  fulfill  our  commitments, 
our  allies  are  likely  to  find  it  impos- 
sible to  convince  their  own  publics  and 
parliaments  of  this  need. 

•  On  theater  nuclear  force  moderni- 
zation, we  will  continue  to  consult 
closely  with  allies,  looking  to  NATO 
decisions  near  the  end  of  the  year. 

•  Close  consultations  will  be  the 
order  of  the  day  for  SALT  III. 

•  On  the  political  side,  the  current 
effectiveness  of  our  intensive  consulta- 
tions in  NATO  does  not  relieve  us  of 
the  task  of  maintaining  that  process.  It 
is  a  primary  necessity  for  NATO,  as 
well  as  for  our  own  foreign  and  secu- 
rity policies.  And,  needless  to  say,  we 
in  the  executive  branch  attach  compa- 
rable importance  to  the  need  to  continue 
to  consult  with  the  Congress  as  we 
move  ahead  on  issues  vital  to  U.S.  se- 
curity. 

Western  Economic  Well-Being 

There  can  be  no  enduring  military 
security  without  a  sound  basis  in  eco- 
nomic strength.  Recession  can  imperil 
the  defensive  underpinnings  of  the  al- 
liance and  the  political  stability  of  its 
member  states.  Concern  about  eco- 
nomic issues  in  general  and  energy  in 
particular  ranks  uppermost  in  the  minds 
of  Europeans,  as  much  as  with  most 
Americans. 

How  to  deal  with  shared  economic 
problems  is  thus  a  major  consideration 
in  U.S. -European  relations.  Because 
the  problems  are  so  great  and  because 
the  need  for  cooperation  is  so  clear,  we 
have  put  primary  emphasis  on  working 
together.  Recognition  of  the  necessity 
for  close  consultation  on  shared  chal- 
lenges to  our  economic  well-being  is 
the  basis  for  holding  economic  summits 
and  it  accounts  for  the  special  emphasis 
we  place  on  working  with  two  major 
multilateral  institutions — the  Organi- 
zation for  Economic  Cooperation  and 
Development  (OECD)  and  the  Euro- 
pean Community  (EC). 

We  have  made  a  concerted  and  con- 
tinuing effort  to  underscore  the  role  of 
the  OECD  as  a  major  forum  for  coop- 
eration among  the  industrialized  na- 
tions. At  the  June  13-14  OECD 
ministerial  meeting.  Deputy  Secretary 
of  State  Warren  Christopher,  Secretary 
of  the  Treasury  Michael  Blumenthal, 
and  Council  of  Economic  Advisers 
Chairman  Charles  Schultze  headed  the 
U.S.  delegation.  They  focused  on  the 


38 


need  to  grapple  collectively  with  such 
problems  as  sustained  noninflationary 
economic  growth,  payments  imbal- 
ances and  the  international  monetary 
situation,  energy,  the  North-South 
dialogue,  and  structural  change  brought 
about  by  changes  in  technology  and 
relative  prices,  as  well  as  shifting  pat- 
terns of  world  production  and  trade. 

Using  the  OECD  as  the  principal 
forum,  we  have  engaged  in  extensive 
consultations  with  the  EC  nine  and 
other  European  countries  on  North- 
South  issues.  We  have  been  successful 
in  building  support  for  U.S.  views  and 
in  achieving  a  common  position  among 
the  OECD  member  countries  in  meet- 
ings such  as  the  recently  concluded 
UNCTAD  V  [U.N.  Conference  on 
Trade  and  Development]  session  in 
Manila.  This  time,  the  industrialized 
countries  had  a  cohesive  approach,  and 
we  avoided  acrimonious  disputes  with 
our  allies. 

The  International  Energy  Agency 
(lEA),  an  independent  agency  within 
the  OECD  framework,  is  the  principal 
forum  for  consumer  country  coopera- 
tion on  energy  matters.  As  recent  price 
and  supply  developments  illustrate, 
there  is  a  need  to  maintain  a  united 
consumer  country  position  and  for 
careful  management  of  the  situation. 
The  lEA  ministerial  meeting.  May 
21-22,  reconfirmed  the  decision  for 
members  to  adopt  measures  to  reduce 
their  collective  demand  for  oil  by  2 
million  barrels  per  day,  or  by  about  5% 
of  anticipated  1979  lEA  demand.  The 
ministers  decided  to  continue  such  ef- 
forts in  1980  and  agreed  on  a  set  of 
policies  and  principles  for  enhancing 
coal  utilization,  production,  and  trade. 
France,  although  not  an  IE  A  member, 
has  adopted  parallel  conservation 
measures.  The  EC  is  an  lEA  participant 
and  the  EC  energy  program  has  re- 
flected lEA  recommendations.  The 
Tokyo  summit  commitments  to  limit  oil 
imports  are  based  upon  the  lEA  pro- 
gram. 

A  substantial  package  of  economic 
assistance  for  Turkey  has  been  de- 
veloped within  the  OECD  framework, 
with  the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany 
and  OECD  Secretary  General  Van 
Lennep  playing  key  lead  roles.  A 
pledging  session  in  Paris,  May  30,  re- 
sulted in  commitments  in  excess  of 
$900  million  over  the  next  year  in  the 
form  of  concessional  credits,  export 
credits,  and  grants.  The  U.S.  share  is 
approximately  $250  million,  subject  to 
congressional  authorization  and  appro- 
priation. The  pledging  of  these  funds 
has  facilitated  the  completion  of  an 
agreement  between  the  Turkish  Gov- 
ernment and  the  International  Monetary 
Fund  (IMF)  on  appropriate  economic 


policies.  We  expect  to  receive  formal 
IMF  approval  later  this  month. 

U.S.  support  for  the  process  of 
European  integration,  exemplified  by 
the  evolution  of  the  European  Commu- 
nity, remains  strong.  We  consider 
progress  toward  European  unity  of 
primary  importance  for  Europe,  for  the 
West,  and  for  the  world.  At  the  same 
time,  we  believe  that  European  unity 
must  be  achieved  by  the  Europeans 
themselves.  It  is  in  that  spirit  that  we 
follow  with  interest  such  milestones  in 
the  move  toward  European  unity  as  the 
establishment  of  the  European  mone- 
tary system,  the  enlargement  of  the 
Community  to  include  nations  of 
southern  Europe,  and  the  holding  of 
direct  elections  to  the  European  Parlia- 
ment. We  view  these  developments 
and  others  as  reflections  of  the  growing 
habit  of  Europeans  to  think  and  act  in 
the  European  context. 

•  We  welcome  the  European  mone- 
tary system,  launched  on  March  13, 
1979,  by  all  EC  members  except  the 
United  Kingdom.  It  is  an  effort  to 
stabilize  intra-EC  exchange  rates  and  to 
provide  additional  resources  to  counter 
exchange  speculation.  It  is  a  major 
Franco-German  political  initiative,  de- 
signed to  stabilize  European  currencies 
and,  incidentally,  to  foster  European 
ecomonic  integration.  Its  long-term 
success  will  depend  on  the  member 
states'  ability  to  harmonize  their  eco- 
nomic policies. 

•  We  applaud  the  signing  of  a  treaty 
of  accession  for  Greece  on  May  28, 
1979.  After  ratification  by  all  the  na- 
tional parliaments,  Greece  is  expected 
to  become  the  1 0th  EC  member  on 
January  I,  1981.  Portugal  and  Spain 
have  also  applied  for  membership  and 
substantive  negotiations  are  expected  to 
begin  this  fall,  with  entry  into  the  EC 
as  early  as  1982-83.  The  primary 
motivation  for  EC  enlargement  is 
political:  to  bind  the  newly  democratic 
applicants  to  the  more  advanced  Euro- 
pean democracies  and  thereby  enhance 
their  political  and  economic  stability. 

•  We  consider  the  first  elections  to 
the  European  Parliament,  June  7-10,  a 
significant  step  forward  for  Europe. 
The  shift  to  direct  elections  will  not  in- 
crease the  limited  advisory  and  over- 
sight powers  of  the  Parliament,  but  the 
new  legislators  will  adopt  a  higher 
profile  than  their  appointed  predeces- 
sors and  will  gradually  seek  to  expand 
their  influence.  We  hope  that,  in  due 
course,  the  present  ties  between  the 
Congress  and  the  European  Parliament 
can  be  strengthened  to  reflect  the  sig- 
nificance of  the  June  elections. 

In  addition  to  expanding  U.S.  activ- 
ity in  the  OECD  and  increasing  cooper- 
ation with  the  EC,  there  are  other  de- 


Department  of  State  Bulletin  ., 

velopments  in  the  economic  realm  that 
merit  mention.  We  continue  to  partici-  ' 
pate  in  economic  summits  as  one  of  ; 
several  means  to  buttress  joint  action 
for  economic  well-being.  The  eco- 
nomic summit  in  Tokyo  was  a  crucial 
opportunity  to  focus  on  such  priority 
issues  as  energy. 

In  the  area  of  energy,  the  most  im- 
portant decisions  revolved  around  the 
commitment  to  set  national  ceilings  for 
oil  imports  for  1980  and  1985  and  to 
insure  adequate  resources  for  the  de- 
velopment and  commercial  application 
of  technologies  for  alternative  sources 
of  energy.  Both  the  OECD,  including 
the  lEA,  and  the  European  Community 
will  play  a  significant  role  in  the  fol- 
lowup  to  the  commitments  made  by  the 
summit  participants. 

Although  energy  was  the  key  issue 
discussed  at  the  Tokyo  summit,  the 
participants  also  made  commitments  to 
do  more  to  improve  the  long-term  pro- 
ductive efficiency  and  flexibility  of 
their  economies,  to  implement  the 
agreements  reached  in  the  Tokyo 
Round  of  the  multilateral  trade  negoti- 
ations (MTN),  to  achieve  durable  ex- 
ternal equilibrium,  and  to  pursue  con- 
structive North-South  relations. 

After  years  of  arduous  bargaining, 
we  have  achieved  the  successful  con- 
clusion of  the  MTN.  U.S. -EC  negotia- 
tions lay  at  the  heart  of  the  MTN  be- 
cause of  the  Community's  weight  in 
world  trade.  We  have,  in  consultation 
with  the  Congress,  prepared  the  neces- 
sary U.S.  implementing  legislation. 
We  will  be  consulting  closely  with  the 
EC  and  other  European  countries  to  in- 
sure that  their  implementing  regula- 
tions and  legislative  procedures  are  a 
comprehensive  and  accurate  reflection 
of  the  agreements  reached  at  Geneva. 
With  ratification,  we  will  have  to  put 
the  new  rules  into  practice  through  re- 
vised GATT  [General  Agreement  on 
Tariffs  and  Trade]  procedures  and  thus 
be  able  to  deal  with  trade  disputes  over 
the  coming  decades. 

Over  the  past  year,  we  have  been 
working  closely  with  our  European  al- 
lies to  arrive  at  reasonable  solutions 
which  balance  proliferation  concerns 
with  energy  needs.  The  International 
Nuclear  Fuel  Cycle  Evaluation 
(INFCE)  is  part  of  this  process.  In  ad- 
dition, as  required  by  the  1978  Nuclear 
Nonproliferation  Act,  we  are  negoti- 
ating a  new  nuclear  cooperation  agree- 
ment with  the  EC  and  hope  to  conclude 
a  new  agreement  sometime  next  year 
after  the  end  of  INFCE.  We  are  also 
working  with  the  EC  and  the  Interna- 
tional Atomic  Energy  Agency  (IAEA) 
in  Vienna  to  accelerate  the  conclusion 
of  facility  inspection  arrangements 
between  the  EC  and  the  IAEA. 


November  1979 


39 


Bilateral  Relations 

Although  the  United  States  places 
significant  emphasis  on  using  multilat- 
eral institutions  to  help  foster  Western 
military  security  and  economic  well- 
being,  we  must,  at  the  same  time,  deal 
with  our  European  counterparts  and 
nonaligned  nations  effectively  on  a 
bilateral  basis.  Here — as  with  NATO, 
the  OECD,  and  the  EC— we  are 
searching  together  for  solutions  to 
problems  that  affect  both  Europeans 
and  Americans. 

We  have  deepened  mutual  under- 
standing on  bilateral  policy  issues  with 
the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany 
through  intensified  consultations.  Of 
particular  note  during  the  last  year 
were  the  President's  highly  successful 
state  visit  to  the  F.R.G.  in  July  1978 
and  Chancellor  Schmidt's  visit  to 
Washington  last  month.  The  Chancel- 
lor has  countered  reports  of  a  deterio- 
ration in  U.S. -F.R.G.  relations  in 
major  speeches  in  Germany  and  during 
his  June  1979  visit  in  the  United  States. 
In  a  speech  at  the  University  of  South 
Carolina,  for  example,  he  emphasized 
that  firm  U.S. -German  ties  are  a  reli- 
able feature  in  today's  international 
affairs  and  that  "the  focus  of  our  rela- 
tions is  no  longer  on  a  purely  bilateral 
relationship  but  on  the  wider  tasks  and 
responsibilities  which  we  share." 

He  has  expressed  strong  support  for 
the  President's  efforts  to  achieve  last- 
ing peace  in  the  Middle  East  and  for 
the  prompt  conclusion  and  ratification 
of  SALT  II.  Areas  of  U.S. -West  Ger- 
man relations  requiring  continued  spe- 
cial attention  include  military-security 
policy,  East-West  relations,  the  coor- 
dination of  economic  measures,  and 
policies  on  nuclear  energy  and  export. 

We  continue  to  have  a  positive  re- 
lationship with  France  based  on 
mutual  respect  and  exemplified  by  the 
recent  Washington  visit  by  French 
Foreign  Minister  Francois-Poncet  and 
effective  consultations  with  the  French 
during  their  term  in  the  EC  presidency 
this  year.  We  recognize  that,  in  its  role 
as  a  major  power,  France  has  its  own 
views  on  such  questions  as  peace  in  the 
Middle  East,  organizing  assistance  for 
Africa,  conventional  disarmament  in 
Europe,  oil  price  ceilings,  and  export 
credit  competition.  All  of  these  ques- 
tions are  under  extensive  discussion,  as 
are  such  questions  as  nuclear  non- 
proliferation  where  there  is  now  a 
greater  identity  of  view.  The  impor- 
tant underlying  factor  in  all  these  ques- 
tions is  that  French  and  U.S.  basic  ob- 
jectives in  the  world  are  similar,  while 
we  sometimes  seek  their  achievement 
along  different  but  parallel  paths. 

Since  I  talked  with  your  committee 
last  year,  the  Conservative  Party  in 


Great  Britian  has  returned  to  power. 
Prime  Minister  Thatcher's  victory. 
May  3,  has  given  her  party  a  solid 
working  majority  in  Parliament  and  a 
strong  mandate  to  try  a  Tory  approach 
to  dominant  domestic  economic  issues. 
We  expect  our  close  ties  with  Britain  to 
continue,  as  we  work  together  on 
problems  of  mutual  interest,  especially 
those  regarding  Western  security  and 
southern  Africa.  If  differences  of  view 
on  some  specific  issues  should  emerge 
between  us  and  the  new  British  Gov- 
ernment, we  are  confident  that  they 
will  be  resolved  through  the  close  and 
continuing  cooperation  that  has  long 
existed  between  our  two  countries.  The 
Administration's  dealings  with  the  new 
British  Government  got  off  to  an  ex- 
cellent start  when  Secretary  Vance  vis- 
ited London,  May  20-24.  The  Presi- 
dent and  Mrs.  Thatcher  met  in  Tokyo 
for  the  economic  summit  last  month. 

We  remain  distressed  by  the  con- 
tinuing violence  in  Northern  Ireland 
which,  although  below  the  level  of 
several  years  ago,  still  claims  lives 
with  tragic  regularity  and  disrupts  so- 
cial peace  and  economic  progress.  As 
President  Carter  has  said,  our  policy  on 
Northern  Ireland  is  one  of  impartiality. 


and  we  recognize  that  the  only  perma- 
nent solution  must  come  from  the 
people  who  live  there.  Given  a  settle- 
ment acceptable  to  both  parts  of  the 
community,  we  would  be  prepared  to 
join  with  others  to  see  how  job-creating 
investment  could  be  encouraged  for  the 
benefit  of  all  in  Northern  Ireland. 

We,  of  course,  continue  to  enjoy 
close  ties  with  the  Republic  of  Ireland 
and  are  pleased  to  witness  its  continu- 
ing economic  growth.  We  welcome 
Ireland's  increased  activity  on  the 
world  scene,  as  evidenced  by  its  con- 
tribution of  troops  to  U.N.  peacekeep- 
ing efforts  in  Lebanon  and  its  assump- 
tion of  the  presidency  of  the  European 
Economic  Community  for  the  second 
half  of  this  year.  We  look  forward  to 
the  visit  of  Prime  Minister  Lynch  this 
November.  That  occasion  will  give  us 
the  opportunity  to  consult  with  him  in 
his  dual  capacity  as  head  of  govern- 
ment and  president  of  the  Council  of 
Ministers  of  the  European  Community. 

We  have  continued  our  traditionally 
close  ties  with  the  nations  of  the  Nordic 
area,  an  area  of  growing  strategic  sig- 
nificance in  the  light  of  the  steady 
build-up  of  Soviet  forces  on  the  nearby 
Kola  Peninsula.    Vice  President  Mon- 


Fourth  Anniversary 
of  the  Helsinki  Final  Act 


PRESIDENT'S  STATEMENT, 
AUG.  1,  1979' 

On  this  day  in  1975,  the  leaders  of 
35  states  met  in  Helsinki  to  sign  the 
Final  Act  of  the  Conference  on  Se- 
curity and  Cooperation  in  Europe 
(CSCE).  They  pledged  to  build  a  future 
of  peace  and  stability  in  Europe  on  the 
strong  foundation  of  mutual  under- 
standing and  respect  for  fundamental 
human  rights. 

In  the  years  since  Helsinki,  we  have 
witnessed  conscientious  efforts  on  the 
part  of  many  signatory  states  to  fulfill, 
fully  and  completely,  their  obligations 
under  the  Final  Act.  We  have  made 
progress  in  insuring  the  freer  flow  of 
people  and  ideas.  Flagrant  abuses  of 
human  rights  no  longer  go  unnoticed 
and  unchallenged. 

The  Final  Act  provision  which  calls 
for  notification  of  large  military  maneu- 
vers has  worked  well.  The  spirit  of 
Helsinki  is  alive.  But  there  have  also 
been  important  setbacks.  For  example, 
in  the  German  Democratic  Republic, 
harsh  new  laws  designed  to  restrict 


contact  with  foreigners  will  take  effect 
today,  on  the  anniversary  of  Helsinki. 
In  Czechoslovakia,  members  of  the 
Charter  '77  movement  remain  in 
prison,  facing  trial  for  their  dedication 
to  basic  human  freedoms.  In  the  Soviet 
Union,  organizations  established  to 
monitor  compliance  with  the  Helsinki 
agreement  have  been  harassed  and  their 
members  jailed.  Acts  like  these  are  to- 
tally inconsistent  with  pledges  made  at 
Helsinki. 

On  the  anniversary  of  the  Helsinki 
accords,  I  rededicate  this  Administra- 
tion and  this  nation  to  strive  tirelessly 
for  full  implementation  of  the  Final 
Act.  We  will  continue  to  review  our 
own  record  in  preparation  for  the 
meeting  of  CSCE  states  at  Madrid  in 
1980.  And  we  call  upon  other  signatory 
states  to  work  with  us  so  that  we  may 
mutually  fulfill  the  obligations  under- 
taken at  Helsinki  to  peace,  security, 
and  human  rights.  D 


'  Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of  Presi- 
dential Documents  of  Aug.  6.  1979. 


40 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


dale's  trip  to  northern  Europe  in  April 
1979  demonstrated  the  solidarity  of  our 
NATO  links  to  Iceland,  Norway,  and 
Denmark.  On  the  same  journey,  he  vis- 
ited Sweden  and  Finland  as  visible 
evidence  of  our  respect  for  these  na- 
tions and  their  policy  of  neutrality, 
which  also  contributes  to  the  stability 
of  the  northern  region.  The  Vice  Presi- 
dent's trip  to  northern  Europe  was  the 
first  undertaken  of  that  scope  and  at 
that  level  since  Lyndon  Johnson  visited 
the  area  as  Vice  President  in  1963. 

Although  the  Nordic  countries  have 
differing  security  policies,  they  share 
common  concerns  with  each  other  and 
with  the  United  States  on  such  global 
issues  as  human  rights,  East-West  re- 
lations, arms  control,  U.N.  peace- 
keeping, the  Middle  East,  and  eco- 
nomic development  of  the  Third 
World.  Vice  President  Mondale's  trip 
provided  an  opportunity  for  high-level 
consultation  on  these  world  issues 
where  the  Nordic  countries  play  a 
leading  role  and  where  their  advice  and 
support  are  important  to  us.  The  visit 
last  month  to  Washington  of  Norwe- 
gian Prime  Minister  Nordii  was  a  wel- 
come reaffirmation  of  this  process. 
Both  in  our  talks  and  in  public  state- 
ments, Nordii  stressed  Norway's 
""close  commitment"  to  NATO  and 
emphasized  that  '"SALT  is  an  impor- 
tant element  in  the  evolution  of  the 
East-West  detente." 

Our  relations  with  the  Benelux 
countries  continue  to  be  excellent  and 
largely  free  of  bilateral  problems.  We 
welcome  their  contributions  to  NATO 
defense  and  to  peaceful  solutions  to 
common  problems,  both  political  and 
economic.  Examples  of  these  include 
the  Belgian  contribution  to  stability  in 
Zaire  and  the  Dutch  contribution  of 
troops  for  the  U.N.  forces  in  Lebanon. 
The  Vice  President's  visit  to  the 
Netherlands  in  April  underlined  the 
importance  we  attach  to  that  country 
and  the  rest  of  the  Benelux. 

U.S.  policy  goals  in  Spain  remain  to 
support  Spanish  democracy  and 
Spanish  integration  with  the  rest  of 
Western  Europe  and  to  maintain  our 
mutually  beneficial  security  relation- 
ship. Our  cooperation  under  the  1976 
treaty  of  friendship  and  cooperation 
contributes  to  the  security  of  both  na- 
tions and  makes  an  important  contribu- 
tion to  the  defense  of  Western  Europe 
and  the  Mediterranean. 

Spain  has  made  tremendous  progress 
in  its  transition  to  democracy  in  the 
face  of  serious  political  and  economic 
difficulties.  Having  adopted  a  new 
democratic  constitution  and  carried  out 
both  national  and  local  elections  since 
December,  the  country  is  about  to  enter 
a  challenging  post-transition  phase  of 


political  life  in  which  fundamental 
issues — such  as  economic  policy,  basic 
implementing  legislation,  and  regional 
autonomy — must  be  addressed.  Of  par- 
ticular seriousness  is  the  problem  of  the 
continued,  brutal  terrorist  campaign  to 
destabilize  Spanish  democracy. 

Our  support  for  Spain,  as  manifested 
by  the  Administration  and  the  Con- 
gress, and  by  our  close  relationship, 
assists  the  Spanish  people  in  their  ef- 
forts to  realize  the  democratic  ideals 
we  share.  Secretary  [of  Defense] 
Brown  visited  Madrid  in  mid-May.  On 
June  1,  Secretary  Vance  cochaired  a 
meeting  of  the  U.S. -Spanish  Council  in 
Madrid  and  met  with  the  King  and  the 
Prime  Minister. 

U.S.  relations  with  Portugal  con- 
tinue to  be  excellent.  Our  governments' 
shared  goals  of  democratic  consolida- 
tion and  professionalization  of  the 
military  were  recently  highlighted  and 
reinforced  during  visits  to  Portugal  by 
Secretary  Brown  and  Senator  Edmund 
Muskie  and  a  meeting  between  Secre- 
tary Vance  and  the  Portuguese  Foreign 
Minister  at  The  Hague.  Secretary 
Vance  stopped  in  Lisbon,  June  18-19 
to  sign  the  extension  of  the  Azores  base 
agreement. 

With  the  May  30  passage  of  the 
budget,  Portugal  can  also  look  forward 
to  resuming  negotiations  with  the  IMF 
on  a  third  credit  tranche  standby.  The 
fourth  constitutional  government 
headed  by  Prime  Minister  Mota  Pinto 
submitted  its  resignation  on  June  6  but 
will  remain  in  caretaker  status  until  a 
government  is  formed  or  elections  are 
held.  The  debate  over  the  formation  of 
any  future  government  is,  however, 
distinguished  by  the  continued  firm 
commitment  to  the  democratic  process 
and  by  a  common  willingness  to  seek  a 
reasonable  compromise  to  solve  pres- 
ent problems. 

Our  important  interests  in  Italy  re- 
main what  they  have  been  since  the 
war.  Italy's  strategic  position  in  south- 
em  Europe  and  the  Mediterranean,  its 
willingness  to  host  American  military 
bases  dedicated  to  NATO,  its  nearly 
total  support  for  American  foreign 
policy  positions,  and  its  status  as  a 
major  U.S.  trading  partner  underscore 
the  value  of  good  U.S. -Italian  rela- 
tions. 

Over  the  past  year  and  a  half,  we 
have  tried  to  reinforce  our  close  re- 
lationship with  Italy  by  pursuing  a 
"strategy  of  cooperation"  comprising 
concrete,  mutually  beneficial  projects 
in  such  diverse  fields  as  energy,  health, 
and  the  environment.  The  program 
stresses  medium-  to  long-range  efforts 
to  assist  the  Italians  to  solve  their  seri- 
ous problems,  to  solidify  our  relations 
for  the  future,  and  to  take  advantage  of 


Italian  expertise  in  areas  where  they  are 
advanced,  like  solar  energy.  We  have 
also  encouraged  high-level  visits  be- 
tween our  two  countries,  the  latest 
being  that  of  Secretary  Vance  less  than 
6  weeks  ago. 

Elsewhere  in  the  eastern  Mediterra- 
nean, the  United  States  continues  to 
work  for  stability  in  the  area,  including 
good  relations  with  Greece  and  Turkey, 
progress  toward  a  Cyprus  solution,  and 
the  general  strengthening  of  democracy 
among  the  countries  of  the  region. 
During  the  past  year,  there  have  been 
significant  developments  in  all  of  these 
areas. 

With  regard  to  Cyprus,  the  Admin- 
istration has  been  actively  engaged 
over  the  past  year  in  seeking  to  pro- 
mote an  early  and  effective  resumption 
of  intercommunal  negotiations.  The 
centerpiece  of  this  effort  was  the  series 
of  substantive  suggestions  that  we 
submitted  to  the  two  Cypriot  parties 
last  November  10,  in  conjunction  with 
the  British  and  Canadian  Governments. 
We  are  gratified  that  our  efforts  and  the 
initiative  undertaken  by  U.N.  Secretary 
General  Waldheim  resulted  in  an 
agreement  to  resume  intercommunal 
negotiations  June  15.  Unfortunately, 
these  talks  have  run  into  temporary 
difficulties  over  the  agenda  and  have 
now  been  recessed. 

We  hope,  however,  that  these  dif- 
ficulties will  be  overcome  soon  and 
that  we  will  see  sustained  and  produc- 
tive negotiations  leading  to  concrete 
progress  toward  a  mutually  acceptable 
settlement.  As  in  past  months,  we  will 
work  closely  with  the  United  Nations, 
the  Cypriot  parties,  and  our  allies  to 
help  insure  the  success  of  these  talks. 

Turkey  continues  to  be  plagued  by 
serious  economic  problems.  We  have 
worked  to  help  solve  them  by  propos- 
ing a  substantial  U.S.  assistance  pro- 
gram, as  well  as  by  working  with  other 
countries  in  a  multilateral  effort  led  by 
the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany  to 
provide  Turkey  with  needed  foreign 
exchange  so  that  necessary  steps  can  be 
taken  by  the  Turkish  Government  to 
start  on  the  road  to  economic  recovery. 
As  I  noted  earlier,  the  multilateral  ef- 
fort is  proceeding  well. 

Our  security  relationship  with  Tur- 
key has  also  improved.  In  response  to 
the  lifting  of  the  arms  embargo,  the 
Turkish  Government,  on  October  9, 
1978,  authorized  the  resumption  of 
U.S.  military  activities  in  Turkey.  The 
authorization  was  for  a  I -year  period 
during  which  a  permanent  arrangement 
for  the  operations  of  the  activities  is  to 
be  negotiated.  Formal  negotiations 
began  on  January  18,  1979,  and  are 
continuing.  They  involve  several  com- 
plex issues  and  much  work  remains  to 


November  1979 


41 


be  done,  but  we  are  confident  that  we 
will  work  out  a  mutually  satisfactory 
agreement. 

Discussions  are  continuing  within 
NATO  to  develop  arrangements  for  the 
reintegration  of  Greek  forces  into  the 
alliance's  integrated  military  structure. 
As  you  know,  Greece  withdrew  its 
forces  in  1974  at  the  time  of  the  Cyprus 
events.  In  the  interim,  there  have  been 
command  changes  on  the  southern 
flank  which  make  necessary  new  com- 
mand and  control  arrangements  in  the 
sensitive  Aegean  area.  The  issue  has 
been  handled  in  NATO  military  chan- 
nels with  Gen.  [Alexander]  Haig  play- 
ing a  key  role  in  his  capacity  as  Su- 
preme Allied  Commander  Europe.  The 
retirement  of  Gen.  Haig  will  not  halt 
the  process.  As  we  have  stated  re- 
peatedly, we  believe  it  is  important  to 
secure  the  return  of  Greek  forces  at  the 
earliest  possible  time. 

Greece,  in  the  meantime,  is  enjoying 
a  continuing  period  of  ecomonic  vital- 
ity and  democratic  strength,  as  demon- 
strated by  it  signing  a  treaty  of  acces- 
sion to  the  European  Communities. 
That  development  contributes  to  one  of 
our  major  policy  goals — stability  in  the 
vital  eastern  Mediterranean  area. 

U.S.  relations  with  Canada  are  ex- 
cellent. We  enjoyed  close  working  re- 
lations with  the  Trudeau  government 
and  look  forward  to  continuing  close 
cooperation  with  Prime  Minister  Joe 
Clark.  We  particularly  value  the  co- 
operative approaches  to  the  energy 
challenge  which  we  have  effected  with 
the  Canadians,  as  well  as  cooperation 
on  such  global  concerns  as  the  Cyprus 
dispute,  southern  Africa,  the  Mideast 
peace  effort,  and  assistance  for  In- 
dochinese  refugees. 

We  are  gratified  by  Prime  Minister 
Clark's  reaffirmation  of  Canada's 
commitment  to  NATO  and  the  North 
American  Air  Defense  Command 
(NORAD)  and  his  indication  that 
Canada  should  increase  defense 
spending.  Finally,  we  hope  that 
longstanding  differences  on  fisheries 
and  boundary  issues  in  the  Gulf  of 
Maine  will  be  resolved  by  two  treaties 
signed  last  March,  agreements  that  we 
hope  will  be  considered  and  approved 
promptly  by  the  Senate. 

Our  good  relations  with  Switzerland 
have  been  bolstered  in  recent  months 
by  visits  from  the  Swiss  Minister  of 
Defense,  Gnaegi,  and  the  Minister  of 
Foreign  Affairs,  Aubert.  Both  visits 
went  smoothly.  While  reaffirming  their 
own  stance  of  armed  neutrality,  the 
Swiss  have  shown  support  for  most  as- 
pects of  U.S.  foreign  policy.  We  have 
a  modest  but  important  defense  re- 
lationship with  them,  including  co- 


14th  Report  on  Cyprus 


MESSAGE  TO  THE  CONGRESS, 
JULY  25,  1979' 

In  accordance  with  the  provisions  of  Public 
Law  95-384,  I  am  submitting  the  following  re- 
port on  progress  made  during  the  past  sixty 
days  toward  the  conclusion  of  a  negotiated  so- 
lution of  the  Cyprus  problem. 

In  my  last  report  to  the  Congress  on  Cyprus, 
dated  June  4,  I  took  note  of  the  decision 
reached  by  President  Kyprianou  and  Turkish 
Cypriot  leader  Denktash  during  their  May 
18-19  meetings  to  resume  intercommunal 
negotiations  on  June  15.  These  negotiations  re- 
sumed as  scheduled  under  the  chairmanship  of 
United  Nations  Under  Secretary  General  Perez 
de  Cuellar.  A  number  of  procedural  issues  were 
settled  in  the  course  of  the  first  session.  Un- 
fortunately, however,  differences  soon  arose 
over  the  interpretation  of  the  ten-point  com- 
munique agreed  upon  in  Nicosia  on  May 
18-19.  which  serves  as  a  broad  agenda  for  the 
talks  The  Greek  Cypriots  took  the  position  that 
the  Varosha  issue  should  be  discussed  first  in 
accordance  with  point  five  of  the  communique 
which  states  that  "priority  will  be  given  to 
reaching  agreement  on  the  resettlement  of  Va- 
rosha." The  Turkish  Cypriots.  on  the  other 
hand,  maintained  that  point  two  of  the  com- 
munique, dealing  with  the  overall  basis  for  the 
talks,  should  be  discussed  first. 

When  it  became  clear  that  these  differences 
of  approach  could  not  easily  be  overcome. 
Under  Secretary  General  Perez  de  Cuellar  de- 
cided to  recess  the  negotiations  on  June  22  and 
to  pursue  a  compromise  resolution  through  in- 
formal consultations  with  the  parties.  These 
consultations  have  now  been  in  progress  in 
Nicosia  for  some  four  weeks.  As  of  this  writ- 


ing, no  firm  date  has  been  set  for  reconvening 
the  talks,  although  there  have  been  indications 
of  greater  flexibility  and  the  elements  of  a  so- 
lution are  beginning  to  emerge.  Our  assessment 
is  that  given  sufficient  determination  on  the 
part  of  all  concerned  a  practical  way  can  be 
found  out  of  these  current  difficulties  that  will 
permit  the  negotiators  to  return  to  the  table 
within  a  short  time.  I  assure  you  that  this  Ad- 
ministration will  continue  to  work  closely  with 
the  United  Nations,  the  Cypriot  parties  and  our 
allies  both  to  overcome  the  present,  hopefully 
temporary,  difficulties  and  to  help  ensure  ulti- 
mate success  in  the  negotiations. 

The  Turkish  Cypriot  side  has  not  yet  given 
final  endorsement  to  the  procedures  worked  out 
in  Nicosia  on  May  18-19  concerning  the  for- 
mation of  a  joint  committee  to  trace  and  ac- 
count for  missing  persons  in  Cyprus.  With  the 
assistance  of  expert  organizations  such  as  the 
International  Red  Cross,  the  proposed  joint 
committee  should  be  in  a  position  to  resolve 
this  long-standing  humanitarian  problem. 

I  enclose  with  this  report  a  copy  of 
Secretary-General  Waldheim's  comprehensive 
report  on  May  31  to  the  United  Nations  Secu- 
rity Council  on  the  United  Nations  operation  in 
Cyprus. 

Sincerely. 

Jimmy  Carter  D 


'  Identical  letters  addressed  to  Thomas  P. 
O'Neill.  Jr.,  Speaker  of  the  House  of  Repre- 
sentatives, and  Frank  Church,  chairman  of  the 
Senate  Foreign  Relations  Committee  (text  from 
Weekly  Compilation  of  Presidential  Documents 
of  July  30.  1979). 


production  arrangements  for  some  U.S. 
weaponry. 

U.S.  relations  with  Austria  are  es- 
sentially troublefree.  We  respect  Aus- 
tria's neutrality  under  the  1955  state 
treaty;  at  the  same  time,  we  admire  its 
democratic  development  and  prosper- 
ity. We  support  the  Austrian  desire  to 
make  of  Vienna  a  third  U.N.  city,  and 
we  are  grateful  for  Austrian  hospitality 
in  connection  with  the  summit  confer- 
ence held  there  in  June. 

U.S.  relations  with  nonaligned  Yu- 
goslavia have  continued  to  improve 
across  the  board,  as  both  sides  have 
demonstrated  a  conscious  effort  to  re- 
solve differences  and  to  build  a  climate 
of  trust  for  the  present  and  the  future. 
President  Tito's  state  visit  to  Wash- 
ington in  March  1978  provided  the  op- 
portunity for  in-depth  discussions.  This 


dialogue  has  continued  through  a  dozen 
or  so  letters  between  the  two  Presidents 
and  through  frequent  consultations. 
Other  Yugoslav  visitors  have  included 
Assembly  President  Markovic  and  De- 
fense Secretary  Ljubicic.  From  our 
side,  several  Cabinet-level  officials 
have  visited  Yugoslavia  or  are  planning 
to  this  year. 

In  the  economic  area,  we  have  made 
significant  efforts  to  increase  trade  and 
to  improve  further  the  climate  for  U.S. 
business  in  Yugoslavia.  The  United 
States  is  Yugoslavia's  fourth  largest 
trade  partner  and  is  first  in  the  value  of 
joint  ventures,  but  we  are  convinced 
that  both  trade  and  investment  can  be 
increased  further. 

In  scientific  affairs,  the  two  sides  re- 
cently reviewed  the  achievements  of 
the  joint  science  and  technology  pro- 


42 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


gram  over  the  past  5  years,  but  the  fu- 
ture of  this  highly  successful  program 
is  clouded  by  the  prospect  that  the 
United  States  may  be  forced  to  cut  its 
contribution  to  about  one-third  of  the 
level  of  the  past  5  years. 

On  the  cultural  side,  Joan  Mondale 
recently  opened  a  major  exhibit  of 
American  arts  in  Belgrade.  Mrs.  Mon- 
dale also  visited  the  earthquake- 
stricken  Republic  of  Montenegro.  Fol- 
lowing the  severe  earthquake,  April  15, 
the  United  States  mobilized  a  major 
disaster  relief  effort  which  resulted  in 
the  prompt  delivery  of  nearly  $1.3  mil- 
lion worth  of  relief  supplies.  We  are 
currently  in  the  process  of  working  out 
a  program  of  longer  term  rehabilitation 
and  reconstruction  assistance. 

All  of  this  activity  is  in  support  of  a 
policy  which  has  remained  consistent 
through  every  Administration  since 
1948:  We  support  Yugoslavia's  inde- 
pendence, territorial  integrity,  and 
unity.  But,  in  addition,  we  are  trying  to 
move  our  relations  toward  broader  in- 
terchange, mutual  understanding,  and 
confidence. 

Evolution  of  East- West  Relations 

Much  that  the  United  States  pursues 
with  the  nations  of  Western  Europe, 
Canada,  and  Yugoslavia  reflects  our 
shared  interest  in  fostering  improved 
East-West  relations.  The  Carter  Ad- 
ministration has  devoted  substantial 
high-level  attention  to  this  area  of  con- 
cern. Since  I  understand  that  you  will 
be  holding  separate  hearings  on  U.S. 
relations  with  the  Soviet  Union  and 
SALT,  I  will  focus  on  U.S.  policy  to- 
ward Eastern  Europe. 

We  are  grateful  to  this  subcommittee 
for  your  initiative  in  convening  hear- 
ings last  year  on  recent  developments 
and  trends  in  Eastern  Europe.  The 
statement  which  then  Deputy  Assistant 
Secretary  Luers  presented  to  you,  Sep- 
tember 7,  remains  valid  as  a  com- 
prehensive account  of  U.S.  policy  and 
objectives  toward  the  region.  As  Mr. 
Luers  indicated  then,  we  are  mindful  of 
the  increased  diversity  in  Eastern 
Europe  and,  at  the  same  time,  of  the 
importance  of  contributing  to  the  secu- 
rity of  all  of  Europe  in  pursuing  our 
policies.  Thus,  we  intend  neither  to 
leave  our  relations  with  Eastern  Europe 
hostage  to  relations  with  the  Soviet 
Union  nor  to  conduct  a  policy  that  is 
reckless  and  destabilizing. 

In  Eastern  Europe,  we  have  con- 
tinued to  make  progress  toward  more 
normal  relations  with  individual  coun- 
tries. We  have  expanded  and  inten- 
sified human  contacts,  trade,  cultural 
and  scientific  exchanges,  and  discus- 
sions of  political  and  security  issues. 


Our  approach  is  designed  to  recog- 
nize and  support  the  sovereignty  and 
individuality  of  each  Eastern  European 
nation  in  its  domestic  and  foreign  af- 
fairs. 

During  the  past  18  months,  our  rela- 
tions with  Romania,  Poland,  and 
Hungary  have  been  particularly  active 
and  fruitful.  For  example,  with  Ro- 
mania, which  pursues  an  independent 
foreign  policy  in  many  respects,  we 
have  conducted  a  useful  dialogue  on  a 
broad  range  of  international  political 
and  economic  issues.  These  discussions 
were  given  special  impetus  during 
President  Ceausescu's  visit  here  in 
April  1978  and  by  subsequent  visits  to 
Romania  by  Secretaries  Blumenthal 
[Treasury]  and  Kreps  [Commerce]. 

With  Poland,  official  and  nongov- 
ernmental exchanges  continue  to  de- 
velop, and  the  level  of  our  two-way 
trade  rose  to  over  $1  billion  last  year. 
Earlier  this  week,  Polish  Foreign 
Minister  Emil  Wojtaszek  visited 
Washington  for  an  extensive  review  of 
bilateral  and  international  issues.  And, 
U.S. -Hungarian  relations  continued  to 
improve,  as  demonstrated  by  successful 
conclusion  last  year  of  a  bilateral  trade 
agreement  extending  most  favored  na- 
tion tariff  treatment  to  the  exports  of 
both  countries. 

With  Czechoslovakia  our  first  pri- 
ority continues  to  be  a  satisfactory  res- 
olution of  the  nationalization  claims  of 
U.S.  citizens.  Following  consultations 
with  the  Congress,  we  hope  to  be  able 
to  initiate  new  talks  on  this  longstand- 
ing problem  in  the  coming  months. 

Our  relations  with  Bulgaria  have 
continued  to  show  gradual  improve- 
ment, although  progress  in  family 
reunification  has  been  slower  than  we 
had  hoped. 

The  United  States  is  continuing  to 
try  to  develop  improved  relations  with 
the  German  Democratic  Republic. 
We  recently  completed  negotiation  of  a 
consular  convention  with  the  G.D.R.  in 
which,  to  our  satisfaction  and  that  of 
the  F.R.G.,  we  successfully  defended 
the  position  that  there  is  a  single  Ger- 
man nationality.  When  the  convention 
has  been  signed,  the  way  will  be  open 
for  some  modest  development  of  our 
relations  with  the  G.D.R.  For  example, 
the  G.D.R.  will  then  be  allowed  to 
open  two  trade  offices  in  New  York. 
We  will  continue  to  stress  claims,  our 
desire  for  more  action  on  divided  fam- 
ily cases,  and  the  need  for  a  general 
improvement  in  their  emigration 
record. 

Of  course,  we  continue  to  have  cer- 
tain fundamental  differences  with  the 
governments  of  the  Eastern  European 
countries.  We  are  concerned  about  the 
lack  of  democratic   institutions,   about 


uneven  observance  of  human  rights, 
and  issues  such  as  divided  families  and  - 
denial  of  freedom  of  movement  which 
directly  affect  many  American  citizens. 
But,  it  is  also  clear  that  the  expansion 
of  U.S.  relations  with  these  countries 
has  enhanced  our  ability  to  talk  can- 
didly with  their  governments  about 
these  and  other  issues. 

During  the  past  months,  for  exam- 
ple, we  have  had  constructive  consul- 
tations with  Eastern  European  govern- 
ments concerning  further  progress  in 
implementing  all  aspects  of  the  Hel- 
sinki Final  Act,  and  we  expect  to  con- 
tinue to  use  these  bilateral  exchanges 
as  we  approach  the  Madrid  Review 
Conference  for  the  Conference  on  Se- 
curity and  Cooperation  in  Europe 
(CSCE). 

Indeed,  continuing  attention  to  the 
CSCE  process  has  been  an  integral  part 
of  U.S.  policy  in  the  area  of  East-West 
relations.  Our  objective  in  the  CSCE  is 
to  achieve  full  implementation  of  the 
Helsinki  Final  Act  and  thereby  reduce 
international  tensions,  improve  observ- 
ance of  human  rights,  and  solve  some 
of  the  human  problems  caused  by  the 
political  differences  among  European 
states.  Progress  has  been  slow,  and 
there  have  been  many  setbacks.  Yet, 
we  have  seen  some  effort  by  all  sig- 
natories to  implement  the  Final  Act  and 
thus  believe  that  sustained  attention  to 
carrying  out  the  commitments  undertak- 
en in  Helsinki  will  have  a  positive 
effect. 

The  first  meeting  for  review  of  im- 
plementation, held  in  Belgrade,  ended 
in  March  1978.  That  meeting  achieved 
our  major  aim  of  providing  a  full  and 
complete  review  of  the  follow-through 
of  the  Helsinki  accords.  The  time  since 
the  Belgrade  meeting  has  been  devoted 
to  a  series  of  experts  meetings;  to  pre- 
pare a  scientific  forum;  to  discuss 
peaceful  settlement  of  disputes;  and  to 
consider  economic,  cultural,  and  sci- 
entific cooperation  in  the  Mediterra- 
nean. 

In  addition  the  United  States,  its  al- 
lies, and  the  other  participating  states 
in  the  CSCE  have  now  turned  their  at- 
tention fully  to  the  review  meeting  to 
be  held  in  Madrid  in  1980.  The  United 
States  has  held  bilateral  consultations, 
using  the  Final  Act  as  a  framework, 
with  Austria,  Bulgaria,  Finland,  the 
German  Democratic  Republic,  Hun- 
gary, Poland,  Romania,  Spain,  and 
Switzerland.  Consultations  were  re- 
cently held  with  Yugoslavia  and  Swe- 
den. We  have  also  had  the  first  of  a 
long  series  of  discussions  on  the  Ma- 
drid meeting  in  NATO.  We  anticipate 
that  these  consultations  will  continue 
throughout  the  period  leading  to 
Madrid. 


November  1979 


43 


At  that  meeting,  the  United  States 
favors  seeking  a  review  of  implemen- 
tation of  the  Final  Act  and  considera- 
tion of  a  limited  number  of  new  pro- 
posals. Any  new  proposals  should  be 
balanced  to  reflect  the  major  concerns 
of  the  Final  Act.  We  should  not  favor, 
for  example,  adopting  new  proposals  in 
the  military  area  without  including  new 
humanitarian  measures. 


Conclusion 

Concern  with  security  and  the  im- 
portance of  the  individual  brings  me 
full  circle  in  this  tour  d'horizon  of 
U.S  .-European  relations.  Several 
points  of  particular  import  emerge  from 
this  summary  of  Western  military  se- 
curity. Western  economic  well-being, 
bilateral  relations  with  individual  na- 
tions, and  the  evolution  of  East-West 
relations. 

First,  U.S.  objectives  in  Europe  are 
clear.  We  have  a  firm  sense  of  overall 
direction  and  priority.  We  consider 
U.S.  relations  with  Europe  the  cor- 
nerstone of  American  foreign  policy. 
Through  pursuit  of  shared  aspirations 
with  the  nations  of  Western  Europe  and 
Canada,  we  seek  to  assure  strong  de- 
fense and  fullest  possible  economic  and 
political  opportunity  for  our  citizens. 
Through  promotion  of  detente  with  the 
countries  of  Eastern  Europe  and  the 
Soviet  Union,  we  try  to  curtail  danger- 
ous competition  and  expand  construc- 
tive cooperation. 

Second,  active  and  sustained  pursuit 
of  these  goals  has  helped  serve  impor- 
tant U.S.  interests.  Relations  with  the 
nations  of  Western  Europe  and  Canada 
are  sound.  Although  much  of  the  rest 
of  the  world  is  torn  by  turmoil,  there  is 
institutional  stability  and  a  sense  of 
communal  progress  in  the  west.  Since  I 
last  met  with  you  for  a  review  of 
U.S. -European  relations,  there  have 
been  elections  in  10  European  coun- 
tries. Transitions  have  been  orderly, 
both  in  terms  of  the  changing  of  guard 
from  one  government  to  the  next  and  in 
terms  of  continuing  American  coopera- 
tion with  the  new  heads  of  government. 
For  the  first  time  in  its  history,  all 
members  of  NATO  are  democracies. 
We  have  resisted  retrenchment  into  na- 
tional reaction  to  challenges  that  trans- 
cend borders.  We  have,  instead, 
reached  out  to  work  together  on  mutual 
problems  for  mutual  benefit.  It  is  for 
that  reason  that  NATO  is  strong  and 
growing  stronger  and  that  we  have  re- 
sisted the  worst  protectionist  pressures 
in  a  generation  in  order  to  try  together 
to  shape  a  healthier  world  economy.  At 
the  same  time,  we  have  achieved  con- 
tinuing success  in  building  more  nor- 
mal relations  with  Eastern  Europe — 


relations  that  reflect  the  diversity  of  the 
area,  our  interest  in  security,  and  our 
concerns  with  fundamental  human 
rights. 

Third,  we  recognize  that,  despite 
some  achievements  to  date,  much  re- 
mains to  be  done.  The  problems  before 
us — most  notably  those  in  the  area  of 
economics  and  energy  and  those  in  the 
sphere  of  East-West  relations — are 
complex.  Bilateral  frictions  persist. 
Uncertainties  exist  within  some  Euro- 
pean nations,  especially  those  in  the 
Mediterranean  area.  We  are,  however, 
determined  to  persist  in  the  pursuit  of 
vital  U.S.  objectives.  And.  we  feel 
confident  that  we  can  succeed.  As 
Secretary  Vance  stated  in  his  address 
before  the  Royal  Institute  of  Interna- 
tional Affairs  in  London  on  December 
9.  1978: 

We  have  passed  through  a  particularly  dif- 
ficult period  during  the  1970's.  But  we  have 
navigated  these  turbulent  waters.  Although  the 
course  ahead  remains  demanding,  the  progress 
we  have  made  should  give  us  great  confidence 
in  our  future.  O 


'  The  complete  transcript  of  the  hearings  will 
be  published  by  the  committee  and  will  be 
available  from  the  Superintendent  of  Docu- 
ments, U.S.  Government  Printing  Office, 
Washington,  D.C.  20402. 


Fisheries  Agreement 
With  Dentnark^ 
Faroe  Islands 


On  September  5,  1979,  representa- 
tives of  the  Government  of  the  United 
States  of  America  on  the  one  part,  and 
the  Government  of  Denmark  and  the 
Home  Government  of  the  Faroe  Islands 
on  the  other  part,  signed  a  new  agree- 
ment relating  to  fishing  activities  of  the 
Faroe  Islands  off  the  coasts  of  the 
United  States. 

The  agreement  sets  out  the  arrange- 
ments between  the  countries  which  will 
govern  fishing  by  Faroese  vessels 
within  the  fishery  conservation  zone  of 
the  United  States.  The  agreement  will 
come  into  force  after  the  completion  of 
internal  procedures  by  the  govern- 
ments. D 


Press  release  215  of  Sept.  5.  1979. 


PUBLiC/lTiOI%S 


GPO  SALES 

Publications  may  be  ordered  by  catalog  or 
slock  number  from  the  Superintendent  of 
Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing  Office. 
Washington,  D.C.  20402.  A  25%  discount  is 
made  on  orders  for  100  or  more  copies  of  any 
one  publication  mailed  to  the  same  address. 
Remittances,  payable  to  the  Superintendent  of 
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are  subject  to  change. 

Offset  for  F-5  Aircraft  Purchases.  Memoran- 
dum of  understanding  with  Switzerland.  TIAS 
9032.  4  pp.  70C.  (Cat.  No.  S9. 10:9032.) 

Social  Security.  .Agreement  with  Italy  TIAS 
9058.  97  pp.  $2.50.  (Cat.  No.  S9. 10:9058.) 

Trade  in  Textiles  and  Textile  Products. 
Agreement  with  the  Polish  People's  Repub- 
lic. TIAS  9064.  II  pp.  90C.  (Cat.  No. 
S9.10:  9064.) 

Agricultural  Commodities — Transfer  L'nder 
Title  II.  Agreement  with  Socialist  Republic 
of  Romania.  TIAS  9103.  5  pp.  70c.  (Cat. 
No.  59.10:9103.) 

Research  Cooperation  in  Transportation. 
Memorandum  of  understanding  with  the 
Polish  People's  Republic.  TIAS  9139.  1  1  pp. 
90^.  (Cat.  No.  S9. 10:9139.) 

Health  and  Medicine.  Memorandum  of  under- 
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(Cat.  No.  59.10:9159.) 

Trade  in  Textiles.  Agreement  with  the  Socialist 
Republic  of  Romania.  TIAS  9166.  13  pp. 
90e.  (Cat.  No.  59.10:9166.) 

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90c.  (Cat.  No.  59.10:9167.) 

Exchanges  and  Cooperation  in  Education. 
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TIAS  9182.  8  pp.  $1.00.  (Cat.  No. 
59.10:9182.) 

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public. TIAS  9193.  7  pp.  $1.00.  (Cat.  No. 
59.10:9193.) 

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the  Hungarian  People's  Republic.  TIAS 
9194.  8  pp.  $1.00  (Cat.  No.  59.10:9194.) 

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9200.  5  pp.  750.  (Cat.  No.  59.10:9200.) 
Aviation — Flight  Inspection  Services.  Mem- 
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9201.  5  pp.  750  (Cat.  No.  59.10:9201.) 
Copyright  License.  Agreement  with  the  Union 

of  Soviet  Socialist  Republics.  TIAS  9205.  6 
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44 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


MIDDLE  EAST:        Vision  of  Poace 


by  Zbignk'H'  Brzezinski 

Address  before  the  World  Jewish 
Congress  in  New  York  City  on  Sep- 
tember 17,  1979.  Mr.  Brzezinski  is  As- 
sistant to  the  President  for  National 
Security  Affairs. ' 

We  meet  at  an  historic  moment.  One 
year  ago  tonight,  President  Carter, 
Prime  Minister  Begin,  and  President 
Sadat  signed  the  Camp  David  accords. 
The  electrifying  meeting  in  the  White 
House  East  Room  culminated  13  days 
of  the  most  intensive  diplomatic  nego- 
tiation in  history.  It  marked  the  first 
moment,  in  30  years  of  efforts,  when 
people  could  truly  say:  Yes,  peace  is 
possible  in  the  Middle  East. 

President  Carter  spoke  that  night  for 
all  Americans: 

We  are  privileged  to  witness  tonight  a  sig- 
nificant achievement  in  the  cause  of  peace,  an 
achievement  none  thought  possible  a  year  ago. 
or  even  a  month  ago.  an  achievement  that  re- 
flects the  courage  and  wisdom  of  these  two 
leaders. 

And  I  may  say,  as  one  privileged  to 
have  participated  at  Camp  David,  that 
none  of  this  would  have  been  possible 
without  the  courage  and  wisdom  of  that 


begun.  Last  March  26,  for  the  first 
time  in  its  history,  Israel  at  last  found 
itself  at  peace — a  real  peace — with  one 
of  its  neighbors.  I  can  only  tell  you  that 
nothing  I  have  ever  experienced  can 
compare  with  that  moment  at  the  air- 
port in  Cairo,  when  President  Carter 
lifted  the  phone  to  tell  Prime  Minister 
Begin  that  peace  was  finally  within 
grasp.  It  was  an  extraordinary  triumph 
of  statesmanship,  of  personal  courage, 
of  vision — a  triumph  shared  by  Presi- 
dent Carter,  Prime  Minister  Begin,  and 
President  Sadat. 

I  felt  deep  pride  in  all  three  men  for 
what  they  alone,  in  a  long  line  of  lead- 
ers of  these  three  nations,  had  accom- 
plished for  the  people  of  Israel,  for  the 
people  of  Egypt,  and — I  believe — 
ultimately  for  all  the  peoples  of  the 
Middle  East.  "No  more  war,  no  more 
bloodshed,  no  more  bereave- 
ment."— the  words  of  Prime  Minister 
Begin  at  the  treaty  signing — "Peace 
unto  you — shalom,  salaam  forever." 

Negotiations  on 
Palestinian  Autonomy 

Yet  even  as  we  rejoiced,  all  of  us,  at 
the  new  state  of  peace  between  Israel 
and  Egypt,  we  knew  that  the  task  was 


The  time  has  come,  too,  for  all  Palestinians  to  accept  fully,  and  in 
good  faith,  U.N.  Resolutions  242  and  338  and  Israel's  right  to  exist; 
the  time  is  fast  approaching  when  the  Palestinians  should  enter  the 
autonomy  negotiations.  .  .  . 


third  great  leader — the  President  of  the 
United  States,  Jimmy  Carter. 

We  are  also  here  tonight  because  we 
share  a  common  commitment  to  the 
future  of  Israel,  to  its  security,  and  a 
common  commitment  to  peace.  The 
United  States  and  Israel  share  some- 
thing that  today  is  particularly  impor- 
tant—  a  belief  that  human  society  must 
be  able  to  devise  ways  for  the  peaceful 
resolution  of  disputes,  whether  within 
each  country,  or  between  them  and 
their  neighbors.  The  peoples  of  both 
countries  are  passionately  committed  to 
peace — and  there  is  no  higher  calling 
in  either  country  than  that  of 
peacemaker. 

The  United  States  today  is  at  peace; 
Israel  has  enjoyed  but  few  moments  of 
peace.    Yet   tangible   progress   has 


not  done;  that  it  was  important  to  move 
ahead  with  the  other  half  of  the  Camp 
David  agreements — a  peaceful  solution 
for  the  West  Bank  and  Gaza. 

This  task  is  more  difficult  than  the 
first:  the  questions  it  raises  are,  at  first 
glance,  more  opaque;  the  stakes  for 
Israel,  its  neighbors,  and  for  a  lasting 
peace  throughout  the  region  clearly  are 
far  higher. 

In  this  process,  all  the  parties  are 
challenged  to  exercise  the  same  wis- 
dom and  foresight  that  brought  the 
dramatic  visit  of  President  Sadat  to 
Jerusalem  and  led  to  the  Camp  David 
accords,  with  all  their  hopes  for  the 
future.  The  time  has  come,  too,  for  all 
Palestinians  to  accept  fully,  and  in 
good  faith,  U.N.  Resolutions  242  and 
338  and  Israel's  right  to  exist;  the  time 


is  fast  approaching  when  the  Palestin- 
ians should  enter  the  autonomy  negoti- 
ations to  help  determine  their  own 
future — though  their  unwillingness  to 
enter  must  not  be  permitted  to  delay  the 
Israeli-Egyptian-U.S.  talks. 

And  we  all  must  seek  to  avoid  any 
impediments  to  peace  that  lie  in  the 
way:  whether  by  continued  building  of 
settlements  on  the  West  Bank,  which 
plays  so  directly  into  the  hands  of  those 
who  argue  that  Israel  does  not  genu- 
inely desire  an  agreement;  or  by  the  use 
of  Lebanon  for  terrorist  attacks  on  Is- 
rael; or  by  the  retaliatory  devastation  of 
that  helpless  country. 

Israel,  meanwhile,  has  a  right  to  ar- 
rangements that  will  guarantee  its  se- 
curity. Yet,  in  securing  this  right,  in 
demanding  full  recognition  as  a  Middle 
East  state,  Israel  also  bears  a  responsi- 
bility to  reach  out  to  the  Palestinians  in 
new  and  creative  ways.  The  Israeli  na- 
tion, which  has  suffered  so  much  and 
worked  so  hard  to  gain  acceptance  in 
the  region,  must  also  be  prepared  to 
accept  legitimate  Palestinian  rights  and 
to  interpret  the  Camp  David  accords  on 
the  West  Bank  and  Gaza  both  gener- 
ously and  with  wise  attention  to  the 
needs  of  an  enduring  peace  with  the 
Palestinian  people;  all,  of  course,  with 
due  regard  for  Israel's  genuine  security 
needs. 

Representatives  of  the  three  Camp 
David  countries — Minister  Burg,  Prime 
Minister  Khalil,  and  Ambassador 
Strauss — are  striving  to  make  the 
negotiations  on  autonomy  succeed. 
Each  carries  the  mandate  of  his  gov- 
ernment to  make  them  succeed,  and 
each  carries  with  him  the  hopes  and 
prayers  of  his  people. 

Bob  Strauss  has  just  returned  from 
the  Middle  East  to  report  that  those 
talks  are  progressing  on  track  and 
ahead  of  schedule.  They  are  full  of 
promise,  and  full  of  the  basic  good  will 
and  mutual  trust  that  are  vital  to  carry- 
ing on  the  great  work  of  peace.  At  the 
same  time,  the  Treaty  of  Peace  between 
Israel  and  Egypt  is  no  longer  just 
words.  It  is  turning  into  facts — facts 
that  should  prove  to  all  the  joint  com- 
mitment of  these  countries  to  both  the 
letter  and  spirit  of  the  Camp  David  ac- 
cords, in  their  entirety. 

Meanwhile,  Prime  Minister  Begin 
and  President  Sadat  are  building  upon 
their  own  unique  friendship:  leaders  of 
once  bitter  enemies  who  know  that  to 
build  peace  is  to  build  for  the  future  of 


November  1979 


45 


their  peoples,  that  '"to  the  counsellors 
of  peace  is  joy."  [Proverbs  12:20] 

I  have  no  doubt  that  success  will 
crown  their  efforts  as  they  work  along- 
side the  United  States.  And  I  have  no 
doubt  that  these  first  steps  toward  res- 
olution of  the  Palestinian  problem  will 
be  followed  by  a  continuing  process  of 
peacemaking  between  Israel  and  all  of 
its  other  neighbors — with  Jordan,  with 
Syria,  with  Lebanon.  I  can  reaffirm  to 
you  tonight:  President  Carter  is  totally 
committed  to  the  attainment  of  peace  in 
the  Middle  East.  There  will  be  peace 
for  all;  there  will  be  security  for  all. 

This  will  take  time,  it  will  take  vi- 
sion, it  will  take  courage.  And  it  will 
take  an  understanding  of  the  conse- 
quences if  we  do  not  all  join  together  to 
seek  a  broad,  lastmg,  and  comprehen- 
sive peace  in  the  Middle  East. 

No  one  needs  to  remind  an  Israeli 
mother,  wife,  or  child  of  the  legacy  of 
conflict:  four  wars  in  30  years;  casual- 
ties in  a  mere  2  weeks  of  1973  which  in 
proportion  nearly  equaled  U.S.  losses 
in  all  of  World  War  II;  and  the  knowl- 
edge that  modern  warfare  is  increas- 
ingly costly,  in  lives  and  in  living 
standards,  whoever  the  ultimate  victor. 

There  has  been  no  more  touching 
moment  than  that  last  May  when  Prime 
Minister  Begin,  President  Sadat,  and 
Secretary  Vance  stood  at  El  Arish  be- 
fore battle-scarred  veterans  of  Middle 
East  wars — from  both  Israel  and  Egypt. 
This  meeting  was  the  surest  reminder 
that  it  must  not  happen  again.  And  I 
will  always  remember  the  moment  at 
my  table  at  the  White  House,  at  the 
dinner  following  the  peace-signing 
ceremony,  when  President  Sadat's 
daughter  embraced  the  wounded  son  of 
General  Weizman,  and  the  tears  that  1 
saw  in  the  General's  eyes. 

No  one  needs  to  remind  the  people 
of  Israel — or  of  Egypt  or  of  other  Mid- 
dle East  states — of  the  economic  and 
human  costs  of  continually  having  to 
pile  arms  upon  arms,  instead  of  devot- 
ing a  greater  proportion  of  precious  re- 
sources to  the  benefit  of  people.  No 
one  needs  to  be  reminded  of  the  risks 
of  instability  in  the  Middle  East  that 
are  posed  by  the  absence  or  breakdown 
of  an  effort  to  build  peace;  or  of  the 
continual  risks  that  outsiders  will 
exploit  instability  for  their  own  ends; 
or  of  the  moral  and  social  conse- 
quences of  a  failure  by  each  party  to 
recognize  the  full  legitimate  rights  of 
the  others. 

The  path  of  peace  is  not  just  a  way 
chosen  from  a  host  of  options.  It  is  the 
only  way  if  we — all  of  us — are  to  fulfill 
our  grave  responsibilities  both  to  our 
own  people  and  to  others.  True,  lasting 
security  for  Israel  and  for  its  neighbors 
cannot  come  from  a  constant  state  of 


tension,  however  well  protected  by 
strength  of  arms.  True  security  can 
come  only  through  efforts  that  set  in 
train  real  and  positive  changes  in  the 
hearts  of  people;  changes  built  not  on 
war  but  on  the  patient  work  of  politics 
and  diplomacy  and  human  wisdom. 

The  Objective  of  Peace 

Today  we  are  all  preoccupied  with 
the  details  of  building  on  the  Camp 
David  agreements,  with  individual 
steps  in  diplomacy,  or  with  continuing 
conflict  taking  place  in  Lebanon  or 
violence  which  originates  from  Leba- 
non. The  stakes  are  too  high  for  it  to  be 
otherwise.  But  at  the  same  time,  we 
must  also  cast  our  minds  forward,  be- 
yond momentary  issues,  to  the  pos- 
sibilities that  lie  ahead.  These  are  the 
possibilities  of  peace  itself. 

I  believe  that  to  understand  the  his- 
toric moment  that  is  before  us,  in  pa- 
tiently and  progressively  building  a 
comprehensive  peace  in  the  Middle 
East,  we  should  be  guided  by  a  vision 
of  what  that  peace  can  bring.  And  in 
developing  such  a  vision,  we  can  better 
understand  what  we  are  striving  for  and 
the  need  to  press  onward. 

1  was  enormously  impressed  by  what 
Prime  Minister  Begin  told  me  once 
about  his  great  teacher,  Vladimir 
Jabotinski.  He  said  that  Jabotinski  in- 
sisted that  one  should  always  focus  on 
the  ultimate  great  objective,  define  it 
clearly,  and  never  lose  sight  of  it  in 
one's  actions.  Otherwise,  one  runs  the 
risk  of  becoming  absorbed  by  details, 
preoccupied  with  the  passions  of  the 
moment,  and  ultimately  diverted  from 
one's  own  great  objective.  Our  objec- 
tive, everyone's  objective  in  the  Mid- 
dle East,  must  be  a  final  and  com- 
prehensive peace — perhaps  not  this 
year,  or  the  next,  but  surely  a  peace 
and  nothing  less.  What  is  our  vision  of 
it?  What  will  it  mean? 

For  the  people  of  Israel  a  final,  com- 
prehensive peace  will  mean  not  just  ac- 
ceptance but  friendship  from  its  neigh- 
bors in  the  Middle  East — a  goal  of 
many  decades  to  rend  the  walls  of  this 
modern  ghetto,  which  isolates  those 
without  as  well  as  those  within. 

Peace  will  mean  a  chance  to  turn  a 
far  higher  proportion  of  Israeli  talents 
and  energies  away  from  the  tasks  of  se- 
curity to  the  task  of  continuing  to  build 
one  of  the  most  creative  societies  of  all 
times — in  the  words  of  Isaiah,  to 
"make  a  way  in  the  wilderness,  and 
rivers  in  the  desert."  [Isaiah  43:19] 
And  it  will  mean  an  end  to  anxiety,  the 
anxiety  that  has  produced  great  cour- 
age, but  ultimately  debilitates  a  society 
and  detracts  from  the  full  enjoyment  of 
simple  human  pleasures  and  the  full 


Saudi  Arabian 
Oii  Production 


WHITE  HOUSE  STATEMENT, 
SEPT.  26,  1979' 

We  have  received  official  confirma- 
tion of  today's  reports  that  the  Gov- 
ernment of  Saudi  Arabia  intends  to 
continue  production  of  9.5  million 
barrels  of  oil  per  day — 1  million  barrels 
above  its  established  limit — for  3  more 
months. 

President  Carter  welcomes  this  deci- 
sion as  "a  constructive  complement  to 
the  efforts  of  the  oil-importing  nations 
to  curb  consumption  and  switch  to 
other  fuels." 

"I  hope  no  one  will  take  this  news  as 
a  signal  to  relax  the  effort  that  each 
citizen  must  make  to  ease  our  demand 
on  a  limited  world  supply  of  oil,"  the 
President  said. 

Continued  high  production  by  Saudi 
Arabia  and  several  other  countries  will 
relieve  concern  about  the  adequacy  of 
oil  supplies  this  winter.  It  will  permit 
full  restoration  of  oil  inventories  drawn 
down  after  Iranian  oil  exports  were 
halted  last  winter  and  subsequently  re- 
duced to  about  half  their  usual  volume. 
It  should  help  to  stabilize  prices  in  the 
world  oil  market.  D 


'Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of  Presi- 
dential Documents  of  Oct.  1.  1979. 


unleashing  of  creative  human  en- 
deavors. 

For  the  United  States  in  its  relations 
with  Israel,  a  final  peace  will  enable  us 
to  build  even  further  upon  the  close  ties 
that  bind  us  together.  Our  relations  will 
not  be  punctuated  in  public  discussion 
by  the  disagreements  and  doubts  that 
from  time  to  time  arise.  It  will  be  pos- 
sible for  us  both  to  concentrate  on  and 
enhance  that  genuine  relationship 
which  is  based  upon  trust,  common  un- 
derstanding, and  shared  commitment  to 
promote  the  best  that  mankind  has  ever 
had  to  offer.  These  two  great  dem- 
ocratic peoples  will  be  able  to  see 
each  other  always  for  that  fact  itself; 
instead  of  too  often  forgetting  what  we 
agree  upon  in  momentary  concern 
about  our  differences. 

At  the  same  time,  the  United  States 
will  continue  to  broaden  its  relations 
and  deepen  its  friendship  with  Arab 
states,  to  the  benefit  of  all.  It  is  both  in 
the  fundamental  U.S.  national  interest 


46 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


—  and  also  Israel's — that  the  Arab  na- 
tions in  the  Middle  East  be  moderate, 
friendly  to  the  West,  and  also  secure. 

For  Israel,  the  West  Bank,  and 
Gaza — all  a  land  of  prophecy  and  of 
the  Bible — the  vision  of  peace  means 
nothing  less  than  the  sharing  of  a 
hopeful  future  by  two  peoples  that  are, 
in  fact,  united  more  by  a  common  past 
than  by  past  hostility;  two  peoples  that 
have  suffered  so  much,  that  have  a 
right  to  a  secure  existence  that  dignifies 
the  individual  and  enshrines  their  dis- 
tinctive religious  and  historical  tradi- 
tions. It  means  peace  for  a  land  on 
ground  undivided  by  barbed  wire,  by 
frontier  posts,  even  if  colored  some- 
what differently  on  the  map;  a  land  in 
which  all  people  can  move  freely,  pray 
wherever  they  wish,  and  work  without 
prejudice  because  of  their  national  or 
religious  identity. 

As  Shimon  Peres  said  in  the  Knesset, 
while  President  Carter  was  there: 

For  over  10  years,  we  and  over  a  million 
Palestinians  have  lived  here  side  by  side.  We 
know  they  do  not  want  us  to  rule  them.  They 
should  also  know  that  we  do  not  want  to  rule 
them  either.  We  have  learned  to  appreciate  their 
national  uniqueness  and  I  hope  they  have 
learned  to  appreciate  our  democracy.  We  want 
to  discuss  with  them  a  new  future — good 
neighborhood  and  security  for  both  them  and 
us. 

A  final  peace  can  also  make  possible 
the  fruition  of  the  shared  interests  of 
the  peoples  of  the  Middle  East.  Except 
for  what  is  beginning  to  happen  be- 
tween Israel  and  Egypt,  cooperation 
between  Israel  and  its  neighbors  in  the 
development  of  the  region  today  is  im- 
possible. It  will  not  come  easily  to- 
morrow unless  and  until  there  is  also  a 
fundamental  awareness  of  the  basic 
equality  and  mutual  respect  that  is 
contained  in  the  concept  of  peace  it- 


Lvtter  of  Credence 


On  July  24,  1979,  Faisal  Alhegelan 
presented  his  credentials  to  President 
Carter  as  the  newly  appointed  Ambas- 
sador from  Saudi  Arabia.  D 


self.  But  this  cooperation  can  come 
with  patience,  and  effort,  and  a  healing 
of  the  memories  of  conflict  and  past 
grievances.  It  can  unlock  the  human 
and  material  wealth  of  this  productive 
region,  and  provide  shared  benefits  to 
enrich  the  lives  of  all  its  people. 

Peace  in  the  region  will  then  make 
possible  genuinely  cooperative  ven- 
tures designed  to  enhance  regional  eco- 
nomic development.  The  Israelis  and 
the  Palestinians  are  among  the  most 
advanced,  best  trained  peoples  of  that 
region,  and  they  have  much  to  contrib- 
ute to  regional  development.  The  Is- 
raelis and  the  Palestinians — whatever 
respective  arrangements  between  them 
develop  from  the  peace  process — can 
transform  their  ancient  lands  into  a 
thriving  community  of  economic  and 
social  interest  in  the  Middle  East;  into 
a  model  for  others;  into  nothing  less,  in 
fact,  than  the  catalyst  for  creative  de- 
velopment, for  intellectual  and  tech- 
nological innovation  for  a  region  that  is 
bursting  with  opportunity  and  that  is 
crying  for  peace. 

And  such  peace  in  turn  will  make 
genuine  regional  security  possible. 
Such  security  is  the  rightful  require- 
ment of  every  people  living  in  that  re- 
gion. Security  for  Israel,  and  also  for 
its  neighbors,  will  mean  security  from 
internal  terrorism,  security  from  exter- 
nal terrorism,  security  from  radical 
subversion,  and  security  from  foreign 
intervention.  With  peace,  and  the 
friendship  that  it  will  generate  between 
the  peoples  who  live  in  the  Middle  East 
and  the  West,  the  United  States  will  be 
in  an  even  better  position  to  help  pro- 
vide security  assurance  and  effective 
protection  from  external  intervention 
and  thereby  help  all  concerned  to  gain 
both  the  spiritual  and  economic  bene- 
fits of  genuine  peace. 

You  and  I  know  that  there  are  some 
who  fear  peace;  there  are  some  who 
prefer  violence  and  hatred;  there  are 
some  who  see  benefits  for  themselves 
ideologically,  and  in  terms  of  power 
politics,  from  continued  hostility  be- 
tween the  Arabs  and  Israelis.  Yet 
progress  toward  peace  can  be  a  source 
of  powerful  magnetic  attraction;  and 
peace  is  clearly  an  attainable  vision, 
however  difficult  the  way  there,  how- 
ever challenging  the  problems  that  will 
inevitably  have  to  be  overcome. 


I7J§I.  Ambassadors 
to  Ifiiddie  East 

Countries^ 
October  1979 


Algeria — Ulric  St.  Clair  Haynes.  Jr. 

Bahrain — Robert  H    Pelletreau,  Jr. 

Egypt — Alfred  L,  Atherton.  Jr. 

Iran —  Vacant 

Israel — Samuel  W.  Lewis 

Jordan — Nicholas  A.  Veliotes 

Kuwait — Francois  M    Dickman 

Lebanon — John  Gunther  Dean 

Libya — Vacant 

Morocco — Richard  B    Parker 

Oman— Marshall  W    Wiley 

Qatar — Andrew  I.  Killgore 

Saudi  Arabia — John  C.  West 

Syria — Talcott  W.  Seelye 

Tunisia — Stephen  W    Bosworth 

United  Arab  Emirates — William  D.  Wolle 

Yemen  Arab  Republic — George  M.  Lane        D 


What  I  have  just  sketched  is  a  per- 
sonal vision  of  what  a  final  peace  can 
mean  to  the  region  and,  indeed,  for  a 
world  removed  from  the  threat  of  Mid- 
dle East  conflicts  that  can  spread  to 
other  parts  of  the  globe.  It  should  give 
us  heart  to  carry  on  with  the  work  of 
the  moment;  with  the  Camp  David  ac- 
cords, with  the  patient  and  often  unre- 
warding work  of  diplomacy;  with  plan- 
ning for  the  future  beyond. 

This  is  a  challenge  to  each  of  us — to 
those  of  us  who  serve  in  government 
and  to  members  of  organizations  like 
the  World  Jewish  Congress,  with  your 
special  insights  and  concerns.  None  of 
us  should  have  any  illusions  about  the 
work  that  is  ahead  of  us,  the  real  risks 
for  peace  that  each  party  to  the  conflict 
must  take;  but  none  of  us  should  ever 
be  without  hope  hope  that  can  lead  us 
to  our  common  goal.  In  the  words  of 
the  Psalm,  "peace  shall  be  upon  Is- 
rael," and  we  can  add,  "and  upon  its 
neighbors,  as  well."  D 


'  Text  from  White  House  press  release  of 
Sept.   17.  1979. 


November  1979 


47 


Anniversary  of  the 
Camp  David  Agreements 


PRESIDENT  CARTER'S 

STATEMENT, 

SEPT.  17,  1979' 

One  year  ago  today,  on  vSeptember 
17,  1978,  Prime  Minister  Begin  of  Is- 
rael, President  Sadat  of  Egypt,  and  1 
returned  from  Camp  David  with  an 
agreement  establishing  the  Framework 
for  Peace  in  the  Middle  East.  We  be- 
lieved then  that  we  had  reached  an 
historic  turning  point  in  the  bitter  his- 
tory of  that  long-suffering  region.  One 
short  year  later,  that  belief  has  become 
a  firm  reality. 

After  30  years  of  hosility  and  war, 
Israel  is  truly  at  peace  with  its  largest 
Arab  neighbor.  The  relations  between 
them  are  improving  daily.  The  provi- 
sions of  the  Treaty  of  Peace  are  being 
carried  out  precisely  and  on  schedule. 

This  peace  is  no  longer  words  on 
paper.  It  is  now  facts  on  the  ground  and 
faith  in  the  hearts  of  millions  of 
people.  This  remarkable  change — from 
war  to  peace,  from  hostility  to 
friendship — was  clearly  visible  in  the 
recent  visit  by  President  Sadat  to 
Haifa,  where  he  was  received  with 
genuine  warmth  and  enthusiasm  by  the 
people  and  the  leaders  of  Israel.  Such 
events,  which  would  have  seemed 
amazing — even  unthinkable — until  the 
very  recent  past,  are  now  accepted  al- 
most as  routine.  That  is  itself  a  meas- 
ure of  how  far  we  have  traveled  along 
the  road  to  peace. 

So  it  is  worth  remembering  on  this 
occasion  what  an  extraordinary  change 
in  attitudes  has  taken  place.  The  suc- 
cesses of  Egypt  and  Israel  so  far  in 
overcoming  three  decades  of  animosity 
give  us  renewed  confidence  in  facing 
the  difficult  tasks  which  remain. 

Our  goal  has  always  been  the  estab- 
lishment of  a  comphrehensive  peace  in 
which  Israel  could  at  last  live  in  secu- 
rity and  tranquillity  with  all  its  neigh- 
bors. The  Camp  David  accords  are  a 
long  step  on  that  path.  We  do  not 
underestimate  the  difficulties  that  lie 
ahead,  but  we  knew  from  the  outset 
that  the  road  would  be  hard  and  rocky. 
And  looking  back  today  at  the  solid 
achievements  of  the  past  year,  we  are 
justified  in  keeping  our  eyes  firmly  on 
the  goal  of  peace  rather  than  in  heeding 
the  inevitable  cries  that  say  peace  can- 
not be  achieved. 

The  peace  process  outlined  at  Camp 
David  1  year  ago  is  alive  and  well.  The 
talks  on  full  autonomy  for  the  West 
Bank  and  Gaza  are  proceeding  on 


schedule,  in  an  atmosphere  of  good 
will  and  serious  cooperation.  1  am 
confident  those  talks  will  succeed. 
Their  progress  is  a  tribute  to  the  vision 
and  courage  of  President  Sadat.  Prime 
Minister  Begin,  and  the  people  of  their 
two  great  nations. 

Over  the  coming  months  it  will  be 
our  common  task  to  continue  demon- 
strating that  peace  does  work  and,  by 
the  evidence  of  our  deeds,  to  convince 
other  nations  and  leaders  to  join  with 
us  in  this  quest  for  lasting  peace,  secu- 
rity, and  the  opportunity  for  productive 
lives  for  all  the  people  of  the  Middle 
East. 

SECRETARY  VANCE'S 
STATEMENT, 
SEPT.  17,  1979 

One  year  ago  today  the  historic 
agreements  between  Egypt  and  Israel 


reached  at  Camp  David  were  signed  in 
the  White  House  by  President  Sadat 
and  Prime  Minister  Begin  and  was  wit- 
nessed by  President  Carter.  All  of  us 
who  were  privileged  to  participate  in 
those  negotiations  continue  to  feel  a 
deep  sense  of  gratification  and  admira- 
tion for  the  three  leaders  whose  vision 
led  to  that  achievement. 

It  is  important  today  to  reflect  on 
how  much  farther  we  have  come  in  the 
year  since  the  Camp  David  accords 
were  signed.  The  commitments  made  I 
year  ago  are  being  carried  out  scrupu- 
lously. 

The  Egyptian-Israeli  Peace  Treaty 
has  been  signed  and  is  being  im- 
plemented as  agreed  with  dedication 
and  in  a  spirit  of  cooperation  by  both 
sides.  The  world  can  see  the  practical 
results  that  have  been  achieved.  Israeli 
military  forces  are  being  withdrawn — 
zone  by  zone — and  the  foundations  are 
being  laid  for  normalization  of  rela- 
tions. 

The  relationship  between  Egypt  and 
Israel  is  beginning  to  broaden  and 
deepen.  As  this  relationship  matures,  it 
will  demonstrate  that  agreements  will 
be  kept.    It  will   show   not  only  that 


MESSAGE  FROM 

PRIME  MINISTER  BEGIN^ 

On  this  the  first  anniversary  of  the 
Camp  David  agreement  signed  in 
Washington  on  September  17th  I  vividly 
recall  the  wonderful  hospitality  which 
you  and  your  gracious  lady  accorded  to 
my  wife,  my  colleagues  and  myself 
during  those  1.^  days  of  the  momentous 
conference.  I  remember  well  the  ses- 
sions, the  strong  debates,  the  mutual 
convincing,  the  difficulties  we  all  had  to 
overcome,  the  weighing  of  every  sen- 
tence and  word  and  ultimately  the  joy  of 
achieving  the  understanding  which  be- 
came the  basis  of  an  historic  agreement. 
Out  of  it  the  treaty  of  peace  between 
Egypt  and  Israel,  certainly  a  turning 
point  in  the  annals  of  the  Middle  East 
emerged  and  the  positive  concept  of  full 
autonomy  for  the  Palestinian  Arabs,  in- 
habitants of  Judea,  Samaria  and  Gaza 
District  was  brought  forth. 

You,  Mr.  President,  did  your  utmost 
by  your  own  hard  work  to  make  these 
agreements  possible,  allow  me,  there- 
fore, on  this  memorable  anniversary  to 
thank  you  from  the  heart  for  the  great 
assistance  rendered  to  both  Egypt  and 
Israel  in  achieving  a  rapprochement 
between  two  countries  which  for  thirty 
one  years,  were  in  a  state  of  war,  and 
which  have  now  concluded  peace,  the 
first  step  towards  a  general  and  com- 
prehensive settlement  in  the  Middle 
East. 


There  are  people  who  do  not  yet  ap- 
preciate the  value  of  this  moral  interna- 
tional achievement,  but  many  millions 
of  women  and  men  of  goodwill  will  re- 
joice together  with  us  in  this  accom- 
plishment. Their  blessings  are  our  joy 
and  the  source  of  satisfaction. 

Accept,  Mr.  President,  my  deepest 
gratitude  for  all  you  have  done  with  such 
great  devotion  in  the  service  of  peace. 

Yours  respectfully  and  sincerely, 

Menahem  Begin 


MESSAGE  FROM 
PRESIDENT  SADAT^ 

This  afternoon  I  have  issued  a  presi- 
dential statement  expressing  my  views 
on  the  first  anniversary  of  the  signature 
of  the  Camp  David  agreements.  On  this 
occasion  I  wish  to  express  my  deep 
feelings  and  thanks  for  your  personal 
contribution  to  this  historical  event,  I  am 
confident  that  these  agreements,  which 
have  been  the  first  steps  toward  a  com- 
prehensive peace,  will  help  bring  a  so- 
lution to  the  Palestinian  question  in  all 
its  aspects.  The  role  of  the  U.S.  as  a  full 
partner  in  the  peace  process  will  remain 
a  key  element  in  our  mutual  efforts  to 
achieve  a  just  and  lasting  peace  in  the 
Middle  East. 

Sincerely. 

Anwar  al-Sadat 


48 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


MILITARY  AFFAIRS:        Deionse 
Btidgets  for  F\  1980  and  1981 


MESSAGE  TO 
THE  CONGRESS, 
SEPT.  11,  1979' 


I  am  sure  you  agree  with  me  Ihal  we  cannot 
effectively  safeguard  U.S.  legitimate  interests 
abroad  nor  pursue  safely  peace,  justice  and 
order  at  home  unless  our  national  security  is 
protected  by  adequate  defenses.  The  funda- 
mental responsibility  of  the  President — a  re- 
sponsibility shared  with  Congress — is  to  maln- 
lam  defenses  adequate  to  provide  for  the  na- 
tional security  of  the  United  Stales,  In  meeting 
that  responsibility,  this  Administration  moved 
promptly  and  vigorously  to  reverse  the  down- 
ward trend  in  U.S.  defense  efforts.  This  is 
demonstrated  by  an  examination  of  the  trends 
in  real  defense  expenditures  since  the  mid 
1960s.  At  NATO  Summits  in  May  1977  and 
1978  we  persuaded  our  allies  to  join  with  us  in 
endorsing  a  goal  three  percent  real  annual 
growth  in  defense  outlays  and  an  ambitious 
Long  Term  Defense  Program  for  the  Alliance. 
Together  these  represented  a  turning  point,  not 
only  for  the  United  States,  but  the  whole  Al- 
liance 

For  our  pari,  we  moved  promptly  to  act  on 
this  resolve  We  authorized  production  of 
XM-1  tanks;  we  greatly  increased  the  number 
of  anti-tank  guided  missiles;  we  deployed 
F-I5s  and  additional  F-llls  lo  Europe,  along 
with  equipment  for  additional  ground  forces. 
We  reduced  the  backlog  of  ships  in  overhaul 
and  settled  contractual  disputes  thai  threatened 
to  hall  shipbuilding  progress.  In  strategic  sys- 


tems, we  accelerated  development  and  began 
procurement  of  long  range  air-launched  cruise 
missiles,  began  the  deployment  of  Trident  I 
missiles,  and  have  begun  the  modernization  of 
our  ICBM  force  with  the  commitment  to  deploy 
the  MX  missile  in  a  survivable  basing  mode  for 
It 

These  and  other  initiatives  were  the  building 
blocks  for  a  determined  program  to  assure  that 
the  United  Sates  remains  militarily  strong.  The 
FY  1980  budget  submission  of  last  January  was 
designed  to  continue  that  program.  In  sub- 
sequent months,  however,  inflation  has  run  at 
higher  levels  than  those  assumed  in  the  cost 
calculations  associated  with  that  defense  pro- 
gram Accordingly.  I  plan  to  send  promptly  to 
the  Congress  a  defense  budget  amendment  to 
restore  enough  funds  to  continue  In  FY  1980  to 
carry  out  the  Administration's  defense  program 
based  on  our  current  best  estimate  of  the  infla- 
tion that  will  be  experienced  during  the  fiscal 
year.  Although  the  detailed  calculations  needed 
to  prepare  an  amendment  are  still  in  progress.  I 
expect  that  the  amount  of  the  amendment  will 
be  about  $2.7  billion  In  Budget  Authority 
above  the  Administration's  January  1979 
budget  request. 

Correcting  for  inflation  is  not  enough  in  it- 
self to  assure  that  we  continue  an  adequate  de- 
fense program  through  FY  1980.  We  must  also 
have  the  program  and  the  funds  authorized  and 
appropriated,  substantially  as  they  were  sub- 
milted.  Therefore,  in  the  course  of  Congres- 
sional consideration  of  the  second  budget  res- 
olution. I  will  support  ceilings  for  the  National 


Camp  David  (Cont'd) 

peace  can  be  achieved  but  that  it  can 
last. 

The  new  round  of  negotiations  fore- 
seen at  Camp  David  also  began  on 
schedule.  Today,  for  the  first  time  in 
the  more  than  30-year-old  Arab-Israeli 
conflict,  a  mechanism  exists  for  begin- 
ning to  resolve  issues  of  concern  to  the 
Palestinians.  These  current  negotiations 
on  an  agreement  to  provide  full  au- 
tonomy for  the  inhabitants  of  the  West 
Bank  and  Gaza  are  gaining  momentum. 

On  this  anniversary,  all  of  my  col- 
leagues and  1  join  President  Carter  in 


committing  ourselves  to  a  redoubled 
effort  to  build  further  on  the  solid 
foundation  laid  at  Camp  David.  We 
call  on  all  who  seek  and  cherish  peace 
to  join  with  us.  D 


'  Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of  Presi- 
dential Documents  of  Sept  24.  1979.  which 
also  carried  the  text  of  remarks  by  President 
Carter,  Egyptian  Vice  President  Mubarak,  and 
Israeli  Foreign  Minister  Dayan  on  the  subject 
of  the  Camp  David  agreements. 

^  On  Sept.  17  the  While  House  announced 
that  the  President  received  messages  from 
Prime  Minister  Begin  and  President  Sadat  (text 
from  Weekly  Compilation  of  Sept.  24). 


Defense  Function  for  FY  1980  of  $141.2  bil- 
lion in  Budget  Authority  and  $1.^0.6  billion  In 
outlays.  I  will  also  request  that  the  Congress 
support  the  Administration's  FY  1980  defense 
program  and.  In  particular,  that  the  Appropria- 
tion Committees  actually  appropriate  the  funds 
needed  to  carry  it  out 

Furthermore,  in  FY  1981  I  plan  a  further  real 
increase  In  defense  spending.  The  Defense  De- 
partment Is  working  on  the  details  of  that 
budget.  It  would,  therefore,  be  premature  to 
describe  the  features  of  that  budget  beyond 
noting  that  it  will  continue  the  broad  thrust  of 
our  defense  program,  and  thai  1  Intend  to  con- 
tinue to  support  our  mutual  commitment  with 
our  NATO  Allies. 

While  this  defense  program  is  adequate,  it  is 
clear  that  we  could  spend  even  more  and 
thereby  gain  more  military  capability.  But  na- 
tional security  involves  more  than  sheer  mili- 
tary capability;  there  are  other  legitimate  de- 
mands on  our  budget  resources.  These  com- 
peting priorities  will  always  be  with  us  within 
the  vast  array  of  budget  decisions  both  the 
Congress  and  the  President  are  called  upon  to 
make.  Defense  outlays  are  actually  lower  In 
constant  dollars  than  they  were  in  1963,  and  a 
much  lower  percentage  of  the  gross  national 
product  (5%  compared  with  9%).  There  are 
those  that  think  this  has  caused  a  decline  In 
.American  inllitary  might  and  that  the  military 
balance  has  now  lipped  against  us.  1  do  not  be- 
lieve this  to  be  so,  but  I  am  concerned  about 
the  trends.  1  believe  that  It  Is  necessary  for  us 
lo  act  now  lo  reverse  these  trends. 

The  Secretary  of  Defense  will  be  presenting 
to  the  Congress  over  the  coming  months  the 
highlights  of  our  defense  program  in  terms  of 
the  goals  we  think  we  should  achieve  and  the 
Five-Year  Defense  Program  we  plan  to  achieve 
them.  In  this  context  he  will  point  out,  among 
many  other  items,  how  MX  and  our  other 
strategic  programs  will  contribute  to  the 
maintenance  of  essential  equivalence  between 
the  central  strategic  forces  of  the  United  States 
and  Soviet  Union,  how  we  plan  to  modernize 
theater  nuclear  forces  in  cooperation  with  our 
NATO  allies,  how  our  general  purpose  forces 
programs  contribute  both  lo  our  military  capa- 
bility lo  support  our  NATO  allies  and  rapidly  to 
deploy  forces  lo  defend  our  vital  Interests 
elsewhere.  That  presentation  can  serve  as  the 
basis  for  future  discussions  (including  open 
testimony)  that  will  allow  us  lo  build  the  na- 
tional consensus  that  is  the  fundamental  pre- 
requisite of  a  strong  and  secure  America. 

Jimmy  CarterD 


'  Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of  Presi- 
dential Documents  of  Sept.  17,  1979. 


Jovember  1979 


J\U€LEAR  POLICY:        Bangiadesh 
Joins  l^onproUfcration  Treaty 


Following  are  the  texts  of  a  Depart- 
nent  of  State  press  release  announcing 
hat,  at  a  ceremony  at  the  Department 
7f  State  on  September  27,  1979, 
Bangladesh  had  deposited  its  instru- 
nent  of  accession  to  the  Nonprolifera- 
ion  Treaty  and  Acting  Secretary  War- 
'en  Christopher' s  remarks  at  that 
eremony. 


STATE  DEPARMENT 
PRESS  RELEASE' 

Bangladesh  is  now  the  1 1 1th  party  to 
the  Treaty  on  the  Non-Proliferation  of 
Nuclear  Weapons  (NPT).  Bangladesh's 
Ambassador  to  the  United  States, 
Tabarak  Husain,  deposited  his  govern- 
ment's instrument  of  accession  at  a 
Department  of  State  ceremony  on  Sep- 
tember 27,  1979.  Participating  in  the 
ceremony  for  the  U.S.  Government 
was  Warren  Christopher,  Acting  Sec- 
retary of  State.  In  his  remarks,  Mr. 
Christopher  stated  that:  "The  specter 
af  nuclear  competition  in  South  Asia  is 

major  concern  to  the  United  States 
.  .  "He  also  welcomed  Bangla- 
desh's accession  and  hoped  that  its  ini- 
tiative will  spur  others  in  the  region  to 
follow  Bangladesh's  lead.  Mr.  Christo- 
pher then  announced  that  negotiations 
would  begin  soon  on  a  U.S.- 
Bangladesh nuclear  cooperation  agree- 
ment. 

The  NPT  was  opened  for  signature 
on  July  1,  1968,  and  entered  into  force 
on  March  5,  1970,  when  the  United 
States  and  the  Soviet  Union  became 
parties.  Among  its  provisions,  it  bans 
the  manufacture  or  acquisition  of  nu- 

ear  explosive  devices  by  parties 
which  are  non-nuclear-weapon  states 
and  requires  these  nations  to  accept 
international  safeguards  on  all  their  nu- 
clear facilities.  The  treaty  also  seeks  to 
insure  that  all  parties  facilitate  the  full- 
est possible  exchange  of  technology  for 
the  peaceful  uses  of  nuclear  energy  and 
requires  all  parties  to  pursue  negotia- 
tions on  disarmament  measures. 

The  United  States  considers  the 
SALT  II  agreement  and  the  current 
negotiations  on  banning  the  testing  of 
nuclear  weapons  to  be  major  examples 
of  fulfillment  of  its  obligations  under 
tthe  treaty. 

In  April  1977  President  Carter  de- 
clared universal  adherence  to  the  NPT 
as  a  U.S.  foreign  policy  objective.  A 
major  international  conference  will  be 


held  in  August  1980  in  Geneva  to  re- 
view the  operation  of  the  treaty.  Re- 
cent parties  to  the  NPT  include  Sri 
Lanka  and  Indonesia. 


ACTING  SECRETARY 
CHRISTOPHER'S  REMARKS 

Since  the  advent  of  the  nuclear  age, 
the  nations  of  the  world  have  wrestled 
with  the  complex  problem  of  harness- 
ing the  enormous  power  of  the  atom  for 
the  good  of  mankind,  rather  than  for  its 
destruction.  The  Treaty  on  the  Non- 
Proliferation  of  Nuclear  Weapons  is  the 
principal  means  by  which  the  interna- 
tional community  has  sought  to  protect 
itself  from  the  dangers  inherent  in  the 
spread  of  nuclear  weapons.   In  this 


49 


context,  the  United  States  welcomes 
the  accession  of  Bangladesh  to  this  im- 
portant treaty. 

The  United  States  takes  seriously  its 
obligations  under  the  NPT.  Article  VI 
of  the  treaty  obligates  the  United  States 
and  other  parties  to  negotiate  in  good 
faith  on  measures  to  end  the  nuclear 
arms  race. 

Through  the  SALT  negotiations,  the 
United  States  and  the  Soviet  Union 
have  attempted,  over  the  past  10  years, 
to  limit  and  ultimately  reduce  our  nu- 
clear arsenals.  We  are  pressing,  and  we 
will  continue  to  press,  for  prompt  Sen- 
ate ratification  of  the  SALT  II  agree- 
ment in  the  belief  that  it  will  promote  a 
stable  strategic  balance  and  that  it  will 
set  the  stage  for  more  significant  arms 
control  measures  in  the  future. 

Similarly,  the  United  States,  the 
Soviet  Union,  and  the  United  Kingdom 
are  negotiating  to  end  the  testing  of  nu- 
clear weapons  in  order  to  constrain  the 
development  of  new  types  of  nuclear 
arms. 

Article  IV  of  the  NPT  obligates  the 


U ^.'Australia  Agreement 
on  l^uclear  Energy 


MESSAGE  TO 
THE  CONGRESS 
JULY  27,  1979' 

1  am  pleased  to  transmit  to  the  Congress, 
pursuant  to  Section  123  d  of  the  Atomic  Energy 
Act  of  1954,  as  amended  (42  U.S.C.  2153(d)), 
the  text  of  the  proposed  Agreement  Between 
the  United  States  and  Australia  Concerning 
Peaceful  Uses  of  Nuclear  Energy  and  accom- 
panying annex  and  agreed  minute;  my  written 
approval,  authorization  and  determination  con- 
cerning the  agreement;  and  the  Memorandum  of 
the  Director  of  the  United  States  Arms  Control 
and  Disarmament  Agency  with  the  Nuclear 
Proliferation  Assessment  Statement  concerning 
the  agreement.  The  joint  memorandum  sub- 
mitted to  me  by  the  Secretaries  of  State  and 
Energy,  which  includes  a  summary  analysis  of 
the  provisions  of  the  agreement,  and  the  views 
of  the  Members  of  the  Nuclear  Regulatory 
Commission  are  also  enclosed. 

The  proposed  agreement  with  Australia  is  the 
first  such  agreement  submitted  to  the  Congress 
since  enactment  of  the  Nuclear  Non- 
Proliferation  Act  of  1978,  which  1  signed  into 
law  on  March  10,  1978  and  which,  among 
other  things,  calls  upon  me  to  renegotiate 
existing  peaceful  nuclear  cooperation  agree- 
ments to  obtain  the  new  provisions  set  forth  in 
that  Act.  In  my  judgment,  the  proposed  agree- 
ment for  cooperation  between  the  United  States 


and  Australia,  together  with  its  agreed  minute, 
meets  all  statutory  requirements. 

I  am  particularly  pleased  that  this  first 
agreement  is  with  Australia,  a  strong  supporter 
of  the  Non-Proliferation  Treaty  and  of  interna- 
tional non-proliferation  efforts  generally.  The 
proposed  agreement  reflects  the  desire  of  the 
Government  of  the  United  States  and  the  Gov- 
ernment of  Australia  to  update  the  framework 
for  peaceful  nuclear  cooperation  between  our 
two  countries  in  a  manner  which  recognizes 
both  the  shared  non-proliferation  objectives 
and  the  close  relationship  between  the  United 
States  and  Australia  in  the  peaceful  applica- 
tions of  nuclear  energy.  The  proposed  agree- 
ment will,  in  my  view,  further  the  non- 
proliferation  and  other  foreign  policy  interests 
of  the  United  States. 

I  have  considered  the  views  and  recommen- 
dations of  the  interested  agencies  in  reviewing 
the  proposed  agreement  and  have  determined 
that  its  performance  will  promote,  and  will  not 
constitute  an  unreasonable  risk  to.  the  common 
defense  and  security.  Accordingly,  I  have  ap- 
proved the  agreement  and  authorized  its  execu- 
tion, and  urge  that  the  Congress  give  it  favora- 
ble consideration. 

Jimmy  CarterD 


'  Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of  Presi- 
dential Documents  of  July  30,  1979. 


50 


Department  of  State  BulletU 


0€EAI\S:        Lair  of  the  Sea 
l^egotiations 


by  Elliot  L.  Richardson 


Statement  to  the  press  in  New  York 
City  on  August  24,  1979.  Ambassador 
at  Large  Richardson  is  Special  Repre- 
sentative of  the  President  for  the  Law 
of  the  Sea  Conference. 

The  successful  completion  of  the 
third  U.N.  Conference  on  Law  of  the 
Sea  is  now  in  sight.  The  conference 
should  be  able  to  produce  a  treaty  in 
the  next  year. 

When  we  assembled  here  in  New 
York  6  weeks  ago,  the  number  of  unre- 
solved issues  had  been  reduced  to 
something  close  to  20.  There  has  been 
steady  forward  movement  on  most  of 
these.  The  conference  cannot  now  fail: 


It  has  come  too  close  to  a  successful 
conclusion  to  stop  or  turn  back. 

Solid  gains  have  been  made  in  nego- 
tiations on  the  seabeds,  particularly  in 
the  financial  arrangements  on  both 
sides  of  the  parallel  system;  the  pow- 
ers, functions,  and  voting  procedures 
of  the  [Executive]  Council  [of  the  In- 
ternational Seabed  Resource  Au- 
thority]; production  limitations;  and 
dispute  settlement.  Similar  encouraging 
progress  has  marked  negotiations  on 
protection  of  the  seabed  mining 
environment  and  the  preservation  of 
whales. 

Although  the  conference  did  not 
issue  a  second  revision  to  the  Informal 
Composite  Negotiating  Text,  the  ad- 
vances made  in  New  York  are  included 
in  reports  which  should  provide  the 


Bangladesh  (Cont'd) 

United  States  to  share  the  benefits  of 
the  peaceful  uses  of  the  atom  with  par- 
lies to  the  treaty.  Since  we  inaugurated 
the  Atoms  for  Peace  program  in  1953, 
the  United  States  has  been  in  the  fore- 
front of  those  nations  that  have  pro- 
vided nuclear  technology  to  others 
under  conditions  assuring  peaceful 
uses.  The  United  States  has  agreements 
for  cooperation  with  more  than  20  par- 
ties to  the  NPT  and  has  provided  tech- 
nical assistance  to  these  and  many 
other  countries  through  the  Interna- 
tional Atomic  Energy  Agency  (IAEA). 

I  am  pleased  to  announce  that  the 
United  States  and  the  Government  of 
Bangladesh  will  soon  enter  into  negoti- 
ations to  conclude  an  agreement  for 
cooperation  in  nuclear  research.  I  am 
also  pleased  to  announce  that  the 
United  States  will  be  in  a  position  to 
assist  Bangladesh  nuclear  projects 
through  the  IAEA. 

Despite  the  efforts  of  many  states, 
the  struggle  to  control  the  spread  of  nu- 


clear weapons  is  far  from  won.  The 
specter  of  nuclear  competition  in  South 
Asia  is  a  major  concern  to  the  United 
States,  as  it  must  also  be  to  nations  of 
the  region  such  as  Bangladesh. 

Closer  to  home,  we  in  the  United 
States  have  been  troubled  by  the  recent 
public  disclosure  of  sensitive  nuclear 
weapons  technology  which  makes 
available  information  that  would  have 
been  very  difficult  to  obtain  otherwise. 
From  these  two  examples  it  is  clear  that 
the  struggle  to  halt  proliferation  of  nu- 
clear weapons  must  be  universal  and 
unceasing.  If  we  are  complacent,  we 
shall  not  be  safe. 

Bangladesh's  action  today  marks  a 
significant  contribution  to  the  historic 
international  effort  to  eliminate  forever 
the  threat  of  nuclear  warfare.  We 
warmly  welcome  your  accession  and 
hope  that  your  initiative  will  spur 
others  in  your  region  and  elsewhere  to 
follow  your  lead.  D 


'  Press  release  237. 


basis  for  the  continuation  of  negotia-f 
tions  when  the  ninth  session  convenest 
early  in    1980.   Conference  experience 
has  been  that  everything  contained  in; 
reports  of  this  type  invariably  holds. 

With  respect  to  the  seabeds,  perhaps 
the  most  significant  improvement  has 
been  to  bring  both  sides  of  the  parallel 
system  into  closer  balance.  Taxes  on 
miners  have  been  scaled  down,  thus 
making  mining  ventures  more  attractive 
to  investors.  As  a  counterbalance, 
agreements  on  financing  the  Enterprise 
will  allow  it  to  compete  and  mine  on  an 
equal  footing. 

Decisionmaking  and  voting  proce- 
dures of  the  Council  remain  vexing  is- 
sues for  in  microcosm  they  reflect  the 
core  of  the  North-South  conflict.  But 
even  here,  opposing  viewpoints  are 
moving  closer  together.  The  powers 
and  functions  of  the  Council  have  been 
agreed  upon.  What  is  left  in  essence  is 
determination  of  the  number  of  voteS' 
that  will  be  accorded  producers  and' 
consumers  of  seabed  minerals  so  that 
their  unique  and  predominant  interests^ 
cannot  be  overridden  arbitrarily. 

Differences  have  narrowed  greatly 
on  the  thorny  question  of  production 
controls.  I  believe  we  are  on  the  verge 
of  a  final  compromise  on  this  question, 
and  I  believe  this  compromise  will 
emerge  in  the  early  weeks  of  the  next 
session.  The  same  prediction  applies  to 
the  negotiations  on  settlement  of  dis- 
putes arising  from  seabed  mining. 

Negotiations  on  the  conduct  of  ma- 
rine scientific  research  showed  signifi- 
cant gains,  including  a  compromise  onr 
the  right  to  conduct  research  on  the 
Continental  Shelf  beyond  200  miles 
without  coastal  state  consent  unless  the 
research  area  is  undergoing  exploita- 
tion by  the  coastal  state. 

Although  I  am  optimistic  as  to  the 
outcome,  I  do  not  underestimate  the 
difficulties  that  lie  ahead.  Serious  dif- 
ferences still  exist  on  the  handful  of  is- 
sues which  have  resisted  broadly  ac- 
cepted solutions.  Yet  my  sense  of  the 
situation  is  that  the  nations  represented 
in  the  conference  have  marshaled  the 
political  will  to  overcome  whatever  ob- 
stacles block  the  road  to  a  treaty.  All  of 
us  have  come  too  far  to  be  deterred. 
We  will  go  the  rest  of  the  way.  D 


Ncivember  1979 


SCIENCE  A]\D  TECHNOLOGY: 

17.]¥.  Conference  on  Science 
and  Technology  for  Development 


The  U.N.  Conference  on  Science 
and  Technology  for  Development 
(INCSTD)  was  held  in  Vienna  August 
20-31,  1979.  Following  are  remarks 
made  at  the  opening  and  closing  ses- 
siiins  by  Ambassador  Theodore  M. 
Hcsburgh,  chairman  of  the  U.S.  dele- 
gation, and  the  text  of  President  Car- 
ter's message  to  the  conference. 


AUG.  20,  1979 

It  is  only  proper  that  this  beautiful 
city  by  the  Danube,  a  witness  of  so 
many  great  historical  events,  should  be 
the  site  to  compose  the  new  contours  of 
our  future.  For  centuries  Vienna  has 
been  a  center  of  culture  and  of  far- 
reaching  diplomatic  decisions.  In  re- 
membrance of  things  past — the  sieges 
and  the  symphonies,  the  genius  of 
Sigmund  Freud,  of  Ignaz  Semmel- 
weiss,  of  Conrad  Lorenz,  of  Ernst 
Mach,  of  Lise  Meitner — Vienna  recalls 
the  vicissitudes  of  time  and  the  ver- 
satility of  man. 

Today,  this  city  is  one  of  the  capitals 
of  the  U.N.  system,  host  for  the  head- 
quarters of  the  U.N.  Industrial  De- 
velopment Organization  and  of  the  In- 
ternational Atomic  Energy  Agency. 
Both  are  symbols  of  the  potentialities 
of  progress,  yet  both  remind  us  of  the 
perils  of  modernity.  The  growth  of  in- 
dustrialization accompanied  by  un- 
wanted pollution,  the  search  for  atomic 
energy  for  peace  haunted  by  nuclear 
hazards,  reveal  not  only  the  possibility 
of  technology  but  also  its  ambivalent 
qualities — hence  the  uncertainty  of  re- 
sult, the  ambiguity  of  promise,  and  the 
necessity  of  high  moral  purpose. 

Again,  here  in  Vienna,  only  2 
months  ago,  with  the  signing  of  SALT 
II,  new  evidence  emerged  that  the  spirit 
of  cooperation  for  peace  may  ulti- 
mately prevail  over  the  awesome  spec- 
tre of  nuclear  disaster.  The  treaty  is  an 
inspirational  witness  to  a  central  thesis 
of  our  times,  that  defines  man  first  by 
his  responsibility  toward  his  brothers 
and  toward  history.  This  is  the  human 
imperative  of  the  modern  age. 

This  imperative  is  the  only  com- 
manding criterion  with  which  we  may 
rein  the  rapid,  exponential  advances  of 
technology,  but  it  is  also  the  human 
imperative  that  makes  these  advances 
possible.   Science  and  technology  are 


knowledge  and  power  that  must  find 
their  true  meaning  and  direction  in  the 
total  life  of  mankind. 

Technological  progress  is  more  than 
a  chronology  of  inventions.  It  must  be 
an  enactment  of  human  rationality  in 
history,  a  portrayal  of  some  vision  of 
the  good  life  and  the  choice  of  pre- 
ferred means  for  moving  toward  it. 

Modern  science  is  changing  man's 
view  of  himself.  We  no  longer  see  our- 
selves as  merely  a  cog  in  a  Newtonian 
world  of  determinism  with  man's  role 
reduced  to  that  of  an  observer — at  best 
a  beneficiary,  often  a  victim.  We  view 
this  modern  world  not  as  static  but  as 
constantly  changing  with  man  and 
woman  as  free  and  responsible  agents 
affecting  that  change.  Science  and 
technology  have  become  a  distinctly 
human  experience,  an  adventure  and  a 
challenge  to  create  a  better  world. 

We  went  to  the  Moon  a  decade  ago. 
The  true  reward  of  that  endeavor  was 
not  what  we  found  on  the  Moon's  sur- 
face but  rather  the  view  it  afforded  us 
of  our  own  planet.  From  that  distant 
perspective  we  were  able  to  recognize, 
for  the  first  time,  the  delicate  fragility 
and  beauty  of  this  gemlike  spaceship 
that  we  call  home.  In  fact,  we  now 
know  Earth  as  more  beautiful  from  afar 
than  up  close. 

Science  and  technology  are  not  the 
guarantors  of  civilization;  they  only 
guarantee  the  possibility  of  civiliza- 
tion. Fast  cars  or  fast  breeders,  syn- 
thetics or  cybernetics  do  not  a  civiliza- 
tion make.  Unless  our  existence 
reaches  beyond  the  frivolities  of  mate- 
rialism and  becomes  a  life  enriched 
with  meaning,  science  and  technology 
will  not  be  hallmarks  of  progress;  they 
will  only  be  the  trappings  of  moder- 
nity. The  pursuit  of  scientific  excel- 
lence must  be  based  upon  the  pursuit  of 
human  goals. 

But  can  we  really  call  ours  a  civili- 
zation: 

•  When  one-fourth  of  this  Earth's 
population  lives  in  abject  poverty, 
starving,  idle,  and  numbed  by  igno- 
rance? 

•  When  in  this  century  alone  over 
100  million  people  have  fallen  victim 
to  wars? 

•  When  millions  today  are  denied 
their  basic  human  rights  because  of 
their  political  convictions,   religious 


51 

beliefs,   ethnic  origin,   or  economic 
status? 

•  When  advances  through  technol- 
ogy often  mean  in  many  societies  new 
forms  of  discrimination  against 
women? 

Today  the  world  is  facing  critical 
shortages  on  many  fronts.  We  live 
under  the  recurring  threat  of  global 
energy  crisis,  the  depletion  of  our 
nonrenewable  resources,  and  the  de- 
spoilment of  our  environment.  Our 
ecosystem  is  strained  by  a  dramatic 
population  growth,  our  security 
threatened  by  the  continuing  arms  race. 
and  our  well-being  jeopardized  by  in- 
flation and  monetary  chaos. 

Does  this  mean  that  we  have  reached 
the  limits  of  our  growth?  Have  we,  in- 
deed, exhausted  the  possibilities  of  sci- 
ence and  technology  for  the  benefit  of 
mankind  or  have  we  exhausted  only  our 
spirit?  I  hope  this  conference  will  be  a 
living  testimony  that  we  have  ex- 
hausted neither  our  knowledge  nor  our 
spirit  and  that  we  can  turn  our  collec- 
tive vulnerabilities  into  a  world  of 
interdependence — a  world  of  interde- 
pendence among  nations  as  well  as 
between  man  and  his  ecosystem. 

Indeed,  ours  is  an  imperfect  world. 
The  global  economy  is  not  working  as 
well  as  it  should  for  either  the  poor  or 
the  rich  countries. 

The  patterns  of  worldwide  technol- 
ogy generation,  diffusion,  and  utiliza- 
tion lack  the  cohesion  that  would  in- 
corporate and  benefit  the  majority  of 
people. 

We  have  not  yet  found  the  right  mix 
between  scientific  excellence  and 
needed  technologies.  Given  the  vast 
potential  of  the  developing  world,  it  is 
an  anomaly  that  around  95%  of  all  re- 
search and  development  is  conducted  in 
the  industrialized  world. 

It  is  even  more  tragic  that  only  1%  of 
the  world's  research  and  development 
on  health,  agriculture,  housing,  and  in- 
dustrial technology  is  spent  on  the 
needs  of  the  poorest  half  of  this  Earth's 
population.  Nations  spend  six  times  as 
much  on  military  research  as  on  energy 
research.  Even  most  developing  coun- 
tries spend  more  on  armaments  than  on 
health  and  education. 

It  is  an  imperfect  world  in  which  sci- 
entists and  technicians  from  the  de- 
veloping countries  do  not  partake  of  the 
latest  and  the  best  or  the  most  eco- 
nomical and  most  appropriate  technol- 
ogies. It  is  a  terrible  waste  that  millions 
of  illiterates  and  uneducated  cannot 
participate  in  our  technological  prog- 
ress either  as  beneficiaries  or  creators 
of  new  implements  to  make  their  lives 
better. 

It  is  an  imperfect  global  economic 
order  that  does  not  fully  benefit  from 


52 


the  robust  and  dynamic  role  of  interna- 
tional business  and  industry  and  has  not 
yet  found  the  right  balance  between  the 
interests  of  private  enterprise  and  of  the 
developing  countries. 

Just  as  modern  science  is  changing 
man's  view  of  man,  so  are  the  new  re- 
lationships among  nations — between 
North  and  South — changing  our  per- 
ceptions of  global  and  national  inter- 
ests. This  change  is  healthy,  this 
change  is  good,  and  we  need  not  fear 
it.  As  our  Secretary  of  State,  Cyrus 
Vance,  said:  "We  cannot  let  ourselves 
be  diverted  by  the  myth  that  if  we  en- 
courage change,  or  deal  with  the  forces 
of  change,  we  only  encourage  radical- 
ism." We  intend  to  encourage  this 
change,  to  quote  the  Secretary  again, 
with  '".  .  .a  positive,  long-term 
strategy  toward  the  Third  World."  So 
let  us  continue  this  dialogue  for  change 
at  this  conference. 

First,  we  must  work  to  make  the  in- 
dustrialized countries  more  responsive 
to  the  aspirations  of  the  developing 
countries  so  that  the  advances  in  sci- 
ence and  technology  in  the  North  will 
be  of  greater  benefit  to  the  South. 

Second,  we  must  increase  the 
participation  and  the  stake  of  the 
developing  countries  in  the  world 
economic  order,  including  global  tech- 
nology circulation. 

Third,  we  must  create  a  more  equi- 
table relationship  between  the  de- 
veloping countries  and  international 
private  enterprise,  so  that  in  the  global 
transfer  of  technology  the  interest  of 
both  is  enhanced. 

The  task  of  this  conference  is  not  one 
of  restating  the  errors  of  the  past  but  of 
weaving  science  and  technology  into 
the  fabric  of  the  future,  the  fabric  of 
development.  We  need  collaboration, 
not  confrontation. 

The  question  is  not  whether  we 
should  do  something,  but  how  will  we 
accomplish  it? 

•  How  can  we  best  mobilize  the 
imagination  and  energies  of  the  scien- 
tific community  to  launch  new  major 
efforts  to  eradicate  the  worst  aspects  of 
poverty  by  the  year  2000? 

•  How  can  we  cooperate  in  building 
indigenous  science  and  techriology 
capacities  in  the  developing  countries 
—  without  which  there  is  neither  self- 
reliant  growth  nor  self-sustaining  eco- 
nomic progress? 

•  How  can  we  correct  current  imbal- 
ances in  the  global  market  of  technol- 
ogy, so  that  the  developing  countries 
may  select  what  they  need — and  reject 
what  they  do  not — from  the  interna- 
tional supermarket  of  products  and 
processes? 


•  How  can  we  best  strengthen  scien- 
tific and  technological  cooperation  so 
as  to  ease  global  pressures  on  food  and 
water  supplies,  energy  sources,  and 
raw  materials  and  deal  effectively  with 
the  problems  of  population  growth  and 
the  deteriorating  environment? 

None  of  these  challenges  can  be  met 
by  any  nation  alone.  But  what  we  have 
done,  individually  and  collectively,  for 
the  development  of  science  and  tech- 
nology and  with  science  and  technol- 
ogy for  development  is  a  good  begin- 
ning. 

Over  the  past  30  years,  for  example, 
the  United  States  has  contributed  more 
than  $100  billion  in  development  as- 
sistance. This  year  our  assistance  has 
risen  to  nearly  $7  billion.  No  element 
of  our  foreign  assistance  fails  to  in- 
volve in  some  form  our  sharing  of  sci- 
entific knowledge,  technical  skills,  or 
technological  hardware. 

•  The  core  of  U.S.  cooperation  con- 
tinues to  be  the  application  of  techno- 
logical know-how  to  increase  food  pro- 
duction in  the  developing  countries. 

•  We  intend  to  make  substantial  and 
real  increases,  over  the  next  5  years  to 
our  contribution  to  the  consultative 
group  for  international  agricultural  re- 
search. And  we  invite  other  nations  to 
join  us  in  this  effort. 

•  Eighty  percent  of  our  development 
aid  goes  to  countries  where  per  capita 
income  is  below  $300  a  year  to  give  the 
masses  of  people  greater  access  to  pro- 
duction technologies,  preventive  health 
care,  family  planning,  and  basic  edu- 
cation. 

•  To  strengthen  the  science  and 
technology  infrastructure  in  the  de- 
veloping countries,  we  have  assisted 
well  over  100  universities  and  more 
than  300  vocational  schools.  Each  year 
we  help  tens  of  thousands  from  the  de- 
veloping countries  to  study  in  U.S.  and 
third-country  institutions  of  higher 
learning. 

We  have  and  will  continue  to  share 
with  the  developing  countries  the  ad- 
vances we  make  in  our  most  sophisti- 
cated technologies. 

•  The  United  States  foresees  invest- 
ing $24  million  in  a  new  6-year 
program  to  test  the  effectiveness  of 
satellites  as  a  medium  of  educational 
broadcasting  and  improved  communi- 
cation in  remote  rural  areas. 

•  The  United  States  will  take  the 
initiative  to  bring  together  the  operators 
of  remote  sensing  satellites,  as  well  as 
the  users,  to  develop  an  international 
system.  We  believe  that  satellites 
should  be  operated  so  that  all  can  have 
easy  access  to  the  data  and  so  that  in- 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 

formation  can  be  collected  without  un 
necessary  duplication  and  for  maxi- 
mum mutual  benefit.  The  objective  is 
to  insure  developing  countries  improve 
their  access  to  infonnation  for  the  use 
and  management  of  forests,  range- 
lands,  water  supplies,  soil  preserva- 
tion, and  the  identification  of  new  min- 
eral and  water  resources. 

•  The  United  States  is  significantly 
expanding  its  renewable  energy  assist 
ance  and  is  working  on  cooperative 
methods  of  applying  advanced  technol 
ogies,  including  solar  technology,  to 
the  energy  needs  of  the  developing 
countries. 

In  the  application  of  science  and 
technology  for  development,  foreign 
assistance  cannot  be  a  substitute  for 
self-reliance.  People  who  are  ill  fed 
and  in  ill  health,  without  shelter  and 
without  jobs,  do  not  need  paternalistic 
redemption.  They  need  tools  and 
trades,  capital  and  opportunities,  help 
to  help  themselves  to  meet  their  own 
basic  needs. 

The  building  of  the  developing: 
countries'  capabilities  and  their  infra- 
structure in  science  and  technology 
must  be  the  first  critical  step  to  elimi- 
nate the  worst  aspects  of  poverty  and  to 
elevate  the  developing  countries  to  full 
partnership  in  the  global  scientific  and 
technological  enterprise.  Education  at 
all  levels  is  at  the  core  of  human  de- 
velopment, the  key  to  a  higher  quality 
of  life. 

We  have  and  will,  therefore,  assist 
in  strengthening  local  scientific  and 
technological  infrastructures,  manage- 
rial, technical  and  general  education 
programs,  research  institutes,  stand- 
ardization activities,  extension  and  in- 
formation services,  laboratory  supply 
and  equipment  centers,  and  training 
activities. 

Technical  assistance  and  the  export 
of  expertise  must  rely  on  local  capacity 
to  define  problems  and  establish 
priorities. 

In  order  to  respond  to  the  challenge 
of  building  such  indigenous  capacity, 
we  are  establishing,  at  the  personal 
initiative  of  President  Carter,  a  new  in- 
stitute for  scientific  and  technological 
cooperation.  The  institute's  principal 
functions  will  include: 

•  Enlisting  developing  countries'  as- 
sistance in  establishing  research  and 
development  priorities; 

•  Long-term  research  and  develop- 
ment on  critical  development  problems; 

•  Building  international  cooperative 
linkages  within  the  scientific  and  tech- 
nological community; 

•  Marshaling  research  and  devel- 
opment activities  of  various  U.S.  pub- 
lic and  private  agencies; 

•  Facilitating  greater  attention  by 


November  1979 


53 


U.S.  scientific  and  technical  institu- 
tions to  joint  research,  training,  and 
other  cooperative  activities;  and 

•  Involving  the  private  sector  in  the 
United  States  in  efforts  to  improve  sci- 
ence and  technology  for  development. 

We  cannot  seriously  contemplate 
more  just  and  equitable  patterns  of  sci- 
entific and  technological  cooperation 
without  the  developing  countries  pos- 
sessing the  leverage  of  scientific 
knowledge  and  information.  Substan- 
tial amounts  of  information  residing  in 
the  public  sector  have  already  been 
made  available  to  developing  nations. 
In  addition,  much  of  the  technology  in 
the  private  sector  is  available  through 
public  information  systems  describing 
these  technologies  or  the  sources  from 
which  such  technologies  can  be 
obtained. 

But  we  should  not  pretend  that  all  is 
well  in  the  international  market  of 
technology.  Technology  is  often  sold 
as  a  product  that  can  be  least  afforded 
by  those  who  most  need  it.  Transferred 
technology  is  often  inappropriate  to 
local  needs,  as  well  as  wasteful  and  in- 
sensitive to  environmental  impact. 
Such  transfers  are  bad  business.  But  at 
the  same  time  we  cannot  ignore  that 
private  enterprise  has  always  been  a 
major  source  of  innovation,  a  major 
actor  in  the  diffusion  of  technology, 
and  an  indispensable  factor  in  the  eco- 
nomic growth  of  the  developing  coun- 
tries. We  must,  therefore,  continue  our 
dialogue  about  a  wide  range  of  meas- 
ures that  enhances  the  negotiating  ca- 
pability of  the  developing  countries  in 
their  acquisition  of  foreign  technol- 
ogies and  strengthens  their  participa- 
tion in  the  market  of  technology,  not 
only  as  consumers  but  also  as  produc- 
ers. 

Through  new  initiatives  and  through 
continuing  programs,  we  must  find  at 
this  conference  and  in  the  years  ahead 
new  grounds  and  new  mechanisms  for 
cooperation.  President  Carter,  in  his 
message  to  this  conference,  spoke  of 
science  and  technology  for  develop- 
ment as  a  "joint  venture."  The  awe- 
some challenges  that  we  all  face,  de- 
veloped and  developing  countries 
alike,  make  this  joint  venture  a  global 
imperative.  The  United  States  notes, 
therefore,  with  pleasure  the  declaration 
of  Bucharest  in  which  the  developing 
countries  reaffirmed  their  willingness 
to  work  with  a  sense  of  urgency  to  as- 
sure the  success  of  this  conference. 

We  inhabit  a  planet  with  finite  re- 
sources, one  ecosphere,  and  one  com- 
mon destiny.  In  this  interdependent 
world,  we  are  all  developing  countries. 
The  differences  between  the  North  and 
the  South,  between  the  East  and  the 
West,  are  minimal  in  contrast  to  the 


PRESIDENT'S  MESSAGE 
TO  UNCSTD 

This  conference  is  a  new  journey  toward 
progress.  Your  endeavor  rekindles  the  spirit 
of  adventure  in  all  of  us.  It  dares  mankind  to 
invent  a  better  future.  After  many  centuries 
of  progress  we  may  now  explore  not  only  the 
frontiers  of  knowledge  but  also  the  frontiers 
of  justice. 

We  must  not  fail  this  time  to  respond  be- 
yond words  to  the  pressing  needs  of  the  de- 
veloping countries.  In  turn  we  can  all  benefit 
from  their  participation  In  a  new  and  stronger 
world  economic  system. 

In  the  robust  spirit  of  imagination,  inven- 
tiveness, and  ingenuity,  let  us  dare  to  re- 
shape the  world  and  elimmate  the  worst  as- 
pects of  poverty  by  the  year  2000.  Let  us  use 
our  knowledge  to  create  the  means  to  provide 
for  the  basic  needs  of  all  people.  Together  let 
us  invent  a  more  dynamic  partnership  among 
governments  and  private  institutions  to  serve 
the  common  interest  of  all  nations. 

We  have  awesome  challenges  to  confront. 
Their  solution  will  require  a  joint  venture  of 
all  nations. 

This  venture  will  inevitably  extend  free- 
dom, because  success  will  require  a  free  flow 
of  information,  free  access  to  the  mar- 
ketplace of  ideas,  and  the  broadest  scope  for 
scientific  imagination  and  initiative. 

Broad  participation  should  characterize  our 
venture,  because  knowledge  unpropagated  is 
knowledge  wasted.  The  worldwide  diffusion 
of  technical  knowledge  must  be  a  liberating 
venture  in  which  all  participate  and  all  will 
profit. 

Our  primary  task  must  be  to  assist  in  the 
building  of  scientific  and  technological 
capabilities  in  the  developing  countries. 


Their  indigenous  capacities  to  invent  and  in- 
novate, to  choose  knowledgeably  the  right 
technologies,  and  to  bargain  on  the  basis  of 
facts  and  not  of  fads  is  the  only  assured  way 
that  the  global  diffusion  of  technology  will 
not  become  a  new  system  of  dependency. 

The  United  States,  for  its  part,  hopes  to 
contribute  to  this  common  endeavor  with  an 
institute  of  scientific  and  technological  coop- 
eration, which  we  plan  to  establish  this  fall. 
The  institute  is  one  of  our  most  important  in- 
novations to  help  developing  countries  who 
so  desire  create  and  adapt  the  technologies 
best  suited  to  their  needs.  Its  work  will  re- 
ceive my  strong  personal  support.  I  will  in- 
sure that  it  cooperates  closely  with  similar 
programs  and  institutions  elsewhere  in  the 
world. 

I  am  confident  that  our  scientific  commu- 
nity, our  government  agencies,  and  our  pri- 
vate institutions  will  heighten  their  involve- 
ment in  research  and  development  programs 
so  as  to  address  the  endemic  problems  of 
food  scarcity,  the  energy  crisis,  population 
explosion,  and  the  lack  of  adequate  health 
care  that  are  common  concerns  of  all. 

I  pledge  our  willingness  to  support  all 
practical  endeavors  that  can  help  us  to  over- 
come these  problems,  to  create  a  world  in 
which  education  is  within  everybody's  reach, 
the  hungry  can  feed  themselves,  millions  are 
freed  from  tropical  diseases,  economies  are 
expanded  to  provide  jobs,  and  worldwide 
trade  assures  every  nation's  progress. 

This  conference  will  test  our  commitment 
to  share  worldwide  the  fruits  of  scientific 
progress  and  to  master  the  forces  of  technol- 
ogy for  the  benefit  of  all  mankind.  To  you, 
Madame  President,  and  to  all  delegates  who 
represent  this  hope  and  this  goal,  I  extend  my 
sincerest  wishes  for  a  successful  endeavor. 


enormity  of  the  common  tasks  facing 
mankind. 

We  are,  therefore,  prepared  to  join 
reasonable  ventures  that  strengthen 
worldwide  scientific  and  technological 
cooperation.  We  strongly  believe  that 
this  will  be  a  shared  effort — where  uni- 
versal values  are  the  organizing  princi- 
ples for  research  and  development, 
where  the  value  of  knowledge  and 
technological  hardware  is  measured  by 
their  contribution  to  the  larger  concerns 
of  human  welfare. 

Science  and  technology  should  open 
new  frontiers  and  new  opportunities  to 
enjoy  all  of  the  beauty  and  boundless 
elements  of  this  planet  Earth.  Our  gen- 
eration must  be  the  guarantors  of  this 
new  tomorrow.  It  is  our  task  to  usher  in 
this  new  age,  to  tend  the  soil  and  plant 
the  seed  which  will  bring  forth  boun- 
tiful fruit.  And  our  harvest  will  be 
threefold:  a  new  realm  of  reason,  a  new 
realm  of  reality,  a  new  realm  of  rights. 

Let  us  invent  this  realm  of  reason. 


For  the  efforts  we  make  are  not  a  zero- 
sum  game  in  which  the  gains  of  those 
who  seek  equality  and  parity  would 
automatically  register  as  a  loss  for 
those  who  now  possess  more.  In  this 
realm  we  can  prove  the  mutual  benefits 
thesis — that  advances  in  any  part  of  the 
world  are  for  the  benefit  of  all. 

Let  us  accept  the  realm  of  reality. 
This  reality  dictates  that  we  become 
aware  of  the  coming  crises  of  the 
global  commons.  While  our  material 
resources  may  dwindle,  our  traditional 
energy  sources  may  run  dry,  there  is 
one  inexhaustible  and  always  renewa- 
ble resource:  our  ingenuity,  our  imagi- 
nation, our  knowledge  and  technology, 
and  especially  our  common  human  as- 
pirations that  can  convert  all  these  into 
a  new  world. 

And  let  us,  with  the  aid  of  science 
and  technology,  construct  a  new  realm 
of  human  rights.  A  new  realm: 

•  Where  the  international  spirit  of 


54 


cooperation  places  basic  rights  at  the 
centerpiece  of  our  agenda  for  the  21st 
century; 

•  Where  freedom  is  the  hallmark, 
equality  of  men  and  women  will  be  the 
cornerstone,  and  justice  the  watch- 
word; and 

•  Where  the  benefits  derived  from 
the  world's  resources  know  no  special 
beneficiary  nor  will  they  be  confined 
by  any  national  border  as  long  as  there 
are  people  in  need. 

So  let  us  make  our  tomorrow  a  world 
full  of  sharing,  where  the  freedom  to 
explore,  the  freedom  to  create,  and  the 
opportunity  to  share  in  the  fruits  of  our 
labor  will  be  the  true  hallmarks  of 
civilization. 

AUG.  31,  1979 

The  U.N.  Conference  on  Science 
and  Technology  for  Development 
opened  1 1  days  ago  amidst  dire  warn- 
ings that  it  would  fail  and  that  it  would 
contribute  little  to  establishing  new  and 
effective  ways  for  science  and  technol- 
ogy to  address  the  great  global  imbal- 
ances of  our  times. 

Nonetheless,  to  the  satisfaction  of  all 
of  us,  UNCSTD  has  just  concluded 
with  the  clear  promise  of  a  new  begin- 
ning. There  is  significant  agreement 
among  us  both  of  the  principal  goals  of 
science  and  technology  for  develop- 
ment and  on  major  new  measures  for 
achieving  them. 

Much  remains  to  be  done,  but  the 
conference  has  good  reason  to  feel  en- 
couraged. Agreement  was  reached  on 
the  following  important  measures. 

•  An  intergovernmental  committee 
was  created — in  effect  a  new  world 
forum.  Henceforth,  all  nations  will 
have  a  voice  in  formulating  policies 
and  plans  for  the  use  of  new  resources 
in  the  area  of  science  and  technology 
for  development. 

•  An  interim  fund  was  created, 
pending  the  arrangements  for  the  finan- 
cial system,  which  will  be  managed  by 
the  U.N.  Development  Program,  with  a 
target  for  voluntary  contributions,  over 
a  2-year  period  of  not  less  than  $250 
million. 

Moreover,  the  conference  has 
reached  agreement  on  a  program  of  ac- 
tion to  enhance  scientific  and  techno- 
logical capacity  in  the  developing 
countries  and  to  improve  international 
information  flows  and  the  commercial 
transfer  of  science  and  technology. 

Differences  of  view  still  remain,  but 
the  mutual  understanding  of  these  is- 
sues has  been  expanded,  and  this 
should  facilitate  further  discussion  of 
the  unresolved  issues  in  the  months 
ahead. 


Department  of  State  Bulletin  <i 


WESTER]\  HEMISPHERE: 

Panama  Acquires  Jurisdiction 

Over  the  Canal  Zone 


Vice  President  Mondale  visited 
Panama  September  30-October  2, 
1979,  to  represent  the  United  States  at 
ceremonies  when  Panama  acquired 
jurisdiction  over  the  Panama  Canal 
Zone  on  October  I  under  the  terms  of 
the  Panama  Canal  Treaty.  Following 
are  his  remarks  made  October  I  at  Al- 
brook  Air  Force  Base  where  the  cere- 
monies took  place. 

This  is,  indeed,  a  proud  day  for  the 
people  of  Panama,  and  it  is  a  proud  day 
for  the  people  of  the  United  States.  To- 
gether on  this  moving  occasion,  our 
two  nations  rejoice  as  we  write  a  new 
chapter  in  the  history  of  our  hemi- 
sphere. 

We  meet  at  the  magnificent  canal  of 
Panama.  For  65  years  it  has  stood  as  a 
triumphant  symbol  of  civilization  of 
the  engineering,  medical,  and  entre- 
preneurial genius  of  the  20th  century. 
But  from  this  moment  forward  the 
Panama  Canal  takes  on  a  second  sym- 
bolic meaning.  It  becomes  two  success 


stories;  both  of  technology  and  of 
political  ideals;  both  of  engineering 
wizardry  and  of  diplomatic  vision;  both 
of  the  conquest  of  nature  and  the  coop- 
eration of  cultures.  We  now  seal  a  re- 
lationship between  two  independent 
nations  to  guarantee  the  operation  and 
defense  of  one  of  the  world's  key  wa- 
terways, working  together  in  mutual 
interest  and  for  mutual  benefit.  The 
United  States  and  Panama  can  be  con- 
fident in  our  ability  to  achieve  our 
shared  objectives. 

I  am  here  today  to  say  that  we  will 
honor  in  full  the  terms  of  the  treaty. 
We  will  keep  the  canal  operating 
smoothly  just  as  it  has  been  since  its 
opening  in  1914.  It  will  remain  a  safe 
and  sure  route  of  transit  for  the  com- 
merce of  the  entire  world. 

Today  the  United  States  and  Panama 
settle  more  than  the  future  of  the  canal, 
for  as  President  Carter  has  said,  these 
treaties  mark  the  commitment  of  the 
United  States  to  the  belief  that  fairness 
and  not  force  should  lie  at  the  heart  of 


Of  equal  importance  is  the  agreement 
reached  on  the  three  priority  goals 
which  our  newfound  cooperation 
should  advance: 

•  Overcoming  the  worst  aspects  of 
poverty; 

•  Solution  of  global  problems  af- 
fecting most,  if  not  all,  nations — food, 
energy,  health,  overharvesting  of  seas 
and  forests,  and  the  general  impairment 
of  our  human  environment;  and 

•  The  progress  of  developing  coun 
tries  toward  self-reliant  growth. 

The  conference  dared  to  raise  dif- 
ficult questions  and  contentious  issues. 
It  did  not  shirk  its  responsibilities.  The 
conference  faced  the  issues  placed  be- 
fore it,  discussed  them  for  long  hours, 
and  now  should  take  some  satisfaction 
in  the  results  of  its  work. 

The  Chinese  have  a  proverb:  every 
journey  of  a  thousand  miles  requires  a 
first  step.  We  have  taken  that  first 
step — to  overcome  the  worst  aspects  of 
poverty  and  to  create  a  better  world  for 
human  kind  by  the  year  2000.  The  2 
years  of  preparatory  work  by  govern- 
ments and  the  scientific  and  educa- 
tional communities  provided  the  essen- 


tial roadmap  for  our  journey. 

Working  together  we  have  achieved 
a  momentum  which  must  be  sustained 
through  the  1980's  and  beyond,  for  the 
problems  we  have  addressed  are  not 
susceptible  to  quick  technological  fixes 
but  require  sustained  planning  and 
continuing  effort. 

President  Carter  pledged  at  the  be- 
ginning of  this  conference  the  willing- 
ness of  the  United  States  to  support  all 
practical  endeavors  to  overcome  the 
endemic  problems  of  food  scarcity,  the 
energy  crisis,  the  population  explosion, 
and  the  lack  of  adequate  health  care. 
The  United  States  will  work  with 
others  to  fulfill  that  pledge. 

Let  us  never  forget  that  it  is  a  pledge 
we  make  to  each  other,  as  brothers  and 
sisters  on  a  small  planet  we  share.  Let 
us  not  give  way  to  either  discourage- 
ment or  cynicism.  Let  us,  rather,  re- 
joice at  what  we  have  begun,  take 
courage  at  what  there  is  yet  to  do,  and 
looking  back  some  future  day  at  what 
we  have  launched  here  in  Vienna 
tonight — this  last  day  of  August — may 
we  say  in  heartful  fellowship  together: 
We  were  present  at  the  new  creation, 
and  we  watched  and  worked  for  the 
emergence  of  a  better  world.  D 


November  1979 


55 


our  dealings  with  the  nations  of  the 
world.  Our  partnership  is  the  outcome 
not  of  the  politics  of  confrontation  but 
ot  a  common  search  for  justice — a 
politics  not  of  domination  or  depend- 
ence but  of  mutual  interest  and  aspira- 
tion. And  other  countries  of  the  world 
near  and  far  can  draw  a  meaning  of 
what  Panama  and  the  United  States 
have  accomplished,  for  both  our  coun- 
tries have  acted  with  restraint  and  re- 
sponsibility. Both  achieved  longstand- 
ing goals,  and  both  have  strengthened 
their  capacity  for  independent  action 
and  influence  on  the  global  scene. 

Panama  has  long  been  a  crossroads 
of  world  commerce.  Today  Panama 
also  stands  at  the  midpoint  of  a  new 
heartland  of  emerging  democracy.  In 
Quito,  in  La  Paz,  we  have  just  wit- 
nessed free  elections  and  a  successful 
transition  to  civilian  rule.  In  Lima  a 
new  constitution  has  been  adopted.  In 
Santo  Domingo  elections  brought  an 
orderly  transfer  of  power  for  the  first 
time  in  our  century.  In  Managua  winds 
of  democratic  progress  are  stirring 
where  they  have  long  been  stifled.  In 
Honduras  the  return  to  constitutional 
rule  and  elections  is  underway.  From 
the  Dominican  Republic  to  the  north, 
from  the  Andean  states  to  the  south,  we 
celebrate  today  a  remarkable  advance 
toward  effective  democratic  institu- 
tions. 

This  move  toward  more  open  and 
democratic  societies  is  an  indigenous 
process,  not  a  formula  imposed  from 
elsewhere  without  regard  to  the  diver- 
sities of  the  people  concerned.  It  is  a 
dynamic  and  evolving  order  reflecting 
national  diversities  alive  to  aspirations 
for  human  rights  and  responsive  to  the 
drive  to  participate  in  the  political 
process. 

The  progress  of  the  past  2  years  re- 
futes the  claim  that  only  authoritarian 
methods  can  provide  the  social  disci- 
pline for  well-being  and  growth.  In- 
stead, as  the  Quito  declaration  states, 
the  best  way  to  guarantee  the  prosperity 
of  people  is  to  provide  a  climate  of 
freedom  and  enforcement  of  human 
rights  under  new  forms  of  social  de- 
mocracy. These  are  the  ideals  we  en- 
shrine in  our  Panama  Canal  treaties. 

As  15  years  of  negotiations  reach 
their  moment  of  fulfillment  today,  let 
us  pay  tribute  to  the  countless  thou- 
sands who  have  made  and  still  make 
the  canal  great.  To  the  French  pioneers 
who  launched  its  history,  to  the  Ameri- 
cans and  Barbadians  and  Jamaicans  and 
people  literally  from  every  nation  in 
the  world  who  built  the  canal  against 
such  overwhelming  odds.  To  the 
Panamanians  and  Americans  whose 
hard  work  day  after  day  has  maintained 
its  efficient  operation  and  to  those  who 


Pananta  Canal  Act  of  1979 


PRESIDENT'S  STATEMENT, 
SEPT.  27.  1979' 

I  am  pleased  to  sign  into  law  the 
Panama  Canal  Act  of  1979,  which  im- 
plements the  Panama  Canal  Treaty  of 
1977. 

The  Panama  Canal  Treaty  and  the 
neutrality  treaty  were  the  result  of  13 
years  of  careful  negotiations.  They 
have  been  hailed  throughout  this  hemi- 
sphere as  a  model  for  equitable  negoti- 
ations between  ourselves  and  our 
smaller  neighbors.  As  I  said  when  I 
signed  the  treaties,  they  express  the 
commitment  of  the  United  States  to  the 
belief  that  fairness,  and  not  force, 
should  lie  at  the  heart  of  our  dealings 
with  nations  of  the  world. 

The  treaties  also  protect  our  eco- 
nomic and  security  interests.  We  will 
continue  to  operate  the  canal  until  the 
end  of  the  century  through  the  Panama 
Canal  Commission,  an  agency  of  the 
United  States  in  which  Panama  will 
have  a  minority  voice.  We  will  main- 
tain military  forces  in  Panama  until  that 
date.  After  the  year  1999,  Panama  will 
assume  responsibility  for  operating  the 
canal.  A  regime  of  permanent  neu- 
trality is  established  under  which  both 
nations  have  the  right  to  act  against  any 
aggression  or  threat  directed  against  the 
canal.  The  Panama  Canal  Act  provides 
a  framework  in  which  the  United  States 
can  exercise  its  rights  to  operate  and 
defend  the  canal  in  a  manner  consistent 
with  our  responsibilities  and  obliga- 
tions under  the  treaties. 

I  particularly  want  to  thank  Senators 
Stennis  and  Levin  and  Congressmen 
Murphy,  Bowen,  and  Derwinski  for 
their  outstanding  leadership  in  resolv- 
ing the  many  difficult  issues  embodied 
in  this  act. 

In  signing  this  act,  I  want  to  assure 


Members  of  Congress  and  the  Govern- 
ment of  Panama  that  this  legislation 
will  be  interpreted  and  applied  by  the 
executive  branch  in  strict  conformity 
with  the  terms  and  the  intent  of  the 
treaties.  In  this  respect,  1  believe  that 
certain  technicalities  in  several  sections 
of  the  act  require  comment. 

Section  1503  requires  congressional 
approval  for  transfers  of  property  to 
Panama.  Section  1504  grants  such  ap- 
proval subject  to  a  180-day  notice  re- 
quirement and  a  prohibition  against 
transfer  of  the  canal  itself  before  termi- 
nation of  the  treaty.  It  remains  the  po- 
sition of  the  Administration  that  the 
treaty  is  self-executing  with  respect  to 
the  transfer  of  property,  and  thus  no 
additional  legislative  authorization  is 
required.  With  regard  to  the  condition 
contained  in  section  1504(c)  concern- 
ing transfer  of  the  canal,  1  note  that  this 
does  not  preclude  other  discretionary 
transfers  during  the  lifetime  of  the 
treaty,  as  provided  for  in  article  XIII, 
paragraph  2(b)  and  2(c)  of  the  treaty. 

Section  1341(e)  lists  certain  costs 
which  must  be  paid  prior  to  any  contin- 
gent payment  to  Panama  under  para- 
graph 4(c)  of  article  XIII  of  the  treaty. 
It  is  my  understanding  that  costs  listed 
in  this  section  are  identical  to  those 
which  will  be  included  in  the  tolls  base 
under  section  1602  of  the  act.  These 
costs  are  related  to  the  operation  and 
maintenance  of  the  canal  and  are  thus 
properly  considered  as  "expenditures" 
under  paragraph  4(c)  of  article  XIII,  to 
be  paid  before  any  surplus  is  due  to 
Panama  under  that  provision.  D 


'Made  on  signing  H.R.    Ill    into  law  (text 
from   Weekly   Compilation   of   Presidential 
Documents  of  Oct    I,  1979).  As  enacted,  H.R 
1 1 1  is  Public  Law  96-70,  approved  Sept,  27. 
1979. 


will  continue  that  crucial  work  by 
staying  on  with  the  Panama  Canal 
Commission.  The  creation  of  the  canal, 
as  its  superb  historian  has  written, 
"...  was  one  of  the  supreme  human 
achievements  of  all  time,  the  culmina- 
tion of  a  heroic  dream  of  four  hundred 
years  and  of  more  than  twenty  years  of 
phenomenal  effort  and  sacrifice.  The 
fifty  miles  between  the  oceans  were 
among  the  hardest  ever  won  by  human 
effort  and  ingenuity  and  no  statistics  on 
tonnage  or  tolls  can  begin  to  convey 


the  grandeur  of  what  was  accomplished 
...  the  canal  is  an  expression  of  that 
old  and  noble  desire  to  bridge  the  di- 
vide, to  bring  people  together."' 

So  today  let  us  celebrate  a  new 
bridging  of  the  divide.  A  new  drawing 
together.  For  65  years  the  Panama 
Canal  has  joined  the  oceans.  Now  and 
forevermore  it  will  join  our  ideals.     D 


'  The  Path  Between  the  Seas:  The  Creation 
of  the  Panama  Canal.  1870-1914  by  David 
McCullough. 


56 


Department  of  State  Bulletir 


]%lcaragua 


by  Warren  Christopher 

Statement  before  the  Subcommittee 
on  Foreifjn  Operations  of  the  House 
Appropriations  Committee  on  Sep- 
tember II,  1979.  Mr.  Christopher  is 
Deputy  Secretary  of  State. ' 

Thank  you  for  giving  me  this  op- 
portunity to  appear  before  you  and  this 
subcommittee  to  support  the  proposal 
to  reprogram  $8.5  million  of  foreign 
assistance  from  FY  1979  funds  for  re- 
lief and  rehabilitation  efforts  related  to 
the  recent  Nicaraguan  civil  strife.  In 
my  statement  today,  I  would  like  to  de- 
scribe briefly  the  current  situation  in 
Nicaragua,  outline  the  circumstances 
that  prompted  the  reprogramming  pro- 
posal now  before  you,  and  provide 
some  additional  details  on  the  proposed 
uses  of  these  funds. 

Current  Situation 

For  both  Latin  America  and  the 
United  States,  the  current  situation  in 
Nicaragua  presents  a  critical  challenge 
and  a  major  opportunity.  The  course  of 
events  there  will  influence  develop- 
ments in  Central  America  and  through- 
out the  hemisphere  and  will  have  an 
important  impact  on  U.S. -Latin  Ameri- 
can relations. 

When  the  new  Government  of 
Nicaragua  assumed  power  July  20,  the 
country's  political,  economic,  and  se- 
curity institutions  had  all  ceased  to 
function.  Almost  half  of  Nicaragua's 
population  was  displaced,  hungry,  or 
unemployed. 

The  new  government,  which  was 
initially  formed  in  exile,  is  a  coalition 
of  former  guerrilla  and  civic  leaders.  It 
consists  of  a  five-member  junta  as  the 
executive  authority,  a  19-member 
Council  of  Ministers,  and  a  33-member 
National  Council,  still  in  the  process  of 
formation.  While  the  Sandinista  Na- 
tional Directorate,  made  up  of  guerrilla 
leaders,  wields  significant  influence, 
so,  too,  does  the  Cabinet,  which  in- 
cludes many  moderate  leaders.  Lines  of 
authority  within  the  government  are 
still  unclear,  and  there  is  considerable 
administrative  confusion. 

The  government's  orientation,  as  re- 
vealed in  its  initial  policies,  has  been 
generally  moderate  and  pluralistic  and 
not  Marxist  or  Cuban.  The  government 
has  restrained  reprisals — indeed,  I  be- 
lieve it  has  been  more  successful  in 


doing  so  than  any  other  recent  govern- 
ment which  has  come  to  power  in  the 
wake  of  a  violent  revolution.  The  gov- 
ernment has  also  promulgated  a  decree 
guaranteeing  individual  rights  and  has 
permitted  an  independent  press  and 
radio. 

The  leadership  of  the  government  is 
very  diverse.  While  there  are  influen- 
tial figures  who  espouse  positions  with 
which  we  strongly  disagree — as  at  the 
recent  nonaligned  conference  in 
Havana — the  government  as  a  whole 
has  expressed  a  desire  for  close  and 
friendly  relations  with  us.  Over  time, 
we  hope  that  Nicaragua  will  find  a  bal- 
anced foreign  policy.  We  are  encour- 
aged by  indications  that  the  Nicara- 
guans  are  making  a  genuine  effort  to 
establish  friendly  relations  with  their 
neighbors  in  Central  America. 

The  situation  in  Nicaragua  today  is 
in  a  process  of  evolution.  With  the 
support  of  the  democratic  countries  in 
the  hemisphere,  Nicaragua  will  have  an 
opportunity  to  revitalize  its  shattered 
economy  and  to  continue  on  a  moderate 
and  pluralistic  path.  Without  adequate 
support  for  reconstruction,  the  Nicara- 
guan Government  might  resort  to  au- 
thoritarian measures  to  expedite  eco- 
nomic recovery.  Our  relationship 
would  doubtless  become  more  strained 
as  a  result.  We  believe  that  the  best  ap- 
proach to  the  situation  in  Nicaragua  is 
for  us  to  adopt  an  attitude  of  friendly 
cooperation,  including  the  provision  of 
effective  and  timely  assistance. 

U.S.  interests  will  be  best  served  by 
the  development  in  Nicaragua  of  a  truly 
democratic  government,  within  a 
flourishing,  pluralistic  society.  We 
recognize  that  some  elements  of  the 
present  government  might  prefer  a 
closed,  Marxist  society.  We  recognize 
as  well  that  Cuba  is  already  providing 
substantial  advice  and  assistance  to 
Nicaragua.  But  the  situation  in 
Nicaragua  remains  fluid. 

Reprogramming  Proposal 

The  moderate  outcome  we  seek  will 
not  come  about  if  we  walk  away  now. 
Precisely  because  others  are  assisting 
Nicaragua  and  may  seek  to  exploit  the 
situation  there,  we  must  not  turn  our 
backs. 

We  want  to  help  alleviate  human 
suffering  in  Nicaragua,  speed  recon- 
struction, foster  respect  for  human 
rights  and  democracy,  and  promote  re- 


gional development  and  security.  These! 
goals  can  best  be  achieved  by  working; 
with   the   new   government  and   with 
other  nations  and  international  institu- 
tions which  share  our  basic  objectives. 
The  basic  tenets  of  our  policy  are 
therefore: 

•  To  develop  a  positive  relationship 
with  the  new  government  in  Nicaragua 
based  on  the  principles  of  noninterven- 
tion, equality,  and  mutual  respect; 

•  To  support  the  development  of  a 
democratic,  pluralistic  government  in 
Nicaragua,  by  maintaining  contact  with 
all  elements  of  Nicaraguan  society,  in- 
cluding the  church,  the  media,  and  the  _ 
private  sector,  as  well  as  public  offi- 
cials; 

•  To  cooperate  with  other  nations, 
and  public  and  private  institutions  in 
assisting  Nicaragua's  economic  recov- 
ery; and 

•  To  help  directly  with  the  recon- 
struction effort  by  interim  aid  such  as> 
we  are  proposing  today  and  by  assess- 
ing and  seeking  to  assist  in  the  longer 
term  effort. 


Proposed  Uses  of  Funds 

I  now  turn  to  the  assistance  package 
we  are  proposing  today.  We  first  in- 
formed this  committee  of  our  intention 
to  reprogram  $8.5  million  of  FY  1979' 
foreign  assistance  funds  by  letter  of 
August  1,  1979.  The  committee  has 
expressed  concern  that  the  letter  ar- 
rived just  as  the  August  recess  was  be- 
ginning and  thus  did  not  afford  the  op- 
portunity for  study  that  the  proposal 
required  before  the  members  departed. 
The  timing  was  the  result  of  the  situa- 
tion in  Nicaragua.  It  was  only  on  July 
20 — only  10  days  earlier — that  the  new 
government  was  sworn  in.  The  Agency 
for  International  Development  (AID) 
officials  and  Department  officers  could 
not  prepare  a  reprogramming  proposal 
without  some  assessment  of 
Nicaragua's  immediate  needs,  and  the 
security  situation  in  Managua  and 
throughout  the  country  made  any  such 
assessment  impossible  for  several  days. 
The  10  days  between  July  20  and  Au- 
gust 1  does  not  seem  an  unreasonable 
amount  of  time  for  this  effort. 

The  upheaval  in  Nicaragua  has  left 
the  people  of  that  country  in  dire  cir- 
cumstances, with  both  severe  short- 
term  humanitarian  needs  and  serious 
long-term  economic  recovery  require- 
ments. The  widespread  civil  war  left 
some  1  million  people  in  need  of  food, 
40,000  in  need  of  medical  services, 
and  250,000  in  need  of  shelter.  At  the 
height  of  the  conflict,  some  150,0001 
Nicaraguans  took  refuge  in  nearby 


November  1979 


57 


'Honduras  and  Costa  Rica. 

The  prolonged  conflict  drained 
Nicaragua's  financial  resources  and  left 
the  economy  in  shambles.  Physical 
damage  to  many  of  the  urban  centers  of 
the  country  has  been  severe.  Even  more 

rimportant  than  the  physical  damage, 
however,  has  been  the  severe  disrup- 
tion of  economic  activity.  The  country's 
"ranking,  commercial,  and  industrial 
enterprises  have  suffered  extensive 
losses.  Inventories  have  been  de- 
stroyed; industrial  plants  have  been 
heavily  damaged.  Unemployment  is 
estimated  to  be  as  high  as  50%  of  the 
labor  force.    Agricultural   production 

ihas  been  sharply  reduced,  and  credit 

jhas  dried  up.  The  financial  system  is 
virtually  bankrupt,  as  loans  were  not 
repaid  and  massive  amounts  of  capital 

iwere  sent  overseas.  Gross  foreign  ex- 
change reserves  are  virtually  nonexist- 
ent. 

Our  immediate  efforts  were  focused 
on  a  humanitarian  assistance  effort  to 
relieve  human  suffering.  As  of  August 
30  the  U.S.  Government  had  com- 
mitted nearly  $8  million  for  human- 
itarian assistance  consisting  primarily 
of  ( 1 )  over  8,500  metric  tons  of  PL  480 
food  commodities;  (2)  grants  to  assist 
private  voluntary  organizations  (in- 
cluding the  Red  Cross,  CARE,  and 
others)  in  their  relief  programs;  and  (3) 
medicines,  tents,  blankets,  and  other 
relief  items. 

In  addition  a  PL  480,  Title  II  agree- 
ment for  $2.9  million  to  ship  food 
commodities  to  Nicaragua  was  signed 
on  August  30.  This  agreement  will  help 
provide  a  transition  from  an  emergency 
program  to  one  following  more  normal 
procedures.  Together  with  the  food 
commodities  already  provided,  the  PL 
480  agreement  should  meet  all  of 
Nicaragua's  requirements  for  oil  and 
dairy  products  and  30%  of  its  cereal 
requirements  during  the  next  3-month 
period. 

While  the  United  States  has  taken  the 
lead  in  averting  famine  in  Nicaragua, 
we  have  not  been  alone  in  this  effort. 
Private  voluntary  agencies  operating  in 
Nicaragua  and  in  the  United  States 
have  provided  some  $3.3  million  in 

'  cash  contributions  to  the  relief  effort. 
Other  nations  and  international  organi- 
zations have  also  participated  gener- 
ously. Seventeen  nations  have  contrib- 
uted so  far,  and  a  number  of  these 

i  countries  are  considering  additional  as- 
sistance. Venezuela,  for  example,  has 

>  made  available  $20  million  of  its  trust 
funds   administered   by   the   Inter- 

'•5  American  Development  Bank  (IDB)  for 

/essential  imports.  Costa  Rica  and 
Panama  have  provided  food  and  techni- 
cal  advice.   The   Central   American 


Visit  of  Iftexican 
President  Lopez  Portillo 


President  Jose  Lopez  Portillo  of 
Mexico  made  an  official  visit  to 
Washington,  D.C.,  September  28-29, 
1979.  Following  is  the  text  of  the  joint 
press  statement  issued  on  September 
29.' 

President  Carter  and  President  Lopez 
Portillo  met  at  the  White  House  Sep- 
tember 28-29  for  the  third  in  a  series  of 
reviews  on  the  status  of  bilateral  rela- 
tions and  consideration  of  regional  and 
global  issues  of  mutual  interest. 

At  their  second  meeting  the  Presi- 
dents had  agreed  to  a  restructuring  of 
the  consultative  mechanism  and  had 
requested  their  Secretaries  of  State  and 
Foreign  Relations  to  report  on  the 


matter.  The  first  order  of  business  at 
this  meeting,  accordingly,  was  to  re- 
view that  report.  The  Presidents  ex- 
pressed satisfaction  with  the  intensive 
effort  made  by  the  working  groups  of 
the  consultative  mechanism  and  the 
substantive  progress  achieved  in  those 
groups.  They  concluded  that  the  mech- 
anism has  proven  to  be  an  effective  ve- 
hicle for  coordinating  and  further  de- 
fining bilateral  relations.  They,  there- 
fore, instructed  their  Administrations  to 
continue  working  through  the 
mechanism  in  the  areas  of  mutual 
interest  already  identified. 

President  Carter  and  President  Lopez 
Portillo  reviewed  the  status  of  bilateral 
consultations  in  the  energy  field  and 


Common  Market  countries  have  made 
available  $10  million  in  loans.  Spain 
has  pledged  up  to  $7  million  for  relief 
and  recovery.  West  Germany  is  pro- 
viding $1.75  million  for  relief. 

Looking  to  the  future,  we  understand 
that  three  Central  American  countries 
are  arranging  a  revolving  export  credit 
fund  of  up  to  $75  million  to  assist 
Nicaragua  within  the  Central  American 
Common  Market.  We  also  understand 
that  the  European  Economic  Commu- 
nity is  providing  special  credit  for  $9 
million  for  grain  exports  to  Nicaragua 
and  that  Germany  is  arranging  an  as- 
sistance program  totaling  some  $19 
million. 

We  now  need  to  begin  to  shift  our 
efforts  from  relief  to  recovery — to  as- 
sist the  Nicaraguan  people  to  meet  their 
own  basic  needs  of  food,  shelter,  and 
medical  attention.  After  reviewing  the 
status  of  our  assistance  accounts  and 
analyzing  all  possibilities,  the  Admin- 
istration has  concluded  that  the  only 
immediate  way  to  assist  is  to  repro- 
gram:  (1)  $8  million  of  Economic  Sup- 
port Fund  (ESF)  funds  which  had  been 
planned  for  the  Maqarin  Dam  but 
which  were  not  required  this  fiscal 
year,  and  (2)  $500,000  from  AID  de- 
velopment assistance.  These  repro- 
grammed  funds  will  enable  us  to  put 
together  an  interim  repair  and  rehabili- 
tation program  to  help  meet 
Nicaragua's  needs.  We  are  now  com- 
pleting an  assessment  of  Nicaragua's 
longer  term  needs,  and  we  will  shortly 
be  consulting  with  Congress  on  the 
feasibility  of  a  longer  term  recovery 
program  for  the  country. 


The  interim  program  we  are  propos- 
ing for  the  balance  of  FY  1979  consists 
of  the  following  elements: 

•  $6  million  to  provide  the  grain 
stabilization  institute  with  the  capacity 
to  assure  purchase  of  food  crop  pro- 
duction and  stable  and  reasonable  con- 
sumer prices  through  the  next  planting 
and  harvest  cycle; 

•  $2  million  to  assist  the  Ministry  of 
Housing  in  the  repair  and  rehabilitation 
of  low-cost  housing;  and 

•  $500,000  reprogrammed  from  de- 
velopment assistance  to  assist  a  major 
Nicaraguan  private  voluntary  agency  to 
restore  small  businesses  and  industries. 

In  addition  to  these  reprogrammed 
funds,  our  proposed  interim  program 
also  includes  PL  480,  Title  I  sales  of 
15,000  tons  of  wheat,  amounting  to 
approximately  $2.6  million.  These 
sales  will  help  the  country  to  feed  itself 
and  to  save  precious  foreign  exchange. 

The  interim  relief  and  rehabilitation 
activities  1  have  described  are  needed 
to  meet  urgent  requirements.  Although 
the  proposed  reprogramming  is  not 
large,  it  will  be  an  important  symbol  of 
the  traditional  and  continuing 
friendship  between  Nicaragua  and  the 
United  States.  1  assure  you  that  the 
focus  of  the  proposed  activities  will  be 
on  the  people  of  Nicaragua,  who  so 
badly  need  our  assistance.  D 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the  hearings  will 
be  published  by  the  committee  and  will  be  avail- 
able from  the  Superintendent  of  Documents, 
U.S.  Government  Printing  Office,  Washington, 
D.C.  20402. 


58 


expressed  their  pleasure  at  the  suc- 
cessful conclusion  of  governmental 
negotiations  for  the  sale  of  Mexican 
surplus  associated  natural  gas  to  the 
United  States.  They  considered  this 
agreement  advantageous  to  both  coun- 
tries. 

Regarding  another  energy  source, 
the  Presidents  expressed  their  hope  that 
ongoing  negotiations  for  electric  en- 
ergy interchanges  along  their  common 
border  may  also  be  satisfactorily  con- 
cluded in  the  near  future. 

Both  Presidents  noted  that  the  com- 
mon border  offers  unique  opportunities 
for  close  collaboration  in  many  areas. 
They  expressed  their  interest  in  en- 
hancing the  environment  along  the  bor- 
der and  preserving  the  quality  of  life  in 
the  region.  Presidents  Carter  and  Lopez 
Portillo  agreed  on  the  need  for  both 
countries  to  prevent  events  or  actions 
on  one  side  of  the  land  or  maritime 
boundary  from  degrading  the  environ- 
ment on  the  other  side.  They  also  in- 
structed their  Administrations  to  give  a 
high  priority  to  such  questions.  They 
also  agreed  to  work  within  the  consul- 
tative mechanism  to  determine  if  it  is 
possible  or  appropriate  to  conclude 
agreements  for  measures  by  both 
countries  to  lessen  or  eliminate  en- 
vironmental damage  in  the  future. 

The  Presidents  recalled  that  last 
February  they  had  instructed  the  Inter- 
national Boundary  and  Water  Commis- 
sion to  recommend  measures  that  might 
be  adopted  within  the  context  of  exist- 
ing agreements  to  achieve  further 
progress  toward  a  permanent  solution 
to  border  sanitation  problems.  The 
Presidents  reviewed  the  recommenda- 
tions submitted  by  the  commission  and 
found  them  satisfactory  as  a  basic 
agreement  for  solution  of  border  sani- 
tation problems.  The  Presidents  asked 
the  commission  to  proceed  as  soon  as 
possible  to  conclude  the  supplementary 
recommendations  for  completion  of  the 
works  required  to  provide  the  good 
quality  water  which  they  had  recog- 
nized in  February  to  be  so  important 
for  the  health  and  well-being  of  the 
citizens  of  both  countries  living  and 
traveling  in  the  border  area. 

The  Presidents  paid  special  attention 
to  the  phenomenon  of  the  migratory 
flow  between  Mexico  and  the  United 
States,  including  specific  issues  that 
arise  therefrom  on  both  sides  of  the 
border.  They  recognized  that,  as  they 
had  agreed  last  February,  it  is  essential 
to  know  with  greater  precision  and  de- 
tail all  aspects  of  the  matter. 

The  President  of  Mexico  accordingly 
outlined  the  purposes  and  first  partial 
results  of  the  national  survey  of  emi- 
gration to  the  northern  border  and  the 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


Agreetnent  With  Btexico 
on  l^atural  Gas 


PRESIDENT'S  REMARKS, 
SEPT.  21,  1979' 

I'm  pleased  to  announce  that  we 
have  just  reached  an  agreement  with 
the  Government  of  Mexico  which  will 
permit  the  purchase  of  Mexican  natural 
gas  by  U.S.  buyers. 

This  is  a  significant  step  toward  pro- 
viding a  new  source  of  energy  supplies 
for  our  country.  Just  as  important,  the 
agreement  is  a  breakthrough  in  building 
the  relationship  of  equity  and  mutual 
respect  which  we  seek  with  the  gov- 
ernment and  the  people  of  our  great 
southern  neighbor. 

Under  the  terms  of  this  agreement, 
the  U.S.  purchasers  will  be  able  to  buy 
300  million  cubic  feet  of  natural  gas 
each  day.  This  gas  will  be  in  excess  of 
Mexico's  national  demand  and  will 
meet  our  own  needs,  which  are  not 
covered  by  our  present  supplies.  The 
price  is  a  fair  one  for  both  countries. 

This  natural  gas  agreement  repre- 
sents an  important  first  step  toward  a 


deeper  and  broader  relationship,  and  it 
will  be  of  great  benefit  both  to  the 
people  of  Mexico  and  to  the  people  of 
our  own  country. 

I've  expressed  to  President  Lopez 
Portillo  today  my  pleasure  that  we've 
reached  an  understanding  with  respect 
to  natural  gas  sales  and  that  we  will 
have  a  chance  to  discuss  more  impor- 
tant issues — other  important  issues^ 
when  we  meet  in  Washington  nexti 
week. 


JOINT  ANNOUNCEMENT, 
SEPT.  21,  19792 

The  Governments  of  Mexico  and  the: 
United  States  of  America  have  reached 
an  understanding  on  a  framework  for 
the  sale  of  300  million  cubic  feet  per 
day  of  natural  gas  by  Petroleos  Mexi- 
canos,  the  Mexican  State  Oil  Com- 
pany, to  U.S.  purchasers. 

Pursuant  to  the  understanding 
reached,   the  Governments  of  the; 


United  States,  undertaken  by  the  De- 
partment of  Labor  and  Social  Welfare. 
This  large-scale  study,  which  is  in  an 
advanced  stage,  will  provide  more  pre- 
cise information  on  the  size  and  nature 
of  emigration,  including  data  on  the 
number  of  emigrants  who  annually 
enter  the  United  States,  how  many  re- 
turn to  Mexico,  their  contribution  to 
the  U.S.  and  Mexican  economies,  and 
the  degree  to  which  they  draw  upon 
and  contribute  to  social  services  in  the 
United  States.  President  Carter  agreed 
on  the  importance  of  statistical  consis- 
tency in  approaching  questions  of 
migration  and  was  pleased  to  learn  of 
the  progress  of  the  survey. 

President  Carter  described  the  steps 
he  has  taken  to  insure  that  all  depart- 
ments and  agencies  of  the  U.S.  Gov- 
ernment give  priority  to  the  protection 
of  the  human  rights  of  all  persons  in 
the  United  States,  whether  or  not  they 
are  American  citizens. 

Both  Presidents  repeated  their  com- 
mitment to  combat  the  smuggling  of 
undocumented  persons,  which  consti- 
tutes a  serious  threat  to  human  rights. 

Following  their  review  of  bilateral 
matters.  President  Lopez  Portillo  and 
President  Carter  discussed  recent  de- 
velopments in  Central  America  and 
agreed  that  progress  toward  a  demo- 


cratic government  in  Nicaragua  had 
improved  the  prospects  of  peace  in  the 
region  and  a  greater  respect  for  human 
rights.  They  committed  their  govern- 
ments to  continue  supporting  the  Nic- 
araguan  Government  of  National  Re- 
construction with  a  view  toward  as- 
sisting it  in  the  task  of  economic  andi 
social  recovery.  Both  Presidents  ex- 
changed points  of  view  on  the  Carib- 
bean. 

President  Carter  congratulated  Presi- 
dent Lopez  Portillo  on  his  proposal  to 
the  United  Nations  on  rationalized  pro- 
duction and  consumption  of  energy, 
both  in  the  industrialized  countries  and 
the  developing  countries,  saying  that  it 
was  a  balanced  presentation,  positive 
in  tone.  President  Carter  also  referred 
to  the  energy  plan  proposed  to  the  U.S. 
Congress  and  agreed  on  the  need  to  de- 
vote increased  efforts  to  alternative 
sources. 

Finally,  there  was  a  review  of  the 
latest  developments  on  the  Middle  East 
and  SALT  II  treaty.  Di 


'Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of  Presi- 
dential Documents  of  Oct.  8.  1979,  which  also 
carries  the  exchange  of  toasts  at  a  state  dinner 
on  Sept.  28  and  the  departure  remarks  on  Sept. 
29. 


November  1979 


59 


United  States  of  America  and  the 
Mexican  States  have  agreed  to  au- 
thorize and  support  as  a  matter  of  pol- 
icy commercial  transactions  which  are 
within  the  following  framework: 

•  The  initial  volume  of  natural  gas 
deliveries  will  be  300  million  cubic 
feet  per  day,  commencing  as  soon  as 
contracts  are  signed,  regulatory  ap- 
provals obtained,  and  gas  is  available 
for  delivery. 

•  The  initial  price  will  be  $3,625/ 
million  btu  as  of  January  1,  1980,  This 
initial  price  is  subject  to  reconsidera- 
tion prior  to  January  1,  1980,  if  the 
price  for  natural  gas  from  comparable 
sources  exceeds  that  amount  prior  to 
said  date. 

•  The  arrangement  shall  continue 
without  limitation  subject  to  the  under- 
standing that  the  gas  to  be  supplied  is 
surplus  associated  gas  in  excess  of 
Mexican  national  demand,  that  the  gas 
being  purchased  is  to  meet  U.S.  needs 
not  covered  from  other  sources,  and 
that  therefore  the  contractual  provisions 
will  provide  that  either  nation,  on  the 
basis  of  its  own  determination  of  its 
national  interest,  taking  into  account  its 
domestic  supply  and  demand  for  natu- 
ral gas,  may  cause  the  termination  of 
the  arrangement  upon  180  days  notice 
to  the  other  nation. 

•  The  initial  price  will  be  adjusted 
quarterly  by  the  same  percentage  as  the 
change  in  world  crude  oil  prices  pur- 
suant to  a  specific  formula  to  be  agreed 
apon  by  the  contracting  parties. 

The  way  is  now  clear  for  the  negoti- 
ation of  commercial  contracts  between 
Petroleos  Mexicanos  and  U.S.  pur- 
chasers on  terms  which  both  govern- 
ments regard  as  mutually  beneficial. 
Such  contracts  will  be  subject  to  ap- 
propriate governmental  approvals  in 
each  country. 

The  two  governments  will  review 
from  time  to  time  the  terms  of  this  ar- 
rangement as  well  as  other  energy  is- 
sues of  mutual  interest.  D 


'Made  to  news  correspondents  assembled  in 
the  Briefing  Room  at  the  White  House  (text 
from  Weekly  Compilation  of  Presidential 
Documents  of  Sept.  24,  1979). 

^Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of  Sept.  24, 
1979. 


(/JS.  Ambassadors 

to  Western  Hemisphere 

Countries, 

October  1979 


Argentina — Raul  H.  Castro 

Bahamas — William  B,  Schwartz.  Jr. 

Barbados — Sally  Angela  Shelton 

Bolivia — Paul  H.  Boeker 

Brazil — Robert  Marion  Sayre 

Chile — George  W.  Landau 

Colombia — Diego  C.  Asencio 

Costa  Rica — Marvin  Weissman 

Dominica — Sally  Angela  Shelton 

Dominican  Republic — Robert  L.  Yost 

Ecuador — Raymond  E.  Gonzalez 

El  Salvador — Frank  J.  Devine 

Grenada — Sally  Angela  Shelton 

Guatemala — Frank  V.  Ortiz.  Jr. 

Guyana — George  B.  Roberts,  Jr. 

Haiti — William  Bowdoin  Jones 

Honduras — Mari-Luci  Jaramillo 

Jamaica — Loren  E.  Lawrence 

Mexico — Vacant 

Nicaragua — Lawrence  A.  Pezzullo 

Panama — Ambler  Holmes  Moss,  Jr. 

Paraguay — Robert  E.  White 

Peru — Harry  W.  Shlaudeman 

Saint  Lucia — (Minister)  Sally  Angela  Shelton 

Suriname — Nancy  Ostrander 

Trinidad  and  Tobago — Irving  G.  Cheslaw 

Uruguay — Lyle  Franklin  Lane 

Venezuela — William  H,  Luers  D 


TREATIES: 

Current  Actions 

MULTILATERAL 

Arbitration 

Convention  on  the  recognition  and  enforcement 
of  foreign  arbitral  awards.  Done  at  New  York 
June  10,  1958.  Entered  into  force  June  7, 
1959;  for  the  U.S.  Dec.  29,  1970.  TIAS  6997. 
Accession  deposited:  Colombia,  Sept.  25, 
1979. 

Antarctic 

Recommendations  relating  to  the  furtherance  of 
principles  and  objectives  of  the  Antarctic 
treaty.  Adopted  at  London  Oct.  7,  1977,  at  the 
Ninth  Antarctic  Treaty  Consultative  Meeting.' 
Notification  of  approval:  Chile,  Sept.  27, 
1979. 

Aviation 

Convention  for  the  suppression  of  unlawful  acts 
against  the  safety  of  civil  aviation.  Done  at 
Montreal  Sept.  23,  1971.  Entered  into  force 
Jan.  26,  1973.  TIAS  7570. 
Accessions  deposited:  El  Salvador,  Sept.  25, 
1979;  Sierra  Leone,  Sept.  20,  1979. 


Protocol  on  the  authentic  quadrilingual   text  of 
the  convention  on  international  civil  aviation 
(Chicago.    1944)   (TIAS    1591),   with   annex. 
Done  at  Montreal  Sept.  30,  1977.' 
Signature:  Spain,  Oct.  4,  1979." 
Ratification  deposited:  Guatemala,  Sept.  27. 

1979. 
Acceptances  deposited:  Peru,  Sept.  26,   1979: 
Yugoslavia,  Oct.  9,  1979. 

Conservation 

Convention  on  international  trade  in  endangered 
species  of  wild  fauna  and  flora,  with  appen- 
dices. Done  at  Washington  Mar.  3,  1973.  En- 
tered into  force  July  1.  1975.  TIAS  8249. 
Ratification  deposited:  Bolivia.  July  6,  1979. 
Accession  deposited:  Bahamas,  June  20, 
1979. 

Environmental  Modiflcation 

Convention  on  the  prohibition  of  military  or  any 
other  hostile  use  of  environmental  modifica- 
tion techniques,  with  annex.  Done  at  Geneva 
May  18,  1977.  Entered  into  force  Oct.  5, 
1978.' 

Accessions  deposited:  Bangladesh,  Cape 
Verde,  Oct.  3,  1979;  Sao  Tome  and  Prin- 
cipe. Oct.  5.  1979. 

Health 

Constitution  of  the  World  Health  Organization. 
Done  at  New  York  July  22.  1946.  Entered  into 
force  Apr.  7.  1948;  for  the  U.S.  June  21. 
1948.  TIAS  1808. 

Acceptance  deposited:  Seychelles,  Sept.  II, 
1979. 

Human  Rights 

American  convention  on  human  rights.  Done  at 
San  Jose  Nov.   22.    1969.   Entered   into  force 
July  18.  1978.3 
Adherence  deposited:  Bolivia.  July  19,  1979. 

Maritime  Matters 

Amendments  to  the  convention  of  Mar.  6,  1948, 
as  amended  (TIAS  4044,  6285,  6490,  8606), 
on  the  Intergovernmental  Maritime  Consulta- 
tive Organization.  Done  at  London  Nov.  14. 
1975.' 

Acceptances  deposited:  Bangladesh.  Oct.  8, 
1979;  Iraq.  Sept.  5,  1979. 

Amendments  to  the  convention  of  Mar.  6,  1948. 
as  amended  (TIAS  4044,  6285.  6490.  8606), 
on  the  Intergovernmental  Maritime  Consulta- 
tive Organization.  Done  at  London  Nov.  17, 
1977.' 

Acceptances  deposited:  Bangladesh,  Oct.  8, 
1979;  Iraq,  Sept.  5,  1979. 

Marriage 

Convention  on  consent  to  marriage,  minimum 
age  for  marriage,   and  registration  of  mar- 
riages.  Done  at  New  York  Dec.    10,    1962. 
Entered  into  force  Dec.  9,  1964.'' 
Accession  deposited:  Barbados.  Oct.  1.  1979. 

Nuclear  Weapons — Nonproliferation 

Treaty  on  the  nonproliferation  of  nuclear 
weapons.  Done  at  Washington,  London,  and 
Moscow  July  1,  1968.  Entered  into  force  Mar. 
5,  1970.  TIAS  6839. 

Accession  deposited:  Bangladesh,  Aug.  31. 
1979. 

Pollution 

Convention  on  the  prevention  of  marine  pollu- 
tion by  dumping  of  wastes  and  other  matter, 
with  annexes.  Done  at  London,  Mexico  City, 
Moscow,   and  Washington  Dec.   29,    1972. 


60 


Enlered  into  force  Aug.  30,  1975    TIAS  8165. 
Ratifications  deposited:  Argentina.  Sept.    12. 
1979;  Switzerland,  July  'S\.  1979. 

Racial  Discrimination 

International  convention  on  the  elimination  of  all 
form.s  of  racial  discrimination.  Done  at  New 
York  Dec.  21,  1965  Entered  into  force  Jan. 
4,  1969.-' 

Accession  deposited:    Cape    Verde,   Oct.    3, 
1979. 

Reciprocal  Assistance 

Protocol  of  amendment  to  the  inter-American 
treaty  of  reciprocal  assistance  (Rio  pact). 
Done  at  San  Jose  July  26,  1975.' 
Ratification  deposited:    U.S.    (with   reserva- 
tion), Sept.  20,  1979. 

Telecommunications 

Final  acts  of  the  World  Administrative  Radio 
Conference  for  the  planning  of  the  broad- 
casting-satellite service  in  frequency  bands 
11.7-12.2  GHz  (in  regions  2  and  3)  and 
11.7-12.5  GHz  (in  region  1),  with  annexes. 
Done  at  Geneva  Feb.  13,  1977.  Entered  into 
force  Jan.  1,  1979.' 
Approval  deposited:  India,  Mar.  31,  1979. 

Partial  revision  of  the  radio  regulations  (Geneva, 
1959),  as  revi.sed  (TIAS  4893,  8599),  relating 
to  the  aeronautical  mobile  (R)  service,  with 
annexes  and  final  protocol.  Done  at  Geneva 
Mar.  5,  1978.  Entered  into  force  Sept  1, 
1979,  except  for  the  frequency  allotment  plan 
for  the  aeronautical  mobile  (R)  service  which 
shall  come  into  force  on  Feb.  1,  1983.' 
Approval  deposited:  Canada,  June  20,  1979. 

Transportation 

Agreement  on  the  international  carriage  of 
perishable  foodstuffs  and  on  the  special 
equipment  to  be  used  for  such  carriage  (ATP), 
with  annexes.  Done  at  Geneva  Sept.  1,  1970. 
Entered  into  force  Nov.  21,  1976.' 
Accessions  deposited:  Belgium,  Oct.  I,  1979; 
U.K   Oct.  5,  1979. 

United  Nations 

Charter  of  the  United  Nations  and  Statute  of  the 
International  Court  of  Justice.  Signed  at  San 
Francisco  June  26,  1945.  Entered  into  force 
Oct.  24,  1945.  59  Stat.  1031. 
Admission  to  Membership:  Saint  Lucia,  Sept. 
19,  1979. 

Convention  on  the  privileges  and  immunities  of 
the  United  Nations.  Adopted  at  New  York 
Feb.  13,  1946.  Entered  into  force  Sept.  17, 
1946;  for  the  U.S.  Apr.  29,  1970,  (TIAS 
6900). 

Accession  deposited:    People's   Republic   of 
China,  Sept.   II,  1979. 

Weights  and  Measures 

Convention  establishing  an  International  Organi- 
zation of  Legal  Metrology.  Done  at  Paris  Oct. 
12,  1955,  and  amended  January  1968.  Entered 
into  force  May  28.  1958;  for  the  US,  Oct.  22. 
1972, 
Accession  deposited:  Algeria,  June  26,  1979. 

Wheat 

Protocol  modifying  and  further  extending  the 
wheat  trade  convention  (part  of  the  interna- 
tional wheat  agreement),  1971  (TIAS  7144). 
Done  at  Washington  Apr.  25,  1979  Entered 
into  force  June  23.  1979,  with  respect  to  cer- 
tain provisions,  July  1,  1979,  with  respect  to 
other  provisions. 
Ratification  deposited:  Peru.  Sept.  26,  1979. 


BILATERAL 


Colombia 

Extradition  treaty,  with  annex.  Signed  at  Wash- 
ington Sept.  14,  1979,  Enters  into  force  on  the 
date  of  the  exchange  of  the  instruments  of 
ratification. 

France 

Protocol  to  the  convention  with  respect  to  taxes 
on  income  and  properly  of  July  28,  1967,  as 
amended  by  the  protocol  of  Oct.  12,  1970, 
with  exchange  of  notes.  Signed  at  Washington 
Nov.  24,  1978. 
Instruments  of  ratification  exchanged:    Sept, 

27,  1979. 
Entr\  into  force:  Oct.  27,  1979;  effective  Jan. 
1,  1979. 

Federal  Republic  of  Germany 

Memorandum  of  understanding  relating  to  coop- 
eration in  the  development  of  national  air 
traffic  control  systems,  with  annex.  Signed  at 
Washington  and  Bonn  Aug.  8  and  20,  1979. 
Enlered  into  force  Aug.  20,  1979, 

German  Democratic  Republic 

Consular  convention,  with  exchange  of  notes. 
Signed  at  Berlin  Sept.  4,  1979.  Enters  into 
force  30  days  following  the  date  of  the  ex- 
change of  instruments  of  ratification. 

Hungary 

Convention  for  the  avoidance  of  double  taxation 
and  the  prevention  of  fiscal  evasion  with  re- 
spect to  taxes  on  income,  with  exchange  of 
notes    Signed  at  Washington  Feb.  12,  1979. 
Entry  into  force:  Sept.   18.  1979. 

India 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of  Dec.  30. 
1977,  as  amended  (TIAS  9036,  9232),  relat- 
ing to  trade  in  cotton,  wool,  and  manmade 
textiles  and  textile  products.  Effected  by  ex- 
change of  notes  at  Washington  Aug.  31  and 
Oct.  4,  1979.  Entered  into  force  Oct.  4,  1979. 

Japan 

Arrangement  concerning  trade  in  cotton,  wool, 
and  manmade  fiber  textiles,  with  related 
notes.  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at 
Washington  Aug  17,  1979.  Entered  into  force 
Aug.  17,  1979;  effective  Jan.  1,  1979. 

Record  of  discussion  relating  to  trade  in  textile 
products.  Signed  at  Washington  Aug.  22. 
1979.  Entered  into  force  Aug.  22,  1979 

Jordan 

Agreement  concerning  the  grant  of  defense  arti- 
cles and  services  under  the  military  assistance 
program.  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at 
Amman  Aug.  27,  1979.  Entered  into  force 
Aug    28.  1979. 

Republic  of  Korea 

Agreement  extending  the  memorandum  of  un- 
derstanding of  Dec.  19.  1975.  and  Jan,  15. 
1976.  as  extended  (TIAS  8609.  9161).  relat- 
ing to  the  development  of  the  Korea  Standards 
Research  Institute  Effected  by  exchange  of 
letters  at  Seoul  and  Washington  June  14.  July 
13  and  Aug.  21.  1979.  Entered  into  force 
Aug.  21.  1979;  effective  July  31,  1979. 

Convention  for  the  avoidance  of  double  taxation 
and  the  prevention  of  fiscal  evasion  with  re- 
spect to  taxes  on  income  and  the  encourage- 
ment of  international  trade  and  investment, 
with  related  notes.  Signed  at  Seoul  June  4, 
1976. 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 

Instruments  of  ratification  exchanged:    Sept. 

20,  1979,  ; 

Entry  into  force:  Oct.  20.  1979.  i 

Malaysia 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of  May  17 
and  June  8.  1978.  as  amended  (TIAS  9180), 
relating  to  trade  in  cotton,  wool,  and  man- 
made  fiber  textiles  and  textile  products.  Ef- 
fected by  exchange  of  letters  at  Washington 
and  New  York  Sept  10  and  14,  1979.  Entered! 
into  force  Sept.  14,  1979. 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of  May  17 
and  June  8,  1978,  as  amended  (TIAS  9180), 
relating  to  trade  in  cotton,  wool,  and  man- 
made  fiber  textiles  and  textile  products.  Ef- 
fected by  exchange  of  letters  at  Washington 
and  New  York  Sept  14  and  28,  1979.  Entered 
into  force  Sept.  28,  1979. 

Mexico 

Minute  261  of  the  International  Boundary  and 
Water  Commission:  Recommendations  for  the 
solution  to  the  border  sanitation  problems. 
Signed  at  El  Paso  Sept.  24,  1979.  Enters  into 
force  after  approval  of  the  two  governments. 

Netherlands 

Agreement  relating  to  cooperation  between  the 
United  States  and  the  Netherlands  Antilles  re- 
garding a  hurricane  monitoring  and  forecast- 
ing program  for  the  Caribbean,  with  memo- 
randum of  arrangement.  Effected  by  exchange 
of  notes  at  The  Hague  July  26.  1979.  Enters 
into  force  on  the  date  on  which  the  Govern- 
ment of  the  Kingdom  of  the  Netherlands 
notifies  the  Government  of  the  United  States 
that  the  necessary  constitutional  procedures 
required  in  the  Kingdom  of  the  Netherlands 
have  been  complied  with. 

Nicaragua 

Agreement  for  sales  of  agricultural  commodities. 
Signed  at  Managua  Aug.  31.  1979.  Entered 
into  force  Aug.  31.  1979. 

Panama 

Convention  for  the  construction  of  a  ship  canal. 
Signed  at  Washington  Nov.   18,  1903.  Entered 
into  force  Feb.  26,  1904.  33  Stat.  2234. 
Terminated:  Oct,   1,  1979. 

Agreement  delimiting  the  Canal  Zone  referred  to 
in  Article  II  of  the  convention  of  Nov.  18, 
1903.  Signed  at  Panama  June  15,  1904.  En- 
tered into  force  June  15,  1904.  10  Bevans 
678. 
Terminated:  Oct,   1,  1979. 

Boundary  convention.   Signed  at  Panama  Sept. 
2,  1914.  Entered  into  force  Feb,  11,  1915.  38 
Stat.  1893. 
Terminated:  Oct.   1,  1979. 

Protocol  of  an  agreement  relating  to  neutrality. 
Signed  at  Washington  Oct.  10.  1914.  Entered 
into  force  Oct.   10.  1914.  38  Stat.  2042. 
Terminated:  Oct.  1.  1979. 

Convention  modifying  the  liquor  smuggling 
convention  of  1924  (43  Stat.   1875).  Signed  at 
Panama  Mar,    14.    1932.   Entered  into  force 
Mar.  25.  1933.  48  Stat.  1488. 
Terminated:  Oct.   I.  1979. 

Convention  with  regard  to  the  construction  of  a 
trans-isthmian  highway  between  the  cities  of 
Panama  and  Colon.  Signed  at  Washington 
Mar.  2.  1936.  Entered  into  force  July  27, 
1939.  53  Stat.  1869. 
Terminated:  Oct.  1.  1979. 

General  treaty  of  friendship  and  cooperation  ac- 
companied by  sixteen  exchanges  of  notes  em- 


November  1979 


61 


bodying  interpretations  of  the  new  treaty  or 
agreements  pursuant  thereto.   Signed  at 
Washington  Mar.  2.  1936.  Entered  into  force 
July  27,  1939.  53  Stat.  1807. 
Terminated:  Oct.   1,  1979. 

Agreement  confirming  that  the  protocol  signed 
at  Washington  on  Oct.  10,  1914  (38  Stat. 
2042),  is  at  present  in  effect.  Effected  by  ex- 
change of  notes  at  Panama  Aug.  25,  1939.  54 
Stat.  1811. 
Terminated:  Oct.   1,  1979. 

Arrangement  providing  for  a  Trans-Isthmian 
Joint  Highway  Board.  Effected  by  exchange 
of  notes  at  Panama  Oct.  19  and  23  and  Dec. 
20,  1939,  and  Jan.  4,  1940.  Entered  into  force 
Jan.  4,  1940.  54  Stat.  2278. 
Terminated:  Oct.  1,  1979. 

Agreement  supplementing  the  convention  of 
Mar.  2,  1936  (53  Stat.  1869),  relating  to  the 
trans-isthmian  highway.  Effected  by  exchange 
of  notes  at  Washington  Aug.  31  and  Sept.  6, 
1940.  Entered  into  force  Sept.  6,  1940.  58 
Stat.  1593. 
Terminated:  Oct.  1,  1979. 

General  relations  agreement.   Effected  by  ex- 
change of  notes  at  Washington  May  18,  1942. 
Entered  into  force  May   18,    1942.   59  Slat. 
1289. 
Terminated:  Oct.  1,  1979. 

Convention  regarding  the  Colon  corridor  and 
certain  other  corridors  through  the  Canal 
Zone.  Signed  at  Panama  May  24,  1950.  En- 
tered into  force  Apr.  11,  1955.  TIAS  3180. 
Terminated:  Oct    1,  1979. 

Treaty  of  mutual  understanding  and  cooperation 
and  memorandum  of  understandings  reached. 
Signed  at  Panama  Jan.  25,  1955.  Entered  into 
force  Aug.  23,  1955.  TIAS  3297. 
Terminated:  Oct.   1,  1979. 

Agreement  providing  for  reciprocal  recognition 
of  drivers'  licenses  issued  in  Panama  and  the 
Canal  Zone.  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at 
Panama  Oct.  31,  1960.  Entered  into  force 
Nov.  1,  1960.  TIAS  4716 
Terminated:  Oct.  1,  1979. 

Philippines 

Agreement  concerning  the  grant  of  defense  arti- 
cles and  services  under  the  military  assistance 
program.  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at 
Manila  Aug  23  and  30,  1979.  Entered  into 
force  Aug.  30,  1979. 

Agreement  continuing  the  operations  of  the  U.S. 
Veterans  Administration  in  the  Philippines. 
Signed  at  Manila  Sept.  5,  1979.  Entered  into 
force  Sept.  5,  1979;  effective  Oct.  27,  1978. 

Poland 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of  Jan.  9 
and  12,  1978,  as  amended  (TIAS  9064,  9213), 
relating  to  trade  in  cotton,  wool,  and  man- 
made  fiber  textiles  and  textile  products.  Ef- 
fected by  exchange  of  notes  at  Warsaw  May 
10  and  Sept.  3,  1979.  Entered  into  force  Sept. 
3,  1979. 

Portugal 

Agreement  concerning  the  grant  of  defense  arti- 
cles and  services  under  the  military  assistance 
program.  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at 
Lisbon  Aug.  14  and  27,  1979.  Entered  into 
force  Aug.  27,  1979. 

Romania 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of  June  17, 
1977,  as  amended  (TIAS  8833,  9211),  relat- 
ing to  trade  in  wool  and  manmade  fiber  tex- 


tiles. Effected  by  exchange  of  letters  at 
Washington  and  New  York  July  23  and  Sept. 
14,  1979.  Entered  into  force  Sept.   14,  1979. 

Sierra  Leone 

Agreement  for  sales  of  agricultural  commodities, 
relating  to  the  agreement  of  Aug.  31,  1978 
(TIAS  9210),  with  memorandum  of  negotia- 
tions. Signed  at  Freetown  Aug.  23,  1979. 
Entered  into  force  Aug.  23,  1979. 

Singapore 

Agreement  amending  the  air  transport  agreement 
of  Mar.  31,  1978  (TIAS  9001).  Effected  by 
exchange  of  notes  at  Singapore  Sept.  14, 
1979.  Entered  into  force  Sept.   14,  1979. 

Spain 

Agreement  concerning  the  grant  of  defense  arti- 
cles and  services  under  the  military  assistance 
program.  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at 
Madrid  Aug.  30,  1979.  Entered  into  force 
Aug.  30,  1979. 

United  Kingdom 

Convention  for  the  avoidance  of  double  taxation 
and  the  prevention  of  fiscal  evasion  with  re- 
spect to  taxes  on  estates  of  deceased  persons 
and  on  gifts.  Signed  at  London  Oct.  19,  1978. 
Instruments  of  ratification  exchanged:  Oct. 

11,  1979. 
Entry  into  force:  Nov.   11,  1979. 

Western  Samoa 

General  agreement  for  special  development  as- 
sistance. Signed  at  Apia  Sept.  20,  1979.  En- 
tered into  force  Sept.  20,  1979.  D 


'  Not  in  force. 

'  Without  reservation  as  to  acceptance. 

'  Not  in  force  for  the  U.S. 


CHROI\OLOGY: 

September  1979 


Sept.  3  Conference  of  nonaligned  countries 
meets  in  Havana,  Sept.  3-9. 

Sept.  4  Fifth  conference  of  the  U.N.  World 
Food  Council  held  in  Ottawa, 
Canada,  Sept.  4-7. 
Egypt  and  Israel  hold  talks  on  Pales- 
tinian autonomy  in  Haifa,  Israel, 
Sept.  4-6. 

Sept.  5  U.S.  Ambassador  to  U.N.  Young  vis- 
its Africa  Sept.  5-20. 

Sept.   10    Constitutional  conference  on  Southern 
Rhodesia  begins  in  London. 
Angolan  President  Neto  dies  follow- 
ing surgery  in  a  Moscow  hospital. 
Egyptian   Vice  President  Mubarak 

visits  U.S.  Sept.  10-17. 
President   Mobutu  of  Zaire   visits 
Washington.  DC,  Sept.  10-13. 

Sept.  12  18th  Congress  of  the  Universal  Postal 
Union  held  in  Rio  de  Janeiro  Sept. 
12-30. 

Sept.  16  Sweden  holds  parliamentary  elections. 
The  Moderate,  Center,  and  Liberal 


Parties  retain  their  parliamentary 
majority  by  a  narrow  one-seat  mar- 
gin. 
President  Taraki  of  Afghanistan  is  re- 
ported by  Kabul  radio  to  have  re- 
signed the  presidency.  Prime 
Minister  Amin  is  named  to  succeed 
him. 

Sept.  17  10th  Antarctic  Treaty  consultative 
meeting  held  in  the  Department  of 
State  Sept.  17-Oct.  5. 

Sept.  18  34th  session  of  the  U.N.  General  As- 
sembly opens  in  New  York, 

Sept.  20    The  Angolan  Central  Committee  of 
the  MPLA-Labor  Party  elects  Jose 
Eduardo  dos  Santos  as  President. 
Ola  Ulsten  resigns  as  Sweden's  Prime 
Minister. 

Sept.  21  U.S.,  Mexico  announce  agreement  on 
Mexico's  sale  of  natural  gas  (300 
million  cubic  feet  a  day)  to  the  U.S. 

UNGA  allows  ousted  Kampuchean  re- 
gime of  Pol  Pot  to  retain  the  coun- 
try's seat  in  the  U.N.  by  a  vote  of 
71  (U.S.)  to  35  with  34  abstentions 
(12  nations  were  absent) 

David  Dacko  leads  a  coup  which 
overthrows  Emperor  Bokassa  I  of 
the  Central  African  Empire.  The 
country  is  renamed  the  Central  Af- 
rican Republic. 

Sept  23  Donald  F.  McHenry  sworn  in  as  U.S. 
Ambassador  to  the  U.N. 

Sept.  24  Hilla  Limann  sworn  in  as  President  of 
Ghana. 

Sept.  25  U.S.  Senate  passes  the  Panama  Canal 
Act  of  1979  to  implement  terms  of 
the  Panama  Canal  Treaty  by  a  vote 
of  63  to  32. 
Israel  returns  another  section  of  the 
Sinai  Peninsula  to  Egypt  in  cere- 
monies at  Abu  Darba. 

Sept  26  U.S.  House  passes  the  Panama  Canal 
Act  of  1979  by  a  vote  of  232  to 
188. 
Egypt  and  Israel  hold  Palestinian  au- 
tonomy talks  in  Alexandria,  Egypt, 
Sept.  26-27. 

Sept.  27  President  Carter  signs  into  law  the 
Panama  Canal  Act 

Danish  Prime  Minister  Jorgensen  re- 
signs. 

World  Administrative  Radio  Confer- 
ence convenes  in  Geneva. 

Sept.  28  Mexican  President  Lopez  Portillo  vis- 
its Washington,  DC,  Sept. 
28-29. 

Sept.  29  Pope  John  Paul  II  visits  Ireland  and 
the  U.S.  Sept.  29-Oct.  8. 

Sept.  30  Vice  President  Mondale  visits  Panama 
Sept.  30-Oct.  2  to  represent  the 
U.S.  when  Panama  acquires  juris- 
diction over  the  Panama  Canal  Zone 
on  Oct.  1  under  terms  of  the 
Panama  Canal  Treaty.  D 


62 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


PRESS  RELEASES: 

Departniont  ot  State 


September  l9-()clober  12 

Press  releases  may  be  obtained  from  the  Of- 
fice of  Press  Relations,  Department  of  State. 
Washington.  DC.  20520. 


No. 

•226 

*227 


*23l 


237 
238 


Date 

9/19 

9/19 


228 

9/19 

229 

9/19 

230 

9/20 

9/20 


•232        9/20 


•233 

9/21 

234 

9/24 

•235 

9/25 

•236        9/26 


9/27 
9/27 


238A      9/27 


•239 

9/27 

•240 

9/27 

•241 

9/27 

•242 

9/28 

Subject 

U.S..  Philippines  amend  textile 
agreement.  Aug    3  and  16. 

U.S..  Japan  confirm  record  of 
understanding  dealing  with 
trade  m  textile  issues.  Aug. 
17. 

US  .  Korea  amend  textile 
agreement.  Aug.  24. 

U.S..  Haiti  sign  textile  agree- 
ment. Aug.   17. 

U.S.  Organization  for  the  In- 
ternational Radio  Consulta- 
tive Committee  (CCIR). 
study  group  6.  Nov.  8. 

Advisory  Committee  on  Inter- 
national Investment,  Tech- 
nology, and  Development, 
Oct.  4. 

Shipping  Coordinating  Com- 
mittee (SCO,  Subcommittee 
on  Safety  of  Life  at  Sea 
(SOLAS),  working  group  on 
standards  of  training  and 
watchkeeping,  Oct.  10. 

U.S.,  Hong  Kong  amend  tex- 
tile agreement.  May  23. 

Vance:  address  before  U.N. 
General  Assembly. 

Program  for  official  visit  to 
Washington,  DC.  of  Mexi- 
can President  Lopez  Portillo, 
Sept.  28-29. 

Ambassador  Paul  C.  Warnke  to 
address  conference  on  U.S. 
security  and  the  Soviet 
challenge,  Portland,  Me., 
Oct    3. 

Bangladesh  joins  nonprolifera- 
lion  treaty. 

Vance;  address  before  Foreign 
Policy  Association,  New 
York. 

Vance:  question-and-answer 
session  following  address 
before  Foreign  Policy  As- 
sociation. 

sec,  Oct.  30. 

see,  National  Committee  for 
the  Prevention  of  Marine 
Pollution,  Nov.  20. 

Hispanic-American  Foreign 
Policy  Conference,  Oct.  29. 

Ambassador  Warnke  to  address 
conference  on  U.S.  security 
and  the  Soviet  challenge, 
Portland,  Ore.,  Oct.  11. 


KAMPUCHEA  DO]\ATIOI\S 

The  authorities  in  Kampuchea  have  reached  agreement  with  the 
tH'o  international  agencies  which  enter  Kampuchea  with  food  and 
medical  supplies -U NIC EF  and  the  International  Red  Cross.  If 
you  or  members  of  your  organization  wish  to  help  the  people  of 
Kampuchea,  please  send  your  donations,  marked  specifically  for 
that  purpose,  to: 

American  National  Red  Cross — Kampuchea  Relief 

2025  E  Street,  N.W. 

Washington,  D.C.  20006 

or 

U.S.  Committee  of  UNICEF 
331  East  38th  Street 
New  York,  N.Y.  10016 

Or  you  may  call  the  U.S.  Committee  of  UNICEF  for  more  infor- 
mation: 800-221-2870 

212-686-5522  (New  York  State  only) 

The  U.S.  Committee  of  UNICEF  serves  as  a  clearinghouse  for 
the  International  Rescue  Committee,  Catholic  Relief  Service, 
American  Friends  Service  Committee,  CARE  Inc.,  Church  World 
Service.  Lutheran  World  Relief,  and  O.rfam-America  Inc. 


•243  9/29  Kenneth  M.  Curtis  sworn  in  as 
Ambassador  to  Canada 
(biographic  data). 

•244  10/1  Stephen  Low  sworn  in  as  Am- 
bassador to  Nigeria  (biog- 
raphic data). 

•245        10/3    CCIR,  study  group  7,  Oct.  22. 

•246  10/3  Advisory  Committee  to  the 
U.S.  National  Section  of  the 
International  Commission 
for  the  Conservation  of  At- 
lantic Tunas,  Oct.  30. 

*247  10/3  Advisory  Committee  on  His- 
torical Diplomatic  Docu- 
mentation, Nov.  8. 

•248  10/3  Richard  Noyes  Viets  sworn  in 
as  Ambassador  to  Tanzania 
(biographic  data). 

•249  10/4  Ambassador  Marshall  Shulman 
to  address  conference  on 
U.S.  security  and  the  Soviet 
challenge.  Portland.  Ore., 
Oct.  II. 
250  10/4  Vance:  interview  on  "Today" 
Show,  New  York. 

*251  10/4  International  Telegraph  and 
Telephone  Consultative 
Committee  (CCITT),  study 
group  I ,  Oct.  31. 

•252  10/4  sec,  SOLAS,  working  group 
on  radio  communication, 
Oct.  18. 


253 

10/4 

254 

10/5 

255 

10/5 

*256 


10/9 


257       10/10 


258       10/10 


»259       10/10 


•260       10/10 


•261 
*262 

*263 


10/11 
10/12 

10/12 


sec,  SOLAS,  working  group 
on  fire  protection,  Oct.  24. 

Vance:  interview  on  CBS-TV 
morning  news.  New  York. 

Jack  Richard  Perry  sworn  in  as 
Ambassador  to  Bulgaria 
(biographic  data). 

Thomas  W.  M  Smith  sworn  in 
as  Ambassador  to  Ghana 
(biographic  data). 

Vance:  statement  before  the 
executive  session  of  the  Sen- 
ate Foreign  Relations  Com- 
mittee 

Press  communique  issued  by 
the  chairman  of  the  10th 
Antarctic  Treaty  Consulta- 
tive Meeting. 

John  R.  Clingerman  sworn  in 
as  Ambassador  to  Lesotho 
(biographic  data). 

Irving  G.  Cheslaw  sworn  in  as 
Ambassador  to  Trinidad  and 
Tobago  (biographic  data). 

CCIR,  study  group  5,  Nov.  5. 

Overseas  Schools  Advisory 
Council,  Dec.  13. 

Advisory  Committee  to  U.S. 
Section  on  the  International 
North  Pacific  Fisheries 
Commission,  Oct.  28.         D 


*  Not  printed  in  the  Bulletin. 


I]\DEX 


NOVEMBER  1979 
VOL.  79.  NO.  2032 

Africa 

Chronology:  September  1979 61 

Common  Needs  in  a  Diverse  World  (Vance)  .1 
Antarctica.    lOth   Meeting  of  the   Antarctica 
Treaty  Consulative  Parties  (Benson,  Depart- 
ment press  release,  press  communique)  .  .  .21 
Arms  Control 

Bangladesh   Joins   Nonproliteration   Treaty 

(Christopher,  Department  announcement)  .49 

Common  Needs  in  a  Diverse  World  (Vance)  .1 

Interview    on    CBS-TV    Morning    News 

(Vance)    19 

Interview  on  NBC's    "Today"  Show  (Vance)  18 

MX  Missile  System  (Carter)   25 

N.XTO's  Fourth  Decade — Defense  and  Detente 

(Brzezinski,  Mondale) 32 

President  Carter's  News  Conference  of  October 

M  (excerpts) 12 

kiview  of  U.S.  Policy  in  Europe  (Vest)  .  .  .  .36 

S  ALT  II  — A  Summation  (  Vance) 24 

.Soviet  Troops  in  Cuba  and  SALT  (Carter)  .  .  .7 
Australia.    U.S. -Australia   Agreement   on   Nu- 
clear Energy  (message  to  the  Congress)   .  .49 
Bangladesh.    Bangladesh   Joins   Nonprolitera- 
tion Treaty   (Christopher,   Department   an- 
nouncement)    49 

Canada.   US  -Canada  Transboundary   Air 

Quality  Talks    26 

Congress 

Defense  Budgets  for  FY  1980  and  1981  (mes- 

■-age  to  the  Congress)    48 

14th  Report  on  Cyprus  (message  to  the  Con- 
gress)    41 

Nicaragua  (Christopher) 56 

Review  of  U.S.  Policy  in  Europe  (Vest)  .  .  .  .36 

SALT  II — A  Summation  (Vance) 24 

US  -Australia  Agreement  on   Nuclear  Energy 

(message  to  the  Congress)  49 

Cuba 

Background  on  the  Question  of  Soviet  Troops 

in  Cuba 9 

Interview    on    CBS-TV    Morning    News 

(Vance)    19 

Interview  on  NBC's  "Today"  Show  (Vance)  18 
President  Carter's  News  Conference  of  October 

9  (excerpts) 12 

Question-and-Answer  Session   Following   New 

York  Address  (Vance)    16 

SALT  II  —  A  Summation  (  Vance) 24 

Soviet  Troops  in  Cuba  and  SALT  (Carter)  .  .  .7 
Cyprus.    I4th   Report  on  Cyprus  (message  to 

the  Congress)    41 

Denmark.   Fisheries  Agreement  With  Den- 
mark, Faroe  Islands 43 

Department  and  Foreign  Service 

U.S.    Ambassadors  to   Middle   East  Countries, 

October  1979 46 

U.S.    Ambassadors   to   Western   Hemisphere 

Countries,  October  1979 59 

Economics 

Currents    of   Change    in    Latin    America 

(Vance)   13 

Review  of  U.S.  Policy  in  Europe  (Vest) ...  .36 

Egypt 

Anniversary  of  the  Camp  David   Agreements 
(Begin,  Carter,  Sadat,  Vance) 47 


Middle  East:  Vision  of  Peace  (Brzezinski)  .  .44 

Energy 

Agreement  With  Mexico  on  Natural  Gas  (Car- 
ter, joint  announcement) 58 

Common  Needs  in  a  Diverse  World  (Vance)  .  1 

Environment — The  Quiet  Crisis  (Lake) 27 

U.S. -Australia  Agreement  on  Nuclear  Energy 
(message  to  the  Congress)  49 

Environment 

Environment — The  Quiet  Crisis  (Lake) 27 

Negotiations  To  Protect  Migratory  Wild  Ani- 
mals     31 

World  Forests  (memorandum  from  President 
Carter)   29 

Europe 

Chionology:  September  1979 61 

President  Carter's  News  Conference  of  October 
9  (excerpts) 12 

Review  of  U.S.  Policy  in  Europe  (Vest)  .  .  .  .36 

Fisheries.  Fisheries  Agreement  With  Denmark, 
Faroe  Islands 43 

Human  Rights.  Fourth  Anniversary  of  the  Hel- 
sinki Final  Act  (Carter) 39 

Israel 

Anniversary  of  the  Camp  David  Agreements 
(Begin,  Carter,  Sadat,  Vance) 47 

Middle  East:  Vision  of  Peace  (Brzezinski)  .  .44 

Kampuchea 

Kampuchea  Donations 62 

President  Carter's  News  Conference  of  October 
9  (excerpts) 12 

Latin  America  and  the  Caribbean 

Chronology:  September  1979 61 

Currents  of  Change  in  Latin  America 
(Vance)    13 

US  Ambassadors  to  Western  Hemisphere 
Countries,  October  1979 59 

Liberia.  President  Carter  Meets  With  Zairean 
and  Liberian  Presidents  (White  House  state- 
ments)   20 

Mexico 

Agreement  with  Mexico  on  Natural  Gas  (Car- 
ter, joint  announcement) 58 

Visit  of  Mexican  President  Lopez  Portillo 
(joint  press  statement) 57 

Middle  East 

Chronology:  September  1979 61 

Common  Needs  in  a  Diverse  World  (Vance)  .  I 

Interview  on  NBC's  "Today"  Show  (Vance)18 

President  Carter's  News  Conference  of  October 
9  (excerpts) 12 

Question-and-Answer  Session  Following  New 
York  Address  (Vance)    16 

U.S.  Ambassadors  to  Middle  East  Countries, 
October  1979 46 

Military  Affairs.  Defense  Budgets  for  FY 
1980  and  1981  (message  to  the  Congress)  48 

Monetary  Affairs.  President  Carter's  News 
Conference  of  October  9  (excerpts) 12 

Nicaragua.  Nicaragua  (Christopher) 56 

North  Atlantic  Treaty  Organization 

NATO's  Fourth  Decade — Defense  and  Detente 
(Brzezinski.  Mondale) 32 

Review  of  US    Policy  in  Europe  (Vest) .  .  .  .36 

SALT  II  —  A  Summation  ( Vance) 24 

U.S.  Commitment  to  Western  Europe 
(Vance)    35 

Nuclear  Policy 

Bangladesh  Joins  Nonproliferation  Treaty 
(Christopher,  Department  announcement)  .49 

U.S. -Australia  Agreement  on  Nuclear  Energy 
(message  to  the  Congress)   49 

Oceans.  Law  of  the  Sea  Negotiations  (Rich- 
ardson)   50 

Panama 

Panama  Acquires  Jurisdiction  Over  the  Canal 
Zone  (Mondale)  54 


Panama  Canal  Act  of  1979  (Carter) 55 

Petroleum.    Saudi    Arabian   Oil   Production 

(White  House  statement)    45 

Presidential  Documents 

Agreement  With  Mexico  on  Natural  Gas.  .  .  .58 

Anniversary  of  the  Camp  David  Agreements  47 

Defense  Budgets  for  FY  1980  and  1981    48 

14th  Report  on  Cyprus   41 

Fourth  Anniversary  of  the  Helsinki  Final  Act  39 

MX  Missile  System 25 

Panama  Canal  Act  of  1 979 55 

President  Carter's  News  Conference  of  October 

9  (excerpts) 12 

Soviet  Troops  in  Cuba  and  SALT 7 

United  Nations  Day.   1979  (proclamation)   .  .   ii 
U.S. -Australia  Agreement   on   Nuclear  Ener- 

gy  '*9 

World  Forests 29 

Publications.  GPO  Sales  Publications   43 

Refugees.  Common  Needs  in  a  Diverse  World 
(Vance)    I 

Saudi  Arabia 

Letter  of  Credence  (Alhegelan) 46 

Saudi  Arabian  Oil  Production  (White  House 
statement)    45 

Science  and  Technology.  U.N  Conference  on 
Science  and  Technology  for  Development 
(Carter.  Hesburgh) 51 

Treaties 

Current  Actions    59 

Fisheries  Agreement  With  Denmark,  Faroe  Is- 
lands   43 

U.S. -Australia  Agreement  on  Nuclear  Energy 
(message  to  the  Congress)  49 

U.S.S.R. 

Background  on  the  Question  of  Soviet  Troops 
in  Cuba 9 

President  Carter's  News  Conference  of  October 
9  (excerpts) 12 

Question-and-Answer  Session  Following  New 
York  Address  (  Vance)    16 

Soviet  Troops  in  Cuba  and  SALT  (Carter)  .  .  .7 

United  Nations 

Common  Needs  in  a  Diverse  World  (Vance)  .  1 

The  152  Members  of  the  United  Nations 6 

United  Nations — A  Profile 5 

UN.  Conference  on  Science  and  Technology 
for  Development  (Carter.  Hesburgh) 51 

United  Nations  Day.  1979  (proclamation)   .  .  .ii 

U.S.  Ambassador  to  the  United  Nations  (bio- 
graphic data) 2 

U.S.  Delegation  to  the  34th  U.N.  General  As- 
sembly    3 

Zaire.  President  Carter  Meets  With  Zairean 
and  Liberian  Presidents  (White  House  state- 
ments)   20 


Name  Index 

Alhegelan.  Faisal 46 

Begin.  Menahem   47 

Benson.  Lucy  Wilson   21 

Brzezinski.  Zbigniew 32,  44 

Carter,  President ii,  7,  12,  25 

29,  39,  41,  47,  48,  51,  55,  58 

Christopher.  Warren 49,  56 

Hesburgh.  Theodore  M 51 

Lake.  Anthony   27 

Mondale,  Vice  President 32,  54 

Richardson.  Elliot  L   50 

Sadat,  Anwar  al-    47 

Vance,  Secretary  1,  13,  16,  18,  19,  24,  35,  47 
Vest ,  George  S 36 


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Department 
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bulletin 


December  19  79 


Record  of  United  States  Foreign  Policy  /Volume  79  /  Nunnber  2033 


Departntpnt  of  State 

bulletin 


Volume  79  /  Number  2033  /  December  1979 


Cover: 

Art  by  Juanita  Adams, 
assistant  editor. 
Department  of  State  Bulletin 


The  Department  of  State  Bulletin, 
published  by  the  Office  of  Public  Com- 
munication in  the  Bureau  of  Public 
Affairs,  is  the  official  record  of  U.S. 
foreign  policy.  Its  purpose  is  to  provide 
the  public,  the  Congress,  and  govern- 
ment agencies  with  information  on 
developments  in  U.S.  foreign  relations 
and  the  work  of  the  Department  of 
State  and  the  Foreign  Service. 

The  Blilletin's  contents  include 
major  addresses  and  news  conferences 
of  the  President  and  the  Secretary  of 
State;  statements  made  before  congres- 
sional committees  by  the  Secretary 
and  other  senior  State  Department  of- 
ficials; special  features  and  articles  on 
international  affairs;  selected  press  re- 
leases issued  by  the  White  House,  the 
Department,  and  the  U.S.  Mission  to 
the  United  Nations;  and  treaties  and 
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CYRUS  R.  VANCE 

Secretary  of  State 

HOODING  CARTER  III 

Assistant  Secretary  for  Public  Affairs 

JOHN  CLARK  KIMBALL 

Chief,  Editorial  Division 

PHYLLIS  A.  YOUNG 
Editor 

JUANITA  ADAMS 
Assistant  Editor 


CO]\TE]\TS 


REFUGEES 

1    Kampuchean  Refugees:  Urgent  Need  for  Worldwide  Relief  (Matthew  Nimetz) 

4   Senators'  Report  on  Refugees  (Max  Baucus.  President  Carter.  John  C.  Danforth. 

James  R.  Sasser) 
7   U.S.  Relief  Efforts  for  Kampuchea  (President  Carter) 

10   U.N.  Pledging  Conference  for  Khmer  Refugees  (Secretary  Vance) 

1  I    Refugees — An  International  Obligation  (Harry  F.  Young] 


THE  PRESIDENT 

18   Iran  and  Energy 

THE  SECRETARY 

21    Where  We  Stand  With  SALT  II 

23   Question-and-Answer   Session    in 

Gainesville 
25   News  Conference  of  October  3  1 

AFRICA 

29   Communism    in    Africa    (David  D. 
Newsom) 

ARMS  CONTROL 

32  Senate  Report  on  SALT  11  Verification 

( White  House  Statement) 

EAST  ASIA 

33  U.S. -China  Trade  Agreement  (Mes- 

sage to  the  Congress.  Proclamation. 
Text  of  Agreement) 

ECONOMICS 

35  Opportunities  and  Challenges  From  the 
MTN  (Julius  L.  Katz) 

ENERGY 

38  Crude  Oil  Transportation  Arrangements 

(Julius  L.  Katz) 

39  Publications 

EUROPE 

40  An  Overview  of  U.S. -Soviet  Relations 

(Marshall  D.  Shulman) 

41  Northern   Ireland   (Department  State- 

ment) 

42  Visit  of  His  Holiness  Pope  John  Paul  II 

(White  House  Statement) 

43  15th  Report  on  Cyprus  (Message  to  the 

Congress) 

44  Czechoslovak  Dissidents  (Department 

Statement) 

GENERAL 

45  U.S.    Foreign   Policy   Achievements 

(Matthew  Nimetz) 


MIDDLE  EAST 

49  Situation   in   Iran   (President  Carter. 

Secretary   Vance.    While  House  An- 
nouncements) 

50  Israelis  and   Palestinians   (Donald  F. 

McHenrx) 

52  Eighth   Report  on   the   Sinai   Support 

Mission  (Message  to  the  Congress) 

SOUTH  ASIA 

53  Situation   in   Afghanistan   (Harold  H. 

Saunders) 

54  Afghan   Refugees   (Harold  H.  Saun- 

ders) 

54  Publications 

UNITED  NATIONS 

55  Economic  Dialogue — A  Challenge  to 

Our  Times  (Donald  F.  McHenry) 

57  Kampuchean  Credentials   (Richard  W. 

Pelree) 

58  Current  State  of  the  World   Economy 

(Robert  D.  H  or  mats) 

59  Venda  Homeland  (Herbert  K.  Reis) 

63   U.N.    Reforms    (Charles    William 
Maynes) 

WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 

65   OAS   General    Assembly   Convenes 
(Secretary  Vance) 


TREATIES 

67  Current  Actions 

CHRONOLOGY 

69  October  1979 

69  PRESS  RELEASES 

PUBLICATIONS 

70  GPO  Sales 

INDEX 


DEC  29 

DEPOSITORY 


Clockwise  from  left: 

A  pair  of  undernourished  Kampuchean  girts  at  the  Sa  Keo 
refugee  center  in  Thailand  wait  their  turn  for  a  bath  at  a 
pond  in  the  camp. 

A  Kampuchean  refugee  eats  rice  gruel  at  the  Klong  Kai 
Tueng  temporary  camp  in  Kampuchea  near  the  Thai- 
Kampuchea  border. 

Kampuchean  refugees  seek  some  rest  in  a  crude  shelter  at 
the  Klong  Kai  Tueng  temporary  camp. 


KAMPIJCHEA]\  REFUGEES:         URGE]\T  ]\EED 
FOR  WORLDWIDE  RELIEF 


by  Matthew  Nimetz 

Statement  before  the  Subcommittee 
on  Arms  Control.  Oceans,  Interna- 
tional Operations  and  Environment  of 
the  Senate  Foreign  Relations  Commit- 
tee on  November  8,  1979.^ 

We  meet  today  at  a  time  of  extraor- 
dinary urgency.  Famine,  dislocation, 
and  warfare  in  Kampuchea  threaten  the 
lives  of  the  Khmer  people.  Of  a  popu- 
lation that  numbered  between  7  and  8 
million  in  1975,  perhaps  a  third  have 
died  in  the  last  4  years.  Many  more 
will  die  in  the  coming  months  unless 
action  is  taken  now  to  end  this  sense- 
less inhumanity.  An  effective 
worldwide  relief  effort  can  save  hun- 
dreds of  thousands  who  would  other- 
wise die.  Worldwide  indignation  at  the 
death  and  suffering  in  Kampuchea  has 
contributed  to  a  climate  in  which  such 
a  program  can  be  pursued. 

Successful  relief  activities  require 
the  active  support  of  all  the  political 
authorities  in  Kampuchea,  as  well  as 
action  by  the  world  community  in 
coordinating  contributions  and  dis- 
tribution of  relief  supplies.  And  clearly 
the  U.S.  role  in  this  essential  human- 
itarian cause  will  depend  on  close 
cooperation  among  the  Administration, 
the  Congress,  and  private  voluntary 
agencies. 

The  Administration  is  committed  to 
this  urgent  humanitarian  task.  The 
presence  of  the  First  Lady,  Rosalynn 
Carter,  in  Thailand  today,  to  view  the 
situation  firsthand,  is  a  manifestation 
of  the  President  and  Mrs.  Carter's  per- 
sonal concern  for  the  Kampuchean 
tragedy.  On  Tuesday,  Mrs.  Carter  will 
be  meeting  with  representatives  of  vol- 
untary agencies  to  discuss  her  trip  and 
plans  for  future  relief  efforts. 

Mr.  Chairman  [Claiborne  Pell  of 
Rhode  Island],  we  also  welcome  your 
personal  efforts  on  behalf  of  this  effort, 
including  your  participation  in  the 
delegation  to  the  U.N.  pledging  con- 
ference on  Kampuchean  refugees  ear- 
lier this  week.  1  am  honored  to  be  a 
part  of  this  group  of  concerned  organi- 
zations and  individuals,  and  I  welcome 
your  ideas  on  ways  we  can  improve 
U.S.  and  international  contributions  to 
the  survival  of  the  Khmer  people. 

U.S.  Policy 

Before  I  outline  relief  efforts  to  date 
I  and  options  for  assuring  that  assistance 


gets  to  those  in  need,  let  me  just  say 
that  the  Administration's  policy  is  sim- 
ple: We  will  do  everything  possible  to 
support  international  organization  and 
voluntary  agency  efforts  in  providing 
humanitarian  assistance  to  the  be- 
leaguered and  starving  Khmer  people. 
Our  purpose  is  to  save  lives. 

Since  the  moment  we  began  to  re- 
ceive indications  of  impending  famine, 
we  have  sought  to  alert  the  interna- 
tional community  to  the  dimensions  of 
the  potential  tragedy.  We  have  un- 
ceasingly supported  relief  agencies 
most  likely  to  work  out  arrangements 
with  the  Kampuchean  authorities  for 
the  necessary  delivery  and  distribution 
of  food  and  medical  supplies  to  all 
Khmer,  regardless  of  political  affilia- 
tion. We  will  work  closely  with  the 
Congress  to  insure  that  the  United 
States  contributes  a  generous  share  of 
the  required  funds,  food  commodities, 
supplies,  and  logistical  support.  In  this 
respect,  we  are  gratified  that  the  Con- 
gress is  moving  expeditiously  to  au- 
thorize and  appropriate  funds  for 
Khmer  relief.  We  are  also  encouraged 
by  the  response  of  other  governments 
at  the  U.N.  pledging  conference  in 
New  York  on  Monday,  at  which  an 
aggregate  of  $210  million  was  pledged. 


It  is  all  the  more  important  to  accel- 
erate our  joint  efforts  now  that  we  have 
a  clearer  idea  of  both  the  needs  of  the 
Khmer  people  and  the  political  and 
logistical  problems  of  providing  hu- 
manitarian assistance  in  a  country  with 
contested  authorities  and  a  war-ravaged 
infrastructure.  The  worst  predictions 
have  been  realized. 

The  picture  of  a  new  holocaust  is  all 
too  graphic  and  horrifying  from  media 
coverage  and  reports  of  delegations  of 
Members  of  Congress,  governors.  Ad- 
ministration officials,  and  representa- 
tives of  private  groups.  The  vulnerable 
younger  and  older  generations  of 
Khmer  are  already  decimated,  and 
there  appear  to  be  few  resources  within 
Kampuchea  to  sustain  those  who  have 
so  far  escaped  starvation  and  disease. 
At  the  same  time,  however,  a  concerted 
international  relief  program  is  under- 
way. I  should  like  to  review  briefly 
what  has  been  done  to  date  and  then 
look  at  the  challenge  ahead. 

Situation  to  Date 

The  U.S.  Government  has  been  con- 
cerned about  the  possibility  of  mass 
starvation  among  the  Khmer  people 
since  Vietnam's  invasion  and  occupa- 


COUNSELOR  AND 

ACTING  U.S.  COORDINATOR 

FOR  REFUGEE  AFFAIRS 

Matthew  Nimetz  was  born  June  17,  1939, 
in  New  York  and  received  degrees  from  Wil- 
liams College  and  the  Harvard  Law  School 
At  Williams  he  was  President  of  Phi  Beta 
Kappa  and  valedictorian  of  his  class.  At  Har- 
vard he  was  President  of  the  Harvard  Law 
Review.  He  also  has  an  MA  from  Balliol 
College,  Oxford  University,  where  he  was  a 
Rhodes  Scholar. 

Mr.  Nimetz  was  a  partner  in  the  New  York 
law  firm  of  Simpson  Thacher  &  Bartlett.  He 
was  also  a  commissioner  of  the  Port  Author- 
ity of  New  York  and  New  Jersey  and  a 
member  of  the  Health  Advisory  Council  of 
the  State  of  New  York.  He  served  as  the 
Executive  Diector  of  Governor-elect  Hugh  L. 
Carey's  transition  council  (1974). 

Mr.  Nimetz  was  a  law  clerk  to  Supreme 
Court  Justice  John  M.  Harlan  (1965-67)  and 
was  a  staff  assistant  to  President  Johnson 
(July  1967-January  1969). 

He  was  sworn  in  as  Counselor  of  the  De- 


partment of  State  on  April  8,  1977.  and  in 
this  capacity  serves  as  a  senior  adviser  to  the 
Secretary  of  State  on  a  wide  range  of  foreign 
policy  matters.  He  has  been  actively  involved 
in  issues  concerning  the  eastern  Mediterra- 
nean, European,  and  East-West  relations, 
SALT,  and  Mexican  affairs. 

Secretary  Vance  named  Mr.  Nimetz  Act- 
ing U.S.  Coordinator  for  Refugee  Affairs  on 
November  1,  1979. 


tion  of  Kampuchea  began  in  December 
of  last  year.  The  invasion  followed  al- 
most 4  years  of  despotic  and  brutal  rule 
by  the  Pol  Pot  regime.  As  a  result  of 
the  regime's  savagery  against  its  own 
people,  2-3  million  Khmer  may  have 
perished — out  of  the  country's  esti- 
mated 1975  population  of  7  to  8  mil- 
lion. 

The  timing  of  the  Vietnamese  inva- 
sion at  the  height  of  the  rice  harvest 
aggravated  the  situation.  Most  of  the 
rice  crop  was  lost  because  both  the 
Vietnamese  and  the  forces  under  Pol 
Pot  tried  to  limit  each  other's  effec- 
tiveness through  food-denial  and  crop- 
destruction  tactics. 

In  addition,  to  avoid  fighting  or 
harassment  in  the  countryside,  the 
population  clustered  along  lines  of 
communication  and  around  troop  con- 
centrations which  had  the  effect  of  re- 
ducing the  numbers  of  people  available 
to  cultivate  the  land.  Competing  mili- 
tary forces  sought  to  restrict  move- 
ments of  the  people  into  areas  where 
they  would  be  subject  to  the  other 
side's  control,  thus  restricting  normal 
agricultural  activity.  As  a  result,  we 
estimate  that  only  a  minimal  percentage 
of  the  spring  crop  was  planted,  and 
persistent  warfare  is  now  impairing  the 
principal  December  harvest  once  again. 
Moreover,  hungry  and  desperate  people 
have  eaten  most  of  the  seed  intended 
for  the  next  crop. 

The  tragic  consequence  is  that  wide- 
spead  famine  is  already  evident.  Its 
victims  have  little  resistance  against 
disease,  and  many  of  them  may  not 
even  have  the  energy  to  seek  food  or 
medical  care.  We  hear  reports  that 
many  people  are  too  weak  even  to  lift 
food  cartons  off  relief  trucks.  A  whole 
generation  of  Khmer  children  faces 
death,  and  Khmer  women  are  so  mal- 
nourished that  few  children  survive  the 
first  days  of  life.  The  fortunate  few 
with  the  strength  to  make  the  journey 
through  ravaged  and  often  hostile  ter- 
ritory to  Thailand  in  search  of  food  and 
safety  are  so  weakened  that  they  are 
close  to  starvation  by  the  end  of  their 
journey. 

As  the  Khmer  are  moved  away  from 
the  border  area  to  camps  like  Sa  Keo, 
where  they  can  receive  medical  treat- 
ment and  food  on  a  regular  basis,  the 
death  rate  has  dropped  from  40  per  day 
to  about  25  per  day.  We  hope  that  these 
numbers  will  continue  to  fall,  but  the 
resistance  of  these  people  to  disease 
has  been  severely  weakened  by  the  ab- 
sence of  an  adequate  diet. 

The  political  consequences  of  this 
tragedy  are  equally  troubling.  Cur- 
rently 35,000  Khmer  are  located  in  a 
new  Thai  holding  center  at  Sa  Keo,  and 
another  200,000  are  poised  along  the 


border.  New  groups  are  fleeing  the 
interior  of  Kampuchea  in  search  of 
food  and  safety  from  the  warring  fac- 
tions. They  will  probably  move  into 
Thailand  at  the  first  sign  of  increased 
Vietnamese  pressure.  The  Thai  and  the 
United  Nations  High  Commissioner  for 
Refugees  (UNHCR)  are  preparing  for 
another  influx — which  may  occur  very 
soon — of  those  on  the  border  plus 
others  from  the  interior  that  could  lead 
to  a  total  of  300.000-400,000  refu- 
gees. We  are  grateful  that  the  Thai 
Government  has  established  a  policy  of 
accepting  the  Khmer  refugees,  making 
contingency  plans  for  the  difficult  days 
ahead  and  cooperating  with  concerned 
governments  and  international  relief 
organizations. 

But  the  new  surge  of  Khmer  refugees 
will  certainly  add  to  Thailand's  exist- 
ing burden  of  sheltering  150,000  refu- 
gees from  Laos  and  Vietnam  and  from 
earlier  waves  of  migration  from  Kam- 
puchea. The  prospects  of  continued 
Vietnamese  military  operations  and  a 
burgeoning  refugee  population  consti- 
tute a  threat  to  Thailand  and  remain  a 
seriously  destabilizing  factor  in  the  re- 
gion and  a  source  of  great  concern  for 
the  United  States  and  the  Association 
of  South  East  Asian  Nations. 


Relief  Efforts 

Let  me  review  briefly  the  relief  ef- 
fort that  is  underway.  Negotiations 
began  in  June  between  the  International 
Committee  of  the  Red  Cross  (ICRC) 
and  UNICEF  and  the  Phnom  Penh  au- 
thorities. We  initiated  diplomatic  de- 
marches in  over  30  countries  in  late 
August  to  urge  them  to  reinforce  our 
efforts  with  the  Soviets.  Vietnamese, 
and  Chinese  to  permit  an  international 
relief  effort  in  Kampuchea.  Finally,  on 
September  26.  ICRC/UNICEF  received 
permission  to  send  a  joint  operating 
team  into  Kampuchea.  On  October  13, 
ICRC  and  UNICEF  established  their 
mission  in  Phnom  Penh  and  initiated  a 
daily  airlift  to  Phnom  Penh  of  about  14 
metric  tons  of  foodstuffs  and  other 
supplies. 

On  October  19,  the  ICRC  and  UNI- 
CEF announced  that  the  estimated 
needs  for  their  relief  program  would  be 
$111  million  for  the  first  6  months,  as- 
suming cooperation  with  the  Kam- 
puchean  authorities  on  delivery  and 
monitoring  of  distribution.  This  esti- 
mate was  calculated  on  the  basis  of 
providing  some  165,000  tons  of  rice, 
15,000  tons  of  sugar,  and  8,000  tons  of 
edible  oils  over  that  6-month  period. 
The  Phnom  Penh  authorities  calculated 
that  these  quantities  were  necessary  to 
provide  food  for  some  2Vi  million 
people  whom  they  stated  were  facing 
serious  food  shortages. 


Department  of  State  Bulletin, 

In  addition,  by  October  31.  thei 
ICRC  and  UNICEF  (working  with  the, 
World  Food  Program)  as  well  as  pri-| 
vate  agencies,  principally  Oxfam, 
had  also  been  able  to  land  about  9.400 
metric  tons  of  foodstuffs  at  the  port  of 
Kampong  Som.  These  agencies  expect 
to  double  that  tonnage  into  the  port  in 
November,  and  in  December  they  hope 
to  meet  the  estimated  need  of  30,000 
tons  per  month  using  all  means  of 
delivery — sea.  air.  and  land.  However, 
when  the  level  of  30.000  tons  per 
month  is  realized  in  December,  the  in- 
ternational agencies  must  still  make  up 
for  the  long  period  prior  to  that  date 
when  they  were  delivering  far  less  than 
the  needed  1,000  tons  per  day. 

To  meet  the  urgent  need,  and  to  fol- 
low up  the  work  of  the  Geneva  confer- 
ence [on  refugees  July  20-21,  1979] 
Secretary  General  Waldheim  convened 
a  pledging  conference  for  humanitarian 
relief  to  Kampuchea  on  November  5. 
Seventy-five  countries  and  observer 
delegations  participated.  ICRC/ 
UNICEF  sought  $250  million  for  a 
year's  program  for  IVi  million  people 
in  Kampuchea,  and  UNHCR  sought 
$60  million  for  8  months  of  operations 
to  care  for  300.000  Khmer  fleeing  to 
Thailand.  At  the  conclusion  of  the 
conference.  Secretary  General  Wald- 
heim announced  that  approximately 
$210  million  in  cash  and  commodities 
had  been  pledged.  The  U.S.  pledge,  a 
reiteration  of  President  Carter's  Oc- 
tober 24  announcement,  was  an  aggre- 
gate of  $69  million,  including  $30  mil- 
lion in  cash  and  commodities  for  Kam- 
puchean  relief,  the  Administration's 
support  of  congressional  efforts  to  pro- 
vide an  additional  $30  million  for 
Kampucheans.  and  $9  million  for  thei 
care  of  Khmer  refugees  in  Thailand. 

Adequate   funding   for  the   initial 
phase  of  the  ICRC/UNICEF  relief  ef- 
fort thus  appears  to  be  available,   al- 
though the  ICRC/UNICEF  operation: 
has  an  immediate  need  for  more  cash 
The  major  difficulty  facing  us  now  is  toiil 
assure  the  delivery  and  distribution  ofli 
essential  food  and  other  supplies  withinlif 
Kampuchea.    Supplies   reportedly   areJn 
already  arriving  in  the  port  of  Kam-I 
pong  Som  and  Phnom  Penh  faster  thanlj 
they  can  be  unloaded  and  distributed.  |ii 
Political   restrictions  on  relief  opera- 
tions have   limited  efforts  to  a    100- 
kilometer  radius  around  Phnom  Penh. 
Food  and  medical  relief  have,  there- 
fore, not  been  getting  to  large  areas  of 
the  country,   particularly  to  western 
Kampuchea  where  they  are  most  des- 
perately needed. 

We  were  gratified  to  learn  on  Tues- 
day that  there  are  signs  that  some  ofBn 
these  obstacles  are  being  overcome. 
The  Phnom  Penh  authorities  are  appar- 
ently  becoming   more   receptive  toBj 


December  1979 

cooperating  with  tiie  international  relief 
.leencies.  in  particular,  we  are  in- 
tormed  that  they  have  approved  multi- 
ple flights  a  day  into  Phnom  Penh  and 
that  they  are  setting  up  their  own  relief 
committee  to  serve  as  a  liaison  with 
ICRC  and  UNICEF  officials  and  to 
coordinate  distributio.n.  They  have  also 
a|iparently  agreed  to  allow  two  truck 
convoys  beyond  the  original  100- 
kiiometer  radius  around  Phnom  Penh  to 
which  they  have  so  far  been  restricted. 
Just  prior  to  the  U.N.  pledging  confer- 
ence, the  Vietnamese  also  announced 
that  the  Mekong  River  would  be 
opened  to  shipments  of  relief  supplies. 
Wc  sincerely  hope  that  the  political 
authorities  in  Phnom  Penh  will  follow 
these  steps  with  further  moves  to  in- 
crease and  facilitate  relief  activities. 


Proposals 

Several  proposals  have  been  made  to 
break  what  has  appeared  until  this 
week  to  be  a  stalemate  between  those 
who  wish  to  speed  aid  to  all  needy 
Khmer  and  the  competing  Kampuchean 
authorities  who  want  to  prevent  diver- 
sion to  forces  under  each  other's  con- 
trol. As  you  know.  Senators  Sasser. 
Danforth,  and  Baucus,  during  their  re- 
cent trip  to  Kampuchea,  urged  au- 
thorities in  Phnom  Penh  to  permit  a 
"land  bridge"  to  bring  supplies  to 
population  centers  in  Kampuchea  by 
truck  convoy  from  Thailand. 

We  are  disappointed  that  the  Phnom 
Penh  authorities  have  so  far  not  ac- 
cepted this  idea.  The  limited  capacity 
of  the  unloading  facilities  and  railway 
service  from  the  port  of  Kampong 
Som.  as  well  as  the  logistical  and  fi- 
nancial burden  of  air  shipments  into 
Phnom  Penh,  preclude  delivery  of  more 
than  half  of  the  estimated  30,000  met- 
ric tons  needed  each  month.  Even  with 
the  addition  of  the  Mekong  route,  ex- 
perts believe  that  there  will  only  be  an 
additional  8,000  tons  per  month  avail- 
able by  this  means.  Thus,  without 
using  the  land  route,  we  can  at  best 
realize  only  21,000-23.000  tons  per 
month  of  the  30,000  ton  goal. 

The  truck-route  concept  also  has  the 
advantage  of  permitting  supplies  com- 
ing in  from  Thailand  to  be  distributed 
to  cities  and  population  centers  along 
the  way  to  Phnom  Penh.  These  supplies 
would  still  remain  under  the  supervi- 
sion of  the  ICRC  and  UNICEF  and 
would  be  distributed  with  the  agree- 
ment of  the  Phnom  Penh  authorities. 
On  their  return  trip  to  Thailand  for  ad- 
ditional supplies,  the  trucks  could 
again  be  used  to  redistribute  com- 
!  modifies  delivered  to  Phnom  Penh  via 
r  the  other  air,  sea.  and  river  routes. 

We  hope  the  Phnom  Penh  authorities 
,  will  reconsider  their  initial  reaction  to 


the  "land  bridge"  proposal.  I  would 
like  to  point  out.  however,  that  our 
continued  support  for  ICRC/UNICEF 
operations  on  behalf  of  Khmer  is  not 
contingent  on  acceptance  of  the  "land 
bridge"  proposal.  We  support  all  av- 
enues of  relief — sea,  river,  air,  and 
land. 

We  are  also  well  aware  of  your  own 
proposal  that  the  United  States,  unilat- 
erally or  in  concert  with  other  nations, 
launch  a  massive  airdrop  of  relief 
supplies  into  Kampuchea.  We  share 
your  concern  for  expediting  aid  to  the 
Khmer,  and  we  certainly  have  not 
eliminated  any  possible  means  of 
responding  to  this  challenge.  Your 
recommendation  is  receiving  serious 
consideration.  However,  we  should 
recognize  that  neither  the  U.S.  Gov- 
ernment nor  the  international  relief 
agencies  control  the  Kampuchean 
airspace,  and  there  is  at  present  no 
guarantee  that  planes  or  helicopters 
carrying  such  supplies  would  not  en- 
counter hostile  fire. 

In  the  coming  days  and  weeks,  we 
will  be  working  with  ICRC  and  UNI- 
CEF and  other  groups  involved  in 
Kampuchean  relief  to  explore  all  means 
of  assuring  that  relief  reaches  those 
who  need  it.  Starvation,  disease,  and 
dislocation  will  obviously  be  of  such 
magnitude  that  a  successful  program 
will  require  delivery  and  distribution 
by  a  wide  range  of  means.  Among  the 
possible  measures  to  be  taken  are  the 
following: 

•  Maximizing  use  of  the  Mekong 
River  route; 

•  Encouraging  the  French  proposal 
to  repair  the  railway  system  in  Kam- 
puchea; 

•  Seeking  an  increase  in  the  number 
of  ICRC/UNICEF  and  voluntary 
agency  personnel  in  Kampuchea; 

•  Increasing  the  number  of  planes 
resupplying  Phnom  Penh; 

•  Seeking  permission  to  use  airports 
in  addition  to  the  one  at  Phnom  Penh 
for  delivery  of  supplies  so  as  to  estab- 
lish new  centers  for  distribution; 

•  Expediting  delivery  of  sorely 
needed  trucks  to  Kampuchea; 

•  Urging  the  Soviets  and  the  Viet- 
namese to  work  with  us  to  obtain  per- 
mission for  increased  access  by  all 
routes — land.  sea.  river,  and  air; 

•  Increasing  support  to  the  UNHCR 
and  other  relief  organizations  for  as- 
sistance to  the  hundreds  of  thousands 
of  Khmer  presently  in  or  likely  to  seek 
refuge  in  Thailand; 

•  Seeking  methods  for  delivering 
humanitarian  supplies  to  those  in  need 
who  cannot  be  reached  by  truck  from 
Phnom  Penh,  including  those  living  in 
areas  controlled  by  Pol  Pot  and  other 
forces; 


•  Consulting  with  other  concerned 
governments  in  an  effort  to  form  a  con- 
sortium of  countries  to  respond  to 
ICRC/UNICEF  requests  for  support; 
and 

•  Encouraging  and  supporting  Amer- 
ican voluntary  agencies  in  bringing 
personnel  and  supplies  to  camps  along 
the  border  in  Thailand. 

We  will  also  be  working  with  the 
Congress  to  make  sure  that  we  are  able 
to  fulfill  our  pledges.  The  ICRC  and 
UNICEF  are  currently  hampered  by  the 
lack  of  ready  cash  since  most  contribu- 
tions have  not  yet  been  handed  over  to 
them.  We  are  planning  to  provide  them 
with  an  advance  of  cash  so  that  rice  can 
be  purchased  in  Thailand  for  immediate 
shipment  to  Kampuchea. 

We  are  pleased  that  the  House  and 
Senate  have  moved  quickly  to  pass  au- 
thorizing legislation  for  this  program 
and  have  also  quickly  reconciled  the 
differences  between  the  two  versions  of 
the  bill.  We  are  looking  forward  to 
passage  of  this  legislation  in  the  next 
few  days.  The  Administration  is  also 
impressed  with  the  speed  with  which 
House  and  Senate  conferees  have 
moved  to  include  $30  million  in  new 
funding  for  relief  to  victims  of  the 
famine  in  Kampuchea  in  the  conference 
committee  report  on  the  Foreign  As- 
sistance Appropriations  Act.  We  hope 
that  the  Congress  will  keep  in  mind  the 
urgent  need  for  contributions  in  cash. 
We  also  hope  the  Congress  will  provide 
the  Administration  sufficient  authority 
to  respond  immediately  to  emergency 
requests. 

The  American  response  will  ob- 
viously not  be  purely  a  governmental 
one.  Voluntary  agencies  are  taking  a 
major  role  in  organizing  contributions 
and  programs  for  Kampuchea  relief. 
The  President,  in  his  October  24th  an- 
nouncement, called  upon  all  Americans 
to  match  the  government  effort  by  sup- 
porting the  work  of  these  agencies. 

The  Congress  has  worked  effectively 
with  the  Administration  in  dramatizing 
the  Kampuchean  tragedy  to  American 
and  world  opinion  and  in  providing  a 
generous  share  of  the  resources  neces- 
sary for  an  effective  relief  operation. 
We  are  gratified  that  so  many  Members 
of  Congress  share  our  belief  that  this 
unfolding  human  calamity  compels  us 
to  show  our  compassion  by  taking 
whatever  action  is  required  to  avert  the 
destruction  of  the  Khmer  people.        D 


'  The  complete  transcript  of  the  hearings  will 
be  published  by  the  committee  and  will  be  avail- 
able from  the  Superintendent  of  Documents, 
U.S.  Government  Printing  Office,  Washington, 
D.C.  20402. 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


Senators^  Report 
oil  Refugees 


At  the  direction  of  President  Carter 
and  the  leadership  of  the  Senate,  Sen- 
ators James  R.  Sasser  (Tennessee). 
John  C.  Danforth  (Missouri),  and  Max 
Bauciis  (Montana)  went  on  a  human- 
itarian mission  to  Southeast  Asia  Oc- 
tober 19-26,  1979.  Following  are  re- 
marks by  President  Carter,  a  press 
briefing  the  three  Senators  held  in  the 
White  House,  and  the  te.xt  of  their  re- 
port, "The  Refugee  Situation  in  Thai- 
land and  Cambodia,"  released  on  Oc- 
tober 26. 


PRESIDENT'S  REMARKS, 
OCT.  26,  1979' 

My  first  comment  to  the  press  and  to 
the  American  people  is  one  of  thanks 
and  appreciation  on  behalf  of  all  of  our 
country  to  Senators  Sasser,  Baucus, 
and  Danforth,  who  have  just  returned 
from  a  visit  to  Thailand  and  Kam- 
puchea to  represent  our  nation  in  the 
analysis  of  what  can  be  done  to  al- 
leviate the  tragedy  that  is  taking  place 
in  that  country. 

It's  been  estimated  that  almost  half 
the  people  of  Kampuchea  have  lost 
their  lives  in  the  last  few  years.  And  at 
the  present  time,  hundreds  of  thousands 
of  people  in  that  unfortunate  country, 
and  some  refugees  that  have  crossed 
the  Thai  border,  are  now  at  the  point  of 
death  because  of  starvation. 

Our  country  has  been  encouraging — 
through  the  United  Nations  and  also 
through  the  International  Red  Cross — a 
means  by  which  we  could  get  food  to 
those  people,  over  the  obstacles  created 
by  the  Vietnamese  and  the  Kampu- 
chean  authorities  of  all  kinds.  We  have 
discussed  this  matter  in  the  last  few 
minutes.  Senators  Sasser  and  Baucus 
and  Danforth  have  given  me  a  report  of 
what  they  observed  there.  They  will 
answer  questions  for  you  in  a  few  min- 
utes. 

We  are  prepared  as  a  nation — my 
own  Administration  and  the  Congress 
—  to  proceed  expeditiously  in  every 
possible  way  to  alleviate  the  extant 
suffering.  I  will  ask  Dick  Clark,  former 
Senator  now  in  charge  of  our  refugee 
prograiTi.  to  represent  me  directly.  The 
State  Department  and  I  will  give  him 
full  authority  and  support  throughout 
all  the  agencies  of  government  to  make 
his  administration  of  relief  to  those 
people  effective.  As  the  Senators  have 
just  described  to  me,  it's  mandatory  for 
effectiveness  to  deal  with  the  starving 


people  and  deliver  aid  through  the 
United  Nations  and  also  through  the 
Red  Cross,  not  on  a  unilateral  basis. 

We  have  had  some  discouraging 
word  from  the  officials  in  Phnom  Penh. 
We  hope  that  this  is  a  temporary  cir- 
cumstance and  that  because  of  world 
concern,  that  they  would  modify  their 
positions  and  permit  a  land  bridge  to  be 
formed  so  that  food  can  be  brought  in 
through  Thailand,  over  the  border,  to 
the  people  who  are  suffering  so  greatly, 
primarily  by  truck. 

I  might  add  one  other  thing:  that  1 
have  agreed  with  the  Senators  that  it 
would  be  important  for  them  to  talk 
directly  to  Secretary  General  Waldheim 
of  the  United  Nations,  to  give  him  a 
first-hand  report  and  also  to  seek  his 
continuing  support  for  the  effort  that  all 
of  us  are  joining  in  helping. 

I  want  to  say  that  the  Thai  Govern- 
ment has  performed  nobly  in  preparing 
and  permitting  a  haven  for  the  starving 
Kampucheans  and  are  cooperating  in 
every  possible  way  to  get  food  to  the 
refugees  who  now  are  living  on  the 
borderline  of  death  in  their  own  coun- 
try. 

I'd  like  to  turn  the  podium  over  to 
Senator  Sasser,  who  was  the  leader  of 
this  group,  and  let  him  make  a  report  to 
you,  and  then  he  and  Senators  Baucus 
and  Danforth  will  answer  questions  that 
you  might  have. 


PRESS  BRIEFING, 
OCT.  26,  1979^ 

Senator  Sasser:  As  many  of  you 
know.  Senator  Danforth  and  Senator 
Baucus  and  I,  at  the  request  of  the 
majority  and  minority  leadership  of  the 
U.S.  Senate  and  also  at  the  request  of 
President  Carter,  journeyed  to  South- 
east Asia  some  6  days  ago.  Ours  was  a 
humanitarian  mission,  an  effort  to  find 
some  way  to  bring  relief  to  the  suffer- 
ing people  of  Indochina  and  Southeast 
Asia. 

We  saw  on  our  arrival  in  Thailand 
three  refugee  concentration  areas.  Here 
we  saw  people  in  make-shift  hospitals 
lying  on  the  ground  covered  only  by  a 
plastic  sheeting  held  up  by  poles,  with 
the  living  and  the  dying  and  the  dead 
all  together. 

We  were  told  that  malaria  was  in 
epidemic  proportions.  The  only  noise 
you  heard  in  the  refugee  concentration 
areas  was  the  cough  of  children  with 
tuberculosis.   There  was  no  laughter; 


there  was  no  crying  among  the  chil. 
dren.  There  were  emaciated  people  ir. 
final  stages  of  malnutrition. 

We  journeyed  to  Phnom  Penh  ant 
there  discussed  with  the  authorities  tht 
possibility  of  opening  up  an  overlanc 
land  route  from  Thailand  into  Cam 
bodia.  We  have  been  told  by  the  repre 
sentatives  of  the  International  Rec 
Cross  and  also  by  UNICEF  and  b) 
others  that  this  is  the  only  practicable 
means  to  deliver  the  total  amount  ol 
foodstuffs  and  medicines  which  have 
been  calculated  to,  I  think,  30,000  tons 
a  month.  This  is  the  only  practicable 
way  to  deliver  this  amount  of  food  anc 
this  amount  of  medicine. 

We  made  our  proposal  in  Phnom 
Penh.  We  were  told  the  proposal  would 
be  seriously  considered  and  seriousl)] 
studied.  The  authorities  there  in  Phnom 
Penh  admitted  that  they  did  not  havq 
the  capacity  to  feed  2,250,000  of  theiil 
population  of  slightly  over  4  millioni 
They  admitted  to  us  that  malaria  was 
raging  at  epidemic  proportions.  They 
admitted  to  us  that  they  needed  some 
help. 

We  and  the  other  countries  of  the 
world  are  offering  this  help,  and  the 
only  way  to  deliver  it  is  by  land  rout0 
from  Thailand  into  Cambodia.  We'r^ 
agreeable  to  it.  The  Vietnamese  sa)| 
they  will  protect  the  trucks  and  the 
convoys  and  the  drivers.  So  it's  only 
the  regime  in  Phnom  Penh  whicH 
stands  in  the  way,  and  they  are  the  onesi 
who  must  say  "yes,"  and  if  the) 
don't,  tens  of  thousands  of  people,  wd 
believe,  will  die  and  perish  over  tha 
next  30-60-90  days. 

Q.  Haven't  thev  already  said  "no" 
today? 

Senator  Sasser:  At  first  blush,  this 
would  appear  to  be  a  "no,"  but  we'rQ 
going  to  persevere  in  our  efforts  to  get 
a  "yes."  Senator  Danforth  and  Senatoii 
Baucus  and  I  are  going  to  meet  with  thai 
Secretary  General  of  the  United  Na- 
tions, and  we're  going  to  maintain  th^ 
pressure.  We're  advised  by  those  ex^ 
perienced  in  these  matters  that  on  occa-i 
sion  a  "no"  has  come  to  mean  aJ 
"yes"  in  a  short  period  of  time.  ' 

Q.  What  kind  of  time  are  you 
talking  about?  How  long  can  you 
wait? 

Senator  Sasser:  I'll  let  Senator 
Danforth  answer  that. 

Senator  Danforth:  Thank  you.  Let 
me  just  say  this.  The  situation  that  we 
saw  on  the  border  between  Thailand 
and  Cambodia  was  absolutely  dreadful. 
It  defies  the  ability  of  a  person  with 
words  to  describe  it.  and.  therefore,  we 
took  some  slides  and  showed  them  to 
the  President. 


December  1979 


When  people  see  in  a  news  magazine 
a  picture  of  a  starving  child,  they  think 
that's  one  starving  child.  But  when  you 
spend  hour  after  hour  looking  at  people 
who  are  dying,  when  you  see  little 
babies  who  are  wizened  up  like  little 
old  men,  when  you  see  people  who  are 
so  weak  that  they  can't  even  travel  a 
hundred  yards  to  get  a  little  medical 
attention,  you  realize  what  a  desperate 
situation  it  is.  And  we  understand  that 
the  situation  within  Cambodia,  par- 
ticularly in  the  rural  areas,  is  even 
worse  than  what  we  saw,  because  at 
least  the  people  who  got  out  were  able 
to  walk  out.  There  are  those  who  are 
even  weaker  within  Cambodia. 

Hundreds  of  thousands,  maybe  mil- 
lions, of  people  face  death  in  a  country 
v\here,   as  the  President  said,   almost 
half  of  the  population  has  already  died. 
There  is  absolutely  no  reason  on  earth 
why  this  dreadful  situation  has  to  con- 
,  tinue.  There  is  a  way  to  solve  it.  and 
I  that  is  by  a  land  route  from  Thailand  to 
i  Cambodia. 

Every  expert  with  whom  we  spoke — 

I  the  International  Red  Cross.  UNICEF, 

the  United  States,  logistics  experts — all 

i  agreed  that  the  land  route  was  the  way 

.  and  that  within  3-5  days  after  receiving 

notice,   truck  convoys  could  begin  to 

travel  across  the  highways — highway  5 

and  highway  6 — set  up  distribution 

centers,  and  start  feeding  people. 

We  presented  that  concept  to  the 
Vietnamese.  We  presented  it,  again,  to 
the  regime  in  Phnom  Penh.  We  asked 
them  to  agree  to  it.  We're  waiting  for  a 
favorable  response.  Now  the  word  we 
got  today,  it's  doubtful  that  it  was  a 
favorable  response.  It  seems  very 
negative.  But  our  view  is  this:  We  can- 
not accept  the  possibility  that  a  gov- 
ernment or  an  alleged  government  is 
going  to  willfully  consign  hundreds  of 
thousands  of  its   own  citizens   to  a 

(needless  death. 
Q.  At  the  risk  of  asking  a  naive 
question,  Cambodia  is  a  small  coun- 
try lightly  defended,  without  air 
cover.  Why  don't  you  just  fly  C- 
130's  down  route  5  and  drop  the 
stuff  out  the  back? 

Senator  Baucus:  The  problem  is 
that  there  are  so  many  people — this  is 
from  mformation  given  to  us  by  inter- 
national organizations  which  are  on  the 
spot.  International  Red  Cross,  UNI- 
CEF, Oxfam.  World  Vision,  all  the  or- 
ganizations there  which  are  basically 
there  to  help  people,  but  they  have  no 
vested  interest  in  one  form  of  govern- 
ment or  another — the  problem  is  there 
are  just  so  many  people  within  the 
country  who  just  haven't  the  strength  to 
get  up  to  get  the  food  or  to  get  the 
medical  attention.  You  have  to  have 
trucks  within  the  country,  too,  to  dis- 


tribute the  food  and  the  medical  sup- 
plies once  it's  within  the  countries.  An 
air  drop  has  all  the  glamor  and  the 
glory,  and  it's  visual  and  it  sounds 
good.  The  fact  of  the  matter  is,  ac- 
cording to  the  people  we  talked  to  on 
the  spot,  by  far  the  most  practical  way 
to  get  the  attention  to  the  people  is  with 
a  truck  system,  to  get  the  trucks,  foods, 
and  supplies  out  to  distribution  points, 
and  also  personnel  on  the  ground  to 
pick  up  the  people  who  are  almost 
dead,  bring  them  to  makeshift  hospi- 
tals, which  really  only  amount  to  rows 
of  people  on  the  ground,  and  to  get 
some  medical  attention  and  some  food. 

Q.  Can  you  explain  to  us  in  your 
words  why  the  Phnom  Penh  govern- 
ment is  not  accepting  this  offer  now? 

Senator  Baucus:  I  frankly  don't 
know  why.  When  we  flew  over  to 
Thailand  and  into  Phnom  Penh,  we 
tried  to  stay  out  of  political  entangle- 
ments and  political  considerations.  For 
one  thing,  we're  not  experts  on  South- 
east Asia.  But  more  important  than 
that,  there  is  one  overriding  human- 
itarian goal,  that's  just  to  get  food  and 
aid  to  people. 

I  can't  tell  you,  I  can't  read  the 
minds  of  Heng  Samrin  authorities  or 
the  Vietnamese  associates  as  to  why 
they  made  the  statement.  But  one 
thing,  I  will  say  this:  It's  premised  on 
an  incorrect  assumption.  One  of  their 
assumptions  is  we  made  the  proposal 
and  said  that  American  aid  is  con- 
ditioned upon  opening  up  a  land 
bridge.  That  is  absolutely  incorrect. 
We  did  not  make  any  condition  at  all. 
We  just  said  we  suggest  the  best  thing 
to  do  is  to  open  up  the  land  bridge. 

Q.  You  said  a  minute  ago  the  Viet- 
namese are  prepared  to  protect  the 
convoys,  but  the  regime  in  Phnom 
Penh  will  not  accept  this  procedure. 
Are  you  trying  to  say  there  is  a  dis- 
tinction here  between  what  the  Viet- 
namese are  willing  to  do  and  what 
the  Heng  Samrin  government  is  pre- 
pared to  do? 

Senator  Sasser:  No,  I  am  not  saying 
that.  What  I  am  relating  to  you  is  what 
the  Minister  of  State  of  Foreign  Affairs 
for  Vietnam  told  us.  He  indicated  that 
guaranteeing  the  security  of  trucks,  the 
drivers,  the  cargo  was  no  problem.  We 
assumed  that  this  security  will  be 
guaranteed  by  forces  of  the  Vietnamese 
army,  since  they  are  operating,  we  are 
told,  up  and  down  routes  5  and  6.  This 
was  repeated  to  us — that  security 
would  not  be  a  problem — by  the  au- 
thorities in  Phnom  Penh. 

If  I  might  respond  to  an  earlier  ques- 
tion. There  is  air  cover  in  Cambodia. 
We  saw  MiGs  in  the  Phnom  Penh  air- 
port. They  put  on  a  little  show  for  our 


pilots,  and  they  are  pretty  good  with 
them.  We  saw  about,  I  would  guess, 
20,  either  MiG-19's,  or  Zl's.  I  can't 
tell  the  difference. 

Senator  Danforth:  Can  I  just  also 
add  to  that?  I  think  it's  important  to 
focus  attention  on  what  can  practically 
be  done.  I  think  that  it's  very  important 
not  to  divert  attention  to  something 
which  has  superficial  appeal  and  to 
chase  some  will-o'-the-wisp  idea  which 
sounds  sensational. 

The  fact  of  the  matter  is.  there  is 
only  one  practical  matter  to  solve  this 
problem,  only  one,  and  that  is  by 
truck.  That  is  the  only  practical  way  to 
deliver  the  tonnage.  Air  transportation 
cannot  deliver  the  kind  of  tonnage 
that's  needed.  It  can't  put  it  in  the  right 
place.  It  doesn't  provide  the  kind  of 
trucks  to  move  it  to  the  countryside.  It 
doesn't  provide  the  kind  of  infrastruc- 
ture to  move  food  and  to  dispense 
medical  supplies  and  to  tell  people 
what  to  do  with  the  medical  supplies 
once  they  get  them.  The  trucks  are  the 
only  available  method  of  doing  that. 

Q.  I  understand  that,  but  still  how 
long  do  you  wait  for  the  Phnom  Penh 
government  to  give  you  permission  to 
drive  the  trucks  in  there? 

Senator  Danforth:  I'm  saying  the 
position  is  that  the  ball  is  in  their  court 
and  that  they  have  the  life  and  death 
decision.  Nobody  else  has  that,  and 
they  have  to  assume  the  responsibility. 
They  have  to  face  up  to  the  fact  that  by 
saying  no  or  by  making  no  answer  at 
all,  they  are  consigning  their  people  to 
death. 

Q.  Do  you  suspect  that  in  saying 
no,  they  are  making  that  decision, 
that  they  have  chosen  this  path  to 
allow  this  mass  starvation  to  take 
place,  as  a  matter  of  policy? 

Senator  Danforth:  It  is  so  insane 
that  I  just  can't  accept  that,  and  I  don't 
think  any  of  the  three  of  us  can.  It  is 
our  understanding  that  sometimes  they 
will  take  one  position  one  day  and  one 
the  next. 

Just  before  we  left  Bangkok,  we  re- 
ceived a  message  from  the  Foreign 
Minister,  at  least  a  transcript  of  his 
comments,  which  looked  as  though  he 
was  really  opening  the  door  to  the  pos- 
sibility of  the  land  route.  That's  the 
way  we  construed  that  message.  So  I 
just  don't  read  one  particular  statement 
as  being  all  that  definitive. 

Q.  But  do  you  think  sanity  prevails 
in  that  land  today? 

Senator  Baucus:  In  some  sense, 
every  country  is  sensitive  to  world 
opinion — I  don't  care  what  the  country 
is — to  some  degree.  And  it  is  our  hope 


that  more  people  in  the  world  begin  to 
understand  what  is  happening  in  Cam- 
bodia. 

Therefore,  the  Heng  Samrin  au- 
thorities and  Vietnam  will  begin  to  be 
more  receptive  to  the  kinds  of  propos- 
als we  are  making.  1  don't  know.  I 
can't  predict  with  absolute  certainty, 
and  none  of  us  here  can,  as  to  what 
they  are  or  are  not  going  to  do.  But 
certainly,  the  more  and  more  people 
realize  what  is  happening  in  the  world 
and,  therefore,  begin  to  focus  on  Cam- 
bodia, their  chances  are  better. 

Q.  You  made  it  sound  like  there 
are  only  two  possibilities — one  air 
and  the  other  trucks  from  the  Thai 
border.  Can  you  discuss  the  third 
possibility,  Kompong  Som  or  bring- 
ing stuff  up  the  Mekong  River? 

Senator  Baucus:  That  is  a  third  pos- 
sibility now  in  the  sense  both  —  Her- 
cules, through  the  British,  are  being 
flown  in,  one  aircraft,  roughly,  a  day 
into  Phnom  Penh,  combined  with  the 
seaport  and  barge  traffic  up  the 
Mekong  River.  But  that's  not  enough. 

It  takes  a  long  period  of  time.  And 
not  only  that,  once  you  get  the  supplies 
into  Phnom  Penh — and  virtually  that's 
where  it  all  ends  up — you  have  to  go 
out  of  Phnom  Penh  out  in  the  country, 
and  that's  where  you  need  the  trucks. 

Q.  Can't  you  bring  trucks  into 
Kompong  Som  or  up  the  river?  The 
Americans  did  it  between  1970  and 
1975.  I  don't  understand  why  you 
are  just  not  discussing  that  possibil- 
ity also. 

Senator  Danforth:  Can  I  say,  on  the 
day  that  we  were  in  Phnom  Penh,  a 
logistics  expert  from  a  U.N.  organiza- 
tion was  also  in  Phnom  Penh  studying 
the  logistics  of  delivering  the  food.  It 
was  his  judgment,  as  an  expert  in  the 
field,  that  under  optimum  conditions, 
the  present  modes  of  delivery — to  wit, 
by  plane  into  Phnom  Penh  and  by  ship 
into  Kompong  Som  —  were  capable  of 
delivering  about  13  to  15,000  tons  a 
month,  when  the  real  needs  were  about 
27  to  30,000  tons  a  month. 

So  the  fact  of  the  matter  is  that  those 
two  methods,  which  are  now  in  use, 
even  operating  under  optimum  condi- 
tions, are  capable  of  only  handling  half 
of  the  tonnage.  Further,  the  distribu- 
tion, once  you  get  north,  is  weakened 
by  the  fact  that  there  are  very  few 
trucks  within  the  country. 

The  situation  can  be  improved  by 
shipping  into  Phnom  Penh  up  the 
Mekong.  But  even  when  that  is  going 
full  force  ahead,  there  will  still  be  a 
very  substantial  shortfall  to  the  tune  of 
about  10,000  tons  a  month. 

Therefore,  the  only  solution  is  the 
truck   solution.    Furthermore,   all   of 


these  arrangements  for  ships  —  putting 
it  on  the  ships,  taking  it  off,  getting  the 
equipment  to  take  it  off — take  a  lot  of 
time. 

The  trucks  are  ready  to  go  between  3 
and  5  days.  They  can  go  between  3  and 
5  days.  That  is  why  it's  so  important  to 
focus  world  attention  on  the  truck 
route — on  the  land  bridge — and  to  call 
attention  to  the  fact  that  the  decision  is 
Phnom  Penh's  to  make  and  that  deci- 
sion will  not  be  made  in  the  dark;  it 
will  be  made  under  the  full  spotlight  of 
Dublic  attention. 

Q.  So  what  do  you  do  next?  What 
do  you  do  to  get  them  to  turn  around 
the  "no"?  Do  you  hold  news  confer- 
ences, try  to  build  up  the  world 
opinion?  Do  you  do  something  dip- 
lomatic? 

Senator  Baucus:  We  are  going  to 
meet  with  Secretary  General  Kurt 
Waldheim  Monday  or  Tuesday  of  next 
week.  That  is  one  avenue.  In  addition 
to  that,  we  will  speak  out  as  imagina- 
tively as  we  can,  talk  to  as  many 
people  as  we  can. 

Q.  Where  does  the  money  for  this 
come  from,  what  fund? 

Senator  Sasser:  This  is  an  interna- 
tional effort.  It's  been  calculated  that 
$110  million  will  be  needed  over  the 
next  6  months.  The  United  States  will 
contribute,  I'm  told,  slightly  over 
one-third  of  that.  There  are  specific 
appropriations  bills  which  are  moving 
through  the  Congress  now,  and  there's 
emergency  relief  available. 

Q.  This  is  all  for  this  specific  oper- 
ation, or  is  it  for  resettlement? 

Senator  Sasser:  It's  for  the  whole 
operation.  That  includes  helping  supply 
the  refugee  camps  on  the  Thai  border, 
for  some  resettlement,  and  for  some  of 
the  foodstuffs  and  medicines  going  in 
now  by  ship  and  by  air  through  the  In- 
ternational Red  Cross  and  UNICEF. 

Q.  My  understanding  is  the  bulk 
of  this  money  may  be  for  resettle- 
ment, as  opposed  to  maybe  a  tenth  of 
the  money  the  United  States  is  sup- 
plying going  specifically  to  feed  these 
people  immediately.  Can  you  clarify 
that? 

Senator  Sasser:  No,  I  really  can't.  I 
haven't  had  the  opportunity  to — we  just 
got  back  in  the  country  last  night  late, 
and  I  have  not  had  an  opportunity  to 
study  how  the  funds  are  being  allo- 
cated. 

Let  me  make  one  point  here.  Laying 
aside  humanitarian  reasons  for  a  mo- 
ment, one  reason  it's  so  important  that 
these  people  be  fed  and  given  medical 
attention  inside  their  own  country  is  to 
stop  this  massive  hemorrhage  of  refu- 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 

gees  across  the  border  into  Thailand.  | 
Once  they  get  into  Thailand,  something 
has  to  be  done,   something  has  to  be  '■ 
done  with  them.  And  if  we  can  get  the  ' 
food  and  the  medicine  into  their  own 
country,   then   we  have  reason  to  be- 
lieve, and  rational  people  would  think, 
they  would  stay  there  rather  than  mov- 
ing into  Thailand  and  then  having  to  be 
dealt  with  there. 

Q.  What  do  you  think  would  hap- 
pen if  you  just  started  a  convoy  into 
that  country  flying  Red  Cross  and 
UNICEF  flags  without  waiting  for 
the  people  in  Phnom  Penh  to  come 
down  on  one  side  of  this  thing  or 
another? 

Senator  Sasser:  That's  speculation. 
You'd  have  to  speculate  as  to  what 
would  happen  with  that.  Quite  frankly, 
I  would  approach  that  prospect  with 
some  trepidation.  In  other  words, 
you're  moving  into  an  area  with  hard- 
ened Vietnamese  combat  troops  there. 
You  are  also  moving  through  an  area 
which,  in  some  places,  the  Pol  Pot 
guerrillas  are  operating.  They  are  very 
short  on  supplies,  and  we're  told  that 
the  Vietnamese  are  not  oversupplied.  I 
think  it  would  be  very  risky  business. 

Q.  What  role,  if  any,  does  the 
Soviet  Union  have  in  this  process? 

Senator  Danforth:  What  the  United 
States  is  doing  is  to  appeal  to  the  offi- 
cials of  Phnom  Penh  and  the  Viet- 
namese to  allow  the  trucks  to  come  in, 
and  I  would  hope  the  Soviet  Union 
would  take  the  same  position.  The  re- 
gime in  Phnom  Penh  and  the  Viet- 
namese are  certainly  within  the  sphere 
of  influence  of  the  Soviet  Union,  and, 
therefore,  the  Soviet  Union  has  a  very 
definite  role  to  play.  I  would  hope  it 
would  take  the  same  humanitarian  po- 
sition that  we  would  take  and  that  it 
would  use  all  of  its  authority  to  inter- 
cede with  the  appropriate  officials. 

Senator  Baucus:  I  think  the  Soviet 
Union  would  be  very  agreeable  to  all 
this.  I'll  tell  you  one  simple  reason. 
Look  at  all  the  wheat  that  they  are 
buying  now  from  the  United  States, 
and  when  we  were  in  Phnom  Penh,  we 
saw  a  lot  of,  at  least  a  significant 
amount  of,  rice  from  Russia.  It  seemed 
to  me  the  more  that  other  organiza- 
tions, other  countries  are  supplying 
foodstuffs  to  Cambodia,  it  would  take 
some  of  the  pressure  off  the  Soviet 
Union.  I'd  think  they'd  like  it. 

Q.  Why  haven't  they  done  any- 
thing yet? 

Senator  Baucus:  I  can't  answer  that. 

Senator  Danforth:  Ask  them.  I 
think  you  should  ask  them. 

Q.  Why  don't  you  ask  them? 


December  1979 


Senator  Danforth:  We  might. 

Q.  From  what  you  three  saw  over 
there,  is  what  this  government  is 
doing  and  is  committed  to  do  suffi- 
cient, is  it  adequate,  or  is  there  more 
that  we  could  be  doing  even  under 
present  circumstances? 

Senator  Danforth:  I  think,  first  of 
all.  the  $70  million  is  really  a  step  in 
the  right  direction  and  that  that's  a  very 
substantial  commitment.  It  may  be  that 
during  the  next  6  months — and  all  the 
projections  that  have  been  made  are  for 
6  months — that  we  might  want  to  con- 
sider some  other  things  that  we  could 
use  specifically  with  respect  to  logis- 
tics, trucks,  and  the  like.  I  think  that 
deserves  further  analysis. 

It's  not  realistic  to  think  that  the 
situation  in  Cambodia  is  going  to  be 
turned  around  on  the  dime  in  a  6-month 
period  of  time.  The  country  is  really  in 
bad  shape.  In  Phnom  Penh,  no  traffic, 
very  few  cars  on  the  streets,  some  army 
trucks,  derelict  buildings.  I  mean  it  is 
really  a  devastating  sight  in  Cambodia. 
Therefore,  I  think  there's  going  to  be  a 
very  long-term  problem  in  turning  that 
country  around. 

So  I  don't  think  that  it's  realistic  to 
think  that  a  $110  million  multinational 
program  over  a  6-month  period  of  time 
is  going  to  bring  them  to — 

Q.  We  should  be  prepared  to  do 
much  more  beyond  the  6-month 
period. 

Senator  Baucus:  Yes,  I  think  we 
could  certainly  help  probably  a  little  bit 
more,  but  the  bigger  problem  now  is 
Cambodia.  It's  not  so  much  the  ques- 
tion of  dollars  in  aid  and  medical 
supplies  now  as  it  is  Cambodia  opening 
up  its  borders.  That's  what  we  have  to 
do  so  we  can  get  that  land  bridge 
across. 


SENATORS'  REPORT 

We  went  on  this  humanitarian  mis- 
sion at  the  direction  of  the  leadership 
of  the  Senate  and  the  President  of  the 
United  States.  We  went  to  see  first- 
hand the  nature  of  the  refugee  problem, 
to  learn  what  more  should  be  done,  and 
to  report  our  findings. 

Over  the  past  few  days,  we  have 
witnessed  a  human  tragedy  of  enor- 
mous and  unfathomable  proportions. 
Without  a  massive  and  prompt  interna- 
tional relief  effort,  the  situation  will 
continue  to  deteriorate.  Inside  Cam- 
bodia today,  and  in  refugee  camps  lo- 
cated in  Thailand  near  the  Cambodian 
border,  hundreds  of  thousands  of  Cam- 
bodians face  death  by  starvation  and 


UJS.  Relief  Efforts 
for  Kampuchea 


PRESIDENT'S  ANNOUNCEMENT, 
OCT.  24.  1979' 

Thirty-seven  years  ago.  a  holocaust 
began  which  was  to  take  the  lives  of 
more  than  6  million  human  beings.  The 
world  stood  by  silently,  in  a  moral 
lapse  whose  enormity  still  numbs  the 
human  mind. 

We  now  face,  once  again,  the  threat 
of  avoidable  death  and  avoidable  suf- 
fering for  literally  millions  of  people, 
and  this  time  we  must  act  swiftly  to 
save  the  men.  women,  and  children 
who  are  our  brothers  and  sisters  in 
God's  family. 

Five  days  ago,  the  International 
Committee  of  the  Red  Cross  and  the 
U.N.  Children's  Fund  appealed  jointly 
for  $111  million  in  aid  to  help  the 
millions  of  Kampucheans — formerly 
known  as  Cambodians — who  are  facing 
death  from  starvation  during  the  next  6 
months.  We  must  respond  to  this  ap- 
peal, and  we  must  also  help  the  related 
need  for  food  and  medicine  and  shelter 
for  refugees  who  are  fleeing  from 
Kampuchea  to  Thailand. 

I'm  urgently  asking  the  Congress  to 
enact  a  supplemental  Food  for  Peace 
appropriation  that  will  make  available 
$20  million  in  commodities  for  use  in 
Kampuchea,  subject  only  to  assurances 
that  it  will  reach  its  destination;  that  is. 
the  human  beings  who  are  suffering. 
This  is  in  addition  to  the  $5  million  in 
food  that  I  pledged  for  this  purpose  last 
week. 

Today,  I'm  also  directing  that  $9 
million  in  U.S.  refugee  assistance 
funds  go  to  meet  about  one-third  of  the 
total  cost  of  Thailand's  program  to  help 
starving  refugees  who  are  entering 
Thailand  from  Kampuchea.  I  commend 
the  Thai  Government  on  its  decision  to 
admit  more  refugees.  They  have  al- 
ready received  tens  of  thousands  of 
them. 

Third,  I've  told  Chairman  Zablocki 
[Congressman  Clement  J.  Zablocki, 
chairman  of  the  House  Subcommittee 
on  Foreign  Affairs]  in  the  House,  and 
cosponsors.  that  the  Administration 
supports  their  proposal  to  authorize  $30 
million  for  the  next  phase  of  relief  in 
Kampuchea.  This  would  enable  us.  as  a 
total,  to  raise  our  contributions  to  the 
continuing  program  for  the  alleviation 
of  suffering  in  Kampuchea  as  high  as 
$70  million. 

The  dimensions  of  the  Kampuchean 
tragedy  are  immense,  and  more  aid  will 


almost  certainly  be  needed.  And  I'm 
also  asking  my  Commission  on  World 
Hunger,  headed  by  Sol  Linowitz,  to 
recommend  to  me  the  next  steps  that 
we  must  take  to  meet  worldwide  hun- 
ger needs. 

I'm  certain  that  the  American  peo- 
ple, in  addition  to  their  government, 
will  want  to  be  part  of  this  urgent  hu- 
manitarian effort.  It's  absolutely  too 
important  to  be  left  to  government 
alone. 

Standing  behind  me  on  the  platform 
are  representatives  of  religious  and 
other  groups  who  have  already  pledged 
to  help  in  this  effort,  who've  called  on 
me  to  do  what  I'm  announcing  now, 
and  who,  I  believe,  sincerely  said  that 
they  would  match  the  government  ef- 
fort. Several  voluntary  agencies  have 
been  working  all  along  to  meet  the 
needs  of  increasing  numbers  of  refu- 
gees, and  I  call  upon  all  Americans  to 
support  this  work.  I  ask  specifically 
that  every  Saturday  and  Sunday  in  the 
month  of  November,  up  until 
Thanksgiving,  be  set  aside  as  days  for 
Americans  in  their  synagogues  and 
churches,  and  otherwise,  to  give 
generously  to  help  alleviate  this 
suffering. 

I'm  confident  that  Americans'  re- 
sponses will  be  matched  abroad.  Many 
governments  and  international  volun- 
tary agencies  are  already  coming  for- 
ward with  their  pledges.  The  human 
family,  those  of  us  who  have  been 
blessed  so  highly  with  food  and  a  rela- 
tive absence  of  suffering,  must  not  be 
found  wanting  in  our  response  to  al- 
leviate this  almost  unprecedented  mass 
human  suffering. 

If  a  tragedy  of  genocidal  proportions 
is  to  be  avoided  in  Kampuchea,  we 
must  all  help,  both  nations  and  gov- 
ernments and  individuals  alike.  D 


'Made  to  reporters  assembled  in  the  Briefing 
Room  at  the  White  House  (text  from  Weekly 
Compilation  of  Presidential  Documents  of  Oct. 
29,  1979).  Prior  to  the  President's  announce- 
ment, he  met  with  religious  leaders  and  repre- 
sentatives of  various  humanitarian  organiza- 
tions to  discuss  the  situation  in  Kampuchea. 
Following  the  President's  announcement.  Rev. 
Theodore  M.  Hesburgh,  Chairman  of  the  Select 
Commission  on  Immigration  and  Refugee  Pol- 
icy and  chairman  of  the  board  of  the  Overseas 
Development  Corporation,  and  Ambassador 
Henry  D.  Owens,  Special  Representative  of  the 
President  for  International  Economic  Summits, 
answered  reporters'  questions.  Their  question- 
and-answer  session  was  issued  as  a  White 
House  press  release  on  Oct.  24. 


8 


disease.   The   survival  of  the   Khmer 
race  is  in  jeopardy. 

At  three  refugee  camps  on  the  Thai- 
Cambt)dian  border,  we  saw  human 
suffering  of  a  kind  so  deep  and  perva- 
sive as  to  defy  our  ability  to  describe  it 
adequately. 

We  walked  through  encampments  of 
thousands  of  Khmer  who  stared  at  us  in 
silence.  No  one  smiled,  and  no  one 
laughed.  Indeed,  they  seldom  spoke  to 
each  other.  We  saw  the  swollen  bellies 
and  stick-like  legs  of  children  suffering 
from  acute  malnutrition.  Even  at  the 
hospital,  areas  where  physical  suffering 
was  greatest,  they  didn't  cry.  We  saw 
people  protected  from  the  elements  by 
only  a  plastic  sheet  strung  up  on  sticks. 

In  makeshift  hospitals,  we  walked 
among  hundreds  of  comatose  patients, 
crawling  with  flies.  The  people  were 
suffering  from  prolonged  malnutrition 
and  malaria.  We  were  told  by  those  to 
whom  we  talked  that  conditions  were 
even  worse  on  the  Cambodian  side  of 
the  border.  Only  the  strongest  survive 
the  trip  across  the  border. 

Yet  amidst  this  appalling  scene  of 
human  suffering,  we  had  reason  to  feel 
a  degree  of  encouragement.  The  Gov- 
ernment of  Thailand  has  magnani- 
mously promised  to  permit  entry  to  all 
refugees  who  arrive  at  the  border.  The 
relief  efforts  by  international  organiza- 
tions are  beginning  to  provide  food, 
medical  supplies,  and  personnel.  The 
international  relief  agencies  are  making 
a  valiant  effort  to  bring  aid  to  those  in 
need  of  assistance,  but  their  efforts  are 
still  inadequate.  The  voluntary  agen- 
cies stand  ready  to  increase  their  assist- 
ance as  soon  as  it  is  possible. 

We  are  absolutely  convinced  that  a 
practical  means  exists  to  provide  the 
food  and  medical  supplies  needed  to 
save  hundreds  of  thousands  of  lives; 
that  means  is  the  immediate  establish- 
ment of  an  overland  route  —  a  "land 
bridge"  linking  Cambodia  to  relief 
supplies  in  Thailand.  The  international 
relief  agencies  estimate  that  as  many  as 
2.25  million  Cambodians  face  serious 
food  shortages.  They  estimate  that 
nearly  30,000  tons  of  food  and  medical 
supplies  are  required  to  meet  this  need 
each  month.  Currently  only  12,000 
tons  can  be  brought  in  by  sea,  and  300 
by  air  per  month.  This  is  less  than  half 
the  estimated  need.  The  establishment 
of  an  overland  route  could,  within  3-5 
days,  more  than  double  the  current 
capacity. 

During  our  visit,  we  devoted  much 
of  our  energies  seeking  to  establish  this 
land  bridge.  We  discussed  it  with 
Thailand's  Prime  Minister  Kriangsak, 
with  Vietnamese  Vice  Foreign  Minister 
Thach,  and  with  representatives  of  the 
international  relief  agencies.  We  trav- 
eled to  Phnom  Penh  to  discuss  the  land 


bridge  with  the  authorities  there.  We 
were  encouraged  by  what  we  heard. 
The  challenge  now  is  to  open  the  over- 
land route.  The  decision  currently  rests 
with  the  Phnom  Penh  authorities.  We 
are  committed  to  prepare  to  pursue  this 
goal  anywhere  and  on  an  urgent  basis. 
To  delay  is  to  prolong  the  suffering  and 
loss  of  life  we  have  seen. 

A  more  detailed  description  of  our 
experiences,  our  findings,  and  our  rec- 
ommendations follows. 

Conditions  in  the  Refugee  Camps 

We  visited  three  refugee  areas  lo- 
cated at  Khiong  Gai  Thuen,  Tap  Phrik. 
and  Nong  Samet.  More  than  150,000 
people  were  in  those  areas  and  esti- 
mates are  that  another  100,000- 
200,000  are  concentrated  just  inside 
the  Cambodian  border.  Persons  of  all 
descriptions,  including  some  former 
combatants,  wander  across  the  border 
into  the  areas.  Intensified  fighting  or 
continued  lack  of  food  may  force  addi- 
tional Cambodians  across  the  border  in 
the  days  and  weeks  ahead. 

In  the  areas  visited,  we  saw  children 
near  death  from  acute  malnutrition  and 
disease.  We  saw  men  and  women  lying 
on  the  ground  in  makeshift  "hospi- 
tals." We  saw  people  too  weak  to  walk 
the  last  100  yards  to  food  distribution 
points.  The  eerie  quiet  strikes  a  visitor. 
Emaciated  and  sick  people  lay  on  the 
ground  in  a  silence  interrupted  only  by 
the  coughs  of  those  with  tuberculosis. 

These  areas  are  not  "camps."  They 
are  places  where  people  stopped  run- 
ning from  war  and  deprivation  inside 
Cambodia.  They  have  no  sanitary 
facilities,  little  water,  and  little  shelter. 
"Hospitals"  are  placed  where  the  very 
ill  and  the  dying  lie  on  the  ground.  We 
were  told  that  5-10%  of  the  people  in 
the  hospital  die  every  day.  A  large 
portion  are  beyond  help,  and  some  of 
those  we  saw  last  Monday  are  not  alive 
today. 

Food  distribution  points,  operated  by 
a  variety  of  relief  agencies,  are  scat- 
tered through  the  areas.  Those  strong 
enough  to  walk  to  the  distribution 
points  are  fed.  Those  who  cannot,  go 
hungry,  unless  relatives  or  friends 
help.  The  social  order  among  these 
people  has  so  deteriorated  that  they  are 
not  helping  those  outside  their  im- 
mediate family  group. 

The  principal  constraint  in  the  effort 
to  aid  the  refugees  in  the  areas  we  vis- 
ited is  insufficient  staff.  We  were  told 
by  physicians  in  the  camps  that  they 
had  adequate  medical  supplies  and  food 
but  they  did  not  have  enough  people  to 
distribute  either.  Without  adequate 
staff,  there  is  no  organized  system  for 
allocating  and  distributing  supplies  of 
food  or  medicine. 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 

Conditions  in  Cambodia 

Our  9-hour  visit  to  Cambodia  en-  ; 
abled  us  to  observe  the  rice  planting 
situation  around  the  capital,  to  see  the 
condition  of  the  city,  and  to  test  the 
reaction  of  both  government  cadre  and 
ordinary  people  to  discussions  with  a 
delegation  of  Americans.  In  addition 
we  met  with  the  Heng  Samrin  regime's 
Foreign  Minister  to  make  a  specific 
proposal  that  Phnom  Penh  permit  the 
International  Committee  of  the  Red 
Cross  (ICRC)  and  the  U.N.  Children's 
Fund  (UNICEF)  to  truck  emergency 
food  and  medical  supplies  from  Thai- 
land to  Cambodia. 

Phnom  Penh  authorities  received  us 
courteously  and  hospitably.  Our  guide 
for  the  day  was  a  middle-level  Foreign 
Ministry  official.  On  the  streets  we 
were  met  with  curiosity,  friendliness, 
and  a  few  suspicious  looks. 

The  shambles  that  was  Phnom  Penh 
can  hardly  be  called  a  city.  The  run- 
down condition  of  this  once-graceful 
city  betrays  both  the  neglect  of  the  past 
4  years  and  deliberate  destruction  by 
the  previous  regime;  both  the  national 
bank  and  the  Roman  Catholic  cathedral 
were  destroyed,  presumably  for  politi- 
cal reasons.  Phnom  Penh  residents  es- 
timate that  its  population  is  between 
30,000  and  70.000.  A  few  vehicles 
travel  the  deserted  streets.  Whole  sec- 
tions of  the  town  are  still  barricaded 
shut.  We  saw  few  foreigners. 

Rice  is  scarce.  In  the  capital,  in  the 
absence  of  currency,  a  small  can  of  rice 
acts  as  the  medium  of  exchange  for  the 
few  street  hawkers  we  saw.  No  or- 
ganized central  market  exists.  Food  is 
distributed  through  local  street  mar- 
kets. The  former  central  market  area 
has  been  planted  in  coconuts.  Our  brief 
aerial  view  of  agricultural  areas  around 
Phnom  Penh  showed  small  plots  of 
vegetables  and  many  fields  of  rice.  A 
large  number  of  paddies  remain  fallow. 
This,  combined  with  the  comments  of 
more  knowledgeable  international  offi- 
cials and  short  interviews  with 
passers-by  during  our  tour  of  the  city, 
leads  us  to  conclude  that  the  govern- 
ment's claim  that  2  million  acres  of 
rice  have  been  planted  is  too  optimis- 
tic. 

ICRC/UNICEF  officials  in  Phnom 
Penh  confirmed  the  desperate  food 
situation  of  the  country.  To  date  their 
programs  have  dealt  successfully  with 
hospital  and  supplementary  feeding. 
Only  very  recently  have  the  two  agen- 
cies been  faced  with  the  logistical 
problems  created  by  bulk  arrivals  of 
rice. 

There  was  general  agreement  that 
approximately  30,000  tons  of  rice  per 
month  are  needed  inside  Cambodia. 
The  best  estimate  we  heard  was  that 


December  1979 


under  current  circumstances  only 
13,000-15.000  tons  of  foodstuffs  could 
be  moved  inside  Cambodia.  Transpor- 
tation within  Cambodia  is  the  major 
■  problem.  Less  than  5.000  tons  of  food 
per  month  can  now  be  moved  from  the 
port  of  Kompong  Som.  The  port  of 
Phnom  Penh  has  the  potential  to  handle 
an  additional  8,000  tons  if  inland 
transportation  is  available.  The  present 
airlift  to  Phnom  Penh  adds  only  frac- 
tionally to  available  supplies. 

Conclusions 

Our  principal  conclusion  is  that 
thiiusands  of  Cambodians  will  die  un- 
less a  massive  expansion  of  relief  ef- 
forts proceeds  on  an  emergency  basis. 

This  finding  is  based  on  our  personal 
observation  of  refugees,  our  discus- 
sions with  the  international  relief  agen- 
cies, and  our  discussions  with  the 
Phnom  Penh  authorities. 

Our  interviews  indicated  that  as 
many  as  two-thirds  of  those  who  try  to 
reach  Thailand  from  Cambodia  may  not 
make  it.  They  die  along  the  way  from 
starvation  and  disease.  Given  the  con- 
ditions in  Cambodia,  we  expect  the 
flow  of  refugees  to  continue  into  Thai- 
land. The  need  to  provide  assistance 
will  accelerate  in  the  months  to  come. 

The  refugee  problem  is  compounded 
by  the  arrival  of  large  numbers  of  Lao 
who  further  flood  the  refugee  camps. 
Reports  of  an  extensive  shortfall  of 
food  in  Laos  will  undoubtedly  increase 
the  refugee  flow  from  there  unless  re- 
lief is  available  at  the  source. 

The  most  serious  problem  inside 
Cambodia  and  along  the  border  with 
Thailand  is  the  lack  of  sufficient  food 
and  medical  supplies.  Under  the  best 
circumstances,  the  shortfall  in  total 
supplies  is  about  15,000  tons  per 
month.  The  current  situation  is  even 
worse  and  not  likely  to  improve  much 
in  the  near  future. 

We  have  concluded  that  this  condi- 
tion need  not  exist.  There  is  a  practical 
,  solution  which  can  be  implemented 
immediately.  An  all-land  route  can  be 
opened  between  the  Thai  border  and 
Phnom  Penh  along  highways  5  and  6. 

This  plan  could  increase  transport 
capacity  by  as  much  as  1 ,000  tons  per 
day  within  3-5  days  of  the  opening  of 
the  route  into  Cambodia. 

The  essential  considerations  for 
,  opening  such  a  route  were,  first,  secu- 
rity of  the  shipments  and,  second,  au- 
I  thorization  and  cooperation  from  the 
authorities  involved  (i.e.,  the  interna- 
tional agencies,  the  Thai  Government, 
the  authorities  in  Phnom  Penh,  and  the 
Vietnamese). 

In  an  effort  to  open  up  the  land  route 
to  Cambodia,  we  met  with  the  head  of 
government  of  the  Thai  Kingdom,   a 


representative  of  the  Socialist  Republic 
of  Vietnam,  representatives  of  the 
Phnom  Penh  authorities,  and  represen- 
tatives of  the  international  agencies. 

Meetings  with  the 
Voluntary  Agencies 

We  met  with  representatives  of 
UNICEF.  the  ICRC.  and  World  Food 
Program  (WPP).  They  agreed  unani- 
mously that  the  key  to  solving  the  situa- 
tion inside  Cambodia  and  on  the  Thai 
border  was  to  establish  a  land  bridge. 
They  stand  ready  in  every  way  to  im- 
plement the  planning  and  shipment  of 
the  needed  supplies.  Other  aspects  of 
those  meetings  appear  throughout  the 
report  as  appropriate. 

Meeting  With  Thailand's 
Prime  Minister  Kriangsak 

At  the  time  of  our  meeting,  we  were 
just  beginning  to  explore  the  pos- 
sibilities of  a  land  bridge  to  Cambodia 
via  the  road  from  Aranyaprathet  near 
the  Thai-Cambodian  border.  The  Prime 
Minister  was  totally  supportive  of  the 
idea. 

He  felt  that  adequate  quantities  of 
most  of  the  needed  supplies  were  avail- 
able in  Thailand.  He  also  expressed  the 
view  that  there  were  enough  trucks  in 
Thailand  to  send  convoys  in  im- 
mediately. 

The  dominant  subject  of  our  meeting 
was  the  desperate  situation  of  the  Cam- 
bodian refugees.  The  day  before  our 
meeting  with  the  Prime  Minister,  he 
had  taken  a  trip  to  the  border  and  had 
witnessed  first-hand  the  suffermg.  He 
said  he  had  been  touched  by  this  ex- 
perience and  had  decided  to  open  the 
border  to  admit  all  refugees  from  Cam- 
bodia. This  was  an  unpopular  decision, 
he  said,  because  it  would  result  in  the 
displacement  of  60.000  Thais. 

The  Prime  Minister  told  us  that  he 
was  planning  to  move  the  refugees 
from  the  border  to  a  nearby  holding 
area.  In  fact,  the  movement  of  the  ref- 
ugees began  before  we  left  Thailand.  It 
should  be  noted  that  the  Prime  Minister 
made  it  clear  to  us  that  the  fleeing 
Cambodians  would  be  granted  only 
temporary  status. 

He  expressed  hope  that  it  would  be 
possible  for  the  Khmer  to  return  home 
when  conditions  improve.  He  was  not 
optimistic  that  this  would  occur  soon. 
He  told  us  that  he  welcomed  the  grow- 
ing involvement  and  support  of  the  in- 
ternational relief  agencies.  He  stressed 
the  importance  of  close  coordination  of 
that  effort. 

We  expressed  our  appreciation  and 
gratitude  for  the  Prime  Minister's  hu- 
manitarian policy  toward  the  refugees. 


notably  his  decision  to  allow  unlimited 
entry  to  the  Khmer. 

Meeting  With  Nguyen  Co  Thach 
of  Vietnam 

At  the  Vietnamese  Embassy  in 
Bangkok  we  met  with  Secretary  of 
State  for  Foreign  Affairs  Nguyen  Co 
Thach.  We  explained  that  we  did  not 
want  to  raise  political  questions.  We 
expressed  our  appreciation  for  his  help 
in  obtaining  a  favorable  reply  to  our 
request  to  visit  Phnom  Penh.  We  noted 
that  our  purpose  for  wanting  to  visit 
Phnom  Penh  was  to  meet  with  repre- 
sentatives of  the  international  relief 
agencies  and  get  a  more  complete  view 
of  the  problems  of  refugees.  We  em- 
phasized in  our  discussions  that  U.S. 
assistance  to  needy  Cambodians  would 
be  provided  through  the  international 
organizations. 

We  asked  Mr.  Thach  if  his  govern- 
ment would  cooperate  in  providing  se- 
curity for  truck  convoys  on  an  overland 
route  between  Thailand  and  Cambodia. 
He  replied  first  by  saying  that  he  could 
not  speak  for  the  Cambodian  people. 
But,  he  added:  "If  the  Cambodian 
people  or  the  Cambodian  Government 
asked  us  for  help  we  will  agree.  There 
is  no  problem  on  this.  You  can  be  sure 
any  humanitarian  actions  without  ul- 
terior motives  we  will  welcome."" 

Mr.  Thach  emphasized  that  the  truck 
convoy  proposal  was  no  problem  for 
his  government  but  was  a  question  that 
had  to  be  addressed  by  Phnom  Penh. 
He  said  that  Vietnamese  troops  would 
not  fire  on  trucks  that  were  on  human- 
itarian missions. 

Meeting  With  Officials 
in  Phnom  Penh 

We  presented  the  proposal  for  a  land 
route  to  Phnom  Penh's  Foreign  Minis- 
ter, emphasizing  the  humanitarian  need 
and  our  desire  to  make  political  consid- 
erations secondary  to  the  fundamental 
problems  of  life  and  death.  With  regard 
to  the  security  of  food  convoys,  he 
agreed  that  Phnom  Penh  could  insure 
security  for  the  shipments  and  drivers. 
He  said  that  he  would  take  the  proposal 
to  the  Central  Committee  for  decision. 
In  the  meantime,  relief  supply  by  sea 
and  air  should  continue.  We  urged  him 
to  recommend  the  speedy  and  favorable 
decision.  We  pointed  out  that  to  delay 
is  to  prolong  the  human  suffering. 

Subsequently  Hun  Sen  issued  the  fol- 
lowing statement  to  the  press:  "In  case 
of  a  substantial  increase  in  the  aid,  we 
are  ready  to  study  with  the  two  organi- 
zations the  improvement  of  our  means 
of  reception  and  transportation  and  to 
think  about  other  access  routes  in  case 
of  need."  We  view  his  statement  as  a 


10 


Department  ol  State  Bulletin 


l7.iV.  Pledging  Conference 
for  Khmer  Refugees 


U.N.  Secretary  General  Kurt  Wald- 
heim  called  for  the  U.N.  General  As- 
sembly to  hold  a  pledging  conference 
to  encourage  member  nations  to  com- 
mit funds  for  humanitarian  relief  for 
Khmer  refugees.  That  conference  was 
held  in  New  York  November  5,  1979. 
Following  is  a  statement  Secretary 
Vance  made  at  that  session . ' 

Mr.  Secretary  General,  let  me  thank 
you  for  your  initiative  in  calling  this 
conference  and  your  leadership  in  ad- 
dressing this  crisis.  I  will  be  brief,  for 
we  are  here,  today,  to  act.  We  are  here 
to  make,  through  our  individual  contri- 
butions, an  international  commitment 
to  deal  with  a  human  tragedy  of  almost 
unfathomable  proportions. 

We  need  no  other  call  to  action  than 
the  grim  facts  in  Kampuchea. 

•  A  nation  of  7  million  has  been 
ravaged  by  famine  and  disease,  brutal- 
ity and  war.  Some  2  million  have 
perished. 

•  Death  has  struck  hardest  at  the 
children.  An  entire  generation  of  Kam- 
pucheans  may  have  been  lost. 


•  The  meager  food  available  has  be- 
come a  booty  of  war. 

•  Malaria  is  rampant.  Anthrax  has 
appeared.  Minimal  health  care  is  virtu- 
ally nonexistent. 

Even  these  are  only  fragments  of  the 
tragedy.  Statistics  are  only  a  shadow  of 
the  reality.  The  reality  of  Kampuchea, 
of  a  people  on  the  verge  of  extinction, 
is  most  powerfully  conveyed  by  the 
images  of  suffering  carried  in  our  daily 
newspapers.  The  silent  grief  of  a  young 
Khmer  mother  cradling  her  dead  baby 
in  her  arms,  a  victim  of  starvation,  or 
the  vacant  gaze  of  an  infant  beyond 
help  and  hope  in  a  makeshift  orphanage 
in  Phnom  Penh. 

We  are  here  as  diplomats,  as  repre- 
sentatives of  our  governments,  to  ad- 
dress this  reality.  But  first  of  all,  we 
are  here  as  human  beings.  Our  presence 
reflects  the  concern  of  millions  of 
human  beings  in  all  our  nations  who 
care  about  this  suffering.  Some  issues 
transcend  politics.  This  is  one  of  them. 

Clearly,  there  are  differences  among 
governments  on  the  political  situation 
in  Kampuchea.  But  all  of  us  must  put 


those  differences  aside  as  we  ask  all  the 
authorities  involved  in  Kampuchea  U) 
turn  away  from  calculations  of  political 
and  military  advantage  and  turn  to  the 
overwhelming  human  issue  before  us. 

In  this  connection.  1  want  to  single 
out  the  Government  of  Thailand  for  its 
courageous  and  correct  decision  to 
allow  into  its  country  large  numbers  of 
people  tleeing  famine  and  disease.  The 
burden  this  places  on  the  Thai  Gov- 
ernment is  immense,  and  we  in  the  in- 
ternational community  owe  Thailand 
not  only  our  admiration  but  also  our 
full  support. 

So  let  us  get  to  the  business  at  hand. 
I  am  here  today  on  behalf  of  the  Presi- 
dent of  the  United  States  to  place  sub- 
stantial material  resources  behind  a 
major  humanitarian  effort. 

•  President  Carter  has  committed  the 
United  States  to  a  contribution  during 
the  next  6  months  of  $30  million  for 
international  relief  efforts  in  Kam- 
puchea and  $9  million  for  Khmer  who 
have  recently  fled  to  Thailand. 

•  Our  Congress  is  approving  $30 
million  of  additional  funds  for  the  next 
phase  of  relief  efforts.  This  is  in  addi- 
tion to  our  already  substantial  contri- 
butions to  the  refugee  program  in  the 
same  area. 

•  And  we  will  give  our  full  sup- 
port, in  any  way  that  will  be  helpful,  to 
the   efforts   of  the   United   Nations, 


Senators  (Cont'd) 

positive  reference  to  the  land  bridge 
because  the  only  way  practical  of  sub- 
stantially increasing  aid  is  by  a  truck 
route  along  highways  5  and  6. 

Our  Ambassador  in  Bangkok  has 
been  in  contact  with  officials  of 
ICRC/UNICEF  requesting  that  they 
follow  through  on  this  directly  with  the 
officials  in  Phnom  Penh. 

Recommendations 

1 .  The  United  States  should  provide 
strong  support  for  the  creation  of  a 
"land  bridge"  operated  by  the  ICRC 
and  UNICEF  to  bring  food  and  medi- 
cine into  Cambodia.  We  should  strive 
to  do  the  following: 

•  Achieve  agreement  to  permit  up  to 
1 ,000  tons  of  food  and  medical  sup- 
plies to  be  carried  daily  by  truck  into 
Cambodia  from  Thailand; 

•  Acquire  by  lease  or  purchase  a 
sufficient  number  of  trucks  to  establish 
the  necessary  distribution  network  (one 
international  relief  official  believes  a 
total  of  500  trucks  is  needed); 

•  Assure  the  security  of  the  truck 
convoys;  and 

•  Establish   storage  centers  at  re- 


gional distribution  points  on  the  main 
highways  between  the  border  and 
Phnom  Penh. 

2.  In  order  to  develop  an  interna- 
tional program  of  food  relief  for  In- 
dochinese  refugees,  the  United  States 
should: 

•  Expedite  implementation  of  the 
full  $69  million  6-month  aid  package 
announced  by  President  Carter  on  Oc- 
tober 24; 

•  Assess  funding  requirements  for  a 
longer  range  program  of  food  and 
medical  relief; 

•  Name  a  senior-level  White  House 
coordinator  with  specific  respon- 
sibilities for  implementation  of  the 
food  and  medical  relief  program  in 
Cambodia;  and 

•  Utilize  emergency  relief  funds  to 
provide  sufficient  logistic  support  to 
the  ICRC  and  UNICEF  to  get  food  and 
medicine  to  where  it  is  needed. 

3.  The  President  should  call  on  other 
nations  and  American  citizens  to  sup- 
port the  efforts  of  international  organi- 
zations and  voluntary  agencies.  Both 
money  and  volunteers  are  needed. 

4.  The  U.S.  Government  should 
make  diplomatic  efforts  and  mobilize 


world  opinion  in  support  of  the  opening 
of  the  land  bridge  to  Cambodia.  The 
role  of  the  Secretary  General  of  the 
United  Nations  is  critical  to  the  success 
of  this  effort. 

5.  The  United  States  should  assist 
the  international  relief  agencies  as  ap- 
propriate to: 

•  Increase  and  regulate  distribution 
of  food  and  medicine  on  the  border 
areas; 

•  Increase  immediately  the  staff  in 
the  border  areas; 

•  Increase  capacity  of  the  ports  to 
handle  shipments  by  sea; 

•  Provide  air  transportation  for  criti- 
cally needed  items; 

•  Establish  a  system  for  equitable 
distribution  from  central  storage 
facilities  to  local  areas  inside  Cam- 
bodia; and 

•  Secure  agreement  that  the  interna- 
tional agencies  have  staff  and  access  to 
insure  that  food  is  used  effectively.    D 


'Made  to  reporters  assembled  in  the  Briefing 
Room  at  the  White  House  (text  from  Weekly 
Compilation  of  Presidential  Documents  of  Oct. 
29,  1979). 

^Text  from  White  House  press  release  of 
Oct.  26. 


December  1979 


11 


Refugees  - 
An  internationai  Ohligation 


by  Harry  F.  Young 

This  article  on  the  world  refugee 
situation  since  World  War  II  was 
written  especially  for  the  Bulletin. 
'  Dr.  Young  is  the  senior  writer  in  the 
Editorial  Division,  Office  of  Public 
Communication,  Bureau  of  Public  Af- 
fairs . 

It  is  often  said,  and  justly,  that  the 
20th  century  is  the  age  of  the  refugee. 
Of  course,  it  is  many  other  things  as 
well,  and  refugees  are  not  only  a  20th- 
century  phenomenon.  The  word  "refu- 
gee" has  been  part  of  the  English  vo- 
cabulary since  the  end  of  the  17th  cen- 
tury when  it  was  first  used  for  the 
Huguenots  who  had  found  refuge  in 
England  after  their  expulsion  from 
France.  It  was  available  for  use  on 
other  occasions  in  the  18th  and  19th 
centuries.  But  it  was  not  until  com- 
paratively recent  times  that  "refugee" 
became  a  common  word  conveying  an 
image  of  many  people  in  flight  or  dri- 
ven from  their  homes  because  of  their 
race,  religion,  or  political  opinion. 

The  White  Russians 

Refugee  history  in  our  time  begins 
with  the  Russian  revolution  of  1917.  In 
that  great  upheaval,  I '/2  million 
'White"  Russians  fled  their  homeland 
and  sought  refuge  abroad.  These  were  a 
new  type  of  migrants,  unlike  the  Euro- 
peans who  crossed  the  oceans  in  the 
previous  century  to  North  America  and 
Australia.  Most  of  the  latter  had  left 
home  of  their  own  accord  for  a  new 


UNICEF,  the  International  Committee 
of  the  Red  Cross,  and  private  voluntary 
groups  as  they  continue  the  enormous 
task  they  have  now  begun. 

We  must  pursue  every  avenue  and 
use  every  means  to  bring  relief  supplies 
to  people  desperately  in  need.  Whether 
through  Thailand,  through  Vietnam,  or 
by  sea,  whether  by  truck — as  we  have 
recently  urged — by  airlift,  or  by  river 
transport,  food  and  medicine,  in  suffi- 
cient measure,  must  be  delivered.  The 
international  relief  agencies  must  be 
allowed  to  do  their  jobs,  to  see  that 
help  gets  to  the  people  so  desperately 
in  need. 

This  is  a  compelling  moment.  Our 
common  humanity  calls  us  to  action.  D 


'Press  release  291 . 


country  of  their  own  choosing  and  with 
the  intention  of  starting  life  anew.  The 
White  Russians,  on  the  other  hand,  had 
fled  their  homeland,  and  where  they 
landed  (at  first,  in  any  case)  made  very 
little  difference.  They  did  not  arrive  as 
laborers  needed  in  an  expanding  econ- 
omy but  as  unexpected  political  fugi- 
tives who,  for  the  most  part,  became  a 
public  burden. 

League  Efforts 

The  White  Russians  were  the  first 
refugees  assisted  by  an  official  interna- 
tional agency.  Private  relief  organiza- 
tions, finding  their  resources  over- 
strained, asked  the  League  of  Nations 
to  take  the  matter  in  hand  as  "an  obli- 
gation of  international  justice."  In 
1921  the  League  set  up  a  High  Com- 
mission for  refugees  headed  by  a  noted 
humanitarian,  the  Norwegian  explorer 
Fridtjof  Nansen.  The  main  task  was  to 
secure  civil  status  to  the  Russians  who 
were  scattered  throughout  Europe 
without  legal  protection  and  represen- 
tation. The  High  Commissioner  intro- 
duced an  identity  document  known  as 
the  Nansen  Passport  which  gained  wide 
acceptance  and  was  later  extended  to 
Armenian  and  other  refugees.  But  be- 
yond this  progress  was  minimal. 

Refugees,  as  the  League  discovered, 
were  an  issue  that  had  none  of  the 
simplicity  of  world  health  or  the  sup- 
pression of  slavery.  Legal  questions 
and  political  concerns  clouded  what 
might  seem  to  be  a  purely  humanitarian 
issue.  Shortly  after  Hitler  came  to 
power  and  Nazi  persecution  began,  the 
League  created  a  High  Commissioner 
for  Refugees  Coming  From  Germany. 
But  this  agency  had  little  positive  ef- 
fect, for  there  was  no  European  gov- 
ernment that  was  prepared  to  let  a  pos- 
sibly temporary  issue  complicate  its 
relations  with  powerful  Germany.  The 
32  governments  that  met  on  the  Ger- 
man refugee  question  at  Evian-les- 
Bains,  in  France,  in  1938,  at  President 
Roosevelt's  suggestion,  also  could 
provide  no  effective  relief.  In  an  at- 
tempt to  bring  order  to  the  German  ref- 
ugee outflow,  they  created  the  Inter- 
Governmental  Committee  on  Refugees, 
which  survived  the  war  and  was  active 
until  1947.  In  the  fall  of  1938  the 
League  also  amalgamated  the  Nansen 
commission  and  the  commission  for 
German  refugees,  bringing  all  League 
refugee  work  under  one  head.  But 
within  less  than  a  year  Europe  was  at 


war,   and   the   refugee  question   was 
transformed  beyond  all  recognition. 

World  War  II 

World  War  II  set  in  motion  far- 
reaching  political  forces.  At  the  time, 
however,  no  one  could  foresee  how 
difficult  the  refugee  problem  would  be- 
come. What  was  clear  was  that  the 
German  war  machine  had  uprooted  tens 
of  millions  of  people  from  across  the 
whole  continent  and  that  those  who 
were  still  alive  at  war's  end  would  be 
left  stranded  far  from  their  homes.  And 
so  the  Allied  powers  in  1943  charged 
the  United  Nations  Relief  and  Re- 
habilitation Administration  (UNRRA) 
"to  prepare  and  undertake  measures  for 
the  return  of  prisoners  and  exiles  to 
their  country  of  origin."  All  agreed 
that  the  solution  was  to  transport  the 
displaced  persons  (DP's)  home  as 
rapidly  as  possible.  The  German  armies 
surrendered  in  May  1945.  By  October 
Allied  authorities  had  repatriated  some 
7  million  persons. 

Soon,  however,  it  was  clear  that  the 
DP  problem  was  not  to  be  solved  so 
easily.  Many  Eastern  Europeans  did 
not  want  to  go  back  to  their  country  of 
origin.  Jews  aspired  to  a  new  homeland 
in  Palestine,  and  others  were  afraid  to 
go  back  to  lands  that  had  fallen  under 
Soviet  control  or  influence.  Thus,  at 
the  end  of  1945,  the  DP  camps  were 
still  sheltering  a  million  persons,  who 
were  joined  by  early  1946  by  another 
million  so-called  new  refugees,  also 
from  Eastern  Europe. 

U.N.  Efforts 

The  DP  and  refugee  problems  came 
before  the  United  Nations.  In  1946  the 
General  Assembly  created  the  Interna- 
tional Refugee  Organization  (IRO)  as  a 
temporary  specialized  agency  with 
wide  authority  to  deal  with  European 
DP's  and  refugees.  A  distinction  was 
made  between  these  two  types  of 
homeless  persons.  A  DP  was  someone 
who  had  been  deported  as  forced  labor 
or  for  racial  or  political  reasons,  while 
the  refugee  was  someone  outside  his  or 
her  homeland  because  of  prewar  fascist 
persecution  or — and  this  made  it  pos- 
sible to  extend  the  protection  to  anti- 
Communists —  due  to  later  events  and 
was  unwilling  or  unable  to  avail  them- 
selves of  the  protection  of  their  home 
government.  The  statute  was  a  com- 
promise between  the  Soviet  bloc  and 
Western  countries.  Although  the  IRO 
was  to  promote  repatriation  by  all  pos- 
sible means  (as  desired  by  the  Soviet 
bloc),  each  eligible  person  was  free  to 
decide  against  repatriation  and  for  re- 
settlement somewhere  else.  It  was  the 


12 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


U.N.'s  hope  that  the  IRO  would  pro- 
vide a  permanent  solution  within  a  few 
years. 

But  the  IRO  proved  to  be  a  begin- 
ning rather  than  an  end.  In  Europe  the 
problem  defied  a  permanent  solution. 
In  4'/2  years  of  operation,  the  IRO 
moved  1  million  persons  (including 
73.000  repatriates).  But  there  remained 
a  hard  core  of  the  aged  and  infirm  and 
others  who  were  not  "emigrable. " ' 
And  in  the  meantime  new  refugees 
continued  to  arrive.  In  IRO's  last  year. 
195 1 ,  between  1 .000  and  1 .500  Eastern 
Europeans  crossed  the  borders  into 
non-Communist  countries  each  month 
(not  including  Germans  leaving  the 
Soviet  Zone  who  were  the  responsibil- 
ity of  the  West  German  Government). 

At  the  same  time,  urgent  refugee 
problems  had  arisen  in  the  Middle  and 
Far  East.  In  the  turmoil  surrounding 
Israel's  birth  in  1948.  over  770.000 
Palestinians  fled  into  neighboring 
countries.  And  in  China  the  Communist 
victory  over  the  Kuomintang  started  a 
flow  of  refugees  pouring  into  Hong 
Kong.  The  Korean  war  also  created  a 
serious  DP  and  refugee  problem  on  that 
peninsula. 

The  United  Nations  took  up  each  of 
these  problems  separately.  They  did 
not  come  within  the  mandate  of  the 
IRO  which  was  confined  to  existing 
groups  of  Europeans.  In  1950  the  Gen- 
eral Assembly,  building  on  an  emer- 
gency organization  created  earlier,  es- 
tablished the  U.N.  Relief  and  Works 
Agency  (UNRWA)  for  Palestinians  in 
the  Near  East.  But  it  found  no  way  to 
set  up  a  fund  to  assist  the  Chinese  in 
Hong  Kong.  Hong  Kong's  long  estab- 
lished policy  was  to  treat  all  Chinese 
who  found  haven  there  not  as  refugees 
but  as  immigrants,  and  as  immigrants 
they  could  not  qualify  for  assistance 
from  regular  U.N.  refugee  programs. 
What  help  they  received  came  from 
British  authorities,  private  donations 
through  voluntary  agencies,  and  the 
U.S.  Far  Eastern  Refugee  Program 
(FERP).  begun  in  1954.  The  United 
Nations  also  designed  a  separate  pro- 
gram for  Korea,  the  U.N.  Korean  Re- 
construction Agency  (UNKRA). 

The  year  1951  saw  several  decisive 
steps  to  improve  the  status  of  refugees. 
It  was  now  clear  that  refugees  were 
going  to  be  a  chronic  problem  of  this 
age  and  would  need  continuing  protec- 
tion. First  the  General  Assembly 
created  a  refugee  agency  of  almost 
global  responsibility,  the  U.N.  High 
Commissioner  for  Refugees  (UNHCR). 
The  UNHCR  did  not  succeed  to  all  of 
IRO's  duties,  for  it  was  not  intended  to 
be  an  operating  agency.  It  was  not  to 
run  camps  or  arrange  for  transportation 
or  resettlement  or  care  for  the  refugee's 


physical  needs.  Its  main  purpose,  un- 
changed over  the  years,  was  to  provide 
legal  protection.  As  the  advocate  of 
refugee  rights  it  was  to  use  its  good  of- 
fices to  induce  governments  to  meet 
their  obligations  toward  refugees. 
Within  a  few  years,  however,  it  gained 
the  authority  to  dispense  the  material 
assistance  that  at  first  was  to  be  pro- 
vided by  other  agencies. 

UNHCR's  main  support  has  been  the 
Inter-Governmental  Committee  for 
European  Migration  (ICEM).  Founded 
at  U.S.  suggestion  in  1951,  it  absorbed 
some  of  the  IRO  facilities  and  staff, 
although  it  is  not  a  U.N.  agency.  Its 
original  purpose  was  to  relieve  the 
pressure  of  overpopulation  in  Europe 
by  supplying  low-cost  transportation  to 
emigrants,  including  refugees.  Later  it 
took  on  responsibilities  in  other  conti- 
nents, and  now  it  is  working  closely 
with  the  UNHCR  in  assisting  refugees 
in  Southeast  Asia. 

Refugee  Magna  Carta 

Also  completed  in  1951  (though  not 
put  into  effect  until  1954)  was  the  U.N. 
Convention  Relating  to  the  Status  of 
Refugees,  known  as  the  refugee  Magna 
Carta.  The  purpose  of  the  convention 
was  to  secure  to  stateless  refugees  a 
body  of  rights  in  international  law.  No 
real  progress  had  been  made  on  this 
issue,  despite  the  League's  concern,  in 
the  period  between  the  wars.  A  refu- 
gee's legal  standing  still  depended  en- 
tirely upon  the  obligations  toward  him 
or  her  that  the  country  of  asylum  had 
voluntarily  assumed.  The  convention 
established  the  rule  that  a  refugee  was 
not  to  be  penalized  for  illegal  entry  (if 
coming  directly  from  the  country  he  or 
she  had  fled)  and  was  not  to  be  expel- 
led to  the  frontiers  of  the  country  where 
his  or  her  life  was  threatened.  The  con- 
vention guaranteed  continuing  personal 
status  to  refugees,  particularly  in  re- 
gard to  the  rights  attached  to  marriage, 
in  accordance  with  the  law  of  the 
country  of  asylum.  Refugees  were  en- 
titled to  administrative  or  consular 
services,  such  as  issuance  of  a  travel 
document.  In  public  education,  social 
security,  public  welfare,  and  other 
matters  they  were  to  be  no  less 
privileged  than  the  nationals  of  the 
host  country,  and  in  employment,  ac- 
quiring property,  and  admittance  to 
studies  and  professions  they  were  to 
enjoy  treatment  no  less  favorable  than 
that  accorded  to  other  aliens  generally. 

U.N.  Definition  of  Refugees 

The  first  article  of  the  1951  conven- 
tion contained  a  definition  of  the  refu- 
gee. Who  was  eligible  for  international 


protection  and  assistance  as  a  refugee 
was  a  question  of  vital  importance,  and 
one  for  which  there  had  been,  up  to 
now,  no  general  answer.  Of  course,  all 
refugee  agencies,  since  the  Nansen 
Commission,  had  been  concerned  with 
the  political  fugitive,  that  is,  the  victim 
of  government  policy,  and  not  persons 
fleeing  from  a  natural  catastrophe.  But 
each  agency  had  been  designed  to  serve 
a  particular  body  of  persons — Rus- 
sians, Germans,  DP's.  or  Palestini- 
ans—  and  the  first  international  agency 
with  a  mandate  broad  enough  to  permit 
a  definition  of  the  refugee  in  the 
abstract  was  the  UNHCR. 

The  convention  took  over  and 
slightly  expanded  the  UNHCR  defini- 
tion. A  refugee  was  a  person  who  was 
outside  his  or  her  country  of  nationality 
or  habitual  residence  because  of 
well-founded  fear  of  persecution  on  ac- 
count of  race,  religion,  nationality, 
membership  in  a  particular  social 
group,  or  political  opinion,  who  was 
unwilling,  because  of  such  fear,  to 
avail  himself  or  herself  of  the  protec- 
tion of  his  or  her  country  of  origin  or  to 
return  to  the  country  of  habitual  resi- 
dence. Such,  in  essence,  were  the 
qualities  of  the  political  refugee. 

But  there  was  more  to  the  definition: 
It  was  hedged  in  by  limitations  on 
place  and  time  not  contained  in  the 
UNHCR  statute.  For,  as  always  when 
refugee  rights  were  debated,  many 
countries  were  not  prepared  to  accept 
an  open-ended  responsibility  and  pre- 
ferred to  handle  emergencies  as  they 
arose  and  as  needs  could  best  be 
judged.  And  so  the  terms  of  the  con- 
vention were  to  apply  to  existing 
groups  of  refugees,  namely  those  who 
owed  their  status  to  events  occurring 
before  January  1,  1951.  What  was 
more,  signatories  could,  by  declara- 
tion, limit  their  responsibility  to  refu- 
gees from  events  that  had  taken  place 
in  Europe. 

The  cutoff  date  was  removed  by  a 
U.N.  Protocol  Relating  to  the  Status  of 
Refugees,  completed  in  1967.  By  this 
time  most  states  had  concluded  that  the 
time  limitation  gave  them  little  protec- 
tion. In  the  modern  world,  refugee 
problems  were,  by  nature,  international 
and  could  not  be  ignored,  even  if  they 
occurred  in  faraway  places,  if  only  for 
humanitarian  reasons.  This  was  appar- 
ent in  the  fall  of  1956  when  200,000 
Hungarians,  within  a  period  of  a 
month,  fled  into  Austria  and  Yugo- 
slavia. In  spite  of  the  time  limitation, 
the  U.N.  agencies  and  Western  gov- 
ernments came  to  the  rescue  without 
any  hesitation. 

What  made  the  cutoff  date  in  a  uni- 
versal convention  even  more  unrealistic 
was  the   situation   in   Africa.    In  this 


December  1979 


13 


continent  of  new  and  struggling  states 
and  of  residual  colonialism,  refugees 
became  a  permanent  feature  in  numbers 
unknown  in  Europe  or  Asia  since  the 
uprooting  that  took  place  during  World 
War  II.  It  was  difficult  (though  not  im- 
possible) to  derive  African  situations 
from  events  prior  to  1951 . 

U.S.  Aid  to  Refugees 

No  country  has  played  such  a  deci- 
sive role  in  world  refugee  affairs  as  the 
United  States.  Assuming  a  large  share 
of  the  costs  of  most  international  refu- 
gee programs  since  the  UNRRA,  it  has 
also  maintained  extensive  programs  of 
its  own  supported  wholly  by  U.S. 
funds.  These  include  the  U.S.  Refugee 
Program  (USRP)  for  Eastern  European 
refugees  (started  as  the  U.S.  Escapee 
Program  in  1952),  the  FERP  for  Chi- 
nese in  Hong  Kong  and  Macao,  educa- 
tional aid  for  young  refugees  from 
southern  Africa,  assistance  to  refugees 
in  South  Vietnam  and  Laos,  food  al- 
lotments under  PL  480  (Food  for  Peace 
program),  and  special  programs  of 
domestic  assistance  for  those  who  have 
fled  directly  to  the  United  States, 
namely,  Cubans  after  1959  and  In- 
dochinese  since  1975.  Like  the  U.N. 
programs,  each  had  its  own  mandate 
and  separate  organization.  Initially 
there  was  no  unified  administration  or 
central  policy  guidance  for  refugees  as 
a  whole.  Refugee  programs  were  con- 
sidered to  be  part  of  the  foreign  aid 
program. 

In  the  1960's,  however.  Congress 
provided  a  coherent  financial  authority. 
The  Migration  and  Refugee  Assistance 
Act  of  1962  authorized  appropriations 
to  cover  U.S.  contributions  to  the 
UNHCR  and  to  the  ICEM,  the  costs  of 
the  USRP  and  the  FERP  and  to  meet 
new  refugee  needs.  It  also  provided 
authority  to  assist  Cuban  refugees  in 
the  United  States,  and  Congress  used 
its  authorities  to  provide  assistance  to 
Indochinese  refugees  after  the  fall  of 
Saigon  in  1975. 

The  United  States  has  also  been  the 
leading  country  of  resettlement.  Since 
1945  close  to  2  million  refugees  have 
found  a  new  home  in  the  United  States. 
While  Canada  and  Australia  have  a 
better  per-capita  record,  these  vast  un- 
derpopulated countries  at  first  selected 
refugees  primarily  for  their  economic 
value.  Australia  insisted  on  a  2-year 
work  contract  and  gave  strong  prefer- 
ence to  single  males  from  Baltic  coun- 
tries, while  Canada  asked  for  those 
willing  to  do  heavy  manual  labor.  (In- 
teresting for  comparison  are  the  two 
special  cases  of  Israel  and  West  Ger- 
many where  immigration  has  been  a 
dominant  fact  of  national   life.   The 


Jewish  population  of  Israel  of  about  3 
million  has  more  than  quadrupled  since 
1948,  with  two-thirds  of  the  increase 
due  to  immigration.  The  West  German 
population  of  about  60  million  includes 
about  12  million  refugees  and  expel- 
lees, all  of  German  extraction.) 

U.S.  Immigration  Law 

Until  1965  U.S.  permanent  immi- 
gration law  made  no  explicit  provision 
for  the  refugee.  All  immigration  is  reg- 
ulated by  the  Immigration  and  Nation- 
ality Act  of  1952,  as  amended  (most 
recently  in  1978).  The  predecessor  to 
the  1952  act  set  a  ceiling  on  immigra- 
tion and  established  a  system  of  dis- 
tributing visas  by  nationality  (defined 
in  most  cases  by  the  country  of  birth). 
The  number,  or  quota,  of  visas  allotted 
to  each  nationality  corresponded  to  the 
share  it  had  already  contributed  to  the 
U.S.  ethnic  make-up.  This  resulted  in  a 
large  quota  for  the  United  Kingdom 
and  small  quotas  for  southern  and  East- 
ern Europe.  While  the  large  German 
quota  enabled  many  refugees  from  the 
Hitler  regime  to  enter  the  United  States 
as  regular  immigrants,  postwar  DP's 
and  refugees  from  Eastern  Europe  who 
wished  to  come  to  the  United  States 
had  no  choice  but  to  wait  or  accept  the 
terms  offered  by  other  countries  of 
immigration. 

At  first  the  United  States,  responding 
to  this  need,  tried  to  speed  up  DP  ad- 
missions without  changing  the  quota 
system.  About  80,000  Poles,  Baits, 
and  southern  Europeans  (about  half  of 
them  refugees)  were  admitted  under  a 
December  1945  directive  by  President 
Truman  to  use  the  quota  numbers  ac- 
cumulated during  the  war.  And  the 
215,000  DP's  admitted  under  the  Dis- 
placed Persons  Act  of  1948  were  to  be 
charged  against  the  quotas  of  future 
years.  It  was  only  with  the  Refugee 
Relief  Act  of  1953  that  the  United 
States  went  outside  the  quota  system  by 
authorizing  distribution  of  215,000 
special  nonquota  immigrant  visas  to  a 
number  of  eligible  groups  of  Europeans 
and  Chinese.  The  McCarran- Walter  act 
of  1952,  amending  the  immigration  and 
nationality  law,  had  eliminated  the 
clause  excluding  Asians  as  immigrants 
but  had  retained  the  quota  system. 

Refugees  were  first  mentioned  ex- 
plicitly in  the  general  immigration  law 
in  the  amendments  passed  in  1965.  The 
law  abolished  the  national  origins 
quota  system  and  set  up  in  its  place  a 
hierarchy  of  preferences  for  visa  dis- 
tribution based  on  personal  qualities; 
that  is,  relationship  with  U.S.  citizens, 
accomplishments,  labor  skills,  and  so 
forth.  First  preference  went  to  the  sons 
and  daughters  of  U.S.   citizens;  the 


ASYLUM  AND  RESETTLEMENT 

The  right  of  polilical  asylum  is  well- 
established  in  international  law,  but  con- 
trary to  common  belief  it  is  a  right  not  of 
the  person  seeking  haven  but  of  the  slate 
thai  is  granting  it.  The  theory  is  that 
every  state,  by  virtue  of  its  sovereignty, 
has  an  absolute  right  to  determine  who 
shall  be  admitted  to  its  territory 
Nevertheless,  states  that  are  party  to  the 
1951  U.N.  Convention  Relating  to  the 
Status  of  Refugees  accept  the  obligation 
not  to  expel  refugees  "to  the  frontiers  of 
territories  where  Itheir]  life  or  freedom 
would  be  threatened," 

Refugee  doctrine  distinguishes  between 
a  state  of  first  asylum  and  a  state  of  sec- 
ond asylum  (or  resettlement  state).  A 
country  that  has  received,  but  cannot  as- 
similate, large  numbers  of  refugees  com- 
ing directly  from  their  homelands  is  a 
state  of  first  asylum,  whereas  a  country 
that  accepts  for  permanent  resettlement  a 
refugee  already  granted  asylum  in  another 
country  is  a  state  of  second  asylum.  The 
main  states  of  second  asylum  for  In- 
dochinese refugees  have  been  the  United 
States,  France,  Canada,  and  Australia. 


seventh  (and  last)  to  refugees.  Hemi- 
spheric immigration  ceilings  established 
by  this  law  were  put  together  in  1978  to 
form  a  worldwide  ceiling  of  290,000 
immigrants  per  year.  Refugees  received 
6%  of  this  ceiling,  or  17,400.  Refu- 
gees, however,  do  not  enter  the  country 
on  the  same  terms  as  others.  They  are 
conditional  entrants  and  must  wait  2 
years  before  they  can  apply  for  status 
as  immigrants. 

There  was  a  definition  of  the  refugee 
given  in  the  1965  law;  it  was  narrower 
than  that  of  the  1951  U.N.  convention. 
Refugee  programs  dependent  upon 
American  initiative  and  funds  spanned 
the  globe.  And  yet  the  U.S.  immigra- 
tion law  of  1965,  following  the  practice 
of  the  1950's,  continued  to  tie  refugee 
status  to  communism  and  turmoil  in  the 
Middle  East.  Thus,  under  the  1965 
law,  refugees  are  persons  who  "be- 
cause of  persecution  on  account  of 
race,  religion,  or  political  opinion  .  .  . 
have  fled  from  any  communist  or 
communist-dominated  country  or  area, 
or  from  any  country  in  the  general  area 
of  the  Middle  East,  and  are  unable  or 
unwilling  to  return  to  such  country  on 
account  of  race,  religion,  or  political 
opinion." 

The  United  States  was  not  a  party  to 
the  1951  Convention  Relating  to  the 
Status  of  Refugees  (which  gave  rise  to 
certain  legal  doubts).  But  it  did  sign 
the  1967  U.N.  protocol  abolishing  the 
cutoff  date  in  the  1951  convention,  and 
this  meant  accepting  a  definition  of  the 


14 


refugee  at  variance  with  the  one  given 
in  U.S.  domestic  law  for  immigration 
purposes.  The  term  as  used  in  the  1962 
Migration  and  Refugee  A.ssistance  Act 
was  not  defined,  however,  and  in  ap- 
plication is  broader  than  the  immigra- 
tion definition. 

The  Parole 

Thus  limited  by  its  immigration 
laws,  the  United  States  could  not  have 
admitted  as  many  refugees  as  it  has  in 
the  past  14  years  if  the  executive 
branch  had  not  had  use  of  a  special 
authority  known  as  the  parole.  Insti- 
tuted by  the  McCarran-Walter  act  of 
1952,  the  parole  clause  authorized  the 
Attorney  General  to  admit  to  the 
United  States  temporarily,  for  '"emer- 
gent reasons"  or  for  reasons  deemed  in 
the  national  interest,  any  alien  apply- 
ing for  admission.  Referring  to  the  use 
of  the  parole  to  admit  over  30,000 
Hungarian  refugees  between  1956  and 
1958,  Congressman  Walter  said:  "We 
never  anticipated  anything  of  this  mag- 
nitude, but  we  did  know  this  sort  of 
situation  would  arise.  That  is  why  the 
provision  was  put  in  the  law."  The 
parole  enabled  the  United  States  to 
admit  refugees  from  non-Communist 
countries,  such  as  Chile,  after  1973. 
And  in  the  absence  of  other  authority, 
the  executive  branch  has  had  to  resort 
to  the  parole  to  admit  large  numbers  of 
refugees  in  emergency  situations. 

The  parole  was  used  extensively  to 
admit  anti-Castro  Cubans  in  the 
1960's.  Of  the  some  800,000  Cubans 
who  have  gone  into  exile  in  the  20 
years  that  Castro  has  ruled  their  island, 
some  650,000  have  found  refuge  in 
the  United  States.  The  Federal  Gov- 
ernment opened  a  reception  center  for 
Cuban  refugees  in  1960  and  created  a 
special  assistance  program  in  1961. 
The  largest  number  of  refugee  Cubans 
processed  into  the  United  States  in  a 
single  year,  1962,  was  78,000.  By 
comparison,  in  the  8  months  of  1975 
following  the  fall  of  Saigon,  the  United 
States  took  in  and  found  homes  for 
135,000  refugees  from  Indochina. 

The  1975  Indochinese  Exodus 

The  flow  of  Indochinese  refugees 
started  with  the  fall  of  Saigon  in  April 
1975.  Preparations  began  when  the 
outcome  of  the  fighting  was  no  longer 
in  doubt.  Alerting  the  UNHCR  and 
ICEM  to  an  impending  refugee  crisis, 
the  United  States  invoked  the  parole 
authority  to  admit  into  the  country  per- 
sons whose  lives  were  believed  to  be  in 
danger.  Within  a  few  days  at  the  end  of 
April,  some  130,000  Vietnamese,  with 
a  smaller  number  of  Laotians  and 


Cambodians,  had  quit  their  country  and 
were  on  their  way  to  the  United  States, 
Many  had  been  evacuated  by  air  from 
staging  sites  in  Saigon  while  others  left 
by  sea  either  in  U.S.  vessels  or  under 
U.S.  naval  escort  for  transit  centers  in 
Guam  and  the  Philippines. 

An  interagency  task  force,  supported 
by  private  voluntary  organizations,  set 
about  the  work  of  resettlement.  Recep- 
tion centers  were  quickly  opened  at 
military  bases  in  California,  Florida, 
Arkansas,  and  Pennsylvania.  The  job 
that  lay  before  them  was  without  any 
real  precedent  in  American  history. 
The  Federal  Government  had  only  the 
experience  of  the  Cuban  resettlement  to 
guide  it,  and  these  new  refugees  were 
Orientals  who  had  been  whisked  almost 
overnight  into  an  Occidental  country  of 
which  many  had  only  superficial 
knowledge. 

The  operation  relied  heavily  upon 
the  work  of  the  voluntary  agencies. 
These  organizations,  most  of  them 
church  based,  had  long  experience 
settling  and  caring  for  immigrants  and 
refugees.  It  was  they  who  found  the 
sponsors  who  would  give  individual  as- 
sistance to  refugees,  arranged  for 
transportation,  and  watched  over  the 
refugees  until  they  were  self-support- 
ing. Fort  Chaffee  in  Arkansas,  the 
largest  of  the  reception  centers,  was 
open  until  December  1975.  In  less  than 
8  months,  130,000  Vietnamese  and 
5,000  Cambodians  had  been  started  on 
new  lives.  Considering  the  difficulties 
this  must  be  regarded  as  a  rare  success. 

The  Flow  From  Indochina 

The  exodus  from  Cambodia  and 
Vietnam  of  April  1975  was  followed 
later  that  year  by  a  flow  of  refugees 
from  Laos.  Now,  4  years  later,  the 
flow  from  Indochina  shows  no  sign  of 
abating.  The  refugees  come  from  all 
three  Indochinese  countries  and  belong 
to  all  social  classes.  Some,  like  the 
Hmong  hill  tribesmen  of  Laos,  are 
under  pressure  because  of  their  race  as 
well  as  their  political  past.  Some,  like 
this  year's  Khmer  are  fleeing  chaos  and 
famine.  And  others  —  the  ethnic 
Chinese  of  Vietnam  —  have  been  vir- 
tually expelled.  But  whatever  the  mo- 
tive in  the  individual  case,  the  root 
cause  of  all  flight  from  Indochina  is  the 
strain  of  life  under  despotic  regimes. 

The  refugees  come  by  land  and  by 
sea.  The  "land  people"  come  from 
Kampuchea  (Cambodia)  and  from  Laos 
(mostly  hill  people,  or  Hmong,  but  also 
lowland  Lao)  and  cross  the  border  on 
foot  into  Thailand.  The  number  of 
those  who  have  taken  this  route  since 
1975  is  over  450,000  (not  counting 
300,000  Khmer  who  crossed  into 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 

Thailand  in  the  fall  of  1979),  and 
180,000  of  these  are  still  in  Thailand 
awaiting  resettlement  elsewhere.  Some 
have  been  in  the  camps  for  more  than  4 
years.  Another  260,000  people,  mostly 
ethnic  Chinese,  have  gone  by  land  into 
the  People's  Republic  of  China,  where 
almost  all  are  in  the  process  of  resettl- 
ing. 

"Boat  people"  first  made  their  ap- 
pearance in  the  summer  of  1975,  al- 
though it  was  not  until  the  following 
year  that  the  world  became  aware  of 
their  plight.  Nearly  all  of  the  boat 
people  come  from  Vietnam,  although 
at  first  there  were  some  Kampucheans 
who  took  this  route.  The  method  of 
flight  is  determined  by  geography.  As 
Vietnam  borders  Kampuchea  and  Laos 
on  the  west  and  China  on  the  north, 
those  who  leave  the  country  clandes- 
tinely for  a  non-Communist  haven  have 
no  choice  but  to  set  out  to  sea  and  hope 
for  the  best. 

Once  at  sea  boat  people  face  enor- 
mous dangers.  Their  craft  are  usually 
small  fishing  vessels,  often  not  more 
than  30  feet  long,  that  were  never  in- 
tended for  use  on  the  high  seas.  Many  . 
boat  people  have  hoped  to  reach  the  | 
shipping  lanes  there  to  be  rescued  by 
some  larger  vessel.  By  international 
law  captains  are  obliged  to  assist  other 
ships  that  are  in  distress  and  to  disem- 
bark crewmen  and  passengers  at  the 
first  port  of  call.  But  as  the  number  of 
refugees  increased  and  port  authorities 
became  reluctant  to  accept  them,  cap- 
tains began  to  ignore  their  obligation. 
Indeed,  refugees  who  were  afloat  in  a 
leaky  boat  reported  that  21  vessels 
passed  them  before  one  picked  them  up 
and  carried  them  to  safety.  It  is  un- 
known how  many  perish  at  sea  (some 
think  30%)  or  are  caught  by  Viet- 
namese patrols.  In  July  1979  eight  ref- 
ugees who  had  arrived  in  the  Philip- 
pines reported  that  their  boat  had  gone 
aground  on  the  Spratly  Islands  where 
Vietnamese  troops  opened  fire,  killing 
20  men,  20  women,  and  45  children. 

Until  mid- 1978  the  boat  people  from 
Vietnam  left  their  homes  by  stealth.  To 
escape  detection  and  punishment,  they 
had  to  lay  plans  well  in  advance.  They 
were  mostly  ethnic  Vietnamese.  But  in 
the  fall  of  1978  boats  began  to  make  jj 
their  appearance  with  passengers  con- 
sisting almost  exclusively  of  ethnic 
Chinese.  Some  were  large  vessels  cap- 
able of  carrying  several  thousand  pas- 
sengers, and  they  had  left  Vietnam 
under  government  supervision. 


Hanoi's  Policy 

What  had  happened  was  that  the 
government  had  seen  the  chance  to 


December  1979 


15 


exploit  the  flight  for  its  own  purposes. 
Hanoi  had  intensified  its  drive  to  do 
away  with  private  enterprise  and  reduce 
the  urban  population.  Many  Chinese 
were  both  businessmen  and  city  dwel- 
lers. But  also  influencing  the  treatment 
they  received  was  the  belief  that  the 
Chinese  are  a  fifth  column  inside  the 
country.  In  any  case,  the  authorities. 
since  mid-1978,  have  been  giving 
Chinese  farmers  and  fishermen  as  well 
as  business  people  the  choice  of  mov- 
ing into  new  economic  zones  in  the  re- 
mote countryside  or  leaving  the  coun- 
try. 

Those  who  choose  to  leave  by  sea 
pay  dearly  for  the  privilege.  Voyages 
are  arranged  strictly  as  a  business  ven- 
ture. A  middleman,  as  a  rule  a  Chinese 
who  will  later  leave  himself,  charters  a 
ship  and  collects  passage  money  while 
officials  certify  the  passenger  list,  col- 
lect an  exit  fee.  and  set  a  day  for  de- 
parture. While  the  government  has  not 
extended  this  favor  to  citizens  of  Viet- 
namese extraction,  some  Vietnamese 
have  reportedly  succeeded  in  bribing 
officials  to  certify  them  as  Chinese  for 
the  voyage.  Both  fare  and  "tax"  are 
payable  in  gold  (a  common  means  of 
storing  wealth  in  Vietnam).  In  this  way 
the  government  is  not  only  rid  of  a  so- 
cially undesirable  class  but  acquires 
specie  to  pay  for  badly  needed  imports. 
Reliable  estimates  are  that  the  exit 
money  collected  from  emigrants  in  the 
past  year  amounts  to  3%  or  more  of  the 
GNP. 


Refugee  Reception 

For  many  the  voyage  itself,  like  the 
overland  trek,  has  been  just  one  phase 
of  a  continuing  ordeal.  The  land  people 
have  no  place  to  go  but  Thailand,  while 
the  "'small  boat"  people  often  set 
ashore  on  the  Malaysian  or  Indonesian 
coast.  Freighters  carrying  "large  boat" 
people  have  appeared  off  those  coasts 
or  slipped  into  Hong  Kong  and  Manila 
Bay.  Up  to  now  both  Thailand  and 
Malaysia  have  refused  to  assimilate  any 
fugitives  (with  the  exception  of  Khmer 
Moslems  in  Malaysia)  but  have  other- 
wise wavered  in  their  treatment  of  ref- 
ugees. Although  neither  government  is 
a  party  to  the  1951  convention  and  the 
1967  Protocol  Relating  to  the  Status  of 
Refugees,  both  have  accepted  the  prin- 
ciple of  granting  asylum.  But  both 
peoples  feel  hostility  toward  the  Chi- 
nese and  Vietnamese,  and  the  con- 
tinuing and  increasing  flow  has  raised 
the  prospect  of  heavy  costs  and  politi- 
cal, eVen  military,  complications. 

Refugees  have  sometimes  been 
forced  back  across  the  border.  Boat 
people,  not  allowed  on  land,  have  had 


to  make  camp  in  their  overcrowded 
vessels.  And  some  boats,  after  being 
reprovisioned.  have  been  towed  back 
out  to  sea.  In  July  1979.  1.000  Sino- 
Vietnamese.  upon  reaching  Malaysian 
coastal  waters,  smashed  their  boats  and 
swam  ashore. 

The  flow  of  Indochinese  refugees 
affects  other  Southeast  Asian  countries 
as  well.  Singapore.  Hong  Kong,  the 
Philippines,  and  Indonesia  are  no  more 
able  to  absorb  a  large  influx  of  helpless 
foreigners  than  were  many  European 
countries  that  gave  asylum  to  Russians 
fleeing  their  revolution. 

Singapore  is  the  nearest  port  for 
many  ships  that  have  rescued  Viet- 
namese from  sinking  vessels.  Being  an 
overpopulated  city-state,  Singapore 
feels  that  it  cannot  accept  any  refugees 
for  permanent  settlement.  Its  present 
policy  is  to  give  temporary  asylum  only 
to  persons  who  have  a  promise  of  per- 
manent settlement  elsewhere.  The 
UNHCR  camp  in  Singapore  is  now 
housing  over  2,000  refugees. 

Hong  Kong,  always  a  place  of  open 
settlement  for  Chinese  and  currently 
housing  63.000  Vietnamese  refugees  in 
UNHCR-sponsored  camps,  also  has 
limited  space  and  is  overpopulated.  As 
it  also  receives  illegal  immigrants  from 
the  P.R.C.,  its  resources  are  badly 
strained.  The  Hong  Kong  Government 
has  imposed  severe  penalties  on  mas- 
ters and  owners  who  have  let  out  ves- 
sels for  the  Vietnamese  refugee  trade. 

Some  Vietnamese  boats  arrive  in  In- 
donesian waters.  Although  Indonesia 
has  given  asylum  to  refugees  who  suc- 
ceed in  landing,  it  will  not  accept  any 
for  resettlement.  Its  naval  patrols  have 
often  intercepted  vessels,  made  them 
seaworthy,  and  sent  them  on  to  other 
destinations.  Some  have  gone  on  to 
Australia,  over  2.000  miles  from  their 
home. 

The  Philippine  Government  has  ac- 
cepted for  permanent  resettlement  a 
small  number  of  Vietnamese  —  less 
than  a  thousand  —  who  have  Philippine 
family  ties.  It  has  also  freely  given 
temporary  asylum  to  small  boat  people. 
But  like  all  other  Southeast  Asian 
countries  it  was  upset  by  the  appear- 
ance in  1979  of  large  boats  with 
thousands  of  refugees  aboard. 

World  Response,  1978-79 

At  the  end  of  1978  there  was  a 
dramatic  increase  in  the  flow  of  refu- 
gees. The  monthly  arrivals  grew  from 
fewer  than  1 ,500  in  January  to  over 
20,000  by  the  end  of  the  year,  and  the 
growth  continued  into  the  new  year.  In 
May  1979  the  number  of  Indochinese 
seeking  asylum  was  64,000,  the  record 


for  a  single  month  until  the  outflow  of 
several  hundred  thousand  Khmer  into 
Thailand  this  fall.  This  high  level  of 
flight  in  1978  and  1979  reflects 
Hanoi's  policy  of  forced  emigration 
and  the  chaos  that  has  reigned  in  Kam- 
puchea after  the  Vietnamese  invasion. 

The  situation  at  the  end  of  1978  gen- 
erated new  efforts  of  assistance.  At  a 
UNHCR  consultative  meeting  attended 
by  38  nations  in  December  1978,  there 
were  new  pledges  of  money  and  refu- 
gee admissions.  The  paramount  need 
was  to  speed  up  resettlement.  It  was 
also  vital,  however,  to  reduce  the  flow 
and  to  work  for  free  emigration  under 
humane  conditions. 

In  January  1979.  Hanoi,  faced  with 
growing  world  disapproval  of  its  poli- 
cies, announced  that  it  would  make 


WORLD  REFUGEE  YEAR 

In  June  1959,  [he  United  Nations 
launched  a  campaign  to  secure  increased 
assistance  for  refugees,  to  which  it  gave 
the  name  World  Refugee  Year.  At  that 
time  the  number  of  refugees  dependent 
upon  international  assistance  was 
2.500,000.  (In  1979,  after  two  decades  of 
upheaval  in  Africa  and  Asia,  the  number 
is  close  to  10  million.)  Chinese,  Pales- 
tinians, and  Algerians  accounted  for  most 
of  these.  Of  special  concern  were  Euro- 
pean refugees  who  had  no  hope  of  re- 
turning home  but  because  of  physical 
handicaps  had  been  turned  down  for  im- 
migration. 

The  U.N.  drive  was  supported  by  97 
nations,  and  in  many  of  these  special 
committees  were  formed  to  solicit  contri- 
butions and  campaign  for  more  liberal 
refugee  policies.  Much  publicity  was 
achieved  through  World  Refugee  Year 
postage  stamps  issued  simultaneously  by 
77  countries. 

In  the  United  States  this  event  was 
marked  by  a  ceremony  attended  by  am- 
bassadors and  representatives  of  40  of  the 
participating  countries.  These  activities 
added  millions  of  dollars  to  refugee  aid 
funds,  led  many  countries  to  accept  the 
handicapped  as  immigrants,  and  focused 
public  attention  for  a  whole  year  on  a 
serious  humanitarian  problem. 


IWORLD  MFUGEE  YEAR 


16 


arrangements  for  orderly  emigration  in 
the  future.  In  May  Hanoi  signed  an 
agreement  with  the  UNHCR  permitting 
free  depiarture  of  all  citizens  who 
wished  to  leave  (except  criminals).  In 
July  the  United  States  and  Hanoi  began 
discussions  on  admitting  U.S.  consular 
officers  to  Ho  Chi  Minh  City  (the 
former  Saigon)  to  issue  visas  to  persons 
qualified  to  enter  the  United  States 
under  a  family  reunification  plan. 
Thus,  on  the  question  of  legal  emigra- 
tion, some  progress  was  achieved  dur- 
ing the  first  half  of  1979  on  paper.  But 
the  results  to  date  have  been  disap- 
pointing. 

In  the  summer  of  1979  activity  inten- 
sified. The  leaders  of  the  industrial  na- 
tions took  up  the  question  of  refugees 
("a  humanitarian  problem  of  historic 
proportions,"  they  said)  at  their  eco- 
nomic summit  in  Tokyo  in  June.  They 
called  upon  the  Indochinese  govern- 
ments to  put  an  end  to  the  disorderly 
outflow  and  respect  the  right  of  peace- 
ful departure.  They  promised  to  admit 
more  refugees  and  increase  their  con- 
tributions to  international  refugee 
agencies.  And  they  also  endorsed  a 
proposal  put  forward  by  Prime  Minister 
Thatcher  for  a  U.N.  refugee  conference 
to  decide  upon  concrete  measures  of 
assistance. 

The  problem  of  refugees  dominated 
the  annual  Foreign  Ministers"  confer- 
ence of  the  Association  of  South  East 
Asian  Nations  (ASEAN)  on  Bali  (In- 
donesia), a  few  days  after  the  economic 
summit.  For  ASEAN  countries — 
Singapore,  Malaysia,  Indonesia.  Thai- 
land, and  the  Philippines — the  events 
in  Indochina  were  a  pressing  concern. 
Vietnamese  troops  had  reached  the 
Thai  border.  Some  feared  that  the 
U.S.S.R.  and  Vietnam  were  embarking 
upon  a  long-range  design  to  dominate 
the  region.  All  were  alarmed  at  what 
they  considered  a  weak  response  by  the 
rest  of  the  world  to  the  flood  of  refu- 
gees that  threatened  them  with  inunda- 
tion. They  appealed  to  other  nations  to 
induce  the  Vietnamese  to  stop  the 
flow,  to  speed  up  resettlement,  and  to 
create  more  refugee  processing  centers. 
To  add  emphasis  to  their  position,  they 
announced  their  refusal  to  accept  fur- 
ther refugees  and  their  right  to  expel 
those  already  present  in  their  countries. 

ASEAN's  rejection  of  the  policy  of 
asylum  was  not  carried  out  completely. 
Although  in  early  July  both  Indonesian 
and  Malaysian  officials  prevented 
many  refugees  from  landing,  the  gov- 
ernments quietly  accepted  some  refu- 
gees pending  the  results  of  the  U.N. 
conference.  Secretary  Vance  went  to 
Bali  after  the  Tokyo  summit  to  confer 
with  the  ASEAN  Foreign  Ministers.  He 
urged  them  to  continue  their  policy  of 


granting  asylum  and  assured  them  that 
a  major  international  effort  to  ease  their 
problems  was  underway. 

U.N.  Conference 

on  Indochinese  Refugees 

The  U.N. -sponsored  conference  on 
refugees  met  in  Geneva  on  July  20-21; 
72  countries  were  in  attendance,  in- 
cluding all  countries  affected  by  the 
Indochinese  refugee  flow  except  Kam- 
puchea and  Laos.  On  the  problem  of 
speeding  up  resettlement  there  were 
notable  achievements: 

•  Pledges  to  resettle  refugees  bring- 
ing total  annual  commitments  up  to 
265,000. 

•  Pledges  totaling  $200  million  for 
the  UNHCR  (not  including  a  pledge  by 
Japan  to  carry  half  the  budget);  and 

•  Progress  toward  establishing  refu- 
gee processing  centers  to  give  tempor- 
ary housing  to  refugees  who  had 
guarantees  of  eventual  resettlement 
elsewhere  (the  Philippines  offered  to 
construct  a  center  capable  of  process- 
ing 50,000  refugees,  and  in  May  1979 
the  Indonesian  Government  designated 
the  island  of  Galang  as  a  refugee  proc- 
essing center  to  accommodate  10,000 
refugees). 

Secretary  General  Waldheim  also 
announced  the  willingness  of  the  Viet- 
namese authorities  to  stem  "■  illegal  de- 
partures" for  a  "reasonable  period  of 
time."  In  addition  there  was  general 
support  for  the  agreement  on  legal  im- 
migation  worked  out  by  the  Viet- 
namese and  the  UNHCR. 

U.S.  Initiatives 

The  United  States  has  played  a 
leading  role  in  the  1979  deliberations. 
Concerned  that  other  countries  carry  a 
fair  share  of  the  burden,  the  United 
States  has  been  fully  prepared  to  carry 
a  heavier  load  itself.  Immigration  and 
financial  assistance  are  both  part  of  the 
American  program.  Since  the  April 
1975  exodus,  the  executive  branch, 
through  repeated  use  of  the  parole,  had 
admitted  an  additional  80,000  In- 
dochinese refugees,  and  by  April  1979 
the  authorized  monthly  intake  was 
7,000.  In  June  President  Carter  raised 
this  number  to  14,000  per  month. 

Contributions  to  international  agen- 
cies were  increased.  Pursuant  to 
pledges  made  at  the  economic  summit, 
the  President  in  July  requested  Con- 
gress to  raise  the  U.S.  contribution  to 
the  UNHCR  Indochina  programs  from 
$41  million  to  $105  million  (that  is,  up 
to  about  one-third  of  UNHCR  esti- 
mated needs  for  Indochina  in  1980). 
And  on  July  21  he  ordered  the  7th  Fleet 


Department  of  State  Bulletin  , 

and  military  aircraft  to  mount  an  "in-  ' 
tense,  active"  search-and-rescue  effort  ■ 
in  the  South  China  Sea.  From  the  be- 
ginning it  has  been  U.S.  policy  to  grant 
resettlement  in  the  United  States  to 
anyone  rescued  at  sea  by  American 
vessels  if  such  a  guarantee  were  neces- 
sary to  disembark  the  refugees  at  the 
next  scheduled  port  of  call,  and  if  the 
refugees  could  not  qualify  for  admis- 
sion to  any  other  country. 

At  the  Geneva  conference  Vice 
President  Mondale  made  a  proposal 
opening  a  new  horizon  in  world  refugee 
assistance.  It  called  for  creation  of  an 
international  fund  with  the  purpose  of 
assisting  the  resettlement  of  refugees  in 
developing  countries.  The  rationale  for 
the  fund  is  that  industrialized  nations, 
and  the  ASEAN  countries,  cannot  con- 
tinue to  absorb  refugees  in  large  num- 
bers while  many  developing  countries 
were  in  need  of  manpower  which  they 
had  no  means  to  attract.  As  proposed, 
the  fund  would  supply  money  for 
transportation,  training,  and  other  re- 
settlement costs  from  capital  donated 
by  national  governments.  These  reset- 
tlement projects  could  be  adapted  to  the 
development  projects  supported  by  the 
World  Bank. 

U.S.  Coordinator 
for  Refugee  Affairs 

Meanwhile  the  United  States 
strengthened  its  own  refugee  machin- 
ery. In  February  1979  the  President 
created  the  office  of  the  U.S.  Coor- 
dinator for  Refugee  Affairs,  the  first 
incumbent  being  former  Senator  Dick 
Clark.  The  coordinator's  mandate  was 
to: 

•  Develop  an  overall  U.S.  refugee 
and  resettlement  policy; 

•  Coordinate  all  U.S.  domestic  and 
international  refugee  programs; 

•  Represent  the  United  States  on 
refugee  matters  with  other  governments 
and  international  agencies;  and 

•  Develop  liaison  on  refugee  matters 
between  the  Federal  Government  and 
the  voluntary  agencies  and  local  U.S. 
authorities. 

Refugee  Act  of  1979 

In  March  the  Administration  sub- 
mitted a  bill  to  reform  U.S.  refugee 
law.  Congress  and  the  Administration 
had  long  agreed  that  the  provisions 
concerning  refugees  in  the  current  law 
were  too  cumbersome  and  not  equal  to 
the  current  problem.  The  new  bill,  en- 
titled "The  Refugee  Act  of  1979," 
would  rationalize  procedures  and  reg- 
ularize and  fund  what  has  been  done  on 
an  ad  hoc  basis  through  parole  author- 


December  1979 


17 


ity.  The  hill  proposes  to: 

•  Eliminate  present  ideological  and 
geographical  restraints  on  which  refu- 
gees can  be  admitted  to  the  United 
States; 

•  Set  a  normal  yearly  flow  of  refu- 
gee admissions  at  50,000; 

•  Leave  it  to  the  President  to  decide 
which  groups  or  classes  of  refugees  are 
of  special  concern  and  should  be  ad- 
mitted to  the  United  States; 

•  Enable  the  President,  after  con- 
sultation with  the  Congress,  to  admit 
■"emergency  groups"  of  refugees  out- 
side the  normal  flow; 

•  Keep  the  parole  authority;  and 

•  Create  a  more  comprehensive  and 
equitable  basis  for  Federal  assistance  to 
refugees  settled  in  the  United  States. 

Refugee  Clearance 

Clearing  Southeast  Asian  refugees 
for  admission  to  the  United  States  is  a 
difficult  process  which  the  new  bill 
will  not  greatly  change.  Screening  is 
conducted  in  the  countries  of  first 
asylum  where  U.S.  officials  work  in 
close  cooperation  with  the  international 
organizations  and  the  voluntary  agen- 
cies. The  UNHCR  is  the  general  advo- 
cate of  refugee  rights  toward  the  re- 
gional governments  and  also  provides 
material  assistance  such  as  food,  health 
care,  and  shelter.  The  ICEM  arranges 
for  transportation  to  countries  of  per- 
manent asylum. 

Refugees  applying  for  admission  to 
the  United  States  are  interviewed  sev- 
eral times.  First  they  are  interviewed 
by  U.S.  voluntary  agency  and  U.S. 
Embassy  personnel  who  decide  which 
refugees  are  the  most  highly  qualified 


for  admission  to  the  United  States. 
First  preference  goes  to  those  who  have 
immediate  family  members  in  the 
United  States,  second  those  who  had 
worked  in  positions  of  trust  for  the 
United  States,  third  those  associated 
with  U.S.  policies  and  programs,  and 
fourth  others  who  have  not  been  ac- 
cepted by  another  country.  These 
priorities  serve  only  as  guidelines  and 
may  be  disregarded  for  compelling  hu- 
manitarian reasons.  Refugees  are  then 
interviewed  by  the  Immigration  and 
Naturalization  Service,  which  has  the 
right  of  final  decision.  When  a  refugee 
is  approved  for  admission  the  voluntary 
agencies  take  the  necessary  steps  to 
search  for  an  American  sponsor. 

Care  is  taken  to  keep  out  undesira- 
bles. All  applicants  are  checked  against 
records  kept  by  U.S.  Government 
agencies.  There  is  an  absolute  prohibi- 
tion on  admission  of  former  members 
of  the  Vietcong  or  those  who  have  en- 
gaged in  persecution.  No  refugee  can 
be  admitted  whose  state  of  health,  de- 
termined by  medical  exam,  is  a  hazard 
to  others. 

Famine  in  Kampuchea 

The  refugee  crisis  in  Indochina  is 
exacerbated  by  the  famine  in  Kam- 
puchea. After  more  than  3  years  of 
brutality  and  dislocation  by  the  Pol  Pot 
regime,  the  Khmer  are  now  caught  in 
the  fighting  between  the  Pol  Pot  forces 
and  Vietnamese  invaders.  Vietnam 
launched  its  invasion  in  December 
1978  at  the  time  of  the  primary  harvest, 
and  the  subsequent  scorched-earth 
strategy  destroyed  most  of  the  rice  crop 
and  disrupted  new  planting.  Starvation 
is   already   afflicting  hundreds  of 


thousands  of  Khmer.  Many  of  the 
Khmer  who  have  fled  since  the  spring 
of  1979  arrive  in  Thailand  totally  de- 
bilitated. Others — no  one  knows  how 
many — are  now  huddled  along  the  bor- 
der not  strong  enough  to  complete  the 
walk  to  the  camps. 

These  conditions  induced  a  new  in- 
ternational effort.  In  March  1979  the 
United  States  began  urging  relief  agen- 
cies to  prepare  for  the  possibility  of 
famine  in  Kampuchea.  The  Interna- 
tional Committee  of  the  Red  Cross  and 
UNICEF  are  acting  as  agents  for  the 
concerned  governments  in  arranging 
for  the  shipment  of  food.  It  was  not 
until  September  26,  months  after  the 
initiative,  that  the  Vietnamese-sup- 
ported government  in  Kampuchea  and 
Hanoi  agreed  to  cooperate  in  an  inter- 
national relief  program.  To  date  the 
announced  U.S.  contributions  to  this 
effort  is  cash  and  commodities  valued 
at  about  $90  million.  The  United  States 
has  also  arranged  through  its  own 
facilities  for  the  distribution  of  food 
and  medicines  to  Khmer  refugees  along 
the  Thai-Khmer  border  and  has  pledged 
to  supply  $9  million,  or  one-third  of  the 
cost,  of  Thailand's  own  program  of 
famine  assistance. 

The  Future 

To  the  crisis  in  Indochina  there  is  no 
end  in  sight.  Even  if  the  famine  in 
Kampuchea  is  checked,  there  is  the 
problem  of  clearing  the  camps.  With 
current  resettlement  pledges  this  could 
possibly  be  done  within  a  year  — 
assuming  there  are  no  new  arrivals.  But 
there  is  no  doubt  that  the  coming  year 
will  see  a  continuing  flow  of  refugees. 
It  is  only  a  question  of  how  many.      D 


Department  of  State  Bulletin  , 


THE  PREI^IDE^T:        Iran  and  Energy 


Remarks  at  the  13th  constitutional  convention  of  the 
AFL-CIO  in  Washington.  DC.,  on  November  15, 
1979.' 

For  a  brief  time  this  afternoon  I  want  to  speak  with 
you  and  all  Americans  about  some  fundamental  princi- 
ples upon  which  our  nation  was  founded  and  which  we 
must  never  forget.  To  some,  these  ideals  may  seem  at 
times  to  be  old  fashioned  or  outmoded.  But  we  have 
been  clearly  reminded  in  recent  days  that  these  princi- 
ples mean  just  as  much  to  us  now  as  they  have  ever 
meant  during  any  time  of  critical  decision  in  the  history 
of  our  nation. 

These  fundamentals  have  old  names  to  which  we  must 
continually  give  new  meaning — names  like  strength, 
courage,  patriotism,  independence,  the  love  of  freedom, 
human  rights,  justice,  concern  for  the  common  good. 

This  is  the  12th  day  that  more  than  100  innocent 
human  beings,  some  60  of  whom  are  members  of  the 
U.S.  diplomatic  mission,  have  been  held  hostage  in  our 
Embassy  in  Iran.  For  a  rare  time  in  human  history,  a 
host  government  has  condoned  and  even  encouraged  this 
kind  of  illegal  action  against  the  sovereign  territory  and 
official  diplomatic  relations  of  another  nation.  This  is  an 
act  of  terrorism  —  totally  outside  the  bounds  of  interna- 
tional law  and  diplomatic  tradition. 

In  this  time  of  trial,  our  deep  concern  is  for  the  lives 
of  these  brave  hostages — our  nation's  loyal  citizens  and 
faithful  representatives.  Every  American  feels  anger  and 
outrage  at  what  is  happening  to  them — just  as  every 
American  feels  concern  for  their  safety  and  pride  in 
their  great  courage.  This  crisis  calls  for  firmness,  and  it 
calls  for  restraint.  1  am  proud  that  this  situation  has 
brought  forth  calm  leadership  by  officials  and  private 
citizens  throughout  this  country. 

Firmness  does  require  patience,  and  it  requires  perse- 
verence.  Firmness  also  means  measured  action  —  delib- 
erate actions  that  clarify  the  real  issues,  reduce  the 
likelihood  of  violence,  protect  our  interests,  and  insure 
justice. 

The  United  States  has  done  nothing  and  will  do  noth- 
ing that  could  be  used  to  justify  violent  or  imprudent 
action  by  anyone.  While  we  are  pursuing  all  avenues  of 
diplomatic  resolution,  we  are  also  acting  unilaterally  as 
appropriate — with  restraint,  yes,  but  without  hesitation. 

First,  in  order  to  discourage  violence  and  possible 
bloodshed  here,  which  when  televised  and  transmitted 
back  to  Iran  might  threaten  the  safety  of  the  hostages,  I 
have  discouraged  the  issuing  of  permits  for  demonstra- 
tions on  Federal  properties  here  in  Washington  consist- 
ent with  our  laws  and  pursuant  to  my  own  powers  and 
responsibilities.  I  have  also  encouraged  local  and  State 
officials  to  take  similar  legal  action. 

Second,  I  have  directed  our  immigration  authorities  to 
review  the  visas  of  some  50,000  Iranian  students  who 


are  guests  here  in  our  country.  Our  nation  is  fully  com- 
mitted to  the  enhancement  of  human  rights,  the  protec- 
tion of  legal  rights,  and  the  enhancement  of  civil  justice. 
All  provisions  of  the  U.S.  Constitution  will  be  honored. 
All  foreign  nationals  who  are  here  lawfully  may  con- 
tinue here  with  their  work  or  their  studies.  But  tho.se 
who  are  here  illegally  will  be  processed  promptly  and 
lawfully  for  deportation  back  to  their  own  country. 

Third,  1  want  to  remove  any  question  that  our  princi- 
ples might  be  compromised  by  our  supposed  need  for 
Iranian  oil.  Early  this  week,  therefore,  I  ordered  an  im- 
mediate halt  to  any  purchases  or  shipments  of  Iranian  oil 
to  the  United  States  of  America. 

I  am  determined  to  make  clear  that  we  will  never 
allow  any  foreign  country  to  dictate  any  American  pol- 
icy. 

Fourth,  in  order  to  protect  our  economic  interests  and 
to  insure  that  claims  on  Iran  by  the  United  States  or  by 
U.S.  citizens  are  settled  in  an  orderly  manner,  we  have 
legally  frozen  official  Iranian  property  and  financial  as- 
sets. The  order  does  not  affect  any  accounts  other  than 
those  of  the  Government  of  Iran,  the  Central  Bank  of 
Iran,  or  other  government-controlled  entities. 

Yesterday  I  further  instructed  Secretary  of  State 
Vance  and  Ambassador  [to  the  U.N.  Donald  F.] 
McHenry  to  oppose  any  discussion  of  Iran's  problems  in 
the  U.N.  Security  Council  as  long  as  American  hostages 
are  being  held.  Only  after  the  hostages  are  released  will 
we  be  willing  to  address  Iran's  concerns  and  then  under 
the  provisions  of  international  law  and  under  the  Charter 
of  the  United  Nations.  The  members  of  the  U.N.  Secu- 
rity Council,  1  am  pleased  to  announce  to  you,  have 
agreed  unanimously  with  our  own  proposal. 

It  is  important  for  all  of  us  to  remember  that  we  will 
not  compromise  our  fundamental  principles  of  justice  no 
matter  how  grave  the  provocation  nor  how  righteous  our 
indignation.  At  the  same  time,  we  will  continue  to  use 
our  influence  around  the  world  to  obtain  the  same  kinds 
of  human  rights  for  people  everywhere. 

In  this  instance,  we  are  upholding  an  important  prin- 
ciple on  behalf  of  the  entire  world  community.  It  is  a 
clear  tenet  of  international  law  and  diplomatic  tradition 
that  the  host  government  is  fully  responsible  for  the 
safety  and  well-being  of  the  property  and  the  legal  rep- 
resentatives of  another  country.  Less  than  a  year  ago — 
and  this  is  a  fact  not  generally  known  or  recognized  — 
less  than  a  year  ago,  70,000  American  citizens  were  in 
Iran.  As  you  know,  thousands  of  people  were  killed 
during  the  upheavals  there  but  almost  miraculously  and 
because  of  the  good  work  of  Cyrus  Vance  and  others, 
our  people  were  brought  home  safely.  I  thank  God  for 
it.  Despite  the  turmoil,  each  succeeding  Iranian 
Government  —  and  they  were  being  changed,  as  you 
know,  quite  rapidly  —  protected  the  citizens  of  other 
countries. 


c.  ember  1979 


19 


■i  Foreign   visitors  are  often   vulnerable  to  abuse.    An 

nbassy  is  not  a  fortress.  There  are  no  embassies  any- 

here  in  the  world  that  can  long  withstand  the  attack  of 

nioh,  if  the  mob  has  the  support  of  the  host  govern- 

L'lii   itself.   We  had  received  repeated  assurances  of 

otcction  from  the  highest  officials  in  the  Iranian  Gov- 

nment.  even  a  day  or  two  before  the  mob  was  incited 

1  attack  and  before  that  protection  was  withdrawn  at  the 

St  minute.  The  principle  of  inviolability  of  embassies 

understood  and  accepted  by  nations  everywhere,  and 

IS  particularly  important  to  smaller  nations  which  have 

1  recourse  to  economic  or  military  power.  This  is  why 

le  U.N.  Security  Council  has  also  unanimously  sup- 

irted  our  demand  for  the  release  of  the  American  hos- 

ges. 

In  accordance  with  this  principle  as  recognized  and  ob- 
■rvod  by  all  civilized  countries,  the  Iranian  Govern- 
lent  and  its  leaders  are  fully  responsible  for  the  safety 
id  well-being  of  our  representatives  in  Iran,  in  Tehran, 
id  they  will  be  held  accountable  for  that  responsibility. 
is  unthinkable  that  any  responsible  government  in  to- 
ay's  modern  world  could  regard  the  seizure  and  the 
:iiding  of  the  diplomatic  officials  of  another  nation  as  a 
■alistic  means  to  advance  any  cause  whatsoever.  Ter- 
irism  is  not  an  acceptable  means  to  resolve  disputes 
;t\\een  individuals  or  between  nations. 
'  No  act  has  so  galvanized  the  American  public  toward 
nit\  in  the  last  decade  as  has  the  holding  of  our  people 
i  hostages  in  Tehran.  We  stand  today  as  one  people. 
'e  are  dedicated  to  the  principles  and  the  honor  of  our 
ition.  We  have  taken  no  action  which  would  justify 
meern  among  the  people  or  among  the  Government  of 
an.  We  have  done  nothing  for  which  any  American 
;ed  apologize. 

The  actions  of  Iranian  leaders  and  the  radicals  who 
.vaded  our  Embassy  were  completely  unjustified.  They 
:d  all  others  must  know  that  the  United  States  of 
nierica  will  not  yield  to  international  terrorism  or  to 
iaekmail. 

These  difficult  days  have  reminded  us  of  basic  facts 
id  principles  which  are  fundamental  to  the  existence  of 
s  as  a  people.  We  will  honor  all  constitutional  protec- 
ons  and  international  law  and  custom,  and  we  will  not 
•t  our  freedom  and  our  security  be  jeopardized. 
The  developments  in  Iran  have  made  it  starkly  clear  to 
II  of  us  that  our  excessive  dependence  on  foreign  oil  is 
direct,  physical  threat  to  our  freedom  and  security  as 
imericans. 

That  is  why  we  must  all  join  together  in  the  battle  for 
n  energy-secure  America.  This  struggle  demands  the 
eliberate  and  the  conscientious  participation  of  every 
ingle  citizen.  Unfortunately,  our  dependence  on  foreign 
il  has  been  growing  for  the  last  5  or  6  years,  especially 
/hen  it  should  have  been  diminishing.  As  a  nation  we 
ave  become  dependent  on  the  undependable  and  ad- 
icted  to  the  unaffordable. 

At  Camp  David  this  summer,  one  man  summed  up  the 
ignificance  of  our  energy  problems  better  than  any 
ither  person  there.  It  was  Lane  Kirkland.  He  said  to  me: 
'Mr.  President,  the  issue  is  freedom." 

That  is  exactly  the  issue  today.  That  is  why  I  have 
leen  calling  on  the  Congress  and  encouraging  the 


American  people  for  the  last  IVi  years  to  recognize  the 
danger  of  excessive  dependence  on  foreign  oil.  That  is 
why  I  have  ordered  phased  decontrol  of  oil  prices  to 
make  conservation  pay  and  to  stimulate  domestic  energy 
sources. 

This  is  an  extremely  important  —  a  vital  —  issue.  Do 
not  be  misled  by  political  demagoguery.  1  and  every 
other  public  official  in  this  country  have  an  obligation  to 
speak  the  truth  and  to  deal  responsibly  with  the  hard 
facts,  and  they  are  hard  facts.  We  cannot  close  down  all 
nuclear  power  plants,  burn  less  coal,  refuse  to  build  oil 
refineries,  refuse  to  explore  for  new  oil  sources,  oppose 
the  production  of  synthetic  fuels,  and  at  the  same  time 
encourage  the  waste  of  energy  by  artificially  holding 
down  its  price  in  order  to  encourage  more  consumption. 
This  is  a  ridiculous  combination  of  proposals  which 
could  only  be  put  forward  in  an  election  campaign. 
America  knows  better. 

I  am  very  pleased  that  our  national  energy  program  is 
now  moving  steadily  through  the  Congress,  after  enor- 
mous difficulty  there  and  sharp  debate.  Now  more  than 
ever  before  it  is  essential  that  we  have  an  energy  secu- 
rity corporation  and  a  windfall  profits  tax  in  order  to 
take  care  of  the  poor,  encourage  production,  build  a 
better  transportation  system.  Armed  with  these  new  pro- 
grams, our  technology,  our  creativity,  our  abundance, 
our  vision,  our  firm  will,  America  can  finally  control  its 
own  resources,  and  we  can  continue  to  control  our  own 
destiny. 

Our  love  of  freedom  will  not  be  auctioned  off  for 
foreign  oil.  Hundreds  of  thousands  of  our  forebears  gave 
their  very  lives  for  our  freedom.  Our  freedom  is  not  for 
sale — now  or  ever  in  the  future. 

Every  important  victory  that  this  nation  has  ever  won 
— with  Americans  struggling  together — has  made  us 
stronger  as  a  nation.  So  will  it  be  with  the  energy  prob- 
lem. There  is  a  clear  choice  for  Americans  to  make:  We 
can  either  keep  pouring  out  billions  and  billions  and  bil- 
lions of  dollars  to  foreign  countries  to  import  oil  — 
which  also  buys  us  inflation,  unemployment,  and  na- 
tional dependency  and  insecurity — or  we  can  take  some 
of  that  money  and  invest  it  in  America  to  hire  American 
workers,  to  unleash  American  ingenuity,  to  develop 
American  resources,  to  promote  American  energy  that 
Americans  own  and  control.  That  is  the  way  to  approach 
the  energy  problem,  and  that  is  what  we  must  do  to- 
gether. 

There  are  millions  and  millions  of  people  who  can 
help  directly  with  this  challenge  and  there  are  hundreds 
of  thousands  of  jobs  involved.  Next  year  we  anticipate 
that  we  will  send  overseas  $70  billion  to  pay  for  foreign 
oil.  Just  think  how  many  fine  things  we  could  do  in 
America  with  that  much  money. 

So  in  the  last  few  days  we  have  been  reminded  once 
again  of  our  essential  need  of  energy  security  so  that  we 
can  continue  to  protect  the  basic  principles  of  our  coun- 
try, and  together  that  is  what  we  must  achieve,  both  for 
ourselves  and,  even  more  importantly,  for  our  children 
and  grandchildren.  America  must  always  be  militarily 
strong  and  economically  strong,  and  that  America  will 
always  be. 

One  final  comment  I  would  like  to  make.  America 


20 


must  also  maintain  its  moral  and  its  ethical  strength.  We 
are  not  a  selfish  people.  History  has  recorded  many 
times  America's  great  generosity,  as  it  does  today  in 
Thailand  and  Kampuchea,  formerly  known  as  Cam- 
bodia. Even  as  we  face  problems  of  great  economic 
concern  in  our  own  country,  we  are  sparing  no  effort  to 
help  those  who  are  suffering  and  starving  in  every  way 
we  can. 

Compassion  enhances  American  strength.  It  is  one  of 
our  deepest  values,  one  to  which  we  will  always  cling 
and  remain  true.  Concern  for  human  life  and  justice  is 
as  vital  as  military  power  to  our  special  place  in  the 
family  of  nations.  Human  rights  is  a  compelling  idea  of 
our  lifetime.  Our  hearts  and  our  aid  will  continue  to  go 


Department  of  State  Bulletii 


to  those  who  are  suffering,  who  are  starving,  or  who  are 
deprived  of  freedom. 

In  this  time  of  tension  and  turmoil  I  am  proud  that  our 
commitment  to  American  strength  and  to  American 
principles  is  unshakable.  D 


'Text  from  White  House  press  release  (opening  and  closing  para- 
graphs omitted). 


For  texts  of  remarks  made  by  President  Carter 
on  November  12,  Secretary  Vance  on  November 
8,  and  White  House  announcements  of  November 
10  and  14  concerning  the  situation  in  Iran,  see  p. 
49. 


December  1979 


21 


THE  SECRETARY:        Where  We  Stand 

With  SALT  n 


Address  at  the  Florida  Blue  Key  Ban- 
quet in  Gainesville,  Florida,  on  Oc- 
tober 26.  1979.' 

I  want  to  talk  to  you  tonight  about 
where  we  stand  in  fulfilling  the  first 
purpose  of  our  foreign  policy — to  pro- 
mote the  security  of  our  nation  and  the 
safety  of  our  people.  We  meet  at  a  time 
when  the  U.S.  Senate  is  in  the  midst  of 
its  work  on  a  crucial  element  of  our  se- 
curity policies — the  second  strategic 
arms  limitation  treaty  between  the 
United  States  and  the  Soviet  Union. 

At  one  level,  that  debate  is  highly 
technical.  The  sophistication  of  modern 
weapons  —  and  with  it  the  complexity 
of  agreements  to  limit  those  weap- 
ons— has  grown  dramatically.  Those 
technical  assessments  of  the  treaty's 
impact  are  an  indispensable  part  of  the 
work  of  the  Senate. 


Opposing  View 

This  evening,  however,  I  want  to 
address  one  of  the  broader  currents  in 
the  public  discussion  of  the  treaty.  It  is 
a  view  that  is  sometimes  stated,  and 
sometimes  implied,  by  those  who  are 
opposed  to  the  treaty.  It  is  the  proposi- 
tion that  the  United  States  cannot  "af- 
ford" this  treaty  because  we  are  al- 
legedly in  a  position  of  weakness  in  the 
world. 

That  contention  simply  is  wrong.  It 
suffers  from  two  fundamental  errors. 

First,  it  portrays  the  United  States  as 
weak,  when  in  fact  America  is  strong 
and  growing  stronger. 

And  second,  it  rests  on  the  erroneous 
assumption  that  the  SALT  II  treaty 
would  detract  from  America's  strength, 
when  in  fact  the  treaty  is  an  integral 
part  of  our  strategy  for  maintaining  and 
building  our  strength. 

I  do  not  mean  to  imply  for  a  moment 
that  the  United  States  does  not  face 
serious  challenges.  We  do.  We  harbor 
no  illusion  about  the  continuing  com- 
petition with  the  Soviets  in  many  areas. 
There  has  been  a  steady  buildup  of 
Soviet  military  power  over  the  past 
several  years.  It  continues.  The  will- 
ingness and  ability  of  the  Soviets  to 
take  advantage  of  local  conflicts  and 
tensions  in  many  parts  of  the  world  is 
self-evident. 

We  face  other  imposing  challenges 
as  well.  The  world  is  undergoing  rapid 
and  fundamental  change — political  as 
well  as  economic.  Decisions  which  di- 


rectly affect  our  lives  can  be  made 
today  not  only  in  Washington  and 
Moscow  but  in  a  host  of  other  capitals 
around  the  world.  Scores  of  developing 
nations  around  the  world  are  grappling 
with  a  new  generation  of  postindepend- 
ence  problems  —  problems  of  growth 
and  equity,  of  internal  consolidation 
and  regional  cohesion. 

In  such  a  world,  no  single  nation,  no 
matter  how  powerful,  can  dictate 
events  or  impose  enduring  solutions  on 
others.  Increasingly,  our  leadership 
must  take  the  form  of  working  with 
others  toward  goals  we  share  and  can 
best  achieve  together. 

The  fact  that  the  world  has  changed, 
however,  does  not  mean  that  America 
has  grown  weak  or  lost  its  will.  The 
realization  that  we  are  not  an  island  in 
the  world  should  not  make  us  either 
romanticize  the  past  or  fear  the  future. 
We  have  unmatched  strengths  as  a  na- 
tion. We  are  moving  appropriately  and 
effectively  to  deal  with  the  challenges 
we  face.  And  the  SALT  II  treaty  is  an 
important  part  of  that  forward-looking 
strategy. 

It  is  important  to  emphasize  that  a 
confident  and  outward  looking  America 
can  thrive  in  a  world  of  change.  We 
obviously  would  jeopardize  our  future 
safety  if  we  underestimated  the  dif- 
ficulties we  face.  But  our  ability  to  act 
with  clarity  and  firmness  can  be 
equally  confused  by  underestimating 
America's  strengths.  For  when  Ameri- 
cans sell  America  short,  so  will  our 
friends  and  potential  opponents  abroad. 

Let  me  review  our  strengths,  and 
how  we  are  responding  to  new  chal- 
lenges, in  the  context  of  three  aspects 
of  our  national  security. 

•  The  first  is  the  balance  of  strategic 
forces  between  the  United  States  and 
the  Soviet  Union. 

•  The  second  is  the  balance  in  Eu- 
rope, where  we  and  our  NATO  allies 
must  be  prepared  to  defend  against  any 
level  of  threat. 

•  The  third  involves  our  influence 
and  leadership  throughout  the  world  at 
a  time  of  profound  change  in  the  inter- 
national order. 


Strategic  Balance 

Let  me  turn  first  to  the  strategic  bal- 
ance. Our  strategic  nuclear  forces  must 
be  strong  enough  to  meet  two  tests.  We 
must  be  able  to  deter  nuclear  aggres- 
sion by  maintaining  forces  which  can 


respond  in  kind  to  any  level  of  attack. 
And  we  must  also  maintain  a  balance 
of  forces,  for  a  strategic  imbalance 
could  lead  some  of  our  friends  and  al- 
lies to  question  our  ability  to  protect 
our  interests  and  theirs. 

Today,  we  manifestly  have  the  abil- 
ity to  meet  both  those  requirements. 
The  three  elements  of  our  strategic 
forces — land-based  missiles,  sea-based 
missiles,  and  long-range  bombers — 
have  a  combined  striking  power  that  is 
awesome.  Together  they  carry  some 
9,000  nuclear  weapons.  The  smallest  is 
several  times  more  powerful  than  the 
atomic  bomb  that  destroyed  Hiroshima. 

The  Soviet  Union  also  has  great  nu- 
clear power  as  do  we.  They  lead  in 
some  categories.  We  lead  in  others. 
But  in  practical  military  terms,  the  two 
sides  today  are  effectively  the  same. 

The  Soviet  buildup  of  recent  years, 
however,  has  considerable  momentum 
behind  it.  We  must  take  steps  now  to 
assure  that  the  balance  is  preserved  in 
the  future. 

We  are  doing  so. 

We  are  modernizing  all  three  legs  of 
our  strategic  forces — land,  sea,  and  air. 

•  Our  strategic  bombers  will  be 
equipped  with  modern  cruise  missiles 
which  will  be  able  to  penetrate  Soviet 
air  defense  for  the  foreseeable  future. 

•  Our  new  Trident  submarines  will 
be  more  capable  than  their  predeces- 
sors. The  new  Trident  missile  has  more 
than  twice  the  range  of  our  existing 
submarine-based  missiles.  Together 
these  new  systems  will  assure  that  our 
deepwater  forces  will  continue  to  be 
invulnerable. 

•  And  we  are  proceeding  with  an 
entirely  new  land-based  missile — 
called  the  MX — which  will  be  able  to 
deliver  more  warheads  with  greater  ac- 
curacy than  our  existing  land-based 
missiles.  It  will  also  be  mobile,  so  that 
it  can  survive  a  surprise  attack. 

With  or  without  SALT  II,  we  must 
make  substantial  new  investments  in 
our  strategic  forces.  But  the  fact  is  that 
those  efforts  will  be  more  effective  and 
less  costly  with  the  SALT  II  agreement 
in  force  than  they  would  be  without  it. 

Let  me  give  you  a  few  of  the  reasons 
why  this  is  true. 

•  The  treaty  limits  will  hold  Soviet 
strategic  forces  significantly  below 
where  they  would  otherwise  be.  Based 
on  past  and  present  rates  of  construc- 
tion, we  can  anticipate  that  the  Soviets 


22 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


would  have  many  thousand  more  war- 
heads by  1985  than  will  be  possible 
under  the  treaty  and  several  hundred 
more  systems  to  deliver  those  weapons. 

•  Without  the  treaty,  our  ability  to 
observe  Soviet  strategic  forces — and 
thus  evaluate  Soviet  capabilities — 
could  be  impaired,  since  there  would 
be  no  constraints  on  the  deliberate  con- 
cealment of  such  forces. 

•  Without  the  boundaries  set  by  the 
treaty  through  1985.  our  predictions  of 
the  level  and  the  nature  of  Soviet  forces 
into  the  future  would  be  less  certain. 
This  would  make  our  own  defense 
planning  more  difficult. 

•  And  without  the  treaty  we  would 
risk  the  opportunity  to  achieve  further 
limits  on  nuclear  forces,  and  thus  a 
greater  measure  of  safety,  in  the  next 
round  of  talks. 

In  light  of  these  advantages,  it  is 
simply  wrong  to  imply,  as  some  SALT 
opponents  have  done,  that  by  agreemg 
to  the  SALT  treaty  we  are  weakening 
our  defenses.  Exactly  the  opposite  is 
true.  The  treaty  will  contribute  to  a 
strong  defense.  The  most  sensible  for- 
mula for  a  stable  strategic  balance  is 
one  that  includes  both  greater  Ameri- 
can strength  and  restraints  on  nuclear 
arms. 


The  NATO  Alliance 

The  second  area  I  want  to  discuss  is 
the  balance  in  Europe.  Here  the  NATO 
alliance — the  North  Atlantic  Treaty 
Organization — is  the  backbone  of  our 
defense.  It  is  an  alliance  founded  both 
upon  collective  security  and  upon 
common  values — a  shared  determina- 
tion to  defend  the  ideals  of  democracy 
and  freedom. 

The  security  of  our  NATO  allies  is 
inseparable  from  our  security,  and  the 
strength  of  our  allies  multiplies  our 
strength. 

•  Our  European  partners  contribute 
more  than  90%  of  the  NATO  ground 
troops  stationed  in  Europe  during 
peacetime. 

•  Some  three-quarters  of  the  West- 
ern military  aircraft  in  the  European 
theater  are  supplied  by  our  allies. 

•  Together,  we  and  our  allies  invest 
about  25%  more  in  defense  than  the 
Soviet  Union  and  the  Warsaw  Pact. 

•  Our  allies  are  stronger  and  our  al- 
liance is  more  cohesive  than  the  War- 
saw Pact. 

Nevertheless,  there  has  been  a  sus- 
tained Soviet  military  buildup  in  Eu- 
rope. Soviet  troop  levels  there  have 
grown  significantly  over  the  past  10 
years.  So  has  the  number  and  sophisti- 
cation of  their  tanks  and  artillery  posi- 


tioned in  Europe.  And  in  recent  years 
they  have  also  been  adding  significantly 
to  their  forces  which  can  deliver  nu- 
clear weapons  throughout  Europe. 

NATO  is  responding  to  this  in- 
creased threat.  Together,  we  and  our 
allies  have  made  major  strides  in 
strengthening  the  alliance — to  assure 
its  political  unity  and  to  enhance  its 
military  effectiveness. 

In  May  of  1977,  President  Carter 
proposed  a  comprehensive  program  to 
modernize  NATO's  forces.  Such  a  pro- 
gram was  adopted  by  the  NATO  heads 
of  state  in  1978.  and  it  is  now  in  prog- 
ress. 

To  assure  that  our  defense  needs  are 
fully  met.  the  NATO  allies  committed 
themselves  to  increase  their  defense 
expenditures  3%  a  year,  after  inflation. 
We  met  that  target  in  the  fiscal  year 
just  past,  and  we  are  seeking  congres- 
sional funding  that  will  assure  that  we 
meet  it  again  in  fiscal  year  1980. 

Our  defense  efforts  must  also  include 
the  modernization  of  our  nuclear  forces 
in  Europe,  to  respond  to  the  Soviet  ad- 
vances in  this  area. 

Recently,  the  Soviets  announced 
their  intention  to  unilaterally  withdraw 
men  and  tanks  from  Eastern  Europe. 
We  naturally  welcome  any  step  that 
would  reduce  Soviet  military  power  in 
Europe.  The  Soviets  have  also  offered 
to  negotiate  about  some  of  their  nuclear 
weapons  directed  against  Western 
Europe  on  the  condition  that  NATO  not 
proceed  with  the  modernization  of  its 
forces.  The  effect  of  this  condition 
could  be  to  prevent  us  from  responding 
to  the  Soviet  buildup.  It  would  be  a 
mistake  for  the  alliance  to  accept  any 
proposal  which  would  perpetuate  in- 
equality. 

Over  the  past  year,  we  have  been  re- 
viewing future  modernization  plans 
with  our  allies.  Because  these  nuclear 
forces  would  be  stationed  in  Europe, 
we  must  work  together  with  our  allies 
in  formulating  these  plans.  Our  allies 
believe — as  do  we — that  the  moderni- 
zation of  nuclear  forces  in  Europe  must 
go  hand-in-hand  with  a  genuine  effort 
to  negotiate  equal  limits  on  such  weap- 
ons with  the  Soviets.  We  believe  that  a 
broad  consensus  can  be  built  in  NATO 
based  upon  such  a  parallel  approach. 

Failure  to  ratify  SALT  II.  however, 
would  jeopardize  that  consensus.  For 
as  a  practical  matter,  without  SALT  II 
there  would  be  no  basis  for  proceeding 
with  SALT  III,  the  forum  in  which  we 
could  pursue  serious  negotiations  on 
limiting  nuclear  forces  in  Europe.  It 
could  lead  to  doubt  and  uncertainty  in 
Europe.  In  such  an  atmosphere  difficult 
political  decisions  would  be  even  more 
difficult  to  make. 

Thus,   defeat  of  the   treaty   could 


jeopardize  what  the  treaty  permits  and 
our  interest  require — the  moderniza- 
tion of  our  nuclear  forces  in  Europe. 
Force  modernization  is  needed  in  any 
case.  But  we  cannot  change  the  plain 
political  fact  that  ratification  of  SALT 
II  is  the  necessary  foundation  for  both 
modernization  and  arms  control. 


Future  U.S.  Strategy 

Finally,  let  me  discuss  the  outlook 
for  our  relations  throughout  the  world. 

Our  international  relationships  are 
increasingly  diverse  and  complex. 
More  and  more  nations  share  in  shap- 
ing international  events.  At  the  same, 
within  nations,  people  are  seeking  a 
fuller  share  in  the  economic  and  politi- 
cal life  of  their  countries.  In  such  a 
world  of  change,  the  possibilities  for 
turmoil  and  conflict  are  ever  present. 
These  conditions  can  be  unsettling; 
sometimes  they  can  be  harmful. 

But  it  is  profoundly  wrong  to  con- 
clude that  a  world  of  change  is  inhos- 
pitable to  America's  interest  or  that 
change  foreshadows  a  decline  for  the 
values  we  cherish.  On  the  contrary, 
there  has  been  an  unmistakable  re- 
surgence of  democracy  in  many  corners 
of  the  world.  In  southern  Europe,  in 
parts  of  Latin  America  and  Africa, 
democratic  institutions  have  gained 
new  vitality  in  recent  years.  And 
everywhere  the  thirst  for  national  inde- 
pendence is  great  and  works  against 
those  who  seek  to  dominate  other  na- 
tions. 

We  are  prepared  to  assist  our  friends 
if  outside  forces  seek  to  create  or 
exploit  local  tensions  for  purposes  of 
their  own.  That  is  why  we  have  taken 
specific  actions,  in  our  own  hemi- 
sphere, to  strengthen  our  ability  to  as- 
sure that  Soviet  troops  in  Cuba  will  not 
threaten  the  security  of  any  state  in  the 
region. 

But  it  should  not  and  will  not  be  our 
policy  to  mirror  Soviet  tactics  in  de- 
veloping nations.  Nor  will  we  treat  the 
developing  world  simply  as  an  arena 
for  East- West  competition,  for  such  an 
approach  would  deny  us  our  most  ef- 
fective diplomatic  instruments. 

In  times  such  as  these,  we  must  not 
only  be  strong  militarily,  we  must  ap- 
preciate and  employ  our  other  powerful 
assets  —  our  economic  strength,  our 
commitment  to  the  growth  of  develop- 
ing countries,  our  capacity  to  innovate 
and  to  share  technology,  our  genuine 
commitment  to  peace  and  the  just  res- 
olution of  disputes,  and  the  resonance 
between  our  ideals  and  the  insistence  of 
developing  countries  upon  national  in- 
tegrity and  respect. 

Thus,  we  are  pursuing  a  positive  and 
forward-looking  approach   which  ad- 


December  1979 


23 


dresses  Third  World  issues  primarily 
on  their  own  terms. 

Through  our  economic  and  security 
assistance  and  our  human  rights 
policies,  this  strategy  supports  the  ef- 
forts of  Third  World  nations  to  develop 
their  own  capacity  to  accommodate 
internal  pressures  and  to  resist  external 
challenges.  It  includes  greater  attention 
to  such  dangerous  problems  as  nuclear 
proliferation  and  escalating  purchases 
of  conventional  arms  by  nations  which 
neither  need  nor  can  afford  them. 

And  our  strategy  involves  active  and 
patient  efforts  to  help  resolve  regional 
disputes.  This  can  be  extraordinarily 
difficult;  the  complexity  of  these  dis- 
putes is  usually  matched  by  their  his- 
toric bitterness.  But  persistent  effort  is 
essential  —  to  save  lives,  to  spare  pre- 
cious resources,  and  to  remove  oppor- 
tunities for  external  intervention. 

Our  strategy  toward  developing 
countries  is  thus  one  which  seeks  to 
bring  other  nations  together  rather  than 
drive  them  apart.  It  seeks  to  heal  dif- 
ferences rather  than  inflame  them;  to 
address  needs  rather  than  exploit  them. 

And  I  believe  it  is  working.  For  our 
relations  with  the  nations  of  Asia,  Af- 
rica, and  Latin  America  are  generally 
stronger  today  than  they  have  been  for 
many  years. 

Even  in  these  broader  relations 
SALT  has  a  bearing. 

•  It  will  help  us  avoid  a  totally  unre- 
strained arms  race  which  would  both 
increase  international  tensions  and  di- 
vert our  resources  and  attention  from 
other  pressing  priorities. 

•  It  will  preserve  the  credibility  of 
our  effort  to  curtail  the  spread  of  nu- 
clear arms  to  more  countries.  They  are 
watching  intently  to  see  if  we  accept 
restraint  for  ourselves  as  readily  as  we 
urge  it  on  others. 

•  And  above  all.  it  will  have  a 
profound  influence  on  the  way  our 
leadership  is  perceived  in  the  world. 
Failure  to  approve  the  treaty  would 
allow  others  to  appear  to  be  more  in- 
terested in  limitations  on  the  weapons 
of  war  than  we  are.  Ratification  will 
reaffirm  America's  commitment  to 
peace. 

We  face  challenges — both  domestic 
and  foreign  —  which  test  our  national 
creativity  and  will.  To  deal  with  these 
challenges  effectively,  we  must  look  at 
the  world  realistically.  It  is,  of  course, 
a  picture  of  somber  as  well  as  brighter 
hues.  But,  we  should  not  so  concen- 
trate on  the  dangers  that  we  overlook 
the  opportunities  or  doubt  our  ability  to 
seize  them. 

Approval  of  the  SALT  II  treaty  will 
provide  a  practical  contribution  to  our 
security.   It  will  also  be  a  sign  to  the 


Qucstion-and'Answer  Session 
in  Gainestnlie 


Secretary  Vance  held  a  news  confer- 
ence upon  arrival  in  Gainesville, 
Florida,  on  October  26,  1979,  before 
addressing  the  Florida  Blue  Key  Ban- 
quet (see  preceding  article). ' 

Q.  The  U.S.  satellite  had  difHculty 
detecting  the  Soviet  troop  buildup  in 
Cuba.  How  will  they  monitor  Soviet 
military  activity  in  Russia  under- 
neath SALT? 

A.  The  kind  of  monitoring  that's  re- 
quired to  monitor  a  ground  activity  is 
completely  different  from  the  kind  of 
activity  which  is  necessary  in 
monitoring  a  SALT  treaty.  What  kinds 
of  things  you  monitor  in  a  SALT 
agreement  are  the  following:  how  many 
missiles  are  there;  how  many  subma- 
rines are  there;  what  is  being  done  in 
the  testing  of  new  missiles  that  are 
being  developed.  Those  kinds  of  things 
require  certain  types  of  equipment  and 
certain  types  of  monitoring  that  are 
really  totally  different  from  the  kind  of 
monitoring  that  one  carries  out  when 
you're  trying  to  determine  from  a 
satellite  overhead  whether  or  not  cer- 
tain ground  forces  below  do  or  do  not 
have  particular  kinds  of  ground  equip- 
ment. 

This  is  particularly  difficult  in  a  situ- 
ation like  that  in  Cuba,  where  the 
equipment  is  exactly  the  same  whether 
it  be  Cuban  equipment  or  Soviet 
equipment.  That  kind  of  case  obviously 
does  not  exist  where  you're  monitoring 
or  not  a  large  missile  is  being  implaced 
in  a  missile  hole  or  whether  a  subma- 
rine exists  and  how  many  missiles  are 
carried  on  that  submarine,  and  the  like. 

Q.  In  your  analysis,  how  great  is 
the  extent  of  concern  at  the  State  De- 
partment now  over  the  discovery  that 
there  apparently  has  been  a  nuclear 
detonation  in  South  Africa? 

A.  First,  let  me  say  it  is  not  clear 
that  there  has  been  a  nuclear  detona- 
tion. We  picked  up  on  the  22d  of 
September  indications  from  one  of  our 
satellites  that  there  may  have  been  a 
low-order  yield  nuclear  detonation 
between  two  and  three  kilotons.  That 
has  not  been  confirmed  by  any  cor- 


roborating evidence.  We  have,  during 
the  period  since  the  22d,  been  check- 
ing the  situation  by  sampling  and  the 
like  to  see  whether  we  could  find  cor- 
roborating evidence.  That  has  not  yet 
been  obtained. 

I  would  point  out  that  within  a  period 
of  an  hour  or  so,  the  information 
picked  up  from  the  satellite  had  been 
reported  back  and  we  knew  about  it.  I 
was  involved  in  a  conversation  with  the 
Secretary  of  Defense  and  National  Se- 
curity Adviser  discussing  it.  so  the 
equipment  which  we  had  worked  per- 
fectly. We  just  simply  have  not  been 
able  to  have  any  corroborating  evidence. 

The  area  in  which  there  are  indica- 
tions that  an  explosion  may  have  taken 
place  is  a  very  large  area.  Some 
4,500-square  miles  running  from  the 
southern  Pacific  to  Antarctica  all  the 
way  over  to  the  south  Atlantic  and 
southern  Africa.  So  it  is  a  huge  area, 
and  we  cannot  say  that  an  explosion 
has  taken  place  in  South  Africa. 

Q.  Is  the  Shah  of  Iran  going  to  be 
allowed  to  stay  in  this  country  to  re- 
ceive his  chemotherapy  treatments, 
and  who  made  the  arrangements  to 
bring  him  into  the  country? 

A.  The  Shah  was  allowed  to  come 
into  the  country  for  humanitarian  pur- 
poses when  he  indicated  that  there  was 
a  possibility  that  his  health  was  de- 
teriorating. We,  of  course,  worked 
with  him  and  helped  to  set  up  arrange- 
ments whereby  he  could  come  and  re- 
ceive the  tests,  treatment,  and,  eventu- 
ally, the  operation.  He  obviously  will 
be  allowed  to  remain  however  long  it 
takes  for  his  recuperation. 

Q.  Cuba  is  being  very  aggressive 
in  its  policy  in  the  Caribbean.  What 
is  the  U.S.  concern  with  the  situa- 
tion? How  do  you  plan  to  take  care  of 
it? 

A.  Insofar  as  Cuba  is  concerned,  we, 
after  the  identification  of  the  Soviet 
combat  brigade,  took  two  kinds  of 
steps.  First,  we  received  certain  assur- 
ances from  the  Soviet  Union  with  re- 
spect to  the  brigade,  and  secondly,  we 
took  unilateral  steps  on  our  part.  Steps 


world  that  Americans  are  as  confident,  world  as  it  is  and  to  help  shape  a  new 

again,  as  we  are  strong.   It  would  be  world  as  we  would  like  it  to  be.          D 

new  proof  that  we  have  the  maturity     

and   determination   to   deal    with    the  'Press  release  284  of  Oct.  29,  1979. 


24 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


I  think  you  all  are  very  familiar 
with  —  there  were  eight  different  steps 
which  the  President  took.  We  believe 
that  the  combination  of  the  steps  which 
we  are  taking,  plus  the  assurances,  will 
preserve  the  peace  of  the  area  and  will 
prevent  any  threat  to  either  the  United 
States  or  the  security  of  any  other  na- 
tion in  the  hemisphere. 

Q.  Back  to  South  Africa.  Have  you 
been  in  touch  with  South  African  of- 
ficials and  what  are  they  telling  you? 

A.  I  have  not  had  time,  myself,  to  be 
in  touch  with  them.  As  to  the  conver- 
sations we  may  have  had  with  the 
South  Africans,  I  really  don't  want  to 
get  into  that. 

Q.  Do  you  know  what  size  bomb  it 
was? 

A.  I  think  I  told  you  that  we  have 
indications  that  there  may  have  been  a 
low-order  yield  detonation  between  two 
and  three  kilotons  —  considerably 
smaller  than  the  Hiroshima  bomb. 


Q.  The  Soviets- 
from  them? 

A.  None 


•any  reaction 


Q.  How  closely  tied  is  SALT  H  to 
NATO?  If  SALT  U  is  rejected,  could 
NATO  break  down? 

A.  I'm  going  to  talk  about  that  to- 
night in  remarks  which  I  am  going  to 
be  making  at  the  banquet.  1  think  it  is 
of  vital  importance  for  going  ahead 
with  much  needed  modernization  of  our 
theater  nuclear  weapons  in  NATO  that 
SALT  be  passed.  I  think  that  if  SALT 
is  not  passed,  it  will  have  an  adverse 
effect  on  being  able  to  go  forward  with 
the  modernization,  so  it  is  of  great  im- 
portance. 

Q.  Should  South  Africa  develop  a 
nuclear  weapon?  Is  the  U.S.  Gov- 
ernment worried  that  it  would  upset 
the  balance  of  power,  specifically 
with  regard  to  the  developing  nations 
in  southern  Africa? 

A.  First  of  all,  we  don't  know,  as  I 
wanted  to  make  very  clear  earlier  and 
to  make  clear  now.  that  anything  has 
happened  in  South  Africa.  We  have 
been  working  with  South  Africa  for 
months  and,  indeed,  over  a  couple  of 
years  trying  to  get  them  to  sign  the 
Nonproliferation  Treaty  which  would 
preclude  any  development  of  nuclear 
weapons.  They  have  refused  so  far  to 
do  that  but  have  said  they  would  not 
develop  nuclear  weapons.  We  do  not 
yet  have  any  evidence  which  would  in- 
dicate that  they  have. 

Q.  Should  they  develop  a  nuclear 
weapon,  how  great  a  threat  is  that? 


A.  I  think  the  development  of  a  nu- 
clear weapon  by  them,  of  course, 
would  be  a  destabilizing  and  dangerous 
step  forward.  That's  one  of  the  reasons 
we  support  so  strongly  the  Nonprolifer- 
ation Treaty  and  adherence  to  that 
treaty. 

Q.  Has  there  been  only  one  bomb 
indicated  in  the  September  22d  one 
and  no  other? 

A.  Let  me  say  again,  there  is  no  in- 
dication that  there  has  been  a  bomb  de- 
veloped. There  are  indications  that 
there  may  have  been  a  nuclear  explo- 
sion and  we  are  not  certain  of  that. 

Q.  Just  one? 

A.  Only  one.  One  explosion. 

Q.  How  do  you  think  Moshe 
Dayan's  resignation  would  affect  the 
Arab-Israeli  negotiations? 

A.  Let  me  say  that  I  have  the  highest 
regards  for  Moshe  Dayan,  both  person- 
ally and  professionally.  He  is  a  man  of 
great  ability  and  of  imagination.  He  is 
a  patriot  and  defends  the  position  of  his 
nation  with  great  skill.  I  personally  will 
miss  him  because  he  has  been  a  very 
constructive  force  in  the  negotiations 
which  led  to  the  Camp  David  accords 
and  to  the  treaty  between  Egypt  and 
Israel.  He  will  continue  to  play  a  role, 
however,  in  the  Knesset  and  that  will 
be  to  the  benefit  of  everybody.  I  do  not 
know  who  will  be  his  successor  as 
Foreign  Minister,  but  I  can  say  that  we 
will  all  miss  him. 

Q.  Would  you  say  what  the  State 
Department  or  the  U.S.  policy  is  re- 
garding the  Haitian  refugees  who 
have  been  flooding  into  southern 
Florida? 

A.  I  discussed  this  matter  on  the 
plane  coming  down  with  Senator 
Stone,  and  I  will  be  looking  into  the 
matter  further.  I  think  that's  about  all  I 
want  to  say  on  it  at  this  point. 

Q.  Are  they  now  classified  as 
political  refugees  or  economic  refu- 
gees? 

A.  I  really  just  want  to  leave  it  right 
where  it  is  for  the  time  being. 

Q.  The  Soviets  have  Backfire 
under  SALT  and  our  B-52  is  be- 
coming obsolescent  —  in  fact,  it 
probably  already  is.  Does  that  confer 
a  disadvantage  upon  this  country? 

A.  Let  me  say  first  that  the  B-52,  I 
do  not  consider  and  I  don't  believe  the 
military  consider  it  to  be  obsolescent. 
It  has  many  more  years  of  life  left.  It  is 
a  very  good,  very  strong,  and  very 
powerful  aircraft.  It  can  continue  to 
perform   its  function   with  great   skill 


and  efficiency  in  the  years  ahead. 

Insofar  as  the  Backfire  is  concerned, 
the  Backfire  is  a  different  aircraft.  It  is 
not  a  long-range  bomber,  designed  as 
such.  Its  principal  mission  is  that  of  a 
theater  weapon  to  be  used  for  what  are 
called  peripheral  missions  on  land  and 
also  for  naval  missions.  It  does  have 
the  capability  to  conduct  a  one-way 
flight  to  certain  targets  in  the  United 
States  if  it  flies  at  subsonic  speeds  from 
the  Soviet  Union  to  the  United  States; 
but  it  is  not  designed  nor  does  it  have 
anywhere  near  the  capabilities  that  the 
B-52  does. 

Q.  How  do  you  feel  about  civilians 
touring  around  the  Middle  East? 
How  does  that  affect  your  foreign 
policy? 

A.  The  negotiations  in  the  Middle 
East  are  going  to  be  conducted  ob- 
viously between  the  governments  — 
that's  where  the  real  business  is  going 
to  be  done.  The  fact  that  certain  indi- 
viduals go  to  the  Middle  East  and  as 
private  citizens  have  conversations  is 
obviously  something  they  have  the 
right  to  do,  and  we  will  not  interfere 
with  it.  I  don't  think  it  helps  in  the 
negotiating  process  nor  do  I  think  that 
it  really  harms  the  negotiating  process. 

Q.  Can  the  development  of  Euro- 
pean nuclear  weapons  by  NATO 
countries  help  offset  any  possible 
disadvantage  that  this  country  might 
have  under  SALT? 

A.  I  think  it  is  necessary  to  modern- 
ize our  forces — our  nuclear  forces  in 
Europe  —  and  that  is  the  reason  that 
we,  several  months  ago,  started  two 
studies  which  have  been  running  in 
parallels.  One  is  to  examine  what  mod- 
ernization there  should  be  of  our  thea- 
ter nuclear  weapons,  how  many 
weapons  should  be  developed  and  de- 
ployed as  a  result  of  modernization. 
And,  side  by  side  with  that,  there  was 
started  a  study  which  has  now  been 
completed  of  what  kinds  of  arms  con- 
trol initiatives  could  go  parallel  with 
the  modernization  of  the  theater  nu- 
clear forces.  Both  of  those  studies  will 
be  put  before  the  meeting  of  the 
ministers  of  NATO  in  December.  It  is 
my  best  judgment  that  both  the  modern- 
ization program  recommended  and  the 
arms  control  measures  which  have  been 
developed  to  be  discussed  with  the 
Soviet  Union  will  be  approved  at  the 
December  meeting.  I  think  this  is  a 
proper,  appropriate,  and  constructive 
way  to  deal  with  the  problems  both  of 
modernization  and  ultimately  to  try  and 
limit  the  number  of  weapons  on  both 
sides.  D 


'Press  release  282  of  Oct.  29,  1979. 


)ecember  1979 


25 


Netvs  Conference  of  October  31 


I  have  a  brief  statement  to  make 
hich  relates  to  Kampuchea. 

As  another  step  in  our  continuing 
ffort  to  deal  with  the  human  catas- 
ophe  in  Kampuchea,  I  plan  to  return 
rom  Korea  in  time  to  attend  the 
fovember  special  conference   in   New 

ork  that  the  Secretary  General  is 
ailing.  At  this  conference,  individual 
ountries  will  be  asked  to  announce 
leir  contribution  to  the   international 

lief  effort.  We  will  reiterate  our  own 
ommitment  of  $30  million  for  use  in- 
ide  Kampuchea  in  response  to  the  ap- 
eal  by  UNICEF  and  the  International 
!ommittee  of  the  Red  Cross  (ICRC), 
nother  $30  million  under  congres- 
ional  consideration  for  use  in  the  next 
base  of  the  UNICEF-ICRC  program. 
nd  $9  million  in  the  Thai  border  area. 

The  conference  should  also  focus  on 
radical  means  for  delivering  relief 
applies  to  the  people  soon  enough  and 
1  sufficient  quantities  to  prevent  mas- 
ive  death  by  both  starvation  and  dis- 
ase. 

The  United  States  supports  all  means 
f  delivery,  by  air,  sea.  and  land.  Our 
wn  information  and  that  of  the  inter- 
ational  agencies  and  private  organiza- 
lons  indicates  clearly  that  only  speedy 
nd  massive  deliveries  by  all  possible 
outes  will  provide  the  relief  which  is 
ceded. 

The  international  community  is 
eady  to  respond.  The  relief  supplies 
nd  means  of  delivery  are  available, 
ivery  day  of  delay  will  mean  more 
Ives  lost. 

What  is  needed  is  for  those  who 
ontrol  the  territory  and  the  population 
f  Kampuchea  to  put  humanitarian 
oncerns  ahead  of  political  or  military 
dvantage.  I  can  think  of  no  issue  now 
lefore  the  world  community  and  before 
very  single  nation  that  can  lay  a 
reater  claim  to  our  concern  and  to  our 
ction. 

Q.  In  your  judgment  were  many 
ves  lost  by  the  United  States  prefer- 
ing,  if  that  is  the  proper  word,  to 
leal  through  international  relief  or- 
anizations  rather  than  to  hammer  at 
Vietnam  even  despite  the  lack  of  re- 
ations  to  try  to  at  least  force  aid  into 
he  areas  controlled  by  the  Vietnam- 
>acked  people  in  Phnom  Penh? 

A.  We  have  been  trying  to  move 

long  both  routes.  As  you  know,  in  the 

ummer  of  this  year  we  made  ap- 

liroaches  ourselves  and  worked  with 


others  in  making  direct  approaches  to 
try  and  move  supplies  into  Kampuchea. 
This  was  done  at  the  same  time  efforts 
were  being  made  to  try  and  proceed 
through  the  international  organizations. 
So  both  routes  were  being  tried. 

Unfortunately,  even  though  we  were 
trying  both  routes,  it  has  taken  far,  far 
too  long  to  even  get  the  process  under- 
way. But  it  is  now  underway,  and  we 
must  now  seek  to  increase  the  amount 
of  aid  that  is  flowing  so  that  we  can 
take  care  of  the  sick  and  needy  people. 

Q.  Do  you  see  anything  in  the  re- 
cently discovered  construction  in 
Cuba  which  would  lead  the  United 
States  to  believe  that  the  Soviets  now 
have  or  are  moving  toward  a 
base — a  military  base — in  this  hemi- 
sphere? 

And,  second,  do  you  see  any  pat- 
tern of  Cuban  involvement  or  sup- 
port in  the  insurrections  most  re- 
cently in  El  Salvador  and  before  that 
in  Nicaragua? 

A.  First,  on  the  question  of  the  con- 
struction at  Cienfuegos.  I  believe  that 
is  what  you  are  talking  about. 

As  I  indicated  yesterday  to  the 
meeting  of  the  Hispanic  leaders  when 
asked  about  this  question,  there  has 
been  construction  going  on  at  Cien- 
fuegos for  about  2  years.  There  have 
been  buildings  which  have  been  put  up; 
there  has  been  a  pier  which  has  been 
constructed;  and  there  are  some  indi- 
cations that  there  is  now  a  second  pier 
under  construction. 

There  is  no  indication  that  this  pier  is 
for  anything  other  than  Cuban  use.  I 
can't  rule  out  the  possibility  that  when 
these  facilities  are  completed  it  might 
be  used  for  port  calls  if  a  Soviet  ship 
should  come  into  the  area.  But  we  have 
nothing  now  to  indicate  this  is  other 
than  for  Cuban  use. 

Q.  Do  you  see  any  pattern  of 
growing  Cuban  support  or  involve- 
ment in  the  various  insurrections  in 
Central  America? 

A.  We  can't  rule  out  that  there  may 
be  some  Cubans  involved  in  connection 
with  some  of  the  elements  which  have 
been  involved  in  the  fighting  which  has 
been  taking  place  there.  The  extent  of 
that,  however,  is  not  clear  at  this  point, 
and,  therefore,  I  do  not  want  to  specu- 
late on  it. 

Q.  I  suppose  it  follows  then  that  if 


you  cannot  rule  out  port  calls  with 
the  Soviet  Union  in  Cuba,  as  I  think 
you  suggested  — 

A.  That  is  correct. 

Q.  And  if  the  Cubans  may  have 
been  involved  in  Central  America,  is 
there  any  pattern  of  policy  you  in- 
tend to  adopt  as  a  result  of  this  to 
forestall  this  kind  of  activity? 

A.  As  far  as  port  calls  are  con- 
cerned, port  calls  have  never  been  pro- 
hibited under  the  1962  agreement  or 
the  1970  extension  of  the  1962  agree- 
ment. As  long  as  they  were  port  calls 
they  have  been  permitted. 

Insofar  as  the  activities  in  El  Sal- 
vador are  concerned,  again.  I  said  the 
extent  of  any  Cuban  involvement  there 
is  a  matter  of  not  great  moment  at  this 
point,  and  we  will  have  to  watch  and 
see  what  happens. 

1  might  indicate  that,  insofar  as  El 
Salvador  is  concerned,  we  have  been 
following  the  situation  there  with,  ob- 
viously, great  interest.  There  are  a 
number  of  steps  that  have  been  taken 
by  the  new  government  which  we  have 
taken  note  of  and  welcome. 

The  new  government  is  being  chal- 
lenged by  the  extreme  left  and  by  the 
extreme  right,  both  of  which  are  trying 
to  prevent  it  from  consolidating  its  po- 
sition. The  violence  of  the  last  few 
days  appears  to  be  a  deliberate  attempt 
by  the  groups  of  the  far  left  to  provoke 
the  Salvadorean  Government  for  the 
purposes  of  the  far  left. 

Still  the  United  States  is  encouraged 
by  the  directions  that  the  new  govern- 
ment has  said  it  intends  to  take,  and  we 
stand  ready  to  assist  them. 

Q.  Some  people,  including  Senator 
Stone,  are  inclined  to  take  a  more 
ominous  view  of  the  developments  at 
Cienfuegos.  You,  for  example,  don't 
mention  the  Soviet  nuclear  subma- 
rines in  here  or  the  possibility  that 
the  construction  may  be  intended  for 
future  stationing  of  such  submarines 
at  Cienfuegos. 

Are  you  inclined  to  take  a  more 
benign  view  of  what  is  happening  in 
Cuba  and  the  Cuban  involvement  in 
the  rest  of  Latin  America  because  of 
your  desire  to  protect  the  SALT 
agreement? 

A.  No.  We  are  following  closely 
what  is  taking  place  in  Cuba  and  in  the 
hemisphere,  and  we  are  trying  to  watch 
it.  to  monitor  it,  and  to  keep  everything 
in  its  proper  proportion. 

We  will  take  the  necessary  actions  to 
carry  out  the  steps  which  the  President 
indicated  in  his  speech  of  October  1 . 
We  believe  those  are  proper  and  meas- 
ured steps  and  will  protect  the  coun- 


26 


tries  of  the  hemisphere  from  any  threat 
to  their  security. 

Q.  Prior  to  the  latest  events  in 
South  Korea  the  U.S.  Government 
on  several  occasions  had  spoken  out 
in  favor  of  a  more  open  political  sys- 
tem in  that  country.  Now  the  mili- 
tary seems  to  be  running  the  coun- 
try, although  a  civilian  is  nominally 
in  charge.  What  is  your  view  on  how 
you  would  hope  South  Korea  would 
evolve  in  the  next  few  months? 

A.  Let  me  mai<e.  if  I  might,  a  gen- 
eral statement  about  Korea  and  answer 
your  question  at  the  same  time. 

As  you  know,  the  President  has 
asked  me  to  lead  the  U.S.  delegation  to 
the  funeral  of  President  Park  which  will 
be  held  in  Seoul  on  Saturday.  We  were 
both  saddened  and  shocked  by  the  news 
of  President  Park's  death.  He  was  an 
able  leader,  a  staunch  ally  of  our  coun- 
try, and  a  key  force  behind  the  remark- 
able economic  development  which 
Korea  has  achieved. 

We  welcome  the  preservation  of  sta- 
bility in  this  difficult  period  and  hope 
that  future  developments  will  take 
place  in  an  orderly  manner. 

We  hope  that  political  growth  in  the 
Republic  of  Korea  will  be  commensu- 
rate with  economic  and  with  social 
progress. 

And,  as  you  know,  we  have  reaf- 
firmed our  commitment  to  the  security 
of  the  Republic  of  Korea  through  our 
statement  which  was  issued  earlier  this 
week  and  through  appropriate  military 
steps.  It  is  important  that  no  actions  be 
taken  that  might  jeopardize  the  stability 
and  the  security  in  the  area. 

Q.  Another  question  about  Cien- 
fuegos,  please.  If  what  is  being  con- 
structed there  turns  out  to  be  a 
Soviet  conventional  warfare  base, 
would  that  be  a  violation  of  the  1962 
agreement  and  its  1970  extension? 

A.  As  I  said  before,  we  have  no  in- 
dication that  that  is  the  case.  That  is  a 
speculative  assumption  at  this  point. 
The  President  has  made  a  statement 
with  respect  to  Soviet  bases  in  Cuba  to 
Senator  Stone,  with  which  you  are  all 
familiar. 

Q.  I  understand  that  there  is  a 
dispute  in  the  intelligence  community 
over  the  existence  of  something 
called  a  cleristory  building  at  Cien- 
fuegos;  that  there  are  some  people 
who  believe  that  it  is  a  signature 
building  that  is  seen  around  the 
world  where  Soviet  nuclear  subma- 
rines are  serviced.  Do  you  have  any 
information  about  that? 

A.  It  is  also  used  for  other  purposes 
around  the  world,  including  the  storage 


of  surface  vessels,  patrol  boats,  and  the 
like.  And  there  are  no  indications  at 
this  point  from  the  intelligence  which 
we  have  of  any  storage  sites  for  any 
nuclear  materials. 

Q.  Have  you  asked  the  Soviet 
Union  for  any  clarification  on  what  is 
involved  in  this  construction  or  what 
purpose  they  intend  to  use  it  for? 

A.  We  have  not  at  this  time  because 
there  is  no  indication  at  this  point  that 
this  is  for  Soviet  use. 

Q.  With  regard  to  Morocco,  does 
King  Hassan  agree  in  principle  to  di- 
rect negotiations  with  the  Polisario 
Front?  And  does  he  also  agree  that 
there  might  be  a  territorial  com- 
promise on  Sahara? 

A.  I  don't  want  to  go  into  the  details 
of  the  discussions  which  have  been 
held  between  Mr.  Christopher  [Deputy 
Secretary  of  State  Warren  Christopher] 
and  the  King.  I  would  merely  like  to 
state  that  they  had  a  discussion  during 
which  they  discussed  the  needs  of 
Morocco  in  the  military  field  in  order 
to  have  the  necessary  weapons  to  de- 
fend its  territorial  integrity. 

As  you  know,  we  have  reviewed 
earlier  this  year  with  the  Congress  the 
question  of  the  delivery  of  arms  to 
Morocco.  Since  that  review  was  made, 
and  we  sought  the  Congress'  view  on 
that,  there  have  been  further  attacks  on 
Morocco — not  only  on  the  western 
Sahara  but  in  Morocco  as  well.  We 
concluded  that  it  is  necessary  to  give 
more  weapons  to  the  Moroccans  in 
order  to  give  them  the  necessary 
strength  to  defend  their  own  country 
and  to  put  them  in  a  position  where 
they  can  negotiate  a  solution  to  the 
problem  of  the  western  Sahara. 

I  think  that  it  is  clear  that  none  of  us 
believe  that  there  is  a  military  solution 
to  this  problem.  But  clearly  Morocco 
must  have  the  weapons  which  it  needs 
to  defend  itself. 

Q.  Do  you  agree  with  the  intelli- 
gence report  that  says  that  the  King 
may  not  survive — 

A.  I  am  not  going  to  comment  on 
any  intelligence  reports. 

Q.  North  Korea  recently  invited  a 
number  of  U.S.  Congressmen  to  visit 
their  country.  Do  you  think  this  is 
some  kind  of  reflection  of  a  relaxa- 
tion of  North  Korea's  policy  toward 
the  United  States  and  on  the  three- 
way  talks?  Will  the  three-way  talks 
be  affected  by  the  assassination  of 
President  Park? 

A.  In  answer  to  your  first  question,  I 
do  not  know  what  motivated  the  invi- 
tation which  was  extended  to  a  number 


Department  of  State  Bullet 

of  Congressmen  by  North  Korea.  I  o 
not  know  either  whether  any  of  the( 
will  accept  that  invitation.  That  is  a  d< 
cision  that  each  one  of  them  will  hav 
to  make  for  themselves. 

Insofar  as  the  effect  the  death  ( 
President  Park  has  made,  I  do  not  thin 
that  that  will  have  a  major  impact  upc 
the  proposal  for  three-way  talks  th; 
was  made.  As  I  have  indicated  pn 
viously,  I  do  not  take  the  initial  rejei 
tion  as  a  flat  turndown  that  cannot  b 
changed.  I  think  that  the  door  still  n 
mains  open  on  that,  and  I  hope  that 
will  be  seized  at  some  time. 

Q.  In  a  television  appearance  n« 
long  after  President  Carter's  speec 
on  the  situation  of  the  Soviet  brigad 
in  Cuba,  you  held  out  the  possibiliU 
that  over  time  there  might  be  som 
change  in  the  nature  of  that  brigade 
Have  you  detected  anything  now  11 
the  month  or  so  since  then? 

A.  I  do  not  want  to  get  into  intell 
gence  matters  in  an  open  session  lik 
this.  Let  me  say  that,  as  all  of  yo 
know,  we  are  following  the  situatio 
which  is  taking  place  there  on  th 
ground  by  intensified  intelligence  co 
lection.  We  are  examining  on  a  ven 
frequent  basis  what  is  taking  placa 
Some  of  the  factors  are  different  thai 
they  were  before,  and  that  is  all  I  war 
to  say. 

Q.  I  wonder  if  I  could  ask  you 
general  question  about  the  conduct  a 
U.S.  foreign  policy.  Today,  again 
there  is  another  one  of  these  period!! 
stories  about  severe  difference 
within  the  Administration  at  thi 
highest  level.  If  that  is,  in  fact,  true 
how  does  it  affect  the  conduct  of  U.SI 
foreign  policy?  If  it  is  not  true,  t< 
what  do  you  attribute  this  continuin} 
spate  of  stories? 

A.  This  is  another  one  of  a  continu 
ing  spate  of  stories  that  have  beei 
going  on  since  the  very  early  days  thai 
all  of  us  came  to  Washington  in  thi 
Administration.  I  have  seen  these  kind; 
of  stories  in  previous  Administrations 
and  I  think,  as  I  indicated  to  you  ear 
lier,  I  guess  that  this  comes  with 
working  in  Washington  and  particularly 
in  having  the  kind  of  job  that  I  do  as 
Secretary  of  State. 

I  would  like  to  comment,  however, 
on  the  general  thrust  of  the  story.  I  am 
not  going  to  comment  on  the  details  ol 
the  story  because  I  just  think  it  is 
fruitless  to  comment  on  this  continuing 
spate  of  stories  which  try  to  draw,  1 
think,  exaggerated  pictures  of  differ 
ences  between  various  elements  of  the 
government  in  the  decisionmakin 
process. 

I  do  want  to  say  that  we  have  been 


December  1979 

ct^ncerned  about  the  activities  of  the 
Cubans  and  the  Soviets  in  various  parts 
(it  the  world.  We  have  conveyed  our 
concerns  to  other  countries  and  have 
kept  them  up  to  date  on  our  thinking, 
our  views,  and  our  information  with  re- 
spect to  these  issues.  And  I  have  sent 
out  the  necessary  messages  to  convey 
these  facts  to  other  governments  at  my 
instruction.  So  I  think  that,  hopefully, 
will  put  to  rest  some  of  these  stories. 

Q.  What  role,  if  any,  did  the 
llnited  States  play  in  Canada's  deci- 
sion to  keep  its  Embassy  in  Tel  Aviv? 
And,  secondly,  would  the  United 
States  now  like  to  see  a  new,  perhaps 
more  moderate,  government  come  to 
power  in  Israel?  Do  you  think  a 
change  in  governments  would  hurt 
the  peace  negotiations? 

A.  On  the  first  question,  we  played 
no  role  whatsoever  in  the  decision 
which  was  taken  by  Canada.  That  deci- 
sion was  taken  by  the  Canadian  Gov- 
ernment itself,  as  one  would  expect  it 
to  be. 

Secondly,  as  to  your  second  ques- 
tion, that  would  involve  me  in  the 
internal  politics  of  another  country  and, 
as  you  know,  I  never  comment  on  that 
kind  of  a  question. 

Q.  Now  that  there  is  a  political 
campaign  underway  and  now  that  we 
have  a  new  candidacy  in  effect  by 
Senator  Kennedy,  are  you  finding 
that  in  the  prosecution  of  your  re- 
sponsibility of  running  foreign  af- 
fairs, other  countries  are  not  as 
eager  to  do  business — that  they  are 
in  a  waiting  period  now  and  waiting 
for  the  outcome  of  an  election? 

A.  Quite  honestly.  1  have  not  found 
that.  I  have  found  that  on  the  key  is- 
sues with  which  we  are  dealing,  there 
is  no  hesitancy  on  the  part  of  any  of  our 
partners  and  colleagues  or  others  who 
sit  across  the  table  from  us  in  negotia- 
tions to  try  and  drag  their  feet  in  these 
negotiations.  They  are  all  moving  for- 
ward, insofar  as  I  am  concerned  and  in 
my  dealings  with  them,  at  a  normal  and 
satisfactory  pace. 

Take,  for  example,  the  discussions 
which  we  have  been  having  with  re- 
spect to  the  modernization  of  theater 
nuclear  forces  and  the  companion  work 
that  has  been  done  in  the  arms  control 
field  which  will  go  as  a  pair  of  reports 
to  the  NATO  ministerial  meeting  in 
December.  Both  of  those  have  been 
proceeding,  I  think,  at  a  very  good 
pace.  We  made  very  good  progress. 
We  are  nearing  the  completion  of  those 
studies,  and  they  will  go  to  the 
ministerial  meeting  well  staffed,  com- 
pleted, and  in  advance  of  the  deadline 
we  set. 


Q.  To  go  back  to  Kampuchea,  you 
said  that  only  speedy  and  massive 
deliveries  can  save  lives  there. 

A.  Yes. 

Q.  I'd  like  to  ask,  one,  why  do  you 
think  that  the  conference  can  pro- 
duce the  results  that  have  not  been 
produced  so  far?  I  mean,  why  would 
the  Vietnamese  accede  to  a  request 
now  at  the  conference  when  they 
have  turned  everything  down  so  far? 
And,  two,  have  you  urged  the  Rus- 
sians to  put  pressure  on  the  Viet- 
namese to  change  their  policy? 

A.  I  believe  that  this  is  such  a  matter 
of  overriding  international  importance 
that  it  is  the  proper  subject  for  a  con- 
ference to  be  held  at  the  United  Nations 
with  all  the  focus  of  public  opinion, 
world  opinion,  directed  at  such  a 
meeting. 

I  think  it  will  serve  two  purposes.  It 
will  serve  the  purpose  of  helping  to  get 
the  necessary  funding  to  proceed  with 
the  programs  which  are  underway  and 
which  must  be  expanded.  And  sec- 
ondly, I  hope  it  will  have  the  purpose 
of  focusing  public  opinion  in  such  a 
way  that  this  may  have  a  positive  effect 
upon  those  in  Vietnam,  Kampuchea, 
and  in  the  Pol  Pot  area  of  Kampuchea 
to  work  in  a  more  responsive  way  so 
that  we  can  get  the  food  in. 

I  think,  as  you  know,  in  order  to 
feed  the  people  it  is  going  to  take 
somewhere  between  26,000  tons  and 
30,000  tons  a  month  in  order  to  meet 
the  needs  of  the  people.  Right  now,  all 
that  we  can  get  in  with  the  facilities 
that  we  have  available  to  us  in  about 
15,000  to  16,000,  so  we're  falling  at 
least  half-way  short,  and  that  means 
that  thousands  and  thousands  will  die 
unless  this  is  overcome.  I  hope,  as  I 
say,  that  by  the  further  focusing  of 
public  opinion  on  this,  this  may  have  a 
positive  effect. 

Now,  on  your  second  question,  have 
we  discussed  this  with  the  Soviet 
Union?  Yes,  we  have  discussed  it  with 
the  Soviet  Union  as  well  as  with  the 
Vietnamese,  the  Chinese,  and  many, 
many  others. 

Q.  Last  weekend.  Under  Secretary 
of  the  Treasury  Tony  Solomon  un- 
leashed a  very  vicious  attack  against 
our  European  allies,  in  particular  for 
their  increased  collaboration  with 
OPEC,  [Organization  of  Petroleum 
Exporting  Countries]  and  implicitly 
for  their  continuing  moves  toward 
the  remonetization  of  gold.  This  Ad- 
ministration has  previously  at- 
tempted to  blame  OPEC  for  our  eco- 
nomic problems.  Do  Solomon's 
statements  indicate  that  there  is  now 
a  change  in  U.S.  policy  and  we  will 


27 


try  to  blame  Europe  with  obvious 
foreign  policy  implications? 

If  not,  then,  will  Mr.  Solomon  be 
reprimanded  for  his  statements  or 
perhaps  treated  as  General  Singlaub 
was  under  similar  circumstances? 
And  if,  in  fact,  he  was  speaking  for 
Administration  policy,  then  why 
shouldn't  other  nations  consider  Paul 
Volker's  recent  credit  constrictions 
and  interest  rate  hikes  as  hostile  ac- 
tions against  their  economies? 

A.  Let  me  try  and  focus  on  what  I 
think  is  the  key  question.  Insofar  as  the 
oil  problem  is  concerned,  there  are  two 
aspects  to  the  oil  problem:  one  is  con- 
trolling the  consumption  of  oil  and  re- 
ducing the  demand  for  it.  Steps  are 
being  taken  by  this  country  and  by 
many  other  countries  to  reduce  the  oil 
which  is  being  consumed  and,  indeed, 
which  is  being  imported  into  those 
countries.  This  must  be  pursued,  and  it 
must  be  made  more  effective  and  in- 
creased as  we  move  forward  during  the 
months  ahead. 

Secondly,  however,  is  the  responsi- 
bility on  the  producers'  side.  On  the 
producers'  side,  they  in  like  measure 
have  a  responsibility  to  keep  the  price 
of  oil  within  such  bounds  as  not  to 
wreck  the  international  economy  with 
damage  to  the  world  economy  and  par- 
ticular hardship  to  those  in  the  de- 
veloping world,  as  well  as  the  adverse 
effect  it  will  have  on  those  of  us  who 
are  better  able  to  take  care  of  it — those 
of  us  in  the  industrialized  world.  So 
they  have  an  obligation  as  well  as  the 
rest  of  us  who  are  the  consuming 
countries,  and  I  think  that  is  one  of  the 
things  Mr.  Solomon  was  talking  about. 

Q.  To  clarify  an  answer  to  an  ear- 
lier question,  you  said  discussions 
were  going  well  in  NATO,  as  I  recall, 
toward  the  winter  meeting? 

A.  Yes. 

Q.  It  now  seems  at  least  possible 
that  the  Senate  will  not  have  acted  on 
the  SALT  treaty  by  the  time  of  that 
meeting.  What  would  be  the  conse- 
quences for  the  whole  theater  nuclear 
forces  discussion  if  that  should  be  the 
case? 

A.  It  is  important  that  affirmative 
action  be  taken  on  SALT  ratification  in 
order  to  bring  about  a  positive  result  in 
the  theater  nuclear  forces  discussions. 
Tough  political  decisions  are  going  to 
have  to  be  made  by  the  countries  of 
NATO  in  making  that  decision;  and 
from  a  political  standpoint,  the  task  of 
making  those  tough  decisions  will  be 
greatly  eased  and  enhanced  if  there  has 
been  positive  action  taken  on  the  SALT 
ratification. 


28 


As  to  the  exact  timing  on  SALT 
ratification,  this  remains  subject  to  the 
scheduling  of  the  Senate  in  setting  up 
its  own  calendar,  and  I  don't  want  to 
make  any  predictions  at  this  point 
exactly  what  that  calendar  is  going  to 
be. 

Q.  The  Middle  East  autonomy 
talks  have  proceeded  at  a  pace  that 
has  produced  a  sense  of  frustration 
not  only  to  Mr.  Dayan,  but  also  to 
Ambassador  Strauss.  I  just  wonder 
at  this  stage  whether  you  are  still  as 
committed  as  you  were  at  the  start  of 
the  Camp  David  summit  to  proceed- 
ing along  with  this  scenario  as  was 
outlined  or  whether  you  are  now 
tempted  to  explore  some  of  the  alter- 
natives that  have  been  proposed  by 
King  Hussein  and  others? 

A.  I  am  still  deeply  committed,  as  is 
our  government,  to  continuing  with  the 
talks  on  the  West  Bank  and  Gaza, 
sometimes  called  the  "autonomy 
talks."  I  think  it  is  of  extreme  impor- 
tance that  we  continue  to  pursue  those 
talks  and  to  pursue  them  to  a  successful 
conclusion.  They  have  been  moving 
slowly,  as  Bob  Strauss  has  said.  There 
was,  however,  some  progress  made  at 
the  talks  recently  held  in  London  at- 
tended by  Ambassador  Strauss,  Minis- 
ter Burg,  and  Prime  Minister  Khalil.  I 
might  just  say  a  word  or  two  about 
what  those  two  areas  of  progress  were, 
because  I  think  they  are  worth  noting. 
They  are  modest  steps,  but  I  think  they 
are  important  steps. 

One  of  the  key  issues  that  has  been 
before  the  negotiators  since  the  begin- 
ning of  the  autonomy  talks  on  the 
question  of  modalities  has  been:  Who 
will  conduct  the  elections?  Will  they  be 
conducted  by  the  military  government 
of  Israel  or  will  they  be  conducted  by 
civilians?  To  what  extent  will  outside 
observers  from  outside  the  countries 
involved  be  a  factor? 

It  was  agreed  at  the  London  talks 
that  the  elections  will  be  conducted  by 
civilians — civilians  from  both  Israel 
and  from  the  West  Bank  and  Gaza.  It 
was  further  agreed  that  there  would  be 
invited  expert  observers  from  outside, 
plus,  of  course,  the  international 
media,  to  come  in  and  have  full  and 
free  access  to  observe  the  conducting 
of  the  elections.  I  think  this  is  an  im- 
portant step  and  clears  away  one  of  the 
major  obstacles  that  remained  in  the 
modalities  area. 

The  second  point  related  to  the  very, 
very  tough  question  of  how  you  deal 
with  the  issue  of  the  powers  and  re- 
sponsibilities. The  issue  which  had 
been  hanging  the  parties  up,  up  to  this 
point,  had  been  whether  or  not  you  had 
to  make  a  decision  in  principle  now 


that  all  of  the  powers  and  respon- 
sibilities had  to  go  or  would  not  go  to 
the  self-governing  authority — this  had 
prevented  an  examination  of  the  indi- 
vidual powers  and  responsibilities. 

It  was  decided  at  London  that  that 
would  now  be  put  aside,  that  they 
would  now  address  themselves  in  the 
working  group  to  going  point  by  point 
through  each  one  of  the  powers  and  re- 
sponsibilities that  is  currently  exercised 
by  the  military  government  or  the  civil 
administration  which  works  with  it. 
This  will  now,  then,  permit  the  parties 
to  examine,  on  a  continuing  basis,  each 
one  of  these  separate  powers  and  re- 
sponsibilities to  decide  whether  or  not 
they  can  reach  agreement  that  this  one, 
yes.  there  is  no  question  —  it  is 
accepted — so  that  you  will  then  build 
up  a  body  on  which  there  is  agreement 
and  isolate  the  remaining  issues  on 
which  there  is  not  agreement.  This  is.  I 
think,  a  very  helpful,  although  modest, 
step  to  move  toward  the  resolution  of 
that  problem. 

Q.  Getting  back  to  Korea.  In  an- 
swer to  an  earlier  question,  you  ex- 
pressed the  hope  for  political  growth 
commensurate  with  economic  growth 
and  also  for  stability  in  the  country. 
One  of  the  questions  facing  them  is 
what  is  going  to  be  the  method  of 
selecting  or  endorsing  a  new  national 
leader?  There  have  been  suggestions, 
at  least  by  inference,  that  the  United 
States  goes  along  with  a  constitu- 
tional process.  Do  you  intend,  or 
does  the  United  States  have  any 
views  on  the  question  of  whether  the 
Yushin  Constitution  there,  which 
was  imposed  by  President  Park, 
should  be  followed  or  whether  some 
other  method  should  be  followed  to 
select  a  new  national  leader? 

A.  This  is  an  important  issue.  It  is  an 
issue  which  is  being  discussed  among 
the  Koreans  at  this  point.  It  is  an  issue 
on  which  perhaps  they  will  wish  to 
consult  with  us,  and  we  will  certainly 
not  be  hesitant  to  express  our  views 
when  asked  on  that  issue.  I  do  not  at 
this  point,  however,  want  to  comment 
any  further  on  it. 

Q.  Do  you  have  any  views  now  or 
are  you  going  to — 

A.  1  would  just  like  to  leave  it  where 
it  is  right  now. 

Q.  In  your  answer  on  the  presence 
of  the  Soviet  troops  in  Cuba  you  said 
that  there  have  been  some  factors 
that  have  changed.  Now,  is  this  a 
significant  development?  In  other 
words,  are  you  still  stating,  as  was 
stated  a  month  or  two  months  ago, 
that  there  is  a  Soviet  combat  brigade 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 

in  Cuba?  Or  is  there  now  some  ques-, 
tion  about  the  status  of  this  group? 

A.  I  do  not  want  lo  go  into  intelli- 
gence matters  in  this  press  conference. 
I  want  to  leave  it  exactly  where  I  left  it 
before . 

Q.  Can  you  go  to  this  extent:  Is  it  a 
pleasant  or  an  unpleasant  develop- 
ment from  the  U.S.  viewpoint?  There 
could  be  a  change  for  the  worse,  of 
course. 

A.  It  is  not  unpleasant. 

Q.  Is  it  true  that  the  U.S.  Gov- 
ernment is  favoring  the  selection  of 
the  Park  successor  through  the  so- 
called  National  Council  for  the 
Reunification,  which  is  a  totalitarian 
political  structure,  an  organ  of  the 
totalitarian  constitution  and  struc- 
ture? 

A.  Again,  this  is  an  internal  matter 
for  the  Government  of  Korea  and  the 
Korean  people  to  decide,  and  it  is 
something  that  I  don't  think  is  helpful 
for  me  to  discuss  in  open  session. 

In  answer  to  an  earlier  question,  I 
don't  want  you  to  leap  to  any  optimis- 
tic conclusions  as  the  result  of  the  an- 
swer that  I  gave  you  to  your  question.  I 
just  say  the  factors  have  changed  and 
that  it  is  not  unpleasant.  D 


Press  release  286. 


December  1979 


29 


AFRICA:        Cotfttttunlsfft  in  Africa 


by  David  D.  Newsom 

Statement  before  the  Subcommittee 
on  Africa  of  the  House  Foreign  Affairs 
Committee  on  October  18,  1979.  Am- 
bassador Newsom  is  Under  Secretary 
for  Political  Affairs. ' 

When  we  speak  of  communism  in 
Africa,  we  are  speaking  almost  exclu- 
sively of  the  role  of  the  Soviet  Union, 
the  Eastern  European  countries  under 
Soviet  domination,  Cuba,  and,  to  a 
much  lesser  extent,  China. 

A  few  African  governments — Mo- 
zambique, Angola,  Benin,  Congo, 
Ethiopia — describe  their  policies  or 
ruling  parties  as  Marxist-Leninist  or 
scientific  Socialist,  but  their  policies 
are  mixed  and  do  not  follow  any  rigid 
Soviet  model.  Even  in  Ethiopia,  there 
is  evidence  of  a  resistance  on  the  part 
of  the  leadership  to  the  total  adoption 
of  the  Marxist-Leninist  pattern  of 
internal  policies  and  organization. 

I  do  not  wish  to  enter  into  the  argu- 
ment over  whether  the  military  and 
civilian  personnel  from  the  Communist 
states  are  in  Africa  according  to  a 
long-term  design  or  simply  through 
exploiting  opportunities.  It  makes  rela- 
tively little  difference  whether  they 
created  the  opportunities  or  took  ad- 
vantage of  them.  The  fact  is  that  such 
personnel  are  in  Africa,  and  they  are 
there  in  relatively  large  numbers. 
Whatever  the  origin  of  their  presence, 
that  presence  represents  a  threat  to  our 
interests  and,  in  our  view,  to  the 
long-term  interests  of  the  African  states 
as  well. 

We  believe  these  interests  are  af- 
fected particularly  by  the  presence  of 
substantial  organized  military  forces, 
particularly  from  Cuba,  and  by  the  ex- 
tensive flow  of  weaponry  from  Com- 
munist countries  to  Africa. 

In  both  global  and  African  terms,  the 
highest  priority  must  be  given  to  a 
peaceful  resolution  of  the  tragic  and 
complicated  problems  of  southern  Af- 
rica. The  Communist  states  have  not 
lent  support  to  fair  and  peaceful  solu- 
tions. They  have  advocated  military 
options  rather  than  urging  all  parties  to 
pay  the  political  price  of  peaceful  set- 
(tlements. 

At  a  time  when  the  African  countries 
continue  to  struggle  under  the  burden 
of  enormous  economic  problems,  the 
Communist  presence  and  the  military 
hardware  represent  an  economic  and 


financial  burden  that  diverts  resources 
from  constructive  development. 

The  obligations  incurred  for  the 
Communist  nations"  support  can  and  do 
include  facilities  and  rights  to  the  naval 
forces  of  the  Soviet  Union — a  clear  and 
unwarranted  extension  of  global  com- 
petition to  Africa. 

While  even  those  African  states 
which  have  a  substantial  Communist 
military  presence  have  sought  to  main- 
tain their  essential  independence,  we 
cannot  discount  the  effect  of  the  finan- 
cial and  political  debts  they  must  repay 
to  the  Communist  world  for  this  politi- 
cal and  military  support  on  their 
long-term  outlook  and  international 
orientation. 

It  is  well  to  keep  in  mind,  as  we  con- 
sider how  to  meet  this  problem,  that 
the  Communist  countries  claim  that: 

•  Their  personnel  are  there  at  the  in- 
vitation of  recognized  sovereign  Afri- 
can states; 

•  They  are  there  in  support  of  liber- 
ation movements  recognized  by  the  Or- 
ganization of  African  Unity  (OAU); 
and 

•  They  are  there  to  protect  weaker 
black  African  states  from  the  military 
power  of  South  Africa  or  from  outside 
aggression. 

Neither  the  states  directly  involved 
nor  the  OAU  challenge  these  as- 
sumptions— just  as  the  OAU  has  never 
challenged  the  right  of  African  states  to 
call  on  the  help  of  other  non-African 
states  to  meet  problems  of  defense  or 
internal  security  and  development. 

To  say  that  there  has  been  no  formal 
challenge,  however,  does  not  mean  that 
African  states,  including  some  of  those 
in  which  Communist  bloc  military  per- 
sonnel are  present,  are  reconciled  to 
these  situations  or  wish  to  see  them 
prolonged.  African  states  have  long 
made  it  clear  that,  while  they  recognize 
the  right  of  governments  to  call  on  out- 
side help,  they  would  much  prefer  that 
African  problems  be  resolved  without 
outside  intervention.  The  heritage  of 
the  colonial  period  has  left  a  strong 
distaste  for  the  influence  and  presence 
of  non-African  powers,  whether  Com- 
munist or  non-Communist. 

Whatever  may  be  their  private 
views,  African  states — including  the 
more  conservative  ones — have  publicly 
resisted  actions  and  policies  which  ap- 
pear to  make  African  conflicts  part  of 
the  larger  East- West  confrontation. 


Most  have  preferred  that  the  Western 
response  to  the  presence  of  Communist 
personnel  in  Africa  be  through  ap- 
proaching the  African  problems  which 
provided  the  original  rationale  rather 
than  through  global  strategic  moves. 

Let  me  now  turn  to  discuss  where  the 
Communist  personnel  and  assistance 
are  found  in  Africa,  where  their  influ- 
ence has  been  reduced,  and,  finally,  to 
the  policies  of  the  United  States  with 
respect  to  this  presence. 

Countries  Given  Communist 
Assistance 

It  is  my  understanding  that  the  focus 
of  the  committee's  attention  is  on  sub- 
Saharan  Africa.  I  will,  therefore,  con- 
centrate on  that  area.  I  would  note  that 
there  are  Soviet  and  other  Eastern 
European  and  possibly  Cuban  military 
technicians  in  Algeria  and  Libya,  but 
there  are  no  organized  Communist 
troop  units  in  this  portion  of  Africa. 
There  is  some  Communist  equipment 
provided  by  Algeria  and  possibly  Libya 
to  the  Polisario  in  the  Sahara. 

Communist  military  personnel  num- 
bered in  1978,  by  our  best  estimate, 
approximately  41,000  in  sub-Saharan 
Africa.  Of  these,  an  estimated  3,800 
were  from  Eastern  Europe,  probably 
about  half  Soviets  and  the  bulk  of  the 
remainder  from  East  Germany.  The 
largest  concentrations  were  in  Angola 
and  Ethiopia,  and  the  major  groups 
were  Cubans  who  numbered  approxi- 
mately 37,000,  including  19,000  in 
Angola  and  16,500  in  Ethiopia. 

The  next  largest  concentration,  after 
these  two  countries,  was  in  Mozam- 
bique, where  there  were  an  estimated 
1,130  personnel  from  all  Communist 
countries.  Other  countries  where  there 
were  Communist  military  personnel  in- 
cluded Equatorial  Guinea,  Guinea, 
Guinea-Bissau,  and  Mali.  Some  of  the 
Soviet,  East  German,  and  Cuban  per- 
sonnel in  Zambia  are  assigned  to  help 
the  Zimbabwe  African  People's  Union, 
Joshua  Nkomo's  Rhodesian  liberation 
movement. 

While  there  has  been  some  reduction 
in  personnel  in  Equatorial  Guinea  and 
Guinea  since  these  estimates,  and 
probably  some  reduction  in  Cuban 
forces  in  Ethiopia,  we  believe  that  the 
overall  total  on  the  continent  is  sub- 
stantially the  same  now. 

Communist  country  technical  experts 
in  Africa  in  1978  were  estimated  at 
37,000,  of  whom  about  7,500  were 
Soviets  or  East  Germans.  Approxi- 
mately 18,000  were  Cubans  and 
11,000,  Chinese.  They  were  present  in 
at  least  23  countries;  the  largest  con- 
centration was  in  Angola  where  about 
10,000  were  present,  mostly  Cubans. 


30 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


The  same  countries  which  had  concen- 
trations of  military  personnel  also  had 
civilian  technicians.  The  only  other 
important  concentration  of  Soviet 
civilian  technicians  is  in  Nigeria  where 
there  are  about  1,600.  The  largest  con- 
centrations of  Chinese  technicians  are 
in  Somalia  and  Zambia — 3,000  in  the 
former;  5,000  in  the  latter. 

It  will  be  noted  that,  with  the  excep- 
tion of  Ethiopia,  the  largest  concentra- 
tion of  Communist  military  personnel 
is  in  those  former  Portuguese  territories 
where  the  successful  liberation  move- 
ments received  strong  preindependence 
Soviet  support.  With  the  departure  of 
the  Portuguese,  these  leaders,  particu- 
larly in  Angola,  turned  to  the  Soviets 
and  their  Cuban  and  East  German  allies 
for  the  military  help  required  to  secure 
power  and  for  the  civilian  help  required 
to  replace  the  Portuguese. 

In  Ethiopia,  a  leftist  revolution 
turned  to  the  Soviets  and  the  Cubans 
for  military  and  civilian  help,  em- 
phasizing to  Africa  and  to  the  world,  as 
a  rationale  for  their  intervention,  the 
threat  posed  by  the  Somali  military  ac- 
tivities in  the  Ogaden  region. 

As  1  have  noted,  the  bulk  of  the 
manpower  has  been  supplied  by  Cuba. 
The  Soviet  Union  has  supplied  the 
equipment  and,  undoubtedly,  much  of 
the  financing.  The  East  Germans  sup- 
plement these  contributions  with  tech- 
nical skills  and  sophisticated  equip- 
ment. 

The  Communist  Approach 

Soviet  and  Cuban  objectives  in  Af- 
rica are  harmonious,  but  not  necessar- 
ily synonymous.  Cuba  sent  technicians 
to  Africa  before  the  more  dramatic 
cooperation  with  the  Soviets  which  we 
have  witnessed  in  the  last  few  years. 
Castro,  emphasizing  the  African  ele- 
ment in  the  Cuban  population,  sees  a 
special  mission  for  Cuba  in  that  conti- 
nent. 

Soviet  motivations  are  probably  a 
mixture  of  geopolitical,  strategic,  and 
ideological.  The  Soviet  approach  con- 
tinues to  be  one  of  seizing  opportuni- 
ties as  they  arise  and  of  relying  heavily 
on  military  rather  than  economic  as- 
sistance to  gain  their  objectives. 

East  Germany  is  a  relative  newcomer 
to  the  African  scene.  Until  1973  its  ac- 
tions in  Africa  were  predominantly 
aimed  at  gaining  international  legiti- 
macy and  diplomatic  recognition.  Once 
this  was  achieved,  its  African  priorities 
became  more  focused  on  supporting 
Soviet  aims,  spreading  of  Marxist- 
Leninist  ideology,  securing  markets 
and  long-term  supplies  of  materials, 
and  competing  against  the  Federal 
Republic. 


The  Soviets  probably  attach  the 
greatest  importance  to  their  help  to 
Ethiopia.  They  continue  to  supply 
arms,  training,  construction  services, 
and  advice  to  the  Ethiopian  forces. 
Cuban  combat  forces  continue  to  help 
protect  Ethiopian  frontiers  in  the  Oga- 
den and  probably  provide  some  logisti- 
cal and  other  support  for  the  Ethiopian 
campaigns  in  Eritrea. 

Despite  the  close  ties,  there  are  un- 
doubtedly problems  in  the  Moscow- 
Addis  Ababa  relationship.  The  Ethio- 
pian inability  to  win  a  military  success 
this  past  summer  in  their  campaign 
against  the  Eritreans,  despite  massive 
Soviet  support,  was  a  disappointment 
to  both  and  did  nothing  to  promote 
mutual  confidence  in  either's  ability  to 
achieve  a  military  solution.  Soviet  eco- 
nomic assistance  to  the  Mengistu  re- 
gime has  been  relatively  modest. 
Ethiopian  failure  to  move  quickly  in 
the  formation  of  a  civilian  Marxist 
party  to  replace  the  military  regime 
must  give  pause  to  the  more  dogmatic 
Marxist-Leninists  who  support  the 
Ethiopian  revolution. 

In  Angola,  the  Soviets  and  Cubans 
continue  to  provide  support  for  combat 
operations  against  the  rival  liberation 
movement  of  UNITA  [National  Union 
for  the  Total  Independence  of  Angola]. 
The  East  Germans  also  provide  advis- 
ers, though  they  have  vehemently  de- 
nied reports  that  they  have  provided 
troops  as  well. 

So,  too,  do  Soviet  and  Cuban  per- 
sonnel provide  significant  support  to 
the  Mozambican  military.  So  far  these 
have  been  advisers  rather  than  combat- 
ants. 

In  the  Rhodesian  conflict,  the  Sovi- 


ets, along  with  the  East  Germans,  con-j 
tinue  to  provide  military  assistance  al- 
most exclusively  to  ZAPU  [Zimbabwe' 
African  People's  Union]  rather  than  the' 
patriotic  front  as  a  whole.  The  Cubans, 
on  the  other  hand,   along  with   the 
Ethiopians,   are  providing  training  to 
both   ZAPU   and   ZANU"  [Zimbabwe 
African  National  Union]. 

Through  their  activities  in  Africa, 
the  Soviets  have  had  fairly  regular 
naval  access  to  repair  facilities  in 
Ethiopia  and  Angola.  Soviet  ships  also 
call  in  Mozambique  and  a  small  West 
African  patrol  "shows  the  flag'"  using 
ports  such  as  Conakry  and  Cotonou,  as 
well  as  Luanda.  A  number  of  other 
countries  have  resisted  Soviet  attempts 
for  naval  access. 

Reduction  of  Soviet  Influence 

The  publicity  afforded  Soviet  ac- 
tivities in  Africa  and  the  fact  that  Mos- 
cow is  the  dominant  foreign  influence 
in  a  few  areas,  like  Ethiopia,  gives  the 
impression  that  Soviet  policy  in  Africa 
is  an  across-the-board  success.  Such  is 
not  the  case. 

The  Soviet's  position  over  the  years 
has  been  reduced  in  places  like  Ghana. 
Guinea,  the  Sudan.  Somalia,  and 
Egypt.  And  even  some  of  the  states 
where  the  Soviets  retain  considerable 
influence  have  indicated  a  desire  to 
strengthen  ties  with  the  West. 

Recently  we  have  seen  the  ouster  of 
two  more  Soviet  clients — Idi  Amin  in 
Uganda  and  Macias  in  Equatorial 
Guinea.  Both  of  those  regimes,  well 
recognized  as  two  of  the  grossest  vio- 
lators of  human  rights,   received  con- 


COMMUNIST 

MILITARY  PERSONNEL 

IN  SUB-SAHARAN 

AFRICA, 

1978' 

U.S.S.R. 

and 
Eastern 

Country 

TOTAL 

Europe^ 

Cuba' 

China 

Angola 

20.300 

1.300 

19.000 

— 

Equatorial  Guinea 

290 

40 

150 

100 

Ethiopia 

17,900 

1.400 

16.500 

— 

Guinea 

330 

100 

200 

30 

Guinea-Bissau 

205 

65 

140 

— 

Mali 

195 

180 

— 

15 

Mozambique 

1,130 

230 

800 

100 

Other 
TOTAL 

ons 

present 

for  a  period  o 

1,330 

500 

485 

345 

41,680           3,815 
f   1    month  or  more  d 

37.275 
uring    1978. 

590 
Rounded 

'  Number  of  pers 

to  the  nearest  5. 

^Mainly  Soviets. 

Among  Eastern  Europeans 

most  are  believed  to 

be  East  Germans.             i 

'Includes  troops. 

I  )iCLMiibcr  1*^79 


31 


Milcrublc  support  from  the  Soviet 
l!iiion  and  its  allies,  including  military 
iKudwaie  and  training.  The  indiscrimi- 
11. lie  supply  of  weapons  and  training  by 
ihc  Communist  nations  to  insecure  and 
icpiossive  regimes  has  sustained  them 
aikl  contributed  to  some  of  the  most 
;jrisly  crimes  against  human  dignity 
c\cr  perpetrated  on  the  African  or  any 
continent. 

Chinese  Influence 

The  committee  has  also  expressed  an 
interest  in  the  question  of  Chinese  in- 
fluence and  activities.  I  have  referred 
above  to  Chinese  technicians  in  Zambia 
and  Somalia.  There  are  approximately 
500  Chinese  military  technicians  scat- 
tered through  the  continent  and  in  ex- 
cess of  10,000  civilian  technicians. 

Despite  this  presence  and  their  major 
effort  in  Africa  in  the  1960's.  they  are 
of  relatively  minor  significance  today, 
Chinese  policy  is  aimed  primarily  at 
parrving  the  Soviet  advances.  Their 
efforts  have  been  largely  in  the  prop- 
aganda field.  The  Chinese  continue 
modest  aid  programs,  and  their  military 
assistance  has  been  limited  to  supply- 
ing light  weapons  and  some  training. 
They  are  one  of  the  primary  suppliers 
to  Robert  Mugabe's  ZANU. 

U.S.  Response 

Our  own  response  to  the  Communist 
presence  in  Africa  is  based  on  the 
premise  that  African  nations  will  fun- 
damentally seek  international  align- 
ments which  will  further  Africa's  own 
central  priorities.  These  priorities  are: 

•  Self-determination — an  end  to  ra- 
cial discrimination  and  white  minority 
rule; 

•  The  maintenance  of  territorial  in- 
tegrity; and 

•  Progress  in  economic  develop- 
ment. 

A  minority  of  the  countries  in  Africa 
have  felt  that  they  have  found  support 
for  these  priorities  in  close  ties  with  the 
Communist  countries.  The  reasons  are 
partly  historic,  stemming  from  our  own 
past  policies  with  respect  to  the  Por- 
tuguese territories  and  our  identifica- 
tion with  the  former  colonial  powers 
and  with  South  Africa. 

But  Africa  is  a  continent  of  moving, 
not  still,  pictures.  Permanent  charac- 
terizations are  risky.  As  1  have  already 
demonstrated,  a  number  of  countries 
have  found  that,  in  the  long  run,  their 
interests  lie  in  rejecting  an  exclusive 
dependence  on  the  Communist  coun- 
tries. Nationalism  is  a  powerful  force 
in  Africa,  and  no  African  leaders  or 
peoples  wish  to  come  under  the  lasting 


COMMUNIST  ECONOMIC  TECHNICIANS  IN  SUB-SAHARAN 

AFRICA, 

1978' 

U,S.S.R. 

and 
Eastern 

Country 

TOTAL 

Europe'^ 

China 

Cuba 

Angola 

9,910 

1,400 

10 

8,500 

Ethiopia 

1.400 

650 

250 

500 

Gabon 

75 

10 

65 

— 

Gambia 

75 

— 

75 

— 

Ghana 

175 

95 

80 

— 

Guinea 

1,035 

700 

300 

35 

Guinea-Bissau 

405 

265 

55 

85 

Kenya 

30 

25 

5 

— 

Liberia 

210 

10 

200 

— 

Madagascar 

200 

— 

200 

— 

Mah 

1,025 

475 

550 

— 

Mauritius 

15 

— 

15 

— 

Mozambique 

1,270 

750 

120 

400 

Niger 

160 

10 

150 

— 

Nigeria 

1,750 

1,625 

125 

— 

Rwanda 

60 

10 

50 

— 

Sao  Tome  and  Principe 

260 

20 

too 

140 

Senegal 

500 

100 

400 

— 

Sierra  Leone 

310 

10 

300 

— 

Somalia 

3,050 

50 

3,000 

— 

Sudan 

775 

125 

650 

— 

Tanzania 

1 ,365 

165 

1,000 

200 

Zambia 

5.645 

125 

5,500 

20 

Others 
TOTAL 

persons  present 

for  a  period  of  1 

7,525 

1,020 

5.415 

1,090 

37,225 
month  or 

7,640 
more  during 

10.970          18.615 
1978.  Rounded  to  the 

'Number  of 

nearest  5. 

''More  than 

half  are  Soviets 

nearly  1 ,000  are 

believed  to  be  East  Germans. 

influence  of  any  foreign  power. 

I  should  note  that  the  African  states 
have  been  particularly  helpful  at  the 
United  Nations  and  in  U.N.  agencies, 
especially  with  regard  to  attempts  by 
certain  states  to  take  action  against 
their  fellow  OAU  member,  Egypt,  for 
its  role  in  the  Middle  East  peace  proc- 
ess. 

In  support  of  our  own  long-term 
interests  on  the  Continent  of  Africa  and 
in  recognition  of  the  forces  of  African 
nationalism,  this  Administration  has 
pursued  and  continues  to  pursue  posi- 
tive regional  policies  that  respond  to 
local  realities  and  that  avoid  East-West 
confrontations.  We  consider  the  fol- 
lowing as  essential  elements  of  this 
approach: 

First,  promotion  of  our  economic, 
cultural,  and  social  ties  with  the  Afri- 
can Continent.  We  continue  to  build  on 
the  strength  of  relationships  which 
have  grown  over  the  years,  addressing 
through  trade,  investment,  and  techni- 
cal assistance  the  genuine  needs  of  Af- 


rican nations  and,  in  so  doing,  pro- 
moting both  our  own  well-being  and 
strengthening  the  independence  of  Af- 
rican states.  Such  a  long-term  com- 
mitment, we  believe,  is  perhaps  the 
strongest  approach  to  the  deterrent  of 
Communist  influence. 

Second,  we  shall  continue  to  seek 
the  peaceful  resolution  of  conflicts  and 
disputes  in  Africa,  as  elsewhere, 
through  strengthening  the  United  Na- 
tions and  the  OAU.  A  resort  to  vio- 
lence to  solve  disputes  almost  inevi- 
tably entails  human  suffering  and  a 
diversion  of  resources  away  from  the 
development  process.  We  recognize 
full  well  that  peace  is  an  indispensable 
prerequisite  for  development  in  its  full- 
est sense. 

Conversely,  continued  turmoil,  con- 
flict, and  a  report  to  arms  provide  op- 
portunities for  Communist  exploitation. 
This  Administration  has,  therefore, 
placed  a  high  priority  on  the  search  for 
peaceful  conflict  resolution  in  Africa, 
and  we  shall  continue  to  do  so. 


32 


Department  of  State  Bulletin' 


Third,  we  shall  continue  lo  consider 
security  requests  from  African  nations 
with  legitimate  defense  needs.  While 
recognizing  that  we  cannot  and  should 
not  downplay  African  security  con- 
cerns, any  increase  in  our  military  as- 
sistance will  be  prudent.  We  have  not 
attempted  to  compete  with  Communist 
nations  in  an  indiscriminate  arms  race 
in  Africa,  for  to  do  so  would  have  been 
contrary  to  our  own  arms  control  re- 
straints and  counterproductive  with  re- 
spect to  our  other  policy  objectives. 

Fourth,  in  Africa  as  elsewhere,  this 
Administration  has  sought  to  foster  re- 
spect for  individual  human  rights.  We 
have  pursued  this  objective  both  be- 
cause it  is  inherently  right  to  do  so  and 
because  we  believe  it  to  be  a  vital  com- 
ponent in  the  peaceful  development  of 
the  continent. 

Fifth,  we  believe  a  continued  respect 
for  African  nationalism  to  be  a  positive 
force  in  Africa's  political,  social,  eco- 
nomic, and  cultural  development  and  in 
sustaining  the  ability  of  African  nations 
to  retain  and  strengthen  their  independ- 
ence from  outside  powers. 

Our  reaction  to  the  Communist  pres- 
ence, therefore,  has  been  a  part  of  a 
broader  African  policy  designed  to 
support: 

•  The  resolution  of  those  African 
problems  which  threaten  the  peace  and 
provide  the  opportunities  for  Com- 
munist exploitation; 

•  The  constructive  participation  of 
African  nations  in  international  fora; 
and 

•  The  peaceful  economic  develop- 
ment of  these  nations. 

To  this  end  we  have  sought  to  main- 
tain a  dialogue  even  with  those  coun- 
tries where  there  is  a  substantial  Com- 
munist presence.  In  most  instances, 
this  is  reciprocated  by  the  African  na- 
tions. Angola,  for  example,  has  coop- 
erated closely  with  the  U.N.  plans  for 
settlement  in  Namibia,  as  Mozambique 
has  cooperated  with  us  in  the  search  for 
peace  in  Rhodesia. 

In  this  dialogue,  it  is  clear  that  we 
will  take  no  steps  which  would  suggest 
an  endorsement  or  acceptance  of  their 
willingness  to  accept  and  maintain 
Communist  troop  presences  in  their 
territories.  In  such  cases  as  Ethiopia, 
too,  our  dialogue  is  necessarily  re- 
stricted by  their  failure  to  take  actions 
required  by  our  legislation. 

The  Soviet  Union  is  not  well 
equipped  to  contribute  importantly  to 
economic  development,  the  funda- 
mental long-term  goal  of  Africa.  The 
Soviets  do  not  provide  a  market  for 
most  African  goods;  they  are  not  part 


ARUIS  CO]\TROL:        Sonait*  Ri'pori  on 
^fifl  ff  Verification 


WHITE  HOUSE  STATEMENT, 
OCT.  5,  1979' 

The  principal  findings  of  the  Senate 
Select  Committe  on  Intelligence  speak 
for  themselves.  They  confirm  that  the 
SALT  II  treaty  can  be  monitored  to  a 
degree  that  justifies  the  Administra- 
tion's conclusion  that  the  treaty  is 
adequately  verifiable. 

The  committee  expressly  finds  that 
the  SALT  II  treaty  enhances  the  ability 
of  the  United  States  to  monitor  those 
components  of  Soviet  strategic  weap- 
ons forces  which  are  subject  to  the 
limitations  of  the  treaty.  Additionally, 
the  committee  has  found  that  in  the  ab- 
sence of  the  SALT  II  treaty,  the  Sovi- 
ets would  be  free  to  take  more  sweep- 
ing concealment   and  deception   meas- 


ures which  could  make  monitoring  of 
Soviet  strategic  forces  even  more  dif- 
ficult. 

Thus,  we  believe  the  Senate  can  pro- 
ceed to  vote  on  the  SALT  II  treaty  with 
the  full  confidence  that  the  issue  of 
verification  has  been  satisfactorily  re- 
solved. 

We  welcome  this  intelligence  com- 
mittee report  and  look  forward  to  the 
Senate  Foreign  Relations  Committee 
testimony  of  Chairman  Bayh  and  Sen- 
ator Goldwater  next  week.  In  addition, 
the  President  intends  to  meet  person- 
ally with  both  Senators  Bayh  and 
Goldwater  to  discuss  the  report  in  more 
detail.  D 


'Text  from   Weekly  Compilation  ot   Presi- 
dential Documents  of  Oct    8.  1974 


of  the  world  economic  system,  not 
members  of  the  IMF  [International 
Monetary  Fund];  they  have  no  multilat- 
eral companies  to  spread  technology; 
their  ruble  is  not  convertible.  We  pre- 
fer not  to  compete  in  the  field  of  arms 
deliveries,  where  the  Soviets  are  effi- 
cient and  without  scruples.  While  we 
provide  military  equipment  within  lim- 
its, we  prefer  to  compete  where  we 
have  comparative  advantage — in  the 
support  for  economic  and  social  de- 
velopment. 

This  approach,  1  might  add,  depends 
heavily  upon  the  willingness  of  Con- 
gress to  provide  adequate  foreign  aid 
resources. 

The  states  of  sub-Saharan  Africa  still 
look  to  us  as  the  primary  peacemaker. 
They  still  find  in  us  ideals  they  would 
like  to  apply  to  their  societies.  They 
still  find  in  the  Western  nations  their 
best  hope  in  their  quest  for  develop- 
ment. The  West  remains  their  main 
trading  partners. 

Our  African  policy  is  on  a  firm 
footing  which  in  the  long  run  will  serve 
both  our  own  interests  and  those  of 
Africa.  Rather  than  contributing  to 
conflict,  we  are  attempting  to  foster 
peaceful  solutions.  Rather  than  treating 
the  symptoms  of  unrest  and  turmoil,  we 
are  attempting  to  deal  with  the  root 
causes.  We  reply  on  our  trade,  aid.  and 
economic  ties  and  on  an  open  dialogue 
based  on  mutual  respect.  Our  assist- 
ance is  designed  to  meet  the  pressing 
needs  of  economic  development  and  to 


help  countries   meet   their   legitimate 
self-defense  needs. 

On  balance.  I  believe  that  these 
policies  have  resulted  in  our  being  in  a 
stronger  position  vis-a-vis  the  African 
Continent  than  the  Soviets  and  other 
Communist  states  have  achieved  with 
their  MiG's  and  Kalashnikov-bearing 
troops.  n 


'  The  complete  transcript  of  the  hearings  will 
be  published  by  the  committee  and  will  be 
available  from  the  Superintendent  of  Docu- 
ments, US.  Government  Printing  Office. 
Washington,  DC,  20402. 


December  1979 


33 


EAST  ASIA: 

U.S.'China  Trade  Agreetnent 


mp:ssage  to  the  congress, 

OCT.  23,  1979' 

In  accordance  with  section  407  of  the  Trade 
All  of  1974.  I  am  transmitting  a  copy  of  a 
pioclamation  extending  nondiscriminatory 
tii'.iiment  to  the  products  of  the  People's  Re- 
public of  China.  I  also  enclose  the  text  of  the 
Ajjieement  on  Trade  Relations  between  the 
Unilcd  States  of  America  and  the  People's  Re- 
piililic  of  China,  which  was  signed  on  July  7, 
I^J^M,  and  which  is  included  as  an  annex  to  the 
pr.'L  lamation. 

The  Agreement  on  Trade  Relations  will  pro- 
Milc  a  nondiscriminatory  framework  for  our 
biLiterai  trade  relations,  and  thus  strengthen 
boih  economic  and  political  relations  between 
ihc  L'nited  States  and  the  People's  Republic  of 
China.  Conclusion  of  this  agreement  is  the 
niosi  important  step  we  can  take  to  provide 
Liicater  economic  benefits  to  both  countries 
lioni  this  relationship.  It  will  also  give  further 
impetus  to  the  progress  we  have  made  in  our 
overall  relationship  since  normalization  of  our 
diplomatic  relations  earlier  this  year. 

I  believe  that  the  Agreement  on  Trade  Rela- 
lions  is  consistent  with  both  the  letter  and  the 
spirit  of  the  Trade  Act  of  1974.  It  provides  for 
nuilual  extension  of  most-favored-nation  tariff 
treatment,  while  seeking  to  ensure  overall  rec- 
iprocity of  economic  benefits.  It  includes 
sulcguard  arrangements  to  ensure  that  our  trade 
wiih  the  People's  Republic  of  China  will  grow 
uiihout  injury  to  domestic  firms  or  loss  of  jobs 
tcir  .American  workers. 

The  Agreement  also  confirms  for  American 
businessmen  certain  basic  rights  and  facilities 
in  establishing  operations  and  conducting  busi- 
ness in  the  P.R.C.  Other  provisions  include 
ihose  dealing  with  settlement  of  commercial 
disputes;  financial  transactions;  government 
commercial  offices;  and  protection  for  indus- 
trial property  rights,  industrial  processes,  and 
copyrights. 

I  am  also  enclosing  a  copy  of  my  report  to 
the  Congress  pursuant  to  section  402  (c)(2)  of 
the  Trade  Act  of  1974.  I  shall  issue  today  an 
txecutive  order  waiving  the  application  of  sub- 
settions  (a)  and  (b)  of  section  402.^ 

In  the  past  year  and  a  half.  Chinese  leaders  on 
several  occasions  have  called  for  facilitating 
family  reunification  and  for  simplifying  the  pro- 
cedure for  getting  permission  to  enter  or  leave 
China.  During  this  period  we  have  noted  a 
marked  relaxation  of  Chinese  emigration  proce- 
dures. Processing  time  has  been  reduced  for 
must  cases  and  numbers  of  emigrants  have 
jumped  dramatically.  We  have  recently  had  dis- 
cussions with  senior  Chinese  officials  and  firmly 
believe  that  Chinese  statements  and  the  marked 
increase  in  emigration  reflect  a  policy  of  the 
Government  of  China  favoring  freer  emigration. 


I  have  reviewed  the  circumstances  of  emigra- 
tion from  the  People's  Republic  of  China  in  light 
ot  all  these  factors,  and  have  determined  that  a 
waiver  of  the  application  of  subsections  (a)  and 
(b)  of  section  402  of  the  Trade  Act  of  1974  will 
substantially  promote  the  objectives  of  that 
section. 

1  uige  that  Congress  act  as  soon  as  possible  to 
approve  the  Agreement  on  Trade  Relations. 
Sincerely. 

Jemmy  Carter 

PROCLAMATION, 
OCT.  23,  1979^ 

As  President  of  the  United  States  of  America, 
acting  through  my  representatives,  I  entered  into 
the  negotiation  of  an  agreement  on  trade  rela- 
tions between  the  United  States  of  America  and 
the  People's  Republic  of  China  with  representa- 
tives of  the  People's  Republic  of  China; 

The  negotiations   were  conducted  in  accord- 
ance with  the  requirements  of  the  Trade  Act  of 
1974  (P.L.  93-618.  January  3.    1975;  88  Stat 
1978)  C'the  Act"); 

An  "Agreement  on  Trade  Relations  between 
the  United  States  of  America  and  the  People's 
Republic  of  China",  in  English  and  Chinese. 
was  signed  on  July  7.  1979.  by  representatives 
of  the  two  Governments,  and  is  annexed  to  this 
Proclamation; 

The  Agreement  conforms  to  the  requirements 
relating  to  bilateral  commercial  agreements 
specified  in  section  405  (b)  of  the  Act; 

Article  X  of  the  Agreement  provides  that  it 
shall  come  into  force  on  the  date  on  which  the 
Contracting  Parties  have  exchanged  notifications 
that  each  has  completed  the  legal  procedures 
necessary  for  this  purpose;  and 

Section  405(c)  of  the  Act  provides  that  a  bilat- 
eral commercial  agreement  and  a  proclamation 
implementing  such  agreement  shall  take  effect 
only  if  approved  by  the  Congress; 

Now,  Therefore.  I,  Jimmy  Carter,  Presi- 
dent of  the  United  States  of  America,  proclaim 
as  follows; 

(1)  This  Proclamation  shall  become  effective, 
said  Agreement  shall  enter  into  force  according 
to  its  terms,  and  nondiscriminatory  treatment 
shall  be  extended  to  the  products  of  the  People's 
Republic  of  China  in  accordance  with  the  terms 
of  the  said  Agreement,  on  the  date  on  which  the 
Contracting  Parties  have  exchanged  notifications 
that  each  has  completed  the  legal  procedures 
necessary  for  this  purpose  in  accordance  with 
Article  X  of  the  said  Agreement 

(2)  General  Headnote  3(e)  of  the  Tariff 
Schedules  of  the  United  States  is  amended  by 
deleting  therefrom  "China  (any  part  of  which 
may  be  under  Communist  domination  or  con- 
trol)" and  "Tibet"  as  of  the  effective  date  of 
this  proclamation  and  a  notice  thereof  shall  be 


published   in  the  Federal  Register  promptly 
thereafter. 

In  Witness  Whereof.  I  have  hereunto  set  my 
hand  this  twenty-third  day  of  October,  in  the 
year  of  our  Lord  nineteen  hundred  and  seventy- 
nine,  and  of  the  Independence  of  the  United 
States  of  America  the  two  hundred  and  fourth. 

Jimmy  Carter 

TEXT  OF  AGREEMENT 

AGREEMENT  ON  TRADE  RELATIONS 

BETWEEN 

THE  UNITED  STATES  OF  AMERICA 

AND 
THE  PEOPLE'S  REPUBLIC  OF  CHINA 

The  Government  of  the  United  States  of 
America  and  the  Government  of  the  People's 
Republic  of  China; 

Acting  in  the  spirit  of  the  Joint  Communique 
on  the  Establishment  of  Diplomatic  Relations 
between  the  United  States  of  America  and  the 
People's  Republic  of  China; 

Desiring  to  enhance  friendship  between  both 
peoples; 

Wishing  to  develop  further  economic  and 
trade  relations  between  both  countries  on  the 
basis  of  the  principles  of  equality  and  mutual 
benefit  as  well  as  nondiscriminatory  treatment; 

Have  agreed  as  follows; 

ARTICLE  I 

1.  The  Contracting  Parlies  undertake  to  adopt 
all  appropriate  measures  to  create  the  most 
favorable  conditions  for  strengthening,  in  all  as- 
pects, economic  and  trade  relations  between  the 
two  countries  so  as  to  promote  the  continuous, 
long-term  development  of  trade  between  the  two 
countries. 

2.  In  order  to  strive  for  a  balance  in  their  eco- 
nomic interests,  the  Contracting  Parties  shall 
make  every  effort  to  foster  the  mutual  expansion 
of  their  reciprocal  trade  and  to  contribute,  each 
by  its  own  means,  to  attaining  the  harmonious 
development  of  such  trade. 

3.  Commercial  transactions  will  be  effected 
on  the  basis  of  contracts  between  firms,  com- 
panies and  corporations,  and  trading  organiza- 
tions of  the  two  countries.  They  will  be  con- 
cluded on  the  basis  of  customary  international 
trade  practice  and  commercial  considerations 
such  as  price,  quality,  delivery  and  terms  of 
payment. 

ARTICLE  II 

1  With  a  view  to  establishing  their  trade  re- 
lations on  a  nondiscriminatory  basis,  the  Con- 
tracting Parties  shall  accord  each  other  most- 
favored-nation  treatment  with  respect  to  prod- 
ucts originating  in  or  destined  for  the  other  Con- 
tracting Party,  i.e.,  any  advantage,  favor, 
privilege,  or  immunity  they  grant  to  like  prod- 
ucts originating  in  or  destined  for  any  other 
country  or  region,  in  all  matters  regarding: 

(A)  Customs  duties  and  charges  of  all  kinds 
applied  to  the  import,  export,  re-export  or  transit 


34 


ot  products,  including  the  rules,  tormalclies  and 
procedures  for  collection  of  such  duties  and 
charges; 

(B)  Rules,  formalities  and  procedures  con- 
cerning customs  clearance,  transit,  warehousing 
and  transshipment  of  imported  and  exported 
products; 

(C)  Taxes  and  other  internal  charges  levied 
directly  or  indirectly  on  imported  or  exported 
products  or  services; 

(D)  All  laws,  regulations  and  requirements 
affecting  all  aspects  of  internal  sale,  purchase, 
transportation,  distribution  or  use  of  imported 
products;  and 

(E)  Administrative  formalities  for  the  issuance 
of  import  and  export  licenses 

2.  In  the  event  either  Contracting  Party 
applies  quantitative  restrictions  to  certain  prod- 
ucts originating  in  or  exported  to  any  third 
country  or  region,  it  shall  afford  to  all  like  prod- 
ucts originating  in  or  exported  to  the  other 
country  treatment  which  is  equitable  to  that  af- 
forded to  such  third  country  or  region. 

.V  The  Contracting  Parties  note,  and  shall  take 
into  consideration  in  the  handling  of  their  bilat- 
eral trade  relatiims.  that,  at  its  current  state  of 
economic  development,  China  is  a  developing 
country. 

4.  The  principles  of  Paragraph  I  of  this  Arti- 
cle will  be  applied  by  the  Contracting  Parties  in 
the  same  way  as  they  are  applied  under  similar 
circumstances  under  any  multilateral  trade 
agreement  to  which  either  Contracting  Party  is  a 
party  on  the  date  of  entry  into  force  of  this 
Agreement. 

5.  The  Contracting  Parties  agree  to  recipro- 
cate satisfactorily  concessions  with  regard  to 
trade  and  services,  particularly  tariff  and  non- 
tariff  barriers  to  trade,  during  the  term  of  this 
Agreement, 

ARTICLE  III 

For  the  purpo.se  of  promoting  economic  and 
trade  relations  between  their  two  countries,  the 
Contracting  Parties  agree  to: 

(A)  Accord  firms,  companies  and  corpora- 
tions, and  trading  organizations  of  the  other 
Party  treatment  no  le.ss  favorable  than  is  afforded 
to  any  third  country  or  region; 

(B)  Promote  visits  by  personnel,  groups  and 
delegations  from  economic,  trade  and  industrial 
circles;  encourage  commercial  exchanges  and 
contacts;  and  support  the  holding  of  fairs,  exhi- 
bitions and  technical  seminars  in  each  other's 
country; 

(C)  Permit  and  facilitate,  subject  to  their  re- 
spective laws  and  regulations  and  in  accordance 
with  physical  possibilities,  the  stationing  of 
representatives,  or  the  establishment  of  business 
offices,  by  firms,  companies  and  corporations, 
and  trading  organizations  of  the  other  Party  in  its 
own  territory;  and 

(D)  Subject  to  their  respective  laws  and  regu- 
lations and  physical  possibilities,  further  support 
trade  promotions  and  improve  all  conveniences, 
facilities  and  related  services  for  the  favorable 
conduct  of  business  activities  by  firms,  com- 
panies and  corporations,  and  trading  organiza- 


tions of  the  two  countries,  including  various 
facilities  in  respect  of  office  space  and  residen- 
tial housing,  telecommunications,  visa  issuance, 
internal  business  travel,  customs  formalities  for 
entry  and  re-export  of  personal  effects,  office 
articles  and  commercial  samples,  and  observ- 
ance of  contracts. 

ARTICLE  IV 

The  Contracting  Parties  affirm  that  govern- 
ment trade  offices  contribute  importantly  to  the 
development  of  their  trade  and  economic  rela- 
tions. They  agree  to  encourage  and  support  the 
trade  promotion  activities  of  these  offices. 
Each  Party  undertakes  to  provide  facilities  as 
favorable  as  possible  for  the  operation  of  these 
offices  in  accordance  with  their  respective 
physical  possibilities. 

ARTICLE  V 

I  Payments  for  transactions  between  the 
United  States  of  America  and  the  People's  Re- 
public of  China  shall  either  be  effected  in 
freely  convertible  currencies  mutually  accepted 
by  firms,  companies  and  corporations,  and 
trading  organizations  of  the  two  countries,  or 
made  otherwise  in  accordance  with  agreements 
signed  by  and  between  the  two  parties  to  the 
transaction.  Neither  Contracting  Party  may  im- 
pose restrictions  on  such  payments  except  in 
time  of  declared  national  emergency. 

2.  The  Contracting  Parties  agree,  in  accord- 
ance with  their  respective  laws,  regulations  and 
procedures,  to  facilitate  the  availability  of  offi- 
cial export  credits  on  the  most  favorable  terms 
appropriate  under  the  circumstances  for  trans- 
actions in  support  of  economic  and  technolog- 
ical projects  and  products  between  firms,  com- 
panies and  corporations,  and  trading  organiza- 
tions of  the  two  countries.  Such  credits  will  be 
the  subject  of  separate  arrangements  by  the 
concerned  authorities  of  the  two  Contracting 
Parties. 

3.  Each  Contracting  Party  shall  provide,  on 
the  basis  of  most-favored-nation  treatment,  and 
subject  to  its  respective  laws  and  regulations, 
all  necessary  facilities  for  financial,  currency 
and  banking  transactions  by  nationals,  firms, 
companies  and  corporations,  and  trading  or- 
ganizations of  the  other  Contracting  Party  on 
terms  as  favorable  as  possible.  Such  facilities 
shall  include  all  required  authorizations  for  in- 
ternational payments,  remittances  and  trans- 
fers, ana  uniform  application  of  rales  of 
exchange. 

4.  Each  Contracting  Party  will  look  with 
favor  towards  participation  by  financial  in- 
stitutions of  the  other  country  in  appropriate 
aspects  of  banking  services  related  to  interna- 
tional trade  and  financial  relations.  Each  Con- 
tracting Party  will  permit  those  financial  in- 
stitutions of  the  other  country  established  in  its 
territory  to  provide  such  services  on  a  basis  no 
less  favorable  than  that  accorded  to  financial 
institutions  of  other  countries. 

ARTICLE  VI 

I.  Both  Contracting  Parties  in  their  trade  re- 


Department  of  State  Bulleti; 

lations  recognize  the  importance  of  effcctiv 
protection  of  patents,  trademarks  anf 
copyrights. 

2.  Both  Contracting  Parties  agree  that  on  th 
basis  of  reciprocity  legal  or  natural  persons  o 
either  Party  may  apply  for  registration  o 
trademarks  and  acquire  exclusive  rights  theret 
in  the  territory  of  the  other  Party  in  accordanc 
with  its  laws  and  regulations. 

^.  Both  Contracting  Parties  agree  that  eaci 
Party  shall  seek,  under  its  laws  and  with  du 
regard  to  international  practice,  to  ensure  h 
legal  or  natural  persons  of  the  other  Party  pro 
tection  of  patents  and  trademarks  equivalent  ti 
the  patent  and  trademark  protection  corre 
spondingly  accorded  by  the  other  Party. 

4.  Both  Contracting  Parties  shall  permit  am 
facilitate  enforcement  of  provisions  concernin; 
protection  of  industrial  property  in  contract 
between  firms,  companies  and  corporations 
and  trading  organizations  of  their  respectiv. 
countries,  and  shall  provide  means,  in  accord 
ance  with  their  respective  laws,  to  restrict  un 
fair  competition  involving  unauthorized  use  o 
such  rights. 

5.  Both  Contracting  Parties  agree  that  cac 
Party  shall  take  appropriate  measures,  under  it 
laws  and  regulations  and  with  due  regard  t' 
international  practice,  to  ensure  to  legal  or  nat 
Ural  persons  of  the  other  Party  protection  o 
copyrights  equivalent  to  the  copyright  protec 
tion  correspondingly  accorded  by  the  othe 
Party 

ARTICLE  VII 

1.  The  Contracting  Parties  shall  exchang 
information  on  any  problems  that  may  aris. 
from  their  bilateral  trade,  and  shall  prompti 
hold  friendly  consultations  to  seek  mutuall; 
satisfactory  solutions  to  such  problems.  No  ac 
tion  shall  be  taken  by  either  Contracting  Part; 
before  such  consultations  are  held. 

2.  However,  if  consultations  do  not  result  ii 
a  mutually  satisfactory  solution  within  a  rea 
sonable  period  of  time,  either  Contracting  Part; 
may  take  such  measures  as  it  deems  appropri 
ate.  In  an  exceptional  case  where  a  situatioi 
does  not  admit  any  delay,  either  Contracting 
Party  may  take  preventive  or  remedial  actiot 
provisionally,  on  the  condition  that  consulta 
tion  shall  be  effected  immediately  after  takinj 
such  action. 

3.  When  either  Contracting  Party  take 
measures  under  this  Article,  it  shall  ensure  thai 
the  general  objectives  of  this  Agreement  are  not 
prejudiced 

ARTICLE  VIII 

1 .  The  Contracting  Parties  encourage  th 
prompt  and  equitable  settlement  of  any  dispute: 
arising  from  or  in  relation  to  contracts  betweei 
their  respective  firms,  companies  and  corpora- 
tions, and  trading  organizations,  througl 
friendly  consultations,  conciliation  or  olhei 
mutually  acceptable  means. 

2.  If  such  disputes  cannot  be  settlec 
promptly  by  any  one  of  the  above-mentioned 
means,  the  parties  to  the  dispute  may  have  re- 


December  1979 


35 


ECOI^OMICI^:        Opportunities 
and  ChaUenges  From  the  MT]% 


by  Julius  L.  Katz 

Address  before  the  League  of 
Women  Voters  in  Providence,  Rhode 
Island,  on  October  24.  1979.  Mr.  Katz 
is  Assistant  Secretary  for  Economic 
and  Business  Affairs. 

I  am  very  pleased  to  have  been  in- 
vited as  the  principal  speaker  at  this 
public  meeting  of  the  League  of 
Women  Voters.  Last  April  5.  I  had  the 
pleasure  of  speaking  at  the  National 
League  for  Women  Voters'  conference 
on  international  trade  in  Racine.  Wis- 
consin. At  that  time,  I  spoke  about  the 
multilateral  trade  negotiations  (MTN). 
which  were  just  Hearing  their  conclu- 
sion in  Geneva.' 

Shortly  after  that  speech  on  April  12. 
the  principal  negotiators  initialed  the 
substantive  results  of  the  multilateral 
trade  negotiations.  The  Administration, 
working  closely  with  the  Congress, 
then  drafted  the  bill  implementing  the 
agreed  results  of  these  negotiations. 
This  bill  was  passed  by  the  House  of 
Representatives  by  the  unprecedented 
vote  of  395-7  and  subsequently  passed 
the  Senate  by  a  vote  of  90-4.  On  July 
26,  the  President  signed  the  bill  into 
law  thus  concluding  5  years  of  difficult 
trade  negotiations.  But  while  this  was. 


in  one  sense,  an  ending,  it  is  also  a  be- 
ginning of  a  new  era  of  trade  relations. 
Tonight  I  would  like  to  briefly  explore 
trade  in  the  aftermath  of  the  multilat- 
eral trade  negotiations,  for  I  believe 
that  it  presents  the  United  States  with 
both  opportunities  and  challenges. 

The  success  of  this  round  of  the 
multilateral  trade  negotiations — known 
as  the  Tokyo  Round  —  is  of  great  im- 
portance to  the  world.  It  is  also  a  great 
success  for  the  United  States,  the  prin- 
cipal force  behind  these  negotiations. 
This  is  especially  remarkable  when  one 
considers  that  these  negotiations  were 
conducted  during  a  period  of  world- 
wide economic  recession  and  economic 
adjustment  to  higher  energy  costs. 

Previous  rounds  of  trade  negotiations 
had  largely  concentrated  on  reducing 
tariffs  charged  on  imported  goods.  And 
they  had  been  relatively  successful, 
with  tariffs  generally  becoming  a  less 
important  factor  in  world  trade.  How- 
ever, the  decline  in  protection  provided 
by  tariffs  brought  other  means  of  pro- 
tection and  trade  distortion  to  the  fore. 
These  practices,  known  collectively  as 
nontariff  measures,  include  such  things 
as  export  subsidies,  quotas,  customs 
valuation,  and  discriminatory  govern- 
ment procurement — practices  that  gov- 
ernments  have   increasingly   used   to 


support  and  protect  domestic  industries 
from  import  competition  or  to  increase 
their  shares  of  world  trade. 

As  a  result,  the  Tokyo  Round  set  out 
to  bring  greater  discipline  over  gov- 
ernment intervention  in  trade.  Through 
a  series  of  agreements  dealing  with 
these  nontariff  measures,  we  have  set 
the  stage  for  a  major  reform  of  the 
world  trading  system.  If  we  start  with 
the  premise  that  our  government  is  rel- 
atively less  inclined  toward  interven- 
tion in  the  economy,  then  this  greater 
discipline  in  the  world  trading  system 
redounds  to  the  benefit  of  our  exports 
and  our  economy. 

Of  course,  we  did  not  meet  all  of  our 
objectives  in  this  negotiation,  and  since 
it  was  a  negotiation,  we  had  to  offer  to 
achieve.  However,  to  a  remarkable  de- 
gree, our  achievements  have  matched 
our  objectives.  What  were  some  of 
these  achievements? 


MTN  Achievements 

Although  tariffs  are  relatively  less 
important  as  a  trade  barrier  than  for- 
merly, tariffs  still  exist.  After  the  re- 
sults of  the  Tokyo  Round  are  com- 
pletely implemented,  the  tariffs  of  the 
major  industrial  countries  will  have 
been  reduced  by  about  one-third,  and 


course  to  arbitration  for  settlement  in  accord- 
ance with  provisions  specified  in  their  contracts 
or  other  agreement  to  submit  to  arbitration. 
Such  arbitration  may  be  conducted  by  an  ar- 
bitration institution  in  the  United  States  of 
America,  the  People's  Republic  of  China,  or  a 
third  country.  The  arbitration  rules  of  proce- 
dure of  the  relevant  arbitration  institution  are 
applicable,  and  the  arbitration  rules  of  the 
United  Nations  Commission  on  International 
Trade  Law  recommended  by  the  United  Na- 
tions, or  other  international  arbitration  rules, 
may  also  be  used  where  acceptable  to  the  par- 
ties to  the  dispute  and  to  the  arbitration  institu- 
tion. 

3.  Each  Contracting  Party  shall  seek  to  en- 
sure that  arbitration  awards  are  recognized  and 
enforced  by  their  competent  authorities  where 
enforcement  is  sought,  in  accordance  with  ap- 
plicable laws  and  regulations. 

ARTICLE  IX 

The  provisions  of  this  Agreement  shall  not 
limit  the  right  of  either  Contracting  Party  to 
take  any  action  for  the  protection  of  its  security 
interests. 


ARTICLE  X 

1.  This  Agreement  shall  come  into  force  on 
the  dale  on  which  the  Contracting  Parties  have 
exchanged  notifications  that  each  has  com- 
pleted the  legal  procedures  necessary  for  this 
purpose,  and  shall  remain  m  force  for  three 
years. 

2.  This  Agreement  shall  be  extended  for  suc- 
cessive terms  of  three  years  if  neither  Con- 
tracting Party  notifies  the  other  of  its  intent  to 
terminate  this  Agreement  at  least  thirty  (30) 
days  before  the  end  of  a  term. 

3.  If  either  Contracting  Party  does  not  have 
domestic  legal  authority  to  carry  out  its  obliga- 
tions under  this  Agreement,  either  Contracting 
Party  may  suspend  application  of  this  Agree- 
ment, or.  with  the  agreement  of  the  other  Con- 
tracting Party,  any  part  of  this  Agreement.  In 
that  event,  the  Parties  will  seek,  to  the  fullest 
extent  practicable  in  accordance  with  domestic 
law,  to  minimize  unfavorable  effects  on  exist- 
ing trade  relations  between  the  two  countries. 

4.  The  Contracting  Parties  agree  to  consult  at 
the  request  of  either  Contracting  Party  to  re- 
view the  operation  of  this  Agreement  and  other 


relevant  aspects  of  the  relations  between  the 
two  Parties. 

In  witness  whereof,  the  authorized  represen- 
tatives of  the  Contracting  Parties  have  signed 
this  Agreement. 

Done  at  Beijing  in  two  original  copies  this 
7th  day  of  July.  1979.  in  English  and  Chinese, 
both  texts  being  equally  authentic. 

FOR  THE  UNITED  STATES 
OF  AMERICA 

Leonard  Woodcock 

FOR  THE  PEOPLES  REPUBLIC 
OF  CHINA 


Li  Xiang 


D 


'  Text  of  identical  letters  addressed  to 
Thomas  P.  O'Neill,  Jr.,  Speaker  of  the  House 
of  Representatives,  and  Walter  F.  Mondale, 
President  of  the  Senate  (text  from  Weekly 
Compilation  of  Presidential  Documents  of  Oct. 
29,  1979). 

'^  For  texts,  see  Weekly  Compilation  of  Oct. 
29. 

^  No.  4697  (text  from  Weekly  Compilation 
of  Oct.  29). 


36 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


the  average  tarit't's  in  the  United  Stales, 
the  European  Eeonomic  Community, 
and  Japan  will  be  between  6%  and  7%. 
Included  are  many  reductions  that  will 
benefit  U.S.  manufactures,  such  as  a 
reduction  in  tariffs  on  paper  products 
by  the  European  Economic  Commu- 
nity: an  elimination  of  tariffs  on  air- 
craft and  parts  by  the  Europeans, 
Japanese,  and  Canadians;  and  tariff  re- 
ductions on  electronic  products  and 
heavy  machinery. 

In  addition,  we  have  negotiated 
bilateral  tariff  arrangements  with  about 
20  developing  countries  which  are  im- 
portant trading  partners  with  the  United 
States. 

Of  all  the  nontariff  measures  codes, 
the  one  on  subsidies  perhaps  ranks  as 
the  most  important.  No  other  issue  has 
been  more  contentious  recently  in  our 
trading  relations,  and  none  so  clearly 
reflects  the  direct  intervention  of  gov- 
ernments in  trade.  The  agreement  we 
have  reached  will  prohibit  the  sig- 
natories from  granting  export  subsidies 
on  industrial  products.  If  this  agree- 
ment is  breached,  countries  can  take 
countervailing  action.  It  also  provides 
that  where  certain  domestic  subsidies — 
such  as  those  to  assist  regional 
development — have  trade  effects  which 
cause  injury  to  other  nations,  their  ef- 
fects can  be  offset  by  countervailing 
action. 

The  code  on  government  procure- 
ment will  open  up  an  estimated  $25 
billion  in  annual  foreign  government 
procurement  which  was  previously 
closed  to  international  competition. 
U.S.  firms  should  have  a  good  oppor- 
tunity to  obtain  a  significant  portion  of 
this  business. 

The  standards  code  will  assure  that 
product  health  and  safety  standards  are 
legitimate  and  not  used  as  a  protective 
device.  It  also  provides  for  nondis- 
criminatory testing  of  foreign  goods  in 
the  standard-setting  country.  In  the 
past,  standards  and  testing  procedures 
have  been  a  problem  for  U.S.  exports 
in  a  number  of  countries;  for  example. 
Japan. 

The  customs  valuation  code  sets  up 
a  uniform  system  of  valuation  of  goods 
for  customs"  purposes,  and  this  will 
minimize  arbitrary  valuation  of  imports 
which  was  often  used  as  a  protective 
device.  This  should  be  especially  im- 
portant for  U.S.  trade  with  Canada. 

In  licensing  the  code  should  mini- 
mize the  nuisance  aspects  of  licensing 
requirements  which  waste  time  and 
cost  importers  money.  This  is  espe- 
cially important  in  developirig  coun- 
tries. 

The  aircraft  agreement  will  elimi- 
nate all  duties  on  civil  aircraft  and  limit 
the  use  of  noncommercial  factors  (such 


as  the  promise  of  landing  rights)  in  the 
procurement  of  aircraft.  Since  the 
United  States  is  the  largest  producer 
and  exporter  of  civil  aircraft,  this 
agreement  should  be  especially  benefi- 
cial. 

Of  course,  as  I  mentioned  earlier,  we 
didn't  achieve  these  successes  without 
cost.  The  United  States,  too,  will  be 
reducing  its  tariffs  by  about  one  third. 
But  because  of  extensive  consultations 
with  business,  labor,  and  agriculture, 
we  attempted  to  cut  tariffs  by  the  great- 
est amount  on  the  least  sensitive  items, 
while  making  no  cuts — or  only  small 
cuts — on  items  particularly  sensitive  to 
imports.  In  addition,  most  tariff  cuts 
will  be  phased  in  over  a  period  of  8 
years,  which  should  allow  domestic  in- 
dustry to  adjust. 

We  also  have  adopted  the  provisions 
of  the  nontariff  measure  codes.  While 
this  will  generally  mean  less  change  for 
the  United  States  than  other  countries, 
since  our  system  is  already  relatively 
more  open,  changes  will  be  required. 
Some  of  our  Federal  Government  pro- 
curement practices  will  be  liberalized. 
For  the  first  time  the  United  States  will 
have  an  injury  test  applicable  to  coun- 
tervailing actions  against  foreign  sub- 
sidy practices.  We  had  been  the  sole 
major  industrial  country  without  such  a 
test.  Thus,  before  a  countermeasure 
can  be  taken  against  a  foreign  subsidy, 
injury  to  a  U.S.  industry  will  have  to 
be  demonstrated. 

Benefits  to  Rhode  Island 

It  would  be  appropriate  at  this  point 
to  indicate  some  of  the  benefits  we  an- 
ticipate from  the  MTN  for  the  State  of 
Rhode  Island. 

Rhode  Island  exported  $268  million 
of  manufactures  in  1976,  a  151%  in- 
crease over  the  1972  level  and  nearly 
four  times  the  increase  in  production. 
About  5.800  jobs  depended  directly  on 
exports  of  manufactured  goods,  and  an 
additional  5,500  jobs  depended  on  sup- 
plying goods  and  materials  in  support 
of  exports.  In  all,  one  of  every  ten 
manufacturing  jobs  in  the  State  de- 
pended on  exports. 

Rhode  Island's  principal  export  in- 
dustry, and  a  major  employer,  is  the 
jewelry  industry.  Tariffs  will  be  re- 
duced susbtantially  in  the  major  export 
markets  for  these  goods:  42%  in  the 
European  Economic  Community,  48% 
in  Japan,  and  46%  in  Canada.  In  addi- 
tion, the  standards  and  licensing  codes 
should  benefit  jewelry  exporters. 

Another  important  exporter  is  the 
metalmaking  machinery  industry. 
While  tariff  cuts  of  33%  have  been 
made  by  the  European  Economic 
Community  and  Japan,   the  most  im- 


portant achievement  is  with  the  Cana- 
dians. Canada  has  agreed  to  liberalize 
its  "made-in  Canada"  program  which 
permits  it  to  vary  the  duty  applied  to 
imports,  depending  on  whether  a  par- 
ticular machine  is  made  in  Canada. 
This  should  substantially  reduce  duties 
paid  in  Canada  by  U.S.  machinery 
exporters. 

The  textile  and  apparel  industry  is 
also  an  important  industry  in  Rhode 
Island.  The  Administration  recognized 
the  importance  and  import  sensitivity 
of  this  industry,  and  thus  U.S.  tariff 
cuts  in  this  area  were  small  and  care- 
fully chosen  so  as  not  to  have  an  ad- 
verse impact  on  the  industry.  We  were 
also  able  to  obtain  some  cuts  from  our 
trading  partners  in  this  sector.  For 
example,  the  European  Economic 
Community  reduced  tariffs  28%  on 
U.S.  weaving  mill  products  of  man- 
made  fiber,  and  Japan  reduced  tariffs 
17%  on  yarn  and  thread  mill  products. 

Challenges  from  MTN 

I  believe  that  it  is  obvious  from  this 
brief  summary  that  the  new  MTN 
agreements  provide  many  opportunities 
for  increased  U.S.  exports.  But  these 
agreements  also  present  us  with  chal- 
lenges. 

The  first  challenge  is  perhaps  the 
most  obvious  one.  These  opportunities 
are  just  that — opportunities.  In  order 
for  these  opportunities  to  be  translated 
into  benefits.  American  business  and 
labor  must  seek  to  take  advantage  of 
them.  This  means  going  aggressively 
after  export  markets,  particularly  in 
areas  where  barriers  have  been  re- 
duced. U.S.  industry  can  no  longer  be 
content  with  our  huge  domestic  market. 
There  is  a  much  larger  foreign  market 
where  U.S.  products  can  be  sold — 
indeed,  must  be  sold — especially  in  the 
difficult  economic  situation  that  we 
find  ourselves  in  today.  Exports  mean 
sales,  profits,  and  jobs.  But  it  requires 
effort  to  obtain  these  benefits.  Without 
it,  the  opportunities  provided  by  the 
MTN  will  be  lost. 

A  second,  related  challenge  is  that 
American  business  and  labor  must  im- 
prove their  competitiveness.  The  MTN 
agreements  underline  the  commitment 
of  the  United  States  and  the  world's 
other  major  trading  nations  to 
liberalized  trade.  U.S.  business  should 
not  have  to  depend  on  the  government 
to  protect  it  from  fair  foreign  competi- 
tion. The  United  States  can  compete 
effectively  both  with  imports  in  the 
U.S.  market  and  with  domestic  pro- 
duction overseas.  But  U.S.  business 
must  increase  its  efficiency  and  mod- 
ernize its  equipment  if  necessary.  And 
U.S.  labor  must  improve  its  productiv- 


December  1979 


37 


ity.  Otherwise,  we  will  not  be  able  to 
take  full  advantage  of  the  opportunities 
offered  by  the  MTN. 

A  third  challenge  is  the  future  of 
trade  liberalization.  Trade  liberaliza- 
tion has  not  been  completed  with  this 
round  of  the  MTN.  Trade  restrictions — 
including  some  prohibitively  high 
tariffs — still  remain,  and  governments 
will  undoubtedly  develop  new  ones. 

In  addition,  we  must  continue  to  at- 
tempt to  bring  the  developing  coun- 
tries, which  are  playing  an  increasingly 
important  role  in  international  trade, 
more  fully  into  the  world  trading  sys- 
tem. And  we  must  recognize  that  our 
economy  is  changing,  and  that  certain 
goods  can  be  produced  more  efficiently 
and  cheaply  in  the  developing  countries 
than  in  Providence,  Rhode  Island.  In 
my  opinion,  future  liberalization  will 
require  the  United  States  and  other  in- 
dustrial countries  to  recognize  this  fact; 
to  recognize  that  they  can  not  continu- 
ally protect  weak  industries  from  com- 
petition; to  recognize  that  high  tariffs 
and  inefficient  industries  only  result  in 
higher  costs  to  their  economy  and  con- 
sumers; to  recognize  the  necessity  of 
economic  adjustment.  These  will  be  the 
tough  trade  decisions  of  the  future. 

The  fourth  challenge  is  perhaps  the 
most  serious.  As  I  mentioned  earlier, 
these  trade  agreements  represent  the 
beginning  of  a  new  era  of  international 
trade  relations.  Codes  of  conduct  have 
been  established  affecting  a  wide  range 
of  government  actions.  These  codes 
and  the  rules  in  them  are  intended  to 
lead  to  freer  and  fairer  trade.  I  believe 
that  this  will  be  the  case.  But  unless  we 
are  careful,  protectionist  forces  will  be 
able  to  pervert  these  codes  and  rules  to 
increase  the  protection  for  domestic  in- 
dustry. This  could  lead  the  world  into  a 
downward  spiral  of  retaliation  and 
protection  with  catastrophic  implica- 
tions for  the  world  economy  and  inter- 
national security. 

How  is  this  possible?  On  the  inter- 
national side,  the  agreed  codes  are  a 
series  of  negotiated  understandings. 
There  were  very  difficult  issues  in- 
volved in  these  negotiations,  and  it  is 
likely  that  there  will  be  differences  of 
interpretation.  And,  of  course,  the 
codes  are  only  as  good  as  the  signatory 
countries  make  them.  They  cannot  be 
enforced  by  force — only  by  the  good 
faith  of  the  signatories. 

In  order  for  the  codes  to  be  success- 
ful, the  first  year  or  two — and  the  first 
cases  brought  under  the  codes — will  be 
crucial.  All  countries  must  show  re- 
straint and  not  bring  frivolous,  weak 
cases  under  the  codes.  Countries  must 
also  show  restraint  domestically,  and 
not  get  so  committed  to  a  case  that  they 
are  unable  to  back  off  if  the  interna- 


tional decision  goes  against  them.  The 
danger  is  that  weak,  frivolous  cases 
will  result  in  signatories  not  taking  the 
provisions  of  a  code  seriously,  eventu- 
ally lessening  the  value  of  the  code — 
even  for  more  serious  cases.  And  there 
is  a  danger  that  a  country  may  become 
so  committed  to  a  weak  case  that  it 
may  be  tempted  to  disregard  an  adverse 
finding  under  the  code's  procedures 
and  take  retaliatory  action.  Not  only 
would  this  make  a  mockery  of  the  code 
itself,  but  it  could  also  lead  to  coun- 
terretaliation  and  increased  protec- 
tionism worldwide. 

Danger  of  Increased 
Protectionism 

The  danger  that  the  MTN  agreements 
could  lead  to  increased  protectionism  is 
even  more  serious  on  the  domestic 
side.  As  I  mentioned,  the  implementing 
legislation  passed  both  houses  of  Con- 
gress by  landslide  margins.  Primarily, 
this  was  a  result  of  hard  work  and 
skillful  presentation  on  the  part  of  the 
Administration,  especially  by  the 
President's  Special  Trade  Representa- 
tive, Bob  Strauss.  There  was  very  close 
consultation  with  the  Congress  and  the 
private  sector  throughout  the  negotia- 
tions, and  we  brought  home  a  good 
agreement,  a  real  success  for  the  Ad- 
ministration. 

However,  trade  bills — no  matter 
what  the  quality — have  traditionally 
never  had  an  easy  time  on  the  Hill.  One 
congressional  observer  stated  after  the 
House  passed  the  bill  with  395  votes  in 
favor  that  he  didn't  think  you  could 
even  get  395  votes  in  the  House  for  a 
Mother's  Day  resolution.  So  there  must 
be  further  reason  for  this  large  vote — 
beyond  the  fact  that  it  was  a  good 
package  and  that  Congress  had  been 
consulted  throughout  the  process.  In 
fact,  I  believe  there  is  an  additional 
reason. 

The  bill  implementing  the  MTN  re- 
sults is,  in  many  ways,  all  things  to  all 
people.  Those  who  favor  freer  trade 
supported  the  bill  because  it  im- 
plemented the  results  of  the  MTN — 
thus  reducing  barriers  to  trade  and  lim- 
iting trade  distorting  practices.  Protec- 
tionists see  the  implementing  legisla- 
tion as  a  way  to  restrict  imports  by 
bringing  cases  against  foreign  produc- 
ers either  under  the  provisions  of  the 
codes  or  under  Section  301  of  U.S.  law 
as  an  unfair  trade  practice.  The  fact 
that  both  the  codes  and  implementing 
legislation  contain — of  necessity — 
ambiguous  points  enforces  such  dif- 
fering perceptions. 

A  further  cause  for  concern  is  that 
the  implementing  bill  is  a  lawyers' 
paradise.  As  a  result  of  the  codes,  there 


is  likely  to  be  an  increase  in  the 
number  of  cases  alleging  some  viola- 
tion or  unfair  trade  practice.  The 
implementing  legislation  sets  up 
quasilegal  procedures  for  most  of 
these  complaints,  with  public  hearings, 
consultations,  and  final  decisions  all  to 
be  done  within  definite  time  limits. 
This  is  a  tremendous  challenge.  How 
the  codes  and  our  legislation  are  used, 
interpreted,  and  administered  will 
largely  determine  whether  the  MTN 
lives  up  to  its  potential  as  a  trade 
liberalizing  measure  and  the  beginning 
of  a  new  international  trading  system, 
whether  trade  policy  continues  more  or 
less  as  it  has  in  the  past  or  whether  it 
actually  leads  to  more  protectionism  in 
the  world. 

The  League  of  Women  Voters  has 
always  recognized  the  benefits  that  ac- 
crue to  the  country  and  world  as  a 
whole  through  freer  trade.  The  League 
has  thus  long  been  in  the  forefront  in 
supporting  free  trade  policies  and  com- 
bating protectionism.  However,  with 
the  conclusion  ot  the  M  IN  and  the 
large  margin  by  which  the  MTN  pack- 
age passed  the  Congress,  it  is  easy  to 
be  lulled  into  a  false  sense  of  security. 
It  is  easy  to  think  that  protectionism 
has  been  defeated. 

The  message  I  would  like  to  leave 
with  you  and  others  who  support  the 
benefits  of  freer  trade  is  that  we  should 
not  rest  on  our  laurels.  The  MTN  re- 
sults can  be  a  great  force  for  liberalized 
trade.  But  we  must  insure  the  protec- 
tionism doesn't  increase  under  the 
guise  of  these  liberalizing  documents. 
Should  this  happen,  5  years  of  impor- 
tant work  on  the  MTN  would  be  lost, 
and  the  postwar  trend  toward  increased 
trade  liberalization  would  be  reversed. 
But  even  more  importantly,  the  conse- 
quences for  our  economy,  which  de- 
pends increasingly  on  foreign  trade, 
would  be  devastating.  D 


'For  text,  see  Bulletin  of  June  1979,  p.  27. 


38 


E]\ERGY:        Crude  Oil 
Trii nsporiaiion  Arrangements 


by  Julius  L.  Katz 

Statement  before  the  joint  hearings 
of  the  Subcommittee  on  International 
Organizations,  Subcommittee  on  Inter- 
American  Affairs,  and  Subcommittee 
on  International  Economic  Policy  and 
Trade  of  the  House  Foreign  Affairs 
Committee  on  September  27.  1979. 
Mr.  Katz  is  Assistant  Secretary  for 
Economic  and  Business  Affairs. ' 

I  am  pleased  to  appear  before  this 
joint  hearing  to  discuss  the  status  of 
west  to  east  crude  oil  transportation 
arrangements.  My  prepared  statement 
is  brief  and  focused  on  the  U.S.- 
Canadian dimension  of  this  important 
subject,  especially  the  status  of  inter- 
governmental consultations. 

Since  the  enactment  of  Title  V  of  the 
Public  Utility  Regulatory  Policies  Act, 
Federal  agencies  under  Interior  De- 
partment leadership  have  been  actively 
engaged  in  a  comprehensive  evaluation 
of  the  various  transportation  proposals 
designed  to  deliver  crude  oil  to  North- 
ern Tier  and  inland  U.S.  markets.  The 
recommendations  that  result  from  this 
evaluation  will  be  transmitted  to  the 
President  next  month.  Throughout  this 
period,  in  keeping  with  Section  510  of 
the  act,  the  Departments  of  State, 
Interior,  and  Energy  have  also  con- 
sulted closely  with  the  Government  of 
Canada. 

As  you  know  three  of  the  four  pro- 
posals submitted  under  Title  V  would 
involve  construction  of  facilities  to 
transport  Alaskan  and  other  crude  oils 
across  Canadian  lands  (and  waters,  in 
the  case  of  Kitimat)  for  delivery  in  the 
United  States. 

The  fourth  applicant,  Northern  Tier, 
has  proposed  to  construct  and  operate  a 
crude  oil  transportation  system  entirely 
within  the  continental  United  States; 
consequently,  apart  from  environmen- 
tal concerns  shared  by  both  countries, 
which  will  be  addressed  in  the  permit- 
tal  process,  the  effect  on  our  bilateral 
relations  of  this  proposal  is  negligible 
for  no  Canadian  approvals  would  be 
required. 

U.S. -Canadian  Consultations 

Consultations  with  Canadian  au- 
thorities concerning  the  timing  and 
characteristics  of  the  Title  V  decision 
process  have  taken  place  on  several  oc- 
casions during  1979.  In  January  repre- 


sentatives of  the  Departments  of  State, 
Interior,  and  Energy  met  with  Canadian 
officials  in  Ottawa  to  outline  the  U.S. 
timetable  for  evaluating  the  Title  V 
proposals  and  for  submitting  recom- 
mendations to  the  President. 

The  proposed  transportation  systems 
were  discussed  again  in  March  at  the 
first  meeting  of  the  U.S. -Canadian 
Consultative  Group  on  Energy.  This 
mechanism  was  established  earlier  this 
year  by  the  two  governments  to  oversee 
the  management  of  bilateral  energy  ac- 
tivities. Oil  transportation  systems 
were  also  discussed  at  a  more  recent 
meeting  of  the  consultative  group 
which  I  chaired  for  the  U.S.  side  on 
September  6  in  Ottawa. 

During  the  course  of  these  contacts, 
we  have  asked  the  Canadian  Govern- 
ment to  provide  us  with  its  views  and 
preferences  concerning  the  proposed 
transportation  systems  so  that  they 
might  be  taken  into  account  in  the  rec- 
ommendations prepared  for  the  Presi- 
dent. 

In  May,  the  Canadians  gave  us  a 
preliminary  response  outlining  the  re- 
view and  permitting  procedure  for  any 
trans-Canadian  route  option.  They  in- 
formed us  that  before  the  Government 
of  Canada  could  make  a  final  decision 
on  any  of  the  three  crude  oil  transpor- 
tation proposals  to  transit  Canada, 
there  would  have  to  be  an  inquiry  by 
the  Canadian  National  Energy  Board 
(NEB).  This  board  controls  pipeline 
construction  applications  as  well  as 
pipeline  tariffs.  If  its  findings  are  posi- 
tive, the  NEB  issues  a  " "certificate  of 
necessity  and  public  convenience,"  in- 
dicating that  the  pipeline  is  in  Canada's 
national  interest. 

After  a  favorable  evaluation  by  the 
NEB,  and  approval  by  the  government, 
permission  to  begin  construction  is 
granted.  Formal  approvals  are  not  re- 
quired from  provincial  governing 
bodies  since  all  the  proposed  Canadian 
routes  are  i nterprovincial ;  con- 
sequently, they  fall  under  the  jurisdic- 
tion of  the  NEB.  Intraprovincial 
pipelines  are  controlled  by  the  province 
in  which  they  are  located.  In  practice, 
however,  provincial  bodies  are  fully 
consulted  prior  to  the  issuance  of  the 
approval  to  begin  construction.  The 
provinces,  therefore,  have  an  opportu- 
nity to  make  their  views  known  and  to 
influence  whether  or  not  a  pipeline  will 
be  constructed. 

In  April  1979,  the  NEB  received  an 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 

application  from  the  Trans  Mountain     . 
Oil  Pipe  Line,  Ltd.,  seeking  a  certifi- 
cate on  a  pipeline  from  Sumas  to  Ed-     '■ 
monton.   Alberta,   and   an   application     ' 
from   Foothills  Oil   Pipe  Line,   Ltd. 
(Northwest  Energy),  seeking  a  certifi- 
cate  for  construction  of  a  pipeline 
along  the  right-of-way  of  the  Alaska 
highway  gas  pipeline.  An  earlier  appli- 
cation for  project  certification  had  been 
received   from   the   Kitimat   Pipeline, 
Ltd.,  but  we  understand  that  Canadian 
authorities  have  opposed  a  Kitimat  site 
and  that  it  is  no  longer  an  active  pro- 
posal. 

The  trans-Canadian  applications  are 
now  under  review  by  the  NEB.  The  ■ 
public  hearing  process  is  now  expected 
to  begin  on  October  2,  followed  by  an 
evaluation  period  and  announcement  of 
the  NEB's  findings.  Thus,  an  NEB  de- 
cision on  certification  for  any  of  the 
proposals  is  unlikely  before  sometime 
in  December. 

In  addition  to  NEB  approval  and 
permitting,  environmental  impact 
analyses  and  approvals  may  be  required 
from  other  Canadian  Federal  agencies 
such  as  the  Department  of  Fisheries 
and  Oceans,  the  Department  of  Envi- 
ronment, the  Department  of  Indian 
Affairs  and  Northern  Development, 
and  the  Federal  Environmental  As- 
sessment Review  Office.  Also  a 
socioeconomic  review  by  the  NEB  may 
be  required. 

Earlier  this  year  we  told  the  Cana- 
dians that  we  would  need  to  have 
Canada's  views  and  recommendations 
on  the  trans-Canada  routes  by  Sep- 
tember 28  for  inclusion  in  the  recom- 
mendation being  prepared  for  the 
President.  We  were  informed  this  week 
by  the  Canadian  Embassy  that  we  can 
expect  to  receive  by  September  28  an 
indication  of  their  government's  pre- 
ferred route,  subject,  of  course,  to 
normal  NEB  regulatory  review  and 
other  approvals  as  appropriate. 

I  will  certainly  insure  that  this  com- 
mittee is  fully  informed  concerning  this 
important  Canadian  communication. 

I  would  like  to  address  briefly  three 
additional  aspects  of  this  issue — its  im- 
pact on  our  bilateral  relations  with 
Canada,  generally,  the  environmental 
question,  and  our  energy  relationship 
with  Canada. 

As  you  know  the  Department  has 
submitted  a  foreign  relations  analysis 
as  part  of  the  Interior  Department's 
preparation  of  recommendations  for  the 
President.  In  brief,  we  conclude  that 
market  assessments  of  risk  and  return 
should  decide  which  proposal  offers  the 
most  efficient  and  economic  alterna- 
tive. We  indicate  that  from  the  stand- 
point of  foreign  relations,  the  President 
can  approach  his  decision  concerning 


December  1979 


39 


an  oil  delivery  system  on  an  essentially 
"neutral"  basis  as  between  route  op- 
tions in  either  country.  Should  a  joint 
route  be  chosen,  we  consider  that  the 
mutual  assurances  contained  in  the 
1977  Transit  Pipeline  Agreement  be- 
tween Canada  and  the  United  States 
should  serve  to  guarantee  U.S.  inter- 
ests. 

This  treaty  applies  to  any  pipeline 
carrying  U.S. -owned  oil  across  Canada 
(and  Canadian  oil  across  the  United 
States).  It  covers  all  existing  or  future 
pipelines  which  transit  the  territory  of 
each  nation,  and  it  applies  to  all  forms 
of  hydrocarbons  including  crude  oil, 
petroleum  products,  natural  gas,  pet- 
rochemical feedstocks,  and  coal  slur- 
ries. 

The  treaty  guarantees  throughput.  It 
also  provides  for  nondiscriminatory 
treatment  of  transit  pipelines  with  re- 
gard to  taxes,  tariffs,  or  other  monetary 
charges.  The  jurisdiction  of  normal 
regulatory  authorities  is  recognized, 
but  the  treaty  also  requires  that  all  reg- 
ulatory measures  be  just,  reasonable, 
and  nondiscriminatory.  The  35-year 
term  of  the  treaty  also  provides  equita- 
ble sharing  of  pipeline  capacity  in  the 
event  of  emergencies.  Both  parties  are 
committed  to  arbitration  in  the  event 
disputes  cannot  be  resolved  by  negoti- 
ation. 

Environmental  Considerations 

With  respect  to  international  en- 
vironmental considerations,  it  is  our 
understanding  that  although  the  U.S. 
National  Environmental  Policy  Act 
does  not  apply  to  the  trans-Canadian 
portions  of  the  various  route  proposals, 
the  Canadian  Government's  environ- 
mental review  and  assessment  proce- 
dures will  be  applied.  We  expect  to 
consult  closely  with  the  appropriate 
Canadian  authorities  to  insure  adequate 
environmental  safeguards  are  in  place 
whatever  route  is  chosen. 

It  is  worth  noting  in  this  respect  that 
the  United  States  and  Canada  have 
reached  ad  referendum  agreement  to 
provide  for  an  improved  management 
system  in  the  Strait  of  Juan  de  Fuca  and 
parts  of  Puget  Sound.  Such  a  system, 
once  installed,  is  expected  to  improve 
safety  and  operating  conditions  for  all 
vessels  transiting  the  area,  particularly 
for  the  large  tankers  which  would  be 
required  for  operation  of  Northern  Tier 
or  Trans  Mountain  proposals. 

Energy  Relationship 
With  Canada 

Finally,  I  would  like  to  make  some 
brief  remarks  about  the  subject  of  joint 
energy  cooperation  with  Canada. 
Energy  trade  has  been  and  will  con- 


tinue to  be  an  important  element  in  our 
economic  relations  with  Canada.  Al- 
though our  net  oil  imports  from  Canada 
are  in  the  process  of  virtual  elimina- 
tion, oil  exchanges  with  Canada  con- 
tribute importantly  to  the  supply  of 
certain  Northern  Tier  refineries  tradi- 
tionally dependent  on  Canadian  oil 
transportation  facilities.  We  import 
nearly  3  billion  cubic  feet  per  day  of 
natural  gas,  or  nearly  5%  of  U.S.  con- 
sumption, and  applications  are  now 
pending  for  an  additional  billion  cubic 
feet  per  day.  We  have  an  extensive  and 
growing  electricity  trade  with  Canada 
—  last  year  we  imported  nearly  20  bil- 
lion kilowatt  hours.  Canada  depends  on 
us  for  nearly  half  its  thermal  coal 
supplies. 

In  addition  to  this  substantial  energy 
trade  relationship,  we  are  jointly  pur- 
suing a  variety  of  important  energy 
cooperation  activities  with  Canada  in- 
cluding the  Alaskan  gas  pipeline  proj- 
ect and  joint  research  and  development 
on  tar  sands  and  heavy  oils.  These  and 
other  activities  are  being  developed  and 
managed  through  the  work  of  the 
Energy  Consultative  Group  as  well  as 
the  broad  range  of  continuing  private 
sector,  academic,  and  government  re- 
lationships in  the  energy  area.  These 
mutually  beneficial  cooperative  ac- 
tivities will  be  an  important  element  in 
the  discussions  President  Carter  and 
Prime  Minister  Clark  will  have  in  Ot- 
tawa later  this  fall.  D 


'The  complete  transcripl  of  the  hearings  will 
be  published  by  the  committee  and  will  be 
available  from  the  Superintendent  of  Docu- 
ments, U.S.  Government  Printing  Office. 
Washington,  DC.  20402. 


Publications 


GPO  SALES 

Publications  may  be  ordered  by  catalog  or 
stock  number  from  the  Superintendent  of 
Documents.  U .S.  Government  Printing  Office. 
Washington,  D.C.  20402.  A  25%  discount  is 
made  on  orders  for  100  or  more  copies  of  any 
one  publication  mailed  to  the  same  address. 
Remittances,  payable  to  the  Superintendent  of 
Documents,  must  accompany  orders.  Prices 
shown  below,  which  include  domestic  postage, 
are  subject  to  change. 

Thermal  Power  Plant  Near  Ismalia.  Agree- 
ment with  Egypt,  amending  the  agreement  of 
May  30,  1976.  TIAS  9137.  3  pp.  700.  (Cat. 
No.  S9. 10:9137.) 

Atomic  Energy  —  Reactor  Safety  Experi- 
ments. Agreement  with  other  Governments. 
TIAS  9184.  58  pp.  $2.75.  (Cat.  No. 
59.10:9184.) 


Peaceful  Nuclear  Cooperation.  Agreement 
with  Australia.  TIAS  9191.  5  pp.  750.  (Cat 
No.  S9. 10:9191.) 

Atomic   Energy — Technical  Information   Ex 
change  and  Nuclear  Safety.  Agreement  with 
Israel.   TIAS  9247.   22  pp.   $1.25.   (Cat.   No 
89.10:9247.) 

Atomic   Energy — Technical   Information   Ex 
change.  Safety  Research,  and  Development 
of  Standards.   Agreement  with  Belgium 
TIAS     9255.     44    pp.     $2.     (Cat.     No 
S9. 10:9255.) 

Atomic  Energy — Transfer  of  Uranium  for  Re 
search  Reactor.  Agreement  with  Argentina 
Peru,  and  the  International  Atomic  Energy 
Agency.  TIAS  9263.  35  pp.  $1.75.  (Cat.  No 
89.10:9263.) 

Coal  Conversion,  Extraction,  and  Processing 
Memorandum  of  understanding  with  Austra 
lia.  TIAS  9269.  17  pp.  $1.25.  (Cat.  No 
89.10:9269.) 

Rural  Electrification.  Agreement  with  In- 
donesia. TIAS  9294.  19  pp.  $1.25.  (Cat,  No, 
89,10:9294.) 

Finance — Payments  for  Uranium  Enrichment 
Services.  Agreement  with  Japan.  TIAS  9295 
6  pp.  750.  (Cat.  No.  89.10:9295.) 

Technical  Cooperation — Nasseriah  Power 
Station.  Agreement  with  Saudi  Arabia,  TIAS 
9316.  6  pp.  75C,  (Cat,  No.  89.10:9316.) 

Coal  Information  Exchange  in  Health,  Safety 
and  Environment,  Memorandum  of  under- 
standing with  Australia.  TIAS  9328,  9  pp.  $1. 
(Cat.  No.  89,10:9328.) 

Rural  Electrification.  Agreement  with  In- 
donesia, TIAS  9357.  27  pp.  $1,50,  (Cat.  No. 
89,10:9357,) 

National  Energy  Control  Center.  Agreement 
with  Egypt,  amending  the  agreement  of  Sep- 
tember 30,  1976,  TIAS  9370,  5  pp,  75«,  (Cat, 
No,  59.10:9370.)  D 


40 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


EUROPE:  An  Overview  of  iJ*S.'Soviet  Relutions 


by  Marshall  D.  Shulman 

Statement  before  the  Subcommittee 
on  Europe  and  the  Middle  East  of  the 
House  Foreign  Affairs  Committee  on 
October  16,  1979.  Ambassador  Shul- 
man is  Special  Adviser  to  the  Secretary 
on  Soviet  Affairs. ' 

This  is  my  third  appearance  before 
your  committee  to  review  the  current 
status  of  key  issues  in  U.S. -Soviet  re- 
lations.^ As  in  previous  years,  the  re- 
lationship centers  around  the  effort  to 
keep  in  reasonable  balance  its  two  es- 
sential elements:  the  competition  which 
flows  from  the  different  and  sometimes 
opposing  philosophies  and  foreign 
policy  objectives  of  the  two  societies 
and  the  necessity  of  achieving  the  de- 
gree of  cooperation  required  to  prevent 
these  differences  from  leading  to  a 
general  nuclear  war  that  would  end  in 
the  destruction  of  both  countries  and 
jeopardize  life  on  the  planet. 

The  contrast  between  these  two  ele- 
ments has,  if  anything,  emerged  even 
more  sharply  since  I  last  appeared  be- 
fore you  in  September  1978.  On  the 
one  hand,  we  have  reached  agreement 
with  the  Soviet  Union  on  the  terms  of  a 
SALT  II  treaty  that  provides  balance  in 
central  strategic  systems  and  begins  the 
process  of  reducing  nuclear  weapons 
systems. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  recognition  of 
mutual  interest  in  bringing  the  arms 
race  under  control  has  not  extended  to 
a  broad  understanding  on  ground  rules 
for  our  continuing  political  competi- 
tion, especially  in  the  Third  World.  At 
a  time  of  extraordinary  turbulence  in 
international  politics,  the  lack  of  such 
an  understanding  makes  it  particularly 
difficult  to  moderate  the  competitive 
aspects  of  the  relationship.  Moreover, 
the  relationship  is  marked  on  both  sides 
by  a  persistent  strong  mistrust  stem- 
ming from  the  very  different  political 
systems  of  the  two  countries  and  re- 
flecting their  divergent  views  about  the 
nature  of  the  individual  and  the  state, 
as  well  as  their  different  geographic 
situations  and  historical  experiences. 

Current  State  of  Relations 

It  is  understandable  that  the  signing 
of  the  SALT  II  treaty  in  Vienna  [June 
18,  1979]  did  not  evoke  the  euphoria  of 
the  first  SALT  accords  —  both  the 
United  States  and  the  U.S.S.R.  have 
recognized  that  detente  is  not  built  on 
SALT  alone.  While  SALT  addresses 


the  priority  issue  of  how  best  to 
strengthen  our  national  security  in  an 
age  of  nuclear  weapons,  it  does  not  and 
cannot  resolve  the  other  political  and 
even  military  issues  which  are  a  source 
of  tension  in  the  relationship. 

Perhaps  the  best  way  to  characterize 
the  present  situation  is  to  acknowledge 
that  SALT  fixes  our  attention  on  the 
vital  issues  of  war  and  peace  and  that  it 
keeps  channels  open  for  dealing  with 
the  strategic  balance.  While  rejection 
of  SALT  could  exacerbate  tensions, 
both  we  and  the  Soviets  have  come  to 
recognize  that  solutions  to  political 
conflicts  do  not  flow  automatically 
from  agreement  on  strategic  weapons. 
We  still  need  the  determination,  the 
military  strength,  and  the  diplomatic 
skill  to  deal  with  the  changing  interna- 
tional situation  and  to  protect  our  vital 
interests  and  strengthen  the  interna- 
tional system  so  that  our  essential  val- 
ues may  survive  and  flourish. 

It  is  clear  that  neither  we  nor  the 
Soviets  are  satisfied  with  the  current 
state  of  our  relations.  This  arises  partly 
from  real  differences  on  specific  issues 
but  is  compounded  by  mutual  suspi- 
cions and  doubts  about  the  very  nature 
of  the  other  country  and  its  intentions. 
Before  turning  to  the  individual  issues 
that  have  dominated  the  relationship  in 
the  past  year,  it  might  be  useful  for  us 
to  examine  some  general  aspects  of  this 
complex  and  changing  relationship. 

•  There  are  substantial  differences 
between  the  Soviet  and  American 
views  of  the  desired  world  order.  These 
views  are  unlikely  to  be  reconciled  in 
the  near  future,  and  we  are  obliged, 
therefore,  to  deal  with  tangible  prob- 
lems in  the  real  world,  with  full  con- 
sciousness of  the  conflicting  purposes 
which  underlie  specific  problems. 

•  We  should  not  lose  sight  of  the 
dynamics  of  Soviet  society,  however 
slow  may  be  the  process  of  change. 
Internally,  the  Soviet  system  has  be- 
come more  complex  as  it  has  moved 
toward  a  higher  level  of  industrializa- 
tion. Although  it  is  still  characterized 
by  a  high  degree  of  centralized  con- 
centration of  political  power  and  by  a 
formidable  political  police  apparatus,  it 
has,  in  some  respects,  modified  some 
of  the  repressive  practices  which  were 
widespread  a  generation  ago.  Exter- 
nally, the  Soviet  Union,  while  still 
seeking  to  increase  its  political  influ- 
ence and  while  continuing  to  increase 
its  military  capabilities,  is  no  longer 


committed  to  the  inevitability  of  war, 
and  it  has  become  more  deeply  in- 
volved in  international  economic  and 
political  intercourse  with  the  non- 
Communist  world. 

•  The  closed  nature  of  Soviet  society 
reinforces  rather  than  dispels  worst 
case  assumptions  abroad  about  their 
intentions  and  capabilities.  Among  the 
encouraging  developments  of  the  past 
year  have  been  the  widening  of  con- 
tacts, including  the  frequent  and  rather 
frank  discussions  between  Members  of 
Congress  and  Soviet  officials  through 
parliamentary  exchanges.  These  are 
useful  in  airing  problems  that  would 
otherwise  be  insulated  from  political 
give  and  take. 

•  Our  own  society,  accustomed  as  it 
is  to  multiple  political  viewpoints  rep- 
resenting various  segments  of  the  soci- 
ety, does  not  always  present  a  unified 
face  to  the  Soviets,  and  this  has  been  a 
source  of  uncertainty  to  them.  The 
Soviets  mistrust  the  volatility  that 
sometimes  results  from  the  projection 
of  our  pluralism  onto  the  foreign  policy 
plane. 

•  While  we  have  become  increas- 
ingly international  in  our  thinking, 
multinational  in  our  commerce,  and 
interdependent  on  global  issues,  the 
Soviet  Union  still  emphasizes  the  pri- 
macy of  sovereignty  and  national  inde- 
pendence. 

Strategic  Arms  Limitation  Talks 

The  single  most  significant  de- 
velopment in  the  U.S. -Soviet  relations 
during  the  past  year  has  been  the  con- 
clusion of  the  SALT  II  negotiations  and 
the  subsequent  Vienna  summit  at  which 
the  treaty  was  signed  by  Presidents 
Carter  and  Brezhnev.  There  are  two  as- 
pects of  SALT  II  that  require  special 
emphasis  at  this  juncture:  the  signifi- 
cance of  SALT  II  for  our  European  al- 
lies and  the  relationship  of  SALT  to 
other  aspects  of  the  Soviet-American 
relationship. 

One  long-term  aim  of  postwar  Soviet 
foreign  policy  has  been  to  take  advan- 
tage of  divisions  within  the  NATO  al- 
liance and  promote,  in  place  of  NATO, 
the  concept  of  a  European  entity  in 
which  the  Soviet  Union  can  play  a 
leading  role.  This  is  evident  in  the 
Soviet  approach  toward  the  Conference 
on  Security  and  Cooperation  in  Europe, 
and  we  saw  it  reflected  in  President 
Brezhnev's  speech  of  October  6  re- 
garding the  military  balance  in  Europe. 


December  1979 


41 


As  its  relations  with  the  United 
States  have  declined,  the  Soviet  Union 
has  sought  to  give  more  effective  em- 
phasis to  its  European  political 
strategy.  In  doing  so,  it  has  shown  an 
increasing  awareness  lately  that  the 
scale  of  Soviet  military  deployments 
bearing  upon  Europe  has  impaired 
Soviet  political  objectives  by 
heightening  European  apprehensions. 
The  initiatives  set  forth  in  the  speech 
by  President  Brezhnev  are  addressed  to 
those  mounting  European  concerns.  We 
are  actively  engaged  in  consultation 
with  our  European  allies  on  the  meas- 
ures required  to  maintain  a  military 
equilibrium  in  Europe  at  moderate  and 
stable  levels.  These  measures  include 
both  the  modernization  of  NATO's 
capabilities  and  active  exploration  of 
the  possibilities  for  arms  control 
negotiations. 

The  NATO  alliance  is  vital  to  our 
defense  posture  as  well  as  to  our 
foreign  policy  generally.  As  many 
prominent  European  spokesmen  have 
pointed  out,  the  rejection  or  postpone- 
ment of  SALT  II  will  have  a  serious 
negative  effect  upon  NATO's  assess- 
ment of  our  ability  to  lead  and  will 
make  it  more  difficult  for  them  to  have 
the  domestic  support  required  for  mod- 
ernization of  NATO.  You  will  recall 
that  this  very  point  was  made  to  the 
subcommittee  by  a  panel  of  distin- 
guished European  parliamentarians  on 
September  12  of  this  year.  Should 
SALT  II  fail  to  pass  the  Senate,  the 
Soviet  Union  will  turn  to  its  advantage 
the  severe  disruptive  effect  of  such 
failure  upon  our  NATO  alliance. 

The  other  aspect  of  the  recent  na- 
tional discussion  of  the  SALT  treaty 
that  has  been  a  source  of  some  ex- 
pressed uncertainty  is  how  it  relates  to 
other  aspects  of  Soviet  behavior.  SALT 
does  not  provide  an  effective  instru- 
ment for  restraining  the  Soviet  exploi- 
tation of  crisis  areas  in  Africa  or  in  this 
hemisphere,  since  it  does  not  confer 
greater  advantage  upon  the  Soviet 
Union  than  it  does  upon  the  United 
States.  It  would  be  a  fateful  error,  in 
my  judgment,  to  lose  the  opportunity  to 
attain  some  measure  of  stabilization  in 
the  strategic  competition  in  a  mis- 
guided effort  to  constrain  Soviet  ex- 
pansionism by  this  means.  SALT  II  has 
become  central  to  the  U.S. -Soviet  re- 
lationship, and,  to  a  large  degree,  to 
East-West  relations  generally.  It  should 
be  seen  as  a  linchpin  in  the  East-West 
relationship  rather  than  as  a  lever  to 
force  concessions  in  other  areas  of  the 
relationship. 

As  a  result  of  the  hardening  of  public 
attitudes  in  this  country  toward  the 
Soviet  Union,  many  have  raised  the 
question  why  we  should  be  engaged  in 


SALT  negotiations  with  a  country  that 
has  been  repressive  at  home  and  ex- 
pansionist abroad.  It  is  often  asked 
whether,  if  the  Soviet  Union  is  in  favor 
of  SALT,  this  should  not  lead  us  to  op- 
pose it. 

There  are  many  aspects  of  the  Soviet 
system  and  Soviet  foreign  policy  that 
we  quite  properly  abhor,  but  in  the  nu- 
clear age  we  cannot  overlook  the  fact 
that  in  some  areas  our  interests  and 
those  of  the  Soviet  Union  overlap. 
There  should  be  no  doubt  but  that  the 
effort  to  reduce  the  danger  of  a  general 
nuclear  war  represents  such  an  area  of 
overlapping  interests,  regardless  of 
other  differences.  Given  the  painstak- 
ingly careful  negotiations  over  7  years, 
with  vigilant  attention  to  the  security 
interests  of  each  side,  SALT  represents 
an  agreement  which  serves  the  interests 
of  both  sides,  without  disadvantage  to 
either. 

Why,  despite  a  fundamental  an- 
tagonism toward  the  United  States  and 
our  way  of  life,  is  the  Soviet  Union 
interested  in  concluding  arms  control 
measures  with  us?  1  believe  the  fol- 
lowing factors  are  central  to  Soviet 
thinking. 

•  From  the  standpoint  of  their  own 
national  security,  the  Soviet  leadership 
clearly  recognizes  that  to  engage  the 
United  States  in  nuclear  warfare  would 
have  catastrophic  consequences  for 
both  countries. 

•  The  Soviet  leadership  has  recog- 


]%orthern 
ireiand 


DEPARTMENT  STATEMENT, 
OCT.  29,  1979' 

We  welcome  the  announcement  of 
the  British  Government  that  it  is  seek- 
ing to  arrange  a  conference  of  the  prin- 
cipal political  parties  in  Northern  Ire- 
land to  consider  ways  to  transfer  some 
powers  of  government  to  elected  repre- 
sentatives of  the  people  of  Northern 
Ireland. 

As  the  President  said  in  his  August 
1977  statement  on  the  tragic  Northern 
Ireland  situation,  the  people  of  North- 
ern Ireland  "...  have  our  complete 
support  in  their  quest  for  a  peaceful  and 
just  society."^  We  would  be  most 
pleased  if  the  current  British  undertak- 
ing leads  toward  those  goals.  D 


'  Read  to  news  correspondents  by  Depart- 
ment spokesman  Hodding  Carter  III. 

^For  full  text,  see  Bulletin  of  Sept.  26, 
1977,  p.  410. 


nized  that,  in  the  absence  of  a  SALT 
agreement,  it  would  be  obliged  to  allo- 
cate still  more  of  its  scarce  resources 
and  technology  to  the  production  of 
strategic  weapons,  thus  further  com- 
plicating and  postponing  the  resolution 
of  major  problems  in  the  civilian  in- 
dustrial sector. 

•  The  Soviet  leadership  is  concerned 
over  the  potential  military  threat  to  the 
U.S.S.R.  from  China,  which  would  be 
still  more  difficult  if  it  were  at  the 
same  time  engaged  in  an  unregulated 
strategic  competition  with  the  United 
States. 

•  And,  probably  not  the  least  im- 
portant, the  Soviet  leadership  has 
committed  itself  to  a  political  strategy 
of  reduced  international  tension,  as  the 
most  prudent  course  for  the  advance- 
ment of  its  interests  and  sees  SALT  as 
a  testament  to  the  efficacy  of  this  pol- 
icy as  well  as  a  symbol  of  equal  status 
which  it  seeks. 

It  is  apparent  that  these  Soviet  inter- 
ests are  not  wholly  congruent  with  our 
own  and  do  not  signify  a  harmony  of 
political  interests — far  from  it.  But  the 
advent  of  nuclear  weapons  requires  a 
reexamination  of  traditional  approaches 
to  national  security.  The  traditional 
pursuit  of  security  through  superiority 
can  confer  usable  advantages  on  neither 
side  and  can  lead  only  to  an  unregu- 
lated nuclear  competition.  We  have  no 
choice,  therefore,  but  to  seek  the 
maximum  feasible  measure  of  stability 
in  the  nuclear  military  competition  we 
can  achieve  through  the  SALT  process, 
notwithstanding  the  realistic  recogni- 
tion of  the  fact  of  the  fundamental  op- 
position of  our  interests  in  many  other 
respects. 

Other  Arms  Control  Issues 

As  with  SALT  1  and  SALT  II,  each 
arms  control  endeavor  with  the  Soviet 
Union  should  be  carefully  assessed  in 
the  light  of  our  own  national  interests. 
In  my  testimony  before  this  subcom- 
mittee last  year  1  mentioned  several 
arms  limitation  negotiations  apart  from 
SALT.  Noteworthy  developments  in 
these  negotiations  over  the  last  year  in- 
clude the  following. 

Comprehensive  Test   Ban.   The 

current  round  in  these  negotiations, 
which  involve  the  British  as  well  as  the 
Soviets  and  ourselves,  got  underway 
in  Geneva  late  last  month.  Progress  has 
been  made  toward  the  acceptance  of  the 
principle  of  verification  by  means  of 
national  seismic  stations  on  the  terri- 
tory of  the  respective  countries,  but 
many  problems  remain  to  be  worked 
out  in  the  implementation  of  this  sen- 
sitive issue. 


42 


Mutual  Balanced  Force  Reduc- 
tions (MBFR).  We  and  our  allies  in 
these  complicated  talks  have  been  un- 
able to  resolve  the  disagreement  with 
the  Soviets  and  their  allies  over  the 
number  ot  troops  they  presently  have  in 
the  reduction  area.  It  is  not  yet  clear 
how  the  Soviet  decision  to  withdraw 
unilaterally  some  troops  and  tanks  from 
East  Germany  will  affect  MBFR.   But 


thus  far  the  data  issue  has  been  a  seri- 
ous stumbling  block. 

Conventional  Arms  Transfer  Lim- 
itations. The  fourth  formal  round  of 
talks  was  held  in  Mexico  last  De- 
cember. We  made  progress  on  general 
guidelines  for  limiting  such  transfers 
but  ran  into  difficulties  in  establishing 
a  mutually   satisfactory   regional   ap- 


\isU  of  His  Hoiincss 
Pope  John  Paui  ii 


His  Holiness  Pope  John  Paul  II  vis- 
ited the  United  States  October  1-7. 
1979  (Boston  October  1-2.  New  York 
October  2-3.  Philadelphia  October 
3-4.  Des  Moines  October  4.  Chicago 
October  4-6.  and  Washington  October 
6-7).  While  in  Washington  His  Holi- 
ness met  with  President  Carter.  Fol- 
lowing is  the  text  of  a  White  House 
statement  issued  at  the  conclusion  of 
their  meeting  on  October  6. ' 

President  Carter  welcomed  His  Holi- 
ness Pope  John  Paul  II  to  the  White 
House  October  6.  1979.  The  Pope's 
visit  to  Washington  concluded  an  his- 
toric week-long  papal  journey  to  six 
American  cities. 

In  their  private  talks,  the  President 
and  the  Pope  discussed,  in  particular, 
situations  of  concern  to  world  peace 
and  justice.  They  also  reviewed  ways 
of  best  serving  the  cause  of  peace, 
freedom,  and  justice  in  the  world. 

Sharing  the  belief  that  respect  for 
human  rights  and  the  dignity  of  the  in- 
dividual must  be  the  cornerstone  of  the 
domestic  and  international  policies  of 
nations,  the  Pope  and  the  President  un- 
derlined their  support  for  international 
covenants  on  human  rights  and  for  in- 
ternational organizations  and  entities 
which  serve  the  cause  of  human  rights. 
They  agreed  that  the  international 
community  must  mobilize  its  concern 
and  resources  to  deal  with  the  problems 
of  refugees,  to  protect  human  rights, 
and  to  prevent  hunger  and  famine. 

The  President  and  the  Pope  urged  all 
states  to  support  humanitarian  efforts  to 
deal  with  the  plight  of  starving  people 
and  refugees. 

The  Pope  and  the  President  agreed 
that  the  cause  of  peace  in  the  world  is 
served  by  international  efforts  to  halt 
the  proliferation  of  armaments  and  to 
eliminate  the  weapons  of  war. 

The  President  discussed  the  impor- 
tance of  the  Camp  David  accords  and 
his  efforts  to  end  the  bitter  conflict  in 


the  Middle  East.  He  emphasized  the 
determination  of  the  United  States  to 
seek  a  comprehensive  peace,  including 
resolution  of  the  Palestinian  and  Jeru- 
salem questions,  the  establishment  of 
peace  and  stability  in  Lebanon,  and 
genuine  security  for  all  countries  in  the 
Middle  East.  The  Pope  reiterated  the 
special  interest  which  the  Holy  See  at- 
taches to  the  Middle  East  peace  process 
and  to  the  need  for  an  internationally 
acceptable  solution  to  these  grave 
problems. 

The  Pope  and  the  President  discussed 
the  tragic  situation  in  Northern  Ireland. 
They  jointly  condemned  resort  to  vio- 
lence, by  any  party  for  any  reason,  and 
recalled  the  appeals  which  both  have 
recently  made  for  a  peaceful  solution. 

The  Pope  reviewed  his  trips  to  Po- 
land and  to  Mexico  and  stressed  the 
universal  longing  for  human  dignity 
and  freedom  which  he  had  encountered 
during  his  pilgrimage. 

The  President  and  the  Pope  also  dis- 
cussed recent  developments  in  southern 
Africa.  Asia,  and  Latin  America.  The 
President  noted  that  the  United  States 
seeks  conditions  of  stability,  prosper- 
ity, and  peace  in  all  these  areas  in  the 
belief  that  these  will  promote  human 
rights.  The  President  emphasized  that 
the  international  community,  and  espe- 
cially the  industrial  nations,  must 
undertake  a  greater  effort  to  assist  less 
developed  countries  to  achieve  a  better 
way  of  life  for  their  peoples.  The  Pope 
and  the  President  agreed  that  efforts  to 
advance  human  rights  constitute  the 
compelling  idea  of  our  times.  D 


'This  .statement  also  included  a  list  of  Vati- 
can and  U.S.  participants  and  topics  discussed 
at  a  meeting  in  the  Cabinet  Room  (not  printed 
here);  text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of  Presi- 
dential Documents  of  Oct.  15.  1979,  which 
also  includes  remarks  made  at  the  arrival  cere- 
mony and  the  While  House  reception  on  Oct    6. 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 

proach.  Progress  on  this  enormously 
complex  problem  remains  slow  because 
of  the  political  sensitivity  of  the  re- 
gional conflicts  involved. 

Antisatellite  Arms  Control.  The 

latest  round  in  these  talks  took  place  in 
Vienna  last  April.  We  reached  some 
agreement  on  activities  that  would  be 
prohibited  under  such  an  arms  control 
measure,  although  a  number  of  thorny 
issues  remain.  We  hope  to  schedule 
another  round  within  the  next  several 
months. 

Indian  Ocean.  The  status  of  these 
discussions  has  not  changed  over  the 
past  year — they  remain  in  recess.  In 
our  view,  the  recent  increase  in  our 
naval  presence  in  the  Indian  Ocean  is 
required  by  changes  in  the  area  and 
does  not  foreclose  the  possibility  of 
progress  should  the  talks  be  resumed. 

Chemical  and  Radiological 
Weapons.  We  continue  to  discuss 
chemical  weapons  with  the  Soviets  in 
Geneva.  Verification  is  the  key  issue. 
We  and  the  Soviets  have  presented  a 
joint  agreed  proposal  on  radiological 
weapons  to  the  Committee  on  Disar- 
mament in  Geneva.  Further  action  will 
depend  upon  that  committee. 

Current  Issues 

in  U.S. -Soviet  Relations 

Outside  the  realm  of  arms  control 
negotiations  detailed  above,  there  were 
several  international  and  bilateral  is- 
sues that  affected  the  course  of  rela- 
tions over  the  past  year. 

China.  We  have  stated  that  our  rela- 
tions with  China  are  based  on  our 
interest  in  normalizing  those  relations 
and  are  not  aimed  against  any  other 
country.  Nevertheless,  this  remains  a 
matter  of  sensitivity  to  the  Soviet 
Union.  Perhaps  the  strongest  source  of 
concern  to  the  U.S.S.R.  remains 
whether  the  United  States  will  enter 
into  a  military  supply  relationship  with 
China.  We  have  made  it  clear  that  we 
do  not  intend  to  supply  military  equip- 
ment to  China,  but  we  have  not  at- 
tempted to  speak  for  our  allies  on  this 
matter. 

The  Soviet  Union  sought  to  implicate 
the  United  States  in  the  Chinese  mili- 
tary incursion  into  Vietnam,  arguing 
that  the  visit  to  the  United  States  by 
Vice  Premier  Deng  Xiaoping  [January 
29-February  4,  1979]  in  some  way 
represented  tacit  U.S.  acquiescence  in 
the  invasion.  This  line  of  argument 
served  Soviet  propaganda  needs  but 
seemed  more  designed  to  divert  atten- 
tion from  Soviet  involvement  in  Viet- 
nam than  a  real  assessment  of  the  cir- 
cumstances by  the  Soviet  leaders. 


December  1979 


43 


The  earlier  Vietnamese  invasion  of 
Kampuchea  had  occurred  with  Soviet 
acquiescence  and  logistical  support,  if 
not  by  actual  Soviet  instigation.  While 
we  condemned  both  the  Vietnamese 
action  against  Kampuchea  and  the 
Chinese  action  against  Vietnam,  the 
potential  escalation  of  the  situation  that 
could  have  arisen  if  the  Soviet  Union 
had  initiated  direct  action  against  China 
was  averted,  largely  because  both 
Moscow  and  Beijing  seemed  aware  of 
the  great  risks  involved. 

Cuba.  There  are  two  aspects  of  the 
Soviet-Cuban  relationship  that  recently 
have  burdened  U.S. -Soviet  relations: 
first,  the  use  of  Cuban  troops  supported 
by  Soviet  logistics  and  using  Soviet 
weapons  to  fight  in  regional  contlicts 
elsewhere  in  the  world,  particularly  in 
Africa;  second,  the  provision  of  mili- 
tary assistance  to  Cuba,  as  well  as  the 
construction  of  military  facilities  in 
Cuba,  which  could  constitute  a  threat 
to  American  security  or  to  the  security 
of  other  countries  in  the  hemisphere. 

Apprehensions  have  been  raised  on 
three  occasions  over  the  past  year  in 
the  context  of  Soviet  activities  in  Cuba: 
first,  when  MiG-23's  were  first  ob- 
served in  Cuba;  second,  when  an  ex- 
panded naval  facility  was  noted  under 
construction  at  Cienfuegos;  and  third, 
when  the  presence  of  a  Soviet  ground 
force  combat  unit  was  detected. 

Throughout  our  discussions  with  the 
Soviets  on  these  issues,  they  have  de- 
clared their  continued  adherence  to  the 
1962  understanding  that  brought  an  end 
to  the  Cuban  missile  crisis  and  the 
confirmation  of  that  understanding  in 
1970,  but  they  have  insisted  on  their 
right  to  implement  the  military  compo- 
nent of  their  special  relationship  with 
Cuba  insofar  as  it  does  not  infringe  on 
the  1962  accord.  Our  current  concerns 
are  to  insure  that  the  1962  understand- 
ing as  confirmed  in  1970  is,  in  fact, 
being  observed  and  to  deal  with  situa- 
tions affecting  our  security  that  are  not 
covered  by  that  understanding.  The 
measures  announced  by  the  President 
on  October  I  were  designed  to  satisfy 
our  requirements  on  both  counts.^ 

Afghanistan.  The  course  of  events 
unfolding  after  the  Afghan  coup  of 
1978  brought  this  previously  neutralist 
government  into  close  alignment  with 
the  Soviet  Union,  at  a  cost  of  major 
internal  resistance.  The  Soviet  Union 
evidently  feels  committed  to  defending 
what  it  terms  the  "Afghan  revolution" 
and  is  providing  substantial  military  as- 
sistance to  the  Kabul  government,  con- 
sisting of  modern  equipment  and  mil- 
itary advisers  numbering  several 
thousands. 

As  the  insurgency  threat  to  the  cen- 


tral government  has  become  more 
acute,  the  Soviet  Union  has  faced  a  di- 
lemma: How  far  should  it  go  to  save  a 
leftist  revolutionary  government  on  its 
periphery?  Some  indication  of  the 
acuteness  of  this  dilemma  can  be  seen 
in  President  Taraki"s  departure  from 
office  just  a  few  days  after  he  met  with 
Soviet  President  Brezhnev. 

For  our  part,  we  are  opposed  to  in- 
tervention by  any  country  in  Afghani- 
stan's internal  affairs.  We  are  consulting 
widely  with  other  countries  in  the  re- 
gion and  have  found  they  share  our 
concern  about  this  situation. 

Iran.  The  winds  of  political  change 
that  brought  down  the  Shah  of  Iran 
were  largely  internal  in  origin;  this  was 
not  a  movement  instigated  or  substan- 
tially supported  by  outside  powers. 
Although  Moscow  has  sought  to  work 
with  the  new  Islamic  Republic  and  lost 
no  opportunity  to  blame  the  evils  of  the 
past  on  U.S.  involvement  in  Iran,  there 
are  signs  of  strain  between  the  Soviet 
Union  and  Iran;  the  Soviets  have 
openly  criticized  the  Islamic  movement 
that  has  emerged. 

It  is  difficult  to  predict  how  things 
might  go  in  the  future,  but  for  the  mo- 
ment it  is  notable  that  the  setback  to 
U.S.  interests  in  the  political  transition 
in  Iran  has  not  been  accompanied  by  a 
corresponding  gain  for  Soviet  interests. 

Africa.  With  fingers  crossed,  I  would 
point  to  what  did  nof  happen  as  the 
most  important  aspect  of  U.S.  and 
Soviet  involvement  in  Africa.  The 
Soviet  Union  has  continued  to  follow 
the  lead  of  the  front-line  states  on  the 
Zimbabwe-Rhodesia  problem  and  has 
been  prepared  to  let  the  negotiation 
process  go  forward.  Soviet  political 
and  military  support  for  the  patriotic 
front  forces  has  remained  steady  but 
has  not  grown  substantially. 

Similarly,  the  Soviet  Union  has  re- 
mained in  the  background  while  efforts 
are  underway  to  resolve  the  problem  of 
independence  for  Namibia.  Neverthe- 
less, the  potential  for  escalation  of 
violence  in  southern  Africa  remains  the 
most  serious  potential  problem  on  the 
horizon  in  U.S. -Soviet  relations. 

Ethiopia.  Soviet  and  Cuban  military 
assistance  to  the  Mengistu  government 
has  continued,  but  the  Ethiopians  have 
been  unable  to  silence  the  insurgency 
in  either  Eritrea  or  the  Ogaden.  Mos- 
cow has  moved  to  consolidate  its  posi- 
tion, and  Premier  Kosygin  was  the 
ranking  foreign  guest  at  celebrations 
marking  the  fifth  anniversary  of  the 
Ethiopian  revolution.  Despite  outward 
signs  of  close  cooperation,  however, 
Soviet-Ethiopian  relations  have  been 
troubled  by  Mengistu's  refusal  to  agree 


15th  Report  on 
Cyprus 


MESSAGE  TO  THE  CONGRESS, 
SEPT.  25,  1979' 

In  accordance  with  the  provisions  of  Public 
Law  95-384,  I  am  submitting  the  following  re- 
port on  progress  made  during  the  past  60  days 
toward  the  conclusion  of  a  negotiated  solution 
of  the  Cyprus  problem. 

In  my  last  Cyprus  report  to  the  Congress, 
dated  July  25,  1  noted  that  UN  Secretary  Gen- 
eral Waldheim  and  his  staff  were  seeking  to 
bring  the  two  parlies  back  to  the  conference 
table.  Unfortunately,  the  recess  in  the  inter- 
communal  talks  continues,  largely  because  the 
two  sides  still  have  major  differences  both  with 
regard  to  their  approach  to  this  negotiation  and 
to  the  content  of  a  final  settlement  of  the  Cy- 
prus problem. 

The  UN  Secretary  General,  through  his  staff, 
is  continuing  to  consult  informally  with  the 
parties.  He  has  had  some  success  in  creating  a 
foundation  on  which  the  talks  might  resume. 
We  are  giving  strong  and  continued  support  to 
this  effort.  We  have  frequently  discussed  the 
situation  on  Cyprus  in  a  frank  manner  with  all 
parties,  reminding  them  that  negotiation  is 
preferable  to  stalemate,  and  that  their  broad 
interests  would  be  served  by  a  return  to  the 
conference  table.  Other  interested  third  parties 
have  made  similar  points  to  them. 

Despite  the  difficulties,  we  continue  to  be- 
lieve that  a  way  can  be  found  to  end  the  present 
impasse  and  to  permit  the  two  sides  to  com- 
mence a  serious  negotiation  of  the  Cyprus 
problem. 

This  Administration  will  continue  to  strive 
for  progress  in  that  direction.  In  pursuit  of  this 
goal,  we  shall  remain  in  close  touch  with  the 
United  Nations,  the  parties  to  the  Cyprus  dis- 
pute, and  our  close  European  allies. 
Sincerely, 

Jimmy  Carter  D 


'  Identical  letters  addressed  to  Thomas  P. 
O'Neill,  Jr.,  Speaker  of  the  House  of  Repre- 
sentatives, and  Frank  Church,  chairman  of  the 
Senate  Foreign  Relations  Committee  (text  from 
Weekly  Compilation  of  Presidential  Documents 
of  Oct.  1.  1979). 


to  Soviet  demands  that  he  create  a 
Marxist  civilian  party.  There  have  also 
been  reports  of  Ethiopian  dissatisfac- 
tion with  the  level  and  quality  of  Soviet 
economic  aid. 

Angola.  Soviet-Angola  relations  have 
been  troubled  by  the  death  of  former 
Angolan  President  Neto  during  a  visit 
to  Moscow.  Prior  to  Neto's  death,  the 


44 


Soviets  were  reported  to  be  unhappy 
with  his  decision  to  cooperate  with  the 
U.N.  plan  for  Namibia  and  his  policy 
of  establishing  ties  with  the  West. 
Neto's  successor,  Jose  Eduardo  dos 
Santos,  appears  intent  on  continuing 
those  policies,  and  it  remains  to  be 
seen  how  the  Soviets  will  react.  Mean- 
while, the  level  of  Soviet  and  Cuban 
military  assistance  has  remained  con- 
stant, as  has  the  challenge  from  insur- 
gent groups  which  operate  freely  in 
major  areas  of  the  country. 

Yemen.  Following  the  end  of  border 
hostilities  in  March,  relations  between 
North  and  South  Yemen  have  focused 
on  talks,  so  far  unsuccessful,  aimed  at 
achieving  unity  between  the  two  coun- 
tries. Soviet  relations  with  South 
Yemen  were  high-lighted  by  Premier 
Kosygin's  stopover  on  his  return  from 
Ethiopia.  Although  Soviet  military  as- 
sistance has  continued,  as  has  a  Cuban 
military  presence,  there  has  been  no  re- 
cent upswing  or  indication  that  the 
Soviets  are  encouraging  aggressive  be- 
havior on  the  part  of  their  South  Yemen 
allies.  Our  own  military  assistance 
program  to  North  Yemen  continues  to 
go  forward  with  the  intention  of  help- 
ing the  Sana  government  to  better  pro- 
vide for  its  own  security. 

Kampuchea.  Vietnam's  current  dry 
season  offensive  in  Kampuchea  has 
again  raised  fears  of  a  spillover  of  the 
fighting  into  Thailand  and  of  mass 
starvation  in  Kampuchea.  We  have 
been  in  contact  with  both  the  Soviet 
and  Vietnamese  Governments  to  urge 
restraint  in  Vietnamese  military  opera- 
tions near  the  Thai  border.  We  have 
also  urged  both  countries  to  continue  to 
facilitate  international  relief  efforts  to 
provide  food  to  civilians  in  all  areas  of 
the  country.  We  would  hope  that  the 
Soviet  Union  would  use  its  influence 
with  Vietnam  to  the  end  that  these  relief 
efforts  could  alleviate  the  suffering  of 
the  peoples  of  the  area. 

The  United  States  will  honor  its 
commitment  to  Thailand's  security  and 
is  accelerating  the  delivery  of  key 
items  of  military  equipment.  We  are 
also  working  with  those  involved  in  the 
relief  effort.  The  President  has  an- 
nounced an  initial  U.S.  contribution  of 
$7  million  for  Kampuchea. 

Human  Rights.  There  has  been  no 
reversal  of  the  Soviet  crackdown  on 
dissidents  but  neither  has  there  been  a 
recurrence  of  the  highly  charged  at- 
mosphere surrounding  the  trials  of 
1978.  A  few  prominent  dissidents  have 
been  released  and  allowed  to  leave  the 
U.S.S.R.,  most  notably  in  an  exchange 
earlier  this  year  which  resulted  in  the 
release  of  five  activists  and  their 
families.   But  several  of  the  most 


prominent  dissidents,  including  those 
seeking  to  monitor  Soviet  performance 
under  the  Helsinki  Final  Act,  remain 
imprisoned.  Little  has  been  done  to  re- 
solve the  hundreds  of  longstanding 
emigration  cases  of  "refuseniks"  in 
the  Soviet  Union,  but  the  overall  rate 
of  emigration  is  currently  running  at  a 
record  annual  rate  of  over  50,000. 

One  celebrated  incident  which  raised 
the  fundamental  question  of  freedom  to 
choose  one's  place  of  residence  oc- 
curred following  the  decision  of  a  vis- 
iting Bolshoi  ballet  dancer  to  remain 
permanently  in  the  United  States. 
Soviet  officials  ignored  a  requirement 
that  the  dancer's  wife  be  interviewed  in 


Czcchoslo  vak 
Dissidents 


DEPARTMENT  STATEMENT, 
OCT.  24,  1979' 

We  condemn  both  the  trial  and  the 
unreasonably  harsh  sentences  handed 
down  in  the  trial  of  the  Czechoslovak 
dissidents  in  Prague  yesterday.  It  is  a 
matter  of  serious  concern  to  us  that  the 
Czechoslovak  Government  has  again 
punished  some  of  its  own  citizens  for 
attempts  to  exercise  their  fundamental 
rights. 

We  cannot  agree  that  the  acts  which 
the  defendants  were  accused  of  com- 
mitting were  in  any  way  criminal  or  that 
they  warranted  punishment.  They  were 
working  to  see  that  the  government 
acted  according  to  its  own  laws,  legal 
procedures,  and  international  commit- 
ments on  human  rights.  We  believe  that 
the  trial  contradicts  the  spirit  and  letter 
of  the  CSCE  [Conference  on  Security 
and  Cooperation  in  Europe].  Final  Act. 

We  are  and  will  continue  to  be  con- 
cerned about  violations  of  human  rights 
wherever  they  occur.  We  have  and  will 
continue  to  speak  out  forcefully  against 
these  actions.  In  the  case  of  Czecho- 
slovakia, we  are  particularly  disap- 
pointed, given  its  past  tradition  and  ex- 
perience of  democracy  and  respect  for 
law  and  the  rights  of  individuals.  The 
human  rights  of  Czechs  and  Slovaks 
and  their  freedom  to  exercise  these 
rights  have  obviously  been  a  matter  of 
interest  to  some  of  Czechoslovakia's 
neighbors  who  have  had  more  than  a 
little  influence  over  the  "internal  af- 
fairs" of  that  country,  in  particular 
during  the  past  1 1  years.  D 


'Read  to  news  correspondents  by  Depart- 
ment spokesman  Hodding  Carter  III. 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 

a  noncoercive  atmosphere  to  permit  her 
to  choo.se  whether  she  would  remain  in 
the  United  States  with  her  husband  or 
return  to  the  Soviet  Union.  After  3 
days  of  negotiation  while  the  plane  re- 
mained at  the  departure  gate,  a  satis- 
factory interview  was  conducted  in  a 
mobile  lounge  under  U.S.  control. 
Such  interviews  had  often  been  con- 
ducted in  similar  cases  in  the  past,  and 
we  believe  the  unwise  Soviet  decision 
to  defy  an  official  requirement  was 
probably  the  result  of  inept  handling 
rather  than  a  new  policy. 

Economic  Relations.  While  trade 
recovered  in  1978  to  a  level  of  $2,789 
billion,  the  level  of  sales  of  U.S.  man- 
ufactured goods  continued  to  fall  far 
short  of  its  potential.  Agricultural 
sales,  on  the  other  hand,  were  again 
high  at  $1,694  billion,  and  the  poor 
1979  Soviet  grain  harvest  is  responsi- 
ble for  a  continued  strong  demand  for 
U.S.  agricultural  commodities.  We  re- 
cently made  possible  Soviet  purchases 
of  25  million  tons  of  our  surplus  grain, 
which  will  benefit  both  our  countries. 

Exploratory  conversations  were  car- 
ried out  in  1979  to  determine  whether 
an  acceptable  way  could  be  found  to 
extend  most-favored-nation  (MEN) 
tariff  status  to  the  U.S.S.R  under  the 
Jackson-Vanik  amendment  to  the  Trade 
Act  of  1974.  The  increase  in  emigra- 
tion from  the  Soviet  Union  suggested 
that  the  Soviet  Government  might  also 
wish  to  resolve  the  MEN  impas.se,  but 
the  Soviet  position  continued  to  be  that 
formal  acquiescence  in  these  legislative 
requirements  would  constitute  an  ac- 
ceptance of  interference  in  their  inter- 
nal affairs.  We  continue  to  hope  that 
circumstances  will  permit  favorable 
action  in  the  same  general  time  frame 
for  both  China  and  the  Soviet  Union, 
although  we  believe  it  would  not  be 
reasonable  to  delay  the  China  agree- 
ment for  reasons  unrelated  to  U.S.- 
China relations.  We  will,  of  course, 
continue  to  consult  with  the  Congress 
on  the  U.S.S.R.  trade  agreement. 

Conclusion 

It  has  been  the  practice  of  the  Soviet 
Union  to  respond  to  opportunities  for 
the  expansion  of  its  influence  thrown 
up  by  local  disruptions,  wherever  the 
balance  of  risks  and  gains  appeared  to 
offer  advantages  to  the  Soviet  Union. 
The  heightened  pace  of  turbulent 
change  in  many  parts  of  the  world  has 
resulted  in  an  increase  of  such  opportu- 
nities in  recent  years.  There  are  three 
new  factors  in  this  realm  of  Soviet  be- 
havior. One  is  the  Soviet  military 
buildup,  which  allows  the  Soviet  Union 
to  project  its  military  power  over  very 
long  distances.   Second,  the  Soviets 


December  1979 


45 


lave  increasingly  supported  Viet- 
lamese  aspirations  to  dominate  South- 
last  Asia.  And  third,  the  Soviets  have 
ngaged  in  arming,  training,  and  trans- 
lorting  Cuban  soldiers  to  participate  in 
oca!  conflict  situations. 

Although  these  interventions,  against 
•le  background  of  a  continued  im- 
rovement  in  Soviet  conventional 
lilitary  capabilities,  have  resulted  in 
ome  gains  for  the  Soviet  Union,  it  ap- 
ears  probable  that  these  gains  may 
rove  as  transitory  as  were  earlier  po- 
itions  won  and  subsequently  lost  in  the 
ice  of  local  nationalist  resistance  to 
le  spread  of  Soviet  control.  While  we 
annot  be  complacent  about  such 
oviet  gains  in  strategically  important 
arts  of  the  world,  however  transitory 
ley  may  prove  to  be  in  the  future,  we 
an  have  confidence  in  our  ability  to 
ompete  effectively  if  we  address  our- 
:lves  to  the  interests  and  concerns  of 
le  people  of  the  areas  affected  and  do 
ot  think  of  them  as  abstract  elements 
1  an  East-West  game. 
In  this  competition,  the  effective  in- 
rumentalities  are  not  always  military, 
it  it  is  evident  that  a  military  equilib- 
ium  —  conventional  as  well  as 
rategic  —  is  a  necessary  condition  for 
le  regulation  of  the  competitive  as- 
sets of  the  Soviet-American  relation- 
lip. 

There  is  a  temptation  for  us,  beset  by 
ir  problems,  to  regard  the  balance  of 
jviet  strengths  and  weaknesses  dis- 
'oportionately .  Both  at  home  and 
5road,  the  Soviet  Union  confronts 
roblems  that  are  a  source  of  major 
mcern  to  its  leadership. 
There  is  also  a  temptation  to  think  of 
Jr  policy  toward  the  U.S.S.R.  as 
.'ing  either  too  hard  or  too  soft, 
either  extreme  is  sensible.  Either 
)uld  encourage  a  more  militant  policy 
1  the  part  of  the  Soviet  Union.  What 
akes  better  sense,  although  less 
amatic  headlines,  is  a  policy  charac- 
rized  by  firmness  and  clarity  of  pur- 
)se  and  priorities.  We  must  continue 

conduct  the  relationship  in  a  way 

at  protects  and  advances  our  inter- 

ts.  but  as  President  Carter  has  said: 

.we  have  a  special  responsibility 

maintain  stability  even  when  there 
e  serious  disagreements  among  na- 
3ns."  Every  problem  with  which  we 
e  concerned  in  the  world  would  be 
ore  difficult  and  more  dangerous  if 
'?  and  the  Soviet  Union  were  locked 
ti>  a  relationship  of  high  confronta- 
'in. 

As  we  traverse  the  period  ahead, 
th  its  upheavals  and  conflicts,  both 
,:  United  States  and  the  Soviet  Union 
ill  have  fateful  decisions  to  make 
lout  the  conduct  of  their  relationship. 
[Ahead  lies  the  uncertainty  of  the  di- 


GEl^ERAL:       U.S.  Foreign 
Policy  Aehievcmcnts 


by  Matthew  Nimetz 

Address  before  the  international  af- 
fairs group  of  the  American  Bankers 
Association  in  Washington.  D.C.,  on 
October  24,  1979.  Mr.  Nimetz  is 
Counselor  of  the  Department  of  State. 

The  foreign  policy  of  the  Carter  Ad- 
ministration has  been  well  conceived 
and,  on  the  whole,  successful  in  pur- 
suing our  national  interests.  Yet  our 
foreign  policy  does  not  receive  deep 
and  broad  support;  the  public  mood  re- 
flects attitudes  of  frustration,  de- 
featism, and  confusion.  I  want  to  dis- 
cuss with  you  today  this  dichotomy 
between  the  overall  soundness  of  our 
policy  and  the  way  it  is  perceived  by 
the  public. 

Changing  World — 
Growing  Challenge 

Let  me  comment  first  on  the  reality 
in  which  the  United  States  must  act. 
We  live  in  a  world  marked  by  rapid 
change,  with  frequent  outbreaks  of 
violence  and  conflict.  The  Soviet 
challenge  still  exists,  and  the  basic 
philosophic  difference  between  their 
system  and  ours  remains  fundamental. 
Twenty  percent  of  the  world's  ever- 
growing population  does  not  have 
enough  to  eat.  The  disparity  between 
haves  and  have-nots  is  a  growing 
global  issue.  Nations  newly  emerged 
from  colonialism  are  torn  between  tra- 
ditionalism and  modernization.  Their 
people  demand  a  better  life,  and  their 
demands  ofttimes  bring  turmoil  in- 
stead. Many  nations  are  wracked  by 
ethnic,  religious,  and  ideological  strife. 
Governments  have  access  to  ever  larger 


stockpiles  of  ever  more  sophisticated 
and  destructive  conventional  weapons, 
and  over  all  stands  the  foreboding 
specter  of  the  nuclear  arsenals  of  the 
superpowers. 

This  is  the  world  we  live  in — it  is 
confused  and  dangerous.  And,  for  the 
first  time  in  history,  what  happens  in 
any  one  country  has  immediate  conse- 
quences worldwide,  especially  when 
modern  methods  of  communication 
bring  up-to-the-minute  news  to  remote 
villages. 

Recognizing  this  interdependent  and 
highly  politicized  world  environment. 
President  Carter  and  Secretary  Vance 
perceived  at  the  start  of  this  Adminis- 
tration that  the  United  States,  as  a 
strong,  stable,  democratic,  and  wealthy 
nation  with  worldwide  interests,  has  a 
large  stake  in  the  maintenance  of 
peace,  the  enhancement  of  democratic 
and  humanitarian  institutions,  and  the 
encouragement  of  cooperative  eco- 
nomic and  social  development.  They 
recognized  that  foreign  policy  cannot 
be  made  in  a  vacuum — that  the  Con- 
gress must  participate  in  and  assist  our 
efforts,  and  the  American  people  must 
understand  and  support  our  broad 
foreign  policy  goals  if  we  are  to  act 
effectively  abroad,  particularly  after 
the  searing  events  of  the  past  decade. 
Our  foreign  policy  has,  therefore, 
sought  to  reestablish  a  national  consen- 
sus based  on  a  strong  national  defense, 
close  relations  with  our  allies,  a  dy- 
namic engagement  with  Third  World 
problems,  and  a  clear  articulation  of 
our  traditional  democratic  and  human- 
itarian values.  Our  first  objective,  as 
Secretary  Vance  said  recently,  is  to 
persist  in  the  search  for  peace  to  reduce 


rections  in  which  a  new  generation  of 
leadership  will  take  the  Soviet  Union, 
in  the  solution  of  its  internal  problems 
and  the  advancement  of  its  interests 
abroad.  We  cannot  directly  affect  the 
choices  they  will  make,  but  we  can 
continue  to  make  it  clear,  with  stead- 
fastness and  patience,  that  if  future 
Soviet  leaders  see  their  national  self- 
interest  in  a  policy  of  restraint  and  re- 
sponsibility, they  will  find  the  United 
States  responsive  to  that  course. 

Our  best  hope  of  evoking  such  a  re- 
sponse from  the  Soviet  Union  will  be  to 
demonstrate  quiet  firmness  in  the  de- 
fense of  our  interests,  together  with  a 


readiness  to  work  toward  a  widening  of 
the  area  of  cooperation  between  oui 
two  countries  whenever  and  wherever 
this  becomes  feasible.  D 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the  hearings  will 
be  published  by  (he  committee  and  will  be 
available  from  the  Superintendent  of  Docu- 
ments, U.S.  Government  Printing  Office, 
Washington,  D.C    20402. 

''For  texts  of  Ambassador  Shulman's  pre- 
vious statements,  see  Bulletins  of  Jan.  1978, 
p.l,  and  Nov.  1978,  p.  28. 

^For  text  of  President  Carter's  address  to  the 
nation  on  Oct.  I,  1979,  see  Bulletin  of  Nov. 
1979,  p.  7. 


46 

both  the  lianger  and  the  destructiveness 
of  war. 

Let  us  look  at  the  record. 


A  Practical  Approach  to 
National  Defense 

We  are  today  a  nation  at  peace. 
Under  President  Carter  and  Secretary 
Vance's  stewardship  no  U.S.  Armed 
Forces  have  been  involved  in  active 
combat  anywhere  in  the  world. 

In  national  defense  matters,  the 
Carter  Administration  has  a  remarkable 
record  of  achievement.  The  trend  of  the 
prior  decade — that  is,  reduced  atten- 
tion to  our  defense  —  has  been  re- 
versed. Under  the  direction  of  the 
Secretary  of  Defense  and  the  Joint 
Chiefs  of  Staff,  sound  planning  and 
steadiness  of  purpose  have  been  the 
benchmarks.  This  Administration  has 
avoided  a  flashy  and  sensational  ap- 
proach to  national  defense  issues.  It 
has  chosen  instead  one  that  is  realistic 
about  our  needs  but  neither  panic 
stricken  nor  bellicose.  President  Carter 
has  approved  an  MX  mobile  basing 
mode  that  will  protect  our  land-based 
strategic  forces.  We  have  undertaken  a 
far-reaching  modernization  of  the  other 
legs  of  our  strategic  triad — with  cruise 
missiles  for  our  manned  bombers  and 
the  new  Trident  missile  and  submarine. 
A  3%  real  increase  in  defense  expend- 
itures last  year  and  a  recent  budget 
amendment  proposal  for  a  3%  real  in- 
crease in  defense  spending  this  year 
will  maintain  this  momentum.  The 
President  has  also  moved  to  enhance 
the  capacity  of  our  rapid  deployment 
forces  to  protect  our  own  interests  and 
to  respond  to  requests  for  help  from  our 
allies  and  friends. 

Perhaps  the  clearest  indication  of 
this  Administration's  dedication  to  a 
sound  defense  has  been  in  President 
Carter's  work  to  reinvigorate  the 
NATO  alliance.  Discussions  in  NATO 
of  a  strengthened  and  modernized  al- 
lied force — including  a  theater  nuclear 
force,  our  joint  commitment  with  the 
allies  to  upgrade  both  our  forces  and 
our  spending  for  defense,  and  the  ef- 
forts to  strengthen  NATO's  southern 
flank  through  the  lifting  of  the  arms 
embargo  against  Turkey — are  concrete 
manifestations  of  a  solid  commitment 
to  the  nation's  and  allied  security. 

In  short,  this  Administration,  in 
cooperation  with  the  Congress,  is 
forging  an  important  new  consensus 
that  will  insure  a  strengthened  and 
modern  military  force  that  is  neither 
wasteful  of  our  own  precious  resources 
nor  needlessly  provocative  in  today's 
world  but  is,  nonetheless,  capable  of 
meeting  any  challenge  to  our  security 
interests. 


Maintaining  World  Peace 

The  preservation  of  our  security  does 
not  depend  simply  on  military  strength. 
Our  interests  around  the  world  can  be 
threatened  by  bitter  regional  conflicts 
which  pose  the  constant  danger  of 
wider  confrontation.  Under  the  lead- 
ership of  President  Carter  and  Secre- 
tary Vance,  the  United  States  has  been 
a  leading  force  in  seeking  to  cool 
dangerous  hot  spots  around  the  world — 
not  because  we  want  to  control  others 
but  because  we  have  a  genuine  interest 
in  peace. 

Thus,  we  are  engaged  in  unprece- 
dented efforts  to  secure  a  just  and  last- 
ing settlement  in  the  Middle  East,  in- 
cluding nine  trips  by  Secretary  Vance 
to  the  region  and  the  President's  per- 
sonal and  successful  mediation  at 
Camp  David.  Although  much  obvi- 
ously remains  to  be  done,  the  return  of 
the  Sinai,  the  peace  between  Israel  and 
Egypt,  and  the  recognition  of  the  im- 
portance of  the  Palestinian  issue  are  all 
important  accomplishments.  No  other 
nation  could  have  played  the  role  the 
United  States  has  played  in  bringing 
Egypt  and  Israel  to  talk  seriously  of 
peace  and  in  creating  a  new  momentum 
for  positive  change  in  the  Middle  East. 

The  Carter  Administration  has  re- 
versed the  earlier  policy  of  passive 
neutrality  toward  the  grave  and  explo- 
sive problems  of  southern  Africa  and 
has  undertaken  active  and  intense  ef- 
forts to  avert  the  tragedy  of  civil  and 
racial  war.  On  African  issues.  Secre- 
tary Vance  announced  in  July  1977  that 
the  "...  Administration  has  decided 
to  pursue  actively  solutions  to  all  three 
southern  African  problems — Rhodesia, 
Namibia,  and  the  situation  within 
South  Africa  itself."  The  continued 
denial  of  racial  justice  in  southern  Af- 
rica, he  said,  "encourages  the  pos- 
sibilities for  outside  intervention."  Our 
objective,  the  Secretary  said,  "must  be 
to  foster  a  prosperous  and  strong  Africa 
that  is  at  peace  with  itself  and  with  the 
world." 

We  have  vigorously  supported  and 
worked  with  the  United  Kingdom  in 
efforts  to  find  a  settlement  for  Zim- 
babwe-Rhodesia. Zimbabwe-Rhodesia 
is  now  biracially  governed,  and  negoti- 
ations are  in  process  to  make  its  gov- 
ernment truly  representative.  In 
Namibia,  through  our  joint  efforts  with 
the  United  Kingdom,  Canada,  West 
Germany,  and  France,  working  through 
the  United  Nations  and  with  affected 
African  states,  prospects  for  a  settle- 
ment are  more  hopeful  now  than  they 
were  a  few  years  ago.  Our  efforts  in 
southern  Africa  have  won  for  us  a  new 
respect  and  trust  throughout  the  conti- 
nent. These  volatile  situations — though 
still  dangerous   and   by   no  means 


Department  of  State  Bullet 

resolved — are  still  contained.  Outsit 
forces  have  not  been  able  to  expk 
these  essentially  localized  problem 
nor  have  they  turned  into  major  are 
of  East- West  confrontation. 

We  have  been  active  in  other  are 
of  peacekeeping  as  well.  The  Cypn 
problem  has  caused  human  sufferii 
and  instability  in  the  Mediterranea 
Together  with  the  British  and  Can 
dians,  we  have  presented  a  framewo 
proposal  for  its  resolution.  Agai 
while  the  problem  has  not  been  solve 
our  work  has  assisted  Secretary  Ge 
eral  Waldheim  in  his  skillful  diploma 
that  we  believe  in  time  will  establish 
mutually  acceptable  framework  for 
federal  biregional  republic. 

In  dealing  with  all  of  these  trout- 
spots — and  I  can  name  others:  Leb 
non,  Kampuchea,  Shaba — our  role  h 
been  constructive.  We  have  respect 
the  interests  of  those  most  directly  C0|j 
cerned.  We  have  enhanced  the  role 
international  institutions  like  t 
United  Nations.  We  have  work 
closely  with  our  allies.  We  ha 
brought  our  influence,  not  our  milita 
force,  to  bear. 

While  working  to  resolve  probleni 
we  have  also  seized  important  opport 
nities.  In  Asia,  for  example,  this  A- 
ministration  has  taken  a  dramatic  ai 
skillful  step  forward  in  the  normali2 
tion  of  relations  with  the  People's  B* 
public  of  China.  That  has  been  accoi 
plished  without  jeopardizing  the  pea 
of  the  area  or  the  future  of  the  peof 
of  Taiwan,  without  affecting  our  cic 
relations  with  Japan  and  witho 
harming  our  relations  with  the  Sov 
Union.  Thus,  we  have  ended  more  thi 
25  years  of  hostile  silence  between  t 
world's  most  powerful  nation  and  t 
world's  most  populous.  Normalizati 
of  our  relations  now  enables  us  to  de 
directly  with  the  government  whi 
represents  a  quarter  of  the  world 
people. 

In  Latin  America  we  have  made  wh 
Secretary  Vance  has  called  a  concertt 
effort  to  fashion  a  course  that  reco 
nizes  the  new  realities  of  the  hem 
sphere  and  the  distinctive  differenc 
among  Latin  American  nations  ai 
peoples.  We  solved  an  old  problem- 
the  status  of  the  Panama  Canal.  Ski, 
fully  negotiated  by  Ambassadc 
Bunker  and  Linowitz,  the  Panan 
Canal  treaties  were  concluded,  i 
merits  persuasively  argued  to  the  Sei 
ate,  and  a  successful  resolution  of  co 
gressional  concerns  achieved.  We  a 
proud  of  this  accomplishment  and  b 
lieve  it  marks  a  turning  point  in  U. 
relations  with  Latin  America. 

We  are  satisfied  also  with  our  r 
sponsible  approach  to  the  extreme 
difficult  events  in  Nicaragua.  The 


J 


ecemoer  iv/y 


no  believe  we  should  stand  firmly  for 
c  suitus  quo  whatever  it  may  be,  even 
hen  it  is  apparent  that  popular  senti- 
ent  overwhelmingly   favors  change, 
e  simply  wrong.  We  do  have  impor- 
nt  mterests  in  Central  America,  and 
CSC    long-term    interests   are   best 
rvcd  by  the  emergence  of  democratic 
oadly   based   governments  that   will 
Hiperate  with  others  in  the  region  and 
ilh  us  to  achieve  economic  develop- 
^ni  and  political  stability.  As  Secre- 
rv  Vance  said  in  New  York  on  Sep- 
mber  27:  "We  cannot  guarantee  that 
ijmocracy   will   take   hold    .  .  ."   in 
icaragua.    "'But   if  we   turn   our 
icks,"  he  said.  ".  .  .  we  can  almost 
jarantee  that  democracy  will  fail." 
The  presence  of  Secretary  Vance  at 
e   inauguration  of  President  Guzman 
.   the  Dominican  Republic  and  Presi- 
L-nt   Roldos  of  Ecuador;   the   steady 
oik   at   forging  a  relationship  with 
k'xico  that  is  based  on  equality  and 
spcct  and  a  mutuality  of  interest;  the 
I  p  port    we    have    given    to    the 
lengthening  of  democracy  in  the  An- 
:an   nations;  the   increased   attention 
e  are  giving  the  Caribbean;  the  allevi- 
loii  of  human  rights  abuses  with  em- 
lasis  on  the   Inter-American   Human 
lights  Commission  of  the  Organization 
American  States   in  Chile,   Argen- 
ia,  Uruguay,  Paraguay,  El  Salvador, 
id  elsewhere;  and,  perhaps  most  im- 
irtant,  a  policy  that  treats  the  nations 
1  this  hemisphere  as  separate  and  im- 
>rtant  entities  in  their  own  right  rather 
an    lumping   them   together   in   a 
iniework  that  distorts  their  individu- 
itv,    all   attest   to   a   solidly   based 
ny-term  strategy  to  develop  our  rela- 
in\  with  the  countries  of  our  hemi- 
here. 


^orld  Economic  Issues 

In  economic  policy,  a  major  success 
the  decade  was  the  successful  con- 
usion  of  the  multilateral  trade  negoti- 
ions,  under  Ambassador  Robert 
:rauss,  with  an  agreement  which  was 
cently  approved  nearly  unanimously 
I  the  Congress.  The  importance  of  the 
;w  trade  arrangement  is  not  widely 
cognized.  It  did  not  involve  a  drama- 
;  issue.  It  was  not  an  appealing  sub- 
ct  for  television.  But  it  was  a  mas- 
rful  achievement  and  one  that  will 
aean  more  to  the  average  working 
merican  than  any  other  international 
Vent  of  the  past  3  years. 
'  America's  strength  rests  on  the  vi- 
lity  of  its  economy,  and  our  exports 
rovide  Americans  with  jobs  (one  out 
f  every  eight  in  the  manufacturing 
;ctor)  and  income  (one  out  of  every  3 

!:res  of  American  farms  produces  for 
uport).  We  have  also  worked  to  better 


coordinate  our  own  economic  policies 
with  those  of  other  industrialized 
countries.  We  have  instituted  regular 
economic  summits  with  them  and  have 
worked  closely  with  them  to  regularize 
and  stabilize  the  monetary  system. 

We  have  taken  a  responsible  and 
mature  approach  to  the  so-called 
North-South  dialogue,  guarding  our 
interests  carefully  but  taking  serious 
steps  to  help  the  developing  countries 
become  full  and  responsible  partici- 
pants in  the  world  economy.  We  have 
endorsed  the  concept  of  a  common 
fund  to  help  finance  international  buf- 
fer stocks.  We  have  increased  our  de- 
velopment assistance,  facilitated  Third 
World  access  to  technology,  and 
helped  them  to  draw  on  our  own  ad- 
vanced technologies — using  satellites, 
for  example,  to  develop  their  natural 
resources  and  improve  their  internal 
communication. 

Many  nations  of  the  Third  World  are 
still  unsatisfied,  but  here  again,  the 
path  Secretary  Vance  has  charted  will. 
I  believe,  mean  more  in  the  long  term 
than  the  rhetoric  we  hear  from  Havana. 
Our  approach  is  straightforward:  The 
imbalance  between  the  wealthy  coun- 
tries and  the  less  developed  countries  is 
real.  It  poses  a  long-range  threat  to 
peace  and  stability.  And,  for  the 
poorest  nations,  it  is  tragic  in  human 
terms. 

We  are  prepared  to  address  these  is- 
sues in  concrete  ways.  We  will 
negotiate  responsively  in  accepted 
forums.  Secretary  Vance  has  made 
world  economic  issues  a  major  per- 
sonal priority.  He  spoke  primarily  of 
economic  issues  in  his  U.N.  General 
Assembly  addresses  both  in  1978  and 
1979.  Again,  we  have  avoided  theatri- 
cal initiatives,  flashy  proposals,  and 
publicity-seeking  doctrines.  Instead  we 
have  chosen  careful  analysis, 
painstaking  negotiations,  and  the  crea- 
tion of  lasting  institutions. 

This  has  been  done  consciously.  We 
have  our  own  interests  to  preserve.  We 
will  not  seek  to  curry  favor  abroad  at 
the  expense  of  domestic  interests,  but 
neither  can  the  greatest  economic 
power  in  the  world  refuse  to  engage  in 
a  serious  dialogue  with  those  in  less 
fortunate  positions.  The  best  hope  of 
achieving  progress  in  North-South  is- 
sues is  to  lower  the  level  of  rhetoric 
and  seek  to  delineate  what  can  be  done 
and  what  very  simply  cannot  be  done. 
This  is  our  approach. 


Response  to  the  World 
Energy  Shortage 

The   Administration  has  acted  par- 
ticularly vigorously  and  with  farsighted 


leadership  in  responding  to  the  world 
energy  shortage.  We  have  worked  con- 
sistently to  promote  improved  relations 
with  the  oil-producing  countries,  both 
in  the  Mideast  and  elsewhere.  For 
example,  our  relations  with  Nigeria, 
which  provides  us  with  well  over  10% 
of  our  oil  imports,  have  been  greatly 
improved. 

We  have  also  reached  a  natural  gas 
arrangement  with  Mexico.  We  have 
launched  long-term  efforts  to  help  de- 
veloping countries  increase  their  own 
energy  production  and  thereby  reduce 
the  demand  for  oil  on  the  world  mar- 
ket. We  have  broadened  our  own  for- 
eign aid  programs  for  these  purposes 
and  have  encouraged  the  World  Bank 
to  double  its  lending  for  exploration 
and  development  of  oil  resources.  With 
U.S.  leadership,  we  and  the  other 
member  nations  of  the  International 
Energy  Agency  have  agreed  to  a  5% 
cut  in  our  expected  oil  consumption. 

Most  important  of  all,  perhaps. 
President  Carter  has  sought  to  put  our 
own  house  in  order  by  presenting  to  the 
country  and  the  Congress  a  comprehen- 
sive energy  program.  Without  a  realis- 
tic energy  policy  at  home,  we  cannot 
put  our  economy  in  order,  nor  can  we 
act  from  a  position  of  strength  in  af- 
fecting the  energy  situation. 

U.S. -Soviet  Relations — 
Maintaining  a  Stable  Balance 

In  U.S. -Soviet  relations,  this  Ad- 
ministration recognizes  the  essential 
dichotomy  of  our  relations  with  the 
Soviet  Union.  As  the  President  has 
said,  there  are  competitive  as  well  as 
cooperative  aspects  to  our  relationship, 
and  we  must  work  diligently  to  expand 
cooperation  wherever  possible,  while 
being  firm  where  our  interests  are  con- 
cerned. No  issue  has  taken  more  of 
Secretary  Vance's  personal  attention. 

The  painstaking  negotiation  of  the 
SALT  agreement  and  the  discussion  of 
U.S. -Soviet  differences — on  European 
issues,  Cuba,  Afghanistan,  the  Horn  of 
Africa — have  been  tough  and  profes- 
sional. We  have  raised  humanitarian 
concerns  with  the  Soviet  Union  in  a 
serious  way  and  specifically  pursued 
implementation  of  the  Helsinki  Final 
Act.  Some  success  in  increased  emi- 
gration and  family  reunification,  al- 
though not  so  much  as  we  would  have 
hoped  for,  has  been  achieved. 

We  have  pursued  a  number  of  im- 
portant arms  control  discussions  with 
the  Soviet  Union  — SALT,  MBFR 
[mutual  and  balanced  force  reduc- 
tions], CTB  [comprehensive  test  ban], 
Indian  Ocean  talks,  and  restraint  in 
conventional  arms  deliveries. 

There  is  no  doubt  that  our  differ- 


48 


uepanmeni  oi  :iiaie  Huiief 


ences  with  the  Soviet  Union  will  last 
for  many  years.  But,  as  Secretary 
Vance  noted  in  his  address  to  the 
United  Nations  on  September  24;  "We 
must  not  react  now  in  frustration  and 
unleash  a  spiral  of  rhetoric  which  can 
deepen  rather  than  resolve  our  divi- 
sions." Nothing  is  more  dangerous 
than  an  impulsive  polemical  or  hysteri- 
cal approach  to  sensitive  foreign  policy 
issues  like  that  of  the  Soviet  role  in 
Cuba.  The  approach  we  have  taken, 
which  we  believe  is  consistent  with  our 
interests,  is  to  rely  on  calm  but  deter- 
mined negotiations  to  find  practical 
solutions  to  East-West  problems,  while 
at  the  same  time  insuring  that  our 
military  forces  preserve  the  balance. 
Any  other  approach  might  bring  an  un- 
stable world  to  the  brink  of  disaster. 

The  President  and  Secretary  Vance 
have  worked  with  particular  interest  on 
the  strategic  arms  negotiations.  Almost 
since  the  dawn  of  the  nuclear  age  in 
1945,  the  nuclear  competition  between 
the  United  States  and  the  Soviet  Union 
has  been  a  central  fact  of  international 
life.  The  advent  of  nuclear  weapons 
meant  that,  for  the  first  time,  it  was 
possible  to  conceive  of  military  arsen- 
als that  would  not  only  break  the  war- 
making  capacity  of  an  adversary,  but 
which  could  actually  destroy  that 
country  itself  as  a  functioning  society. 
Against  such  power,  it  was  inevitable 
that  the  Soviet  Union  would  bend  every 
effort  to  match  our  nuclear  might. 

With  the  stakes  so  high — national 
survival  hanging  in  the  balance  — 
neither  side  could  accept  a  lasting  nor 
significant  advantage  for  the  other.  As 
a  result,  both  countries  have  accumu- 
lated unimaginable  nuclear  power.  In 
the  absence  of  mutual  restraints,  the 
progression  could  continue  indefi- 
nitely. Neither  side  has  been  able  to 
decide  by  itself  how  much  is  enough, 
for  that  decision  always  depends  on 
what  the  other  side  does. 

The  SALT  process  is  helping  both 
sides  cool  this  dangerous  competition. 
In  1972,  SALT  I  made  a  vital  begin- 
ning. The  detailed  and  painstaking 
negotiation  of  the  SALT  agreement  by 
Secretary  Vance  and  Ambassador 
Warnke  [former  Director  of  the  Arms 
Control  and  Disarmament  Agencyl  has 
brought  both  sides  for  the  first  time  to 
agree  on  several  principles  which  we 
view  as  essential  for  authentic  arms 
control  limitation. 

The  agreement  is  a  substantial  ac- 
complishment, and  the  many  weeks  of 
serious  and  important  hearings  before 
the  Senate  Foreign  Relations  Commit- 
tee, the  Armed  Services  Committee, 
and  the  Select  Committee  on  Intelli- 
gence have,  in  my  opinion,  amply  sup- 
ported the  conclusioi;!  that  the  treaty  is 


solid,   balanced,   and   in  our  national 
interest  for  the  following  reasons. 

Equal  overall  limits.  It  is  this  es- 
sential equivalence  in  strategic  arms 
which  allows  us  to  make  further  prog- 
ress. If  one  side  were  far  ahead,  it 
would  feel  no  urgency  about  arms  con- 
trol, and  the  side  that  was  behind 
would  refuse  to  negotiate  from  a  posi- 
tion of  weakness.  Under  SALT  I,  the 
Soviets  had  a  numerical  advantage; 
SALT  II  for  the  first  time  provides  for 
equal  aggregates  in  strategic  weapons, 
imposing  limits  that  require  the  Soviets 
to  reduce  their  present  numerical  super- 
iority in  strategic  systems. 

Qualitative  limits.  The  Soviets 
agreed  for  the  first  time  to  some  limits 
on  the  improvements  in  the  quality  of 
weapons  and  on  the  creation  of  new 
systems.  The  limit  on  warheads  is  one 
important  new  limitation.  Without  such 
qualitative  controls  on  the  arms  race, 
unexpected  technological  break- 
throughs on  either  side  could  have  de- 
stabilizing consequences  that  could  in 
and  of  themselves  seriously  threaten 
the  prospects  for  peace.  With  the  threat 
known  and  better  defined,  our  planning 
is  eased,  the  pressure  to  overreact  is 
lessened,  and  we  can  plan  more  intelli- 
gently our  defense  spending. 

Verification.  The  treaty  outlaws 
concealment  of  strategic  weapons  or 
interference  with  national  technical 
means  of  verification.  For  the  first  time 
the  Soviet  Union  has  agreed  not  to  en- 
crypt telemetric  information  from  their 
missile  tests  when  so  doing  would  im- 
pede our  verification  of  compliance  to 
treaty  obligations. 

Actual  reduction.  For  the  first  time, 
in  the  SALT  II  treaty,  the  Soviet  Union 
agreed  to  reduce  its  number  of  nuclear 
launchers  and  dismantle  existing  mis- 
siles—  more  than  250  nuclear  systems 
— each  one  capable  of  delivering  one  or 
potentially  more  bombs  each  with  70 
times  the  explosive  power  of  the 
Hiroshima  bomb.  The  United  States 
need  not  dismantle  any  presently  oper- 
ational system. 

There  is  no  doubt  in  any  of  our 
minds  that  the  SALT  agreement  is  a 
masterful  achievement  —  for  our  inter- 
nal security  and  for  world  peace. 


Human  Rights — 
A  Major  Goal 

I  want  to  say  a  few  words  at  this 
point  about  the  encouragement  of 
human  rights,  another  major  goal  of 
American  foreign  policy  which  re- 
ceived new  impetus  in  the  Carter  Ad- 
ministration.  Our  support  for  human 


rights  is  grounded  in  the  ideals  w 
value  most  as  a  people  —  human  fre« 
dom  and  dignity,  the  rights  of  the  indi 
vidual,  and  the  belief  that  governmen 
exist  to  serve,  not  control,  their  cit; 
zens. 

Our  consistent  support  of  huma 
rights  helps  other  governments  cofl 
with  the  growing  demand  by  peopJ 
around  the  world  to  share  fully  in  tH 
political  affairs  and  economic  growl 
of  their  nations.  Secretary  Vance  ai 
ticulated  the  broad  outlines  of  oi 
human  rights  policy  in  his  Athens 
Georgia,  address  of  April  30,  197' 
noting  the  three  essential  componeni 
of  our  policy;  the  right  to  be  free  froi 
governmental  violations  of  the  integril 
of  the  person;  the  right  to  fulfillment  o 
such  vital  needs  as  food,  shelter 
health,  and  education;  and  the  right  I 
enjoy  civil  and  political  liberties. 

Our  own  traditions  should  remind  u 
that  such  demands  can  most  often  b 
met  best  through  democratic  processa 
and  respect  for  human  rights.  W( 
should  not  be  diverted  by  the  myth  tha 
if  we  deal  with  the  forces  of  change 
we  only  encourage  radicalism.  The; 
aspirations  do  sometimes  lead  to  cot' 
vulsions  and  turmoil,  but  they  are  ah 
producing  new  institutions  which  ma 
better  be  able  to  shape  change  in 
democratic  and  ultimately  stable  way  i 
many  nations  throughout  the  world.  I 
the  last  few  years  there  have  been 
number  of  encouraging  developments 

•  International  institutions  dealini 
with  human  rights  have  been  strength 
ened,  and  documents  that  speak  c 
human  rights — the  Universal  Declan 
tion  of  Human  Rights  and  the  Helsinh 
Final  Act  —  have  been  given  vitality. 

•  India  has  returned  to  democracy 
and  democracy  flourishes  in  Spain 
Portugal,  and  Greece.  Democraticalll 
elected  civilian  governments  have  re 
cently  replaced  military  rule  in  Ghani 
and  Nigeria,  and  a  similar  trend  is  evi 
dent  in  several  Latin  American  cour 
tries. 

•  The  call  for  human  rights  has  bee 
a  significant  factor  in  replacing  Amin 
Bokassa,  and  Macias  in  Africa 
Somoza  in  Central  America;  and  Po 
Pot  in  Southeast  Asia. 

•  Political  prisoners  in  many  nation 
have  been  pardoned  or  otherwis 
released. 

•  The  tragic  refugee  problems  i 
Southeast  Asia  and  elsewhere  are  deal 
with  directly,  not  covered  up  as  in  th' 
past. 

We  do  not  claim  that  the  Admini^ 
tration's  human  rights  policy  direct! 
caused  all  of  these  developments,  bi 
we  can  claim  that  the  clear  and  consist 
ent  articulation  of  our  policy  on  th 


December  1979 

international  scene,  and  the  actions  we 
have  taken  —  often  without  publicity  — 
have  sensitized  international  public 
opinion  from  central  Africa  to  the  walls 
of  the  Kremlin.  Violators  of  basic 
human  rights  now  do  so  at  serious  cost, 
and  they  know  it. 

Summary 

Why,  then,  with  all  these  accom- 
plishments —  a  nation  at  peace, 
strengthened  defense  programs,  a 
major  step  forward  in  the  Middle  East, 
the  SALT  II  treaty,  the  Panama  Canal 
treaties,  a  major  international  trade 
agreement,  solid  relations  with  our  al- 
lies and  a  strengthened  NATO  alliance, 
normalization  with  China,  better  access 
to  Third  World  nations,  a  new  self- 
confidence  in  expressing  our  human- 
itarian ideals  and  concrete  achieve- 
ments in  the  world  human  rights  pic- 
ture—  why  with  all  these  accom- 
plishments do  we  not  see  widespread 
enthusiasm  for  our  foreign  policy? 
Why,  indeed,  do  we  see  a  disparaging 
of  our  accomplishments,  an  exaggera- 
tion of  our  problems,  an  emphasis  on 
U.S.  weakness,  a  downgrading  of  our 
strengths? 

I  do  not  think  we  should  minimize 
our  problems.  We  must  deal  decisively 
with  the  domestic  issues  of  energy  and 
inflation  which  have  such  detrimental 
effects  on  our  foreign  policy.  We  have 
to  meet  the  challenge  of  growing 
Soviet  military  strength  and  Soviet- 
Cuban  involvement  abroad.  We  must 
face  the  phenomenon  of  instability, 
even  revolution,  in  Third  World  na- 
tions, with  the  recent  events  in  Iran  as 
the  major  example.  Even  recognizing 
the  problems  we  face,  I  submit  to  you 
that  the  balance  between  positive  and 
negative  developments  is  heavily  in 
favor  of  the  positive.  Yet  this  reality  is 
not  reflected  in  public  perceptions  nor 
in  the  national  political  debate. 

There  are  many  reasons  for  this 
dominance  of  the  negative,  but  I  will 
mention  one.  It  is  in  our  national  inter- 
est to  defuse  dramatic  confrontations 
and  to  build  functioning  relationships. 
Yet  it  is  in  the  nature  of  the  public 
dialogue  on  foreign  policy  to  concen- 
trate on  crisis.  Thus,  we  tend  to  ignore 
the  development  of  fruitful  relation- 
ships with  the  European  Community, 
the  ASEAN  group  [Association  of 
South  East  Asian  Nations],  Japan, 
China,  and  Egypt;  the  improvement  of 
our  relations  with  Nigeria  and  the  bet- 
ter security  situation  in  Zaire;  the 
achievement  of  excellent  relations  with 
Yugoslavia  and  steadily  improved 
political,  cultural,  and  economic  ties 
we  have  developed  recently  with  Ro- 
mania, Poland,  Hungary,  and  Bulgaria; 


49 


miDDLE  EAST:    Situation  in  iran 


SECRETARY'S  STATEMENT, 
NOV.  8,  1979' 

Since  the  first  word  that  our  Em- 
bassy had  been  taken  over  in  Tehran, 
the  President,  aided  by  his  senior  ad- 
visers, has  been  directing  the  efforts  of 
our  government  to  secure  the  safe  re- 
lease of  our  people.  We  have  been  as- 
sured repeatedly  that  those  being  held 
have  not  been  physically  harmed.  We 
expect  those  assurances  to  be  observed. 

The  situation  is  extremely  difficult 
and  delicate.  I  am  sure  that  all  Ameri- 
cans understand  that  the  efforts  we  are 
pursuing  cannot  take  place  in  the  glare 
of  publicity.  Let  me  assure  you,  how- 
ever, that  we  are  pursuing  every  av- 
enue open  to  us  to  secure  their  safe  and 
early  release.  Our  actions  will  continue 
to  be  guided  by  that  overriding  objec- 
tive. 

Let  me  say,  in  particular,  to  the 
families  of  those  being  held  in  Tehran 
that  we  understand  fully  your  anguish, 
and  we  will  continue  to  work  around 
the  clock  to  achieve  their  release. 

We  have  announced  our  readiness  to 
have  the  personal  representatives  of  the 
President  go  to  Iran  to  discuss  with  the 
Iranian  authorities  the  release  of  our 
Embassy  people.  Many  governments 
and  others  have  been  helping.  We  ap- 
preciate those  efforts. 


We  need  the  continued  support  of  the 
American  people  as  we  pursue  these 
efforts.  It  is  a  time  not  for  rhetoric  but 
for  quiet,  careful,  and  firm  diplomacy. 

In  this  situation,  the  United  States 
has  no  higher  obligation  than  to  do  all 
that  it  can  to  protect  the  lives  of  the 
American  citizens.  We  will  honor  that 
obligation. 


WHITE  HOUSE 
ANNOUNCEMENT, 
NOV.  10,  1979^ 

The  President  has  directed  the  Attor- 
ney General  to  identify  any  Iranian  stu- 
dents in  the  United  States  who  are  not 
in  compliance  with  the  terms  of  their 
entry  visas  and  to  take  the  necessary 
steps  to  commence  deportation  pro- 
ceedings against  those  who  have  vio- 
lated applicable  immigration  laws  and 
regulations. 

As  an  initial  measure,  the  Immigra- 
tion and  Naturalization  Service  of  the 
Department  of  Justice  will  issue  a 
notice  requiring  all  Iranian  students  to 
report  their  present  location  and  status 
immediately  to  the  nearest  INS  office 
and  will  take  additional  steps  to  locate 
and  identify  such  students  to  determine 
legal  status.  For  students  found  to  be  in 
illegal  status,  deportation  proceedings 


the  achievement  of  democracy  in 
Spain,  Portugal,  Greece,  India, 
Nigeria,  and  Ghana;  the  movement  to- 
ward stability  and  democracy  in  im- 
portant areas  of  Latin  America;  and  the 
strengthening  of  new  international  in- 
stitutions for  economic  develop- 
ment— all  these  to  a  great  extent  are 
unnoticed. 

Events  that  we  do  not  control  are 
seen  as  signs  of  American  impotence 
rather  than  as  a  manifestation  of  a  di- 
verse and  multipolar  world.  It  is  not  a 
sign  of  weakness  to  recognize  that  we 
alone  cannot  dictate  events  elsewhere. 
It  is,  rather,  a  sign  of  American  matur- 
ity in  a  complex  world.  The  foreign 
policy  leadership  of  President  Carter 
and  Secretary  Vance  is  based  on 
strength,  not  belligerence;  on  thought, 
not  impulse;  on  confidence,  not 
paranoia. 

When  the  debate  is  over,  I  believe 
we  will  find  that  the  American  people 
want  a  safer,  less  volatile  world  and 


appreciate  that  reasoned,  intelligent, 
and  steady  leadership  is  needed  to 
achieve  it.  I  believe  the  approach  we 
are  taking  deals  correctly  with  the  fun- 
damental changes  taking  place  in  the 
world  and  is  protecting  our  interests 
and  values  with  real  effectiveness. 

The  voices  of  doom  we  hear  today 
are  particularly  strange  because  it  was 
American  leadership  that  triggered  the 
rapid  changes  now  taking  place 
worldwide.  Our  democracy,  our  tech- 
nology, our  concept  of  personal  free- 
dom are  envied  and  emulated  through- 
out the  world.  While  the  Soviet  Union 
worries  about  potential  defectors  trying 
to  flee  the  stultifying  Communist  soci- 
ety, we  concern  ourselves  with  all 
those  millions  who  are  not  U.S.  citi- 
zens but  who  want  to  study,  work,  and 
live  in  our  country.  In  short,  the  tide  of 
human  affairs  is  running  very  much  in 
our  favor.  To  maintain  our  leadership 
and  our  security,  we  need  only  have  the 
good  sense  to  act  in  a  reasoned  and  re- 
sponsible way.  n 


50 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


will  be  conducted  in  accordance  with 
constitutional  due  process  require- 
ments. 


Israelis  and  Paiestinians 


PRESIDENT'S  ANNOUNCEMENT, 
NOV.  12,  1979^ 

We  continue  to  face  a  grave  situation 
in  Iran,  where  our  Embassy  has  been 
seized,  and  more  than  60  American 
citizens  continue  to  be  held  as  hostages 
in  an  attempt  to  force  unacceptable 
demands  on  our  country.  We  are  using 
every  available  channel  to  protect  the 
safety  of  the  hostages  and  to  secure 
their  release. 

Along  with  the  families  of  the  hos- 
tages, 1  have  welcomed  and  I  ap- 
preciate the  restraint  that  has  been 
shown  by  Americans  during  this  crisis. 
We  must  continue  to  exhibit  such  con- 
straint, despite  the  intensity  of  our 
emotions.  The  lives  of  our  people  in 
Iran  are  at  stake. 

I  must  emphasize  the  gravity  of  the 
situation.  It  is  vital  to  the  United  States 
and  to  every  other  nation  that  the  lives 
of  diplomatic  personnel  and  other  citi- 
zens abroad  be  protected  and  that  we 
refuse  to  permit  the  use  of  terrorism 
and  the  seizure  and  the  holding  of  hos- 
tages to  impose  political  demands. 

No  one  should  underestimate  the  re- 
solve of  the  American  Government  and 
the  American  people  in  this  matter.  It 
is  necessary  to  eliminate  any  sugges- 
tion that  economic  pressures  can 
weaken  our  stand  on  basic  issues  of 
principle.  Our  position  must  be  clear.  I 
am  ordering  that  we  discontinue  pur- 
chasing of  any  oil  from  Iran  for  deliv- 
ery to  this  country. 

These  events  obviously  demonstrate 
the  extreme  importance  of  reducing  oil 
consumption  here  in  the  United  States. 
I  urge  every  American  citizen  and 
every  American  business  to  redouble 
efforts  to  curtail  the  use  of  petroleum 
products.  This  action  will  pose  a  real 
challenge  to  our  country.  It  will  be  a 
test  of  our  strength  and  of  our  determi- 
nation. 

I  have  directed  Secretary  [of  Energy 
Charles  W.]  Duncan  to  work  with  the 
Congress  and  with  other  Federal,  State, 
and  local  officials  and  with  leaders  of 
industry  to  develop  additional  measures 
to  conserve  oil  and  to  cope  with  this 
new  situation.  We  will  strive  to  insure 
equitable  and  fair  distribution  of  pe- 
troleum products  and  to  insure  a 
minimum  of  disruption  of  our  nation's 
economy. 

These  American  measures  must  be 
part  of  an  effective  international  effort, 
and  we  will  consult  with  our  allies  and 
with  other  oil-consuming  nations  about 


by  Donald  F.  Mc Henry 

Address  before  the  Appeal  of  Consci- 
ence Foundation  awards  dinner  in  New 
York  on  October  23.  1979.  Ambas- 
sador McHenry  is  U.S.  Permanent 
Representative  to  the  United  Nations. ' 

It  is  a  great  honor  for  me  to  accept 
the  foundation's  kind  invitation  to 
speak  here  this  evening.  As  Permanent 
Representative  of  the  United  States  to 
the  United  Nations,  I  believe  that  an 
important  part  of  my  responsibilities  is 
to  engage  in  discussing  the  central  is- 
sues of  our  foreign  policy,  not  only 
with  delegates  at  the  United  Nations 
but  also  with  our  own  citizens. 

I  am  particularly  pleased  to  do  so 
from  this  platform.  In  its  14-year  his- 
tory, the  Appeal  of  Conscience  Foun- 
dation has  devoted  its  efforts  to  pre- 
serving the  most  basic  and  essential 
values  of  free  people — the  unfettered 
expression  of  beliefs  and  the  protection 
of  civil  and  religious  freedoms.  The 
foundation  has  urged  world  leaders  to 
sustain  a  moral  vision  and  not  to  regard 
policy  simply  as  the  maximization  of 
national  self-interest. 

Tomorrow  is  U.N.  Day,  celebrating 
the  34th  anniversary  of  the  world  body. 
Many  of  you  who  are  here  tonight  re- 
member personally,  and  we  all  know, 
of  the  6  years  of  war  and  of  the  enor- 
mous human  tragedy  which  befell  mil- 
lions in  the  1930's  and  the  1940's. 
After  that  war,  the  hope  of  the  founders 


of  the  United  Nations  was  that  a  new 
start  could  be  made  in  international 
affairs.  Our  collective  goal,  in  the 
words  of  the  charter,  was  ".  .  .to  save 
succeeding  generations  from  the 
scourge  of  war.  ..." 

No  one,  either  in  our  country  or  in 
the  United  Nations,  can  have  any  illu- 
sions. We  have  not  yet  succeeded  in 
eliminating  the  scourge  of  war.  Con- 
flicts—  little  and  large,  hot  and  cold, 
known  and  unknown — are  an  everyday 
occurrence.  Even  the  fundamental  as- 
sumption on  which  the  United  Nations 
was  founded — the  assumption  of  great 
power  cooperation  —  is  only  rarely 
realized.  The  United  Nations  of  1979  is 
an  accurate  reflection  of  the  difficult 
world  in  which  we  live,  mirroring  not 
only  our  accomplishments  but  also  our 
divisions,  reflecting  consensus  on  the 
basic  objective  of  peace  but  also  the 
profound  differences  which  still  persist 
about  how  best  to  proceed  toward  the 
peaceful  resolution  of  conflicts.  We 
should  be  neither  surprised  nor  dis- 
mayed by  this  state  of  affairs.  Ours  is  a 
pluralistic  society  in  which  we  expect 
to  air  our  differences  openly.  And  the 
same  is  true  of  the  United  Nations. 

Today's  United  Nations  is,  of 
course,  profoundly  different  from  the 
organization  as  it  was  in  1945.  There 
are  three  times  as  many  member  coun- 
tries, most  of  them  young  and  poor,  the 
progeny  of  colonial  empires.  The 
peoples  of  the  so-called  Third  World 
are  going  through  wrenching  and  dif- 


further  actions  to  reduce  oil  consump- 
tion and  oil  imports. 

America  does  face  a  difficult  task 
and  a  test.  Our  response  will  measure 
our  character  and  our  courage.  I  know 
that  we  Americans  shall  not  fail. 

WHITE  HOUSE 
ANNOUNCEMENT, 
NOV.  14,  1979^ 

The  President  has  today  acted  to 
block  all  official  Iranian  assets  in  the 
United  States,  including  deposits  in 
U.S.  banks  and  their  foreign  branches 
and  subsidiaries.  This  order  is  in  re- 
sponse to  reports  that  the  Government 
of  Iran  is  about  to  withdraw  its  funds. 
The  purpose  of  this  order  is  to  insure 
that  claims  on  Iran  by  the  United  States 
and  its  citizens  are  provided  for  in  an 
orderly  manner. 


The  order  does  not  affect  accounts  of 
persons  other  than  the  Government  of 
Iran,  the  Central  Bank  of  Iran,  and 
other  controlled  entities.  The  precise 
amounts  involved  cannot  be  ascertained 
at  this  time,  but  there  is  no  reason  for 
disturbance  in  the  foreign  exchange  or 
other  markets. 

The  President  is  taking  this  action 
pursuant  to  the  International  Emer- 
gency Economic  Powers  Act,  which 
grants  the  President  authority  "to  deal 
with  any  unusual  and  extraordinary 
threat  to  the  national  security,  foreign 
policy,  or  economy  of  the  United 
States."  D 


'  Press  release  294. 

^Texl  from  While  House  press  release. 

^Made  to  reporters  assembled  in  the  Briefing 
Room  at  the  White  House  (text  from  White 
House  press  release). 


December  1979 

ficult  transitions,  coming  to  terms  with 
the  realities  of  governing  themselves 
while  coping  from  a  much  lower  stand- 
ard of  living  than  our  own  with  many 
of  the  same  economic  dilemmas  as  our- 
selves. 

I  know  that  many  Americans  often 
are  angered  by  criticism  of  our  policies 
or  discomfitted  by  the  voting  patterns 
in  the  General  Assembly.  We  do  not 
have  to  agree  with  our  critics;  indeed. 
on  many  issues  we  would  be  doing 
them,  as  well  as  ourselves,  a  disservice 
if  we  failed  to  point  out  that  there  are 
no  panaceas.  At  the  same  time,  how- 
ever, I  believe  it  is  important  that  we 
understand  as  clearly  as  we  can  the  re- 
cent and  also  the  historic  experience  of 
the  peoples  of  the  developing  world, 
where  they  are  coming  from  in  terms  of 
their  own  lives — rather  than  just  re- 
jecting what  they  espouse  for  the  solu- 
tion of  world  problems  when  it  does 
not  jibe  with  our  own  approach. 

We  will  not  resolve  those  differences 

by  engaging  in  shouting  matches  or  by 

1  attempting  to  stop  the   world  and  get 

,  off.  On  the  contrary,  we  might  do  well 

i;  to  listen.  We  might  discover  why  it  is 

I  that  a  relatively  young  country,  built 

on  the  principles  of  the  Declaration  of 

Independence,  is  so  broadly  perceived 

as  too  often  acting  contrary  to  its  own 

ideals   which   continue   to  spark   the 

hopes  of  mankind. 

As  you  undoubtedly  know,  the 
agenda  of  the  United  Nations  since  its 
inception  has  been  focused  on  the 
protracted  political  crises  in  two  parts 
of  the  world — southern  Africa  and  the 
Middle  East.  This  remains  very  much 
the  case  right  now.  The  Carter  Admin- 
istration also  has  concentrated  a  major 
part  of  its  diplomatic  resources  on  ef- 
forts to  bring  about  peaceful  solutions 
to  the  longstanding  disputes  in  those 
two  areas.  While  I  have  devoted  much 
of  my  own  time  in  the  last  2V'2  years  to 
the  problems  of  southern  Africa,  I  want 
to  talk  with  you  this  evening  about  the 
Middle  East — about  the  problems  fac- 
ing Americans  and  the  United  Nations 
— in  our  continuing  search  for  a  just 
and  durable  peace  between  Israel  and 
its  Arab  neighbors. 

Breaking  Ancient  Barriers 

We  have  reason  to  rejoice  because 
the  prospect  for  peace  in  the  Middle 
East  is  better  in  1979  than  at  any  time 
in  the  century  of  modern  Jewish-Arab 
relations.  We  have  reason  to  be  proud 
that  leaders  of  conscience  have  broken 
through  ancient  barriers  so  that,  for  the 
first  time  since  the  creation  of  the  State 
of  Israel,  there  are  real  negotiations 
directed  toward  lasting  peace  and  not 
jList  temporary  armistice.  In  the  course 


of  human  events,  such  progress  should 
not  be  taken  for  granted.  It  is  the  work 
of  extraordinary  dedication — and  be- 
fore we  go  on  to  what  remains  to  be 
done,  let  us  be  grateful  to  the  Prime 
Minister  of  Israel,  the  President  of 
Egypt,  and  the  President  of  the  United 
States  for  what  they  have  already  done. 

As  we  look  back  on  this  tumultuous 
decade  of  events  in  the  Middle  East, 
we  can  see  a  change  of  attitudes  in  the 
aftermath  of  the  1973  war.  For  the  first 
time  among  real  parties  in  interest, 
fatalistic  assumptions  about  the  insolu- 
ble nature  of  the  conflict  gave  way  to 
a  willingness  to  negotiate.  Israel  and 
Egypt  showed  a  readiness  to  take  a 
chance  for  peace.  No  one  thought  the 
process  would  be  easy  then;  no  one 
thinks  the  process  is  easy  now.  But, 
after  1973,  brave  men  who  had  already 
shown  their  courage  and  bravery  in  war 
demonstrated  that  they  were  prepared 
to  show  those  same  qualities  in  the 
more  difficult  quest  for  a  durable 
peace. 

One  thing  that  is  clear  to  any  ob- 
server is  that  although  the  countries  of 
the  Middle  East  have  long  and  ancient 
histories,  their  governments  are  young 
and  new.  That  is  an  important  thing  to 
remember  as  we  try  to  achieve  results 
that  have  eluded  generations  of  our 
predecessors.  We  should  understand 
that  even  without  the  Arab-Israeli  con- 
flict, there  would  be  turmoil  and  insta- 
bility in  the  area.  And  because  of  the 
turmoil  and  instability,  leaders  on  both 
sides  inevitably  ask  themselves  about 
the  reliability  of  the  other  side's  com- 
mitments and  about  the  durability  of 
agreements  as  governments  fall  and 
leaders  change. 

The  interim  agreements  of  1974  and 
1975  set  the  stage  for  the  historic 
events  of  the  last  2  years: 

•  Prime  Minister  Begin's  invitation 
and  President  Sadat's  visit  to  Jerusa- 
lem; 

•  The  Camp  David  accords  of  Sep- 
tember 1978;  and 

•  The  signing  and  ratification  of  the 
Egyptian-Israeli  Peace  Treaty  this 
spring. 

Both  Egypt  and  Israel  made  major 
concessions — Egypt  becoming  the  first 
of  Israel's  neighbors  to  break  the  pat- 
tern of  confrontation,  and  to  extend  full 
recognition  and  acceptance  and  Israel 
agreeing  to  withdraw  completely  from 
the  Sinai. 

None  of  us  can  be  insensitive  to  the 
courage  of  President  Sadat  and  Prime 
Minister  Begin  or  to  the  risks  which 
each  has  taken.  The  treaty  is  a  major 
step  forward  toward  peace.  But  it  is  not 
an  end  in  itself. 

The  principal  unfinished  item  on  the 


51 


Middle  East  agenda  today  is  the  re- 
lationship between  Israel  and  its  other 
neighbors,  particularly  between  Israel 
and  the  Palestinian  Arab  people.  Our 
goal  now  must  be  to  assure  on  a  per- 
manent basis  the  full  security  of  Israel 
and  at  the  same  time  to  respect  and 
fulfill  the  legitimate  rights  of  the  Pal- 
estinians. 

To  this  end,  the  Camp  David  frame- 
works laid  down  not  only  the  principles 
of  peace  for  Egypt  and  Israel  but  also 
outlined  a  process  of  negotiations  to 
address  the  future  of  the  more  than  1 
million  Palestinians  living  on  the  West 
Bank  and  Gaza,  as  well  as  of  those  dis- 
placed by  war  now  living  elsewhere. 

Negotiations  to  establish  the  basis 
for  election  of  a  transitional  Palestinian 
self-governing  authority  are  underway. 
You  are  all  doubtless  aware  of  the 
complexity  and  difficulty  of  those 
negotiations  and  of  the  refusal  thus  far 
of  the  Palestinians  and  Jordanians  to 
associate  themselves  with  them. 

Facing  Hard  Realities 

We  are  faced  now  with  certain  hard 
realities  —  whether  we  like  it  or  not. 
The  first  of  these  is  that  there  cannot  be 
a  just  and  durable  solution  of  the  Mid- 
dle East  conflict  without  the  active 
participation  of  the  Palestinians.  That 
reality  was  recognized  in  the  accord  at 
Camp  David  when  it  said:  "...  for 
peace  to  endure,  it  must  involve  all 
those  who  have  been  most  deeply  af- 
fected by  the  conflict"  and  that  the 
Palestinians  must  participate  in  the  de- 
termination of  their  own  future.  The 
second  hard  reality  is  that  so  far  no 
prominent  Palestinian  has  indicated 
readiness  to  participate  in  the  negotia- 
tions in  view  of  the  position  adopted  by 
the  Palestine  Liberation  Organization 
(PLO)  and  the  Baghdad  summits. 

The  underlying  problem  beneath 
these  two  realities  is  one  of  conflicting 
perceptions.  There  is  a  mirror  imagery 
to  Israeli  and  Palestinian  perceptions. 
Each  is  profoundly  convinced  of  the 
justness  of  its  stand.  Each  has  deep  at- 
tachment to  the  land.  Each  has  its  own 
unique  associations  with  that  land. 
Moreover,  each  side  seriously  doubts 
the  motives  and  intentions  of  the  other. 
This  underlying  problem  explains  the 
present  impasse  in  Israeli-Palestinian 
relations. 

Let  us  look  at  the  concerns  of  each 
for  a  moment.  The  basic  Arab  argu- 
ment against  the  Camp  David  agree- 
ments is  that  Israel's  purpose  is  not  at- 
tainment of  a  comprehensive  peace  but 
the  destruction  of  Arab  unity.  The 
Arabs  see  Egypt  as  having  been  pulled 
out  of  a  united  Arab  strategy,  of  having 
entered  into  a  "separate  deal."  They 


52 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


believe  Israel  may  seek  other  separate 
treaties,  in  effect  sidestepping  or  ig- 
noring the  Palestinians.  Many  Arabs 
believe  Israel's  true  purpose  is  to  ex- 
pand its  territory  to  the  Jordan  River, 
to  keep  the  million  plus  Arab  inhabi- 
tants of  the  West  Bank  and  Gaza  under 
Israeli  control,  and  to  deny  what  they 
see  as  the  Palestinian's  legitimate  right 
to  self-determination. 

Israel  has  a  diametrically  opposite 
perception  of  what  is  at  stake.  It  fears 
that  the  Palestinian  demand  for  self- 
determination  is  not  confined  to  work- 
ing out  the  final  status  of  the  West 
Bank  and  the  Gaza  Strip.  Many  Israelis 
fear  that  Arab  strategy  envisages  the 
present  phase  as  a  way-station  to  ab- 
sorbing Israel  into  the  dream  of  a 
"secular-democratic"  Palestine.  There 
is  also  profound  concern  that  the  con- 
tiguity of  the  West  Bank  and  Gaza  to 
the  population  centers  of  Israel  creates 
unique  problems  for  Israel's  security. 
The  basic  anxiety  is  that  the  Arab  na- 
tions will  only  pretend  to  accept  Is- 
rael's existence  and  sovereignty. 

There  is  a  special  dimension  here  — 
the  deep  attachment  of  Judaism  and 
Islam  to  the  city  of  Jerusalem.  We  have 
to  recognize  the  profound  religious 
significance  of  that  city  for  Jews  and 
Arabs,  the  intense  emotions  which  are 
involved  on  both  sides.  In  addition, 
there  is  concern  on  both  sides  that  the 


other's  religious  or  ideological  argu- 
ments may  be  a  cover  for  expansionist 
ambitions. 

Present  Negotiations 

In  developing  the  Camp  David 
frameworks,  we  recognized  that  we 
could  not  bridge  the  gap  between  Is- 
raeli and  Palestinian  perceptions  of 
each  other's  motivations  at  one  stroke. 
The  idea  underlying  the  present  negoti- 
ations is  to  engage  the  parties  in  an 
evolutionary  process  of  mutual  ac- 
commodation. The  transitional  5-year 
period  provides  an  opportunity  for 
building  trust  and  confidence  to  replace 
the  decades  of  distrust  and  suspicion. 
In  order  for  this  to  happen,  however, 
we  have  to  be  able  to  persuade  the  Pal- 
estinians and  the  Jordanians  that  the 
arrangements  for  a  self-governing  au- 
thority under  negotiation  are  genuine 
and  not,  as  many  of  them  presently  be- 
lieve, a  sham. 

I  do  not  want  to  try  this  evening  to 
address  in  detail  the  complex  questions 
of  the  hard  choices  and  decisions  fac- 
ing the  negotiators,  or  those  facing  the 
rest  of  the  Arab  world.  Instead,  I  want 
to  raise  the  question  of  how  we  can 
best  encourage  the  continuation  of  the 
peace  process.  I  want  to  suggest  to  you 
that  the  starting  point  is  to  extend  our 
vision  to  encompass  the  concerns  and 


Eighth  Report 
on  the  Sinai  Support  Mission 


MESSAGE  TO  THE  CONGRESS, 
OCT.  5,  1979' 

I  am  pleased  to  transmit  herewith  the  Eighth 
Report  of  the  United  States  Sinai  Support  Mis- 
sion. It  covers  the  Mission's  activities  during  the 
six-month  period  ending  October  1.  1979  This 
Report  is  provided  to  the  Congress  in  conformity 
with  Section  4  of  the  Public  Law  94-1 10  of  Oc 
tober  13,  1975. 

The  Peace  Treaty  which  Egypt  and  Israel 
signed  in  Washington  on  March  26,  1979  calls 
for  the  United  States  to  continue  monitoring  re- 
sponsibilities in  the  Sinai  until  January  25, 
1980,  when  Israeli  armed  forces  withdraw  from 
areas  east  of  the  Giddi  and  Mitia  Passes.  This 
mission  will  be  completed  on  schedule. 

Trilateral  talks  in  Washington  on  September 
18  and  19  resulted  in  tentative  agreement  for  the 
United  States,  using  the  Sinai  Field  Mission,  to 
verify  force  levels  specified  in  Annex'  I  of  the 
Treaty,  in  the  area  of  the  Sinai  west  of  the 
Interim  Buffer  Zone.  Administration  officials 
have  been  in  touch  with  appropriate  Congres- 


sional committees  on  various  aspects  of  the  U.S. 
undertaking  and  will  provide  Congress  with  all 
agreements  and  understandings  to  which  the 
United  States  is  a  party. 

This  year's  funding  of  the  Sinai  Support  Mis- 
sion is  authorized  under  Chapter  6,  Part  II  of  the 
Foreign  Assistance  Act,  "Peacekeeping  Opera- 
tions." A  request  has  been  made  to  Congress  to 
restore  $6. 1  million  of  the  Sinai  Support  Mission 
funds  for  FY  1980.  to  cover  anticipated  outlays 
associated  with  the  new  US  undertaking  in  the 
Sinai. 

The  American  peacekeeping  initiative  in  the 
Sinai  has  been  highly  successful  I  know  the 
Congress  will  continue  its  support  of  the  Mis- 
sion, as  part  of  United  States  efforts  to  meet  our 
goal  of  permanent  peace  in  the  Middle  East. 

Jimmy  Carter  D 


'Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of  Presiden- 
tial Documents  of  Oct  8.  1979 


historical  experience  of  both  sides,  i 
Four  wars  in  the  Middle  East  have 
taken  a  heavy  toll  of  life  and  injury  for 
the  people  of  the  area.  Those  wars  in- 
evitably heightened  Israel's  concerns 
about  the  security  of  its  people,  par- 
ticularly since  so  many  of  those  people 
were  themselves  survivors  of  the  Holo- 
caust. Those  wars  also  have  created 
two  generations  of  Palestinian  refu-  , 
gees.  I 

These  experiences  and  memories  ac-  ' 
count  for  the  profound  reciprocal  dis- 
trust which  has  been  at  the  heart  of  the 
Middle  East  conflict.  This  distrust,  as  I 
have  suggested  here  tonight,  is  a  root 
cause  of  Israel's  security  concerns  and 
of  the  refusal  of  the  Palestinians  so  far 
to  join  the  negotiating  process. 

We  cannot  change  or  obliterate  these 
experiences  and  memories.  But  we  can 
understand  and  try  to  deal  with  them. 
We  can  encourage  Israelis  and  Pales- 
tinians to  avoid  becoming  prisoners  of 
the  past.  Hard  as  it  is.  Israel  and  Egypt 
are  in  the  process  of  doing  so.  We  must 
now  work  to  bring  about  the  foundation 
for  a  new  relationship  between  Israelis 
and  Palestinians. 

Beneath  the  daily  headlines,  I  be- 
lieve that  there  are  indications  that  the 
Palestinians  are  carefully  considering 
their  next  steps  and  that  a  greater  sense 
of  realism  is  emerging  within  their 
ranks.  There  is  also,  I  believe,  a 
greater  awareness  in  Israel  of  the  need 
for  fresh  thinking  about  the  Palestinian 
movement  and  about  Israel's  own 
policies.  In  our  own  country  there  is  a 
widespread  recognition  that  we  cannot 
run  away  from  the  Palestinian  dimen- 
sion of  the  Middle  East  conflict. 

Violence  in  the  Area 

I  have  no  illusions  about  the  diffi- 
culty of  the  course  I  am  describing.  It 
is  hard  to  begin  a  process  of  reconcil- 
iation given  the  conflict  of  claims,  the 
history  of  suspicions  and  sufferings.  A 
necessary  first  step  is  for  all  concerned 
to  give  up  recourse  to  violence.  Let  me 
repeat  that:  A  necessary  first  step  is  for 
all  concerned  to  give  up  recourse  to 
violence. 

We  have  witnessed  for  many  months 
in  Lebanon  a  fatal  pattern.  Each  act  of 
violence — viewed  as  "terrorism"  by 
Israel  and  as  "armed  struggle  for  free- 
dom" by  Palestinians — produced  a 
more  determined  Israeli  respon.se.  Each 
Israeli  response  produced  another  act 
of  violence.  This  pattern  must  be 
broken.  Israeli  citizens  must  no  longer 
have  their  lives  jeopardized  by  attacks 
and  bomb  explosions.  There  must  be  a 
final  stop  to  violence  directed  against 
Israelis  by  Palestinians  from  Lebanon. 
There  must  also  be  a  final  stop  to  vio- 


December  1979 


53 


lence  directed  against  Lebanese  and 
Palestinians  in  Lebanon  from  Israel. 

A  very  fragile  cease-fire  was  attained 
by  the  United  Nations  in  south  Lebanon 
at  the  end  of  August.  It  has  been 
broken  briefly  but  violently  several 
times  this  past  week.  We  must  do  all 
we  can  to  turn  this  cease-fire  into  a 
permanent  end  to  violence.  This  re- 
quires cooperation  by  all  concerned 
with  the  United  Nations  Interim  Force 
in  Lebanon.  Private  armies  must  be 
seen  as  a  source  of  instability.  The  au- 
thority of  the  Lebanese  Government 
must  be  restored.  Villagers  must  be 
allowed  to  return  to  their  homes,  and 
refugees  who  fled  to  Beirut  and  the 
niirth  must  be  allowed  to  return  to  the 
South.  In  the  words  of  Lebanon's  Am- 
bassador to  the  United  Nations,  south 
Lebanon  must  become  a  "zone  of 
peace."  This  is  not  only  in  Lebanon's 
interest;  an  end  to  violence  will  affect 
Israeli  and  Palestinian  perceptions  of 
each  other.  It  will  make  it  possible  to 
consider  difficult  political  questions  in 
a  much  better  atmosphere. 

A  separate  but  equally  serious  aspect 
of  the  problem  of  violence  is  that 
which  emanates  from  the  West  Bank 
and  Gaza.  An  essential  condition  for 
building  trust  among  Israelis  about  a 
Palestinian  self-governing  authority 
certainly  must  be  for  this  violence  to 
end.  Each  time  that  a  bomb  is  deto- 
nated in  Jerusalem  or  another  city,  each 
time  a  bus  is  attacked,  each  time  an 
agricultural  settlement  or  a  person's 
house  is  entered  by  armed  force,  the 
prospect  of  improving  relations  be- 
tween Israelis  and  their  Arab  neighbors 
is  set  back.  It  is  very  hard,  indeed,  to 
ask  people  to  take  chances  for  peace 
when  the  lives  of  their  families  and  rel- 
atives are  perceived  to  be  in  jeopardy. 

It  is  also  in  the  interest  of  all  con- 
cerned for  Israel  to  begin  now  to  ease 
the  conditions  of  its  neighbors  living 
on  the  West  Bank  and  in  Gaza.  The 
steps  which  would  make  a  real  differ- 
ence to  Palestinian  Arabs  include  al- 
lowing the  reunion  of  families,  releas- 
ing those  still  under  administrative  de- 
tention, and  allowing  political  activity 
in  preparation  for  the  election  of  the 
self-governing  authority.  Israelis 
should  be  sensitive  to  correct  any  offi- 
cial action  which  in  some  measure, 
even  unintentionally,  offends  the  sense 
of  human  dignity  and  worth  of  their 
Palestinian  Arab  neighbors.  These 
would  be  not  only  humanitarian  ac- 
tions; they  would  be  a  token  of  genuine 
intention  to  move  toward  better  rela- 
tions in  the  years  ahead. 

Before  concluding  these  remarks,  I 
want  to  say  a  word  about  the  role  of  the 
United  States  at  the  United  Nations  on 
Middle  East  issues.   Unfortunately, 


SOUTH  ASIA:         Situation 
in  Aighanistan 


by  Harold  H.  Saunders 

Statement  before  the  Subcommittee 
on  Asian  and  Pacific  Affairs  of  the 
House  Foreign  Affairs  Committee  on 
September  26.  1979.  Mr.  Saunders  is 
Assistant  Secretary  for  Near  Eastern 
and  South  Asian  Affairs. ' 

As  you  know  from  your  own  recent 
visit  to  South  Asia,  Afghanistan  is 
today  the  scene  of  continuing  human 
suffering.  In  April  1978,  the  People's 
Democratic  Party  came  to  power  in 
Kabul  in  a  violent  coup.  Since  then, 
the  prospects  for  reform  under  the  new 
government  have  been  overshadowed 
by  internal  strife.  Much  Afghan  blood 
has  been  shed  in  this  conflict,  and  to 
our  sorrow  a  number  of  foreigners  have 
also  fallen  victim,  including  our  late 
friend  and  colleague  Ambassador  Spike 
Dubs. 

Important  U.S.  interests  are  affected 
by  developments  in  Kabul.  Our  effort 
to  encourage  peace  and  stability  in  that 
troubled  region  of  the  world  is  clearly 
made  more  difficult  by  Afghanistan's 
internal  unrest  and  the  exodus  of  refu- 
gees from  Afghanistan.  The  reorienta- 
tion in  Afghanistan's  foreign  policy 
away  from  its  traditional  genuine 
nonalignment  is  one  we  regret. 

Our  interest  in  the  welfare  and  eco- 
nomic development  of  the  people  of 
Afghanistan — one  of  the  world's  poor- 
est nations — has  been  amply  demon- 
strated by  the  fact  that  we  have  pro- 
vided over  $500  million  of  assistance 
in  the  past  30  years.  In  the  present  situ- 
ation, economic  development  has 
largely  come  to  a  standstill,  and  our 
own  aid  program  will  be  phased  out 
after  October  1 ,  in  conformance  with 
legislative  requirements. 

We  are  especially  disturbed  by  the 
growing  involvement  of  the  Soviet 
Union  in  Afghan  affairs.   Afghanistan 


and  the  Soviet  Union,  as  neighbors, 
have  always  had  close  relations.  Never 
before  in  recent  times,  however,  have 
the  Soviet  military — and,  apparently, 
the  political — roles  been  as  extensive. 
Direct  interference  in  Afghanistan  by 
any  country,  including  the  Soviet 
Union,  would  threaten  the  integrity  of 
that  nation  and  peace  in  the  area  and 
would  be  a  matter  of  deep  concern  to 
the  United  States.  We  have  repeatedly 
impressed  on  the  Soviet  Government 
the  dangers  of  more  direct  involvement 
in  the  fighting  in  Afghanistan.  We  will 
continue  to  monitor  developments  in 
this  area  closely. 

Afghanistan's  relations  with  its  other 
neighbors — Pakistan,  Iran,  and  China 
—  have  been  severely  strained  by  the 
internal  conflict  which  affects  nearly 
all  areas  of  Afghanistan.  We  will  be 
supportive  of  any  efforts  by  these 
countries  aimed  at  better  relations  and 
which  reduce  the  possibility  of  conflict 
between  them  and  Afghanistan. 

For  its  part,  the  U.S.  Government 
seeks  no  special  position  in  Afghani- 
stan. We  look  for  a  relationship  based 
on  mutual  respect  and  shared  interests 
in  regional  stability,  the  independence 
and  territorial  integrity  of  all  states  in 
the  area,  and  nonintervention.  We  have 
important  differences  with  the  Afghan 
Government,  including  our  deep  con- 
cern about  the  human  rights  situation  in 
Afghanistan.  Security  concerns  and  the 
decline  in  our  programs  have  required 
us  to  reduce  our  Embassy  staff  in 
Kabul  and  to  withdraw  dependents  of 
U.S.  Government  personnel.  Never- 
theless, we  have  continued  to  express 
to  the  Government  of  Afghanistan  our 
desire  for  normal  and  friendly  rela- 
tions. We  consider  that  the  initiative 
for  such  relations  lies  with  them. 

Narcotics  control  may  be  one  area  in 
which  closer  U.S. -Afghan  cooperation 
is  possible.  Afghanistan  has  become  a 


others  often  perceive  us  as  irretrievably 
one-sided.  We  must  be  seen  to  be  fair, 
to  be  just,  to  understand  the  concerns 
of  both  sides.  This  does  not  imply  any 
change  in  our  friendship  and  strong 
support  for  Israel  or  our  deep  commit- 
ment to  its  security.  It  does  imply, 
however,  the  need  for  us  at  all  times  to 
be  true  to  our  principles  and  to  make 
the  positions  we  take  at  the  United  Na- 
tions and  elsewhere  continue  to  be  con- 
sistent with  them. 


I  can  think  of  no  greater  challenge 
for  the  years  ahead  than  the  opening  of 
a  new  chapter  in  relations  between  Is- 
raelis and  Palestinians.  This,  in  starkly 
simple  terms,  must  be  the  goal.  Bar- 
riers built  over  decades  will  not  go 
down  overnight.  But  this  is  certainly 
the  time  to  start.  D 


'  USUN  press  release  100  of  Oct.  24,  1979. 


54 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


Afghan  Refugt^es 


by  Harold  H.  Saunders 

Statement  before  the  Subcommittee 
on  Asian  and  Pacific  Affairs  of  the 
House  Foreign  Affairs  Committee  on 
September  26,  1979.  Mr.  Saunders  is 
Assistant  Secretary  for  Near  Eastern 
and  South  Asian  Affairs. ' 

1  am  pleased  to  have  an  opportunity 
to  appear  before  this  subcommittee  to 
hear  about  your  first-hand  impressions 
of  the  Afghan  refugee  situation  and  to 
share  with  you  the  views  of  the  execu- 
tive branch. 

At  the  outset,  let  me  express  our  ap- 
preciation for  the  interest  which  you 
and  the  subcommittee  have  shown  in 
this  growing  problem,  in  particular 
your  recent  visit  to  a  refugee  camp  in 
Pakistan  which  has  helped  to  bring 
about  greater  international  awareness 
of  the  situation  there.  We  are  as  con- 
cerned as  you  about  the  nearly  200,000 
Afghans  who  have  fled  to  Pakistan  in 
the  last  year,  and  we  believe  the  United 
States  has  a  deep  humanitarian  interest 
in  seeing  that  the  world  community 
does  everything  possible  to  assist  the 
Government  of  Pakistan  in  caring  for 
them. 

In  our  view  the  principal  cause  for 
the  influx  of  large  numbers  of  Afghans 
into  neighboring  Pakistan  is  the  unset- 
tled and  violent  conditions  which  cur- 
rently exist  in  Afghanistan.  The  flow  of 
refugees  continues  at  the  rate  of  about 
4,500  per  week.  This  exodus  will  un- 
doubtedly continue  until  the  internal 
Afghan  situation  stabilizes  and  greater 
security  can  be  offered  to  the  Afghan 
people.  Indeed,  we  must  be  prepared 
for  the  possibility  of  an  even  faster 
flow  as  cold  weather  sets  in. 

Pakistan  is  to  be  commended  for  its 


humanitarian  action  over  the  past  many 
months  in  providing  food,  clothing, 
and  shelter  to  these  thousands  of  Af- 
ghan refugees — many  of  whom  have 
strong  ethnic  and  kinship  ties  with 
Pakistani  tribal  groups.  It  is  clear  now, 
however,  that  the  financial  burdens  of 
this  generosity  are  unfairly  taxing  Paki- 
stan's limited  resources,  and  the  inter- 
national community  should  offer  its 
help. 

As  you  know  the  U.N.  High  Com- 
missioner for  Refugees  (UNHCR)  has 
looked  into  this  situation  carefully,  and 
we  understand  that  an  international  as- 
sistance program  is  already  getting 
underway.  As  a  start,  the  UNHCR  has 
announced  an  interim  emergency  pro- 
gram of  $190,000  to  provide  shelter 
and  blankets  for  refugees.  UNICEF,  we 
understand,  will  be  setting  up  a  medi- 
cal program. 

We  have  encouraged  the  UNHCR  to 
plan  and  implement  a  program  as  soon 
as  possible  and  are  prepared  to  contrib- 
ute our  fair  share  if  additional  funds  are 
requested.  I  hope  we  will  have  the  sub- 
committee's support  in  this  endeavor. 
It  is  our  expectation  that  required  funds 
will  come  from  the  UNHCR's  general 
program.  While  precise  figures  are  not 
yet  available,  we  would  estimate  that 
an  international  program  of  at  least  $10 
million  will  be  needed  over  the  next 
year  and  perhaps  more  if  the  flow  of 
refugees  increases  this  winter. 

I  should  add  that  we  are  deeply  trou- 
bled by  the  suffering  and  loss  of  life 
which  the  fighting  has  brought  in  Af- 
ghanistan. Our  hope  is  that  conditions 
of  peace  and  prosperity  can  be  created 
in  Afghanistan  which  will  reflect  the 
will  of  the  people,  so  that  the  refugees 
can  return  to  their  homeland  at  an  early 
date.  D 


Puhllvationa 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the  hearings  will 
be  published  by  the  committee  and  will  be 
available  frpm  the  Superintendent  of  Docu- 
ments, U.S.  Government  Printing  Office, 
Washington,  D.C.  20402. 


GPO  SALES 

Publications  may  be  ordered  by  catalog  or  slock 
number  from  the  Superintendent  of  Documents, 
U.S.  Government  Printing  Office,  Washington, 
D.C.  20402.  A  25%  discount  is  made  on  or- 
ders for  100  or  more  copies  of  any  one  publi- 
cation mailed  to  the  same  address.  Remit- 
tances, payable  to  the  Superintendent  of 
Documents,  must  accompany  orders.  Prices 
shown  below,  which  include  domestic  postage, 
are  subject  to  change. 

Agricultural  Commodities.   Agreement  with    , 

Bangladesh.  TIAS  9065.  19  pp.  $1.10.  (Cat. 

No,  59.10:9065,) 
Agricultural  Commodities.   Agreement  with 

Bangladesh,   amending   the   agreement  of 

January   13.   1978,  as  amended.  TIAS  9066. 

15  pp.  $1.10  (Cat,  No,  S9, 10:9066,) 
Postal    Money   Orders.    Agreement   with 

Bangladesh.  TIAS  9120.  18  pp.  $1   10.  (Cat. 

No.  S9, 10:9120.) 
Rural   Development.   Agreement   with   Af- 
ghanistan. TIAS  9126.  5  pp.  70*.  (Cat.  No. 

59,10:9126,) 
Agricultural  Commodities.   Agreement  with 

India,   TIAS  9142,  45  pp.   $1.70.   (Cat.   No. 

59.10:9142.) 
Trade  in   Textiles  and  Textile  Products. 

Agreement  with  India,  amending  the  agree- 
ment of  December  30,    1977.   as  amended. 

TIAS     9232.     11     pp.     $1.     (Cat.     No. 

59.10:9232.) 
Agricultural  Base  Mapping.  Agreement  with 

Sri  Lanka.  TIAS  9284,    14  pp,  $1.  (Cat.  No. 

59,10:9284.) 
Launching  and  Associated  Services  for  Indian  i 

Satellites.  Agreement  with  India.  TIAS  9285. 

10  pp.  $1 .  (Cat.  No.  59. 10:9285.) 
Trade  in  Tropical  Products.  Agreement  with  i 

India,    TIAS   9289,    8   pp,    $1.    (Cat.    No. 

59.10:9289.) 
Criminal   Investigations.   Agreement  withi 

Nepal,   TIAS  9347,   5  pp.   75?.   (Cat.   No. 

59.10:9347.)  D 


(Afghanistan  (Cont'd) 

major  source  of  illicit  narcotics,  and 
we  have  a  strong  interest  in  developing 
greater  cooperation  in  the  field  of  nar- 
cotics enforcement  and  control.  The 
present  government  has  made  some 
noticeable  progress  in  opium  seizures 
but  has  had  little  time  to  concern  itself 
with  long-term  solutions  to  the  growing 
problem  of  illicit  opium  production. 

In  conclusion,  I  want  to  emphasize 
that  we  are  deeply  troubled  by  the  suf- 
fering and  loss  of  life  which  have  re- 
sulted from  the  fighting  in  Afghani- 
stan. The  violence  in  Afghanistan  has 
already  generated  a  continuing  flow  of 


refugees  into  Pakistan  as  well  as  a 
smaller  number  to  Iran.  It  has  the  po- 
tential of  undermining  the  peace  of  the 
region.  We  urge  all  parties  concerned 
in  Afghanistan  to  look  toward  resolu- 
tion of  their  differences  through 
peaceful  means  in  a  way  that  will  re- 
flect the  desires  of  the  Afghan  people 
themselves  and  obviate  external  in- 
volvement in  Afghanistan's  internal 
affairs.  D 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the  hearings  will 
be  published  by  the  committee  and  will  be  avail- 
able from  the  Superintendent  of  Documents, 
US  Government  Printing  Office,  Washington, 
DC.  20402. 


December  1979 


55 


U]\ITED  ]\ATIOI\!$:         Economic  Diaiogt^e  - 
A  Chailenge  to  Our  Times 


by  Donald  F.  McHenry 

Statement  to  the  General  Assembly 
on  October  22.  1979.  Ambassador 
McHenry  is  U.S.  Permanent  Repre- 
sentative to  the  United  Nations. ' 

For  over  30  years,  the  United  Na- 
tions has  been  a  force  for  peace.  It  has 
been  an  obstacle  to  aggression  and  a 
pacifying  presence  in  the  midst  of  an- 
cient conflicts.  It  has  provided  a  place 
for  private  consultations  which  have 
enabled  public  solutions  to  be  reached. 
It  has  offered  a  prestigious  platform 
where  national  frustrations  could  be 
expressed,  international  hopes  extolled, 
world  opinion  mobilized,  and  global 
action  undertaken. 

The  horrors  of  war  have  not  been 
avoided  during  the  lifetime  of  the 
United  Nations.  But  in  large  part  be- 
cause of  this  institution,  the  interna- 
tional community  has  survived  intact 
through  what  has  probably  been  the 
most  volatile,  dangerous,  and  dynamic 
period  in  recorded  history. 

The  mandate  of  the  U.N.  system, 
however,  must  and  does  range  beyond 
the  concerns  of  peace  and  security.  It 
encompasses  virtually  all  areas  of 
human  association  from  enhancing 
human  rights  to  protecting  our  physical 
environment.  In  recent  years,  it  has  be- 
come the  central  focus  of  the  interna- 
tional deliberations  concerning  eco- 
nomic relations  between  and  among 
developing  and  developed  nations.  The 
question  before  us  is  whether  the 
dialogue  is  capable  of  being  trans- 
formed into  even  more  negotiations 
than  are  presently  underway.  The  an- 
swer is  neither  clear  nor  simple,  but  in 
the  debate  in  which  we  are  now  en- 
gaged, both  the  question  and  the  an- 
swer are  crucial. 

Why  have  global  economic  issues 
become  a  priority  item  on  the  interna- 
tional agenda?  Because  the  economic 
interdependence  of  nations  is  a  pro- 
found reality.  The  economic  futures  of 
our  countries,  whatever  their  economic 
systems,  are  inseparably  linked  — 
through  trade,  direct  investments,  pub- 
lic and  private  capital  flows,  technol- 
ogy, labor  mobility,  and  bilateral  and 
multilateral  institutions.  We  can  be 
competitive.  We  can  be  supportive. 
But  we  cannot  be  destructive  of  one 
another's  material  objectives  without 
hurting — maybe  even  destroying — 
ourselves. 


I  intend  to  be  candid  today  —  perhaps 
more  so  than  diplomacy  traditionally 
permits.  I  do  so  out  of  a  strong  per- 
sonal commitment  to  the  U.N.  system, 
to  the  needs  and  aspirations  of  the  de- 
veloping countries,  and  to  the  many 
people  on  this  planet  —  the  poor,  the 
sick,  the  hungry  —  who  continue  to 
look  to  this  assembly  of  nations  with 
hope  and  confidence.  I  am  convinced 
that  if  we  define  our  objectives  care- 
fully, understand  our  limitations  intel- 
ligently, and  speak  to  each  other 
frankly.  v,'e  can  navigate  this  sea  of 
economic  distress  successfully.  But  if 
some  of  us — and  this  applies  to  coun- 
tries in  all  regional  groups — choose  the 
easy  path  of  confrontation,  we  will 
fail. 

The  United  States  will  do  its  share  to 
strengthen  and  reform  the  international 
economic  system  so  that  all  nations 
have  access  to  economic  opportunity 
and  to  increasing  prosperity  in  a 
framework  of  social  justice. 

To  affect  the  direction  of  the  inter- 
national economy,  all  of  us  must  work 
together.  There  was  a  time  when  the 
size  of  the  U.S.  economy  was  so  over- 
powering that  a  decision  by  my  gov- 
ernment alone  could  move  the  global 
economy  in  a  new  direction.  For  exam- 
ple, in  1950  the  United  States  ac- 
counted for  67%  of  the  world's  indus- 
trial production.  That  era  is  over.  Not 
because  the  United  States  has  become 
poorer  but  because  the  rest  of  the  world 
has  become  richer.  We  sought  this  new 
relationship,  we  facilitated  it,  and  we 
welcome  it.  It  is  no  longer  possible  for 
one  country,  or  for  even  a  few  coun- 
tries, to  decide  the  direction  of  our  in- 
ternational economy.  It  is  now  for  all 
of  us  —  the  industrialized  countries,  the 
oil-producing  countries,  the  developing 
countries,  and  the  Socialist  countries — 
to  act  as  united  nations  in  reordering 
the  international  economy  and 
eliminating  the  worst  aspects  of  global 
poverty  before  the  end  of  this  century. 

Changing  Global  Economy 

We  do  not  advance  our  common  ob- 
jectives by  unending  speeches  over 
whether,  how,  and  when  the  new  inter- 
national economic  order  will  occur. 
Whether  we  like  it  or  not,  the  global 
economy  is  undergoing  constant  and 
accelerating  change.  A  new  order  is 
arising  before  our  eyes,  and  our  task  is 
to  see  that  this  order  serves  our  com- 


mon interest.  The  institutional  structure 
of  today's  economy  is  not  the  same  as 
that  created  by  Bretton  Woods.  To- 
morrow it  will  be  different — signifi- 
cantly different — from  today.  And  this 
transformation  will  result  from  a  com- 
bination of  market  forces,  actions  by 
governments  and  the  individual,  and 
collective  efforts  of  our  nations,  our 
peoples,  our  entrepreneurs,  and  our 
workers.  As  we  guide  and  participate 
in  this  change,  we  must  steadily  pursue 
real  progress  and  concrete  results.  We 
must  be  rigorous  in  our  analysis  and 
realistic  in  our  expectations.  We  must 
not  only  talk,  we  must  find  a  way  to 
agree  on  how  to  move  forward. 

Our  dialogue  has  been  confused  by 
the  frequent  insistence  on  a  rigid  divi- 
sion of  the  world  into  developed  and 
developing  nations.  The  fact  is  that 
there  is  a  spectrum  of  development 
along  which  each  nation  occupies  a 
specific  space,  from  the  poorest  nations 
to  the  richest.  Moreover,  different  parts 
of  all  countries  occupy  different  parts 
of  the  spectrum.  Some  sectors  of  the 
developing  countries  now  compete  on  a 
world  market  scale.  Some  parts  of  the 
developed  countries  themselves  are  in 
urgent  need  of  development.  Our 
common  task  is  to  move  all  nations  and 
all  sectors  toward  the  more  developed 
end  of  the  spectrum.  Our  institutions 
must  have  the  flexible  capacity  to  help 
all  countries  while  fulfilling  a  basic 
obligation  to  provide  the  appropriate 
assistance  to  the  poorer  countries.  The 
more  developed  the  country,  or  sector, 
the  greater  its  obligations  toward  mak- 
ing the  entire  system  function. 

In  saying  this,  I  am  aware  of  the 
political  reality  that  groups  of  countries 
have  a  need  to  maintain  unity.  My  plea 
is  simply  that  such  legitimate  coalitions 
should  not  serve  as  obstacles  but  rather 
as  catalysts  which  enhance  our  efforts 
to  reach  genuine  consensus. 

Too  often,  all  of  us  fail  to  temper  with 
realism  our  demands  on  others.  In  their 
just  calls  for  assistance  and  investment, 
the  developing  countries  should  under- 
stand the  restraints  on  other  govern- 
ments because  of  economic  austerity, 
rising  unemployment  and  inflation,  and 
the  need  to  marshal  the  support  of  pub- 
lic opinion  and  parliaments.  Moreover, 
developing  countries  must  recognize 
that  the  engine  of  growth  in  OECD 
[Organization  for  Economic  Coopera- 
tion and  Development]  countries  is  the 
response  of  private   initiative  to  eco- 


56 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


nomic  incentives.  If  other  countries 
want  to  use  that  engine,  they  must  find 
ways  consistent  with  their  sovereignty 
to  make  their  economies  attractive  to 
foreign  investment. 

By  like  measure,  when  insisting  on 
economic  reforms  in  developing  coun- 
tries, the  developed  nations  should 
realize  the  acute  social  and  political 
problems  such  reforms  present  and  the 
political  difficulties  those  countries' 
leaders  face  in  pressing  these  changes 
vigorously  and  consistently. 

Progress  and  Problems 
in  the  Global  Economy 

If  effective  joint  action  —  not  debat- 
ing points — is  our  goal,  let  us  not  pre- 
tend that  there  has  been  no  progress  in 
reorganizing  the  global  economic  sys- 
tem. This  is  simply  not  so.  There  has 
been  important  progress. 

The  International  Monetary  Fund  has 
significantly  expanded  its  facilities  and 
made  them  more  responsive  to  the 
needs  of  all  members,  particularly  the 
developing  countries.  The  creation  of 
the  Trust  Fund,  the  Extended  Finance 
Facility,  the  Supplementary  Financing 
Facility,  and  most  recently  the  sub- 
stantial liberalization  of  the  Compen- 
satory Finance  Facility  are  examples. 
The  Fund  has  also  agreed  to  consider  a 
lengthening  of  the  repayment  terms 
under  the  Extended  Finance  Facility 
and  means  of  lowering  the  interest 
costs  of  the  Supplementary  Finance 
Facility. 

The  lending  levels  of  bilateral  and 
multilateral  assistance  programs  have 
been  raised,  and  negotiations  for  major 
replenishments  of  the  World  Bank  and 
the  regional  banks  have  been  or  are 
nearing  completion.  Special  attention  is 
being  devoted  to  innovative  new  na- 
tional and  international  endeavors  in 
energy  exploration  and  development 
and  in  science  and  technology  de- 
velopment and  transfer. 

International  trade  has  been 
liberalized,  most  recently  with  the 
multilateral  trade  negotiations  and 
generalized  preferences  provided  and 
expanded  for  developing  countries.  The 
International  Fund  for  Agricultural  De- 
velopment was  created  with  initial 
financing  of  $1  billion.  A  common 
fund  for  commodities  could  be  com- 
pleted in  the  near  future.  Price 
stabilizing  agreements  have  been 
reached  on  sugar,  tin,  coffee,  rubber, 
and  work  is  underway  on  commodities. 
It  is  important  to  recognize  the  prog- 
ress that  has  been  made,  so  that  gov- 
ernments, citizens,  and  parliaments  will 
be  encouraged  to  work  for  more  of  it. 

Despite  the  progress  in  international 
economic  cooperation  and  develop- 


ment, the  global  economy  is  clearly  in 
trouble.  The  industrialized  countries 
face  mounting  inflation  and  unem- 
ployment, sharply  declining  growth 
rates,  deteriorating  trade  accounts,  and 
intensifying  protectionist  pressures. 
The  situation  in  most  developing  coun- 
tries is  also  gloomy:  development  pros- 
pects impeded  and  often  undermined  by 
the  exploding  costs  of  energy  and  other 
imports,  the  slow  growth  of  foreign 
markets  for  their  exports,  constraints 
on  real  aid  levels,  growing  deficits, 
and  the  growing  uncertainty  about  the 
ability  of  the  system  to  recycle  pet- 
rodollars equitably. 

It  is  unproductive  to  be  critical  of  the 
oil-exporting  countries  without  under- 
standing that  their  favored  circum- 
stances are  tempered  by  special  prob- 
lems. Some  OPEC  countries  [Organi- 
zation of  Petroleum  Exporting  Coun- 
tries] themselves  are  poor.  Some  find 
that  their  financial  bonanza  is  real  only 
if  the  international  economy  is  healthy. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  oil-exporting 
nations  have  a  major  responsibility  for 
insuring  the  growth  and  stability  of  the 
global  economic  system,  a  responsibil- 
ity that  they  cannot  ignore  in  their  pro- 
duction and  pricing  policies.  The  jolt  to 
the  international  economy  of  in- 
adequate oil  production  levels  could  be 
devastating  to  the  oil-exporting  nations 
as  well  as  to  oil-consuming  countries. 
Oil  prices  should  reflect  the  depleting 
nature  of  the  resource  but  also  the 
unique  role  of  oil  for  the  health  and 
prosperity  of  all  nations. 

Global  economic  conditions  in- 
creasingly affect  as  well  the  centrally 
planned  economies.  Their  growing  re- 
liance on  food,  energy,  and  manufac- 
tured imports  and  their  increasing  bor- 
rowing from  the  international  banking 
system  link  them  tightly  into  the  global 
economic  system  and  to  its  fate. 


Mutual  Solutions 

to  Common  Problems 

And  so,  all  of  us  must  acknowledge 
that  the  economic  destinies  of  our  na- 
tions are  tied  together.  We  must  find 
mutually  acceptable  solutions  to  com- 
mon problems. 

•  Together  we  must  find  the  means 
to  end  the  tragic  paradox  that  in  the 
most  prosperous  era  in  human  exist- 
ence, one-fourth  of  the  world's  citizens 
live  in  abject  poverty.  We  must  rapidly 
complete  a  new  food  aid  convention 
and  encourage  governments  to  give  ur- 
gent attention  to  adopting  food  sector 
strategies.  We  must  act  to  prevent 
famine  anywhere  and  at  any  time. 

•  We  must  be  sure  that  the  growing 
deficits  of  countries  can  be  managed  in 


a  way  that  strengthens  the  global  econ- 
omy. I 

•  We  must  intensify  cooperative 
bilateral  and  multilateral  efforts  to  in-|J 
sure  that  the  international  community 
can  achieve  the  goal  of  adequate 
health  care  for  all  by  the  year  2000.  It 
is  unacceptable  that  many  of  the 
Earth's  inhabitants  do  not  have  access 
to  basic  health  care.  The  United  States, 
hopes  many  other  countries  will  join  in 
sponsoring  a  resolution  for  adoption  by 
this  General  Assembly  calling  on  all 
relevant  U.N.  organizations  and  pro- 
grams to  give  greater  priority  in  their 
activities  to  health  care  and  its  im- 
provement. 

•  Together  we  must  confront  and 
overcome  the  energy  crisis.   We  must] 
have  the   imagination   and  courage  toi 
fashion   international   solutions  to  the; 
energy  problem  based  on  a  sharing  of 
responsibilities  and   benefits.    We  add 
our  voice  to  those  urging  speed  in  the 
international  community's  considera- 
tion of  this  issue. 

•  Let  us  find   innovative  means  fon 
increasing  literacy  and  insuring  educa- 
tion,  fundamental   ingredients   in   any. 
viable  development  strategy. 

•  Let  us  begin  implementation  of  the 
agreements  reached  in  Vienna  at  the 
U.N.  Conference  on  Science  and  Tech- 
nology for  Development. 

Ongoing  Negotiations 

The  G-77  group  of  nations  put  for- 
ward   for  our  consideration   at   the 
Committee  of  the  Whole  an  important 
resolution   suggesting   a   ''round   of 
global   and   sustained   negotiations  on 
international  economic  cooperation  for' 
development."   Secretary   Vance  has 
already  stated  in  his  speech  before  the 
U.N.  General  Assembly  that  ".  .  .the; 
United  States  would  participate,  in  the! 
Committee  of  the  Whole,  in  consulta- 
tions to  decide  the  most  effective  way. 
of  conducting  such   negotiations. 
Clearly  the  G-77  had  made  a  majori 
contribution   to  this   Assembly's, 
deliberations. 

In  discussing  this  resolution,  let  me 
go  back  to  my  earlier  theme  —  the  dif- 
ference between  dialogue  and  negotia- 
tion, a  difference  clearly  understood  by 
the  sponsors  of  the  resolution. 

The   air,   and   millions  of  pages  of 
U.N.   documents,   have  been  filled  by 
dialogue — a  process  the  dictionary  de- 
fines as  "a  conversation  between  two  i 
or  more  persons."  These  conversations, 
have  been  useful,  illuminating,  some- 
times brilliant,   often  dull,   and   too  i 
often  unheard  by  the  other  participants. 
They  can  go  on  as  long  as  the  United 
Nations — and  some  cynics  think  they 
will.  But  I  understand  this  resolution  to 


December  1979 


57 


propose  something  else  —  negotia- 
tions— a  process  the  dictionary  defines 
as  "treating  with  another  with  a  view 
to  coming  to  terms." 

If  it  is  truly  the  sea  of  global  negoti- 
ations we  are  to  travel,  then  we  must 
build  a  solid  ship  and  navigate  a  course 
that  offers  all  of  us  the  prospects  of  a 
successful  voyage.  The  Committee  of 
the  Whole  is  destined  to  be  the  ship- 
yard, and  the  craftsmen  in  that  institu- 
tion will  have  an  awesome  responsibil- 
ity. They  will  be  entrusted  with  forging 
a  consensus  among  all  nations  on  the 
direction,  procedures,  and  scope  of 
these  negotiations,  a  consensus  re- 
quired for  the  proposed  round  to  be 
successfully  launched.  They  will  cer- 
tainly have  to  take  account  of  the  vari- 
ous negotiations  already  in  progress 
and  the  progress  already  achieved. 
They  must  create  an  environment  for 
their  discussions  that  emphasizes  over 
and  over  again  the  global  aspect  of  the 
proposed  negotiations  and  the  global 
responsibility  for  our  objectives. 

1  am  not  suggesting  that  any  of  us 
can  or  would  forget  our  geographical, 
political,  or  economic  identities,  but  I 
am  urging  that  we  embrace  a  larger  self, 
that  we  listen  as  well  as  talk,  that  we 
welcome  the  opportunity  to  be  more 
than  what  we  have  been  —  each  of  us 
for  each  of  us. 

The  possibilities  of  success  will  de- 
pend in  important  measure  on  avoiding 
recrimination.  I  have  never  been  in  a 
successful  negotiation  which  began 
with  one  party  calling  the  other  selfish, 
destructive,  arrogant,  ignorant,  lazy,  or 
pointless.  If  that  is  the  sport  intended, 
let  us  stay  in  a  dialogue  where  new 
participants  in  the  conversation  can 
forget  what  was  said  or  tear  out  a  page 
of  the  record  without  anyone  caring. 
But  if  we  are  serious  about  negotia- 
tions, let  us  be  serious  and  respectful 
of  one  another. 

I  read  the  resolution  as  saying  that 
the  global  negotiations  will  not  be 
duplicative  of  negotiations  going  on 
elsewhere  in  the  U.N.  system.  Rather 
our  intention  is  "to  reinforce  and  draw 
upon"  those  ongoing  processes.  That 
makes  sense  considering  the  limitations 
of  time  and  resources  that  face  us. 
Which  of  our  peoples  would  forgive  us 
if,  in  the  face  of  crisis,  we  carelessly 
allowed  duplication  of  negotiations  al- 
ready going  on  elsewhere  in  the  U.N. 
system?  With  the  possible  exception  of 
energy,  the  issues  which  have  been 
suggested  for  global  negotiation  do  not 
need  new  fora  or  organizations — our 
predecessors  have  done  a  good  en- 
gineering job  in  building  enough 
structures  where  any  possible  discus- 
sion can  take  place. 

Those  charged  with  planning  these 


negotiations  must  subject  them  to 
helpful  schedules.  By  "helpful,"  I 
mean  precise  enough  to  encourage  de- 
cision but  not  so  difficult  so  that  they 
cannot  be  met.  thereby  detracting  from 
their  seriousness  of  purpo.se. 

Let  us  leave  no  doubt  that  all  coun- 
tries will  have  the  right  to  participate  in 
these  negotiations.  Of  course,  all  of  us 
are  prepared  to  examine  devices  to 
facilitate  our  work.  It  is  difficult  to 
imagine  the  essential  preparatory  work 
being  done  unless  such  devices  as  lim- 
ited working  groups  are  employed  in 
the  process. 

The  major  issues  enumerated  in  the 
resolution  can  certainly  be  interrelated. 
but  clearly  they  are  also  entitled  to 
different  priorities  and  different  time- 
tables of  progress.  In  a  serious  negoti- 
ation, the  different  parties  can  be  ex- 
pected to  use  their  negotiating  assets  to 
maximum  advantage,  and  in  that  sense 
I  have  always  understood  the  various 
attempts  to  link  the  apples  and  oranges 
of  past  negotiating  efforts.  Sometimes 
this  is  effective,  or  at  least  is  worth  the 
effort,  but  too  often  the  unhappy  result 
of  this  linkage  is  stalemate,  not  prog- 
ress. 

We  should  not  be  so  ambitious  as  to 
believe  that  if  these  global  negotiations 
take  place,  they  will  solve  all  of  our 
problems.  If  we  are  seeking  agreement, 
we  should  be  very  careful  about  condi- 
tioning progress  in  one  area  upon 
equivalent  progress  in  another.  Linkage 
may  be  good  for  sausage  makers,  but  it 
has  rarely  helped  progress  in  substan- 
tive negotiations  where  political  pres- 
sures are  an  important  element. 

As  has  been  already  said  in  this 
Assembly:  "Defining  the  problem 
constitutes  a  substantial  part  of  the 
solution."  Those  words  should  be  en- 
graved on  the  door  of  the  meeting  room 
of  the  Committee  of  the  Whole  if 
negotiations  in  the  spirit  of  the  G-77 
resolution  are  to  be  successful. 

If  this  Assembly  envisions  negotia- 
tions and  not  just  a  continuation  of  the 
present  dialogue,  then  all  participants 
should  be  expected  to  give  as  well  as 
take,  to  offer  as  well  as  demand,  to 
suggest  as  well  as  to  criticize,  and  to 
compromise  instead  of  censure. 

The  United  Nations  has  shown  that  it 
can  be  a  successful  negotiating  forum 
for  global  economic  issues.  The  com- 
mon fund  is  an  example  although  im- 
portant work  remains  to  be  done  before 
it  can  prove  its  possibilities.  What  we 
have  learned  in  this  multilateral  process 
is  clear:  The  issues  must  be  clearly  de- 
fined; substantive  experts  who  know 
the  problem  areas  must  be  important 
contributors  to  the  process;  those  who 
conduct  the  negotiations  must  have  a 
special  talent  to  see  the  faint  sparks  of 


possible  agreement  and  fan  them  gently 
into  flame;  the  strength  of  any  agree- 
ment in  these  fora  rests  on  consensus, 
and  with  goodwill  and  political  will  the 
nations  of  the  world  have  shown  that 
consensus  is  available  for  all  important 
decisions  in  significant  negotiations. 

And  one  further  lesson  all  of  us  have 
learned;  We  will  not  always  agree. 
That  is  the  nature  of  multilateral  life, 
and  we  should  understand  it.  We  can 
disagree  without  acrimony.  We  can 
disagree  and  even  understand  one 
another.  But  the  task  that  the  resolution 
calling  for  global  negotiations  gives  to 
us  is  to  find  areas  where  our  dis- 
agreements can  be  resolved,  where  our 
hopes  can  be  made  realities,  where 
progress  can  be  made  together. 

President  Carter  has  said:  "We  need 
to  share  responsibility  for  solving 
problems  and  not  to  divide  the  blame 
for  ignoring  the  problems."  This  is  the 
challenge  for  all  of  us  —  and  a  chal- 
lenge the  United  States  enthusiastically 
accepts.  n 


'  USUN  press  release  99. 


Kampuchean 
Credentials 

by  Richard  W .  Petree 

Statement  in  the  U.N.  General  As- 
sembly on  September  21.  1979.  Am- 
bassador Petree  is  U.S.  Alternate  Rep- 
resentative to  the  U.N.  for  Special 
Political  Affairs. ' 

The  matter  before  us  is  the  report  of 
the  Credentials  Committee.  We  can  ac- 
cept or  reject  that  report. 

The  proposal  of  India  contained  in 
document  A/34/63  is  not  an  amend- 
ment. It  does  not  merely  add  to  or  de- 
lete a  part  of  the  recommendation  of 
the  committee  as  required  by  Rule  90 
of  the  Rules  of  Procedure.  It  amounts 
to  producing  the  opposite  result  and 
consequently  constitutes  a  new  and 
separate  proposal. 

My  government  supports,  on  techni- 
cal grounds,  the  recommendation  of  the 
Credentials  Committee  to  accept  the 
credentials  of  the  representative  of  the 
Democratic  Kampuchean  authorities. 
In  the  absence  of  a  superior  claim,  the 
General  Assembly  should  seat  the  rep- 
resentatives of  the  government  whose 
credentials  were  accepted  by  the  pre- 
vious General  Assembly. 


58 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


Current  State 
of  the  World  Economy 


by  Robert  f).  Hormats 

Statement  to  the  U.N.  Committee  of 
the  Whole  on  September  II,  1979.  Mr. 
Hornidis  is  Deputy  Assistant  Secretary 
of  State  for  Economic  and  Business 
Affairs  and  U.S.  Representative  to  the 
committee. ' 

In  May  of  last  year,  this  committee 
began  its  substantive  work  with  a  re- 
view of  the  state  of  the  world  economy. 
A  considerable  number  of  delegations 
spoke  and  submitted  analytical  papers. 
Finally,  with  the  help  of  Under  Secre- 
tary General  Ripert  [Jean  Louis  Ripert 


of  France,  in  charge  of  the  U.N.  De- 
partment of  International  Economic  and 
Social  Affairs]  and  his  staff,  agreement 
was  reached  on  a  number  of  substantive 
paragraphs. 

Useful  as  this  exercise  was,  I  cannot 
but  feel  that  it  proceeded  in  somewhat 
of  a  vacuum.  The  committee  was  anx- 
ious to  get  on  with  its  discussion  of 
transfer  of  resources  and,  in  its  desire 
to  cover  all  aspects  of  this  question, 
left  no  time  for  reflection  on  the 
broader  subject.  Moreover,  we  did  not 
make  the  necessary  effort  to  link  the 
global  analysis  to  the  immediate  ques- 
tion. 


Credentials  (Cont'd) 

The  Heng  Samrin  regime,  installed 
and  maintained  by  Vietnam  through  its 
military  invasion  and  continuing  occu- 
pation of  Kampuchea,  does  not  present 
such  a  superior  claim.  This  conclusion 
parallels  the  position  taken  during  the 
Security  Council  meetings  held  in 
January  and  March  of  this  year  to  con- 
sider the  situation  in  Southeast  Asia 
and  is  one  supported  by  the  govern- 
ments of  the  region  which  are  most  di- 
rectly concerned  with  the  problem. 

However,  I  wish  to  make  it  abso- 
lutely clear  that  our  position  on  the 
technical  question  of  credentials  in  no 
way  implies  any  degree  of  support  or 
recognition  of  the  Pol  Pot  regime  itself 
or  approval  of  its  atrocious  practices. 
For  ?i  years  we  have  been  in  the  fore- 
front of  international  efforts  to  effect 
fundamental  changes  in  these  practices 
and  policies  by  peaceful  means.  We 
condemn  and  abhor  the  brutal  human 
rights  violations  which  have  taken 
place  under  the  Pol  Pot  regime  in 
Kampuchea.  We  have  spoken  against 
those  abuses  in  the  Security  Council,  in 
the  Human  Rights  Commission,  and  in 
the  General  Assembly,  and  I  reiterate 
that  condemnation  today.  The  brutal 
practices  of  the  Pol  Pot  regime  are 
clearly  contrary  to  internationally  ac- 
cepted principles  of  human  rights  as  set 
forth  in  the  U.N.  Charter  and  the  Uni- 
versal Declaration  of  Human  Rights. 

However,  the  so-called  Heng  Samrin 
regime,  both  because  it  was  imposed 
by  Vietnamese  military  force  on  the 
Khmer  people  and  because  of  its  treat- 
ment of  the  Khmer  people,  is  also  open 
to  condemnation.  One  indication  of 
that  regime's  cruel  attitude  toward  the 


Khmer  people  is  the  serious  threat  of 
famine  which  affects  over  2  million 
people  and  the  obstacles  which  the  re- 
gime continues  to  pose  to  an  effective 
international  relief  effort. 

Moreover,  in  the  case  of  the  Viet- 
namese invasion,  U.N.  members  con- 
front an  important  principle  of  the 
charter — the  sovereign  independence 
of  member  states.  The  United  Nations 
cannot  condone  the  action  of  one  na- 
tion to  invade,  occupy,  and  control  the 
internal  political  life  of  another. 

My  Government  believes  that  while 
it  is  incumbent  upon  the  General  As- 
sembly to  address  the  fundamental  is- 
sues involved  in  the  situation  in  Kam- 
puchea, this  is  not  the  time  to  do  so. 
We  believe  the  overall  human  rights 
situation  and  the  political  aspirations  of 
the  Khmer  people  need  further  investi- 
gation through  U.N.  machinery,  and 
there  will  be  appropriate  occasions  to 
deal  with  these  questions.  During  the 
consideration  of  the  item  of  the  situa- 
tion in  Kampuchea,  for  example,  my 
government  will  spell  out  in  greater 
detail  ideas  on  what  should  be  done  to 
deal  with  these  very  serious  problems. 

The  United  States  looks  forward  to 
working  with  the  governments  of  the 
region  and  with  all  U.N.  members  to 
encourage  withdrawal  of  Vietnamese 
troops,  an  end  to  outside  interference, 
and  emergence  of  a  genuinely  inde- 
pendent government  in  Kampuchea 
which  is  at  peace  with  its  neighbors, 
represents  the  aspirations  of  the  Khmer 
people,  and  respects  their  human 
rights.  D 


'USUN  press  release  81. 


This  is  not  intended  as  a  criticism 
Indeed,  since  our  first  days  as  a  com 
mittee,  we  have  done  much  to  find  ou 
way.   We  have  clarified  the  commit* 
tee's  mandate.  We  reached  agreement 
on  a  text  on  transfer  of  resources  thisi 
January  and  then  on  food  and  agricul 
ture  in  March.  We  should  continue  tc 
learn  from  experience  and  to  improve 
our  committee's  effectiveness. 

Discussions  and  resolutions  over  the 
last  5  years  have  shown  that  we  canno» 
construct  a  new  international  economic 
order  as  an  exercise  in  scholarship 
diplomacy,  or  even  justice.  We  mus. 
find  our  route  to  a  new  order  beginning; 
with  a  realistic  understanding  of  the 
current  state  of  the  world  economy 
Thus,  we  will  know  at  the  start  where 
action  is  needed  and  where  it  is  possi- 
ble. Further,  we  must  be  aware  that  no 
all  goals  are  obtainable  at  once  and  that 
the  identification  of  practical  objective; 
and  the  establishment  of  priorities  per 
mit  a  better  focus  more  conducive  to 
progress. 

I  would  add,  too,  that  the  essence  o'^ 
development  lies  not  in  the  adoption  oi 
texts.  If  our  efforts  are  to  be  of  rea: 
use,  they  must  be  translated  from  the 
theoretical,  and  indeed  the  diplomatic 
level,  into  day-to-day  policy  planning 
and  policymaking  in  our  individua 
countries.  This  applies  to  all  countrie: 
and  groups  of  countries.  The  ability  on 
any  one  of  them  to  do  what  is  needed  i: 
clearly  related  to  the  willingness  o; 
others  to  bear  their  share  of  the  burden 
as  well. 

Current  Statistics  and 
Policy  Problems 

For  most  countries  represented  here 
the  need  for  hard  thinking  about  ou« 
national  and  collective  futures  is  conn 
siderably  more  pressing  than  it  was 
when  we  began  these  exchanges  well 
over  a  year  ago.  This  is  certainly  true 
of  my  own  country. 

After  a  strong  increase  in  output  in 
the  last  quarter  of  1978,  the  anticipated 
leveling  off  of  our  economy  has  taken  a 
more  severe  turn  than  expected.  Oun 
real  gross  national  product  declined  by 
0.4%  in  the  first  half  of  this  year,  and 
there  are  expectations  that  negative 
growth  and  increases  in  unemployment 
will  continue  throughout  this  year.  At 
the  same  time,  inflation  in  our  country 
hit  an  annual  rate  of  10%  or  11%  foi 
the  year  as  a  whole  and  will  be  only 
somewhat  less  in  1980. 

On  the  external  side,  the  burden  ot 
the  additional  costs  of  imported  oil  will 
retard  the  progress  we  have  been  mak- 
ing in  reducing  our  current  account 
deficit.  However,  our  underlying  trend 
is  positive.  This,  coupled  with  appro- 


December  1979 


59 


priate  monetary  and  fiscal  policy,  can 
be  expected  to  assure  a  strong  dollar 
during  this  period. 

With  respect  to  the  economies  ot 
other  developed  countries,  while  no 
one  projects  a  decline  as  pronounced 
and  general  as  that  of  1974-75,  there 
has  been  a  distinct  worsening  in  pros- 
pects for  the  countries  of  the  Organiza- 
tion for  Economic  Cooperation  and 
Development  (OECD)  as  a  group.  In 
many  OECD  countries,  the  problem  of 
(he  1970's  has  been  a  slower  rate  of 
gn)wth  at  a  higher  rate  of  inflation  than 
in  the  1960's.  The  oil  price  increases 
(i\er  the  last  year  did  not  cause  these 
problems,  but  they  did  seriously  exac- 
erbate them  and  made  their  solution 
considerably  more  difficult.  In  all,  by 
the  end  of  1980,  the  cumulative  effects 
of  the  oil  price  increase  will  be  to  re- 
duce OECD  growth  by  l'/2-2  percent- 
age points  less  than  it  might  have  been. 
This  represents  some  $120  billion  in 
potential  OECD-country  goods  and 
services  lost  and  an  additional  2.8  mil- 
ium people  out  of  work.  Inflation  will 
increase  as  a  result  of  the  oil  price  in- 
crease by  2-2'/2  points  more  than  had 
been  projected  earlier.  Average  growth 
rates  are  now  expected  to  decline  to 
3%  in  1979  and  to  roughly  2%  in 
1480.  Inflation,  at  6.5%  for  the  group 
in  1978,  is  expected  to  hit  9.2%  in 
1479  and  could  remain  at  9%  in  1980. 

The  slower  growth  in  the  indus- 
trialized countries  will  translate  into 
reduced  markets  for  exports  from  de- 
\eloping  countries  and  increased  cur- 
rent account  deficits  for  many  of  them. 
As  in  1974-75,  some  developing 
countries  will  do  reasonably  well  de- 
spite the  slow  growth  in  developed 
countries  by  increasing  their  borrow- 
ings or  improving  the  competitiveness 
of  their  exports.  But  others,  particu- 
larly the  least  developed  countries,  will 
be  especially  injured.  Under  Secretary 
General  Ripert  has  made  a  useful  con- 
tribution in  describing  the  difficulties 
facing  the  developing  countries  in 
maintaining  growth  despite  current 
economic  problems.  These  difficulties 
include  the  rising  prices  of  energy  im- 
ports. But  energy  is  not  the  only  prob- 
lem facing  the  developing  countries, 
and  I  shall  turn  to  some  of  these  prob- 
lems a  bit  later. 

For  almost  all  countries,  the  conflu- 
ence of  economic  slowdown  and 
heightened  inflation  poses  difficult 
choices  among  policies  of  stimulation 
and  stabilization.  Too  much  economic 
contraction  could  lead  to  the  kind  of 
generalized  decline  that  occurred  in 
1974-75;  accelerating  growth  in  such  a 
way  as  to  strengthen  inflationary  pres- 
sures is  also  undesirable. 


Slower  Growth  in  the  Future? 

On  the  basis  of  current  projections,  it 
appears  that  industrialized  market 
economies  could  be  entering  a  period 
of  slower  growth,  accompanied  by 
levels  of  unemployment  and  inflation 
higher  than  those  to  which  we  had  ear- 
lier become  accustomed.  While  the 
immediate  situation  is  less  acute  than 
the  slump  of  1974-75,  it  is  accom- 
panied by  a  greater  awareness  that 
these  problems  may  be  with  us  in  one 
form  or  another  for  several  years. 

One  must  then  ask  why  we  face  the 
problems  of  slower  growth  with  high 
inflation.  A  central  reason  is  that  of 
supply  constraints.  Traditionally, 
economists  and  economic  policymakers 
have  focused  their  attention  on  prob- 
lems of  demand.  If  demand  could  be 
properly  managed  through  monetary 
and  fiscal  policies,  the  necessary 
supplies  would,  it  was  felt,  be  avail- 
able. 

In  recent  years,  however,  the  prob- 
lem of  supply  and  structural  rigidities 


Vetiiia 
Homeiand 


by  Herbert  K.  Re  is 

Statement  in  the  Security  Council  on 
September  21.  1979.  Mr.Reisis  U.S. 
Alternate  Representative  to  the  Secu- 
rity Council. ' 

The  United  States  would  like  to 
commend  you  for  calling  the  attention 
of  the  international  community  to  this 
latest  attempt  by  South  Africa  to  grant 
a  fraudulent  independence  to  another  of 
the  tribal  homelands.  We  wish  to  reaf- 
firm that  the  policy  of  the  United  States 
is  to  withhold  recognition  and  all  forms 
of  official  relations  from  the  so-called 
independent  homelands  of  Transkei  and 
Bophutatswana  already  created  by 
South  Africa.  We  shall  apply  the  same 
strict  policy  to  Venda. 

My  country  fully  supports  the  spirit 
and  thrust  of  your  statement.  We  take 
its  main  point  that  there  is  no  such  en- 
tity as  Venda;  that  the  territory  which 
South  Africa  chooses  to  call  Venda  is 
in  fact  an  integral  part  of  South  Africa. 
We  agree  with  this  position.  We  will 
treat  Venda  exactly  as  we  treat  South 
Africa.  D 


'  USUN  press  release  82. 


and  the  uncertainties  they  bring  with 
them  have  become  major  factors  in 
higher  inflation  and  slower  growth. 
Seen  in  a  macroeconomic  way,  this  is  a 
matter  of  a  mismatch  between  old,  but 
available,  capacities  and  new  demand. 
Thus,  in  some  cases  countries  run  up 
against  constraints  imposed  by  lack  of 
availability  of  skilled  labor,  manufac- 
turing capacity,  raw  materials,  or 
energy  at  lower  growth  rates  than  in  the 
past.  From  a  microeconomic  view- 
point, we  have  the  image  of  a  busi- 
nessman who  is  unsure  of  the  avail- 
ability of  human  or  material  inputs 
necessary  for  his  products.  Because  of 
these  doubts — to  which  may  be  added 
market  uncertainties  due  to  inflationary 
expectation,  import  barriers,  and  ex- 
change rate  fluctuations — his  attitude 
toward  investments  grows  more  cau- 
tious. New  facilities  are  not  built;  re- 
search and  development  may  be  ne- 
glected. The  result  is  a  further  decline 
in  the  rate  of  increase  of  productivity. 
Supply  constraints  tighten  further,  and 
even  lower  levels  of  growth  trigger 
new  inflationary  pressures. 

Another  reason  for  current  problems 
is  the  near  institutionalization  of  the 
wage-price  spiral.  Wage  increases, 
which  once  bore  a  direct  relation  to  in- 
creases in  productivity,  now  relate 
statistically,  and  even  formally  in  many 
cases,  to  present  or  anticipated  rises  in 
prices.  These  increases,  in  turn,  are 
passed  on  again  to  the  consumer,  and 
the  spiral  begins  all  over  again.  Pro- 
ductivity increases,  even  at  a  good 
rate,  cannot  keep  pace. 

In  many  cases,  countries  have  cho- 
sen policies  of  growth  moderation  in 
order  to  reduce  the  rate  of  inflation  or 
avoid  rekindling  inflationary  pressures 
which  would  occur  by  attempting  to 
achieve  growth  rates  which  would 
bump  up  against  supply  constraints. 

One  difficulty  with  slower  growth, 
of  course,  is  that  new  jobs  are  created 
at  a  slower  pace,  and  new  investment 
which  increases  productivity  and  helps 
reduce  supply  constraints  does  not  take 
place  at  a  desirable  rate.  While  the 
main  effects  of  this  are  domestic,  it 
also  means  less  scope  for  adjusting  to 
new  imports  from  abroad.  Thus  slow 
growth  both  slows  demand  for  imports 
and  reduces  the  capacity  to  adjust  to 
imports  —  leading  to  inevitable  protec- 
tionist pressures.  This  has  obvious 
negative  implications  for  export  and 
development  prospects  in  developing 
countries. 

Finally,  and  of  particular  concern  to 
the  most  disadvantaged  countries,  is 
the  question  of  concessional  assistance 
flows.  All  developed  market  economy 
countries,  whether  or  not  they  have 
formally  accepted  specific  targets,  are 


60 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


pledged  to  continue  to  increase  flows 
of  such  assistance,  particularly  to 
low-income  countries  whose  access  to 
capital  is  limited. 

In  the  United  States,  the  emphasis  on 
helping  the  low-income  countries  and 
in  eliminating  world  poverty  is  not  only 
the  policy  of  the  Administration  hut  the 
desire  of  our  Congress  and  our  people 
as  well.  This  national  commitment 
stems  from  our  belief  that  growth  and 
equity,  for  the  world  as  a  whole  and  for 
each  country,  are  inseparable.  It  was 
for  this  reason  that  we  supported  es- 
tablishment of  the  International  Mone- 
tary Fund  (IMF)  Trust  Fund,  endorsed 
special  benefits  in  the  multilateral  trade 
negotiations  (MTN)  for  least  developed 
countries,  are  directing  much  of  our  aid 
to  the  special  problems  of  the  low- 
income  countries,  and  were  pleased  to 
join  in  the  consensus  for  special  action 
for  the  least  developed  countries  at 
UNCTAD  V  [U.N.  Conference  on 
Trade  and  Development]. 

Our  commitments  with  regard  to  as- 
sistance to  the  developing  nations  re- 
main unchanged.  Yet,  it  takes  no 
political  or  economic  wizardry  to  see 
that  when  budgetary  restraint  is  called 
for,  when  domestic  welfare  demands 
grow  and  the  revenue  base  shrinks, 
obtaining  the  necessary  appropriations 
is  more  difficult. 

Should  the  world  follow  a  scenario 
of  low  growth  such  as  I  have  outlined, 
we  all  know  it  would  produce  grim  ef- 
fects on  developing  countries — with 
tragic  effects  on  their  peoples.  Cer- 
tainly, in  those  countries,  demand  for 
goods  would  slow,  their  imports  would 
cost  more,  and  aid  would  be  tighter.  In 
addition,  a  decline  in  growth  in  the  de- 
veloping countries  would  impact  ad- 
versely on  the  prosperity  of  the  indus- 
trialized market  and  Socialist  countries 
whose  economic  prospects  are  in- 
creasingly dependent  upon  the  expan- 
sion of  the  economies  of  the  develop- 
ing countries. 

In  our  interdependent  world,  the  cir- 
cle is  complete.  We  cannot  spend  our 
time  looking  back  at  one  group  of 
countries  or  another  and  saying  your 
growth  is  too  low,  your  inflation  is  too 
high,  your  aid  is  too  low,  your  oil 
prices  went  up  too  sharply.  The  question 
is,  rather,  what  together  we  can  do  to 
reverse  this  kind  of  scenario,  and  to  re- 
place it  with  one  of  new,  sustained, 
mutually  beneficial  and  equitable 
growth? 


International  Responses 

Much  work  already  has  been  done 
which  will  enable  the  international 
community  to  respond  better  to  the 


present  situation  than  it  did  to  the  situ- 
ation in  1974-75. 

•  The  IMF — as  a  result  of  major  in- 
creases in  its  resources,  creation  of  the 
Witteveen  facility,  modifications  in  its 
approach  to  conditionality,  and  a  sig- 
nificant liberalization  of  the  Compens- 
atory Finance  Facility — is  in  a  vastly 
better  position  to  support  efforts  of 
countries  to  reduce  payments  imbal- 
ances. 

•  The  large  payments  deficits  of 
some  developed  countries,  which 
forced  them  earlier  to  draw  heavily  on 
the  Fund  and  borrow  large  amounts  in 
international  capital  markets,  have 
been  reduced. 

•  The  large  surpluses  of  some  in- 
dustrialized countries,  which  were 
matched  by  deficits  on  the  part  of  other 
countries,  have  been  in  many  cases  re- 
duced or  eliminated. 

•  The  recently  concluded  MTN  have 
resulted  in  a  more  liberal  trading 
system — one  based  on  rules  which  re- 
duce the  potential  for  arbitrary  in- 
creases in  trade  barriers.  These  have 
led  to  important  benefits  for  developing 
nations.  Contrary  to  assertions,  there 
is,  as  the  result  of  the  MTN,  consid- 
erably less,  not  more,  protection  in  the 
world  today  than  in  the  past. 

•  The  system  of  generalized  tariff 
preferences  has  led  to  important  im- 
provements in  market  access  for  de- 
veloping countries.  In  my  country 
alone,  over  $5  billion  in  imports  came 
in  under  the  GSP  system  in  1978. 

•  Substantial  increases  in  contribu- 
tions to  the  multilateral  development 
banks  have  been  made  by  developed 
countries  and  the  Organization  of  Pe- 
troleum Exporting  Countries,  and 
commitments  for  still  greater  contribu- 
tions have  been  undertaken. 

•  Agreements  have  been  reached  on 
measures  to  stabilize  prices  in  tin, 
sugar,  and  coffee. 

Together,  these  developments  con- 
stitute an  important  set  of  structural 
improvements  in  the  international 
economy  and  a  major  response  by  in- 
ternational institutions  to  needs  of  de- 
veloping nations.  We  must  continue  to 
press  ahead  in  seeking  improvement  of 
international  economic  mechanisms. 
This  means  moving  forward  on  key  is- 
sues we  have  been  negotiating  in  many 
forums,  such  as: 

•  Full  implementation  of  the  agree- 
ments reached  at  the  MTN,  including 
the  various  codes; 

•  In  that  context,  agreement  on  the 
outstanding  issue  of  safeguards  in  a 
way  which  does  not  discriminate 
against  individual  countries; 

•  Agreements  on  international  grain 
reserves,   on  food  aid   levels,   and  on 


means  of  furthering  food  production  in 
developing  countries; 

•  Agreement  on  the  articles  of  a 
common  fund,  together  with  further 
progress  in  individual  commodity 
negotiations; 

•  Follow-up  to  the  agreed  conclu- 
sions of  the  U.N.  Conference  on  Sci- 
ence and  Technology  for  Development 
(UNCSTD); 

•  A  speedy  implementation  of  the 
measures  in  favor  of  the  least  de- 
veloped and  other  categories  of  de- 
veloping countries  which  were  agreed 
on  at  UNCTAD  V; 

•  Conclusion  of  a  treaty  on  illicit 
payments; 

•  Conclusion  of  the  codes  relating  to 
transfer  of  technology,  transnational 
corporations,  and  restrictive  business 
practices; 

•  Agreement  on  mechanisms  to 
promote  the  production  of  both  con- 
ventional and  nonrenewable  energy  in 
developing  countries;  and 

•  Further  improvements  in  the  IMF 
and  making  good  use  of  the  already 
major  improvements  in  the  interna- 
tional trust  fund  which  have  taken 
place  in  recent  years. 

As  we  make  or  add  to  such  lists, 
however,  we  must  avoid  the  temptation 
to  believe  that  the  primary  answers  to 
economic  problems  lie  in  international 
discussion  and  agreement.  We  can  and 
will  reach  agreements  here  and  else- 
where, but  the  present  economic  situa- 
tion I  have  outlined  suggests  that  the 
most  important  answers  are  to  be  found 
and  implemented  at  home,  in  all  of  our 
countries. 


Structural  Change 
in  World  Industry 

Factors  Supporting  Industrializa- 
tion. The  industrialized  countries  have 
particularly  important  responsibilities 
at  the  present  time.  Clearly  my  country 
and  others  share  the  objective  of  curb- 
ing inflation  and  resuming  the  path  to- 
ward stable  growth.  But  beyond  this  is 
the  goal  of  structural  adjustment 
through  an  expansion  of  industrial 
capacity  in  sectors  with  a  promising 
future.  Through  such  an  expansion, 
new  jobs  will  be  created,  and  our  flag- 
ging rate  of  productivity  growth  can  be 
revived.  To  accomplish  this,  we  need 
greater  savings,  more  investment,  par- 
ticularly in  research  and  development 
and  in  new  facilities,  and  greater  mo- 
bility of  resources.  In  developed  and 
developing  countries  alike,  savings  are 
often  discouraged  by  policies  directed 
to  achieve  other  objectives. 

Because  we  are  this  week  addressing 
the  industrial  development  of  develop- 


December  1979 


61 


ing  countries,  it  is  particularly  appro- 
priate to  note  that  countries  successful 
in  pursuing  industrialization  strategies 
and  competing  in  the  international 
economy  have  been  those  where 
policies  encourage  a  high  rate  of  sav- 
ings and  investment.  Other  key  factors, 
identified  by  recent  studies  carried  out 
under  the  aegis  of  the  U.N.  Industrial 
Development  Organization  (UNIDO) 
include:  the  efficient  utilization  of 
human  and  physical  capital;  educa- 
tional and  training  programs  relevant  to 
the  industrial  and  technological  needs 
of  the  individual  country;  the  encour- 
agement of  entrepreneurship;  and  the 
availability  of  a  commercial  infra- 
structure including  banking,  market  re- 
search, and  other  services. 

No  doubt,  the  examination  of  the  in- 
dustrial achievements  of  countries  such 
as  South  Korea,  Singapore,  and  Brazil 
might  suggest  other  factors  as  well. 
What  is  clear  from  their  experience, 
however,  is  that  the  world  economy 
today  provides  significant  opportunities 
for  developing  nations  to  compete.  The 
success  of  such  countries — rather  than 
any  internationally  mandated  rede- 
ployment of  industry — has  given  an 
important  impetus  to  global  change. 

I     The  Role  of  Positive  Adjustment. 

The  commitment  to  a  progressive  shift 
to  more  positive  adjustment  policies,  as 
an  integrated  part  of  efforts  for  more 
sustained  and  better  balanced  global 
growth,  was  made  by  the  OECD  Min- 
isters in  June  1978  and  reconfirmed  at 
their  meeting  in  June  1979.  It  was  also 
an  important  focus  of  the  Tokyo  eco- 
nomic summit. 

Positive  adjustment  policies  mean 
more  than  just  palliatives  to  ease  the 

1  burden  of  change  on  workers,  enter- 
prises, and  communities  most  directly 
affected  by  it.  They  facilitate  the  de- 
velopment of  new  facilities  to  employ 
the  resources  freed  through  the  play  of 
comparative  advantage  in  international 
trading  patterns. 

The  United  States  and  other  OECD 
governments  are  working  together  to 
develop  sound  and  effective  positive 
adjustment  policies.  One  aspect  of 
positive  adjustment  policies  is  trade 
adjustment  assistance.  The  United 
States  has  an  active  program  of  trade 
adjustment  assistance  for  industries  and 
workers  injured  by  increased  imports. 

Mn  1975  a  greatly  improved  program 
was  put  into  effect.  Since  1975  benefits 
of  over  $724  million  have  been  ex- 
tended to  more  than  458,000  workers. 

[Over  100  U.S.  firms  have  received 
$150  million  in  loans,  guarantees,  and 
technical  assistance  to  facilitate  their 
adjustment.  Our  government  is  seeking 
to  make  trade  adjustment  assistance 


even  more  dynamic  and  forward  look- 
ing. 

Enhanced  efforts  to  stimulate  posi- 
tive adjustment  represent  an  important 
new  challenge.  There  is  a  hard-to- 
define  line  between  facilitating  change 
which  is  basically  in  response  to  mar- 
ket forces  and  artificially  stimulating 
economic  developments  which  may,  in 
fact,  be  contrary  to  these  forces  and, 
therefore,  create  inefficiency  in  the 
long  run.  If  the  commitment  to  positive 
adjustment  of  the  OECD  governments 
is  to  be  fully  realized,  however,  we 
must  do  everything  feasible  to  facilitate 
orderly  structural  change.  In  this  way, 
we  can  assure  that  positive  trends  of 
the  past  can  be  further  accelerated.  For 
example,  total  OECD  imports  of  man- 
ufactures from  developing  countries 
rose  from  $11.7  billion  in  1972  to 
about  $27  billion  in  1978,  an  annual 
rate  of  21%.  Moreover,  this  figure 
should  increase  substantially  in  the  fu- 
ture since  manufactured  exports  as  a 
share  of  total  developing  country  ex- 
ports may  rise  from  the  current  level  of 
40%  to  55%  in  1985. 

Mutual  Responsibilities  for  Ex- 
panding Global  Trade.  The  responsi- 
bility for  such  change  in  world  indus- 
trial trade  does  not  rest  with  the  indus- 
trialized countries  alone.  New  jobs  and 
new  opportunities  for  workers  and  cap- 
ital can  only  exist  in  a  situation  of  ex- 
panding world  trade.  While  an  open 
trading  system  in  the  "North"  will  in- 
sure growing  import  demand,  the 
greatest  new  impetus  to  world  trade  can 
come  from  the  developing  world.  The 
importance  developing  countries  are 
giving  to  increasing  exchanges  with 
each  other,  and  the  growing  flow  of 
goods  of  all  categories  between  North 
and  South,  indicate  a  potential  for  a 
new  configuration  and  a  new  dynamism 
to  world  trade  in  which  the  role  of  de- 
veloping countries  will  be  far  more 
important. 

For  this  to  happen,  however,  a 
common  basis  for  global  trade  must  be 
maintained  and  strengthened.  The 
Geneva  agreements,  terminating  the 
Tokyo  Round,  are  the  most  recent  and 
significant  steps  in  this  process.  How- 
ever, the  agreements  and  the  codes 
which  were  developed  at  the  MTN 
represent  the  end  only  of  a  negotiation. 
The  codes  are  a  new  beginning  to  a 
more  open  international  trading  sys- 
tem. Their  successful  implementation 
domestically  and  internationally  will 
insure  that  their  further  evolution  opens 
new  avenues  of  trade.  In  the  long  run, 
it  is  this  evolution  which  will  deter- 
mine the  nature  of  change  in  world 
trading  patterns.  The  developing  coun- 
tries have  an  opportunity  to  exert  a  sig- 


nificant influence  on  this  process.  They 
and  the  developed  nations  lose  if  they 
do  not.  My  government  renews  its  ap- 
peal to  them  not  to  stand  aside  from 
this  process  but  to  bring  to  it  the  en- 
hanced participation  which  we  have  all 
recognized  as  essential  in  a  more  pros- 
perous and  just  world  order. 

Consistent  with  the  common  interest 
our  nations  have  in  expanded  trade 
must  be  the  willingness  of  the  de- 
veloping countries,  as  they  indus- 
trialize, to  open  their  borders  to  the 
products  of  others. 

One  of  the  characteristics  of  the  ear- 
lier phase  of  expansion  of  world  trade, 
which  still  remains  true  of  trade  among 
developed  countries  today,  is  the  mas- 
sive exchange  of  manufactured  goods 
among  economies  that  are  on  similar 
levels  of  development.  This  has  pro- 
moted economies  of  scale  and  has  cer- 
tainly provided  for  levels  of  welfare  far 
higher  than  would  have  existed  had 
each  country  tried  to  meet  all  of  its 
own  demand.  Despite  this  history, 
statistics  show  that  only  one-fifth  of 
trade  in  manufactures  among  develop- 
ing countries  is  among  countries  having 
the  same  level  of  industrial  develop- 
ment. This  suggests  that  some  of  these 
countries  are  not  extending  to  others  in 
similar  situations  and,  ultimately,  their 
own  people  as  well,  the  benefits  of 
economies  of  scale  and  regional  inte- 
gration. 

Developing  countries  also  have  rea- 
sons to  open  their  doors  further  to  the 
exports  of  developed  countries.  First, 
consumers  in  developing  countries 
would  obviously  benefit.  In  addition,  I 
need  only  point  out  that  theoretical  and 
statistical  arguments  demonstrating  the 
minimal  effects  of  economic  displace- 
ment through  imports  from  developing 
countries  will  not  be  convincing  to  af- 
fected workers  and  industries  in  de- 
veloped countries  if  new  market  op- 
portunities for  their  goods  cannot  be 
shown.  In  short,  if  industrial  produc- 
tion and  exports  in  each  developing 
country  are  to  increase,  so  too  must  the 
individual  and  collective  willingness  of 
developing  countries  to  absorb  each 
other's  exports  and  the  exports  of  the 
developed  countries. 

Responsibility  for 
the  Earth's  Resources 

Raw  materials,  energy,  and  the  basic 
qualities  of  the  land  and  sea  are  critical 
elements  in  the  problem  of  supply. 
With  regard  to  the  first,  the  World 
Bank  has  noted  that  inadequate  incen- 
tives and  low  investment  priorities 
have  been  accorded  primary  com- 
modities in  developing  countries  in  re- 
cent years.  While  each  nation  may  have 


62 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


its  own  view  on  the  reasons  for  this  de- 
velopment, there  is  no  doubt  that,  in 
the  longer  term,  it  could  lead  to  critical 
shortages. 

To  head  these  off,  both  national  and 
international  action  is  required.  Com- 
modity agreements  and  compensatory 
financing  facilities  should  lessen  the 
risks  to  developing  countries  in  further 
developing  their  raw  materials  poten- 
tial. Each  country,  however,  must 
make  its  own  decision  on  whether  it 
wants  foreign  investment  and,  if  so, 
create  a  well-understood  and  dependa- 
ble set  of  conditions  to  promote  such 
investment.  A  code  of  conduct  provid- 
ing guidelines  that  reflect  the  interests 
of  all  can  certainly  be  helpful  in  this 
regard. 

Earlier  in  this  discussion,  I  noted  the 
greater  awareness  we  now  have  of  the 
fundamental  problem  of  limited  supply 
and  growing  world  demand  for  oil. 
Neither  individual  states  nor  the  inter- 
national community  as  a  whole  can  be 
said  to  have  fully  responded  to  this 
major  concern.  At  the  Tokyo  economic 
summit,  leaders  of  a  number  of  indus- 
trialized democracies  undertook  a  bold 
set  of  commitments  to  limit  oil  imports 
and  increase  energy  production  and 
conservation.  In  my  own  country, 
agreement  between  the  executive  and 
legislative  branches  on  a  national  pro- 
gram of  energy  conservation  and  de- 
velopment has  proved  elusive.  We  ex- 
pect, however,  that  in  response  to 
President  Carter's  policy  pronounce- 
ments of  this  July,  the  Congress  will 
take  action  to  insure  the  achievement  of 
our  national  energy  objectives. 

Oil  exporters  have  a  parallel  respon- 
sibility, while  efforts  at  enhanced  con- 
servation and  the  search  for  new  energy 
sources  are  taking  place,  to  be  more 
sensitive  to  the  impact  of  their  actions 
on  the  world  economy.  Many  of  us 
may  be  reluctant  to  recognize  publicly 
the  disruptive  impact  of  the  energy 
situation  on  the  international  economy. 
However,  a  discussion  of  the  problems 
of  the  world  economy,  and  of  the  de- 
veloping countries  in  particular,  with- 
out such  recognition  would  be  as  in- 
complete as  an  attempt  to  understand 
the  problems  faced  by  Noah  without 
mentioning  the  fact  that  it  rained. 

I  mention  energy  not  because  I  in- 
tend that  it  be  a  divisive  issue.  On  the 
contrary,  it  is  a  global  problem  which 
should  unite  all  of  our  countries  in  a 
common  effort  to  insure  more  stable 
energy  markets,  the  absence  of  supply 
and  price  disruption,  increased  conser- 
vation, and  a  more  vigorous  search  for 
new  sources. 

One  point  on  which  we  can  all  agree 
was  underlined  by  the  Secretary  Gen- 
eral of  the  United  Nations — the  need  to 


help  developing  countries  increase 
energy  production.  In  many  cases,  their 
economic  prospects  will  depend  in- 
creasingly on  their  ability  to  meet  more 
of  their  energy  needs  from  domestic 
production  than  on  any  other  single 
factor.  Assisting  them  to  develop  new 
sources  of  both  conventional  and  non- 
conventional  energy  is  in  the  interest  of 
the  entire  international  community. 

An  issue  on  which  there  has  been 
veritable  international  agreement  is  that 
of  food.  Many  of  our  countries  are 
currently  cooperating  actively  to  en- 
hance agricultural  research  to  help  de- 
veloping countries  increase  food  pro- 
duction, to  reduce  postharvest  food 
losses,  and  increase  food  assistance. 
We  welcome  the  recent  decision  of  the 
World  Food  Council  to  assist  develop- 
ing countries  elaborate  comprehensive 
food  sector  strategies  which  can  lead  to 
increased  production  and  improved 
distribution,  particularly  for  nutri- 
tionally vulnerable  groups.  Greater  ef- 
forts are  clearly  required.  One  out  of 
every  five  of  our  fellow  human  beings 
is  sick  or  weak  or  hungry  because  he  or 
she  simply  does  not  have  enough  to 
eat.  No  nation,  no  person  can  feel  that 
equity  is  served  while  this  problem  per- 
sists; each  of  our  nations  can  and  must 
do  more  to  eliminate  it. 

There  are  other  key  natural  resources 
which  do  not  normally  enter  into  inter- 
national commerce.  I  refer  to  forests, 
arable  cropland,  water,  and  even  the  air 
we  breathe.  We  are  living  in  a  period 
of  desertification  and  deforestation.  We 
have  held  a  U.N.  conference  on  that 
theme.  Major  causes  of  these  problems 
are  the  stripping  of  forests  for  firewood 
and  the  depletion  of  the  soil  because  of 
overuse,  lack  of  irrigation,  and  higher 
price  of  fertilizers.  We  must  address 
these  problems  both  as  part  of  the 
global  energy  and  food  problems  and 
also  as  a  transcendental  issue  which,  if 
not  reversed  soon,  can  dramatically 
affect  the  global  environment  and 
economy  for  decades  to  come. 

The  International  Dialogue 

There  will  be  much  discussion  dur- 
ing this  week  of  the  form  the  interna- 
tional economic  dialogue  is  to  take  as 
we  move  into  the  1980's.  We  agree 
with  the  Secretary  General  of  the 
United  Nations  that  new  institutional 
arrangements  are  not  substitutes  for 
addressing  real  substantive  issues.  New 
institutions  should  be  created  if  they 
are  needed.  But  in  assessing  their  need, 
we  would  want  to  insure  that  they 
would  not  duplicate  the  work  of  exist- 
ing bodies.  We  would  want  to  be  con- 
vinced that  they  would  provide  oppor- 
tunities that  do  not  now  exist  for  prog- 


ress in  the  dialogue.  Moreover,  we' 
would  need  to  take  into  account  the  ex- 
pense, both  in  financial  and  human 
terms,  of  establishing  new  bodies,  par- 
ticularly since  work  will  continue 
elsewhere. 

We  believe  that  the  record  indicates 
that  advances  have  been  made  on  many 
important  North-South  issues.  Yester- 
day Under  Secretary  General  Corea 
[Gamina  Corea  of  Sri  Lanka,  Director 
General  of  UNCTAD]  identified  the 
progress  made  at  the  Manila  meeting 
and  in  UNCTAD's  other  fora;  we,  too, 
think  progress  has  been  made.  Wt.r 
agree  with  Executive  Director  Khane" 
[Abd-el  Rahman  Khane  of  Algeria,! 
Executive  Director  of  UNIDO]  that  the| 
UNIDO  consultations  have  proved! 
useful  and  that  their  sector  focus  andi 
broad  participation  are  conducive  toi 
meaningful  progress.  We  share  yourll^ 
judgment  that  the  Committee  of  the 
Whole  is  demonstrating  increasing  ef- 
fectiveness in  addressing  specific  items 
of  common  interest.  And  we  can  take 
considerable  satisfaction  from  the-, 
major  improvements  in  the  IMF.  the'l 
increased  lending  of  the  multilateral 
development  hanks,  the  trade  liberali- 
zation in  the  MTN,  and  the  structural 
changes  in  the  world  economy  resulting 
from  countries  taking  advantage  of  new 
opportunities. 

The  importance  of  the  future  of  the 
dialogue,  and  the  long-term  conse- 
quences of  our  decisions,  argue.  I  be- 
lieve, that  we  not  try  to  reach  a  defini- 
tive answer  this  week  on  the  proposi- 
tion before  us.  Instead,  over  the  nexi 
weeks,  we  should  reflect  on  whether  a 
new  round  of  global  negotiations  will 
strengthen  our  dialogue  and  enhance  its 
utility  or  whether,  on  the  contrary,  it 
risks  diverting  attention  and  energy 
from  those  arenas  where  the  dialogue  is 
now  going  on  and  where,  as  noted, 
progress  is  being  made,  as  the  technical 
and  political  obstacles  are  sorted  out 
and  overcome.  When  these  points  are 
clear,  we  will  be  better  able  to  decide! 
together  on  the  most  appropriate  means 
by  which  we  can  seek  to  deal  effec- 
tively with  global  economic  problems 
to  our  common  benefit.  Once  agree 
ment  has  been  reached  on  this,  you  can 
count  on  the  United  States  to  play  an 
active  and  constructive  role.  D 


'USUN  press  release  77  of  Sept.  12,  1979. 


December  1979 


63 


I7.]V.  Reforms 


by  Charles  William  Maynes 

Statement  before  the  Subcommittee 
on  Arms  Control  and  International  Op- 
erations of  the  Senate  Foreign  Rela- 
tions Committee  on  October  26,  1979. 
Mr.  Maynes  is  Assistant  Secretary  for 
International  Organization  Affairs.^ 

I  appreciate  your  invitation  to  appear 
before  this  subcommittee  to  discuss  our 
ongoing  efforts  to  bring  reform  and 
improved  functioning  to  the  United 
Nations. 

As  you  icnow,  we  have  made  a  num- 
ber of  specific  proposals  and  sugges- 
tions on  U.N.  reform  in  the  Secretary 
of  State's  report  to  the  President  and 
the  President's  report  to  Congress  on 
U.N.  Reform  and  Restructuring  in 
March  1978.  Since  you  are  familiar 
with  these  reports,  1  will  focus  on  some 
of  the  most  important  areas  for  reform. 

In  some,  such  as  improving  the 
functioning  and  effectiveness  of  the 
General  Assembly,  progress  has  been 
made.  In  others  such  as  enhancing  the 
role  of  the  Security  Council  and  the 
peacekeeping  operations  of  the  United 
Nations  and  in  the  area  of  human 
rights,  more  progress  needs  to  be 
made.  In  yet  others,  such  as  the 
peaceful  settlement  of  disputes  and  use 
of  the  International  Court  of  Justice, 
progress  is  decidedly  too  slow. 

Improved  Procedures 
of  the  General  Assembly 

There  has  been  marked  improvement 
in  the  functioning  and  effectiveness  of 
the  U.N.  General  Assembly.  As  I 
stated  in  testimony  before  the  House 
Foreign  Affairs  Subcommittee  on  Sep- 
tember 13,  the  Secretary  General  has 
issued  a  report  outlining  suggestions 
and  recommendations  for  making  the 
General  Assembly  more  efficient.  The 
report  incorporated  many  of  our  own 
proposals  and  has  already  had  a  posi- 
tive influence  on  the  work  of  the  cur- 
rent session  of  the  Assembly.  The  Gen- 
eral Committee  of  the  34th  General 
Assembly  recommended  that  the 
Assembly  approve  the  suggestions  and 
recommendations  of  Secretary  General 
Waldheim  on  the  organization  of  the 
session,  and  on  September  21  the  Gen- 
eral Assembly  adopted  those  recom- 
mendations. 

A  key  element  of  the  Secretary  Gen- 
eral's proposals  is  the  recommendation 


on  ways  the  General  (Steering)  Com- 
mittee may  be  used  to  advance  the  ra- 
tional organization  and  general  conduct 
of  the  Assembly's  proceedings.  This 
calls  for  having  the  committee  reg- 
ularly review  the  progress  of  work  of 
the  session  and  for  staggering  the  con- 
sideration of  items  over  2  or  more 
years. 

Other  important  proposals  included 
in  the  report  were  the  early  selection  of 
candidates  for  election  to  the  General 
Committee  so  that  presiding  officers 
and  the  committee  itself  might  prepare 
more  thoroughly  for  upcoming  ses- 
sions; the  requirement  that  candidates 
for  presiding  officer  have  2  years'  prior 
experience  in  the  U.N.  system;  and  that 
committee  officers  conduct,  whenever 
appropriate,  informal  negotiations 
aimed  at  reaching  agreement  on  spe- 
cific issues.  Several  of  the  main  com- 
mittees of  the  General  Assembly  have 
already  implemented  this  latter  pro- 
posal. 

The  United  States  and  numerous 
other  member  nations  have  been  con- 
cerned by  the  organizational  chaos  that 
affected  last  year's  session.  We  believe 
the  Secretary  General's  report,  and  the 
action  of  the  Assembly  in  approving  it, 
will  have  a  major  positive  effect  on  this 
and  future  General  Assemblies. 


Enhancing  the  Role 
of  the  Security  Council 

The  President's  report  on  U.N.  re- 
form put  forward  a  cluster  of  proposals 
to  strengthen  the  role  of  the  Security 
Council  in  encouraging  and  assisting  in 
the  peaceful  resolution  of  disputes 
threatening  international  peace  and  se- 
curity. These  proposals  are  designed  to 
identify  areas  of  threats  to  peace  and  to 
explore  actions  the  Security  Council 
might  take  to  defuse  potential  crises. 

Our  proposals  include: 

•  Greater  use  of  informal  meetings 
or  consultations  among  members  of  the 
Security  Council  on  particular  disputes; 

•  Greater  use  of  periodic  meetings — 
perhaps,  as  foreseen  in  Article  28  of 
the  Charter,  with  participation  of  offi- 
cials for  capitals; 

•  Greater  use  of  informal  consulta- 
tions of  the  Council;  and 

•  More  frequent  use  of  committees 
of  the  Council  comprised  either  of  all 
Council  members  or  a  few  members  of 
the  Council,  as  well  as  periodic  oral 


reports  by  the  Secretary  General  to  in- 
formal sessions  of  the  Council. 

In  preparation  for  this  session  of  the 
General  Assembly,  we  have  devoted 
increased  attention  in  our  bilateral  dis- 
cussions to  enhancing  the  role  of  the 
Security  Council.  I  personally  partici- 
pated in  consultations  with  officials  of 
the  Soviet  Union  and  the  People's  Re- 
public of  China  and  found  them  sup- 
portive of  several  of  our  proposals.  We 
have  also  seen  a  growing  appreciation, 
on  part  of  other  members  of  the  Coun- 
cil, of  the  need  for  a  broadened  infor- 
mal role  for  the  Council. 


Strengthening  Peacekeeping 
Capabilities 

U.N.  peacekeeping  operations  are 
among  the  most  successful — and  un- 
heralded— of  the  U.N.  activities.  There 
were,  until  the  U.N.  Emergency  Force 
completed  its  mandate  on  the  Sinai, 
almost  13.000  officers  and  men  from 
27  nations  involved  in  six  separate 
U.N.  peacekeeping  operations.  The 
technique  of  peacekeeping  is  one  of  the 
true  contributions  of  the  U.N.  member- 
ship to  the  maintenance  of  international 
peace  and  security. 

We  continue  to  seek  support  for  our 
proposals  which  we  feel  would 
strengthen  the  U.N.'s  peacekeeping 
capabilities.  For  example,  our  propos- 
als for  a  U.N.  peacekeeping  reserve 
and  for  the  training  of  standby  units 
and  observers  would  make  U.N. 
peacekeeping  operations  more  flexible 
and  effective  and  less  expensive. 

We  have  introduced  our  proposals  on 
peacekeeping  in  the  Special  Committee 
on  the  Charter  of  the  United  Nations 
and  in  the  Special  Committee  on 
Peacekeeping  Operations.  We  also  de- 
livered a  report  containing  our  views  to 
Secretary  General  Waldheim  in  June, 
in  accordance  with  General  Assembly 
Resolution  33/114,  which  invited  all 
member  states  to  supply  the  Secretary 
General  with  information  on  possible 
standby  capacities  and  on  experience 
gained  in  peacekeeping  operations  and 
national  training  programs.  I  will  sup- 
ply a  copy  of  our  report  for  the  record. 

We  have  consulted  a  number  of  other 
governments  over  the  last  several 
months  to  see  if  there  is  sufficient  sup- 
port for  a  new  resolution  on  peace- 
keeping in  this  General  Assembly.  We 
have  also  called  the  attention  of  a 
number  of  governments  to  the  text  of 
our  June  report  to  the  Secretary  Gen- 
eral, urging  them  to  make  similar  re- 
ports if  they  had  not  already  done  so. 
While  most  other  governments  did  not 
support  the  idea  of  a  new  resolution  on 
peacekeeping  at  this  stage,  a  number  of 


64 

them  have  indicated  their  intention  to 
make  reports  to  the  Secretary  General. 

Peaceful  Settlement  of  Disputes 

Under  the  charter,  member  states 
have  an  obligation  and  a  responsibility 
to  settle  their  differences  by  peaceful 
means.  In  addition,  the  charter  contains 
specific  provisions  for  the  peaceful 
settlement  of  disputes. 

Resort  by  states  to  institutionalized 
third-party  disputes  settlement  proce- 
dures is,  unfortunately,  not  frequent. 
This  state  of  affairs  periodically  gener- 
ates initiatives  for  institutional  reforms. 
It  is  doubtful  that  the  establishment  of 
new  institutions  would,  by  themselves, 
persuade  parties  to  a  dispute  to  have 
more  frequent  recourse  to  third-party 
dispute  settlement. 

We  believe,  first,  that  existing  meth- 
ods can  be  made  more  efficient.  We 
also  feel  that  until  the  reasons  are 
known  why  states  do  not  use  existing 
machinery,  the  establishment  of  new 
machinery  would  probably  have  the 
effect  of  simply  increasing  the  size  and 
expense  of  international  bureaucracies. 
We  have  proposed  an  analysis  of  these 
reasons  in  the  Charter  Review  Com- 
mittee and  in  the  Committee  on  En- 
hancing the  Effectiveness  of  the  Prin- 
ciple of  Non-Use  of  Force. 

International  Court  of  Justice 

We  feel  that  far  greater  use  should  be 
made  of  the  ICJ.  It  is  a  forum  before 
which  all  states — large  and  small — may 
come  as  equals.  We  have  suggested 
that  its  role  as  a  potential  dispute  settler 
and  as  a  source  of  international  law  be 
studied  and  expanded  if  we  are  ever  to 
elaborate  a  coherent  body  of  norms  to 
govern  the  ever  increasing  interactions 
of  states.  However,  there  is  no  sense  in 
speaking  of  greater  use  of  advisory 
opinions  unless  there  is  at  least  a 


political   commitment  to  accord  such 
advice  a  very  high  measure  of  respect. 

In  1970  the  United  States  introduced 
into  the  General  Assembly  an  agenda 
item  intended  to  focus  renewed  inter- 
national attention  on  the  Court.  Among 
the  principal  suggestions  made  were 
expansion  of  the  Court's  jurisdiction, 
broadening  access  to  the  Court's  advis- 
ory opinion  procedures,  simplification 
of  the  rules  of  the  Court  in  order  to 
reduce  costs  and  time  delays,  and 
increased  flexibility  in  the  use  of 
chambers  of  the  Court.  The  General 
Assembly  was  unable  to  agree  on  any 
concrete  positive  measures  and  in  1974 
merely  adopted  a  resolution  calling 
upon  states  to  consider  recourse  to  the 
Court  for  the  peaceful  settlement  of 
disputes. 

While  there  have  been  some  prom- 
ising modifications  of  the  Court's  rules 
designed  to  make  use  of  the  Court  less 
complicated,  these  have  not  yet  led  to 
any  increased  use  of  the  Court.  There 
is  still  widespread  reluctance  among 
states  toward  third-party  dispute  set- 
tlement. 

Steps  can,  of  course,  be  taken  to  en- 
hance the  use  of  the  Court.  For  in- 
stance, it  should  be  our  standard  prac- 
tice to  examine  every  treaty  which  the 
U.S.  negotiates  with  a  view  of  accept- 
ing the  jurisdiction  of  the  ICJ  in  dis- 
putes arising  under  the  treaty.  Even  if 
there  is  no  mention  of  the  Court,  there 
should  be  a  provision  for  binding 
third-party  settlement  of  disputes  aris- 
ing under  the  treaty. 

Unfortunately,  any  proposal  by  the 
United  States  to  expand  the  use  of  the 
Court  and  strengthen  it  is  likely  to  raise 
serious  doubts  as  to  our  bona  fides. 
The  continued  limitation  upon  U.S.  ac- 
ceptance of  the  Court's  compulsory 
jurisdiction  imposed  by  the  Connally 
reservation  is  an  obstacle  to  U.S.  lead- 
ership to  reform  in  this  field. 


Department  of  State  Bulletis 

Human  Rights 

At  the  current  General  Assembly 
there  are  a  number  of  reform  proposal 
which  we  feel  will  enhance  the  effort? 
of  the  United  Nations  in  the  area  ol 
human  rights.  The  Canadian  Foreigr 
Minister,  in  her  speech  to  the  Assem 
bly,  recommended  the  creation  of  ar 
Under  Secretary  General  for  Humar 
Rights.  At  other  General  Assemblies 
developing  nations  have  urged  the  ere 
ation  of  a  High  Commissioner  foi 
Human  Rights.  These  and  similar  pro 
posals  have  been  warmly  received  anq 
we  believe  will  escalate  efforts  tc 
strengthen  the  status  and  program  oi 
the  Secretariat's  Human  Rights  Divi 
sion.  There  is  a  good  deal  of  suppoi 
for  moving  the  division  back  to  New 
York  from  Geneva. 

We  are  encouraged  by  signs  tha 
human  rights  is  becoming  more  of  i 
priority  area  in  international  organizan 
tions.  U.S.  initiatives  in  this  area  hav 
served  as  a  catalyst  for  active  partici-ij 
pation  by  individuals  and  groups  in  thi 
grievance  process.  The  procedures 
under  the  Human  Rights  Commissior 
for  petitions  against  countries  have 
produced  growing  response,  and  mort 
countries  are  adhering  to  procedure; 
under  the  International  Convention  or 
the  Elimination  of  All  Forms  of  Racia 
Discrimination  and  the  International 
Covenant  on  Economic,  Social,  and 
Cultural  Rights.  Perhaps  most  impor-i 
tantly,  U.N.  members  are  more  sensi- 
tive to  human  rights  issues  and,  there- 
fore, are  more  willing  to  considei 
human  rights  initiatives  and  the  humar 
rights  records  of  individual  countries. C 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the  hearings  will 
be  published  by  the  committee  and  will  be  avail- 
able from  the  Supermtendent  of  Documents, 
U.S.  Government  Printing  Office,  Washington. 
D.C.  20402 


December  1979 


65 


WE!$TER]\  HEMISPHERE: 

OAS  General  Assemhiy  Convenes 


The  ninth  regular  session  of  the 
General  Assembly  of  the  Organization 
of  American  States  (OAS)  met  in  La 
Paz.  Bolivia.  October  21-31.  1979. 
Following  is  Secretary  Vance's  state- 
ment at  that  session  on  October  23 . ' 

All  of  us  understand  that  the  prob- 
lems we  face  require  that  we  lift  our 
sights  to  a  more  distant  horizon.  We 
face  imposing  challenges  in  the  1980's. 
Our  ability  to  surmount  them  will  de- 
termine whether  we  can  achieve  three 
fundamental  goals  which  our  people 
share: 

•  To  live  in  peace; 

•  To  participate  freely  in  the  deci- 
sions which  affect  their  lives;  and 

•  To  share  equitably  in  the  benefits 
of  steady  economic  development. 

We  approach  these  goals  from  dis- 
tinct and  sometimes  diverse  per 
spectives.  but  I  believe  each  of  us 
recognizes  as  well  that  our  futures  are 
interwoven.  Thus,  it  is  essential  that 
we  understand  each  other's  goals  as  we 
shape  our  individual  courses  and  our 
collective  direction  in  the  decade 
ahead. 

Peace 

Our  OAS  Charter  seeks  to  assure  that 
each  nation  in  the  hemisphere  will  be 
free  from  external  aggression.  The 
charter's  guarantees  of  nonintervention 
and  self-determination,  which  are  rein- 
forced by  the  Rio  treaty,  are  intended 
to  free  our  energies  and  our  resources 
for  the  works  of  peace — to  enhance  the 
freedom  and  the  well-being  of  our 
people. 

Strengthening  the  fabric  of  peace  in 
the  Americas  is  the  first  goal  that  must 
shape  our  vision  of  the  1980's.  It  is  a 
goal  that  could  be  endangered  in  the 
decade  ahead  by  territorial  disputes  and 
other  tensions  among  countries,  by 
breakdowns  in  processes  of  peaceful 
and  democratic  change  within  coun- 
tries, or  by  the  terrible  dangers  created 
by  modern  armaments. 

President  Carter  has  made  clear  our 
support  for  efforts  to  resolve  differ- 
ences within  the  hemisphere  peace- 
fully. 

•  Working  together,  the  United 
States  and  Panama  have  forged  a  new 
partnership  that  insures  the  sovereignty 
of  Panama  and  the  security  of  the 
canal. 


•  We  strongly  endorse  the  efforts  of 
the  distinguished  mediator  Dr.  Jose 
Luis  Bustamante  y  Rivero  to  help  El 
Salvador  and  Honduras  find  a  just  and 
lasting  solution  to  their  border  conflict. 

•  We  are  indebted  to  the  Holy  See 
for  undertaking  to  mediate  the  long- 
standing and  troubling  differences  be- 
tween Argentina  and  Chile  concerning 
the  Beagle  Channel. 

•  We  hope  that  a  mutually  accept- 
able solution  to  Bolivia's  landlocked 
status  can  be  found  and  that  this  As- 
sembly will  take  positive  steps  in  this 
direction. 

This  organization  and  its  member 
states  can  play  an  important  role  in  the 
search  for  peaceful  settlements  to  these 
and  other  disputes  between  nations  in 
the  hemisphere. 

Tensions  and  injustices  within  na- 
tions can  also  produce  disturbances  that 
reverberate  beyond  national  boundaries 
and  create  opportunities  for  outside  in- 
terference. Thus,  responding  to  popular 
aspirations  is  an  essential  element  in 
assuring  the  preservation  of  national 
sovereignty  and  self-determination. 
Peaceful  and  democratic  change  within 
nations  is  vital  to  the  security  of  the 
hemisphere. 

But  if  a  strong  and  prosperous  region 
made  up  of  strong  and  prosperous 
countries  is  the  best  assurance  of  peace 
in  today's  world,  we  must  also  be  alert 
to  any  threat  of  interference  from  out- 
side powers. 

Earlier  this  month.  President  Carter 
reported  Soviet  assurances  that  their 
troops  in  Cuba  would  not  threaten  the 
security  of  any  nation  in  this  hemi- 
sphere. At  the  same  time,  he  an- 
nounced certain  specific  actions  by  the 
United  States  to  assure  that  they  would 
not  in  fact  do  so.  Our  interest  is  in 
helping  to  preserve  the  freedom  of 
choice  and  action  of  the  member  states 
of  this  organization. 

The  Caribbean  region,  in  particular, 
can  ill  afford  the  emergence  of  tensions 
or  confrontations  that  could  divert 
scarce  resources  badly  needed  for  de- 
velopment. Few  regions  of  the  world 
have  suffered  more  from  this  decade's 
international  economic  dislocations. 
We  welcome  the  suggestion  made  by 
the  Dominican  Republic  3  weeks  ago 
that  an  ad  hoc  committee  be  established 
to  allow  for  regular  consultations  be- 
tween the  United  States  and  the  coun- 
tries of  the  Caribbean.   Such  regional 


collaboration  can  contribute  to  a  cli- 
mate of  confidence  and  peace  —  a  cli- 
mate where  all  countries  can  concen- 
trate on  pressing  economic  and  social 
needs. 

The  resources  we  must  marshal  for 
human  needs  can  be  diverted  as  well  by 
the  unnecessary  accumulation  of  de- 
structive weaponry.  The  leaders  of  this 
hemisphere  have  long  recognized  this 
inescapable  reality.  The  regional  goal 
of  limiting  conventional  arms  was  first 
proclaimed  by  the  signatories  to  the 
declaration  of  Ayacucho  in  1974.  It 
was  reaffirmed  by  the  same  states  just 
last  year.  The  Government  of  Mexico 
has  put  forward  concrete  proposals. 

President  Carter  has  expressed  my 
country's  strong  support  for  these  ini- 
tiatives. The  United  States  and,  we  be- 
lieve, most  other  arms  exporting  coun- 
tries, would  respect  and  cooperate  with 
restraint  agreements  among  arms  im- 
porting countries  of  Latin  America  and 
the  Caribbean. 

Such  agreements  would  parallel  this 
region's  leadership  in  controlling  the 
spread  of  nuclear  weapons.  We  all  look 
forward  to  the  day  when  the  treaty  of 
Tlatelolco  will  enter  into  force 
throughout  the  hemisphere.  As  we 
enter  the  1980's,  each  of  us  has  an 
interest  in  assuring  that  the  expanding 
developments  of  nuclear  energy  will  be 
free  of  the  dark  shadow  of  nuclear 
arms. 

Human  Rights 

The  second  goal  which  shapes  our 
vision  of  the  future  is  to  open  our 
societies  to  the  full  participation  of  all 
citizens.  In  this  respect,  it  is  especially 
significant  that  we  are  meeting  in 
Bolivia.  We  join  other  delegations  in 
expressing  our  respect  and  support  for 
Bolivia  in  its  transition  to  democratic 
rule. 

Significant  progress  had  been  made 
in  many  countries  of  the  Americas  in 
recent  years. 

•  A  revitalized  Inter- American 
Commission  on  Human  Rights  is  giv- 
ing new  vitality  to  the  American  Dec- 
laration of  the  Rights  and  Duties  of 
Man.  The  Commission  performs  an  in- 
valuable service  as  an  authoritative, 
impartial  body  whose  reports  provide  a 
basis  for  practical  improvements  in  the 
lives  of  many  of  our  citizens. 

•  The   American   Convention   of 


66 


Human  Rights  has  now  entered  into 
force,  creating  the  Inter-American 
Court  of  Human  Rights — another  mile- 
stone in  our  system. 

•  In  a  number  of  nations  in  the 
hemisphere,  people  live  today  in 
greater  freedom.  Democratic  institu- 
tions have  grown  stronger.  And,  in 
turn,  the  democracies  have  assumed  a 
growing  role  in  the  activities  of  the 
OAS.  We  warmly  welcome  this  de- 
velopment, for  it  can  only  serve  to 
strengthen  the  inter-American  system 
as  a  whole. 

•  The  leadership  exercised  by  the 
OAS  has  through  the  17th  meeting  of 
consultation  on  Nicaragua  contributed 
significantly  to  bringing  about  neces- 
sary change  in  that  country.  Let  me  say 
to  the  delegation  from  the  Government 
of  Nicaragua  that  we  know  that  a  new 
day  has  come  to  your  country.  We  will 
join  with  others  in  the  hemisphere  to 
support  your  efforts  to  build  a  demo- 
cratic and  equitable  Nicaragua. 

We  welcome  the  declarations  of  the 
new  Government  of  El  Salvador  and 
hope  that  peaceful  and  democratic 
change  will  take  root  there. 

The  adoption  of  democratic  norms  in 
an  increasing  number  of  countries  al- 
lows us  to  look  to  a  hemisphere  that  is 
united  in  its  appreciation  for  shared 
human  values.  Governments  that  hold 
democratic  values  in  common  will  find 
it  easier  to  understand  each  other  and  to 
work  together. 

As  we  review  the  progress  that  has 
been  made  to  strengthen  democracy 
and  human  rights,  we  must  also  recog- 
nize that  distinct  cross-currents  are  still 
present.  We  cannot  close  our  eyes  to 
torture  or  killings,  to  disappearances  or 
arbitrary  detention  —  wherever  they 
occur.  We  cannot  be  oblivious  to  the 
fact  that  respect  for  the  rule  of  law  and 
for  freedom  of  speech,  press,  and  as- 
sociation is  not  honored  in  some  coun- 
tries. 

Where  terrorism  exists,  whether 
within  nations  or  across  borders,  it 
must  be  dealt  with  firmly  and  in  ac- 
cordance with  the  rule  of  law.  At  the 
same  time,  we  must  distinguish  be- 
tween violence  and  subversion  on  the 
one  hand  and  legitimate  dissent  on  the 
other.  The  suppression  of  legitimate 
rights  cannot  be  justified  in  the  name  of 
national  security. 

In  the  decade  ahead,  we  must  con- 
tinue to  press  for  the  full  recognition  of 
human  rights  and  freedoms,  and  we 
must  insure  that  progress  achieved  is 
reinforced  by  institutions  that  safeguard 
against  continued  or  renewed  oppres- 
sion. 

As  we  look  to  the  I980"s,  let  me 
strongly  reaffirm  the  commitment  made 


by  President  Carter  at  the  eighth  ses- 
sion last  year:  ".  .  .  we  will  continu- 
ally support  and  encourage  political 
systems  that  allow  their  people  to  par- 
ticipate fully  and  democratically  in  the 
decisions  that  affect  their  lives." 

Cooperation  for  Development 

Our  long-term  success  in  building 
more  open  and  pluralistic  societies  will 
depend  in  part  on  our  ability  to  work  to 
sustain  economic  growth  and  to  assure 
that  the  fruits  of  that  growth  are  shared 
fairly. 

As  we  move  into  the  I980's,  we  all 
will  be  grappling  with  serious  eco- 
nomic dilemmas:  controlling  inflation 
without  choking  growth;  expanding 
world  trade  in  ways  that  are  fair  to  both 
developing  and  industrial  nations;  lim- 
iting energy  consumption  without  dis- 
rupting development;  holding  down 
expenditures  when  necessary,  but 
without  placing  the  burden  of  adjust- 
ment on  the  poor. 

Democratic  institutions  provide  the 
best  means  for  meeting  such  economic 
tests,  for  citizens  who  are  participating 
in  decisions  that  affect  their  well-being 
are  more  likely  to  accept  sacrifices  that 
serve  the  common  good. 

Regional  institutions,  including  the 
OAS,  can  help  us  to  devise  more  crea- 
tive approaches  to  these  economic 
quandaries.  In  the  past,  Latin  America 
has  led  the  way  in  designing  new  de- 
veloping strategies  that  respond  to 
changing  world  conditions.  It  can  do  so 
again. 

As  we  adjust  to  new  forms  of  inter- 
dependence, there  inevitably  will  be 
differences  among  us,  but  the  need  for 
cooperation  will  be  more  compelling 
than  ever  before. 

One  area  for  which  this  is  particu- 
larly true  is  energy.  As  the  President  of 
Mexico,  Lopez  Portillo,  said  in  his  per- 
ceptive speech  to  the  U.N.  General  As- 
sembly last  month:  "Within  a  few  dec- 
ades, the  age  of  petroleum  will  come  to 
an  end.  We  have  reached  a  watershed 
between  two  different  eras  in  the  life  of 
mankind." 

While  each  of  us  must  put  our  own 
energy  house  in  order,  there  are  im- 
portant steps  we  can  take  together. 

•  There  are  no  plans  for  regional 
preparatory  meetings  for  the  1981 
World  Conference  on  New  and  Renew- 
able Energy.  This  organization  and  the 
nations  of  the  region  —  some  of  which 
are  world  leaders  in  the  development  of 
renewable  energy  —  should  consider 
ways  of  contributing  to  the  develop- 
ment of  an  effective  program  of  action. 

•  We  should  pursue  the  promising 
IDB  [Inter-American  Development 
Bank]  initiative  to  see  whether  a  work- 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 

able  program  can  be  established  to  en-, 
courage  investment  in  energy  and  min- 
erals projects  in  the  hemisphere. 

•  And  we  should  intensify  our  ef- 
forts to  share  in  the  development  of 
new  energy  technologies.  The  recent 
consultations  between  President  Car- 
ter's science  adviser  and  a  number  of 
governments  in  the  region  have  con- 
tributed to  this  process.  Energy  de- 
velopments will  be  among  the  highest 
priorities  of  our  new  institute  for  sci- 
entific and  technological  cooperation. 

Beyond  energy,  this  organization  is 
now  addressing  a  number  of  other  eco- 
nomic challenges  we  face  together.  The 
OAS  Economic  and  Social  Council 
(CIES)  meeting  in  Barbados  last  month 
agreed  to  consider  whether  the  scope  of 
the  inter-American  process  for  trade 
consultation  could  be  widened.  A  clear 
consensus  also  emerged  in  Barbados 
that  social  development  programs 
should  receive  greater  priority  in  the 
OAS  budget.  We  should  implement 
those  decisions  rapidly. 

In  defining  our  regional  agenda,  we 
must  consider  together: 

•  How  we  can  more  effectively 
confront  the  conditions  of  poverty 
which  still  afflict  millions  of  our 
people; 

•  How  to  stimulate  greater  subre- 
gional  economic  cooperation  —  in  the 
Caribbean,  in  Central  America,  and 
among  the  countries  of  the  Andean 
pact; 

•  How  to  strengthen  the  IDB,  al- 
ready an  institution  with  a  worldwide 
reputation  for  successful  development 
lending  and  one  of  my  country's  high- 
est priorities  among  the  international 
financial  institutions,  as  well  as  the 
subregional  development  banks,  such 
as  the  Caribbean  and  Central  American 
Development  Banks;  and 

•  How  better  to  coordinate  our  re- 
spective positions  in  global  negotia- 
tions when  matters  of  vital  concern  to 
us  are  under  consideration. 

The  Organization  of  American  States 

Such  cooperative  efforts  demand  a 
strengthened  OAS.  The  forces  of 
change  reshaping  the  political  and  eco- 
nomic landscape,  in  this  hemisphere 
and  the  world,  will  intensify  in  the 
coming  decade. 

We  must  decide  how  this  organiza- 
tion should  meet  these  new  realities. 
What  are  the  themes  and  subjects  we 
should  deal  with  in  the  decade  ahead? 
What  are  our  priorities?  If  the  organi- 
zation is  not  to  become  irrelevant,  it 
must  deal  with  the  major  issues  of  our 
day  —  global  and  regional  —  and  the 
priority  interests  of  its  members.   The 


December  1979 


67 


organization  will  be  what  its  members 
want  it  to  be  —  nothing  more  or  less.  1 
suggest  that  a  prime  tasic  before  us  is  to 
reexamine  and  redefine  the  role  and 
function  of  this  organization  and  how  it 
should  relate  to  the  problems  of  today's 
uorld. 

The  organization's  structure  must 
enable  us  to  meet  these  new  chal- 
lenges. Toward  that  end,  the  United 
States  supports  the  proposals  before  us 
to  authorize  the  Secretary  General  to 
reorganize  and  streamline  the  Sec- 
retarial and  to  rationalize  the  national 
offices  in  the  member  countries.  And 
ue  would  support  efforts  to  strengthen 
tlie  Secretariat's  technical  and  eco- 
nomic e.xpertise. 

The  financing  of  this  organization 
must  also  be  addressed.  Specifically, 
there  must  be  a  wider  sharing  of  costs. 
The  existing  assessment  system  simply 
does  not  accord  with  our  present  re- 
lationships. We  are  convinced  that  a 
new  formula  is  needed  now. 

We  have  recently  proposed  a  formula 
uhich  we  consider  a  fair  compromise.  I 
hope  that  we  can  resolve  this  issue  here 
in  La  Paz. 

In  closing,  let  me  say  that  I  look  to 
the  1980's  with  hope.  The  future  is  not 
without  dangers,  but  1  have  a  hopeful 
vision.  1  see  a  new  and  more  equitable 
balance  among  us.  I  see  a  hemisphere 
increasingly  united  by  the  common 
practice  of  democracy.  I  see  new  lead- 
ership bringing  extraordinary  talents  to 
bear  on  accumulated  social  problems.  I 
see  a  Latin  America  at  peace  with  itself 
and  reaching  out  to  greater  participa- 
tion in  matters  of  global  concern.  Let 
me  reaffirm  to  you  today  the  United 
States  wants  to  join  with  you  in  realiz- 
ing this  vision.  D 


'Press  release  279  of  Oct.  25,  1979. 


TREATIES: 

Current  Actions 

MULTILATERAL 

Antarctica 

Recommendation.s  relating  to  the  furtherance  of 
principles  and  objectives  of  the  Antarctic 
treaty.  Adopted  at  London  Oct.  7,  1977,  at 
the  9th  Antarctic  Treaty  consultative  meet- 
ing.' 

Notification  of  approval:  Australia,  Oct     17, 
1979. 

Aviation 

International  air  services  transit  agreement. 
Signed  at  Chicago  Dec.  7.  1944.  Entered  into 
force  for  the  U.S.  Feb.  8,  1945.  59  Stat. 
1693. 


Acceptance  deposited:   Seychelles,  Oct.    16, 
1979 

Convention  for  the  suppression  of  unlawful  sei- 
zure of  aircraft.  Done  at  The  Hague  Dec.  16, 
1970.  Entered  into  force  Oct.  14,  1971. 
TIAS  7192. 

Accessions  deposited:  Afghanistan,  Aug.  29, 
1979;  Vietnam,  Sept.  17.  1979.^ 

Convention  for  the  suppression  of  unlawful  acts 
against  the  safety  of  civil  aviation.  Done  at 
Montreal  Sept.  23,  1971.  Entered  into  force 
Jan.  26,  1973.  TIAS  7570. 
Accession  deposited:  Vietnam,  Sept  17, 
1979.^ 

Amendments  to  Article  V  of  the  1956  agree- 
ments on  the  joint  financing  of  certain  air 
navigation  services  in  Greenland  and  the 
Faroe  Islands  and  in  Iceland  (TIAS  4048, 
4049).  Adopted  by  the  ICAO  Council  at 
Montreal  Sept.  27.  1979.  Entered  into  force 
Sept.  27,  1979. 

Biological  Weapons 

Convention  on  the  prohibition  of  the  develop- 
ment, production,  and  stockpiling  of  bac- 
teriological (biological)  and  toxin  weapons 
and  on  their  destruction.  Done  at  Washing- 
ton, London,  and  Moscow  Apr.  10,  1972. 
Entered  into  force  Mar,  26,  1975.  TIAS 
8062. 

Accession  deposited:   Seychelles,   Oct.    16, 
1979. 

Coffee 

International  coffee  agreement   1976,  with  an- 
nexes.  Done  at  London  Dec     3,    1975.   En- 
tered into  force  provisionally  Oct.    1,    1976, 
definitively  Aug.  1,  1977.  TIAS  8683. 
Accession  deposited:  Angola,  Oct.  17,  1979. 

Maritime  Matters 

Amendments  to  the  convention  of  Mar  6, 
1948,  as  amended,  on  the  Intergovernmental 
Maritime  Consultative  Organization  (TIAS 
4044,  6285,  6490).  Adopted  at  London  Oct. 
17,  1974.  Entered  into  force  Apr.  1,  1978. 
TIAS  8606 

Acceptance  deposited:   Colombia.   Sept.   4, 
1979. 

Amendments  to  the  convention  of  Mar.  6, 
1948.  as  amended,  on  the  intergovernmental 
Maritime  Consultative  Organization  (TIAS 
4044,  6285.  6490,  8606).  Adopted  at  Lon- 
don Nov.  17,  1977.' 
Acceptance  deposited:  China,  Oct.  30,  1979. 

Narcotic  Drugs 

Single  convention  on  narcotic  drugs.  Done  at 
New  York  Mar.  30,  1961.  Entered  into  force 
Dec.  13.  1964;  for  the  US,  June  24,  1967. 
TIAS  6298. 

Ratification  deposited:   Liechtenstein,  Oct. 
31,  1979. 

Nuclear  Material 

Convention  on  the  physical  protection  of  nu- 
clear material,  with  annexes.  Adopted  at 
Vienna  Oct.  26,  1979.  Enters  into  force  on 
the  30th  day  following  the  date  of  deposit  of 
the  21st  instrument  of  ratification,  accept- 
ance, or  approval. 

Patents 

Patent  cooperation  treaty,  with  regulations. 
Done  at  Washington  June  19,  1970.  Entered 
into  force  Jan.  24,  1978;  except  for  chapter 
II.  Chapter  II  entered  into  force  Mar.  29, 
1978.3  jj^S  8733 


Ratification  deposited:    Norway,   Oct.    1, 
1979. 

Postal 

Second  additional  protocol  to  the  Constitution 
of  the   Universal   Postal   Union  of  July    10. 
1964,  general  regulations  with  final  protocol 
and  annex,  and  the  universal  postal  conven- 
tion with  final  protocol  and  detailed  regula- 
tions. Done  at  Lausanne  July  5,   1974.  En- 
tered into  force  Jan.  1,  1976.'tIAS  8231. 
Ratifications  deposited:    Afghanistan,   July 
27,   1979;  Bhutan.  Sept.  7,   1979;  Guate- 
mala, July   2,    1979;'   Kenya,  May  25, 
1979;  Mali,  June  25,   1979;  Upper  Volta, 
Aug.    31,    1979;   Venezuela,   Sept.    12, 
1979;  Yemen  (Aden),  Mar,  20,  1978. 
Money   orders   and   postal   travelers'   checks 
agreement,  with  detailed  regulations.   Done 
at  Lausanne  July  5,  1974.  Entered  into  force 
Jan.  1,  1976,  TIAS  8232. 
Ratification  deposited:  Yemen  (Aden).  Mar. 

20.  1978. 
Approval  deposited:  Upper  Volta,  Aug.  31, 
1979. 

Property.  Industrial 

Convention  of  Paris  for  the   protection  of  in- 
dustrial property  of  Mar.   20,   1883,  as  re- 
vised. Done  at  Stockholm  July  14,  1967.  Ar- 
ticles 1-12  entered  into  force  May  19,  1970; 
for  the  U.S.  Aug.  25,  1973.  Articles  13-30 
entered  into  force  Apr.   26,    1970;  for  the 
U.S.  Sept.  5,  1970.  TIAS  6923. 
Notification  from    World  Intellectual  Prop- 
erty Organization  that  accession  depos- 
ited: Uruguay,  Sept.  28,  1979. 
Notification  from    World  Intellectual  Prop- 
erly Organization  that  ratification  depos- 
ited: Indonesia,  Sept.  20.  1979.2-= 

Property,  Intellectual 

Convention  establishing  the  World  Intellectual 
Property  Organization  Done  at  Stockholm, 
July  14,  1967.  Entered  into  force  Apr.  26, 
1970;  for  the  U.S.  Aug.  25,  1970.  TIAS 
6932. 
Ratification  deposited:  Indonesia,  Sept.   18, 

1979. 
Accession  deposited:   Uruguay,   Sept.   21, 

1979- 

Publications 

Statutes  of  the  international  center  for  the  reg- 
istration of  serial  publications.  Done  at  Paris 
Nov.  14,  1974,  and  amended  Oct.  1976. 
Entered  into  force  Jan.  21,  1976;  for  the 
U.S.,  Mar.  31,  1978  (provisionally). 
Accession  deposited:  Sweden,  May  29, 
1979, 

Slavery 

Supplementary  convention  on  the  abolition  of 
slavery,  the  slave  trade,  and  institutions  and 
practices  similar  to  slavery.  Done  at  Geneva 
Sept.  7,  1956.  Entered  into  force  Apr.  30. 
1957;  for  the  U.S.  Dec.  6.  1967.  TIAS  6418. 
Notification  of  succession:    Suriname.   Oct. 

12.  1979. 
Convention  to  suppress  the  slave  trade  and 
slavery.   Done  at  Geneva  Sept.   25.    1926. 
Entered  into  force  Mar.  9.  1927;  for  the  U.S. 
Mar.  21.  1929,  46  Stat.  2183. 
Notification   of  succession:    Suriname.   Oct. 

12,  1979. 

South  Pacific  Commission 

Memorandum  of  understanding  modifying  pro- 
cedures under  the  agreement  of  Feb    6,  1947 


68 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


(TIAS  2317).  Done  al  Canberra  and  signed  al 
Noumea  Oct.  20.  1976  Hntered  into  force 
Oct.  20.  1976. 

Space 

Convention  on  registration  of  objects  launched 
into  outer  space.  Done  at  New  York  Jan,  14. 
1975.  Entered  into  force  Sept.  15.  1976. 
TIAS  8480. 

Ratification  deposited:   Federal   Republic  of 
Germany,  Oct.  16,  1979. 

Telecommunications 

Final  Acts  of  the  World  Administrative  Radio 
Conference  for  the  planning  of  the  broad- 
casting-satellite service  in  frequency  bands 
11.7-12.2  GHz  (in  regions  2  and  3)  and 
11.7-12.5  GHz  (in  region  1),  with  annexes. 
Done  at  Geneva  Feb.  13.  1977.  Entered  into 
force  Jan.  1,  1979.'' 

Approval  deposited:   Czechoslovakia.    Aug. 
9.   1979 

Partial  revision  of  the  radio  regulations 
(Geneva,  1959).  as  revised,  relating  to  the 
aeronautical  mobile  (R)  service,  with  an- 
nexes and  final  protocol.  Done  at  Geneva 
Mar.  5,  1978.  Entered  into  force  Sept.  I, 
1979,  except  for  the  frequency  allotment 
plan  for  the  aeronautical  mobile  service 
which  shall  come  into  force  on  Feb.  I. 
1983." 
Approvals  deposited:  Japan.  Aug.   17.   1979: 

Netherlands.   Aug.    31,    1979;'   United 

Kingdom,  Aug.  27,  1979.' 

Trade 

Protocol  of  provisional  application  of  the  Gen- 
eral Agreement  on  Tariffs  and  Trade  Done 
at  Geneva  Oct.  30,  1947.  Entered  into  force 
Jan.  1.  1948.  TIAS  1700. 
Notification  of  de  facto  application: 
Kiribati,  July  12,  1979. 

Protocol  extending  the  arrangement  regarding 
international  trade  in  textiles  of  Dec.  20, 
1973  (TIAS  7840).  Done  at  Geneva  Dec.  14, 
1977.  Entered  into  force  Jan.  I,  1978.  TIAS 
8939. 

Acceptance  deposited:    Brazil,    Sept.    26. 
1979. 

Treaties 

Vienna  convention  on  the  law  of  treaties,  with 
annex.  Done  at  Vienna  May  23,  1969.' 
Ratification  deposited:   Honduras,  Sept.   20, 
1979. 

Wheal 

Protocol  modifying  and  further  extending  the 
wheat  trade  convention  (part  of  the  interna- 
tional wheat  agreement),  1971  (TIAS  7144). 
Done  at  Washington  Apr.  25.  1979.  Entered 
into  force  June  23.  1979.  with  respect  to 
certain  provisions,  July  I,  1979,  with  respect 
to  other  provisions. 

Accessions  deposited:    Federal   Republic   of 
Germany.  Nov.  7.   1979  " 

Protocol  modifying  and  further  extending  the 
food  aid  convention  (part  of  the  international 
wheat  agreement).  1971  (TIAS  7144).  Done 
at  Washington  Apr.  25,  1979.  Entered  into 
force  June  23.  1979,  with  respect  to  certain 
provisions.  July  1.  1979.  with  respect  to 
other  provisions. 

Accession  deposited:    Federal   Republic   of 
Germany.  Nov.  7,  t979." 


BILATERAL 

Bolivia 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  for  sales  of 
agricultural  commodities  of  May  31,  1978 
(TIAS  9518).  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes 
at  La  Paz  Sept.  13  and  24,  1979.  Entered 
into  force  Sept,  24.  1979. 

Canada 

Agreement  concerning  support  of  U.S.  ac- 
tivities at  the  Canadian  National  Research 
Council  Space  Research  Facilities  Effected 
by  exchange  of  notes  at  Ottawa  Mar.  19  and 
Sept.  20.  1979.  Entered  into  force  Sept.  20. 
1979.  Effective  July  1.  1979. 

Agreement  extending  application  of  the  agree- 
ment of  May  8.  1974.  on  air  transport  pre- 
clearance  to  Edmonton  (TIAS  7825).  Ef- 
fected by  exchange  of  notes  at  Ottawa  Aug. 
23  and  Oct.  15,  1979.  Entered  into  force 
Oct.  15,  1979. 

China,  People's  Republic  of 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of  May  I  1, 
1979  (TIAS  9306)  concerning  the  settlement 
of  claims.  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at 
Beijing  Sept.  28,  1979.  Entered  into  force 
Sept,  28,  1979, 

Dominica 

Agreement  relating  to  privileges  and  im- 
munities for  Department  of  Defense  en- 
gineering personnel  temporarily  in  Dominica 
for  the  purpose  of  emergency  repairs.  Ef- 
fected by  exchange  of  letters  at  Bridgetown 
and  Roseau  Sept,  17,  1979,  Entered  into 
force  Sept.  17.  1979. 

Egypt 

Project  grant  agreement  for  major  cereals  im- 
provement system,  with  annex.  Signed  at 
Cairo  July  25,  1979.  Entered  into  force  July 
25,  1979. 

Project  grant  agreement  for  Shoubrah  El 
Kheima  thermal  power  plant,  with  annex. 
Signed  at  Cairo  Aug,  29,  1979  Entered  into 
force  Aug,  29,  1979 

Project  grant  agreement  for  Alexandria  waste- 
water system  expansion,  with  annex  Signed 
at  Cairo  Aug.  29,  1979.  Entered  into  force 
Aug.  29,  1979. 

Project  grant  agreement  for  improvement  of 
Egyptian  telecommunications  system,  with 
annex.  Signed  at  Cairo  Aug.  29,  1979.  En- 
tered into  force  Aug.  29,  1979. 

Grant  agreement  for  commodity  imports. 
Signed  at  Cairo  Aug.  29,  1979.  Entered  into 
force  Aug.  29,  1979. 

Agreement  amending  the  grant  agreement  of 
Aug.  29,  1979,  for  Alexandria  wastewater 
system  expansion.  Signed  al  Cairo  Sept.  22, 
1979.  Entered  into  force  Sept.  22,  1979. 

Project  grant  agreement  for  private  investment 
encouragement  fund,  with  annex.  Signed  at 
Cairo  Sept.  22,  1979.  Entered  into  force 
Sept.  22,  1979. 

Agreement  for  sales  of  agricultural  com- 
modities, relating  to  the  agreement  of  June  7, 
1974  (TIAS  7855),  with  agreed  minutes. 
Signed  al  Cairo  Oct.  4,  1979.  Entered  into 
force  Oct    4,  1979. 

Agreement  between  Egypt  and  the  U.S.  and 
United  Kingdom  relating  to  liability  and  in- 
surance for  architects  and  contractors  work- 
ing on  sewerage  projects.  Signed  at  Cairo 
Oct.  19,  1979.  Entered  into  force  Oct.  19, 
1979. 


Fiji 

Air  transport  agreement     Signed  at  Suva  Oct,  'L 
I,    1979     Entered    into   force   provisionally  ; 
Oct     1,   1979,  definitively  Oct.   II,  1979. 

France 

Protocol  to  the  convention  with  respect  to  taxes 
on  income  and  property  of  July  28,  1967,  as 
amended  by  the  protocol  of  Oct.  12,  1970, 
with  exchange  of  notes  (TIAS  6518,  7270). 
Signed  at  Washington  Nov.  24,  1978.  En- 
tered into  force  Oct.  27,  1979, 
Proclaimed  by  the  President:  Oct.  20,   1979 

Germany,  Federal  Republic  of 

Agreement  on  social   security,   with  final   pro- 
tocol. Signed  at  Washington  Jan.  7,  1976. 
Entry  into  force:  Dec.   I,  1979. 

Administrative  agreement  for  the  implementa- 
tion of  the  agreement  on   social   security  oC 
Jan.  7,  1976,  Signed  at  Washington  June  21, 
1978, 

Entry  into  force:   Oct.    30,    1979;  effective 
Dec.   1,  1979. 

Indonesia 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of  May  17, 
1977  (TIAS  8677).  for  sales  of  agricultural 
commodities  and  the  exchange  of  letters  of 
Dec.  16.  1977  (TIAS  8984),  concerning  de- 
velopment projects.  Effected  by  exchange  of 
notes  at  Jakarta  Oct.  2,  1979.  Entered  into 
force  Oct.  2,  1979 

Japan 

Agreement  extending  the  period  of  operation  of 
the  Tokai  Reprocessing  Facility  referred  to  in 
the  joint  communique  of  Sept.  12,  1977 
(TIAS  8734),  relating  to  reprocessing  of  spe- 
cial nuclear  material  of  United  Stales  origin. 
Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  al  Washington 
Oct.  1,  1979.  Entered  into  force  Oct.  I, 
1979. 

Korea 

Convention  for  the  avoidance  of  double  taxa- 
tion and  the  prevention  of  fiscal  evasion  with 
respect  to  taxes  on  income  and  the  encour- 
agement of  international  trade  and  invest- 
ment, with  related  notes.  Signed  al  Seoul 
June  4,  1976.  Entered  into  force  Oct.  20, 
1979. 
Proclaimed  by  the  President:  Oct.  23,   1979. 

Malaysia 

Memorandum  of  understanding  relating  to 
cooperation  in  combating  illicit  international 
traffic  in  narcotics  and  other  dangerous 
drugs.  Signed  at  Washington  Sept.  19.  1979. 
Entered  into  force  Sept    19,  1979. 

Mexico 

Agreement  on  natural  gas.  Announced  Sept. 
21.  1979,  Entered  into  force  Sept.  21,  1979. 

Minute  261  of  the  International  Boundary  and 
Water  Commission:  recommendations  for  the 
solution  to  the  border  sanitation  problems. 
Signed  at  El  Paso  Sept.  24,  1979. 
Entry  into  force:  Oct.  2,  1979. 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of  June  2, 
1977,  as  amended  (TIAS  8952,  9251),  relat- 
ing to  additional  cooperative  arrangements  to 
curb  the  illegal  traffic  in  narcotics.  Effected 
by  exchange  of  letters  at  Mexico  Sept.  27 
and  28,  1979.  Entered  into  force  Sept.  28, 
1979. 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of  Nov.  9, 
1972,  as  amended  (TIAS  7697,  9436),  con- 
cerning frequency  modulation  broadcasting 


December  1979 

in  the  88  to  108  MHz  band.  Effected  by  ex- 
change of  notes  at  Mexico  Oct.  2  and  II. 
1979.  Entered  into  force  Oct.  11,  1979. 

Morocco 

Agreement  for  sales  of  agricultural  com- 
modities, relating  to  the  agreement  of  May 
17,  1976  (TIAS  8309),  with  agreed  minutes. 
Signed  at  Rabat  Aug.  28,  1979.  Entered  into 
force  Aug.  28.  1979. 

Panama 

Panama  Canal  treaty,  with  annex  and  agreed 
minute,   related   agreements,   notes,   and   let- 
ters.   Signed   at   Washington   Sept.    7,    1977. 
Entered  into  force  Oct.  1,  1979. 
Proclaimed  by  the  President:  Sept.  24,  1979. 

Treaty  concerning  the  permanent  neutrality  and 
operation  of  the  Panama  Canal,  with  annexes 
and  related  protocol.  Signed  at  Washington 
Sept.  7.  1977.  Entered  into  force  Oct.  I. 
1979. 
Proclaimed  hy  the  President:  Sept.  24.  1979. 

Papua  New  Guinea 

Air  transport  agreement.  Signed  at  Port 
Moresby  Mar.  30,  1979.  Entered  into  force 
provisionally  Mar.  30,  1979,  definitively 
June  27,  1979. 

Philippines 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of  Aug.  22 
and  24,  1978.  as  amended  (TIAS  9223).  re- 
lating to  trade  in  cotton,  wool,  and  manmade 
fiber  textiles  and  textile  products.  Effected 
by  exchange  of  notes  at  Manila  Sept.  4  and 
12,  1979.  Entered  into  force  Sept.  12,  1979. 

Sierra  Leone 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of  Aug. 
23,  1979.  for  sales  of  agricultural  com- 
modities. Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at 
Freetown  Sept.  5  and  6.  1979.  Entered  into 
force  Sept.  6,  1979. 

Singapore 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of  Sept.  21 
and  22,  1978,  as  amended  (TIAS  9214),  re- 
lating to  trade  in  cotton,  wool,  and  manmade 
fiber  textiles  and  textile  products.  Effected 
by  exchange  of  notes  at  Washington  Oct.  4 
and  10.  1979.  Entered  into  force  Oct.  10, 
1979. 

Syria 

Project  loan  agreement  for  rural  roads.  Signed 
at  Damascus  Sept.  12,  1979.  Entered  into 
force  Sept.  12,  1979. 

Thailand 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of  Oct.  4, 
1978.  as  amended  (TIAS  9215.  9462),  relat- 
ing to  trade  in  cotton,  wool,  and  manmade 
fiber  textiles  and  textile  products.  Effected 
by  exchange  of  letters  at  Bangkok  Aug.  21 
and  Sept.  25.  1979.  Entered  into  force  Sept. 
25,  1979. 

U.S.S.R. 

Agreement  amending  and  extending  the  agree- 
ment of  Oct.  18.  1972,  as  amended  and  ex- 
tended (TIAS  7772,  8958),  relating  to  estab- 
lishment of  the  Temporary  Purchasing  Com- 
mission for  the  procurement  of  equipment  for 
the  Kama  River  truck  complex.  Effected  by 
exchange  of  letters  at  Washington  Oct.  2  and 
16,  1979.  Entered  into  force  Oct.  16,  1979. 

Western  Samoa 

General  agreement  for  special  development  as- 


sistance. Signed  at  Apia  Sept.  20,  1979.  En- 
tered into  force  Sept.  20,  1979. 

Zaire 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  for  sales  of 
agricultural  commodities  of  July  27,  1979. 
Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  Kinshasa 
Aug.  29  and  30,  1979.  Entered  into  force 
Aug.  30,  1979.  D 


'  Not  in  force. 

^With  reservation. 

■'Not  in  force  for  the  U.S. 

■•With  declaration. 

^For  articles  13  through  30. 

''For  the  Kingdom  in  Europe  and  the  Neth- 
erlands Antilles. 

'  In  respect  also  of  the  territories  under  the 
territorial  sovereignty  of  the  U.K..  as  well  as 
the  State  of  Brunei,  and,  within  the  limits  of 
(urisdiction  therein,  the  Condominium  of  the 
New  Hebrides. 

"  Applicable  to  Berlin  (West). 


CHROI\OLOGY: 

October  1979 


Oct.  1  A  new  civilian  government  in 
Nigeria  is  sworn  in  headed  by 
President  Alhaji  Shehu  Shagari. 
Under  terms  of  the  Panama  Canal 
Treaty,  Panama  resumes  territorial 
jurisdiction  over  the  Canal  Zone. 
The  U.S.  retains  rights  in  Panama 
to  operate  and  defend  the  Canal 
until  Dec.  31.  1999. 

Oct.  2  Liberian  President  Tolbert  visits 
Washington,  DC,  Sept.  25-Oct. 
2. 

Oct.  4  U.S.S.R.  President  Brezhnev  visits 
East  Germany,  Oct  4-8  to  attend 
ceremonies  marking  the  30th  an- 
niversary of  the  formation  of  the 
German  Democratic  Republic. 

Oct.  7  Japan  holds  parliamentary  elections. 
Prime  Minister  Ohira's  Liberal 
Democratic  Party  remains  in  con- 
trol of  the  government. 

Oct.  9  25th  assembly  of  the  Atlantic  Treaty 
Association  meets  in  Washington, 
DC.  Oct.  10-13. 

Oct.  1  1  Cuban  President  Castro  visits  New 
York  Oct.  11-15  to  address  the 
U.N.  on  Oct.  12. 
A  division  of  the  Bolivian  Army,  lo- 
cated in  the  northern  region  of 
Beni  and  led  by  Lt.  Col.  Tito  Var- 
gas, rebells  against  the  civilian 
government  of  President  Walter 
Guevara.  The  uprising  fails  to 
evoke  any  support  and  is  suppres- 
sed within  the  day. 

Oct.  12  The  following  newly  appointed  am- 
bassadors to  the  U.S.  presented 
their  credentials  to  President  Car- 
ter: John  A.  Tzounis  of  Greece. 
Enriquillo  Antonio  del  Rosario 
Cebollos  of  the  Dominican  Repub- 
lic. Raoul  Schoumaker  of  Bel- 
gium. Joshua  Luejimbazi  Zake  of 
Uganda,  and  Ricardo  Crespo  Zal- 
dumbide  of  Ecuador. 


69 


Oct.  14  Turkey  holds  parliamentary  elections 
resulting  in  a  serious  reverse  for 
ruling  Republican  People's  Party. 
Prime  Minister  Ecevit  resigns  and 
major  opposition  party  leader. 
Demirel.  is  asked  to  form  new 
government. 

Oct.  15  Armed  forces  oust  President  Carlos 
Humberto  Romero  of  El  Salvador 
and  proclaim  the  country  will  be 
ruled  by  a  joint  civilian-military 
junta. 
Chinese  Premier  Hua  Guofeng  ar- 
rives in  France  for  a  3-week  tour  of 
Western  Europe  including  West 
Germany,  the  United  Kingdom, 
and  Italy. 
Syrian  President  Assad  visits 
U.S.S.R.  Oct.  15-18. 

Oct.  17  U.S.  lands  1.800  marines  at  U.S. 
naval  base  in  Guantanamo. 

Oct.  20  Secretary  Vance  visits  La  Paz.  Bo- 
livia. Oct.  20-23  to  attend  9th 
OAS  General  Assembly  meeting 
held  Oct.  21-31. 

Oct.  21  Switzerland  holds  parliamentary 
elections  There  is  a  slight  gain  by 
major  parties  on  the  right,  mainly 
at  the  expense  of  Social  Democrats 
and  Independents.  Composition  of 
government  is  not  affected. 

Oct.  22  Mohammed  Reza  Pahlevi.  deposed 
Shah  of  Iran,  is  flown  into  New 
York  from  Mexico  to  undergo 
medical  tests  at  New  York 
Hospital-Cornell  Medical  Center. 

Oct.  24  President  Carter  announces  U.S.  as- 
sistance efforts  in  emergency  aid 
program  for  Kampuchea. 

Oct.  26  South  Korean  President  Park  is  fa- 
tally shot  in  Seoul. 

Oct.  28  Israeli  Foreign  Minister  Dayan  re- 
signs. 

Oct.  31  Assistant  to  the  President  for  Na- 
tional Security  Affairs,  Zbigniew 
Brzezinski.  departs  for  Algiers  to 
attend  celebrations  for  the  25th  an- 
niversary of  the  start  of  the  Alge- 
rian revolution  against  French 
rule.  D 


PRESS  RELEASES: 

Departtneni  of  State 

October  l5-November  14 

Press  releases  may  be  obtained  from  the  Of- 
fice of  Press  Relations.  Department  of  State. 
Washington,  D.C.  20520. 


No.  Date      Subject 

t264  10/15  U.S.,  Canada  research  con- 
sultation group  on  the 
long-range  transport  of  air 
pollutants. 

*265  10/16  U.S.,  Malaysia  amend  textile 
agreement,  Sept.  14  and  28. 

*266  10/15  U.S.,  India  amend  textile 
agreement,  Aug.  31  and 
Oct.  4. 


70 


•267       10/12 


t268       10/23 


•269       10/18 


•270       10/18 


•271        10/18 


•272 
•273 


'276 


•277 


286 

*287 


•288 
•289 


10/18 
10/18 


•274       10/19 


•275       10/23 


10/23 
10/25 


•278       10/25 


279       10/25 


•280       10/26 


•281 

10/26 

282 

10/29 

•283 

10/27 

284 

10/29 

•285       10/29 


10/31 
10/30 


10/31 
11/9 


Thomas  J.  Watson.  Jr..  sworn 
in   as   Ambassador   lo   the 
U.S.S.R.  (biographic  da(a). 
Foreign  Relations  of  the  U.S.. 
1951.  Vol.  II.  "The  United 
Nations:     The     Western 
Hemisphere"  released. 
U.S..   Poland  amend  textile 
agreement.    May    10   and 
Sept.  3. 
U.S.,   Thailand   amend   textile 
agreement.    Aug     21    and 
Sept.  25. 
U.S.   Organization  for  the   In- 
ternational  Radio  Consulta- 
tive Committee   (CCIR). 
study  group  2.  Nov.   14. 

CCIR.  study  group  CMTT, 
Nov.   15. 

Secretary's  Advisory  Com- 
mittee on  Private  Interna- 
tional Law.  Nov.   16. 

Assistant  Secretary  Barbara 
Watson  leads  regional  con- 
gressional staff  workshops 
on  consular  services.  Los 
Angeles  (Oct.  23)  and  San 
Francisco  (Oct.  25). 

Conference  on  Trade.  Invest- 
ments, and  Development 
(Conference  on  the  Carib- 
bean), Miami.  Nov.  28-30. 

George  B.  Roberts.  Jr..  sworn 
in  as  Ambassador  to  Guyana 
(biographic  data). 

Horace  G  Dawson.  Jr..  sworn 
in  as  Ambassador  to  the  Re- 
public of  Botswana  (bio- 
graphic data). 

Joint  communique  following 
meeting  of  Andean  Pact  of- 
ficials with  representatives 
of  the  U.S.  Government  and 
the  private  sector,  Oct. 
22-23. 

Vance:  statement  at  the  OAS 
General  Assembly.  La  Paz. 
Oct.  23. 

State  Department  and  San 
Antonio  Chamber  of  Com- 
merce to  present  conference 
on  U.S.  security  and  the 
Soviet  challenge.  Nov.  7. 

Conference  on  the  Middle 
East,  St.  Louis.  Nov.  6. 

Vance:  question-and-answer 
session  following  Gaines- 
ville address.  Oct.  26. 

Vance:  remarks  at  United  Na- 
tions Day  concert 

Vance:  remarks  at  Florida 
Blue  Key  Banquet  in 
Gainesville,  Oct.  26 

Vance:  remarks  before  the 
Hispanic  Conference. 

Vance:  news  conference. 

U.S.  and  13  maritime  nations 
of  the  Consultative  Shipping 
Group  (CSG)  open  3  days  of 
shipping  talks,  Washington, 
DC,  Oct.  30. 

U.S.,  Macau  amend  textile 
agreement,  Oct.   17. 

Barbara  W.  Newell  sworn  in 
as  Ambassador  to  UNESCO 
(biographic  data). 


•290        11/5     Program   of  official    visit   of 
Irish    Prime   Minister  Jack 
Lynch   and   Mrs.    Lynch, 
Nov.  7-15. 
291  11/5     Vance:  statement  before  U.N. 

General   Assembly  pledging 
conference  on  Kampuchea 

•292  11/5  U.S.,  Malaysia  amend  textile 
agreement,  Sept.  10  and  14. 

•293  11/5  US.,  Romania  amend  textile 
agreement,  July  24  and 
Aug.  27. 

294  1  1/8     Vance:  statement  on  situation 

in  Iran. 

•295         11/9    CCIR  study  group  5,  Dec.  7. 

•296  1  1/9  Advisory  Committee  on  Inter- 
national Intellectual  Prop- 
erty, Dec.  4. 

•297  11/13  U.S.,  Romania  amend  textile 
agreement,  July  2  3  and 
Sept.   14. 

'298  11/13  U.S.,  Singapore  amend  textile 
agreement,  Oct.  4  and  10 

'299  11/14  Proposed  consular  convention 
with  the  P.R.C.  D 


tHeld  for  a  later  issue. 
•Not  printed  in  the  Bulletin. 


PUBLICATI01\S 


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The  Egyptian-Israeli  Peace  Treaty,  March 
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8976.  Near  Eastern  and  South  Asian  Series  91. 
28  pp.  $1.50.  (Stock  No.  044-000-01732-6.) 

United  States  Contributions  to  International 
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Pub.  102.  85  pp.  $3.25.  Stock  No.  002-000- 
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Foreign  Consular  Offices  in  the  United  States, 
1979.  A  complete  and  official  listing  of  the 
foreign  consular  offices  in  the  United  States,  to- 
gether with  their  jurisdictions  and  recognized 
personnel.  Pub.  7846.  Department  and  Foreign 
Service  Series  128.  107  pp.  $2.50.  Stock  No. 
044-000-01693-1. 
■Air  Transport   Services.    Agreement   with 

Argentina.   TIAS   8978.   48   pp.   $1.80.   (Cat. 

No.  89.10:8978.) 
Omega  Navigational  Facility.  Agreement  with 

Australia.  TIAS  8979.  9  pp.  800.  (Cat.  No. 

S9. 10:8979.) 
Audit  of  Certain  Subcontracts.  Undertaking 

with  Canada.   TIAS  8980.   8  pp.   80c.   (Cat. 

No,  S9. 10:8980). 
Trade  in  Textiles.  Agreement  with  the  Repub- 
lic of  China.  TIAS  8985.    II   pp.  90C.  (Cat. 

No.  59.10:8985.) 
Housing  Loan  Guaranty.   Agreement  with 

Paraguay.  TIAS  8990.  6  pp,  70(?.  (Cat.  No. 

S9. 10:8990.1 
Rural   Education.    .Agreement   with    Bolivia. 

TIAS    8994.    65    pp.    $2,00.    (Cat.    No. 

59.10:8994.) 
Geological  and  Geophysical  Research  Station 

at  Alice  Springs.  Agreement  with  Australia. 

TIAS    8995,    16   pp.    $1.10.    (Cat.    No. 

59.10:8995.) 
Air  Transport  Services,  Agreement  with  Sin- 
gapore. TIAS  9001.  25  pp.  $1.30.  (Cat.  No. 

59.10:9001.) 
Investment   Guaranties.   Agreement  with 

Papua  New  Guinea.  TIAS  9004.   10  pp.  80(?. 

(Cat.  No.  59.10:9004.) 
Criminal   Investigations.   Agreement  with 

Mexico.   TIAS  9005.   3   pp.   70C.   (Cat.   No. 

59.10:9005).  D 


I^DEX 


DECEMBER  1979 
VOL.  79,  NO.  2033 

Afghanistan 

Afghan  Refugees  (Saunders) 54 

Situation  in  Afghanistan  (Saunders) 53 

Africa 

Communism  in  Africa  (Newsom) 29 

U.S.  Foreign  Policy  Achievements  (Nimetz)  .45 

Arms  Control 

An  Overview  of  U.S. -Soviet  Relations  (Shul- 
man)  40 

Question-and  Answer  Session  in  Gainesville 
(Vance) 23 

Senate  Report  on  SALT  II  Verification  (White 
House  statement) 32 

U.S.  Foreign  Policy  Achievements  (Nimetz)  .45 

Where  We  Stand  With  SALT  II  (Vance)   ...  .21 

Asia 

Refugees  —  An  International  Obligation 
(Young)   II 

U.S.  Foreign  Policy  Achievements  (Nimetz)  .45 

Canada.  Crude  Oil  Transportation  Arrange- 
ments (Katz)   38 

China.  U.S. -China  Trade  Agreement  (message 
to  the  Congress,  proclamation,  text  of 
agreement) 33 

Communism.  Communism  in  Africa 
(Newsom) 29 

Congress 

Afghan  Refugees  (Saunders) 54 

Communism  in  Africa  (Newsom) 29 

Crude  Oil  Transportation  Arrangements 
(Katz)  38 

Eighth  Report  on  the  Sinai  Support  Mission 
(message  to  the  Congress) 52 

15th  Report  on  Cyprus  (message  to  the  Con- 
gress)     43 

Kampuchean  Refugees:  Urgent  Need  for 
Worldwide  Relief  (Nimetz) 1 

An  Overview  of  U.S. -Soviet  Relations  (Shul- 
man)  40 

Senate  Report  on  SALT  II  Verification  (White 
House  statement) 32 

Situation  in  Afghanistan  (Saunders) 53 

U.N.  Reforms  (Maynes)   63 

U.S. -China  Trade  Agreement  (message  to  the 
Congress,  proclamation,  text  of  agreement) 33 

Cuba 

News  Conference  of  October  31  (Vance)  ...  .25 

An  Overview  of  U.S. -Soviet  Relations  (Shul- 
man)  40 

Question-and-Answer  Session  in  Gainesville 

(Vance) 23 

Cyprus.  15th  Report  on  Cyprus  (message  to  the 

Congress) 43 

Czechoslovakia.  Czechoslovak  Dissidents  (De- 
partment statement)   44 

Department  and  Foreign  Service.  Situation  in 
Iran  (Carter,  Vance,  White  House  an- 
nouncements)    49 

Developing  Countries 

Current  State  of  the  World  Economy  (Hor- 
mats) 58 


Economic  Dialogue — A  Challenge  to  Our  Times 
(McHenry) 55 

Economics 

OAS  General  Assembly  Convenes  (Vance)      .65 

U.S.  Foreign  Policy  Achievements  (Nimetz)  .45 

Energy 

Iran  and  Energy  (Carter)   18 

Situation  in  Iran  (Carter,   Vance,  White  House 
announcements) 49 

Europe.  Refugees — An  International  Obliga- 
tion (Young) II 

Foreign  Aid.  U.S.  Foreign  Policy  Achievements 
(Nimetz) 45 

Human  Rights 

Czechoslovak  Dissidents  (Department  state- 
ment)   44 

OAS  General  Assembly  Convenes  (Vance)   .  .65 

An  Overview   of  U.S. -Soviet   Relations  (Shul- 
man)   40 

U.S.  Foreign  Policy  Achievements  (Nimetz)  .45 

Immigration.  Refugees — An  International  Ob- 
ligation (Young)  II 

Industrialized  Democracies 

Current  State  of  the  World  Economy  (Hor- 
mats) 58 

Economic  Dialogue — A  Challenge  to  Our  Times 
(McHenry) 55 

Iran 

Iran  and  Energy  (Carter)  18 

Question-and-Answer  Session   in  Gainesville 
(Vance) 23 

Situation  in  Iran  (Carter,   Vance,  White  House 
announcements) 49 

Israel.  Israelis  and  Palestinians  (McHenry)  .  .50 

Kampuchea 

Kampuchean  Credentials  (Petree) 57 

Kampuchean   Refugees:   Urgent  Need   for 
Worldwide  Relief  (Nimetz) 1 

News  Conference  of  October  31  (Vance)  ...  .25 

Senators'  Report  on  Refugees  (Baucus,  Carter, 
Danforth,  Sasser)   4 

U.N.  Pledging  Conference  for  Khmer  Refugees 
(Vance) 10 

U.S.  Relief  Efforts  for  Kampuchea  (Carter)  .  .  .7 

Korea.    News  Conference   of  October  3  1 
(Vance) 25 

Latin   America  and   the  Caribbean.   U.S. 
Foreign  Policy  Achievements  (Nimetz)  .  .  .45 

Lebanon.  Israelis  and  Palestinians  (McHenry)50 

Middle  East 

Eighth  Report  on  the  Sinai  Support  Mission 
(message  to  the  Congress) 52 

News  Conference  of  October  31  (Vance) 25 

Question-and-Answer   Session   in   Gainesville 
(Vance) 23 

North  Atlantic  Treaty  Organization 

News  Conference  of  October  31  (Vance)  ...  .25 

U.S.  Foreign  Policy  Achievements  (Nimetz)  .45 

Where  We  Stand  With  SALT  II  (Vance)   ...  .21 

Organization  of  American  States.  OAS  Gen- 
eral Assembly  Convenes  (Vance) 65 

Petroleum 

Crude    Oil   Transportation    Arrangements 
(Katz)  38 

News  Conference  of  October  31  (Vance)  ...  .25 

Presidential  Documents 

Eighth  Report  on  the  Sinai  Support  Mission 
(message  to  the  Congress) 52 

15th  Report  on  Cyprus  (message  to  the  Con- 
gress)    43 

Iran  and  Energy  18 


Senators'  Report  on  Refugees  (Baucus,  Carter. 

Danforth,  Sasser)   4 

Situation  in  Iran  (Carter,   Vance,  White  House 

announcements) 49 

U.S. -China  Trade  Agreement  (message  to  the 
Congress,  proclamation,  text  of  agreement)  33 

U.S.  Relief  Efforts  for  Kampuchea  7 

Publications.  GPO  sales 39,  54,  70 

Refugees 

Afghan  Refugees  (Saunders) 54 

Kampuchean   Refugees:    Urgent   Need   for 

Worldwide  Relief  (Nimetz) I 

News  Conference  of  October  31  (Vance)  ...  .25 
Question-and-Answer  Session   in  Gainesville 

(Vance) 23 

Refugees  —  An    International    Obligation 

(Young)   11 

Senators'  Report  on  Refugees  (Baucus,  Carter, 

Danforth,  Sasser)   4 

U.N.  Pledging  Conference  for  Khmer  Refugees 

(Vance) 10 

US    Relief  Efforts  for  Kampuchea  (Carter)  .  .  .7 

South  Africa.  Venda  Homeland  (Reis) 59 

Terrorism 

Iran  and  Energy  (Carter)  18 

Situation  in  Iran  (Carter,  Vance,  White  House 

announcements) 49 

Thailand.    Senators'   Report  on   Refugees 

(Baucus,  Carter,  Danforth,  Sasser)   4 

Trade 

Opportunities  and  Challenges  From  the  MTN 

(Katz)  35 

U.S. -China  Trade  Agreement  (message  to  the 
Congress,  proclamation,  text  of  agreement) 33 

Treaties.  Current  Actions  67 

U.S.S.R. 

News  Conference  of  October  31  (Vance)  ...  .25 

An  Overview  of  U.S. -Soviet  Relations  (Shul- 

man)  40 

Where  We  Stand  With  SALT  II  (Vance)   ...  .21 
United  Kingdom.  Northern  Ireland  (Department 

statement) 41 

United  Nations 

Current  State  of  the  World  Economy  (Hor- 

mats) 58 

Economic  Dialogue  —  A  Challenge  to  Our  Times 

(McHenry) 55 

Kampuchean  Credentials  (Petree) 57 

U.N.  Pledging  Conference  for  Khmer  Refugees 

(Vance) 10 

U.N.  Reforms  (Maynes)   63 

Venda  Homeland  (Reis) 59 

Vatican  City.  Visit  of  His  Holiness  Pope  John 

Paul  II  (White  House  statement) 42 

Name  Index 

Baucus,  Max  4 

Carter,  President 4,  7,  18,  33,  43,  49,  52 

Danforth,  John  C 4 

Hormats,  Robert  D 58 

Katz,  Julius  L 35,  38 

Maynes,  Charles  William   63 

McHenry,  Donald  F 50,  55 

Newsom,  David  D   29 

Nimetz,  Matthew 1 ,  45 

Petree,  Richard  W 57 

Reis,  Herbert  K 59 

Sasser,  James  R 4 

Saunders,  Harold  H 53,  54 

Shulman,  Marshall  D 40 

Vance,  Secretary 10,  21,  23,  25,  49,  65 

Young ,  Harry  F 11 


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IH*partntpn  t 


buUetin 


Index  1979 


rhe  Official  Monthly  Record  of  United  States  Foreign  Policy  /  Vol.  79  /  Nos.  2022  -  2033 


SALT  Treaty 


Refugees 


NATO 


Mexico 


Human  Rights 


Economic  Summit 


Departnwni  of  State 

bulletin 


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published  by  the  Office  of  Public  Com- 
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major  addresses  and  news  conferences 
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CYRUS  R.  VANCE 

Secretary  of  State 

HOODING  CARTER  III 

Assistant  Secretary  for  Public  Affairs 

JOHN  CLARK  KIMBALL 

Chief,  Editorial  Division 

PHYLLIS  A.  YOUNG 
Editor 

COLLEEN  SUSSMAN 
JUANITA  ADAMS 
Assistant  Editors 


fc 


I]\DEX:  Vol.  79,  ]%os.  2022-2033 


Advisory  committees,   notice  of  meetings.   See 

Notice  of  meetings 
Afghanistan: 
Opium  control  problem:   Falco,   Aug.   51; 

Miklos,  Oct    56;  Saunders,  Dec.  53 
Refugees  (Saunders),  Dec.  54 
Revolution:   Carter,   Mar.    21;   Miklos,   Oct. 

55;  Saunders,  Oct.  48 
Soviet    influence   and   activities:    Feb.    40 
Brzezinski,  Feb.   19;  Carter,  Apr.  6,  7 
Christopher,   Apr.  48;  Miklos,  Oct.   55 
Saunders,  Dec.  53;  Shulman,  Dec.  43 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Apr.  67,  July  72, 

Dec.  67 
U.S.   Ambassador  (Dubs),  death  of:   Apr. 
52n,   69;  Carter,   Mar.   21,   Apr.   49; 
Christopher.  Apr    48;  Miklos,  Oct.  55; 
Saunders,  Dec.  53;  Vance,  Apr.  49 
U.S.   economic  aid.  reduction:   Apr.   70;  Saun- 
ders, Dec.  53;  While  House.  Apr.  50 
U.S.   Embassy   staff  reduction  (Saunders), 
Dec.  53 
Africa  (see  also  names  of  individual  countries): 
July  57;  Derian,  Jan.  7;  Maynes,  Jan.  47; 
Newsom,  Dec.  29;  Vance,  Jan.  18 
Brazilian  interests  in  (Ruser),  Sept.  5 
Communism  in  (Newsom),  Dec.  29 
Economic  problems  (Harrop),  Oct.  24 
Horn  of  Africa  (Moose).  Apr.   12 
Nationalism  (Newsom),  Dec.  31,  32 
Sahel,   WHOU.S.   river  blindness  control 

program  (Vance),  Mar.  36 
Southern  (see  also  Namibia,  Rhodesia,  and 
South  Africa):  Carter,  July  53;  Moose, 
Oct.    20;   Newsom,   PR    134,   5/17; 
Nimetz,  Dec.  46;  White  House,  Sept.  49 
Foreign  economic  interests,  Jan.  55 
U.N.  Education  and  Training  Program  for 
Southern     Africa     (UNETPSA); 
Maynes,  June  60 
U.N.   Trust  Fund  for  Southern  Africa 

(Maynes),  June  61 
Visit   by   Assistant   Secretary   Derian,   an- 
nouncement, PR  50,  2/27 
Soviet  and  Cuban  military  aid  and  influence: 
Feb.     39,     40,     Mar.     36    (cited); 
Brzezinski,  Feb.    19;  Carter,   Mar.   28, 
July  3;  Moose,  Apr.  9,  10.  12;  Newsom, 
June  21,   Dec.   29;  Shulman,   Dec.  43; 
Vance.  June  22,  Aug.  30 
U.S.  Ambassadors,  list,  Oct.  24 
,      U.S.  policy,  interests,  and  role:  Brzezinski, 
Feb.    19;  Carter,   Feb.    1,   Mar.   28; 
Moose,   Apr.    12;  Newsom,  June  20, 
Dec.  31;  Vance,  Aug.  27,  29 
Detroit  foreign  policy  conference,  announce- 
ment, PR  318,  12/4 
U.S.  security  assistance,  proposed:  Benson, 
Apr.   45,   47;   Moose,   Apr.   9,    12; 
Newsom,  Dec.  32 


Africa  (Coni'd) 

Western  Sahara  dispute:  Jan.   38;  Harrop, 
Oct.   23;  Newsoin,   Dec.   29;  Saunders. 
Oct.  46,  53;  Vance.  Dec.  26 
Agency   for  International  Development  (White 

House),  June  25 
Agricultural   surpluses,   U.S.    use   in  overseas 
programs:   Bangladesh,  July  72,  Aug.   68, 
Sept.   69;   Bolivia,   July   72,   Dec.   68; 
Dominican  Republic,  Apr.  68;  Egypt,  Jan. 
60,   May  68,   Sept.   69,   Dec.   68;  Ghana, 
Apr.  68;  Guinea,  July  72;  Guyana,  Aug. 
68;  Haiti,  Aug.  68;  Honduras,  June  67;  In- 
donesia, Feb.  66,  Sept    69,  Oct.  67.  Dec. 
68;  Israel,  Mar.  68;  Jamaica,  June  67,  July 
73,  Sept.  69;  Jordan,  Apr.  69;  Korea,  Re- 
public of,   Aug.   68;   Lebanon,   Jan.    60 
Mauritius,  Aug.   68;  Morocco,   Dec.   69 
Mozambique,  Sept.  69;  Nicaragua,   Nov 
60;  Pakistan.   Mar     69;  Peru,   Apr.   69 
Philippines,  Oct.   67;  Portugal,  Jan.   60 
Oct.  68;  Sierra  Leone,  Nov.  61,  Dec.  69 
Somalia,   Mar.   69,  Oct.   68;  Sri  Lanka 
May  69;  Sudan,  May  69;  Syria,  July  73 
Aug.  68;  Tunisia,  May  69;  Zaire,  Apr.  69 
May  69,  Oct.  68,  Dec.  69;  Zambia,  Oct 
68 
Agriculture   {see  also   Food   production   and 
shortages): 
Agricultural  bank  management  and  training, 
technical   cooperation    in,    bilateral 
agreement  with  Saudi  Arabia,  Jan.  61 
Agricultural  exchange  with  China,  text  of 

understanding  on.  Mar    7 
Cereals   improvement   system,   project  grant 

agreement  with  Egypt,  Dec.  68 
Farm  supply  and   marketing  center,   U.S.- 
Caribbean  Development   Bank   program 
(Vance).  Mar.  36 
Fertilizer  distribution  improvement  I  project, 
bilateral   agreement   with   Bangladesh, 
Aug.  68 
High  plains  cooperative  experiment,  bilateral 

agreement  with  Canada,  Aug.  68 
Inter-American  Institute  for  Cooperation  on 
Agriculture,  convention  (1979).  signa- 
tures:  Argentina,    Barbados,    Bolivia, 
Brazil,  Canada,  Colombia.  Costa  Rica, 
Chile,  Dominican  Republic,  Ecuador,  El 
Salvador,   Guatemala,  Guyana,  Haiti, 
Honduras,  Jamaica,  Mexico,  Nicaragua. 
Panama,   Paraguay,   Peru,   Trinidad   and 
Tobago,   U.S.,   Uruguay,    Venezuela, 
Sept.  67 
International   Fund   for   Agricultural   De- 
velopment: Carter,   Feb.   57;  McHenry, 
Dec.  56;  Vance,  May  36 
Current  actions:   Afghanistan.   Barbados, 
Bhutan,   Burundi,    Apr     67;   Central 
African  Empire,  Mar.  67;  Colombia^,- 
Sept.  67;  Costa  Rica,  Jan.  59;  Greece, 
Guatemala,   Feb.   65;  Jordan,  Laos 


btP-4 


Agriculture  (Cont'd) 
Intl.  Fund  (Cont'd) 
Current  actions  (Cont'd) 

Madagascar,  Apr.  67;  Mauritania, 
Aug.  66;  Mauritius,  Mar.  67; 
Paraguay.  May  67;  Portugal,  Feb.  65; 
Seychelles,  Spain,  Apr.  67;  Syria, 
Mar.  67;  Togo.  June  65;  Yemen  Arab 
Republic,  Mar.  67 
Irrigation  and  drainage  project   in  Indonesia 

(Vance),  Mar.  36 
Plant   protection,    international    convention 
(1951):   Bangladesh,  Jan.   59;   Solomon 
Islands.  Mar,  67;  Thailand,  Jan.  59 
Potash   plant   project,   bilateral   agreement 

with  Jordan,  Apr.  69,  May  68 
Production  and  marketing,  rural  roads  pro- 
gram in  Bangladesh  (Vance),  Mar.  36 
Research  (Vance),  Mar.  37,  Nov.  5 
Small   farmer   production,    project   grant 

agreement  with  Egypt.  Sept.  69 
U.S.  exports  (Carter),  Mar.  25 
Algeria  (Saunders),  Oct.  53 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc..  Feb.   65.  Aug.  67, 
Nov.  60 
Alhegelan,  Faisal,  Nov.  46 
American  ideals  (Brzezinski),  Jan.  5 
American  strengths:  Feb.  42.  Dec.  21;  Carter, 
Jan.  2,  Mar.  23,  June  1  1 ,  July  3;  Mondale, 
Apr.  14,  Oct.  10;  Nimetz,  Dec   47;  Vance, 
Apr.  30,  June  16 
Amiar,  Jose-Joseph:  Mar.  43;  remarks  on  pre- 
sentation of  credentials  and  reply  by  Presi- 
dent Caner.  UNN.  1/11 
Andreotti,  Giulio.  Aug.  5 
Angola:  Carter,   Apr.   6;   Newsom,  June  20, 
Dec.  29,  30,  31 
Coffee  agreement,   international,   with  annexes 

(1976),  accession.  Dec.  67 
Soviet  relations  (Shulman).  Dec.  43 
U.S.  policy  (Moose),  Oct.  21 
Antarctic  treaty  ( 1959): 

Accession.   Federal   Republic   of  Germany, 

Mar.  67 
Antarctic  fauna  and  flora,  conservation  of, 
recommendations  (1964),  U.S.  (notifi- 
cation of  approval),  Feb.  65,  Sept.  67 
Marine   living  resources,   conservation  of. 
proposed  treaty:  Nov.  21;  Benson.  Nov. 
22;  press  communique,  Nov,  23 
Principles  and  objectives,  recommendations 
re    furtherance   (1966,    1968,    1970, 
1972),   current   actions,   U.S..   Sept. 
67-68 
Principles  and  objectives,   recommendations 
re  furtherance  (1977):   Australia,   Dec. 
67;  Belgium.  Jan.  59;  Chile,  Nov.  59; 
New  Zealand.   South  Africa,  Jan.   59; 
U.S.,  Feb.  65 
QOcEreaty  Consultative  Parties,  lOth  meeting  of, 
Nov.  21 

niversary:  Nov.  21;  Benson,  Nov.  22 


20th  anni 

m 


DEPOSITORS 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


ANZUS  (Australia,   New  Zealand,  U.S.):  Car- 
ter,   Apr.   6;   Holbrooke,    Apr.    7;    Vance, 
Aug.  36 
20lh  council  meeting.  Sept.  53.  56 
Arab-Israeli  conflict:   Jan     37.   39,  Julv   57. 
Sept.   49.  58;  Carter,   Apr.   4;  McHenry, 
Dec.  51;  Ruser.  Sept.  5;  Vance.  Jan    22. 
June  17 
Arab  position:  Carter.  May  30;  Draper.  Apr. 
40;  McHenry.  Dec.  51;  Saunders.  Mar. 
50.  Oct.  46.  49 
Camp  David   agreements:   Carter.   Apr.   6; 
Saunders.  Mar.  49 
First   anniversary:    Begin,   Carter,    Sadal. 
Vance.  Nov.  47 
Comprehensive   peace   settlement:    Atherton, 
May  62;  Brzezinski,   Nov.   45;  Carter. 
Jan.   8.  May  20.  July  53;  Draper.   Apr 
40;   Saunders.   June   39,   Oct.   44,   48; 
Vance,  Nov.  1 
Egypt,  role  (Carter).  Apr.  6 
Egyptian-Israeli   peace   treaty:   Begin.   May 
24;  Brzezinski.  Nov.  44;  Carter.  Apr   6. 
Nov.   47;  Saunders.  June  37;   Vance. 
May  55.  Nov.  47 
Approval  by  Israeli  and  Egyptian  Cabinets 
and  Israeli  Knesset  (Carter).  May  2. 
3.  4 
Linkage  with  comprehensive  peace  treaty, 
question  of:   Carter.  Jan.   8.   9-10; 
Saunders.  Mar.  51 
Negotiations:  Begin.  May  25;  Brzezinski. 
Feb.  19;  Carter.  Jan.  10,  11,  12,  Mar. 

22.  34.  Apr.  5,  7,  39.  May   18.  20. 

23.  26.  28,  29,  30;  Christopher,  Jan. 
35;  Department,  Mar.  49;  Sadat.  May 
18.  22;  Vance.  Jan.  17.  Feb.  7-8.  10. 
12,  Mar.  39,  42,  May  39 

Signature:   Apr.   38;  Atherton,  May  61; 
Begin.  May  2;  Brown.  May  58;  Car- 
ter. May  I;  Sadat.  May  I 
Text.  May  3 

Israeli  air  attacks  on  Lebanon: 

Condemnation  (Department).  Oct.  50.  51 
Use  of  U.S.  aircraft  (Vance).  Nov.  17 

Israeli  government,  question  of  change 
(Vance),  Dec.  27 

Israeli  position  (McHenry).  Dec.  52 

Jerusalem,  religious  significance  (McHenry), 
Dec.  52 

GAU  resolution  (Harrop).  Oct.  24 

Palestine  Liberation  Organization  (PLO), 
U.S.  position  (Carter),  May  31,  Nov.  13 

Palestinian  issue  (see  also  West  Bank  and 
Gaza,  infra):  Jan.  39;  Atherton.  May 
63;  Brzezinski,  Nov.  44;  Ribicoff,  Feb. 
62;  Saunders.  Mar.  49,  June  38,  39, 
Oct.  46,  49;  Strauss,  Oct.  47;  Vance, 
May  57.  Aug.  48.  Nov.  2;  Young.  Feb. 
63.  Oct.  61 

Peace:  basis,  need:  Aug.  38;  Brzezinski 
Nov.  44;  Carter,  Mar.  28.  May  26 
NATO.  Aug.  47;  Saunders.  Mar.  48 
Vance,  Nov.  I 

Security  Council  resolutions  242  and  338 
Atherton.  May  63;  Carter.  May  20 
Ribicoff.  Feb.  62;  Saunders.  Mar.  49 
Vance.  May  55.  Aug.  49.  Oct.  53 

Private  citizens,  question  of  effect  of  visits 
(Vance).  Dec.  24 


Arab-hriicli  conflict  (Cum'iJ) 

Saudi  or  Arab  position  (Vance),  May  39 
Sinai: 

Israeli    withdrawal:    May   6,    8,    10,    12 
(maps);  Carter,   May  32;  Stahl,   Feb. 
64;  Vance.  Aug.  48,  Oct.  16 
U.N.    security   forces:   Maynes.   Jan,    47; 
White  House.  Oct.  60 
Soviet  influence,  question  of.  Feb.  39.  40 
U.N.   aid  to  Palestinians,  question  of  chan- 
neling through  PLO  (Stahl),  Feb.  64 
U.N.   position,   role:   Jan.   56,   May  65; 
Hechinger,  Feb.   58;  Maynes,  Jan.   47. 
June  51;  Ribicoff.  Jan.  50;  Young.  Jan 
51.  June  48 
U.S.    policy    toward   Israel,    question   of 
change:  Strauss.  Oct.   47;   Vance,   Oct. 
52 
U.S.   role;  Newsom.  PR   134.  5/17;  Nimetz, 
Dec.  46;  Vance.  May  40.  57.  June   17; 
Young.  Feb.  60 
U.S.  Sinai  Support  Mission,  sixth,  seventh, 
eighth  reports  (Carter).   Apr    41.   Aug. 
49,  Dec.  52 
Visit  of  President  Carter:  Apr.  38.  May   16; 

itinerary.  May  19 
Visit  of  Secretary  Brown  (Carter),  Apr.  8 
West  Bank  and  Gaza  autonomy  talks;  Ather- 
ton, May  63;  Brzezinski,  Nov.  44;  Car- 
ter, May  18,  30,  31,  32,  Aug.  19;  Saun- 
ders, June  39,  Oct.  48;  Strauss.  Oct.  47; 
Vance.  Jan.   17,  Feb.   12,   13,  May  39, 
57.  Aug.  22.  Nov.  48,  Dec.  28.  PR  124, 
5/8 
Camp  David   framework:   Saunders,   Mar. 

50;  Vance,  Aug.  48 
Dayan  resignation,  question  of  effect 

(Vance),  Dec.  24 
Palestinian  participation,  need  for:   Feb. 
49;   Carter,   May   28,   30,   31.   32; 
McHenry.   Dec.   51;  Stahl.   Feb.   64; 
Vance.  Aug.  48,  Oct.  16,  Nov.  2 
Private  trips  to  Middle  East,  question  of 

(Vance),  Nov.  16,  19 
U.S.   representative  (Strauss),   nomination 
(Saunders),  June  39 
West  Bank  and  Gaza  occupied  territories, 
Israeli  civilian  settlements,  U.S.  posi- 
tion: Brzezinski,  Nov.  44;  Carter,  Mar. 
14;  Stahl,  Feb.  63;  Vance,  Jan.  17,  Feb 
13,  Aug.  23,  Nov.  17 
Arbitration: 

Arbitral   awards,    foreign,    recognition   and 
enforcement,   convention   (1958):   Co- 
lombia.  Nov.  59;  San  Marino.  July  71; 
U.K..  extension  to  Isle  of  Man.  May  66 
Canada-US.   dispute  over  Gulf  of  Maine, 
agreements  on  arbitration:  May  68,  June 
10;  Pickering,  June  7 
Signature,  PR  82.  3/29 
France-US.: 

Civil  aviation,  conclusion.  PR  2.  1/2 
Status,  privileges,  and  immunities  in  Swit- 
zerland of  the   tribunal   of  arbitration 
between  the  U.S.  and  France,  and  of 
persons   participating,    agreement 
(1978),  Feb.  65 
Inter-American  convention  on  international 
commercial   arbitration  (1975),   ratifica- 
tion, Honduras,  June  65 


Arce  Alvarez,  Roberto:  Oct.   63;  remarks  on 

presentation  of  credentials  and  reply  by 

President  Carter,  UNN,  3/30 

Argentina:  Vaky.  Apr.  57,  60;  Vance.  Dec    65 

Treaties,  agreements,  etc..  Mar   68,  May  68. 

June  66,  Aug.  67,  68.  Sept.  67.  Nov.  60 

Arias-Schreiber.  Alfonso:  Oct    63;  remarks  on 

presentation   of  credentials  and   reply   by 

President  Carter.  UNN.  3/30 

Armaments.  See  Defense  and  national  security 

and  Strategic  arms  limitation  talks 
Arms  control   and  disarmament  {see  also 
Strategic   arms   limitation   talks):   Carter. 
Feb.  2.  Mar.  54.  June  44;  NATO.  Jan.  37. 
Aug.  46;  Newsom.  Jan.  32;  Pearson.  Feb. 
55;  Vance.  Jan,   15.  Mar.  39 
Conventional  arms  transfers,  limitation  pro- 
posed:  Mar.   60;  Brzezinski.  Feb.    19; 
Gelb,  June  45;  Vaky.  Mar.  66;  Vance, 
Sept.  7 
South  Asia,  nuclear-weapons-free  zone,  pro- 
posed. May  65 
U.N.   Committee  on  Disarmament  (Fisher), 

Jan.  53 
U.N.    Special   Session   on   Disarmament! 
(1978):  Mar.   60;  Fisher.  Jan.   52.  53;- 
Gelb.  June  45.  46;  Maynes.  Jan.  49, 
June  52;  Young,  June  48 
U.S.   sales  policy  (see  also  Military  assist- 
ance and  Security  assistance):   Benson,  i 
Apr.  42;  Carter.  Feb.  49;  Christopher, 
Jan.  28;  Gelb.  June  45;  Lake.  Jan.  20 
Arms  Control   and   Disarmament   Agency,   an- 
nual report,  transmittal  (Carter),  Aug.  35 
ASEAN.  See  Association  of  South  East  Asian* 

Nations 
Asia  (see  also  names  of  individual  countries): 
July  57 
Asian-American  Foreign  Policy  Conference, 
New   York,   announcement.   PR  305, 
11/21 
East  Asia:  Holbrooke.  Apr    17;  Vance.  Feb. 

14 
Southeast  Asia  (Newsom).  PR  134.  5/17 
Soviet  activities:  Carter.  Sept.   37;  Miklos. 

Oct.  54 
U.S.  policy,  interests,  and  role:  Brzezinski. 
Feb.    21;  Carter.   Mar.    22,   Apr.  4; 
Christopher.  Apr.  48;  Holbrooke.  Apr. 
22;  Miklos.  Oct.  54;  Newsom.  Apr.  27; 
Vance.  Feb.  16.  Sept.  35 
Security  assistance.   FY    1980  proposals: 
Apr.    18;  Benson.   Apr.  45.  46;  Hol- 
brooke. Apr.  17,  20 
Association  of  South  East  Asian  Nations:  Apr. 
26,     Aug.     38;    ANZUS.    Sept.    57; 
Brzezinski,  Feb.   19;  Carter,  Mar.  22,  27, 
Aug.    15;  Holbrooke,  Apr.    17,  Oct.  38; 
Newsom,  Jan.   32,  Apr.   27;  Vance,  Feb. 
16,  June  18.  Aug.  36 
Asian-US.   Business  Council  (Department). 

Apr.  20 
Declarations  on   Kampuchea  and   Vietnam 

(Petree).  June  64 
Economic  development  and  U.S.  economic 
relations;  Holbrooke,  Apr.  22;  Newsom. 
Apr.  28;  Vance,  Sept.  36 
Indochinese  refugees,  policy:   Vance.  Sept. 

35.  37;  Young.  H..  Dec.  16 
Ministerial  meeting.  Bali  (Vance).  Sept.  35 


Index  1979 


Assoc,  of  South  East  Asian  Nations  (Cont'd) 
Narcotic  control,  cooperation  (Falco).   Aug. 
51 
Alherton,  Alfred  L..  Jr.:  May  61;  swearing  in 

as  Ambassador  to  Egypt.  PR  140.  5/22 
Alwood,  James  R.,  selection  as  Senior  Deputy 
Legal  Adviser  for  State  Department,   PR 
194.  8/10 
Australia: 

Indian  Ocean  patrols,  question  of:   Killen. 

Sept.  55.  56;  Vance.  Sept.  53.  55 
Indochinese  refugees,  reception:  Holbrooke, 
Apr     19.  Oct.   36;  Peacock.  Sept.  53; 
Young.  H  .  Dec.   15 
Nuclear  energy   agreement   with   U.S.    (Car- 
ter). Nov.  49 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc..  Mar.  68,  May  67. 

68.  July  72.  Aug.  66.  67.  68,  Dec.  67 
U.S.  military  aid:  Benson,  Apr.  42;  Killen, 

Sept.  55 
U.S.  relations  (Vance),  Sept.  55 
Austria  (Vest).  Nov.  41 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc..  Jan.  59.  Mar.  67. 

68.  Apr.  68.  June  66.  67,  Aug.  66 
Visit  of  President  Carter:  Brezhnev,  July  51. 
52.   53,   54;  Carter.  July  49.  50.   53; 
Kirchschlager.  July  50 
Aviation: 

Air  hijacking,   need  for  collective  action 
against:  Christopher.  Jan.   29;  Ohira. 
Aug.  3;  Quainton.  Sept.  61 
Air  navigation  aids,  site  test,  periodic  flight 
checks,    1977  and    1978  amendments  to 
bilateral  agreement  with  Cape   Verde, 
Feb.  65 
Air  navigation  services  in  Greenland  and  the 
Faroe   Islands  and   in   Iceland,  joint 
financing  agreements  (1956).   amend- 
ments to  Art.  V.  June  65.  Dec.  67 
Air  services  transit,  international  agreement 
(1944):      Bangladesh,      Mar.      67; 
Mauritania,  July  71;  Seychelles,  Dec.  67 
Air  traffic  control,  bilateral  agreements  with: 
Germany,  Federal  Republic  of,   Nov.  60; 
Panama,  Mar.  69 
Air  transport,   bilateral   agreements  with: 
Austria,   Apr.   68;  Fiji,   Dec.   68;  Ger- 
many,  Federal  Republic  of,  Jan.   60; 
Jamaica,  June  67,  PR  96,  4/1 1;  Korea, 
Republic  of.   May  68,   PR  81,   3/26; 
Papua  New  Guinea,   Dec.   69;  Poland, 
Apr.  69;  Singapore.   Nov.   61;  Syria. 
Mar.  69;  Yugoslavia.  Sept.  69 
Air  transport   preclearance   to  Edmonton, 
bilateral   agreement   with  Canada,   Dec. 
68 
Air  transport  services,  bilateral  agreements 
with:  Belgium,  Mar.  68;  Senegal,  May 
69 
Airbases.  funding  and  construction,  bilateral 

agreements  with  Israel.  June  67 
Certificates  of  airworthiness  of  imported  air- 
craft,  bilateral   agreement  with   New 
Zealand.  May  68 
Civil  air  transport,  bilateral  agreement  with 

Romania.  Oct.  68 
Flight   inspection  services,   bilateral  agree- 
ments with:  China.  People's  Republic 
of,  Jan.  60;  Singapore,  Jan.  61 
International   civil   aviation,   convention 


Aviation  (Cont'd) 
Intl.  civil  (Cont'd) 

(1944).  Botswana.  Feb.  65 
Protocol   (1954.    1961.    1962).    Korea, 

Democratic  Republic  of,  Apr.  67 
Protocol   (1971)  re  amendment:   Congo. 
Korea.  Democratic  Republic  of.  Tan- 
zania. Apr.  67 
Protocol   (1974)   re   amendment:    Korea. 
Democratic  Republic  of.   Mali.   Peru. 
Tanzania.  Apr.  67 
Protocol  (1977)  re  authentic  quadrilingual 
text:   Barbados.  Feb  65;  Egypt.  July 
77;  Finland.  Feb.  65;  Israel.  July  77; 
Mexico.   Apr.   67;   Netherlands.   July 
71;  Seychelles.  May  66;  Switzerland. 
July  77;  Upper  Volta.  Jan.  59 
Acceptance:  Peru.  Yugoslavia.  Nov.  59 
Ratification.  Guatemala.  Nov.  59 
Signature.  Spain.  Nov.  59 
Protocol  (1968)  re  authentic  trilingual  text. 
Barbados,  Feb.  65 
International   Civil   Aviation   Organization 

(Maynes).  Jan.  50 
International  recognition  of  rights  in  aircraft, 
convention  (1948):  Madagascar. 
Seychelles.  Apr  67 
Offenses  and  certain  other  acts  committed  on 
board  aircraft,  convention  (1963): 
Bangladesh.  Botswana,  China.  Congo. 
Gambia.  Grenada.  Nepal.  Seychelles, 
Apr.  67 
Nonscheduled  air  service,  bilateral  agree- 
ment with  Jordan.  Mar.  69 
Suppression  of  unlawful  acts  against  safety 
of  civil  aviation,  convention  (1971): 
Bolivia,  Sept.  68;  Botswana,  Feb.  65;  El 
Salvador.  Nov.  59;  Ethiopia  (with  reser- 
vation). May  66.  Aug.  66;  Gambia.  Jan. 
59;  Nepal.  Feb.  65;  Sierra  Leone.  Nov. 
59;  Sudan.  Mar.  67;  Togo.  Apr.  67; 
Vietnam.  Dec.  67 
Suppression  of  unlawful  seizure  of  aircraft 
convention  (1970):  Afghanistan.  Dec. 
67;  Bolivia.  Sept  68;  Botswana.  Feb. 
65;  Ethiopia  (with  reservation).  May  66. 
Aug.  66;  Gambia.  Jan.  59;  Kuwait, 
Sept.  68;  Luxembourg.  Jan.  59;  Nepal. 
Feb.  65;  Sudan.  Mar.  67;  Togo,  Apr. 
67;  Vietnam.  Dec.  67 
Unification  of  certain  rules  re  international 
carriage  by  air.  convention  (1929),  pro- 
tocols 3  and  4:  Egypt,  Finland,  Italy, 
Mar.  67 


B 


Bahamas  (Vaky).  Apr.  61 

Treaties,  agreements,  etc..  Apr.  67.  68.  May  67. 

Nov.  59 
Bahrain.   US     Ambassador  (Pelletreau). 

swearing  in.  PR  54.  2/26 
Balance  of  payments: 
China  (table).  Mar.  20 
Turkey,   loan   agreement  for  economic 

financing.  Feb.  66 
U.S.:  Blumenthal.  Feb.  17;  Carter.  Mar.  24. 

Apr.   32;   Cooper.   June   31;   Katz.   June 


Balance  of  payments  (Cont'd) 
U.S.  (Cont'd) 

30;  Solomon,  June  35;  Vance.  Jan.   14. 
Feb.  8 
Baltic  States.  U.S.  policy  toward  Estonia.  Lat- 
via, and  Lithuania  (Barry).  Sept.  52 
Bangladesh:  Christopher.  Apr.  49.  51;  Miklos. 
Oct.  56;  Vance.  Mar.  36 
NPT.  accession:  Christopher.   Department. 

Nov.  49 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc..  Jan.  59.  60.  Feb. 
65.  Mar.  67.  Apr.  67.  July  72.  Aug.  67. 
68.  Sept.  69.  Nov.  59 
Barbados: 

Treaties,  agreements,  etc..  Feb.  65.  Apr.  67. 

Sept.  67.  68.  69.  Oct.  67,  Nov.  59 
U.S.  aid  (Vaky),  Apr.  61 
U.S.  Ambassador  (Shelton).  swearing  in.  PR 
141.  5/24 
Barry,  Robert  L..  Sept.  52 
Barton,  William  H.,  Jan.  51 
Baucus,  Max,  Dec    4 
Begin.  Menahem.  May  2,  23,  24.  28 

Visit  to  U.S.:  Apr.  40;  Carter.  Apr.  7 
Belgium,   treaties,  agreements,  etc..  Jan.   59. 
Feb    65.  Mar.  68.  Apr.  67.  June  25.  Aug. 
66,  67.  68,  Nov.  60 
Benedick.  Richard  Elliot,  swearing  in  as  Slate 
Department  Coordinator  of  Population 
Affairs.  PR  90.  4/4 
Benin.  Vienna  convention  on  consular  relations 

(1963).  ratification,  June  65 
Benson.  Lucy  Wilson.  Apr.  42.  Sept.  58.  Nov. 

22 
Berlin  (NATO).  Jan.  36.  Aug.  46 

GDR  Election  Law.  amendment.  Sept.  47 
Protocols  (1979)  on  food  aid  convention  and 
wheat  aid  convention,  application  to. 
Dec.  68 
Bermuda: 

Ambassador  to  U.S.:   Apr.   58;  remarks  on 
presentation  of  credentials  and  reply  by 
President  Carter.  UNN.  I/U 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Oct.  67 
Bhutan,   treaties,  agreements,  etc..   Apr.   67. 

May  67.  Dec.  67 
Big-power  responsibility:  Brzezinski,  Feb.  19; 
Carter.  Mar.  21.  Apr.  4.  Nov.  9;  Maynes. 
June  57;  Vance,  Dec.  22 
Bill  of  Rights  Day:  Brzezinski,  Jan.  5;  Carter, 

Jan.  2,  3 
Bills  of  lading,  international  convention  (1924) 
for  unification  of  certain  rules,  protocol 
(1968):   German   Democratic   Republic. 
Netherlands.  May  66 
Biological   and   toxin   weapons,   convention 
(1972): 
Current  actions:  Belgium,  Apr.  67.  June  65 
Honduras.  Apr.  67;  Romania,  Sept.  68 
Seychelles.   Dec.   67;  Spain.   Aug.   66 
Yemen  (Aden).  Sept.  68 
Review  conference.  1980  (Fisher).  Jan.  54 
Blumenthal.  W    Michael:  Feb.  17;  Carter.  Mar. 

31;  Christopher.  Jan.  28 
Bolivia:   Falco.   Aug.   54;  Maynes.  June  60; 
Vaky.  Apr.  58,  61;  Vance,  Nov.  14,  Dec. 
65 
Ambassador  to  U.S.:   Oct.    63;   remarks  on 
presentation  of  credentials  and  reply  by 
President  Carter.  UNN.  3/30 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


Bolivia  (Colli'  J) 

Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Jan.  59.  July  72. 
Aug.   67.   Sept.    67,   68.   69.    Nov.    59, 
Dec.  68 
Bondi,  Sir  Hermann  (quoted),  Jan.  43 
Bosworlh,  Stephen  W.,  swearing  in  as  Ambas- 
sador to  Tunisia.  PR  59.  3/7 
Botswana:  Maynes.  June  60;  Moose.  Apr,   10.  11 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc..  Feb.  65.  Apr.  67. 

Aug.  67 
U.S.  Ambassador  (Dawson),  swearing  in,  PR 
277,  10/25 
Bowdler,  William  C,  Jan    9,   12n 
Brandt,  Willy  (Maynes).  Jan.  50 
Brazil: 

Africa,  interests  in  (Ruser),  Sept.  5 

Ambassador  to  U.S.,  Oct.  63 

Democratic   progress:    Maynes,   Jan.    49; 

Sayre,  Sept.  3 
Profile,  Sept.  ii 
Textile  agreements  with  U.S.,  amendments, 

PR  58,  3/6;  PR  94,  4/11 
Treaties,   agreements,   etc..   Mar.   68,   Apr. 
68,  May  68,  June  66,  67,  July  72,  Aug. 
67,  Sept.  67,  Dec.  68 
US  -Brazil  joint   group  on  energy   technol- 
ogy, joint  communique,  Jan.  58 
U.S.   economic   and   other  relations:   Ruser, 
Sept.  4;  Sayre,  Sept.   1;  Vaky,  Apr.  56, 
57,  60 
Brezhnev,  Leonid  I.:  July  51,  52,  53;  Carter, 
Feb.  6;  Shulman,  Dec.  40;  Toon,  Sept    49 
Brokaw,  Tom.  Nov.  18 

Brown.  Harold.   May  51,   58,  June   23,  July  65 
Sept.  13,  27 
NATO,  30th  anniversary,  remarks.  PR  93. 

4/4 
Visit  to  Middle  East  (Carter).  Apr.  5 
Brzezinski.   Zbigniew,   Jan.   3,   May  48,   Nov. 

34,  44 
Budget,    FY    1980   (see  also    Defense   and 
Foreign  assistance):  Carter,  Jan.  8;  Vance, 
Jan.   13,  Mar.  39 
Bugotu,  Francis:  Sept.  55;  remarks  on  presen- 
tation of  credentials  and  reply  by  President 
Carter,  UNN,  3/30 
Bulgaria  (Vest),  Nov.  42 

Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Jan.  60,  Mar.  68, 

Aug.  66,  67,  Sept.  68 
U.S.    Ambassador  (Perry),   swearing   in,   PR 
255,  10/5 
Burma:  Apr.   18;  Falco,  Aug.  50,  51 
Burundi,   International   Fund  for  Agricultural 
Development,   agreement  (1976),   acces- 
sion, Apr.  67 
Byelorussian  Soviet   Socialist   Republic, 
treaties,  agreements,  etc..  Mar.  67,  June 
66 
Byrd,  Robert  (Vance).  Feb.   13 


Callaghan,  James,  Feb.  36 
Cambodia.  See  Kampuchea 
Cameroon,  U.S.  aid  (Moose),  Apr.   1  1 
Canada: 


Canada  IConi'd) 

Air  quality  talks  with  U.S.:  Carter,  June  42; 
Jamieson.  Jan  22;  |omt  statement.  Nov. 
26 
Alaskan  oil  transportation  arrangements: 
June  9;  Enders,  June  4;  Jamieson.  Jan. 
21,  23;  Katz,  Dec.  38 
Canadian   Embassy   at  Tel   Aviv   (Vance), 

Dec.  27 
Economic   relations   with   U.S.:   June  4,   5; 
Katz,  June  29,  Oct.  42,  43 
Automotive  trade:  Jamieson,  Jan.  22;  Katz, 
Oct.  42;  Vance,  Jan.  22 
Energy  trade  with  U.S.:  June   10;  Enders, 

June  5;  Kalz,  Oct.  42.  Dec.  38 
Garrison  Diversion  Unit,  meeting.  June  8 
Great  Lakes.  See  Great  Lakes 
Haines-Fairbanks  pipeline  agreement  (1953), 

termination.  Mar.  68 
Maritime  boundary  agreements  with  U.S.: 
May   68,   June    10;   Enders,   June   6; 
Jamieson,  Jan.   21,   22,   23;  Pickering, 
June  7 
Signature  of  Gulf  of  Maine  agreement.  PR  82, 

3/29 
Poplar  River   Project,   consultations   with 

U.S.,  PR  138,  5/18;  PR  191,  8/8 
Profile,  June  2 

Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Jan.  59,  60.  Mar. 

68,  Apr.  68,  May  68,  June  67,  July  72, 

Aug.  66,  67,  68,  Sept.  67,  69,  Oct.  67, 

Nov.  60,  Dec.  68 

United  Canada,   question   of  (Vance),   Jan. 

21,  22 
U.S.  Ambassador  (Curtis),  swearing  in,  PR 

243,  9/29 
U.S.    Ambassador  (Enders),   biographical 

details,  June  1 
U.S.  relations:  Enders,  June  I,  6;  Vest.  Nov. 

41 
U.S.  visit  of  Prime  Minister  Trudeau,  June  9 
Visit  of  Secretary  Vance,  Jan.  21 
Cape   Verde,   treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Jan. 
59,  Feb.  65.  June  66,  Sept.  68,  Nov.  59, 
60 
Caradon,  Lord  Hugh  (quoted),  Aug.  27 
Carter,  Hodding  III,  swearing  in  as  Assistant 
Secretary  for  Public  Affairs  and  Spokes- 
man of  the  State  Department,  PR  30,  2/6 
Carter,  Jimmy: 

Addresses,  remarks,  and  statements: 
Afghanistan,  Apr.  6,  7 

Ambassador   Dubs,   death   of.   Mar.    21, 
Apr.  49 
AFL-CIO  13th  constitutional  convention, 

Dec.  18 
American  Newspaper  Publishers  Associa- 
tion, June  1 1 
Arab-Israeli    conflict   (/or   details  see 
Arab-Israeli  conflict),   Apr.  4,  July  53 
Camp  David   agreements,   first  anniver- 
sary, Nov.  47 
Egyptian-Israeli  peace  treaty,  Apr.  5,  6, 
7.  May  30 
Negotiations,  Jan.    ID.    11-12,  Mar. 
22,  34,  Apr.  39,  May  18,  20,  26, 
28 
Signature,  May  I,  2,  3,  4 


Carter.  Jimmy  {Cont'd) 

Addresses,  remarks,  etc.  (Cont'd) 
Arab-Israeli  conflict  (Cont'd) 

Israel,  commitment  to  security  of.  May 

63  (quoted) 
Israeli   civilian   settlements  on   West 

Bank.  June  1  5 
Meetings  with  Prime  Minister  Begin  and 

Prime  Minister  Khalil.  Apr.  39 
Palestinian   Liberation   Organization, 

U.S.  position.  May  31.  Nov.  13 
Peace,  need  for.  Jan.   8,  Mar.   28,  May 

21,  28 
Visit  of  President  Carter  to  Egypt  and 

Israel,  Apr.  38,  May  16 
West   Bank  and  Gaza  autonomy   talks, 
May   18,  28,  30,  31,  32,  June  39 
(quoted),  Aug.  19 
Arms  control,  Feb.  2,  42 
Bill  of  Rights  Day,  Jan.  2 
China,  People's  Republic  of,  Apr    8,  June 
43 
Relations,   normalization,   Jan.   9,  25, 
Feb.   I,  6,   15,   17,  21  (quoted),  221 
(quoted),   23  (quoted),   37,  Mar.    I, 

5,  12,  30,  32,  Apr.  5 

Soviet  reaction  to  U.S.   relations,  Feb. 

6,  Mar.  31 
Taiwan: 

Continuation  of  U.S.  nongovernmen- 
tal relations,  Jan.  25,  26,  Feb.  1, 
4,  5,  6,  7,  24,  Mar.  27,  30,  32,. 
45,  June  26 
U.S.  defense  treaty,  legality  of  termi 
nation,  Feb.  7 
Taiwan  Relations  Act,   signature,  Junei 

26 
U.S.  trade,  Jan.   11,  26.  June  14.  Dec. 

33 
Visit  of  Vice  President  Deng.  Jan.  25, 
Feb.   I.  4.  Mar.   1,  2,  4,  5,  12,  27, 
31,  33,  Oct.  12  (quoted) 
Civil  defense  program,  question  of.  Jan.  9 
Civil  liberties,  June  1  1 
Cuba,  Apr.  6,  59,  July  3 

MIG-23's,  presence,  Jan.  10 
Soviet  combat  brigade,  presence  of, 
Oct.  63,  Nov.  7,  12 
Cyprus  (see  also  under  Messages  to  Con- 
gress), Jan.  1 1 ,  Feb.  1 .  Apr   6 
Decisionmaking.  Mar.  33 
Defense  and  national  security,  June  43, 
Aug.   18,  Nov.  7 
Budget,  Jan.  8,  9,  Feb.   1,  Mar.  22,  26, 

31,  June  12,  44,  Nov.  12,  48 
Fixed  silo  missiles,  question  of  vulnera- 
bility, Jan.  9,  June  12,  Nov.  25 
Military  strength  and  capability,  Feb.  5 
MX  missile,  decision  on,  Jan.  9,  July  2, 
Aug.  19,  Nov.  25,  48 
Economy,  domestic.  Mar.  24,  28 

Dollar,  value,  Apr.  32,  Oct.  9,  Nov.  12 
Economy,   world.   Mar.   24,   54,   Apr.   32, 
Nov.   12 
Tokyo  summit  meeting.  Mar.  27,  Aug. 
9,  12.  18 
Education,  Hubert  H.   Humphrey  North- 
South  Scholarship  Program,  Feb.  35 


Index  1979 


Carler.  Jimmy  (Coiu'il) 

Addresses,  remarks,  etc.  {Cont'd) 
Energy  (see  also  Mexico,  infra).  Apr.  5, 
June  42 
Domestic  energy  program,  Apr,  8,  Aug. 

I,  Dec.   19,  50 
Domestic  oil  prices.  Mar.  34,  Apr.  7.  8 
Iranian  oil  curtailment,  Feb   3,  Mar   32, 

Apr.  7,  9 
Oil  import  limitations.  Aug.  4.  9.  18 
Oil  prices.  Jan    12,  Apr.  8,  Aug.   1,  lU. 
18 
Europe,  Mar.  27 

Brezhnev   proposed   arms   reduction, 

Nov.  13 
CSCE  Final  Act.  Feb.  40 
Fourth  anniversary.  Nov.  39 
Export  policy.  Mar.  24.  Apr.  32.  June  44 
Federal    Reserve    Board,    appointment   of 

Chairman  (Volcker).  Oct.  9 
Food,  world  problems.  Mar.  24 
Foreign  aid.  Jan.   1.  Mar.  27.  37  (quoted) 
Foreign  policy.  Jan    I.  Feb.  1.  8.  Mar.  25. 
33 
Foreign   policy   conference   for  editors 

and  broadcasters.  Apr.  4 
1979  assessment.  Jan.   I  I 
Georgia  Institute  of  Technology,  address. 

Mar.  21 
Guadeloupe  meeting.  Feb.  37 
Hubert    H.    Humphrey    North-South 

Scholarship  Program.  Feb.  35 
Human  rights,  Jan.  9,  Feb.  I,  2,  Mar.  25. 
29.  54,  59,  June   13,  Aug.    15,  Nov. 
14,  Dec.  20 
Czechoslovakia,  Nov.  39 
Universal  Declaration  of  Human  Rights, 
30th  anniversary,  Jan.   1 
Imports,  beef,  Jan.  8 
Intelligence  community,  Jan.   10,  Nov.  8, 

10 
Iran,  Feb.  3,  4.  Mar.  21.  28,  30,  31,  Apr. 
4,  9 
Oil  supplies  to  U.S.,  question  of,  Feb. 

3,  Mar.  32,  Apr.  7,  9 
Shah,  problems.  Jan.   10.  12 
U.S.    Embassy   personnel   seizure   and 
U.S.  response.  Dec.  18.  50 
Israel: 
Oil  supply  arrangements.   Apr    9.  May 

28 
U.S.  commitment.  Feb    I.  Apr.  5.  May 
26,  31 
Jackson.  Reverend  Jesse.  Nov.   12 
Kampuchea.  Dec.  20 

U.S.  relief  efforts,  Nov.  13,  Dec.  4 
Vietnamese   intrusion  (see  also  Refu- 
gees, infra).  Feb.  4,  Mar.  22,  Apr. 
5.  8.  July  53 
Korea.  Republic  of.  Mar.  26,  Aug.  15 
U.S.  troop  withdrawals,  adjustment.  Sept. 
37 
Mexico.  Apr.  59.  June  42 

Natural   gas  and  oil.   U.S.    purchases. 

Feb.  5,  Mar.  33,  59.  62.  Nov.  58 
Visit  to,  Mar.  32.  52 
Namibia.  Jan.  1 1 .  Feb.  1 .  Mar.  28.  Apr.  6 
NATO,  Jan.  8,  9.  Feb.  1.  Mar.  26,  Apr.  6, 


Carter.  Jimmy  (Cont'd) 

Addresses,  remarks,  etc.  (Cont'd) 
NATO  (Cont'd) 

June  44.  Aug.  35.  Nov.  7.  48 
30th  anniversary,  proclamation.  Apr.  ii 
Near  and  Middle  East,  Mar.  22,  Apr.  4,  8 
Nicaragua.   Jan.   9.    II.   Feb.    I.   Mar.   28. 

Oct    9 
Nuclear  energy.  Mar.  27-28.  June  43 
Nuclear   nonproliferation   treaty.   Feb.    I. 

Mar.  27.  June  12.  July  2,  Aug    53 
Nuclear  weapons,   non-use  against   non- 
nuclear  slates.  Jan.  53  (quoted) 
Panama  Canal  Act  of  1979.  Mar.  28.  Apr. 
63 
Signature,  Nov.  55 
Panama  Canal  treaties,  Feb.   I.  Mar.  59 
Refugees.  Jan.   1.  July  53 
Indochinese: 
Senatorial  humanitarian  mission.  Dec. 

4 
U.S.  and  other  relief  efforts.  Mar.  29, 
Aug.  4,  9,  Nov.   13.  Dec.  4.  7 
SALT  11.  Jan.   I  1 .  Feb.  1 .  38.  Mar.  22.  30. 
33,  Apr.  7,  May  11.  June   11,  July   1, 
Aug.  18,  Nov.  7,  12.  13.  26 
Summit  meeting  and  signature  of  SALT 

II  treaty.  July  49.  50.  53 
Verification.  Feb.   2.  4.   Mar.   23.   31. 
June  13.  14.  July  2.  Nov.  8.  26 
Saudi  Arabia.  Apr.  8 

Oil  production.  Nov.  45  (quoted) 
Science  and  technology.  June  42 

Institute  for  Scientific  and  Technolog- 
ical Cooperation  (ISTC),  Mar.   29. 
June  43.  Nov.  53 
Security  assistance.  Feb.  49 
Southeast  Asia.  Mar.  22 
Southern  Rhodesia.  Feb.   1.  Mar    28,  Apr. 
6 
U.S.  economic  sanctions.  June  16.  Aug. 
18.  25 
Soviet  Union.  Jan    9.  Mar.  31.  June  12 
Brezhnev  conditional  offer  on  arms  re- 
duction in  central  Europe.  Nov.   13 
Soviet   dissidents  exchanged   for  Soviet 

spies.  June  15.  Aug.   18 
U.S.    relations.   Feb.    37.   38   (quoted). 
41,   Mar.    27.   33.   Apr.   6.   8.   June 
44,  July  1.  3.  53.  Aug.   19.  Dec.  45 
(quoted) 
Spain,  constitutional  referendum,  Jan.  36 
State  of  the  Union  (excerpts),  Feb.  1 ,  Mar. 

24 
Sugar  agreement,   international,    ratifica- 
tion urged.  Mar.  25,  29 
Thailand,  U.S.  relations.  Feb.  4 
Trade.  June  14 

Multilateral   trade  negotiations  agree- 
ments. Feb.    I.  34<:,  Mar.   24,  28, 
50,  Apr.  32,  June  29,  Aug.  43 
Security  restraints,  Jan.  1  1 
World  Trade  Week.  June  28 
Uganda.  Oct.  22 

United  Nations.  Feb.  57.  Dec.  57  (quoted) 
Technical   agencies.   Congressional   re- 
strictions on   U.S.   financing,   Jan. 
48  (quoted) 


Carter.  Jimmy  (Cont'd) 

Addresses,  remarks,  etc.  (Cont'd) 
United  Nations  (Cont'd) 
U.N.    Fund   for  Drug   Abuse   Control, 
U.S.  contributions,  Jan.  53 
Correspondence,   memoranda,  and  messages: 
China,  normalization  of  relations.  Feb.  15. 
17 
Taiwan,  relations.  Feb.  24 
CSCE  Final  Act.  implementation.  Feb.  40 
Military  Bases  Agreement  with  Philip- 
pines. Apr.  22 
Multilateral   trade   negotiations,   agree- 
ments, Feb.  34 
Panama  Canal  Treaty  of  1977  and  related 
agreements,    implementation    urged, 
Apr.  63 
SALT  II   treaty,   transmittal   to  Congress, 

July  4 
Uganda,  resumption  of  trade,  Oct.  22 
U.N.  Conference  on  Science  and  Technol- 
ogy for  Development,  Nov.  53 
World  forests,  Nov.  29 
Meetings  with  Heads  of  State  and  officials 
of.   remarks  and  joint  communiques: 
Canada.  June  9;  China.  Mar.    1;  Egypt 
and  Israel.  May  16;  Federal  Republic  of 
Germany.    Sept.    49;   Israel.    Apr.   40; 
Liberia.   Nov.   20:  Mexico.   Mar.   52; 
Morocco,  Jan.   38;  Thailand,   Apr.   26; 
Tunisia,  Feb.  48;  Zaire,  Nov.  20 
Camp  David  meeting,  Egyptian,   Israeli, 
and  U.S.  officials,  Apr.  39 
Messages  and  reports  to  Congress: 
Countervailing  duties,  proposed  waiver  of, 

Apr.  32 
Cyprus,   progress   reports.   Feb.   44.    Apr. 
34,  June  36,  Sept.  51,  Nov.  41,  Dec. 
43 
Defense  budgets  FY    1980  and    1981, 

transmittal,  Nov.  48 
Economic  report,  Apr    32 
Maritime  boundary  treaties  with  Mexico, 
Cuba,   and    Venezuela,   transmittal, 
Apr.  59 
Nuclear  energy  agreement  with  Australia. 

transmittal.  Nov.  49 
Nuclear  Nonproliferation   Act  of   1978. 

first  report,  transmittal,  Aug.  53 
Science,  technology,  and  international  re- 
lations, excerpts,  June  42 
Sinai   Support  Mission,   reports,   Apr.   41, 

Aug.  49.  Dec.  52 
Taiwan,  commercial,  cultural,  and  other  rela- 
tions with.  Mar.  45 
Trade  Agreements  Act  of  1979.  transmit- 
tal, Aug.  43 
United   Nations,   U.S.    participation   in 

1977,  Feb.  57 
U.S.    Arms   Control    and   Disarmament 
Agency,   annual   report,    transmittal, 
Aug.  35 
U.S. -China  Trade  Agreement,  transmittal, 
Dec.  33 
News  conferences,  excerpts.  Jan.   8,  9,   10, 
Feb.  3.  5.  Mar.  30.  31.  Apr.  7,  June  14, 
Aug.  2.  18.  Oct.  9,  Nov.  13 
Question-and-answer  sessions.  Mar.   12,  62, 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


Carter.  Jimmy  (Com' J) 

QuesliiinanJ-answer  sessions  (Cont'd) 

Apr.  5.  May  18,  30,  31,  Aug.  1,  9 
Television  interviews,   iranscripl.s.   May  30, 

31 
Visits  to: 
Austria,  July  49 

Egypt  and  Israel,  Apr.  38,  May  16 
Japan:  Aug.   11;  Vance,  Sept.  33 
Korea;  Aug.  14;  Vance,  Aug.  23,  Sept.  35 
Mexico;  Carter,  Feb.  5.  Mar.  27,  32,  52; 
joint  communique.  Mar.  60 
Carter,    Rosalynn,    visit    to    Kampuchea 

(Nimelz),  Dec.  1 
Carter,  W.  Beverly,  Jr..  nomination  as  Ambassador 
at  Large  (White  House  announcement),  Jan 
24. 
Central  African  Empire,  International  Fund  for 
Agricultural    Development,    agreement 
(1976),  accession.  Mar.  67 
Central   Treaty   Organization   (CENTO); 

Maynes,  June  61 
Chad,  OAU  ministerial  meeting,  proposed  ex- 
clusion of  Chad  delegation  (Harrop),  Oct. 
24 
Chai   Zemin;   Feb.    21,   Mar.   4n,   20;    Vance, 

Feb.  15 
Chernyayev,  Rudolph,  June  16/i 
Cheslaw,    Irving  C,   swearing   in   as   Ambas- 
sador to  Trinidad  and  Tobago,  PR  206, 
10/10 
Chile;  Vaky.  Apr.  60;  Vance.  Dec.  65 
Human  rights  (Mezvinsky).  Apr.  53 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,   Aug     67,   Sept 
67,  Nov.  59 
China; 

Foreign   Relations  of  the    United  Slates. 
1949.    volume    VIII.    The   Far   East: 
China,  released.  Jan.  62 
U.S.  Policy  Toward  China.  July  15.   1971- 
Jan.  15.  1979.  released.  Mar.  U 
China,  People's  Republic  of  (Carter),  Feb.  37 
Africa,   military   and   technical   assistance 

(Newsom),  Dec.  29,  30,  31 
Ambassador  to  U.S.,  credentials.   Mar.  4n, 

20 
Chiefs  of  Liaison  Offices,  list.  Mar.  4 
Claims,  settlement  of,  and  release  of  assets 
in  US;   Mar     19,  July   72,   Dec.   68; 
Carter,   Mar.   31;  Blumenlhal,  Feb.    17; 
Kreps,  Feb.   18;  Mondale,  Oct.   11;  text 
of  agreement,  Aug.  40 
Consular  agreement  with  U.S.; 

Negotiations;  PR  299,  11/14;  Carter,  Mar 

5;  Mondale.  Oct.   13 
Text,  Mar.  10 
Democratic  progress  and  human  rights;  Car- 
ter, Jan    9,  Dec    33;  Maynes.  Jan.  49 
Diplomatic  relations  with  U.S..   normaliza- 
tion: Feb.  27,  39,  41,  Mar.  70,  Apr.  26 
Brzezinski,  Feb.  19;  Carter,  Jan.  9,  Feb 
1,  Mar.    1,  3,  5,    12,  22,  30.  42,  45 
Christopher,   Mar.   44;  Deng  Xiaoping 
Mar.    2,   4,   5;   Mondale,   Oct.    12 
Newsom,    Apr.    29;   Nimetz,    Dec.   46 
Schmidt,  Feb.  38;  Vance,  Jan.  18,  Feb. 
9.  11,  Mar.  40,  42.  June  18 
Background;  Feb.  23;  Carter,  Jan.  25,  26, 

Feb.  6;  Vance,  Feb.  14 
Establishment:  Jan.   25;  Carter,  Jan.   25, 


China.  People's  Republic   oj  (Com' di 
Diplomatic  relations  with  U.S.  (Cont'd) 
Fstahlishment  (Com' d) 

Feb.  5,  15,  17;  Chai  Zemin,  Feb    21; 
Deng  Xiaoping,   Feb.    18,   23;  Hua 
Guofeng,  Feb.    16;  Huang  Hua,  Feb. 
20;  Mondale,   Feb.   22;   Vance.  Feb. 
19;  Woodcock.  Feb.  22 
Joint  communique.  Jan.  25 
U.S.  statement.  Jan.  26 
Soviet  relations,  question  of  effect:  Feb. 

4.  41;  Carter.  Jan.  26,  Feb.  5.  6,  Mar. 
31,  Apr.  8;  Shulman,  Dec.  42;  Vance. 
Feb.   11.  14.  16 

Special  briefing  on  China  by  Secretary 
Vance,  announcement.  PR  9,  1/9 
Emigration  policies  (Carter),  Dec.  33 
Hydroelectric   energy,   proposed   agreement 

with  (Mondale).  Oct.   1 1 
ICBM   development,   question  of  (Vance). 

Sept.  56 
Maps.  Mar.  9,  14 
Offshore   oil   resources;   Feb.    23;   Mondale. 

Oct    11 
Pinyin  system  of  romanization.  Mar.  13 

Chinese  proper  names.  Feb.  22 
Principal  government  and  party  officials. 

list.  Mar.  16 
Profile.  Mar.  15 
Sino-Soviet  relations;  Carter.  Feb    5.  Mar. 

33,  Apr.  6;  Shulman,  Dec.  41 
Taiwan;  Carter,   Feb.    1;   Newsom,  June  20; 

Vance.  Feb.  14.  Mar.  42.  Aug.  24 
Peaceful  resolution  of  Taiwan  issue;  Feb. 

23.  24.  28.  Mar.   17;  Carter,  Feb.  4, 

5,  Mar.  30,  32;  Christopher,  Mar.  44; 
U.S.  statement,  Jan.  26;  Vance.  Jan. 
18.  Feb.   11.  12.  14.  16,  17,  Mar.  40 

Profile,  Feb.  27 

Treaties,  agreements,  etc  ,  Feb.  65,  Mar. 
68,  May  69 

U.S.  commercial,  cultural,  trade,  and 
other  relations;  Jan.  26,  Feb.  24,  25, 
27;  Blumenthal,  Feb.  17;  Carter,  Jan. 

25,  26,  Feb.  1,  4,  6,  24,  Mar.  27,  30, 
45,  June  26;  Christopher,  Mar.  44; 
Holbrooke,  Apr.  17;  joint  com- 
munique, Jan.  25;  Kreps,  Feb.  18; 
U.S.  statement.  Jan.  26;  Vance.  Feb. 
II,  12,  16,  Mar.  40,  42 

U.S.    diplomatic   relations,   termination: 

Feb.  24,  27.  Mar.  70;  Carter,  Feb.  24 

U.S.  future  sales  of  defense  weapons;  Feb. 

24,  25.  28;  Carter,  Feb.  4,  5,  7; 
Christopher,  Mar.  44;  Vance,  Feb. 
11,  13,  15,  16.  Mar.  40 

U.S.  security  assistance;  Apr.   18;  Benson. 

Apr.  47 
U.S.  termination  of  mutual  defense  treaty 

(1978);  Feb.  24.  25.  28;  Carter,  Jan. 

26,  Feb.  4,  5.  7;  Vance,  Feb.  15 
Constitutional   authority  of  President; 

Feb.  25;  Carter,  Feb.  7,  26  (quoted) 
Textile  agreement   with  U.S..  amendment, 

PR  6,  1/22 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc..  Jan.  60.  Mar.  68. 

Apr.   67.  July   72,   Aug.   66,   Sept.   69, 

Nov.  60,  Dec.  67,  68 
U.S.  Ambassador  (Woodcock),  swearing  in, 

PR  52.  2/28 


China.  People's  Republic  of  (Cont'd) 

US.  arms  sale,  denial;  Carter.  Jan.  9;  Shul- 
man, Dec.  42;  Vance,  Jan.   18,  May  41, ! 
Sept.  54,  Nov.  19  ' 

US    export  controls  (Cooper),  June  32 
U.S.   relations:  Mar.    15,   Aug.   37;  Carter, 
Mar.  13.  Apr.  8;  Mondale.  Oct.  10,  12 
U.S.  trade:  Feb.  23.  Mar.   17.   19;  Blumen- 
lhal, Feb.   17;  Carter,  Jan.   11,  June  14; 
Kreps.  Feb.  18;  Vance.  Feb    16 
Agreement  with  China;  Sept    69;  Carter, 
Dec.  33;  Proclamation,  Dec.  33;  text, 
Dec.  33 
Export-import  credit   arrangements,   pro- 
posed: Carter.  Jan.  26;  Mondale.  Oct. 
11 
U.S.   visit  of  Vice  Premiers  Deng  Xiaoping< 
and  Fang  Yi:  Jan.  25,  26.  Feb.  25;  Blu- 
menthal.  Feb.    17;  Carter.  Feb.    I,  4, 
Mar.  1,  2.  4,  5,  12.  27.  33;  Chai  Zemin, 
Feb.  22;  Deng  Xiaoping.  Feb.  23,  Mar. 
2.  3.  4.  5;  joint  press  communique.  Mar. 
II;  Kreps,  Feb.   18;  Mondale,  Oct.   12; 
Woodcock,  Feb.  23;  Young,  June  63 
Discussion  topics:  Carter,  Mar.  31;  Vance, 

Feb.  9,  II 
Itinerary,  highlights.  Mar.  2 
Visit  of  Secretary  Bergland;  Carter.  Apr.  8; 

Christopher.  Jan.  28 
Visit  of  Secretary  Blumenthal:  Blumenthal, 

Feb.  17;  Carter,  Mar.  31 
Visit  of  Secretary  Kreps:  Blumenthal,  Feb. 

17;  Carter,  Mar.  31;  Kreps,  Feb.  18 
Visit  of  Secretary  Schlesinger  (Christopher), 

Jan.  28 
Visit  of  Vice  President  Mondale  (Mondale), 
Oct.   10 
Christopher.  Warren.  Jan.  27.  34.  57.  Mar.  44, 
Apr.   48,  62,   Aug.   44,  58,  64,  Sept.   39, 
Nov.  49,  56 
Chronology  of  world  events  by  month.  Mar. 
70,  Apr.  69.  May  69.  June  67.  July  73. 
Aug.  69.  Sept.  70.  Oct.  68.  Nov.  61.  Dec. 
69 
Church.  Frank  (Vance),  Nov.  18 
Churchill,  Winston  (Vance),  Jan.  16 
Civil  liberties  (see  also  Human  rights):  Carter, 
June  1  1;  Mezvinsky.  Apr.  55;  Vance.  Jan. 
22.  Nov.   19 
Civil  rights.  U.S.  (Carter).  Jan.  2.  Feb.  2 
Claims,  settlement  of,  bilateral  agreements; 
China.   See  under  China,  People's  Republic 

of 
Egypt.  Aug.  68 
Clark.    Dick:   Oct     6;  Carter.   Dec     4;   Young, 
H..  Dec     16 
Biographical  details,  Oct.  7 
Clark.  Joan  M.,  swearing  in  as  Ambassador  to 

Malta.  PR  77.  3/20 
Clark,  Joe,  Aug.  7 
Clift.  Eleanor.  May  39 

Clingerman.  John  R.,  swearing  in  as  Ambas- 
sador to  Lesotho,  PR  259.  10/10 
Coffee,   international   agreement  (1975)  *ith 
annexes  (Ruser).  Sept.  5 
Accession,  Angola,  Dec.  67 
Colby,  William  E.,  key  speaker  for  Conference 
on  U.S.  Security  and  the  Soviet  Challenge, 
announceinent,  PR  65,  3/9 
Colombia:  Falco,  Aug.  52;  Vaky,  Apr.  61 


Index  1979 


Ci'liimhia  (Conl'il) 

Extradition  treaty  with  U.S.,   signature.   PR 

223,  7/14 
Textile  agreement   with  U.S.,  amendment. 

PR  23,  1/30 
Treaties,   agreements,   etc..   Mar.    68,   Apr. 
68,   Aug.    67,   Sept.    67,    Nov.   59,   60, 
Dec.  67 
Commodity   trade   i,see  also   Less  developed 
countries    and  name    of  commodily): 
Newsom,  Jan.  31;  Nimetz,  Dec.  47;  Ruser, 
Sept.  5;  Vance,  May  34,  Sept.  36;  Young, 
Sept.  66 
Commodily    imports,   bilateral    agreement 
with  Egypt,  Dec.  68 
Communications   development   (Reinhardt), 

Feb.  50 
Conde,  Mamady  Lamine,  credentials,  Oct.  20 
Congo: 

Ambassador  to  U.S.,  credentials:   Mar.   43; 

remarks  on   presentation   of  credentials 

and  reply  by  President  Carter,  UNN  1/1  1 

Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Apr.  67,  June  66, 

Aug.  67 
U.S.   Ambassador  (Swing),  swearing  in,  PR 
120,  5/4 
C'lngress,  U.S.: 

F-.xecutive-congressional   relations:    Feb.    6, 

42;  Carter,  Feb.  6 
Legislation: 

Countervailing  duties,   waiver  of:   Carter, 
Mar.   24;  Ruser,  Sept.  4;   Vaky,  Apr. 
58;  Vance,  Jan.   14 
Energy  legislation  (Vance),  Jan.  14 
Institute  for  Scientific  and  Technological 
Cooperation,   establishment:   Carter, 
June  43;  Young,  Sept.  66 
Panama  Canal  Act  of   1979:  Carter,   Mar. 
28.   Nov.   55;  Christopher.   Aug.   62, 
64;   Moss,    Apr     64;   White   House, 
Aug.  65 
Taiwan  Relations  Act:   Carter,  Jan.   26, 
Feb.   7,   Mar.  45,  June  26;  Christo- 
pher, Mar.  44;  Vance,  Feb.   16,  Mar. 
40 
Text  (as  proposed)  and  analysis.   Mar. 
46 
Trade    Agreements    Act   of    1979   (im- 
plementation  of  multilateral   trade 
agreements):  Carter.  Feb.   1,  34,  Mar. 
24,  28,   Aug.   43;  Cooper,  June  32; 
Katz,  Dec.  35;  McDonald,   Aug.  42; 
Vaky,  Apr.  58;  Vance,  Apr.  31,  June 
28,  Sept.  36 
Legislation,  proposed: 

Antiterrorisl  legislation  (Quainton),  Sept. 

63 
Arms   Export   Control   Act,   proposed 

amendments  (Benson),  Apr.  46 
Coffee  Agreement,   International,   imple- 

inenting  legislation  (Ruser),  Sept.  5 
Defense  budget:  Carter,  Feb.   1,  Mar.  22, 
26,  Nov.  48;  Mondale,  Aug.  20,  Nov. 
32 
Egypt  and  Israel  supplementary  assistance: 
Atherton,  May  62;  Benson,   Apr.  45; 
Brown,  May  58;  Saunders,  June  38; 
Vance,  May  56;  PR  124,  5/8 
Egyptian-Israeli  peace  treaty,   implement- 
ing legislation:  Carter,  May  59;  Saun- 


Congress  (Cont'd) 

Legislation,  proposed  (Cont'd) 

Egyptian-Israeli  (Cont'd) 
ders.  June  38 

Energy: 
Comprehensive  energy  program:  Carter, 

Aug.  1,  10;  Nimetz,  Dec.  47 
lEA  Allocation  System,  U.S.  participa- 
tion in  (Katz),  Sept.  45 
Standby  authority  (Carter),  Apr.  8,  9 
Synthetic    fuels   and   other  energy 
supplies,   authorization  of  produc- 
tion (Carter),  Aug.   1 
Windfall  profits  tax  and  establishment  of 
energy  security  fund:  Carter,  Aug. 
1,  2,  Dec.  19;  Cooper,  Sept.  44 

Export  Administration  Act,  reauthorization 
(Carter),  Mar.  24 

Federal  Pipeline  Inspector,  Office  of,  es- 
tablishment, joint  communique,  June 
9 

Foreign  Service  Act,  statements  at  hear- 
ings on  (Vance),  PR  157,  6/21;  PR 
180,  7/27 

Indochinese  refugee  relief:  Carter,  Dec.  7, 
Mar.  29;  Clark,  Oct.  6,  7,  8;  Mon- 
dale, Oct.  3;  Nimetz,  Dec  1,  3; 
Vance,  Mar.  41,  Oct.  5,  6,  Dec.  10; 
Young,  H.,  Dec    16 

International  emergency  wheat  reserve, 
establishment  urged  (Carter),  Mar.  25 

International  organizations  and  confer- 
ences, FY  1980  appropriations  request 
(Maynes),  June  51 

Meat  Import  Act  of  1978  (disapproved): 
Carter.  Jan.  8;  Christopher,  Jan    27 

Nicaragua  relief  (Christopher),  Nov.  56, 
57 

Refugee  Act  of  1979  (Young,  H),  Dec    18 

Turkey,  additional  economic  and  military 
assistance  (see  also  Foreign  aid  FY 
1980,  supra):  Christopher,  Aug.  44 

U.N.  technical  assistance  programs,  repeal 
of  restrictions  on  U.S.  contributions 
urged:  Jan.  48;  Maynes,  Jan.  46,  June 
54,  59;  Vance,  Mar.  38,  41 

Voluntary   contributions   and   OAS,   FY 
1980      appropriations       request 
(Maynes),  June  56 
Senate  advice  and  consent: 

Genocide  convention  and  other  human 
rights  treaties,  ratification  urged: 
Carter,  Jan.  I,  3,  Mar.  29;  Derian, 
Jan.  7;  Mezvinsky,  Apr.  52;  Vance, 
Jan.  3;  Young,  June  49 

IAEA  Voluntary  Safeguards  offer  (Carter), 
Mar.  28 

Maritime  boundary  and  fishery  agreements 
with  Canada,  ratification  urged 
(Vest),  Nov.  41 

Maritime  boundary  treaties  with  Mexico, 
with  Venezuela,  and  with  Cuba, 
ratification  urged  (Carter),  Apr.  59 

Sugar  Agreement,  International,  ratifica- 
tion urged:  Carter,  Mar.  25,  29; 
Ruser,  Sept.  5;  Vaky,  Apr.  58; 
Vance,  May  34,  Nov.  15;  Young, 
Sept.  66 

TIateloIco  Treaty,  protocol  1,  ratification 
urged:  Mar.  60;  Carter,  Mar.  28 


Congress  (Cont'd) 
Senatorial  humanitarian  mission  to  South  East 
Asia:  Dec.  7;  Baucus.  Dec.  4;  Carter.  Dec. 
4;  Danforth.  Dec.  4;  Sasser,  Dec.  4 
Conservation: 

Antarctica.  See  Antarctic  entries 
Endangered  species  of  wild  fauna  and  flora, 
international   trade  convention  (1973): 
Bahamas,   Nov.   59;  Bolivia,   Nov.   59; 
Sri   Lanka,   U.K.,   extension   to  the 
Cayman  Islands,  Aug.  66 
Migratory   birds,    protection   of.    protocol 
(1979)   amending   U.S. -Canada  conven- 
tion of  1916,  May  68 
Migratory  species  of  wild  animals,  conven- 
tion (1979),  negotiations,  Nov.  31,  PR 
159,  6/27 
Consular  relations: 

Bilateral  agreements  with: 
China:  Mar.   68,  PR  299,   11/14;  Carter, 
Mar.  5;  Mondale,  Oct.  13;  text.  Mar. 
10 
German  Democratic  Republic,  Nov.  60 
Vienna  convention  (1963):  Benin,  June  65; 
Cape  Verde,  Sept.  68;  China,  Aug.  66; 
Seychelles,  July  71 
Cooper,  Richard  N.,  June  31,  Sept.  42 
Copyright,   universal    copyright   convention 
(1971),   with  protocols,  ratification,   Den- 
mark, Aug.  66 
Costa  Rica  (Vaky),  Apr.  60 

Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Jan.  59,  Apr.  68, 
June  66,  Aug.  67,  Sept.  67 
Crawford,  William  R.,  June  39 
Cronkile,  Walter,  Feb.  5 
Cuba:  June  33;  Carter,  Apr.  6 

African  involvement.  See  Africa  and  names 

of  individual  countries 
Central   American   activities:    Vance,    Nov. 

15-16,  Dec.  25 
Cienfuegos  construction,   and  Soviet   port 
calls,  question  of:  Shulman,  Dec.  43; 
Vance,  Dec.  25,  26 
Maritime  boundary  treaty,  ratification  urged 

(Carter),  Apr.  59 
MIG-23,  presence  of,  and  Soviet  assurances: 

Carter,  Jan.  10;  Shulman,  Dec.  43 
Protocol  (1979)  modifying  the   wheat  trade 

convention,  June  67 
Soviet  combat  brigade,  presence  of,  Soviet 
assurances  and  U.S.  response:  Nov.  9, 
Dec.  69;  Carter,  Oct.  63,  Nov.   8,   12; 
Department,   Oct.   63;   Mondale,   Nov. 
33;  Shulman,  Dec.  43;  Vance,  Oct.  14, 
17,  63,   Nov.    16,    17,   18,    19.  20,   25, 
Dec.  22,  23,  25,  65 
U.S.  relations,  question  of  (Vance),  Nov.  20 
Cultural  relations: 

"Africa  in  Antiquity:  The  Art  of  Ancient 
Nubia  and  the  Sudan,"  exhibition  in 
U.S.,  bilateral  agreement  with  Egypt, 
Mar.  68 
China,  cultural  exchanges:   Mar.   68;  Deng 
Xiaoping,   Mar.  4;  Mondale,  Oct.    II; 
text  of  cultural  agreement.  Mar.  10 
Trade  exhibitions,   bilateral   agreement, 
July  72 
Cultural  and  education  exchanges; 
Japan,  Aug.  39 
Korea:  Aug.  17;  Holbrooke,  Feb.  31 


8 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


Cultural  relalid/is  ICdhi'iI) 

Cultural,  educalional.  scientific,  and  tech- 
nological exchanges,  bilateral  agree- 
ments: Bulgaria.  Jan.  6U;  Hungary.  July 
72 

Cultural  properly,  illicit  import,  export,  and 
transfer  of  ownership,  convention 
(1970):  Honduras,  July  71;  Italy.  Jan.  59 

Educational  and  Cultural  Exchanges.  Provi- 
sional Commission,  bilateral  agreement 
with  Morocco.  Oct.  67 

Educational,  scientific,  and  cultural  mate- 
rials, importation,  agreement  (1950): 
Holy  See.  Oct.  67;  Hungary,  May  67; 
Syria,  Sept.  68 

India-U.S.  joint  commission,  joint  com- 
munique, June  46 

International  Centre  for  the  Study  of  the 
Preservation  and  Restoration  of  Cultural 
Property,  Statutes  (1956)  as  amended, 
accession.  Somalia,  June  65 

Korea,  Republic  of  (Carter).  Aug.  15 

Mexico-U.S.  Commission  on  Cultural  Coop- 
eration, agreement  establishing.  Apr.  69 

Scientific,  academic,  and  cultural  exchanges 
with  Soviet  Union,  Feb.  39.  41.  42 

World  cultural  and  natural  heritage,  protec- 
tion, convention  (1972):  Afghanistan, 
July  72;  Denmark,  Oct.  67;  Guinea, 
Aug.  68;  Libya,  Jan.  60 

World  Heritage  Trust  Fund,  June  62 

Yugoslavia.   American  arts  exhibit   in  Bel- 
grade (Vest).  Nov.  42 
Curtis,   Kenneth   M.,   swearing   in  as   Ambas- 
sador to  Canada,  PR  243.  9/29 
Currency,  suppression  of  counterfeiting,  inter- 
national convention  and  protocol  (1929), 
succession,  Singapore.  May  67 
Customs: 

Containers,  customs  convention  (1972).  ac- 
cession, Algeria,  Feb.  65 

Customs  Cooperation  Council,  convention 
(1950),  accession.  United  Arab  Emi- 
rates, May  67 

European  Customs  Union  Study  Group,  pro- 
tocol (1950),  accession.  United  Arab 
Emirates,  May  67 

Safe  containers  (CSC),  international  con- 
vention (1972):  Bahamas,  Denmark, 
May  67;  Republic  of  Korea,  Mar.  67; 
Yemen  Arab  Republic,  May  67 

TIR  carnets,  international  transport  of  goods 
under,  customs  convention  (1975),  ac- 
cession, Portugal,  Apr.  67 
Cyprus:  Carter,   Jan.    II,   Feb     I.   Apr.   6; 
Christopher,  Jan.  34,  Aug.  45;  Mondale, 
Aug.  21;  Nimelz,  Dec.  46;  Vest.  Nov.  41; 
White  House  statement,  Oct.  61 

Ambassador  to  U.S.,  credentials,  Sept.  48 

Progress  reports  (Carter),  Feb.  44,  Apr.  34, 
June  36.  Sept.  51,  Nov.  41.  Dec.  43 

Security  assistance,  FY  1980  proposals:  Benson. 
Apr.  46;  Nimetz,  Apr.  35 

Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Jan  60.  Aug.  67, 
Sept.  68 

Czechoslovakia:  Carter.  Nov.  39;  Department, 
Dec.  44;  Vest.  Nov.  42 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc..  Mar.  68,  Dec.  68 


Czi'chdslovakiii  (Cimt'dl 

U.S.  Ambassador  (Meehan),  swearing  in,  PR 
103,  4/17 


D 


Danforth,  John  C,  Dec.  4 

Dawson.  Horace  Greeley.  Jr.,  swearing  in  as 

Ambassador  to  Botswana.  PR  277,  10/25 
Dayan.  Moshe  (Vance),  Dec.  24 
Debts,  international: 

Consolidation   and   rescheduling,    bilateral 

agreements:   Pakistan,   Aug.   68;  Peru, 

Sept.  69;  Zaire,  Apr.  69.  May  69,  Oct. 

68 

Turkey:   Mar.    69.    Apr.   69;  Christopher. 

Jan.  34 

Debt  relief.  US    position  (Newsom).  Jan.  31 

Defense   and    national    security   {see   also 

Strategic   arms   limitation   talks):    Brown, 

May  52,  Sept.  14,  27;  Brzezinski,  Feb.  19, 

May  50;  Carter,  Jan.  9,  Feb.  5,  June  43, 

Aug.  18,  Nov.  7;  Mondale,  Apr.  14;  Seig- 

nious,  Oct.   25;   Vance,  Jan.    15.  May  38. 

July  71 

B-52    and    Soviet     Backfire    compared 

(Vance),  Dec.  24 
Budget:  Feb.  39,  40;  Brown,  July  65; 
Brzezinski,  Feb.  19;  Carter,  Jan.  8,  9, 
Feb.  1,  Mar.  22,  26,  31,  June  12,  44, 
Nov.  12,  48;  Gelb,  June  24;  Mondale, 
Apr.  14,  Nov.  32;  Nimetz,  Dec.  46; 
Vance,  June  17,  Aug.  22 
Civil  defense  program,  question  of  (Carter).  Jan. 

9 
Launching  of  the  USS  Samuel  E.   Morison. 

remarks  (Richardson).  PR  171.  7/13 
Minuteman,  fixed  silo  missiles,  vulnerability 
of:  Brown,  May  52,  54,  June  23,  July 
70.  71,  Sept.    15;  Brzezinski,  May  50; 
Carter,  Jan.  9,  June  12,  Nov.  25;  Gelb, 
June  25;  Mondale,  Apr.   15;  Seignious, 
Oct.  27;  Vance,  Jan.   15,  July  70,  Aug. 
31 
Modernization  of  strategic  triad:  Brown,  May 
53,  Sept.  28;  Carter,  June  12,  44,  Nov. 
25;  Gelb,  June  24;   Mondale,   Apr.    15; 
Nimetz.   Dec.   46;  Seignious,  Oct.   27; 
Vance,  Jan.    15,  June   17,  July  4,   Aug 
30,  Nov.  24,  Dec.  21 
MX  missile:  Brown,  May  53,  July  68.  Sept. 
15,  17,  28;  Carter,  Jan.  9,  July.  2.  Aug. 
19.  Nov.  25.  48;  Gelb.  June  24;  Jones, 
Sept.   34;   Nimetz,   Dec.   46;  Seignious, 
Oct.  27,  30.  31;  Vance,  June  17,  Aug. 
23,  31,  Nov.  35.  Dec.  21 
Roland  11  weapons  system,  memorandum  of 
understanding  no.  3  re  joint  test  program 
(1978):   France,   Federal   Republic   of 
Germany,  U.S..  May  67 
Surface-to-air  missile  system,   memorandum 
of  understanding  concerning  cooperative 
full-scale   engineering   development   of. 
signatures:   Denmark.  Federal  Republic 
of  Germany.  U.S..  Oct.  67 
Triad  (Brown).  Sept,   14 
Defense    Department   engineering   personnel 
temporarily   in   Dominica,   privileges  and 


Defense  Depanmenl  (Cinii'd)  i 

immunities,    bilateral    agreement    with, 
Dominica.  Dec.  68 
Delaney.  Steve.  Feb.   I  I 

Deng  Xiaoping:  Feb.   18,  23,  Mar.  2,  3.  4,  5, 
44  (quoted);  Carter,  Mar.  5;  Vance,  Feb. 
15 
Visit  to  U.S.  See  under  China,  People's  Re- 
public of 
Denmark: 

Treaties,  agreements,  etc  ,  Feb.   65.   Mar. 

67.  May  67.  Aug.  66,  67.  68,  Oct.  67 
Visit  of  Vice  President  Mondale,  Aug.  19 
Derian.  Patricia  M..  Jan.  6 
Biographical  details.  Jan.  6 
Swearing    in   as   Assistant   Secretary   for 
Human   Rights   and   Humanitarian   Af- 
fairs. PR  29,  2/5 
Travel   to   South   African  countries,   an- 
nouncement, PR  50.  2/27 
Desertification.   U.S. -Mexico  cooperation  on 
arid   and   semiarid   land   management.   PR  1 
44.  2/16 

Development   assistance:   Aug.    39;   Hesburgh, 
Nov.  52;  Young,  Sept.  66 
Alexandria   wastewater   system   expansion,' 
project   grant   agreement   with   Egypt, 
Dec.  68 
Bilateral  agreements  with:  Egypt  (termina- 
tion). Jan.  60;  India.  Sept.  69.  Oct.  67; 
Western  Samoa,  Nov.  61,  Dec.  69 
Economic,  technical,  and  related  assistance, 
bilateral  agreements  with:   Egypt.  Jan. 
60.  Aug.  68.  Sept.  69,  Dec.  68;  Jordan, 
Jan.   60,   Mar.   69;  Pakistan.  Jan.   60; 
Portugal.  Aug.  68 
India,  project  loan  agreement  for  rural  elec- 
trification. Sept.  69 
Syria,  project  loan  agreement  for  rural  roads, 
Dec.  69 
Diplomatic  premises,  inviolability  of  (Carter), 

Dec.  19 

Diplomatic  relations.  Vienna  convention' 
(1961):  Cape  Verde.  Sept.  68;  Ethiopia, 
May  67;  Seychelles,  July  71 
Diplomatic  representatives,  Soviet  and  Ameri- 
can embassies,  members  of,  privileges  and 
immunities,  bilateral  agreement  with 
Soviet  Union,  and  termination  of  agree- 
ment for  nondiplomatic  personnel.  Feb.  66 
Diplomatic  representatives  in  the  U.S.,  cre- 
dentials: Bolivia.  Brazil,  Oct.  63;  China, 
Mar.  4n.  20;  Congo.  Mar.  43;  Cyprus, 
Sept.  48;  Gabon.  Mar.  43;  Gambia,  Oct. 
20;  Guatemala.  Apr  58;  Guinea.  Oct.  20; 
Honduras.  Apr.  68;  Israel.  Lebanon.  Feb. 
47;  Lesotho,  June  21;  Mauritania.  Apr.  I  I; 
Norway.  Apr.  37;  Pakistan.  Apr.  51; 
Panama,  Apr.  58;  Peru.  Oct.  63;  Saudi 
Arabia.  Nov.  46;  Solomon  Islands,  Sept. 
55;  Togo,  Oct.  20;  Tonga.  Tuvalu.  Sept. 
55;  U.K.,  Sept.  48;  Venezuela,  Oct.  63 
Diplomats,  protection  of.  convention  (1973): 
Trinidad  and  Tobago.  Aug  67;  U.K..  July 
72 
Djibouti  (Moose).  Apr.   13 

Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Feb.  65,  Apr.  67, 
May  67 


Index  1979 


Dominica: 

Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Jan.  59,  June  bb. 

July  72,  Aug.  66,  Dec.  68 
U.S.  Ambassador  (Shelton),  swearing  in,  PR 
141,  5/24 
Dominican   Republic:    Derian,   Jan.    7;    Vaky. 
Apr.  61;  Vance.  Nov.  14,  15 
Textile  agreement   with   U.S.,   amendment, 

PR  204,  8/22 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Jan.  59,  Apr    68, 
June  66,  Sept.  67,  Oct.  67 
Double   taxation,   avoidance  of,   bilateral   con- 
ventions,  agreements,   and   protocol   with: 
France.  Feb.  65.,  Aug.  68,  Sept.  69;  Hun- 
gary,  Mar.   68,   Aug.   68,   Sept.   69,   Nov. 
60;  Korea,  Aug.  68,  Sept.  69,  Nov.  60, 
Dec.  68;  U.K..  Jan.  61,  May  69,  Aug.  68, 
Oct.  68,  Nov    61 
Draper,  Morris,  Apr.  38 
Drew,  Elizabeth,  July  65 
Drugs,  narcotic: 

International  narcotic  control  (Miklos).  Oct. 
56 
Budget  request  for  FY  1980  (Falco),  Aug. 
50 
Malaysia,  cooperation  program  for  suppres- 
sion of,   bilateral   agreement,  Feb.   66, 
Aug.  68,  Dec.  68 
Mexico,  illegal  drug  traffic,  efforts  to  con- 
trol: Mar.  62;  Falco,  Aug.  50 
Bilateral  agreements  re.  Mar.  69,  Apr.  69. 
July  73.  Sept    69.  Oct.  67.  Dec.  68 
Psychotropic   substances,   convention   (1971): 
Byelorussian  Soviet  Socialist  Republic. 
Mar.  67;  Guatemala,  Oct.  67;  Hungary, 
Kuwait,  Sept.  68;  Libya,  Portugal,  June 
66;  Soviet  Union,  Jan.  59;  Trinidad  and 
Tobago,   May   67;  Tunisia,   Sept.   68; 
Ukrainian  Soviet  Socialist   Republic, 
Mar.  67 
Single   convention   (1961),    ratification, 
Liechtenstein,  Dec.  67 
Protocol  (1972):  Honduras,  Sept.  68;  Por- 
tugal. June  66;  Trinidad  and  Tobago. 
Sept.  68 
OECD  control  programs,  proposed  (Christo- 
pher). Sept.  42 
U.N.  Fund  for  Drug  Abuse  Control:  Falco. 
Aug.  51;  Miklos.  Oct.  56 
U.S.  contributions  (Carter),  Jan.  53 
Dubs.  Adolph  (quoted).  Apr.  48 

Death  of:   Apr     52n,   69;   Carter,   Mar.   21, 
Apr.   49;  Christopher,   Apr.   48;   Vance, 
Apr.  49 
Memorial   plaque,   unveiling,   remarks  by 
Secretary  Vance  (Vance),  PR  119,  5/3 
Duncan,  Charles  W.  (Carter),  Dec.  50 

Key  speaker  for  Conference  on  U.S.  Security 
I  and   the  Soviet  Challenge,   announce- 

I  ment,  PR  60,  3/9 

Dymshits,  Mark,  June  16n 


E 


Earle,  Ralph  II,  Sept.  22 

East-West  relations:  Jan.  36;  NATO,  Aug.  46; 
Vance,  Jan.   12,  Nov.   I;  Vest,  Nov.  42 
Economic  (Christopher),  Jan.  28 


Economy,  domestic:  Carter,  Mar.   28;  Vance, 
Jan.  13 
Adjustment   assistance:   Hormats,    Dec.    61; 
Katz,  June  29,  Oct.  64;  Vance,  Sept.  6 
Anti-inflation   measures:  Carter,   Mar.   24. 
Apr.  32;  Katz.  June  30;  Solomon.  June 
35;  Vance,  Jan.  13,  Apr.  30 
Dollar,  valuation:  Brzezinski,  Feb.   19;  Car- 
ter, Mar.  28,  Apr.  32,  Aug.  2,  Oct.  9. 
Nov.  12;  Christopher,  Sept.  39;  Cooper, 
June  32;  Solomon,  June  34;  Vance,  Jan. 
13 
Federal   Reserve    Board,   appointment   of 
Chairman  (Volcker):  Carter.  Oct.  9 
Economy,  world:  Jan.  37;  Carter,  Mar.  28,  54; 
Vance,  Jan.    13,  Mar.   39,  Apr.  30,  May 
34,  June  18 
Economic  nationalism  (Vance),  Nov.  3 
European  monetary  system.  See  under  Euro- 
pean Economic  Community 
Gold  prices  (Carter),  Nov.  12 
Inflation:   Aug.    8;   Hormats,   Dec.    58; 

McHenry,  Dec    56;  Thatcher,  Aug.  7 
International  reserve  system  (Solomon),  June 

35 
New  international  economic  order:  Hormats. 
Dec.   58;  McHenry.   Dec.   55;   Vance. 
May  35;  Young.  Sept.  65 
OECD  ministerial   meeting.  Paris  (Christo- 
pher). Sept.  39 
Tokyo  summit  meeting:  Carter,   Mar.   27, 
Aug.  9,  12,   18;  Cooper,  Sept.  44;  Gis- 
card  d'Estaing,  Aug.   3;  Ohira,  Aug.  2, 
12;  Vest,  Nov.  38 
Declaration,  text,  Aug.  8 
Joint  communique,  Aug.  17,  Sept.  58 
Participants,  list,  Aug.  2 
ECOSOC   (Economic   and   Social   Council. 

U.N.),  Jan.  33 
Ecuador:   Derian.   Jan.    7;   Vaky,   Apr.   61; 
Vance,  Nov.  14 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc..  May  68,  July  72, 
Sept.  67 
Education: 

Bilateral  agreement  with  Israel,  Jan.  60 
Educational,  scientific,  and  cultural  mate- 
rials,  importation,   agreement   (1950): 
Holy  See,  Oct.   67;  Hungary,  May  67; 
Syria,  Sept.  68 
Exchange  programs  with: 

China:  Feb.  23;  Carter,  Mar.  5;  Mondale, 

Oct.  1  1;  text.  Mar.  7 
Cultural,  educational,  scientific,  and  tech- 
nological exchanges,   bilateral  agree- 
ments:  Bulgaria.  Jan.   60;  Hungary. 
July  72 
Cultural  and  educational  exchanges  with: 
Japan.  Aug.  39 

Korea:  Aug.  17;  Holbrooke.  Feb.  31 
Educational  and  Cultural  Exchange.  Provi- 
sional Commission,   bilateral  agree- 
ment with  Morocco,  Oct.  67 
Japan,  Apr.  69 
Morocco,  Jan.  38 

Scientific,   academic,   and  cultural   ex- 
changes with  Soviet  Union,  Feb.  39, 
41,  42 
Hubert  H    Humphrey  North-South  Scholar- 
ship Program  (Carter),  Feb.  35 


Education  (Cont'd) 

India-U.S.  joint  commission,  joint  com- 
munique, June  46 

U.N.  Educational  and  Training  Program  for 
Southern  Africa.  May  65 

Egypt  Isee  also  Arab-Israeli  conflict):  Brown, 
May  60;  Carter,   Apr.   5,   8;   Vance,   Aug. 
29-30 
Economic   Commission   for   Western   Asia 

(ECWA),   suspension  of  membership 

(Department),  June  38 
Profile,  May  21 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Jan.  60,  Mar.  67, 

68,  May  68,  June  66,  67,  July  71,  72, 

Aug.  68.  Sept.  69,  Dec.  68 
U.S.    Ambassador  (Atherton).   swearing   in. 

PR  140.  5/22 
U.S.    economic   and   security   assistance: 

Atherton,    May   62;   Benson,    Apr.   45; 

Brown,   May  60;  Carter,   Apr.   6;  Saun- 
ders, June  38,  Oct.  50,  52;  Vance.  Mar. 

36.  May  56.  PR  1 10.  4/26;  PR  124.  5/8 
U.S.  visit  of  Vice  President  Mubarak  (White 

House  statement).  Oct.  49 
Visit  of  President  Carter:   Apr    38;  Carter. 

May  16.   17.   18.  20.  22.  29;  Mondale, 

May  16,  29;  Sadat,  May  16,  18,  19,  22 
El  Salvador:   Vaky,  Apr.   58,  60;  Vance.  Dec. 
65 
Cuban   involvement,   question   of  (Vance), 

Dec.  25 
Peace  Corps   Volunteer  Loff.   release  of 

(Vance),  PR  331,  12/21 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Jan.  59,  Feb.  65, 

Mar.   68.  Apr.   68,  June  66,  July   72, 

Aug.  67.  Sept.  67,  69,  Nov.  59 

Enders,  Thomas  O.,  June  1 

Energy  resources  and  problems  [see  also  Nu- 
clear energy):  Aug.   17,  Sept.  49;  Christo- 
pher,   Sept.    39:    McHenry,    Dec.    56; 
Thatcher,  Aug.  6;  Vance,  Jan.   13 
Antimisting  kerosene  and  related  equipment, 

bilateral  agreement  with  U.K.,  May  69 
Brazil,  gasohol  development:  Ruser,  Sept.  5; 

Sayre,  Sept.  3 
Coal:  Christopher,  Sept.  40;  Lake.  Nov.  28; 

Tokyo  declaration,  Aug.  8 
Cooperation  with: 

Brazil:  Jan.  58,  Sept.  58;  Ruser,  Sept.  5 

Canada.  See  Canada 

Japan:  June  67,  Aug.  38,  39;  Carter.  June 

42;  text  of  agreement.  PR  117.  5/2 
Mexico.  See  Mexico 
Soviet  Union.  Aug.  69 
Spain.  Mar.  69 
Energy  conservation  through  energy  storage, 
research  and  development  program,  im- 
plementing agreement  (1978).  entry  into 
force.  June  65 
Energy  Technology  Group,  proposed  (Tokyo 

declaration),  Aug.  9 
High  temperature  materials  for  automotive 
engines,  implementing  agreement,  Ger- 
many, Federal  Republic  of,  Aug.  66 
Hydroelectric  energy,   proposed   agreement 

with  China  (Mondale),  Oct.   I  1 
International   energy   program,    agreement 
(1974),  accession,  Australia,  Aug.  66 


10 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


Enerfiy  resources  ami  problems  (Cont'd) 

Israel,    U.S.   oil   supply   arrangements.    See 

itiiiler  Israel 
Jel   fuel   prices,   agreement   with   Colombia, 

Apr.  68 
Middle  East  oil-producing  states:   Carter, 

Apr.  5,  8;  Saunders,  Oct.  50 
Nasseriah  power  station,  technical  coopera- 
tion in  increasing  capacity  of,  bilateral 
agreement  with  Saudi  Arabia,  Feb    66 
New   and  renewable  energy  sources;  Carter, 
Aug.  4,   9;  Lake,   Nov.   29;  Saunders, 
Oct.  50;  Vance,  May  36,  Nov.  1,  3 
Geothermal   equipment,   research,   de- 
velopment,  and  demonstration   of, 
agreement  (1979):  Italy,  Mexico.  New 
Zealand,  U.S.,  July  71 
Shoubrah  El  Kheima  thermal  power  plant, 
project  grant  agreement  with  Egypt. 
Dec.  68 
Solar  power  systems  project,  supplement- 
ing agreement  (1979):   Austria,   Bel- 
gium, Germany,  Federal  Republic  of, 
Greece,  Spain,  Sweden,  Switzerland, 
U.S.,  Aug.  66 
Ocean  drilling  of  the  deep  sea  drilling  proj- 
ect,  bilateral   agreements  with:  France, 
Apr.  68;  Germany,  Federal  Republic  of, 
Apr.    68,   May   68;   Soviet   Union,   May 
69;  U.K.,  Apr.  69 
Oil: 

Enhanced  recovery   of,   implementing 
agreement  (1979):   Austria,   Canada, 
Germany,  Federal  Republic  of,  Japan, 
Norway,  U.S.,  Aug.  66 
Import  limitations:  June   33.  Sept.   43; 
Carter,  Feb.  3,   Apr.   8,  Aug.    I,   18, 
Dec.    19,  50;  Christopher.   Sept.   40; 
Cooper,  June  33,   Sept.   43;   Lake, 
Nov.  28;  Nimetz,  Dec.  47;  Saunders, 
Oct.   50;   Vance,   May  35,  June   19, 
Sept.  36,  Nov.  3,  Dec.  27;  Vest,  Nov. 
38 
Tokyo  declaration:  Aug.  8;  Carter,  Aug. 
1,  4,  9.  10;  Clark,  Aug.  7;  Giscard 
d'Estaing,   Aug.   3;  Hormats,   Dec. 
62;  Schmidt,  Aug    5 
Iranian  supplies.  See  under  Iran 
Latin  America,  U.S.  imports  (Vaky),  Apr. 

56 
Prices:  Aug.  8,  9;  Carter,  Jan.  12,  Feb.  3, 
Apr.  8,  Aug.  1,  9,  10,  18;  Cooper, 
Sept.  42;  Hormats.  Dec.  59;  Vance. 
May  41,  Nov.  3,  Dec.  27;  White 
House,  Feb.  35 
Saudi  Arabian  crude  oil  production:  Vance, 

May  41;  White  House,  Sept.  44 
Soviet  oil  exports  (Cooper),  Sept.  44 
Tar  sands  (oil  sands)  and  heavy  oil,  cooper- 
ation   in   research   and   development, 
bilateral  agreement  with  Canada,  Sept. 
69 
U.S.: 

Alaskan  oil  transportation  arrangements 
with  Canada:  Enders,  June  4; 
Jamieson,  Jan.  21,  23;  Katz,  Dec.  38 
Domestic  policy:  Carter.  Feb.  3,  Apr.  8, 
32,  Aug.  I;  Hormats,  Dec.  62;  Vance, 
Jan.  14 


Energy  resources  and  problems  (Cont'd) 
U.S.  (Cont'd) 

Domestic  policy  (Cont'd) 

Phase   HI   (energy  security  corporation 

(fundi    and   energy    mobilization 

board,  proposed):  Sept.  43;  Carter. 

Aug.   I,  2.  Dec.   19;  Cooper,  Sept. 

45;  Lake,  Nov.  29 

Phased  decontrol   of  oil  prices:  Carter, 

Mar.  34,  Dec.  19;  Cooper,  Sept.  44 

Gasoline  supplies  (Carter),  Aug.  2,  10 

U.S. -ASEAN  consultative  group  on  energy, 

proposed  (Vance),  Sept  36 
U.S.  joint  research  and  development  proj- 
ects: Carter,  June  42;  Vance,  May  36, 
Nov.  3 
World  (U.N.)  conference  on  new  and  renew- 
able sources,  1981:  Lake,  Nov.  30; 
Maynes,  June  52;  Vance,  May  36,  Dec. 
66 

Enger,  Valdik,  June  I6n 

Environmental  problems  and  control  (see  also  Oil 
pollution):  Vance.  Mar.  35 
Acid  rain:  Nov.  26;  Carter.  June  42;  Lake,  Nov. 

28 
Canada-US.: 

Garrison  Diversion  Unit,  June  8 

Great  Lakes  Water  Quality  Agreement  ( 1978): 

Jan.  23;  Jamieson,  Jan.  22 
Oil   transportation,   environmental   consid- 
erations (Katz),  Dec.  39 
Transboundary   air  quality   talks:   Nov.    26; 
Carter,  June  42 
Environmental   modification,   prohibition  of 
military  or  other  hostile  use,  convention 
(1977):  Bangladesh,  Cape  Verde,  Nov.  59; 
India,  Mar.  67;  Malawi,  Norway,  Apr.  67; 
Sao  Tome  and  Principe,  Nov.  59;  Yemen 
(Aden),  Aug.  66 
Intervention  on  the  high  seas  in  cases  of  pollu- 
tion by  substances  other  than  oil,  protocol 
(19731,  Yemen  Arab  Republic,  May  67 
Mexico-U.S.  border,  Nov.  58.  60.  Dec.  58 
Poplar  River  Project,   consultations   with   U.S.. 

PR  138.  5/18;  PR  191.  8/8 
Prevention  of  marine  pollution  by  dumping  of 
wastes  and  other  matter,  convention  (1972): 
Argentina.  Nov.  59;  Finland,  July  71;  Po- 
land, Mar.  67;  Switzerland.  Nov.  59 
Prevention  of  pollution  from  ships,  international 
convention   (1973):   Uruguay,   July   72; 
Yemen  Arab  Republic.  May  67 
Protfx-ol  (1978):  Australia.   Aug.  67;  France. 
May  67;  Germany.  Federal  Republic  of. 
Liberia.   Netherlands.  Spain,  Aug.  67; 
Sweden,  May  67;  Uruguay,  July  72 
Toxic  chemicals,  OECD  program  (Christopher). 

Sept.  40 
U.S. -Mexico  cooperation  on  arid  and  semiarid 

land  management.  PR  44,  2/16 
Water  pollution  (Lake),  Nov.  28 
World  forests:  Carter,  Nov.  29;  Hormats,  Dec. 
62;  Lake,  Nov.  27 
Equatorial    Guinea,    Communist    presence 

(Newsom),  Dec.  29,  30 
Ethiopia: 

East  German  military  personnel  (Newsom),  Dec. 
29,  30 


Ethiopia  (Cont'd) 
Soviet  and  Cuban   military  aid   and   influence: 
Moose,  Apr    13;  Newsom,  Dec.  29.  30.  31, 
June  20;  Shulman,  Dec.  43 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc..  Mar.  67.  May  66.  67. 

June  66.  Aug.  66,  67 
U.S.  aid  (Moose),  Apr.  13 
Europe  (see  also  East- West  relations  and  names  of 
imlividual  countries): 
CSCE  Final  Act  of  Helsinki: 

Fourth  anniversary  (Carter),  Nov.  39 
Implementation:  Jan.  36,  Feb.  42;  Carter,  Feb. 
40;   Derian,   Jan.   7;  NATO.   Aug.   46; 
Vance,  Jan.  12;  Vest,  Nov.  42 
Madrid  follow-up  meeting,  1980:  Jan.  36.  July 
57;  Christopher,  Jan.  35;  NATO.  Aug. - 
46;  Vest,  Nov.  42 
Eastern:  Jan.  37;  Carter,  Mar.  27;  Christopher, 
Jan.  35;  Vance.  Jan.   12;  Vest.  Nov.  42 
Soviet  arms  reduction,   Brezhnev  proposal: 
Carter.    Nov.    13;  Mondale.   Shulman, 
Dec.  40;  Vance.  Dec.  22 
European  integration  (Vest),  Nov.  38 
Guadeloupe  meeting  (France-Federal  Republic  of 
Germany-U.K.-U.S.):  Jan.  37;  Callaghan, 
Feb.  36;  Carter,  Feb.  37;  Giscard  d'Estaing, 
Feb.  36;  Nimetz.  Apr  33;  Schmidt.  Feb.  38 
Mutual  and  balanced  force  reductions  (MBFR): 
Jan.   37.  Feb.  40.  43.  July  56;  Brezhnev, 
July  52;  Carter.  Mar    27;  Christopher,  Jan. 
34;  NATO.   Aug.   46;  Schmidt.   Feb.   38, 
Sept.   21   (quoted);  Seignious,  Sept.   21; 
Shulman,   Dec.   42;   Vance,   Jan.    16;  von 
Steenwyk,  Sept.  50 
U.S.  relations:  Carter,  Mar.  27;  Vance,  Jan. 

12;  Vest,  Nov.  36 
Western,  U.S.  security  assistance  (Benson), 
Apr.  45.  46 
European  Economic  Community: 

European  monetary  system:  Solomon.  June  34, 
35;  Tokyo  declaration.  Aug.  4;  Vance.  Jan. 
14;  Vest,  Nov.  38;  White  House,  Feb.  34 
Membership,  proposed,  Greece,  Portugal,  and 

Spain  (Vest).  Apr.  36.  Nov.  38 
MTN  concessions:  Katz.  June  28;  McDonald, 

Aug.  41;  Vest.  Nov.  38 
Parliamentary  elections  (Vest).  Nov.  38 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc..  Mar.  68.  Aug.  67.  68 
European  Space  Agency,  acceptance  of  convention 
on  registration  of  objects  launched  into  outer 
space.  Apr.  68 
Evron.  Ephraim,  Feb.  47  i 

Executive   management  development,   technical    r 
cooperation  in,  bilateral  agreement  with  Saudi 
Arabia,  Jan.  60 
Export-Import  Bank:  Christopher.  Jan.  27;  Vance. 
Apr.  31.  May  36 
FY  1980  appropriations  (Cooper).  June  32 
South  Africa,  restrictions  of  facilities  in:  Chris- 
topher. Jan.  29;  Lake.  Jan.  20 
Taiwan:  Feb    27;  Carter,  Jan.  26;  Vance,  Feb. 
16 
Exports,  U.S.  (see  also  Commixlity  trade):  Vance, 
Apr.  30.  June  19 
Anti-boycott  amendments  to  Export  Adminis- 
tration Act:  Carter.  Mar.  24;  Cooper.  June 
33 
Security  controls:   June  33;  Carter.  June  44; 
Christopher,  Jan.  27;  Cooper,  June  32 


Index  1979 


11 


Exports  (Cont'd) 

U.S.   policy:   Carter.   Mar.    24.   28.   Apr.   32: 
Christopher,   Jan.   27;  Cooper,   June   31; 
Vance.  Jan.  14 
Extradition  treaty  with  Colombia.  PR  223,  7/14 


Fairbanks.  John  K.  (Mondale).  Oct.   1  1 
Falco.  Mathea.  Aug.  50 

Faletau.  'Inoke:  Sept.  55;  remarks  on  presenta- 
tion of  credentials  and  reply  by  President 
Carter.  UNN.  3/30 
Feldman.  Harvey  J.,  swearing  in  as  Ambas- 
sador to  Papua  New  Guinea  and  to  the  Sol- 
omon Islands.  PR  217.  9/5 
Fiji,   air  transport  agreement   with  U.S..   Dec. 

68 
Figueiredo.  Joao  Baptista  de  Oliveira  (quoted). 

Sept.  3 
Finland: 

Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Feb.   65.   Mar. 

67.  68.  June  67.  July  7],  Aug.  67,  68 
Visit  of  Vice  President  Mondale:   Aug.    19; 
Vest.  Nov.  40 
Fish  and  fisheries: 

Bivalve   mollusca,   cooperation   to  assure 
sanitary  quality  of  those  exported  to 
U.S..  bilateral  agreements  with:  Iceland. 
July  72;  Mexico,  July  73 
East  coast  fishery  resources,  agreements  with 
Canada:  May  68.  June  10;  Enders,  June 
6;  Jamieson,  Jan.  21,  22,  23;  Pickering. 
June  7 
Signature,  PR  82,  3/29 
Fisheries  off  U.S.   coasts,  bilateral   agree- 
ments with  Denmark  and  Faroe  Islands, 
Oct.  67,  Nov.  43 
Halibut  fishery  of  North  Pacific  Ocean  and 
Bering   Sea,    agreement   with   Canada: 
May  68;  Pickering,  June  7 
Signature,  PR  82,  3/29 
High  seas  fisheries  of  the   North  Pacific 
Ocean,  international  convention  (1952), 
protocol  (1978),  Apr.  67,  May  67 
Inter-American  Tropical  Tuna  Commission, 
convention  ( 1949):  Costa  Rica  (denunci- 
ation), June  66 
North  Pacific  Fur  Seal  Commission,   Wash- 
ington meeting,  announcement,  PR  114. 
4/30 
Northwest  Atlantic  fisheries,  future  multilat- 
eral cooperation  in,  convention  (1978); 
Bulgaria,  Denmark,  Aug.  66 
Reciprocal  fisheries  agreement  with  U.K., 

Feb.  66,  May  69 
Tuna  fishing  in  Eastern  Pacific,  bilateral 

agreement  with  Mexico,  Aug.  68 
U.S.  groundfish  fishery  off  coast  of  British 
Colombia,  agreement  with  Canada,  sig- 
nature, PR  82,  3/29 
West  coast  of  Canada,  bilateral  agreement. 

May  68 
Whaling: 

Bowhead  season  in  Alaska,  observers  for 
1979  spring  season,  bilateral  agree- 
ment with  Canada,  June  67 


Fish  and  fisheries  (Cont'd) 

International  convention  (1946),  with 
schedule  of  whaling  regulations 
Chile,  Aug.  67;  Korea,  Feb.  65 
Panama,  Apr.  68;  Peru,  Aug  67 
Seychelles,  May  68;  Spain,  Sweden, 
Aug.  67 
Amendments  to  schedule  (1978).  entry 

into  force,  Jan.  60,  June  66 
Protocol   (1956):    Korea.   Feb.    65; 
Seychelles.  May  68;  Sweden,  Aug. 
67 
Fisher,  Adrian  S.,  Jan.  52 

Food  and  Agriculture  Organization  (FAO): 

Vest,  May  37 
Food  production  and  shortages  (see  also  Ag- 
riculture): Mar.  50f.  Aug.  9;  Hormats, 
Dec.  62;  Lake,  Nov.  27,  30;  McHenry, 
Dec.  56;  Vance,  Sept.  36,  Nov.  1,  4; 
Young,  Sept.  66 
Presidential  Commission  on  World  Hunger: 

Carter,  Mar.  24;  Vance,  May  36 
U.S.  food  aid:  Lake,  Nov.  30;  Moose,  May 

44;  Vance,  May  36 
World   Food   Program,    US     appropriations 
request  FY  1980  (Maynes),  June  61 
Foreign  aid,  U.S.: 
Appropriations  requests  FY    1980:   Vaky, 
Apr.  56;  Vance,  Mar.  34,  PR  89,  3/29; 
PR  1  10,  4/26 
Human  rights  considerations:   Benson,   Apr. 
43;  Carter,  Jan.  1;  Christopher,  Jan.  28, 
29;  Moose,  Apr.  11,  13;  Vaky,  Apr.  57, 
59,  60;   Vance,  Mar.   37,   Apr.   3 1 ,  PR 
89,  3/29;  PR  110,  4/26 
Principles:  Newsom,  Jan.  31;  Vaky,  Apr.  59; 
Vance,  Mar.  39,  Apr.  31,  May  38,  June 
19 
Reorganization  (White  House),  June  25 
Security  assistance  (Vance),  PR  89,  3/29;  PR 
110,  4/26 

Foreign  policy,  U.S.:  Carter,  Feb.   1,  Apr.  8; 
Newsom,  PR   134,  5/17;  Vance,  Jan.   18, 
May  34,  Aug.  21 
Africa,   Detroit  foreign   policy  conference, 

announcement,  PR  318,  12/4 
Asian-American  Foreign  Policy  Conference, 

New   York,  announcement ,  PR   305, 

11/21 
Decisionmaking:  Carter,   Mar.   33;   Vance, 

Oct.   16,  Dec.  26 
Foreign  Policy  for  Editors  and  Broadcasters: 

Carter,   Apr    4;  announcement,  PR  24, 

2/1 
Foreign  relations,  question  of  effect  of  elec- 
tion year  (Vance),  Dec.  27 
National   Foreign   Policy   Conference  for 

Young  Political  Leaders,  PR  111,  4/26 
New  England   Middle  East  conference,  an- 
nouncement, PR  20,  1/23 
1979  assessment:   Carter,  Jan.    11;   Vance, 

Sept.  6 
Principles,   objectives,    and   purpose: 

Brzezinski,  Feb.   20;   Vance,  Mar.  42, 

June  18 
Priorities:  Brzezinski,  Jan.   5;  Carter,   Mar. 

25;  Newsom,  PR  134,  5/17;  Vaky,  Mar. 


Foreign  policy.  U.S.  (Cont'd) 
Priorities  (Cont'd) 

66,  Apr.  57;  Vance.  Mar.  39 
Private  diplomacy  (Vance),  Nov.  17 
Public  opinion  (Nimetz).  Dec.  45 
U.S.  interests  in  the  Middle  East,  announce- 
ment of  conferences:  Pittsburgh,  PR  80, 
3/21;  St.  Louis,  PR  281,  10/26 
Foreign  Relations  of  the  United  States,  1949, 
volume    VIII,    The   Far  East:  China,    re- 
leased, Jan.  62 
Foreign   Service   Act   of   1979,   proposed 

(Vance),  PR  157,  6/21;  PR  180,  7/27 
France  (see  also  Guadeloupe  meeting): 

France-U.S.   Cooperative  Science   Program, 

annual  review  meeting,  PR  25,  1/25 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Feb.  65,  66,  Apr. 
68,  May  67,  July  71,  72,  Aug.  67,  68, 
Sept.  69,  Nov.  60,  Dec.  68 
U.S.  relations  (Vest),  Nov.  39 
Freedom  of  speech  (Vance),  Jan.  22,  Nov.  19 


Gabon: 

Ambassador  to  U.S.:  credentials.  Mar.  43; 
remarks  on  presentation  of  credentials 
and   reply   by   President   Carter,    UNN, 
1/11 
Communist  presence,  Dec.  31 
Gambia: 

Ambassador  to  U.S.,  Oct.  20 
Communist  presence,  Dec.  31 
Treaties,   agreements,  etc..   Mar.   67,  68, 
Apr.  67,  May  67 
Gas,   asphyxiating,   poisonous,   and   bac- 
teriological  warfare,   Geneva  convention 
(1925),  accession,  Bhutan,  May  67 
Gelb,  Leslie  H.:  June  24,  45;  key  speaker  at 
town  forum  on  American-Soviet  relations. 
Riverside,  California,  PR  14,  1/15 
General  Assembly,  U.N.  (.See  also  United  Na- 
tions): Maynes,  June  52,  Dec.  63 
Kampuchean  representative,   credentials 

(Petree),  Dec.  57,  58 
34th  session  (Vance),  Nov.   1 
U.S.  delegation.  Nov.  3 
Geneva  conventions  (1949)  on  treatment  of 
armed  forces,  civilian  persons,  and  prison- 
ers of  war: 
Protocol  I  re  protection  of  victims  of  interna- 
tional armed  conflicts:   Australia,  Mar. 
68;  Botswana,  Aug.  67;  Bulgaria,  Mar. 
68;  Cyprus,  Jan.  60,  Aug.  67;  Czecho- 
slovakia, Mar.  68;  Ecuador,  July  72;  El 
Salvador,   Mar.   68;  Jordan,  July  72; 
Korea,  Mar.   68:   Madagascar,  Jan.  60; 
New  Zealand,  Mar.  68;  Niger.  Jan.  60, 
Aug.   67;  San  Marino,  Jan.   60;  Spain, 
Togo,  Mar.  68;  Yugoslavia,  Aug.  67 
Protocol   II   re   protection   of  victims  of 
noninternational  armed  conflict:  Austra- 
lia, Mar.  68;  Botswana,  Aug.  67;  Bul- 
garia,   Czechoslovakia,    Mar.    68 
Ecuador,  July  72;  El  Salvador,  Mar.  68 
Jordan,   July   72;   Korea,   Mar.    68 
Madagascar,  Jan.  60;  New  Zealand,  Mar 


► 


]2 


Geneva  conventions  (Cont'd) 
Protocol  II  (Cont'd) 

68:    Niger,   Jan.    60.    Aug,    67;   San 
Marino.  Jan.  60;  Spain.  Togo.  Mar.  68; 
Yugcslavia.  Aug.  67 
Genocide,  prevention  and  punishnienl  of,  con- 
vention (1948).  Jan.  4 
Current  actions:  Gambia,  New  Zealand,  Mar. 
67 
German  Democratic  Republic: 

Election  law,  amendment:   Sept.  47;  Carter, 

Nov.  39 
Military  and   technical   personnel    m   Africa 

(Newsom),  Dec.  29,  30,  31 
Treaties,   agreements,   etc  ,   Mar     67,    Apr 
67,  May  66,  67,  July  72,  Oct.  67,  Nov. 
60 
U.S.  relations  (Vest),  Nov.  42 
Germany,  Federal  Republic  of: 

Multilateral   emergency   assistance  for  Tur- 
key, organization  of:  Sept.  49;  Christo- 
pher, Aug.  44;  Vest,  Nov.  38,  40 
Restriction  of  contact  with  foreigners,  legis- 
lation (Carter),  Nov.  39 
SALT  II  (Schmidt),  Oct.  29  (quoted) 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Jan.  60,  Feb.  65, 
Mar.  67,  68,  Apr.  68,  May  67,  68,  June 
66,   67,  July  71,   72,   Aug.   66,  67.  68, 
Sept.  69,  Oct.  67,  Nov.  60,  Dec.  68 
U.S.  relations  (Vest),  Nov.  39 
Ghana: 

Communist  presence,  Dec.  31 

Democratic  progress  (Derian),  Jan.  7 

Sales  of  U.S.   agricultural  commodities, 

agreement  (1979),  Apr.  68 
U.S.   Ambassador  (Smith),  swearing  in,  PR 
256,  10/9 
Gibraltar,  taking  of  evidence  abroad  in  civil  or 
commercial   matters,   convention  (1970), 
extension  to.  Feb.  65 
Ginzburg.  Aleksandr,  June  16/i 
Giscard  d'Estaing,  Valery,  Feb.  36,  Aug.  3 
Gleysteen.  William  H..  Jr.,  biographical  notes, 
Feb.  31 

Great  Lakes: 

Great  Lakes  and  St  Lawrence  Seaway,  oper- 
ation of  pilotage,  bilateral  agreement 
with  Canada  (1970),  termination,  June 
67 

Operation  of  pilotage,  bilateral  agreement 
with  Canada  (1977),  June  67 

Promotion  of  safety  on  by  means  of  radio, 
agreement  with  Canada  (1973),  amend- 
ment. Mar.  68 

Water  Quality   Agreement   (1978):   Jan     23; 
Jamieson,  Jan.  22 
Greece: 

EC  membership  (Vest),  Nov.  38,  41 

Greek- Turkish  discussions  (see  also  Cy- 
prus), Jan.  37 

NATO,  reentry,  proposed:  Carter,  Mar  26; 
Christopher,  Jan.  34,  36;  Aug.  45; 
Mondale,  Aug.  21;  Nimetz,  Apr.  35; 
Vance,  Mar.  37;  Vest,  Nov.  41 

Security  assistance,  FY  1980  proposals: 
Benson,  Apr.  46;  Nimetz,  Apr.  34; 
Vance,  Mar.  37 

Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Jan.  60,  Feb.  65. 
July  72,  Aug.  66,  Sept.  68,  69 


Green,  Marshall,  Distinguished  Honor  Award, 
presentation   by   Secretar>    Vance,   PR  36, 
2/13 
Grenada: 

Offenses  and  certain  other  acts  committed  on 
board  aircraft,  convention  (1963),  ac- 
cession, Apr.  67 
U.S.  Ambassador  (Shelton).  swearing  in,  PR 
141,  5/24 
Groinyko,  Andrei  (quoted),  Jan.  53 
Grove,  Brandon,  Jr.,  Aug.  62 
Grunitsky,  Yao,  Oct.  20 

Guadeloupe  meeting  (France-Federal  Republic 
of  Germany-U.K.-U.S.):  Jan.  37;  Cal- 
laghan,  Feb.  36;  Carter,  Feb.  37;  GLscard 
d'Estaing,  Feb.  36;  Nimetz,  Apr.  33; 
Schmidt,  Feb.  38 
Guatemala: 

Ambassador  to  U.S.:   Apr.   58;   remarks  on 
presentation  of  credentials  and  reply  by 
President  Carter,  UNN,  2/26 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Jan.  59,  Feb.  65, 
Mar.  68,  Apr.  67,  68,  July  72,  Aug.  67, 
Sept.  67,  Oct.  67,  Nov.  59,  Dec.  67 
U.S.  aid  (Vaky),  Apr.  60.  61 
U.S.    Ambassador  (Ortiz),   swearing   in,   PR 
170,  7/12 
Guinea: 

Ambassador  to  U.S..  Oct.  20 

Communist  presence  (Newsom),   Dec.   29, 

30,  31 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  July  72,  Aug.  68 
Guinea-Bissau,  Communist  military  and  tech- 
nical personnel  (Newsom),  Dec.  30,  31 
Guyana: 

Jonestown   deceased,    transportation   and 

interment,  PR  105,  4/20 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Aug.  68,  Sept.  67 
U.S.  aid  (Vaky),  Apr.  58 
U.S.  Ambassador  (Roberts),  swearing  in,  PR 
276,  10/22 


H 


Haiti  (Vaky),  Apr.  58,  60 

Textile  agreements  with  U.S.,  amendments. 
Mar.  68,  June  67,  Aug.  68,  Oct.  67,  PR 
56,  3/1;  PR  64,  3/9;  PR  229,  9/19 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc..  Mar.  68,  Apr. 
68,  June  67,  July  72,  Aug.  68,  Sept.  67, 
Oct.  67 

Harrop,  William  C,  Oct.  23. 
Health  and  medical  research  (McHenry),  Dec. 
56 
Peru,   U.S.   curative   and   preventive   health 

care  services  (Vance),  Mar.  36 
Sahel  Africa.   U.S. -WHO  river  blindness 

control  program  (Vance),  Mar.  36 
World  Health  Organization  (Maynes),  Jan 
50 
Constitution      (1946),      acceptance, 
Seychelles,  Nov.  59 
Amendment   to  articles   24   and   25: 

Guatemala,  Mexico,  Apr.  67 
Amendment  to  articles  34  and  55  ( 1973); 
Upper  Volta,  June  67 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 

Health  and  medical  research  (Cont'd) 
World  Health  Ornunizatiiin  (Cont'd) 
Constitution  (Cont'd) 
Amendment    to   article   74:   Jan.    60; 
Niger,   June   67;   Norway.   July   71; 
Singapore.  June  67 
Hechinger.  John  W.,  Feb.  57 
Hedemann,  Knut,  Apr.  37 
Hegemony  (Vaky),  Mar.  64 
Helman,  Gerald  B.,  swearing  in  as  US    Repre- 
sentative to  U.S.  Mission  to  European  Of- 
fice of  the  United  Nations  and  Other  Inter- 
national Organizations  in  Geneva,  PR  322, 
12/11 
Henderson,  Nicholas,  Sept.  48 
Herman,  George,  May  39 
Hesburgh.  Theodore  M..  Jan.  2  (quoted).  Nov. 

51.  54.  Dec.  In 
Hirohito.  Emperor  (quoted).  Aug.   13 
Hispanic-American  foreign  policy  conference; 
announcement.  PR  241.  7/27;  remarks  by 
Secretary  Vance.  PR  285.  10/29 
Hitler.  Adolf  (quoted).  Oct.  I 
Holbrooke.  Richard  C,  Feb.  29.  Apr.  17,  Oct. 

34 
Holloway.  Anne  Forrester,  swearing  in  as  Am- 
bassador to  Mali,  PR  307,  1 1/27 
Honduras:  Vaky,  Apr.  58,  60;  Vance,  Nov.  14, 
Dec.  65 
Ambassador  to  U.S.,  credentials:   Apr.   58; 
remarks  on   presentation   of  credentials 
and  reply  by   President  Carter,   UNN, 
1/11 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Apr   67,  68,  June 
65,  67,  July  71,  Sept.  67,  68,  Dec.  68 
Hong  Kong: 

Refugee  influx,  policy:  Holbrooke,  Oct.  35; 

Young,  H.,  Dec.  15 
Textile  agreements  with  U.S.,  amendments, 

Jan.  60,  Apr   68,  PR  233.  9/21 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Jan.  60,  Apr.  68, 
May  68,  Aug.  68 
Hormats,  Robert  D.,  Dec.  58 
Hottelet,  Richard,  Nov    19 
Housing   and   urban   development,    bilateral  ' 

agreement   with  Mexico:   (Carter),   Mar.   59 
Hua  Guofeng  (Hua  Kuo-feng),  Feb.    16.  22 

(quoted),  24  (quoted) 
Huang  Hua,  Feb.  20 

Human   rights  (see  also  under   Foreign   aid, 
U.S.):  June  33,  Dec.  42;  Brzezinski,  Feb. 
19;  Carter.  Jan.   9.  Feb.    I.  2.  Mar.   25. 
June    13.   Dec.   20;  Hesburgh.   Nov.   53; 
Newsom.   Jan.    32;   Nimetz,   Dec.   48; 
Reinhardt,  Feb.  50;  Vance,  Mar.  35,  42, 
June  17,  Sept.  8,  PR  285,  10/29;  Young. 
Feb.  59 
Afghanistan  (Christopher).  Apr.  50 
Africa:   Derian.  Jan.   7;   Harrop.  Oct.   24; 
Maynes,  Jan.  48;  Newsom,  Dec.  30,  32; 
Reinhardt,  Feb.  51 
American  convention  on   human   rights 

(1969),  adherence,  Bolivia,  Nov,  59 
Basic  human  rights  documents,  list,  Jan.  4 
Chile  (Mezvinsky),  Apr.  53 
Czechoslovakia:   Carter,    Nov.    39;    Depart- 
ment, Dec.  44 
Eastern  Europe.  See  Europe:  CSCE  Final  Act 
of  Helsinki   and  names  of  individual 
countries 


Index  1979 


13 


Human  rights  (Coiu'Jj 

Fundamental  to  U.S.  foreign  policy:  Feb.  42; 
Brzezinski,  Jan  3;  Carter,  Jan.  2,  Mar. 
29;  Christopher.  Jan.  28;  Vance.  Feb. 
1  I ;  Young.  June  49 

Human  Rights  Day  and  Week  (Carter),  Jan. 
3 

India;  Christopher.  Apr    49;  Derian.  Jan;  7 

Indochina:  Carter.  Dec.  20;  Mezvinsky,  Apr. 
53;  Mondale,  Oct.  3;  Newsom,  Apr.  29; 
Petree,  Dec.  58;  Vance,  Oct.  4;  Young, 
June  63 

International  Covenant  on  Civil  and  Political 
Rights  (1966):  Gambia,  Mar.  67,  May 
67;  Iceland.  Oct.  67;  India.  June  66; 
Japan,  Aug.  66;  Morocco,  July  71; 
Netherlands,  Jan.  59;  New  Zealand, 
Mar.  67 

International  Covenant  on  Economic.  Social, 
and  Cultural  Rights  (1966):  Iceland, 
Oct.  67;  India,  June  66;  Japan,  Aug.  66; 
Morocco,  July  71;  Netherlands, 
Trinidad  and  Tobago,  Jan.  59 

International  Covenants  on  Civil  and  Politi- 
cal Rights,  on  Economic,  Social,  and 
Cultural  Rights,  Genocide  Convention, 
and  related  agreements:  Jan.  4;  Mez- 
vinsky. Apr.  52 
U.S.  ratification  urged:  Carter,  Jan.  1,  3; 
Vance,  Jan.  2;  Young,  June  49 

Iran  (Saunders),  Feb.  46,  47 

Korea,  Republic  of:  Aug.  17;  Carter.  Aug. 
15;  Holbrooke,  Feb.  30 

Latin  America:  Mar.  60,  Aug.  61;  Carter, 
Nov.  14;  Vaky,  Mar.  66,  Apr.  59; 
Vance,  Dec.  65 

Mexico,  support  for:  Carter,  Mar.  54,  59, 
63;  Lopez  Portillo,  Mar.  58 

Nicaragua:  Christopher,  Aug.  58;  Depart- 
ment, May  66;  Aug.  61;  Grove,  Aug. 
62,  63;  McGee,  Aug.  55;  OAS  Resolu- 
tion II,  Aug.  58;  Vaky,  Apr.  60;  Vance, 
Aug.  57 

Panama  (Christopher).  Aug.  64 

South  Africa:  Leonard.  Feb.  61;  Maynes,  Jan. 
48 

Soviet  Union.  See  under  Soviet  Union 

Uganda,  violations  during  Amin  regime:  Car- 
ter, Oct.  22;  Mezvinsky,  Apr.  52 

U.N.  Human  Rights  Commission;  May  64; 
Maynes,  Jan.  49;  Mezvinsky,  Apr.  52; 
Young,  June  49 

Universal  Declaration  of  Human  Rights,  Jan. 
4 
30th  anniversary:  Brzezinski,  Jan.  3;  Car- 
ter, Jan.    1;  Derian,  Jan.   6;  Maynes, 
June  52;  Mezvinsky,   Apr.   52,   56; 
Vance,  Jan.  2 

U.S.  Assistant  Secretary  for  Human  Rights 
and  Humanitarian  Affairs  (Derian), 
swearing  in,  PR  29,  2/5 

Zaire  (Moose),  May  42 
Humphrey,  Hubert:  Jan.   2  (quoted);  Mondale, 

Apr.  14,  16,  Aug.  19 
Hun  Sen  (quoted),  Dec.  9 
Hungary: 

Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Jan.  60,  Mar.  68, 
May  67,  June  66,  July  72;  Aug.  67,  68 
Sept.  68,  69,  Nov.  60 

U.S.  relations  (Vest).  Nov.  42. 


I 


Iceland: 

Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  July  72,  Oct.  67 
Visit  of  Vice  President  Mondale,  Aug.   19 
linmigration:  Carter,  Mar.  62;  Vance,  Aug.  23 
Refugee  Act  of  1979:  Vance,  Oct.  6;  Young, 

H.,  Dec.  16 
U.S.  immigration  law,  review  (Young.  H). 

Dec.  13 
Imports.  U.S.  (see  also  Exports  and  Trade): 
Color  television  receivers,  bilateral   agree- 
ments with:   Korea,  May  68;  Taiwan, 

May  69 
Meat  import  bill  (disapproved):  Carter.  Jan. 

8;  Christopher,  Jan.   27 
Meat   imports,   limitations  of.   bilateral 

agreements  with:  Austria.  May  68;  Costa 

Rica,   El  Salvador,   Guatemala,   Haiti, 

Honduras.   Apr.   68,  69;  Mexico,  Mar. 

69,    Apr.    68,    69;    New    Zealand, 

Nicaragua,  Apr,  68,  69;  Panama,  Mar. 

69,   Apr.  68.  69;  U.K.   (from  Belize). 

Apr.  68.  69 
Income  and  property  taxes,  bilateral  convention 
(1967),  protocol  (1978):  France,  Feb    66, 
Aug.  68,  Sept.  69,  Nov.  60,  Dec.  68 
India  (Carter),  Apr.  6 

Democratic  progress:  Christopher,  Apr    49; 

Derian,  Jan.  7;  Maynes,  Jan.  49 
India-U.S.   Joint  Commission,   fourth  ses- 
sion, joint  communique,  June  46 
Pakistan,  relations  (Saunders),  Oct.  46 
Textile  agreements  with  U.S.,  amendments, 

Jan,    60,   Apr.   69,   June   67,   Aug.   68, 

Nov.  60,  PR  53,  2/28;  PR  146,  5/31;  PR 

169,  7/11  PR  266,  10/15;  PR  309,  1 1/28 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Jan.  60,  Mar.  67, 

Apr.  68,  June  66,  67,  July  72,  Aug.  66, 

67,  68,  Sept.  69,  Nov.  60 
U.S.    interests,    relations,    and    role: 

Brzezinski,  Feb.    19;  Christopher,  Apr. 

48,  51;  Miklos,  Oct.  56;  Vance.  Mar.  39 
Indian  Ocean: 

Australian  patrols,  question  of:  Killen.  Sept. 

55;  Vance,  Sept.  53 
U.S.    naval   forces,   deployment:   Nov.    10; 

Carter,  Nov.  8;  Vance,  Sept.  55 
Use  of  Australian  bases,  question  of:  Killen, 

Sept.  55,  56;  Vance,  Sept.  53,  55 
U.S.  policy  (Vance),  Feb.  10,  Mar.  39 
U.S. -Soviet  arms  limitation  talks,  status  of: 

Feb.  40,  July  56,  Sept.  57;  Christopher, 

Apr.  51-52;  Shulman,  Dec.  42 
Indonesia; 

Indochinese  refugees,   reception:   Oct.   4; 

Young,  H.,  Dec.  15,  16 
Narcotic  control  program  (Faico),  Aug.  51 
Political  prisoners,  release  (Derian),  Jan.  7 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Jan.  60,  Feb.  66, 

June  67,   Aug.   66,   Sept.   69,   Oct.   67, 

Dec.  67,  68 
U.S.   economic  and   military  aid;  Apr.    18; 

Benson,   Apr.  47;  Holbrooke,  Apr.   23; 

Vance,  Mar.  36 
Industrial  property: 

Nice  agreement  (1957)  as  revised:  Ireland, 

Jan,   59;  Netherlands,  July  72;  Spain, 

Apr.   67,  68;  Sweden,  Jan.  59;  U.K., 

June  66 


Industrial  properly  (Cont'd) 
Protection  of,  convention  of  Paris,  as  re- 
vised: Indonesia.  Uruguay,  Dec.  67 
Intellectual  property.  World  Intellectual  Prop- 
erty Organization,  convention  establishing 
(1967):  Barbados,  Sept.  68;  El  Salvador, 
Aug.  67;  Indonesia,  Uruguay,  Dec.  67 
Intelligence,   collection  of  (see  also  Strategic 
arms  limitations  talks:  SALT  II:   Verifica- 
tion): Carter.  Jan.  10.  Nov.  8,  10;  Vance. 
Oct.  14.  17.  Nov.  19.  Dec.  23,  26 
Foreign  intelligence  activities  (Vance).  Oct. 
15 
Inter-American   Development   Bank:    Ruser. 
Sept.  4;  Vaky,  Apr.  58;  Vance,  Mar.   37, 
Nov,  3,  Dec,  66 
Inter-Governmental   Conimiltee  for   European 
Migration  (ICEM):   Young,  H,,   Dec,    12, 
17 
Interdependence  of  modern   world:   Benson, 
Sept.  60;  Carter,   Mar.   27;  Cooper,  June 
32;  Saunders,  Oct.  45;   Vance,  May  35; 
Sept.  3  (quoted) 
Economic:  Carter,   Apr.   32,   Aug.  43;  Hor- 
mats,  Dec.  60;  Katz,  Oct.  42;  Maynes, 
June  57,  58;  McHenry,   Dec.   55;  Sol- 
omon, June  34,  37;  Thatcher,   Aug.  6; 
Vance,   Jan.    13,   June    19.    Nov.    1; 
Young,  June  48,  Sept.  64,  65 
International  Atomic   Energy  Agency:   Carter, 
Mar.   28;  Maynes,  June  56,  62;  Young, 
June  49 
International  Bank  for  Reconstruction  and  De- 
velopment (World  Bank):   Newsom,  Jan. 
32;  Vaky,  Apr,  58;  Vance,  Jan,   14,  Mar, 
37,  May  36,  Nov.  3 
Articles  of  agreement  (1945),   signature. 
Cape  Verde,  Jan.  59 
International  Court  of  Justice  (Maynes),  Dec. 

64 
International    Development   Cooperation    Ad- 
ministration (IDCA):  Vance,  PR  89,  3/29, 
PR  1 10.  4/26;  White  House.  June  25 
International  expositions,   protocol  (1972)  re- 
vising 1928  convention,  ratification.  Swe- 
den. Aug.  66 
International  Labor  Organization:  Jan.   33; 

Maynes,  Jan.  50 
International   Monetary   Fund;   Christopher, 
Aug,  44;  Hormats,   Dec.   60;  McHenry, 
Dec.  56;  Newsom,  Jan.  32;  Solomon,  June 
35,  36;  Tokyo  declaration,  Aug.  9;  Vance, 
Jan.  14,  May  34,  Nov.   15;  Vest,  Nov.  38 
Articles  of  agreement  ( 1944):  Solomon,  June 
36 
Current  actions:  Cape  Verde,  Jan.  59;  Dji- 
bouti, Feb.  65;  Dominica,  Jan.  59 
Supplementary  Financing  Facility,   agree- 
ment re  financing  by  U.S.,  Apr.  69 
International  organizations  and  conferences, 
FY  1980  appropriations  (Maynes),  June  51 
International   Refugee   Organization   (IRO): 

Young,  H.,  Dec.  11 
Investment  of  private  capital  abroad:  Hormats, 
Dec.  61;  Newsom,  Jan.  32 
ASEAN:   Department,    Apr.    20;   Newsom, 

Apr.  28 
Investment   encouragement   fund,   project 

grant  agreement  with  Egypt,  Dec.  68 
Investment  guarantees,   bilateral   agreement 


14 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


Invesunen!  <if  private  capital  (Cunt'il) 
Investment  guarantees  (Cont'il) 
with  Bangladesh.  Jan    60 
Morocco:  Jan.  38;  Holbrooke.  Feb    .11 
Taiwan,  Feb.  25.  27 
Zaire  (Moose),  May  42 
lonatana,  lonatana,  Sept.  55 
Iran;  Carter,  Feb.    1,  3,  4,  Mar.   21,  Apr,   5; 
Vance,  Mar.  42 
Assets  in  U.S.  blocked  (White  House),  Dec. 

50 
Ayatollah  Khomeini  (Carter),  Feb.  3 
Bakhtiar  government:  Carter.  Feb.   3.   Mar. 
32.  33;  Saunders,  Feb.  47;  Vance,  Feb. 
7 
Bazargan  government:  Carter.  Mar    32.  Apr. 

9;  Vance.  Aug.  22 
Kerosene  and  fuel  oil  export  licenses,  ap- 
proval (Departinent).  Oct.  45 
Oil  supplies,  curtailment:   Carter,  Feb.   3; 
Mar.   32.  Apr.  7.  9;  Cooper,  Sept.  42; 
Vance,  Aug.  22 
Revolution:  Atherton,  May  63;  Carter,  Apr. 

4;  Saunders,  Mar.  51.  Oct.  46,  48 
Shah  Pahlavi:   Carter,   Jan.    10,    12;   Vance, 
Jan.   17 
Departure  from  Iran:  Brzezinski,  Feb    19; 
Carter,  Feb.   3;  Saunders,  Feb    47; 
Vance,  Feb.  7,  10 
Medical  treatment  in  U.S.  (Vance).  Dec. 

23 
Residence   in   U.S..   question  of  (Vance), 
Nov.   17 
Soviet  relations  (Shulman).  Dec.  43 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc..  Mar. 68,  May  68. 

July  72.  Aug.  67 
U.S.  arms  sales  policy  (Carter).  Feb.  3 
US.   diplomatic  hostages,  holding  of.  prin- 
ciples and  U.S.   response:  Carter.   Dec. 
18.  50;  Vance,  Dec.  49;  White  House, 
Dec.  49,  50 
U.S.    intelligence  stations,   loss  of:   Brown, 
May   55,   July   69;  Jones,   Sept.   34; 
Vance,  July  69 
U.S.   interests  and  policy:  Carter,  Jan.    12, 
Mar.  21,  28.  30,  31;  Saunders,  Feb.  45; 
Vance,  Feb.  8,  9.  Mar.  39 
U.S.   oil   purchases,   discontinued   (Carter). 
Dec.   18.  50 
Iraq,  treaties,  agreements,  etc..  Mar.  68,  May 

67.  June  67.  Oct.  67.  Nov.  59 
Ireland: 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Jan.  59,  Apr.  68, 

June  66,  Aug.  67,  68 
U.S.  relations  (Vest),  Nov.  39 
U.S.   visit  of  Prime  Minister  Lynch,  pro- 
gram. PR  290.   I  1/5 
Israel: 

Ambassador  to  U.S..  credentials.  Feb.  47 
Defense  treaty  with  U.S..  question  of  (Car- 
ter), May  31 
Economy  (Saunders),  Oct.  48 
Golda  Meir,  funeral,  Jan.  39 
Oil  supply  arrangements:  May  60,  68,  Aug. 
68;  Carter,  Apr.  9,  May  28;  Vance.  May 
56.  PR  124.  5/8 
Text  of  agreement.  Oct.  51 
Profile.  May  25 

Security,  U.S.  commitment:  Atherton,  May 
62;  Carter,  Feb.   1,  May  26;  Saunders, 


Israel  (Ciinl'd) 
Security  ICont'dj 

Mar.  49,  50,  June  37;  Strauss,  Oct    47; 

Vance,  Nov.  2 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc..  Jan.  6U,  Mar.  68. 

May  68.  June  67.  July  71.  Aug.  67.  68. 

Sept.  68 
U.N.  resolutions  on.  US.  position.  May  65 
U.S.    anti-boycott    amendments   (Carter). 

Mar.  24. 
U.S.  economic  and  military  assistance:  May 

62;  Atherton.  May  62;  Benson.  Apr.  45; 

Brown,  May  58;  Carter,  May  28;  Saun- 
ders, June  38;  Vance,  Mar.  36,  May  39. 

56.  PR  110.  4/26;  PR  124,  5/8 
Visit  of  President   Carter:   Apr.   38;   Begin, 

May  23,  24,  28;  Carter,  May  22,  23,  25, 

26,   28,   29;   Mondale,   May    16.   29; 

Navon.  May  22,  23 
Visit  of  Secretary  Brown.  Apr.  8 
Italy: 

Andreotti  government,  resignation.  Mar.   70 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc..  Jan.  59.  Feb.  65. 

Mar.   67,   Apr.   67.   May   67.   June   66. 

July  71,  Aug.  67,  68 
U.S.  interests  (Vest),  Nov.  40 
Itani.  Khalil.  Feb.  47 

Ivory   Coast.    U.S.    Ambassador   (Rawls), 
swearing  in,  PR  329.  12/20 


Jackson.  Rev.  Jesse.  Nov.  12 
Jamaica: 

Treaties,  agreements,  etc..  May  68,  June  65, 

66.  67.  July  73.  Sept.  67,  69 

U.S.   Ambassador  (Lawrence),  swearing  in, 
PR  83,  3/29 
Jamieson.  Donald.  Jan.  21 
Japan  (Carter),  Mar.  26 

ASEAN  nations,  relations  with  (Newsom), 
Apr.  28 

Economic  relations  with  US.,  Aug.  38 
US  -Japan  Consultative  Group  on,  estab- 
lishment, Aug.   12 

Japan's  financial  contribution  for  U.S.  ad- 
ministrative and  related  expenses  for  the 
Japanese  fiscal  year  1978,  pursuant  to 
the  mutual  defense  assistance  agreement 
(1954),  bilateral  agreement,  Sept.  69 

MTN  concessions:  Katz,  June  28; 
McDonald,  Aug    41 

Oil  import  goals  (Carter),  Aug.  9 

Textile  agreement  with  U.S.,  amendments: 
PR  208.  8/27;  PR  209.  8/28;  PR  227, 
9/19 

Treaties,  agreements,  etc..  Jan.  60.  Mar  67. 
69,  Apr.  69,  May  68,  June  67,  Aug.  66, 

67,  68,  Sept.  69,  Nov.  60,  Dec.  68 
U.N.   High  Commissioner's  Fund  on  Refu- 
gees, financial  support  (Carter),  Aug.  9 

U.S. -Japanese  security  relations,  Aug.  37 

U.S.  military  aid:  Benson,  Apr.  42;  Hol- 
brooke, Apr    17,19 

U.S.  trade,  textile  products,  record  of  U.S.- 
Japanese discussions,  PR  209,  8/28 

U.S.  visit  of  Prime  Minister  Ohira,  Aug.  37; 


Japan  (Cont'd) 

U.S.  visit  of  Ohira  (Cont'd) 
program.  PR  115.  5/1 
Jefferson.  Thomas  (quoted).  May  64 
Jenkins,  Roy,  Aug.  7 
Jocovides,  Andreas  J.,  Sept.  48 
Jones,  David  C  Sept    32 
Jordan: 

Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Jan.  60,  Mar.  69, 
Apr.  67.  69.  May  68,  July  72,  Nov.  60 

U.S.  aid,  FY  1980  proposals:  Ben.son,  Apr. 
46;  Draper.  Apr.  39 

Visit  of  Secretary  Brown.  Apr.  8 
Juarez,  Benito  (quoted).  Mar.  60 
Judicial  matters: 

Boeing  Company,  mutual  assistance  in  ad- 
ministration of  justice,  bilateral  agrees 
ment  with  Nepal,  Mar.  69 

Boeing  Company  and  McDonnell  Douglas 
Corporation,  mutual  assistance  in  ad- 
ministration of  justice,  bilateral  agree- 
ments with:  Kuwait,  Mar  69;  Ven- 
ezuela, Jan.  61 

Extradition  and  mutual  assistance  in  criminal 
matters,  bilateral  agreements  with:  Co- 
lombia, Nov.  69,  PR  223,  9/14;  Turkey, 
Aug.  68 

General  Tire  and  Rubber  Company,  Fire- 
stone Tire  and  Rubber  Company,  and 
International  Telephone  and  Telegraph 
Corporation  (ITT)  matters,  mutual  as- 
sistance in  administration  of  justice, 
bilateral  agreement  with  Mexico.  Jan. 
60 

Gulfstream  American  Corporation  matters, 
mutual  assistance  in  administration  of 
justice,  bilateral  agreement  with  Togo, 
Mar   69. 

Jamaica  Nutrition  Holdings  Ltd..  bilateral 
agreement  re  mutual  assistance  with 
Jamaica.  May  68 

Liability  and  insurance  for  architects  and 
contractors  working  on  sewerage  proj- 
ects, bilateral  agreement  with  Egypt, 
Dec.  68 

Lockheed  Aircraft  Corporation,  mutual  as- 
sistance in  the  administration  of  justice, 
bilateral  agreement  with  Peru.  Sept.  69 

Lockheed  Aircraft  Corporation.  McDonnell 
Douglas  Corporation  and  Grumman 
Corporation  matters,  mutual  assistance 
in  administration  of  justice,  bilateral 
agreement  with  Japan,  Mar.  69 

Lockheed  Aircraft  Corporation,  McDonnell 
Douglas  Corporation  and  ITT,  mutual 
assistance  in  administration  of  justice, 
bilateral  agreement   with  Turkey,  Aug. 
68.  69 
Lockheed  Aircraft  Corporation  and  McDon- 
nell  Douglas   Corporation   matters,  , 
mutual   assistance   in  administration  of 
justice,  bilateral  agreement  with  Federal 
Republic  of  Germany.  Mar.  68 
McDonnell   Douglas  Corporation,   bilateral 
agreement    re    mutual    assistance. 
Netherlands.  May  68 
Penal  judgments,   enforcement,   bilateral 

agreement  with  Turkey.  Aug.  68 
Penal   sentences,   execution  of,   bilateral 
agreements  with:   Panama,   Mar.   69; 


Index  1979 


15 


Judicial  matters  (Cont'd) 

Penal  sentences  {Cont'd} 
Peru,  Aug.  68 

Reynolds  Metals  Company  mutual  assistance 
in  administration  of  justice,  bilateral 
agreement  with  Suriname,  May  69 

Service  abroad  of  judicial  and  extra  judicial 
documents  in  civil  or  commercial  mat- 
ters: Germany,  Federal  Republic  of, 
July  71;  Italy.  Mar.  67 

Taking  of  evidence  abroad  in  civil  or  com- 
mercial matters,  convention  (1970); 
Germany,  Federal  Republic  of,  July  71; 
Gibraltar  (extension  to),  Feb.  65;  Israel, 
Sept.  68;  extended  to  Sovereign  Base 
Areas  of  Akrotiri  and  Dhekelia  in  Island 
of  Cyprus,  Sept.  68;  Netherlands,  Apr, 
67;  Singapore,  Jan.  59 

Westinghouse  Electric  Corporation  and  Bea- 
Jay  Products  Corporation,  mutual  assist- 
ance in  administration  of  justice,  bilat- 
eral agreement  with  Egypt,  June  67 

Westinghouse  Electric  Corporation  matters, 
mutual  assistance  in  administration  of 
justice,  bilateral  agreement  with  Egypt, 
Jan.  60 


K 


Kaiser,  Robert,  July  65 
Kalb.  Marvin,  May  39 

Kampuchea:  June  33;  Carter,  July  53,  Dec.  20 
Famine   {see  also    Refugees:    Indochinese): 
Dec.   8;  Nimetz,   Dec.    1.  Petree,   Dec. 
58;  Vance,  Sept.  56,  Oct.  5,  Dec.  10 
U.S.  and  other  relief  efforts:  Carter,  Nov. 
13;  Department.  Oct.  40;  Holbrooke, 
Oct.   37;  Nimetz,   Dec.   3;  Shulman, 
Dec.   44;    Vance,   Sept.    36,   Nov.    5; 
Young.  H..  Dec.  7 
Land  route,  importance  of  and  negotia- 
tions for:  Dec.  8.  9;  Baucus.  Dec. 
5,  7;  Carter,  Dec.  4;  Danforth,  Dec. 
5,  6;  Sasser,  Dec.  4,  5 
Soviet  role,  question  of:  Baucus,  Dec. 
6;  Danforth,  Dec.  6;  Vance,  Dec. 
27 
List  of  pledges,  PR  324,   12/12 
Human    rights:    Mezvinsky,    Apr.    53; 
Newsom,   Apr.   29;   Petree.   Dec.   58; 
Vance.  Oct.  4 
Political  solution,   need  for;  Oct.   8;   Hol- 
brooke,  Oct.    37;   Mondale.   Oct.   2; 
Vance.  Sept.  36,  53 
Prince  Sihanouk,   return  as  head  of  state, 

question  of  (Vance),  Sept.  56 
U.N.    acceptance   of  credentials  of  Demo- 
cratic  Kampuchean   representative   and 
U.S.  position  (Petree).  Dec.  57.  58 
Vietnamese   invasion;   Apr.   38,   Sept.    57; 
Benson,   Apr.  47;  Brzezinski,  Feb.    19; 
Carter.  Feb   4,  Mar.  22,  Apr.  5,  8;  Hol- 
brooke, Apr.   17,  18.  19,  Oct.  37;  Oak- 
ley, Oct.  39;  Petree.  June  64.  Dec.  58; 
Vance,  Feb.  8,  Sept.  36,  38.  39.  Oct.  4; 
Young.  June  62.  63 
Soviet  support:  Shulman.   Dec.  43;   Vance, 
Feb.  8 


Katz.  Julius  L..  June  27.  Sept.  45,  Oct.  42,  64, 

Dec.  35,  38 
Kennedy,  John  F.  (quoted),  June  1 1 ,  Sept.   1 8 
Kenya: 

Communist  presence.  Dec    31 

Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  June  67,  Sept    69, 

Dec.  67 
U.S.  Aid  (Moose),  Apr.   11,12 
Khan,  Sultan  Mohammed:  Apr.  51;  remarks  on 
presentation  of  credentials   and   reply   by 
President  Carter.  UNN.  2/26 
King.  Martin  Luther.  Jr.  (quoted).  Feb.  59 
Kirchschlager.  Rudolf,  July  50 
Kiribati,  de  facto  application  of  General  Agree- 
ment on  Tariffs  and  Trade,  protocol  of  pro- 
visional application  (1947).  Dec.  68 
Kirkland,  Lane  (quoted).  Dec.  19 
Kissinger,  Henry:   Nov.    12  (quoted);  Christo- 
pher, Jan.  34 
Korea,  Democratic  Republic  of,  June  33 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc..  Apr.  67 
U.S.  intelligence  reports  (Vance),  Oct.  17 
Korea.  Republic  of: 

Dialogue  with  North  Korea,  proposed:   Aug 

17,  38;  Carter,  Sept.  37;  Holbrooke,  Feb. 

31,  Apr.   17,  20;  Park.  Aug.   14;  Vance, 

Feb.  9.  Oct.  16,  Dec.  26 

National  and  defense  budgets,  table.  Apr    25 

Political  development,  question  of  (Vance), 

Dec.  26.  28 
President  Park,  funeral,  and  U.S.  chief  dele- 
gate (Vance),  Dec.  26 
Profile,  Feb.  32,  Aug.   17c 
Textile  agreements  with  U.S.,   amendments, 

PR  5,  1/5;  PR  228.  9/19 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Jan.  60,  Feb.  65, 
Mar.  68,  69,  Apr.  68,  May  68,  July  71, 
72,  Aug.  68,  Sept.  69,  Oct.  67,  Nov.  60, 
Dec.  68 
U.S.  economic  and  security  assistance:  Apr. 
18;  Benson,   Apr.  47;  Carter,  Mar.   26; 
Holbrooke,  Feb.  30,  Apr.  17,  23;  Vance, 
Mar.  37,  Apr.  24 
U.S.  relations  (Holbrooke),  Feb.  29 
U.S.   troop  withdrawals:  Aug.  38;  Carter, 

Sept.  37;  Vance,  Apr.  25,  26 
Visit  of  President  Carter:  Carter.  Aug.    15; 
Park,  Aug.   14;  Vance,  Aug.  23;  text  of 
joint  communique,  Aug.  16 
Kreps,  Juanita:  Feb    18;  Christopher,  Jan.  28 
Krueger,  Robert,  Oct.  66 
Kuwait,  treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Mar.  67,  69, 

Aug.  66,  Sept.  68 
Kuznetsov,  Eduard,  June  I6n 


Lake,  Anthony,  Jan.   18,  Nov.  27 
Laos: 

China,  position  on  (Petree),  June  64 
Human  rights  (Mezvinsky),  Apr.  53 
International   Fund   for  Agricultural   De- 
velopment,  agreement  (1976),   acces- 
sion, Apr.  67 
Latin   America  (see  also   Organization  of 
American  Stales  and  names  of  individual 
countries): 
Andean   Pact-U.S.    meetings:  joint   com- 


Latin  America  (Cont'd) 

Andean  Pact-U.S.  meetings  (Cont'd) 

munique.  PR  278.  10/25;  PR  306.  11/23 

Caribbean  and  Central  America:   Nimetz, 

Dec.   47;   Vaky,   Mar.   66,   Apr.   58; 

Vance,  Mar.  36,  Nov.  15,  Dec.  65 

Caribbean   Development   Facility   (Vaky), 

Apr.  58 
Caribbean-US.   Conference  on  Trade,   In- 
vestment,  and   Development,  announce- 
ment, PR  275,  10/19 
Democratic   development   and   human   rights 
(see  also  Human  rights):  Derian.  Jan    7; 
Mondale.    Nov.    55;    Vaky.    Mar.    66; 
Vance,  Dec.  65 
Drug  control  programs  (Faico),  Aug.  52 
Inter-American   treaty  of  reciprocal   assist- 
ance (Rio  Pact),  protocol  of  amendment 
(1975);  Guatemala,  Jan.  59;  U.S.  (with 
reservation),  Nov.  60 
Nuclear-free  treaty   (Treaty  of  TIateloIco): 
Carter,   Mar.    54,   59;   Fisher,   Jan.   53; 
Nye,  Jan.  40;  Pearson,  Feb.  56;  Vance, 
Nov.  3,  Dec.  65 
Protocol  I  (1967):  Vaky,  Mar.  66 

Signature,  France  (with  reservations  and 
declarations),  July  71 
Protocol  II,   ratification,   Soviet   Union, 
Apr.  67 
Pan  American  Day  and  Week,  1979  (Carter), 

Apr.  57 
U.S.  Ambassadors,  list,  Nov.  59 
U.S.  relations:  Brzezinski,  Feb.    19;  Carter, 
Mar.  59;  Nimetz,  Dec.  46;  Vaky,  Mar. 
64;  Vance,  Nov.  13,  PR  285,  10/29 
U.S.   security  assistance,  appropriations  re- 
quest FY    1980:    Benson,   Apr.   45,   47; 
Vaky,  Apr.  56 
Law,  private  international: 

Hague   conference   on   private   international 
law,  statute  (1951),  acceptance,   Ven- 
ezuela, Oct.  67 
International  Institute  for  the  Unification  of 
Private  Law,  statute  (1940),  accession, 
Poland,  June  66 
Law  of  the  sea  conference:  Newsom,  Jan.  32; 
Richardson,  June  41,   Nov.   50;  Ruser, 
Sept.  5 
Launching  of  the  USS  Samuel  E.   Morison 
(FFG    13),   remarks  (Richardson),   PR 
171,  7/13 
Lawrence,  Loren  E.,  swearing  in  as  Ambas- 
sador to  Jamaica,  PR  83,  3/29 
Lebanon:  Jan.   39;  Brzezinski,   Nov.  44;  De- 
partment,  Oct.   51;  Maynes,   Jan.   49; 
McHenry,  Dec.  52;  Saunders,  Oct.  46,  48, 
49;  Vance,  Nov.  2;  Young,  Oct.  61 
Ambassador  to  U.S.,  credentials,  Feb.  47 
Israeli  air  attacks  on  Lebanon: 

Condemnation  (Department),  Oct.  50,  51 
Use  of  U.S.  aircraft  (Vance),  Nov.  17 
Sales  of  U.S.   agricultural   commodities, 

agreement,  Jan.  60 
U.S.   Interim  Force  in  Lebanon  (UNIFIL): 
Jan.   56.   May  65;   Maynes.  June  51; 
McHenry.  Dec.  53;  Young.  Oc^.  61 
U.S.  aid,  FY  1980  proposals  (Draper),  Apr. 
38 
Leonard,  James  F.,  Feb.  61 


16 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


Lesolho  (Moose).  Apr.   10 

Ambassador  to  U.S.;  June  21;  remarks  on 
presentation  of  credentials  and  reply  by 
President  Carter,  UNN,  3/30 
U.S.   Ambassador  (Clingerman),   swearing 

in.  PR  259.  10/10 
World    Meteorological   Organization,   con- 
vention (1947).  accession.  Sept.  68 
Less  developed  countries  (see  also  Commodity 
trade.    Food   production   and   shortages. 
Population   problems   and   control,    and 
names  of  individual  countries):   Feb.    39; 
Andreotti.  Aug.  6;  Katz.  June  30;  Vance, 
Dec.  21,  22 
Communications  development:  May  65;  Hes- 

burgh,  Nov    52;  Reinhardi,  Feb.  50 
Economic   problems;    Hormals.    Dec.    59; 

Vance.  Mar.  38.  Nov.  6 
Energy  problems:  Christopher.  Sept  40; 
Giscard  d'Estaing.  Aug.  4;  Hesburgh. 
Nov.  52;  Hormats,  Dec.  62:  Lake.  Nov. 
29;  Nimelz,  Dec.  47;  Tokyo  declaration, 
Aug.  9:  Vance,  May  35,  Sept.  6,  8,  36, 
Nov.  3;  Young,  Sept.  66 
GATT  membership,  question  of  (Katz),  June 

29 
Hubert   H,   Humphrey   North-South   Scholar- 
ship Program  (Carter),  Feb.  35 
Nationalism  (  Vance),  Jan.  16,  June  18,  Sept 

7 
North-South   relations:    Aug.    9,   Sept.    58; 
Christopher,  Sept    40;  McHenry,   Dec 
55;  Newsom,  Jan.   30;  Ruser,  Sept    5; 
Vaky,   Apr.   57;   Vance,  Jan.    14,   Mar. 
35,  May  33 
Political  issues  (Newsom).  Jan.  32 
Soviet   influence  and   activities:   Feb.   40; 

Vance.  Jan.  16.  Mar.  35.  Sept    8 
U.S.  relations:  Carter,  Mar.  29.  June  13.  43; 
Maynes.   June  57;   Newsom,   Jan.    30; 
Nimetz.  Dec    47;  Vance,  Mar.  35,  May 
33.  June  18.  Sept.  6.  PR  1  10.  4/26 
Liberia: 

Communist  presence.  Dec.  31 

President  Tolbert.   meeting  with  President 

Carter  (White  House).  Nov.  20 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc..  Mar.  68,  May  68, 

Aug.  67 
U.S.  aid  (Moose),  Apr.   I  1 
Libya  (Vance),  Feb.  7 

Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Jan.  60,  June  66 
Liechtenstein,  ratification  of  single  convention 

(1961)  on  narcotic  drugs,  Dec.  67 
Lincoln,  Abraham  (quoted),  Jan.  2,  Nov.  9 
Load  lines,  international  convention  (1966): 
Accession.  Yemen  Arab  Republic.  May  67 
Amendments  ( 1971 ).  Panama.  May  67 
Amendments  (1975).  Panama,  June  66 
Loff,  Deborah  (Vance),  PR  331,  12/21 
Lopez-Guevara,  Carlos  Alfredo,  Apr.  58 
Lopez  Portillo  y  Pacheco.  Jose:  Mar.  52,  53, 
57,  59  (quoted).  Dec.  66  (quoted);  Vaky, 
Mar.  65 
Low,  Stephen,   swearing  in  as  Ambassador  to 

Nigeria.  PR  244.  10/1 
Lu  Xun  (quoted).  Mar.  4 
Lucey.  Patrick  (Carter).  Mar.  56 
Luthuli.  Albert  (quoted).  Jan.  20 
Luxembourg,   treaties,   agreements,   etc.,   Jan. 
59,  Apr.  68,  Aug.  67,  68 


M 


Macao,    treaties,   agreements,   etc..    Mar.    69, 

July  73 
MacArthur,  Douglas  (quoted),  Sept.   18 
Macau,   textile  agreements  with  U.S..   amend- 
ments. PR  149.  5/4;  PR  288.   10/31 
Madagascar: 
Communist  presence.  Dec.  31 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Jan.  60,  Apr.  67, 
Aug.  67 
Malawi  (Moose),  Apr.  10,  May  47 

Environmental  modification,  prohibition  of 
military  or  other  hostile  use.  convention 
(1977).  accession.  Apr.  67 

Malaysia: 

Narcotic   control   program   and   U.S.    aid 

(Falco).  Aug.  51 
Refugees,  policy:  Holbrooke.  Apr    19.  Oct 

35;  Rithauldeen.  Sept.   39;  Young.  H  , 

Dec.  15 
Textile  agreements  with  U.S..  amendments. 

PR  265,   10/15;  PR  292,   11/5:  PR  301. 

11/19 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc..  Jan.  60.  Feb.  66. 

June  66.  Aug.  68,  Nov.  60,  Dec.  68 
U.S.  security  assistance,  proposed:  Apr.    18; 

Benson,  Apr.  47 
Mali  (Derian),  Jan.  7 
Communist  military  and  technical  personnel 

(Newsom),  Dec.  30,  31 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Apr.  67.  Dec.  67 
U.S.    Ambassador  (Holloway).  swearing  in. 

PR  307.   11/27 

Malta: 

Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  June  66,  Sept.  69 
U.S.   Ambassador  (Clark),  swearing  in,  PR 
77,  3/20 
Marcos,  Ferdinand  E.  (quoted).  Apr,   17 
Maritime  boundaries: 

US     bilateral   treaties  with  Mexico,   Ven- 
ezuela,  and  Cuba,   ratification  urged 
(Carter),  Apr.  59 
U.S. -Canada:  May  68,  June  10;  Enders,  June 
6;  Jamieson,  Jan.  21,  22,  23;  Pickering, 
June  7 
Signature  of  Gulf  of  Maine  agreement.  PR 
82.  3/29 

Maritime  matters: 

Great  Lakes.  See  Great  Lakes 

Argentina,   memorandum   of  understanding 

with.  Mar.  68 
Carriage  of  goods  by  sea,  convention  ( 1978): 
Austria,  Egypt,  Hungary,  June  66;  Tan- 
zania, Uganda,  Sept.  68;  U.S.,  July  72; 
Zaire,  June  66 
Consultative  Shipping  Group-US.   shipping 

talks  opened,  PR  287,  10/30 
Intergovernmental   Maritime  Consultative 
Organization,   convention  (1948):   Dji- 
bouti,   Apr     67;   Gambia,   Mozambique. 
Nepal.  Mar.  67;  Yemen.  May  67 
Amendments  (1974):  Colombia.   Dec.  67; 

Ireland,  Jan.  59 
Amendments  (1975):  Bangladesh,  Nov. 
59;  Ethiopia,  Gambia,  Mar.  67;  Iraq, 
Nov.  59;  Jamaica,  June  66,  Kuwait, 
Mar.  67;  Malta,  June  66;  Nepal,  Mar 
67;   Saudi   Arabia,   Singapore,   Sept. 


Maritime  matters  (Cont'd)  i 

Intergovern.  Mar.  Const.  Or/;.  (Cont'd) 
Amendments  (1975)  (Cont'd) 

68;  Suriname,   Tanzania,  June  66; 
Tunisia,  Sept.  68;  USSR.  Aug.  66 
Amendments   (1977);   Bangladesh.    Nov. 
59;  Barbados,  Oct.   67;  China,   Dec. 
67;  Cyprus,  Sept.  68;  Denmark,  Mar. 
67;  Ethiopia,  June  66;  Gambia,  India, 
Mar.  67;  Iraq,  Nov.  59;  Jamaica,  June 
66;   Korea,   Republic  of,  July  67; 
Malta,  June  66;  Nepal,  Mar.  67;  Saudi 
Arabia,     Singapore,     Sept.     68; 
Suriname,  June  66;  Sweden,  Mar.  67; 
Tanzania,  June  66;  Tunisia.  Sept.  68; 
USSR.,  Yugoslavia,  Aug.  66 
International  maritime  traffic,  facilitation  of," 
convention  (1965),  acceptance,  Yemen, 
May  67 
International    waterborne    transportation, 
facilitation   of,    inter-American   conven- 
tion (1963):   Dominican  Republic,  Jan. 
59;  Peru,  Mar.  67 
Jurisdiction  over  vessels  utilizing  Louisiana 
offshore  oil  port,   bilateral   agreements 
with:   Liberia,   May  68;  Portugal.  Oct. 
67;  U.K..  Aug.  69 
Lake  of  the  Woods,  agreement  with  Canada 

amending  convention  (1925),  Aug.  68 
Marine  cargo  insurance,  bilateral  agreement 

with  Soviet  Union.  June  67 
Maritime  transport,  bilateral  agreement  with 
Romania,   Sept.   69,  Oct.   68  OMEGA 
navigation  system  monitoring  stations, 
agreement  with  Canada,  Mar.  68 
Red   Sea  lights,   maintenance  of,   agreement 

(1962),  acceptance.  China,  Aug.  66 
Standards  of  training,   certification,   and 
watchkeeping  for  seafarers,  convention 
(1978):  China.  Denmark.  Aug.  66 
Tonnage  measurement  of  ships,  international 
convention  (1969):  Argentina,  May  68; 
Sweden,  July  72;  Trinidad  and  Tobago, 
Yemen  Arab  Republic,  May  68 
Mark,   David  E..  key  speaker,  conference  on 

U.S. -Soviet  relations,  PR  144,  5/30 
Marriage,  consent,  minimum  age,  and  registra- 
tion, accession  to  convention  (1962).  Bar- 
bados, Nov.  59 
Martindell,  Anne  C  swearing  in  as  Ambas- 
sador to  New  Zealand  and  Western  Samoa, 
PR  188,  8/1 
Mass  media,  UNESCO  declaration  on:  Feb.  54; 

Department.  Feb.  55 
Matheron.  Richard  Cavins.  swearing  in  as  Am- 
bassador to  Swaziland.  PR  315.  1  1/30 

Mauritania: 

Ambassador  to  U.S..  credentials:  Apr.  II; 
remarks  on  presentation  of  credentials 
and  reply  by  President  Carter.  UNN, 
2/26 

Treaties,  agreements,  etc..  July  71.  Aug.  66 

Mauritius: 

Communist  presence.  Dec.  31 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc..   Mar.   67.  June 
67.  Aug.  67.  68 
Maynes.   Charles  William.   Jan.   46,  June  51, 

56.  Dec.  63 
McDonald.  Alonzo  L..  Aug.  41 


Index  1979 


17 


McGee,  Gale,  Aug.  55 

McHenry,  Donald  F..  Feb.  60.  Oct.  57.  Nov. 
3.  Dec.  50.  55 
Biographical  details,  Nov.  2 
Meehan,  Francis  Joseph,  swearing  in  as  Am- 
bassador to  Czechoslovakia,  PR  103,  4/17 
Melone,  Harry  Roberts,  swearing  in  as  Ambas- 
sador to  Rwanda,  PR  300,  1 1/19 
Meteorology: 

Atmospheric  research   sounding  rockets  and 
balloon  cooperation,  bilateral  agreement 
with  Brazil,  Mar    68 
Global  weather  experiment,  agreement  and 

protocol,  entry  into  force,  July  71 
Hurricane  monitoring  and  forecasting  pro- 
gram  for  the  Caribbean,  cooperation 
between  U.S.  and  Netherlands  Antilles, 
bilateral   agreement   with   Netherlands, 
Nov.  60 
Monsoon  experiment   (MONEX-79),   bilat- 
eral agreement  with  India,  July  72 
World  Meteorological  Organization: 

Convention  (1947),  accession,  Lesotho, 

Sept.  68 
U.S.    appropriations   request   (Maynes), 

June  61 
World  Weather  Watch  (Maynes),  Jan.  50 
Metrology,  International  Organization  of  Legal 
Metrology  convention  ( 1955),  as  amended: 
Algeria,  Nov.  60;  Ireland,  June  66 
Mexico  (Vaky),  Apr.  57 

Arid   and   semiarid   lands   management,   co- 
operative agreement  with  U.S.,  PR  44. 
2/16 
Border  sanitation  problems,  Nov.  58 
Maritime  boundary   treaty,   U.S.   ratification 

urged  (Carter),  Apr.  59 
Oil  spill  in  Bay  of  Campeche:  Krueger,  Oct 

66;  Vance,  Oct.  17 
Petroleum  production:   Mar.   62  (graph); 

Cooper,  Sept.  43 
Presidential   visits,   U.S. -Mexico,   list.   Mar. 

53 
Profile,  Mar.  55 
Textile  agreement  with  U.S.,  amendments, 

PR  61,  3/9 
Trade  (graph).  Mar.  58,  61 
Trade  with  U.S.:  Mar.  60;  Carter,  Mar.  59; 
Katz,  Oct.  42,  43;  Vaky,  Mar.  65,  Apr. 
56 
Natural  gas  agreement  with  U.S.:  Nov.  58, 
Dec.   68;  Carter,   Nov.   58;   Nimetz, 
Dec.  47;  Vance,  Oct.  17 
Oil,  natural  gas,  and  other  energy  sources: 
Mar.  61,  Nov.  57-58;  Carter,  Feb.  5, 
Mar.  33,  59,  61   (quoted),  62;  Katz, 
Oct    42,  64,  65 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Jan.  60,  Mar.  68, 
69,  Apr.  67,  69,  July  71,  73,  Aug.  68, 
Sept   67,  69,  Oct.  67,  Nov.  60,  Dec.  68 
Undocumented  workers:  Mar.  61,  Nov.  58; 
Carter,  Mar.  33,  59,  62;  Vance,  Oct.  17 
U.S. -Mexican  Consultative  Mechanism,  re- 
view. Mar.  60,  Nov.  54 
U.S. -Mixed  Commission  on  science  and 
technology  (Katz),  Oct.  64 
Meeting,  PR  152,  6/1  1 
U.S.  relations:  Carter,  Mar.  58,  62,  63,  June 
42;  Cooper,   Sept    43;  Lopez  Portillo, 


Mexico  (Cont'd) 

U.S.  relalions  (Com' it) 

Mar.  57;  Nimetz,  Dec.  47;  Vaky,  Mar. 
65;  Vance,  Nov.  15 
U.S.  visit  of  President  Lopez  Portillo:  Nov. 

57;  program,  PR  235,  9/25 
Visit  of  President  Carter:  Carter,   Feb.   5, 
Mar.  32,  33,  52,  54,  55,  56,  58;  Katz, 
Oct.  64 
Mezvinsky,  Edward  M..  Apr.  52 
Micronesia,  Sept.  57 
Miklos,  Jack  C,  Oct.  54 

Military  assistance  (see  also  Foreign  aid  and 
Security  assistance):   Carter,   Mar     22; 
Vance.  PR  89,  3/29 
Bilateral   agreements  with:   Iran,   Mar.   68. 
May   68;   Jordan,   Nov.   60;   Portugal, 
Spain,  Nov.  61 
Defense   equipment,    inutual   cooperation    in 
research,    development,    production, 
bilateral   agreements   with:   Israel,    Por- 
tugal, June  67 
Mutual  defense  treaty  with  Taiwan,  notice  of 

termination,  Feb.  65 
Security  controls  (Christopher),  Jan.  27 
Military  bases,   bilateral   agreements  with: 
Philippines,  Saudi  Arabia,  U.K.,  Mar   69 
Military   force,   special,   question  of  (Vance), 

Sept.  55 
Miller,  Bill  (Carter),  Oct.  9 
Mochtar,  Kusuniaatmaja,  Sept.  38 
Monaco,  patent  cooperation   treaty  (1970), 

ratification.  May  67 
Mondale,  Walter: 

Addresses  and  remarks: 

Arms  control,   Jan.    53   (quoted),    54-55 

(quoted),  Apr.   14 
China,   normalization  of  US     relalions, 

Feb.  21  (quoted),  22 
NATO,  Nov.  32 

Norway  and  the  Atlantic  Alliance,  Aug.  19 
Visit  of  President  Carter  to  Egypt  and  Is- 
rael, arrival  and  departure  remarks. 
May  16,  29 
Key  speaker  for  Conference  on  U.S.  Security 

and  the  Soviet  Challenge,  PR  34,  2/9 
Visits  to: 
China  (Mondale),  Oct.  10 
Northern  Europe  (Vest),  Nov.  40 
Panama,  Nov.  54 
Mondjo,  Nicolas:  Mar.  43;  remarks  on  presen- 
tation of  credentials  and  reply  by  President 
Carter,  UNN,  i/ii 
Mongolian   People's   Republic,   accession   to 
World  Intellectual  Property  Organization 
convention  (1967),  Feb.  65 
Monnet,  Jean  (quoted).  May  37 

Death  of,  PR  74.  3/16 
Monroe,  Bill,  Feb.   11,  July  65 
Monterroso  Miranda,  Felipe  Doroteo:  Apr.  58; 
remarks  on  presentation  of  credentials  and 
reply  by  President  Caner,  UNN,  2/26 
Moose,  Richard  M.,  Apr.  9,  12,  May  42,  45, 
Oct.  18,  20 
Swearing  in  as  Assistant  Secretary  of  State 
for  African  Affairs,  PR  150,  6/5 
Morocco: 

Profile,  Jan.  38 

Treaties,  agreements,  etc. ,  July  71 ,  Aug.  67, 


Morocco  (Cont'd) 

Treaties,  agreements,  etc.  (Cont'd! 

Oct.  67,  Dec.  69 
U.S.  military  aid  (Vance),  Dec.  26 
U.S.  visit  of  King  Hassan  II,  joint  statement, 

Jan.  38 
Western   Sahara  dispute:   Jan.   38;   Harrop, 
Oct.   23;  Newsom,   Dec.   29;  Saunders, 
Oct.  46,  53;  Vance,  Dec.  26 
Moroz,  Valentin,  June  16n 
Moss,  Ambler  H.,  Jr..  Apr.  64 
Mountbatten,  Lord,  death  of  (Vance),  Nov.  2 
Moynihan,  Daniel  P.  (quoted).  Jan.  48 
Mozambique:  Carter,  Apr.  6;  Moose.  Apr.  10 
Communist  military  and  technical  personnel 

(Newsom),  Dec.  29,  30,  31 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc..  Mar.  67,  Sept.  69 
Multinational  corporations:  Jan.   33,  Sept.   41; 
Christopher,   Sept.   4;   Maynes,   June   52; 
Newsom,  Jan.  32 


N 


Namibia:   Jan.    55,   Feb,   41,   May   65;  Carter, 
Feb.    1,   Mar.   28,   Apr.   6;  Jamieson,  Jan. 
21;  Maynes,  Jan.  49;  Moose,  Apr.  9,   10; 
Newsom,  Jan.  32,  PR  134,  5/17;  Nimetz, 
Dec.   46;   Vance,  Mar.   37,  42,   Nov.   2; 
Young,  Feb.  60 
Background  (McHenry),  Oct.  57 
Elections,  U.N. -supervised,  proposed:  Sept. 
58;  Barton,  Jan.  51;  Department,  Mar. 
43:  McHenry,  Feb.  61,  Oct.  57:  Moose, 
Oct.  21 
Five-power  contact   group  proposals,   key 

elements  (McHenry),  Oct.  58 
Negotiating  process  (McHenry),  Oct.  57 
Proximity  talks:  June  65;  McHenry,  Oct.  59 
Security  Council  Resolution  439,  text,  Jan. 

52 
South  Africa: 

Acceptance  of  proposals  and   subsequent 

objectives:  Carter,  Jan.   II;  McHenry 

Oct.  59,  60:  Moose,  May  45,  Oct.  21 

Role,  responsibilities:  Oct.  57;  McHenry, 

Feb.  61;  Vance,  Mar.  42 
Unilateral  election,  nullity:  June  65;  Bar- 
ton, Jan.  51,  52;  McHenry,  Feb.  60, 
Oct.  59 
South  West  Africa  People's  Organization: 
Acceptance  of  proposals:  Carter.  Jan.    11; 
McHenry,  Oct.  57,  59;  Moose,  May  45. 
Oct.  21 
Police  actions  against  (McHenry).  Feb.  61, 

Oct.  60 
Restrictions  on   force   movements,   South 
Africa  proposals  (McHenry),  Oct.  59,  60 
SWAPO-South   Africa  distrust  (McHenry), 
Oct.  58 
Soviet  position  (Shulman),  Dec.  43 
U.N.   Council  for  Namibia,  UNESCO  mem- 
bership, June  66 
U.N.  Institute  for  Namibia  (Maynes),  June  60 
U.N.  role:  Maynes,  June  57;  Young,  June  48 
U.N.    Transition   Group,    proposed:    Barton, 
Jan.   52;  Maynes,  June  51;  McHenry, 
Oct.  58;  Vance,  Mar.  40 


18 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


Nauru.  Irealies.  agreements,  elc.  May  hX.  June 

Navon.  Yitzhak,  May  22,  23 
Near  and  Middle  East  (Saunders).  Oct,  44 
Heroin  production  (Faico),  Aug.  51 
Iranian  revolution,  question  of  effect  (.Saun- 
ders), Feb.  47 
Islamic   revival:   Miklus,   Oct.   .'i4;   Saunders, 

Oct.  46.  48 
New   England    Middle   East   foreign   policy 

conference,  announcement,  PR  2().  1/23 
Pan-Arab  nationalism  (Saunders),  Oct.  46 
U.S.  Ambassadors,  list,  Nov.  46 
U.S.   efforts  to  promote  stability:   Atherton, 
May  62;  Brzezinski,   Nov.  45;  Carter, 
Mar.   22,   Apr.   4,   8;  Christopher.   Aug. 
44;  Draper,  Apr.  38;  Saunders,  June  37; 
Vance,  Mar.  39,  May  39,  41 
U.S.  interests  in  Middle  East,  announcement 
of  conferences:  Pittsburgh,  PR  8U,  3/21; 
St.  Louis,  PR  281,  10/26 
U.S.  security  assistance  (Saunders),  Oct    5(J 
Nepal  (Christopher),  Apr.  49-50,  51 

Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Feb    65,  Mar.  67, 
69,  Apr.  67 
Netherlands: 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Jan.  59,  Feb.  65, 
66,  Apr.  67,  68.  May  66.  67.  68.  June 
66,  July  71,  72,  Aug.  67,  68.  Sept.  68. 
Nov.  60.  Dec.  68 
Visit  of  Vice  President  Mondale.  Aug.   19 
New  Zealand: 

Indochinese  refugee  quota  (Talboys).  Sept.  53 
T  caties.  agreements,  etc.,  Jan.  59.  Mar.  67. 

68.  Apr.  69,  May  68,  July  71 
U.S.    Ambassador  (Martindell),   swearing   in, 

PR  188,  8/1 
U.S.   military  aid,  exemption  from  standard 
policy  controls  (Benson),  Apr.  42 
Newell,  Barbara  W.,  swearing  in  as  U.S.  Per- 
manent Representative   lo  UNESCO.   PR 
289,  11/9 
Newsom,  David  D.,  Jan,  30,  Apr.  27,  June  20, 
Dec.  29 
Foreign  policy  review,  PR  134,  5/17 
Nicaragua:   Nimetz,   Dec.   46;   Vance,   Nov.    14, 
Dec.  66 
Costa  Rica,   relations:   Grove,   Aug.   62; 
McGee,  Aug.  56;  Vaky.  Aug,  59;  Vance. 
Aug.  56 
Cuba,  involvement  in:  Carter,  Oct,  9;   Vaky, 

Aug,  59;  Vance,  Aug.  57 
Government  of  National  Reconstruction:  Nov. 
58;  Christopher,  Nov.   56;  Department. 
Aug.  62;  Vance.  Nov.   15 
Humanitarian  aid:  Christopher.  Jan    57.  Nov 
56.   57;   Department.   Aug.    61;    Vaky. 
Aug.  60;  Vance,  Nov.   15;  White  House, 
Oct    65 
Interim   government   (Urcuyo):    Department, 
Aug    61;  Vaky,  Aug.  60 

OAS  Resolution  II:  Christopher,  Aug.  58; 
Vaky,  Aug.  60;  text,  Aug    58 

Panama,  question  of  linkage  (Grove),  Aug 
62,  63 

President  Somoza:  Carter,  Oct.  9;  Christo- 
pher, Aug.  58;  Vaky,  Aug.  58,  59,  60 
Resignation  (Department),  Aug,  60 


,\iiiiraf>ua  (Com' il) 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc  .  Apr,  69.  Sept.  67. 

Nov.  60 
U.S.  Ambassador  (Pezzullo).  swearing  in.  PR 

151,  6/7 
U.S.  and  other  international  mediation  efforts: 
Mar.  60;  Carter,  Jan.  9,  11,  Feb.  1,  Mar 
28,  Oct.  9;  Christopher.  Jan.  58;  Depart- 
ment. May  66.  Aug.  60;  Grove.  Aug.  63; 
McGee.  Aug.  55;  Vaky.  Mar.  65.  Aug. 
59;   Vance.   Feb.    11.    Aug     21.   24.   56; 
Young.  Feb.  60 
Bowdler  mission  (Vance).  Aug.  24 
US.  diplomatic  relations,  resumption  (White 

House).  Oct    65 
U.S.  reduction  in  diplomatic  and  other  staff 
(Department),  May  66,  Aug.  61 
Niger: 

Communist  presence,  Dec    31 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc  ,  Jan.  60.  June  67. 
Aug.  67 
Nigeria: 

Democratic  progress:  Derian.  Jan    7;  Maynes. 

Jan.  49 
Protocol  (1978)  modifying  the   wheat  trade 

convention,  accession,  June  67 
Soviet  technicians,  presence  (Newsom),  Dec. 

30,  31 
U.S.    Ambassador  (Low),   swearing   in,   PR 

244,  10/1 
U.S.   relations:   Cooper,   Sept.   43;   Newsom, 
June  20;  Nimetz,  Dec.  47;  Vance,  Aug. 
24,  25 
Nimetz,  Matthew,  Apr.  33,  Dec.   1,  45 

Biographical  details,  Dec,  1 
Nixon,  Richard:  Oct.  63  (quoted);  Carter,  Feb.  4 
Nonintervention  (Carter),  Nov.   12 
North  Atlantic  Council: 

Ministerial   meeting,    Brussels   (Dec.    7-8, 
1978)  and  final  communique:  Jan.  23n, 
36;  Jamieson,  Jan.   22;   Vance,  Jan.  22. 
Dec.  24 
Ministerial  meeting.  The  Hague  (May  30-31. 
1979),  final  communique,  Aug.  46 
North  Atlantic  Treaty  Organization:  Feb.  43; 
Carter,  Apr.   6;  Derian.  Jan.  7;  Nimetz, 
Apr.   33;   Vance,  Jan.    12,    15,   Nov.   35; 
Vest,  Apr.  36,  Nov.  40,  43 
Atlantic  Treaty  Association,  25th  annual  as- 
sembly:  Brzezinski,   Nov.   34;  Mondale, 
Nov.  32 
Civil  emergency  planning  (NATO),  Aug.  47 
Greece,  reintegration,  proposed:  Carter,  Mar. 
26;  Christopher,  Jan.   34.  36,  Aug.  45; 
Mondale.    Aug.    21;   Nimetz.    Apr.    35; 
Vance.  Mar.  37;  Vest,  Nov.  41 
Long-Term  Defense  Program:  Carter,   Mar. 
26,  Nov.  48;  Mondale,  Aug.  20;  Vance, 
Jan.  16;  Vest,  Nov.  31 
Modernization  of  defense:  Jan.  37,  Feb.  40, 
Sept.  49;  Benson,  Apr.  46;  Carter,  Jan. 
8,  9,  Feb.  1,  June  44,  Nov.  7;  Shulman, 
Dec.  41;  Vance,  June  17,  Aug.  22,  Nov. 
35,  Dec.  22 
Noncircumvention   provision  of  SALT 
treaty,   U.S.   statement:   Aug.    36; 
Vance.  Aug.  35 
Theater  nuclear  weapons:  Sept.  49;  Christo- 
pher.  Jan.    36;   Department.   Aug.   47; 


NATO  (Cont'd) 

Mddernizatiim  of  defense  (Cont'd) 

Theater  nuclear  (Cont'd)  '. 

Mondale.   Nov.   33;  Nimetz.   Dec.  46;  ' 
Seignious,  Oct.  29;   Vance,  Jan.    16, 
Dec.  24,  27;  Vest,  Nov.  36.  37 
NATO-Warsaw  Pact  Balance  Sheet,  Apr.  3 
Norway,  importance  of  (Mondale),  Aug.  21 
SALT  II: 
U.S.   consultations:  Christopher,  Jan    35; 
NATO,   Aug.   46;  Seignious,   Oct.   29; 
Vance,  July  5;  Vest,  Nov.  37 
US.  ratification,  effect:  Carter,  Nov.  8,  13; 
Gelb,  June  24;  Seignious.  Oct.   28; 
Shulman,  Dec.  40,  41;  Vance,  Jan.  15, 
16,  Dec.  24,  27 
30th  anniversary:  Jan.   37.   Apr     1;   Brown.  PR 
93.  4/4;  Carter.  Apr.  ii;  Vance.  Apr.   I, 
PR  93,  4/4 
Turkey,   importance  of:   Benson,   Apr.  42; 
Carter.  Mar.   26;  Christopher.  Aug,  44; 
Nimetz.  Apr.  34.  Dec.  46;  Vance.  Mar. 
37,  June  17 
U.S.  policies  (Vest),  Nov.  36 
Norway: 

Ambassador  to  U.S.,  credentials,  Apr.  37 
Profile,  Aug.  20 

Treaties,  agreements,  etc..  Mar.  68,  Apr.  67, 
July  71.  72.  Aug.  66.  67.  Sept.  68.  Dec. 
67 
U.S.    visit  of  Prime   Minister  Nordli   (Vest), 

Nov.  40 
Visit  of  Vice  President  Mondale.  Aug.   19 
Notices  of  meetings: 

Advisory  Committee  of  the  U.S.  National 
Section  of  the  International  Commission 
for  the  Conservation  of  Atlantic  Tunas, 
PR  45,  2/21;  PR  246,  10/3 
Advisory  Committee  of  the  U.S.  National 
Section  of  the  Inter-American  Tropical 
Tuna  Commission.  PR  212.  9/4 
Advisory  Committee  on  Historical  Diplomatic  ■ 

Documentation.  PR  247.  10/3 
Advisory  Committee  on  International  Intel- 
lectual Properly: 
International  Copyright  Panel,  PR  126,  5/10 
International  Industrial  Property  Panel,  PR 
296,  11/9 
Advisory  Committee  on  International  Invest- 
ment, Technology,  and  Development,  PR 
198,  8/17 
Working  group  on  accounting  standards,  PR 

112,  4/27 
Study  Group  on  restrictive  business  prac- 
tices, PR  231,  9/20 
Working  group  on  transborder  data  flows, 
PR  3.  1/3;  PR  47.  2/23;  PR  106.  4/20; 
PR  199.  8/17 
Working  group  on  transfer  of  technology, 

PR  4.  1/3;  PR  231.  9/20 
Working  group  on  UN/OECD  investment 
undertakings.  PR  4.  1/3;  PR  42.  2/16; 
PR  78,  3/20;  PR  316.  12/3 
Advisory  Committee  on  the  Law  of  the  Sea, 
partially  closed  meeting,  PR  21,  1/23;  PR  ' 
118,  5/3 
Advisory  Committee  on  the  1979  World  Radio 
Administrative  Conference,  PR  57,  3/2; 


Index  1979 


19 


Notiifs  i>f  nwctings  (Cont'd) 

Advisory  Comm.  on  World  Radio  (Cont'd) 

PR  193.  8/10 
Advisory  Committee  on  Oceans  and  Interna- 
tional  Environmental   and   Scientific   Af- 
fairs,  partially   closed   meeting,   PR    12. 
1/11 
Antarctic  Section,  partially  closed  meeting. 

PR  128.  5/11;  PR  320.  12/7 
Fisheries  and  Marine  Science  and  Technol- 
ogy Sections,  partially  closed  meeting, 
PR  225,  9/14 
General  Panel,  PR  330.  12/26 
Advisory  Committee   to  U.S.   Section.   Inter- 
national North  Pacific  Fisheries  Commis- 
sion, PR  263,  10/12 
Fine  Arts  Commiltee,  PR  72,   3/13;  PR  319, 

12/7 
Overseas  Schools  Advisory  Council.  PR  100, 

4/16;  PR  262.  10/12 
Secretary  of  State's  Advisory  Committee  on 
Private  International  Law.  PR  273,  10/18 
Ad  hoc  study  group  on  the  second  inter- 
American   specialized   conference  on 
private  international  law,  PR  35,  2/13 
Study   group  on   international  child   abduc- 
tion. PR  332.  12/28 
Study  group  on  international  child  abduc- 
tion by  one  parent.  PR  221,  9/13 
Study  group  on  maritime  law  matters.  PR 

55,  2/28 
Subgroup  on   recognition   and   enforcement 
of  foreign  judgments,  PR  95,  4/1 1 
Shipping   Coordinating   Committee;   PR   66, 
3/12;  PR  69.  3/12;  PR  86.  3/29;  PR  101. 
4/16;  PR   135.  5/18;  PR  219.  9/11;  PR 
239.  7/27 
Commiltee  on  Ocean  Dumping,  PR  92,  4/4; 

PR  222,  9/12 
National  Committee   for  the   Prevention  of 
Manne   Pollution,   PR    102,   4/16;   PR 
240,  7/27 
Subcommittee  on  SOLAS: 

Working  group  on  bulk  chemicals.  PR 

68.  3/12;  PR  195.  8/13 
Working  group  on  carriage  of  dangerous 

goods.  PR  85.  3/29;  PR  139.  5/21 
Working  group  on  fire  protection.  PR  41, 

2/16;  PR  253,  10/4 
Working   group   on    international   mul- 
timodal transport  and  containers,  PR 
18.  1/17 
Working  group  on  lifesaving  appliances, 

PR  178.  7/26 
Working  group  on  radiocommunications. 
PR  16.  1/17;  PR  43.  2/16;  PR  107. 
4/20;  PR   142.  5/28;  PR  202,  8/17; 
PR  252.  10/4 
Working  group  on  safety  of  fishing  ves- 
sels, PR  67,  3/12 
Working  group  on  safety  of  navigation, 

PR  184,  7/31 
Working  group  on  ship  design  and 
equipmem,  PR  1,  1/2;  PR  109,  4/25; 
PR  179,  7/26 
Working  group  on  standards  of  training 
and  walchkeeping,  PR  79.  3/20;  PR 
121,  5/4;  PR  232.  9/20 


Notice  of  meetings  (Cont'd) 
Shipping  Coord.  Comm.  (Cont'd) 
Subcommittee  on  SOLAS  (Cont'd) 

Working  group  on  subdivision  and  stabil- 
ity. PR  203.  8/17 
Panel  on  bulk  cargoes.  PR  26.  2/2;  PR 
206,  8/23 
Working  group  on   subdivision,   stability 
and  loadlines,  PR  51,  2/28;  PR  130. 
5/15 
US,  National  Committee  for  the  International 
Radio  Consultative  Committee  (CCIR): 
Study  group  CMTT,  PR  272,  10/18 
Study  group  I.  PR  17.  1/17;  PR  137,  5/18; 
PR  197,  8/15;  PR  302.  11/19;  PR  325. 
12/13 
Study  group  2.  PR  8.   1/5;  PR  271.   10/18; 

PR  327,  12/19 
Study  group  4.  PR  136.  5/18;PR328.  12/19 
Study  group  5.  PR  48.  2/26;  PR  125.  5/10; 

PR  261.  10/11;  PR  295,  11/9 
Study  group  6.  PR  10.  1/15;  PR  131.  5/15; 

PR  230.  9/20 
Study  group  7,  PR  91 ,  4/4;  PR  192,  8/9;  PR 

245,  10/3 
Study  group  9,  PR  73,  3/16 
U.S.  National  Committee  of  the  International 
Telegraph   and   Telephone   Consultative 
Committee  (CCITT): 
National  Committee.  PR  21 1.  8/29 
Study  group  A.   PR  304.    11/21;  PR  333. 

12/28 
Study  group  1.  PR  7.  1/5;  PR  28,  2/5;  PR 
71,  3/12;  PR  87,  3/29;  PR  148,  5/4;  PR 
162,  7/5;  PR  205,  8/22;  PR  251,  10/4 
Study  group  2.  PR  186.  8/1 
Study  group  4,  PR  70,  3/12;  PR   122,  5/4; 
PR  187,  8/1 
Novira,  Hedi,  Feb.  48 

Nuclear  energy,   peaceful  uses:  Christopher, 
Sept.  40;  Fisher.  Jan.  54;  Vance.  Nov.  3 
Bilateral  agreement  with  Australia:   Aug.   68; 

Carter,  Nov.  49 
International  Nuclear  Fuel  Cycle  Evaluation: 
Carter.  Mar.   27-28.  June  43;  Nye.  Jan. 
41.  44;  Vance.  Nov.  2;  Vest,  Nov.  38 
Liquid   metal-cooled   fast  breeder  reactors. 

bilateral  agreement  with  Japan,  May  68 
Nuclear   cooperation    with:    Bangladesh 
(Christopher).    Nov.    49.    50;    Brazil 
(Ruser),  Sept  4;  European  Community 
(Vest),   Nov.    38;   Japan,   Aug.    39; 
Mexico.  Mar.  61 
Physical  protection  of  nuclear  material,  con- 
vention (1979).  Dec.  67 
Reprocessing  of  U.S. -origin  nuclear  material: 
Bilateral  agreement  with  Japan,  Dec.  68 
U.S.  policy  (Nye),  Jan.  44 
Safety  considerations  (Lake),  Nov.  28 
Safety   matters,   exchange  of  technical   infor- 
mation  and   cooperation   in,    bilateral 
agreement  with  Greece,  Jan.  60 
Spent  fuel  storage  (Nye).  Jan.  42,  45 
U.S.  sales  policy  (Christopher),  Jan.  27,  28 
Nuclear  nonproliferalion:  June  33,  July  56,  Aug. 
39;  Brzezinski.   Feb.    19;  Carter,  Feb.    1, 
July  2;  Christopher,  Jan.  28;  Cooper,  June 
33;  Lake,  Nov.  28,  29;  Nye,  Jan.  39;  Saun- 


Nuclear  nonproliferution  (Cont'd) 

ders.  Oct.  46.  50;  Vance.  Jan.  13.  Mar.  35, 
39,  June  18.  Sept.  7.  Nov.  2.  Dec.  23 
Nuclear  Nonproliferation  Act  of  1978:  Carter, 

Mar.  27,  Aug.  53;  Nye,  Jan.  41,  44 
Treaty   (1968):   Sept.   57;  Carter,   June    12; 
Seignious,  Sept.   20,  Oct.   29;   Vance, 
Aug.  37,  Sept.  54,  Nov.  3,  Dec.  24 
Current  actions:   Bangladesh,  Department, 
Nov.    59,   Christopher,    Nov,    59;   In- 
donesia,  Aug.   66;  Sri  Lanka,  Tuvalu, 
Apr,  67;  Yemen  (Aden),  Sept,  68 
Review  conference,    1980:  July  56;  Fisher, 
Jan.    54;   Pearson,    Feb,    56;    Vance, 
Aug.  37,  Nov.  3 
Nuclear  test  ban  treaty  (1963):  Carter,  June  12 

Accession,  Yemen  (Aden),  Sept,  68 
Nuclear  testing: 

Comprehensive   test   ban   treaty   with  Soviet 
Union,  proposed:  Feb,  40,  July  5b,  Sept 
57;  Carter,   Mar,   27,  31;  Christopher, 
Nov.  49;  Fisher,  Jan.   54;  Pearson,  Feb. 
56;  Seignious,  Sept,   21;  Shulman,  Dec. 
41;  Vance,  Jan.  16,  Aug,  36,  Nov,  2 
South  Africa,  question  of  (Vance),  Dec.   23, 
24 
Nuclear  war,  dangers  of:  Brown,  July  68;  Car- 
ter, July   1,  54,  Nov,    12;  Seignious,  Oct, 
28,  29;  Shulman,  Dec,  41;  Vance,  July  67, 
68,  Aug,  33,  Sept.  9 
Nuclear  weapons: 

Eliinination,  goal:  July  55;  Carter,  Aug,   18 
First  use,   principle:   Fisher,  Jan,   53;   Vance, 

Nov,  3 
Seabed  disarmament  treaty  (1971),  ratifica- 
tion. Yemen  (Aden),  Sept,  68 
Nye,  Joseph  S,,  Jr,,  Jan,  39,  44 


o 


Oakley,  Robert  B,,  Oct.  39 

Swearing  in  as  Ambassador  to  Zaire,  PR 
303,  11/20 
Obando  y  Bravo,  Archbishop  (quoted),  Jan.  58 
Oceans,  world,  cooperation  in  studies  of,  bilat- 
eral agreement  with  Soviet  Union,  Apr.  69 
Ohira,  Masayoshi,  Aug,  2,  II,  37 
Oil  pollution  (Lake),  Nov.  28 

Civil   liability  for  oil  pollution  damage,   in- 
ternational  convention   (1969):    Italy, 
May  67;  Republic  of  Korea.  Mar.  67 
International   fund   for  compensation   for  oil 
pollution  damage,  international  conven- 
tion (1971),  accession,  Italy,  May  67 
Intervention  on  the  high  seas  in  cases  of  oil 
pollution  casualties,   international  con- 
vention (1969):  German  Democratic  Re- 
public, Mar.  67;  Italy,  Yemen  Arab  Re- 
public, May  67 
Prevention  of  pollution  of  the  sea  by  oil.  in- 
ternational convention  (1954).  accept- 
ance, Yemen  Arab  Republic,  May  67 
Amendments  (1969),  acceptance.  Yemen 

Arab  Republic,  May  67 
Amendments  (1971)  concerning'  tank  ar- 
rangements and   limitation   of  tank 
size,  acceptance,  Uruguay,  July  72 


20 


Oil  pollurioii  (Cdiu'iI) 

Prevention  of  sea  (Cont'd) 

Amendments  re  protection  of  Great  Barrier 
Reef  (1971):    Bahamas,   German 
Democratic   Republic.    Apr.    67; 
Uruguay.  July  72 
Organization   for   Economic   Cooperation   ami 
Development  (Hormats).  Dec.  59 
Drug   control   programs,   proposed   (Christo- 
pher). Sept.  42 
Ministerial    meeting,    Paris  (Christopher). 

Sept.  39 
Multinational  corporation  guidelines,  review 
of,  Jan.  33,  Sept.  41 
Organization  of  African   Unity:    Brzezinski. 
Feb.    19;  Moose.   Apr.    12;  Newsiim.   Dec. 
29,  31;  Vance.  June  18 
Monrovia  summit  meeting:  Harrop.  Oct.  23; 
Moose,  Oct    18 
Organization  of  American  States:  Carter,  Apr, 
57;  Derian,  Jan.  7;  Vaky,  Apr.  61;  Vance, 
June  18,  Nov.  14 
Charter  (1948)  and  Protocol  of  Buenos  Aires 
(1967),  current  actions:  Dominica,  St 
Lucia,  Aug.  66 
General    Assembly,    ninth   regular   session 

(Vance).  Dec.  65 
Ministers  of  Foreign  Affairs.    17th  meeting. 
Resolution  II  re  Nicaragua,  text,   Aug. 
58 
Nicaragua  mediation.   See  Nicaragua:   U.S. 
and  other  international  mediation  efforts 
U.S.    appropriations   request   FY    1980 
(Maynes).  June  56.  61 
Organization  of  Petroleum  Exporting  Coun- 
tries: Newsom,  Jan.  30,  Apr.  28;  Vance. 
Apr.  31,  May  33 
Oil   prices.    See  under  Energy   sources  and 

problems 
Retaliatory   action   against,    proposed 

(Cooper).  Sept.  43 
UNRWA  contributions  (Maynes).  June  61 
World  economy,  role:  Christopher,  Sept.  40; 
Cooper.  Sept.   43;  McHenry,   Dec.   56; 
Saunders.  Oct.  45.  50 
Ortiz.  Frank  V..  swearing  in  as  Ambassador  to 

Guatemala.  PR  170,  7/12 
Overseas  Private  Investment  Corporation:  Feb. 
27;  Carter,  Jan.  26;  Vance.  Feb.  16;  While 
House.  June  25 
Owens.  Henry  D.,  Dec.  In 


Pacific  Islands,  Trust  Territory  of  the,  Sept.  57 
Pakistan:  Brzezinski,  Feb.  19;  Christopher,  Apr. 
48,  50;  Faico,  Aug.  51;  Miklos,  Oct.  54, 
55;  Saunders,  Oct.  46;  Vance,  Mar.  39 
Ambassador  to  U.S.:  Apr.  51;  remarks  on  pre- 
sentation of  credentials   and   reply   by 
President  Carter,  UNN  2/26 
Nuclear-weapons  capability:  Miklos,  Oct.  56; 

Vance,  Sept.  54 
Textile  agreements  with  U.S.,  amendments. 
Oct.  67,  PR  210,  8/28;  PR  213.  9/4;  PR 
308,  11/28 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Jan.  60,  Mar    69, 
June  67,  Aug.  67,  68.  Oct.  67 


Palmieri.  Victor  H..  appointment  as  U.S.  Coor- 
dinator for  Refugee  Affairs.  PR  317.  12/5 
Panama: 

Ambassador  to  U.S..  credentials,  Apr.  58 

Canal  treaties;  Aug.  61,  Dec.  69;  Brzezinski, 

Feb.  19:  Carter,  Feb.  I,  Mar.  59;  Nimetz, 

Dec.  46;  Vance.  June  18.  Nov.   15.  Dec. 

65 

Related  agreements:  Christopher,   Apr.   63; 

Department,  Apr.  65;  Moss,  Apr.  65 
U.S.  implementing  legislation:  Carter,  Mar. 
28,   Apr.    63;   Christopher.   Apr.    62; 
Moss.  Apr.  64;  Vaky.  Mar.  66;  White 
House.  Aug.  65 
Signature  (Carter).  Nov,  55 
Canal  Zone: 

Acquisition  of  jurisdiction  (Mondale).  Nov. 

54 
Termination   of  related   bilateral    treaties. 
1904  to  1960,  Nov.  60 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Feb.  65,  Mar.  69, 
Apr.  68,  69,  May  67,  June  66,  Aug    67, 
Sept.  67,  Nov.  60,  Dec.  69 
U.S.  aid  (Vaky),  Apr.  61 
Papua  New  Guinea: 

Air  transport  agreement  with  U.S..  Dec.  69 
U.S.  Ambassador  (Feldinan).  swearing  in.  PR 
217.  9/5 
Paraguay: 

Human  rights  (Vaky).  Apr.  60 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc..  Jan.  59.  May  67. 
Aug.  67.  Sept.  67 
Park  Chung  Hee.  Aug    14 
Patents: 

Patent  classification,  international.  Strasbourg 
agreement   (1971).   ratification.    Italy. 
June  66 
Patent  cooperation   treaty  (1970):   Austria. 
Mar.  67;  Monaco,  May  67;  Netherlands. 
June  66;  Norway.   Dec     67;  Romania. 
July  71 
Plants,  international  convention  for  protection 
of  new  varieties  (1961).  as  revised:  Jan. 
59;  Belgium.   Denmark,   France,  Ger- 
many,  Federal   Republic  of.    Italy, 
Netherlands,  South  Africa,  Switzerland, 
U.K.,  U.S.,  Feb.  65 
Reciprocal  granting  and  protection  of  the  right 
of  priority  on  patents,  bilateral  agreement 
with  Korea.  Jan.  60 
Paz.  Oclavio  (quoted).  Mar.  58 
Peacock.  Andrew.  Sept.  53 
Pearson.  James  P..  Feb.  55 

Pelletreau.   Robert   H..   swearing   in  as  Ambas- 
sador to  Bahrain,  PR  54,  2/26 
Peres,  Shimon  (quoted),  Nov.  46 
Perez  Chiriboga,  Marcial,  Oct.  63 
Perry,  Jack  Richard,  swearing  in  as  Ambassador 

to  Bulgaria,  PR  255,  10/5 
Peru;  Derian,  Jan.   7;  FaIco,   Aug,   54;   Vaky, 
Apr.  61;  Vance,  Mar.  36,  Nov.  14 
Ambassador  to  U.S.:  Oct.  63;  remarks  on  pf-^ 
sentation  of  credentials  and  reply   yj 
President  Carter,  UNN,  3/30 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc..  Mar.  67,  Apr.  67. 
69.  May  66,  68.  June  66.  July  72.  Aug. 
67,  68,  Sept.  67,  69,  Nov.  59,  60 
Petree,  Richard  W.,  June  64,  Dec.  57 
Pezzullo,  Lawrence  A.,  swearing  in  as  Ambas- 


Departmcnt  tit  State  Bulletin 

I' 


I 


Pezzullo.  Lawrence  (Cont'd) 

sador  to  Nicaragua,  PR  151,  6/7 
Philippines:  ' 

Indochinese  refugees  (Young,  H).  Dec.  15 
Processing  center:  Oct.  8;  Mondale.  Oct.  3; 
Vance.  Oct.  5;  Young.  H.,  Dec.  16 
Textile  agreement   with   U.S..   amendments, 

PR  226.  9/19 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc..  Mar    69.  Oct.  67, 

Nov.  61.  Dec.  69 
UNICEF  educational  program  (Vance).  Mar. 

37 
U.S.  economic  security  assistance:  Apr.    18; 
Benson.  Apr.   43.  47;  Holbrooke.   Apr. 
20.  23 
U.S.  military  bases  agreement:  Apr.  26;  Ben- 
son. Apr.  47;  Carter,  Mar.  26,  Apr.  22; 
Holbrooke,  Apr.    17,   19,  21;  Newsom, 
Apr.  27;  Vance,  Feb.  16 
Phonograms,   protection  against   unauthorized 
duplication,   convention  (1961);   El   Sal- 
vador, Paraguay,  Jan.  59 
Pickering.  Thomas  R  .  June  7 
Poland: 

Textile  agreement   with   U.S..   amendments, 

PR  269.  10/18 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc..  Jan.  59.  Mar.  67, 
Apr.   69.   May  67.  June  66.  Sept.  68, 
Nov.  61 
U.S.  relations  (Vest),  Nov.  42 
Political  asylum,  right  of  (Young.  H).  Dec.  13 
Political  prisoners; 

Releases  of:  Carter.  Mar.  29;  Derian.  Jan.  7; 

Vaky.  Mar.  66.  Apr.  59 
Trade  unionists  (Mezvinsky).  Apr.  56 
Pope  John  Paul  II  (quoted).  Aug.  57 

Visit   to  U.S.:   Mondale.   Nov.   34;  White 
House,  Dec.  42 
Population  growth  and  problems:  Lake,   Nov. 
27.  30;  Vance.  Mar.  38,  Nov.  5:  Young, 
Sept.  66 
U.S.  Coordinator  of  Population  Affairs  (Ben- 
edick), swearing  in.  PR  9U.  4/4 
Portugal  (Vance).  Jan.   14 

Azores  facilities.   U.S.   use  of,   bilateral 
agreement:   Aug.   68;  Carter,   Mar.   26; 
Vest.  Apr.  36 
European  Community   membership,  proposed 

(Vest).  Nov.  38 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Jan.  59,  60,  Feb, 
65,  Apr.  67,  June  66,  67,  July  72,  Aug. 
68,  Oct.  67,  Nov.  61 
U.S.  relations  (Vest),  Nov.  40 
U.S.  security  assistance:  Benson,  Apr   43.  46; 
Vest,  Apr.  36 
Postal  matters: 

International  express  mail  agreement  with  de- 
tailed regulations:  Bermuda,  Canada, 
Oct.  67;  China  (Taiwan),  Mar.  68;  Hong 
Kong,  May  68;  Singapore,  Mar.  69; 
U.K.,  Mar.  69.  70 
International  express/data  post  agreement  with 
Federal  Republic  of  Germany.  Apr.  68, 
Oct.  67 
Money  orders  and  postal  travelers'  checks, 
agreement  (1974):  Finland,  Madagascar, 
Aug.  67;  Upper  Volta,  Dec.  67; 
Uruguay.  Aug.  67;  Yemen  (Aden).  Dec. 
67 


Index  1979 


21 


Postal  matters  (Cnnt'ii) 
Parcel   post   agreement   with  detailed   regula- 
tions: German  Democratic  Republic.  July 
72,  Oct.  67;  Hungary.  Aug.  68 
Postal  Union  of  the  Americas  and  Spain: 
Constitution,   additional  protocol  (1976): 

Argentina,  June  66;  U.S.,  Apr.  67 
Money  order  agreement  and  final  protocol 
(1976):  Argentina,  June  66;  U.S..  Apr. 
67 
Parcel  post  agreement,  final  protocol,  and 
detailed  regulations  (1976):  Argentina, 
June  66;  U.S..  Apr.  67 
Universal  Postal   Union,  Constitution  with 
final    protocol    (1964):    Paraguay, 
Uruguay,  Aug.  67 
Protocol   (1969):   Botswana,   Colombia, 
Congo,   Paraguay,   Peru,   Turkey, 
Uganda,  Uruguay,  Aug.  67 
Second  additional  protocol  (1974):  Afghani- 
stan.   Bhutan,    Dec.    67;   Botswana, 
Brazil.  Congo,  Ethiopia,  Finland,  Aug. 
67;  Guatemala,  Dec.  67;  Ireland,  Aug. 
67;  Kenya,  Dec.  67;  Madagascar,  Aug. 
67;  Mali,   Dee.   67;  Paraguay,  Peru, 
Trinidad  and  Tobago,  Uganda,  United 
Arab  Emirates,  Aug.  67;  Upper  Volla, 
Dec.   67;   Uruguay,   Aug.   67;   Ven- 
ezuela. Yemen  (Aden),  Dec.  67 
Proclamations  by  the  President: 

Bill  of  Rights  Day.   Human  Rights  Day  and 

Week  (4609).  Jan.  3 
NATO  30th  Anniversary  (4646),  Apr.  ii 
Pan  American  Day  and  Week,   1979  (4644), 

Apr.  57 
Trade  agreement  with  China  (4697),  Dec    33 
United  Nations  Day  1979  (4684),  Nov.  ii 
World  Trade  Week  (4654),  June  28 
Publications: 

Commerce   Department,    Doing   Business  in 

China,  released.  Mar.   12 
Congressional  documents,  lists,  June  70 
Government  Printing  Office,  sales,  lists,  Jan 
62,  Feb.  28,  44,  49,  Mar.  63,  Apr,   13, 
37,  May  15,  June  21,  70,  July  75,  Aug. 
45,  47,  70,  Sept.  52,  Oct.  70.  Nov.  43. 
Dec.  39,  54,  70 
International  Center  for  Registration  of  Serial 
Publications,  statutes:  Norway,  Mar.  68; 
Sweden,  Dec.  67;  Switzerland,  Mar.  68 
State  Department: 

Department  of  State  Bulletin,   40th  anniver- 
sary (Vance),  July  ii 
Notes,  July  iv 
Foreign  Relations  of  the   United  Slates, 
1949,    volume    VIII,    The  Far  East: 
China,  released,  Jan.  62 
Foreign   Relations  of  the   United  States, 
1952-1954,    volume  III,    United  Na- 
tions Affairs,  released,  Oct.  69 
International  Relations  Dictionary,    re- 
leased, Oct.  69 
Press  releases,  lists,  Jan.  61.  Feb.  66,  Mar 
70,  Apr.  70,  May  70,  June  68,  July  73, 
Aug.  70,  Sept.  70,  Oct.  68.  Nov.  62, 
Dec.  69 
Selected  Documents  No.  9,    "U.S.   Policy 
Toward  China  July  15,  1971-Jan.   15, 
1979,"  Mar.   II 


Publications  (Cont'd) 

State  Department  (Cont'd) 

Women  in  the  Department  of  State:  Their 
Role  in  American   Foreign  Affairs, 
released,  PR  31,  2/7 
U.S. U.N.  press  releases,  lists.  Jan.  61.  Feb. 
66,  June  68.  Aug,  70,  Oct.  69 


Quainton.  Anthony.  C.  E..  Sept.  60 


Racial  discrimination  (Newsom),  June  20 
Apartheid:  Jan.  55,  Feb.  49;  Lake,  Jan,    18; 
Leonard,   Feb,   61;   Moose,  Oct.   21; 
Vance.  Mar,  43;  Young.  Feb.  59 
International  convention  (1965),  on  elimina- 
tion of,  Jan.  4 
Current  actions:   Bangladesh,   Aug.   67; 
Cape  Verde,  Nov.  60;  Gambia,  Israel, 
Korea,  Mar.  68 
U.S.   ratification   urged:   Carter.  Jan     I; 
Vance,  Jan,  2 
UNESCO   Declaration  on   Race   and   Racial 
Prejudice  (Maynes).  June  53 
Rawls.  Nancy  V..  swearing  in  as  Ambassador 

to  Ivory  Coast.  PR  329,  12/20 
Refugees:   Carter,  Jan,    1;    Vance,   Mar.    37; 
White  House,  Dec.  42 
Afghan  (Saunders),  Dec.  54 
African:  Clark,  Oct,  7;  Young,  H.,  Dec,   12 
Cuban,    1960   and   later:    Vance,    Mar.   41; 

Young,  H  ,  Dec.  14 
Eastern  Europe  and  Soviet  Linion  (Clark). 

Oct    7 
Evian  conference.  1938:  Mondale,  Oct.  I,  3; 

Young,  H.,  Dec,  I  I 
First-asylum,  principle  of  (Vance),  Sept.  38. 

39,  54 
Haitian,   in   southern   Florida  (Vance),   Dec, 

24 
Historic  review  (Young,  H).  Dec.   II 
Indochinese: 

ASEAN  position:  Mochtar,  Sept.  38; 
Vance,  Sept.  35,  38.  Oct.  4;  Young. 
H.,  Dec.  16 
Boat  people:  Derian,  Jan.  7;  Holbrooke. 
Oct.  35;  Rithauddeen,  Sept.  39; 
Vance,  Aug,  24;  Young,  H,,  Dec.  14. 
15 
U.S.   rescue  directives:  Oct.   2;   Vance. 

Oct.  6;  Young,  H.,  Dec.  16 
Laotian:   Dec.   9;  Mezvinsky,   Apr.   53; 

Nimetz,  Dec.  2;  Young,  H.,  Dec.  14 
1975-1979  review  (Young,  H.),  Dec.  14 
Processing  centers:  Aug.  38,  Oct.  8;  Mon- 
dale, Oct.  3;  Vance,  Sept    35,  Oct.  5 
Young,  H.,  Dec.  16 
Refugee  Act  of   1979:   Nimetz,  Dec.   3 

Young,  H.,  Dec.   16 
Tokyo  summit:  Aug,  16;  Carter.  Aug.  4,  9 
Ohira,  Aug.  3;  Young.  H  ,  Dec.   16 
Statement,  text,  Aug.  5 
U.N.  pledging  conference:  Aug.  5,  Oct.  8 
Derian,  Jan.   7;   Maynes,   June  52 


Refugees  (Cont'd) 

Indochinese  (Cont'd) 

U.N.  pledging  conference  (Cont'd) 

Mondale.  Oct.  1,  12;  Nimetz,  Dec.  1, 
2;  Petree,  June  64;  Vance,  Sept.  37, 
Oct,  5.  Dec.  10,  25,  27;  White  House. 
Oct.  60;  Young,  H.,  Dec.  16 
U.S.  and  other  relief  efforts:   Aug.   38, 
Sept.  57,  Oct.  ii,  3;  Carter,  Mar.  29. 
Aug.  4.  9,  Dec.  4,  7;  Clark,  Oct.  7; 
Danforth.    Dec.    7;   Derian,   Jan.    7; 
Holbrooke.   Apr.    19.  Oct.   35;  Mon- 
dale.  Oct.    2;   Newsom,   Apr.    29; 
Nimetz,  Dec.   2;  Peacock,  Sept.   53; 
Sasser.   Dec,   6;  Talboys,  Sept.   53; 
Vance,   Mar,   41,   Sept,    35,   38,   53, 
Oct,   4.   Dec,    10.   PR    110.   4/26;   PR 
176.  7/26;  Young.  H..  Dec,   14.  16 
U.S.    Counselor  and   Acting   U.S.    Coor- 
dinator for  Refugee  Affairs  (Nimetz). 
Dec    I 
US    Senators  humanitarian  mission:  Dec. 
7;  Baucus,  Dec.  5;  Danforth,  Dec.  4; 
Sasser,  Dec,  4 
Vietnamese:  Oct.   I;  Holbrooke,  Apr.   17; 
Nimetz,   Dec.   2;   Vance,   Aug,    24, 
Sept.  56;  Young.  H.,  Dec.  14 
Vietnamese  responsibility:   Mondale.  Oct. 
2;   Peacock.   Sept.   53.   54;   Vance, 
Aug.   24,  Sept.   35,  37,   38.  54,  55. 
Dec.  25 
Joint  communique,  Sept.  57 
Middle  East  (Atherton),  May  63 
Status  of,   convention   (1951):   Dec.    13; 
Young,  H.,  Dec.  12 
Protocol  (1967):  Young,  H.  Dec,  12 
Succession.  Suriname.  Jan,  59 
U.S.   Coordinator   for  Refugee   Affairs 

(Clark):  Oct.  7.  8;  Young  H..  Dec,   16 
US.   Coordinator  for  Refugee   Affairs  (Pal- 

mieri),  appointment,  PR  317.  12/5 
World  Refugee  Year,  Dec.  15 
Zairian  (Moose),  May  43,  44 
Regional  security:   Carter.  June    13;   Nimetz. 
Dec.  46;  Vance.  June  17,  Sept.  7.  8.  Nov. 
16.  Dec.  23 
Reinhardt,  John  E.,  Feb.  50 
Reis.  Herbert  K..  Dec.  59 
Reslon.  Tom  (Vance),  Feb.  9 
Ribicoff,   Abraham  A,,  Jan,   50.   Feb.   62.  63 

(quoted) 
Richardson,  Elliot  L.,  June  41.  Nov.  50 

USS  Samuel  E.  Morison  (FFG  13).  remarks 
at  launching.  PR  171.  7/13  Rithauddeen. 
Tengku  Ahmad,  Sept.  39 
Roberts,  George  B.,  Jr..  swearing  in  as  Am- 
bassador to  Guyana.  PR  276,  10/22 
Romania: 
Textile  agreements  with  U.S.,  amendments, 
Oct.   68,  Nov.   61,  PR  293,   11/5;  PR 
297,  11/13 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Feb.  66,  Apr.  68, 
May  68.  July  71,  Aug.  67,  Sept.  68,  69, 
Oct.  68,  Nov    61 
U.S.  relations:  Christopher,  Jan.  35;  Vance, 
Jan.   18;  Vest.  Nov.  42 
Roosevelt,  Eleanor  (quoted),  Jan.   I 
Roosevelt,  Franklin  (quoted).  Mar.  3.  Oct.   12 
Rowan,  Carl  T.,  Feb.  11 


22 


Rowan.  Ford.  July  65 

Rubber  agreement   negollalions:   Carter.   Mar. 

29;  Vance.  Sept.  36;  Young.  Sept.  66 
Ruser.  Claus  W..  Sept.  4 
Rwanda: 
Communist  presence.  Dec.  31 
U.S.  Ambassador  (Melove).  swearing  in.  PR 
300.  11/19 


Sadat,  Anwar  al-:  May    1.    16.    18,   19;  Carter. 

May  20 
Safety  at  sea: 

International  regulations  for  preventing  col- 
lisions at  sea.  convention  (1972):  Italy. 
Apr.   67;  Jamaica.   June  65;   Kuwait, 
Aug.   66;  Panama.   May  67;  Senegal. 
Jan.   59;  Trinidad  and  Tobago.   Yemen 
Arab  Republic,  May  67 
Safety  of  life  a(  sea,  international  convention 
(  I960).   Iraq,   May  67 
Amendments:  India,   Romania.  Singapore. 
Apr.  68 
Safety  of  life  at  sea.  international  convention 
(1974):    Bahamas.    Apr.    68;   Gerinan 
Democratic   Republic,   May  67;  Ger- 
many, Federal  Republic  of,  June  66;  Is- 
rael, Romania,   Aug.   67;  Trinidad  and 
Tobago,   Apr.   68;  Uruguay,  July  72; 
Yemen  Arab  Republic,  May  67;  Yugo- 
slavia, Aug.  67 
Protocol  (1978):  Bahamas,  France,  Federal 
Republic    of   Germany.    May   67; 
Liberia.    Mar.    68;   Netherlands.   Po- 
land. Sweden,  May  67;  Uruguay.  July 
72 
Sallah.  Ousman  Ahmadou.  credentials,  Oct.  20 
Sao  Tome  and  Principe: 

Communist  presence,  Dec    31 
Environmental  modification,  prohibitions  of 
military   or  other   hostile   use,   conven- 
tion, accession,  Nov.  59 
St.  Lucia,  treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  July  72, 

Aug.  66.  Nov.  60 
San  Marino,   treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Jan. 

60.  July  71 
Sasser.  James  R..  Dec.  4 
Satellites: 

Communications  satellites  (Reinhardt).  Feb. 

52.  53 
Direct  television  broadcasting.  Jan.  56 
Educational   broadcasting   in   reinote   rural 
areas,  proposed  development  of  interna- 
tional system  (Hesburgh),  Nov.  52 
International  Maritime  Satellite  Organization 
(INMARSAT),  convention  (1976): 
Current   actions:   Australia,   May  67;   Bul- 
garia.  Sept     68;   Byelorussian   Soviet 
Socialist  Republic.  June  66;  Canada, 
Denmark,   Finland,   Aug.   67;  France 
(with  reservation),  July  72;  Germany, 
Federal    Republic   of,    Aug.    67; 
Netherlands.   Poland.   Singapore, 
Sept     68;  Soviet   Union,  June  66; 
Sweden,  Sept.   68;  Ukrainian  Soviet 
Socialist  Republic,  June  66;  U.K., 
July  72;  U.S.,  Apr.  68 
Operating  agreement  (1976): 


Satellites  (Cont'd) 
INMARSAT  iC(intd) 

Operating  agreement  (Cnnt'tl) 

Current   actions:    Bulgaria,    Aug.    67; 
Byelorussian  Soviet  Socialist   Re- 
public, June  66;  Canada,  Denmark, 
Finland.  Germany.  Federal  Repub- 
lic of,  Aug.  67;  Greece,  Singapore, 
Sweden,  Sept.  68;  U.K.,  Ukrainian 
Soviet  Socialist  Republic.  June  66; 
U.S..  Apr.  68 
Entry  into  force.  Aug.  67 
U.S.  signature.  PR  40,  2/16 
NAVSTAR  global  positioning  system,  bilat- 
eral agreement  with  Canada,  Sept.  69 
Program-carrying   signals   transmitted   by 
satellite,  distribution  of,  convention 
(1974).  Germany,  Federal  Republic  of, 
July  72,  Aug.  67 
Entry  into  force,  Aug.  67 
Remote  sensing:  Jan    56;  Benson,  Sept    59 
Saudi  Arabia: 

Ambassador  to  U.S.,  credentials,  Nov.  46 
Oil   production   (White  House),   Sept.   44, 

Nov.  45 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Jan.  60,  61,  Feb. 
66,  Mar.  69,  May  69,  July  72,  Sept.  68, 
69 
U.S.  military  aid  (Saunders),  Oct,  50,  52 
U.S.  relations:  Carter,  Apr.  8;  Cooper,  Sept. 
43;  Crawford,  June  39;  Vance,  Mar.  39, 
May  40 
Visit  of  Secretary  Brown,  Apr    8 
Saunders,  Harold  H.,  Feb.  45,  Mar.  48,  June 

37,  Oct.  44,  52,  53,  Dec.  53 
Sayre,  Robert  E  ,  biographical  details.  Sept    1 
Schieffer,  Bob,  Nov.  19 
Schmidt,  Helmut,  Feb.   38,  Aug.  4,  Sept.   21 

(quoted),  Oct.  29  (quoted) 
Science  and  technology: 
Cooperation  with: 

ASEAN  (Vance),  Sept.  36 
Bilateral  agreements:  Canada,   May  68; 
China,   Mar.   68  (Carter),   Mar.   31; 
Colombia,   Apr    68;  Indonesia,  Jan. 
60;  Netherlands,  Feb.   66;  New  Zea- 
land, Romania,  May  68 
European  Communities,  Feb.  34 
Mexico:  Mar.  61;  Carter,  June  42;  Katz, 

Oct.  64 
Soviet  Union:  Feb.  41;  Carter,  June  42 
U.S. -France  cooperative  science  program, 
annual  review  meeting,  PR  25,  1/25 
Cultural,  educational,  scientific,  and  tech- 
nological  exchanges,   bilateral   agree- 
ments with:  Bulgaria,  Jan.  60;  Hungary, 
July  72 
Educational,   scientific,   and   cultural   mate- 
rials,  importation,   agreement  (1950): 
Holy  See.  Oct.   67;  Hungary,   May  67; 
Syria.  Sept.  68 
Foreign  policy  aspects  (Carter).  June  42 
High  energy  physics,  cooperation  in,  bilat- 
eral  agreement  with  China:   Mar.   68; 
text.  Mar.  8 
India-U.S.   Joint  Commission,   joint  com- 
munique, June  46 
Institute  for  Scientific   and   Technological 
Cooperation  (ISTC),  proposed:  Benson, 


Department  of  State  Bulletin -l 

Science  and  technology  (Com' d) 

ISTC  (Cont'd)  ' 

Sept.   59;  Carter,   Mar.   29,  June  43,' 
Nov.   53;  Hesburgh,   Nov.   52;  Lake, 
Nov     29;  Reinhardt,  Feb.  53;   Vance, 
Mar.  36,  Nov.  3;  White  House.  June  25; 
Young,  Sept.  66 

Korea  Standards  Research  Institute,  de- 
velopment, bilateral  agreement  with 
Korea.  Nov.  60 

Loran-C  station  in  British  Colombia,  bilat- 
eral agreement  with  Canada,  June  67 

Provisional  international  technological 
group,  establishment  proposed  (Vance), 
Nov.  3 

Scientific,  academic,  and  cultural  exchanges 
with  Soviet  Union,  Feb.  39,  41,  42 

Soviet  request  for  computer  technology,  de- 
nial (Vance),  Nov.  19 

Technical  cooperation,  bilateral  agreements 
with:  Egypt  (termination).  Jan  60; 
Saudi  Arabia,  May  69 

U.N.  Conference  on  Science  and  Technology 
for  Development,  1980:  Benson,  Sept. 
58;  Carter.  June  43.  Nov.  53;  Hesburgh, 
Nov.  51.  54;  McHenry,  Dec.  56; 
Newsom,  Jan.  32;  Reinhardt,  Feb.  50 

U.S. -Mexico  Mixed  Commission,  meeting, 
PR  152,  6/11 

Security  assistance  (see  also  Africa,  Asia,  and  i 
names  of  individual  countries): 
Appropriations  requests  FY   1980:  Apr.  44; 
Benson,  Apr.  42;  Carter,  Feb.  49;  Hol- 
brooke.  Apr.    17;  Moose,  Apr.  9,    12; 
Nimetz.   Apr.   33;   Vaky,   Apr.   57,  60; 
Vance,   Mar.   36,   PR    I  10,  4/26;   Vest, 
Apr.  36 
Security  Council  (see  also  United  Nations), 
peacekeeping  role  (Maynes),   June  51, 
Dec.  63 
Seignious,  George  M..  II.  Sept.  18,  Oct.  25 
Key  speaker.  Conferences  on  U.S.  Security 
and   the   Soviet  Challenge,   announce- 
ments and  schedules,  PR  145,  5/31;  PR 
196.  8/13;  PR  207.  2/27 

Senegal: 

Communist  presence,  Dec.  31 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Jan.  59,  Apr.  68, 
May  69,  Sept.  68 
Seychelles,  treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Apr.  67, 
May  66.  68,  July  71,  Nov.  59,  Dec.  67 

Shelton.  Sally  Angela,  swearing  in  as  Ambas- 
sador to  Barbados,  Grenada,  and 
Dominica,  PR  141,  5/24 

Shinn,  David  H.,  Jan.  24 

Shulman,  Marshall  D..  Dec.  40 

Key  speaker  for  Conference  on  U.S.  Security 
and  the  Soviet  Challenge,  PR  249,  10/4 

Sidi,  Sidi  Bouna  Ould:  Apr.  II;  remarks  on 
presentation  of  credentials  and  reply  by 
President  Carter,  UNN,  2/26 

Sierra  Leone: 

Communist  presence,  Dec.  31 

Treaties,   agreements,  etc.,   Nov.   59,  61, 
Dec.  69 
Silveira,  Francisco  Azeredo  da,  Oct.  63 


Index  1979 


23 


Singapore: 

Refugee  influx,  policy  (Young.  H),  Dec.  15 
Textile  agreements  with  US-,  ameniinients. 
PR   168.  7/11;  PR  298,    11/13;  PR  310. 
11/28 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc..  Jan.  59.  61.  Mar. 
69,  Apr.  68.  May  67,  June  67.  Sept.  68. 
Nov.  61.  Dec.  69 
.Sl.ivery: 

.Abolition  of,   slave   trade,  and   institutions 
and   practices   similar  to  slavery,   con- 
vention  (1956):    Djibouti.    May   67; 
Senegal,  Sept.  68;  Suriname,  Dec.  67 
Convention   (1926).   succession,   Suriname, 
Dec.  67 
Smith,  Gerard  C   speaker,  conference  on  the 
SALT  II  treaty  and  U.S. -Soviet  relations, 
PR  144,  5/30 
Smith.  W.  M.  Thomas,  swearing  in  as  Ambas- 
sador to  Ghana.  PR  256,  10/9 
Social  security,   bilateral   agreements  with: 
Germany.   Federal   Republic  of.    Dec.   68; 
Switzerland.  Sept.  69 
Solomon.  Anthony  M..  June  34.  Dec.  27 
Solotiion  Islands: 

.Ainbassador  to  U.S.:  Sept.  55;  remarks  on 
presentation  of  credentials  and  reply  by 
President  Carter,  UNN,  3/30 
Independence,  Sept.  57 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc..  Jan.  59.  Mar.  67. 

July  72 
U.N.  membership.  Jan.  56 
U.S.    Ambassador  (Feldman),   swearing   in, 
PR  217,  9/5 
Somalia: 

Communist   technical    assistance   (Newsom), 

Dec.  30,  31 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc..   Mar.   69.  June 

65,  Oct.  68 
U.S.  aid  (Moose),  Apr.  13 
South  Africa  (see  also  Namibia  and  Southern 
Rhodesia):   Feb.   49,   May  65;  Newsom. 
Jan.  32;  Vance.  Mar.  40,  42 
Apartheid:  Lake,  Jan.   18;  Leonard,  Feb.  61; 
Maynes,   Jan.   48;   Moose,   Oct.    21; 
Vance,  Mar.  43 
Black  trade  unionism  (Mezvinsky),  Apr.  56 
Nuclear  detonation,   question   of  (Vance), 

Dec.  23,  24 
Nuclear  potential,  Jan.  55 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Jan.  59,  Feb.  65, 

June  67,  Aug.  67 
U.S.  export  controls:  June  33;  Cooper,  June 

33;  Moose,  Oct.  22 
U.S.  policy:  Jan.  55;  Lake,  Jan.  18;  Moose, 
Oct.  21;  Newsom,  June  20;  Vance,  Mar. 
43 
Venda,  U.S.  position  on  as  integral  part  of 
South  Africa  (Reis).  Dec    59 
South  Pacific  Commission: 

Agreement   (1947).   accession.   Solomon   Is- 
lands. Jan.  59 
Memorandum   of  understanding   modifying 
procedures   (1976).   entry    into   force, 
Dec.  67 
Southern  Rhodesia  (Zimbabwe):  Feb.  41,  Sept. 
38;  Carter,  Feb.    1,   Mar.   28,   Apr.   6; 
Moose,  Apr.  9,  10,  Oct.  21;  Newsom,  Jan. 
32,  June  20,  PR  134,  5/17;  Nimetz,  Dec. 


Southern  Rhodesia  (Cont'd) 

46;   Vance,  Feb.  9.  Mar.   37,  40.  Nov.  2; 
Young,  Feb    60,  June  48 
Anglo-American  peace  efforts:  Moose,  May 
45;  Vance,  Jan.    17,  Mar.  43.  Aug.  26, 
27,  28 
Border  raids  and  other  terrorist  acts:   Mon- 
dale,  Oct.  20;  Vance.  Jan.  21 
ICRC  humanitarian  aid  (Department),  May 
46 
British   role:   Moose,   Oct.    18.    19;    Vance. 

Aug.  29;  White  House.  Oct.  19 
Muzorewa   regime,   question  of  recognition: 
Moose.   Oct.    18;   Peacock.   Sept.    54; 
Vance.  Sept.  54 
OAU  resolution  on  (Harrop),  Oct.  24 
Patriotic  Front  (Zimbabwe  African  National 
Union  and  Zimbabwe  African  People's 
Union):    Harrop,   Oct.    24;   Moose,    May 
45;  Newsom,  Dec.  29,  30,  31 
South  African  role:  Lake,  Jan.   20;  Moose, 

Oct.  21;  Vance.  Mar.  42 
Unilateral   elections:   Carter,   Aug.    25; 
Moose,  May  47,  Oct.  22;  Vance,  Aug. 
26,  27,  28 
U.N.    supervised   elections,   proposed;   De- 
partment.   Mar.   43,   May   46;   Moose, 
May  46,  47;  Vance.  June  22 
U.S.   economic  sanctions,  question  of  re- 
moval: June  33;  Carter,  June   16,  Aug. 
18,   25;   Moose,   May  47;    Vance,   Mar. 
43.  June  22,  Aug.  22,  26 
Nigerian  oil  embargo  of  U.S.,  question  of 
(Vance).  Aug.  24.  25.  29 
U.S.  visit  of  Bishop  Abel  Muzorewa:  Moose, 
Oct.   18,  19;  White  House.  Oct.   19 
Soviet  Union: 

China,  relations  with:  Carter.   Feb    5.   Mar. 

33.  Apr    6;  Shulman.  Dec    41 
Human  rights:  Feb.  39.  42;  Maynes.  Jan.  48; 
Shulman.  Dec    44 
Defection  of  Bolshoi  ballet  dancer  to  U.S. 
(Shulman).  Dec.  44 
Internal    developments:    Feb.    39,    41; 
Brzezinski,  May  48;  Shulman,  Dec.  40; 
Toon,  Sept.  46;  Vance.  July  68 
Kama  River  truck  complex,  establishment  of 
Temporary   Purchasing  Commission, 
bilateral  agreement.  Dec.  69 
Military    programs    and    deployments; 
Brezhnev.  July  51;  Brown.  May  51,  53, 
June  23;  Carter,  Mar.  31,  June  12,  Nov. 
13;  Mondale,  Aug.  20,  Nov.  33;  NATO, 
Aug.  47;  Saunders,  Oct.   50;  Shulman, 
Dec.  44;  Toon,  Sept.  46;   Vance,  Jan. 
15,  Dec.  22;  White  House.  Sept.  49 
Eastern  Europe.   Brezhnev  proposal   for 
Soviet  arms  reductions:   Carter,   Nov. 
13;  Mondale.  Nov.  32;  Shulman.  Dec. 
40;  Vance.  Dec.  22 
Soviet  request  for  computer  technology,  de- 
nial (Vance).  Nov.   19 
Soviet  spies  in  U.S.  exchanged  for  Soviet 

dissidents  (Carter).  June  15,  Aug.  18 
Summit  meeting.   See  under  Strategic  arms 

limitation  talks 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Jan.  59,  Feb.  66, 
Apr.  67,  69,  May  69,  June  66,  67,  July 
72,  Aug.  66,  67,  69,  Dec.  69 


Soviet  Union  (Cont'd) 
U.S.  Ambassador  (Watson),  swearing  in.  PR 

267,  10/12 
U.S.  arms  control  negotiations:  Feb.  40,  July 
56;  Brezhnev.  July  52;  Carter.  Mar.  27. 
June  44;  Gelb.   June  45;   Nimetz.   Dec 
47;  Shulman,  Dec.  41;   Vance,  Jan.   16, 
Aug.  22.  23.  36.  Dec.  22 
Aniisatellite  negotiations:  July  56;  Seigni- 
ous.   Sept.    22;   Shulman.    Dec.    42; 
Vance.  Aug  36 
Indian  Ocean,  in,  status:  Feb.  40,  July  56, 
Sept.    57;   Christopher,    Apr.    51-52; 
Shulman,  Dec.  42 
Mexico  City  talks:  Christopher,  Jan.   35; 
joint  communique,  Feb.  12;  Shulman. 
Dec.  42;  Vaky.  Apr.  60;  Vance,  Jan. 
16 
U.S.    arms   sales,   denial:   Carter,   Jan.   9; 

Vance,  Jan.  18,  May  41,  Sept.  54 

U.S.    economic   relations:   Feb.   41;  Carter, 

Jan.   II;  Christopher,  Jan.  28;  Shulman. 

Dec.  44;  Vance.  Feb.  17.  Aug.  23 

U.S.  export  controls:  June  33;  Cooper,  June 

32 
U.S.  relations:  Feb.  38,  39;  Brzezinski,  Feb. 
20,   July   51  ;  Carter,    Feb.    37.    38 
(quoted).  Mar.  27.  33,  Apr.  6,  7,  8,  July 
1,    3,    Nov.    12;    Maynes,    June    52; 
Nimetz,  Dec.  47;  Vance,  Feb.  11,  Mar. 
39,  42,  Aug.  23,  Oct.  33,  PR  182,  7/30 
Key  speaker  (Mark),  conference  on  U.S.- 
Soviet relations.  PR  144.  5/30 
SALT  treaty,  question  of  effect:  July  55; 
Brown,  July  67;  Brzezinski,  May  48; 
Carter,  May  23.  Apr.  8.  June  13.  July 
3;  Gelb,  June  24,  26;  Seignious,  Oct. 
29;  Shulman,   Dec.  40;  Toon,  Sept. 
46;    Vance,   July   67,   68,    Aug.    34. 
Sept.   II 
SALT  treaty,  question  of  linkage:  Brown. 
Sept.   17;  Brzezinski,  May  50;  Carter, 
June  14,  Nov.  10;  Mondale,  Nov.  33; 
Seignious,   Oct.   29;  Shulman,   Dec. 
41;  Vance,  Nov.  24 
U.S.  security  and  Soviet  challenge,  confer- 
ences, announcements,  PR  19,  1/18;  PR 
34,  2/9;  PR  38,  2/14;  PR  60,  3/9;  PR  65, 
3/9;  PR  98,  4/12;  PR  99,  4/12;  PR  145, 
5/31;  PR   155,  6/14;  PR  156,  6/14;  PR 
163,  7/6;  PR  164,  7/6;  PR  173,  7/18;  PR 
189,  8/2;  PR  196,  8/13;  PR  207,  8/27; 
PR  214.  9/4;  PR  218.  9/7;  PR  236.  9/26; 
PR  242.   7/28;   PR  249.    10/4;   PR   280. 
10/26 
Visits  by  Secretaries.  Blumenthal  and  Kreps 
(Christopher).  Jan.  28 
Space: 

Canadian   National   Research   Council   Space 
Research    Facilities.    U.S.    activities, 
bilateral   agreement   with  Canada,   Dec. 
68 
Exploration  and  use  of  outer  space,  princi- 
ples governing,   treaty  (1967):   Peru, 
May  67;  Yemen  (Aden),  Sept.  68 
Liability  for  damage  caused  by  space  ob- 
jects,  international  convention  (1972). 
India,  Aug.  67 
Palapa-B    spacecraft,    launching   and   as- 


24 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


Space  (Cont'd) 

Palapa-B  (Cont'd) 

sociated   services,   bilateral   agreement 
with  Indonesia.  June  67 

Polar  regions  of  the  sun,  European  Space 
Organization-US.  study  (Carter),  June 
42 

Registration  of  objects  launched  into  outer 
space,  convention  (1975):  European 
Space  Agency,  Apr.  68;  Germany,  Fed- 
eral Republic  of,  Dec.  68;  Peru,  May 
68;  Poland,  Jan.  59;  Spain,  Feb.  65 

Rescue  and  return  of  astronauts  and  objects 
launched  into  outer  space,  agreement 
(1968):  India,  Aug.  66;  Peru,  May  66 

Space  technology,  bilateral  agreement  with 
China,  Mar.  8 

U.S.  outer  space  programs,  Jan.  56 
France,  PR  25,  1/25 
Spain: 

Democratic  progress:  Carter,  Jan.  36;  Vest, 
Apr.  37,  Nov.  40 

European  Community  membership,  proposed 
(Vest),  Nov.  38 

Treaties,  agreements,  etc..  Feb.  65.  66, 
Mar.  68.  69,  Apr.  67,  68,  July  72,  Aug. 
66,  67,  Nov.  59,  61 

U.S.   security  assistance:   Benson,   Apr.  43, 
46;  Vest,  Apr.  37 
Sri  Lanka  (Christopher).  Apr.  49.  51 

Treaties,  agreements,  etc..  Apr.  67.  May  69. 
Aug.  66.  68 

World    Bank    financing    development 
(Maynes).  June  60 
Stahl,  Angelique  O..  Feb.  63.  64 
Stale  Department: 

Advisory  committee  charter  renewals,  an- 
nouncement. PR  15,  1/17 

Advisory  committees,  annual  comprehensive 
review.  PR  46.  2/22 

Affirmative  action  program  (Vance).  Mar 
43 

Ambassador  at  Large  (Carter),  nomination 
(White  House),  Jan.  24 

Assistant  Secretary  of  State  for  African  Af- 
fairs (Moose),  swearing  in,  PR  150,  6/5 

Assistant  Secretary  of  State  for  Human 
Rights  and  Humanitarian  Affairs  (Der- 
ian),  swearing  in,  PR  29,  2/5 

Assistant  Secretary  of  State  for  Public  Af- 
fairs and  Spokesman  for  the  Department 
(Carter).  PR  30.  2/6 

Budget.  FY  1980  (Vance).  Mar.  39 

Coordinator  of  Population  Affairs  (Bene- 
dick), swearing  in.  PR  90,  4/4 

Office  for  Liaison  with  State  and  Local  Gov- 
ernments, proposed  (White  House).  Jan. 
24 

Senior  Deputy   Legal   Adviser  (Atwood). 
selection,  PR  194,  8/10 
State  of  the  Union  (excerpts):  Carter,  Feb.   1, 

Mar.  24 
Strategic  arms  limitation  talks: 

SALT  I:  Brzezinski,  May  49;  Carter,  Feb.  2, 
June  12;  Gelb,  June  24;  Jones.  Sept  32; 
Seignious.  Oct.  28,  32;  Vance,  Jan.  15, 
July  67 

SALT  II:  Mar.  60,  June  10,  Aug.  38,  Sept. 
57;  Brown.  July  65;  Brzezinski,  Feb. 
19;  Callaghan,  Feb    37;  Carter,  Feb    I, 


SALT  (Cont'd) 
SALT  II  (Cont'd) 

38.  Mar.  22.  33.  June  II.  Nov.  7;  Hes- 
burgh.  Nov.  51;  Mondale.  Apr.   14.  15; 
Schmidt.  Feb.  38;  Vance.  Feb.  17,  May 
38.  41.   Nov.    1,   2;  White  House.   Apr. 
15 
Amendments,   reservations,  and  condi- 
tions,  question  of:  Carter,   Apr.   7; 
Vance,  July  67,  Aug.  21,  Nov.  18,  24 
Backfire  system:   Brown,  July  66;  Jones, 
Sept.   33;   Seignious,   Oct.   30,   31; 
Vance.  July  66.  Sept.  12 
Soviet  statement:   July   22.   61;   Brown. 
Sept.   16;  Earle.  Sept.  23;  Seignious. 
Oct.  30;  text.  July  47;  Vance,  July  6 
Background,  guide,  July  58 
Glossary,  July  61 

Joint  Statement  of  Principles:  July  21,  24, 
61,  63;  Earle,  Sept.  23;  text.  July  47; 
Vance.  July  6 
Memorandum  of  Understanding:  July  22, 

24;  text,  July  46 
NATO,  question  of  effect  of  U.S.  ratifica- 
tion: Carter.  Nov.  8.   13;  Gelb,  June 
24;   Seignious,   Oct.   28;  Shulman. 
Dec.  40,  41;  Vance,  Jan.  15,  16,  July 
68,  Aug.  33,  35,  Sept.   12,  Nov.  24, 
Dec.  24,  27.  PR  182.  7/30 
NATO,  U.S.  consultations:   Brzezinski, 
May  50;  Christopher,  Jan.  35;  NATO, 
Aug.  46;  Seignious,  Oct.   29;  U.S. 
statement,   Aug.   36;   Vance,  July  5, 
Aug.  33,  35;  Vest,  Nov.  37 
Negotiations;  Jan.   37.  Feb.   39;  Carter. 
Jan.    II.  Mar.   30;  Christopher,  Jan. 
35;  Earle,  Sept.  24;  Fisher,  Jan.  55; 
Pearson,  Feb.   56;  Toon,  Sept.  48; 
Vance,  Jan.   16,  Feb.  9,  10,  Mar.  42, 
July  70 
Conclusion:   (Carter),   July    1;   Vance, 
June  23 
Summit  meeting:   Brezhnev,  July  51,  52. 
53;  Carter,  Jan.   11,   12,  Feb.  6,  July 
49,  50,  53,  54;  Kirchschlager,  July 
50;  joint   communique.   July   54; 
Vance,  Feb.  10,  May  41,  Aug.  22,  23 
Treaty: 

Analysis,  July  7 

Annex:  Detailed  Analysis  of  SALT  II 

Provisions  (Vance),  July  7 
Protocol:  July  20,  60,  64;  Brown,  Sept. 
16;  Earle,  Sept.  22,  24;  Seignious, 
Oct.   26,  29;  text,  July  44;   Vance, 
July  6 
Signature:   Aug.   69;   Brezhnev  July  53; 
Carter,  July  54;  joint  communique, 
July  54 
Terms:   July   58;   Brezhnev   July   52; 
Brown,  May  53,  June  23,  Sept.   15; 
Carter,  June  13.  July  2;  Seignious. 
Sept     19,  Oct.  26;  Vance,  July  5, 
65,  Oct.  32 
Text,  July  23 
US     diplomatic    relations   with   China, 
question  of  effect  on:  Carter,  Jan.  26, 
Feb.  6,  Apr.  8;  Vance,  Feb.  11,14 
U.S.    foreign   policy   conference,   an- 
nouncement, PR  144,  5/30 
U.S.  ratification  urged:  Feb.  4.  Nov.    10; 


SALT  (Cont'd) 
SALT  II  (Cont'd) 

U.S.  ratification  (Cont'd) 

Brown,  Sept.  13;  Carter.  Mar.  27, 
June  15,  July  1  ,  4,  Nov.  8,  26; 
Christopher,  Nov.  49;  Jones,  Sept.  32; 
Mondale,  Nov.  33;  Seignious,  Oct. 
25;  Toon,  Sept.  46;  Vance,  July  4, 
67,  Aug.  30,  Sept  II,  Oct.  14.  Nov. 
24.  Dec.  21.  28.  PR  182,  7/30 
Failure  to  ratify,  effect:  Brown.  May  54, 
July  67,  Sept.  16;  Carter.  Mar.  23, 
June  13,  15,  July  2,  Nov.  8;  Seigni- 
ous, Sept.  21,  Oct.  29;  Toon,  Sept, 
48;  Vance,  June  17,  July  68.  Aug.  34, 
Sept.  II.  Oct.  33,  Nov.  24,  Dec.  22 
Senior  military  officers,  question  of  opin- 
ions (Brown),  July  66 
Soviet  brigade  in  Cuba,  question  of  effect: 

Nov.  II;  Vance,  Nov.  18 
U.S.  security  and  other  national  interests: 
Brown,  May  51,  June  23,  Sept.  13, 
27;  Brzezinski,  May  48;  Carter,  Feb. 
I.  Mar.  23,  June  II,  Aug.  18,  Nov. 
12;  Gelb,  June  24;  Jones,  Sept.  32; 
Mondale,  Nov.  33;  Newsom,  PR  134, 
5/17;  Nimetz,  Dec.  48;  Seignious, 
Sept.  18.  Oct.  25;  Vance.  Mar.  39, 
June  23.  Aug.  22,  30,  Sept.  9.  Oct. 
32.  33,  Nov.  24,  Dec.  2 1 ,  PR  285, 
10/29 
Verification:  Brown,  May  54,  June  23, 
July  66,  68,  69;  Brzezinski,  May  50; 
Carter,  Feb.  2,  4,  Mar.  23,  31.  June 
13.  14,  Nov.  8,  26;  Gelb,  June  24: 
Mondale,  Apr.  16;  Seignious,  Oct 
27;  Toon,  Sept.  48;  Vance,  July  4 
66,  69.  Sept.  9,  12,  54,  Oct.  33,  Nov 
19,  Dec.  22 
Senate  report.   White  House  statement 

on,  Dec.  32 
Treaty  provisions:  July   18,  21,  60,  62, 
63.  65;  Brzezinski.  May  49;  Carter, 
July  2;  Earle.  Sept.  24.  26;  Jones, 
Sept.  33;  Nimetz.  Dec.  48;  Seigni- 
ous. Sept.  20.  Oct.  28;  Vance.  Mar. 
40.  July  5.  65.  Aug.  32.  Sept.  10 
SALT  III:  July   56;   Brezhnev,  July  52; 
Brown,   Sept.    15;   Brzezinski,   May  51; 
Callaghan,  Feb.  37;  Carter,  July  3,  54, 
Nov.  26;  Pearson,  Feb.  56;  Vance.  Jan. 
16.  July  70,   Aug.   32,   Dec.   22;   Vest, 
Nov.  37 
Strauss,  Robert  S.:  Aug    41  (quoted),  Oct.  47; 
Saunders,  June  39 
Biographical  details.  Oct    47 
Sudan: 

Communist  presence,  Dec.  31 

Treaties,  agreements,  etc..  Mar.  67,  May  69 

U.N.   programs:   Maynes,  June  60;   Vance, 

Mar.  37 
U.S.  aid  (Moose),  Apr.  II,  13 
Sugar,  International  Sugar  Agreement  (1977): 
Current  actions;   Austria,   Apr.   68;   Egypt, 
Mar.  68;  EI  Salvador,  Feb.  65;  Finland, 
Guatemala,  Haiti.  Iraq.  Mar.  68;  Korea, 
Feb.   65;   Mexico.   Norway.   Mar.   68; 


Index  1979 


25 


Sugar  (Conl'il) 

Current  inlions  (Com' il) 

Panama.  Feb.  65 
US.  ratification  urged:  Carter,  Mar.  25,  29; 
Ruser,  Sept.  5;  Vaky,  Apr.  58;  Vance. 
May  34,  Nov.  65;  Young,  Sept.  66 
Suriname: 

Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Jan.  59.  May  69, 
June  66.  Dec.  67 
Swaziland: 

UNESCO  Constitution,  signature.  June  66 
U.S.    Ambassador  (Matheron).   swearing  in, 
PR  315.  11/30 
Sweden: 

Treaties,  agreements,  etc  .  Jan.  59.  Mar.  67. 
May  67.  July  72,  Aug.  66,  67.  Sept,  68. 
Dec.  67 
Visit  of  Vice  President   Mondale:   Aug.    19; 
Vest.  Nov.  40 
Swing.  William  L..  swearing  in  as  Ambassador 
to   Peoples   Republic  of  the  Congo.   PR 
120.  5/4 
Switzerland: 

Treaties,  agreements,  etc  .  Jan.  59.  Feb    65. 
Mar.  68.  June  67.  July  71,  72,  Aug.  66, 
Sept.  69,  Nov.  60 
U.S.  relations  (Vest),  Nov.  41 
Syria: 

Treaties,  agreements,  etc..  Mar.  67,  69,  July 

72,  73,  Aug.  68,  Sept.  68,  Dec    69 
U.S.  aid,  FY   1980  proposals:  Benson,   Apr 
47;  Draper,  Apr.  40 


Talboys,  Bryan,  Sept.  53 
Tanzania: 

Communist  presence:  Dec.  31;  Carter,  Apr. 
6 

Military  intervention  in  Uganda  (Harrop). 
Oct    23 

Treaties,  agreements,  etc  ,  Apr.  67,  June  66, 
Sept.  68 

U.S.    Ambassador  (Viets),   swearing   in,   PR 
248,  10/3 
Telecommunications: 

Egyptian  telecommunication  system,  project 
grant  agreement  with  Egypt,  Dec.  68 

Etching  radio  installation,  operation,  bilat- 
eral agreement  with  Federal  Republic  of 
Germany,  June  67 
-Frequency  modulation  broadcasting  in  the  88 
to  108  MHz  band,  bilateral  agreement 
with  Mexico,  Jan.  60,  July  73,  Oct.  67, 
Dec.  69 

Geneva  radio  regulations  (1959),  revision  re 
aeronautical  mobile  (R)  service  (1978): 
Canada,  Nov.  60;  Japan,  Netherlands, 
Dec.  68;  Paraguay,  Aug.  67;  U.K.,  Dec. 
68 

International  telecommunication  convention 
(1973):  Congo,  June  66;  Nauru,  May  68, 
June  66  (with  reservation);  Peru, 
Uganda,  June  66;  Zambia,  Mar.  68 

Licensed  amateur  radio  operators,  reciprocal 
granting  of  authorizations  to  operate  in 
either  country,  bilateral  agreements 
with:  Haiti,  July  72;  Jordan,  May  68 


Telecommunications  (Cont'd) 
Modular  thermal   imaging  systems  (MOD 
FLIR),  bilateral  agreement  with  Federal 
Republic  of  Germany,  Sept.  69 
World    Administrative    Radio   Conference 
(1979):   Carter,   June  43;   foreign   rela- 
tions outline,  Oct.  62;  Maynes,  June  53 
Advisory  Committee,  notices  of  meetings, 

PR  57,  3/2;  PR  193,  8/10 
Final  Acts,  approval:  Canada,  Apr.  68; 
Czechoslovakia,  Dec.  68;  Denmark, 
Feb.  65;  Hungary,  Aug.  67;  India, 
Nov.  60;  Ireland,  Korea,  Netherlands, 
Senegal,  Apr.  68;  Switzerland,  Feb. 
65 
Terrorisin  (Vance),  Dec.  66 

Attacks  on  U.S.  citizens  or  property,  tables. 

Sept    61,  63 
Definition,  question  of  (Quainton),  Sept.  60 
Government  sanctioned  political  kidnapping 
(■'missing  persons"):   Mezvinsky.   Apr. 
54 
Iranian  seizure  of  U.S.   Embassy  and  hos- 
tages: Carter,  Dec.  18,  50;  Vance,  Dec. 
49;  White  House,  Dec.  49,  50 
Lord  Mountbatten,  death  of  (Vance),  Nov.  2 
Prevention  and  punishment  of  crimes  against 
internationallv    protected   persons,    in- 
cluding  diplomatic   agents,   convention 
(1973):  Trinidad  and  Tobago,  Aug.  67; 
U.K.,  July  72 
U.N.   convention  to  outlaw  the  taking  of 
hostages,  proposed:  Quainton,  Sept.  64; 
Vance.  Nov.  2 
U.S.  antiterrorism  efforts:  June  33;  Christo- 
pher. Jan.  29,  Quainton,  Sept    62 
Textiles: 

Cotton,  International  Institute,  articles  of 
agreement  (1966),  amendment,  entry 
into  force,  Oct.  67 
Cotton,  wool,  and  manmade  fiber  textiles, 
trade  in,  bilateral  agreements  with: 
Brazil,  May  68,  PR  58,  3/6;  PR  94, 
4/11;  China,  PR  6.  1/22;  China 
(Taiwan),  Mar  68;  Colombia,  Mar  68, 
PR  23,  1/30;  Dominican  Republic,  Oct. 
67,  PR  204,  8/22;  Haiti,  Mar.  68,  June 
67,  Aug.  68,  Oct.  67,  PR  56,  3/1;  PR 
64,  3/9;  PR  229,  9/19;  Hong  Kong,  Jan. 
60,  Apr.  68,  PR  233.  9/21;  India.  Jan. 

60.  Apr.  69,  June  67,  Aug.  68,  Nov.  60, 
PR  53,  2/28;  PR  146,  5/31;  PR  169, 
7/11;  PR  266,  10/15;  PR  309,  11/28; 
Japan.  Nov.  60.  PR  208.  8/27;  PR  209. 
8/28;  PR  227.  9/19;  Korea.  Republic  of. 
Mar.  69,  Oct  67.  PR  5.  1/5;  PR  228. 
9/19;  Macao.  Mar.  69,  July  73;  Macau, 
PR  149,  6/4;  PR  288,  10/31;  Malaysia, 
Jan.  60,  Nov.  60,  PR  265,  10/15;  PR 
292,  1 1/5;  PR  301 ,  1 1/I9;  Mexico,  Apr. 
69,  PR  61.  3/9;  Philippines,  Oct.  67, 
Dec.  69,  PR  226,  9/19;  Poland,   Nov. 

61,  PR  269,  10/18;  Singapore,  Dec  69, 
PR  168,  7/11;  PR  298,  11/13;  PR  310, 
11/28;  Thailand,  Jan.  60,  July  73,  Dec. 
69,  PR  172,  7/17;  PR  270,   10/18 

Cotton  textiles  and  textile  products,  trade  in, 
bilateral  agreements  with:  Brazil,  Apr. 
68;  Pakistan,  Oct.  67,  PR  210,  8/28;  PR 


Textiles  (Cont'd) 

Cotton  textiles  etc.,  trade  in  (Cont'd) 

213,  9/4;  PR  308,  11/28;  Romania,  Oct 
68.  PR  293,  11/5;  PR  297.  11/13 
International    trade,   arrangement   (1973). 
Dominican  Republic.  June  66 
Protocol   extending   (1977);    Austria, 
Bolivia,  Jan.   59;   Brazil,   Dec.   68; 
Canada,    Jan.    59;    El    Salvador, 
Malaysia,  June  66;  Portugal  (on  behalf 
of  Macau),   Switzerland,   Jan.   59; 
Trinidad  and  Tobago,  June  66 
U.S.  tariffs  on  textile  and  apparel  products. 

MTN  re  (Katz).  June  29 
Visa  system  for  exports  of  cotton,  wool,  and 
manmade  fiber  apparel,  bilateral  agree- 
ment with  Sri  Lanka.  Aug    68,  PR  200, 
8/24 
Wool  and  manmade  fibers,  trade  in,  bilateral 
agreement   with:   Romania,   Nov.   61; 
Yugoslavia,  Apr.  69,  Sept.  69,  PR  62, 
3/9 
Thach,  Nguyen  Co,  Dec.  9 
Thahane,  Timothy  T.:  June  21;  remarks  on  pre- 
sentation of  credentials  and  reply  by  Presi- 
dent Carter,  UNN,  3/30 
Thailand  (Carter).  Dec.  20 

Drug  control  program:  Apr.  27;  Falco.  Aug. 

50.  51 
Kampuchean   border   incidents:    Holbrooke. 
Oct.  38;  Petree.  June  64;  Shulman.  Dec. 
44;  Vance.  Sept.  53 
Refugees,   reception,   problems:   Apr.    27, 
Dec.   8,  9;  Carter,   Dec.  4;  Holbrooke. 
Apr.   18.  Oct.  35,  37;  Nimetz,  Dec.  2; 
Sasser,  Dec.  6;  Vance,  Dec.  10;  Young, 
H.,  Dec.  14,  15,  17 
Textile  agreements  with  U.S.,  amendments. 

PR  172.  7/17;  PR  270,  10/18 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Jan.  59,  61,  Julv 

73,  Dec.  69 

U.S.   economic   and   military   aid:   Apr.    18; 

Benson,   Apr    47;   Holbrooke,   Apr.    19. 

23;  Shulman.  Dec.  44;  Vance.  Sept.  38 

U.S.  relations:  Carter.  Feb.  4;  Vance.  Sept. 

38 
U.S.  visit  of  Prime  Minister  Kriangsak:  Dec. 
9;  Apr.   26;  Holbrooke,  Oct.   38;  pro- 
gram, PR  27,  2/2 
Thatcher,  Margaret,  Aug    6 
Tin,   fifth   international   tin   agreement   (1975): 
Carter,  Mar.  29 
Current   actions:   European   Economic  Com- 
munity, Norway,  Turkey,  Mar.  68 
Togo,  Admiral  (quoted),  Aug.   12 
Togo: 

Ambassador  to  U.S.,  Oct.  20 
Treaties,   agreements,   etc..   Mar.   68.   69. 
Apr.  67,  June  65 
Tonga,  Ambassador  to  US:  Sept    55;  remarks 
on  presentation  of  credentials  and  reply  by 
President  Carter,  UNN,  3/30 
Toon,  Malcolm,  Sept.  46 

Key  speaker.   Conference  on  U.S.   Security 
and  the  Soviet  Challenge,  PR  189,  8/2 
Tourists   and   tourism,    American   International 
Traveler  Conference,  announcement,  PR 
123,  5/4 
Trade  (see  also  Balance  of  payments): 


26 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


TruJc  (Conl'il) 
General  agreemeni  on  tariffs  and  trade:  June 
31.  Aug.  9;  Vance,  Apr.  31 
Mexico,  question  of  membership.  Mar.  60 
Protocol  (1947)  of  provisional  application, 
de  facto  application:   Dominica,  July 
72;  Kiribati,  Dec.  68;  St.  Lucia,  Sol- 
omon Islands,  Tuvalu,  July  72 
Protocol  (1965)  to  introduce  a  pan  IV  on 
trade  and  development,  and  to  amend 
Annex  1,  France,  Feb.  65 
Philippines.    2nd    proces-verbal .    accept- 
ance; Austria.  Brazil.  June  66 
Tunisia,    llth   proces-verbal.   acceptance. 
Bra/il.  June  66 
Multinational   trade   negotiations,   agree- 
ments:    June     10.     30.     Aug.     38 
Brzezinski.  Feb.   19;  Carter.  Feb.   1.  34 
Mar.  24.  28.  50.  Apr.  32.  June  29.  Aug 
43;  Christopher.  Jan.   27.   Sept.   39 
Cooper.  June  32;  Holbrooke.  Apr.   23 
Hormats.   Dec.   61;  Jamieson.  Jan.   22 
Katz,   June   27,   Oct.   43,   Dec.    35 
McDonald,  Aug.  41;  McHenry,  Dec.  56 
Newsom,  Jan.   31;   Nimelz,   Dec     47 
Ruser,  Sept.  4;  Vance,  Jan.  14,  Apr.  31 
May   34,   35,  June    19,   28,   Sept.   36 
Vest,  Nov.  38;  Young,  Sept.  66 
Protectionism:    Mar.    61;   Carter,   Mar     29, 
June   28,   29;   Katz,   June   30,    Dec.   37; 
Vance.  Jan.   14.  May  34 
U.S.; 
Adjustment  assistance:  Hormats,  Dec.  61; 
Katz.  June  29.  Oct.  64;  Vance.  Sept. 
6 
China.  See  China 

Countervailing  duties,  proposed  extension 
of  waiver:   Carter.    Apr     32;    Vance. 
Jan.  14 
Korea  (Holbrooke).  Feb.  30 
Less  developed  countries:  Carter.  June  43 
Hormats,  Dec.  60;  Newsom.  Jan    31 
Vance.   Mar.   35.   Apr    31.  Sept     6 
Young.  June  49 
Mexico.  See  Mexico 

Most-favored-nation   status  for  China  and 

for  Soviet  Union,  question  of:  Carter. 

June  14.  Dec.  33;  Shulman,  Dec.  44; 

Vance,  May  41 

Nonrubber  footwear,   bilateral   agreement 

with  Hong  Kong,  Jan    60 
Tariff  matters  bilateral   agreement  with 

Hungary,  Jan.  60 
Uganda,  resumption  of  trade  (Carter),  Oct. 

World  Trade  Week:  Carter,  June  28;  Vance, 
June  28 
Transportation: 

Cooperation,    bilateral    agreements   with: 
Hungary,  Jan.  60;  Saudi  Arabia,  Jan.  61 
International    carriage    of   perishable 
foodstuffs,  agreemeni  (1970):  Belgium, 
Nov.  60;  Norway,  Sept.  68;  U.K.,  Nov. 
60 
Road   traffic,   conventiim  (19491,   accession, 
Bangladesh,  Feb.  65 
Treaties,   agreements,   etc.,  Jan.   59,   Feb.   65, 
Mar.  67,  Apr.  67,  May  66.  June  65,  July 


Treaties,  agreemenis  (Cimi'd) 

71.  Aug.  66.  Sept.  67.  Oct.  67.  Nov.  59, 
Dec.  67 
Vienna  convention  on  law  of  treaties  ( 1969): 
Austria,  June  66;  Honduras.  Dec.  68 
Trinidad  and  Tobago: 

Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Jan.  59,  Feb.  65, 
Mar.  67,  Apr,.  68;  May  67,  68,  June  66, 
Aug.  67,  Sept.  67,  68,  Oct.  67 
U.S.    Ambassador  (Cheslaw),   swearing   in, 
PR  260,  10/10 
Truman,  Harry  (quoted),  Feb.  22,  Aug.  20 
Tunisia: 

Treaties,  agreements,  etc..  May  69.  June  67. 

July  72.  Sept.  68 
U.S.   Ambassador  (Bosworlh).   swearing   in. 

PR  59,  3/2 
U.S.    visit   of  Prime   Minister  Nouira.  joint 
communique.  Feb.  48 
Turkey: 

Economic  problems,  international  assistance: 
Christopher,  Jan.  34,  36,  Aug.  44,  Sept. 
40;  Mondale,  Aug.  21;  Vance,  Mar.  37; 
Vest,  Nov.  38,  40;  White  House,  Sept. 
49 
Greek-Turkish  problems  (see  also  Cyprus): 

Jan.  37;  NATO,  Aug.  47 
NATO.  See  under  North  Atlantic  Treaty  Or- 
ganization 
Treaties,   agreements,  etc..   Feb.   66.   Mar. 

68,  69,  Apr.  69.  Aug.  67.  68 
U.S.  arms  embargo,  lifting  of:  Nimetz,  Dec 

46;  Vance,  June  1  7 
U.S.  defense  facilities  and  intelligence  col- 
lection activities,   resumption:   Christo- 
pher, Aug.  45;  Vest,  Nov.  40 
U.S.    military   assistance:   Benson,   Apr.   46; 
Christopher,  Aug.  44;  Nimetz,  Apr.  33; 
Vance,  Mar.  37,  PR  1  10,  4/26 
Turner.    Admiral,    question   of   speeches   on 

SALT  II  (Carter),  June  15 
Tuvalu: 

Ambassador  to  U.S.,  credentials,  Sept.  55 
Independence,  Sept.  57 

Preaties,  agreements,  etc..  Apr.  67.  69.  July 
72 


u 


Uganda  (Maynes),  Jan.  48 

Human  rights:  Carter.  Oct.  22,  Mezvinsky, 

Apr.  52 
Idi  Amin,  ouster  of  (Newsom),  Dec.  30 
Tanzanian   military   intervention   (Harrop), 

Oct    23 
Treaties,   agreements,   etc.,   June   66,   Aug. 

67,  Sept.  68 
U.S.  embargo,  June  33 
U.S.  trade,  resumption  (Carter),  Oct.  22 
Ukrainian  Soviet  Socialist  Republic,  treaties, 
agreements,  etc.,  Jan.  59,  Mar.  67,  June 
66 
Undsel,  Sigrid  (quoted),  Aug.   19 
United   Arab  Emirates,   treaties,   agreements. 

etc. ,  May  67.  Aug.  67 
United  Kingdom: 

Ambassador  to  U.S.,  credentials,  Sept.  48 


United  Kinfiddin  (Cont'd) 
Fylingdales   Moor  ballistic   missile  early 
warning  station,   bilateral   agreement 
with  U.S..  Sept.  69 
Northern    Ireland:    Department.    Dec.   41; 

Vance.  Oct     17;  Vest,  Nov.  39 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Jan.  61,  Feb.  65, 
66,  Mar.  69,  70,  Apr.  69.  May  66.  69, 
June  66,  67,  July  72,  Aug.  66  (extension 
to  Cayman   Islands),  67,   68,  69,   Sept. 
69.  Oct.  68.  Nov.  60,  61,  Dec.  68 
U.S.  relations  (Vest).  Nov.  39 
U.S.  visit  of  Prime  Minister  Thatcher,  pro- 
gram. PR  323.  12/12 
United  Nations: 

Accomplishments  and  role:  Maynes.  June  56; 

McHenry.  Dec.  50;  Young.  June  48 
Budget  and  management  (Maynes).  June  53 
Civil  service  (Maynes).  June  54.  59 
Communications   development   (Reinhardt), 

Feb    60 
Economic  negotiations  (McHenry),  Dec.  55 
Foreign  Relations  of  the   United  States, 
1952-1954.  volume  III.  United  Nations 
Affairs,  released,  Oct.  69 
Human  rights  role:   Maynes,  Dec.   64;  Mez- 
vinsky, Apr.  52 
Members,  list,  Nov.  6 
Membership: 

Dominica.  May  64,  June  66 
St.  Lucia.  Nov.  60 
Solomon  Islands,  Jan.  56 
Peacekeeping  role:  July  56;  Hechinger.  Feb. 
57;  Maynes,  Dec.   63,  64;   Vaky,   Apr. 
61;  Young,  June  48 
U.S. -Mexico  joint  communique.  Mar.  60 
Privileges  and   immunities  of,   convention 

(1946),  accession,  China,  Nov.  60 
Profile,  Nov.  5 
Reform  and  restructure  proposals:   Maynes, 

Dec.  63;  Young.  June  50 
Technical  assistance,  use  of  U.S.  appropria- 
tions,  limitations  (Helms  amendment): 
Jan    48;  Maynes,  Jan.  46,  June  54,  59; 
Vance,  Mar.  38.  41 
U.S.  Ambassador  (McHenry).  Nov.  2 
U.S.  foreign  policy  interests:  Maynes.  June 

56;  Young.  June  47 
U.S.   participation   in;   Carter.   Feb.   57; 

Maynes.  Jan.  49,  50;  Vance,  June  18 
U.S.   voluntary  contributions,   FY   1980  ap- 
propriations request:  Jan.   50;  Maynes, 
June  56 
Women's  employment  opportunities.  Jan    57 
United  Nations  Children's  Fund:  Maynes.  June 

56.  61;  Vance.  Mar.  37 
United  Nations  Conference  on  Trade  and  De- 
velopment: 
Fourth  session  (Vance).  May  34 
Fifth  session:   Vance.  May  37.  38;  Young, 
Sept.  64  ' 

United   Nations   Day:    McHenry.   Dec.   50; 
Vance.  PR  283.  10/29 
Proclamation  (Carter),  Nov.  11 
United  Nations  Decade  for  Women:  Jan.  57; 
Maynes,  June  52,  61 
Conference,  announcement,  PR  201,  8/17 
United  Nations  Development  Program:  Hes- 


Index  1979 


27 


I    \DP  (Could) 

burgh,  Nov.  54;  Maynes.  June  55.  56,  58, 
59;  Vance,  Mar.  37,  41;  Young,  June  49 
Uniled  Nalion.s  Economic  and  Social  Council. 

See  Economic  and  Social  Council,  U.N. 
United   Nations   Educational,   Scientific,   and 
Cultural  Organization: 
Communications   development:    May   64; 

Reinhardt.  Feb.  50 
Constitution   (1945),   current   actions:   Cape 
Verde,    Dominica,    Swaziland,    U.N. 
Council  for  Namibia,  June  66 
Declaration  on  the  Mass  Media;  Department, 
Feb.  55;  Maynes,  June  52 
Text,  Feb.  54 
Draft   convention   on   illicit   payments   by 
foreign  corporations  (Maynes),  June  52 
U.S.    Permanent   Representative   (Newell), 
swearing  in,  PR  289,   I  1/9 
United    Nations    Environment    Program 

(Maynes),  June  62 
Lulled   Nations   High  Commissioner  for  Refu- 
gees (UNHCR):  May  65,  Aug.   16,  Oct.   I; 
Clark,  Oct     7;  Holbrooke.   Apr.   19;  Mon- 
dale,   Oct.   2;   Moose,   May  44;   Newsom, 
Apr.  29;  Nimetz,  Apr.  36,  Dec.  2;  Saun- 
ders, Dec.  54;  Vance,  Aug.  24 
Japanese  support:   Aug.   38,   Oct.   8;  Carter. 
Aug.   9;  Holbrooke,   Oct.   36;  Newsom, 
Apr.  29,  Vance,  Oct.  5 
V  N    pledging  conference,  Oct.  3,  8 
United  Nations   Institute  for  Training  and  Re- 
search (UNITAR):  Maynes,  June  62 
Liiiiled   Nations   Relief  and   Rehabilitation  Ad- 
ministration  (UNRRA):    Young,   H.,    Oec. 
II 
United    Nations    Relief   and    Works   Agency 
(UNRWA):  Jan.  56;  Maynes,  June  56,  ^\\ 
Young,  H  ,  Dec.   1  2 
Upper  Volta  (Derian),  Jan.  7 

Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Jan.  59,  June  67, 
Dec.  67 
Uruguay  (Vaky),  Apr.  60 

Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  July  72;  Aug.  67. 
Sept.  67.  Dec.  67 


Vaky.  Viron  P..  Mar.  64,  Apr.  56,  Aug.  58 
Valeriani,  Richard,  Nov.   18 
Vance,  Cyrus  R.: 

Addresses,  remarks,  and  statements: 

Afghanistan,  Ambassador  Dubs,  death  of, 

Apr.  49 
Africa,  Jan.   18,  Mar.  36.  Aug.  27 

Soviet  influence.  June  22.  Aug.  30 
Ambassador  Young,  resignation.  Oct.   16. 

17.  Nov.   16 
ANZUS  council  meeting.  Sept.  53 
Arab-Israeli   conflict   {for  details,    see 
Arab-Israeli  conflict).  Jan.   22.  June 
17,  Oct.  52,  Nov.  I 
Camp  David  agreements,  first  anniver- 
sary, Nov.  47 
Dayan,  Moshe,  resignation  and  question 

of  effect,  Dec.  24 
Egyptian-Israeli  peace  treaty,  Jan.    17. 
Feb.  6-8.  10.  12.  Mar.  39,  41,  May 


Vance,  Cyrus  (Conl'd) 
Addresses,  remarks,  etc.  (Cont'd) 
Arab-Israeli  conflict  (Cont'd) 

Egyptian-Israeli  peace  treaty  (Conl'd) 

39,  40,  55,  Nov.  47 
Private  civilian   visits,   question  of  ef- 
fect, Nov.   16,  18,  Dec.  24 
West  Bank  and  Gaza  autonomy  talks: 
Elections,  conditions  for,  and  powers 
and   responsibilities   issue,    Dec. 
28 
Israeli   settlements,   question  of,   Jan. 

17,  Feb.  13,  Aug.  23.  Nov.   17 
Palestinian  autonomy  talks.  Jan.    17. 
Feb.    12.    13.   May  39,  40,  57, 
Aug.   22,   48,   Oct.    16,   Nov.    2, 
48,  PR  124,  5/8 
Arms  control,  Jan.   15.  Mar.  39,  Aug.  22, 

Sept.  7,  Nov.  2 
ASEAN,  Feb.   16,  June  18 

Annual  conference,  Sept.  35 
Asia,  Feb.   14,  16,  Sept.  35 
Australia,  U.S.  relations,  Sept.  53,  55 
Canada: 

Embassy  retained  at  Tel  Aviv,  Dec.  27 
United  Canada,  question  of,  Jan.  21,  22 
China,  Peoples's  Republic  of  {for  details, 
see  China,  People's  Republic  of): 
ICBM  capability,  Sept.  56 
Normalization  of  U.S.    relations,   Jan, 

18,  Feb.  9,  11,  14,  16,  Mar.  40,  42, 
June  18,  PR  9,  1/9 

Taiwan.  Jan.    18.  Feb.    II.   12.   14.   17. 

Mar.  40.  42,  Aug.  24 
U.S.   arms  sales,   denial,   Jan.    18,   May 

41,  Sept.  54,  Nov.  18 
Visit   of  Vice   Premier  Deng   .Xiaoping, 
discussion  topics,  Feb.  9,  II 
Commodity  trade.  May  34,  Sept.  36,  Nov. 

15 
Cuba; 

Cienfuegos  construction,  Dec.  25.  26 
Soviet  combat  brigade,   presence  of. 
Oct.    14.    17.   63,   Nov.    16,    17   18, 

19,  25,  Dec.  22,  23,  26,  28,  65 
U.S.  relations,  question  of,  Nov.  20 

Defense   and   national   security,   Jan.    15, 

Mar.  42,  May  38,  June  16,  July  4,  70, 

Aug.  22,  30,  31,  Nov.  24,  35,  Dec. 

21 

B-52   and   Soviet   Backfire   compared, 

Dec.  24 
M-X   missile,   June    17,    Aug.    23,   31, 
Nov.  35,  Dec.  21 
Dubs,   Adolph   (Spike),   memorial   plaque, 

PR  119,  5/3 
Economy,   domestic,   Jan.    13,    Apr.    30, 

June  19,  Sept.  6 
Economy,  world,  Jan.    13.  Mar.   39.  Apr. 
30,    May    34,    June    19,    Sept.    3 
(quoted),  Nov.  3 
Egypt,  Aug.  29-30 

U.S.  security  and  other  assistance.  Mar. 
36,  May  55,  PR  1 10,  4/26;  PR  124, 
5/8 
El  Salvador,  Dec.  25,  65 

Peace  Corps  Volunteer  Loff,  release  of, 
PR  331,  12/21 


Vance,  Cyrus  (Cont'd) 
Addresses,  remarks,  etc.  (Cont'd) 
Energy,  Jan.   13,  May  35,  Nov.   I 
Oil  import  limitations.  May  35,  June  19, 

Sept.  36,  Nov.  3,  Dec.  27 
Oil  prices.  May  41,  Nov.  3,  Dec.  27 
World  conference  on  new  and  renewable 
energy,  1981,  May  36,  Dec.  66 
Europe: 
Eastern: 

CSCE  Final  Act  of  Helsinki,  Jan    12 
Soviet   military   reduction,    proposed, 
Dec.  22 
Mutual   and   balanced   force  reductions, 

Jan.   16 
U.S.  relations,  Jan.  12 
European  Community,  Jan.   14 
Foreign  assistance.  Mar.  34,  Apr.  31,  May 
38,  June  18,  19,  PR  89,  3/29;  PR  I  10, 
4/26 
Foreign  policy,  Jan.   18,  Mar.  39,  42,  May 
34,  June  18,  Sept.  6 
Decisionmaking,   Aug.    21,   Oct.    16, 

Dec.  26 
Private  diplomacy,  Nov.   17 
Foreign  Service   Act  of   1979,   proposed, 

PR  157,  6/21;  PR  180,  7/27 
General  Assembly,  34th  session,  Nov.   1 
Greece,  Mar    37 
Haitian  refugees,  Dec.  24 
Hispanic   Conference,   remarks,   PR   285, 

10/29 
Human  rights.  Feb.   II,  Mar.  35,  42,  June 
17,  Sept.  8,  Nov.  4,  Dec.  65,  PR  285, 
10/29 
30th  anniversary  of  Universal   Declara- 
tion of  Human  Rights,  Jan.  2 
Indian  Ocean-Persian  Gulf  region.   Feb. 
10.  Mar.  39 
Naval  patrols,  question  of.  Sept.  53.  55 
Institute  for  Scientific   and  Technological 
Cooperation,   proposed.    Mar.    36, 
Nov.  3 
Iran,  Jan.    17,  Feb.  7,  8,  9,   10,  Mar.  39, 
42,  Aug.  22,  Nov.  17.  Dec.  23 
Seizure  of  U.S.  Embassy  and  hostages, 
Dec    49 
Israel: 

Change    in   government,   question   of, 

Dec.  27 
Oil  supply  agreement,  May  55,  PR  124, 

5/8 
Security  assistance,  Mar.  36,  May  39, 

55,  PR  no,  4/26;  PR  124,  5/8 
U.S.  policy,  question  of  change,  Oct.  52 
Kampuchea: 

Famine,  Sept.  56,  Oct.  5,  Nov.  5,  Dec. 

10,  27 
Prince   Sihanouk,   question   of  return, 

Sept.  56 
Vietnamese  invasion,  Feb.  8,  Sept.  36, 
38,  53 
Korea,  North.  Oct.  17 
Korea.  Republic  of: 

Dialogue   with   North   Korea,   proposed. 

Feb.  9.  Oct.   16.  Dec.  26' 
Political  development,  question  of,  Dec. 
26,  28 


28 


Value.  Cyrus  (Conl'il) 

Addresses,  re/narks.  e!<  .  (C:iiir'<l) 
Korea  (Com' J) 
President  Park,  funeral,  Dec    26 
U.S.  security  assi.stance.  Mar.  }b.  Apr. 

24 
Visit  of  President  Carter.  Aug    2? 
Latin  America.  Mar.  36.  Nov.  3,  1.^,  Dec. 

65.  PR  28.S,   10/29 
Lebanon.  Nov.  2 

Israeli  use  of  U.S.  aircraft  and  military 
equipment.  Nov.  17 
Less  developed  countries.  Jan     14.   16.  Mar 
35.   May  33.  June    18.  Sept.   6.   36.  40 
(quoted).  Nov.    1.  42  (quoted).  Dec.  21. 
22.  PR  I  10.  4/26 
Libya,   signature  of  anlihijacking  conven- 
tions. Feb.  7 
Mexico: 

Oil  spill.  Oct.   17 
U.S.  relations.  Oct,   17.  Nov.   15 
Military  force,  special  U.S..  question  of. 

Sept.  55 
Morocco.  U.S.  military  aid.  Dec,  26 
Namibia.  Mar.  37.  40.  42.  Nov.  2 
NATO.  Jan.  12.  22.  Apr.  2  (quoted).  Dec. 
24 
Modernization   and   budgets.   Jan      16. 
June   17.   Aug.   22.   Nov.   35.   Dec. 
22.  24.  26 
SALT  treaty,  consultations  and  need  for 
U.S.  ratification.  Jan.    15.   16.  July 
5.  Dec.  24 
30th  anniversary.  Apr.   1.  PR  93,  4/4 
Nicaragua.    Feb.    II.    Aug,    21.    24.   56. 

Nov.   14.  15.  Dec.  47  (quoted).  66 
Nigeria.  U.S.  relations.  Aug.  24.  25 
Northern  Ireland.  Oct.   17 
Nuclear  comprehensive  test  ban.  Jan.    16. 

Aug.  36.  Nov.  2 
Nuclear  nonproliferation.   Jan,    13.    Mar, 
35.  39,  June  18,  Aug,  37.  Sept,  7.  54. 
Nov.  2.  Dec.  23 
Nuclear  weapons  non-use  policy.  Jan    53 

(quoted).  Nov.  3 
OAS.  June  18.  Nov.   14 

General  Assembly,   ninth   regular  ses- 
sion. Dec.  65 
Pakistan.  Mar,  39 

Nuclear  weapons  capability.  Sept,  54 
Panama  Canal  treaties.  June  18.  Nov.   15. 

Dec.  65 
Peace  Corps  Volunteer  Deborah  Loff.  re- 
lease of.  PR  331.  12/21 
Philippines.  Mar.  37.  Oct.  5 

U.S.  military  bases  agreement.  Feb.   16 
Population  growth  and  problems.  Mar.  38. 

Nov.  5 
President  Carter,  leadership.  Aug.  21 
Press,  question  of  contacts  with,  Feb.  9 
Refugees.  Mar.  37.  41.  Aug.  23 
Haitian.  Dec.  24 

Indochine.se.  Aug.  24.  Sept.  35.  53.  54. 
55.  56.  Oct.  4.  PR   I  10.  4/26;  PR 
176.  7/26 
U.N.   pledging  conference.  Sept,    37. 
Oct.  5.  Nov.  5.  Dec.   10.  25.  27 
Vietnamese,  Aug.  24,  Sept.  56 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


Vance,  Cyrus  (Cont'd) 

.Addresses,  remarks,  etc.  (Cont'd) 
Romania.  U.S.  relations.  Jan.   18 
SALT   II   {for  details,   see   Strategic  arms 
limitation   talks),   Jan.    15,   Feb.   8-9. 
14.    17.    Mar,    39.   42.   May   38.   41. 
June  23.  July  70.  Aug.  22.  30.  Sept. 
9.  Oct.  32.  33.  Nov.    1.  2.  Dec.  21. 
PR  285.  10/29 
Amendments  or  reservation,   question 

of.  July  67.  Aug,  21.  Nov.   18.  24 
NATO,   consultations,   and   question   of 
effect  of  US,  ratification.  Jan     15. 
16.  July  5.  68.   Aug,  33.  35.  Sept, 
12.  Nov.  24.  Dec.  24.  27.  PR   182. 
7/30 
Negotiations,  conclusion,  June  23 
Soviet  Backfire  system.  July  6.  66  Sept, 

12.  Dec,  24 
U,S,  ratification  urged.  June  17.  July  4. 
65.  Aug,  30.  34.  Sept,   11.  Oct.   14. 
33.   Nov.    18.  24.   Dec.   21.   28.   PR 
182.  7/30 
Verification.   Mar.   40,   July  4.   66.   69. 
Aug.  32.  Sept,   10.   12.  54.  Oct,  33. 
Nov.   19.  Dec,  22 
Saudi  Arabia.  Mar.  39.  May  39.  40 
Security  assistance.  Mar.  36.  PR  1  10.  4/26 
South  Africa.  Feb.  61   (quoted).  Mar    40. 

42.  43 
Southern   Rhodesia.   Jan.    17.   21.   Feb,   9. 
Mar.  40.  42.  Nov.  2 
Recognition  of  Muzorewa  regime,  ques- 
tion of.  Sept.  54 
Unilateral  elections.  Aug.  26.  27.  28 
U.S.  economic  sanctions.  Mar    43,  June 
22.  Aug.  22.  26 
Soviet  Union.  Jan.   15.  Mar.  35.  July  68 
U.S.  arms  control  negotiations  (.see  also 
Strategic   arms  limitation   talks). 
Jan.   16.  Aug.  22.  23.  36.  Dec.  22 
U.S.   arms  sales,   denial.  Jan.    18.   May 

41.  Sept.  54 
U.S.  computer  sales,  denial.  Nov.   18 
Soviet-U.S.   relations.  Feb,    11.   16.   Mar. 
42.  July  67.  68.  Aug.  23.  34.  Sept. 
1  1  .   Oct.    33.    Nov,    24.    Dec.   48 
(quoted).  PR  182.  7/30 
State  Department: 

Affirmative  action  program.  Mar.  43 
Bulletin.  40th  anniversary.  July  ii 
Terrorism,  Nov    2,  Dec.  66 
Thailand,  Sept.  36,  38,  53,  Dec.  10 
Trade: 

MTN   agreements,   Jan,    14,    Apr,    31, 
May   34,   35,   June    19,   28,   Sept,   36 
U.S.,  Jan.   14,  Mar.   35,  Apr,  30.  May 
33.  June  19.  Sept.  6 
Most-favored-nation  status.  May  41 
World  Trade  Week,  June  28 
Turkey,  Mar,  37,  June  17 
U.N.,  June  18 

Technical   assistance   programs.   Con- 
gressional restrictions.  Mar.  38,  41 
UN.  Day,  remarks  at  Kennedy  Center,  PR 

283,  10/29 
U.N.  Development  Program.  Mar.  37.  41 
UNCTAD  V,  proposed,  May  37 


I' 


24,  Sept, 


Vance.  Cyrus  (Cont'd) 

Addresses,  remarks,  etc.  (Cont'd) 
Vietnam: 
Chinese  invasion.  May  41 
Soviet  influence,  Feb.  8,  Aug 
55 
Western  Sahara,  Dec.  26 
Correspondence  and  messages: 

China,    People's   Republic  of,   establish- 
ment of  diplomatic  relations,  Feb.  19 
Cuba,  Soviet  combat  brigade  in,  Oct.  63 
SALT  II   treaty,   submitted   to  President 
Carter,  July  4 
Foreign   Policy   Conference  for  Editors  and 
Broadcasters,  announcement,  PR  24,  2/1 
News  conferences,  transcripts,  Jan.  21,  Feb, 

7,  II,  Aug,  21,  25,  Sept.  37,  53,  Oct, 
14,  Dec.  25 

Presentation   of  Distinguished   Honor   Award 

to  Marshall  Green,  PR  36,  2/13 
Question-and-answer  sessions,  Jan,   16,  May 

37,  39,  Sept,  1  1,  Nov.  16,  Dec.  23 
Resignation,  question  of,  Oct,  16 
Television  interviews,  transcripts.  Feb,    II, 

July  65.  Nov,   18.  19 
Visits  to: 

Canada.  Jan.  2  1 
Europe.  Feb.  10 

London.  Jan.  12.  39:  Christopher.  Jan.  35 
Middle  East:  Jan.  39:  Christopher.  Jan.  35 
van  Steenwyk.  W.  J.  de  Vos.  Sept.  50 
Vatican  City  State,  treaties,  agreements,  etc,, 

Feb.  65.  July  72.  Oct,  67 
Venezuela  (Vaky),  Apr.  56,  57,  60 
Ambassador  to  U.S.,  Oct,  63 
Maritime  boundary  treaty,  ratification  urged 

(Carter),  Apr.  59 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Jan.  61,  Aug.  67, 
Sept.  67,  Oct.  67,  Dec.  67 
Vessey,  John  W.,  Jr.,   recipient  of  Defense 

Distinguished  Service  Medal,  Aug.   16 
Vest,  George  S.,  Apr.  36,  Nov.  36 
Vietnam    (see   also   under    Kampuchea): 
Newsom,  Apr.  29,  PR  134,  5/17 
Chinese  invasion:  Aug.   38;  Carter,  Mar.  22, 
Apr,  5,  8:  Holbrooke,  Apr.  17,  18;  Petree, 
June  24;  Shulman,   Dec.  42:   Vance,   May.jj 
41;  Young,  June  62,  63  f 

Chinese- Vietnamese  relations,    discussions 

(Holbrooke).  Oct.  36 
Emigration   policies:    Vance,   Sept     56; 
Young,  H.,  Dec.  15-16 
UNHCR- Vietnam  memorandum  of  under- 
standing: Clark,  Oct.  8;  text,  Oct.  5 
Ethnic  Chinese  refugees,  policy:  Holbrooke, 

Oct.  35;  Young,  H.  Dec.  14 
Human   rights:    Holbrooke,   Oct.    34;   Mez- 

vinsky,  Apr.  53 
Soviet  support:  Feb.  40;  Carter,  Feb    4;  Hol- 
brooke, Oct.   35,   36:  Petree,  June  64; 
Shulman,  Dec.  42,  44,  45;  Vance,  Feb. 

8,  Aug.  24,  Sept.  55 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Dec.  67 
US.  embargo,  June  33 

U.S.  MIA's,  accounting  for:  Holbrooke, 
Oct.  34;  Oakley,  Oct.  39 

U.S.  relations,  question  of  normalization: 
Department,  Oct.  37;  Holbrooke,  Oct, 
34;  Oakley,  Oct.  39,  40  l| 


Index  1979 


29 


Viets,  Richard  Noyes.  swearing  in  as  Ambas- 
sador 10  Tanzania,  PR  248,  10/3 

Vins,  Georgi,  June  16n 

Visas,  preclearance  for  entry  inlo  U.S..  bilat- 
eral agreement  with  Bermuda,  Oct    67 

Volcker,  Paul.  Chairman  of  Federal  Reserve 
Board,  appoinlmenl  (Carter).  Oct.  9 


w 


Waldheim.  Kurt  (quoted).  Dec.   16 
Warnke,  Paul:  Fisher.  Jan.  55;  Vance.  July  69 
Key  speaker.  Conferences  on  U.S.  Security 
and   the  Soviet  Challenge,   announce- 
ments and  schedules.  PR   19.   1/18;  PR 
38,  2/14;  PR  98.  4/12;  PR  99.  4/12;  PR 
155,  6/14;  PR   156,  6/14;  PR   163,  7/6; 
PR   173,   7/18;  PR  236,   9/26;   PR  242, 
7/28 
Water  resources: 

Amman  water  and  sewerage,  project  loan 

agreement  with  Jordan.  Jan.  60 
Canal   cities  water  and   sewerage,   project 

grant  agreement  with  Egypt.  Sept.  69 
Great  Lakes  water  quality,  bilateral  agree- 
ment   with    Canada:    Jan.    23.    60; 
Jamieson,  Jan.  22 
Middle  East  (Saunders),  Oct.  45 
Nepal  (Christopher),  Apr.  51 
Tarbela   Dam.    Pakistan   (Christopher).    Apr. 
50 
Watergate  (Carter).  Feb.  4 
Watson.   Barbara  M.,  workshops  on  consular 

services,  announcement,  PR  274,  10/19 
Watson,  Thomas  J.,  Jr.,  swearing  in  as  Ambas- 
sador to  Soviet  Union,  PR  267,  10/12 
Western  Samoa: 

Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Nov.  61,  Dec.  69 
U.S.  Ambassador  (Martindell),  swearing  in, 
PR  188,  8/1 
Wheat: 

Food  aid  convention  (1971):  Vance.  May  37. 
Sept.  36,  Nov.  4 
Protocol  modifying  and  extending  (1978): 
Japan  (with  reservation),   Jan.   60; 
Luxembourg,   Apr.   68;  Switzerland, 
Mar.  68;  U.S.,  Sept.  69 
Protocol  modifying  and  extending  (1979): 
Argentina,   Aug.   68;   Australia,   July 
72;  Belgium,   Aug.   68;  Canada,  July 
72,   Aug.   68;  Denmark,   European 
Economic    Community,    Finland, 
France,  Federal  Republic  of  Germany, 
Ireland,   Italy,   Japan,   Luxembourg, 
Netherlands,  Aug.  68;  Norway,  Swe- 
den, Switzerland,  July  72;  U.K.,  Aug. 
68;  U.S.,  July  72,  Aug.  67-68 
Wheat  trade  convention  (1971): 

Protocol  (1978):  Austria,  Mar.  68;  El  Sal- 
vador, Apr.  68;  Finland,  Feb.  65; 
Japan,  Jan.  60;  Luxembourg.  Apr.  68; 
Nigeria,  June  67;  Spain,  Feb.  65 
Switzerland,  Mar.  68;  Trinidad  and 
Tobago,  Feb.  65;  Tunisia,  June  67; 


Wheal  (Conl'ci) 

Wheal  trade  convention  (Cont'd) 
Protocol  (1978)  (Cont'd! 

U.K.,  June  67;  U.S..  Aug.  67,  Sept. 
68;  Vatican.  Feb.  65 
Protocol  (1979):  Algeria,  Argentina,  Aug 
67;  Australia,  July  72;  Barbados, 
Sept.  69;  Belgium,  Aug.  67;  Bolivia, 
Aug.  67,  Sept.  69;  Brazil,  July  72; 
Canada,  July  72.  Aug.  67;  Costa 
Rica,  Denmark,  Aug.  67;  Ecuador. 
Egypt,  July  72;  El  Salvador,  July  72, 
Aug.  67,  Sept.  69;  European  Eco- 
nomic Community,  Aug.  67;  Finland, 
June  66,  Aug.  67;  France,  Aug.  67; 
Germany,  Federal  Republic  of,  Aug. 
67,  Dec.  68;  Greece,  July  72,  Sept. 
69;  Guatemala.  July  72,  Aug  67; 
India,  Iran,  July  72,  Aug.  67;  Iran, 
Oct.  67;  Ireland,  Italy,  Aug.  67;  Japan 
(with  reservation),  June  66,  Aug.  67; 
Kenya,  Sept.  69;  Korea,  Republic  of, 
July  72;  Luxembourg,  Aug.  67; 
Malta,  Sept.  69;  Mauritius.  Morocco. 
Netherlands.  Aug.  67;  Norway.  July 
72,  Aug.  67;  Pakistan.  Panama.  Aug. 
67;  Peru,  July  72,  Nov.  60;  Portugal. 
July  72;  Saudi  Arabia.  July  72.  Sept 
69;  South  Africa.  Aug.  67;  Spain, 
July  72,  Aug.  67;  Sweden,  July  72; 
Switzerland,  June  66,  July  72;  Syrian 
Arab  Republic,  July  72;  Trinidad  and 
Tobago,  Oct.  67;  Tunisia.  July  72; 
U.K.,  Aug.  67;  U.S.,  July  72,  Aug. 
67;  U.S.S.R.,  July  72,  Aug.  67;  Vati- 
can, July  72;  Venezuela,  Aug.  67 
Will,  George  F.,  Feb.  11,  July  65 
Williams,  G.  Mennen  (quoted).  June  20 
Williams,  Richard  (Mondale).  Oct.  13 
Wills,   international   uniform   law  on  form  of, 

convention  (1973),  Ecuador,  May  68 
Wilson,  Woodrow  (quoted),  Jan.  50 
Wisner.  Frank,  swearing  in  as  Ambassador  to 

Zambia,  PR  190,  8/6 
Women  (Reinhardt),  Feb.  50 
OECD  Conference   on   Employment   of 
Women,  proposed  (Christopher),  Sept. 
41 
U.N.  Decade  for  Women:  Jan.  57;  Maynes. 
June  52.  61 
Conference,  announcement,  PR  201,  8/17 
Women  in  the  Department  of  State:   Their 
Role  in  American  Foreign  Affairs,    re- 
leased, PR  31,  2/7 
Woodcock,  Leonard:  Feb.  22,  24;  Carter,  Jan. 
26;  Vance,  Feb.  15 
Biographical  details.  Mar.  3 
Swearing  in  as  Ambassador  to  People's  Re- 
public of  China.  Mar.  4n.  PR  52.  2/28 
World   Assembly   on   the   Elderly,   proposed. 

May  65 
World  Heritage  Trust  Fund  (Maynes),  June  62 
World   Intellectual   Property  Organization,   de- 
posit of  accessions  in:   Korea,   Mongolian 
People's  Republic,  Feb.  65;  Yemen  Arab 
Republic,  Mar.  68 


World  order:  Brzezinski,  Jan.  3,  Feb.  20;  Car- 
ter, Feb.  1;  McHenry,  Dec.  55;  Mondale, 
Oct.   II;  Vance,  June  17,  Dec.  22 

World  problems:  Carter,  Mar.  12,  27;  Hes- 
burgh,  Nov.  51;  Newsom.  PR  134.  5/17; 
Vance.  Nov.   1 


Yemen  (Aden):  Crawford.  June  40 
Profile.  June  40 

Soviet   activities   and   influence:    Feb.    40; 
Crawford.   June  40;   Draper,    Apr,    41; 
Shulman.  Dec.  44 
Treaties,  agreements,   etc.,   Aug.   66,   Sept. 
68,  Dec.  67 
Yemen  Arab  Republic: 
Profile,  June  40 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc..  Mar.  67,  68,  May 

67,  68 
U.S.   aid:   Crawford,   June  39;   Department. 
Apr.  41;  Draper.  Apr.  41; 
Saunders,  Oct.  50;  Shulman,  Dec.  44 
Young,  Andrew: 

Resignation  (Vance).  Oct.   16,  17,  Nov.   16 
Statements   and   correspondence,    Feb.    57 
(quoted),  June  47,  Oct.  23.  (quoted) 
Human  rights,  Feb.  59 
Indochina,  June  62,  63 
Lebanon,  U.S.  policy,  Oct.  61 
Palestinian  issue,  Feb.  63 
U.N.   Committee  on  the  Palestinian  Peo- 
ple. Jan.  51 
UNCTAD  V,  Sept    64 
Young,  Harry  F.,  Dec.   11 
Yugoslavia: 
Textile  agreement  with  U.S.,   amendments. 

PR  62,  3/9 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Apr    69,  Aug. 

66,  67,  Sept,  69,  Nov.  59 
U.S.  relations  (Vest),  Nov.  41 


Zaire  (Moose),  May  42 
Profile,  May  44 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc..  Mar.  69,  May  69, 

June  66,  Oct.  68,  Dec.  69 
U.S.  aid  (Moose),  Apr.  1  I,  May  44 
U.S.  Ambassador  (Oakley),  swearing  in,  PR 

303,  11/20 
U.S.   visit  of  President  Mobutu  Sese  Seko 

(White  House),  Nov.  20 
Zambia  (Moose),  May  47 

Communist  military  and  technical  assistance 

(Newsom),  Dec.  29,  30,  31 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc..  Mar.  68,  Oct.  68 
U.S.  aid  (Moose),  Apr.  10 
U.S.  Ambassador  (Wisner),  swearing  in.  PR 

190.  8/6 


I 


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