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■^i 



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October 1980 


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Df*partmf>nt of Statt* 

bulletin 



Volume 80 / Number 2043 / October 1980 



The Department of State Bulletin , 
published by the Office of Public 
Communication in the Bureau of PubUc 
Affairs, is the official record of U.S. 
foreign poUcy. Its purpose is to provide 
the pubUc, the Congress, and 
government agencies with information 
on developments in U.S. foreign 
relations and the work of the 
Department of State and the Foreign 
Service. 

The Bulletin's contents include major 
addresses and news conferences of the 
President and the Secretary of State; 
statements made before congressional 
committees by the Secretary and other 
senior State Department officials; 
special features and articles on 
international affairs; selected press 
releases issued by the White House, 
the Department, and the U.S. Mission 
to the United Nations; and treaties and 
other agreements to which the United 
States is or may become a party. 



EDMUND S. MUSKIE 
Secretary of State 

WILLIAM J. DYESS 

Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs 

PAUL E. AUERSWALD 

Director. 

Office of Public Communication 

JOHN CLARK KIMBALL 

Chief, Editorial Division 

PHYLLIS A. YOUNG 

Editor 

JUANITA ADAMS 

Assistant Editor 



The Secretary of State has determined that 
the publication of this periodical is 
necessary in the transaction of the public 
business required by law of this 
Department. Use of funds for printing this 
periodical has been approved by the 
Director of the Office of Management and 
Budget through January 31, 1981. 



NOTE: Contents of this publication are not 
copyrighted and items contained herein 
may be reprinted. Citation of the 
Department of State Bulletin as the 
source wiU be appreciated. The Bulletin is 
indexed in the Readers' Guide to Periodical 
Literature. 



For sale by the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing 
Office, Washington, D.C. 20402 

Price: 12 issues plus annual index— 
$19.00 (domestic) $23.75 (foreign) 
Single copy— $3.25 (domestic) $4.10 (foreign) 
Index, single copy— $2.25 (domestic) $2.85 (f H 



CONTENTS 



»e President 

National Security Policy 
News Conference of August 4 
(Excerpts) 



le Secretary 

Interview by the French Media 

(Excerpts) 
Interview for "U.S. News & 

World Report" 



rica 

Access Agreement With Somalia 
(Richard M. Moose, Depart- 
ment Announcement) 



mada 

U.S. -Canada Relations (Sharon 
E. Ahmad) 

U.S., Canada Sign Memo on Air 
Pollution 

Canada Approves Segment of 
Alaska Gas Pipeline (Presi- 
dent Carter's Letter to Prime 
Minister Trndean, Statement) 



5t Asia 

Thai-Cambodian Border Situa- 
tion (Morton I. Abramoivitz) 

Military Equipment to Thailand 
(Wliite House Announcement) 

Khmer Relief Efforts (Depart- 
ment Press Release and 
Statement) 

Accounting for MIAs: A Status 
Report (Michael A. Arma- 
cost) 

U.S. -Indonesia Nuclear Enei'gy 
Agreement (Message to the 
Congress) 



I 



nomics 



2' Economics and National Security 
in the 1980s (Richard N. 
Cooper) 

4' U.S. Trade Policy (Harry Kopp) 



FEATURE 

1 U.S. Relations With the Persian Gulf States (Harold H. Saunders; Country 
Profiles on Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United 
Arab Emirates) 



Energy 

36 Oil-Supply Pro-spects and U.S. 
International Energy Policy 
(Gerald A. Rosen, Joseph W. 
Twinam) 



Europe 

45 Export Restrictions on the 

U.S.S.R. (Richard N. Cooper) 

46 Secretary Meets With German 

Foreign Minister (Joint Press 
Statement) 

48 Trident I Missile Sale to the 

U.K. (Exchange of Letters 
Between President Carter and 
Prime Minister Thatcher, 
White House Statement) 

49 20th Report on Cyprus (Message 

to the Congress) 

49 Poland (Secretary Muskie) 

General 

50 Granting Political Asylum 

Abroad (William T. Lake) 



Human Rights 



51 



56 



Review of Human Rights in 
Latin America (Patricia M. 
Derian) 

Human Rights in South Africa 
(Patricia M. Derian) 



Middle East 

60 U.S. -Libyan Relations Since 
1969 (David D. Newsom) 

63 Iran Chrolonogy, August 1980 

64 Tank Sale to Jordan (Harold H. 

Saunders) 
66 U.S. -Jordan Relationship (Mor- 
ris Draper) 



Military Affairs 

67 Arms Coproduction (Matthew 
Nimetz) 

Oceans 



70 



73 



Ocean Development in the 1980s 
(Thomas R. Pickering) 

Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Re- 
sources Act (White House 
Stateme7it) 



South Asia 

74 Secretary Meets With Pakistani 
Foreign Minister 



Terrorism 

75 Hostage Convention (Message to 
the Senate) 



United Nations 

76 



78 



80 



Securing the World's Common 
Future (Secretary Muskie) 

Jerusalem and the Peace Negoti- 
ations (Secretary Muskie, 
Text of Resolution) 

U.S. Relationship With the U.N. 
(Donald F. McHenry) 



Treaties 

83 Current Actions 

Chronology 

85 August 1980 

Press Releases 

86 Department of State 

Index 



Special (See Center Section) 



Superintendent of Dec 



Secretary Muskie Interviewed on "Face the Nation" 

Secretary Muskie's News Conference of September 15 [\jQ\/ 1 4 



DEPOSITORY 



FEATURE 

Persian Gulf: 

Common Interests, Different Views 



Following are excerpts from a statement by As- 
sistant Secretary Harold H. Saunders before the Sub- 
committee on Europe and the Middle East of the 
House Foreign Affairs Committee on September 3, 
1980. The full text will be available as a committee 
print. 



Nitie years ago, the British withdrew from the [Per- 
sian] Gulf. There was much concern and uncertainty 
about the area because of internal, regional, and ex- 
ternal pressures . ... As events evolved, these states 
have enjoyed a period of relative security and im- 
pressive national progress, thanks to their own efforts 
and a helpful regional environment. 

Now in the past 2 years that regional environ- 
ment has changed dramatically, and these states, 
having successfully met the challenges of the 1970s 
face new ones in the 1980s. While their domestic de- 
velopment goes on, developments such as the Iranian 
revolution, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and 
Soviet activism in the Horn of Africa and South 
Yemen, the still unresolved Arab-Israeli conflict, and 
Iraq's search for a new role in the area have changed 
the regional political and strategic environment. 



The people in this area have their oivn view of the 
security threat they face, and this view is not widely 
under.stood. They are as concerned as anyone in the 
area about potential Soviet efforts to achieve a pre- 
dominance there which would curb their independ- 
ence. They recognize that they themselves do not have 
the capacity to meet that threat militarily, but they do 
believe that a strong Arab nationalism and vigorous 
Islamic faith can be important bulwarks against 
Soviet efforts to move toward predominance in indi- 
vidual states. 

But they also see security issues of two other 
kinds. They see the opportunity for external aggres- 
sion or for subversion, either with Soviet support or 
stemming from regional conflicts. The modernization 
process itself brings strains to traditional societies. 
The large influx of foreign workers, including many 
Palestinians and other Arabs so necessary to imple- 
ment their national development programs, has given 
most Gulf states a work force more foreign than indi- 



genous. The leadership in these countries has shotn 
concern for human developynent in the use of 'I 
wealth, but they are likely to be faced in the i/as 
ahead with continuing internal pressures to ox-s'/ne 
various elements of society — particularly the u>iii<. 
ally large percentage of young people — a fair id 
meaningful role. Having made progress in est <■ 
lishi)ig government institutions, these states face \e. 
challenge of maintaining soisitive contact with fh r 
peoples and of developing institutions whicli 1,1 
carry their traditional social harmony over into 1« 
modern era. Since the Iratiian revolution, the 
titude of minority Shia'a communities in many of 
Gulf societies has been of concern because pr 
aganda from Tehran has urged Shia'a residents 
oppose the monarchical Gulf regimes and th 
Western ties. 

On a different plane, the governments of the G 
states also consistently assert that the absence of k 
Arab-Israeli peace is a primary threat to security c I 
stability in the Gulf region. They regard the An^ 
Israeli conflict as providing a main opportunity 
enhanced Soviet influence in the region, as an 
strument for revolutionaries and those who wo i 
spread radical political influence, and as the prim) 
obstacle to the firm relationship with the Uni i, 
States which their national inte^-ests otherwise a 
for. 



We continue to share tnany common goals ci 
interests with the states of the Gulf: We all want/ 
maintain a global strategic balance which prote\ 
their independence. We all want to achieve a co 
prehensive Middle East peace. We all want to mai 
tain orderly energy and fina)tcial markets. We 
want to expand economic cooperation. 



f 



Today, some aspects of our earlier approach 
remain valid; others must be adjusted to take it 
consideration conditions in Iran and neighboring 
ghanistan. My comments here today are designed 
present to you our sense both of the continuity a 
more permanent elements of U.S. policy toward ti 
region and an explanation of why and how we c 
making the adjustments necessary in response 
changed local and regional circumstances. U 



Feature 



f.S. Relations With the Persian Gulf States 



/ Harold H. Saunders 

Statement xuhmitted to the Hviixe 
h-rii/u Af'fah-fi Committee on Sej)- 
r 3. 1980. Mr. Saunders is As- 

■ t Secretary for Near Eastern and 
-ith Asian Affairs.^ 

■;i(h of the past 2 years at this time, I 
(■ been asked by this subcommittee to 
-ml an overview of the developments 
111' Middle East and Southwestern 
L Although today's hearing is not 
■I I as that presentation, it is appropri- 
III that context to discuss with the 
"inmittee the evolving U.S. relation- 
u ith the Arabian Peninsula states on 
' I'lTsian Gulf — Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, 
• I'ain, Qatar, the United Arab Eniir- 
lU.A.E.), and Oman. Developments 
!■ surrounding region and the im- 
iince of the Gulf itself warrant our 
ii.u: made this area the centerpiece of 
iiificant policy review. 
.My purposes in this statement are to: 

• Outline our interests in these 
s as they have intensified in the last 
■al years; 

» Present our perception of the 
inics of this area, how it has devel- 
in the past decade, and the chal- 
s ahead; and 

» Discuss how our policies toward 
rea fit our expanding interests and 
' langing circumstances there. 

■i Interests 

11 nterests in the region are longstand- 
lajor, and interrelated. They take 
'.ance of: 

The area's strategic location and 
i :nificance to maintaining a global 
a gic balance; 

The significance we place on the 
wvl^ignty and independence of these 
5oil"ies as part of a more stable world; 

The world's vital need for the re- 
nal oil; and 

The importance of these states in 
atBational finance and development 
■nJi; markets for our goods and 



ec iilogy. 

1 the last decade our interests in 
he gion have changed little in nature 
'Ut ,ve grown in importance. 



We then spoke of the vital flow of 
Gulf oil to our NATO allies and our 
friends east of Suez. Now we ourselves 
have become excessively dependent upon 
Gulf oil. 

As the Gulf countries have grown 
prosperous, they have assumed a much 
more prominent role in both regional and 
world affairs. 

Our commerce with the area has ex- 
panded enormously, as has the presence 
of Americans there. 

Our cultural relations have greatly 
increased, including the education in 
American universities of large numbers 
of students from the region. 

Events in surrounding countries 
have sharply increased concern about 
Soviet pressure on this sensitive region. 

In the last decade, our relationships 
with these six Gulf states have been sol- 
idly developed on a foundation that in- 
cludes: 



• The strategic importance of the 
area to the Western world and the im- 
portance the Gulf states attach to our 
ability to maintain a global strategic bal- 
ance which discourages outside interven- 
tion in the area; 

• The priority these states attach to 
a just and lasting resolution of the Arab- 
Israeli conflict and their recognition that 
among outside powers the United States 
is unique in its ability to play an effective 
role in the search for a comprehensive 
Middle East peace; 

• A general recognition of the com- 
mon responsibility of major oil producers 
and consumers to maintain orderly mar- 
kets conducive to international economic 
welfare; 

• An expanding mutual interest in 
economic cooperation including: the 
growth of commerce, the transfer of 
technology for sound economic develop- 



Bahrain — A Profile 



Geography 

•Area: 260 sq. mi. (four time.'* the size of 
Washington, D.C.; it is an archipelago of 
islands of which si.x are inhabited). Capi- 
tal: Manama (pop. 90,000). 

People 

Population: 34.3.000 (1979 est.). Annual 
Growth Rate: 3.4 '7f. Ethnic Groups: Arab 
(80'*), Iranian (12'7(), Pakistani, Indian. 
Religions: Shia'a Muslim (60'7f), Sunni Mus- 
lim (40*70. Languages: Arabic (official), 
English, Farsi, Urdu. 

Government 

Type: Traditional Emirate (Cabinet- 
Executive system). Date of Independence: 
Aug. 15, 1971. Constitution: May 26, 1973. 
Branches: E.recutiir — Amir (Chief of 
State), Prime Minister (Head of Govern- 
ment), Council of Ministers (cabinet). 
Leg i slat ice — suspended. Judicial — inde- 
pendent judiciary with right of judicial re- 
view. Political Parties: None. Suffrage: 
Not applicable. 



Economy 

GDP: $1.7 billion (1979 est.). Annual 
Growth Rate: 6'7t (est.). Per Capita In- 
come: $4,967 (1979 est.). Inflation Rate: 
15'J. Natural Resources: Oil, associated 
and nonassociated natural gas, fish. Ag- 
ricultural Products: Eggs, vegetables, 
dates. Industries: Oil, aluminum, ship re- 
pair, natural gas, fish. Trade (1978): 
Exj)orts — $1.9 billion: oil, aluminum, fish. 
Partners — Japan, Saudi Arabia, U.K., 
U.S. Imports — $2 billion: machinery, in- 
dustrial equipment, motor vehicles, 
foodstuffs, clothing. Partners — Japan, 
U.K., U.S. Official Exchange Rate: .384 
Bahrain dinars= US$1.00. 

Membership in 
International Organizations 

U.N. and most of its specialized agencies, 
Arab League, OAPEC. 

Principal Government Officials 

Bahrain: Amir — Shaikh Isa bin Salman Al 
Khalifa; Crown Prince — Hamad bin Isa Al 
Khalifa; Prime Minister — Khalifa bin Sal- 
man Al Khalifa; Minister of Foreign 
Affairs — Mohammad bin Mubarak Al 
Khalifa; Ambassador to the U.S. — 
Abdulaziz Buali. United States: Ambas- 
sador to Bahrain — Peter Sutherland. 






Feature 



ment of the Gulf states, maintaining in- 
ternational financial order, and facilitat- 
ing the development of poorer countries; 
and 

• The desire of these states for U.S. 
assistance in developing an appropriate 
defense capability and our willingness to 
join our allies in fulfilling this need. 

A Decade of Progress 

Eight years ago the Department testified 
before this subcommittee on U.S. policy 
toward the Persian Gulf, following an in- 
tensive, prolonged review of U.S. policy 
toward that region in light of the ending 
of the United Kingdom's historic protec- 
tive treaty relationships with the smaller 
states on the Ai-ab side of the Gulf. Then 
we looked forward to developing formal 
relations with three states achieving full 
independence, while retaining an historic 
relationship with Oman and building on 
well-established relations with Saudi 
Arabia and Kuwait. 

But the international community 
contemplated the British withdrawal 
from the Gulf with understandable con- 
cern. 

Revolutionary ideologies had long at- 
tacked the Gulf's ruling order. 

Territorial disputes complicated the 
quest for regional cooperation. 

Communist-supported insurgency in 
Oman's Dhofar Province demonstrated 
the destabilizing effect of outside inter- 
vention. 

The world wondered if states so 
small and thinly manned could develop 
the institutions and national character 
required to stand on their own in a 
troubled world. 

As it turned out, the smaller states 
of the Gulf were helped in their progi'ess 
toward nationbuilding by a relatively 
tranquil environment. Their larger 
neighbor, Saudi Arabia, was and remains 
in a period of great national progress. 
The concept of close cooperation among 
the Arabian Peninsula states on the Gulf 
progressed steadily. The harmonious rela- 
tionship that the two largest Middle East 
countries, Iran and Egypt, developed 
with one another and with Saudi Arabia 
and the other Gulf states provided an at- 
mosphere conducive to orderly develop- 
ment. 

In this environment, progress on the 
Arab side of the Gulf was impressive. 

The seven so-called Trucial States 
came together to form the United Arab 
Emirates. Bahrain and Qatar firmly es- 
tablished their national identities. All the 
lower Gulf states developed a strong 
foundation of cooperation across a broad 



range of economic, political, and security 
issues among themselves, Kuwait, and 
Saudi Arabia. 

Many of the sensitive boundary dis- 
putes in the Gulf were resolved. 

The insurgency in Oman's Dhofar 
Province, supported by the radical South 
Yemen regime, collapsed when faced with 
Oman's spirited resistance and progress 
toward national unity. Oman was aided by 
significant support from its neighbors. 

Saudi Arabia and its Gulf neighbors 
made progress in developing institutions 
of public administration, accommodating 
traditional social structures to the needs 
of modern government. In the U.A.E. 
the federal assembly has developed as a 
constructive expression of public senti- 
ment. Kuwait and Bahrain have experi- 
mented with popularly elected national 
assemblies and in the process have gained 
valuable experience in how to engage 
public opinion constructively in the for- 
mulation of national policy. Kuwait's ruler 
has just issued a decree calling for the re- 
convening of an elected national assembly 
before the end of Februaiy Saudi Arabia 
has announced that it will soon establish a 
consultative council. 

Without exception these six govern- 
ments have made important strides in 
using the benefits of oil wealth to better 
the lives of their peoples by meeting basic 
human needs and developing human po- 
tential while building the material attri- 
butes of modem societies. 

The Surrounding Environment 

Presently, however, and as we look 
ahead, the reassuring record of progress 
in these six Gulf states must be weighed 
against events in surrounding countries 
which impact heavily on these states. 

The revolution and the decline of 
central authority in Iran have radically 
altered the strategic environment of 
other Gulf countries. 

The Soviet invasion of nonaligned 
Afghanistan threatens the security of all 
of Southwest Asia. 

In this regional atmosphere, Soviet, 
Cuban, and East German presence in the 
Horn of Africa and South Yemen rein- 
forces longstanding concern about Soviet 
pressure through support of radical forces. 

There is, furthermore, an atmos- 
phere of marked instability within the 
wider region. Rejection of long-cherished 
traditions of civility is becoming more 
notable. Specific examples are: 



Kuwait — A Profile 



Geography 

.'Xrea: 7,780 sq. mi. (slightly smaller thi 
New Jersey). Capital: Kuwait (pop. 1.0 
million). 

People 

Population: 1.2 million (1979 est.). Am 
Growth Rate: G'i (1977 est. which inch 
immigration). Ethnic Groups: Arab, I 
nian, Indian, Pakistani. Religion: Mus 
Languages: Arabic (official), English 
widely spoken. 

Government 

Type: Constitutional monarchy, goveri 
by an Amir chosen by consensus of the 
ruling al-Sabah family from its own me 
bers. Independence: June 19, 1961. Co 
stitution: Suspended temporarily. Pol' 
cal Parties: None. Suffrage: Males ov 
21. 

Economy 

GDP: $23.8 billion (1979 est.). Per Cai 
GDP: $19,817 (1979 est.). Inflation Ri 
5.2'^. Agricultural Products: None. I 
dustries: Crude and refined oil, fertili: 
chemicals, building materials, shrimp. 
Trade (1979): Exports — $18.3 billion: 
crude and refined petroleum, shrimp. 
Import.i — $4.9 billion: foodstuffs, au- 
tomobiles, building materials, machine 
te.xtiles. Partners — Japan, U.S., U.K., 
F.R.G. Official Exchange Rate: 1 Kux | 
dinar = $3.68 (1980). Economic Aid Re p 
ceived: None. Economic Aid Sent: $2. 
billion (1975-79). 



I 



Membership in 
International Organizations 

U.K., Arab League, OPEC, OAPEC, L 
IBRD. 

Principal Government Officials 

Kuwait: Amir — Jabir al-Ahmad al-Sab 
Crown Prince and Prime Minister — Sai 
al-Abdullah al-Sabah; Minister of Forei 
Affairs — Sabah al-Ahmad al-Sabah; An 
bassador to the U.S. — Khalid M. Jaffai 
United States: Ambassador to Kuwait- 
Francois M. Dickman. 






« 



t 

i 

I '"a 

k 



Department of State ^^^^ 



• The violation of international law 
id standards of civilized conduct among 
itions in the continued holding of diplo- 
atic hostages in Iran; 

• The unprecedented campaign of 
rrorism by Libyan leaders against their 
m people abroad; 

• The violence in Lebanon and the 
Bculty of rebuilding civil order; and 

1 • The legacy of Iraq's support for 
idical groups engaged in terrorism. 
The complexity of Iraq's search for 
national personality, its future rela- 
ynship with Gulf neighbors, and its in- 
1 -national role as a wealthy member of a 
'irld under economic pressure all impact 
STiificantly on the region. 

Historic progress in achieving peace 
.1 ween Egypt and Israel has in its cur- 
I it state created tension between Egypt 
i 1 other Arabs. The current isolation of 
1 \ pt from the Arab world has inhibited 
I vpt's role as a force for stability else- 
V ?re in the Middle East. 

At the same time, our commitment 
• eal with all aspects of the Palestinian 
ilem while sustaining Israel's security 
fishes hopes for the tranquility which 
e can bring throughout the area. But 
ijuest challenges leaders in the Gulf 
elsewhere in the Middle East to rise 
le level of vision and courage re- 
A ed to proceed on the path to a lasting 



I Present and Future Gulf 

[iGulf states perceive themselves and 
rorld perceives the Gulf region with 
larkable mixture of anxiety and 
Tft . Tensions in surrounding areas have 
It 'ased concern about the Gulf's secu- 
while the very progress in the region 
irought internal stresses. The vast 
irces of the region and the demon- 
ed willingness of its leaders to meet 
challenges at home and abroad sug- 
Lthat these states have the capabihty 
kep their own houses in order while 
jng an ever more constructive and 
jrtant role in regional and world af- 



Ve can pursue our interests in the 
1 in harmony with the aspirations 
loncerns of its people. To do so we 
1 constantly bear in mind how our 
as interests and their various needs 
There is, for instance, an obvious 
lonship between the security of the 
|ri and its reUability as an oil supplier, 
rowth of our economic relationships 
ave an impact on the pace and qual- 
j development in the Gulf states, and 
i\ turn will influence the prospects 
lability. 



Our ability to be supportive of the 
security of the region will be influenced 
by both international economic and re- 
gional political factors, and regional secu- 
rity will in turn enhance the prospects for 
orderly development and stability. The 
progress which we can make toward a 
comprehensive Middle East peace not 
only will heavily influence the quahty of 
our relationship with these states but also 
will have profound impact on their pros- 
pects for orderly progress. 

Security and Orderly Progress 

Given our deep interest in the security of 
the region and the alertness of the Gulf 
states to external and internal pressures 
on their stability, we might define possi- 
ble threats to the region as a framework 
for discussing part of the U.S. policy re- 
sponse, making clear that our posture is 
one of defense, finely tuned to the sen- 
sitivity and sovereignty of the states in 
the area. 



Feature 



Direct Soviet Agg^ression. In the 

light of historic Russian objectives and 
expansionism into Central Asia, the Gulf 
states have good reason to be apprehen- 
sive about the possibility of direct Soviet 
military intervention. The Soviet invasion 
of Afghanistan gives a tangible quality to 
this longstanding concern. The turbu- 
lence in revolutionary Iran suggests a 
further immediate possibility for the 
Soviets which could give them a direct 
opening into the Persian Gulf and its oil 
and a further lever with which to upset 
domestic stability in the Gulf region. The 
thinly populated Gulf states realize they 
have no prospect for developing a mili- 
tary capability to meet these threats. 
They look to us to check them, but they 
prefer that we do so by actions outside 
the region and in a way that minimizes 
their involvement. They greatly fear that 
the area will become an arena of super- 
power confrontation. 

Our response to the Soviet threat 
must, therefore, involve a complex of 



Saudi Arabia — A Profile 



Geography 

Area: About 873,000 sq. mi. (one-third the 
size of the U.S.; boundaries are undefined 
and disputed). Capital: Riyadh (pop. 
750,000 est.). Other Cities: Jidda (615,000; 
site of the Foreign Ministry and the foreign 
diplomatic representatives), Mecca 
(250,000), Medina (150,000), Taif (100,000), 
Damman (100,000). 

People 

Population: 7.1 million (1979 est.). Annual 
Growth Rate: 3.1 -5 (1979), Ethnic 
Groups: Arab tribes with admixture of 
peoples from other Arab and Muslim coun- 
tries. Religion: Muslim. Language: 
Arabic. 

Government 

Type: Monarchy. Date of Unification: 
Sept. 23, 1952. "Constitution: None. 
Branches: Executive — King (Chief of 
State and Head of Government). 
Legislative — none. Judicial — Islamic 
Courts of First Instance and Appeals. 
Political Parties: None. Suffrage: None. 

Economy 

GDP: $78 billion (1979 est.). Annual 
Growth Rate: 24.9* (1979). Per Capita 



Income: $11,500 (1979 est.). Inflation 
Rate: lO'^t, Natural Resources: Petro- 
leum, natural gas. Agricultural Products: 
Dates, grains, vegetables, livestock. In- 
dustries: Petroleum and petroleum prod- 
ucts, fertilizer, cement. Trade (1979): 
Exports — $46,5 billion: petroleum. 
Partners — EEC (50'7f), U.S. (16%), Japan 
(15%), LDCs(19'7f). /mpor?s— $217 bil- 
lion: transportation equipment, machinery, 
foodstuffs. Partners — EEC and Japan 
(62%), U.S. (25%), LDCs (12%), other 
(1%). Official Exchange Rate: 3.34 Saudi 
riyals = US$1.00. Economic Aid Received: 
None. Economic Aid Sent (1974-78): Ap- 
proximately $15 billion. 

Membership in 
International Organizations 

U.N. and its specialized agencies, OPEC, 
OAPEC, INTELSAT. 

Principal Government Officials 

Saudi Arabia: King and Prime 
Minister — Khalid bin Abd al-Aziz A! Saud; 
First Deputy Prime Minister and Crown 
Prince — Fahd bin Abd al-Aziz Al Saud; 
Minister of Foreign Affairs — Sa'ud bin 
Faisal bin Abd al-Aziz AI Saud; Ambas- 
sador to the U.S. — Faisal Alhegelan. 
United States: Ambassador to Saudi 
Arabia — John C. West. 



ber 1980 



Feature 



military, economic, and political actions, 
and working in close cooperation with our 
allies, our friends in the Gulf, and key 
states in the broader region. 

Economic and political measures we 
and our allies have taken to bring home 
to the Soviets the cost of intervention in 
Afghanistan are part of this response. 
The Gulf countries, in their own Islamic 
context, have led international efforts to 
obtain Soviet withdrawal from Afghani- 
stan. 

Other industrial democracies have 
joined us in intensified efforts to sujjport 
two key neighboring states which are 
deeply concerned about Soviet intentions 
in the region — Turkey and Pakistan. Gulf 
governments have indicated their desire 
to assist and cooperate with these coun- 
tries. We are also seeking to provide the 
states of the region with an improved de- 
fense capability of their own. 

We have made significant sacrifices 
to transfer scarce resources into a 
strengthened global militai-y capability 
and continue to work with our allies in 
the common task of maintaining a mili- 
tary balance which will deter Soviet 
intervention in the Gulf or elsewhere. We 
and our NATO allies are proceeding with 
actions in Europe to buttress Western 
strength vis-a-vis the Soviets, while we 
also direct resources and militaiy capabil- 
ities toward the Persian Gulf to establish 
the capacity to deter there as well. 

Because of its strategic location and 
its critical resources, the Gulf is inescap- 
ably a factor in the global balance. Our 
abiUty to maintain that balance requires a 
capability to project effective force to- 
ward the region for the purpose of con- 
fronting aggressors and safeguarding the 
integrity of its nations. We are deter- 
mined that the Gulf will be secure against 
outside interference. In his State of the 
Union address the President made this 
point clearly when he said: 

An attempt by any outside t'oree to gain 
control of the Persian Gulf region will be re- 
garded as an assault on the vital interests of 
the United States of America, and such an as- 
sault will be repelled by any means necessary, 
including military force. 

The logistics of maintaining this de- 
terrent capability requires cooperation 
from friendly states in the region. Eor 
one-third of a century we have main- 
tained a military presence in the Gulf and 
our deployed forces have had access to 
logistic support facilities. Our continued 
ability to contribute to the security of the 
region greatly depends upon such access. 

In order to carry out this policy in 
the region, we have undertaken several 



^ 



United Arab Emirates— 
A Profile 

Geography 

Area: About 32,000 sq. mi. (about the size 
of Maine). Capital: Abu Dhabi (pop. 
300,000). Other Cities: Dubai, Sharjah. 

People 

Population: 900,000 (1979 est.). Annual 
Growth Rate: S'7, (1979). Ethnic Groups: 

Arab, Iranian, Pakistani, Indian (less than 
2b''i of the population are U.A.E. citizens). 
Religions: Muslim (90'>f), Hindu, Chris- 
tian. Languages: Arabic (official); Farsi 
and English widely spoken. 

Government 

Type: Federation of Emirates. Date of In- 
dependence: Dec. 2, 1971. Date of Provi- 
sional Constitution: Dec. 2, 1971. 
Branches: Executive — 7-member Supreme 
Council of Rulers which elects President 
and Vice President. Legislative — 40- 
member National Consultative Council. 
Judicial — secular legal code.s being intro- 
duced; Islamic law influential. Political 
Parties: None. Suffrage: None. 



i 



Economy 

GDP: $16 billion (1979). Annual Growtl; 
Rate: 5^'t (1979 est.). Per Capita Inconi ^ 
$16,000 (1979 e.st.). Inflation Rate: 159' 
Natural Resource: Oil. Agricultural 
Products: Vegetables, dates, limes. Ind 
tries: Light manufactures, petroleum. | 
Trade (1979): E.r parts— $55.5 billion: p 
troleum. Imports — $13.1 billion; machii 
ery, consumer goods, food. Partners — 
Western Europe, Japan, U.S. Official 1 
change Rate: 1 dirham = US$0.26. Eco- 
nomic Aid Received: None. Economic 
Sent: $3.5 billion (1974-78). 

Membership in 
International Organizations 

U.N., Arab League, OPEC, OAPEC. 

Principal Government Officials 

United .\rab Emirates: President and 
Ruler of Abu Dhabi — Shaikh Zayid bin £' 
tan al Nuhayan; Vice President, Prime 
Minister, and Ruler of Dubai — Shaikh 
Rashid bin Said al-Maktum; Minister of 
Foreign Affairs — Ahmad Khalifa al- 
Suwaidi; Ambassador to the U.S. — 
Vacant. United States: Ambassador to I 
U.A.E. — William D. Wolle. 



initiatives. In response to the destabiliz- 
ing situation and Soviet pressures in the 
general region, we have significantly in- 
creased our naval presence in the Indian 
Ocean. Further, we are improving our 
capability to surge forces into the area by 
organizing the rapid deployment force 
(RDF) and by improving our airlift and 
sealift forces to move the RDF more 
quickly In addition, we have sought and 
are seeking selective and limited access 
to air and naval facilities in the area, such 
as Oman, Kenya, and Somalia. We are 
also upgrading facilities in the area, such 
as Diego Garcia. 

These facilities are to support our 
peacetime presence, periodic exercises 
and deployments, and to allow us to move 
more significant forces into the area if 
necessary. We seek no bases. Our cooper- 
ative arrangements fully respect the 
sovereignty of the cooperating states, 
and of their neighbors. Such cooperation 
reflects the realism and strategic grasp of 



governments determined to preserve 
their own independence and to foster ai 
secure regional environment. 

Soviet-Supported Aggression. Ov< 

the years, Gulf governments have been 
concerned about Soviet military supper 
for and political influence in radical 
neighboring states with aggressive 
policies. In the last decade the Marxist 
regime in South Yemen, strongly backer 
and heavily armed by the Soviets, foug 
border actions against Saudi Arabia, su 
ported the insurgency in Oman's Dhofai 
Province, and last year invaded North 
Yemen. The Soviet position in Ethiopia, 
combined with a prominent Soviet role i 
South Yemen, increases the vulnerabilit 
of the Bab-al-Mandab/Red Sea access ai 
intensifies the concern of the Gulf coun- 
tries. Cubans and East Germans are ac- 
tively engaged in supporting Soviet ef- 
forts in the area. 

All six Arabian Peninsula countries 
on the Gulf seek harmonious relations 



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Department ot State Buliei* ^ 



Feature 



ith all their neighbors. Their basic pol- 
y has been to foster a sense of common 
irpose among Arab and Islamic nations 
dich finds no room for Soviet interven- 
»n. 
This policy is supportive of our own 
!»sire to see the Gulf peoples preserve 
jace and tranquility. We are encouraged 
1 signs that Iraq has developed a 
f ?ater harmony with Arab neighbors on 
t ' Gulf. We have noted the emergence of 
aiew leadership in South Yemen and will 
\| tch carefully for tangible indications it 
r jht come to live in peace and perhaps 
i) cooperation with its neighbors. 

As elsewhere in the Middle East, we 
s nd ready to work with others in the 
p ion to ease tensions where our help is 
b eficial. Our political and military sup- 
p efforts and deployments in response 
U ast year's Yemen war manifested this 
ir nt. 

But if Saudi Arabia and its Gulf 
tU ;hbors are to be secure from Soviet- 
; <e(l military threat or the political 
sure such threat can bring to bear, 
must have a modern defense capabil- 
>ur security assistance to these coun- 
r ; is a significant factor in providing 
-h capability and a key element in our 
o\ all relationship with them. Our 
[« etime military presence in the region 
:s additional element in assuring the 
se rity of the area. 

Over the years we have had an im- 
?o int role in assisting Saudi Arabia to 
^e lop a modern defense capability. 
>• the last decade we have played a 
2 ficant part in Kuwait's defense pro- 
; . In recent years we have demon- 
r I'd our willingness to be supportive 
■ defense requirements of the other 
u states. 

3ur arms policy toward the region is 
'* stent with our worldwide approach 
) ; oviding military equipment and 
-a ing. Our arms sales to all six states 
= reesigned not to seek short-range 
<5| cal or commercial gains by loading 
nfl with unsuitable or e.xcessive equip- 
1* but rather to help provide them 
■m appropriate and effective national 
.se. In this effort we do not wish an 
i' sive role and welcome the contribu- 
'i f our industrialized allies and of 
goBTiments in the region, such as Jor- 
daBwhich can assist in various ways. 

egional Conflict. The atmosphere 
ich the Gulf states seek their future 
uenced by rivalries, tensions, and 
ce in the wider region — in the 
Israel dispute, in Lebanon, in parts 
ica, and, closer to home, in the cur- 
njjension between Iraq and Iran and 



South Yemeni pressures on neighbors. 
The Gulf states recognize clearly the need 
to defuse these tensions. Our own policy 
remains dedicated to this objective. In 
some cases we can play a significant role, 
at times working together with Gulf 
countries. In other situations, such as the 
tension between Iraq and Iran, our con- 
cern exceeds our ability to influence 
events. We welcome whatever influence 
the Gulf states can bring to bear in re- 
moving the source of regional tension. 

Externally Supported Subversion 
and Internal Threats. No catalogue of 
possible threats to the Gulf states would 
be complete without acknowledging that 
there is widely publicized concern about 
threats from within. That outside forces 
seek to subvert these states is a matter 
of public record. The Gulf states face a 
number of challenges, some resulting 
from the very progress they have made. 

The modernization process itself 
brings change to traditional societies. 

The large influx of foreign workers — 
so necessary to implement their national 
development programs — has given most 
Gulf states a work force more foreign 
than "native." This raises the long-term 
problem of the claims of foreign residents 
on the society. 

The leadership in these countries has 
shown wisdom and concern for human 
development in the use of oil wealth. In 
the years ahead, however, they are likely 
to be faced with continuing internal 
pressures to assure various elements of 
society a fair share and a meaningful role. 
Insuring a meaningful role for the unusu- 
ally large percentage of young people in 
these societies, all of them with access to 
education, is a special challenge. 

Having made progress in establish- 
ing government institutions, these states 
face the challenge of maintaining sensi- 
tive contact with their peoples and of de- 
veloping institutions which will carry 
their traditional social harmony over into 
the modern era. 

Since the Iranian revolution the at- 
titude of minority Shi'a communities in 
many of the Gulf societies has been of 
concern. Propaganda from Tehran urges 
Shi'a residents to oppose the monarchial 
Gulf regimes and their Western ties. The 
Gulf states wish to maintain decent rela- 
tions with Tehran. They desire a reduc- 
tion of tensions between the United 
States and Iran as a means of fostering 
regional tranquility. 

We will not interfere in the internal 
affairs of any country. We have, however, 
through both official and private channels. 



Oman — A Profile 



Geography 

Area: 115,800 sq. mi. (about the size of 
Kansas). Capital: Muscat (pop. NA). 

People 

Population: 860,000 (1979 est.). Annual 
Growth Rate: NA. Ethnic Groups: Arab, 

Baluchi, East African, Indian, Pakistani. 
Religions: Muslim, some Hindus. Lan- 
guages: Arabic (official), English, Farsi, 
Urdu, Indian dialects. 

Government 

Type: Absolute monarchy; sultan rules 
through ministries and other government 
agencies. Constitution: None. Branches: 
Executive — Sultan. Legislative — None. 
Judicial — Traditional Islamic judges and a 
nascent civil court system. Political Par- 
ties: None. Suffrage: None. 

Economy 

GDP: $3.4 billion (1979 est.). Per Capita 
GDP: $3,934 (1978 est.). Inflation 
Rate: 87f (1979 est.). Natural Resources: 
Oil, some copper, asbestos, marble, lime- 
stone. Ag^ricultural Products: Dates, al- 
falfa, wheat, bananas, coconuts. Indus- 
tries: Petroleum, fish, construction. Trade 
(1979 est.): Erportx— $2.3 billion: oil. 
Imports — $1.4 billion: machinery and 
transportation equipment, food and live 
animals, mineral fuels, tobacco. 
Partners— Japan, U.K., U.A.E., West 
Germany, U.S., Netherlands. Official Ex- 
change Rate: Omani rial = US$2.90. Eco- 
nomic Aid Received: Total — NA. 
U.S. —as of 1979, U.S. aid consisted of a 
small Peace Corps program and a small 
reimbursed Federal Aviation Administra- 
tion program. 

Membership in 
International Organizations 

U.N. and several of its specialized agen- 
cies, Arab League, INTELSAT. 

Principal Government Officials 

Oman: Sultan, Prime Minister, Minister of 
Defense and Finance — Qaboos Bin Said; 
Minister of State for Foreign Affairs — Qais 
Abdul-Munim Al-Zawawi; Ambassador to 
the U.S. — Sadek Jawad Sulaiman; L^nited 
States: Ambassador to Oman — Marshall 
W. Wiley. 



ler 1980 



Feature 



had an important role in the region's eco- 
nomic and social development, and we are 
eager to continue this contribution wher- 
ever it is welcome. We share the view of 
these governments that their economic 
and social development must be sound 
and wisely paced. 

The Gulf governments are aware 
that we welcome their efforts to devise 
political institutions which will respond 
effectively to the desire of their people to 
participate in the shaping of national pol- 
icy in a period of rapid economic and so- 
cial change. These governments under- 
stand we advocate no particular doctrine 
or political system for them but that we 
support their interest in developing via- 
ble institutions of government, which as- 
sist in providing protection for basic 
human rights. 

Middle East Peace. The Palestinian 
issue weighs heavily on all the Gulf gov- 
ernments and on our relations with them. 
These governments seek a comprehen- 
sive Middle East peace on the basis of 
Security Council Resolution 242. They all 
strongly assert the need to fulfill the 
rights of the Palestinian people in any 
peace arrangements, and Saudi Arabia in 
particular feels a special responsibility 
toward the future status of Jerusalem. 

Consistently these governments as- 
sert that absence of peace in the Middle 
East is the primary threat to Middle East 
security, including the stability of the 
Gulf region. They regard tensions and 
alienations created by one-third of a 
centurj' of conflict between Arabs and Is- 
raelis as the main source of Societ influ- 
ence in the region, as a leading contribu- 
tor to revolution and radical political cur- 
rents throughout the Middle East, and as 
the primar>' obstacle to developing the 
sort of firm relationships with the United 
States which their national interests 
otherwise call for 

In the last 2 years the Gulf states, 
except Oman, have rejected the approach 
we have taken toward the peace negoti- 
ations. Even Oman has recently stated 
publicly that continued negotiations on 
Palestinian autonomy should be "dis- 
carded" if Israel refuses to end its efforts 
to consolidate control over East 
Jerusalem occupied in June 1967. The 
Gulf states generally are skeptical that 
the negotiations under the Camp David 
agreement will lead to a comprehensive 
peace. Our differences on this question 
have caused strains in our relations. We 
intend to continue to stay in close touch 
with them. We seek their understanding 
that the course we are pursuing is the 
only practical approach to a lasting peace. 



These states all understand the commit- 
ment of the United States to a deter- 
mined pursuit of the peace process and 
our unique ability among outside powers 
to influence events. 

The Arab-Israeli problem is the most 
striking example of the interrelationship 
of concern and hope in the Gulf states. 
Our own responsibility to seek peace in 
the Middle East flows from national ob- 
jectives much broader than our interests 
in the Gulf. But if we can successfully 
pursue the path to peace at some early 
point with the cooperation of the Gulf 
states, we can proceed to turn a danger 
into an opportunity, for progress toward 
peace will enhance the security and 
domestic tranquility of the Gulf. It will 
strengthen the quality of our overall rela- 
tions with the region. And it can unleash 
enormous additional Gulf resources to en- 
hance the international effort to improve 
the lives of all the peoples of the Middle 
East and areas beyond. As a final point, I 
would stress that while a solution to the 
Arab-Israeli problem will not solve all the 
problems of the Persian Gulf, visible 
progress in pursuit of such a solution 
would contribute significantly to our pur- 
suing a Gulf policy in active harmony 
with the states of the region. 



The Economic Issues 

Our policy and our relations address tl 
total context of these countries, which 
play and will continue to play an impoi 
tant role in some of the most pressing 
economic issues facing the world comn J 
nity. , , 

Energy. These six states currentl 1 1 
provide almost half of the free world's II 
imports. Because their absorptive capirj 
ity is, at least in the short run, limited 
relation to their enormous oil reserves 
they have considerable flexibility in 
production policies. Because oil is over 
whelmingly the mainstay of their natif I 
economies, they face growing domesti( 
pressure to conserve this national pat- 
rimony. These countries have generall, 
been on the moderate side in OPEC [i 
ganization of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries] price debates, and they h: 
tended to produce more than their 
domestic revenue needs require in on j [n, 
to help meet international demand. ,,. 
Saudi Arabia, by far the largest pro- „( 
ducer, has, of course, been noteworth' Vj 
the responsibility toward the intern^ jj, 
tional economy it has demonstrated t J 
both price and production policy. jj 

A key issue for the United States jj 
and the world generally in this decade 8^ 



Qatar — A Profile 



Geography 

Area: 4,000 sq. mi. (about the size of Con- 
necticut and Rhode Island). Capital: Doha 
(pop. 150,000). 

People 

Population: 250,000 (1979 est.). Annual 
Growth Rate: 11%. Ethnic Groups: Arab 
(407f), Iranian (17%), Pakistani (7%). Re- 
ligion: Muslim. Languages: Arabic (offi- 
cial), EnglLsh, and Farsi. 

Government 

Type: Traditional Emirate. Date of Inde- 
pendence: Sept. 3, 1971. Constitution: 

None; however a 1970 "Basic Law" serves 
as a constitution. Branches: Executive — 
Council of Ministers (cabinet). 
Legixlatire — Advisory Council (has as- 
sumed only limited responsibility to date). 
Judicial — independent. Political Parties: 
None. Suffrage: None. 



Economy T 

GNP: $4.5 billion (1979 est.). Annual 'k 
Growth Rate: NA. Per Capita Income: Hfr 
$18,000. Natural Resources: Petroleun |i.,,|, 
fish. Agricultural Products: Fruits, ve j 
tables. Industries: Oil production and rj 
fining, fishing, cement, desalting planfT 
Trade (1978): Exports — $2.5 billion: oiH 
Imports — $1.2 billion: industrial and co 
sumer goods. Partners — LT.K., Wester 
Europe, Japan, U.S. Official Exchangt te 
Rate: 1 riyal = US$0.27. Economic Aid *c 
ceived: None. Economic Aid Sent: ll.llnj 
billion (1974-78). Up 



Membership in 
International Organizations 

U.N., Arab League, OPEC, OAPEC. 

Principal Government Officials 

Qatar: Amir; Acting Prime Minister- 
Khalifa bin Hamad Al-Thani; Minister o: 
Foreign Affairs — Suhaim bin Hamad Al 
Thani; Ambassador to the U.S. — Abdel 
Qader Bareek al-Amari. United States: 
Ambassador to Qatar— Charles Marthin 
sen. 



Department of State Buil<? ^iji 



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Feature 



X narrowly or how broadly these oil 
)ducers define their econoinic interests 
ipproaching production and price deci- 
is. As we face the tight energy supply 
lation anticipated in this decade, there 
1 be continuing need to find means to 
ourage these producers to maintain 
ir production. We have pursued a sus- 
led exchange with them in recent 
rs on energy issues and their relation- 
) to the world economy. 
We seek to intensify this dialogue to 
leelop a stronger sense of the common 
' mnsibility of key producers and con- 
ris toward an orderly transition to a 
I- 1 less dependent upon oil as an en- 
source. As this dialogue has devel- 
ip 1 in the last year, it is noteworthy 
h the Gulf producers have strongly 
1 limed the efforts we are making to 
II' our dependence on imported oil 
lave urged us to do considerably 
.( '. 

International Finance. The official 
;ii assets of these Gulf states now 
■ liver $140 billion and are increasing 
i] }>• as these states produce more oil 
they currently need to meet domes- 
I lenses. The Gulf states have acted 
es nsibly in their investment of these 
or us assets, but such huge amounts 
OB a number of problems for the inter- 
at :al economy: 

The difficulty of sustaining world 
niic gi'owth with financial stability 
face of the massive transfer of re- 
■s from industrial democracies and 
■veloping world to the producer 
t : 

The need to maintain adequate op- 
r\ lities for investment by Gulf states 
1 U.S. and other economies; 
The requirement for stability in 
ernational financial system and to 
ij iin confidence on the part of inves- 



h: 



nd 

The problem of coping with the 
of those developing countries 
are increasingly strapped to pav 
il bills. 



« consult in a variety of fora with 
ilf countries on these problems and 
"inancial issues. They have become 
ant and constructive members of 
ernational financial community. We 
encourage their further participa- 
icluding greater recognition of the 
'^'.e\ )r the wealthy oil producers to bear 
la: r share of the task of helping 
countries to finance their large 
!-of-payments deficits through con- 
al aid and direct lending. 



-rtia 



International Development. Saudi 
Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emir- 
ates, and Qatar have collectively commit- 
ted over $20 billion in economic assistance 
to developing countries in the Arab world 
and beyond, including some $5 billion in 
support of a variety of regional, OPEC, 
and international lending institutions. 
They devote some 5% of their GNP to 
economic development lending. We seek 
to work closely with them in a common 
effort to assist third countries. In the de- 
cade ahead there is great scope for even 
closer cooperation, in some eases combin- 
ing U.S. and other Western technology 
with the financial power of the Gulf 
states to pursue constructive develop- 
ment projects in needy nations, including 
helping them develop energy resources. 

Commerce. U.S. exports to these 
six Gulf countries now exceed $7 billion a 
year, representing about one-half of our 
sales to the Middle East. Our sales to 
these countries provide employment for 
some one-quarter million Americans. Yet 
because of our dependence on Gulf oil and 
the rapid increase in oil prices, we ran a 
$4-billion trade deficit with these coun- 
tries last year and expect that gap to in- 
crease this year 

U.S. exporters currently hold over 
one-sixth of the market in these countries 
and an even higher one-fifth share in 
Saudi Arabia. But we continue to face ex- 
tremely tough competition from other in- 
dustrial democracies and some develop- 
ing countries in our efforts to maintain 
and expand our sales. There are a 
number of important policy issues under 
the general heading of "export disincen- 
tives" which both the Administration and 
the Congress must continue to address if 
we are effectively to pursue our national 
interest in expanding commercial ties 
with this region. 

TVansfer of Technology. We can take 
satisfaction in the role of private Ameri- 
cans in the development of the Gulf oil 
industr>', which has provided the where- 
withal for the remarkable improvement in 
the living conditions of the people of the 
Gulf. American technology continues to 
contribute in a wide range of develop- 
ment activity. Today there are some 
.30,000 private Americans working in 
Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf states 
contributing to the orderly development 
of these societies. It is in our interest, 
consistent with other national policies, to 
encourage greater U.S. participation. 

There has long been official Ameri- 
can involvement in the development of 
Saudi Arabia through the activities of the 
U.S. Geological Survey and the U.S. 



Corps of Engineers. In recent years we 
have significantly expanded our official 
participation under the U.S. -Saudi Joint 
Economic Commission, which provides 
expertise to the Saudi Government on a 
fully reimbursable basis. There are cur- 
rently 20 Joint Commission projects in 
such areas as water resource planning, 
solar energy, vocational training, highway 
management, water desalinization, data 
processing, and financial information ser- 
vices. 

We have recently established a 
U.S.-Omani Joint Economic Commission 
which also will focus on technical assist- 
ance for development projects. The 
United States intends to contribute, 
along with Oman, in financing the ac- 
tivities of the commission, which we re- 
gard as the centerpiece of expanding eco- 
nomic cooperation. 

For some years our Peace Corps has 
been active in Oman, as it was until re- 
cently in Bahrain. There we have also 
provided a number of Agency for Inter- 
national Development experts on a cost- 
sharing basis. In the other Gulf states 
through a variety of mechanisms we have 
provided U.S. Government experts at 
host government request. In recent 
years, the trade and development pro- 
gram of the International Development 
Cooperation Agency has been an effective 
mechanism for facilitating this transfer of 
technology. 

It is our policy to be helpful, wher- 
ever host governments desire, in making 
official U.S. expertise available to their 
development programs. We fully recog- 
nize, however, that in the future as in the 
past our private sector will play the lead- 
ing American role in helping the Gulf 
societies meet their development aspira- 
tions. 

Educational and Cultural Ties. In 

the last decade both the official and pri- 
vate American cultural and educational 
links with the Gulf countries have grown 
enormously. Today there are over 15,000 
students from the Arabian Peninsula in 
U.S. institutions of higher learning. The 
exchange of visits by public and private 
officials in educational and cultural fields 
has grown significantly. In our policy to- 
ward the Gulf region we fully recognize 
the need to continue to nurture these re- 
lationships. Our ongoing effort to develop 
stronger relations with the Gulf states 
will greatly benefit from the understand- 
ing and ties which are being created by 
the experience of students from these 
countries in our universities. The im- 
portance of this region to the United 
States today and in the future requires 



l;r 1980 



THE PRESIDENT 



that in our society there be a better 
understanding of the culture and aspira- 
tions of the peoples of the Gulf. 

The Evolving Relationship 

As we seek to build our relations with 
Saudi Arabia and its Arab neighbors on 
the Gulf, in a mutually beneficial way, we 
are sensitive to the fact that the pursuit 
of each of our interests — security, peace, 
energy, economic development, financial 
cooperation, commerce, and culture — im- 
pacts on the prospects for our other 
interests. We will continue to seek a bal- 
ance in our relationships which reflects 
the totality of our own interests and the 
total personality of the Gulf states. 

We do not underestimate, nor do our 
friends in the Gulf states, the problems 
that lie ahead and the difficulty of the is- 
sues which our e.xpanding relationships 
must address. On the contrary', we recog- 
nize that we are striving for security and 
stability in the midst of complex and 
crosscutting issues in a region whose con- 
tinued independence and orderly progress 
are in our deep interest. On the basis of 
the progress made to date, however, we 
believe that we can continue to build firm 
and close relations with each of these 
countries in a way which will increasingly 
serve the interests of both our peoples 
and, indeed, of the world community 
generally. 



National Security Policy 



'The complete transcript of the hear- 
ings will be published by the committee and 
will be available from the Superintendent 
of Documents, U.S. Government Printing 
Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



President Carter's address before 
the a initial conreiifioii of the American 
Legion ill Boston on August Jl, 1980.'' 

This morning, as Commander in 
Chief, I want to talk to you very briefly 
and very frankly about some of the 
problems that we face, some of the 
achievements that we've had, some of 
the uncertainties about the future, and 
how you can help. As Commander in 
Chief of America's Armed Forces, work- 
ing with the Congress, I have the final 
responsibility for making those difficult 
choices. They are critical choices. They 
are far from simple. I need your support 
and your understanding based on experi- 
ence in the Armed Forces in under- 
standing the real choices that we face in 
defense and in the broader realm of na- 
tional security policy. 

Our goals are simple but profound: 
security, honor, and peace. Those are 
the victories we seek for ourselves, for 
our children, and for our children's chil- 
dren. These victories can be won but not 
by nostalgic nor wishful thinking and 
not by bravado. They cannot be won by 
a futile effort either to run the world or 
to run away from the world. Both of 
these are dangerous myths that cannot 
be the foundation for any responsible na- 
tional policy. 

Objectives 

American requires the authority and 
the strength— and the moral force— to 
protect ourselves, to provide for the 
defense of our friends, and to promote 
the values of human dignity and well- 
being that have made our own nation 
strong at home and respected abroad. 
To this end, our national security policy 
has four specific objectives: 

• First, to prevent war, through the 
assurance of our nation's strength and 
our nation's will— in this we will not fail; 

• Second, to share with our friends 
and allies the protection of industrial 
democracies of Europe and Asia— in this 
we will not fail; 

• Third, to safeguard and to 
strengthen our vital links to the nations 
and the resources of the Middle East— in 
this we will not fail; and 

• Fourth, to defend America's vital 
interests if they are threatened any- 
where in the world— and in this we will 
not fail. 



All of these objectives require 
America's great military strength. But 
arms alone cannot provide the security 
within which our values and our inter- 
ests can flourish. Our foreign policy 
must be directed toward greater intern; 
tional stability, without which there is i 
real prospect for a lasting peace. Thus, 
our strength in arms— very important- 
must be matched by creative, responsi- 
ble, and courageous diplomacy. 

We have as a nation that strength 
and that courage now to present clearl\ 
to potential adversaries as well as to mi 
allies. We must continue to build wisely 
for a future when our patience and [jer- 
sistence will be taxed by challenges per 
haps even more diverse and even more 
dangerous than those that we've seen ii 
recent years. In planning for that futur 
we must have the foresight to accept tl 
reality of change. Americans have neve 
feared change. We must prepare for 
what we cannot completely predict- 
there is no way for any nation or any 
person to know what might happen 
next— and to know with certainty the o 
jeetives that we intend to reach and to 
hold. 

For the sake of all humanity, we 
must prevent nuclear war. To do so re- 
quires the most modern strategic force; 
based on America's superior technology 
Our country has always been in the fon 
front of new developments, new ideas, 
new technology, new systems for de- 
fense. The decisions that we make to- 
day — some of them highly secret — will 
affect the risks of nuclear war well into 
the next century. 

Like our weapons, our diplomacy 
must also be aimed at enhancing strate- 
gic stability. Thus far in my Administra 
tion we've strengthened every single ele 
ment of our strategic deterrent, and we 
have also worked to enhance strategic 
stability through world peace and 
through negotiation of mutual and 
balanced limits on strategic arms. And 
I'm thankful to the American Legion foi 
your support of that effort to control 
nuclear weapons. 

Strategic Forces 

We could have spent more money on ou 
strategic forces, but we would not have 
spent it as wisely. We could have placed 
our chips on the B-1 bomber, which 
would have been in service quickly and 
obsolete almost as quickly. In order to 



Department of State Bullet 



The President 



ipitalize on advanced American tech- 
(ili'^-y and to deal with predictable im- 
rnM'ments in Soviet air-defense capabil- 
iis. 1 decided instead, after close con- 
ization with the Secretary of Defense 
nd the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to ac- 
■Icrate the development of cruise 
lissiles. 

Four years ago there was no pro- 
'•am for long-range air-launched cruise 
issiles. This year, in a very quick 
■rind of time, we will actually begin 
•dduction of those kinds of missiles, 
ecause of their accuracy and because 

■ their ability to penetrate Soviet air- 
•fense systems, they represent a far 
(ire effective deterrent than would 
i\e the B-1 bomber. We needed the 
rht answer for the long run, and 

)viet air-defense capabilities, as known 
day, and U.S. technological develop- 
ents, as known today, have proven this 
iswer to be the right one. 

Similarly, we could have decided, 
(i some still propose, to resume pro- 
ction of land-based intercontinental 
ssiles and simply build more vertical 
OS to house them. But that solution 
)uld not have increased our strategic 
i^ength, because the new missiles in 
|ed silos would have been just as vul- 

K'able as the old ones to the predict- 
e improvement in the accuracy of 
Bviet missile systems. Instead, we con- 
cted a searching evaluation of our real 
id responsible choices, and I chose to 
forward with the MX missile pro- 
am. 

Four years ago, there was no known 
ution to the increasing vulnerability of 
ed silos. Today, we've devised a 
)bile system for basing these missiles 
it will really shelter them from attack, 
e MX will be ready to strengthen our 
•ategic defenses just when we need 
it added strength. And I might point 
t to you that the total area covered by 
? MX system— from which civilians, 
wsmen, and others, would be ex- 
ided— only would comprise 25-square 
les, a block of land in our whole coun- 

■ just 5 miles on a side. And the total 
it of the MX mobile missile system, in 
istant dollars, would be less than the 
52 bomber system, less than the 
nuteman missile system, and less than 
> combined cost of the Poseidon and 

' Polaris submarine-launched missile 
items. 

At sea, as well, we've altered the 
.yward course that we were steering 
1977. We've put the Trident missile 
5tem and the Trident submarine pro- 
ims back on track. The U.S.S. Ohio, 

first Trident submarine, is about to 



begin sea trials. Its sister ship, the 
U.S.S. Michigan, is ready to be 
launched, and five more Tridents are 
under construction. 

And finally, in this combined system, 
let me mention that we've made steady 
progress in a less visible and less 
dramatic but crucially important area of 
our strategic forces, and that is the sys- 
tem of command and control to insure 
that they and the communications asso- 
ciated with them can survive a crisis, a 
peremptory, unexpected attack or a ma- 
jor conflict. This has been an area of our 
defense system which has been too long 
overlooked and neglected in the past. 

All these steps add up to a prudent 
and a forward-looking program for en- 
hancing our strategic forces and the 
credibility of our deterrent. In order to 
keep those forces adequate for the 
future, we continue to work on new air- 
craft and on new technology and weap- 
ons of all kinds that will be equal to any 
threats that may arise in the next 
decade or beyond. 

Our strategy, now modernized to 
take advantage of Soviet planning and 
Soviet attitudes, must leave them no 
room for the illusion that they can ob- 
tain any advantage over the United 
States of America by the use of their 
force. And we will keep our forces that 
strong and that clearly dominant. 

Recently there's been a great deal of 
press and public attention paid to a 
Presidential Directive that I have issued, 
known as PD-59. As a new President 
charged with great responsibilities for 
the defense of this nation. I decided that 
our nation must have flexibility in re- 
sponding to a possible nuclear attack- 
in responding to a possible nuclear at- 
tack. Beginning very early in my term, 
working with the Secretaries of State 
and Defense and with my own national 
security advisers, we have been evolving 
such an improved capability. It's been 
recently revealed to the public in outline 
form by Secretary of Defense Harold 
Brown. It's a carefully considered, 
logical, and evolutionary improvement in 
our nation's defense capability and will 
contribute to the prevention of a nuclear 
conflict. 

No potential enemy of the United 
States should anticipate for one moment 
a successful use of military power 
against our vital interest. This decision 
will make that prohibition and that cau- 
tionary message even more clear. In 
order to insure that no adversary is 
even tempted, however, we must have a 
range of responses to potential threats 
or crises and an integrated plan for their 
use. 



Arms Control 

Equally vital for our strategic purposes 
is the pursuit of nuclear arms control 
and balanced reduction of nuclear arse- 
nals in the world. Just as we build stra- 
tegic forces equal to our needs, we seek 
through negotiated agreements to keep 
unnecessary competition from carrying 
us into a purposeless and dangerous 
nuclear arms race to the detriment of 
our nation's security and to the detri- 
ment of the adequate strength of our 
conventional and other forces. We will 
continue to make every responsible ef- 
fort to bring our forces and those of any 
potential foe under strict, balanced, and 
verifiable controls, both in the quantity 
of strategic arms and in their quality. 

I want to make clear that if an 
unlimited nuclear arms race should be 
forced upon us, we will compete and 
compete successfully. Let no one doubt 
that for a moment. But to initiate such a 
dangerous and costly race, abandoning 
our efforts for nuclear-weapons control, 
would be totally irresponsible on our 
part. 

The destructive power of the world's 
nuclear arsenals is already adequate for 
total devastation. It does no good to in- 
crease that destructive power in search 
of a temporary edge or in pursuit of an 
illusion of absolute nuclear superiority. 
To limit strategic nuclear weapons, as 
the SALT Treaties do, is not to reduce 
our strength but to reduce the danger 
that misunderstanding and miscalcula- 
tion could lead to a global catastrophe. 
This is a course that has been pursued 
by the last six Presidents, both 
Democratic and Republican. To go 
beyond the reductions that were outlined 
in the SALT II Treaty, as I firmly in- 
tend to do, is to advance the stability on 
which genuine peace can be built. 

Strategic Stability 

Stability in the strategic area, however, 
leaves us still to meet serious challenges 
now and in the future in Europe, in the 
Far East, the Middle East, and in 
Southwest Asia. We must understand 
those challenges in order to deal with 
them prudently and responsibly. We do 
not need massive standing armies in 
place everywhere in the world to defend 
our friends and our interests. But we do 
need and we and our allies are acquiring 
the skilled, modernized, specially equip- 
ped conventional forces that can respond 
fast and effectively to crises and threats 
before they engulf us in larger conflicts. 



:tober 1980 



The President 



Europe. With NATO in Europe, for 
example, we do not need overwhelming 
tank forces. We and our alHes do not 
plan to start a war on the European 
Continent. What we do need and what 
we will maintain are the weapons to 
repulse any force that seeks or 
threatens the domination of Europe. 
After years of neglect during the Viet- 
nam war, we have led NATO's commit- 
ment to the deterrent levels of strength 
it actually needs. The Long-Term 
Defense Program to which we are now 
all committed— a 15-year program— will 
add $85 billion to NATO's fighting 
strength over the next decade or so and 
will permit the alliance to meet any real 
threat to Europe's security and to our 
own. This is a major step forward in the 
closer coordination among ourselves and 
our allies and a restoration of the spirit 
of NATO that is crucial to the defense 
of Europe and to the security of our 
own country. It must be continued, and 
it will be continued. 

Reversing a long, downward trend 
in real defense expenditures, above and 
beyond inflation, we have had real 
growth for the last 4 years, and we will 
continue this commitment during the 
years ahead. That is a promise that I 
make to you, and that is a promise that 
the Congress of the United States has 
also confirmed. We will not permit us to 
take a downward trend, as was the case 
during the 8 years before I became 
President. 

A very significant development was 
the NATO decision last December to 
modernize theater nuclear forces in 
Europe, a direct response to the War- 
saw Pact buildup of the last 10 years 
with their SS-20 medium-range missile 
and others similar to it. This is a vital 
part of our commitment. It was very 
difficult politically for some of the Euro- 
pean nations to agree to take this major 
step. The Soviets used every possible 
propaganda that they could marshal. 
But our efl"orts and those of our allies 
were successful. 

Pacific and East Asia. In the 

Pacific and in East Asia, our alliances 
and our military strengths are firm and 
they're adequate. We have the military 
presence on land and at sea to insure 
that no would-be aggressor can profit at 
the expense of ourselves or our friends 
from any upheaval in that region. Sus- 
tained, normal relations with China are 
very important and improve the pros- 
pects for a stable and a peaceful future 
in Asia. 

You of the American Legion have 
pledged at this convention to the cause 



10 



of Kampuchean relief. It's important 
that we Americans show the world the 
strength of American compassion and 
concern. I applaud your decision to 
alleviate human suffering and to help the 
cause of peace in Southeast Asia. 

Persian Gulf and Southwest Asia. 

In the most volatile and vital area to our 
security — the Persian Gulf and South- 
west Asia — we're taking additional steps 
to protect our vital interests. The securi- 
ty of the region and the crucial energy 
that it supplies to us and other nations 
are both now exposed to the new threat 
of Soviet forces in Afghanistan, which 
have turned that country from its 
former status as a buffer state into a 
wedge pointed at the sealanes of the 
Persian Gulf and to the rich oil deposits. 
To deter any further encroachment of 
Soviet power in this region, we must 
help to strengthen the resolve and the 
defenses of the countries there. 

We are continuing to build up our 
own forces in the Indian Ocean and in 
the adjacent areas and to arrange to use 
facilities on land which we might need to 
aid our friends in the region in case of 
conflict and primarily to prevent the 
need for conflict. We've speeded up for- 
mation of a mobile force of up to 
100,000 personnel that could be rapidly 
deployed to any area where sudden trou- 
ble loomed and needed to be met. We've 
arranged to put supplies and equipment 
for such a force in place ahead of time 
so they will be there when and if they're 
needed. 

Most of all, in the Middle East, 
we've pursued the arduous, difficult, 
frustrating but absolutely essential cause 
of peace between Israel and its Arab 
neighbors. The real security of that 
crucial area of the world depends heavi- 
ly on the force with which we promote 
stability and political compromise to 
avoid the outbreak of conflict. It's crucial 
that our nation use all its influence to 
prevent a fifth Middle East war. The 
Camp David accords and the Egyptian- 
Israeli Peace Treaties that followed them 
were two extraordinary steps on a long 
road that until 1978 no one had been 
able to travel. 

In the real world we know that we 
cannot expect miracles on the Middle 
East peace negotiations. The issues are 
too emotional. The difficulties are too 
great. The obstacles sometimes appear 
to be insurmountable. But I'm convinced 
that Israel wants peace, and I'm con- 
vinced that the Egyptians want peace, 
and I'm equally as convinced that those 
who live in Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, and 
the Palestinians all want peace. We 



Ik 
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if 



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know that our own future peace make' 
this work very important, and it's wor 
that must be continued. 

Other Concerns 

At home, over intense opposition, as y 
know, but with great help from the 
American Legion, we have won the fij 
for peacetime draft registration. We 
need the ability to mobilize quickly am 
effectively, and we have shown our 
resolve to both friend and foe alike 

It should be clear to everyone who 
studies national security or defense th; 
our work to keep America the stronge 
nation in the world is not finished. Th( 
are no laurels on which to rest. There 
are no victories which are final. There 
are no challenges which have disap- 
peared magically. But we've resumed i 
firm and steady course of diplomacy ai 
defense preparedness to lead our allies 
and our friends and ourselves with 
confidence toward the challenges facin- 
the world of today and the world of 
tomorrow. 

The independance, the security, ai' 
the development of the countries of tl' 
Third World — the small nations, the 
nations, the developing nations, the 
nonaligned nations — are also very imp 
tant to our national security. Violence 
and radical revolution thrive in an at- 
mosphere of political repression, 
economic want, massive unemploymen 
and hunger. Our interest is served wh 
the countries of the developing world 
are able to meet the needs and aspira 
tions of their people peacefully, 
democratically, and through cooperati 
with the United States of America anc 
the other Western nations. 

In helping them to achieve these '61 
jectives, we are encouraging democrac _ 
yes, but we are also strengthening our 
ability to compete effectively with the 
Soviet Union. Those who are most con 
cerned about Soviet activism in the 
world should be the strongest sup- 
porters of our foreign aid programs 
designed to help the moderate transitic 
from repressive tyranny to democratic 
development and to bolster the strengt, 
and independence of our friends. 

We've revived in this Administratic 
the policy that gives added purpose to 
our nation's strength: our whole-hearte 
national commitment to promote the 
universal standards of human rights. 
Freedom for ourselves is not enough. 
Americans want to see other people en 
joy freedom also. It's an unswerving 
commitment of our nation, and as long 
as I'm in the White House, it'll be a ma: 
jor part of our international policy 



Department of State Bulle| 



fl 



The President 



We do not maintain our power in 
ier to seize power from others. Our 
al is to strengthen our own freedom 
d the freedom of others, to advance 
3 dignity of the individual and the 
ht of all people to justice, to a good 
and to future secure from tyranny. 
choosing our course in the world, 
lerica's strength must be used to 
ve America's values. 
The choices ahead are every bit as 
nanding as the ones we've already 
de. Facing them takes a clear 
lerstanding of where we are and 
jre we want to go as a nation, 
ponding to dangers that might 
lace our future security also will 
isure America's common sense and 
■age, just as previous history has 
'.sured America's common sense and 
•age. 

I've known America's courage by 
ng it tested. I've seen it in the men 
went to Iran to attempt so valiantly 
1 isolated desert to rescue their 
•w Americans, who are still held 
frge there. I saw it in the families of 
hien who died in that effort, and I've 
it in the families— with whom I've 
p,s frequently as possible— of the 
:ns who are still held captive in 
What a nation we are to produce 
men and women. All Americans 
ankful to them. 

,nd finally let me say that our coun- 
so has the courage to reject the 
Illusions of something for nothing, 
'le mtasy goals of strength without 
ice, the irresponsible advocacy of 
ut economics and quick-fi.x defense 
. There are no magic answers, 
sdlutions are very difficult to find. 
U'e, sometimes quiet courage, un- 
ized courage, is the most to be 
) riated. 

>ee this kind of courage in you, as 
t ms who have served and sacrificed 
.:'Sl y, but who still work continuously 
i sake of service, not for recogni- 
• reward. Your example 
thens my faith in our nation and 
future of our nation. With your 
nd with your courage and with 
ommon sense, I know America 
ntinue to be a nation of unmatch- 
mgth, a nation that faces the 
as it is today and works with 
1 to bring to the world of the 
freedom, peace, and justice. 

'Xt from Weekly Compilation of 
Intial Documents of Aug. 25, 1980 
Kg paragraphs omitted). ■ 



News Conference of August 4 
(Excerpts) 



ft 

'Wll 



ii 



:M\ 



There are few governments in the 
world with which we have more sharp 
and frequent policy disagreements. 
Libya has steadfastly opposed our ef- 
forts to reach and to carry out the 
Camp David accords to bring peace to 
the Middle East. Our two governments 
have strongly different opinions and at- 
titudes toward the PLO (Palestine Lib- 
eration Organization] and toward inter- 
national terrorism. Within OPEC- [Or- 
ganization of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries], Libya has promoted sharply 
higher prices of oil and, on occasion, 
has advocated the interruption of oil 
supplies to the United States and to 
other Western nations. 

On the other hand, we have sub- 
stantial trade with Libya. Libya is one 
of our major oil suppliers, and its 
high-quality crude oil is important to 
our east coast refineries. Libya has 
publicly and privately opposed Iran's 
seizure and holding of our hostages, and 
for a time, Libya joined with other 
Muslim countries in opposing the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan. 

So for many years, our policies and 
actions toward Libya have, therefore, 
mixed firmness with caution. 

And now I'd like to say a word 
about my brother's relations with 
Libya. As all of you know by now, Billy 
is a colorful personality. We are per- 
sonally close. I love him, and he loves 
me. Billy is extremely independent. On 
occasion he has said: "I don't tell Jimmy 
how to run the country, and he doesn't 
tell me how to run my life." When I was 
elected President, Billy was thrust into 
the public limelight. Media attention 
made him an instant celebrity. He was 
asked to make a number of television 
and other speaking engagements, and 
he even put his name on a new brand of 
beer. 

And in the summer of 1978, Billy 
was invited to visit Libya with a group 
of businessmen and State officials from 
Georgia. This highly publicized trip oc- 
curred late in September 1978. I was 
not aware that he was planning the trip 
until after he had left the United States 
and shortly before he arrived in Libya. 
When I heard about it, I was deeply 
concerned that there might be some 
serious or unpleasant incident while he 
was there. 



Shortly after he returned from 
Libya, in October 1978, I saw a mes- 
sage from our charge in Tripoli report- 
ing on the positive nature of the visit. I 
was greatly relieved, and I sent a copy 
of that message to Billy. This message 
contained no sensitive information, was 
never encoded, and, in fact, more than 
a year ago it was made publicly avail- 
able by the State Department to a news 
columnist. 

Early in 1979 a Libyan trade mis- 
sion came to the United States, visited 
several localities in our country. Billy 
visited with the Libyans and made a 
number of controversial statements, 
which were roundly criticized both by 
the press and also by the American 
public. I publicly deplored, in a news 
conference, some of those comments 
myself. 

As a result of Billy's remarks and 
his new association with the Libyans, 
almost all of his scheduled television 
and other appearances were canceled. 
His income from these public appear- 
ances almost totally disappeared, while 
his financial obligations continued to 
mount. 

I shared the general concern about 
Billy's relationship with Libya, and the 
members of our family were also con- 
cerned about some of his personal 
problems. During this period, Billy en- 
tered the hospital for medical treat- 
ment. On one occasion while he was 
hospitalized, he discussed with me the 
possibility of another trip to Libya, and 
I urged him not to go, partly because of 
his health and partly because of the ad- 
verse effect it could have on our Middle 
East negotiations, which were at a 
critical stage at that time. 

By the late summer of 1979, Billy 
had successfully completed his medical 
treatment, and despite my advice he 
made a second trip to Libya. There was 
relatively little publicity about this 
trip. 

I am not aware of any effort by 
Billy to affect this government's 
policies or actions concerning Libya. I 
am certain that he made no such effort 
with me. The only occasion on which 
Billy was involved, to my knowledge, in 
any matter between Libya and the 
United States was his participation, 
with my full approval, in our efforts to 
seek Libyan help for the return of our 



■■olisr 1980 



11 



The President 



hostages from Iran. Let me discuss this 
incident briefly. 

On November the 4th, 1979, our 
hostages were seized in Tehran. In the 
weel<s that followed, we explored every 
possible avenue to bring about their 
release. We increased our military 
presence in the Persian Gulf, we 
stopped all oil imports from Iran, and 
we seized the assets of that country. 
We appealed to the U.N. Security 
Council and to the World Court. We 
asked other governments, and particu- 
larly Muslim governments, including 
Libya, to support our position. As is 
still the case, we explored every official 
and unofficial avenue of contact we 
could find to encourage the Iranians to 
release the American hostages. 

Public statements coming out of 
Libya at that time were not supi^ortive 
and indicated that our diplomatic ef- 
forts to secure their assistance had not 
been successful. During the third week 
in November, it occurred to us that 
Billy might be able to get the Libyans 
to help to induce the Iranians to release 
the American hostages. As requested, 
he talked to the Libyans about our hos- 
tages and arranged a meeting with a 
Libyan diplomat at the White House. I 
did not attend that meeting, and so far 
as I'm aware, Billy played no further 
role in these discussions with the 
Libyans. 

As matters turned out, the Libyan 
foreign office announced that the hos- 
tages should be released, and the leader 
of Libya, Col. Qadhafi, also made the 
direct private appeal to Ayatollah 
Khomeini that we requested. At least 
in this respect, the approach to the 
Libyans was successful; whether it 
would have been successful if Billy had 
not participated is a question that no 
one can answer with certainty. 

I made this decision in good faith, 
with the best interests of the hostages 
and our nation in mind. Billy merely re- 
sponded to our request for assistance, 
and I believe his only motive in this ef- 
fort was to seek release of the Ameri- 
can hostages from Iran. 



Q. But don't you think that by 
using your brother, Billy Carter, at 
least as an emissary to make con- 
tact with a foreign government — 
don't you feel that perhaps it might 
have been better judgment to have 
used a trained diplomat in that 
capacity? 

A. No, not in that particular in- 
stance concerning the hostages. We 
were using trained diplomats. Im- 



12 



metliately after the hostages were 
seized, this became an absolute, total 
obsession of mine, to get those hostages 
released. We inventoried every possi- 
bility of influence on the Iranians to in- 
duce them to release our hostages, 
safely and immediately. We sent 
messages — and had our diplomats in 
those counti'ies and contacted their 
diplomats in Washington — to almost 
every nation on Earth, every one that 
we thought might have the slightest 
semblance of intluence with Iran. We 
especially thought that the Muslim 
countries, believing in the Koran, hav- 
ing the same religion as the Ayatollah 
Khomeini, might have a s])ecial 
influence. 

We had tried through diplomatic 
means to get Libya to give us some 
support in condemning the Iranian ac- 
tion and calling for the release of the 
hostages. Up through the 18th of 
November, the public statements com- 
ing out of Libya — and these are 
documented in Dr. Brzezinski's [Special 
Assistant to the President for National 
Security Affairs] report — had been 
negative, against our position, in effect 
supporting the holding of the hostages. 
Some private comments from Libyan 
diplomats to our diplomats in the 
United Nations, for instance, had said, 
"We would like to help you," but the 
public comments, which were the im- 
portant ones, were contrary to that. 

Under those circumstances, I de- 
cided to use Billy to see if he could have 
some special influence to get the Lib- 
yans to help. I had no reticence about 
it. 

That was the same day that the re- 
ligious fanatics attacked the mosque in 
Saudi Arabia. It was the same day, I 
believe, that Khomeini announced that 
the hostages — American hostages — 
would be tried and, if convicted, Kho- 
meini said, "Jimmy Carter knows 
what's going to hajjpen to them." We 
thought that the hostages' lives were 
directly in danger. 

I saw then and see now nothing 
wrong with asking Billy and other private 
citizens to try to help if it's appropriate 
and legal. The only thing Billy did was 
to contact the Libyans, whom he knew 
personally — he does not know Qadhafi, 
but he did know the charge in Washing- 
ton — and say, "We would like very 
much to have your help in having the 
hostages released. Will you meet with 
Dr. Brzezinski at the White House," a 
week from then, which was the 27th 
day of November. 

Billy then met a week later with 
Dr. Brzezinski and the charge, and we 
believe that some progress was made. 



As I said in my opening statement, 
cannot say for sure that Billy had an 
thing in the world to do with the pre 
ress that was made. But 2 days afte: 
Billy contacted the charge, they mad 
public announcement for the first 
time — Libya did — calling for the re- 
lease of the hostages. After that mei 
ing. Col. Qadhafi himself sent a per- 
sonal emissary to Khomeini, asking 
Khomeini for the first time to releas 
our hostages, and then he sent me wi 
that he had done so. 

I'm not trying to claim great thii 
from that small involvement of Billy 
But Billy came up to Washington, so. 
as I know, at his own expense on tw 
occasions. He went back to Plains. } 
never told anybody publicly that he I 
done it. He never bragged about it. 
And I have enough judgment to kno 
that that may have enhanced Billy's 
stature in the minds of the Libyans. 
That's the only down side to it that 
can understand. And that may have- 
been bad judgment, but I was the o* * 
that made the judgment. I did what 
thought was best for our country an 
best for the hostages, and I believe t 
that's exactly what Billy was doing. 



h 

Of 



LE' 



■IPI 



Col 



h 



Q. You said that you were ob- 
sessed with the hostages and that's v- 
you called your brother in. Do yout 
have an> new ideas for freeing the 
hostages now'.' 

jKt, 

A. No, we are pursuing the san) Jde 
kind of degree of effort that we wert Jesj 
then. 

I think I tried to point out, as b 
I could remember, a couple of things 
that were happening at the time — tl 
threat by Khomeini that the hostage 
might be killed and the fact that the 
Grand Mosque in Jidda was — in Met 
I think — was attacked by radical belaid 
lievers in the Muslim faith. Those W' 
the kind of things that were causing)J!«u| 
great concern. 

The approach to Libya, althougl 
now it has taken on great significam 
here, 9 or 10 months later, was one o 
broad pattern of things that I was _ 
doing, the National Security Council 
was doing, everyone in the State De' 
partment assigned to this task was 
doing, and many private citizens wei 
doing. And there was nothing extrao 
dinary about it. It was just one of a 
broad gamut of things that we were 
tempting to do in every possible way 
get word to Khomeini that it was bet' 
for Iran to release those hostages, 



Department of State BulWj 



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lint 
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Hit 
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HE SECRETARY 



iterview by the French Media 



While he was i)/ New York on Aii- 
tf 13, 19Hi), Secrefarij Mnskie was 
erriewed hi/ Doniiiiiqite Broiiiherqev 
French television and Christian 
Hard of French radio. Following are 
erpts front those two i)iterviews. 



ILEVISION' 

Apparently there is a new I'.S. nu- 
ar strategy contained in a docu- 
nt known as Presidential Directive 
Could you give us an update on 

A. I am hardly the man to give you 
update, since I was not involved in 
eloping it. But as I understand it, it 
ot a new doctrine. PD 59 has been 
bribed to me as a codification of a 
,rine that has been in the process of 
lution since 1977 when PD 18 di- 
d a study following on the 

esinger doctrine of 1974 to evaluate 
It our policy ought to be. And as it 
(evolved, I am told that it has been 
ed in the Secretary of Defense's 
lure statement of January and Feb- 

y of 1979, and especially that one of 



t 



Waving said that, I ought to make 
e points about it, as I understand 
iirst, that it does not abandon as- 
>'d destruction as a deterrent policy, 
designed to add flexibility to that 
y in order to make deterrence a 
? effective policy. It is based, in 
on the fact that the Russians, 



Your spokeman, Mr. Powell, 
laid, in defending your use of 
jbrother as an intermediary — 
tou have alluded to this as 
|— that we'd be very surprised 

day when we hear of some of the 
• unorthodox emissaries you've 

channels to other countries to 
Ind secure the release of the hos- 

. Can you surprise us a little and 
|s who they are, who some of 

might be? And might we be em- 
Issed by the revelations of any of 
I names'' 

ti Hl. No, you wouldn't be embarras- 
•)Ut I think maybe the surprise 
to come later. 



''or full text, see Weekly Compilation 
Isidential Documents of Aug. 11, 



given our evaluation of their policy, see 
nuclear war as possibly a prolonged ex- 
change of weapons. We've always con- 
ceived of nuclear war as being of rather 
short duration given the devastation 
that would follow. 

And so this new policy is not new 
but a policy which has evolved over 
these several years and which Secre- 
tary I of Defense Harold] Brown refers 
to as countervailing strategy and in- 
volves mixing our response so as to 
preserve the assured deterrence aspect 
which is aimed at the urban industrial 
complex but adding selected military 
targets as well. 

Q. Nevertheless, do you think it is 
a priority to being able to strike at 
military targets in the Soviet Union 
other than cities'? Doesn't that make 
war more thinkable because it leaves 
the aggressor less possibilities of total 
destruction? 

A. I don't believe so and neither 
does Secretary Brown, because I don't 
think a limited nuclear war is conceiva- 
ble. I think that as soon as there is an 
exchange of nuclear weapons, the war 
would rapidly escalate to an all out nu- 
clear war. I can't imagine that anything 
less than that would happen. 

Secondly, neither side has a first- 
strike capability. So there is no way 
that either side could eliminate the 
other side's ability to retaliate given 
the present posture of both parties. 
That being so, it would seem to me that 
the deterrent value is still there. But if 
the Russians, for any reason, consider a 
limited nuclear war possible, the pur- 
pose of the countervailing strategy is to 
discourage them from that notion. 

Q. In Europe it is difficult to 
hold a clear distinction between the 
deterrence, which is war avoidance, 
and defen.se, which is a damaging ad- 
dition, because we feel that if there is 
a limited war it could be limited from 
an American point of view and yet in 
Europe — Do you rule out completely 
this possibility? 

A. I am not sure the human mind 
can comprehend all of the hypothetical 
possibilities. My own view may be an 
oversimplistic one, but, as I said ear- 
lier, I think nuclear war in any form is 
unthinkable because I cannot conceive 
of a limited one. Nevertheless, the ar- 
gument that we must have an ability to 
strike selected military targets as well 
as the urban industrial complex as well 



as military related industrial targets as 
well as command and control targets, I 
think is a possible deterrent, a more 
sophisticated deterrent added to that 
one of assured destruction. Our capac- 
ity to destroy cities is formidable, and, 
I think, one in analyzing the counter- 
vailing strategy ought not to overlook 
that. We are not abandoning our policy 
at all; we are simply refining it, as I 
understand it. 

Q. You have indicated at the be- 
ginning of this interview that you 
were not consulted in the process of 
elaborating the evolution of this 
strategy. How could this be possible? 

A. First of all let me make clear 
that I raised the question not in a per- 
sonal sense but in an institutional 
sense. And what I have been 
examining — and I have been examining 
the records since the question first 
arose last week, and I didn't raise it, it 
was raised in a New York Times article 
based upon a leak from some agency — 
that the State Department did not par- 
ticipate, and I have been examining 
that record. And that comes pretty 
close to being true. There was some 
State Department participation a little 
over a year ago which then terminated. 
I think this is institutionally wrong, and 
I have said so, and the President and 
the Secretary of Defense have agreed 
with me at this point. So it remains to 
be seen whether or not this institu- 
tional problem will be corrected. Now 
how long that institutional problem 
existed, I have not yet determined. It 
has gone back at least to 1977. 

Q. This last example seems to 
confirm what is the common feeling 
in Europe that there is some diffi- 
culty in managing the foreign policy 
in this country among the White 
House, the National Security Coun- 
cil, the State Department, and other 
government agencies. What is your 
feeling about that? 

A. One ought not to overblow it. 
Just as I think the question of consulta- 
tion between the allies and differences 
between the allies has been escalated 
this year and, indeed, since I have been 
Secretary of State under a widespread 
conception of disarray in the alliance 
which I think was overblown, now that 
I have examined it closely. So this can 
be overblown. The President, after all, 
is the supreme foreign policymaking au- 
thority. The Constitution of the United 
States makes him so. And he has not 
been excluded from this policy. He has 
made it. PD 59 means Presidential Di- 
rective 59 and it is for him to organize, 



3r 1980 



13 



The Secretary 



so organize his agencies as to enable 
him to make foreign policy in a way 
which he finds useful, convenient, and 
comfortable. One ought not to think of 
foreign policy being made by anyone 
but the President of the United States. 
And how he organizes his assistants is 
for him to decide, and each President 
will do it in a different way. Neverthe- 
less, even within those limits it seems 
to me the President would be wise to 
include in the formulation of doctrines 
like this, advice from the State De- 
partment because of its foreign policy 
implications which your questions ob- 
viously suggest. 

Q. Let's stay for awhile in the 
strategic field. The Republican Party 
and Reagan called for military and 
nuclear superiority over the Soviet 
L nion. What do you think of that? 

A. I think it is unthinkable. I 

think it is totally inconsistent with the 
notion of arms control because if we 
were to achieve nuclear superiority and 
then seek an arms control treaty, it is 
inconceivable to me that the Russians 
would sign a treaty that froze them into 
a position of nuclear inferiority. That 
proposition seems so obvious on its face 
that it must have been obvious when 
that Re])ublican ]jlank was written. 

And the reverse is also true. We 
would not sign a treaty which froze us 
into nuclear inferiority. So that that 
prescription of nuclear superiority is a 
prescription for an uncontrolled es- 
calating arms race with enormous costs 
in terms of greater insecurity for the 
superpowers and others and also enor- 
mous costs for the tax payers of both 
countries. 

1 might add incidentally that this 
concern of mine — it is obvious to me 
that our NATO allies place a high value 
on arms control not only with respect to 
central systems but theater nuclear 
systems as well. So it seems to me that 
that policy on the part of the Republi- 
can platform raises an issue of serious 
concern to the alliance that could 
weaken our alliance ties. 

({. Since you are talking of the 
allies, I'residenI tarter pointed to the 
unity of the Atlantic alliance Sunday 
and quite frankly many observers 
here <»r in Kurope think also of the 
wh.\ and what kind of basis can you 
claim unity to the point that it was 
claimed by President Carter. 

A. Let me turn your question 
around a little bit. Ttie United States is 
50 States and 22(1 million people. Now 
by unity, you mean unanimity? Ob- 



14 



viously, in a free society this is not 
unanimity. Within your own country 
there is more than one political party, 
and you pursue unity in terms of na- 
tional goals but there is not unanimity, 
not at least from my perception of 
France. And even within Europe, 
exclufling the United States, there are 
differences of opinion and yet you 
strive for unity in the European Com- 
munity and in other fora. So unity 
ought not to be overplayed. I mean 
unity of purpose is an important thing 
but disagreements as to the ways for 
achieving those purposes may be a 
healthy thing. 

Now with respect to NATO's pri- 
mary objective, which is the defense of 
NATO territory, I think the alliance 
has never been in a stronger position. 
When one looks back to the days of the 
Mansfield amendment, when I was then 
a Member of the Senate, and Senator 
Mansfield failed by less than a handful 
of votes in getting the Senate to adopt 
that proposition which would have in- 
volved the total withdrawal of Ameri- 
can forces from Europe to the present 
time when the alliance is committed, 
among other things, to 3% real growth 
each year, in real terms, to moderniza- 
tion of theater nuclear weapons, to a 
more flexible NATO defense which will 
enable the United States to deploy its 
forces outside the NATO territory if 
our common interests were jeopardized 
outside that territory. Now- these are, I 
think, significant improvements in 
NATO defense and significant commit- 
ments to NATO defense. 

So within that alliance territory 
perspective there has been, I think, 
better performance on the part of all 
countries, including the United States 
and France and so on, than previously. 

With respect to issues that arise 
outside the NATO territory, one posi- 
tive development that has taken place 
is a growing apjjreciation of the need to 
find some way to consult on such issues 
more effectively. I have heard that idea 
expressed by Francois-Poncet, by 
Genscher, by myself, by other Foreign 
Ministers, by the Japanese Foreign 
Minister, and so on, and it is important 
to do so. Afghanistan is such an issue. 

Q. Have you any idea at this 
point how this kind of consultation 
could work? 

A. I think to suggest a framework 
at this point might destroy the sugges- 
tion. I think that at the present time, 
we do it not as effectively as some 
would like through the NATO struc- 
ture, to some extent through the 



ii 



f( 



United Nations where there are oppoi 
tunities for meetings on bilateral and 
multilateral bases independent of the 
United Nations. So we have ad hoc poa 
sibilities for consultation that many o 
us would like to see institutionalized 
but no one yet has come up with a 
suggestion. 

Q. Are you still frustrated, asyi 
said during your first press confer- 
ence, by the independent voice of 
F>ance? 

A. There are frustrations with th «l 
job, and I have heard other foreign 
ministers express them. But I say thjijlup 
overall I think that the opportunity tli(tl 
deal with the diverse world on a glob.M 
basis and to discuss its problems and IN 
approaches to it with men of the capjPPf 
bilities that I have encountered in iwc 
NATO and elsewhere is an intellectu-iwilf 
ally stimulating exercise; frustrations ill'ii 
from time to time, challenges from tin|fif( 
to time. 

Each country has it's own interes 
to protect, and I think I have a slighi 
different perspective on how to take 
that pursuit of national interests in 
context of establishing a common pi 
of view, and struggling with that I 
think is a stimulating challenge, am 
enjoy it on the whole. I like my col 
leagues in the NATO alliance; I ha' 
enjoyed working with them, and my 
stinct is that on the whole they seek 
positive solutions. 

Q. Fifty-two Americans have 
been held hostage in Iran for more 
than 9 months now. Can this situa 
tion last until the election day, for 
example? Do you plan any new initi 
five? 

A. We continue to pursue the op- 
tion of quiet diplomacy through all of 
the channels that are made available 
us by our friends, by our allies, by nor 
governmental sources. We have been 
undertaking, in these indirect ways, I 
persuade the emerging powers in Irai 
that it is in Iran's self-interest to get 
the hostage situation behind it. We 
have been waiting for the emergence 
effective governmental authority in 
Iran without which the decision to re- 
lease the hostages or even to create a 
dialogue of negotiation has been very 
difficult. With the appointment of ane 
Prime Minister, perhaps we are close'' 
that second objective. 

With respect to the first, therein 
been a growing appreciation of the nee 
to get the decision behind us, and, in- 
creasingly, various elements in Iran 
have identified the Parliament as the . 



m 
ttrsh 
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Dfinarlmfint of State Bulled 



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Jtit 

I'Jien 
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The Secretary 



ice where the decision will be made. 

id once the Parliament is fully consti- 
t:ted with a Prime Minister and a 
(binet as well as a President, then it 
s ins to me we'll know how soon we 
:i liegin to get to grips with the 
p iblem finally. 



R>I)I()2 

H. Recently you complained 
i)u( the fact that you learned 
lou^h the press the change of nu- 
ll ir policy of President Carter. So 
» got the impression that there was 
t ick of coordination at the White 
Ijse at the same time that many 
i opeans complain about the lack of 
i mess, the lack of leadership of 
* sident Carter. Are you very satis- 
i with the Administration vou 
V k for? 

A. You have implied a lot of ques- 
i( s. As I perceive Europe I see dif- 
f iK'es of opinion. I don't see the al- 
'' countries always agreeing with 
'iiher or each other's policies, and 
lu' alliance is strong and it is 
.. i,u in part because of confidence 
e onstrated in President Carter's 
'<• Tship. It was President Carter's 
: rship which led to the decision to 
K 'ase NATO defense spending in 
ei terms by S''i a year. It was his 
■a Tship that led to the decision to 
e] ly modernized theater nuclear 
e inns, at the same time asking for 
I nil limiting theater nuclear 

"Ills for the Russians. It was his 
I rship which pi-ompted the NATO 
use Ministers to begin planning for 
I i-f flexible defense of Europe which 
' I enable the United States to de- 
) iis forces elsewhere in the area if 
til. These surely are not signs of 
1 >t' confidence in President Carter's 
-i\ rship. 
Vith respect to the decision here 
clear strategy, it is a fact that the 
Department's participation in the 
:■' opment of that strategy has been 
lal. That's a fact that I have 
ed since last week, and I think it 
d be comprehensive, for the 
jn policy implications are obvious 
vident in the fact that you asked 
e question. And yet our European 
Is ought not to overlook the fact 
after all, it is the President w^ho is 
itutionally the foreign policy- 

And he was not e.xcluded from 
olicymaking. The State Depart- 
apparently was to an e.xtent that 
^uldn't have been. The question 



that was raised really is not a complaint 
on my part, it's not personal on my 
part. I just think that the President's 
ability to deal with that sort of policy 
would be enhanced if the State De- 
partment as well as the Defense De- 
partment and the National Security 
Council were involved. I suspect from 
now on it may be. 

Q. Last May, a few days after 
your trip to Vienna, you harshly 
complained about the Europeans and 
especially about the French political 
initiatives toward the Soviet I'nion. 
How would you qualify today the 
French foreign policy and its re- 
lationship to the United States? 

A. I think that my complaint was 
very limited and had to do more with 
consultation than with the fact of the 
meeting. And I raised the question of 
consultation somewhat with tongue in 
cheek because I had been pretty se- 
verely lectured in Europe about the 
lack of American consultation of allies 
only to learn on my return here that we 
had not been consulted on that. So we 
both have something to learn about the 
importance of consultation, and I 
thought I made the point relatively 
gently but I think it stuck and I expect 
that we'll have better consultation in 
the future. 

Q. But how would you qualify 
the Franco-American relationship 
today and the exchange of views? 

A. I think that you French are in a 
better position to qualify that. I think 
there is a lot of residual goodwill for the 
French people here going back to the 
Revolution and our historic ties. In my 
own State, about 25'^(- of our people are 
of French extraction — French Cana- 
dian mostly. And so there is that. 

The special French trait of seeking 
an independent position for the sake of 
being independent is sometimes frus- 
trating to us, but on the other hand 
there have been evidences of French 
cooperation that are important. So, the 
French have captured the knack of get- 
ting special attention by acting in a 
specially different way, and I suppose 
all countries seek to find that way. The 
United States, being a superpower, 
gets attention by virtue of that fact 
which I suspect is frustrating to our 
European friends at the same time that 
they understand and support the value 
of our collaboration. 

Q. How do you view the attitude 
of Mr. Brezhnev using France, and 
especially President Giscard d'Esta- 
ing, very often as a sort of mediator 



between the Eastern and the Western 
world? Does it hurt you quite a lot? 

A. It all depends upon what the 
French response is. I think looking at it 
one way, if as a result of those contacts 
Mr. Brezhnev comes away impressed 
with the fact of alliance unity on a par- 
ticular issue, then to get it from two or 
three different countries is a useful 
kind of thing. 

If, however, as a result he succeeds 
UT dividing the alliance on an important 
issue then the result is negative. I don't 
think we should prejudge such contacts 
as being either negative or positive but 
seek rather by consultation to insure to 
the maximum extent possible that we 
are moving in a common direction. 

Q. Do you really believe that 
during the Venice Summit that the 
Soviets were withdrawing the 10,(»00 
troops when everybody knows that for 
3 weeks before they sent 10,000 more? 

A. We tried to take it at face value 
because we knew that our friends 
wanted to show that we weren't totally 
negative on it. But we really did not 
find that there was anything more than 
some refleployment of about 5,000 
troops from within Afghanistan to the 
Afghanistan border, and it involved 
units that were not particularly valu- 
able to the kind of fighting that was 
going on. 

Q. Let's come back to the U.S. 
hostages in Iran. How do the negotia- 
tions go now between Washington and 
Tehran, and do you have any hope to 
have the hostages freed before next 
November, especially after the nomi- 
nation of a new Prime Minister, Mr. 
Mohammad Ali Rajai? 

A. There is no way of setting a 
date, and if one were to do so it could 
prove very unfortunate in raising ex- 
pectations. Nevertheless, the develop- 
ment to which you refer — the election 
of a Prime Minister and a gradual 
emergence of the formal government in 
Iran — at least moves us closer to the 
(lay when there will be somebody in 
authority — somebody with the author- 
ity. Khomeini himself has said that the 
Parliament will settle this issue. The 
hardliners have said that the Parlia- 
ment will settle this issue. And others 
have said that the Parliament will set- 
tle this issue. So once the Parliament is 
constituted, it is our hope and we'll try 
to build on that hope through all the 
diplomatic channels made available to 
us by our allies and others in order to 
shape the decision and the terms which 
will eventually resolve in the release of 
the hostages. 



ler 1980 



15 



The Secretary 



Q. So you are still very hopeful in 
spite of the confusion in this Iranian 
administration? 

A. That makes it particularly frus- 
trating. We have never been in that 
particular kind of a situation before, 
but one can recall the hostages that 
were seized by North Korea in connec- 
tion with the Piiehlu in 1964. Those 
hostages were held 11 months before 
they wei'e released and they were fi- 
nally released. That was a frustrating 
period and 11 months is an awfully long 
time. And there have been other in- 
stances. 

So that patience, especially in a 
situation such as this where events 
from time to time escalate emotions 
there — after all, the economy is in bad 
shape, there is factionalism, there are 
those who seek to dethrone the Kho- 
meini and his revolutionary govern- 
ment. So in that kind of a situation it's 
easy to whip up popular emotions and 
use the hostages as sort of a scapegoat, 
the bargaining chip for getting some 
kinds of political power. They really are 
a source of political power now more 
than anything else. 



Q. How do you view the situation 
in Afghanistan right now? The Rus- 
sians are still there. What are your 
plans to make them leave? 

A. There are two objectives that 
are important. I don't think that we 
really entertained any hope that the 
Russians would leave very soon or that 
they would withdraw or reverse their 
policy in response to the pressures that 
we tried to bring upon them. But 
nevertheless, we hope to influence that 
and influence the level of fighting there; 
but in addition, to deter the Russians 
from further expansionism beyond 
Pakistan. 

So it is important, I think, to main- 
tain the pressure that we sought to im- 
pose. The grain embargo which did not 
involve Europe very much, because 
Europe is not a big grain growing area, 
but with the help of other countries I 
think we did exact an important price. 
The Russians did not recapture what 
they lost in American exports. As a re- 
sult they were not able to increase their 
meat supplies, which was one of their 
objectives. In addition they had to draw- 
down their grain reserves, and it is 
very doubtful that their crop this year 
will enable them to re.store those re- 
serves or build up their meat supplies. 
So there has been a price they have had 
to pay. 



COMECON (Council for Mutual 
Economic Assistance] is very impor- 
tant. It is very important that the in- 
dustrial countries hold the line. This in- 
volves high technology related, of 
course, to military uses. And up to 
now, I think, the allies have held pretty 
steady on that policy to build up our 
defenses, I think, is a fact that the Rus- 
sians cannot ignore and over time 
promises to increase their own defense 
levels with the resulting impact upon 
their peoples' standard of living and so 
on. So all of these pressures, I think, 
are im))ortant. 

I think also the disajjproval of the 
Islamic conference — a conference 
within which the Soviet Union had 
made great headway prior to the Af- 
ghanistan invasion — is an important 
detei'rent to the Russians. They have 
run into moi'e difficulty in Afghanistan 
than they anticipated which makes it 
difficult for them to pull out and save 
face. But I think if we hold steady that 
eventually that problem will perhaps be 
worked out. 

Q. In the next coming days the 
President of the European Council, 
Mr. Gaston Thorn, is going to the 
.Middle East to try to promote the 
European initiatives and the negotia- 
tion in the Middle East. How do you 
view that? 

A. It is nut a very encouraging 
time. In all of these actions — unilateral 
actions taken by the parties to the 
negotiatons, these resolutions in the 
United Nations, the special session of 
the United Nations related to Pales- 
tinian rights — all of these things so 
exacerbate the emotional climate in 
both Egypt and Israel as to be counter- 
productive. I understand the objective 
of the European initiative. It seeks to 
play the role of middleman, and at some 
point it may be of help in broadening 
the negotiative base so that we can in- 
clude all parties who will be affected. 
But in the meantime the principal 
engine — the negotiations — have stalled 
again because of these outside diver- 
sions w'hich have prompted the parties 
to pull back from the talks. 

'Press release 220 of Aug. 15, 1980. 
^Press release 221 of Aug. 15, 1980. ■ 



Interview for 
"U.S. News & 
World Report" 



Folldwitifi IK the text of an inter 
view Secretari/ Miiskie held with the^^ 
editors of U.S. News & World Repo 
n;^f/ u'hich appeared in the August 1 
1980, issue. 



Q. There is a great deal of criticisi 
that the Carter Administration has 
bungled foreign policy — that after 
years we are in trouble with allies, 
adversaries, and the Third World. 
What do vou sav to it? 



■■ 



A. I've heard the same criticisn 
made of just about every Administr;, 
tion I've been involved with as a ser 
tor. I don't know that there is a gen 
ei'al, succinct rebuttal to a sweeping, 
criticism of that kind. It would be mc 
useful to deal with particular 
situations — the North Atlantic Trea 
alliance, for example. 

I can recall when the state of th 
alliance was such that Senator Mike 
Mansfield almost persuaded the Cor 
gress to vote to withdraw all our tro 
from Europe. And I remember the 
complaints that our European frienc 
and allies didn't seem to be sufficien 
concerned about the threat and aboi 
adequately supporting NATO. Sural 
that must have been a low point — a 
it did not occur in this Administratic 



Q. What about all the talk of 
array in the alliance that critics at 
tribute to Administration policies? 



«itl 



A. The fact is that NATO, in tei' 
of the defense of Europe, is in bette- 
shape than it has been in a long time 
thanks to President Carter's leaders* 
as well as the impact of events such 
the invasion of Afghanistan. 

Even before Afghanistan, NATOfJU 
committed itself to a Z'^i annual real 
growth in defense spending, and, by 
and large, that commitment is being |,™" 
honored. Furthermore, the allies ^ ;" 
agreed in May to give us greater fle;| .'I* 
bility in deploying our forces outside 
the NATO area. Finally, there is the %\ 
decision to modernize theater nuclea l(i.(| 
weapons. \^\\ 

So, in terms of the original purpcjlii«|f 
of NATO— the defense of the territol \, 
covered by the treaty — the alliance ii 
strong and supportive of U.S. lead- 
ership. Really, I don't think there is- 
any basis for complaint. 



•U 



16 



DRnarfmfint nf State Bulli,I% 



The Secretary 



Q. Have the allies been drajjgins 
their feet when it comes to helping us 
'counter the Soviet invasion of Af- 
ghanistan and protect Persian Gulf 
jjil? 

A. Outside the NATO territory 
here have been differences of 
;)pinion — not over the strategic signifi- 
ance of the Soviet invasion of Afghani- 
tan but over the means for imple- 
iienting our concern. 

With respect to the grain embargo, 
Ithough the Europeans are not big 
iippHers, they did support us. 

With respect to technology trans- 
■rs to the Soviets since the Afghani- 
aii invasion, our NATO allies and 
ipan have been cooperating with us in 
OCOM [Coordinating Committee for 
ast-West Trade Policy], the organiza- 
un which regulates exports to Russia 
lat have potential strategic value. 
With respect to the Olympics, 
ere was disagreement — but not so 
uch among the governments as among 
I' Olympic committees. It's interest- 
■X, too, that the Olympics emerged as 
• said they would — sort of an East 
_ 'rmany-Russia bilateral track meet. 
In addition to that West Germany 
s led the effort to form a consortium 
help Turkey economically; Britain 
is been helpful in allowing us to e.x- 
md our facilities on Diego Garcia in 
e Indian Ocean. 
The performance among the allies 
been mixed, but there's been per- 
fmance. 
Still, it's true that there's an incli- 
ion on their part to continue the 
efits of detente in terms of trade 
I economic benefits and, in the case 
iVest Germany, in terms of human 
ktacts. And they want to see arms 
iitrol continue: that's a very high 
rity with them. 
When we disagree, it does not 
an that they necessarily are chal- 
ging American leadership so much as 
■suing their own interests to the ex- 
t that they can while still cooperat- 
with us. You're not going to get a 
lolithic line — unquestioning support 
every initiative that we take or 
ry policy that we seek to put in 
:e. 

Q. Do you share the concern of 
ir Administration officials who 

I the future danger of what they 
self-Finlandization of Western 

|-ope — a drift to neutralism"' 

I A. No. I think that's a theoretical 
iment. I suspect it may be a Soviet 
'ctive down the line. But in terms of 
I day-to-day relationship of Western 



Europe and the Soviet Union and our 
perceptions of our alliance with West- 
ern Europe, I don't see any impulse to- 
ward neutralism. 

It's directly the contrary: There is 
a vigorous determination to restrain 
Soviet behavior and to demonstrate 
that it's unacceptable, not only in 
NATO but elsewhere. The allies under- 
stand that their independence and their 
freedom can be inhibited and restrained 
without war if we don't maintain a 
strategic balance, if the NATO defense 
is allowed to flag, if we don't establish 
common policies and common views 
wath respect to common areas. 

The European allies would like to 
be independent of us, but they'd like 
even more to be independent of the 
Soviet Union. They don't want to be too 
independent of us, but they'd like to be 
perceived as able to be independent 
whenever they're in a position to assert 
themselves. That is natural. 

Nevertheless, when you get 
through all the angry rhetoric that oc- 
casionally erupts and you sit around the 
table with the foreign ministers and 
you've had your arguments and your 
disagreements, then you come to un- 
derstand there's a basic agreement that 
the alliance is important to us all. It's 
important for all of us to sustain it, to 
support it, to work at it, and to 
minimize the perception that it's in 
disarray. 

Q. Looking at another specific 
area of American foreign policy that 
is widely viewed as the .Administra- 
tion's outstanding achievement: Isn't 
the Camp David agreement on Middle 
East peace showing signs of unravel- 
ing'.' Is there danger that Egypt might 
pull out of the negotiations? 

A. There is that danger. There is a 
problem with mutual reaction — the 
tendency by one side to take unilateral 
actions that create political difficulties 
for the other side and produce reactions 
that in turn tend to put the other side 
on the defensive. 

The settlements question and the 
Jerusalem issue have been the most 
difficult. The parties get diverted by 
unilateral actions, their concentration is 
disturbed, and they tend to cause the 
other side to walk away from the talks. 

The actions now taken and being 
considered in Israel on Jerusalem can- 
not finally settle the status of 
Jerusalem. At some point it will be dis- 
cussed as an issue. If agreement even- 
tually is reached concerning the status 
of Jerusalem, then presumably both the 
Israeli and Egyptian Governments will 
support it notwithstanding any prior 



J 



ober 1980 



position either government may have 
taken. I've tried to make that point to 
both sides. 

I regret the actions that Israel is 
now taking because the risk is that they 
will lead to interruption of the talks. At 
the same time, I make the point to the 
Egyptians that the issue of Jerusalem 
really is still there to be discussed, and 
they ought to bear that in mind in their 
reactions to such things. 

Q. How do you answer our Euro- 
pean allies and others who maintain 
that events have demonstrated that 
the Camp David process can't work 
and that it's necessary now to move to 
a comprehensive negotiating 
framework to include the Palestin- 
ians and Jordanians'/ 

A. The conclusion that the Camp 
David process can't work applies even 
more to any other approach to this 
pi'oblem that one can conceive. 

Nothing else has worked for more 
than 30 years in the Middle East. There 
have been four wars. There have been 
U.N. resolutions before. Nothing else 
has ever produced anything. If one uses 
pessimism based upon 30 years of frus- 
tration as the test of this or any other 
process, one can conclude that it won't 
work. 

My answer to that is that the Camp 
David process has worked remarkably 
up to this point and that it can work the 
rest of the way if we don't adopt that 
defeatist attitude. It's like Winston 
Chui'chiU's description of democracy: 
The worst form of government — until 
you consider the alternatives. When I 
consider the alternatives for dealing 
with this issue, all I can see in the fu- 
ture is a growth of violence, an exacer- 
bation of tensions, and maybe a de- 
struction of what has been accom- 
plished under Camp David. 

Q. Do you contemplate some new 
American initiative to get the talks 
back on the tracks again? 

A. What I see developing is some- 
thing like this: As the talks go forward, 
from time to time the parties ask the 
United States: "Do you have any ad- 
vice? Do you have any suggestions on 
how to handle this next point?" 

I think that we can be a positive 
force in the context of ongoing talks in 
which U.S. influence, innovation, and 
creativity can be one of the ingredients 
that all of the parties can take advan- 
tage of. It is a leadership role that must 
be played. But I think the idea of using 
the State Department bureaucracy to 
build a plan and then take it over there 
and present it is the least effective way 
to exercise leadership. 



17 



The Secretary 



P« 



Q. Do you see any prospect of 
breaking the stalemate and making 
major progress in the Camp David 
negotiations before the American 
elections? 

A. I think there is that possibility 
if the parties woukl concentrate. They 
might not complete the job by election 
day. But before the talks were sus- 
pended in May, they were moving from 
point to point. 

What strikes me about the talks is 
that the attitudes of the Egyptian and 
Israeli negotiators and their delega- 
tions are constructive; they're positive. 
There's no sign of foot-dragging. 

Q. Turning to relations with the 
Soviets: What are the prospects of 
improving relations with Russia while 
its army remains in Afghanistan? 

A. There certainly will not be any 
business-as-usual relationship with the 
Soviet Union so long as their troops are 
in Afghanistan. We should continue our 
policies that are designed to impose a 
cost on them. We don't, however, to- 
tally destroy the framework of East- 
West relations within which there are 
contacts. 

For example, the meeting of the 
Conference on Security and Coopera- 
tion in Europe (CSCE) in Madrid to re- 
view compliance with the Helsinki Final 
Act is going forward. This is a way for 
us, among other things, to raise the Af- 
ghanistan issue and to challenge the 
Soviets' ])erformance and all par- 
ticipating countries' performance in the 
human rights area. 

We must not forget, also, that the 
CSCE framework is a way for the 
Eastern European countries to relieve 
the repressive nature of their relation- 
ships with the Soviet Union — to estab- 
lish more contacts with the West. So 
you would not want to destroy the 
CSCE or postpone it or suspend it. In 
that sense, we continue our relation- 
ships with the Soviet Union. 

With respect to arms control, we're 
[preparing for preliminary exchanges on 
controlling theater nuclear forces in 
Europe that we agreed to begin with 
the Soviet Union. It's important to our 
security interests as well as theirs that 
we begin to establish a system of re- 
straint for nuclear arms in Europe. I 
expect we will meet the Soviets on this 
before too long. 

Q. And SALT? 

A. Yes, we need to pursue that. 
But it's very difficult to do. At the mo- 
ment, the prospects of getting the 
necessary votes in the Senate are 
pretty remote. 



But time is running out on us with 
respect to the deadline for the dis- 
mantling of mi.ssiles that SALT II re- 
quires of the Soviet Union. Thus far, 
the Soviets are honoring the SALT II 
Treaty— or at least not violating it. 
Neither are we. There's no explicit 
agreement on this, but there's a very 
clear understanding. 

With respect to trade relations, the 
grain embargo, technology transfers, 
and other contacts, we will insist upon 
continuation of our current policies de- 
signed to impose a cost on the Soviet 
Union. 

The Soviets, of course, are having 
a very difficult time in Afghanistan. 
Right now, there's no progress at all on 
Afghanistan, except the fact that we're 
communicating. 

Q. Are you considering other 
sanctions against the Soviets to exact 
a higher cost for their invasion of Af- 
ghanistan? 

A. No. I think what we've got in 
place really covers the options that are 
available: grain embargo, technology 
transfers controlled under the COCOM 
list, the buildup of Western defenses, 
and defense budgets. That imposes a 
heavy pressure on the Soviet Union. 

Q. Have those measures had any 
practical effect on the Soviets as far 
as forcing them to rethink their Af- 
ghanistan policy is concerned? 

A. They are obviously uncomforta- 
ble, at the very least, and seriously 
concerned that world reaction has been 
what it has been. They would like to re- 
store their relationships with Europe, 
the West, and the United States. 
There's no doubt in my mind they're 
seeking to do that. Of course, they may 
hope to have their cake and eat it, too. 
But I think it's been made very clear to 
them up to now that they cannot. 

They're having difficulty pacifying 
Afghanistan — and yet they have re- 
frained from any troop buildup beyond 
what it has been for several months. 
Now that the Olympics are over, it will 
be interesting to see whether their 
policy changes, whether they begin to 
put in more forces in an effort to bring 
the situation in Afghanistan under con- 
trol. I suspect they will not do that im- 
mediately, because they will want to 
continue their diplomatic efforts — 
Madrid, talks on theater nuclear forces, 
and so on. 

The pressure we have applied on 
the Soviets has had its effect. But 
whether it's had enough to cause them 
to actually reverse their policy in Af- 
ghanistan is certainly not clear. 



Jc 



Q. If not an all-out offensive tc 
crush the insurgents, what do you € 
pect the Soviets to do? 

A. They're in sort of a dilemma ; 
to which course to pursue in Afghani 
Stan. I suspect they're going to build 
their pressure on the Pakistani boi'de 
in order to stop the flow of materiel a 
arms and food to the insurgents. 

Q. What is the United States 
doing to deter the Russians from 
pressuring Pakistan or to respond i 
they actually move troops across th 
border? 

A. We are in communication wit 
the Pakistanis. Maybe I could just pi 
it this way: 

The Pakistanis see increased pre 
sure and occasional hot pursuit acros 
the border, but not a major invasion 
this point. They need economic assist 
ance. But at the moment, the situatii 
seems controllable. 

Even though we've not been able 
reverse Soviet policy, there's a high 
probability that the international rea 
tion to Afghanistan has had a deterri 
effect upon any thought that the 
Soviets may have of extending their 
expansion beyond Afghanistan. I thii 
they'd be very careful about that. 

Q. Does the Administration in- 
tend to help the Afghan insurgents _^ 
continue their resistance against tM ^ 
Soviet army of occupation? 

A. Do you mean go to war? 

Q. No. Provide the insurgents 
with arms — 

A. If that were a question under 
serious consideration, it isn't one I 
could discuss. 



Q. Has the death of the Shah 
somehow cleared the way toward at 
resolution of the crisis and the relea 
of the hostages? 

A. Not in any way that we've ba 
able to perceive at this point. 
Nevertheless, we place it in rank wit* 
other developments that have taken 
place which might warrant new initia 
tives by us. 

The death of the Shah was one SU' 
development. Another was the returi 
of Richard Queen, which indicatedat 
the very least that somebody was in : 
position to make the decision and haci 
the authority to do so very quickly. 
Also, Ramadan— the holy season—^ 
expires on August 12 in Iran. And fi- 
nally there is the slow but gradual 
emergence of political institutions— t. 
Parliament, in particular— which mig^j 



18 



Departnnent of State BuH&ij 



AFRICA 



Access Agreement With Somalia 



FoUoivhig are a Department an- 
lOKuceniei/f of August JJ, 1980, a)td a 
tafenieiit bi/ Richard M. Moose, As- 
istatit Secretarij for Africai/ Affairs, 
'efore the Siibroiiniiittee on Africa of 
he House Foreigti Affairs Coiiniiittee 
ri August ,'t>. 



)EPARTxMENT ANNOUNCEMENT, 
UG. 22. 19801 

n August 22, 1980, the United States 
nd the Somalia Democratic Republic 
xchanjjed diplomatic notes providing 
ir expanded cooperation between 
omalia and the United States in both 
lie civil and military spheres. The ini- 
ementation of this agreement will be 
matter of mutual and continuing con- 

Itation between the two governments 

we work together toward an ex- 
inded relationship across a broad 

nge of mutual interests, including the 

velopment of programs of security 
*sistance and economic cooperation. 

This exchange of notes allows the 
fiited States increased access to 

malia's air and port facilities. The 
rovisions of this agreement are defen- 

e in nature and are aimed at the 
motion of stability in the general 
a; they are not directed against any 

tieular nation or group of nations. 



ASSISTANT SECRETARY 
MOOSE. AUG. 2«, 1980^ 

On August 22 we exchanged notes with 
officials of the Somali Democratic Re- 
public which incorporated an agreement 
to allow our military forces increased 
access to the port and air facilities in 
Somalia. 

We will shortly be sending copies 
of this agreement to the appropriate 
House and Senate committees as re- 
quired under the Case act. At that time 
you will see that they are unremarkable 
and differ only in minor ways with 
other agreements which we have 
negotiated. 

As you know, the agreement with 
Somalia is one of three which we have 
sought for the purpose of increasing our 
ability to project our military strength 
in the Southwest Asian area. We have 
felt that access to the facilities in 
Somalia would round out our military 
capabilities in this region. I want to 
emphasize that we have undertaken 
these negotiations and this agreement 
in furtherance of a global strategic 
objective. 

We have had a series of discussions 
with countries in the Southwest Asian 
and Indian Ocean littoral area and have 
found general acceptance of our desire 
to enhance our ability to counter poten- 
tial threats in the Indian Ocean region. 



^ntually concentrate authority that's 
« ountable and responsive. Now all of 
se are coming together. 
You will remember that when the 
LM. commission went to Iran early 
- year, there was no follow-through 
' ts plan because there was nobody 
«h the authority to implement it. 
V 've been waiting for this authority to 
#'elop and to emerge. The situation 
hi. reached a point where perhaps 
■il rtly it will have emerged. 

Q. What kinds of new initiatives 
I \()u have in mind? Can you elabo- 
■ e on that? 

.■\. I cannot, because I would de- 
ly them if I were to do so. But ba- 
^ dly what it involves is contacts that 
' ve developed over these agonizing 

iths — diplomatic, nondiplomatic, 
«-'ious countries, through our allies. 



These enable us to establish indirect 
contact with people of importance in 
Iran. We're considering expanding the 
effort . 

Q. Would you say you're more 
hopeful now about the release of the 
hostages? 

A. I'd rather not use words like 
that in connection with the hostages. 

I think eventually a decision is 
going to be made. Increasingly there's a 
perception in Iran that holding the hos- 
tages is against Iran's self-interest. 
Once that perception coincides with our 
desire to have the hostages returned, I 
think something's going to happen. 

Q. In 1 month, B months, or 
when? 

A. Don't jnit out a bulletin on it.H 



To date, we have had little reaction 
from African nations to our efforts to 
acquire access to additional facilities 
along the Indian Ocean. We have made 
clear on numerous occasions that these 
efforts do not represent any basic 
change in the policy established by this 
Administration toward Africa. We con- 
tinue to believe that conflicts on the Af- 
rican Continent should be resolved 
peacefully and that economic develop- 
ment remains the primary task with 
which we should associate ourselves. I 
feel that an undue amount of attention 
has been paid to the military assistance 
aspects of our agreements with both 
Kenya and Somalia. In point of fact, in 
both cases we have placed considerable 
emphasis on responding to economic 
needs within the framework of our new 
relationship. 

Negotiations on the agreement 
with Somalia have taken considerable 
time and have been the occasion for 
frank discussions between the Somalis 
and ourselves on bilateral problems — 
past, present, and future. In particular, 
they have given us the opportunity to 
discuss problems which could arise from 
the continuing dispute between Somalia 
and Ethiopia over the Ogaden region. 

We believe that we have made 
abundantly clear to the Somalis the 
limitations imposed by our laws on the 
use of materiel which might be supplied 
in the future under foreign military 
sales agreements and the possible con- 
sequences of their violation of these 
provisions. We are confident that the 
Somalis understand our views on the 
activities in the Ogaden. 

In this connection, we have again 
expressed our view that the problems 
of the Horn cannot be solved by mili- 
tary means, and we believe the Somalis 
agree that their only long-term solu- 
tions lie in the political realm. This lat- 
ter view is supjjorted by most of the 
states of Africa, and we continue to 
hope that the OAU (Organization of Af- 
rican Unity] Good Offices Committee on 
Settlement of the Dispute between 
Somalia and Ethiopia, which met again 
in Lagos last week, will eventually be 
able to bring the two parties to some 
sort of agreement on a solution to the 
Ogaden which is acceptable to all. 



' Read to news correspondents by act- 
ing Department .spokesman David Passage. 

^The complete transcript of the hear- 
ings will be published by the committee and 
will be available from the Superintendent 
of Documents. U.S. Government Printing 
Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



.-ober 1980 



19 



CANADA 



U.S.-Canada Relations 



by Sharon E. Ahmad 

Statement before the Siibeom iiiittee 
on Inter-Aiiierieaii Affairs of the HoKxe 
Foreign Affairs Conniiiftee on June 17. 
1980.' Mrs^ Ahmad is Depnti/ Assistant 
Secretary for Enropean Affairs. '^ 

I welcome the opportunity to appear be- 
fore you today to review with you the 
nature and current state of U.S. rela- 
tions with Canada. The involvement of 
the United States with Cana(ia over a 
broad range of areas— political, econom- 
ic, cultural, commercial, and defense, 
etc.— is greater than with any other for- 
eign country. 

In the political area, our govern- 
ments work closely and harmoniously, 
both bilaterally and in international fora. 
As friends and allies we share the same 
goals of peace, freedom, and the better- 
ment of mankind's existence on the 
planet. 

We are deeply involveil with each 
other economically, as our people pro- 
duce and exchange goods and services 
for our mutual benefit. More than one- 
fifth of our exports go to Canada, nearly 
twice that which goes to Japan, our next 
largest customer. U.S. exports to Cana- 
da are greater than our exports to all 
the countries of the European Economic 
Community combined. A quarter of all 
U.S. foreign investment is located in 
Canada, while the net flow of equity in- 
vestment has now shifted and is now di- 
rected toward the United States from 
Canada. 

We are allies in NATO, but our de- 
fense relations go well beyond those 
with other NATO allies, involving the 
40-year-old Permanent Joint Board on 
Defense. Also, we have a unique military 
joint command — the North American 
Air Defense Command (NORAD) — and 
longstanding defense procurement rela- 
tions. 

Our people know each other well 
and share a common outlook on the 
world. Over 70 million people cross the 
U.S.-Canada border annually. In addi- 
tion to business and government travel, 
we vacation in the areas of each other's 
country that we find attractive. Our stu- 
dents attend each other's educational in- 
stitutions in large numbers. We see 
many of the same films and television 
shows and read many of the same publi- 
cations. 



We share a common interest in a 
large part of our environment— land, 
air, and water— and are both increasing- 
ly concerned about the maintenance and 
improvement of the quality of life and 
the effects of our actions on each other's 
environment. 

All of this involvement leads fre- 
quently to the need for cooperation, con- 
sultation, and negotiation at many levels 
of Federal, provincial, and local govern- 
ment. The success or failure of this co- 
operation has a significant impact on our 
bilateral relations. 

I think it is also useful to discuss 
some of the factors which affect how the 
relations between the two countries are 
perceived from each other's perspective. 
The difference in size, on the order of 10 
to 1 in terms of both population and eco- 
nomic strength, is a central fact. In ad- 
dition, the distribution of the Canadian 
population should be noted. Canadians 
are concentrated along the U.S. border, 
with 8()'Ri of Canadians living within 100 
miles of the United States. 

As a result, Canadians are far more 
conscious of the relationship than are 
Americans, and our bilateral issues are 
usually national issues in Canada, while 
they more often are regional issues in 
the United States. Furthermore, there is 
an ambiguity in Canadian attitudes to- 
ward the United States. While Cana- 
dians are attracted to many elements of 
our culture and society and welcome 
their relationship with us, at the same 
time they are determined to maintain 
their own separate identity and not be 
overwhelmed by us. 

Situation in Canada 

With these general factors in mind, I 
would now like to say a few words about 
the current .situation in Canada and the 
state of our relations. As you know, the 
Liberal Party of Prime Minister Trudeau 
currently governs Canada, having won a 
majority of 12 in the House of Commons 
in elections last Feliruary. With this ma- 
jority, the Liberals will probably be in 
power for the next 4 to 5 years. 

More recently, the most important 
event on the domestic political scene in 
Canada has been the May 20 referen- 
dum in Quebec. Canada has a heritage 
of two distinct founding cultures which 
has no parallel here. For many years 
there has been substantial attention 



given to what the relation between the 
two cultures should be. The referendum 
was on a proposal by Quebec Premier 
Rene Levesque to negotiate with Ottawa 
a new relationship termed "sovereignty- 
association." That proposal was defeated ' 
by a vote of nearly 60%. Levesque was 
opposed by the provincial Liberal Party, 
headed by Claude Ryan. 

With the decision in Quebec, the 
people of Canada now are turning their 
renewed efforts to resolving their consti- 
tutional differences. Canadian provinces 
already have far more autonomy than dc 
our States. Nevertheless, and for differ- 
ent reasons, the provinces are also inter- 
ested in constitutional change. Prime 
Minister Trudeau met with the 10 pro- 
vincial premiers on June 9 and agreed tc 
an intensive series of constitutional ne- 
gotiations over the summer, culminating 
in a federal-provincial formal meeting 
September 8-12 to revise the country's 
federal structure. Trudeau has said that 
failure to reach substantial agreement in 
the September talks would be "a disas- 
ter" for Canada. 

Recognizing that the national unity 
issue is vital to the future of Canada, 
the United States has followed with in- 
terest the events taking place to the 
north. However, we recognize that whik 
we hope Canada will remain united and 
strong, these questions are internal is- 
sues which Canadians must decide with- 
out outside interference. 

Canada has emerged as the world's 
seventh-ranking industrial power. With 
regard to the current state of the Cana- 
dian economy, it is expected to grow in 
lySO at less "than 1%. Inflation will be 
held to about 10%, in part because Can- 
ada, as a net energy exporter, is insu- 
lated from increases in the costs of im- 
ported oil. Export industries will suffer 
as a result of an expected decrease in 
demand in the United States. Unemploy 
ment should increase slightly to about 
8.5%. However, a deep recession in the 
United States could change this outlook 
substantially for the worse. 

Bilateral Relations 

Current U.S. -Canadian relations are I 
now in excellent shape. The differences 
which prevailed during the X'ietnam era i 
have been put aside , and our relationship 
can properly be characterized as warm 
and cordial.' As I mentioned earlier, the 
United States and Canada share a broad 
range of global interests and are active : 
in cooperating in pursuit of those inter- 
ests throughout the world. 






20 



Department of State Bulletiryj 



Canada 



Canada has been strongly supportive 
)f the United States on a wide variety of 
irlobal issues. Canada gave strong sup- 
port on Iran and AfghanisUin from the 
neginning of the crisis in Southwest Asia 
,nd took the lead in the boycott of the 
Moscow Olympics. Canada agreed in 
anuary to support the U.S. partial 
rain embargo against the Soviet Union 
nd not to replace U.S. grain withheld 
•om the U.S.S.R. Canada has held to 
.8 million tons the amount of grain to 
e delivered to the Soviet Union during 
us Canadian crop year, which ends 
jly 31. 

Americans will not forget the brav- 
■y of the Canadians who protected and 
ded in the escape of our six Americans 
oni Tehran in January. Also, Canada 
iplemented from the start informal 
lancial restrictions on trade with Iran 
concert with our major European al- 
■s and Japan. Canada attaches great 
iportance to allied unity and concerted 
tion and favors close consultation with 
e United States and its other allies on 
f developing events in Southwest 
;ia. 

As I indicated earlier, our joint m- 
bitation of this continent also involves 
in a wide range of bilateral matters, 
't me turn now to some of the current 
ecific issues involved in U.S. -Canadian 
iations, an area where the potential 
• unsettling our relations is greater 
;d, therefore, bears close watching. 

East Coast Maritime Boundary 
Fisheries Treaties. Last year the 
fited States and Canada signed two 
aties concerning the disputed bound- 
between the two countries in the 
if of Maine and related issues involv- 
li mineral resources and fisheries. Cur- 
U.S. -Canadian east coast maritime 
Jjndary differences have as their origin 
I extension of fisheries jurisdictions to 
miles by l)oth countries in 1977. The 
sries treaty covers fish stocks of mu- 
interest on the Atlantic coast, includ- 
j those in the dis|)uted area. It would 
tblish a U.S. -Canada east coast fish- 
Is commission for the management of 
liy of the fish stocks and would assign 
rentage shares to each country for 
li stock covered. In addition, the trea- 
Itrovides for conciliation of disagree- 
lits and for ways of settling disputes 
[j'Ugh an arbitrator. The boundary 
|ty provides for settlement of the 
ladary dispute by referral to a special 
Inber of the International Court of 
lice. 

HThere has been substantial opposi- 
I in the Senate to approval of the 
Jties. Opponents have been critical of 



the permanent nature of the treaty, of 
the division of shares of some fish spe- 
cies, and of the treaty's provision for Ca- 
nadian access to certain stocks off the 
U.S. coast. 

Recognizing that the treaties have 
encountered very substantial opposition, 
we are in touch with the Senate, with 
representatives of fishery interests, and 
with Canada in an effort to work out an 
early and acceptable resolution of this 
important matter. Failure to do so 
would have a serious adverse effect on 
our bilateral relations. 

Alaska Gas Pipeline. In 1977 the 
United States and Canada agreed to fos- 
ter the construction of a pipeline to 



bring Prudhoe Bay gas through Canada 
to the U.S. market. Most of the regula- 
tory procedures have been completed, 
and early agreement on financing this 
$23 billion project has become critical to 
continued progress. 

The U.S. builder envisaged financing 
the southern legs of the pipeline (from 
Alberta to California and from Alberta 
to the Midwest) through the advance 
construction or "prebuild" of facilities to 
carry increased Canadian gas exports. It 
was planned that transmission revenues 
would cover the construction costs. 

From the outset Canada was con- 
cerned that financing the technically 
complex Alaska segment might prove 
difficult, leaving Canada in the position 



U.S., Canada Sign Memo 
on Air Pollution 



The United States and Canada took an 
important step on August 5, 1980, to- 
ward dealing with acid rain and other 
forms of air pollution crossing the 
U.S. -Canada border. They agreed to 
set in motion a bilateral process to deal 
more effectively with these problems. 
The action took the form of a Memoran- 
dum of Intent signed for the United 
States by Secretary Muskie and En- 
vironmental Protection Agency Ad- 
ministrator Costle and for Canada by 
Ambassador Towe and Environment 
Minister Roberts.' 

In signing the memorandum, Sec- 
retary Muskie stated that this action 
confirms the mutual goal of the United 
States and Canada to take concrete, co- 
operative steps to combat the problem 
of transboundary air pollution and to 
negotiate a bilateral agreement as soon 
as possible. The Secretary noted that 
the memorandum responds to the 1978 
congressional resolution calling for 
U.S. -Canadian negotiations to pre- 
serve and protect mutual air resources.^ 

The Canadian Government wel- 
comed the Memorandum of Intent as a 
step forward in efforts to develop co- 
operative measures with the United 
States to combat transboundary air 
pollution. This includes the already 
serious problem of acid rain which af- 
fects the environment of both coun- 
tries. Ontario Environment Minister 
Harry Parrott also attended the 
Washington signing ceremony. 

The Memorandum of Intent estab- 
lishes five work groups to prepare for 



future negotiation of an agreement on 
air pollution. The work groups will 
undertake the necessary technical 
preparations for the negotiations. The 
United States and Canada are moving 
ahead to name experts and technicians 
to these work groups. 

The Memorandum of Intent also 
creates a U.S. -Canada coordinating 
committee to oversee the activities of 
the work groups and provides that the 
work groups submit work plans to the 
coordinating committee at an early 
date. Preparatory U.S. -Canadian dis- 
cussions on transbounflary air pollution 
will continue, and formal negotiations 
will commence as soon as possible. 

The Memorandum of Intent also 
calls upon both governments to take 
important interim actions, under cur- 
rent authority, to combat transbound- 
ary air pollution, pending conclusion of 
the agreement. The interim measures 
include mutual commitments for de- 
velopment of domestic air pollution con- 
trol policies, vigorous enforcement of 
existing laws, increased advance notifi- 
cation of proposed actions involving 
risk of transboundary air pollution and 
further development of exchanges of 
scientific studies, cooperative monitor- 
ing programs, and research on pollution 
control technologies. 



Press release 209 of Aug. 5, 1980. 

' For text of the Memorandum of In- 
tent, see press release 209A of Aug. 6. 

^The statements by the participants in 
the signing are printed in press release 
209B of Aug. 6. ■ 



Dber 1980 



21 



Canada 



of having authorized increased exports 
of Canadian gas to the United States to 
facilitate a pipeline for Alaskan gas that 
might never be built. Accordingly. Cana- 
da seeks assurances that the entire line 
will be built before it will authorize addi- 
tional gas exports and the construction 
of the "prebuild" facilities. 

We are working with Canada to find 
a formula for the assurances Canada 
seeks. We are optimistic that the re- 
maining issues can be resolved in the 
near future and that it will be possible 
to move ahead on authorizing construc- 
tion of the "prebuild" facilities within a 
short time. 

Bilateral Air Quality Agreement. 

Following a request by Congress in Oc- 
tober 1978, the United States and Cana- 
da began consultations on the negotia- 
tion of an air quality agreement. We 
have met several times and have agreed 
on principles which would be included in 
an agreement. At this juncture we are 
considering the next steps to be taken to 
accomplish the important objectives we 
share in this area. 

One of the major concerns prompt- 
ing U.S. interest in an air quality agree- 
ment is the desire to control Canadian 
sources of air pollution near the U.S. 
border. Examples include the Poplar 
River plant just north of the Montana 
line, Atikokan near the Minnesota 
boundary waters canoe area, and Nan- 
ticoke across Lake Erie from Cleveland. 
Air quality in Canada is under i)rovincial 
rather than federal control, and Cana- 
dian provincial pollution controls are 
generally less stringent than U.S. con- 
trols. There are, for example, no scrub- 
bers required on coal-fired power plants 
or smelters in Canada. 

On the Canadian side, a major moti- 
vation for concluding an air quality 
agreement with the United States is to re- 
duce acid rain. Also the United States is 
itself interested in combating acid rain. 
(Acid rain is caused by a combination of 
sulfur dioxide with oxygen and water 
vapor, producing a mild sulfuric acid 
which returns to the Earth in rain.) Al- 
though a recent study indicates that 
Canada generates at least half its own 
acid rain, it is a fact that the United 
States produces five times as much sul- 
fur dioxide as Canada, much of which 
originates in the Middle Western and 
Northeastern States, which are general- 
ly uf)wind from eastern Canada. Also, 
some of the acid rain falling in the 
United States originates in Canada. The 
geological makeup of eastern Canada 
and parts of ihe United States are par- 
ticularly vulnerable to acid rain poilu- 



22 



tion, which in certain cases kills aquatic 
life and may be harmful to crops and 
trees. 

We share Canada's concern about 
transboundary air pollution and acid 
rain, issues of vital importance to the 
jieople concerned in l)oth countries. We 
wish to move ahead to develop an air 
quality agreement and have under con- 
sideration mechanisms to aid both coun- 
tries in arriving at a workable agree- 
ment on this important problem. 

U.S. -Canadian Automotive Agree- 
ment. Until recent years the North 
American auto industry was unique. It 
was dominated by three manufactures of 
large cars to meet demand in North 
America. In Europe and Japan, produc- 
tion was princijially of smaller cars to 
satisfy demand in Europe and else- 
where. In recognition of Canada's inter- 
est in the North America auto indus- 
try—particularly in the areas of trade, 
investment, and employment— in 1965 
the United States and Canada concluded 
an agreement in this area. The agree- 
ment provides for duty-free trade in 
finished vehicles and original-equipment 
parts in commerce between both coun- 
tries. Two-way trade has increased from 
.$700 millicjn in 1964 to about $22 billion 
in 1979. This has resulted in substantial 
advantages for both countries in terms 
of investment, employment, and econo- 
mies of scale. 

For several years Canada has suf- 
fered a persistent deficit in its automo- 
tive trade with the United States. Last 
year's deficit came to $2.5 billion, a 
record high. This has caused some Cana- 
dians to question whether Canada is re- 
ceiving a "fair share" of the benefits 
under the agreement. There is also con- 
cern in Canada that it may not benefit 
sufficiently from investment and re- 
search and development expenditures 
made by auto manufacturers to meet the 
increased demand for smaller cars. 

In 1978 the Canadian Federal Gov- 
ernment and the Province of Ontario 
provided the Ford Motor Company a 
$68 million incentive to encourage the 
company to locate a $500 million plant 
in Ontario rather than Ohio. This 
brought a U.S. effort to reach agree- 
ment with Canada on the use of invest- 
ment incentives in the North American 
automotive sector. The U.S. and Cana- 
dian Governments have consulted sever- 
al times on mutual restraint on invest- 
ment incentives. Canada has also ex- 
[jressed the desire to consult on the 
state of the auto industry, including 
operation of the auto pact. We expect 



that within the next few weeks the firs' 
of these formal consultations will take 
place. 

Defense Issues. The United State: 
and Canada have few ditferences in the 
defense field. The North American Air 
Defense Command agreement remains 
key element in the U.S. -Canadian de- 
fense relationship. Earlier this year we 
agreed to extend for 1 year the NORA 
agreement, to allow time for the Stand 
ing Committee on External Affairs and 
Defence of the House of Commons to 
consider issues involved in the NORAD 
agreement. There is every reason to be 
lieve that the forthcoming negotiations^ 
will result in a new agreement for an e 
tended [leriod and a continuation of thi 
longstanding close defense relationship 

The Canadian Government an- 
nounced on April 10 its decision to pur 
chase the .McDonnell Douglas F-18A as 
Canada's new fighter aircraft to replaC" 
the existing fleet of obsolescent fighter- 
The number of aircraft to be purchaser 
will be between 129 and 137 depending 
on arrangements now under discussioru 
concerning the possible waiver of certal 
costs incurred l)y the U.S. (Jovernmen* 
Delivery of the aircraft is sche' .led tot 
begin in the second half of 1982 and w( 
continue until 1989. 

Conclusion 

The questions I have described are illu! 
trative of the many issues which are in 
volved today in U.S. -Canadian bilateral 
relations. There are many more, and I 
would be happy to try to provide any 3\ 
ditional details which members of this 
subcommittee may wish. 

As I have noted, U.S. -Canadian rel 
tions are close and friendly. I see no re. 
son to expect that our shared view of 
global issues will alter significantly in 
the foreseeable future. Bilaterally the 
same priorities will continue to apply: 
energy, transborder pollution control, 
maritime boundaries and fisheries, and 
trade and investment. The close interd 
pendence which exists between our twoi 
countries will inevitably bring clashes oli 
interests. We must vigorously .seek way 
to resolve these issues to the mutual sal 
isfaction of both countries. 

While success or failure in dealing 
with individual problems is bound to 
have some broader impact on other 
issues, we must recognize that in a rel 
tionship as extensive and complex as ex- 
ists between the United States and Can- 
ada, there are real risks in drawing spe- 
cific linkages between unrelated issues. 
Such a practice can give rise to a trade- 



II 



Canada 



iff mentality that could greatly compli- 
;ate our efforts to resolve individual 
Issues, and would not serve us well in 
he long run. Further, our two nations 
le:irly have the capacity to help or hurt 
ne another, and this fact dictates cau- 
on and restraint in our relations. Our 
•adition of consultation, of prior notifi- 
ition on issues of importance to the 
ither country and of genuine considera- 
on of each other's concerns is of great- 
t value to us. In most cases we are 
lie to resolve our differences by meet- 
g them head on, but when we are un- 
tie to do so it is strongly in our inter- 
t to isolate and minimize the area of 
ntlict involved. 
U.S. -Canadian relations are carried 
in an atmosphere of mutual confi- 
nce. Given the broad range of our two 
tion's interests, it is understandable 
it we are challenged by individual dif- 
ences, particularly in the bilateral 
■ 'a. We must remain vigilant to insure 
: It (lur differences are managed in the 
I -spective of our broader relationship. 
' is is significant not only for the two 
c Hitries involved, but it sets an import- 
j : example for the world of how two 
: I', dynamic, and complex societies can 
. ate a productive and cooperative rela- 
t iship on the basis of mutual respect 
a 1 consideration. 



'The complete transcript of the hear- 
II < will be published by the committee and 
»l be available from the Superintendent 
)ocuments. U.S. Government Printing 
Cice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 






Canada Approves 

Segment 

of Alaska Gas 

Pipeline 



Folloivhig are President Carter's 
letter to Canadian Prime Minister 
Trudeaii and /?/.s stafeineiif of Juli/ IS 
1980.'^ 



LETTER TO 

PRIME MINISTER TRUDEAU 

Dear Mr. Prime Minister: 

Since you last wrote to me in March, 
the United States Government has taken a 
number of major steps to insure that the 
Alaska Natural Gas Transportation System 
is completed expeditiously. 

Most significantly, the Department of 
Energy has acted to e.xpedite the Alaskan 
project. The North Slope Producers and 
Alaskan segment sponsors have signed a 
joint statement of intention on financing 
and a cooperative agreement to manage 
and fund continued design and engineering 
of the pipeline and conditioning plant. The 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 
recently has certified the Eastern and 
Western legs of the System. 

The United States also stands ready to 
take appropriate additional steps necessary 
for completion of the ANGTS. For exam- 
ple, I recognize the reasonable concern of 
Canadian project sponsors that they be as- 
sured recovery of their investment in a 
timely manner if, once project construction 
is commenced, they proceed in good faith 
with completion of the Canadian portions of 
the project and the Alaskan segment is de- 
layed. In this respect, they have asked that 
they be given confidence that they will be 
able to recover their cost from U.S. ship- 
pers once Canadian regulatory certification 
that the entire pipeline in Canada is pre- 
pared to commence service is secured. I ac- 
cept the view of your government that such 
assurances are materially important to in- 
sure the financing of the Canadian portion 
of the system. 

Existing U.S. law and regulatory prac- 
tices may east doubt on this matter. For 
this reason, and because I remain stead- 
fastly of the view that the expeditious con- 
struction of the project remains in the 
mutual interests of both our countries, I 
would be prepared at the appropriate time 
to initiate action before the U.S. Congress 
to remove any impediment as may exist 
under present law to providing that desired 
confidence for the Canadian portion of the 
line. 

Our government also appreciates the 
tim.ely way in which you and Canada have 
taken steps to advance your side of this 
vital energy project. In view of this prog- 
ress, I can assure you that the U.S. Gov- 



ernment not only remains committed to the 
project; I am able to state with confidence 
that the U.S. Government now is satisfied 
that the entire Alaska Natural Gas Trans- 
portation System will be completed. The 
United States' energy requirements and 
the current unacceptable level of depend- 
ence on oil imports require that the project 
be completed without delay. Accordingly, I 
will take appropriate action directed at 
meeting the objective of completing the 
project by the end of 1985. I trust these re- 
cent actions on our part provide your gov- 
ernment with the assurances you need from 
us to enable you to complete the procedures 
in Canada that are required before com- 
mencement of construction on the prebuilt 
sections of the pipeline. 

In this time of growing uncertainty 
over energy supplies, the U.S. must tap its 
substantial Alaska gas reserves as soon as 
possible. The 26 trillion cubic feet of natu- 
ral gas in Prudhoe Bay represent more 
than ten percent of the United States total 
proven reserves of natural gas. Our gov- 
ernments agreed in 1977 that the Alaska 
Natural Gas Transportation System was 
the most environmentally sound and mutu- 
ally beneficial means for moving this re- 
source to market. Access to gas from the 
Arctic regions of both countries is even 
more critical today as a means of reducing 
our dependence on imported petroleum. 

Successful completion of this project 
will underscore once again the special 
character of cooperation on a broad range 
of issues that highlights the U.S./Candian 
relationship. 

I look forward to continuing to work 
with you to make this vital energy system a 
reality. 

Sincerely, 

Jimmy Carter 



PRESIDENTS STATEMENT 

My Administration's energy policy has 
always recognized that the energy 
problem is not unique to our country. 
The energy burden of the 1980s is 
shared by all the industrialized nations 
and by the lesser developed nations as 
well. Just as the energy burden is 
shared by all nations, so must the solu- 
tion be borne by all in a cooperative 
spirit. 

Just last month in Venice, I met 
with the heads of six other leading na- 
tions of the industrialized world to es- 
tablish specific goals and a series of 
comprehensive commitments to conser- 
vation and the development of new 
energy supplies. At the time, we 
pledged increased international cooper- 
ation among ourselves and with other 
countries to help achieve these objec- 
tives. 



bber 1980 



23 



EAST ASIA 



When I met with Prime Minister 
Trudeau of Canada in Venice, we 
agreed that one of the potential cooper- 
ative projects— one that could be most 
meaningful to both our countries— was 
the Alaska natural gas transportation 
system. I am very pleased that today 
the Canadian Government has an- 
nounced its willingness to move for- 
ward on this vast project by approving 
the construction of the first major seg- 
ment of what is intended eventually to 
be a 4,800-mile pipeline from Prudhoe 
Bay in Alaska through British Colum- 
bia and Alberta to the heartland of the 
United States. 

This first segment, approved today 
by the Canadian Government, will en- 
able U.S. consumers in 33 States to 
begin receiving additional natural gas 
from Canada by 1981, replacing 200,000 
barrels a day of crude oil, even before 
the Alaskan and northern Canadian 
portions of the pipeline are completed. 
Eventually, too, Canadian natural gas 
from the north will be able to flow to 
consumers in Canada. 

The entire project, which I ap- 
proved in 1977, is intended to be com- 
pleted in 1985 and will bring about 2.4 
billion cubic feet of Alaskan natural gas 
to U.S. consumers each day, replacing 
more than 400,000 barrels of foreign oil. 
Prudhoe Bay natural gas represents 
10'7f of our nation's reserves. 

I have today sent a letter to Prime 
Minister Trudeau expressing our confi- 
dence that this project will be carried 
forward to completion and become an 
e.xample to the world of how interna- 
tional cooperation can serve the com- 
mon energy needs of both partners. 
Both Houses of Congress have recently 
jjassed resolutions of support for the 
Alaska pipeline, and I have been able to 
provide several specific assurances to 
Prime Minister Trudeau on our com- 
mitment as a nation to this joint 
project. 

The pipeline is one of the most 
complex and demanding energy ven- 
tures ever undertaken. When com- 
pleted, it will be a major element in our 
transition to a more diversified and se- 
cure energy economy. 



'Texts from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents" of July 21, 1980. 



Thai-Cambodian 
Border Situation 



by Morton I. .Ahramowitz 

Sfateiiioit he/on' the Snbconnnittee 
oil Asian and Pacific Affairfi of the 
House Foreign Affairs Couniiittee on 
JiiUi -!!>. 19S(). Mr. Ahramowitz is U.S. 
Ambassador fo Tliailaii(L^ 

I am pleased to be here today and to 
have this opportunity to talk with you 
on the situation along the Thai- 
Cambodian border and in Cambodia. I 
have welcomed this committee twice in 
Bangkok and genuinely hope to see it 
again in Bangkok at an early time. It is 
important for our own interests that we 
understand what is happening in In- 
dochina: it is important that Thailand 
and the other members of the Associa- 
tion of South East Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) know that we ai-e deeply in- 
terested and concernefl about what is 
going on in the region and are prepared 
to play a constructive role there. Our 
continued involvement in Khmer relief 
remains a life or death matter for the 
Khmer people. 

Let me briefly review the principal 
elements of the present situation. 

Present Situation 

The Vietnamese in December 1978 — 
3 weeks after creating their Heng 
Samrin puppet authority — in- 
vaded Cambodia, quickly took Phnom 
Penh, and drove on to the Thai border. 
In the process, the country's population 
was dislocated and the 1979 harvest 
doomed, with consequences starkly 
seen in subsequent months of hunger 
and refugee wanderings. The Viet- 
namese forces, however, have failed to 
destroy the Khmer Rouge and other 
small resistance efforts, such as Son 
Sann's Cambodian nationalist 
movement. 

The Vietnamese Army has gar- 
risoned Cambodia with about 180,000 
troops and perhaps 20,000 more sup- 
port personnel. They impose authority 
in the name of Heng Samrin on all the 
key cities and along the main roads. In- 
security and conflict are most prevalent 
in the stretch of Cambodian territory 
along the Thai border. There Khmer 
Rouge and Son Sann units carry out 
their struggle against Vietnamese 
forces, taking advantage of rugged ter- 



ritory and a porous, often poorly mark* 
border that is unsealable by either sid 

We have little good information ( 
the composition of the Democratic 
Kampuchean or Pol Pot forces. We di 
not know their strength but realistic 
estimates range from 20,000 to 40,00( 
Their forces, badly decimated in 1979 
have recovered. They are a cohesive, 
disciplined fighting force with sti'ong 
organization and good communication 
They are concentrated along the bord' 
on the Cambodian side but with some 
strength far into the interior of Cam 
bodia. Given the bloody history of tht 
short rule in Cambodia it is question; 
ble whether they can recruit more 
forces. They hope to capitalize on 
Khmer nationalism and the strong 
anti-Vietnamese sentiments of the 
Khmer people. The Son Sann forces 
total about 5,000 and have focused mo( 
on political proselytizing than fightinji 

The Thai-Cambodian border is 
roughly divisible into four segments ( 
military activity. 

• The most active combat is takii 
place in Khmer Rouge-dominated arei 
south of the Thai border town of 
Aranyaprathet anchored on Phnom 
Melai on the north and extending into 
the Cardamon Mountains in the south 

• The southwestern corner, when 
the Thai border meets the sea, is also 
an area of Khmer Rouge o])erations ar 
presents considerable security prob- 
lems for the Vietnamese, who have m 
extended strong control over Koh Kon 
Province and the shoreline. 

• The northern border of Cambod 
is a sparsely populated area with the 
border formed by mountains sharply f 
dropping to the Cambodian plain. Its 
rugged territory provides protection 
for both Khmer Rouge and small Son 
Sann units. 

• The less-rugged land north of 
Aranyaprathet has received most oft! 
news coverage. Here are interminglei 
over 100,000 refugees with small nam 
bers of petty Khmer Serei warlords 
(mostly a collection of ragtag anti- 
Vietnamese units who have spent mor^ 
time fighting each other than the Viet 
namese and profiteering on the relief 
effort), one substantial Khmer Rouge 
area (Phnom Chat), and the bases of 
Son Sann's forces. The Vietnamese 
have sought with limited success to 



24 



Department of State Bulled 



East Asia 



Irike at military opportunities here 
tid, until the Mak Mun incursion, exer- 
'sed considerable restraint with re- 
lect to the civilian concentrations 
iliich are no military threat. 

■cent Incursion 

If most dramatic recent event has 
fii the Vietnamese incursion into 
laihmd June 23. Our best reconstruc- 
t'li (if that event is as follows. Early 
Ht day the Vietnamese sent several 
bidred troops into the Thai village of 
In Non Mak Mun, enveloping the 
fi-haps 20,000-person refugee concen- 
t tion. Camp 204, on the border east 
othat Thai village. Elements of three 
\'tnamese regiments were involved in 
t full operation — one in a blocking 
p;ition just north of the attack point; 
(ither just south, while the third, in 
center, provided most of the troops 
«ich moved against the refugees and 
tl Thai village. 

A newly dug antitank trench, lo- 
ci h\ between the border and the Thai 

V age, was crossed by the Vietnamese, 

V 1 thus could have no question about 
I r location. The nearest Thai Army 

.11 responded quickly, but the platoon 
/,■ ambushed on the road to the village 
«' 1 heavy casualties. By midmorning 
1 Thai moved against the Vietnamese 
ticins using artillery supjjort and air 
■ o e helicopters and planes. The Viet- 
m ese withdrew from the village that 
af rnoon, and some fighting continued 
in le area until the 24th. Thereafter, 
htwo sides disengaged but ex- 
■h iged mortar and artillery fire for 
HB her day. 

Intelligence indicates that Viet- 
laese commanders told their troops 
(hi would be going into Thailand, that 
h< would stay for a well-defined if 
-h' t space of time, and that they 
^•cld contest, if necessary. Thai army 
'' -ts to move into the area they oc- 
.'<!. It seems, therefore, that the 
nation was planned in advance and 
111 result of vague demarcation of the 
'ler, hot pursuit, or local initiative. 
1 would emphasize that this was 
, major military action. It did not 
id over a large area, the number of 
lamese involved was limited, and 
employed no armor or air. In 
, it was an incursion not an 
iion. 

Nevertheless, an armed incursion 
t a trifling matter. Consider if such 
cident had happened along the de- 
arized zone in Korea with the 
ilties involved — 22 for the Thais 
ii6 Vietnamese killed and one cap- 



tured, according to the Thais. The 
greatest sufferers were actually the 
Khmer refugees caught in the artillery 
crossfire. It appears that some hundred 
were killed, several hundred wounded, 
and thousands forced from the camp 
into the interior. Overall, the major 
significance of the event lies in its dem- 
onstration of Vietnamese disregard for 
Thai sovereignty and its disruption of 
refugee congregations. 

The U.S. response to the Viet- 
namese incursion was swift and wel- 
comed by the Thai. Secretary Muskie's 
condemnation of Vietnamese action and 
support for Thailand was unambiguous. 
I myself called on the Vietnamese 
Foreign Minister visiting in Bangkok 
and underlined our deep concern and 
our ties to Thailand. We also made 
strong representations to the Soviet 
Union. Simultaneously we accelerated 
delivei-y of arms purchased by the Thais 
to defend their borders, providing a 
timely airlift of howitzers and other 
items direct to Bangkok. We are con- 
tinuing close consultation with the 
Thais on political and military measure 
appropriate to deter further Viet- 
namese aggression and strengthen 
Thailand's defenses. I might note that 
the question of sending U.S. troops is 
not at issue, by Thai desires as well as 
our own assessment of the situation. 

Vietnamese leadership appears to 
have miscalculated the impact of their 
incursion on ASEAN. Whereas, Hanoi 
strategy has attempted to sow division 
among ASEAN, the incursion in June 
on the eve of the ASEAN ministerial 
conference in Kuala Lumpur united the 
ASEAN allies firmly in support of 
Thailand. That support was reflected in 
the ASEAN communique which 
strongly condemned the Vietnamese in- 
cursion. The fact that Vietnamese 
Foreign Minister Thach in Jakarta de- 
nied that any incursion had occurred 
underscored the cost to Hanoi's cred- 
ibility caused by the crossing of Viet- 
namese Army troops of the second in- 
ternational frontier — for the first time 
in history — despite repeated promises 
to the contrary. 

While a Vietnamese invasion of 
deep incursion into Thailand is unlikely, 
the situation remains very serious. The 
Vietnamese have mounted in this rainy 
season a concerted campaign all along 
the Thai-Cambodian border. Seven 
Vietnamese divisions — some 60,000 
troops — are involved in the effort. 
They appear to be intent on destroying 
the Khmer Rouge along the border and 
at a minimum depriving them of any 
military initiative during this rainy sea- 
son. Their efforts raise again the possi- 



bility of further incursions into Thai- 
land and action against the restored 
refugee concentrations. The Foreign 
Minister of Vietnam swore both pub- 
licly and privately in Bangkok in late 
June that the Vietnamese would not 
transgress Thai territory. We hope his 
credibility will not be impaired again. 

Plight of Khmer People 

Let me now turn to the plight of the 
Khmer people. Their sufferings and the 
holocaust visited on them since Pol 
Pot's rise to power in 1975 are well 
known to all of you. From your trips to 
Thailand, many of you are personally 
familiar with the starvation and disease 
that wracked the Khmer people in the 
wake of the Vietnamese invasion. The 
situation has improved, if far too 
slowly, since the massive international 
relief began last November, and we can 
take pride in our role in that human- 
itarian endeavor. The United States 
has been the catalyst and prime con- 
tributor to an effort which I believe has 
thus far saved large numbers of Khmer 
people. The support of the American 
people and Congress has been gratify- 
ing. 

Nevertheless, the situation is still 
tenuous. The first question remains 
whether a good portion of the Khmer 
people will have enough food to eat 
until the coming harvest some 4 months 
away. Our interviews over several 
months of hundreds of Khmer farmers 
appearing at the Thai border produce a 
depressingly unanimous response: Rice 
supplies from the previous harvest — 
nature conspired with invasion to pro- 
duce an extremely poor one — have been 
exhausted. 

Relief Efforts 

The subject of international assistance 
is a difficult one to assess. There have 
been different perceptions of how effec- 
tively the programs have been carried 
out. There have been limitations on 
both the channels through the Heng 
Samrin administration in Phnom Penh 
and across the border. Given the enor- 
mity of the requirements and the lim- 
ited means for achieving delivery, we 
have sought to maximize the infusions 
of aid through all channels. 

Assistance through Phnom Penh 
has had myriad problems: the devasta- 
tion of the infrastructure during the Pol 
Pot years; lack of vehicles, cargo land- 
ing facilities, destroyed bridges, a road 
net left untended for years; and near 
total lack of personnel with either the 



.Der 1980 



25 



East Asia 



technical or administrative expertise to 
manage an assistance program. These 
problems were compounded by the ear- 
lier general debilitation of the Khmer 
people and new deprivations following 
the Vietnamese invasion. Moreover, at 
least until recently the priorities of the 
Vietnamese/Heng Samrin administra- 
tion essentially ignored the rural 
Khmer, most of whom at best received 
a kilogram or less of food per person 
per month from the Phnom Penh ad- 
ministration since relief efforts began in 
the late fall. Finally the Vietnamese 
held the relief effort hostage to their 
political pui-poses. 

The cross-border feeding operation 
from Thailand obviously also has had 
serious limitations. The arduous and 
long trek across Cambodia and back for 
sustenance is a terribly inefficient 
means of achieving relief for the al- 
ready weakened Khmers. It has also 
hampered agricultural activity, but 
without food or seed for the farmers, 
most of which came from the border, 
agriculture is seriously inhibited. 
Moreover, transients who come to the 
border have been subjected to harass- 
ment, robbery, and physical jeopardy 
by a variety of both Khmer and Viet- 
namese. Despite these hazards, prior to 
the Vietnamese attack on the refugee 
camps June 23, an estimated 60,000 
Khmers a week turned up for food dis- 
tribution at the main food point at Nong 
Chan. These figures are rough, but we 
estimate that 500,000-1 million people, 
principally in western Cambodia, bene- 
fited from this cross-border feeding 
operation. 

Despite the difficulties and va- 
garies of both aspects of the program, 
we estimate that roughly 100,000 tons 
of relief, including 22,000 tons of rice 
seed, were distributed across the bor- 
der. Some 100,000 tons of food and 
some 20,000 tons of rice seed have 
been sent via the Phnom Penh 
administration. 

I would be remiss if I did not ex- 
press my appreciation to the Thai Gov- 
ernment and people for their coopera- 
tion in this and all other aspects of the 
relief and refugee programs for the 
people of Cambodia and all of In- 
dochina. Thailand has had up to a mil- 
lion people running in and out of its 
borders since 1975. It has the burden of 
granting asylum to almost 300,000 In- 
dochine.se refugees at this point. It has 
received over lO'/r of the population of 
Laos. Thai support for the whole relief 
operation has been essential in keeping 
alive a goodly portion of the people of 
Cambodia and Indochina. 



26 



As I have indicated, despite faults 
and controversies, the first phase of the 
effort has been a success in saving 
countless lives from starvation and dis- 
ease. A limited crop is now in the proc- 
ess of being planted. Our knowledge of 
its extent and prospects are limited. In 
any event the acreage will certainly be 
short of the need. Nevertheless, a 
corner toward self-sufficiency will have 
been turned. Relief agencies and donors 
must also start to plan now for the 1981 
planting season. 

The short- and long-term problems 
faced by the international relief agen- 
cies are complex and very difficult. I 
have alluded several times to the re- 
strictions placed on operations within 
Cambodia. We all welcome the recent 
news from the international organiza- 



Military Equipment 
to Thailand 

WHITE HOUSE ANNOUNCEMENT. 
JULY 1. 19801 

President Carter today approved an 
immediate U.S. airlift of military 
equipment to Thailand, involving the 
shipment of small arms and artillery on 
U.S. military aircraft from Army arse- 
nals in the United States directly to 
Bangkok. The President's determina- 
tion, about which the appropriate com- 
mittees of the Congress have been in- 
formed, was taken under section 50(5(a) 
of the Foreign Assistance Act. 

The decision was made in the wake 
of last week's Vietnamese attack across 
the Thai/Kampuchean border on refu- 
gee concentrations and Thai villages. 
The airlift responds to urgent Thai re- 
quests for accelerated delivery of 
equipment items purchased by Thailand 
under the foreign military sales (FMS) 
program. The airlift, which is expected 
to cost roughly $1 million, will trans- 
port M-16 rifles, 106mm recoilless 
rifles, and 105mm howitzers. 

The United States will also begin 
expediting surface shipments to Thai- 
land of needed small arms and artillery 
ammunition and is making arrange- 
ments to accelerate the delivery by sea 
of 35 M48-A5 tanks, following comple- 
tion of the required 30-day congres- 
sional review period on July 23, 1980. 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of July 7, 1980. 



tions of relaxations of restrictions andl 
successful effort to clear Cambodian 
ports of relief commodities. But giver 
past history it seems wise to see wha 
they mean in practical terms of feedir 
the rural Khmer. We cannot rest until 
comprehensive system permitting 
broad, reasonably monitored distribu- 
tion to the countryside is achieved. 
Controversy continues as to the best 
means to do this — the keys are ob- 
viously in Hanoi and Moscow. The ex 
cuse of noninterference in the interna 
affairs of the Heng Samrin governme 
does not wash in the face of the urgei 
needs of the Khmer people and Hanoi 
massive influence in all other aspects i 
Cambodian life. Conceivably recent ri 
ports of improvement reflect a Viet- 
namese perception that there are moi( 
political benefits to be gained from 
cooperation with the international reli 
effort rather than from obstructionist 

On the border, the international 
relief effort has also faced multiple 
frustrations. Most discouraging 
perhaps has been the repeated out- 
break of fighting between the so-callei 
Khmer Serei groups, whose disreputg 
ble leaders seek to maintain their petl 
positions of personal power and the u 
doubtedly lucrative cut from diversic 
and sales of relief supplies. There is i 
simple solution, but the Thai Govern- 
ment and international organizations 
are working within their limitations t 
overcome the problems by both 
separating out armed elements and 
trying to develop direct distributions 
which would make black market prof- , 
iteering more difficult. 

The second major border dilemm:| 
is assuring that relief supplies go to tl 
needy civilians in Khmer Rouge con- , 
trolled area; not to soldiers. Their li. 
numbers are uncertain: Some put it as B^ 
low as 20,000, some as high as 55,000 , 
Insecurity makes monitoring here 
nonexistent. International relief 
supplies to this area have been recent! 
suspended. This issue is under the ur- 
gent consideration of the Thai Govern 
ment and international organizations, 
understand from recent reports that d 
rect distributions to civilians in these 
areas as well is being considered. 

The dilemmas of the relief effort 
both on the border and through Phnor 
Penh have been caught up in the polit 
cal objectives of the countries involved 
This has been principally reflected in 
the debate about relative priorities to 
be given to the Phnom Penh vs. borde 
program. But it must not be forgotten 
that cross-border feeding and large 
concentrations of Khmer refugees at 



Department of State Bullev, 



% 



East Asia 



he border developed because of the ab- 
ence of an adequate food distribution 
irogram within Cambodia. Once that is 
n place, the border operation should 
ither away in any event. Until then 
oth avenues of relief have to be pur- 
iied as vigorously as possible. We sim- 
ly cannot risk the cessation of cross- 
order feeding which puts food into the 
ands of those who need it, not- 
ithstanding the associated uncertain- 
es, on the basis of hopes out of Phnom 
_jnh. 

Since the Vietnamese invasion a 
onth ago, the refugee and relief situa- 
in north of Aranyaprathet has 
aiiged significantly. The number of 
fiitrees at the border is down and is 
u very crudely estimated at from 
11,000 to 150,000. The armed Khmer 
I 'iiients of all stripes in the area are a 
S;all fraction of this amount — some 
f tOn-10,000. The bulk of the refugees 

■ at the two camps of Nong Samet 
;. 1 Nong Chan being cared for by in- 
t national and voluntary agencies. 
1 sre are, of course, another 150,000 
i mer in refugee camps within 
1 dland. 

The cross-border feeding situation 
r lains seriously disrupted. Only small 
!f lunts of food have been distributed 
i t'cent weeks at two border points by 
ji 'rnational agencies. The interna- 
tiial agencies are trying but have not 
yi reestablished the previous major 
rr -hanism of cross-border feeding that 
■ in place at Nong Chan. Most sig- 

•ant only very small numbers of 
'( >le are ap]3earing at the border to 
t i food, although in the past few days 
ii ibers coming to the border on foot 
; :> increased. Some of this reduction 
1 be due to the present absorption in 
ting in Cambodia, but the main fac- 
^eems to be that the Vietnamese are 
ping at least some and perhaps 
y Khmer from going to the border. 
i ler may also simply fear going to 
''border for fear of hostilities. The 
ible impact of all this can be cata- 
I >hic. In the months of April and 
: some 12,000-16,000 tons of food 
iioing into western Cambodia. That 
ly has been cut off for over a 
h, and there is no evidence that 
distributions from Phnom Penh 
made up that deficiency. 
Kinally, we must frankly recognize 
; while the world has saved millions 
imer, the end of the Khmer relief 
' lem and some serious reconstruc- 
n Cambodia can derive only from a 
jical resolution of the struggle for 
ol in Cambodia. The resolution 
d bv the last U.N. General As- 



ber 1980 



sembly provides a solid basis to pursue 
a settlement of the Cambodian prob- 
lem. But nothing has so far been 
achieved, and the prospects for a politi- 
cal solution are hardly promising. 

Thus far, the Vietnamese have 
shown no flexibility on their part over 
substantive issues involved in the Cam- 
bodian problem. Vietnamese insistence 
on keeping its troops in Cambodia in- 
definitely and on the outside world's ac- 
ceptance of the Heng Samrin regime 
remain the nub of the problem. Their 
recent statement on the subject — the 
Indochinese ministerial statement of 
July 18 — artfully seems to indicate 
some flexibility but in effect offers us 
again only the Heng Samrin govern- 
ment and Vietnamese occupation. We 
cannot achieve peace in Cambodia if the 
Vietnamese insist on a peace exclu- 
sively on their own terms. Without 
some flexibility, there can be no hope 
for resolution of the problem. 

In addition to the Vietnamese at- 
titude, other major uncertainties re- 
main. The situation inside Cambodia is 
still ambiguous. Democratic Kam- 
puchea capabilities to harass the Viet- 
namese are unclear. The border situa- 
tion continues to be tense and danger- 
ous. Thai security remains a major con- 
cern of ours. Amidst all this uncer- 
tainty, we cannot lose sight of the near 
total dependence of the Khmer people 
on outside sources for their very lives. 

I would conclude by saying that de- 
spite the ambiguities and difficulties, 
the United States has no choice but to 
continue its vigorous relief efforts to 
save Cambodia and the Khmer people 
from extinction while at the same time 
remaining vigilant for possibilities of a 
satisfactory negotiated outcome — 
however remote it appears at this 
time. 



'The complete transcript of the hear- 
ings will be published by the committee and 
will be available from the Superintendent 
of Documents, U.S. Government Printing 
Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



Khmer Relief 
Efforts 

STATUS OF U.S. CONTRIBUTIONS! 

The U.S. Government, as of July 1, 1980, 
has spent or obligated for Khmer relief 
$108,810,500. This figure does not include 
$1,425,000 the U.S. Government spent for 
the same objective during the previous fis- 
cal year. Grants break down as follows. 
Figures are rounded to the nearest 
hundred dollars. 



UNICEF 

Amount 



Reason/Date 



.$2,500,000 Startup costs for Khmer relief 
program (10/79) 
2,000,000 Rice purchases in Thailand for 
distribution in Kampuchea 
(11/79) 
448,000 (in kind) Airlift of cranes from 
Japan to Singapore for on- 
ward shipment to Kam- 
puchea (11/79) 
44,600 (in kind) Incremental air 

transport cost of Archer, 
Daniels, Midland-donated 
food (12/79) 
6,500,000 Relief of cash shortage (12/79) 
2,500,000 Cash for ongoing relief pro- 
gram (5/80) 
2,000,000 Cash for rice purchases for 
World Food Program (6/80) 



$15,992,600 



International Committee of the Red 
Cross 

$2,500,000 Startup costs for Khmer relief 
program (10/79) 
27,000 (in kind) Two field labs (11/79) 
20,000 (in kind) Medical survey team 
for contingency planning 
(11/79) 
2,500,000 Relief of cash shortage (12/79) 
1,012,900 (in kind) 40-day lease of Her- 
cules for shuttle flights to 
Phnom Penh (12/79, 1/80) 
5,500 (in kind) Airlift of a field hospi- 
tal donated by SAWS (1/80) 
714,400 (in kind) Lease of Hercules for 
shuttle flights to Phnom 
Penh (4/80) 
1,785,600 Cash for ongoing relief pro- 

gram (5/80) 

$8,565,400 



World Food Program 

$43,108,000 Food for Peace commodities 
including shipping costs 
($34.23 million directly to 
Kampuchea; $8,878 million in 
and through Thailand, 11/79, 
.3/80, 5/80) 
290,000 Lease of trucks in Thailand 

(11/79) 
150,000 (in kind) Airlift and commodity 
cost of instant corn sov milk 
(11/79) 



27 



East Asia 



1,026.000 Food processing in Thailand 
and Singapore (11, 12/79) 
891,(300 Food management in Thailand 
(12/79) 
3.000,000 Rice purchases in Thailand for 
border and holding center 
feeding (12/79) 
8,800 (in kind) Air transport cost for 
soy fortified bulgur (2/80) 
4,000,000 Cash for cross border seed rice 
programs (3, 5/80) 



$52,474,400 

Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for 
Refugees 

$ 381,200 (in kind) Airlift and commodit.v 
cost of 800 tents and tent 
flies (10/79) 

9,000,000 Care and maintenance of 

Khmer in holding centers 
and center construction 
(11/79) 

5,618,800 Care and maintenance of 

Khmer in holding centers 
and center construction (bal- 
ance of U.S. Government 
pledge to UNHCR, (1/80) 
3,000 (in kind) Four hand pumps 
(5/80) 

6,400,000 Care and maintenance of 

Khmer in holding centers 
(6/80) 



$21,403,000 



Food and .Agriculture Organization 

$ 3,000,000 Agricultural rehabilitation 
program in Kampuchea 
(3/80) 



National Council for International 
Health 

$ 87,200 Medical assistance clearing- 
house (12/79, 5/80) 



Cambodia Crisis Center 

$ 80,900 Startup costs for informational 
clearinghouse (1/80) 



Church World Service 

$ 1,250,000 Emergency delivery of 

medicines, relief supplies, 
and seeds for agricultural 
rehabilitation in Kampuchea 
(1/80) 



World Vision Relief Organization 

$ 3,103,300 Rehabilitation of rice culture, 
small animal breeding, or- 
phanages, and a youth hostel 
in Kampuchea (3/80) 



Care 



55,800 Ocean freight reimbursement 
for baby food and relief 
supplies (3/80) 



100,000 Cash for cross border seed rice 

program (3/80) 

$ 155,800 

American Friends Service Committee 

$ 558,300 Agricultural rehabilitation in 

Kampuchea (3/80) 
15,900 Ocean freight reimbursement 

for medical supplies and 
vegetable seeds (4/80) 



$ 574,200 



World Relief 

$ 1,000,000 Su'bsistence agricultural pack- 
ages (tools, 6/80) 

Office of the U.N. Secretary General's 
Special Representative for Kampuchean 
Humanitarian Relief 

$ 150,000 Startup costs of coordinating 
office (3/80) 



Embassy Bangkok 

$ 102,500 Emergency funds for Khmer 
relief at Ambassador's dis- 
cretion (some for communi- 
cations equipment, 11/79) 



Thai Red Cross 

$ 100,000 Mrs. Carter's presentation for 
Khmer relief (11/79) 



Task Force 80 (Thai Supreme Command) 

$10,700 Office supplies for Thai coor- 
dinator (3/80) 



Royal Thai Government 

$ 25,000 Assistance to Thai victims of 
Vietnamese incursion (6/80) 



Unattributed 

$ 384,000 Special airlift of medical and 
other relief supplies in re- 
sponse to the President's 
11/13 deci-sion (11/79) 
351,500 Travel and administrative ex- 
penses of staffing Khmer re- 
lief program in Thailand 

(10/79-9/80) 

$ 735,500 



$108,810,500 (Grand Total) 



DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, 
JULY 9. 198()2 

The United States is deeply concerned 
by the continuing disruption of relief 
efforts to the Khmer people along the 
Thai/Kampuchean border and inside 
Kampuchea, which was cut off as a re- 
sult of the Vietnamese attacks on sev- 



eral refugee concentrations in Thailand 
2 weeks ago. Food, rice seed, and othei 
relief supplies distributed to the Khniei 
who came to the Thai border prior to 
the Vietnamese attack comprised a 
vital element of the international com- 
munity's relief effort and sustained 
hundreds of thousands of Khmer inside 
Kampuchea who had no other source ol 
sustenance and who were attempting tc 
plant a new rice crop there. 

The United States believes it is esi 
sential that relief supplies continue to 
be distributed to all needy Khmer 
wherever they are via the border as 
well as through Phnom Penh and Kam-i 
pong Som. We believe urgent steps 
must be taken to provide adequate caret 
for the refugees from the camps dis- 
rupted by the fighting. We also urge 
the Vietnamese and Phnom Penh au- 
thorities concerned to facilitate dis- 
tribution of food and relief supplies 
throughout Kampuchea. At the same 
time, we call on the international or- 
ganizations, voluntary agencies, and 
the governments concerned in this 
critical humanitarian effort, with the 
support of the donor nations, to take al 
measures necessary to restore these 
urgent feeding operations to insure 
survival of the Kampuchean people. 



'Press release 170 of July 1, 1980. 
^Read to news correspondents by De- 
partment spokesman John Trattner. ■ i^ 



»i 



\ 






Hi 



It 



lin 



28 



Department of State Bulleti^ 



East Asia 



Accounting for MIAs: 
\ Status Report 



/ Michael A. Armacost 

Siibnilttcil to the Siihconiiiiittee on 
lat Asian and Pacific Affairs of the 
oHSe Foreign Affairs Connniitee on 
ne J7, 1980. Mr. Armacost is Depnti/ 
isistai/t Secretari/ for East Asian and 
icific Affairs.'^ 

you will recall. Assistant Secretary 
(ir East Asian and Pacific Affairs 
Ichard] Holbrooke appeared before 
nil- subcommittee last October with a 
i 1 update on developments up to that 
t le. From time to time since then 
t *re have been informal briefings and 
c cussions. I propose to touch briefly 
some background, and then to deal 
iiiiore detail with events since last 
( ober. 

From the beginning this Adminis- 
lidii and the Department of State 
II e followed a policy of obtaining the 
ft est possible accounting of our miss- 
ir personnel. In one of his earliest 
fc ^ign policy initiatives. President 
C "ter sent a Presidential commission 
t( ndochina — the Woodcock Commis- 
si i — to explore directly with the Viet- 
Mi lese and Lao how such an account- 
in might be obtained. On March 12, 
1! 7, the President referred to the 
1^ )dcock Commission, saying he was 
'. . hopeful that this step we are tak- 
11 will meet with a positive response 
r ])ut in motion a process that will 
V'iii the fullest possible accounting 
lur men who sacrificed so much for 
1- country. At the same time, we 
gnize that information may never 
\ailable on many of them." 
The commission's report stated: 
J.i highlight of the Commission's 
13 3 in Hanoi was the SRV's formal 
Ji -rtaking to give the U.S. all available 
in Tnation on our missing men as it is 
:o d and to return remains as they are 
■"e vered and exhumed." The report also 
nc i that Vietnam "... promised to set 
J{ permanent study mechanism by 
h the U.S. Government can provide 

ation that we have about the po- 
al whereabouts or identity of serv- 
en who were lost, and the Viet- 
!se have promised to cooperate in 
iing the evidence we might present 
in the future." 

The United States met with the 
\V. [Socialist Republic of Vietnam] 
ree occasions in 1977 to discuss 



prospects for normalizing relations be- 
tween our countries. In those meetings 
we stressed Vietnamese willingness to 
follow policies supportive of peace and 
stability in the region and continued 
Vietnamese efforts to provide us with 
the fullest possible accounting of our 
missing personnel as factors which 
would affect progress toward normali- 
zation of relations. 

We also stressed that we rejected 
any effort to link the accounting issue 
to the question of aid, or any idea that 
the return of remains or information 
could be traded for diplomatic relations. 
We stressed then, as we do now, that 
Hanoi has a humanitarian obligation to 
provide this information irrespective of 
U.S. recognition or a commitment for 
aid. 

During 1978 the S.R.V. showed 
signs of flexibility in its position on 
U.S. aid, and by the fall Hanoi had 
stopped demanding U.S. aid as a qidd 
pro quo for normalization or for prog- 
ress on accounting for the missing. As 
you know, however, progress toward 
normalization was halted due to the 
emergence in October and November 
1978 of new Vietnamese policies which 
were destabilizing to the region — 
closer ties with the Soviet Union, the 
massive flow of refugees, and sharp 
clashes with Kampuchea, culminating in 
Vietnam's invasion and occupation of 
Kampuchea in December 1978 and 
January 1979. 

Although under the circumstances 
there is no question of any movement 
toward normalization of relations with 
Vietnam at this time, we have con- 
tinued our efforts to obtain a full ac- 
counting on MIAs [missing-in-action]. 
As Assistant Secretary Holbrooke told 
you last fall, this has been underscored 
in all high-level contacts between our 
governments. You will recall, we acted 
on a number of suggestions made by 
your subcommittee: contacting the 
Soviets for their assistance, using U.N. 
channels, and following up on state- 
ments the Vietnamese made to you 
during your August 1979 visit to Hanoi 
about new information and about the 
visit of JCRC (Joint Casualty Resolu- 
tion Center] experts. As you are aware, 
however, the Vietnamese have pro- 
vided no new information and have not 
allowed visits by JCRC experts as 



they suggested to you last August they 
would. Nor have they returned any re- 
mains since August 1978. 

Assistant Secretary Holbrooke also 
reviewed efforts we had made with the 
Lao Government, including his talks 
with the acting Lao Foreign Minister, 
contacts by State Department officials 
and Members of Congress with the Lao 
Charge here, and efforts by our Charge 
in Vientiane, Leo J. Moser, to under- 
line the importance of the issue. We 
have consistently pressed the Lao and 
Vietnamese authorities on this issue. 
There is no doubt that they understand 
its importance to us. We will continue 
our efforts to obtain the fullest possible 
accounting for our missing personnel. 

Vietnam 

In November 1979, we learned that a 
refugee from Vietnam stated he knew 
that the Vietnamese were holding the 
remains of over 400 Americans. Many 
of you were intimately involved in the 
events that followed. The refugee was 
exhaustively debriefed and was found 
to be a credible source. He met with 
some of you, and during your January 
trip to Hanoi, you and other members 
raised the information he provided with 
the S.R.V. authorities. 

In order to follow up on the matter, 
[former] Secretary of State Vance sent 
a letter February 7 to the Vietnamese 
Ambassador to the United Nations, Ha 
Van Lau. In the letter he referred to 
the report of remains and to your ef- 
forts to raise the matter with S.R.V. 
officials and noted that, without full in- 
quiry and investigation, serious ques- 
tions about the report would remain 
unanswered. He suggested that U.S. 
experts go to Hanoi to discuss the mat- 
ter with Vietnamese officials and also 
asked that Ambassador Lau meet with 
Deputy Assistant Secretary jfor East 
Asian and Pacific Affairs, John D.] 
Negroponte. 

The letter was hand delivered to 
the Vietnamese Mission in New York 
on February 8. The State Department 
officer carrying the letter referred to 
the Secretary's personal interest in 
continuing progress on MIAs. The offi- 
cer also noted the long time that had 
passed since the Vietnamese had shown 
any progress on the matter, which was 
puzzling in light of the "new informa- 
tion" they had said in the summer of 
1979 might soon be available. He also 
noted the continuing congressional and 
public interest in the matter. 

Ambassador Lau replied in a letter 
dated February 20 that the S.R.V. 



ioer 1980 



29 



East Asia 



Ministry of Foreign Affairs had au- 
thorized him to reply that the report of 
the 400 remains "was completely un- 
true, spread with ill-intention, and 
aimed at creating further complications 
to the relations between our two coun- 
tries and to the search itself for the 
Americans MIA." He added: ". . . it was 
a tendentious fabrication, and even 
opinion among American political cir- 
cles was also skeptical about the single 
source of spreading speculation. I 
therefore believe there is no sound jus- 
tification for a serious concern in the 
United States as it was said in your let- 
ter." Ambassador Lau recalled the ear- 
lier return of remains of 73 Americans 
and stated that the Vietnamese ". . . 
continue the search although the 
American side has not only failed to re- 
spond to that gesture of goodwill on the 
part of the Vietnamese side but also 
pursued a policy of overt hostility 
against Vietnam. . . ."He concluded by 
noting that the Vietnamese were still 
considering the subject of allowing 
American e.xperts to travel to Hanoi 
and would advise us at a convenient 
time. 

On March 27, Deputy Assistant 
Secretarv Negroponte, accompanied bv 
Brig. Gen. T.C. Pinckney of DOD/ISA 
[International Security Affairs], raised 
the report of 400 remains again during 
a call on Ambassador Lau. It was raised 
during a lengthy discussion of the en- 
tire issue of accounting for missing 
Americans. Gen. Pinckney also dis- 
cussed four specific cases with Ambas- 
sador Lau and left with him materials, 
including photographs, press stories, 
and other identifying data on each case. 
Ambassador Lau said that his govern- 
ment would review the material, and he 
would reply at a later date. 

In mid-March we were advised of 
the results of an earlier effort on the 
MIA question. The text of House Con- 
current Resolution 10, sponsored by 
this committee and adopted by the 
House of Representatives on July 9, 
1979, called for the Secretary of State 
to seek the good offices of the Secretary 
General of the United Nations for the 
purpose of establishing a special inves- 
tigatory commission charged with the 
responsibility of securing a full ac- 
counting of Americans listed as missing 
in Southeast Asia. Through our U.N. 
mission, the Secretary promptly trans- 
mitted the text of the resolution to the 
Secretary General, who in turn trans- 
mitted the resolution to the Vietnamese 
mission at the United Nations. In addi- 
tion, the Secretary General instructed 
one of his special representatives to 



discuss the matter directly with the 
Vietnamese during a visit to Hanoi. 

The special representative raised 
the subject with senior officials of the 
Vietnamese Ministry of Foreign Af- 
fairs. They responded by stating that 
the Government of Vietnam had done 
all that was needed to trace the missing 
Americans, that the U.S. Government 
was fully aware of the Vietnamese posi- 
tion, that they were, nevertheless, con- 
tinuing their efforts, and that they 
would not fail to inform the U.S. Gov- 
ernment if new evidence were found. 
The representative raised the idea of 
establishing a special investigatory 
commission with responsibility for se- 
curing a full accounting of Americans 
listed as missing. The Vietnamese did 
not accept this proposal. Nonetheless, 
we continue to use the U.N. channel, 
and in early April, for instance, we sent 
background information on the report 
of the 400 remains to the Secretary 
General for his use in making further 
inquiries into the matter. 

Laos 

I would like now to turn to the MIA 
situation in Laos. All of you are aware, 
I believe, that the United States has 
consistently pressed the Lao Govern- 
ment for further information on Ameri- 
cans missing in Laos. The Woodcock 
Commission visited Laos in March 1977 
as well as Vietnam. A number of con- 
gressional delegations have visited 
Laos since then and have also stressed 
to senior Lao officials the deep concern 
of the American people. In October 
1978, Assistant Secretary Holbrooke 
traveled to Vientiane and met with Lao 
President Souphanouvong and other 
officials to restate the importance 
which we attach to obtaining full Lao 
cooperation relating to the provision of 
information on missing U.S. personnel 
in Laos. Assistant Secretary Holbrooke 
also met with acting Foreign Minister 
Khamphai Boupha last October 4 in 
New York, as he mentioned in his tes- 
timony last year, and emphasized the 
importance of this issue to the Ameri- 
can people, the Congress, and the 
Administration. 

When he met with you last Oc- 
tober, Assistant Secretary Holbi'ooke 
also noted that our new Charge in Laos, 
Leo J. Moser, was talking with Lao of- 
ficials about this matter during his ini- 
tial calls in Vientiane and would con- 
tinue to do so throughout his assign- 
ment there. 



Over the past 9 months the Char;, 
has been very active on this issue. No 
only did he raise it during his initial 
round of calls, he has vigorously pui-- 
sued the matter throughout his time 
there. He has reported on his efforts a 
some length, and we have tried to ket 
you posted on major developments. Th 
Embassy staff has been able to travel : 
recent months somewhat more than ha 
been possible for a number of years; this 
was helpful in getting a feel for condi- 
tions outside of Vientiane. 

In January 1980, Deputy Assistar 
Secretary Negroponte visited Laos to- 
gether with JCRC liaison officer Lt. 
Col. Paul Mather. While they were 
there, they raised the subject with Lai 
Foreign Ministry Deputy Secretary 
General Soukthavone Keola and specif 
ically requested that periodic meetingi 
be held to exchange MIA information. 
The Embassy and other visiting offi- 
cials have continued to raise the matte» 
at every appropriate opportunity. 

In the course of the discussions Mf 
Moser and other members of his staff 
have had with Lao officials at all levels 
we have stressed the continuing impo 
tance of obtaining the fullest possible 
accounting for Americans killed or 
missing in Laos. The Lao have gener- 
ally replied that they hope for an im- 
provement in U.S. -Lao relations. They 
have reviewed the past efforts of thei , 
government, including the return of 
nine American prisoners from Laos inf|( 
1973 and the recovery and return of 
four sets of remains in August 1978. 
They have discussed the difficulties ei4i 
countered in searching for remains an 
their limited resources for the task. 
They have expressed their experience 
that it is difficult to motivate people t 
search for remains but have also said 
that they would continue to look for 
remains. 

In February our Embassy initiatej|li| 
an exchange of notes with the Lao 
Foreign Ministry. I would like to quotf 
for the i-ecord, the substantive parts c 
the Lao response: 

"The LPDR [Lao People's Demo- 
cratic Republic] has returned all 
American prisoners of war, and at 
present, to the knowledge of the Lao- 
tian Government, there are no longer 
any Americans in Laos under the cate- 
gory of 'deserters,' such as criminal 
prisoners, 'former Americans who haV' 
opted for Laotian nationality,' or unde 
any other such category." 

As our Embassy noted, the Lao 
statement considerably amplifies pre- 
vious assertions on Americans in Laos 



K 



i 



30 



Department of State Bullelj 



East Asia 



ind covers such categories as "desert- 
ers." The Embassy also noted that they 
jvould energetically pursue any indica- 
■ion that POWs may, in fact, remain in 
l^aos. 

I I will not go into great detail on all 
If the Embassy's efforts on this matter. 
j do want you to be aware of the great 
nergy that the Embassy staff and 
'harge Moser have brought to this 
ffort. 

There is one particular subject that 
as recently engaged a great deal of the 
mbassy's attention that I would like 
) mention specifically. The Embassy 
18 been aware of the possibility that 
le Military Museum in Vientiane 
ight have information on Americans 
at would help advance the accounting 
•oeess. The museum, however, is 
■rmally closed to foreigners and dip- 
nats. The Embassy staff initiated a 
ries of requests to visit the museum, 
lich were repeatedly denied. At the 
DW time, the Embassy asked visiting 
, \vs media representatives, who some- 
1 les could get permission to enter the 
iiseum, to be on the lookout for possi- 
i ■ information on MIAs. Several have 
( lie so, and it appears that the 
! iseum may, indeed, have some sig- 
I leant information. 

In light of this indication that the 
r seum contains information which 
r2;ht help account for Americans lost 
iiLaos, the Embassy has repeatedly 
r^ewed its request to visit the 
n seum. 

Deputy Assistant Secretary Ne- 
g ponte raised the matter with the Lao 
" irge here on May 14. We also in- 
! icted our Embassy to again ap- 
ach Lao authorities for permission 
isit the museum, reviewing our past 
4 rts to seek further information, and 
li ng Lao Government assurances that 
t as acting in good faith in providing 
he United States all information in 
■ )ossession on Americans missing in 
.: s. We also noted that failure of the 
.; Government to provide information 
s possession and failure to permit 
. Embassy inspection of this infor- 
ion despite U.S. requests does not 
act the earlier assurances of the Lao 
ernment. We repeated our 
standing request that appropriate 
. and Lao officials meet to discuss 
iformation which might be available 
btainable which would help in the 
unting and renewed the standing 
ation for a Lao delegation to visit 
loint Casualty Resolution Center/ 
lalty Identification Laboratory 



K 
I 



(JCRC/CIL) in Hawaii. There has been 
no immediate reply on any of the points 
raised. 

We are also preparing to request 
access to specific crash sites in Laos. 
We view our request for such access, 
along with our request for access to the 
information in the Military Museum, as 
a new opportunity to test Lao coopera- 
tion on MIAs and to seek a better 
awareness among Lao officials on the 
seriousness with which we regard the 
MIA issue and their handling of it. 

We have consistently addressed 
the MIA accounting issue in our con- 
tacts with the Vietnamese and Lao au- 
thorities. There is no doubt that they 
understand that the issue is important 
to us. We will continue to work toward 
eliciting from the Vietnamese and Lao 
forthcoming and satisfactory coopera- 
tion in obtaining the fullest possible ac- 
counting for our missing personnel. 



'The complete transcript of the hear- 
ings will be published bv the committee and 
will be available from the Superintendent 
of Documents, U.S. Government Printing 
Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



U.S.-lndonesia 
Nuclear Energy 
Agreement 



MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS, 
JULY 2. 19801 

I am pleased to transmit to the Congress, 
pursuant to Section 123d of the Atomic 
Energy'Act of 1954, as amended (42 U.S.C. 
2153(d)), the text of the proposed Agree- 
ment for Cooperation between the Gov- 
ernment of the United States of America 
and the Government of the Republic of In- 
donesia Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nu- 
clear Energy with accompanying agreed 
minute; my written approval, authoriza- 
tion, and determination concerning the 
agreement: and the memorandum of the Di- 
rector of the United States Arms Control 
and Disarmament Agency with the Nuclear 
Proliferation Assessment Statement con- 
cerning the agreement. The joint memo- 
randum submitted to me by the Secretaries 
of State and Energy, which includes a 
summary analysis of the provisions of the 
agreement, and the views of the Members 
of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and 
the Director of the United States Arms 
Control and Disarmament Agency are also 
enclosed. 

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 
1978, which I signed into law on March 10, 



1978, calls upon me to renegotiate existing 
peaceful nuclear cooperation agreements in 
order to obtain the new provisions set forth 
in that Act. In my judgment, the proposed 
agreement for cooperation between the 
United States and Indonesia, together with 
its agreed minute, meets all statutory 
requirements. 

I am particularly pleased to note in this 
connection that Indonesia deposited its in- 
strument of accession to the Treaty on the 
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons on 
July 12, 1979, thereby becoming the 109th 
Party to that landmark treaty and cor- 
nerstone of international nonproliferation 
efforts. This action reflected Indonesia's 
commitment to international non- 
proliferation efforts, and marks a notable 
step toward the ultimate goal of universal 
acceptance of the objectives of the NPT. 

The proposed bilateral agreement be- 
tween us reflects the desire of the Govern- 
ment of the United States and the Govern- 
ment of Indonesia to update the framework 
for peaceful nuclear cooperation between 
our two countries in a manner that recog- 
nizes both the shared nonproliferation ob- 
jectives and the close relationship between 
the United States and Indonesia. The pro- 
posed agreement will, in my view, further 
the non-proliferation and other foreign 
policy interests of the United States. 

I have considered the views and rec- 
ommendations of the interested agencies in 
reviewing the proposed agreement and 
have determined that its performance will 
promote, and will not constitute an unrea- 
sonable risk to, the common defense and 
security. Accordingly, I have approved the 
agreement and authorized its execution, 
and urge that the Congress give it favora- 
ble consideration. 

Jimmy Carter 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of July 7, 1980. 



bber 1980 



31 



ECONOMICS 



Economics and National Security 
in the 1 980s 



bfi Richard A . Cooper 

Address at Broirii f'/z/rers//// hi 
Proi-ldeiice, Rhode Island, on March 7, 
l9S(i. Mr. Cooper is Umlcr Secretari/ 
for Ecoiioiiiic Affairs. 

Our topic today is economics and national 
security in the 1980s. I will begin my re- 
marks with a few words on what I mean 
by national security and then go on to 
discuss the relation of economics to it. 

It is conventional to consider national 
security as the prevention of physical at- 
tack on the United States and its people. 
Apart from pin pricks, the only country 
which now, and in the foreseeable future, 
threatens U.S. physical security is the 
Soviet Union. It is worth remarking in 
this connection, however, that many of 
our potential or actual adversaries in the 
past — Britain, France, Germany, 
Japan — are technically capable, if they 
had a will to do so, of imparting great 
damage to the United States. It is a 
measure of the success of our foreign pol- 
icy over the past 30 years that neither we 
nor they even conceive of such an even- 
tuality. 

The conventional response to our 
concerns about our physical security is to 
maintain a strong defense establishment 
— primarily for deterrence but if neces- 
sary to fight for our protection — back- 
stopped by a vigorous and productive na- 
tional economy. I will return to this re- 
sponse later on. 

We should also, however, consider 
broader conceptions of our national secu- 
rity; for example, security in our enjoy- 
ment of our high level of economic well- 
being. Threats to our security in this 
sense were brought home to the average 
American by gasoline shortages last year. 
With those came the realization that we 
are vulnerable to interruptions in remote 
parts of the globe to supplies that are 
crucial to our welfare. This sense of vul- 
nerability is new to Americans. It is 
much older for Europeans and Japanese. 
It is worth recalling that one of the rea- 
sons the Japanese bombed the U.S. fleet 
at Pearl Harbor was to remove what they 
conceived to be the major threat to their 
oil lifeline to the then Dutch East Indies. 
There is a third dimension to national 
security, and that concerns security in the 
pursuit of our moral values, i.e., a per- 
ception that the world is following, or is 



32 



at least compatible with, our deepest feel- 
ings about society and humanity This fac- 
tor is not normally considered a "secu- 
rity" issue at all. Yet it continually 
thrusts us into foreign affairs, as when 
we offer substantial help to political refu- 
gees in the far corners of the Earth. It 
represents a secular reflection of the still 
strong missionary tradition in the United 
States. 

I was struck by a recent article in 
Harvard Magazine, in which seven pro- 
fessors, ranging in field from divinity to 
engineering, were asked to identify the 
most important issue facing the United 
States (and the world) in the decade of 
the 1980s. Five of the seven chose topics 
involving international affairs, and only 
one of those focused on the prevention of 
nuclear war Four of the seven dealt with 
different aspects of what would now be 
called North-South relations, focusing on 
the pervasiveness and growth of world 
hunger, the maldistribution of world 
wealth and income, the tensions and tur- 
moil created by the growing pressure of 
population on limited resources, and the 
increasing loss of biological species (which 
takes place ovei^whelmingly in the 
tropics). 

The reasons why these issues should 
be of concern to Americans are not typi- 
cally spelled out. They could lie in the ul- 
timate threat of these developments to 
our economic security, as resoui'ces are 
used by others, or even to our physical 
security. (Disaffection in Third World 
countries can perhaps not literally 
threaten the United States, but it can 
lead to physical harm to American dip- 
lomats and ti'avelers.) 

But I suspect that the authors simply 
take for granted that these issues should 
be of concern to Americans, without hav- 
ing to spell out tangible ways we may feel 
the tensions. The threat is thus in the 
psychological or moral realm rather than 
in the physical realm. Here lies perhaps 
the most serious threat to our security, 
which rests fundamentally on our shared 
values and our cohesion as a nation and as 
a society. Some argue that it will not be 
politically sustainable within the United 
States for Americans to go on enjoying 
our growing affluence when there are 
daily reminders through our media of 
death and destitution elsewhere in the 
world. 



Let me turn now to economics and 
the relationship that that bears to eacli o 
these three broad aspects of security. I 
will take them up in reverse order 

Pursuing Mora! Values 

The relationship of economics to securit} 
in the enjoyment of our moral values is 
the most difficult to define. If we are 
honest with ourselves, we must recognize 
that we may not be able to provide 
enough resources effectively to assure 
that the evils of hunger and poverty and 
the social and political consequences tha' 
flow from them will be diminished in anj 
finite period of time. This is for the sim- 
ple reason that we cannot control w'hat 
goes on elsewhere in the world. 

The best we can do is to provide a 
positive influence to the overall environ- 
ment in which national economies can 
prosper, supplemented by specific guid- 
ance, technological assistance, and finare 
cial resources to help alleviate poverty. 
We cannot assure world prosperity, and 
we cannot assure that prosperity will le: 
to the adoption of our values and our 
standards of a civilized life. But we can 
be confident that w ithout some technica* 
and financial assistance from us, these 
aims will become immeasurably more di;' 
ficult to achieve. 

To be true to our own values, we mus 
do what we can. We should provide tech- 
nical and financial assistance to poor na- 
tions where it can be used effectively. 
And we should gear our own macroeco- 
nomic and trade policies to the mainte- 
nance of a vigorous world economy whes 
pool- countries can trade those goods th( 
produce foi- the goods and services they 
need ft'om us. Our own economic policiei 
thus have a vitally important influence ( 
creating the possibility for the eventual 
elimination of poverty and destitution. I:' 

Threat to Economic Well-being 

It is the second notion of security — 
secure enjoyment of our economic well- . 
being — that has become a matter of wid ' 
spread public concern during the past di| : 
cade. This issue was brought home by tl 
dramatic increase of the prices of most i 
commodities in 1972-73. For the generali . 
public most notable were the si.x-fold in- 
crease in the price of sugar and the four-l 
fold increase in the price of oil. Sugar i 
prices have since receded, but oil prices! 



Department of State Bulle! 



i 



Economics 



have gone on to new highs; to make niat- 
tei-s worse, we have had periods of physi- 
cal shortage. 

A world in which (it)'* of a crucial 
commodity comes from 14 nations, with 
the supply heavily concentrated in a polit- 
ically unstable area, is not a comfortable 
line. And the medium-run outlook prom- 
ises to be worse i-ather than better, with 
prospective demand outrunning prospec- 
tive supply. 

This outlook has several implications. 
The fii-st is slower world economic 
.^rowth, with possibly devastating impli- 
•ations for developing nations. The sec- 
md is more inflation, with its corrosive 
'ffect on our own institutions. The third 
s that it will give rise to divisive compe- 
ition among oil-consuming nations foi- 
he limited supplies of oil, with a corro- 
ive effect on political harmony among al- 
es. Finally, it suggests a dangerous vul- 
erability to interruptions in supply 
hich may come about as a consequence 
f political turmoil oi' by military action, 
,g., a Soviet move into the Persian Gulf. 
I want to emphasiEe that our current 
■icomfortable condition is not due to th-^ 
rganization of Petroleum Exporting 
ountries (OPEC). OPEC, led by the 
lah of Iran, took advantage of the situa- 
m in December 1978 and raised prices 
larply by decree. But the basic problem 
that demand for oil is growing more 
pidly than supply The recent sharp 
ice increases were not decreed by 
^EC. Rather, market prices rose 
ai-ply, and OPEC scrambled to catch 
1. The loss of substantial Iranian pro- 
ction in eaiiy 1979, combined with an- 
-ties about further intei-ruption in sup- 
.' and a changing structure in world 
u'keting of oil, led in 1979 to substantial 
■leases in precautionaiy demand and 
• ickpiling. 

We face two conceptually different 
1 1 factually related problems. The first 
i unanticipated intei'i'uptions in supply of 
I , and the second is a pi'ospect of future 
I niand for oil increasingly outrunning 
iailable supply. 

Interruptions in Oil Supply. Our re- 

iii>e to the first of these pi'oblems has 
I'll a three-fold one. We have decided to 
■ate a strategic reserve of petroleum, 
imately of 1 billion bai-i-els. We have so 
achieved about 9'~f of this ultimate 
) al, and we hope to resume purchases for 
I ' I'eserve when market conditions per- 
it it. Beyond that, through the Paris- 
' -ed International Energy Agency 
■-A), we have agreed with other major 
lustrial nations to keep commercial 
.ks of no less than 90 days supply of 



Second, we have created in the lEA 
an emergency sharing mechanism. If oil 
supplies fall by 7'7f or more, we will be 
able to allocate oil on an agreed basis 
among the 20 member countries of the 
lEA, thus inhibiting a catch-as-catch-can 
scramble for oil under circumstances of 
shortage. 

Third, we tr>' to maintain coopera- 
tive relationships with the leafling oil- 
producing nations, so that in an 
emergency they will be well disposed to- 
ward increasing their production as much 
as they can. It is noteworthy that in early 
1979 several OPEC countries increased 
their production sharply in order to com- 
pensate for the shortfall in Iranian pro- 
duction. 

Imbalance in Oil Supply and De- 
mand. The second problem is the long- 
run imbalance between prospective de- 
mand and supply Here the task before us 
is clear: to take all those sensible actions 
which help reduce our future demand for 
imported oil. I will not rehearse here all 
of the elements of the Administration's 
energy policy, but they include incentives 
for conservation, stimulus for switching 
from oil to other forms of energy, and in- 
centives for increased domestic oil pro- 
duction. Moreover, through the lEA and 
through the various economic summit 
meetings we have engaged other leading 
countries in this vital effort. Collectively 
we have had considerable success, in that 
the relationship of energy use to total 
production of goods and services is sub- 
stantially below pre-1974 relationships. 
However, much more remains to be done. 

Of one thing we can be sure: We can- 
not consume more oil than is available. 
The question is not where the e.xtra oil 
will come from but rather what mecha- 
nism of adjustment will be used to cut 
demand for oil back to available supplies. 
It can be done through much lower 
growth, even economic recession, in the 
oil-consuming countries. It can be done 
through much higher oil prices, which in 
addition to discouraging oil consumption 
will also aggravate inflation and retkice 
economic growth. Or it can be done 
through conscious policies designed to 
conserve oil and thus protect our growth 
possibilities and inhibit inflation. It is 
strongly in our interest to take the last 
course. 

Supply of Other Commodities. This 
discussion of oil raises the question of 
whether we are equally vulnerable with 
respect to other commodities that we im- 
port from the rest of the world. We rely 
heavily on imports for our consumption of 
tin. chromium, cobalt, and a host of other 



materials. But none of these has the cru- 
cial importance for the economy that oil 
does. Moveover. the likelihood of inter- 
ruption is generally less. 

The potential for producer cartels 
and for serious disruption of supply de- 
pends on several factors: limited supply 
relative to demand, limited sources of 
production, few substitutes (at least in 
the short run), anrl essential importance 
to the industrialized world. All four con- 
ditions must be met. Stability of such a 
cartel depends also on the strength of the 
producer countries: They must be willing 
to forego immediate gains, if necessary, in 
order to take the product off the market 
and so maintain or raise prices. Many 
Third World nations, typically dependent 
on exports of a few pi-imaiT products, 
could not long afford to deny themselves 
crucial foreign exchange. 

What we find is that no other com- 
modity besides oil currently has all the 
attributes just described. Bauxite is both 
essential and localized in its production, 
but plentiful, with ample scope for exten- 
sive recycling that would become increas- 
ingly economic as price increases. Fur- 
ther, many of the exporting countries 
woulfl find it difficult to forego for even a 
short time needed foreign exchange earn- 
ings. Copper is in both tight supply and 
essential but production is too diffuse to 
offer easy cartelization. Tin is both lim- 
ited in supply and mined in only a few 
countries but lacks much strategic or in- 
dustrial importance. 

Put somewhat differently, we should 
have a healthy regard for the power of 
the market. If commodities become 
scarce, the resulting increase in price 
generates investment in mines previously 
uneconomic, encourages substitution, and 
leads to greater recycling — the last option 
does not obtain for oil. a pi'oduct that is 
literally consumed in use. 

In an effort to guide the market, the 
United States has supported, where 
practical, the formation of consumer- 
producer commodity agreements. These 
agreements, now in place for tin, sugar, 
and soon rubber, represent an interna- 
tional effort to reduce risk by moderating 
price fluctuations and so spur investment 
in increased supplies. Such agi-eements 
should reduce the threat of supply disrup- 
tion. 

Turning from the likelihood of supply 
disruption, let us consider our vulnerabil- 
ity if one were to occur. Here we find the 
United States is particularly fortunate 
relative to most other industrialized na- 
tions. Although our imjiort dependence 
on 12 critical industrial matei'ials, other 
than fuel, has inci-eased since 1974. it re- 



'tober 1980 



33 



Economics 



mains modest — less than 209!- of con- 
sumption. Further, our sources of supply 
are concentrated in developed countries, 
with Canada alone supplying one-half our 
needs. None of these critical materials 
could have the economic impact that oil 
has had on our economy. U.S. petroleum 
imports were $45 billion in 1977, or SO'/r 
of total U.S. imports, as compared to .$1 
billion for iron ore, the highest value of 
any industi'ial raw material outside the 
energy field. 

We are not wholely insulated fi'om 
the possibility of supply disruptions, jjai- 
ticularly in cobalt and chromium. The dis- 
ruption in the Zairian province of Shaba 
illustrated the short-term world depend- 
ence on that source of cobalt. However, 
unexploited cobalt reserves are plentiful 
in many other nations. Also, within this 
centuiy, we can look forward to a consid- 
erable quantity of cobalt mined from the 
ocean floor. Chromium is likely to be a 
longer lasting problem, since ovei- time 
we ai'e likely to become increasingly de- 
pendent on South Africa, Zimbabwe, and 
the U.S.S.R. Fortunately, however, 
chromium is not that crucial to U.S. 
interests, and, further, between our stra- 
tegic stockpiles and private supplies, we 
have a 5-year reserve. More generally, 
our ample strategic stockpiles protect us 
against supjjly disruption in the event of 
a national security emergency. 

Looking ahead, we will have to in- 
crease the level of investment in minerals 
worldwide in order to insure adequate 
supply in the ne.xt century. This may be- 
come a major problem, as it currently ap- 
pears we ai-e underinvesting significantly, 
and we may, thei'efore, have to adjust to 
the higher pi-ices that may be required 
for the needed investment to be under- 
taken. However, for the foreseeable fu- 
ture, we in the United States need not 
feai- supply disruption that could severely 
affect our balance of payments or eco- 
nomic gi'owth. 

F'.urope and .Japan are far more de- 
pendent than we foi' their raw materials; 
Kuropeans impoi't lH^i of their critical 
commodities and the Japanese OOVr . This 
does not mean that our allies will suffer 
from supply disi'uption more freciuently 
than we. As I mentioned befoi-e, there 
are major reasons on the pi'oduction side 
that mitigate the likelihood of such dis- 
ru|)tions. However, we should not under- 
estimate the psychological impact of such 
ovei-whelming reliance on imported raw 
materials. The fear of supply disruption 
and of [Ji'oducer cartels is significant 
enough to influence the foreign and eco- 
nomic policies of our allies. 



U.S. Trade Policy 



>( ittee 



by Harry Kopp 

Statement before the Siibcoinnn 

(III Trade of the House Wat/s and Means 
Committee on June 26, 1980. Mr. Kopp 
is Deputij Assistant Secretary for Eco- 
nomic and Business Affairs. '^ 

We have been operating now for sev- 
eral months in the new environment 
that was created by the conclusion of 
the MTN [multilateral trade negotia- 
tions], the 1979 Trade Agreements Act, 
and trade reorganization. It is entirely 
appropriate that we should take stock 
to see how we are doing. I hope that 
from these hearings we can get the kind 
of support and constructive criticism 
that we need from the Congress to do 
our job effectively. 

The State Department attaches 
high priority to trade and commodity 
policies. We play an active role at all 
levels of the decisionmaking process 
here in Washington, and our ambas- 
sadors, deputy chiefs of mission, and 
economic officers are regularly involved 
in trade and commodity policy issues 
overseas. We give trade this much at- 
tention because of its importance in our 
foreign relations. It is important in 
three ways. 



Trade and the U.S. Economy 

First, trade is increasingly important ii 
the U.S. economy. Exports now rejire- 
sent about S'/f of our GNP, as comparei 
with 4% 15 years ago. If we e.xclude 
services from GNP, they account for 
more than 20'7f . That is a remarkable 
statistic. One-fifth of the goods that wi 
produce are exported. As for imports, 1 
need not elaborate here on the impor- 
tance of foreign oil and other raw mate- 
rials to our economy. 

While trade with other countries h 
increasingly important to us, trade witl 
the United States is even more impor- 
tant for other countries. U.S. trade ac- 
counts for about 19*^^ of total world 
trade. For 42 other countries, the 
United States is the most important 
export market. These include not only 
our neighbors — Canada, Mexico, a 
number of Central American and 
Caribbean countries — but also major 
developed and developing countries in 
other parts of the world — Japan, the 
U.K., Korea, Israel, India, Singapore, 
and the Philippines. Because trade witl 
us is so important for these countries, 
our trade policies are bound to have a 
strong effect on our overall political — 
and even security — relations. 



Maintaining a Strong Defense 

F'inally, let me I'eturn to the question of 
national security in the conventional 
sense — security from physical attack. Our 
key line of defense here is the vigor of 
our own economy, including its cajiacity 
foi' technical change, combined with the 
share of I'esources we are willing to spend 
on defense. During the past decade the 
Soviet Union has spent considerably 
more on its military forces than has the 
United States. It is paradoxical that as 
we become richer, we seem to find 
greater, not less, difficulty in financing 
traditional government exiienditures, 
such as national defense. The share of na- 
tional defense expenditures in our 1979 
gross national product was 4.5%, less 
than one-half of the 9.3% share 20 yeai's 
ago in 1959, which itself was not an ex- 
ceptional year in this regard. 

More alarming, national defense ex- 
penditures in i-eal terms actually fell 
(after rising in the late 19(;0s for the 
Vietnam war) between 19.59 and 1979. (It 
is worth noting here that the other major 



component of what might be called for- 
eign affaii's expenditures — foreign eco- 
nomic assistance — also fell in real terms, 
by about 7%, between 1959 and 1979.) I 
find it extraordinai-y that an economy 
that has doubled in size during this 
period finds itself unable or unwilling to 
spend a bit more on its own security or tc 
help friendly developing countries. 

More important in today's woi'ld thai 
the quantity of goods and services pur- 
chased for national defense is theii' qual- 
ity, which above all dejiends on continual 
scientific and technical advances. 
Weapons systems, reconnaissance, com- 
munications, etc., are all greatly en- 
hanced by improvements in technology. 
We must continue to provide adequately 
for basic research in our universities and 
research institutions. It is this i-esearch 
which lays the foundation both for im- 
proved national security and for techno- 
logical progress in the civilian economy in 
future years. Oui' national security in all 
of the senses I have desci'ibed depends 
heavily on it. ■ 



34 



Department of State Bulietir, 



\f 



Economics 



For many developing countries, 
trade in raw materials is the principal 
economic activity and accounts for the 
bulk of foreign exchange earnings. The 
lUnited States is both a major producer 
Hid consumer of raw materials, and we 
ire dependent on foreign sources for 
supplies of many critical commodites. 
\s a result of this convergence of re- 
source interests, commodity issues are 
I dominant element — if not the domi- 
lant element — in our relations with 
ei'tain developing countries — Bolivia, 
or example, a major tin producer; or 
lalaysia, the leading rubber and tin 
'riiducer; and the Ivory Coast, the 
iggest producer of cocoa. 

In the multilateral setting of the 
'nited Nations, moreover, developing 
uuntries have made commodity issues 
major topic on the agenda of the 
lorth-South dialogue. In these discus- 
ions, the U.S. objective has been to 
?ek international measures, where 
■asible, to improve the functioning of 
immodity markets for the benefit of 
i-oducers and consumers alike. The In- 
■rnational Rubber Agreement, which 
le Congress recently approved, is a 
jod example of these efforts. This 
rreement is intended not to manage 
le i-ubber market but to help create 
ore stable conditions under which to 
idertake investment and assure 
lequate supply. In short, commodity 
■;ues can offer opportunities for inter- 
itional cooperation to improve the 
)en market trading system. 

When I stress the importance of 
ade in our foreign relations, I am not 
vocating that we make unilateral 
afle concessions for the sake of politi- 
1 harmony. What I do mean is that as 
result of the ex])losion of trade and 
v'estment over the past 35 years, the 
iinomic links are often the major ele- 
■iit in our bilateral relations. The way 
w hich we deal with problems arising 
ini those economic links can signifi- 
(ntly affect the overall relationshi]). 
The world trading system works 
I St when each country promotes and 
I fends its interests in a healthy and 
^rorous way — but does so in accord- 
< I'e with established rules. Differences 
■ normal. When we meet with our 
inr trading partners for periodic 
' ateral consultations, the agendas are 
1 ig, and many of the problems are dif- 
f idt. As long as we deal with the 
1 iblems responsibly, recognizing the 
hts, obligations, and vital interests 
ill parties, no serious damage will be 
I' to our relations. Sudden measures 
it do not follow the rules of the game, 
' the other hand, even when they do 



not provoke retaliation, can have a se- 
verely negative impact on our broader 
relations. 



Multilateral Trading System 

It was 46 years ago this month that 
Congress adopted a trade agreements 
act that marked the beginning of this 
country's commitment to freer trade. 
Since the end of World War II and the 
establishment of the GATT (General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade], 
every Administration has worked hard 
to strengthen an open world trading 
system on a multilateral basis. That 
system has promoted economic effi- 
ciency and growth throughout the 
world. Trade is now the most dynamic 
sector of the world economy, growing 
faster than production. 

The iTiultilateral trading system — 
strengthened by the new codes of con- 
duct negotiated in the MTN — is now 
under enormous pressure because of 
developments in the world economy. 
The oil shock of 1979-80 is proving to 
be at least as severe as the shock of 
1973-74. World payments problems are 
becoming more intractable. The OPEC 
[Organization of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries] surplus could be as high as 
$120 billion this year. Even countries 
like West Germany and Japan are fac- 
ing trade deficits. Our own deficit could 
be an all-time high. Governments of in- 
dustrialized countries are mounting ex- 
port drives to cover their oil bills. At 
the same time, they are being urged by 
domestic constituencies to resort to 
protectionism to protect sectors where 
imports are a symptom, not a cause, of 
economic distress. We cannot afford to 
succumb to a new wave of protec- 
tionism. Neither can Europe, Canada, 
and Japan. The costs — economic and 
political — would be incalculable. 

Rising energy costs and slow 
growth in the OECD lOrganization for 
Economic Cooperation and Develop- 
ment] are also causing serious 
problems — perhaps more serious than 
our own — in developing countries. The 
oil-importing less developed countries 
(LDC) as a group are expected to run 
combined current account deficits on 
the order of $60 billion in 1980 and 
comparable amounts in the years im- 
mediately thereafter. They face a major 
challenge in financing these deficits and 
servicing their debt. Exports are cru- 
cial to the ability of these countries to 
manage their economic problems with- 
out reducing economic growth to so- 
cially unacceptable levels. Because of 
the increasing importance of these 



countries to U.S. trade — they are the 
most rapidly growing markets for U.S. 
exports — we have an economic, as well 
as a political, interest in helping them 
avoid a downward spiral. 

Developing Countries 

Our objectives toward developing coun- 
tries are twofold. 

• We want to encourage them, par- 
ticularly the advanced ones, to 
rationalize and open up their trade re- 
gimes. This is good for our exporters 
and also for their development. What 
we are seeking is not only more liberal 
trading structures but also more stable 
and predictable ones. A more active 
and constructive participation by these 
countries in the GATT system of 
mutual rights and obligations would 
also serve our own and their interests. 

• Recognizing that trade is neces- 
sarily a two-way street, we will need to 
maintain access to our market and con- 
tinue to give developing countries the 
opportunity to earn foreign exchange. 
Obviously, given our own economic 
slowdown, as well as the substantial 
MTN liberalization now being im- 
plemented, we will not be able to offer 
substantial new trade benefits over the 
next few years. Generally speaking, 
however, access by LDCs to our mar- 
ket is already very good, although some 
of the products of greatest interest to 
developing countries are also those of 
greatest domestic sensitivity for us — 
for example, textiles and footwear. 

These and related questions in the 
trade area are some of the most impor- 
tant and controversial issues being dis- 
cussed internationally in various inter- 
governmental fora, covered by the 
shorthand term "North-South 
dialogue." At a time of growing eco- 
nomic difficulties, we can expect LDCs 
to express their frustrations vocally 
and to press strongly for changes in the 
international economic system to their 
benefit. Where we can, and where it is 
in our interest to do so, we will respond 
positively to the concerns of developing 
countries; at the same time, however, 
we recognize that some of the proposals 
advanced by the Group of 77 would, if 
adopted, undermine the effective func- 
tioning of the international trading sys- 
tem. We will continue to insist on an in- 
ternational trading system in which all 
countries undertake obligations that 
are consistent with their economic ca- 
pabilities and needs. 



lober 1980 



35 



ENERGY 



Trade Reorganization 

The impact of Reorganization Plan No. 
3 on the Department of State has been 
greatest in the handling of export- 
promotion activities abroad. The estab- 
lishment of the Foreign Commercial 
Service of the United States under the 
Department of Commerce, and the 
transfer of positions and respon- 
sibilities from State to Commerce in 
more than 60 overseas posts, has pro- 
ceeded more smoothly and coopera- 
tively than most observers expected. 

The officers and foreign service na- 
tional employees of the Foreign Com- 
mercial Service are responsible for 
trade promotion and other commercial 
support activity and share with the of- 
ficer and foreign service national em- 
ployees of the Department of State re- 
sponsibility for monitoring foreign 
compliance with MTN agreements. The 
delineation of responsibilities is de- 
scribed in two messages (State 92661 of 
April 9, 1980, and State 110972 of 
April 27, 1980) that I am submitting 
with this statement for the record. 

East-West Trade 

In the area of East-West trade, the 
U.S. Trade Representative and the 
Trade Policy Committee have assumed 
the functions formerly carried out by 
the East-West Foreign Trade Board 
under Section 411 of the Trade Act of 
1974. That board had been chaired by 
the Secretary of the Treasury. The De- 
partment of State participates in inter- 
agency discussions of East-West trade 
issues in the Trade Policy Committee 
system in much the same way it did 
under the East-West Foreign Trade 
Board and its working group. With re- 
spect to national security controls 
under the Export Administration Act 
on the export of militarily significant 
goods and technology to the Soviet 
Union, the Department of State par- 
ticipates in the committee, chaired by 
Commerce, that advises the Secretary 
of Commerce on the administration of 
those controls. The Department of 
State has primary responsibility under 
the Export Administration Act for U.S. 
participation in COCOM [Coordinating 
Committee for East-West Trade 
Policy 1, the Coordinating Committee of 
NATO countries (except Iceland) and 
Japan that develops and administers 
multilateral controls on strategic trade 
with Communist countries. 

In the area of investment policy, 
trade reorganization has brought new 
responsibilities to the U.S. Trade Rep- 
resentative. The delineation of respon- 



Oil-Supply Prospects and U.S. 
international Energy Policy 



Statt')iieiits bji Gerald A. Rosen, 
Acting Depiiti/ Assistant Secretary for 
Economic and Business Affairs, and 
Joseph W. Twiiiani, Depiiti/ Assistant 
Secretari) for Near Eastern a)id South 
Asian Affairs, before the Snbconnnittee 
(in Enrope and the Middle East of the 
House Foreign Affairs Committee on 
J 111 II 1, ;<?.sv/. 1 



ACTING DEPUTY ASSISTANT 
SECRETARY ROSEN 

Oil-supply prospects and U.S. inter- 
national energy^ policy are critical sub- 
jects. Even though the oil market has 
eased over the past few months, the 
long-term outlook gives cause for serious 
concern. Oil exports from the members of 
the Organization of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC) are unlikely to increase 
beyond today's level, and competition for 
that oil is likely to increase. The total 
amount of imported oil available to the in- 
dustrial democracies is likely to decline 
significantly over the next decade. Fur- 
thermore, these diminishing supplies could 
be subject to sudden interruptions or price 
increases. 

Superimposed on all of these poten- 
tial difficulties is a substantially altered 
structure in the world oil market. Since 
1973 the influence of the major oil com- 
panies has declined as their share of 



OPEC exports has gone from over 90% 
to about 45%. Oil-producing countries 
now market directly, in channels outside 
the majors, almost 13 million barrels per 
day (mm b/d) compared to only 2.4 
million barrels in 1973. Some important 
implications of these developments are: 

• During a period of market 
tightness, prices are bid up as potential 
buyers, formerly supplied by the majors 
as third-party customers, compete 
against each other for oil now sold 
directly by producers; 

• Some crude-short majors also are 
forced into the spot market; 

• Oil sales may become increasingly 
politicized as government-to-governmenb 
deals become more common; and 

• The industrialized oil consumers 
are becoming lower priority customers 
of OPEC as OPEC's own consumption 
needs and LDC [less developed coun- 
tries] oil requirements, frequently met 
through direct government deals, take 
precedence over OPEC sales to major oii 
companies. 

To attempt to deal effectively and 
systematically with these and other 
troublesome aspects of the energy situ- 
ation, which confront all nations of the 
world, the Administration has developed^ 
three closely interconnected elements off 
its international energy policy: 

• To cooperate with other in- 
dustrialized democracies to control oil 



sibilities between the Department of 
State and the Trade Representative is 
set forth in a memorandum of Oc- 
tober 19, which I submit for the record 
as an attachment to this statement. 

The reorganization also transferred 
lead responsibility on commodity mat- 
ters from the State Department to the 
Trade Representative. As noted ear- 
lier, commodity issues form an impor- 
tant element of U.S. relations with de- 
veloping countries. Consequently, the 
State Department continues to be 
heavily engaged in the interagency 
policy process, as well as in the 
negotiating phase. The Economic and 
Business Affairs Bureau of State re- 
mains a major source of government 
expertise on commodity markets and 
issues. 

Finally, I want to reaffirm that my 
Department has a major stake in trade 



policy. We will continue to cooperate 
with other agencies and with the Con- 
gress in defending our interests in the | 
open multilateral trading system. At 
the same time, our officials at home and? 
overseas will continue to work closely 
with the business community and with 
the Department of Commerce to pro- 
mote American exports. In my view 
expanding the stake that American in- 
dustry, labor, and agriculture have in 
world markets is the key to maintaining 
the American commitment to an open 
world trading system — the commit- 
ment on which our prosperity, and that 
of much of the world, depends. 



'The complete transcript of the hear- I 
ings will be published by the committee andj 
will be available from the Superintendent 
of Documents, U.S. Government Printing 
Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



36 



Department of State Bulletit'; 



Energy 



lonsumption, promote development of 
ilternative energ}' sources, and prepare 
I common approach to possible oil sup- 

rly shortfalls or disruptions; 
• To work with the OPEC countries 

insure that their oil production and 
iricing policies take account of the 
.'Grid's need for an adequate supply of 
il at reasonable prices; and 

• To promote the development of 
nergj' sources in developing countries to 
icrease global energy supplies and to ease 
le energy constraint upon these nations' 
:onomic growth. 

To be successful, our international 
nergy activities must be based on a 
:rong domestic energy policy. Other in- 
ustrial nations look to the United 
tates for leadership in developing efFec- 
ve domestic policies since they 
•cognize that acting alone they can 
ive no decisive effect on global energy 
ilances. The major oil-producing na- 
iiis have emphasized that our conser- 
tion efforts make it easier for them to 
ntribute to stabilizing energy markets 
rough their price and production 
licies. Developing nations will be more 
^ponsive to our international policies if 
jy see that we are making a maximum 

1 ort to develop our own energy 

1 sources and to use energy wisely. 

I would like to concentrate on the 
) lowing elements of our policy: 

• The production and pricing 

] icies of some of the major oil pro- 
( :ers outside the Middle East; 

• U.S. international energy policy, 
\ h particular emphasis on recent ac- 
c nplishments at the annual economic 
s nmit meetings and in the Interna- 

t lal Energy Agency; and 

• The energy recommendations of 
t Brandt Commission. 

C -Supply Outlook 

f ;t month in Algiers, the OPEC 

■ listers decided to set a price ceiling 
"marker" or benchmark crude at $32 
barrel. They also agreed that sur- 

rges or value differentials of up to $5 
barrel could be added to reflect 
i erences in quality or location. We do 
1 know how this decision will affect 
■r premiums, such as premiums for 

■ buyers, for incremental volumes, or 
( exploration rights. The Saudis have 

r cated they may increase oil prices in 
' next few months but probably not 

lie $32 ceiling, at least initially. 

According to press reports, the 
' ^C long-term strategy committee at 



its meeting in May recommended that 
over the long term, prices should ap- 
proximate the cost of alternative fuels. 
To insure advancement toward that 
target, the committee proposed a price 
floor adjustment mechanism. This 
mechanism would adjust oil prices to ac- 
count for inflation, exchange rate 
changes, and OECD [Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Develop- 
ment] real growth rates. To sustain 
these price changes OPEC countries 
would adjust production as necessary. 

Moreover, as OPEC's own oil con- 
sumption grows, with production likely 
to be essentially steady or declining, 
OPEC oil available for export will 
necessarily decline. At the same time, 
the non-OPEC developing nations and 
the Communist nations are likely to in- 
crease their demand for OPEC oil. This 
means that developed country access to 
OPEC oil will be reduced. It is, in our 
view, crucial that this expected decline 
in oil availability be matched by a reduc- 
tion in developed countries' demand 
brought about by our own efforts to con- 
serve energy and switch to alternatives. 

If we are unprepared to cope with 
reduced oil supplies, the result would be 
a rapid bidding up of world oil prices 
which would impose tremendous 
economic costs on us. Any interruption 
of these reduced supplies— whether by 
accident or political design— would im- 
pose still more serious costs. 

I believe it would be useful to in- 
dicate why we believe OPEC's exports 
are unlikely to increase beyond today's 
level. The Persian Gulf oil producers are 
the most important in this regard 
because these are the countries which 
have the physical capacity to increase oil 
production substantially. I will, however, 
defer to Mr. Twinam for an analysis of 
the oil policies of the Persian Gulf and 
North African producers and will in- 
stead discuss briefly other important oil 
producers, their likely output levels, 
their policies, and our influence. 

Other Producers 

Oil consumers have begim to look with 
increased interest toward oil producers 
in other areas of the world because of 
recent events in the Middle East. I do 
not propose to cover in detail all of these 
producers but would like to provide 
some information on four groups of 
countries: major non-Middle East OPEC 
countries, oil-exporting LDCs, the North 
Sea producers, and China and the Soviet 
bloc countries. 



Non-Middle East OPEC. The largest 
producers in this group are Indonesia, 
Nigeria, and Venezuela. Each has limited 
resources of conventional oil and faces po- 
tential production declines. Since these 
countries have relatively large developing 
economies which can make good use of oil 
revenues as a tool for economic growth, 
they will probably continue oil production 
at maximum capacity. 

Indonesia has recently increased ex- 
ploration expenditures, reversing the 
trend of the past few years. Additional 
oil will no doubt be found (reserves are 
now 9.5 billion barrels), but the 
discovery of large fields is unlikely, based 
on the geology of the country. If there 
are no major new finds, rapidly increas- 
ing domestic demand for oil (12-15% 
annually) may result in Indonesia becom- 
ing a net oil importer by 1990. 

In many ways, Nigeria is similar to 
Indonesia. Output is static at about 2 
mm b/d, while proved and probable 
reserves are only 20-26 billion barrels. 
While it is likely that more oil can be 
found, the Nigerian Government has not 
emphasized exploration and appears to 
be focusing on the exploitation of other 
energy sources. One project being con- 
sidered is to export some 1,500 million 
cubic feet per day of liquefied natural 
gas. 

Venezuela is another example of a 
large oil producer facing declining pro- 
duction. Output has declined from 3.7 
mm b/d in 1970 to 2.1 mm b/d projected 
for 1980. Official reserves are less than 
Nigeria's, requiring Venezuela to inten- 
sify its exploration activities or exploit 
its nonconventional petroleum if it is to 
sustain output at current levels. 

Venezuela has a major source of 
nonconventional oil in the Orinoco heavy 
oil belt. Estimates vary widely, but oil- 
in-place is probably in the range of 750 
billion to 3 trillion barrels. Since the 
recoverability factor could be anywhere 
from 10% to 25% of oil-in-place, ultimate 
potential production from these reserves 
is highly uncertain, ranging from as lit- 
tle as 75 billion barrels to as much as 
750 billion barrels (compared to Saudi 
Arabian reserves of 166 billion). 
Venezuela has decided on a phased plan 
for exploration of its heavy oil in order 
to test out alternative technical proc- 
esses in commercial-scale pilot projects 
before deciding what processes to use 
for subsequent expansion of heavy oil 
production. The present plan calls for 1 
mm b/d output of heavy oil by the year 
2000. Limiting factors are Venezuela's 



ober 1980 



37 



Energy 



sensitivity to including foreign multina- 
tionals, which could help with the 
technology required and the need for 
refinery modifications to process the 
heavy oil. 

While the United States has good 
relations with these countries, our ability 
to influence their oil production decisions 
is limited. The primary action we can 
and have taken is to urge provision of 
adequate incentives for new exploration. 

Oil-Exporting LDCs. The more im- 
portant of these countries are Mexico, 
Malaysia, Egypt, and Angola. With the 
possible exception of Mexico, these coun- 
tries are likely to continue to produce at full 
capacity because petroleum revenues are 
critically important to finance their eco- 
nomic development. 

The case of Mexico is somewhat 
more complicated. Mexican oil produc- 
tion is continuing to grow, and reserves 
could support a very high level of pro- 
duction. President Lopez Portillo has 
stated, however, that Mexico will limit 
its production to domestic needs plus an 
export level which will provide revenues 
needed for balanced growth. Mexico is 
finding that it can absorb a greater 
quantity of imports than initially an- 
ticipated, and if the Mexican Govern- 
ment expands social programs, it would 
imply an increase in petroleum exports 
beyond projected levels. There are some 
in the country, however, who argue that 
production should be restrained, either 
to manage resources more conservative- 
ly or because they fear ambitious 
development programs would lead to 
disastrous inflation. In any event, it is 
unlikely that long-term production deci- 
sions will be made in the next 2 years, 
before the 1982 presidential election. 

The United States, Mexico's largest 
customer, is receiving about 590,000 
b/d of current Mexican exports of 820,000 
b/d. Because of the economics of transpor- 
tation, the United States will continue as 
Mexico's largest customer, but many coun- 
tries are vying for Mexican oil, and the 
Mexican Government has indicated a de- 
sire to diversify its sales. Nonetheless, 
even though the U.S. share is declining, 
Mexico's accelerating production may lead 
to an increase in the absolute level of ex- 
ports to the United States. 

The North Sea Producers. Based on 

current estimates of proven reserves, 
U.K. oil production should peak at about 
2.5 mm b/d in 1985. Production is then ex- 
pected to decline steadily and could reach 
about 1 mm b/d by the early 1990s. This 
suggests that the United Kingdom could 



become self-sufficient in oil within the next 
year and be a net exporter into the late 
1980s. These estimates, however, do not 
take into account future discoveries or de- 
velopment of fields not judged commercial 
at mid-1979 prices. 

Because North Sea crudes are light 
and sweet, they command top prices 
along with North African and some 
Nigerian crudes. Thus far, the United 
Kingdom has followed prices of com- 
parable OPEC crudes. 

There are indications that the U.K. 
Government is considering restricting 
depletion rates to stretch out the period 
of net self-sufficiency. No official an- 
nouncement has been made, but U.K. 
Energy Secretary David Howell has 
publicly indicated that a new policy is 
being considered, and Labor Party 
shadow Secretary for Energy David 
Owen has called for a long-range pro- 
duction policy aimed at self-sufficiency. 

Should such a policy evolve, it could 
mean that the United Kingdom will be 
producing in the mid-1980s at about 
300,000-500,000 b/d less than has been 
officially projected based on technical 
consideration. We have urged the 
United Kingdom to consider allowing 
production to continue at the maximum 
efficient rate. 

Norway's proven oil and gas 
reserves as of mid-1979 were estimated 
at about 11.5 billion barrels of oil 
equivalent, divided about equally be- 
tween oil and gas. The Norwegian 
Government recently reaffirmed its 
longrun oil and gas production goal of 
1.8 mm b/d which could be reached by 
the mid-1980s. Currently, Norway pro- 
duces about 600,000 b/d of oil and a 
slightly smaller amount of gas. Follow- 
ing an export-oriented production policy, 
Norway exports almost all of its gas as 
well as 400,000 b/d of oil. 

The Norwegian Government is 
undergoing a comprehensive review of 
its North Sea production policy in the 
wake of the recent disaster in which the 
offshore structure, Alexandfr Keilland, 
capsized with the loss of 123 lives. In- 
dications are that Norway's longrun oil 
policies will remain unchanged, but its 
offshore operations will be more careful- 
ly scrutinized. The result is likely to lead 
to slower exploration, especially north of 
the 62d parallel, as more stringent safe- 
ty requirements are imposed on offshore 
structures and personnel. This northern 
region, yet unexplored, encompasses 
Sb'/i of the Norwegian Continental Shelf, 



and substantial discoveries could en- 
hance Norway's production possibilities 
significantly. Although this area appears 
promising, development will be very 
costly. Even if commercial discoveries 
were made, 5-8 years would be required 
before production could begin. 

Norway has not been an oil price 
leader but has been quick to follow 
other producers of sweet, light crudes to 
post top prices. This has evoked 
criticism from some of Norway's 
neighbors. 

China and the Soviet Bloc. Substan- 
tial uncertainty surrounds the petroleum 
situation in China. Large-scale explora- 
tion is just getting underway, and it will 
be a few years before we have a 
reasonably accurate picture of China's 
potential. Present production is about 2 
mm b/d. While China may have as much 
as 80 billion barrels of recoverable oil, 
the rate of annual increases in output is 
declining. Growth in output in 1979 was 
1.9%, and China is now turning to 
Western firms for the sophisticated tech-j 
nology needed for offshore exploration 
and development. 

China looks toward petroleum to 
finance the import of technology and 
capital goods needed for modernization. 
It is diffiicult, however, to judge how 
much revenue will be needed to support 
planned growth rates. In any case, 
sizable increases in exports are not likely 
before 1985, when results can be ex- 
pected from activities recently initiated 
by foreign firms. 

The Soviet Union's energy situation 
is characterized by declining or stagnant 
oil production, along with an abundance 
of oil, gas, and coal resources and 
nuclear energy capability. Their produc- 
tion problems result mainly from 
managerial and technological difficulties 
compounded by reserves being located in 
extremely hostile environments at long 
distances from energy consumers. 

One problem which complicates our 
assessment of likely Soviet oil produc- 
tion and policies is lack of hard data on 
Soviet oil reserve estimates and on pro- 
jected Soviet oil production. The uncer- 
tainties are substantial, but it appears 
that the Soviet bloc might soon shift to a 
net importer position from its traditional 
role as an exporter of oil. 



Cooperation with Industrial 
Consumers 

Excessive dependence on imported oil 
clearly threatens the economic health of 
the industrial nations. In 1979 a relative- 



's! 
)tl 
'« 
h 

i 

u 
k 



ait 



38 



Department of State Bulletir^'l 



Energy 



small and temporary interruption of 
applies caused a more than doubling of 
il prices. Today the United States is 

'ct'iving about a million barrels a day 

ss oil than a year ago, but U.S. 

lynients for imported oil in 1980 are 

;pected to reach $90 billion. This im- 
|)rt bill will make it harder to master 

flation and overcome the current 

cession. 
These problems are likely to grow 

ore serious over the coming decade as 
. supplies tighten further. We 
licognize that the economic strains of 
ie energy crisis have the potential to 
i'aken the mutually reinforcing eco- 
imic, political, security, and cultural 
t s which we have built up since World 
lir II with the democracies of Western 
lirope, Japan, Canada, Australia, and 
I w Zealand. Many of these nations are 
r 're dependent on imported oil than we 
a •■ Their vulnerability increases our 
c n vulnerability. We cannot let our 
e >rgy problems tear down relationships 

V ich have taken us years to build. 
F ^her,we are determined to find 

c perative solutions to our mutual 
e rgy problems and by so doing to turn 
e rgy into a force which will unify, not 
d ide, us. 

Our urgent tasks are to reduce our 

V lerability to sudden supply interrup- 
ti L and price increases and to make an 
01 eriy transition to a world economy 

le dependent on oil. We have been 
rr dng some progress on these issues in 
t\ International Energy Agency (lEA) 
ai at the annual economic summit 
m 'tings. 

Since 1974, the lEA nations have 
IS an emergency oil-sharing system for 
li in the event of major disruptions. In 
lii, however, we learned that even a 
■"etively small shortfall could, under 
;o litions of uncertainty, lead to sharp 
1' cases in the world price of oil, with 
till effects on our economies. Since 
I i>nset of the Iranian crisis, we have 
t" 'loped a flexible system for respond- 
' > oil-market disturbances which are 
arge enough to trigger the lEA 
I I'gency sharing system. In March 
' • the IE A nations agreed to reduce 
■ collective demand for oil on the 
' 1 market by 2 mm b/d. Although 
ction did not take place fast enough 
lol off a steaming oil market right 
■^ ,-, our restraint was helpful in slow- 
liiwn the pace of oil price increases 
ighout the first half of this year and 
icouraging moderate oil producers 
aintain responsible production 



levels. Without the lEA action, prices 
would probably have increased even 
more. 

To replace the creative but impro- 
vised response to the oil crisis of 1979, 
the May 1980 IE A meeting at ministeri- 
al level established an ongoing system of 
oil-import yardsticks and ceilings de- 
signed to improve our ability to deal 
with tight oil markets. Under this 
system, the lEA nations will establish 
national oil-import "yardsticks" each 
year. These yardsticks will be based 
largely on projections of oil require- 
ments. In normal circumstances these 
yardsticks will be used to monitor each 
nation's performance in reducing oil im- 
ports. If the oil market tightens, the 
lEA nations will consider converting the 
yardsticks into politically binding oil- 
import ceilings. Nations would be ex- 
pected to use effective energy policy 
measures to restrain demand for oil to 
levels compatible with their national ceil- 
ings. 

The United States and its allies have 
also made progress toward the longrun 
goal of reducing imports and thus 
facilitating the transition of the world 
economy away from its heavy depend- 
ence on oil. At the Tokyo summit last 
June, we pushed for strong com- 
mitments on limiting medium-term oil 
imports and achieved the following 
results. 

• The United States adopted as a 
goal 1985 imports not to exceed the 
1977 level of 8. 5 mm b/d. 

• Japan agreed to limit 1985 im- 
ports to between 6.3 and 6.9 mm b/d. 

• Canada agreed to limit 1985 im- 
ports to 0.6 mm b/d or less. 

• France, Germany, Italy, and the 
United Kingdom agreed to limit 1985 
imports to the 1978 figure. 

At the December 1979 IE A 
ministerial meeting, all lEA nations 
adopted national oil import goals for 
1985. At the May 1980 lEA ministerial 
meeting, lEA nations agreed that it 
would be necessary to undershoot 
substantially these 1985 goals. The 
United States and the lEA Secretariat 
believe that a reduction of 4 mm b/d for 
the lEA as a group is both necessary 
and achievable. 

At the May 1980 lEA ministerial, 
lEA nations for the first time estab- 
lished energy objectives for 1990. They 
agreed to take action to limit the ratio 
between energy growth and economic 
growth to 0.6. (Before the oil crisis the 
ratio had been about 1.0). They also 



World Crude Oil 




Production 






(excluding natural gas 


liquids) 




(thousand b/d) 


1978 


1979 


WORLD 


60,190 


62,400 


Non-Communist 






countries 


46.425 


48,370 


Developed countries 


12,170 


12,745 


United States 


8,700 


8,535 


Canada 


1,315 


1,495 


United Kingdom 


1,080 


1,570 


Norway 


355 


405 


Other 


720 


740 


Non-OPEC LDCs 


4,455 


4,915 


Mexico 


1,215 


1,460 


Egypt 


485 


525 


Other 


2,755 


2,930 


OPEC 


29,800 


30,710 


Algeria 


1,160 


1,135 


Ecuador 


200 


215 


Gabon 


210 


205 


Indonesia 


1,635 


1,590 


Iran 


5,240 


3,035 


Iraq 


2,560 


3,435 


Kuwait' 


1,895 


2,215 


Libya 


1,985 


2,065 


Neutral Zone^ 


475 


565 


Nigeria 


1,895 


2,305 


Qatar 


485 


505 


Saudi Arabia' 


8,065 


9,250 


United Arab 






Emirates 


1,830 


1,835 


Abu Dhabi 


1,U5 


IMS 


Dubai 


365 


355 


Sharjah 


20 


15 


Venezuela 


2,165 


2,355 


Communist 






countries 


13,765 


14,030 


U.S.S.R. 


11,215 


11,470 


China 


2,080 


2,120 


Other 


470 


440 



' Excluding Neutral Zone production, 
which is shown separately. 

2 Production is shared equally between 
Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. 



.ber 1980 



39 



Energy 



agreed to reduce the share of total 
energj- requirements suppHes by oil from 
52% now to 40% by 1990. 

These commitments will be strongly 
reinforced by actions taken at the 
Venice economic summit meeting. At 
Venice, the heads of state agreed on 
specific policy measures that each nation 
should undertake to insure a substantial 
reduction in oil use over the decade. 
They also pledged to make a coordinated 
and vigorous effort to increase the avail- 
ability of alternative fuels by the 
equivalent of 15-20 mm b/d of oil over 
the next decade. This will require great- 
ly expanded production of coal, nuclear, 
gas, synthetic fuels, and renewables. 
The United States intends to do its 
share. We have made great progress in 
these areas in recent years; our allies 
acknowledge and appreciate this. We 
have reduced our import levels from 8.5 
mm b/d in 1977 to less than 7 mm b/d 
during the first half of this year. Our re- 
cent energ>' policy initiatives will en- 
courage a continuation of this progress 
in the future. 

Several problem areas remain; each 
nation has room to make some improve- 
ment in energy policy. At recent summit 
and lEA meetings, we have criticized 
some aspects of the energy policies of 
our allies; they, in turn, have pointed out 
areas where they feel we could make im- 
provements. Among the most important 
areas in which our allies see room for 
improvement in U.S. policy are gasoline 
taxes, oil use in electricity generation, 
and coal exports. Our allies, most of 
whom impose taxes of $1-2 per gallon 
on gasoline, were disappointed by the 
defeat of the President's gasoline conser- 
vation fee. They also attach importance 
to the Administration proposals to en- 
courage conversion of power plants from 
oil to coal and to remove obstacles to in- 
creased exports of coal. 

Our efforts to establish tough objec- 
tives and to take steps to achieve them 
are also valued by oil producers. Many 
of the Persian Gulf producers are con- 
cerned about stretching the productive 
life of their one significant economic 
resource and have linked responsible 
price and production policies to strong 
efforts in conservation by the industrial 
nations. The developing nations also sup- 
port our efforts. They fear that without 
restraint, our appetite for energy could 
crowd them out of the world oil market. 

Brandt Commission Report 

Finally, I would like to take up the ideas 
on energy proposed in February of this 



year by the Brandt Commission report. 
North South: A Prognnn for Survival. 
In the report, energy is part of the 
emergency program for the next 5 years 
together with the problems of resource 
transfers, food, and reforms of the inter- 
national economic system. In fact, the 
emergency program calls for a major 
global agreement on these issues, in- 
cluding "an international energy 
strategy" that would insure "regular sup- 
plies of oil, more rigorous conservation, 
more predictable changes of prices, and 
more positive measures to develop alter- 
native sources of energy." 

The report argues that there is a 
strong case for an understanding be- 
tween all producers and consumers, 
citing the particular impact of sudden 
rises in petroleum prices on developing 
countries and the fact that "no country 
can escape serious disruption if its sup- 
plies of oil are drastically reduced." The 
report calls for an agreement on energy 
to include: production assurances, 
special arrangments to insure that 
poorer developing countries receive ade- 
quate supplies of oil, demand restraint 
commitments, indexed price increases at 
levels which give incentives for produc- 
tion, guarantees of accessibility and 
value of financial assets, major invest- 
ment in energy resource development in 
developing nations, increased funding 
for energy research, and broad interna- 
tional access to the fruits of that 
research. 

The United States is interested, in 
principle, in undertaking constructive 
discussions between producers and con- 
sumers on the future of the oil market. 
We have made clear our interest in pur- 
suing such talks as recently as the 
Venice summit, when the summit na- 
tions agreed to "welcome a constructive 
dialogue on energy and related issues 
between energy producers and con- 
sumers in order to improve the 
coherence of their policies." 

Topics mentioned for discussion by 
industrialized nations or by producing 
nations include those listed above as well 
as spare oil production capacity for 
emergency use and cooperation in in- 
dustrialization of OPEC countries. Some 
of these subjects would present for- 
midable legal, political, and economic 
challenges. In any case, to date, the 
main producers have declined to enter 
discussions about oil price and supply 
and are willing to discuss other aspects 
of energy only when linked to other 
development-related international 
economic issues. Efforts in the United 



Nations to initiate discussions solely mi 
energy, such as Mexican President 
Lopez Portillo's proposal last fall, have 
not been successful, largely because of 
the opposition of OPEC countries. 

A comprehensive producer-consume 
agreement, even if achieved, would be 
difficult to enforce. To hold down prices 
in the event of an interruption would r( 
quire a buffer stock or excess capacity. 
But a buffer stock of adequate size 
would be extremely e.xpensive and 
difficult to build and maintain. Excess 
capacity, though cheaper than holding 
stocks, is also very expensive to install 
and maintain. We could offer to help 
finance excess capacity, but control of 
this capacity would effectively rest in tf 
hands of producers. Internal political 
pressure would make it difficult for 
OPEC nations to use this capacity to 
hold down prices if a serious interrup- 
tion drove spot prices up rapidly. And ii 
producer-consumer agreement would n« 
prevent interruptions arising from 
political instability, such as in Iran. Anjf 
agreement on prices could, therefore, 
turn out to guarantee a floor price but 
not prevent excessive price increases. 
Notwithstanding these potential 
difficulties, we can endorse the idea of 
producer-consumer negotiations. We ar 
confident that at least some progress 
can be made. 

We are moving rapidly ahead in 
some areas which the Brandt Commis- 
sion highlights. The report makes a 
strong case for major financial and 
technical assistance for oil and gas 
development in non-OPEC Third Worlo 
countries, estimating that additional 
capital of roughly $14 billion annually is 
needed in the 1980s for these purposes, 
including $3.3 billion in official 
multilateral loans. We are now actively 
seeking ways to assist in expanding oil 
and gas production from non-OPEC 
developing countries. We have made in' 
creased assistance for energy develop- 
ment in energy-deficient countries a big 
priority item in our approach to the up- 
coming U.N. global negotiations and ex 
pect to receive broad support. Further- 
more, the Venice summit requested the 
World Bank to examine the adequacy o: 
the resources and mechanisms now in 
place for increased conventional and 
nonconventional energy development in 
oil-importing developing countries, to in 
vestigate ways to improve and expand 
its lending programs in this area, and t( j^ 
discuss its findings with both in- 
dustrialized and oil-exporting countries, 



k 



at 



1,1 



40 



Department of State Bullet;^ 



Energy 



The Brandt Commission also 
tresses industrialized consumer coun- 
ries' responsibility in energy conserva- 
ion and calls for "more ambitious 
irgets than those agreed in 1979 at the 
'okyo Summit and by the twenty 
lembers of the International Energy 
gency." We have been moving in this 
irection. Our recent commitments at 
le summit and the lEA ministerial in- 
icate that the industrial nations 
icognize their responsibility and are 
iking concrete steps to achieve un- 
•ecedented reductions in energy con- 
imption within this decade. 

Emphasis is also placed on 
droelectric development and on solar 
«ergy. We are actively engaged in 
leparing for the upcoming 1981 U.N. 
onference on New and Renewable 
»urces of Energy which will promote 
18 of both of these resources as well as 
Dmass, wind energy, ocean, geother- 
bJ, oil shale and tar sands, peat, and 
&ft animal power. 
m While the report is clear on the 
Blues of development of oil and gas in 
U/eloping countries and renewable 
T'ergy sources, it devotes less attention 
t coal and nuclear energy. We would 
( phasize that to the extent that in- 
c itrialized countries shift to coal and 
r .'lear energy sources, there will be 
r re leeway in international oil markets 
V ich would also benefit the oil-import- 
L developing countries. Measures to in- 
c ase production, trade, and use of coal 
a receiving high priority both 
d nestically and internationally in the 
I, \ and at recent economic summit 
n etings. 

The Brandt report proposes the 
•^ iblishment of a global energy 
■' 'arch center under U.N. auspices to 
rdinate information and projections 
to support research on new energy 
ri jurces. It is certainly to everyone's 
ai antage to increase international 
ciperation on energy research. Useful 
n 'hanisms for that cooperation exist 
n r in the IE A and in other bilateral 
a multilateral agreements, and we 
3 II give serious attention to other 
a sible means to encourage research 
^Ich are broadly supported within the 
1 Irnational community. 

IBASSADOR TWINAM 

. jblcome the opportunity to appear 
ire this subcommittee to discuss an 
lie of profound importance to U.S. 
jjtegic and economic interests— the oil 



policies of the members of the Organiza- 
tion of Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC) in the Middle East and North 
Africa and U.S. policies for dealing with 
our interest in the region's oil resources. 

The importance to our country and 
our allies of a secure flow of Middle 
East and North African oil at sus- 
tainable prices is longstanding, has in- 
creased sharjDly in recent years, and wiU 
continue for the foreseeable future. I 
cannot overemphasize the need to 
restrain our own dependence upon this 
faraway resource, and it is significant 
that the OPEC producers of the region 
support the Administration's effort to 
make the United States less dependent 
upon their oil. 

It is clearly in the interest of oil con- 
sumers to have good relations with pro- 
ducers. Our relations with the diversity 
of governments in the North African 
and Middle Eastern oil states cover the 
spectrum from excellent to virtually 
nonexistent. The Western oil industry's 
loss of control to producer governments, 
the Arab oil embargo in 1973, and the 
pressures brought on world oil markets 
by the Iranian revolution leave no doubt 
that political factors can profoundly in- 
fluence the availability of the region's oil 
and attitudes with which producing 
governments approach pricing and other 
energy issues. The quality of our overall 
relationships with producing govern- 
ments, involving a range of political and 
security considerations, determine to a 
large extent the environment in which 
we seek their cooperation on energy 
questions. Relations among the oil pro- 
ducers, including the political dynamics 
in OPEC, also affect pricing and produc- 
tion decisions. Political considerations 
will remain an important determinant of 
the availability of the region's oil, as 
will, of course, the security of the 
region. 

Increasingly, however, as the 
region's producers in the last decade 
have gained full control of their national 
oil policies, economic considerations have 
come to play a more complex role in 
price and production policies. A critical 
concern in this decade is that the de- 
mand for the region's oil is likely to keep 
pressing against the limits of the pro- 
ducers' willingness to provide it. The 
issue focuses on OPEC's leading pro- 
ducer, Saudi Arabia, and its gulf 
neighbors. The demand for their oil ex- 
ceeds their demand for oil income. As a 
result, there are strong and intensifying 
pressures in these countries to conserve 
the principal source of national wealth. 



These governments, however, have 
strong ties to and interests in both the 
industrial and the developing worlds. 
Hence the issue is joined on how nar- 
rowly or how broadly they define their 
economic interests as they make deci- 
sions on how to respond to market 
forces in their oil production and pricing 
policies. 

A central task for our diplomacy in 
this decade will be to seek a stronger 
base of common economic purpose with 
these producers. The task involves a 
variety of issues: 

• Conservation of energy in the 
United States and other industrial coun- 
tries; 

• Development of alternate energy 
resources in both the industrial and 
developing worlds; 

• Control of inflation and stability 
of the dollar; 

• The quest for greater interna- 
tional financial cooperation and more ef- 
fective international economic develop- 
ment; and 

• The transfer of technology. 

Given reasonably propitious political 
and security environments for U.S. in- 
terests in the Middle East and North 
Africa, our success in dealing with these 
economic issues will increasingly help 
determine the quality of our relations 
with key producers, our own security 
and prosperity, and that of the world 
generally. 

Political Factors 

The political environment in each of the 
producer nations and their attitudes 
toward the United States and other in- 
dustrial countries clearly have an impact 
on how each government approaches oil 
production and price decisions. Over the 
last quarter century, revolutionary 
regimes in the region— particularly new 
ones— have exhibited considerable 
hostility to Western oil interests, have 
tended to be confrontational rather than 
cooperative on economic issues, and 
generally have been "price hawks." 

By contrast, Saudi Arabia and the 
three gulf emirates in OPEC have main- 
tained close relationships with the 
United States and the United Kingdom, 
and our political relations with these 
monarchies have, except in periods of in- 
tense Arab-Israeli hostilities, generally 
been conducive to a cooperative ap- 
proach in economic matters, including 
oil. 



Dber 1980 



41 



Energy 



A variety of political intluences, in- 
cluding a common attachment to 
preserving the strength of OPEC as a 
mechanism for setting a price floor, 
work on the producers as they formulate 
production and pricing policies and seek 
OPEC price decisions. 

All of the region's producers are in- 
fluenced by an attachment to Third 
World causes, although the breadth and 
degree of commitment varies. The Iraqis 
increasingly seek a leadership role in 
this regard and have gone further than 
other producers in pushing the idea of a 
two-tier price system for industrial and 
developing countries. Kuwait, Saudi 
Arabia, and Abu Dhabi are leaders in 
development lending. 

Security considerations obviously lie 
at the heart of the politics and foreign 
policy of the producers. They produce 
complex and sometimes contradictory 
forces. All of the producers feel 
vulnerable to some degree to outside 
powers, to Middle East rivals, and to 
the tensions of domestic change. 

This complexity prevents our draw- 
ing simple conclusions on how the gulf 
producers relate political and security 
concerns to their oil policy. Clearly, 
however, a strong U.S. global military 
posture, including an ability to project 
deterrent strength, is important to a 
long-term constructive relationship with 
producers. So is the perception that the 
United States is alert and tirm in check- 
ing Soviet designs in the area and is 
dynamic in its role in a Western alliance 
with great interests in the Middle East 
and North Africa. The complexities and 
contradictions of the security situation 
and the basic fragility of the region re- 
quire that the U.S. security role be 
played out with steadiness of purpose, 
nuance, and sensitivity to the political 
environment. 

All of the Arab producers have in- 
dicated to some degree that in the 
longer term their attitudes on oil will be 
affected by their perception of how the 
international community deals with the 
Palestinian cause. Revolutionary rhetoric 
on punitive use of the "Arab oil weapon" 
is unabated. Among the monarchies 
there is a growing tendency to use a 
"carrot" approach, by suggesting more 
favorable consideration in oil supply in 
return for greater political support for 
the Palestinian cause. We cannot rule 
out that this trend will intensify over 
time if the Arab producers become in- 
creasingly disillusioned with the rate of 
progress toward Middle East peace. The 
recent trend toward state-to-state oil ar- 



rangements enhances the ability of the 
Middle East and North African pro- 
ducers to mix politics and oil and lessens 
the ability of the major oil companies to 
manage dislocations resulting from 
destination restrictions. 

Political Dynamics of OPEC 

Although economic considerations 
primarily determine producer policies, 
the impact of political factors on an 
organization such as OPEC, composed 
of nation states, is inevitable. Political 
relations among the diverse members of 
the organization play some role, as does 
the motivation to exert leadership within 
OPEC councils. Thus within the range 
of options which the market offers, 
OPEC as an organization is liable to 
political responses. The perception that 
consumer nations are banding together 
in confrontational posture to "break" the 
cartel tends to elicit a political and more 
confrontational response from OPEC. 
The perception that the industrial world 
is seeking to work with the OPEC coun- 
tries to expand common economic in- 
terests tends to elicit a more cooperative 
OPEC response toward consumers. 

Iran 

In the context of this appearance I 
believe it is not necessary to lay out for 
the committee the recent state of our 
relations with Iran, on which there is an 
extensive public record. For the present 
the hostage situation prevents normal 
development of economic and other rela- 
tions. 

With regard to energy, Iran in the 
past was the one OPEC member that 
had both large oil reserves and produc- 
tion capacity and also a large appetite 
for revenues. The intent of the Islamic 
Republic to reshape Iran's economy 
toward less dependence on oil, combined 
with labor and technical difficulties in 
the oil fields, had resulted in much lower 
production even before Iran's attempt to 
charge exceptionally high prices brought 
its production to present low levels— cur- 
rently about 1.5 mm b/d. Given the Ira- 
nians' recent willingness to forgo ex- 
ports rather than reduce their high ask- 
ing price, we must assume that Iran will 
continue to stress maximizing prices 
rather than seeking increased revenues 
through higher export volume. 

Algeria 

Our relations with Algeria were fully 
restored in November 1974 and have in 



general shown gradual improvement. 
Political differences on the Middle East 
peace process and on the Western 
Sahara have not prevented the develop- 
ment of a cooperative approach on 
bilateral matters involving mutual 
economic interests. Currently, however, 
we and certain European nations are in 
volved in bilateral negotiations with 
Algeria over the price of Algerian liq- 
uefied natural gas. Shipments under tht 
El Paso contract have been suspended 
pending resolution of this problem. 

Our Embassy has had ready access 
to appropriate Algerian officials, but 
over the years we have had little 
influence on Algerian attitudes on oil 
pricing. Algeria, of course, has been a 
net borrower, whose development ex- 
penditures have regularly exceeded its 
income. It has maintained oil productior 
at a high percentage of reserves and is 
currently attempting to increase ex- 
ploration activity (e.g., through its $3 
per barrel exploration fee), though on 
terms many companies find onerous. 

Libya 

Since the Libyan revolution, relations 
between the United States and Libya 
have been at best strained. In the after- 
math of the attack on our Embassy in 
December of 1979 and allegations of a 
worldwide Libyan Government- 
sponsored intimidation campaign, rela- 
tions are at a low ebb, and the U.S. Em 
bassy in Tripoli remains temporarily 
closed. Nonetheless, the United States 
continues to emphasize the mutual 
benefits in our economic relations. The 
United States receives approximately 
8% of its imported oil supply from 
Libya, and U.S. companies and person- 
nel provide much of the vital expertise, 
manpower, and facilities for the produc- 
tion and distribution of Libyan oil. We 
have not been able to carry on a mean- 
ingful dialogue on energy issues with the 
Libyan Government. 

In spite of its small population, 
Libya, though maintaining some finan- 
cial reserves, has generally managed to 
spend the bulk of its considerable 
revenues on development, arms, and 
support for its foreign policy. It has con 
sistently argued for keeping upward 
pressure on price through adjustment of 
production. Libya itself has used this 
method to some extent but has generallj 
produced near its practicable capacity in 
recent years, desiring to maximize 



!f 



f( 



Is 



42 



Department of State BuWem 



FECIAL 



ecretary Muskie Interviewed on "Face the Nation" 



Secretary Mn/skie was interviewed 
CBS's "Face the Nation" on Sep- 
iber 7, 1980, by George Herman, 
S News (moderator): Robert Pier- 
nt, CBS News; and Don Oberdorfer, 

Washington Post.^ 

Q. Is the new Government of Po- 
d a step toward some kind of 
imiin suppression of the workers' 
ns in Poland? 

A. Not if one is to take the first 
ements of the new First Secretary, 
[Stanislaw] Kania. He has said that 
fvill honor those commitments to the 
And he, of course, has gotten a 
,ty generous endorsement from Mr. 
zhnev so that on the whole, I think 
iscription I read in either the Times 
ne Post this morning, describing 
las a conservative but a pragmatist, 
rests that he may give comfort to 
■poviets but, at the same time, de- 
Ikine to keep the commitments that 
^Edward Gierek, former First Sec- 
■W '•y and Politburo Member of the 
'o ;h Communist Party] Gierek made 
e workers. 

'4- If you think the new Govern- 
ne t of Poland is likely to continue 
I) :ree to the gains won by the 
■ Lers in their strikes why bother to 
tii ge it? Why get rid of Mr. Gierek? 
in his name disappeared from the 
rei in the Soviet Union 3 or 4 days 
^f -e he had the "heart attack." 

h get rid of it if you're only going 
i> I ve someone else who is going to 
iti nue with this policy? 

i. Of course, in any system of gov- 
■nent there comes a time when lead- 
is itwear their welcome or their 
^alness. I would suspect that Mr. 
:^ k had expended a great deal of his 
'li:al capital not only vis a vis the 
i*ts but also internally, and at that 
■;i| maybe his health was such as to 
oile a rational explanation for 
aie in leadership. I don't have any 
^nation to suggest otherwise. 

' ;. You and others in the Admin- 
• ion were very cautious in what 



you said about the Polish strikes 
while they were going on. And we un- 
derstand that you privately pointed 
out to the head of the AFL-CIO, Lane 
Kirkland, the possible dangers of 
broad-scale and open American labor 
movement contributions to the work- 
ers. Now, the labor federation has 
gone ahead. Do you think this is 
going to complicate the situation over 
there? 

A. That depends, I think, on how 
it's perceived by the Poles and the Rus- 
sians and upon it's nature. Mr. Fraser 
[Douglas Fraser, President of the 
United Automobile Workers] has de- 
scribed it as a humanitarian effort to 
assist the families of the strikers, and 
he, in the same breath, indicated that 
we have to be careful that the 
problem — basic problem — is left to the 
Poles and their government. So it's a 
sensitive and delicate kind of situation. 
Up to this point, it has not been, yet, a 
destabilizing factor in the relationships 
between the Poles and the Russians. I 
think that if, with this new leadership, 
both sides within Poland develop a 
healthy understanding of their new re- 
lationship that it will probably last. It's 
not over by any means. 

Q. You are aware, of course, that 
there was a delegation of Polish 
bankers and financial experts here 
this past week asking for agricultural 
credits. I think that the total they 
asked for was $670 million. This is not 
anything new. They have done it for 
the past several years, but this is a 
larger amount of money than they 
have ever asked for before. And some 
of our allies reportedly are suggesting 
that we wait a while before granting 
those credits and see whether the new 
Polish Government is going to live up 
to its promises to the workers. What 
is the attitude of the Carter Adminis- 
tration about that loan? Are they 
going to grant it? 

A. It's been under consideration in 
roughly that magnitude before the re- 
cent events in Poland. I think we had 
been considering seriously about $550 



million. The $650 or $670 million is 
somewhat more, but we've had that 
program with the Poles now for, I 
think, at least 3 years, and we under- 
stand the economic difficulties of Po- 
land. 

We've had a long-time economic 
relationship with Poland, and I think 
we ought not to indicate that that is 
doubtful at this point. They are going 
through a very difficult period, and 
their economic situation would impose 
strains upon these new arrangements 
that they have worked out with their 
workers; I think that's basically the at- 
titude of our allies as well. I don't think 
there's been any formal request that we 
suspend any particular decisions. I 
think they also understand that there 
may be need for strengthening the eco- 
nomic ties between ourselves and Po- 
land. 

Q. So you're indicating, if I read 
you correctly, that we are going to go 
ahead and grant that $670 million 
loan. 

A. We've not made that decision 
yet. The other factor in it is that those 
resources are limited. There are other 
demands upon them, and it is in that 
context that we will make the decision. 

Q. Is it too early — have you as- 
sessed what the meaning of the work- 
ers" gains — the licensing, in the sense 
of free trade unions — whether this 
means the beginning of a really fun- 
damental change in the satellite 
countries around the Soviet Union? 

A. It could well be. On the other 
hand, it may be that Poland will be a 
different sort of arrangement within 
the Soviet bloc than others. The Poles 
have had — 

Q. Do you think it will be isolated 
in Poland? 

A. The Poles have had a greater 
degree of religious freedom, for exam- 
ple. They've had greater freedom in 
dealing with their agricultural prob- 
lems. One of their problems there is 
that the average farming unit, for 



fer 1980 



Special 



example, is under 10 acres which makes 
it inefficient. But nevertheless, there 
has been very careful treatment of that 
problem of enlarging those units in 
order to make the agriculture more ef- 
ficient. 

So there have been a number of 
ways in which the Poles have been 
allowed — perhaps because of their his- 
tory, because of what they are — a 
greater measure of liberalization than 
some of the other Eastern bloc coun- 
tries. That, obviously, has triggered 
some dissatisfaction — not very visible, 
I don't think — on their part, but it 
may, at some point, trigger greater dis- 
satisfaction and lead to pressures for 
similiar liberalizations within their own 
countries. That is clearly possible. 

Q. We have a new government 
now appointed by the Prime Minister 
or Premier in Iran being submitted to 
the Parliament. Do you see signs that 
this is going, in any immediate fu- 
ture, to forward the question of the 
hostages and their release? 

A. There are signs that they are 
beginning to think of actually debating 
the hostage issue. There are signs of in- 
creasing awareness on the part of lead- 
ers in various factions that the hostage 
issue ought to be settled in Iran's inter- 
ests. There are, of course, signs that 
there will be responses to initiatives 
taken on our side from Members of 
Congress, my own letter to the Prime 
Minister. 

Perhaps in other ways, there are 
signs that also they are listening to 
urgings — from other sources, other 
countries — to settle the hostage issue 
in their own interest. So it may be that 
as governmental authorities put to- 
gether that they will begin to debate 
the issue, consider the terms on which 
they are willing to resolve it, and we 
may find ourselves engaged in a debate 
or dialogue with them on those terms. 

Q. One of the initiatives which 
you referred to a minute ago was the 
letter from 187 Members of Congress. 
They are drafting a reply and as pub- 
lished, at least in the Iranian press, 
the draft reply suggests a kind of con- 
gressional inquiry into the past his- 
tory of Iranian-American relations 
and into the question of Iran's legiti- 
mate claims, as they put it, for re- 
dress on the financial side. Some time 



ago. you remember, the congressional 
inquiry was discussed when Con- 
gressman (George (Idaho)] Hansen 
was out there. The Administration, at 
that time, was very negative about it. 
Do you have a view now as to whether 
such a congressional inquiry could be 
useful in this process? 

A. I think it would depend upon its 
timing and nature as related to the 
timing for the release of the hostages 
and other possible terms that might be 
raised. I think, standing by itself, its 
value might be lost. I think that when 
this hostage crisis is over that there 
will be congressional hearings whether 
as part of an agreement with the Ira- 
nians or not. I can't imagine Congress 
being insensitive to the usefulness of 
such an inquiry when it's behind us, but 
its timing within the timeframe when 
the question of the release of the hos- 
tages is involved has to be very care- 
fully identified. 

Q. If the Iranian Parliament, as 
is now indicated, suggests this to the 
U.S. Congress as a means of paving 
the way for the settlement of the hos- 
tage problem, do you think it would 
be a good idea or a bad idea? 

A. I think it would depend upon 
what else is part of that initiative. 

Q. You wrote a letter, as you 
mentioned, to the new Iranian Prime 
Minister. There have been rumors 
that in that letter you proposed that 
you might meet with some represent- 
ative of their government. Did you, in 
fact, do that? And what can you tell 
us about that letter? 

A. The letter was consistent with 
positions that we had taken previously 
and which were known publicly. That 
particular subject was not in it. I refer 
to that only to make it clear that it was 
not in the letter. But I am not inclined 
to otherwise characterize the contents 
of the letter because I think I want to 
maximize the possibility that the Ira- 
nians will respond to that letter on its 
merits and perhaps initiate a dialogue. 
It's conceivable that if I were to release 
the text or characterize it — even 
though I don't think there are many 
surprises, if any, in it — that they would 
regard that as being an affront, and I 
see no point in risking that. 



Q. The last time you were sitt g 
in this chair as a Senator, I think, •. 
fore you were even invited to beco e 
Secretary of State, you said that i 
the case of American relations wit 
Iran, you would see nothing wroni 
with admitting things that Americ 
had done to Iran because that was 
part of history, and we might as w 1 
admit it; there would be no proble 
You were not saying we should tal 
blame or say mea culpa but that y i 
saw nothing wrong with admitting 
American actions to Iran which w » 
part of past history. Is that still y( • 
attitude now that you are Secretar i 
State or — 

A. I'm not sure that you have c 
rectly and accurately characterized 
what I said then, but I remember it 
quite clearly, and I see nothing wro 
with it as I remember it. 

Q. You would still be willing t 
put on the record America's past 
actions — 

A. I think they were part of his 

tory. 

Q. There have been reports thi 
in order to get the Palestinian au- 
tonomy talks going, Prime Ministi 
Begin is willing to forego the mov 
of his office into East Jerusalem, 
may also release some Palestinian 
prisoners. Are those reports accura> 

A. I've read the transcript of M 
Linowitz' [Ambassador Sol M. 
Linowitz, Personal Representative ( 
the President for the Middle East 
Peace Negotiations] press conferenc 
yesterday, and his statement is consi 
ent with my own understanding that 
what he did was discuss all those issi 
with both Mr. Begin and Mr. Sadat. 
Out of his conversations with Mr. Be 
and members of the Israeli 
Parliament — the Knessfet — he got V( 
strong impressions which he convey( 
to Mr. Sadat and also to Mr. Begin 
about issues that troubled Mr. Sadat 
And on that basis and on the basis o: 
the apprehension of both of those 
statesmen that the situation might b 
slipping into a time of great threat ti 
peace in the Middle East, they were 
prompted to move forward. I am not 
under the impression that there wen 
specific quid pro qiios discussed. 



B 



Department of State Bull-f 



Special 



Q. There were not? 

A. Not. There were very strong 
ipressions conveyed to both sides. 

Q. Why then would Mr. Sadat 
live changed his mind and put him- 
ilf further out on the limb vis-a-vis 
Is Arab brethren by agreeing to re- 
)rn to the talks when, in fact, he had 
fid he would not do so unless some of 
(ese things did take place? 

A. Mr. Linowitz made this point 
a)Ut as clearly as anyone could. First 
(11, both Mr. Sadat and Mr. Begin 
k the opportunity in the statement 
w hich they jointly agreed to as a 
miitment to the Camp David process 
! hf only viable road to peace. That's 
.1 y strong statement for each of 
ni to make at this point, and espe- 
ly for Mr. Sadat, given some of the 
^t ions that have been raised as a re- 
1 (if the frustrating events of recent 
ks and months, but they made it. 
I the second point they made was 
the process could not continue ef- 
.'ly unless there was an atmos- 
■ of trust and confidence slowly 
:t -loped between the two countries. 

Q. Reports that there have been 
3i an and middle European troops 
d ng the attempt to subdue the reb- 
A n Afghanistan, do you know of 
n confirmation or do you believe 
h e reports? 

A. I recall only the vaguest of ru- 
' ; with respect to Cuban involve- 
s, and that's not been verified by 
information that's come to my at- 

(in. 



Q. And middle European forces 
besides the Russians? 

A. I've not even heard rumors to 
that effect. 

Q. You're going up to the U.N. 
General Assembly meeting this fall, 
and we understand that you're going 
to meet with Soviet Foreign Minister 
Gromyko on, I believe, it is the 25th 
of this month. 

There have been reports that you 
are going to discuss with Mr. 
Gromyko the subject that they — the 
Soviets — are very anxious to discuss 
and that we have avoided in the re- 
cent past; the reduction of nuclear 
forces in Europe, the theater nuclear 
forces issue. Is it true? Does that 
mean that we have decided to go 
ahead with detente and arms control 
despite the Soviet presence in Af- 
ghanistan? 

A. From the beginning we have in- 
dicated a desire to discuss theater nu- 
clear weapons limitations with the Rus- 
sians, and that was the second part of a 
two-part decision that NATO made last 
December. NATO decided to deploy the 
Pershing II missile but, at the very 
same time, offered to discuss lim- 
itations with the Russians. 

The Russians delayed for 6 months 
by imposing a precondition upon discus- 
sion, and that is a reversal of the deci- 
sion to deploy. It was when the Rus- 
sians dropped that precondition that we 
agreed to go forward, and they know 
we have agreed to go forward. It's a 
question of agreeing on the time and 
the character of the initial talks which 
have to be certainly technical and pre- 
paratory, and I expect to discuss that 
with Mr. Gromyko in New York. That 
may be the only positive development 
that comes out of that meeting, but is 
this inconsistent with our policy on Af- 
ghanistan? I think not. 



I think that both pursuit of arms 
control and our policies in Afghanistan 
are designed to impose restraint upon 
Soviet aggressive intentions. And so 
they are consistent. 

Q. Are you ready to suggest a 
time as suggested by some news re- 
ports for going ahead with these 
technical preparatory talks, and will 
it be before November as these reports 
suggest? 

A. I think that's possible. I don't 
like to try to preempt the question of 
time from the Soviets, and I don't know 
what would be convenient for them, but 
we're willing to go forward as early as 
possible. 



Press release 247. 



ber 1980 



Special 



Secretary Muskie's News Conference of September 1 ■) 



The Senate is considering the Foreign 
Service Act this afternoon, and I take 
this opportunity to urge my former col- 
leagues to enact it. 

The bill is a response to the mandate 
of Congress in 1976 for a comprehensive 
review of the personnel system of the 
Foreign Service. It is designed to 
simplify the system and to Unk advance- 
ment more closely with performance. It is 
also designed to establish a more equita- 
ble relationship between the Civil Service 
and the Foreign Service. 

Our diplomatic service is the best in 
the world. The men and women who run 
it are capable and dedicated. Increasingly, 
they serve under difficult or dangerous 
conditions abroad. The Foreign Service 
Act is designed to recognize their work 
and their working conditions and to 
codify their treatment. It deserves 
enactment, which I hope it will receive. 

The Congress will soon be voting on 
the President's decision to supply fuel and 
equipment for India's Tarapur reactors. I 
have reviewed the arguments carefully on 
both sides of this issue. I approached that 
review from the perspective of a com- 
mitted advocate of nuclear nonprolifera- 
tion. Our nonproliferation policy is one I 
helped shape as a Senator and one I sup- 
port without reservation. I understand 
and share the seriousness with which the 
Senate and House view this policy. I am 
convinced our interests are served by 
going ahead with the Tarapur shipments. 
Indeed, the President based his deci- 
sion on his own deep commitment to nu- 
clear nonproUferation. We have a respon- 
sibility to make our nonproliferation 
policy work in the real world, to obtain 
tangible progress, and to gain the cooper- 
ation of other nations to stop the spread 
of nuclear weapons. The heart of the 
issue is how best to accomplish these ob- 
jectives. 

In 1963 we agreed to provide all the 
nuclear fuel for the Tarapur reactors. In 
return, India agreed to use only U.S. fuel 
in these reactors. 



India also agreed to accept interna- 
tional safeguards on the Tarapur fuel and 
to obtain U.S. consent before transfer- 
ring the spent fuel to third parties or re- 
processing the spent fuel to extract its 
plutonium. 

If the Congress blocks our decision, 
India might well claim that we have 
breached the 1963 agreement and that 
India is, therefore, no longer bound by its 
nonproliferation commitments. Fuel for 
Tarapur is available elsewhere. Indeed, 
in the longer run, the Indians may repro- 
cess the spent fuel and use the resulting 
plutonium for fuel. I need not remind you 
that plutonium is a weapons-usable mate- 
rial. The spent fuel is being stored at 
Tarapur If it is removed from the agreed 
upon international safeguards, inspection 
would be impossible, and a precedent 
would be set that would strike at the 
very heart of our efforts to halt the 
spread of nuclear weapons. 

Other nations which support strong 
nuclear safeguards have told us they 
understand the President's decision and 
our desire to maintain a dialogue with 
India on this critical issue. And they 
understand the importance of living up to 
an existing commitment. 

The Nuclear Nonproliferation Act 
permits the supply of fuel to India. These 
two shipments fall under a grace period 
designed to assure that lines of communi- 
cation remain open with countries which 
have not yet accepted full-scope safe- 
guards. The Administration's proposal 
does not contravene the law; it is in- 
tended to maintain nonproliferation con- 
trols over the Tarapur facility while we 
seek broader application of the goals of 
our policy. 

Q. On Iran: Do you see any signs 
of any hope that the hostage crisis is 
closer to resolution today than last 
week? 

A. I think it is very important to be 
cautious in our reaction to statements 
coming out of Iran. We have read them 



before. As a matter of fact, we have bi 
reading them over a period of weeks a 
months. I think it would be a mistake 
raise expectations based upon any spe 
cific statements which are now the sul 
ject of speculation in the press. 

Q. The public statement attribui 
to Ayatollah Khomeini the other 
day — has that been reflected in any 
other direct or indirect communica- 
tions with the United States? In otht 
words, the dropping, apparently, of ( 
condition — for an apology? 

A. Different statements coming o 
of Iran over a period of several weeks 
have focused upon some combination c 
the totality of ideas that have been ad 
vanced by Iranian spokesmen of one k 
or another. 

Q. The Saudi Report reports toe- 
that the Administration authorized i 
study by the Rand Corporation of se 
rity implications of Israel's giving u| 
the West Bank and that it concluded 
rael's security would not be hurt if i 
yielded the West Bank. I'm not even 
aware of such a report, so if there is 
one, I wonder if you would tell abou 
and tell us about your feelings? 

And, while you are at it, U.S. of i 
cials over the last several weeks havi 
been quoted as saying that they 
thought the internationalization of 
Jerusalem might not be a bad idea, t 
I wondered if you thought it was a g. 
idea or a bad idea? 

A. With respect to the first part t 
your question, I'm not aware of the 
report — that doesn't mean it doesn't 
exist. Secondly, it has been our policy : 
to characterize the ultimate decision W 
respect to Jerusalem beyond saying thi 
our position is supportive of an undivic 
Jerusalem, open to all religions. And fi 
us to go beyond that formulation, at th 
point, I think, would have the effect oi 
perceived as having the effect of under 
taking to prejudge the outcome of the 
gotiations. 



Department of State Bull 



Special 



Q. Against the backgrround of your 
jopening remark warning against rais- 
ing expectations, I wonder how you can 
Ireconcile that with what President 
[Carter has said today, "statements by 
Iranian authorities" — if I am quoting it 
precisely — "might very well lead to a 
resolution of the hostage question in 
the future." And another report says 
'in the near future." 

How do you reconcile what the 
['resident has said against your own 
tvarning about building expectations? 
And, secondly, what can you tell us 
ibout whatever negotiations, or what- 
'ver the President is hinting at, to avert 
I he possibility that what the President 
las said will be seen by many as Presi- 
lential politicking? 

A. I have no reason to conclude that 
he President is hinting at anything. I 
hink his statement is perfectly consistent 
I'ith statements I've made, pointing out 
I hat we have been looking to as many 
hannels of communication as we could 
ind — private and governmental — over 
he last several months, with the view to 
Itimately establishing official contact 
nat might lead to negotiations. It is our 
onstant hope that one or more of these 
hannels might hold promise for the kind 
f result that the President suggested 
lis morning. 

Q. Shortly after you took office, 
ou spoke about the possibility of eco- 
omic incentives to encourage Iran to 
jlease the hostages. Would the United 
tates, if there is a satisfactory conclu- 
on of the hostage crisis and they come 
ome safely, be willing to consider eco- 
omic aid to Iran to address what you 
ave described many times as "the real 
roblems that confront the nation"? 

A. What I have had reference to in 
le past is the fact that in my judgment 
-and I think this is borne out by the 
.'ents in Iran in the last 4 months — it is 
Iran's economic self-interest, as well as 
ilitical self-interest and in the interest of 
irmalization of relations with its normal 
ading partners, to get the hostage prob- 
m behind it. 

In that sense it has an economic di- 
ension. Precisely what may be the ulti- 



mate basis for the release of the hostages 
is something I don't think could be ad- 
vanced by public discussion. 

Q. Would you be willing, for 
example, to consider either a partial 
lifting of the sanctions against Iran or 
unfreezing of some of the Iranian as- 
sets prior to the actual release of all the 
hostages? 

A. To answer your question would 
be to appear to be opening a negotiation 
process publicly. I don't think that's the 
way to advance the objective. 

Q. You're not ruling it out? 

A. I'm not ruling it out or ruling it 
in. 

Q. A week ago you made public the 
text of a letter to the new Iranian 
Prime Minister asking for the opening 
of direct channels of communication. 
Have you received any reply from him, 
either directly or indirectly? 

A. I have received the oral reply in 
the sense that he read the letter to an 
audience in Iran. I look forward to a writ- 
ten reply, although I have had no clear 
signal on that. 

Q. There is a report today that the 
State Department has been negotiating 
for the last 3 months on some docu- 
ment with former Foreign Minister 
Ghotbzadeh. This creates the impres- 
sion that there have been some very 
active negotiations going on. Is that 
accurate? 

A. That story is inaccurate. 

Q. On Poland: Can you tell us 
whether you believe that the recent 
labor troubles and the drive for freedom 
in that country is over and the Soviet 
Union has decided not to intervene, or 
whether this infectious disease of free- 
dom is liable to spread further and be a 
continuing problem for the Soviet 
Union? 

A. Obviously, the questions you've 
raised are questions we all speculate 
about, without really knowing the hard 
answers. I think that the Soviet attitude 
toward developments in Poland wiU 
emerge over time. The fact that they've 
received Polish representatives since 



those agreements were concluded and 
that the result has been some step up in 
Soviet economic assistance suggests that 
the Soviets are going to be supportive 
with respect to the economic problems 
that may have been generated. 

Beyond that we can only speculate. I 
would like to believe that the workers in 
Poland have achieved an important gain 
to themselves and that it will prove to be 
a constructive contribution to their na- 
tional life. 

Q. Ronald Reagan said over the 
weekend that he felt we should accept 
three of the Ayatollah's demands — 
unfreezing the assets, dropping claims, 
and promising not to intervene. Can 
you go that far? 

A. It was useful to have that guid- 
ance. [Laughter.] 

Q. Do you endorse his guidance? 
Do you agree with his guidance? 

A. Again, they are questions the an- 
swer to which would imply that we are in 
some kind of negotiating posture, which I 
think would be premature. I think it may 
represent an overreaction to the news 
coming out of Iran, and I just found it 
useful in these past few months to be as 
cautious in public reaction to develop- 
ments in Iran as possible. 

Q. Could you say whether it is 
helpful or not helpful for statements 
such as this to be made by a person who 
is seeking the Presidency in a few 
weeks? 

A. Well, I don't find it unhelpful. 

Q. Did you meet with the liaison 
board of hostages' wives when they met 
here about a week or 10 days ago, and 
did they show their letter to you before 
they sent it? 

A. Yes. We've been in touch. 

Q. Did you promise them, at that 
time, any part of the assets of Iran for 
the hostages or their families? 

A. No. That question was not dis- 
cussed. 

Q. Last week the President an- 
nounced commodities aid to Poland. Is 
any other aid possible under the exist- 
ing laws should the Poles request it? 



stober 1980 



Special 



Are you studying the matter? Do you 
have any thoughts on what else the 
United States could provide? 

A. Resources, as I think those of you 
who attend these conferences regularly 
know, are very limited at the present 
time because of the failure of Congress to 
enact a foreign aid appropriations bill in 
fiscal year 1980 and the generally nega- 
tive climate on Capitol Hill to such pro- 
grams. If the Poles decide to place their 
problem before us and to seek our assist- 
ance, we certainly will consider their re- 
quest. But 1 must say at the moment our 
resources are limited except for the CCC 
[Commodity Credit Corporation] grants 
that we approved. And, incidentally, 
those were approved at a higher level 
than we've ever approved before. 

Q. There seems to be a slight dif- 
ference in the mood, at least, of what 
you have said here and what President 
Carter said earlier today. Let me ask 
the question in a slightly different way. 
The President was quoted as saying: 
"They are making statements" — 
meaning people in Iran — "that might 
very well lead to the resolution of this 
problem in the near future." Do you 
agree with that statement by the Presi- 
dent? 

A. I could, I think, if my memory 
were precise enough, identify maybe a 
half dozen statements that have been 
made by one Iranian leader or another 
over the last month which might very 
well lead. But that isn't, I don't think, 
phraseology to suggest either optimism 
or pessimism. It's a rather obvious con- 
clusion. It might, but the reverse is also 
true: It might not. 

Q. Would you recommend a trilat- 
eral meeting among the Egyptians, the 
Israelis, and Americans while Ali 
[Egyptian Foreign Minister Kamal 
Hassan Ali] and Shamir [Israeli For- 
eign Minister Yitzhak Shamir] are in 
Washington this week? 

A. Would I recommend what? 

Q. TVilateral talks among the 
Americans, the Israelis, and the Egyp- 
tians this week in Washington. And 
what, in your opinion, can be the out- 
come of such talks? 

A. We would hope that the bilateral 
talks, with which the present initiative 
\\ill begin, will lead to trilateral talks and 



then to the formal reopening of negoti- 
ations somewhat later The pace of that 
movement, I think, will depend upon the 
first talks, then the second talks, and 
then the third. I don't think it would be 
particularly helpful for me to identify 
which talks ought to then lead to the 
trilaterals. That's part of the objective. 

Q. At the World Energy Confer- 
ence meeting in Munich that just con- 
cluded, European and Third World 
leaders were extremely critical of Ad- 
ministration policy toward nuclear en- 
ergy, saying that it had foreign policy 
implications, that the Carter Adminis- 
tration's explicit stand against aggres- 
sive nuclear energy development in this 
country and around the world had im- 
plications that went very far. The 
people who made these statements in- 
cluded Chancellor Schmidt. 

Are they wrong to see the Adminis- 
tration's policy toward nuclear energy 
as reflecting a broader antigrowth pol- 
icy of this Administration? That is, do 
you disagree with their charges, or will 
you try to convince Europe of your 
policies? 

And, secondly, because the Third 
World leaders made a very direct con- 
nection between the antigrowth policies 
of this Administration and the dete- 
rioration of the situation in the Third 
World, I'd like to ask you, at this point, 
what the United States is going to rec- 
ommend or what we will vote on in 
terms of the seating of Pol Pot at the 
United Nations? 

A. Number one, with respect to the 
Nonproliferation Treaty and the meeting 
which is just concluded, may I point out 
the positive side of that. The meeting 
concluded with all parties in support of 
the Nonproliferation Treaty and its objec- 
tives, including the United States. 

When you referred to our antigrowth 
policy, I'm not sure whether you were re- 
ferring to anti-nonproliferation policy or 
anti-economic growth policy. Economic 
growth was not involved in negotiations 
on the Nonproliferation Treaty. 

With respect to some of the issues 
that were discussed in the treaty — and 
there were a number of them — some of 
them were raised for the purpose of ad- 
vancing the cause of nonproliferation; 
some of them I would describe as being 



more political in motivation. But, in any 
case, it was not possible, after an exten- 
sive effort, to reach agreement. Opposi- 
tion did not stem only from the United 
States; there were opponents to some of 
the specific proposals from other sources. 
I regret that more was not done. We 
made an effort, and we made a last- 
minute effort, to try to move the confer- 
ence toward a declaration which all na- 
tions could join. 

With respect to the concern of the 
non-nuclear states that the major powers 
had not moved as they committed them- 
selves to move in the Nonproliferation 
Treaty toward a comprehensive test ban 
and toward the reduction of nuclear 
arms, I sympathize altogether with their 
concern that we haven't moved in those 
directions. We know that, in our country, 
the SAUr II Treaty has not been ad- 
vanced and is awaiting ratification sug- 
gests that we, perhaps, are not as com- 
mitted as we ought to be to the objectivec 
of the Nonproliferation Treaty. I can only 
assure those who are interested in know- 
ing that that is this Administration's 
commitment as soon as it is feasible. 

I'm not sure what you meant with 
your nongrowth question, so maybe you'll 
get another chance. 

Q. Is the United States now in the 
early stages of a negotiation with Iran 
to seek the release of the hostages? 

A. No. ! 

Q. We're not yet there? Because 
for so many months, it had been stated 
here that you were looking for the for- 
mation of an Iranian Government with 
which you could then negotiate. 

A. Let me say this: After the fact, 
one is able to identify the roots of a nego- 
tiating process which may have been laid, 
say, 2 months ago prior to this date. I 
have not yet recognized it as such. I 
mean, when we have a number of chan- 
nels opened and are trying to communi- 
cate messages of one kind or another, one 
never knows when one of those sug- 
gestions takes root and blossoms out into 
the kind of contact that results in negoti- 
ations. But that link has not yet been 
made. 

The question that was raised earlier 
about a 3-month negotiation having been 
underway seems to have originated in 
one of those indirect channels that, from 



Department of State Bulletin,! 



Special 



lomebody's perception, looked like a ne- 
gotiation. Well, it was not. 

Q. The Speaker of the Iranian Par- 
iament is quoted as saying that it is 
low America's turn, ". . . if it has the 
'> rood will vis-a-vis the hostages, to 
•rove its sincerity in action." Does the 
nited States now believe that there is 
ny action that it could take to advance 
he cause of getting the hostages re- 
?ased? 

A. I think action to get the hostages 
eleased involves mutuality. Unilateral 
ction is not likely to do it. We learned 
imething of that earlier this year. 

Q. I have several questions that 
ow from your opening statement with 
•gard to the Indian reactor T^rapur. 
efore I get to those, though, the ques- 
on that was left on the table back here 
as about Pol Pot, whether you have 
I ade up your mind yet what to do 
)out that? I'd like to just pose that to 

lU. 

And regarding the Indian matter, 
ive the Indians told the United States 
at they will take any of the actions 
at you suggest they might take if the 
lited States does not ship the fuel — 
at is to say, abandon the safeguards 
eviously agreed to, reprocess the fuel 
lich is available, and so on? Does 
: ur statement that they might do so 
1 id to legitimatize the possibility that 
1 ey could take some action if Congress 
• es not agree to ship the fuel? And 
Mat would the U.S. position be if Con- 
I ;ss refuses to do as you and the Pres- 
i !nt suggest, and the Indians then 
I ink about abandoning the agreement 
i ;y made in 1963? 

A. First, "if they abandon the 
t aty," your question presupposes that 
\ would have abandoned it first, so the 
1 rd "abandonment," with respect to In- 
f s response to such abandonment on 
c ■ part, I don't think is a very fair defi- 
r ion of the proposition. 

With respect to what the Indians 
n^ht do, they have not uttered any 
t. eats, but the Indian options which the 
1 3 agreement foreclosed are clear. And 
Hhe agreement is no longer binding on 
If it is surely a fair assumption that they 
»?ht consider it no longer binding on 
ti m. And if it is no longer binding on 
tl m, then the specific provisions to 



which my statement refers could well be 
aborted; we ought to assume that. 

The opponents of the shipments 
make speculative arguments about Indian 
behavior or performance, but the argu- 
ment I make is not a speculative one. I'm 
making an argument based on a very 
simple proposition: If one party to an 
agreement abandons it, the other party 
surely is free not to feel bound by it. 

With respect to the Kampuchean 
credentials question, anticipating that I 
might just conceivably be asked this 
question, I have the following statement 
to make. 

In the event that the credentials of 
the Democratic Kampuchean regime are 
challenged at the U.N. General Assem- 
bly the United States will again vote to 
support the Association of South East 
Asian Nations (ASEAN) position in favor 
of the continued seating of that regime. 

Our decision on this question was 
reached after careful consultation with 
our friends and allies, particularly those 
Southeast Asian countries most con- 
cerned about the Vietnamese invasion of 
Cambodia. We support the ASEAN posi- 
tion on the grounds that the Democratic 
Kampuchean regime has been seated by 
all General Assemblies since 1975, and 
there still is no superior claimant for the 
seat. 

The seating of the current regime in 
Phnom Penh, the Heng Samrin adminis- 
tration, which was installed and is main- 
tained by 200,000 Vietnamese troops, 
would indicate international acceptance of 
a government imposed by foreign aggres- 
sion in violation of the U.N. Charter. 
This decision is also based on our 
conclusion, based on careful diplomatic 
soundings, that Vietnam has not shown a 
willingness to negotiate concerning the 
central issues of the Kampuchean 
question — the withdrawal of Vietnamese 
troops from Kampuchea — and self- 
detennination for the Khmer as called for 
by the U.N. General Assembly last year. 
Our position on the U.N. credentials 
issue is consistent with our objective of 
working actively with the ASEAN na- 
tions and wnth all U.N. member states to 
seek a permanent settlement in Cam- 
bodia which satisfies the aspirations of 
the Khmer people as well as the interests 
of all countries in the region. 

This position, on the technical ques- 
tion of U.N. credentials, in no way im- 



plies any support or recognition of the 
Democratic Kampuchean regime. We 
abhor and condem the regime's human 
rights record and would never support its 
return to power in Phnom Penh. Our pol- 
icy is to work for the termination of all 
forms of foreign intervention in Cambodia 
and for the emergence of a genuinely 
neutral government in Phnom Penh. 

Our position on this issue cannot and 
will not restore the Democratic Kampu- 
chean regime to power, but our vote can 
prevent legitimization of a government 
installed by aggression and maintained by 
the presence of an invading army. 

Q. On Vietnam: Is it correct to as- 
sume that, in the light of the latest 
statement as well as other pronounce- 
ments earlier, a precondition for any 
progress in normalization or negoti- 
ations with Vietnam is withdrawal 
from Kampuchea, or is there any other 
linked issue which would first have to 
be resolved before you can progress in 
the normalizaiton process with Viet- 
nam which was begun sometime ago? 

A. We think the objective, consistent 
with the position of the ASEAN coun- 
tries, is a political settlement in Kam- 
puchea; the terms of that settlement, ob- 
viously, must emerge out of negotiations 
which the Vietnamese have been unwill- 
ing to undertake. 

Q. We probably will not see you be- 
fore you see Foreign Minister 
Gromyko. Could you tell us what you 
expect to accomplish out of that meet- 
ing? And is there a disagreement now 
with the Soviet Union over whether 
forward-based systems are a fit agenda 
item in TNF [theater nuclear forces] 
negotiations, and what are the pros- 
pects for those negotiations getting 
started, either before or after 
November? 

A. It's a short timeframe, at best. It 
seems longer to some than to others. 

With respect to my meeting with Mr. 
Gromyko on the TNF issue, I would ex- 
pect that we would reach agreement on 
the time for beginning the talks on that 
subject, a place, the date — and my staff 
urge me not to use this word, but I will 
just to indicate that I'm slowly becoming 
a diplomat — the modalities of the meet- 
ing. So I would expect that we will reach 
agreement on those points. 



er 1980 



With respect to what each side would 
be free to discuss in those talks, I think it 
is premature to anticipate what that may 
be. And the difference of view that you 
expressed in your question, I presume, 
would be a part of that discussion. 

Q. Can you conceive of any basis 
for improving relations with the Soviet 
Union without negotiations beginning 
with the withdrawal of Soviet troops 
from Afghanistan? 

A. I think that is critical, as it has 
been from the beginning and will continue 
to be. 

Q. Do you have any reason to be- 
lieve that Foreign Minister Gromyko 
will bring any willingness to begin such 
negotiations to New York? 

A. If I had a positive response to 
that, I would be standing here with much 
greater enthusiasm than I am. 

Q. You're not saying that we're 
unwilling to talk to the Soviets in face- 
to-face negotiations about theater nu- 
clear forces in Europe until their troops 
are out of Afghanistan, are you? 

A. No. I was talking about Af- 
ghanistan. 

Q. But he was saying can you en- 
vision improved relations with the 
Soviets unless they make some 
progress — beyond TNF, can you envis- 
age— 

A. One never knows when one is in a 
trap. [Laughter] Number one, we did 
not, in our Afghanistan policy, 
undertake — and you've heard this 
phraseology before — to dismantle the 
framework of East- West relations which 
includes arms control, arms control talks, 
and arms control agreements. We've 
made it clear that we are still going to 
press for ratification of SALT II when it 
is feasible, and that's still our commit- 
ment. 



With respect to TNF, we and our 
NATO allies last December linked two 
things: one, the deployment of Pershing 
II missiles in Europe; and two, the be- 
ginning of talks on theater nuclear 
weapons. When the Soviets dropped their 
precondition about a reversal of the deci- 
sion on deployment of the weapons and 
indicated a willingness to talk without 
that precondition, we responded, and we 
are willing to go forward with those talks. 

We don't think that is inconsistent 
with our policy toward the Soviet Union's 
unacceptable action in Afghanistan. In- 
deed, the objective of our policy there as 
well as the objective of our arms control 
policy is Soviet restraint, and both 
fwlicies work to that end. 

Q. You mentioned earlier that you 
thought SALT should be ratified when 
it's feasible. I think the question is 
when it would ever be feasible so long 
as the Soviets are in Afghanistan. A 
group, inlcuding former Ambassador 
[George] Kennan, have published 
documents and letters urging that the 
Administration take up, or push for, the 
SALT IVeaty even as early as the spe- 
cial session in November. Others have 
said the first thing next year. 

Do you think it would be helpful, 
feeling the way toward feasibility, if 
President Carter, in this campaign, 
made SALT a major issue so that you 
could, in effect, have a plebiscite of the 
popular will on this question? 

A. That's exactly our objective. 

Q. What? 

A. To develop the issue in this cam- 
paign in such a way that the American 
people can come to grips with the issues 
and, hopefully, create a constituency for 
SALT II ratification. There are a couple 
of points involved: number one, the one 
you very appropriately raised — the ques- 
tion that this is a Presidential campaign 
and it's highly appropriate that an issue 
of this magnitude be discussed in it. 

Mr. Reagan's position is opposed to 
SALT II. The President's is clearly sup- 
portive of SALT II, and debate between 
the two conceivably could help bring that 
issue to the fore and give the public the 
benefit of both points of view. 



Secondly, there is, among the mili- 
tary and I suspect among thoughtful citi 
zens, a growing apprehension about the 
prospect of a SALT-free world, or a 
SALT-less world, and what that can mea 
in terms of our security interests, in 
terms of budgetary burdens, the cost of 
an arms race. And as those perceptions 
grow, I would expect the constituency fo 
SALT II may grow. 

What the odds are that that would 
happen is a question that one may legitl 
mately raise. But I am simply indicating, 
that so far as I'm concerned — and I hav« 
the full support of the President with re- 
spect to my role in this debate — I hope t 
press it and hope to change the climate c 
public opinion with respect to SALT. 

Q. Is it possible to have a vote thi» 
November, do you think? 

A. There are problems not necessan 
ily associated with the SALT II issues. I 
gather that the postelection scenario for ' 
the Congress is likely to be limited to 
about 30 days — November 15 to Decem- 
ber 15. I don't know whether that is fixe > 
or are just dates that I've heard tossed 
around. That timeframe is going to be 
pretty much filled with budgetary issuesi 
and appropriations bills, and the time 
that may be necessary' to really debate 
SALT II would not be available in that 
period. I would not exclude anything at 
this point; it just doesn't seem Ukely at 
this point. 

Q. Could we close this off with a 
footnote question? What is the signifi- 
cance of that yellow ribbon in your 
lapel? 

A. It says "Free the Hostages." 

Q. Can we draw anything from 
that? 

A. This is a very useful reminder 
that was prepared by the committee rep- 
resenting the hostage families and pre- 
sented to me just this last week with a 
kiss on both cheeks as a reminder to me. 
I wear it every day, and it is a daily re- 
minder to me that this is the first order 
of business. 



Press release 254. 



Department of State Bulleti| 



Energy 



evenue through both volume and price. 

ven recent cutbacks appear influenced 

jy technical factors, as new discoveries 

lave lagged and reserves are declining. 

Taq 

raq broke diplomatic relations with the 
Jnited States during the 1967 Arab- 
sraeli war. Since 1972, when Interests 
icctions were opened in Baghdad and 
Vashington, we have maintained sus- 
ained but limited contact with the Iraqi 
overnment. Over the past several 
ears, the United States has made 
nown on a number of occasions its will- 
igness to normalize relations. Although 
raq has not precluded this possibility 
ometime in the future, it has indicated 
does not believe the present is the ap- 
opriate time. Thus the United States 
limited in its ability to carry on an 
onomic dialogue with Baghdad at pres- 
nt, but the U.S. private sector is play- 
iig an increasing role in Iraq's economic 
evelopment. 

With the sharp price increases of 
)79-80, Iraq has become a new 
ember of the surplus-revenue club. 
'aq has carefully kept development 
)ending within limits of absorptive 
.pacity and is expected to continue to 
j) so. Nevertheless, spending on 
ivelopment and arms has been high 
d until recently has not lagged far 
ihind revenues. Since early 1979, 
wever, Iraq's foreign exchange 
serves have grown rapidly and are 
iw believed to stand at well over $20 
lion. Spending will continue to grow 
t not so rapidly as revenue unless the 
irket permits Iraq to trim production 
thout setting off further price in- 
ases. Iraq has generally produced 
"^ar capacity and has plans to continue 
:reasing capacity and exploring for 
w reserves. It is increasing bilateral 
listance to developing countries, in 
rt to further its desire for a leadership 
.6 in the nonaligned movement, 
cently Iraq has taken a more 
Dderate attitude toward prices. 

ludi Arabia 

ir over a third of a century, the 
lited States has maintained a deep in- 
est in the territorial integrity and 
:urity of Saudi Arabia and has worked 
develop broad, strong ties with that 
jntry. This Administration has 
rked intensely to further this 
igstanding policy. Our relationship 
th Saudi Arabia has weathered 
riods of great tensions in U.S. -Arab 
ations and has progressed steadily. 



The contribution that we make to Saudi 
and regional security is one of the im- 
portant elements in this relationship. 
The Saudis look to us to be a dependable 
supplier of military equipment and train- 
ing to enhance the Kingdom's own 
defense capability, and they recognize 
the key importance of U.S. global power 
in maintaining a strategic balance which 
deters outside intervention in the region. 

As Saudi wealth and influence have 
grown, we have increasingly worked 
closely with the Saudi Government in ef- 
forts to bolster other countries in Africa 
and Asia where our two governments 
perceive a common interest in security 
and orderly development and a need to 
help reduce regional tensions. 

Another major element in our rela- 
tionship has been the ability of the 
United States, as a power with influence 
in both Israel and the Arab world, to 
make a unique contribution in the long 
quest for a just, comprehensive, and 
durable peace in the Middle East. The 
Saudis have come to share our basic ob- 
jectives in this regard. They have not 
supported the Camp David approach, 
and disagreement on how best to pursue 
the negotiations has caused some strain 
in our relations. Nevertheless, we re- 
main in close consultation. The Saudis 
have continued to urge more rapid prog- 
ress in the peace process, while we seek 
Saudi understanding of our negotiating 
effort and eventual Saudi support for it. 

In recent years our economic ties 
with Saudi Arabia have expanded 
significantly. The U.S. -Saudi Joint 
Economic Commission has become an ef- 
fective vehicle for the transfer of 
American technology to assist Saudi 
development, while our private sector 
continues to play a leading role in this 
regard. This year about 37% of our total 
exports to the Middle East and North 
Africa are going to Saudi Arabia. As 
Saudi Arabia has become an interna- 
tional financial power, its role as in- 
vestor and development lender has ex- 
panded tremendously as has the need 
for close consultations between our two 
governments on international financial 
and development issues. 

In this Administration our sustained 
diplomatic exchanges on the wide range 
of issues of common interest with Saudi 
Arabia have been reinforced by a proc- 
ess of frequent presidential and Cabinet- 
level communications and contacts. 
Crown Prince Fahd's Washington visit 
in the spring of 1977, the President's 
visit to Saudi Arabia in January 1978, 
and King Khalid's visit to the White 
House in November 1978 have been 



highlights of a sustained exchange, 
which on the economic side has included 
exchanges of visits between the 
Secretary of the Treasury, Secretary 
of Energy, and the Under Secretary of 
State for Economic Affairs and their 
Saudi counterparts. 

Saudi Arabia has, in recent years, 
maintained oil production at levels pro- 
viding income well in excess of its 
domestic development needs. Since last 
summer Saudi Arabia has produced 9.5 
mm b/d of oil (9.8 mm b/d counting its 
share of production from the partitioned 
zone between Saudi Arabia and Kuwait), 
a million barrels daily above its pre- 
ferred production level. 

Saudi oil reserves would permit ex- 
pansion of sustainable production capaci- 
ty significantly above present levels, but 
many Saudis question whether there is 
sufficient economic incentive to make the 
investment required to increase produc- 
tion. The Saudi Government has, in re- 
cent years, embarked on ambitious 
economic and social development pro- 
grams. Much of the physical infrastruc- 
ture of a modern society is now in place, 
and the absorptive limits of the economy 
have been revealed. Industrial prospects, 
except in the petrochemical area, are 
limited. There are strong social 
pressures for slower development, which 
in view of recent price increases sug- 
gests slower growth in expenditures and 
even more rapid accumulation of finan- 
cial surpluses than in the past. Some 
Saudi officials argue that oil in the 
ground is a better investment than 
financial assets acquired with surplus 
revenue. It has become increasingly 
difficult for policymakers to justify, in 
terms of narrowly defined economic self- 
interest, continued production well in ex- 
cess of domestic income requirements. 

The growing conservationist trend in 
Saudi Arabia has been balanced by con- 
cern for the welfare of the international 
economy. In addition to its significant 
role as a lender to poorer countries, 
Saudi Arabia has an increasing stake in 
the international economy and financial 
system. There is no question that the 
government approaches oil production 
and price decisions with concern for the 
impact of its decisions on the stability of 
financial markets, the state of the dollar, 
and the impact on inflation and growth 
rates in the industrial countries— from 
which most of their imports come— and 
in developing countries. The importance 
Saudi Arabia attaches to these broader 
economic interests and concerns, involv- 



Itober 1980 



43 



Energy 



ing the health of the international 
economy, is evidenced by the choices it 
has made in its own production and pric- 
ing policy and the role it has played in 
OPEC in working for a more orderly 
evolution of oil prices. Saudi Arabia's 
legitimate and continuing concern with 
balancing its narrower and broader 
economic interests will continue to play 
a central role in its choices on oil pro- 
duction and prices. 

Gulf Emirates 

The gulf states were important to U.S. 
economic interests and private American 
presence was significant there well 
before Kuwait achieved full in- 
dependence in 1961 and before the in- 
dependence of Qatar and the formation 
of the United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.) in 
1971. In the era of full independence, it 
has been U.S. policy to develop close 
relations with these three states and 
their gulf neighbors and to pursue the 
expansion of mutual interests across a 
range of issues, while remaining in close 
consultations with the United Kingdom, 
which has long shared our basic in- 
terests in this region. Our general policy 
approach toward the gulf states, and the 
general course of our relationships, has 
been consistent with our longstanding 
and more developed relationship with 
Saudi Arabia, and we welcome and seek 
to encourage the commitment of Saudi 
Arabia and its gulf neighbors to close 
cooperation in the interest of the 
region's security and sound develop- 
ment. 

The Iranian revolution and the inten- 
sified Soviet pressure against the region, 
manifested in the invasion of 
Afghanistan and the close Soviet rela- 
tionship with South Yemen, have, of 
course, prompted careful and sustained 
review of our policy toward the gulf 
states and of how we best can contribute 
to the region's security and progress. 
We seek to strengthen our relations 
with the gulf sUites across the economic, 
political, cultural, and security spec- 
trums. We have increased U.S. naval 
presence in the Indian Ocean and are in 
the process of developing an improved 
capability to project deterrent force 
toward the region. 

Over a number of years we have 
developed security assistance relation- 
ships with Kuwait and the other 
emirates and continue to make ap- 
propriate U.S. military equipment and 
training available to help these small 
states develop a reasonable defense 



capability. We remain in close diplomatic 
contact with them on a variety of 
political issues of importance to the 
region, particularly our quest for a com- 
prehensive Middle East peace. Kuwait, 
Qatar, and the U.A.E. share our goal of 
a peaceful settlement although they do 
not support the Camp David approach. 

On the economic side we maintain 
important commercial ties with Kuwait, 
the U.A.E., and Qatar and have sup- 
plemented, when requested, the substan- 
tial exchange of private sector 
technology with U.S. Government ex- 
perts in areas of interest to these coun- 
tries' development programs. We keep 
in close diplomatic contact on energy 
and economic issues, including the 
significant role these states play as con- 
structive international investors and 
generous development lenders. In this 
Administration this dialogue has been 
supported by visits of former Secretary 
of the Treasury [W. Michael] Blumen- 
thal. Secretary of the Treasury [G. 
William] Miller, and Under Secretary of 
State [Richard N.] Cooper to both 
Kuwait and the U.A.E. 

The oil policies of these three states 
differ notably. Qatar is a relatively 
minor producer of oil (500,000-550,000 
b/d). Although it has vast reserves of 
non-oil-associated natural gas, which it is 
now making plans to exploit, its oil 
reserves are limited, and production is 
expected to decline slightly over the 
decade. Qatar's production has tended to 
move up to capacity as the market 
tightens and to fall off slightly as the 
market eases. 

The U.A.E.'s production and pricing 
policy involves essentially the same con- 
siderations as that of Saudi Arabia. On 
one hand there is concern for conserving 
its primary resource and avoiding too 
great a surplus in revenues and a 
broader concern, reflecting its stake in 
the international economy, for helping to 
maintain the health of that economy by 
contributing to orderly oil markets. The 
U.A.E. has generally supported Saudi 
positions on price restraint, although in 
recent months its price has been above 
the Saudi level. The U.A.E., too, has 
been a substantial lender and investor. 
The U.A.E. has also contributed to 
world energy supplies and domestic 
economic development through fostering 
exports of liquefied petroleum gas and 
liquefied natural gas. 

Recent nuances in the oil policy of 
Kuwait may be a guide to future tenden- 
cies in other producing countries. 
Kuwait's new production level of 1.5 mm 
b/d (1.8 mm b/d counting its share of the 



1^ 



partitioned zone) represents a long- 
heralded decision to cut back production 
in response to conservationist pressure, 
and hence this level may remain firm for 
some time to come. This level of produc- 
tion provides sufficient associated 
natural gas and natural gas liquids to 
supply Kuwait's liquefied petroleum gas 
plant at the desired level and to meet 
domestic needs. It also provides oil 
revenues more than sufficient to finance 
Kuwait's domestic development, welfare, 
and security needs; its foreign aid; and 
its extensive and sophisticated invest- 
ment programs. If it maintains a fixed 
production policy, Kuwait will, in effect, 
have opted out of any ongoing efforts to 
influence prices through production 
policy. In the past Kuwait has at times 
asserted that oil policy is a "commercial" 
rather than "political" issue, and its new 
approach seems to reflect a more ag- 
gressive commercial thrust to market- 
ing. Kuwait's oil policymakers reportedlj 
are focusing attention downstream and 
overseas— on controlling the destinations 
of their crude and using access to their 
fixed supply as an instrument to gain ac- 
cess to promising investments abroad in 
exploration, refining, and petrochemi- 
cals. 

Conclusion 

The implications of the foregoing discus-^ 
sions are clear and unsurprising. The 
OPEC countries that desire greater 
revenues have little or no flexibility to 
raise production. Those that have this 
flexibility in production capacity, and 
sufficient reserves to expand capacity, 
currently receive a surfeit of oil 
revenues. Thus, as noted at the begin- 
ning of this statement, the issue focuses 
on OPEC's leading producer, Saudi 
Arabia, and its gulf neighbors: Kuwait, 
the U.A.E., and, increasingly, Iraq. 
These countries can easily support or 
raise oil prices by trimming production. 
They can ease upward price pressure by 
producing more, though their ability to 
restrain prices in this manner is limited, 
as the past year shows. In a tight 
market, they can increase their revenuest] 
by producing less oil, and as prices in- 
crease so do surplus revenues and 
pressures for lower production. 

In the case of the three monarchical 
states, these facts, plus their concerns 
for and stake in the international 
economy, add up to conflicting economic 
interests. In each of them many argue 
that oil production should be reduced to 
maximize unit revenue and to stretch 



44 



Department of State Bulletin 



EUROPE 



ihe life of their oil reserves, whose 
alue, they believe, will increase more 
apidly than the financial assets they can 
cquire with excess revenues. These 
iroups also argue (a) that excessive 
avenues promote excessive and de- 
labilizing development spending and (b) 
lat restricting production and driving 
ip the price of oil will force the 
jveloped countries to conserve energy 
id to accelerate the development of 
ternatives, thus reducing their extreme 
^pendence on imported oil. 

Opposing this narrow "conserva- 
Dnist" view is a broader conception: 
lat over the long term, the economic 
terests of these states are linked to 
ose of the industrial and developing 
orlds and that they should, therefore. 
How production and pricing policies 
at will sustain the international 
onomy while facilitating an orderly 
iinsition to alternative energy sources. 

This broader view also recognizes 
e relation between healthy economies 
d the ability of the industrial democ- 
: cies to maintain a global strategic 
1 lance conducive to world peace and 
■ ? security of the Middle East. 

This economic debate, of course, 
xt's place in a political context in 
• lich the dominant themes are Middle 
1 ist peace and regional security. This 
( itext, in turn, influences our ability to 
( gage in useful dialogue with these pro- 
< cers. But there are no simple trade- 
( s between the economic and energy 
i ues on one hand and political and 
£ 'urity issues on the other. Only a 
1 sening of our dependence on Persian 
( If oil, desired by both consumers and 
■! -plus-revenue producers, will in time 

I ,olve the economic and energy issues. 

I I such factors as significant progress 
t vard a just and comprehensive peace 
3i U.S. ability to accommodate 

r clonal security concerns can greatly 
a L'ct our ability to make ourselves 
h u-d. 

Our energy diplomacy with respect 
t these states aims at strengthening the 
t lader, more cooperative view of their 
c n interests. This purpose is served by 
■ cooperation in their efforts to 
, elop and strengthen their own 
:-. ieties and by their increasing involve- 
'• nt in the international economy. 
The pace of economic development 
and transfer of technology to, these 
intries will be a factor in determining 
ir domestic income requirements. An 
Hirtant element, for example, will be 
extent to which countries, such as 
idi Arabia, are able to develop viable 
related industries which might serve 
m inducement to higher crude oil 



Export Restrictions 
on the U.S.S.R. 



by Richard N. Cooper 

Statement before the Senate Com- 
yyiittee on Banking, Housing, and 
Urban Affairs on August 20, 1980. Mr. 
Cooper is Under Secretary for Eco- 
nomic Affairs.^ 

I am happy to have the opportunity to 
appear before this committee. As you 
have requested, I will review Soviet ac- 
tions in Afghanistan and the responses 
that the United States and its allies 
have taken to this aggression. I would 
like to begin with a brief status report 
on the current level of Soviet involve- 
ment in Afghanistan. 

Almost 8 months have passed 
since Soviet forces invaded the 
nonaligned nation of Afghanistan in De- 
cember 1979. Since that time the 
U.S.S.R. has increased the level of its 
occupation forces in an effort to quell 
the nationwide resistance of the Afghan 
people. The Soviet aggression has 
caused great suffering for the people of 
Afghanistan. It has resulted in over 1 
million Afghans — about 7'"-; of the total 
population — seeking refuge outside 
their country. Fierce resistance to the 
Soviet occupation continues. The 
U.S.S.R. has failed in its efforts to es- 
tablish effective control over the coun- 
try. Its attempts to obtain recognition 
for the puppet regime headed by Bab- 
rak Karmal have been rebuffed by the 
overwhelming majority of the interna- 
tional community. 



The United States continues to re- 
gard the Soviet action as a blatant vio- 
lation of the rules of international con- 
duct and a serious threat to world 
peace. The presence of Soviet forces in 
Afghanistan continues to pose a threat 
to other countries of Southwest Asia 
and to our own interests in the region. 

The United States had to respond 
vigorously to this provocative Soviet 
step. Failure on our |)art to react would 
only encourage new adventures and 
risk miscalculation. Also, failure to 
react would have baffled and distressed 
many countries in the area and would 
have undermined our jjosition there and 
elsewhere. Our policy has been to take 
a number of firm and highly visible 
steps which express our feelings to the 
Soviets in the clearest possible manner. 
We intend to continue to do what we 
can to convince the U.S.S.R. to with- 
draw its forces from Afghanistan and to 
reduce the possibility that they will be 
tempted to undertake similar adven- 
tures in the future. 

I would now like to describe the ac- 
tions we have taken. 

Militarily we have accelerated our 
efforts to increase our strategic capa- 
bilities, including plans for the estab- 
lishment of a rapid deployment force 
sufficiently large and mobile to deter 
possible Soviet aggression in critical 
areas such as the Middle East. We have 
increased our naval presence in the In- 



production levels. The continuing 
willingness of surplus-revenue producers 
to commit substantial amounts of their 
oil income to foreign aid will also be an 
important factor, and the ability of the 
industrial nations to draw them more 
closely into the development assistance 
community will influence this. Perhaps 
more critical will be the perception of 
the surplus producers of the benefits or 
lack thereof of investment of their 
surplus earnings in the industrial world. 
This involves not only questions of 
freedom and security of investment but 
also the issues of inflation, stability of 
financial markets, and particularly the 
strength of the dollar. 

In the perception of Saudi Arabia, 
Kuwait, and the U.A.E., a stable market 



for Middle East oil in the industrial 
world is preferable to ever-increasing 
demand. They fear that future gaps be- 
tween supply and demand can lead to 
dangerous international tensions. The 
heart of this way of looking at things is 
that consumers' excessive dependence on 
Persian Gulf oil endangers both sides. In 
this situation the producer's responsibili- 
ty is to make possible a reasonably 
smooth transition to less dependence; 
the consumer's is to achieve that transi- 
tion as quickly as possible. 



'The complete transcript of the hear- 
ings will be published by the committee and 
will be available from the Superintendent 
of Documents, U.S. Government Printing 
Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



^.tober 1980 



45 



Europe 



(lian Ocean and are rapidly proceeding 
with plans to expand our facilities in 
Diego Garcia. 

We have concluderl agreements 
with friendly governments in the area 
which will increase their capacity to re- 
sist Soviet pressure. Some of these 
agreements will provide us access to 
facilities that will significantly improve 
our ability to respond quickly and effec- 
tively to provocative actions. 

Our response has not occurreii in a 
vacuum. On the diplomatic front we 
have worked closely with our allies and 
with other nations concerned by the in- 
vasion. No action by a major power has 
been more quickly or universally con- 
demned, as votes in the United Na- 
tions, the European Community, the 
Islamic conference, and numerous other 
international bodies testify. Any hopes 
Moscow may have had that the interna- 
tional community would shrug off the 
invasion have been shattered. 

We boycotted the Moscow Olym- 
pics and helped to persuade 59 other 



countries to take similar action. Coun- 
tries joining in the boycott included 
major sports powers such as West 
Germany, Japan, Canada, and the 
People's Republic of China. Many par- 
ticii)ating teams were diluted by indi- 
vidual and federation decisions not to 
attenfl. The sweep of medals by the 
Warsaw Pact countries illustrates the 
extent to which outstanding Olympic 
teams from all continents supported the 
boycott. 

Economically we took a number of 
measures in areas intended to result in 
substantial costs and disruptions for the 
II.S.S.R. These included restrictions on 
exports of grain and other agricultural 
commodities, phosphates, goods for the 
Olympics, and high technology items. It 
is, of course, obvious that any interfer- 
ence with trade would involve costs for 
the exporting country as well as for the 
imiKirting country. But under the cir- 
cumstances it was inappropriate to 
maintain business as usual. 

Some of our actions were clearly 



Secretary Meets With 
German Foreign iVIinister 



JOINT PRESS STATEMENT, 
AUG. 26, 1980 

Secretary of State Muskie and Foreign 
Minister Genscher of the Federal Re- 
public of Germany met on August 26 to 
continue consultations on matters of 
importance to their two countries. They 
agreed that these consultations are par- 
ticularly useful and necessary at the 
present time. 

Developments in Poland occupied 
an important part of their talks. They 
agreed that the issues there are for the 
Polish people and the Polish Govern- 
ment to settle and that all outside par- 
ties should exercise the greatest re- 
straint. Minister Genscher informed the 
American Government about the con- 
siderations which have led the Federal 
Government to adjourn the meeting be- 
tween the German Federal Chancellor 
and the President of the State Council 
of the G.D.R. [German Democratic Re- 
public], although the will to develop 
relations with the G.D.R. continues. 

Secretary of State Muskie and 
Minister Genscher reiterated their con- 
demnation of the Soviet aggression in 
Afghanistan and called once again for 
withdrawal of Soviet troops. With re- 
spect to this objective, they consider it 



46 



necessary to continue to pursue coordi- 
nated policies of their countries within 
the framework of the Atlantic alliance. 

They exchanged views on the cur- 
rent state of disarmament negotiations. 
They underscored the importance of the 
alliance decision of December 1979 on 
theater nuclear forces (TNF) and dis- 
cussed the preparations for preliminary 
exchanges between the United States 
and the Soviet Union on TNF which, in 
their view, are expected to occur at an 
early date. 

They discussed the prospects for 
the Madrid Review Conference of 
CSCE [Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe] and agreed on 
the importance of thorough prepara- 
tions and constructive work to insure a 
balanced outcome which contributes to 
East-West cooperation. 

The present status of the North- 
South dialogue and the situation at the 
11th U.N. special General Assembly 
were also discussed. 

In conclusion the Secretary of 
State and the Minister agreed that they 
should take every possible opportunity 
to continue these consultations which 
both countries believe are of great 
value to them and to the purposes of 
the NATO alliance. ■ 



punitive in character and intention — 
designed to get the Soviets to take 
notice of the strong negative reaction o1 
the United States and other countries. 
Other actions were a longer term re- 
sponse to a new situation. The Soviet 
invasion makes it most important that 
the Unitefl States and its allies bolster 
the countries of Southwest Asia, espe- 
cially Turkey and Pakistan, and in- 
crease the capability of our military 
forces in the region. We must also reas- 
sess the strategic significance of our 
exports to the U.S.S.R. In this context 
we have proposed tightening the appli- 
cation of COCOM [Coordinating Com- 
mittee for East-West Trade Policy] 
procedures and suggested that COCOMI 
consult on all major process know-how 
sales of potential military significance. 

We believe that our actions have 
demonstrated to the Soviets that they 
cannot engage in aggressive actions 
with im])unity. The United States has 
shown that it is willing to assume a 
leadership role among our allies and 
make sacrifices when we are provoked. 
This demonstration of our readiness to 
react will help deter future Soviet ag- 
gression. 

In formulating our response we 
chose specific measures such as the re- 
strictions on the export of grain and 
high technology which would impose 
tangible costs upon the Soviets. We 
have deliberately avoided sweeping 
measures such as a total trade em- 
bargo. We do not seek a return to the 
cold war. We wish to leave the door 
open for rebuilding our economic rela- 
tions if the Soviet Union withdraws 
from Afghanistan. fi 



Grain 

The partial grain embargo an- 
nounced by President Carter on 
January 4 stopped 17 million tons in 
U.S. grain shipments to the Soviet 
Union. This action limited exports 
during the fourth year of the U.S.- 
U.S.S.R. grains agreement (October 
1979-September 1980) to the 8 million 
tons to which we were committed by 
that agreement. To compensate for a 
disastrous harvest, the Soviets had ex- 
pected to import about 36 million tons, 
including 25 million tons from the 
Unitefl States. The President also pro- 
hibited sales of soybeans and of other 
agricultural commodities which would 
contribute to the Soviet livestock sec-^ 
tor. 

We estimate that, because of our 
action, grain imports by the Soviets 



Department of State Bulletin'u 



Europe 



ill be about 8-9 million metric tons 
ss than they had planned for the year 
iding September 30. This means that 
\l October the Soviets will have made 
only about half of the 17 million met- 
c tons we stopped from the United 
tates. Our actions have forced the 
jviets to rely on an unpredictable va- 
ety of feed grains and substitutes ar- 
ving on an irregular schedule. As a 
■suit of our restrictions, and their poor 
irvest, we expect Soviet meat produc- 
)n in 1980 to drop by 200,000-300,000 
ns or 1 Vf-2':f below the 1979 level. By 
nuary 1981 livestock inventories may 
down 2'7f-3'7f . Even though the 
viets will have an improved grain 
op this year — we now estimate an 
ierage harvest of between 200-225 
I llion tons — the continuation of the 
tibargo will curtail Soviet ability to 
I build depleted grain stocks and will 
like its impact felt on the livestock 
^ tiir for several years to come. The 
, ^liability of meat is a very sensitive 
1 ernal issue in the U.S.S.R. and is 
( isidered by Soviet consumers to be 
f. ' of the most important measuring 
s c'ks in gauging improvements in their 
E ndard of living. Despite Soviet Gov- 
6 iment promises of a steady increase, 
p- capita consumption has not risen 
cing the past 5 years. Our partial 
( ains embargo has made it still more 
( ficult for the Soviet leadership to 
1 fill promises of significant increases 
i meat availability to Soviet consum- 
( ;. Reports have been growing of se- 
\ re meat and dairy product shortages. 
I'ws reports attributed work stop- 
I jes in May at auto and truck plants in 
t ' Soviet Union to food shortages. 
In addition to its effects on the 
Si'iet economy, the partial grains em- 
b-go has proved to be a successful 
e imple of allied cooperation in re- 
S)nse to the invasion of Afghanistan. 
Cnada, Australia, and the European 
Immunity all imposed restraints on 
ti'ir sales to the U.S.S.R., despite 
•ious opposition by some segments of 
■ir populations. Australia and the 
ropean Community recently agreed 
hold 1980-81 grain sales to' the 
IS.S.R. to the 1979-80 level, while 
aada will limit sales to "normal and 
ditional" levels. Argentina's exports 
Ireased to 5.1 million metric tons in 
'9-80, as compared to 1.3 million 
s in 1978-79. Argentina has agreed 
jiupply the Soviets with 4.5 million 
Itric tons of coarse grains and soy- 
|ins under the terms of a recently 
eluded 5-year agreement. But 
^entine sales have not been large 



enough to offset restraints imposed by 
the United States and other exporters. 

Phosphates 

In February we blocked exports to 
the U.S.S.R. of U.S. origin phosphates, 
whether in the form of rock, acid, or 
fertilizer. The phosphate embargo 
stopped annual U.S. shipments to the 
U.S.S.R. of about 1 million tons of 
superphosphoric acid as part of a major 
20-year trade agreement. Inability to 
obtain this phosphoric acid will delay 
and disrupt Soviet plans to produce a 
complex liquid fertilizer, since there is 
no alternative supply for this quantity 
of superphosphoric acid. Utilization of 
lower grades of phosphoric acid or con- 
ventional phosphatic fertilizers, either 
from Soviet or foreign sources, could 
reduce the impact of our embargo. It is 
too early to see what effect this restric- 
tion will have on future Soviet grain 
output. 

High Technology 

In January, in the area of high 
technology, we suspended issuance of 
new licenses and shipments to the 
Soviet Union under old licenses, pend- 
ing the development of a new licensing 
policy. The most important element of 
the new policy, which was announced 
on March 19, is generally to approve no 
exceptions from agreed COCOM con- 
trols on exports to the U.S.S.R. The 
result of our virtually no-exceptions 
policy is to cut off U.S. high technology 
exports to the U.S.S.R. which, for 
1979, were valued at $50 million, in 
large part related to computers. We 
also increased controls on computers, 
polycrystalline silicon, lasers, and fiber 
optics and stopped shipments of spare 
parts for a computer and of a diesel en- 
gine assembly line for the Kama River 
truck plant. 

We tabled proposals in COCOM in 
March to multilateralize tighter con- 
trols on high technology. COCOM re- 
view of these proposals has not yet 
been completed. 

The actions we have taken in the 
area of high-technology transfer have 
had their impact on the Soviets. They 
will disrupt Soviet programs. They 
have also introduced serious uncertain- 
ties into the Soviet planning process at 
a time when the next 5-year plan is in 
the final stages of elaboration. 



Fish 

An additional economic measure we 
have taken has been to withhold from 
the Soviets the allocation of approxi- 
mately 300 million tons of fish in the 
U.S. fishery zone during 1980. This 
amounts to roughly h'i of the Soviet 
annual catch, which will be difficult to 
replace because of worldwide scarcities. 

Essential Elements 

Where do we go from here'? We be- 
lieve it is essential that we and our al- 
lies maintain pressure on the Soviets to 
let them know they cannot selectively 
carry out a policy of reduced tensions in 
one sphere, beneficial to them, while 
they commit naked acts of aggression in 
another. We will continue to insist upon 
a satisfactory political resolution of the 
crisis which the Soviets have created 
through their intervention in Afghani- 
stan. As Secretary Muskie noted last 
month, we believe that a political set- 
tlement must contain four essential 
elements: 

• A prompt and complete with- 
drawal of all Soviet forces; 

• Nonintervention in Afghan af- 
fairs by any outside state; 

• A government acceptable to the 
Afghan people; and 

• An independent and nonaligned 
Afghanistan. 

Until the Soviets make it clear that 
they are prepared to move in this direc- 
tion we cannot relax our efforts. 



'The complete tran-script of the hear- 
ings will be published by the committee and 
will be available from the Superintendent 
of Documents, U.S. Government Printing 
Office. Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



ober 1980 



47 



Europe 



Trident I Missile 
Sale to the U.K. 



Following are an exchange of let- 
ters between British Prime Minister 
Margaret Thatcher a)id President Car- 
ter and a White House statement. '■ 



EXCHANGE OF LETTERS^ 

10 July 1980 

Dear Mr. President, 

As you are aware the United Kingdom 
Government attaches great importance to 
the maintenance of a nuclear deterrent ca- 
pability. It will be necessary to replace the 
present Polaris force in the early 1990s, 
and having reviewed the options, the Gov- 
ernment has concluded that the Trident I 
weapon system best meets the need to 
maintain a viable nuclear deterrent capa- 
bility into the 21st century. I write there- 
foreto ask you whether the United States 
Government would be prepared, in con- 
tinuation of the cooperation which has 
existed between our Governments in this 
field since the Polaris_Sales Agreement of 
6 April 1963, to supply on a continuing 
basis. Trident I missiles, equipment and 
supporting services, in a manner generally 
similar to that in which Polaris was 
supplied. 

The United Kingdom Government 
would wish to purchase sufficient missiles, 
complete with multiple independently 
targettable re-entry vehicles and less only 
the warheads themselves, together with 
equipment and supporting services, on a 
continuing basis to introduce and maintain 
a force of 4 British submarines (or .5 if the 
United Kingdom Government so prefer), 
close coordination being maintained be- 
tween the Executive Agencies of the two 
Governments in order to assure compati- 
bility of equipment. 

The successor to the Polaris force will 
be assigned to the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation, like the Polaris force; and 
except where the United Kingdom Gov- 
ernment may decide that supreme national 
interests are at stake, the successor force 
will be used for the purposes of interna- 
tional defence of the Western alliance in all 
circumstances. It is my understanding that 
cooperation in the modernisation of the 
United Kingdom nuclear deterrent in this 
way would be consistent with the present 
and prospective international obligations of 
both parties. 

In particular, I would like to assure 
you that the United Kingdom Government 
continues to give whole-hearted support to 
the NATO Long-Term Defence Programme 



and to other strengthening of conventional 
forces. The United Kingdom Government 
has substantially increased its defence 
spending, in accordance with NATO's col- 
lective policy, and plans to make further 
such increases in the future in order to im- 
prove the effectiveness of its all-round con- 
tribution to Allied deterrence and defence. 
In this regard the objective of the United 
Kingdom Government is to take advantage 
of the economies made possible by the 
cooperation of the United States in making 
the Trident I missile system available in 
order to reinforce its efforts to upgrade its 
conventional forces. 

If the United States Government is 
prepared to meet this request, I hope that 
as the next step the United States Gov- 
ernment will be prepared to receive techni- 
cal and financial missions to pursue these 
matters, using the framework of the 
Polaris Sales Agreement where 
appropriate. 

Yours sincerely 

" Margaret Thatcher 



July 14, 1980 

Dear Madame Prime Minister: 

In reply to your letter of July 10, 1980, 
I am pleased to confirm that the United 
States attaches significant importance to 
the nuclear deterrent capability of the 
United Kingdom and to close cooperation 
betw-een our two Governments in main- 
taining and modernizing that capability. To 
further that objective, the United States is 
prepared to supply the United Kingdom 
TRIDENT I missiles, equipment and sup- 
porting services, as you propose in your 
letter, subject to and in accordance with 
applicable United States laws and proce- 
dures. 

I view as important your statements 
that the POLARIS successor force will be 
assigned to NATO and that your objective 
is to take advantage of the economies made 
possible by our nuclear cooperation to 
reinforce your efforts to upgrade the 
United Kingdom's conventional forces. As 
you know, I regard the strengthening of 
NATO's conventional and nuclear forces as 
of highest priority for Western security. 

I agree that as the next step in imple- 
menting these agreed arrangements, our 
two Governments should initiate the tech- 
nical and financial negotiations which you 
propose. 

Sincerely, 

Jimmy Carter 



WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, 
JULY 15, 1980 

Today in London, the British Govern' 
ment is informing the House of Com- 
mons of its decision to modernize the 
British strategic nuclear deterrent 
force. In this connection, the British 
Government has requested that the 
United States sell the United Kingdon 
U.S. Trident I missiles. The Trident I 
missiles would be carried in new sub- 
marines built in Britain and would re- 
place the existing British Polaris sea- 
based strategic missile force in the 
early 1990s. This request was formally 
conveyed in a letter from Prime Minis-' 
ter Thatcher to the President on 
July 10, 1980. In a letter sent to the 
Prime Minister yesterday, the Presi- 
dent agreed that the United States wi 
sell Trident I missiles to the United 
Kingdom. 

Since the Second World War, the 
United States has cooperated inti- 
mately with the United Kingdom on nui 
clear matters. In President Roosevelt' 
Administration, American and British j 
scientists began working together on 
the development of nuclear weapons. Ii. 
1962 at Nassau, President Kennedy 
agreed to assist the British in the de- 
velopment of their strategic nuclear 
forces by selling Polaris missiles to iht) 
United Kingdom. 

Today's announcement of Anglo 
American cooperation on a modernized' 
British Trident missile force signals a 
continuation of this longstanding coop- 
eration, which is a central element in 
the close cooperation between the 
United States and the United Kingdomi 
This cooperation is, of course, not lim- 
ited to the nuclear field and includes a 
strong U.K. conventional commitment 
to NATO, which Britain also intends tq 
strengthen. 

The Administration believes the 
independent British strategic nuclear 
force which is assigned to NATO makes 
an important contribution to the ability 
of the North Atlantic alliance to deter 
Soviet aggression. For this reason, the 
President decided to assist the United 
Kingdom in the maintenance of a mod- 
ernized, independent British deterrent 
force into the 21st century. 

This joint step by the United 
States and United Kingdom is part of 



I 



48 



Department of State BulletilJ 



Europe 



he broader pattern of efforts by this 
dministration and our allies in Europe 
strengthen NATO defense capabili- 
es — S9( real growth in defense budg- 
ts, the NATO Long-Term Defense 
rogram, and the NATO decision to 
lodernize theater nuclear forces. It is 
sign of our determination to 
trengthen close cooperation with our 
, Hies on sensitive security matters. 



'Texts from Weekly Compilation of 
residential Documents of July 21, 1980. 

^Texts of the letters were released by 
e White House on July 15. ■ 



t 



!Oth Report 
•n Cyprus 



iESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS, 
.'LY 22, 19S01 

1 accordance with the provisions of Public 
1 w 95-384, I am submitting the following 
1 )ort on progress made during the past 60 
< vs toward conclusion of a negotiated so- 
1 ion of the Cyprus problem. 

The intercommunal talks remain re- 
c :sed despite persistent efforts by UN 
S:retary General Waldheim and his staff 
t bring the two parties back to the confer- 
i 'e table. Ambassador Hugo Cobbi, the 
r X Special Representative of the Secre- 
t y General, arrived in Cyprus in May and 
I nediately began working with the two 
8 es in an effort to overcome the remain- 
L difficulties. As the UN efforts inten- 
S ed, the Secretary General also dis- 
f ched Under Secretary General Perez de 
Cellar to Cyprus. Mr. Perez de Cuellar 
P'Sented the two parties with a com- 
p^mise formula under which they might 
r ume the intercommunal talks. Early on 
J le 7, the Greek Cypriots informed the 
Ider Secretary General that they would 
ept the proposal. Later that day, the 
"kish Cypriots told Mr. Perez de Cuellar 
t they had given the UN formula serious 
sideration but felt unable to accept it. 
It is encouraging to note, however, 
t the Perez de Cuellar mission suc- 
ided in narrowing somewhat the gap be- 
en the positions of the two parties, and 
bassador Cobbi is continuing to consult 
h the two sides in an attempt to reach a 
iipromise. The Secretary General's 
e 13 statement to the Security Council 
Mr. Perez de Cuellar's mission is 
iched. 



1- 



I am pleased to report that the United 
Nations Security Council voted on June 13 
to extend the mandate of the UN Peace- 
keeping Forces in Cyprus (UNFICYP) for 
another six months. The calm that prevails 
on the island today is due to the profes- 
sionalism and dedication of the men of UN- 
FICYP. Without the .stability provided by 
the peacekeeping troops, there would be 
little hope for eventually achieving a 
negotiated Cyprus settlement. (The Secre- 
tary General's report to the Security Coun- 
cil on UNFICYP is also attached.) ' 

Secretary of State Muskie recently re- 
turned from Ankara where he discussed the 
Cyprus problem with Turkish Prime Minis- 
ter Demirel. In a productive exchange of 
views. Secretary Muskie stressed the con- 
tinuing interest of the United States in 
seeing the Cyprus dispute resolved. During 
his meeting with the 'Turkish Prime Minis- 
ter as well as in his discussions with Greek 
Foreign Minister Mitsotakis, the Secretary 
of State reaffirmed our faith in Secretary 
General Waldheim's efforts as the best 
hope for achieving an early resumption of 
the intercommunal talks. 

Other members of the Executive 
Branch have also been active in support of 
the Secretary General's efforts. On 
June 23, for example, while in Athens, 
Under Secretary of State Nimetz took the 
opportunity offered by the presence of Cy- 
prus Foreign Minister Rolandis to arrange 
an informal but useful meeting on the Cy- 
prus problem. 

The United States Government will 
continue to use every opportunity to em- 
phasize to all concerned parties that coop- 
eration with the efforts of UN Secretary 
General Waldheim offers the best chance 
for a resumption of the intercommunal 
talks. The Secretary General has pledged 
to persevere in his mission, and the two 
parties on Cyprus have renewed their 
commitment to reach a negotiated settle- 
ment. The roots of the Cyprus problem are 
deep, and a solution will not easily be 
found. I am convinced, however, that if the 
two communities on Cyprus are seriously 
committed to resolve their differences, a 
settlement will eventually be achieved. I 
urge both sides to return to the negotiating 
table and begin the process of searching for 
a just and lasting solution that will meet 
the needs of all people of Cyprus. 

Sincerely, 

Jimmy Carter 



'Identical letters addressed to Thomas 
P. O'Neill, Jr., Speaker of the House of 
Representatives, and Frank Church, 
Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee (text from Weekly Compilation 
of Presidential Documents of July 28, 
1980). ■ 



Poland 



SECRETARY'S STATEMENT, 
AUG. 22, 19801 

We are concerned about the situation in 
Poland. It is a key European country 
with which we have had good relations 
for a number of years. It is also a coun- 
try to which 12 million Americans are 
linked by family ties. We have stressed 
repeatedly our view that internal 
problems in Poland are for the Polish 
people and the Polish authorities to 
resolve. 

We are watching developments 
closely. We are concerned to hear of the 
arrest of a number of Polish dissidents, 
and we hope they will be released soon. 
We continue to hope that a solution will 
be found to the current problems in 
Poland which meets the wishes and 
interests of the Polish people. 



' Read to news correspondents, on the 
Secretary's behalf, by acting Department 
spokesman David Passage. ■ 



ober 1980 



49 



GENERAL 



Granting Political Asylum Abroad 



hy William T. Lake 

Stafeiiieiit before the Snbcdiirniittec 
tni Africa of the House Foreign Affairy 
Cunnintfeeon April 29, 1980. Mr. Lake 
is Deputy Legal Adriser.^ 

I am pleased to appear on behalf of the 
Department of State this morning to 
discuss the U.S. policy with respect to 
granting asylum in U.S. diplomatic 
premi.ses abroad. I will summarize that 
policy briefly and then explain the con- 
siderations, both legal and practical, 
that underlie it. Deputy Assistant Sec- 
retary for African Affairs, William C. 
Harrop will then describe the events 
following the recent coup in Liberia 
that led up to the executions of a 
number of former Liberian Government 
officials IJuly 1980 Bulletin, p. 18|. 

U.S. policy in this area is set forth 
in regulations in the Department of 
State's Foreign Affairs Manual and was 
published in full in the Federal Regis- 
ter in 1972. We have provided those 
documents to the committee. 

Chief Elements of the Policy 

First, the United States does not grant 
asylum at its embassies or at other in- 
stallations within the territorial juris- 
diction of a foreign state. Likewise, 
diplomatic and consular affairs officers 
are not authorized to extend asylum to 
persons who are not members of the of- 
ficers' official or personal households. 
Any request for asylum that is received 
in the field must be reported im- 
mediately to Washington, but the policy 
is not to grant such requests. 

At the same time, U.S. embassies 
are authorized to grant temporary ref- 
uge for humanitarian reasons in ex- 
treme or exceptional circumstances 
when the life or safety of a person is 
put in immediate danger, such as pur- 
suit by a mob. 

Any decision to grant temporary 
refuge must be made by the senior U.S. 
official present at the embassy, who 
must take into consideration the possi- 
bility that that decision may pose a 
danger to the safety of U.S. personnel. 
When the period of active danger to the 
individual has ended, temporary refuge 
is to be terminated after the embassy 
obtains authorization from the 
Department. 

It is important to add that if a vio- 
lent coup or similar event disrupts the 
normal processes of the host govern- 



50 



ment and creates a danger that it may 
deal unfairly and summarily with some 
of its citizens, we do bring to bear all 
possible diplomatic and consular re- 
sources to try to assure that those indi- 
viduals receive due process. The chief 
weapon on which an embassy must rely 
in such a situation is the power of 
persuasion. 

The policy I have just outlined was 
reexamined and reaffirmed in 1977 fol- 
lowing a study jH'epared for the Na- 
tional Security Council on the Latin 
American practice of granting diplo- 
matic asylum. A year later, in 1978, the 
policy was again carefully reviewed, 
following incidents with a group of dis- 
sidents at our embassy in Bucharest 
and with the Pentecostalists in Moscow. 
It was concluded that the present policy 
is the proper one. 

The United States has adhered to 
its policy of not granting asylum 
throughout the many violent coups and 
changes of government of the past dec- 
ade. To the best of my knowledge, the 
case of Cardinal Mindszenty,^ dating 
from 1956 to 1971, and the continuing 
accommodation of the Pentecostalists in 
Moscow, a situation in no way involving 
a change of government, are the only 
arguably contrary examples in recent 
history. I cannot provide you with 
statistics on past instances in which 
diplomatic asylum was actually re- 
quested and refused. This is next to im- 
possible because of limitations on the 
storage of records at the State Depart- 
ment plus the difficulty in actual prac- 
tice of distinguishing between an alien's 
inquii'y into the possibility of territorial 
asylum, that is, asylum within the 
United States, and an inquiry about po- 
tential diplomatic asylum in the em- 
bassy. The chief of our asylum unit es- 
timates, however, that each year our 
posts abroad receive up to 15t) requests 
for asylum, either territorial or 
diplomatic. 

U.S. policy in this area comports 
with the practice of most other states. 
Other states generally do not follow a 
practice, or assert a right, to use their 
diplomatic premises in this country or 
elsewhere as places of asylum. The 
most notable exception is the somewhat 
erratic practice of Latin American 
countries in allowing their embassies in 
other Latin American countries to pro- 
vide asylum to political refugees. Even 
in Latin America the practice of grant- 
ing diplomatic asylum has not been con- 
sistent over the vears or from country 



to country, and the practice has not 
gained acceptance outside Latin 
America. 

Reasons for Declining Asylum 

The reasons for the U.S. practice of dt, 
dining to grant diplomatic asylum ar& 
both legal and practical. ] 

• On the legal side, our embassie.'i 
abroad exist to perform diplomatic t 
functions, and they receive special prd 
tections from international law to allo| 
them to perform those functions. The I 
granting of asylum is not recognized a I 
a diplomatic function under customarj i 
international law or the Vienna Con- 
vention on Diplomatic Relations, to I 
which both the L'nited States and i 
Liberia are parties. ' 

To use our embassies as havens f( ! 
asylum of nationals of the host countr ' 
might invite charges that we are vio- ' 
lating article 41 of the Vienna conven- 
tion, which prohibits diplomatic per- 
sonnel from interfering in the internal 
affairs of the host country and from 
using embassy premises in any way 
that's incompatible with the functions IP 
of the embassy. i 

• There are also compelling pract 
cal considerations. First, if we were t 
grant diplomatic asylum and the host 
country refused to permit safe condud 
of the persons out of the country, the 
embassy would be faced with the di- 
lemma of either accommodating the 
persons within the embassy for an in- 
definite period of time or else turning 
them over to the authorities. 

The publicized example of Cardin! 
Mindszenty illustrates the dangers in i 
this area. 

Second, the residence within an 
embassy of persons hostile to the gov- 
ernment of the host country would coi 
stitute a continual source of friction an' 
controversy and would be extremely 
detrimental to our normal diplomatic 
relations. In fact, the possibility that 
mobs — either with or without govern- 
ment approval — would, however un- 
lawfully, storm the embassy to capturi 
such persons cannot be discounted, par 
ticularly, in light of recent events in 
Tehran, Tripoli, and Islamabad. 

Third, since diplomatic asylum 
could never be granted in more than a 
few cases, the United States would be 
placed in the difficult position not onl.v 
of having to deny most requests for 
asylum but also of having to justify 
granting asylum in some cases and de- 
nying it in others. 



Department of State Bulleti'S 






HUMAN RIGHTS 



There is reason to believe that if 
t:' United States began a policy of 
innting diplomatic asylum, our embas- 
s abroad could quickly become the 
Ill-red sanctuaries. In any country, 
■ I'.S. embassy generally has a spe- 
1 prominence which would attract 
sdiis seeking refuge. The claims of 
alum would force us to distinguish 
aong an almost limitless variety of 
fitual situations — persons seeking 
alum primarily as a means of acquir- 
ir r.S. visas, persons seeking to avoid 
olinary criminal charges, anrl persons 
Ml h various types of real political 
gevances. 

We would need procedures and 
: lilies for dealing with ))ossibly large 
iilii'rs of cases, particularly in the 
111 (if major, violent change in a gov- 
iiitnt. The need to decide who is en- 
'I to diplomatic asylum would 
1-1 the United States directly into 
1 iral judgments concerning events 
I he country involved. 
Thus, a policy of allowing diplo- 
ic asylum would expose us to 
■ees of interference in internal af- 
n < and would complicate greatly our 
t rging relations with new 
i nies — whether left, right, or cen- 
rt. 

A final and important consideration 
• iw the United States would respond 
1 .-situation were reversed — that is, 
i foreign embassy in this country 
;o icht to give diplomatic asylum to 
Mions sought by U.S. authorities. We 
n ht, for example, be faced with a 
iiion in which a foreign embassy 
. -fil diplomatic asylum to political 
^ 'ii-ists. We do not believe that the 

. (Government — or the American 
•u ic — would tolerate such action by a 
■ iuii government. 

( elusion 

y, I would like to stress again the 
•tant function that a U.S. embassy 
lay in a country, such as Liberia, 
going through violent change. 
le that our embassies are 
I led to play is to provide a calming 
it-adying influence on a new gov- 
int, to remind it as often and as 
fully as necessary that it has obli- 
iis to its citizens and to the inter- 
nal community and that the world 
tching to see that it respects those 
It ions. That diplomatic role can be 
inely important at such critical 
, and we should be loath to take 
i<'|)s that, although intended to 
it human rights, might actually 
ish the role our diplomats can play 
itecting those rights. 



Review of Human Rights 
in Latin America 






by Patricia M. Derian 

Address prepared for presei/fatloii 
tu the Center for I liter-America)! Rela- 
tions ill New Yorf: on April Zk, I98(i. 
Ms. Derian is Assistant Secrefartj for 
Hiniian Rights anil Hn iiianitarian 
Affairs. 

I am glad that you have chosen to dis- 
cuss human rights in the Latin Ameri- 
can context. It is both relevant and im- 
portant. A popular theme we often hear 
in these first few months of 1980 is how 
some objective, product, or issue re- 
lates to the decade of the 1980s. This 
theme is particularly appi-opriate to de- 
scribe concern for human rights, which 
I can firmly state has come of age and 
will continue to be a priority issue as 
we mov£ through this period, not only 
in our country but worldwide. 

Concern for the individual's right 
to enjoy civil, political, and economic 
freedoms are fundamental principles 
which we hold in common with many 
governments in this hemisphere. More 
importantly, they are principles with 
which the peoples of the Americas 
identify. 

President Carter reaffirmed this 
government's deep commitment to 



In recent years, we have, on a 
number of occasions, explained to 
Members of the Congress our policy 
against diplomatic asylum. In just the 
last 2 years, letters on the subject were 
sent to Senator (Edward] Kennedy, to 
Congressman [J. Kennedy] Robinson, 
to Congressman [Andrew] Maguire, 
and to Congressman [Dante] Fascell. 
And we, of course, welcome this occa- 
sion to discuss the policy with the 
memb&rs of this committee. We con- 
tinue to believe that our policy is the 
proper one, that it conforms with our 
obligations under international law, and 
that it serves the long-term interests of 
the United States. 



'The complete transcript of the hear- 
ings will be published by the committee and 
will be available from the Superintendent 
of Documents, U.S. Government Printing 
Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. 

^Jozsef Mindszenty, Hungarian prelate 
and Cardinal of the Roman Catholic Church 
who spent 15 years living in the U.S. Em- 
bassy in Budapest. ■ 



human rights and to meeting human 
needs in his State of the Union address 
on January 23 when he stated that it 
"... is in our own national interest as 
well as part of our own national charac- 
ter." Secretary Vance, in a statement 
to the Senate Committee on Foreign 
Relations on March 27, noted that ". . . 
we pursue our human rights objectives 
not only because they are right but be- 
cause we have a stake in the stability 
that comes when people can express 
their hopes and find their futures 
freely. Our ideals and our interests 
coincide." 

Is it compatible with national secu- 
rity interests? Of course. It has always 
been understood that human rights 
policy operates in tandem with our pur- 
suit of other interests. Secretary Vance 
addressed this point in the same state- 
ment mentioned earlier. He said that: 

We must constantly weigh how best to en- 
courage the advancement of human rights 
while maintaining our ability to conduct es- 
sential business with governments — even 
unpopular ones — in countries where we 
have important security interests. 

But the fact remains that over the 
longer term, our pursuit of human rights is 
not only generally compatible with our na- 
tional security, it contributes to that 
security. 

There is much evidence to support 
the emergence of human rights as a 
major priority in our hemisphere. We 
have seen substantial progress regard- 
ing both personal and political rights, 
significant actions by both governments 
and international bodies, and more pre- 
cise attention given to serious problems 
which still need alleviating. 

In 1979 Ecuador and Bolivia in- 
stalled civilian governments; Bolivia 
averted renewed efforts to install a 
military government. Peru adopted a 
new Constitution. Brazil maintained a 
steady course of liberalization. There 
was a decline in violations of the integ- 
rity of the person in countries where 
abuses have been most serious. Fewer 
disappearances occurred in Argentina. 
Cases of prolonged arbitrary detention 
were down in Chile. The Uruguayan 
Armed Forces adopted apparently ef- 
fective internal measures to stop the 
use of torture. Cuba released about 
3,900 political prisoners. But, as we 
have recently seen in the sad situation 
of thousands of Cubans seeking asylum 



rr 1980 



51 



Human Rights 



in the Peruvian Embassy in Havana, 
people are still voting with their feet to 
flee from the Cuban model of life. Hon- 
duras has just held its first national 
election in almost a decade. 

The American Convention on 
Human Rights, which entered into 
force in 1978, established an Inter- 
American Court on Human Rights. The 
Court has begun to meet at its perma- 
nent site in San Jose, Costa Rica. The 
American convention strengthened the 
role of the Inter-American Human 
Rights Commission (lAHRC), and the 
General Assembly of the Organization 
of American States (OAS) in its Oc- 
tober 1979 meeting approved new stat- 
utes for both bodies. The lAHRC has 
undertaken five on-site investigations 
during the past 2 years, including a 
landmark visit to Argentina in 1979. 
The lAHRC has just released a report 
on human rights in Argentina, based, in 
part, on its on-site observations. The 
report confirms the findings of many 
human rights oi'ganizations that sys- 
tematic and massive violations of 
human rights have occurred during the 
past 5 years, notes that the scale of 
abuses has declined in recent months, 
and makes numerous constructive rec- 
ommendations to the Argentine Gov- 
ernment for needed improvements. 

The October 1979 OAS General As- 
sembly devoted much attention to 
human rights issues. It approved res- 
olutions urging reforms in Paraguay, 
Uruguay, and Chile and emphasized the 
need to deal with the problem of 
disappearances. 

The U.N. Human Rights Commis- 
sion (UNHRC), which met for fi weeks 
in Geneva in February and March, 
achieved very positive results, which 
we hope will have lasting beneficial im- 
pact. The United States strongly sup- 
ported efforts to insure that the United 
Nations acts evenhandedly in applying 
human rights criteria to all countries. 
Among the actions taken by the 
UNHRC were the following: 

• Condemned the U.S.S.R. inva- 
sion of Afghanistan; 

• Condemned the Vietnamese in- 
vasion of Kampuchea as well as human 
rights abuses within that country; 

• Extensively debated the sup- 
pression of dissidents in the Soviet 
Union and maintained the Andrei 
Sakharov case on the agenda as a 
priority item; 

• Took public action on South Af- 
rica, Equatorial Guinea, Malawi, 
Israeli-occupied territories, Chile, and 
Guatemala; and 



52 



• Discussed in detail specific 
abuses in 11 countries in Africa, Asia, 
and Latin America in closed sessions. 

Perhaps the most far-reaching 
achievement of the UNHRC was the 
establishment of a five-member work- 
ing group to investigate reports of dis- 
appearances. The group, composed of 
independent experts acting in their own 
capacity, will deal worldwide with the 
thousands of cases of missing persons. 
The group is empowered to seek and 
receive information from governments, 
intergovernmental organizations, hu- 
manitarian organizations, and other re- 
liable sources. This is the first time in 
its history that the UNHRC has 
adopted a procedure for possible im- 
mediate action on human rights cases. 
The need for this type of action is par- 
ticularly appropriate to the situation in 
Argentina, where thousands of persons 
have been abducted by security forces 
in recent years. 

There should be little doubt that 
concern for human rights has now be- 
come universal. Our representative to 
the U.N. Human Rights Commission, 
Jerry Shestack, wrote eloquently that 
"human rights is far from a passing fad; 
on the contrary it has an increasingly 
wide appeal." He reported that the sig- 
nificance of the recent overthrow of 
repressive rulers in Uganda, the former 
Central African Empire, Equatorial 
Guinea, Nicaragua, and, I might add. 
El Salvador was not lost on the nations 
rejiresented at the commission. 

The positive accomplishments are 
encouraging. Government officials and 
oppositionists alike in this hemisphere 
have acknowledged that the steady ap- 
plication of U.S. human rights policies 
has been an important stimulant in 
maintaining an improving trend. This is 
good news, but we cannot take credit; 
no improvement in human rights can be 
sustained unless it emanates from the 
will of the people and their govern- 
ments. Our objective is to encourage 
governments to take necessary action 
to fulfill their obligation to their own 
people, to their international commit- 
ments, for the sake of improving their 
relations with us and achieving respect 
in the international community. 

It is our hope that the gathering 
momentum of human rights awareness 
can be brought to bear on the many 
serious problems that remain. In this 
connection I will focus my remarks on 
Argentina, Chile, Guatemala, 
Nicaragua, Panama, Grenada, Haiti, 
Cuba, and El Salvador. 



Argentina 

A distinguished recent resident of 
Argentina has said: 

... it is up to the Argentine military 
government to prove that it does, as it 
claims, wish to return to a "stable pluralis 
tic democracy" by ending all violations of 
law and by accounting for those who have 
disappeared. The military has long argued 
that their aims are respectable and that thi 
methods employed were forced upon them 
by a ruthless enemy. ... It is time that thi 
so-called moderates in the Argentine Gov- 
ernment showed the resolution needed to 
account for the past and to ensure that thi 
atrocities committed by extremists on the li 
left and the right are not allowed to happei- j 
again. ... It is important to get the truth 
out into the open and demand that if the 
Argentine Government wishes to have a 
respectable place in the estimation of the 
democratic world, it must act swiftly and >^' 
promptlv to return to the rule of law. 

'fie 

The message that we are getting 

from groups in Argentina is an expreS' 
sion of hope that the U.S. Government 
and private sectors will not ease the 
human rights pressure on the Argen 
tine Government because of geopolitical! ,( 
contingencies. I can tell you today thai 
we have not. One of the objectives of 
recent visits by U.S. Ambassador at 
Large Gerard Smith and Gen. Andrew 
Goodpaster to Argentina was to ex- 
change views and achieve a better un- 
derstanding of our respective positions' 
regarding human rights. 

Some areas of our continuing con- 
cern are the following. 

Disappearances. As we noted in 
our report to Congress, the most care- 
fully recorded and documented list of 
unexplained disappearances in Argen- 
tina, comjiiled by the Permanent As- 
sembly for Human Rights in Buenos 
Aires, contains about 6,500 cases for 
the period 1976-79. Some estimates run 
considerably higher. Our records con- 
tain 44 cases of disappearances for 
1979, compared to over 500 in 1978 and 
many more in earlier years. We are 
aware of three cases thus far in 1980. 
The Argentine Government has taken 
no meaningful action to provide to 
families or other interested parties an 
accounting of the many thousands who 
have disappeared during the past 4 
years. 

Executive Detention Prisoners. 

There are approximately 1,300 persons 
being held in this category. Most have 
never been charged with any offense. I 
should note, however, that there has 





it 



Human Rights 



1 en a gradual reduction in the number 
executive prisoners. There has also 
t'li some improvement in prison 

( iiditions. 

Torture. There are credible allega- 
iis that torture of new detainees 
dring interrogation continues. We are 
a are of no measures taken by au- 
ii'ities to halt this practice. 

"Right of Option" Program. 

^. hough the Government of Argentina 
nctivated a constitutional provision 
n-mitting e.xecutive detainees to 

Mise self-e.xile, and the U.S. Gov- 
einient established a special parole 
Digram to accept qualified applicants, 
i Kist two-thirds of our requests for 
I M-xiews have been denied and the 
G.'ernment of Argentina has refused a 
laje number of option requests sub- 
rr ted by detainees to whom we have 
is led certificates of eligibility. 

With respect to bilateral relations, 
U i. military assistance and sales re- 
m n prohibited by law. At the multina- 
ti lal level, since Januarv 1977 and 
ijugh January 31, 1980, the U.S. 
S ernment has opposed 18 and sup- 
)< ted 2 out of a total of 20 loan appli- 
es ons submitted by Argentina to the 
Ir >rnational Development Bank. At 
:h same time, since September 1978, 
fi' have been approving financing of 
U . exports to Argentina through the 
E lort-Import Bank in large amounts. 

'lie 



ous problems remain although 
■e have been some improvements in 
human rights situation in Chile 
ng the past 2 years. Our bilateral 
tions continue to be affected by that 
?rnment's disposition of the Orlando 
?lier and Ronni Moffitt assassina- 

case. The Chilean Government has 
'd to fully investigate or prosecute 
■e former security officers indicted 
le United States for complicity in 
1976 assassinations. 

In October 1979, the Chilean Su- 
ne Court denied a U.S. Government 
■adition request for the three offi- 
. A domestic investigation of the 
e case in Chile has dragged on for 
•ly 2 years without a full and dili- 
; effort. Following the October 1979 
sion of the Chilean Supreme Court, 
sident Carter took a number of ac- 
s: 



• Reduced the size of our mission 
in Santiago; 

• Terminated the foreign military 
sales (FMS) pipeline of military equip- 
ment; 

• Removed the U.S. military 
group; 

• Suspended all Eximbank financ- 
ing in Chile; and 

• Terminated new Overseas Pri- 
vate Investment Corporation (OPIC) 
business. 

Despite the Letelier case, there are 
some encouraging signs in Chile. There 
have been no disappearances since 
1977. There is relative freedom to 
speak out and to criticize the govern- 
ment. Although institutionalized or 
legal guarantees against violations of 
the integrity of the person are weak, 
there are some indications that the 
courts and the press are taking more 
interest in defending human rights. 

We continue to have concern in 
some areas. 

• The lAHRC reported in October 
1979 that the rights to a fair trial and to 
due process were subject to significant 
limitations, principally because of the 
active role of the military courts in 
judicial proceedings and the reluctance 
of the civil courts actively to investi- 
gate human rights violations. 

• While fewer than in past years, 
in 1979 there were one dozen allega- 
tions of torture by credible sources. 

• Political parties remain formally 
dissolved. 

• While having pledged eventual 
restoration of an elected government, 
the Pinochet regime has not set a time- 
table for relinquishing control. 

• On March 7, 1980, the Chilean 
Supreme Court upheld internal 
banishment for those who participated 
in the proscribed women's day ac- 
tivities. A total of 17 have been af- 
fected. 

• The Chilean courts continue to 
side with the government in pi-ohibiting 
the return of exiles the Government of 
Chile doesn't want. 

The status of bilateral relations, in 
addition to the actions taken in the 
Letelier case, is that all new military 
assistance and sales remain terminated 
since 197(5. New economic development 
assistance is also terminated. In the 
multinational development banks, the 
U.S. Government has voted "no" on all 
loans since 1977. At the United Nations 



and the OAS, we have supported res- 
olutions criticizing Chilean human 
rights abuses and those establishing in- 
ternational procedures to work toward 
improvements. In recent U.N. meet- 
ings on this subject, we have issued 
statements taking note of the improve- 
ments mentioned earlier. 

Guatemala 

Guatemala is a country where human 
rights are in jeopardy and where the 
government is doing little or nothing to 
bring violence under control. Many 
human rights groups have focused con- 
cern on the level of violence. Amnesty 
International began a worldwide cam- 
paign in September 1979 and estimated 
in December that more than 2,000 per- 
sons had been killed for political rea- 
sons in the last 18 months. The Interna- 
tional Commission of Jurists in a Sep- 
tember 1979 report stated that the 
Lucas government had "embarked on a 
systematic campaign to suppress dis- 
sent which has, in fact, generated a 
widespread climate of fear, demoraliza- 
tion, and the growth of clandestine 
opposition." 

Numerous other groups have spo- 
ken out against the violence, and two 
international unions have organized 
boycotts to protest specific violations. 
Our own estimation of political and 
death squad murders for 1979 is be- 
tween 800 and 900. Since our report 
was written, violence has increased 
both from the right and left. Perhaps 
the most graphic incident was the 
burning of the Spanish Embassy, when 
government security forces broke into 
it in an attempt to dislodge a group of 
occupiers. Thirty-nine persons, the 
majority of whom were Guatemalan 
caiiipesiiios. died in the fire. The 
Spanish Embassy broke diplomatic re- 
lations as a result, and the U.S. Gov- 
ernment expressed shock and called it 
deplorable because it could have been 
avoided. 

The Guatemalan Government has 
invited the lAHRC to make an inspec- 
tion visit, which should take place later 
this year. The UNHRC, in a resolution 
approved March 11, 1980, concerning 
the assassination of Dr. Alberto 
Fuentes Mohr, expressed profound 
concern at the situation of human rights 
and fundamental freedoms in 
Guatemala. 

In our bilateral relations, 
Guatemala has not received security as- 
sistance since FY 1978. We have con- 



bber 1980 



53 



Human Rights 



tinned to give economic development 
assistance for projects which meet basic 
human needs criteria. In the multina- 
tional development banks, the United 
States abstained on a tourism and in- 
dustrial development loan in 1979, the 
only application to be considered. 

We recognize the instability of 
Central America and the threat of ter- 
rorism which e.xists. Nevertheless, 
ways must be found to strengthen the 
democi'atic processes; vital reforms are 
essential and acknowledged to be 
necessary by influential sectors of the 
Guatemalan society. Violence must be 
investigated and the instigators 
brought under control in order to avoid 
a serious radicalization of that country. 

Nicaragua 

There can be no doubt that the over- 
throw of the Somoza government in 
July 1979 reflected the will of the 
majority of the people of Nicaragua. 
The victory of the Sandinista forces 
ended a repressive family dynasty of 
more than 40 years' duration. The civil 
war that resulted in the violent change 
of government cost an estimated 
30,000-50,000 lives and left the country 
in economic shambles. Nine months 
after the event, there is still little dis- 
cernible evidence of significant eco- 
nomic recovery. Another legacy of the 
war was over 7,500 jjolitical prisoners 
held by the Sandinistas for association 
with the former Somoza National Guard 
or for some other relationship with that 
government. 

The U.S. Government is making a 
sincere effort to have good relations 
and assist the revolutionary govern- 
ment. We worked hard to obtain a $75 
million supplemental appropriation 
from the Congress to assist the eco- 
nomic recovery efforts. 

The Nicaraguan revolution did not, 
however, bring an end to human rights 
concerns. A number of summary execu- 
tions have occurred. Allegations of tor- 
ture continue, particularly with respect 
to political prisoners. The Nicaraguan 
Permanent Commission on Human 
Rights, a private organization which 
has courageously documented abuses 
both under this government and under 
Somoza, on March 27 presented a spe- 
cific case of torture to the Nicaraguan 
Supreme Court. Other disturbing de- 
velopments include efforts to intimidate 
the free press, the resignations this 
week of the two prominent moderate 
members of the ruling junta and the 



moderate Central Bank president, the 
slow pace of the special tribunals con- 
ducting the trials of the political prison- 
ers, and concern that proper judicial 
safeguards are not being applied. This 
latter concern motivated a mission of 
the International Commission of Jurists 
to visit Nicaragua to observe the trial 
process. 

These and other developments por- 
tend a consolidation of control by the 
Sandinistas and lead to serious specula- 
tion about the future of pluralism in 
that society. Thus, we believe the 
scheduled visit of the lAHRC to 
Nicaragua this summer, at the invita- 
tion of that government, is of particular 
importance, and we look forward to its 
findings. 

Panama 

Panama is another country in the hemi- 
sphere where important segments of 
the public are not satisfied with the 
pace of the transition to free elections. 
In September 1979, there was a major 
teachers strike dedicated to the repeal 
of a controversial educational reform 
plan. On October 9 there was an ex- 
traordinary series of protest marches 
throughout Panama wherein the 
teachers attracted widespread support 
for their opposition to the reform plan. 

Within human rights and opposi- 
tion circles in the country and 
elsewhere, there is criticism of the lack 
of independent judicial and legislative 
branches of government, certain penal 
and judicial practices, such as interro- 
gation techniques, the "night courts," 
limitations on freedom of expression, 
and restrictions on political party for- 
mation. 

Our annual report commented on 
the lack of freedom of expression, not- 
ing that the Panama Government's 
point of view dominates the media. It 
cited a law implemented in 1979, re- 
quiring the licensing of journalists, 
which was subject to criticism by many 
newsmen as a threat to freedom of ex- 
pression and as a guarantee of self- 
censorship. This concern was well 
founded. On March 3, 1980, the licenses 
of four radio commentators were can- 
celed. They were charged with distort- 
ing facts with the intention of disrupt- 
ing public order and jeopardizing 
security and attacking the reputation of 
President Royo. 

Opposition and human rights 
groups in Panama have called these 
sanctions a violation of human rights. I 



would mention that one of those 
sanctioned, Julio Ortega, is currently ini 
the United States on a travel grant i 
under our USICA (U.S. International ! 
Communication Agency] education and ' 
cultural exchange [program. I under- i 
stand that a suit has been filed with 
Panamanian courts on behalf of all four 
commentators asking for immediate 
suspension of the cancellation orders. 

Grenada 

The government of Prime Minister 
Gairy was overthrown by a coup d'etati|j(« 
in March 1979 by leaders of a former 
opposition party, the New^ JEWEL 
Movement. Our annual report docu- 
ments human rights violations by the 
former Gairy government. There were 
also charges of corruption, rigging of 
the 1976 elections, and intimidation of 
the opposition by violent means. The 
new People's Revolutionary Govern- 
ment, which came into being, had the '■ 
advantage of replacing a dictatorial antl 
unpopular regime. It has maintained a 
reputation for honesty and begun some ' 
necessary economic programs, particu- i 
larly in the agricultural field. Ij 

However, the revolutionary nature |i 
of the coup has led to the replacement m 
of one set of human rights concerns by IS 
others equally serious. The constitution '• 
has been suspended, opponents have 
been detained indefinitely and without itr 
legal representation, freedom of as- Hti 
sembly and private enterprise have f 
been limited or abridged, and the inde- 
pendent press has been abolished. The 
Church has been a target for pressure. 
A publication called the Catholic Focus ( 
published only its initial issue before it 
was suspended, allegedly at the instiga- 
tion of the new government. On a posi- 
tive note, some 13 prisoners were re- 
leased on March 25. We believe there 
are in excess of 50 persons still 
detained. 

Grenada continues to send mixed 
signals in the international arena con- 
cerning its human rights stance. It has 
participated actively in human rights 
issues in the OAS forum but voted 
against the U.N. General Assembly 
resolution condemning Soviet aggres- 
sion in Afghanistan. 

Haiti 

Haiti continues to be the poorest coU9- 
try in the Western Hemisphere, and ft 
continues to function under authoritar- 



54 



Department of State Bulletin,:: 



Human Rights 



n rule. In 1979 the first independent 
ilitical parties in recent history 
Merged, but negative developments 
I tweighed the positive. A restrictive 
1 \\ press law was enacted; the political 
position was further intimidated by 
te militia and the executive. Objective 
(servers characterized our report on 
tB 1979 human rights situation in Haiti 
8 accurate representation. 

Last week the lAHRC issued a re- 
1 n on its August 1978 inspection visit 
t Haiti. Prior to its release, the report 
V s updated to December 1979. The 
Dort concluded, among other things, 
t It the right to life was violated, par- 
t Lilarly in the mid-1970s, by means of 
snmary executions, prison terms, and 
lik of medical care, but there has been 
ujrovement in this regard since. 
I wever, numerous persons continue 
t oe detained without benefit of legal 
p 'cedure or access to an attorney. 

Freedom of inquiry, speech, and 
d semination of thought do not exist, 
tl ugh freedom of religion does. Free- 
d a of association is extremely limited. 
T 're have been violations of the right 
Icesidence, movement, and national- 
it Numerous civil and political rights 
ai certain prerogatives of the 
jiiciary have been suspended. The 

S report makes a series of specific 

r< jmmendations for amelioration of its 
fi lings and makes a special appeal to 
ir -rnational organizations to give Haiti 
ai to improve living conditions in order 
tl ; the country can establish respect 
fc the rights currently being violated. 
Ir )ne development, we understand 
y the Haitian Government has mod- 
f: 1 the 1979 press law in response to 
r icism, but details are lacking. 
The case of Haitian "boat people" is 

1 pic of serious concern. The plight of 
lue people involves disputed matters 
if uman rights as well as issues of ref- 
i|e policy. Since 1972 thousands have 
iBved illegally in Florida, in small 
)^:s and, therefore, at considerable 

. Many request political asylum. 

re are over 9,000 such cases pend- 
r^in Florida. The U.S. Government is 
'dmitted to the careful case-by-case 
■% uation of all claims for political 
i-ilum, according to our law which re- 
4is to the U.N. Protocol on Refugees. 

♦ t week President-for-Life Duvalier 
4|ed a statement on the "boat 
>U:>\e," reiterating that Haitians de- 
'U ed from Florida "have not been and 

* not be harassed." 

(j The Administration is urgently re- 
'f ssing the situation of the Haitian 
Pit people." Meanwhile, none are 
'♦ijg deported. 



Cuba 

Returning to the question of Cuba, I 
noted earlier that 3,900 prisoners had 
been released in 1979. According to 
Huber Matos, the prominent political 
prisoner released last October, there 
are about 1,100 still being held. We do 
not know if this number had been in- 
creased in the last 2 weeks. This situa- 
tion is now complicated by the im- 
mediate problem of the 10,000 Cubans 
who sought refuge in the Peruvian Em- 
bassy in Havana. The Cuban Govern- 
ment does not permit free emigration 
and arbitrarily determines who may 
leave the country through issuance of 
exit permits. It has, furthermore, not 
held to its earlier agreement to permit 
those who were in the Peruvian Em- 
bassy to proceed to any country willing 
to receive them. 

We are lending our efforts to break 
the impasse by cooperating with gov- 
ernments in this hemisphere and 
elsewhere to facilitate their departure. 
The United States has agreed to take 
3,500 who meet our immigration, refu- 
gee, or asylum criteria. We believe that 
the boat owners and captains from the 
country who are taking people out of 
Cuba and trying to land them in the 
United States are playing into the 
hands of the Cuban authorities. 



El Salvador 

Those who subscribe to the domino 
theory in Central America view what is 
happening in El Salvador as the next 
target of international marxism after 
Nicaragua. Those who study El Sal- 
vador know that the problem is home 
grown and has been building to the 
present crisis level for many years. 
Solutions to the problems of that belea- 
gured country are not handy, and the 
current U.S. Government policy is 
highly controversial, particularly with 
U.S. religious groups. What is incon- 
trovertible is that urgent reforms are 
absolutely essential to the survival of 
the revolutionary junta now governing 
the country. 

In early March 1980, the 
Salvadoran Government bit the bullet 
and instituted both agrarian and finan- 
cial reforms, after the original junta, 
installed by the military coup in Oc- 
tober 1979, failed to act before it ex- 
pired at the beginning of 1980. The 
junta's reforms have been violently op- 
posed by both exti'emes of the right and 
the left. It is clear that reforms must be 
made. The agrarian reform, if fully im- 



plemented, could be one of the most 
profound and far-reaching social ex- 
periments in the modern history of 
Central America. 

I know that the U.S. Government's 
decision to provide security assistance 
to the junta is controversial. The vol- 
ume of mail on this subject received in 
Washington in recent weeks is near the 
level of correspondence regarding the 
Iranian question. One widespread mis- 
conception that I wish to clarify is that 
this security assistance consists of 
arms; it does not. It is restricted to 
credits to enable the Salvadoran Armed 
Forces to purchase communications and 
transportation equipment to improve 
its ability to control the violence. We 
remain deeply concerned at the level of 
violence now prevalent in El Salvador, 
some of it the responsibility of undisci- 
plined security forces in the coun- 
tryside. Most of it, we believe, comes 
from rightist groups opposed to all re- 
forms who are engaging in indiscrimi- 
nate assassinations. 

Before his tragic death, Archbishop 
Oscar Romero was given written assur- 
ance by Secretary Vance that "the ad- 
vancement of human rights . . . under- 
lies every aspect of U.S. policy toward 
El Salvador." 

There is much that has been writ- 
ten about the brutal assassination of 
Archbishop Romero, and much that I 
could say. Perhaps I should merely con- 
clude my remarks by saying that his 
death is a noble symbol of the human 
rights struggle we all are facing and 
that many have given their lives 
defending. 

I returned to the United States 
from a month-long visit to the Near 
East and South Asia the day before the 
beautiful Requiem Mass given for 
Archbishop Romero at Georgetown 
University on March 29. I would like to 
quote from the eulogy given by Rev- 
erend Timothy Healy, which I pro- 
foundly believe best expresses what 
human rights is all about. 

His message was the simplest 
teaching of modern theology and he 
couched it in the words of the Second 
Vatican Council. Again and again he 
raised his voice, in his Cathedral, in his 
radio station (until it was bombed out 
from under him), and with everyone he 
met, to remind his countrymen, oppres- 
sors and oppressed, the hunters and the 
hunted, that no man can reach his full 
religious being unless he enjoys some 
dignity, some freedom, some self- 
determination in his daily life; unless he 
has some hope of something better for 
his children. ■ 



i 



Dber 1980 



55 



Human Rights 



Human Rights in South Africa 



by Patricia M. Derian 

Stafe))/e)it before the Si(bco))nint- 
fees 0)1 Africa and I)iteriiatio)ial Or- 
ganizations of the House Foreign Af- 
fairs Committee on Mail IS, 1980. 
Ms. Derian is Assista)it Secretart/ for 
Human Rights and Humanitarian 
Affairs.^ 

The status of human rights in South Af- 
rica is a crucial and timely subject for 
the following reasons: 

First, in recent weeks, tens of 
thousands of colored (mixed racial ori- 
gin) students have been engaging in a 
massive school boycott. They are pro- 
testing against the inferior education 
system given them under the white- 
dominated apartheid system. Several 
hundred have been detained. The sys- 
tem for the South African black student 
is even worse. '^ 

Second, South Africa's policy of in- 
stitutionalized and legalized racism is 
one of the cruelest forms of human 
rights abuse in the world today. Under 
the apartheid system, the black, col- 
ored, and Asian South African majority 
suffers pervasive discrimination in all 
areas of life. Protest against this dis- 
criminatory racial system is punishable 
by law. 

Third, apartheid remains among 
the most persistent human rights 
abuses before the world community. 
The United Nations has focused on this 
issue almost from its inception. Al- 
though considerable achievements in 
combating racial discrimination have 
taken place in many nations, including 
our own, there has been rooted resist- 
ance to change in South Africa. 

Fourth, time is running out for the 
prospects of j^eaceful change in that 
country. Dissatisfaction and resent- 
ment on the part of black South Afri- 
cans have never been more widespread 
than they are today. As a result of the 
suppression of the Soweto demonstra- 
tions in 1976, several hundred black 
South Africans died; others fled to 
neighboring countries in search of mili- 
tary training; others were sentenced to 
prison terms. 

Today's hearings, significantly, 
focus on the perilous human rights situ- 
ation in South Africa. I hope that the 



recommendations resulting from these 
hearings will contribute to the rapid 
development of racial equality and re- 
spect for all human rights in that 
country. 

LAWS. REGULATIONS. AND 
PROCEDURES 

The subcommittee has addressed sev- 
eral questions to me. The first asks that 
I identify the South African laws, reg- 
ulations, and procedures which result in 
the greatest and most serious violations 
of human rights in that country. 

Apartheid is a system of legalized 
racism. It is a web of discriminatory 
laws and practices by which liV/( of the 
population dominate 84 '7f of the popula- 
tion. The Constitution enti-enches a 
white monopoly of political power in a 
parliament whose membership is all 
white and elected by whites only. The 
parliament is the supreme lawmaking 
authority. Thus, the Constitution itself 
denies to more than 19 million black as 
well as colored and Asian South Afri- 
cans the right to participate in the 
political process which ultimately gov- 
erns them. 

"Homeland" Policy 

The government's "homeland" policy is 
perhaps the most explosive single issue 
in South Africa today; the homelands 
legislation is serving to forcibly relo- 
cate substantial numbers of the black 
population and dive.st all black South 
Africans of their citizenship. Black 
South Africans comprise 72*^ of the 
population. The government has desig- 
nated 13 '7( of the land area as "inde- 
pendent" homelands for this 72'"// of the 
population. The V3'/i of the land desig- 
nated is generally the less arable and 
removed in large part from advanced 
centers of commerce and industry. 

In the homelands, there is often 
neither space nor water to conduct ag- 
riculture. There is often no industrial 
development to provide jobs. Under the 
law, once a homeland gains "independ- 
ence," its members lose their South Af- 
rican citizenship. To date, three home- 
lands have reached independence, and 
the black people assigned to them have 
been divested of citizenship. When the 



1 



government grants independence to al 
the homelands, South Africa will no 
longer have any black citizens. Thus, 
black men, women, and children, who 
have lived all of their lives in South 
Africa — people whose families before 
them have lived in South Africa — 
suddenly find themselves stripped of 
their citizenship and dumped into reset 
tlement areas where they cannot find 
jobs and where they do not necessarilj 
want to reside. 

The photographs on the board in 
front of me show the tragic human con 
sequences of this policy. They were re 
cently taken by an officer in the Bureai 
of Human Rights and Humanitarian 
Affairs. These are pictures of a de- 
stroyed village of the Makgato people. 
Since most of the Makgato resisted 
moving from their longstanding home i 
the northern Transvaal to a desolate 
and arid resettlement area in 
Kromhoek, government forces entered 
the community in September 1979, de- 
stroyed buildings, and removed their 
belongings. Thus, a community of 500 
families, who had developed substantia 
homes, a school, and prosperous farms 
have been forced to leave their prop- 
erty, their homes, their community be 
cause they are black and because they 
were located in areas designated as 
white by the South African 
Government. 

Similarly, this government remain 
intent upon forcibly removing a 
neighboring and much larger 
community — the Batlokwa people — to 
the same arid resettlement area. They 
number 50,000-80,000. They, too, havt 
substantial homes, schools, and agricul 
tural productivity in the northern 
Transvaal. Their lives are also to suffes 
dismantling and the destruction of their 
communities as a result of the home- 
lands policy. 

Black laborers who cannot subsist 
in the homelands and must seek work ir 
white urban areas have no political or 
economic rights in these areas. They 
are relegated to the status of migrant 
workers in their own country. Their 
families are not allowed to live with 
them; they must remain in the home- 
lands, often great distances away. The 
human suffering involved in these for- 
cible family separations is one of many 
cruel consequences of the homelands 
legislation. I 

Group Areas Act 

To rigidly maintain racial separation in 
urban areas, the Group Areas Act de- 



56 



Department of State Bulleti.'; 



■i 



Human Rights 



es separate residential places for all 
ack, colored, and Asian South Afri- 
Ins. As a result, tens of thousands of 
■iman beings have been moved into 
•lecially designated urban areas be- 
(use they are not white. In 1979 alone, 
5317 colored families and 819 Indian 
Imilies were moved out of their homes 
J were nine white families who found 
temselves forced to leave their homes 
t satisfy the apartheid policy. Most of 
te black South Africans at Crossroads 
Id been moved more than once before 
tey created that threatened commu- 
I y. 

A highly reputable private source, 
lack Sash, reported in February 1980 
tit as a result of the Group Areas Act, 
t ' homelands policy anfl the pass laws, 
cer 2 million people had been forcibly 
tirooted by 1978. At least 1 million 
pple were still to be removed, and 
ci'ing 1979, these removals continued 
a tee. 



I lux and Pass Laws 

I lu.x and pass laws are used to enforce 
r ial separation. Under these laws, 
k)wn as one of the most despised re- 
q rements of the apartheid system, 
bck people over age 16 are required to 
c ry reference books at all times. They 
n St produce them to demonstrate that 
tly are entitled to be in any urban 
a a. Arrests for pass law offenses to- 
tiKl 272,887 in 1978 and 119,869 in 
119. They have resulted in the re- 
ti val of large numbers of black people 
fill urban areas, although they en- 
t( ?d such areas looking for economic 
■ortunities otherwise denied them. 



PLITICAL OPPOSITION 

"i also asked about the treatment of 
•k activists who are seeking to pro- 
r change in South Africa. South Af- 
M laws do not only racially segre- 
■ lilack people, restrict economic 
• iii-tunities — including the use of 
^ I — and bar particijjation in the 
" tical process. South African legisla- 
i I also curtails the ability of everyone 
I 'xpress their views or opposition to 
^ IHilitical and economic system im- 

■il upon them. Restrictions are 
't'll on their right to publish, to as- 
l)le, to form organizations, and to 
>>■; in sum, to peacefully affect the 
If political process. 



Banning 

A variety of laws ban organizations on 
loosely defined political grounds. The 
basic ones are the Internal Security Act 
(1976), previously called the Suppres- 
sion of Communism Act, and the Un- 
lawful Organizations Act (1960). Under 
the latter act, the two most influential 
black political organizations were 
banned — the African National Con- 
gress and the Pan African Congress. As 
a result, their members and supporters 
became liable for imprisonment, and 
many hundreds were arrested for fur- 
thering the organizations' aims, for at- 
tending meetings, for distributing 
pamphlets. 

The Internal Security Act further 
enables the government to ban indi- 
viduals for activities loosely defined as 
a danger to state security or public 
order. Banned individuals are re- 
stricted in their freedom of expression, 
association, and movement. They are 
prohibited from publishing or making 
public statements. They are restricted 
to a particular area. They are forbidden 
to meet with others. They must 
periodically report to the police. In 



law, the Minister is not required to give 
any grounds for his banning decision, 
and there is no judicial review. 

Arbitrary Detention 

In addition to the baning laws which 
have served to stifle and silence black 
African opinion, the government is em- 
powered to arbitrarily and preventively 
detain its critics. A variety of security 
laws provide the state with extraordi- 
nary powers to detain persons without 
charge, in some cases indefinitely. Sec- 
tion 6 of the 1967 Terrorism Act au- 
thorizes the government to detain indi- 
viduals and hold them incommunicado, 
indefinitely. No court may intervene by 
writ of habeas corpus. Visits to the de- 
tainee by family, lawyers, clergy, doc- 
tors, or the press are prohibitecl. 

Arbitrary detention is authorized 
by other South African laws as well, 
among these the Internal Security Act 
and the Sabotage (General Law Ad- 
ministration) Act. 

At present, there are about 500 
men and women serving prison sen- 
tences under these main security laws; 
other political prisoners have been con- 



. . . Apartheid /.s a sijsteni of legalized racism. It is a web of discrimina- 
tor i/ laws and practices by which 16% of the population dominate 847c of 
the population. 



some instances, they have been prohib- 
ited from carrying on their occupation. 
For example, black leader Thomazile 
Botha of Port Elizabeth, released from 
detention to banning, was forced to 
peddle goods in the street. Mrs. Winnie 
Mandela and Dr. Mamphela Ramphele 
have been moved to remote areas, tan- 
tamount to internal exile. 

Banning is no ordinary human 
rights abuse. As recently described by 
our Representative to the U.N. Human 
Rights Commission, Jerome J. Shes- 
tack, banning negates human worth in 
its entirety. It seeks to make a person 
disappear by making his human person- 
ality disappear. A banned person can- 
not even be quoted. There are cur- 
rently 146 banned men and women in 
South Africa. 

Generally, banning orders are im- 
posed for a 2- or 5-year period arbitrar- 
ily by the Minister of Justice. Fre- 
quently, they are renewed. Under the 



victed under criminal laws; still others 
are detained. From January to 
November 1979, a total of 334 people 
were placed in detention. At least 64 of 
the persons detained during 1979 were 
known to the Institute of Race Rela- 
tions to have been students. The Minis- 
ter of Justice places at 48 the number of 
persons under 18 that were detained in 
1979. Six were females. 

The incommunicado interrogation 
of detainees has resulted in reports of 
systematic abuse and torture of de- 
tainees by the police. Since 1963, at 
least 52 persons died while detained 
under security laws, including 24 be- 
tween March 'l976 and mid-July 1978. 
Tortures applied have included severe 
beatings; electric shocks; extracting 
teeth with pliers; depriving detainees of 
food, water, and sleep; forcing them to 
run on stones; and long periods of inter- 
rogation and solitary confinement. 
Partly in response to the strong domes- 
tic and international reaction to the 
death in detention of student leader 



- ober 1980 



57 



Human Rights 



Steve Biko, there have been no known 
deaths of security detainees since mid- 
July 1978. However, this does not mean 
that torture and mistreatment have 
come to an end. The laws giving rise to 
such abuses and the security apparatus 
enforcing them remain in effect. 

Thus, the incidence of torture and 
cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment 
or punishment remains an exceedingly 
serious problem. The government, it- 
self, does not completely deny the use 
of torture. The government, in fact, has 
paid claim.s arising out of assaults on 
detainees. It paid $214,000 for 78 claims 
in 1978. In 1979, the government paid 
R65,000 to the family of Steve Biko. 
Thirty-two similar cases are pending. 
Its attitude perhaps is reflected in the 
statement by Justice Minister Kruger 
in response to the Biko case: "I am not 
sorry about Mr. Biko. He leaves me 
cold." 

The result of this governmental de- 
termination to repress black activists is 
that black leaders who have standing in 
the black community and probably 
could influence events in a moderate 
and lawful direction continue to be de- 
tained, banned, or imprisoned. Such 
policies surely serve to heighten anger 
and bitterness and drive black South 
Africans to violence in their struggle 
for their legitimate rights. This repres- 
sive treatment for peaceful change has 
led many black activists to leave South 
Africa to seek military training. 



GOVERNMENT POLICIES 

The third question in your letter was 
whether Prime Minister Botha's 
policies have resulted in any improve- 
ment in human rights of South Afri- 
cans. The answer unfortunately is, no; 
there have been no significant changes. 
Reliable reporting attests that it is the 
overwhelming opinion of black South 
Africans that changes effected so far 
have been inconsequential adjustments 
in an unacceptable system. 

The Botha government has allowed 
a rela.xation of certain segregation 
measures, including an easing of re- 
strictions against multiracial sports; the 
removal of "whites only" signs from 
some public places; and the opening of 
certain hotels, theatres, and municipal 
buildings. Small numbers of black stu- 
dents have been admitted to white uni- 
versities. The changes, thus, have been 
limited to opening up institutions and 
privileges reserved exclusively for 



58 



whites to limited numbers of blacks. 
They have not taken the form of change 
in the basic laws; they are merely 
exemptions, often on an ad hoc basis. 

The Prime Minister has promised 
to review discriminatory legislation, for 
example, laws limiting the amount of 
land available for Africans, as well as 
the Immorality Act and the Mixed Mar- 
riages Act which prohibit sexual rela- 
tions between white and black. The 
government, also, has indicated will- 
ingness to engage in dialogue with 
black, colored, and Asian leaders. In 
1979, a government commission rec- 
ommended major changes in labor laws 
affecting blacks. However, few results 
have emerged. New labor legislation 
perpetuates ultimate government con- 
trol of black labor organizations. With 
regard to the Immorality Act, I would 
note that during 1979, 299 persons were 
prosecuted under this act, and 222 con- 
victed; 46 await trial. 

In sum, for black South Africans, 
there has been little or no change in 
existing patterns of discrimination. 
None of the measures have made any 
real change in the overall pattern of 
apartheid. Black South Africans remain 
excluded from the political process and 
continue to be denied their basic human 
rights. 

Certainly, we hope that meaningful 
steps will be taken and that the consid- 
erable debate in the white community 
on the apartheid system will lead to 
concrete actions to end discrimination 
and afford participation for all black 
citizens in the political life of the na- 
tion. Otherwise, the deepening frustra- 
tion at the lack of substantial change 
will increase an already polarized politi- 
cal situation and increase the prospect 
for violent convulsion. 



U.S. RESPONSE 

Your final question was what specifically 
the United States has done to protest 
human rights violations in South 
Africa. 

The U.S. Government has con- 
tinued to underscore our opposition to 
the apartheid system in South Africa. 

Private and Public Diplomacy 

At the diplomatic level, the United 
States has repeatedly protested human 
rights violations to the South African 
Government at the highest levels. In 
these exchanges, we have raised the 



practice of banning, arbitrary deten- 
tion, torture, the pass laws, the forcibj 
removal of black communities, the sys 
tematic denial of South African citizen 
ship to blacks, the denial of meaningfi 
participation by all South Africans in 
the political process, and the lack of 
justice in the judicial system. 

The United States also has public!; 
protested the egregious abuses in Sout 
Africa. Our Ambassadors at the Unite' 
Nations have delivered forceful public 
statements on apartheid's abhorrent 
nature. On October 4, 1979, speaking 
before Ambassadors and Ministers uf 
the Organization of African Unity 
[OAUI, former Secretary Vance reaf- 
firmed that unless a system of govern- 
ment evolved in which all South Afri- 
cans could participate equitably, our 
relations with South Africa would in- 
evitably deteriorate. Vice President 
Mondale has affirmed this same point 
publicly. 



Arms Embargo 

In addition to private and public diplo- 
macy, the United States imposed a voj 
untary arms embargo against South AS 
rica, beginning in 1962. In 1977, the ' 
Carter Administration supported the , 
U.N. mandatory arms embargo on j 



South Africa. In 1978, we imposed a 
ban on all exports to the South Africj 
military and police and have made 
sometimes effective representations tc 
other governments to do likewise. We 
shall continue to do so. There have beeij 
no sales to South Africa under the U.SJ 
foreign military sales program since 
1973. We, further, have tightened pro-* 
cedures on the commercial sale of civil' 
ian aircraft to South Africa to help as- 
sure that they will not be used for mill 
tary, police, or paramilitary purposes. 
There also have been no exports o; 
nuclear supplies or materials to South 
Africa since 1975. We have made it 
clear that resumption of peaceful nu- 
clear cooperation would depend on 
South Africa's agreement on the Non- 
proliferation Treaty and safeguards 
issues. , 



I 



Economic Endeavors 

In the economic sphere, legislation was 
passed in 1978 to confine Export- 
Import Bank support to those private 
firms implementing fair employment 
practices. In consequence of this re- 
striction, there have been no new au- 
thorizations for Exim financing for ex- 



Department of State B 



ulletif#' 



Human Rights 



■ts to South Africa since September 
'8. Prior to these restrictions, the 
ited States had halted Eximbank 
incing to the South African 
k'eriiment. 
In 1979 and 1980, CCC | Commodity 
dit Corporation, U.S.A.] credits 
'6 not been made available to South 
ica. 
In the area of private investment, 
have urged U.S. firms operating in 
51th Africa to follow fair employment 
' dices for black emjiloyees in ac- 
(ilance with the Sullivan code. The 
li\an principles set reasonable 
plai-ds for corporate conduct in 
^ 'th Africa. They have sought to m- 
.i>e the business community in pro- 
n ing economic opportunities for 
jhks. The Sullivan principles call for 
n rovements in wages, working condi- 
s, fringe benefits, and advancement 
I irt unities for black workers. 
They also support recognition of 
' tentative black trade unions. To 
, more than 130 companies have 
-i-ribed to the Sullivan principles, 
■' senting 75% of the work force on 
n pa.NTolls of U.S. corporations doing 
H.ness in South Africa. Certainly, 
h ;e American firms which have not 
rrlemented the Sullivan code are not 
icng in accordance with the thrust of 
J . policy. It is noteworthy that as a 
•edt of the Sullivan initiative, similar 
•0 -s of conduct have emerged from 
t r nations and some South African 
'Orations, too, have agreed to im- 
jIi lent these principles. 



IMARY 

ically and legally, the United 
les has refused to recognize the in- 
ndent homelands, proclaimed by 
outh African Government. 
ijAt the United Nations, we have 
orted resolutions condemning the 
lishment of these independent 
lands. We also have sujjported 
llutions on South Africa's ill- 
tment of political prisoners and 
endorsed continuation of U.N. 
t funds for South Africans. I would 
that we have been unable to sup- 
resolutions that encourage vio- 
9 or call for economic sanctions 
ii nst South Africa. 

We have sought to maintain ties 
many elements of the black South 



African community, including human 
rights organizations and banned indi- 
viduals. We have dispatched embassy 
observers to political trials. 

We have contributed generously to 
U.N. funds providing educational as- 
sistance and training to black South Af- 
ricans. We also have contributed funds 
for legal aid to prisoners, relief for their 
families, and assistance to black South 
African refugees in neighboring states. 

Through the visitors program of 
the International Communications 
Agency (USICA), we have brought ap- 
proximately 50 South Africans annually 
to the United States. Twenty-five 
Americans, in turn, have visited South 
Africa. By means of this program, we 



Baiiiiiiig is iiu urdiiiari/ luiiiiaii 
riglifs abuse. If seeks to make a 
person disappear by making his 
Intuiax persoualitii disappear. 



have demonstrated our support for 
black South Africans seeking change; 
we have encouraged white South Afri- 
cans to recognize the need for change. 
The program's effectiveness is perhaps 
evidenced by the South African Gov- 
ernment's refusal on occasion to grant 
passports to some of the black grant- 
ees. We have vigorously protested 
these actions. 

In sum, the United States has un- 
dertaken a variety of measures to influ- 
ence and persuade South Africa to 
change its policies. There is still a great 
deal to do. 

For example, many private groups 
in the United States today are calling 
for stronger measures to combat apart- 
heid in South Africa. They have urged 
broadening of the Sullivan principles 
and strengthening their implementa- 
tion. It would be useful for this sub- 
committee, in its hearings on the role of 
U.S. corporations, to e.xamine this pro- 
posal. Private groups also have called 
upon the U.S. Government to disas- 
sociate itself more clearly from the 
South African Government through our 
trade and investment policies. Specif- 
ically, they have urged the U.S. Gov- 
ernment to curtail or halt private trade 
and investment to South Africa. They 
have called upon corporations to with- 
draw from South Africa. In at least two 
cases, corporations have done so. It 
might be useful for this subcommittee 



to review these recommendations too. 
Private groups also have urged the 
United States to consider if there are 
any circumstances whereby it could 
support economic sanctions against 
South Africa in the United Nations. To 
date, the United States has limited its 
support of sanctions to our expanded 
arms embargo. 

Our policies must encourage rapid, 
peaceful, and significant change in 
South Africa. It is incumbent upon the 
United States, consistent with its obli- 
gations under the U.N. Charter, to 
continue to seek respect for the rights 
of all South Africans to participate in 
the political process of South Africa 
without distinction based on race. The 
Government of South Africa will remain 
in violation of its human rights obliga- 
tions under the charter as long as this 
participation is denied. We, further, 
must persist vigorously to seek an end 
to the use of violence and force by the 
Government of South Africa to main- 
tain apartheid. Such practices could, in 
turn, lead to violence by the victims of 
apartheid. We look forward to a South 
Africa in which race, creed, or color 
form no basis for distinction and in 
which fundamental human rights and 
freedoms are guaranteed to all. 



' The complete transcript of the hear- 
ings will be published by the committee and 
will be available from the Superintentlent 
of Documents, U.S. Government Printing 
Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. 

'■^ In 1976-77, the average expenditure 
per black South African student was R49 
($73.50); per white student, R654 ($981). ■ 



!■ 



ber 1980 



59 



MIDDLE EAST 



U.S.-Libyan Relations Since 1 969 



by David D. \ewsom 

Stafeiiient before the Siibcoitniiiffee 
to Investigate Individuals Representing 
Interests of Foreign Governments of the 
Senate Judiciary Committee on August 
J,, 1980. Ambassador Newsoni is Under 
Secretary for Political Affairs. ^ 

I am here to respond to the subcommit- 
tee's request for a review of the relations 
of the United States with Libya since 
Col. Qadhafi came into power in Septem- 
ber 1969. The Department of State 
wishes to cooperate fully with the sub- 
committee in its inquiry, and I am here in 
that spirit. 

My own connection with Libya goes 
back to 1962, when I became Director of 
the Office of North African Affairs in the 
Department. I subsequently served as 
Ambassador to Libya from 1964 until the 
summer of 1969, leaving Libya just 3 
months before the revolution which 
brought Col. Qadhafi to power. But I was 
not to leave association with Libya, be- 
cause I then became Assistant Secretary 
for African Affairs, and at that time the 
I'esponsibility for Libya was in that 
bureau. In my present position, I have 
dealt closely with many of the recent as- 
pects of our relationship with Libya. 

This afternoon I would like to begin 
with a short sketch of Libya and then 
discuss in more detail and in response to 
the subcommittee's request our interests 
in Libya, the main features of the current 
U.S.-Libyan relationship, and the princi- 
pal problems that we encounter in that 
relationship. 

Libya: Past and Present 

This sparsely populated desert country, 
which is almost three times the size of 
Texas with 2.5 million people, today has 
many of the relics of its mi.xed and turbu- 
lent histoiy: as an extension of ancient 
Carthage, as a major outpost of the 
Roman Empire, as the invasion path of 
tribes from the Arabian Peninsula, as the 
site of some of the pirates who preyed on 
the commerce of the young United 
States. As an Italian colony, it was part 
of Mussohni's dream of a Mediterranean 
empire, and the charred tanks and un- 
spent explosives which litter the Libyan 
desert today are reminders of the battles 
between Rommel and Montgomej-y. 



In 1951, under U.N. auspices, Libya 
became independent. A king, Idris, was 
chosen, who was at the same time head of 
an Islamic religious order, the Senussis. 
A poor country until commercial oil pro- 
duction began in 1962, Libya lived at that 
time with the help of substantial aid from 
the United States and Britain. Each 
countiy had, during that period, as part 
of that cooperation an air base in Libya. 

Even in the period of King Idris, 
certain attitudes wei'e present in Libya 
which today have become more pro- 
nounced: a bitter resentment against the 
establishment of the State of Israel, 
strong support for the Arab cause, a fer- 
vent attachment to Islam, and a degr-ee of 
xenophobia. 

When Col. Qadhafi and his young fel- 
low officers overthrew the King in Sep- 
tember 1969, these attitudes intensified 
and became integral elements of Libyan 
policy. The young officers believed that 
the influence of the United States and 
Britain had prevented Libya from playing 
its rightful role in the sti-uggle against Is- 
rael, and particularly in the 1967 war 
They vowed to change that by closing the 
British and American bases in Libya, by 
acquiring large quantities of arms, and by 
supporting anti-Israel and revolutionaiy 
causes eveiywhere. 

The Libyan leaders saw in their oil 
wells the opportunity to support not only 
Palestinian and Islamic movements 
everywhere but many revolutionaiy 
movements and particularly any cause 
which they believed would weaken tradi- 
tional Arab kingdoms or would be di- 
rected at Britain or the United States. 
What we call terrorism, they call 
revolution. 

On the Palestinian question, Libya 
under Qadhafi has taken an extreme posi- 
tion. Qadhafi has, in recent months, pub- 
licly called upon Palestinian groups to at- 
tack Egyptian, Israeli, and American 
targets in the Middle East. In addition to 
helping Palestinian groups, the Libyans 
have provided money, training, and, in 
some cases, arms to virtually any gi'oup 
around the world which asserts revolu- 
tionai-y credentials, including the Moro 
insurgents in the southern Philippines, 
the provisional wing of the Iiish Republi- 
can Army, the Japanese Red Army, and 
certain African organizations. In the im- 
mediate area of Libya, activities have in- 
cluded support for various factions in the 



Chadian civil war and for the Polisario ii 
its struggle against Morocco in the 
Western Sahara. 

Qadhafi has also sought to develop i 
whole new theoiy of government; namel 
that government is unnecessary and thai 
the people could rule. People's commit 
tees are taking the place of traditional oi 
gans of government. Diplomats are a rel 
of the past to him; he has recently estab- 
lished, instead. People's Bureaus which 
represent the Libyan people to many 
countries, including the United States. 

U.S. Interests in Libya 

But despite the many problems which 
exist in our relations with Libya, the 
United States has important reasons for 
seeking to find a basis for satisfaetoiy re 
lations, and our policy choices are not 
easy ones. We cannot remain indifferent 
to the activities and orientation of a na- 
tion which is strategically situated on thd 
southern shore of the Mediterranean, lo- 
cated between two nations — Egypt and 
Tunisia — with which we have close and 
particularly friendly relations. 

There is an American community of', 
between 2,000 and 2, .500 people resident 
in Libya, connected both with oil produc- 
tion and other projects important to 
Libya's economic and social well-being 
and to the trade between the two coun- 
tries. There is a mutuality of interest in 
the continuation and security of that 
community. 

We have important energy interests • 
in Libya. The United States receives ap- 
proximately 10.8% of its imported oil 
supplies from Libya. This equals about 
700,000 barrels a day and makes Libya 
our third largest supplier, after Saudi 
Arabia and Nigeria. The United States is 
Libya's largest single customer, and our 
purchases account for almost 40*^ of 
Libya's total production each year. It is 
low sulphur, light density oil of high value 
for gasoline production. 

The Libyan economy is almost totall] 
dependent upon oil revenues for its in- 
come. It relies heavily upon American 
and other Western companies for the 
production and the distribution of that 
oil. 

There are currently over .50 Ameri- 
can companies in Libya, the majority of 
them in oil or in oil-related fields. Over 
half of Libya's total oil production is in 
the hands of American companies, and all 



60 



Department of State Bulletir 



Middle East 



Libya's liquefied natural gas produc- 
ti is accounted for by one American 
fipany Exxon. 

In addition to the United States, 
)ya supplies oil to West Germany (14% 
)roduction), Italy (13%), France (3%), 
I a small but growing amount to the 
net Union. The United States receives 
liquefied natural gas from Libya, but 
lin relies upon Libya for 80% of its 
lefied natural gas and Italy for 40% of 
supply 

In price deliberations in the Organi- 
lon of Petroleum Exporting Countries 
'EC), Libya has been a hawk. Its cur- 
t $37 per barrel price is at the upper 
It of official OPEC prices. Libya has 
been a strong advocate of production 
n^acks as a means to husband a limited 
"t >urce and to maintain price levels. 
Statements have been attributed to 
i,^adhafi from time to time that be- 
-f iif political differences Libya might 
i:i]'uo oil sales to the United States. 
annot dismiss totally this possibility. 
ii late, however, Libya has seen the oil 
•e tionship as mutually beneficial. 

We also have important general 
;r 'e interests in Libya. Given the high 
/< !me of U.S. oil purchases from Libya, 
V -h may surpass $9 billion in 1980, we 
1 lie running a bilateral balance-of- 
jc neiit deficit of around $8.5 billion this 
n : In 1979 Libya purchased $468 mil- 
it from the United States, and 1980 fig- 
u are likely to show little, if any, im- 
M 'ement. With its high oil revenues 
ir its major development progi-ams, 
Li /a represents a valuable potential 
n ket for American products and ser- 
i s, but both strong European competi- 
,i( and Libyan official attitudes are cur- 
ie ly obstacles to an increase in trade. 

4 n Features of the 
. -Libyan Relationship 

1 rmath of Revolution. As I said at 

lutset, immediately following the 
* revolution, the leaders of the new 
i an Government closely identified the 
1 i'(l States with the deposed Idris 
■ aivhy and with support for the Gov- 
Hiit of Israel. Libyan attitudes to- 
i any government which had enjoyed 
1 \ ileged position in that country be- 
i the revolution were marked by great 
I iiion and even hostility. The new 
riiinent in the first year expelled 
-t all of the last members of the old 
ail colonial community and closed 
1 he British military base at Tobruk 
I hen, on .June 11, 1970, the U.S. Air 
I e Base at Wheelus. 



In the early days of the revolution, 
our then Ambassador to Libya, Joseph 
Palmer, had some brief talks with Col. 
Qadhafi and his deputy Maj. Jallud. 
After the closure of Wheelus, these con- 
tacts ceased, and Ambassador Palmer 
found over the next 2 years that it was 
virtually impossible to communicate di- 
rectly with the senior levels of the Libyan 
Government. This difficulty has generally 
continued until the present time. 

Tferrorism. During this period, Li- 
byan criticism of U.S. Middle East policy 
grew increasingly vocal and strident. Li- 
byan support for revolutionary 
movements and for groups carrying on 
international terrorism grew, exemplified 
by the sanctuaiy which Libyans gave to 
the perpetrators of the terrorist attack 
on Israeli athletes at the Munich Olym- 
pics in 1972. 

In consequence of these and other 
similar problems in our relations with 
Libya, we decided in early 1973 that we 
would not appoint a successor to Ambas- 
sador Palmer, who had, meanwhile, re- 
turned to the United States. From that 
point until our Embassy in Tiipoli was 
temporarily closed on May 2, 1980, 
U.S. -Libyan relations in Tiipoli have 
been conducted at the level of charge 
d'affaires. 

Military Equipment. Because of 
Libya's support for international ter- 
rorism and subversive activities and its 
interference in the internal affairs of 
other countries, we also decided in 1973 
to disapprove the sale to Libya of military 
weaponry and certain other equipment 
and products which could add signifi- 
cantly to Libya's military capability. 

That policy was the basis for our de- 
cision to block the export of eight C-130s 
to Libya in 1973, despite the fact that 
Libya had paid for them. I should say 
that Libya already had eight other 
C-130s which were acquired through eon- 
tracts signed by the prerevolutionary re- 
gime. It remains our policy to the present 
not to sell militaiy equipment to Libya. 

Nationalization. A further comph- 
cation in U.S. -Libya relations was the 
Libyan decision, starting in 1973, par- 
tially to nationalize American and other 
Western oil companies operating in Libya 
on the basis that the contracts negotiated 
by the previous regime had been too fa- 
vorable to the foreign companies. Non- 
American, as well as American, com- 
panies wei-e involved. This process was a 
turbulent one, and several companies 
closed their Libyan operations. 



By the late 1970s, however, most 
claims had been settled, and the Ameri- 
can companies there had largely come to 
an acceptable working relationship with 
the Libyans. 

Peace Process. Libya's relations 
with Egypt deteriorated after the 1973 
Arab-Israeli war, as Egypt moved closer 
to the United States. In July 1977 the two 
countries were involved in a brief but in- 
tense militaiy conflict. President Sadat's 
1977 visit to Jerusalem produced vitriolic 
Libyan criticism, and Libya has pursued 
a policy firmly rejecting all that has 
flowed out of our Middle East peace ne- 
gotiations. It promotes and finances op- 
position to the Camp David agreements 
and the Egyptian-Israel Peace Treaty, as 
well as Security Council Resolutions 242 
and 338, which form the basis of the 
Camp David accords. On several occa- 
sions. Col. Qadhafi has called for a solu- 
tion involving "the expulsion from Pales- 
tine of all Jews who arrived after 1947." 
We can and we do have differences with 
other Arab states on the peace process. 
But with Libya, the differences are more 
profound and involve active and often vio- 
lent opposition to the process of peace. 

Aircraft Sales. Commercial aircraft 
sales, largely for Libya's scheduled inter- 
national air routes, have been a promi- 
nent element in our relationship. Starting 
in the early 1970s, we allowed the export 
of civilian commercial aircraft, such as 
Boeing 727s and 707s. 

We made a distinction between com- 
mercial aircraft and militaiy aircraft, 
such as the C-130s, which we had refused 
to license. In March 1978, however, in a 
signal intended to underline our opposi- 
tion to certain of Libya's policies and cer- 
tain of its activities, the Department of 
State recommended to the Department of 
Commerce that licenses not be issued for 
two Boeing 727s, which were then on 
order for the Libyan Arab Airlines. 

Decisions on matters of this kind are 
always difficult. Significant U.S. com- 
mercial interests are involved, not only in 
the particular sale but in the maintenance 
of a market against increasingly strong 
European competition in commercial air- 
craft. Also market conditions and the 
growth and route structure of Libyan 
Arab Airlines made it clear that use of 
these aircraft was justified economically. 

In June 1978, recommendations from 
within the Department that the Depart- 
ment's earlier decision be reviewed and 
reconsidered were sent to Secretary 
Vance. The Department of Commerce 
supported reconsideration on the basis of 



itjer 1980 



61 



Middle East 



its own economic analysis. During the 
summer, Libya indicated it was ready to 
accede to The Hague convention on 
hijacking — the most important of the 
three international antihijacking con- 
ventions — and it did so formally in Octo- 
ber 1978. Meanwhile Libya agi'eed to 
provide in writing assurances that the 
aircraft involved in the sale would not be 
used for militaiy purposes. This injunc- 
tion was made an actual part of the 
licenses. 

It was finally decided on November 
2, 1978, by both the Departments of State 
and Commerce, following congressional 
consultations, to go foi-ward with this 
sale. In early 1979, consistent with the 
727 decision, the Department of State 
also recommended the sale of three 747s 
to Libya, on condition that similarly 
strict assurances were obtained regard- 
ing their nonmilitaiy use. 

We entertained hopes that these de- 
cisions would not only be commercially 
advantageous but would also open oppor- 
tunities for a more constructive dialogue 
with Libya on issues which have divided 
us. We had candid talks with senior 
Libyan officials in Ti-ipoli in late 1978. 
I met in October 1978 in Washington with 
Libyan Foreign Secretaiy Turayki to 
discuss our relations. However, a new 
development occurred. 

Libyan TVoops. In Februai-y 1979, 
Libyan troops were detected in Uganda, 
supporting Idi Amin's army in its fight 
against the Tanzanians and anti-Idi Amin 
forces. As the Ugandan Army fell back, 
Libya rushed in more troops and 
supplies. Both soldiers, possibly as many 
as 1,500, and militaiy supplies were flown 
to Entebbe on C-130s (those which 
Libya had acquired before the revolution) 
and Boeing 727s. There is no evidence 
that the two 727s sold in 1978, which car- 
ried the specific prohibitions on military 
use, were employed, but others from the 
Libyan Arab Airlines fleet were used. 
These planes were also used in evacuat- 
ing some of the 400-500 Libyan troops 
who were wounded in the fighting. 

WTien these reports were confirmed, 
it left the State Department with no al- 
ternative but to regard the 747s for 
Libya, then being manufactured, as hav- 
ing a "potential significant militaiy appli- 
cation," and in May 1979 the Department 
of State recommended that the Depart- 
ment of Commerce not allow their ex- 
port. These three planes were never 
e.xported. 



Bilateral Discu-ssions. The Libyan 
attitude toward the United States had, 
throughout this period, been ambivalent. 
Col. Qadhafi had, as I have stated, pur- 
sued policies clearly contraiy to our 
interests. But at the same time, he had 
reiterated to private Americans and to 
foreigners, including high foreign offi- 
cials, his desire for better relations with 
the United States. Given our interests in 
the countiy, we believed that we had a 
responsibility to continue to e.xplore 
whether any basis could be found for im- 
proved relations. 

In 1979, and in 1978 to a lesser de- 
gree, we had serious talks at a level 
higher than any that had been agi-eed to 
since the early days of the revolution. In 
January 1979, Ambassador Quainton, who 
is the Director of our Office for Combat- 
ting Terrorism, held talks with the Li- 
byan Foreign Secretaiy and other offi- 
cials in Ti'ipoli and emphasized to them 
that improvement in our bilateral rela- 
tions would depend on changed Libyan 
policies as regards terrorism. On June 17, 
1979, I met in Ti-ipoli with Maj. Jallud, 
who is Col. Qadhafi's deputy. Secretaiy 
Vance met with Libyan Foreign Secre- 
taiy Turayki on October 3, 1979, at the 
U.N. General Assembly for discussions of 
U.S. -Libyan relations. 

All these talks confirmed that wide 
differences still divided our two govern- 
ments but also suggested that Libya 
wanted to find a way to contain those dif- 
ferences and to "agi-ee to disagi'ee." It 
was agi-eed as a result of the conversa- 
tions Isetween Secretaiy Vance and For- 
eign Secretaiy Turayki that discussions 
would be continued at my level. Accord- 
ingly on October 18, Foreign Secretaiy 
Turayki designated the Libyan Ambas- 
sador to the United Nations, Monsieur 
Kikhya, as their point of contact. During 
the last week of October, I arranged to 
meet with him on November 8 in New 
York. 

Diplomatic Missions. In this same 
period, however, changes were taking 
place within the Libyan foreign policy es- 
tablishment. I mentioned earlier Qadha- 
fi's philosophy which said that there 
should not be a government, that rules 
should be in the hands of the people; so 
he began creating a people's liaison office 
under their National People's Congress. 
The foreign policy aspect of that was the 
creation of Libyan People's Bureaus in 
Washington and other major capitals in 
September 1979, replacing regular em- 
bassies as the authority for dealing with 
the United States. Authoritv was increas- 



r 



ingly shifted from Dr. Turayki's Foreign 
Ministiy to the Foreign Liaison Office, 
headed by Ahmed Shahati. All El- 
Houderi, who came to Washington to 
open and to head the People's Bureau in 
September, reports directly to Ahmed 
Shahati in Ti-ipoli. By the end of the yea 
it was apparent that the shift was com 
plete and that the Foreign Liaison Offici 
was to be solely responsible for all deal 
ings with countries where People's 
Bureaus has been established. 

Hostages in Iran. In my Novembei 
8, 1979, meeting with Libya's U.N. Am- 
bassador Kikhya, which occurred just 4 
days after the Tehran hostage crisis had 
begun, I urged that Libya, along with 
many other countries, take a stand 
against the seizure of the hostages. My 
urging was part of our global effort to 
mobilize international opinion and 
pressure. 

While Ambassador Kikhya show ed 
understanding and a helpful attitude, 
other official Libyan statements, includ- 
ing a public call at the Arab Foreign Mil 
isters' meeting in Tunis by the Libyan 
Foreign Secretaiy for a concerted Arab 
boycott action against the United States 
following our freezing of Iranian assets, 
prompted us to weigh in strongly with 
Libyan officials to make the point that 
Libya could not have it both ways. Theif 
public attacks on us and their call for a 
boycott were clearly inconsistent with 
their private and unpublicized criticism -! 
the hostage taking. I informed Ambas- 
sador Kikhya on November 16 that be- 
cause of the position which Libya had 
taken on this issue, we would have to 
postpone the planned talks on our bilat- 
eral relations. Two days later our charge 
in Ti-ipoli made similar representations t 
high officials in both the Foreign Ministn 
and the Foreign Liaison Office. 

On November 22 Libya issued a for- 
mal statement in which the section on 
hostages was helpful, and Col. Qadhafi 
sent a message to President Carter on 
November 29 which indicated that he w 
against the seizure of the hostages and 
would try to be helpful in securing their 
release. 

Attack on U.S. Embassy. The attac 
on our Embassy in Ti'ipoli on December 
2, 1979, turned a new page in our rela- 
tionship. The Libyan mob which attacke 
our Embassy and burned it as our peopl 
withdrew to safety ostensibly was dem- 
onstrating in support of the Iranian rev( 
lution. This event took place, however, 
against a backdrop of other development 
which had caused the temperature to ris 



62 






Department of State Bullet-^ 



Middle East 



parts of the Islamic world. These in- 
hliil not only the hostage crisis and 
! ii ism over our freezing of Iranian as- 
- lait also the takeover temporarily of 
I ;i-and Mosque at Mecca and the burn- 
! iiur Embassy in Islamabad, Pakis- 
ly mobs which had been incited to 
ii:ir the United States for involvement 
ilir desecration of this Islamic shrine. 
Immediately after the December 2 
a ack on uui' Embassy, our efforts con- 
Citrated on getting the Libyans to do 
C'tain things: first, to accept responsibil- 
i f(ir failing to provide adequate secu- 
IV for the Embassy; second, to agi-ee to 
r npensation for damages; and, most im- 
f 'tant, to give assurances about the 
S'Ui'ity of official and nonofficial U.S. 
c zens in Libya. 

We had received high-level assur- 
a es regai'ding the safety of Americans 
i l>ihya just prior to the attack on our 
I li'assy. After the attack, we received 
! \ assurances, but we did not consider 

111 satisfactory in the absence of Col. 
t ihafi's willingness to receive our 
C rge and to establish clear responsibil- 
i1 in the Libyan Government for con- 
t. ts in the case of threats. Our charge 
r ai-ned to Tripoli on December 31, 1979, 
ti ;eek those assurances from Col. Qad- 
b i, but he was still awaiting a meeting 
w en other events unfolded. 



Regional Dispute. In late Januaiy 
0, a commando attack was mounted 
inst the Tunisian city of Gafsa. Ever 
!■ an abortive effort to forge a union 
ween Tunisia and Libya in 1974, Col. 
Ihafi had made clear his opposition to 
ii'gime of President Boui'guiba and 

nffered training and sanctuaiy to 
lisian dissidents. Tiniisia publicly ac- 
'd Libya of planning and suppoi'ting 
raid. Both the United States and 
lice rushed military equipment to 
lisia. In consequence, on February 4, 
Fi-ench Embassy in Ti'ipoli and the 
nch Consulate General in Benghazi 
•e attacked and badly damaged by Li- 
n mobs protesting the alleged pres- 
e of French troops in Timisia. We told 
charge to return to Washington, and 
eft Libya on Febi'uary 8, 1980. 

Intimidation Campaign. Shortly 
•eafter a series of assassinations of 
van citizens in Europe commenced, in 
t appeared to be an effort to stifle 
osition to the regime by Libyan 
es. Libyan public statements cer- 
ly offered strong evidence that these 

wei'e officially sanctioned. 

He)-e in the United States, as in 
ope, an intimidation campaign was 



Iran Chronology, 
August 1980 



August 2 

172 of the Iranian protesters aVrested 
on July 27 in Washington, D.C., are trans- 
ferred to a Federal prison in Otisville, New 
York. 

August .3 

Khomeini charges that the protesters 
are being brutally mistreated by U.S. au- 
thorities. U.S. authorities deny charge. 

August 4 

In retaliation for the alleged mistreat- 
ment of the protesters, Iranian Parliament 
announces it will delay debate on hostage 
issue. 

August 5 

Federal authorities release 171 of the 
protesters. 

August 9 

President Bani-Sadr announces 
Mohamad Ali Rajai, a former mathematics 
teacher, as Prime Minister designate. 

.\ugust 14 

Heads of nine embassies — Australia, 
Austria, Finland, Greece, New Zealand, 
Norway, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland 
— appeal to Iran's Parliament to end the 
hostage crisis. 

Iran's internal security chief. Gen. 
Hossein Fardoust, is reported seen in the 
U.S. shortly before the shooting on July 22 
of Ali Akhar Tahatabai. an Iranian exile. 



U.S. officials stale that it appears that his 
mission was to boost activities in support of 
Khomeini and against his critics. 

August 17 

Because of growing tension in Iran, 
Britain announces temporary closing of its 
embassy. 

Heads of the European Common Mar- 
ket appeal to Iranian Parliament to release 
hostages. 

August US 

Speaker of Iran's Parliament rebuffs 
appeal from diplomats representing four 
U.S. allies — Japan, Italy, Belgium, and the 
Netherlands — to let an international mis- 
sion visit the hostages. 

-August 29 

300th day of eapitivity for U.S. hos- 
tages in Iran. 

.August 30 

Eleven Iranians are e.xecuted for their 
alleged roles in plotting a coup aimed at re- 
storing power to Shahpur Baktiar, last 
Prime Minister under the Shah. Ninety- 
two have been shot for their part in the 
conspiracy and 300 arrested on charges of 
involvement. 

After 2 weeks of disagreements, the 
Islamic Republic Party and Bani-Sadr con- 
fer to break deadlock over the composition 
of a cabinet. 

.August 31 

Iranian Cabinet is announced by Prime 
Minister Rajai but Bani-Sadr disapproves 
of several nominees. ■ 



mounted against Libyan citizens and stu- 
dents resident in this countiy suspected 
by the regime in Ti'ipoli of being dissi- 
dents or of avoiding service to the state. 
We took strong steps to stop this cam- 
paign. We expelled a total of six members 
of the Libyan People's Bureau from the 
United States and insisted that the Li- 
byan mission observe accepted diplomatic 
norms of conduct. 

Assuming, under these circum- 
stances, that we could not safely keep our 
own officials in Libya, we withdrew the 
last two American diplomats from Tripoli 
on May 2, 1980, and temporarily closed 
our Embassy. This does not constitute a 
formal break in relations with Libya, and 
their mission in Washington — the 
People's Bureau — remains open. We de- 
cided, in light of these experiences and 
the apparent unwillingness of Qadhafi to 
receive our charge in Ti-ipoli, that the re- 
lationship should not be put back on a 
more usual basis while present circum- 
stances prevail. 



Meanwhile, as our Embassy remains 
closed, we seek ways to assist and pro- 
tect the private American community in 
Libya. We are in close and continuing 
touch with the American companies 
which have American citizens living in 
that counti-y. 

The intimidation campaign, mean- 
while, remains an issue. Col. Qadhafi 
publicly indicated in June 1980 that the 
campaign was over but seemed to exempt 
the United States and supporters of Is- 
rael. There have been no assassinations 
of Libyans in Europe since June 11, and, 
fortunately, no serious incident has yet to 
occur in the United States. But we con- 
tinue to monitor the situation closely. 

Libya's Attitude. The attitude of 
Qadhafi and his followers toward the 
United States has been ambivalent and 
often self-contradictory. They have seen 
the value of cooperation with American 
companies in the production and market- 
ing of their oil and have recognized the 



i 



ober 1980 



63 



Middle East 



role American citizens have played in 
keeping production high. At the same 
time, in Qadhafi's revolutionaiy philoso- 
phy, the American Government and all it 
stands for is, to quote one of his 
statements, "the embodiment of evil." 
Particularly in international policies, our 
differences are deep. 

It is both in this latter connection 
and consistent with Qadhafi's general 
political theory that government and 
people can be separated, that Libya has 
made efforts over the past 2 years to im- 
prove its ties with nonofficial Americans. 
For example, in October 1978, the Li- 
byans sponsored an "Arab-American 
dialogue." which took the form of bring- 
ing to Libya a large gi-oup of private 
Americans for meetings and discussions 
with senior Libyan officials. Ahmed 
Shahati, head of the Foreign Liaison Of- 
fice, came to this countiy with a goodwill 
delegation in Januaiy 1979 and visited 
several Amei'ican cities, including Wash- 
ington, Atlanta, Miami, New Orleans, 
Los Angeles, San Francisco, Detroit, and 
Moscow (Idaho). A Libyan women's dele- 
gation in March 1979 made a goodwill 
visit to the United States, meeting with 
Americans in Washington, New York, and 
on the west coast. We have to assume 
that such Libyan efforts will be a continu- 
ing feature of Libya's foreign relations 
under Qadhafi. 

For the Future 

As the subcommittee can see, Libya is a 
country where the combination of our im- 
portant interests and the policies of the 
Libyan Government present us continu- 
ally with difficult choices. 

We obviously cannot have satisfac- 
toi-y relations in the face of Libyan- 
supported terrorism practiced against us 
and our friends. While we don't see eye- 
to-eye on how Middle East peace can be 
achieved, in the absence of terrorist ac- 
tions and subversion directed against 
other parties involved, it should be possi- 
ble for our two countries to accept that 
we have differences and proceed on that 
basis — as is the case with other Arab 
countries in the region. 

We cannot reopen our mission in 
Ti-ipoli until we have credible and accept- 
able assurances for the safety of our per- 
sonnel. But at the same time we believe 
it is in our interest to keep the channels 
of communication open with Libya, 
through the People's Bureau in Washing- 
ton and through other channels which 
may be available, such as third countiy 
embassies in Tripoli. 



If the atmosphere can improve, we 
do not exclude the eventual return of our 
American staff to Ti-ipoli, the resumption 
of a dialogue over the differences which 
divide us, and possibly a lessening of our 
restrictions on trade. 

In present circumstances, however, 
our broad interests require that we con- 
tinue efforts to communicate with the Li- 
byan authorities wherever possible, at 
the same time making clear in our spe- 
cific actions and policies our concern over 
many of the attitudes and activities of the 
Libyan regime. ■ 



'The complete transcript of the hear- 
ings will be published by the committee and 
will be available from the Superintendent 
of Documents, U.S. Government Printing 
Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



Tank Sale 
to Jordan 

by Harold H. Saunders 

Statement before the SHbcormiiittee 
1)11 Europe and the Middle East of the 
House Foreign Affairs Committee on 
Jiilji 29, 1980. Mr. Saunders is Assist- 
ant Secretary for Near Eastern and 
South Asian Affairs.^ 

What I would propose to do this after- 
noon is to recall briefly my testimony of 
a year ago when a possible sale of tanks 
to Jordan was an issue and then to 
bring you up to date on developments 
since that time. I then would like to 
summarize the importance of this sale 
for U.S. national security interests and 
for our relations with Jordan. 

Situation Last Summer 

Last summer when I testified on this 
issue, my starting point was the study 
the United States did in the summer of 
1973 to assist Jordan to design a force 
modernization plan, dropping from five 
motorized divisions to four, more mod- 
ern, mechanized and armored divisions. 
In the conte.xt of these four divisions, 
we discussed a maximum of 18 armored 
battalions each with a strength up to 54 
tanks, i.e., a structure identical to a 
U.S. tank battalion. For their own rea- 
sons, the Jordanians settled on an even- 
tual structure of 44 tanks per battalion. 
Implementation of the jjlan was slowed 
by funding constraints, and the Jorda- 
nians limitefl themselves to 16 



battalions — rather than 18 — with 35 
tanks per battalion — instead of even 
44 — in the interim. 

The Jordanian tank fleet consists 
a large number of aging tanks, includ 
ing U.S. M48A1S and British Centur- 
ions. These are tanks of Korean war 
vintage and, after periods of service i 
long as 20 years, the Jordanians wishe 
to replace or upgrade these vehicles. 
They decided to rebuild the Centurions 
The M48s were to have been rebuilt/ 
upgraded in an Iranian facility at Ira- 
nian expense, and we had concurred i 
this plan in 1976. This would have mac 
the M48 a close match for the M60s no 
being offered. The collapse of the Iral 
nian Government foreclosed this optic 1 

Before the Iranian collapse, the 
Jordanians had also begun to considei ,j 
alternative options for completing the 
tank modernization program — rebuild 
in Jordan, or new U.S. tanks and/or 
foreign-source tanks. They engaged ii» 
an extended cost and effectiveness 
study. As an input into the study, thei 
United States was asked whether it 
would supply up to 300 new M60A3 
tanks. We agreed to consult with the 
Congress on that proposal, subject to 
the provision that the older M48 tank^ 
in the Jordanian inventory be retired ' 
an essentially one-for-one basis. The 
Jordanians at the same time explored 
mix of U.S. and foreign-source 
procurement. 

This was the situation when we 
discussed the subject of tanks a year 
ago with the Congress. At that time, 
we briefed on the then current Jorda- 
nian plans to finish equipping the 
existing 16 battalions, i.e., to raise thi 
strength of each battalion from 35 to 4 
tanks in the process of modernizing th 
inventory. We also said that we were 
not prepared to sell the tank thermal 
sight at that time. 



Present Situation 

What has changed since last summer? 
The Jordanians have made two deci- 
sions. One was to buy 274 British 
Chieftain tanks. The other was to re- 
turn to the 18-battalion structure 
originally proposed in our 1973 discus- 
sions. They will mechanize their last 
two infantry brigades, which would re 
quire the armoring of two battalions. 
The four-division structure remains un- 
changed. The Jordanians still intend ti 
dispose of the aging M48s. 

At the April 1980 meeting of the ' 
U.S. -Jordanian Joint Military Commis- |, 
sion, we informed Jordan that we wer(' 






64 



Department of State Bulletr,' 



^ 



Middle East 



■pai-ed to sell 100 M60A3s, subject to 
luressional concurrence, and to con- 
~ I w ith the Congress about the sale of 
; aililitional 100 tanks. We also agreed 
ilTtr the tank thermal sight, which, 
. ( our negative decision about Jor- 
s i-equest a year ago, has been re- 
. Sill to Israel, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, 
ul Korea. At that meeting, Jordan re- 
iitfd an earlier request for U.S. as- 
aiice in finding purchasers for the 
-^ anks and reiterated their intent to 
n\e these tanks from their inven- 
, . In May the Jordanians requested 
MiiOASs to complete their force 
1 li-i'iiization plans. 

;. Interests 

Ah this factual background, I would 
i( • like to turn to the significant ])olicy 
OS underlying this decision. These 
II to me to be three. How are U.S. 
lists served by this sale? What will 
■t he effect of the sale on the regional 
n tary balance? What would be the 
f I't on our interests of a refusal to 
1 I- I he sale? 

We believe this sale is fully con- 
J!?nt with America's interests in the 
■eon. U.S. cooperation with moderate 
•e mes in preserving the integrity and 
;e rity of their own nations is an im- 
1 ant part of the role the United 
IS is expected by its friends to 
•li . A strong American position of this 
;ii in the area serves the interests of 
ill 'ho depend on us for their ultimate 
eirity. 

Jordan has a longstanding policy of 
e ing Jordanian territory to potential 
1 irists. Maintenance of this policy, 
I i,u other sensible Jordanian 
• ifs, is reinforced by U.S. coopera- 

aiid understanding for Jordan's 
J iinate defensive needs and goals. 

loi'dan works actively for the sta- 
1 .■ and security of the states of the 
' ian Gulf and the Arabian Penin- 
il This Jordanian policy conforms to 
iiiwn interests in the region's stabil- 
11(1 in promoting a policy of regional 
^siveness in resisting outside ag- 
I sion. In 1961 Jordan sent troops to 
1 ait to ward off a threatened Iraqi 
mn. Jordan cooperated in the de- 
' of Oman against the 1965-75 
I iiiunist-supiJorted rebellion in 
1 II. Over 1,000 Jordanian military 
(i-s are actively serving in the 
isula states, and more than 10,000 
ii-y personnel from this area have 
I rained in Jordanian facilities. 
nu his recent visit to Washington, 
Hussein reaffirmed his willingness 



to respond, if called on for help by the 
peninsula states. The effectiveness of 
Jordan's assistance, which closely sup- 
ports our interests, is directly related 
to both Jordan's own military strength 
and the close military relationship 
which Jordan is perceived as having 
with the United States. 

We disagree with Jordan about the 
merits of the Camp David process. The 
recent meetings between the President 
and King Hussein, however, reaffirmed 
the fact that Jordan supports Resolu- 
tion 242 and wants a comprehensive 
peace with Israel. Jordan's attitude will 
be critically important to bringing 
about a West Bank settlement which 
we would find acceptable. As we work 
toward the goal of a comprehensive 
peace, it is essential that we preserve 
and protect our relations of trust and 
cooperation with Jordan — something 
which we will have greater difficulty 
doing if we do not continue our 
longstanding cooperation with them in 
maintaining their legitimate defensive 
strength. 

We have examined carefully the 
question of the military balance, both 
between Jordan and Israel and in the 
broader regional context. Let me 
briefly take you through the numbers. 

• The present Jordanian tank force 
numbers 673 tanks, including 283 M48 
tanks, 308 British Centurions, and 82 
M60Als. 

• The Jordanians have on order 274 
British Chieftains. If the Chieftains 
were added to the existing inventory, 
the total would be 947 tanks, i.e., more 
than the Jordanians want. 

• They are, however, planning to 
dispose of the M48s. 

• If they add the 100 tanks which 
you are considering today and dispose 
of the M48s, they will have an inven- 
tory of 749 tanks, consisting of 293 up- 
graded Centurions (15 Centurion tanks 
will be used in the upgrading process), 
274 Chieftains, 82 M60Als, and 100 
M60A3s. That is 76 more tanks than 
they have right now and fewer than 
they actually have on hand and on order 
combined. It is also fewer than the 972 
envisioned in the 1973 study. 

• If we go forward with the sale of 
the second 100 tanks, a decision which 
is still under review, the total impact of 
both sales would be 150 more tanks 
than Jordan presently has on the 
gi-ound. This is not, nor can it be, a sig- 
nificant threat to Israel; it is, nonethe- 
less, a substantial contribution to Jor- 
dan's defense capability and to regional 
stabilitv. 



Iraq and Syria have both qualita- 
tively and quantitatively increased 
their tank forces. In fact, this has been 
a primary reason for Jordan's continued 
modernization. Furthermore, even 
when Jordan's tank forces are added to 
those of other Arab countries, one must 
realize that Isi-ael has also expanded 
and modernized its tank forces since 
1973 and continues to enjoy an over- 
whelming superiority against all likely 
adversaries. Equally important is our 
judgment that Jordan has no offensive 
intentions, that it is a small country 
outnumbered by all its major 
neighbors, and that its forces moderni- 
zation plan, long under way, is both 
prudent and reasonable. 

In considering this sale, you must 
also contemplate the effects of our re- 
fusal or your rejection. In that context, 
it should be I'emembered that the 
British Chieftain tank, purchased by 
Jordan last year and which Jordan 
could again purchase, is at least a com- 
parable vehicle to the M60A3 and has 
features, such as gun size and engine 
power, superior to the M60A3. The 
policy cjuestion we have to address is 
not whether Jordan will obtain more 
modern tanks but who will supply them 
and under what conditions. Consider 
the following. 

• A U.S. sale to Jordan bolsters a 
key bilateral relationship and carries 
with it restraints (on transfer to third 
countries, for example), while acquisi- 
tion of tanks from another country 
would carry few or no restraints. 

• In the context of the M60 sale, 
Jordan has agreed to replace its M48s 
on a one-for-one basis and intends, in 
fact, to pha.se out virtually all its M48s. 
Working with the Jordanians we have 
already identified three friendly coun- 
tries whose combined requests for 
tanks exceed Jordan's M48 inventory. 
Serveral other purchasers are also 
possible. 

An effort to "punish" Jordan by 
withholding our consent to this sale will 
not prevent the acquisition of tanks, 
but it will do serious damage to a key 
bilateral relationship and to our efforts 
to work with Jordan for regional secu- 
rity and stability. 

In summary, the sale is a clear 
demonstration that we are capable of 
recognizing and supporting our inter- 
ests in the stability and security of the 
region as a whole and supporting these 
interests. Jordan performs a critically 
important security role in cooperation 
with kev states of the Persian Gulf re- 



ber 1980 



65 



Middle East 



gion, thus serving U.S. interests di- 
rectly and indirectly. The United 
States must maintain a close working 
relationship with Jordan in the present 
and future interest of peace. This can 
only be done if we are jirepared to re- 
spond in a reasonable way to reasonable 
Jordanian requests for cooperation in 
areas vital to Jordan's own security. 

We have not provided all that Jor- 
dan has requested; however, close 
Jordanian-U.S. working relationships 
have reinforced the inclination of the 
Jordanian Armed Forces to look to the 
West, and the United States particu- 
larly, for advice, training, and military 
orientation. For the United States to 
turn away from this relationship would 
clearly diminish our capacity to influ- 
ence Jordan's future policies, political 
and military, and to serve our broad, 
enduring national interests in an impor- 
tant region of the world. 



'The complete transcript of the hear- 
ings will be published bv the committee and 
will be available from the Superintendent 
of Documents, U.S. Government Printing 
Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



U.S.-Jordan 
Relationship 

by Morris Draper 

Stati'tiicHt before the Siihcoitniiiftei' 
oil Em-ope and the Middle East of the 
House Foreign At'fairs Coiinnittee on 
AHgusf i7, 1980. Mr. Draper is Depiiti/ 
Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern 
and South Asian Affairs.^ 

I welcome the opportunity to testify 
before this subcommittee on the his- 
torically close U.S. -Jordanian relation- 
ship as well as on the important role the 
United States e.xpects Jordan to play in 
the region in the years ahead. To begin 
with, I would like to review briefly 
U.S. policies toward Jordan and U.S. 
interests in a moderate, stable govern- 
ment which remains ready to make 
peace on the basis of Security Council 
Resolution 242, Jordan's attitude to- 
ward peacemaking, and how our 
policies toward Jordan fit into the 
tumultuous period in which King Hus- 
sein has led his country, along with our 
expanding interests in the region and 
the changing circumstances there. 



U.S. Interests in and 
Policies Toward Jordan 

A succession of American Administra- 
tions has believed that we .should work 
particularly closely with moderate and 
like-minded governments such as Jor- 
dan to preserve their integrity, to 
strengthen their abilities to pursue in- 
dependent policies, and to expand their 
capacity to respond constructively to 
inevitable change. Our friends in turn 
expect us to respond positively and 
fairly to their legitimate concerns and 
interests, as well as to some of their 
honest grievances. We believe that the 
success of moderate policies will affect 
the political nature of the region in a 
useful way and will reinforce the con- 
cept of resolving problems — both inter- 
nal and international— through negotia- 
tion and compromise rather than 
through conflict and confrontation. 

American policy toward Jordan, 
particularly in the last decade, there- 
fore, has been centered on the following 
major elements. 

• We intend to assist Jordan in 
maintaining its independence, its integ- 
rity, and its freedom to make decisions 
of its own, despite influences and pres- 
sures exerted by other states. 

• In return we will want a reason- 
able degree of Jordanian cooperation in 
seeking to realize our long-term policy 
goals of peace, stability, and security 
for the area. 

• We will do what we can to rein- 
force Jordan's willingness and ability to 
join in a negotiated, comprehensive 
Middle East peace settlement based on 
Securitv Council Resolutions 242 and 
338. 

• At the present stage, we will try 
to set the stage for Jordan's possibly 
more active involvement in the peace 
process at an early future moment. 
Such an opportunity could arise fol- 
lowing a satisfactory completion of 
negotiations for a self-governing au- 
thority in the West Bank and Gaza. 

• We will continue to encourage 
Jordan's determination to preserve 
peace along the long border with Israel 
and the occupied territories. 

• We will encourage Jordan in its 
useful role of helping to preserve sta- 
bility in the gulf region, including 
Yemen, through its current programs 
involving the training of gulf military 
personnel and the seconding to certain 
gulf states of Jordanian military and se- 
curity advisers. In this connection we 
have noted King Hussein's willingness 
to provide Jordanian forces on a limited 
scale for deterrent or defensive 



purposes — if called upon for help — in 
periods of challenge and tension. 

• We will want to manage our ec 
nomic and military assistance prograi 
in such a way as to make it clear to Jo 
dan it need not depend — to a possibl.\ 
unacceptable degree — upon the assist 
ance of states which might want to 
exact politically difficult demands. 

• We will want to continue — 
through the military assistance pro- 
gram, training programs, and the Joi 
Military Commission — a relationship 
with Jordan's military establishment, 
based on mutual trust and confidence 
which will reinforce and preserve Jor 
dan's present major dependence on tl 
United States and the West for 
weaponry, for training, and for milita 
doctrine and orientation. It is reason^ 
able to assist Jordan in satisfying its 
legitimate defensive needs. 

• We will want to maintain a con I 
structive economic assistance prograM 
which will advance the day when Jor; 
dan will be self-supporting and whicli 
meanwhile, will contribute to the : 
strengthening of Jordan's institutions 
and stability. 

• We will encourage Jordan to 
maintain good cooperative relationshi 
with the other moderate governmentli 
and to pursue foreign and domestic 
policies aimed at enhancing stability 
the region. 

• We will continue to acknowledj 
in appropriate ways the contribution 
Jordan has been making in providing? 
opportunity — political and economic 
to the Palestinian element of its total* 
population. 

• We intend to work constructive 
with Jordan for the fair and efficient 
use of vital water resources in the ar? 

<'■ 

Jordan's Attitudes 3 

Toward Peacemaking J 

King Hussein is a member of a small 
handful of Arab statesmen who have 
persistently applied real and serious 
thought to ways of securing a com- 
prehensive Arab-Israeli peace on hori 
orable terms. President Sadat of Egy" 
and President Bourguiba of Tunisia a 
others. All— Hussein included— have 
suffered bitter and unfair criticism, a 
well as political ostracism, for their 
courage and convictions. All have bee 
ready to accept the reality of Israel an 
to recognize Israel's genuine security 
needs. 

Following the 1967 Arab-Israeli 
war, Jordan adhered to Security Coui 



66 



Department of State BuH^ 



MILITARY AFFAIRS 



Resolution 242 as the basis for a set- 
nent and has stuck to that position 
r since; it cooperated with U.N. 
bassador Jarring's mediatory efforts 
ler that resolution; and it accepted 
thrust of the so-called Rogers plan. 

In 1972 Jordan floated a pro])osal 
a "United Arab Kingdom" encom- 
sing the West and East Banks, 
ile it met strong opposition, the con- 
t would have to be viewed by any 
active observer as a serious effort to 
jlve one of the more sensitive prob- 
s in an overall Arab-Israeli peace 
;lement. 

Following the 1973 war, Jordan 
ported the initial, limited disen- 

iment agreements in the Sinai and 

n Heights; however, it made clear 
-eservations about the potentially 
sive implications — in the Arab 
lid — of the second Egyptian-Israeli 
(ngagement agreement. Jordan ap- 
fed ready, in principle, to e.xplore a 
re lanian-Israeli disengagement, but 
It ling materialized. 

In 1978 Jordan decided it could not 
■|it the invitation to join the process 
I saged in the Camp David accords; 

I irt it was worried about "partial and 

II niplete" settlements. We, of course, 
li gree with Jordan about the merits 
)f le Camp David approach. But there 
s ) misunderstanding between us on 
hfact that Jordan still wants a fair 

IT just peace based on the principles 
'f ecurity Council Resolution 242. 
J Hussein has made clear to us — as 
,is in his recent talks in Washington 
iM his address to the National Press 
I ) — that he will remain skeptical 
.bit the Cam]j David process but 
ipi-mindefl about unfolding develop- 
nt ts. Under certain circumstances, he 
vi consider involving Jordan more ac- 
i\ly in peacemaking efforts. 
Consistently since Camp David, 
Hussein has advised his fellow 
bs not to be bound by ideological 
mients. He has, instead, urged 
n to develop an alternative to the 
p David route which, however. 
Id be peaceful, jjragmatic, and 
ible to all parties. He has stressed 
the Arab states must e.xhibit an at- 
e of reasonableness in lieu of rigid 
tivism if an honorable end to the 
Israeli conflict is to be achieved. 
We believe it is important to sus- 
this pragmatic and open-minded at- 
le until developments in the peace 
jtiations turn what we hope will be 
w and fresh page and offer oppor- 
ties for accelerated progress. 



Arms Coproduction 



by Matthew Nimetz 

Addresfi before the A7nerica)i De- 
fense Preparedness Association iyi Ar- 
lington, Virginia, on July 15, 1980. 
Mr. Nimetz is Under Secretary for 
Security Assistance, Science, and 
Technology. 

I want to talk to you this morning about 
an evolution in one aspect of our securi- 
ty assistance relationship with other 
countries around the world, and that is 
the trend toward coproduction. I will 
emphasize at the outset that this trend 
is driven not only by military considera- 
tions but also by political and economic 
realities. Policies have not created the 
trends but are of necessity responding 
to them. 

With our NATO allies we face the 
specific task of achieving the most effec- 
tive combat forces possible, given 
limited resources and a relentlessly 
growing Soviet military power. The 
goals of rationalization, standardization, 
and interoperability (RSI) have been im- 
posed to achieve the most effective 
mobilization of our Western defense 
assets, which on the battlefield may 
mean survival or destruction. So the 
overriding justification of RSI, with its 
cooperative development and production 



programs within NATO, is essentially 
military. 

In the context of history, the trend 
toward coproduction is an evolution that 
has developed with the economies of our 
Western allies. It has been a long time 
now since we provided our ravaged 
friends Marshall plan economic aid and 
surplus military equipment from our 
World War II stocks. As you know, that 
grant program was followed by the de- 
velopment of foreign military sales 
(FMS) commercial and government-to- 
government transactions on either a 
cash or loan basis, with the gradual 
phasing out of the military assistance 
program (MAP). The war-torn econo- 
mies we once bolstered have now be- 
come major competitors with us in the 
arms industry. 

For U.S. manufacturers, the growth 
of European industry translates into a 
loss of assured markets and, especially 
in the aerospace industry, competition 
with international consortia of com- 
panies backed by European govern- 
ments. This trend to consortia-produced 
systems reflects the high costs and tech- 
nological complexity involved, among 
other factors. 

Faced with the political and econom- 
ic realities of modern Europe, we must 
conclude that we have two choices; 



What Kind of .Jordan 
Do We Want? 

It would be short-sighted and irrespon- 
sible of us to play down the potential 
role of Jordan in contributing to area 
peace and stability. 

Jordan will be an indispensable 
partner to a comprehensive peace and 
to an accommodation to Israel's critical 
security requirements. Active Jorda- 
nian cooperation will be essential in 
dealing with the Palestinian problem, 
including its political and refugee di- 
mensions, among others. 

We want Jordan to continue its 
useful advisory and training activities 
in the gulf region and to continue to act 
as a responsive and responsible ally of 
moderate Arab leaders. 

Broad American interests will be 
served well through a continuing, close 
partnership of the kind that has existed 
for most of the years of King Hussein's 
stewardship. This requires, however, 
that we continue our sound relationship 



in the military field and consult reg- 
ularly and systematically about Jor- 
dan's legitimate defensive require- 
ments. We cannot expect them to take 
decisions which they believe would 
compromise their national security, but 
we can work with them for prudent 
programs which will not upset the basic 
military balance. 

In the conduct of our relationship, 
we should not try to force proven 
friends of the past into adopting our 
preferred tactics of the moment. This 
might be worth trying if we had funda- 
mental differences over our ultimate 
goal, but the goal of a just and full 
peace is common to both Jordan and the 
United States. Our relationship must 
revolve about our common interests 
and our common, long-term objectives. 



'The complete transcript of the hear- 
ings will be published by the committee and 
will be available from the Superintendent 
of Documents, U.S. Governmenting Print- 
ing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



3ber 1980 



67 



Military Affairs 



Either we cooperate in some way, 
tlirough licensing, shared research and 
development, and coproduction, ot-we 
try to go it alone on both sides o*" the 
Atlantic. The days of wholesale accer ■ 
ance of American finished products, util- 
izing advanced and unmatchable technol- 
ogy', have just about ended in Europe 
and even elsewhere around the world. 
Everyone wants a piece of the pie and 
will strike the deal that gives him the 
biggest slice. But I would remind you 
that the pie is a large and expanding 
one— the NATO market accounts for 
over 60% of the free world total of mili- 
tary expenditures. 

Allied Cooperation 

Within a NATO context our recognition 
of the need for military effectiveness, 
along with these politico-economic real- 
ities, is incorporated in our cooperative 
arms projects, which range from licens- 
ing, through cooperative research and 
development to the projected "families 
of weapons" for the late 1980s and 
1990s. 

Have our cooperative projects been 
successful thus far? The answer to that 
is a qualified yes. RSI has not achieved 
the savings it might in an ideal world 
where all duplicative research and 
development would be eliminated, along 
with all duplicative production; nor has 
it achieved the complete rationalization 
of allied logistics. But coproduction has 
achieved improved battlefield com- 
patibility and savings in both cost and 
development time. An example is the 
ROLAND air-to-air missile system, 
developed through Franco-German 
cooperation and bought by the U.S. Ar- 
my in 1975. By agreeing to coproduce 
the ROLAND, the United States 
acknowledged that it would not spend 
the money to develop a comparable 
state-of-the-art weapons system when it 
had the capability to do so, but which 
perhaps would not have been within the 
desired timeframe. 

From a general comparison of esti- 
mates, it would appear that the United 
States saved at least $,500 million in de- 
velopment costs and several years in 
drawing board to production'time, and 
these are conservative estimates. We 
have achieved general equipment com- 
monality, which means interoperability 
and standardization on the battlefield. 
Euromissile, the Franco-German devel- 
oper, received an infusion of licensing 
fees, and we received a share of the jobs 



and the profits. The families of weapons, 
the air-to-air missile systems, and the 
antitank guided weaponry now under de- 
velopment for the late 1980s are to use 
the best technology available in the 
alliance but will be coproduced on both 
sides of the Atlantic. 

This means that U.S. industry will 
compete; we will not make all of the 
profits, but we will share in the profits 
as will our European partners. So our 
cooperative projects are very much a 
part of our planning for the future. In 
pursuing them we are conscious of the 
need to work with U.S. industry to in- 
sure fair procedures, good opportunities 
for investment and sales, and a better 
feel for the international competitive 
situation. 

One reality of NATO arms coopera- 
tion is the Europeans' desire for third- 
country sales. For reasons which are 
familiar to you, such as the need for a 
large enough production run to justify 
initial investment and to maintain a vi- 
able industry, the Europeans believe 
they need to be able to sell coproduced 
weapons to non-NATO markets. In rec- 
ognition of this, our effort is to channel, 
in full cooperation with the governments 
of NATO, those third-country sales into 
areas and to countries that will be con- 
sistent with our worldwide interests and 
those of our NATO allies. 

We are conscious of our global re- 
sponsibilities to restrain the arms trade 
and to maintain stability in troubled 
regions. On this issue, we and the Euro- 
peans diflFer somewhat in approach: Gen- 
erally the Europeans desire to maximize 
third-country sales, while it is U.S. 
Government policy to temper the export 
drive with foreign policy-motivated 
restraint. It is not inconceivable that 
without cooperative projects the Euro- 
peans would go off entirely on their 
own. While they have this right, we 
believe that all our interests are better 
served through cooperation. 

Another reality is that with coopera- 
tive development there may be less 
research and development to go around, 
certainly less for any one type of weap- 
on system. We hope the research and 
development will be better, by virtue of 
focusing the dollars and talent on the 
priority areas— not difflised and poorly 
utilized. But because there may be less 
to go around, industry will have to do 
even better than in the past. We will 
assuredly see more coproduction, more 
licensed production, more cooperation 
with our allies and friends, even more 
offsets, which are all part of the growing 
competitiveness of the international pro- 
duction and sale of weapons today. We 



must all, government officials and indi 
trialists alike, think as broadly and fie 
ibly as is possible to meet the challeng 
of the decade ahead. 



Impact on Developing Countries 

I have spoken briefly about the proble 
and benefits of coproduction with our 
allies, which include Japan, Australia, 
New Zealand, and other special friend) 
Within these countries, economic and 
political pressures may work to create 
an overly large industrial capacity for 
the production of certain items, leadin 
in turn to the inevitable pressure to fii 
export markets. But the issue of coprc 
duction has a new dimension when we 
examine its effects on lesser developeo, 
countries. We are now seeing our Eurt 
pean friends and the United States, an 
even the Soviet Union, sharing techno ■ 
ogy and coproducing weapons with then 
less developed countries (LDCs). 

Very simply, there is a worldwide 
trend of increased production of weap' 
ons by an increasing number of coun- 
tries. Over 30 nations are now produci 
arms for their use, and the number is 
growing each year. This trend is not 
confined just to Western European am 
Warsaw Pact states and China but is 
spreading to middle-tier and lesser de- 
veloped countries. Major combat sys- 
tems are now being produced by Argen 
tina, Brazil, Egypt, India, Israel, Nort 
Korea, South Korea, Pakistan, Singa- 
pore, South Africa, Taiwan, and Yugo- 
slavia. Arms production by all LDCs is> 
about 5% of the world's yearly total; it< 
has grown from $1 billion in 1969 to a 
present figure of more than $5 billion. 
This is not a small sum, especially con-> 
sidering the demands for developments 
resources. 

Some of the industrialization in tha 
lesser developed counti-ies has been in 
high-technology civilian sectors, but for 
weapons they have mainly produced sir 
pie, rugged, reliable, and practically de 
signed systems. Some of the weapons 
production, though, has become quite 
complex, reflecting a substantial infusio 
of advanced technology. Less developeo 
countries are now building destroyers 
and frigates, jet fighters, antitank 
missiles, submarines, and main battle 
tanks. And some will soon be in the 
missile business. 

Indigenous weapons production is 
considered important by some develop- 
ing nations for a number of reasons. 
Among these are: •'. 

, . . . , "■-'* 

• Increasmg their mternational 

prestige; 



a 



68 



Department of State Bullets 



Military Affairs 



• Enhancing their security; 

• Saving foreign exchange; 

• Training workers for other in- 
itrial skills; 

Reversing the "brain drain"; 

Moving from buying to assembling 
producing to selling; 

Exerting a regional influence; and 

Ending their dependence on 
ers. 

Let me cite a couple of examples. In- 
after its independence, procured 
it of its weapons from abroad (the 
Ited Kingdom and the United States 
finally, then the Soviet Union) but 
n joined the trend toward coproduc- 
, primarily with the United Kingdom 
France. In the late 1970s, the 
iets, in spite of their secretiveness, 
9red the coproduction scheme by way 
A ompetitive bidding against Western 
re grnments and industry. Recently, In- 
ii signed a very large arms purchase 
H ?ement with the Soviet Union, which 
.V probably lead to coproduction of 
iC e very sophisticated weapons. Inci- 
k ;ally, India's construction of a space- 
ai ;ch vehicle is a good example of the 
IS of civilian technology which has ap- 
)li itions for military systems. 

Brazil is another good example. The 
ii dlians have improved their capability 
ic to the point where, from totally in- 
« al sources, Brazil was able to pro- 
It ' and sell armored combat vehicles 
jveral lesser developed countries, 
rhe point I want to make here is 
h the so-called lesser developed coun- 
ri ; are modernizing fast, and the com- 
m d growth of their defense industries 
in the accompanying growth of their 
nl istructure make it possible for many 
if lem now to produce for export. 

[n looking at 10 major arms pro- 
!u Ts from among the LDCs which 

■ received technological assistance, 
scs, or coproduction agreements, we 

n that of 40 major weapons systems 
■' -j: produced by those 10 countries, 26 
t ' accomplished with help from the 
' liiped industrial states. 
The suppliers to these 26 projects 
•: fiiur from the United States, six 
1 the United Kingdom, five from 

■ lie, four from West Germany, and 
n from the Soviet Union. Interest- 
in a couple of cases one LDC 

■il another. In 10 cases the LDCs 
need the major weapons systems 
iselves from internal resources, 
liilities, and manpower. 
Viiu can see from this that a little 
tance can go a long way— be it 
ary coproduction or dual-use civilian 
•iiiilogy. And major suppliers tend to 



at least seek to maintain their relation- 
ships by continuing to supply still more 
advanced technology and improvement 
packages to the LDCs. 

In this competitive world we see this 
trend continuing— licensing and copro- 
duction are a way to protect an export- 
ing nation's economic interests, as well 
as the interests of a particular company. 
We must recognize that in many cases, 
unless one is willing to consider these 
types of arrangements, someone else 
will; or the LDCs will do it themselves. 

The problem for the LDC in all this 
is to find a balance between civilian and 
military needs, and within the defense 
sector, between buying weapons and 
producing its own. This is not an easy 
decision when you consider; 

• What are the LDCs' other societal 
and industrial needs? Will building an 
arms industry unnecessarily upset the 
precarious balance among economic sec- 
tors? 

• Will an arms industry drain valu- 
able cash and assets (people and raw 
materials) away from other priorities? 

• Will an arms industry upset neigh- 
boring countries and contribute to 
regional instability? 

• Will an internal arms industry 
really give a country prestige, regional 
dominance, and enhanced security? 
Might it not make for vulnerability in- 
stead? 

• Will an arms industry create new 
pressures for exports in a highly com- 
petitive field? Is this not a competition in 
which the LDC is likely to fare badly, 
leaving the government the embarrass- 
ing and expensive choice between aban- 
doning or subsidizing a failing domestic 
arms industry? 

It is also clear that in weighing 
these factors, the country that opts for 
coproduction will not always make the 
most economically feasible choice be- 
tween buying and coproducing. In fact, 
even a highly developed nation might 
pay twice as much per copy of a major 
item to gain the industrial development 
benefits from coproduction. 

U.S. Concerns 

In my view, we need to think about the 
policy issues we will all face because of 
the proliferation of conventional arms 
production. When we speak about "pro- 
liferation," we commonly refer to nucle- 
ar matters. But we must also be con- 
cerned about the security and destabi- 
lizing risks of conventional arms prolif- 
eration. This should be particularly on 



our agenda because we advanced coun- 
tries supply the technology, the licenses, 
the turnkey factories, the education, and 
training that provides the lesser devel- 
oped countries with the ability to go into 
large-scale arms production. But of the 
major suppliers only the United States 
has a comprehensive arms transfer 
policy. 

We are most concerned that weap- 
ons and weapons-production prolifer- 
ation could lead to increasingly unstable 
regions. While we support economic 
development and technology transfer 
generally, we take a somewhat more 
cautious approach to the flow of new or 
advanced technology with military appli- 
cations except to allied countries; and 
we scrutinize carefully arrangements 
that significantly expand arms industry 
capabilities of others. We in goverment 
recognize these responsibilities and take 
the most sophisticated approach we can 
toward our arms transfer restrictions, to 
insure that their application fully ac- 
counts for the changing realities. 

Another implication of the politically 
motivated decision by more and more 
countries to establish their own arms in- 
dustries is that arms manufacturing 
capacity is likely to become excessive to 
real needs, leading in turn to untram- 
meled efforts to export, which will upset 
regional balances and afi'ect our own 
security and foreign policy. 

Another of our major concerns is the 
risk to U.S. or allied forces during mili- 
tary operations worldwide. We have 
heard of the problems of protecting the 
oil-shipping lanes from fast patrol boats 
armed with surface-to-surface missiles, 
but we must recognize that our carrier 
task forces could also be faced with 
threats from smaller countries and even 
terrorists, utilizing advanced weapon 
systems, possibly nuclear weapons. The 
growth of missile technology in these 
countries is also alarming. Earlier this 
year, China tested the intercontinental 
capabilities of its ballistic missile, and 
others no doubt will soon have this 
capacity. When the yearning and capaci- 
ty to develop advanced delivery systems 
is added to the nuclear proliferation 
problem, we see real grounds for con- 
cern ahead. 

This is a very complicated area. We 
have many friends around the world 
who have a legitimate security need for 
coproduction and a stable economic and 
political base on which to build. We 
want to accommodate them whenever 
possible, within reason. We also under- 
stand that some sales will be made 
anyway, and that coproduction is a re- 
quirement of the acquiring country. We 



lober 1980 



69 



OCEANS 



also recognize that there is a difference 
between limited coassembly, partial co- 
production, and wholesale transfer of 
sensitive technology. 

We do not take a doctrinaire ap- 
proach to this problem. Exceptions to 
our general policy against coproduction 
are possible. Each such arrangement is, 
of course, considered on its merits and 
for its contribution to the national in- 
terest. And national interest must be 
seen in the long as well as in the short 
term. We have found that some flexibili- 
ty in our sales policy can work to our 
advantage. We are looking carefully at 
the goals we seek and balancing them 
against our policy of restraint. 

The President alone can make ex- 
ceptions and will do so if such an excep- 
tion is in the national interest. In 
January he decided to make an excep- 
tion to allow U.S. firms to develop a 
fighter solely for export— a quite major 
exception to Presidential Determination 
13. In coproduction, he has made some 
13 exceptions to our policy of no 
coproduction. 

An important baseline to recall here 
is that the arms transfer limitations of 
our policy do not apply in any manner to 
NATO states, Japan, Australia, or New 
Zealand (a market encompassing close to 
70% of non-Communist military expend- 
itures); there are no dollar ceilings and 
no prohibitions on coproduction. The one 
limit that remains is that to which I 
have alluded earlier— third-country 
transfers. Just as with U.S. firms, if 
U.S. -origin technology goes into a 
weapons system, then the U.S. Govern- 
ment, for policy reasons and because of 
a congressional mandate, must carefully 
review proposed transfers. Some U.S. 
firms have argued that for the govern- 
ment to allow coproduction puts them at 
a competitive disadvantage, as the Euro- 
peans can more easily market, but I dis- 
agree. It is not our policy to permit 
European sales to countries to which we 
would we would not at the same time 
perm.it U.S. firms to sell. In other 
words, if one competes, we want every- 
one to compete on an equal basis. 

Conclusion 

Where, then, does this leave us? First, 
on the NATO side, we can see some 
trends. Rationalization, standardization, 
and interoperability (RSI) has a solid 
foothold, and I believe has solid public, 
congressional, and industry support. The 
family of weapons concept has taken 
hold, as have codevelopment, coproduc- 
tion, and industrial teaming. 



Ocean Development 
in the 1 980s 



hy Thomas R. Pickering 

.4(/r/rt'.s.s heforc the Sntmual Ocean 
I iidiitifries Associdfiiiii in Waaliiiigton , 
DC., oil March 11, insn. Mr. Pickcr- 
iiifl /.s Assi.'^taiit Sccrctd)-!/ fur Oceans 
and I ntcrnafional E nrlriin iiicntal anil 
Scieniific Affairs. 

It is a pleasure to be with you at your 
Eighth Annual Meeting. Your theme, 
"The 1980s: Decade for Ocean De- 
velopment," is timely and places you in 
good company. As you know, last year 
53 Members of the Congress broached 
the concept of the 1980s as a decade of 
ocean resource use and management in 
a letter to the President. The idea is 
now under study by the Administration 
and by the presidentially ap])ointed Na- 
tional Advisory Committee on Oceans 
and Atmosphere. 

By whatever name we give to these 
endeavor.s — whether it be the decade of 



ocean development, the flecade of oc( 
resource use and management, or a 
name yet to be coined — I believe we 
all striving to attain a common goal. 
That goal is the development of mar 
resources, through the encourageme 
of private enterprise, in a manner th 
protects the marine environment am 
equitably accommodates the often co 
peting demands on ocean space. 

Certainly, that is a principal goa 
the bureau which I head in the Depa 
ment of State — the Bureau of Ocean 
and International Environmental ano 
Scientific Affairs. We are charged w- 
handling a wide variety of internatioul 
oceans issues pertinent to your themi 
These include fisheries negotiations 
ocean management matters concerne 
\Aith marine scientific research, marl 
mammals, marine pollution, and pola 
affairs. We also have responsibilities! 
with regard to the third U.N. Confe 
ence on the Law of the Sea, which is 



] 



But our task is to take into account 
the realities of the trends in coproduc- 
tion and adjust and channel our energies 
to the reality of what is happening in 
the world. We want to assure greater 
predictability to industry and cooperat- 
ing governments. We have, therefore, in 
certain cases, established sales ter- 
ritories to allow sales to all NATO coun- 
tries; this builds in stability and predic- 
tability which helps industry to plan. Ad- 
ditionally, where and when possible we 
are approving sales territories for sales 
to countries outside NATO. 

In reaching our decisions we focus 
not on abstractions but on the sensitivity 
of technology that needs to be con- 
trolled. Does it make sense for us to 
control the sale of a tank because it has 
U.S. paint or even tank treads? We are 
considering waiving export reviews of 
items containing low-level technology. 
Similarly, we expect European govern- 
ments to waive their restrictions on U.S. 
coproduced items containing European 
technology. We are more and more con- 
cerned about the economics of major 
arms sales, including the impact of oflFset 
arrangements on our balance-of- 
payments position. 

With these trends in mind, it is up 
to both government and industry to 



adapt to the changing nature of global 
arms sales. Even with our NATO allie- 
we must be aware of the problems in 
volved in the difficult partnership ahead 
And with regard to the less developedi 
countries, we must keep in mind the 
host of new problems, as well as bene- 
fits, that arms coproduction brings. 
Given the trends in the world today, iti 
our task to work together in this coun-* 
try, government and industry, to chaiw 
nel these trends into productive 
endeavors to the United States and foi 
the other countries concerned. 

That is why we are attempting to ' 
fine-tune our arms transfer restraint 
policy, and why we are working with 
others in cooperative projects. We are ' 
looking not to short-term maximization 
but to the long-term health of our de- 
fense industry and American economic, 
political, and security interests. In fact, I 
it is one of the accomplishments of this ' 
Administration that we have made such. 
progress in developing cooperative 
weapons projects, as well as maintaininj 
a responsible restraint policy. So I urge 
you to work with us in the coming 
decade to maintain the superiority of 
our industry, both qualitative and quan-| 
titative, in the context of a more com- 
petitive world and a period of height- 
ened risks for our country. ■ 



70 



DRnarlment ^f c;tatP Rnllfc^ 



Oceans 



isently meeting at the United Na- 
ns in New Yori<. At the conclusion of 
I Law of the Sea Conference, my 
•eau will be responsible for the 
eip:n policy follovvu|) and 
)lementation. 
During the past year we have been 
aged in an analysis of likely trends 
I related national objectives in ocean 
lirs during the 1980s. I would like to 
re with you some of our thoughts on 
se matters, particularly as they re- 
' to the development and manage- 
nt of ocean resources. I look forward 
'our comments on our analysis in the 
?ussion period after the.se remarks. 
We see that, whether or not a 
Ea of the sea treaty is concluded, 
aiiciples are evolving that will be ap- 
jjahle to the development and man- 
iment of ocean resources. Chief 
1 iiig these is the growing trend to- 
V (I coastal state control over e.xplor- 
1 exploiting, conserving, and man- 
lu both the living and nonliving 
iLirces of the seabed, subsoil, and 
H, Tjacent waters out to 200 nautical 
s from the coast. Coastal state con- 
n\er other activities such as the 
'1 iuction of energy from the water 
ir winds would also be asserted. Be- 
•a;e most of the presently exploitable 
•eiurces of the oceans are found 
viiin 200 nautical miles of the coast, 
ii ng the 1980s the majority of ocean 
■e urce activities will be carried out 
ir 'r the regulation and control of na- 
ic:il governments, although we in the 
I I' Department will necessarily be 
lUi'd because of the |)oteiitial for 
iitr and conflict which these ac- 
its could engender. 

Heries 

ocean resource activity with which 
Department of State has had the 
est association is fishing. Since the 
Is the Department has been con- 
ed with the development and man- 
nent of the living I'esources of the 
ns as an impoi'tant world source of 
iein. Looking ahead to the decade of 
|1980s, we foresee a declining per 
ta world fisheries hai'vest. Despite 
irked increase in investment in 
ng fleets since 1970, the annual 
Id catch has increased little beyond 
niillion tons. At the same time the 
Id's population continues to grow 
?e. 

During the 1980s maximum sus- 
able yields will have been reached 
urpassed in many regions unless 
e sophisticated management 



schemes are instituted to rebuild 
stocks. Better management might ac- 
tually reduce world catch over the short 
run as overfishing in some regions is 
cut, but the end re.sult should be a 
highei- sustained catch over the longer 
term as depleted stocks recover. An in- 
crease in the workl catch to 80 million 
tons by the year 2000 is a possibility. 
We also see a trend through the 1980s 
away from long-distance fishing fleets, 
as coastal states extend their control. 
Increased emphasis will be placed on 
new coastal fishing vessels and domes- 
tic shore-based or offshore processing 
operations. 

We expect U.S. fisheries policy to 
continue to be set by the Fishery Con- 
servation and Management Act of 197(5, 
which established our 200-nautical-mile 
fishery conservation zone. Under the 
terms of that act, regional fishery man- 
agement councils initiate the calculation 
of the optimum yield from each fishery 
and determine how much U.S. vessels 
are capable of harvesting. The Depart- 
ment of State allocates the balance to 
other nations with which we have gov- 
erning international fishery agree- 
ments. In the past, the primary factor 
in the Department's determination of 
allocations has been the traditional or 
historical levels of foreign fishing. 

However, sentiment also is grow- 
ing in Congress, industry, and the re- 
gional councils to use U.S. fish alloca- 
tions as devices or bargaining chips to 
open foreign markets to U.S. fisheries 
exports and to gain other economic 
benefits in the fisheries arena. We 
share this interest. As an example, we 
are now carrying on consultations with 
Congress, the Commerce Department, 
and industry prior to reallocating some 
350,000 tons of fish we withheld from 
the Soviet Union in our reaction to the 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. These 
consultations will establish the basis for 
reallocation of this resource, including 
how we can use it to pi'oniote the ex- 
ports of our own fish. 

The Fishery Conservation and 
Management Act has encouraged sig- 
nificant new investment in the U.S. 
harvesting and processing capacity. 
During the 1980s we expect to see a 
continuing decline in the level of foreign 
fishing off our coa.sts. This will reduce 
the occasions to negotiate additional 
governing international fishery agree- 
ments except in cases where there are 
opportunities for either reciprocal ac- 
cess by U.S. vessels or where there is a 
potential for increased economic benefit 



in the U.S. fisheries sector, such as es- 
tablishing new joint ventures and in- 
creased foreign trade. During the 1980s 
we will also be giving priority to 
negotiating arrangements with other 
countries to help maintain U.S. access 
to important distant water fisheries 
such as tuna and shrimp. 

Mineral Resources 

Turning from fish to mineral resources, 
during the past decade exploration for 
petroleum and natural gas from ocean 
areas has increased dramatically. The 
search for hydrocarbons on the Conti- 
nental Shelf has accelerated at a jiace 
that has exceeded all expectations. 
However, management of the inci'eased 
recovery of petroleum from the Conti- 
nental Shelf should not prove to be as 
difficult as the management of 
fisheries. Unless the seaward extension 
of a boundary between two countries 
happens to cross an oil pool, coopera- 
tive international management ar- 
rangements for the production of pe- 
troleum should not be necessary. 
Where the problem of a common pool 
occurs, a bilateral or multilateral 
agreement will have to be reached if it 
is to be exploited efficiently. In certain 
areas, coojjerative arrangements con- 
cerning the landing or shipment of oil 
and gas may be desirable. 

The increased exploitation of 
offshore petroleum in the 1980s will 
bring greater possibilities of blowouts 
and other pollution incidents. Of par- 
ticular interest to my Department are 
the possible transboundary environ- 
mental impacts arising from offshore 
hydrocarbon development. The massive 
blowout and oil spill of the Ixtoc well in 
the Bay of Campeche is an example of 
the effect upon our nation of the ac- 
tivities on the Continental Shelf of 
another. The mutual vulnerability of 
coastal nations bordering the same 
body of water points to a clear need to 
harmonize safety and antipollution 
measures, including provisions for 
blowout prevention, control, and 
liability. 

Working in close cooperation with 
other agencies such as the Coast Guard, 
the Department of Energy, and the 
Department of the Interior, we expect 
during the 1980s to negotiate with our 
neighboring nations new and additional 
contingency planning and other en- 
vironmental agreements concerning 
offshore hydrocarbon development. 
Such initial agreements may well also 



3ber 1980 



71 



Oceans 



serve as a precedent for the negotiation 
of minimum safety and environmental 
standards within a broader interna- 
tional context. Our long-term goal will 
be the development of an internation- 
ally agreed upon policy for offshore re- 
soui-ce activities which have possible 
transboundary impacts. 

Antarctic Resources 

Interest in ocean resources have di- 
rected man's attention to the farthest 
frontiers of our planet. The ongoing 
discussions within the Antarctic Treaty 
system to develop regimes for the man- 
agement of the living resources in Ant- 
arctic waters and of Antarctica's min- 
eral resources — primarily offshore 
hydrocarbons — testify to this interest. 
The United States has taken the lead in 
seeking solutions to these resource is- 
sues. Our objectives for this decade 
involve: 

• Maintaining the Antarctic Treaty 
system which has successfully reserved 
Antarctica for peaceful purposes as an 
arena of free scientific research for the 
past two decades; 

• Instituting an effective system of 
managing and harvesting its living re- 
sources so that the renewability of 
these resources and the health of the 
marine ecosystem of which they are a 
part will be insured; and 

• Developing an international re- 
gime to determine the acceptability of 
possible mineral resource activities in 
Antarctica and to govern any such ac- 
tivities carried out there. 

To achieve these objectives we 
must find imaginative solutions to dif- 
ferences of view over sovereignty in 
Antarctica and imaginative approaches 
to resource management. We are very 
close now to an agreement on a conven- 
tion for the conservation of Antarctic 
marine living resources and have made 
a good start toward dealing with min- 
eral resources. If we persevere on the 
basis of ex])erienee and in the spirit of 
the Antarctic Treaty system, I believe 
that we will achieve our goals in both of 
these important resource areas. 

Renewable Knergy Resources 

Toward the end of the decade of the 
I'JHOs, renewable ocean energy s(jurces, 
such as ocean thermal energy conver- 
sion, will become commercially attrac- 
tive. By the middle 1980s the 'Depart- 
ment of Energy intends to inaugurate a 
power plant for ocean thermal energy 



conversion of about 10 megawatts for 
experimental and demonstration pur- 
poses. Successful demonstrations, com- 
bined with ever-increasing oil prices, 
could make this type of energy conver- 
sion a very interesting energy option 
during the 1990s f(jr countries in a suit- 
able geographic environment, espe- 
cially if they must import oil for base- 
load electricity generation. We expect 
demonstration projects during the 
1980s to receive a great deal of atten- 
tion, especially with respect to their 
possible environmental impacts and 
with respect to the international legal 
regime under which ocean thermal 
energy conversion is to opei'ate. 

Environmental Concerns 

In addition to possible injury from 
offshore energy production, the en- 
vironmental health of the ocean in the 
1980s may be threatened by greater 
pressures to use the oceans for dump- 
ing. Increasing environmental and 
political objections to the land-based 
disposal of highly toxic chemical wastes 
are making at-sea incineration of such 
wastes more attractive. During 1979, 
the ocean dumping convention was 
amended to take account of this 
em'erging technology. Interim technical 
guidelines were endorsed by the parties 
at their fourth consultative meeting. 

Disposal of nuclear wastes at sea is 
also likely to become a more visible 
issue in the 1980s. Quantities of low- 
level radioactive wastes being dumped 
at the Organization for Economic Coop- 
eration and Development's North Atlan- 
tic site have been increasing yearly, 
and the United States, while not a 
dumping country, has advocated proper 
monitoring and assessment of the site. 
The possible emplacement of high-level 
nuclear wastes in the deep seabed is 
also receiving increased attention. The 
United States is studying this concept 
as a backup option to our primary plans 
for land-based geological disposal of 
such wastes. But for countries having 
serious demographic, geographic, 
geologic, or hydrologic restrictions, the 
deep seabed option may be the only al- 
ternative short of shij^piiig wastes to 
other nations. As further experimenta- 
tion and development occur on the con- 
cejJt during the 1980s, international 
legal and policy issues are certain tn 
arise. 

The Department of Stale will also 
continue to be involved in the more tra- 
ditional ocean pollution issues. Re- 
Deated accidents involving large super- 



tankers will require us to be concernt 
with the development of standards 
which meet the needs of the interna- 
tional community. Because of our 
strategic interests in the freedom of 
navigation, the United States wishes' 
move the international community 
away from the concept of absolute 
coastal state control for pollution pur 
poses in the 200-mile zone. We are in 
stead in favor of other means of han- 
dling offshore pollution, such as agret 
ments for joint pollution enforcement 
contingency plans for containment an' 
cleanup, information exchange regarcij 
ing shipping, and port entry regulatio 

Solving pollution problems result 
ing from ocean-based activities is, he 
ever, only part of the issue. At presen 
land-based activities are responsible fi 
the bulk of ocean pollution through 
river runoffs and atmospheric trans- 
fers. With the continued growth of 
coastal populations and increased ag- 
ricultural and industrial activity, the 
pressures on the oceans' absorptive 
capacities from land-based activities 
will increase. 

The Department of State is work 
ing with the National Oceanic and At- 
mospheric Administration (NOAA) to 
develop methods for comparing 
strategies for dealing with coastal zon 
pollution on an international basis. It. 
essential that monitoring of the marinl 
environment and scientific research t(i 
increase our understanding of marine 
pollution processes be carried out. Th 
National Ocean Pollution Research an 
Development and Monitoring Planning 
Act of 1978 designates the NOAA as 
the lead agency for developing a com- 
prehensive 5-year plan for Federal 
ocean pollution research and develop- 
ment and monitoring programs. This 
plan is to be revised and updated at 
2-year intervals. In the coming years 
we expect also to work closely with 
NOAA and the other Federal agencies! 
in determining how our national marinr 
pollution monitoring, research, and 
regulation programs might complemeni 
similar activities of international 
organizations. 



Rights of Navigation 

While coastal nations are consolidatiri] 
their control over resources within 201 
nautical miles of their coasts, these I 
same ocean areas will be used by othei ' 
nations for navigation. The need to ac-^ 
commodate national and international j 
rights and duties within 200-mile zonef'i 



I 



72 



Department of State Bulletr 



Oceans 



be one of the more difficult tasks 
ing us in this decade. My Depart- 
nt will work with other Federal 
ncies in developing national and in- 
national regulations safeguarding 
dgation in areas of resource activity. 
5 negotiating text presently under 
sideration within the Law of the Sea 
iference treats this subject to the 
isfaction of the United States. 
Another navigation issue which ap- 
rs to be emerging as a major prob- 
1 involves the safety of navigation in 
igested areas, such as international 
lits or entrances to harbors. These 
les may well have to be addressed in 
ti'matioiial organizations such as the 
I ■I'governmental Maritime Consulta- 
i ■ ( )i-ganization. 

1 iference on Law of the Sea 

\\i)U know, the third U.N. Confer- 
1 1- on the Law of the Sea resumed its 
li h session in New York on February 
I'. My bureau, along with Ambassador 
R hardson (Special Representative of 
fh President for the Law of the Sea 

fcrencel and his interagency team, 
: u (irked long and arduously to de- 
k'op a realistic negotiating posture in 
■li hope of obtaining substantial prog- 
( ;, as we perceive it, in revision I of 
h Informal Composite Negotiating 
Fi t. As many of you are aware, we 
1£ ? tried to draw upon all the varied 
m rests in the United States who will 
X ffected by a comprehensive law of 
h sea treaty, including, most cer- 
i \\ . the industries represented by 
•- '• organization. 

At this time, while our representa- 
' s are deep in intensive negotiation 
iffribly lengthy and intricate text, 
iiinot predict exactly what improve- 
.' ts we can anticipate at the conclu- 
i( of this session. Certainly our 
e )tiators have serious concerns with 
present text as it applies to the 
■ sfcr of technology, a subject with 
I :h your organization has been so in- 
• sted. We are hopeful that a number 
f langes will be accepted by the con- 
iice in the area of technology 
stVr with regard to seabed mining 
ill as in the related provisions per- 
mit to voting rights, assured access, 
I iicial arrangements, and other 

I I'S. 

It would be less than candid if I left 
with the impression that the 
111 States negotiating team will ob- 
agreenient from the conference on 
he positions that we are proposnig 
1 irotect the economic interests of the 



United States. We will do our utmost. 
Our goal is to obtain a treaty that, on 
balance, will be acceptable to the 
United States, including the firms rep- 
resented by the National Oceans Indus- 
tries Association. 

The Senate has already enacted a 
bill on deep seabed mining and the 
House has a .similar bill before it. Gen- 
erally, we continue to believe that the 
legislation should: 

• Be transitional or interim, pend- 
ing international agreement on a re- 
gime for the deep seabed; 

• Proceed on the legal basis that, 
notwithstanding future agreement on 
an international regulatory regime, 
deep seabed mining is a freedom of the 
high seas; 

• Not contain investment guaran- 
tees against financial losses as a conse- 
quence of U.S. ratification of an inter- 
national treaty; 

• Provide for effective environ- 
mental protection, sound resource man- 
agement, the safety of life and property 
at sea, and effective law enforcement; 

• Establish an international 
revenue-sharing fund to be used for the 
benefit of developing countries; 

• Encourage other deep-seabed- 
mining legislation patterned on our 
example through the mechanism of re- 
ciprocating state recognition of rights; 

• Not require that vessels used in 
the recovery, processing, or transport 
of hard minerals from the seabed be ex- 
clusively constructed in or documented 
under the laws of the United States; 

• Not require processing plants to 
be located in the United States; and 

• Not issue licenses or permits for 
specific mine sites in a manner that 
could be misinterpreted as assertion of 
sovereignty over high seas areas on the 
seabed. 

We believe that these elements are 
not only consistent with the establish- 
ment of an effective domestic seabed- 
mining regime, but also are fully com- 
patible with the goals and position we 
have espoused in the law of the sea 
negotiations. ■ 



Deep Seabed Hard 
Mineral Resources 
Act 



WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, 
JULY 3, 1980' 

The Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Re- 
sources Act, signed by the President on 
June 28, 1980, reaffirms this nation's 
commitment to both a law of the sea 
treaty and orderly development of a 
U.S. ocean mining capability. Our na- 
tion needs assured access to the nickel, 
copper, cobalt, and manganese — metals 
important in steelmaking, high per- 
formance alloys, and many other indus- 
trial uses — found in seabed nodules. 
This legislation will further these 
domestic and international aims. The 
act establishes an interim regulatory 
procedure for ocean mining activities 
conducted by U.S. nationals that will be 
superseded when a law of the sea treaty 
enters into force for the United States. 

Since 1974 many nations have been 
working through the U.N. Conference 
on the Law of the Sea to design rules 
governing the entire range of uses of 
the oceans. Arrangements for mining 
deep ocean minerals have constituted 
the greatest challenge to the confer- 
ence. Both developed and developing 
nations see the opportunities for 
exploring new avenues of international 
cooperation and decisionmaking. The 
International Seabed (Resource] Au- 
thority being considered could become 
the first international organization with 
authority to manage a major natural 
resource. 

The U.S. Government has been 
working with other nations at the con- 
ference to fashion a treaty acceptable to 
the world community and serving the 
best interests of the United States. We 
hope that substantive negotiations on 
the treaty can be concluded this year. 

The Deep Seabed Hard Mineral 
Resources Act will serve as a step- 
pingstone to this broader, long-term in- 
ternational goal. It will fill the gap 
created by the pace of technological de- 
velopment and our need for minerals on 
the one hand and the slow, deliberate 
process of international lawmaking on 
the other. Without the national ocean 
mining legislation that we are enacting, 
the deep seabed provisions of the law of 
the sea treaty would be hollow, since 
private industry would not be able to 
deliver benefits to this nation and the 
world for many years. 



ober 1980 



^obei 



73 



SOUTH ASIA 



In enacting this legislation, the Con- 
gress displayed the bipartisan coopera- 
tion necessary to strike a judicious bal- 
ance between American domestic and 
international interest. This legislation 
has been continuously revised and im- 
proved since its original introduction in 
1971. During the past 18 months, it was 
considered and reported by four House 
and si.x Senate committees and numer- 
ous subcommittees and was unani- 
mously passed by both Houses. The 
chairmen and members of those various 
committees and subcommittees deserve 
praise for their patient leadership in 
shei)herding this complex legislation to 
its final enactment. The cooperation 
aiifl support of the mining industry and 
labor unions were instrumental in 
reaching this valuable result. 

This act will serve three purposes. 
First, it will insure that when a law of 
the sea treaty is implemented, there 
will, in fact, be a viable ocean mining 
industry. Second, it will subject ocean 
mining operations conducted in the 
interim to stringent domestic regula- 
tion to insure protection of the marine 
environment, safety of life and prop- 
erty at sea, prevention of unreasonable 
interference with other uses of the high 
seas, and conservation of mineral re- 
sources. Third, it will encourage na- 
tions that embark on ocean mining ven- 
tures before the treaty is in force to 
manage the activities of their nationals 
in a similar fashion and to respect 
licenses and permits issued under this 
and other national legislation. 

Moreover, the act is drafted to be 
compatible with the work of the Law of 
the Sea Conference. It recognizes that 
the resources of the seabed are a com- 
mon heritage of mankind. It requires 
that revenues from commercial produc- 
tion be set aside for developing coun- 
tries. No sovereign jurisdiction is as- 
serted over areas of the international 
seabed. No license will be issued for 
exploration to be conducted before July 
1, 1981, and more importantly, no per- 
mit for commercial recovery will be ef- 
fective sooner than January 1, 1988. 

Under this timetable, the Law of 
the Sea Conference will have ample 
time to complete its work and to pre- 
pare for implementation of the treaty 
before commercial recovery under 
American law would actually take 
place. At the same time, potential 
ocean miners are assured that they may 
continue the orderly progress of their 
work without fear that delays in the in- 
ternational process will cause unantici- 
pated and costly interruptions in their 
development programs. 



Secretary Meets With 
Pakistani Foreign ly/linister 



Fullowiiig are remark x hi/ Secre- 
tarij Miiskie and Pakistani Foreign 
Minister Agha S hah i following their 
meeting in the Depart)iient of State on 
Jiili/ J.y, 19S().^ 

Secretary Muskie. I have had the plea- 
sure this afternoon of welcoming the 
Foreign Minister of Pakistan, Mr. 
Shahi, to our country. This is his first 
visit to Washington since he became 
Foreign Minister, so in a sense we are 
going through the same experience of a 
new job in the same field. The Foreign 
Minister has been kind enough to give 
me a report on his activities as a 
member of the Islamic Committee of the 
Throe which was created by the Islamic 
conference to deal with the Afghanistan 
problem. So we have spent the last 
hour or more discussing the Afghani- 
stan issue — our perception of its sig- 
nificance and a report on his efforts to 
pursue a political solution. I am de- 
lighted to present the Foreign Minister 
at this time. 

Foreign Minister Shahi. 

Thank you, Mr. Secretary, for your 
kind words. I came here in response to 
Secretary Muskie's invitation to ex- 
change views on the developments in 
connection with the Afghanistan situa- 



The act authorizes reciprocal agree- 
ments with any foreign nation that reg- 
ulates the conduct of its citizens in a 
manner compatible with this legislation; 
recognizes the licenses, permits, and 
priorities of right granted under it; and 
provides an interim framework for 
ocean mining that respects other na- 
tions' freedom of the high seas. Re- 
sponsible cooperation among the early 
ocean mining nations can set the stage 
for successful implementation of a law 
of the sea treaty. 

Ocean mining holds great promise for 
meeting the strategic mineral needs of 
this nation. With the Deep Seabed 
Hard Mineral Resources Act, we can 
look forward to an era in which ocean 
resources benefit all mankind and the 
institutions overseeing these resources 
set a new standard for international 
cooperation. 



'As enacted H.R. 2759 is Public Law 
96-283, approver! June 28, 1980 (text from 
Weekly Compilation of Presidential Docu- 
ments of July 7). ■ 



tion. As you might be aware, I have 
had talks with the European leaders 
last month. I thought I should comple' 
this round of consultations by informii 
the U.S. Government of the efforts 
made by the Standing Committee of tl 
Three to explore the possibilities of a 
political solution of the Afghanistan 
crisis. 

Q. Can you tell us what prospectf 
do you see for a political solution at 
this time? 



k 



iV 



Foreign Minister Shahi. The 

standing committee has made a begin 
ning in meeting the leaders of the 
Mujaheddin whose cooperation is essed 
tial if there is to be a cease-fire in Af-I 
ghanistan. That is the first step towaj 
any political solution. We have ex- 
pressed our readiness to hold talks wit 
the representatives of the Babrak 
Karmal regime, in their capacity as 
members of the Peoples Democratic 
Party of Afghanistan, to exchange 
views on how to advance the prospect 
of a political settlement. We have had 
to adopt this course of dealing only wi' 
the representatives of the ruling polit 
cal party because we are under the in! 
junction of the Islamic conference not< 
to compromise the principal of non- 
recognition in the consultations that w< 
undertake. 

Q. Have you gotten any responsd 
at all from this political leadership i 
Afghanistan? 

Foreign Minister Shahi. As I hav 

said, we have had no clear indication 
one way or the other whether they 
w-ould be prepared to talk to us. Of 
course, in the past, they have indicates 
that they would like to hold talks with 
the Foreign Ministers of Pakistan and 
Iran on a bilateral basis, on a 
government-to-government basis, but 
we have indicated the position that wet 
have taken and our readiness to meet 
with the representatives of the ruling 
political party as a standing committee 

Q. What about your contacts wHJ 
the Soviets? Have they gotten any- 
where? 

Foreign Minister Shahi. The 

President of Pakistan is in communica-i| 
tion with the Soviet leadership, and ex- 
changes of views have taken place. Wi 
have explained to the Soviet leadershij 
our approach to a political solution. Thi 



74 



Department of State Bulletif 



TERRORISM 



ets take their stand on the May 14 
losals. There are common elements, 
there are important differences. So 
dialogue is continuing. 

Q. Have you come to the conclu- 
d Ihat it might be time to besin ac- 

V support for the nationalist forces 
fijhanistan, or do you .still main- 

li a hands-off attitude? 

.Secretary Muskie. I would not call 
;i:inds-off attitude in the sense of 
I riiit; the ])roblem. It obviously is a 

■ important policy objective to 

; \ r the withdrawal of Soviet troops 
niiniction with a political settle- 
< )ur objective politically is the 
IS that of the Islamic conference 
iiuh independently arrived at; that 
1 independent Afghanistan, elected 
If Afghan people, representatives 
fir desires, nonaligned, and the 

' Irawal of troops. So our objectives 
111' same; we have not abandoned 

.. What your question is aimed at is 

n her or not we are about to become 

V ved as a combatant, no. 

I. Not as a combatant but as a 
iflier of weapons or of .support, or 
ly sort of assistance? 

H'cretary Muskie. Our assistance 
I ■ Pakistan Government at this 
i lakes the form of debt- 
( luling which we have under con- 
;ii ion and are willing to be respon- 
' li Pakistan's needs for economic 

■ .iiice and support. That is the ex- 
it' which we ai'e asked to be in- 

■1 d at this time. 

J. What is your government's 
<>l the possibility of assistance 
i ; supplied to the nationalist 
n s fighting from Pakistani terri- 

r 

'oreign Minister Shahi. We have 
■( a policy statement that we cannot 
1 ourselves to become a conduit for 
- ii\\ of arms to the Mujaheddin. We 
• xii-nding humanitarian assistance 
.'irhan refugees, and they now 
n.er nearly a million. That is about 
' xtent of our assistance. 



Hostage 
Convention 

MESSAGE TO THE SENATE, 
AUG. 4, 1980' 

With a view to receiving the advice and con- 
sent of the Senate to ratification, I transmit 
herewith a copy of the International Con- 
vention Against the Taking of Hostages, 
adopted by the United Nations General As- 
sembly on December 17, 1979 and signed on 
behalf of the United States of America on 
December 21, 1979. The report of the De- 
partment of State with respect to the Con- 
vention is also transmitted for the informa- 
tion of the Senate. 

In recent years, we have witnessed an 
unprecedented and intolerable increase in 
acts of terrori.sm involving the taking of hos- 
tages in various parts of the world. Events 
have clearly demonstrated that no country 
or region is exempt from the human tragedy 
and immense costs which almost invariably 
result from such criminal acts. Con- 
sequently, the urgent need to take positive 
action against these manifestations of inter- 
national terrorism has become readily ap- 
parent. Although the penal codes of most 
States contain provisions proscribing as- 
sault, extortion, kidnapping, and other seri- 
ous crimes inherent in hostage-taking inci- 
dents, an international framework for coop- 
eration among States directed toward pre- 
vention of such incidents and ensuring 
punishment of offenders, wherever found, 
has not previously existed. 

The Convention creates a legal 
mechanism whereby persons alleged to have 
committed offenses under the Convention 
will be prosecuted or extradited if ap- 
prehended within the jurisdiction of a State 



Party, wherever the offense was committed. 
In essence, the Convention imposes binding 
legal obligations upon States Parties either 
to submit for prosecution or to extradite any 
person within their jurisdiction who commits 
an act of hostage-taking (as defined in Arti- 
cle 1), attempts to commit .such an act, or 
participates as an accomplice of anyone who 
commits or attempts to commit such an act. 
A State Party is subject to these obligations 
without regard to the place where the al- 
leged act covered by Article 1 was com- 
mitted. 

Article 1 of the Convention declares 
that the act or offense of taking of hostages 
is committed by any person who seizes or 
detains and threatens to kill, injure, or 
continue to detain another person (the 
"hostage") in order to compel a third party 
(a State, an international intergovernmen- 
tal organization, a natural or juridical per- 
son, or a group of persons) to do or abstain 
from doing any act as an explicit or implicit 
condition for the release of the hostage. 
States Parties to the Convention will also 
be obligated to cooperate in preventing 
hostage-taking offenses by means of inter- 
nal preventive measures, exchange of in- 
formation, and coordination of enforcement 
activities. 

This convention is a vitally important 
new element in the campaign against the 
scourge of international terrorism in gen- 
eral and the heinous crime of hostage- 
taking in particular. I hope that all States 
will become Parties to this Convention, and 
that it will be applied universally. I rec- 
ommend, therefore, that the Senate give 
early and favorable consideration to this 
Convention. 

Jimmy Carter 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Aug. 11, 
1980. ■ 



I'ress release 201 of July 24, 1980. 



Iber 1980 



75 



UNITED NATIONS 



Securing the World's Common Future 



by Secretary Miiskie 

Statement before the lltli special 
sessio)) of the U.N. General As.^enihh/ 
0)1 August ,>5. 1980.^ 

I welcome this opportunity to address the 
U.N. special session on economic devel- 
opment. I intend to speak frankly. And I 
will suggest some specific obligations of 
the world's nations — including my own — 
to secure our common future on a fragile 
planet. 

We meet because we are in the midst 
of a world economic crisis. We cannot es- 
cape it. We must respond to it. Millions of 
our fellow humans are starving, and mil- 
lions more are malnourished, on what can 
be a bountiful planet. Soaring oil prices 
have crippled the developing world; even 
the strongest industrial economies are 
struggling. Infectious recession and infla- 
tion touch us all. Nations in desperate 
need of growth and development instead 
face worsening trade deficits, deeper 
debt, and diminishing prospects for meet- 
ing the needs of their people. 

The work ahead is substantial. The 
time is short. But if we take an ambitious 
view, seasoned with realism, we can ac- 
complish our main purposes at this spe- 
cial session. We can adopt a realistic in- 
ternational development strategy that 
will help improve development prospects. 
And we can agree on procedures and an 
agenda for a new round of global eco- 
nomic negotiations — serious work aimed 
at concrete progress where the need is 
urgent and consensus appears within 
reach. My country will participate con- 
structively in these proceedings. Prog- 
ress is essential for the world's interest 
and also our own. 

We are encouraged that progress is 
possible because progress has been made. 
The fact is that over the past decade 
many people in developing nations have 
attained better lives. Per capita income in 
the Third World has risen by some 3% 
per yean Exports have increased by 8.7% 
annually Manufacturing output is higher 
Life expectancies and literacy i-ates have 
improved. Infant mortality rates have 
declined. Striking progress has been 
made, much of it recently, in adjusting 
the system to improve Third World 
prospects. 



• The flow of aid to jioorer nations 
has steadily increased. More than $100 
billion in replenishments for the multilat- 
eral development banks and their af- 
filiates have been agreed. 

• Access to International Monetary 
Fund resources has been sharply in- 
creased. Terms are more flexible. New- 
facilities are in operation. A major quota 
increase is in process. The World Bank 
has also launched an innovative program 
of lending for structural adjustment. 

• The common fund negotiations 
have been completed. We have moved 
ahead on individual commodity agree- 
ments. 

• On trade, last year's multilateral 
trade agreement will mean an average 
cut of 25% in tariffs on principal 
developing-country exports. Preferential 
tariff systems have been adopted by all 
Western industrial countries. 

• Use by developing countries of 
world capital markets has increased four- 
fold—from $11 billion in 1970 to $44 billion 
in 1978. 

• The effort to increase world food 
supplies has been advanced through the 
International Fund for Agricultural De- 
velopment and through the concentration 
of World Bank resources. In the past 5 
years the World Bank committed some 
$11.6 billion to agricultural projects. 

• And in another urgent priority 
area — energy — the World Bank will be 
lending well over $10 billion for energy 
projects between now and 1985. 

This partial listing is not the record 
of a world community frozen in short- 
sighted self-interest, rigidly divided by 
ideology or stalemated on methods. 
Those tendencies do afflict us. Yet in re- 
cent years we have also found the com- 
mon sense and good will to move for- 
ward. 

But our accomplishments are still far 
short of our needs. My government has 
just completed a major study of the 
world's population, resources, and en- 
vironmental prospects for the year 2000 
— just 20 years away. Its conclusions re- 
mind us again why these debates must 
move from rhetoric to reality. Our "Global 
2000" study begins with a harsh truth. In 
the year 2000, the world population will 
be more than half again higher than in 
1975. Over the last quarter of this 
century, more than 2 billion people will be 



added — 2 billion more mouths to feed, 
bodies to clothe, individual hopes to b« 
fulfilled. 

Given this fact, the study tells us 
what could happen if nations fail to act 
time and with reason. Based on curren 
trends, food production should nearly 
double. Still, the number of people goi 
hungry will rise by millions. Many nati( 
already hungr/ see their croplands anc 
grasslands drying to desert — a loss ea« 
year equal to the size of my home Stat, 
Maine. 

On energy, from the vantage of a 
precarious present, we could face a pui 
ishing future. Unless trends are chang 
oil supplies will be insufficient and, for 
many, unaffordable. Wood, the main 
household fuel for over 1 billion people 
will be found only at ever greater dis- 
tances and in dwindling amounts. 

We have become accustomed to 
warnings about the need to conserve, 
nonrenewable resources such as oil. Bu 
the "Global 2000" study also points up 
serious stresses on renewable resourca 
— croplands and forests, fisheries, air, 
water, and land — resources we havetall, 
for granted as endless. T 

Another central observation of tht 
study is that protecting the environme: n. 
and succeeding in economic developmei 
are not competing goals but complemeii 
tary paths. Poverty worsens the most 
acute environmental dangers, such astl 
loss of forests and soil. Thus we will not 
save the environment unless we also 
solve the problems of the poor and moV' 
the global economy forward. 

"Global 2000" is not a forecast. It is 
projection of present trends. But it is ai 
other chilling reminder that our commod 
future depends on our common success,? 
here and throughout the complex of reU 
tions known as the North-South dialogul 
We must work together to raise food 
production, to diversify energy sources 
and to use energy and other resources 
more efficiently, to protect our common 
environment, to restrain population 
growth, to deal effectively and equitablj' 
with mounting deficits, and to keep an 
open system of trade. 

It falls to us to rewrite the future. 1 
is within our power to do so. But it will 
require a change not only in the quantity 
but in the character of our effort. For as 
fast as we have run in recent years, the 
challenges still outpace us. Too often, 3i 



76 



Department of State Bullei; 



United Nations 



Brandt Commission reminds us, we 
i engaged in a "dialogue of the deaf," 
hich "we judge ourselves by our good 
ts and the other side by their failings, 
result is frustration and deadlock." 

Ibal Responsibilities 

^leadlock must be broken. The de- 
iL- of our common future require it. 

compel a new inquiry. We must ask 
inly what individual nations can take 
t he global system but what each na- 
; must bring to it. Without exception, 
eiust recognize that assigning respon- 
ly for the future to others is not an 
ii- but an abdication. Such excuses 
1 lot feed, nor clothe, nor heal, nor 
I oft our successors if we fail. And fail 

ill, unless all nations are fully en- 
^1 

(ndustrial Countries. I do not by 
iioans exclude my own country from 
.. irescription. In suggesting what dif- 
wt societies, differently situated, 
lO d offer, let me begin with the indus- 
ii .'ountries. 

■' First, we must reduce the rate of 
IT omestic inflation. Spiraling prices 
131 lin growth and make the world 
my more vulnerable and less fair. 

' Second, we should keep our mar- 
!ti )pen, particularly to products from 
'V oping countries. 

' Third, the industrial nations must 
•e lergy more efficiently, increase 
in 3tic production, spur the develop- 
'•■i of new energy sources, and cut our 
i; ce on imported oil. 

Fourth, despite the need for 

I i restraint to control inflation, we 

II 1 increase our aid to the developing 
i IS. This Administration has said 

t times to the American Congi'ess 
1 If American people that our present 
e of assistance to lower income coun- 
'. ire not enough. I intend to keep 
r all in my power to change that con- 

i Fifth, developed countries should 
ue to accept an increasing role for 
)ping countries in international eco- 

decisionmaking — a role commensu- 
'/ith their growing importance in the 
economy and their willingness to 
international obligations. 

Sixth, we must increase the capac- 
developing countries to apply sci- 
.nd technology for development. We 
iccelerate the transfer of informa- 
'echnology, pollution-control strate- 
ind other skills. 



Most of these steps will entail short- 
term sacrifice for the sake of long-term 
returns. I believe the American people 
will support those investments. But as a 
former practicing politician, let me speak 
frankly. The American people will insist 
that their contributions have an effect — 
that people's lives must actually be 
changed for the better And we can as- 
sure that only if other nations are also 
prepared to do their part. 

Oil-Exporting Nations. The oil- 
exporting nations have a unique respon- 
sibility. In recent years rising oil prices 



The vision we share is a vision of 
opportunity and of peace. It is 
within our capacity to alter the 
future to fit that vision. 



have been a ponderous drag on develop- 
ment and growth and a major cause of in- 
flation. This year the oil-importing devel- 
oping countries will have to spend — for 
that single commodity — almost double 
the amount they will receive from all 
sources in aid. Thus steps such as these 
by oil-exporting nations will be vital to 
our common goals: 

• First, they must adopt stable price 
and supply policies to avoid further 
trauma to the international economy. 

• Second, the oil-exporting countries 
must increase their aid and recycle more 
of their surpluses directly to developing 
countries. 

• Third, oil-exporting countries 
should join with consuming nations in 
working for rational global energy ar- 
rangements. 

Developing Countries. Whatever 
the level, external assistance will always 
be a secondaiy factor. The major deter- 
minants are internal — the ability to use 
resources effectively, to encourage inno- 
vation, and to share broadly the benefits 
of gi-owth. Thus, there are responsibili- 
ties that developing countries must 
shoulder. 

• First, domestic and external re- 
sources must be used efficiently and 
fairly, with concentration on such priority 
areas as energy and food. 

• Second, serious family-planning ef- 
forts are vital. Nine-tenths of the world's 
population increase in the next 20 years 
will be in developing countries. No other 
single factor does more to darken their 
future. 



• Third, as their economic strength 
grows, individual developing nations 
should accept more responsibility for the 
common management of international 
economic problems. 

• Fourth, as their development pro- 
ceeds, they must open their own 
economies to free flows of world trade. 

Centrally Planned Countries. The 

market economy countries have received 
dominant attention in the North-South 
dialogue. But the centrally planned coun- 
tries have global responsibilities as well. 
Empty bellies will not be filled by 
polemics. No nation or group of nations 
has grounds to remain aloof from this 
struggle. World opinion looks to the cen- 
trally planned countries: 

• First, to increase their assistance 
to developing countries; 

• Second, to increase their uncon- 
ditioned purchases of LDC [less devel- 
oped country] products; and 

• Third, to cooperate in international 
efforts to stabilize commodity markets. 

Proposals 

For all of us, the principles I have out- 
lined must be the basis for practical ac- 
tion. For our part the United States is 
prepared to join with others to meet the 
global challenge. 

Our most urgent task is to confront 
the specter of imminent famine haunting 
Africa. This summer alone the United 
States has provided an additional 235,000 
tons for emergency African food relief. 
We strongly urge that all nations able to 
contribute foodstuffs or funds join under 
the leadership of the Food and Agricul- 
ture Organization to coordinate relief to 
drought-afflicted regions. I am happy to 
note that the Director General will con- 
vene a meeting of concerned govern- 
ments and international organizations in 
the coming weeks. 

Targets have been set for annual 
food assistance in the new Food Aid Con- 
vention and for emergency food aid 
through the international emergency 
food reserve. We encourage others to 
join us in the eifort to reach those 
targets, to guarantee that food will be 
available to those in need. Further, we 
should develop reserves that are ade- 
quate to back up donor commitments and 
assure that food emergencies can be met. 
My government is working toward a 
4-million-ton reserve of wheat to assure 
our food aid commitments. 

Despite efforts to produce more food, 
many poor developing countries will still 



' 



er 1980 



77 



United Nations 



have to import substantial quantities over 
the next decade. We should consider new 
arrangements to assist those developing 
countries that are improving their own 
food production. 

We should explore ways to channel 
more international funds, both conces- 
sional and nonconcessional, into food 
production. We, therefore, support rapid 
agreement on an equitable replenishment 
of the International Fund for Agricultural 
Development (IFAD). We would also 
consider further measures to strengthen 
IFAD. 

To help developing countries adjust 
to oil-driven balance-of-payments deficits, 
we favor continued improvements in In- 
ternational Monetary Fund facilities, in- 
cluding subsidizing the Supplementary 
Financing Facility. Such arrangements 
should receive strong support from those 
who prosper as oil prices climb. Private 
capital flows also will continue to play a 
critical role. We look forward to the De- 
velopment Committee's report on propo- 
sals for increasing nonconcessional flows 
to developing countries. 

We are committed to the stimulation 
of energy production worldwide and to 
the increased use of renewable fuels. The 
United States strongly supports an ex- 
pansion of World Bank energy programs, 
to permit Bank participation in multina- 
tional risk-sharing ventures to discover 
and develop new energy sources. Here, 
too, as we agreed at the Venice summit, 
we are open to new institutional and fi- 
nancial arrangements. We will participate 
positively in the U.N. Conference on New 
and Renewable Energy Sources. We urge 
the U.N. Secretariat and member nations 
to make every effort to insure its success. 

Coal is an attractive alternative to 
high-priced oil. We will expand our capac- 
ity to produce and ship coal, and we are 
ready to help developing countries estab- 
lish coal-burning facilities and increase 
their use of coal. 

We support discussions between oil- 
exporting and oil-importing nations on 
ways to insure orderly market conditions 
and on further assistance for non-oil de- 
veloping countries. 

Requests for population program as- 
sistance have outpaced the international 
community's ability to respond. We are 
ready to join an international commit- 
ment to double, in this decade, the avail- 
ability and use of family-planning and re- 
lated health services. 

On trade, my country would support 
a pledge by all countries to restrain pro- 
tectionism and ease adjustment. Such a 
commitment would provide more assured 



Jerusalem and the 
Peace Negotiations 



FoJUiwiiig are Secretari/ Miiskie'a 
statement before the U.N. Securify 
CoinieU uti Aiignsi JO, 19H0. mid the 
te.rt of Seciiriti/ Cuiiiicil Renoliitioii 4 7A' 
adijpted that dnt/. 



SECRETARY'S STATEMENT' 

I come here today out of my deep respect 
for the United Nations and all it has rep- 
resented for 3.5 years. It is a force for 
peace and reason in the world. It is a 
forum where nations may air their differ- 
ences and seek out the common ground. 
We should all be grateful that this institu- 
tion has worked so well, on so many is- 
sues, in its relatively short span of time. 

Therefore, I also come here today 
with a feeling of sorrow, for I believe 
that in its work on the Middle East over 
the past 5 months the United Nations has 
been the focus of attempts not to advance 
the cause of peace but to restrain it, con- 
trary to the ideals and purposes of this 
institution. 

The succession of resolutions before 
this Council and the emergency special 
session of the General Assembly has 
neither aided the Camp David process 



market access to developing countries. 
Also, beyond the sharp reductions in 
tariffs already agreed, we are prepared 
to increase the benefits of our generalized 
system of preferences for poorer develop- 
ing countries. 

These proposals reflect the positive 
approach we believe our common prob- 
lems demand and this special session de- 
serves. 

Let me conclude with this observa- 
tion. I am persuaded, to the depth of my 
being, that the challenges ahead are not 
beyond us. The "Global 2000" report has 
been described as a reconnaissance of the 
future. It describes the possibility. I be- 
lieve it will not be the reality. The vision 
we share is a vision of opportunity and of 
peace. It is within our capacity to alter 
the future to fit that vision. The re- 
sources do exist. The solutions can be 
found. Together we can summon the will. 
Knowing what is at stake, we must not 
fail. 



i 



I 



'Press release 230 and USUN press re- 
lease 92. ■ 



nor offered a single alternative with tl 
slightest chance of success. Eight time 
in these .5 months resolutions on the 
Middle East have come before us. For 
our part, the United States has joined 
the debate and the voting. We have do 
that because we respect this institutio 
and we honor those who have labored 
hard for a positive approach. 

But eight times, those resolutions 
have failed the critical tests of reason, 
balance, of accounting for the concerns 
both sides, of genuinely serving the ob 
jective of peace. The resolution before 
today is illustrative of a preoccupation 
which has produced this series of unbai 
anced and unrealistic resolutions on 
Middle East issues. It fails to serve thi 
goal of all faiths that look to Jerusalem 
holy. 

We must share a common vision o!* 
this ancient city's future — an undivide 
Jerusalem, with free access to the holj 
places for people of all faiths. But how 
can that vision be realized? Certainly i 
cannot be realized by unilateral actioni 
nor by narrow resolutions in this forur 
Rather the question of Jerusalem mus 
addressed in the context of negotiatior ' 
for a comprehensive, just, and lasting 
Middle East peace. 

That is the position of my govern- 
ment. But it is more. The status of 
Jerusalem cannot simply be declared; ii 
must be agreed to by the parties. That( 
a practical reality. It will remain so de- 
spite this resolution or 100 more like it.i 
We have encouraged all parties to refri 
from unilateral actions which seek to ■ 
change the character or status of 
Jerusalem. In line with this position w« 
will not vote against the resolution as 
presently written. 

So there can be no mistake, let me 
note that we will continue firmly and 
forcefully to resist any attempt to impo 
sanctions against Israel under Chapter 
VII [of the U.N. Charter]. That step is 
contained in a draft resolution to be pre ' 
ented here but not to be voted upon. W 
are unalterably opposed to it. We will 
vote against any such resolution. 

But if we do not vote against the 
version before us today, neither can we ' 
find cause to support it. F'or the resolu- 
tion is still fundamentally flawed. It fail 
even to reaffimi Resolution 242 as the 
basis for a comprehensive peace. Israel, 
for example, is to be censured — yet thei; 
is no censure, indeed no mention at all, ]j 



78 



Department of State Bulle 



United Nations 



nee against Israel or of efforts that 
ermine Israel's legitimate security 
is. Further, the resolution before us 
upon those states that have estab- 
id diplomatic missions in Jerusalem to 
draw them from the holy city. In our 
;ment this provision is not binding. It 
ithout force. And we reject it as a 
iptive attempt to dictate to other na- 
i. It does nothing to promote a reso- 
n of the difficult problems facing Is- 
and its neighbors. It does nothing to 
ince the cause of peace. On these 
ific grounds, we abstain on the 
lution. 

And on broader grounds, we ask that 
Jnited Nations return to first princi- 
in addressing the Middle East. Let 
isist useless pronouncements and re- 
'. the practical search for results — on 
5alem and on all other issues. 
There are few problems in the world 
IS much in need of resolution — and 
lit, constructive effort to achieve 
. )ur cruel wars in 30 years — and the 
a and suffering that remain — under- 
;ei the urgency of this task. And it is 
K -scored again by recent fighting in 
el non, renewing that violent cycle. 
QD 11 those 30 years there was no 
!a . Plans were tried and abandoned. 
a al solutions came apart. Modest, 
al zing steps were the very most to be 
h ved; and they were all too fragile, 
'hen in November 1977, President 
id of Egypt took the courageous step 
§ ng to Jerusalem in an inspired act of 
al imanship to break the deadlock, 
it equal statesmanship the Israeli 
M -nment responded. At Camp David 
' 'xt September, for 13 days, Presi- 
1 -^adat, Prime Minister Begin, and 
e lent Carter joined to create a 
ir work for peace in the Middle East. 
'X was born the first real chance to 
r the goals of Resolution 242 into be- 

licn, following President Carter's 
■ 1 the Middle East in February 1979, 
I' between Israel and Egypt — the 
^1 eal peace — was achieved. 

Aen so, it was only a beginning. 
.1 1 )avid was designed not just for a 
1 1 1 settlement between Israel and 
Its neighbors but as a framework 
nily comprehensive and final peace 
J all parties to the conflict. A year 
st May, the second stage of the 
I I )avid process began — negotiations 
' fii Egypt and Israel, with the 
i I States as full partner, to provide 
1 1 )nomy for the inhabitants of the 
liaiik and Gaza. This is to be a tran- 
il arrangement of 5 years. Not later 
III' third year after the start of that 
', negotiations to settle the final 
^ of the territories would begin. 



This may be an imperfect process. 
But let me remind you of this. It is also 
the first time the twin issues of Palesti- 
nian rights and Israeli security — issues 
at the core of the Arab-Israeli conflict — 
have been at the top of the agenda to- 
gether It is the first time there has been 
real hope — not a mirage or a wish — that 
a comprehensive settlement could be 
attained. 

My government has stated many 
times in the past, and I will restate it 
again today: We are absolutely and firmly 
committed to the success of the process 
begun at Camp David and its ultimate 
goal of a just and lasting peace through- 
out the region. There is no issue on which 
President Carter has spent more time 
and effort than this great cause. And that 
will continue to be the case until the job 
is done. 

This is difficult and painstaking 
work. It is precisely the kind of effort 
that inspired the creation of the United 
Nations. It is precisely the work to which 
the United Nations should now rededi- 
cate itself. We desire to work closely with 
the Islamic states in order that their 
legitimate goals set out in Resolution 242 
may be attained in peace and honor 

It is vital that a political climate be 
preserved within which the hard work of 
peace can succeed. That is why we have 
urged all the parties not to take unilateral 
steps that could prejudice the outcome of 
the negotiations. That is why we have 
counseled patience and sought wider sup- 
port for our efforts. And it is why events 
here in the last several months have been 
so profoundly disturbing. We do not ex- 
pect everyone to support the Camp 
David process. We do, however, seek an 
end to efforts that work in the contrary 
direction — not just to undermine the 
Camp David process but to disrupt the 
search for peace itself. 

Let me, therefore, repeat our belief 
that this constant recourse to debates and 
resolutions that are not germane to the 
peace process — and even harmful to it — 
should stop. Elsewhere in Southwest 
Asia and in Southeast Asia warfare is a 
present reality. The aggressor nations 
make no effort to find peace. Yet this 
Council is continuously drawn to the 
Middle East, where authentic work for 
peace is under way. 

The United States will not be deter- 
red from this historic enterprise. Indeed, 
I would like to reiterate our firm deter- 
mination to finish what has so well be- 
gun. At Camp David, as a result of 
statesmanship and courage, the two par- 
ties with the help of the United States 
designed a framework for comprehensive 
peace. They agreed to start with a treaty 



of peace between Egypt and Israel. This 
was a goal which many thought to be ut- 
terly unattainable but which was 
achieved through negotiation and on the 
basis of Resolution 242. 

As a further step toward a com- 
prehensive peace, the parties agreed to 
launch serious negotiations aimed at pro- 
viding autonomy for the Palestinian in- 
habitants of the West Bank and Gaza for 
a transitional period. The final objective 
is clear: resolution of the Palestinian 
problem in all its aspects and, ultimately, 
peace treaties between Israel and all of 
its other neighbors — Jordan, Syria, and 
Lebanon. 

We intend to persevere in this effort 
regardless of all distractions, diversions, 
and difficulties. 



SECURITY COUNCIL 
RESOLUTION 478 ^ 

The Security Couticil. 

Recalling its resolution 476 (1980) of 30 
June 1980, 

Reaffirming again that the acquisition of 
territory by force is inadmissible, 

Deeply concerned over the enactment of a 
"basic law" in the Israeli Knesset proclaiming a 
change in the character and status of the Holy 
City of Jerusalem, with its implications for 
peace and security. 

Noting that Israel has not complied with 
Security Council resolution 476 (1980), 

Reaffirming its determination to examine 
practical ways and means, in accordance with 
the relevant provisions of the Charter of the 
United Nations, to secure the full implementa- 
tion of its resolution 476 (1980), in the event of 
non-compliance by Israel, 

1. Censures in the strongest terms the 
enactment by Israel of the "basic law" on 
Jerusalem, and the refusal to comply with rel- 
evant Security Council resolutions; 

2. Affirms that the enactment of the 
"basic law" by Israel constitutes a violation of 
international law and does not affect the con- 
tinued application of the Fourth Geneva Con- 
vention of 12 August 1949 Relative to the Pro- 
tection of Civihan Persons in Time of War in 
the Palestinian and other Arab territories oc- 
cupied since June 1967, including Jerusalem; 

3. Determines that all legislative and ad- 
ministrative measures and actions taken by Is- 
rael, the occupying Power, which have altered 
or purport to alter the character and status of 
the Holy City of Jerusalem, and, in particular, 
the recent "basic law" on Jerusalem, are null 
and void and must be rescinded forthwith; 

4. Affirms also that this action consti- 
tutes a serious obstruction to achieving a com- 
prehensive, just and lasting peace in the 
Middle East; 

5. Decides not to recognize the "basic law" 
and such other actions by Israel that, as a re- 
sult of this law, seek to alter the character and 
status of Jerusalem and calls upon all Members 
of the United Nations: 



r 1980 



79 



United Nations 



U.S. Relationship With the U.N. 



hfi Donald F. McHenry 

Address at the Joth Con vocation of 
the U.S. United Nations Association 
on April 19. 1980. Ambassador 
McHenri/ is U.S. Permanent Repre- 
sentative to the United Nations.'^ 

I am very pleased to be here with you 
today on this important anniversary. In 
fact, there is no group of people with 
whom I would rather celebrate the 
founding of the United Nations than the 
members of the U.N. Association. You 
perform a valuable service for both the 
United Nations and the United States. 
I wish there were more of you, that 
more Americans understood the role of 
the United Nations in the world and of 
the United States in the United Na- 
tions. The United Nations has never 
been more important than it is today. 
Multilateral initiatives and global coop- 
eration are a crucial complement to our 
own efforts to resolve the pressing in- 
ternational problems that have such a 
profound effect on our economy and 
lifestyle here at home — energy, hunger, 
pollution, depletion of nonrenewable 
resources, protectionism, global eco- 
nomic affairs — these are all matters 
which only a generation ago we thought 
of as domestic affairs. 

U.S. Attitude Toward the 
U.N. Since 194.5 

Yet American public support for the 
United Nations is muted today. The 
United Nations is a frequent target of 
attack — in some places where it 
counts — on Capitol Hill. A small but 
vocal grouj) of legislators, who are 
critical of the Third World's occasional 
use of the forum to criticize or rebuff 
the United States, tends to hamstring 
our attempts to expand American par- 



(a) to accept this decision; 

(b) and upon those States that have estab- 
lished diplomatic Missions in .Jerusalem to 
withdraw such Missions from the Holy City; 

(). Requests the Secretary-General to re- 
port to the Security Council on the im- 
plementation of this resolution before 15 
November 1980; 

7. Decides to remain seized of this serious 
situation. 



'Press release 227 and USUN press re- 
lease 89. 

^Adopted by a vote of 14 to with 1 
abstention (U.S.). ■ 



ticipation in the U.N. system. These 
legislators have, obviously, tapped a 
wellspring of anti-U.N. sentiment 
among the American people; one based 
on several disquieting factors: 

• Lack of understanding about the 
United Nations; 

• Preoccupation with domestic con- 
cerns at the e.xpense of foreign policy; 

• Failure to understand the in- 
creasing interrelationships between 
domestic and foreign policy; 

• Vain hope that complex problems 
can be resolved simply and quickly, and 
finally; 

• What anthropologists would call 
an "ethnocentric" view of the world, in 
which everything that is not done the 
American way is automatically suspect. 

At the core of the love-hate re- 
lationship our country has carried on 
with the United Nations since 1945 are 
some fundamental misperceptions and 
outmoded ideas. We must correct those 
wrong impressions and change Ameri- 
can attitudes about the United Nations 
if we are to play the leadership role we 
wish and ought to play in the world 
organization. 

American views about the United 
Nations are grounded in the Wilsonian 
idealism we brought to the organization 
at its founding. The U.N. Charter re- 
flects an essentially American vision — a 
dream that the world could transcend 
political differences and, for some pur- 
poses at least, become the kind of 
melting pot our nation has turned out to 
be. 

Alinost from the beginning, the 
United Nations was less than we had 
hoped. In American eyes, its 
shortcomings stemmed from the in- 
transigence of the Soviet Union and its 
Warsaw Pact allies, against whom we 
and our more numerous political friends 
were arrayed on most issues. 

The United Nations did not tran- 
scend — it could not — cold war politics. 
It became a forum where confronta- 
tional scenarios between the world's 
two major blocs were acted out peace- 
fully. Since the tally of pro-American 
votes outnumbered the opposition 
through the 1950s, we were on the win- 
ning side of most questions. 

The United Nations thus vindi- 
cated our belief in the fundamental rec- 
titude of American ideals and foreign 
policy. That the Russians could only 
make their presence felt by repeatedly 



exercising their veto simply reinfoi 
our belief in Communist obstruc- 
tionism. I grew up as a boy believii 
there was something viciously wron 
casting a veto. Every evening I he; 
Mr. Gabriel Heatter keep count of 
number of vetoes the United States 
cast. I didn't know then that the id 
was essentially American. 

Ironically, it was the ultimate 
triumph of American ideals in the 
United Nations, and the fulfillment 
one of the main objectives of the U 
Charter, that fundamentally alterec 
organization and set it on a course 
many Americans disliked. I am spe 
ing of the decolonization of Asia, A 
rica, and the Caribbean and the abi •' 
of those nations to express fundame i 
disagreements with our policy on tl i 
three most contentious issues facing, 
organization: the Middle East, soutlt 
Africa, and the North-South dialogue 

Third World Nations 

Beginning in about 1960, the world 
underwent a transformation unlike 
other in recorded history. In the lat 
two decades almost a hundred new 
tions have emerged from colonial sti( 
to become full members of the worl 
community and of the United Natio* 
Their presence changed what had b 
an essentially homogenous body, do 
nated by industrialized northern 
hemispheric states, into a pluralistiu 
forum that reflects many different 
interests and ideologies. 

On the whole, these new nation 
imbued with a strong sense of 
nationalism, have little use for the p 
tics of superpower confrontation. TI 
United Nations is the one forum wh 
they can speak out on what they see 
an "equal footing" with older nation! 
and deal with the issues that are imp 
tant to them: an end to colonialism a 
racism, economic development, the 
reallocation of world financial re- 
sources, and noninterference by est! 
lished powers in their internal affai; 
Furthermore, they approach these ii 
sues from a radically different pers] 
five than we do. 

Unlike the United States, the 
Third World nations do not have to (H 
with broad, strategic considerations 
when they consider the inerits of pai 
ticular issues. Their interests are fai 
narrower than ours. Their needs are 
great; their goals, immediate. They 
take support from whomever offers i 
They are aware of John Kennedy's 
warning that he who rides on the tigf 
back may end up in the tiger's stomac 
They hope, however, that knowledge' 



! 



80 



Department of State BuH^ 



United Nations 



tiger's proclivities will enable them 
void being maimed or devoured. 
The United States, however, can- 
ignore broad, strategic concerns in 
ding its position on foreign policy 
es. As a world leader that seeks 
ids on the basis of shared principles 
interests, rather than by military 
idation, we must balance a number 
ctors every time we take a position 
ny issue. These include the wishes 
sensitivities of our allies, economic 
iderations that arise from our free 
rprise system, public opinion in 
ocratic societies, and our overall 
egic responsibility in the Western 
d. We also have honest differences 
tinion about how the Third World 
aest achieve goals like economic 
llopment and fiscal responsibility 
ocial and political equality. 
Thus, even though we support the 
tiples that the sponsors of many 
9 World resolutions seek to vindi- 
the United States has been on the 
g side of many U.N. votes. 
The Soviets are not constrained by 
'S jnsibilities like ours. They can 
lit many one-sided initiatives that 
list oppose because the positions 
!.ike mean nothing to them and 
III! consequences for them in their 
I society. 
. ilany Americans have thus come to 
i]\>!e that the United Nations is now 
1 ; ti-American, if not pro-Soviet, or- 
ination in conti'ast to its former 
•0 Lmerican stance. The public seems 
" need that American interests are 
itiied by the changing forces at a 
•I I Nations dominated by a Third 
1 l-Soviet bloc. Public support for 
e !-ganization has fallen in the 
■li'il States to alarming levels. The 
:l;:onsolation I have in my job is that 
e nited Nations is still thought more 
£^\- of than the U.S. Congress. 

S Views Today 

' support reached its nadir in the 
;) ;t7()s. Too often the United States 
i: (i confrontation politics at the 
■il Nations. After he left, one of 
■ cnnanent representatives called 
iLianization "a very dangerous 
and belittled its abilities and 
n\es. As our national disenchant- 
w ith the United Nations grew, 
illuence and national prestige at 
' nited Nations declined further, 
believe that beginning with Gov- 
! William W., (Mar. 1976-Jan. 
Seranton's tenure, we have seen 
ifirence of American prestige and 
lice at the United Nations. At the 



root of this shift has been acknowl- 
edgment of Third World nationalism 
as an ideology independent of interna- 
tional communism. 

We no longer view every issue and 
every vote through the lenses of 
East-West politics. We recognize that 
the developing countries can take posi- 
tions that do not mirror ours without 
being either anti-American or pro- 
Soviet. Simply according the Third 
World nations fundamental respect for 
their independent interests, motives, 
and points of view has aided our image 
at the United Nations. 

Furthermore, we have become 
more secure in dealing with the United 
Nations as the myth of Third World- 
Soviet solidarity has been exploded. 

During the past few years, the de- 
veloping nations and the United States 
have been on the same side of a number 
of politically sensitive U.N. votes. The 
Third World views any interference 
with national autonomy as intolerable, 
so it condemned the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan and the Soviet-backed 
Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea. 
The Third World supported the United 
States (luring the Iranian hostage 
crisis, even to the point of voting in 
favor of the imposition of sanctions 
against a state with whose revolu- 
tionary goals they are fundamentally in 
sympathy. This underscores its com- 
mitment to legal and moral principles 
that America has long espoused. 

The developing countries also re- 
buffed a Cuban-inspired move to pro- 
claim the Soviet Union as the natural 
ally of the nonaligned movement. And 
the ringing condemnation of the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan that came after 
the Islamabad conference demonstrated 
to the Soviets the political costs of their 
interference in Third World affairs. 

The difference between America's 
view of the United Nations today and 5 
years ago is simply summed up: Our 
government has reappraised what the 
United Nations was founded to accom- 
plish and what the organization can ac- 
complish in today's world. We have set 
our policy goals at the United Nations 
accordingly. And our position in the 
world forum has slowly but surely im- 
proved. The time has now come for the 
American people to bring their views of 
the United Nations into line with 
reality. 

U.N. Role 

The American people must understand 
that, for all the lofty ideals set forth in 
the U.N. Charter, the United Nations 
can do no more than its 152 [Zimbabwe 



became the 153rd member on Augfust 
25, 1980] sovereign members permit it 
to do. 

The U.N. Charter may read like a 
supernational constitution, but the 
United Nations is not a supernational 
government. If we expect the United 
Nations to exercise governmental pow- 
ers or prerogatives — and too many 
Americans do though they would object 
strenuously if they did — we will be 
sorely disappointed in what the organi- 
zation is able to accomplish. 

Yet despite the limitations that 
sovereignty inevitably imposes, U.N. 
members have conceded certain pre- 
rogatives to the organization and placed 
powerful tools in its hands. 

The United Nations is the vehicle 
through which the collective weight of 
international political pressure can be 
imposed on states whose actions violate 
the tenets of law and comity enshrined 
in the U.N. Charter. Political censure 
can lead to real political costs by 
isolating countries that violate their 
charter obligations from the rest of the 
world community. Political censure can 
have indirect consequences as well, as 
Cuba learned to its sorrow when its 
failure to condemn the Afghan invasion 
cost it a seat on the Security Council 
and created such tensions within the 
nonaligned movement that Cuba has 
been greatly handicapped in its effort 
to use the platform of the nonaligned 
movement to pursue its political goals. 

The United Nations also imposes 
moral pressure. It focuses the world's 
attention on crises that have political 
roots but human consequences — the 
plight of refugees, the seemingly insol- 
uble problem of worldwide hunger, the 
repression of human rights. 

The United Nations' most familiar 
role is that of mediator: The neutral 
third party that attempts to defuse vol- 
atile situations and find acceptable 
grounds for solving problems. We have 
become so accustomed to the United 
Nations in this role that we no longer 
think it unusual. Yet what a marvel it is 
that the world has fashioned an interna- 
tionally accepted honest broker, to 
which resort in times of crisis is almost 
automatic. 

The United Nations' record as a 
mediator in places like Cyprus, Leba- 
non, and the Middle East, and cur- 
rently in Namibia or Iran, is alone a 
testament to the organization's impor- 
tance. So is the performance of U.N. 
forces patrolling cease-fires in media- 
tion areas. The United Nations seems 
even to have breached some of the hos- 
tility that Iran initially displayed to- 
ward it and is doing everything possible 



3er 1980 



81 



United Nations 



to bring an end to the holding of Ameri- 
can diplomatic hostages. Of course, the 
United Nations possesses no magic that 
would enable it to circumnavigate those 
obstacles that impede the resolution of 
international dilemmas. Despite its best 
efforts, the United Nations has not yet 
solved the Iran conundrum. The fac- 
tors that have thus far frustrated U.N. 
attempts to find a solution are the same 
factors that have prevented our gov- 
ernment from ending the crisis: 

• A revolution that is not yet com- 
plete; 

• A political scene presided over by 
a fanatic; and 

• A struggle for power among the 
various factions that hope to inherit the 
Ayatollah's mantle of power. 

But the United Nations has, 
through patient effort, demonstrated 
that a neutral party can command an 
audience in Iran that we cannot yet 
command. When the impasse in Tehran 
breaks, the United Nations will have 
played a leading role. 

We also take for granted United 
Nations' coordination of international 
initiatives across a spectrum of ac- 
tivities. Global efforts to eradicate dis- 
ease, poverty, hunger, and pollution 
commence frequently at the United Na- 
tions. The international monetary and 
trade system and much of the world's 
development funding is administered 
through U.N. agencies. Science and 
technology, arms control and disarma- 
ment, education and research are 
among the fields that U.N. agencies 
fund and coordinate. 

I believe the United Nations per- 
forms one more important function 
which we should not belittle. It pro- 
vides a place where the nations of the 
world can blow off steam. Much of the 
rhetoric and invective that receives so 
much publicity in the Ainerican press, 
and causes Americans to denounce the 
United Nations, is just that — blowing 
off steam. 

Those who are critical of this facet 
of life at the United Nations view the 
organization as no more than a debating 
society. 

Yet each of us has found it useful, 
in family life or business dealings, to 
explode verbally from time to time. It 
serves an equally useful purpose for na- 
tions grappling with tense issues. In- 
deed, strident speeches are often face- 
saving gestures that allow nations to 
compromise or soften their positions. 

It seems apparent that, if the U.N. 
system did not exist, we would have to 
invent it. The interdependent world of 



1980 simply could not exist without a 
global body to provide coordination, 
conciliation, and counsel on all fronts. 

Given the importance of the United 
Nations, it is equally apparent that the 
United States ought to find it politically 
advantageous to play as much of a role 
in the U.N. system as we can. We 
ought to commit ourselves to enhancing 
America's image at the United Nations 
and to laying the political groundwork 
that helps build consensus in favor of 
our positions. 

U.S. Support 

Our efforts to bolster the American 
image at the United Nations are un- 
dermined by the United Nations' de- 
tractors in this country. Already, 
budget cuts and congressional opposi- 
tion have forced us to withdraw budg- 
etary support entirely from several in- 
novative U.N. programs and to restrict 
our participation in others. 

Yet the United States was assessed 
only $143 million by the United Nations 
last year. That amounts to about 65c 
per man, woman, and child in the 
United States — less than the cost of a 
package of cigarettes or an ice cream 
cone. 

Ours is the largest single assess- 
ment in the $600 million U.N. budget. 
But when we take both assessed and 
voluntary contributions into account, 
our share is miniscule compared to the 
contribution of smaller nations. Nor- 
way's contribution per citizen is eight 
times ours; so is Kuwait's. Even tiny 
New Zealand pays more to the United 
Nations than we do on a per capita 
basis. 

Obviously, cutting back on our con- 
tributions to the United Nations is not 
the way to win friends and influence 
there. It short-circuits the world body's 
ability to reach constructive solutions 
and reinforces a widespread belief that 
the United States can give short shrift 
to the rest of the world's needs or 
interests as long as we take care of 
ourselves. 

Congress also has shown no reluc- 
tance to attach riders to our U.N. 
appropriations — a practice, heretofore, 
more typical of the Soviet Union. These 
special conditions bar the use of Ameri- 
can contributions for particular proj- 
ects. Obviously, such conditions 
exacerbate the United Nations' pre- 
carious financial position. They also im- 
pair our credibility and good will, par- 
ticularly in the eyes of nations that do 
not withhold payment for programs or 
activities adopted by the majority of 
the membership, even though they op- 
pose them. 



Withholding American support 
particular programs certainly calls 
question our commitment to the dei 
cratic principles we espouse in our 
domestic affairs. And it has anothei 
unfortunate twist. It gives a congre 
sional stamp of approval to the Sov 
tactic of deliberately withholding fu 
from selected U.N. activities — a pr 
tice we have long opposed but whicl' 
are increasingly adopting. 

Those of us who believe in the 
U.N. system must defend the orgai 
tion and American participation in i 
loudly and vehemently. It is time fc 
Congress and the American public 1 
broaden their perspective on why tl 
United Nations exists and how it cai. 
used to advance our country's intera 

Of course, there will always be 
those who believe that U.S. supporti 
the United Nations ought to be a fu 
tion of U.N. support for the views i 
policies of the United States. 

I believe this position has the e< 
ments of the function reversed. Oun 
cent experiences in the United Natij 
indicate that there is plenty of suppj 
at the United Nations for Americara 
sitions that are principled and consi 
ent with our national ideals. 

Support for American leadershi 
the United Nations will depend on I 
role America chooses to play at the 
United Nations and the attitude we( 
display towarfl the organization. If 
are supportive and cooperative, 
rather than abusive and confronta- 
tional, I believe we will see a stronji 
impetus from Third World nations, 
well as from our allies, for the Unitd 
States to resume the preeminence til 
has recently eluded us at the United 
Nations. 

And if Americans make an effort 
understand and respect the motivesi 
the many diverse members of the 
United Nations, I believe we can ex* 
pect better understanding, at homes 
abroad, for the principles and positi 
that the United States espouses in i( 
foreign relations. 



1980. 



HJSUN press release 36 of Apr. 



82 



Department of State Bullft 



lEATIES 



rrent Actions 



TILATERAL 

lie Energy 

th supply agreement for the transfer 
niched uranium for a research reactor 
igoslavia, with annex and exchange of 
. Signed at Vienna Jan. 16, 1980. 
red into force: July 14, 1980. 

ement for the exchange of fuel ele- 
3, relating to the agreements of Dec. 
)63, and Oct. 4, 1972, for the transfer 
"iehed uranium for a research reactor 
xico. Effected by exchange of notes at 
la Mar. 6, 1980. Entered into force 
■6, 1980. 
tures: IAEA, Mexico, U.S. Mar. 6, 

igement on research participation and 
leal exchange in a coordinated ana- 
I and experimental study of the ther- 
iraulic behavior of emergency core 
it during the refill and reflood phase 
■ss-of-coolant accident in the pres- 
d water reactor. Signed at Washing- 
onn, and Tokyo Jan. 25, Mar. 20, and 
:8, 1980. Entered into force Apr. 18, 

:ures: F.R.G., Mar. 20, 1980; Japan, 
.8, 1980; U.S., Jan. 25, 1980. 



es of agreement of International Cot- 
1 stitute. Done at Washington Jan. 17, 
W Entered into force Feb. 23, 1966. 
\ riH64. 
at iun of intent to seek approval of 
n ement deposited: Argentina, June 
1 I. 



■ nicnt on an international energy pro- 
r I)(ine at Paris Nov. 18, 1974. En- 

■ into force provisionally Nov. 18, 
I l.'finitively, Jan. 19, 1976. TIAS 

lo iial accession deposited: Portugal, 
, 1980. 



inient establishing the International 
( nf Agricultural Development. Done 

M' June 13, 1976. Entered into force 

n. 1977. TIAS 8765. 
' i on deposited: Grenada, July 25, 
0' 

ran Rights 

' ational covenant on civil and political 
Adopted at New York Dec. 16, 
Altered into force Mar. 23, 1976.' 
I i on deposited: Australia, Aug. 13, 



liiients to the international conven- 
I Iliad lines, 1966, relating to amend- 
to the convention (TIAS 6331). 
I jd at London Nov. 12, 1975. ^ 

Mfc ances deposited: U.S., Aug. 12, 

■fugoslavia, July 25, 1980. 

Her 1980 



Maritime Matters 

Amendments to the convention of Mar. 6, 
1948, as amended, on the Intergovernmen- 
tal Maritime Consultative Organization 
(TIAS 4044, 6285, 6490, 8606). Adopted at 
London Nov. 14, 1975. ^ 
Acceptances deposited: Iceland, July 28, 
1980; Morocco, July 25, 1980; Yugoslavia, 
Aug. 4, 1980. 

Amendments to the convention of Mar. 6, 
1948, as amended, on the Intergovernmen- 
tal Maritime Consultative Organization 
(TIAS 4044, 6285, 6490, 8606). Adopted at 
London Nov. 17, 1977.^ 
Acceptances deposited: Iceland, July 28, 
1980; Morocco, July 25, 1980. 

International convention on maritime 

search and rescue, 1979, with annex. Done 

at Hamburg Apr. 27, 1979.^ 

Signatures: France, Apr. 9, 1980;=' U.K., 

May 22, 1980.'- = 

Ratification deposited: U.S., Aug. 12, 

1980. 

Amendments to the convention of Mar. 6, 
1948, as amended, on the Intergovernmen- 
tal Maritime Consultative Organization 
(TIAS 4044, 6285, 6490, 8606). Adopted at 
London Nov. 15, 1979. ^ 
Acceptances deposited: Iceland, July 28, 
1980; Morocco, July 25, 1980. 

Nuclear Material — Physical Protection 

Convention on the physical protection of 
nuclear material, with annexes. Adopted at 
Vienna Oct. 26, 1979.* 
Signatures: Austria, Greece, Mar. 3, 1980; 
Belgium, Denmark, European Atomic 
Energy Community,'' France, ° F.R.G., 
Ireland, Italy,* Luxembourg, Netherlands, 
U.K., June 13, 1980; German Democratic 
Republic," Paraguay, May 21, 1980; 
Guatemala, Mar. 12, 1980; Haiti, Apr. 10, 
1980; Hungary," June 17, 1980; Panama, 
Mar. 18, 1980; Philippines, May 19, 1980; 
Sweden, July 2, 1980; U.S.S.R.," May 22, 
1980; Yugoslavia, July 15, 1980. 

Pollution 

Protocol of 1978 relating to the interna- 
tional convention for the prevention of 
pollution from ships, 1973. Done at London 
Feb. 17, 1978.2 

Ratification deposited: U.S., Aug. 12, 
1980. 

Postal 

Constitution of the Universal Postal Union, 

with final protocol. Done at Vienna, July 

10, 1964. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1966. 

TIAS 5881. 

Accession deposited: Saint Lucia, May 16, 

1980. 

Additional protocol to the constitution of 
the Universal Postal Union with final pro- 
tocol signed at Vienna July 10, 1964. Done 
at Tokyo Nov. 14, 1969. Entered into force 
July 1, 1971, except for article V of the ad- 
ditional protocol which entered into force 
Jan. 1, 1971. TIAS 7150. 
Accession deposited: Saint Lucia, May 16, 
1980. 



Second additional protocol to the constitu- 
tion of the Universal Postal Union of July 
10, 1964, general regulations with final 
protocol and annex, and the universal 
postal convention with final protocol and 
detailed regulations. Done at Lausanne 
July 5, 1974. Entered into force Jan. 1, 
1976. TIAS 8231. 

Accession deposited: Saint Lucia, May 16, 
1980.« 
Ratification deposited: Mexico, Apr. 16, 

Money orders and postal travelers' checks 
agreement, with detailed regulations. Done 
at Lausanne July 5, 1974. Entered into 
force Jan. 1, 1976. TIAS 8232. 
Ratification deposited: Mexico, Apr. 16, 
1980. 

Publications 

Convention concerning the exchange of of- 
ficial publications and government docu- 
ments between States. Adopted at Paris 
Dec. 3, 1958. Entered into force May 30, 
1961; for the U.S. June 9, 1968. TIAS 6439. 
Acceptance deposited: Sweden, June 10, 
1980. 

Convention concerning the international 
exchange of publications. Adopted at Paris 
Dec. 3, 1958. Entered into force Nov. 23, 
1961; for the U.S. June 9, 1968. TIAS 6438. 
Acceptance deposited: Sweden, June 10, 

Refugees 

Protocol relating to the status of refugees. 

Done at New York Jan. 31, 1967. Entered 

into force Oct. 4, 1967; for the U.S. Nov. 1, 

1968. TIAS 6577. 

Accession deposited: Upper Volta, June 18, 

1980. 

Rubber 

International natural rubber agreement, 
1979. Done at Geneva Oct. 6, 1979.^ 
Signatures: Australia, Brazil, Canada, 
Czechoslovakia, Italy, Liberia, Peru, 
Philippines, June 30, 1980; Belgium, 
F.R.G., Luxembourg, U.S.S.R., U.K., 
June 27, 1980; Morocco, Netherlands, June 
26, 1980. 

Telecommunications 

Partial revision of the radio regulations 
(Geneva, 1959), as revised, relating to the 
aeronautical mobile (R) service, with an- 
nexes and final protocol. Done at Geneva 
Mar. 5, 1978. Entered into force Sept. 1, 
1979, except for the frequency allotment 
plan for the aeronautical mobile (R) service 
which shall come into force on Feb. 1, 
1983.1 

Approvals deposited: Argentina (with 
statement) May 16, 1980; Zambia, May 20, 
1980. 

Safety at Sea 

Protocol of 1978 relating to the interna- 
tional convention for the safety of life at 
sea, 1974 (TIAS 9700). Done at London 
Feb. 17, 1978.2 



83 



Treaties 



Ratification deposited: U.S.. Aug. 12, 

1980^ 

Approval deposited: Netherlands, July 8, 

1980.' 

Terrorism 

Convention on the prevention and punish- 
ment of crimes against internationally pro- 
tected persons, including diplomatic 
agents. Adopted at New York Dec. 14, 
1973. Entered into force Feb. 20, 1977. 
TIAS 8532. 

Accessions deposited: Israel, July 31, 1980; 
Panama, June 17, 1980. 

International convention against the taking 

of hostages. Adopted at New York Dec. 17, 

1979.» 

Signatures: Dominican Republic, Aug. 12, 

1980; Mauritius, June 18, 1980; Portugal, 

June 16, 1980; Suriname, July 30, 1980; 

Switzerland, July 18, 1980. 

Treaties 

Vienna convention on the law of treaties, 
with annex. Done at Vienna May 23, 1969. 
Entered into force Jan. 27, 1980.' 
Accession deposited: Panama, July 28, 
1980 

United Nations 

Charter of the United Nations and Statute 
of the International Court of Justice. 
Signed at San Francisco June 26, 1945. En- 
tered into force Oct. 24, 1945. TS 993. 
Admission to membership: Zimbabwe, 
Aug. 25, 1980. 

UN I DO 

Constitution of the United Nations Indus- 
trial Development Organization, with an- 
nexes. Adopted at Vienna Apr. 8, 1979. ^ 
Signature: Morocco, July 25, 1980. 
Ratifications deposited: Guinea, June 23, 
1980; Malaysia, Sweden, July 28, 1980; 
Panama, July 23, 1980. 

Wheat 

Protocol modifying and further extending 
the wheat trade convention (part of the in- 
ternational wheat agreement), 1971 (TIAS 
7144). Done at Washington Apr. 26, 1978. 
Entered into force June 24, 1978, with re- 
spect to certain provisions, July 1, 1978, 
with respect to other provisions. TIAS 
9459. 

Ratification deposited : Italy, Aug. 20, 
19W. 

Protocol modifying and further extending 
the wheat trade convention (part of the in- 
ternational wheat agreement), 1971 (TIAS 
7144). Done at Washington Apr. 25, 1979. 
Entered into force June 23, 1979, with re- 
spect to certain provisions, July 1, 1979, 
with respect to other provisions. 
Ratification deposited: Iran, Aug. 14, 1980. 

Protocol modifying and further extending 
the food aid convention (part of the inter- 
national wheat agreement), 1971 (TIAS 
7144). Done at Washington Apr. 26, 1978. 
Entered into force June 24, 1978, with re- 



spect to certain provisions, July 1, 1978, 

with respect to other provisions. TIAS 

9459. 

Ratification deposited: Italy, Aug. 20, 

1980. 

Food aid convention, 1980 (part of the In- 
ternational Wheat Agreement, 1971, as ex- 
tended (TIAS 7144)). Done at Washington 
Mar. 11, 1980. Entered into force July 1, 
1980. 

Ratification deposited: Austria, Aug. 14, 
1980. 

Women 

Convention on the elimination of all forms 
of discrimination against women. Adopted 
at New York Dec. 18, 1979.^ 
Signatures: Afghanistan, Aug. 14, 1980; 
Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, 
Bhutan, Bulgaria, Burundi, Byelorussian 
Soviet Socialist Republic, Canada, Chile, 
China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Czechoslo- 
vakia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, 
Ecuador, Finland, France, Gabon, F.R.G., 
Ghana, Grenada, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, 
Guyana, Haiti, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, 
Jamaica, Japan, Laos, Lesotho, Luxem- 
bourg, Madagascar, Mexico, Mongolia, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, 
Norway, Spain, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, 
Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, 
U.S.S.R., Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Zaire, 
Zambia, July 17, 1980; Barbados, Iceland, 
Tunisia, July 24, 1980; Congo, Gambia, In- 
donesia, Senegal, Vietnam, July 29, 1980; 
Egypt, July 16, 1980; India, Uganda, July 
30, 1980; Panama, June 26, 1980; Philip- 
pines, July 15, 1980. 
Ratifications deposited: Cuba, Guyana, 
July 17, 1980; Poland, Portugal, July 30, 
1980. 



BILATERAL 

ASEAN 

Agreement regarding the establishment of 
an ASEAN Agricultural Development and 
Planning Center. Effected by exchange of 
notes at Kuala Lumpur June 28, 1980. En- 
tered into force June 28, 1980. 

Australia 

Agreement providing for the continuation 
of a cooperative program facilitating space 
flight operations for the advancement and 
application of mutual scientific knowledge. 
Effected by exchange of notes at Canberra 
Mar. 25, 1970. Entered into force Mar. 25, 
1970; effective Feb. 26, 1970. TIAS 6866. 
Terminated: Feb. 26, 1980. 

Agreement amending the agreement of 
Mar. 25, 1970 (TIAS 6866), providing for 
the continuation of a cooperative program 
facilitating space flight operations for the 
advancement and application of mutual sci- 
entific knowledge. Effected by exchange of 
notes at Canberra Mar. 3 and June 27, 
1978. Entered into force June 27, 1978. 
TIAS 9270. 
Terminated: Feb. 26, 1980. 






Canada 

Memorandum of intent concerning tra 
boundary air pollution, with annex. S: 
at Washington Aug. 5, 1980. Entered 
force Aug. 5, 1980. 

Colombia 

Mutual legal assistance treaty, with e 
change of notes. Signed at Washingto 
Aug. 20, 1980. Enters into force on th 
date of the exchange of the instrumen 
ratification. 

Dominican Republic 

Agreement amending the agreement f 
sales of agricultural commodities of Jj 
1980 (TIAS 9730). Effected by exchan 
notes at Santo Domingo June 13 and J 
22, 1980. Entered into force July 22, ] 

Egypt 

Agreement amending the agreement f 
sales of agricultural commodities of M 
20, 1979 (TIAS 9683). Effected by ex- 
change of notes at Cairo June 30, 1980. 
tered into force June 30, 1980. 

Agreement extending privileges and i: 
munities to U.S. military personnel in 
Egypt in connection with joint 
Egyptian-U.S. Air Force training exei 
Effected by exchange of notes at Cair 
June 25 and July 15, 1980. Entered in- 
force July 15, 1980. 

Agreement amending the agreement f 
sales of agricultural commodities of 0( 
1979. Effected by exchange of notes a,! 
Cairo July 31, 1980. Entered into force* 
31, 1980." 

France 

Convention for the avoidance of doublf 
taxation and the prevention of fiscal e" 
sion with respect to taxes on estates, i 
heritances, and gifts. Signed at Washii 
ton Nov. 24, 1978. 
Instruments of ratification exchanged: 



Aug. 7, 1980. 

Enters into force: Oct. 1, 1980. 

Federal Republic of Germany 

Treaty concerning extradition, with pr 
tocol. "signed at Bonn June 20, 1978. E 
tered into force Aug. 29, 1980. 
Proclaimed by the President: Aug. 9, 1 

Guyana 

Agreement amending the agreement fo 
sales of agricultural commodities of Apl 
23, 1980 (TIAS 9755). Effected by ex 
change of notes at Georgetown July 12 1 
14, 1980. Entered into force July 14, 19 

Honduras 

Agreement amending the agreement fol 
sales of agricultural commodities of Fetf 
27, 1979 (TIAS 9521). Effected by ex- 
change of notes at Tegucigalpa July 18, j 
1980. Entered into force July 18, 1980. 

International Atomic Energy Agency 

Agreement for the application of 
safeguards in the U.S., with protocol. 
Signed at Vienna Nov. 18. 1977.^ 



84 



Department of State Bulls 



CHRONOLOGY 



iment of ratification signed by the 
ienf. July 31, 1980 (with understand- 



lational Sugar Organization 

Iment relating to a procedure for U.S. 
lie tax reimbursement. Effected by ex- 
je of letters at London July 10, 1980. 
Jed into force July 10, 1980; effective 

,'. 19S0. 



.nniit for financing certain educa- 
;ixihange programs. Signed at Rome 

\ 1948, as amended (TIAS 1864. 

;l:7s, 4254, 6179, 6408). Entered into 

). r 18, 1948. 
niated: July 28, 1980. 

■ent-nt extending the agreement of 
;i, 1967, as extended (TIAS 6280, 

: ]W) for a cooperative program in 
Effected by exchange of notes at 
I line 19, 1980. Entered into force 

i I, 1980. 

luiit for exchanges in the fields of 
• :]] and culture. Signed at Rome 
., 1975. 
.1 in to force: July 28, 1980. 



lent amending and extending the 
lent of Aug. 5, 1975, on cooperation 
Jield of environmental protection 

J172). Effected by exchange of notes 
I'o Aug. 5, 1980. Entered into force 
1980. 



[•eduled air service agreement, with 

as amended (TIAS 7954, 8553, 
pigned at Amman Sept. 21, 1974. 

into force Sept. 21, 1974. 
ated: June 8. 1980. 



■tional express mail agreement, with 
, regulations. Signed at Seoul and 
ton Dec. 27, 1979 and Jan. 14, 

ment of ratification signed by the 
It: July 31, 1980. 



Maputo July 24, 
July 24, 1980. 



1980. Entered into force 



lent of cooperation regarding pollu- 
,he marine environment by dis- 
of hydrocarbons and other hazard- 
itances, with annexes. Signed at 
iCity July 24, 1980. Entered into 
[ily24, 1980, provisionally. Defini- 
pon exchange of notes informing 
irty that the other party has eom- 
tSts necessary internal procedures. 

Iient relating to additional coopera- 
jjangements to curb the illegal traffic 
|)tics. Effected by exchange of let- 
iMexico July 25, 1980. Entered into 
|ily 25, 1980. 

bique 

lent amending the agreement for 
(bJ agricultural commodities of June 
\). Effected by exchange of notes at 



Nigeria 

Memorandum of understanding on coopera- 
tion in the field of agriculture. Signed at 
Lagos July 23, 1980. Entered into force 
July 23, 1980. 

Oman 

Agreement concerning the use of certain 
facilities in Oman by the U.S. Effected by 
exchange of notes at Muscat June 4, 1980. 
Entered into force June 4, 1980. 

Panama 

Treaty on the execution of penal sentences. 
Signed at Panama Jan. 11. 1979. Entered 
into force June 27, 1980. 
Proclaimed by the President: Aug. 5, 1980. 

Peru 

Treaty on the execution of penal sentences. 
Signed at Washington July 6, 1979. En- 
tered into force July 21, 1980. 
Proclaimed by the President: Aug. 9, 1980. 

Sierra Leone 

Agreement for sales of agricultural com- 
modities, relating to the agreement of Aug. 
31, 1978 (TIAS 9210), with memorandum of 
negotiations. Signed at Freetown Aug. 8, 
1980. Entered into force Aug. 8, 1980. 

Spain 

Master data exchange agreement for the 
mutual development of weapons systems. 
Signed at Washington June 19, 1980. En- 
tered into force June 19, 1980. 

Cover agreement on the Territorial Com- 
mand Net, with annexes. Signed at Madrid 
July 24, 1980. Entered into force July 24, 
1980. 

Sri Lanka 

Agreement relating to trade in cotton, wool, 
and manmade fiber textiles and textile 
products, with annexes. Effected by ex- 
change of notes at Colombo July 7, 1980. 
Entered into force July 7, 1980; effective 
May 1, 1980. 

Turkey 

Agreement regarding the consolidation and 
rescheduling of certain debts owed to, 
guaranteed, or insured by the U.S. Gov- 
ernment and its agencies, with annexes. 
Signed at Ankara Dec. 11, 1979. 
Entered into force: Jan. 14, 1980. 

Implementing agreement regarding the con- 
solidation and rescheduling of certain debts 
owed to the Agency for International De- 
velopment. Signed at Ankara Apr. 22, 1980. 
Entered into force: Apr. 22, 1980; effective 
Jan. 14, 1980. 

Zaire 

Agreement for sales of agricultural com- 
modities, with memorandum of understand- 
ing. Signed at Kinshasa May 30, 1980. 
Entered into force May 30, 1980. 



' Not in force for the U.S. 

*Not in force. 

'Signature definitive. 

■•With declaration(s). 

* Applicable to The Bailiwick of Jersey, 
The Bailiwick of Guernsey, Isle of Man, St. 
Christopher-Nevis-AnguiUa, Belize, Ber- 
muda, British Virgin Islands, Gibraltar, 
Hong Kong. 

«With reservation(s). 

'Applicable to Netherlands Antilles. ■ 



August 1980 



Events pertaining to Iran may be 
found on page 63. 

August 5 

U.S. -Canada sign memorandum of in- 
tent on transboundary air pollution. 

August 6 

Secretary Muskie visits Los Angeles 
and San Francisco Aug. 6-8. 

August 11 

Nonproliferation Treaty Review Con- 
ference opens in Geneva. Ambassador 
Charles N. Van Dorn heads U.S. delega- 
tion. 

August 19 

U.S. -Colombia sign agreement on 
mutual legal assistance in criminal matters. 

U.S. -Oman sign agreement establish- 
ing a Joint Commission for Economic and 
Technical Cooperation. 

August 20 

By a vote of 14-0 with 1 abstention 
(U.S.), the U.N. Security Council censures 
the action of the Israeli Parliament in ap- 
proving a law which asserts Israeli 
sovereignty over Jerusalem and calls upon 
those states that have diplomatic missions 
in Jerusalem to withdraw them. 

August 21 

Zimbabwean Prime Minister Robert 
Mugabe makes official visit to U.S., Aug. 
21-26. 

August 22 

The following newly appointed Ambas- 
sadors presented their credentials to 
President Carter: Don Carmelo NVONO 
NCA Menene Oluy of Equatorial Guinea, 
Abdelkadir Braik Al-Ameri of Qatar, 
PROK Amaranand of Thailand, Juan Jose 
Amado III of Panama, Aboubacar Bokoko 
of Gabon, and Jose Luis Fernandes Lopes 
of Cape Verde. 

U.S. -Somalia exchange notes providing 
for expanded cooperation in the develop- 
ment of security assistance and economic 
cooperation programs. 



br 1980 



85 



PRESS RELEASES 



II 



August 25 

Zimbabwe becomes the 153rd member 
of the U.N. 

Eleventh U.N. General Assembly spe- 
cial session on North-South economic issues 
is held Aug. 25-Sept. 5. 

Objectives of the special session are: 

• To begin a series of global negotia- 
tions with attention on North-South issues: 

• To adopt an international develop- 
ment system for the third development 
decade; and 

• To receive reports from the Secre- 
tary General on economic progress. 

August 26 

The following newly appointed Ambas- 
sadors presented their credentials to 
President Carter: Filipe Nagera Bole of 
Fiji, Dr. Mohamed Warsame AH of 
Somalia, Dr. Bhekh Bahadur Thapa of 
Nepal, Frank Gill, C.B.E., D.S.O. of New 
Zealand, .Jan Hendrik Lubbers of the 
Netherlands, Anton Hegner of Switzer- 
land, Dr. Joseph Kingsley Baffour- 
Senkyire of Ghana, and Dr. Elleck K. 
Mashingaidze of Zimbabwe. 

August 27 

Ambassador to Lebanon, John Gunther 
Dean, is target of an assassination attempt 
in Beirut. 

August 29 

Ambassador Sol M. Linowitz, Personal 
Representative of the President for the 
Middle East Peace Negotiations, visits Is- 
rael and Egypt to discuss the current 
status of the Palestinian autonomy negotia- 
tions Aug. 29-Sept. 5.B 



Department of State 



Press releases may be obtained from 
the Office of Press Relations, Department 
of State, Washington, D.C. 20520. 



No. Date 

209 «/5 



*209A 8/6 



■209B 8/6 



Subject 

U.S., Canada sign memo- 
randum of intent on 
transboundary air pollu- 
tion. 

Memorandum of Intent 
Between the Govern- 
ment of the United 
States of America and 
the Government of 
Canada Concerning 
Transboundary A'r 
Pollution. 

Muskie, Towe, Roberts, 
Costle: statements at 
the signing ceremony 
for the U.S., Canada 
memorandum of intent 
on transboundary air 
pollution, Aug. 5. 



210 8/7 Muskie: address before 

the United Steelwork- 
ers of America, Los 
Angeles. 

211 8/11 Muskie: news conference 

following address in Los 
Angeles, Aug. 7. 

212 8/8 Muskie: address before 

the G.I. Forum, Los 
Angeles, Aug. 7. 
21.3 8/11 Muskie: address before 

the Commonwealth Club 
and the World Affairs 
Council of Northern 
California, San Fran- 
cisco, Aug. 8. 
21.3A 8/12 Muskie: question-and- 

answer session follow- 
ing address in San 
F'rancisco, Aug. 8. 
214 8/13 Muskie: news conference 

following luncheon with 
hostages' families, San 
Francisco, Aug. 8. 

*215 8/13 Muskie: interview on 

NBC's "Today" Show, 
New York. 

*216 8/13 Advisory Committee on 

International Invest- 
ment, Technology, and 
Development, Sept. 3. 

*217 8/14 Muskie: interview on 

ABC's "Good Morning, 
America," New York, 
Aug. 13. 

*218 8/14 Muskie: interview for 

ABC News, New York, 
Aug. 13. 

*219 8/14 Muskie: interview for 

CBS News, New York, 
Aug. 13. 

220 8/15 Muskie: interview for 

French television. New 
York, Aug. 13. 

221 8/15 Muskie: interview for 

French radio. New 
York, Aug. 13. 

*222 8/19 U.S., Colombia sign 

treaty on mutual legal 
assistance in criminal 
matters. 

*223 8/21 Frances D. Cook sworn in 

as Ambassador to 
Burundi (biographic 
data). 

*224 8/21 Shipping Coordinating 

Committee (SCO, Sub- 
committee on Safetv of 
Life at Sea (SOLAS), 
panel on bulk cargoes, 
Sept. 9. 

*225 8/21 sec, SOLAS, working 

group on subdivision, 
stability, and load lines, 
Sept. lb. 

*226 8/21 sec, SOLAS, working 

group on standards of 
training and watch- 
keeping, Sept. 24. 
227 8/20 Muskie: statement in the 

U.N. Security Council 
on the question of 
Jerusalem. 



*228 8/22 

*229 8/22 

230 8/25 

*231 8/26 

*232 8/28 

*233 8/28 

*234 8/28 

*235 8/28 

*236 8/28 

*237 8/28 

*238 8/29 



U.S. Organization foi 
International Teleg 
and Telephone Con 
tative Committee 
(CCITT), Sept. 16. 

U.S., Canada agree o 
interim arrangemer 
albacore fishing. 

Muskie: statement be 
the 11th special ses 
of the U.N. Genera 
sembly. 

Hume Alexander Hor 
sworn in as Ambass 
to Cameroon and 
Equatorial Guinea 
(biographic data). 

U.S., Philippines amf 
te.xtile agreement, 
Sept. 4 and 12, 197! 

U.S., China establish 
tile visa system, Ju 
and 25. 

U.S., Singapore amei 
textile agreement, . 
14 and 18. 

U.S., Mexico amend t 
tile agreement. Juh 
and Aug. 6. 

U.S., Malaysia anient 
textile agreement, . 
23 and Aug. 8. 

U.S., Sri Lanka sign 
tile agreement, Jul; 

Theresa Ann Healy s' 
in as Ambassador ti 
Sierra Leone (bio- 
graphic data). 



*Not printed in the Bulletin. 



86 



Department of State Bulh' 



JDEX 



lictober 1980 
ibl. 80, No. 2043 

tjhanistan. Secretary Muskie Inter- 
viewed for "U.S. News & World Re- 

piirt" 16 

Tad a 

laiia Approve.s Segment of Alaska Gas 

Pipeline (Carter) 23 

v-Canada Relations (Ahmad) 20 

V, Canada Sign Memo on Air 

I'ldliition 21 

mre.ss 

V c'i.'i Agreement With Somalia (Moose, 
Department announcement) 19 

Counting for MIAs: A Status Report 
(.Armacost) 29 

, Mirt Restrictions on the U.S.S.R. 
( < 'ooper) 45 

; nting Political Asylum Abroad 
(Lake) 50 

1 tage Convention (message to the Sen- 
ate) 75 

\ nan Rights in South Africa (Derian) .56 
Supply Prospects and U.S. Interna- 
tional Energy Policy (Rosen, 
Twinam) 36 

^: k Sale to Jordan (Saunders) 64 

i-Cambodian Border Situation (Ab- 
ramowitz) 24 

H 1 Report on Cyprus (message to the 

( '(ingress) 49 

Canada Relations (Ahmad) 20 

Indonesia Nuclear Energy Agree- 
ment (message to the Congress) . . . .31 

'.lurdan Relationship (Draper) 66 

.Libyan Relations Since 1969 

( Newsom) 60 

. Trade Policy (Kopp) 34 

: rus. 20th Report on Cyprus (message 
to the Congress) 49 

tiinomics 

dmomics and National Security in the 
1980s (Cooper) 32 

Siuring the World's Common Future 
(Muskie) 76 

A\ rgy. Oil-Supply Prospects and U.S. In- 
ternational Energy Policy (Rosen, 
Twinam) 36 

Hiiope. Secretary Muskie Interviewed for 
"U.S. News & World Report" 16 

'l<many. Secretary Meets With German 
Foreign Minister (joint press state- 
ment) 46 

inan Rights 

fiian Rights in South Africa (Derian) .56 

i' iew of Human Rights in Latin America 
(Derian) 51 

ria. Secretary Muskie's News Confer- 
ence of September 15 D 

Wjnesia. U.S. -Indonesia Nuclear Energy 
Agreement (message to the Con- 
gress) 31 

r.'rnational Law. Granting Political 
Asylum Abroad (Lake) 50 

' Chronology, August 1980 63 



President Carter's News Conference of 

August 4 (excerpts) 11 

Secretary Muskie Interviewed by the 

French Media (excerpts) 13 

Secretary Muskie Interviewed for "U.S. 

News & World Report" 16 

Secretary Muskie Interviewed on "Face 

the Nation" A 

Secretary Muskie's News Conference of 

September 15 D 

Jordan 

Tank Sale to Jordan (Saunders) 64 

LI. S. -Jordan Relationship (Draper) 66 

Kampuchea 

Khmer Relief Efforts (Department press 

release, Department statement) . . . .27 

Thai-Cambodian Border Situation (Ab- 

ramowitz) 24 

Laos. Accounting for MIAs: A Status Re- 
port (Armacost) 29 

Latin America and the Caribbean. Re- 
view of Human Rights in Latin 

America (Derian) 51 

Libya 

President Carter's News Conference of 

August 4 (e.\cerpts) 11 

U.S. -Libyan Relations Since 1969 

(Newsom) 60 

Middle Ea.st 

Jerusalem and the Peace Negotiations 

(Muskie, te.xt of resolution) 78 

Secretary Muskie Interviewed by the 

French Media (excerpts) 13 

Secretary Muskie Interviewed for "U.S. 

News & World Report" 16 

Secretary Muskie Interviewed on "Face 

the Nation" A 

Secretary Muskie's News Conference of 

September 15 D 

U.S. Relations With the Persian Gulf 

States (Saunders) 1 

Military Affairs 

Arms Coproduction (Nimetz) 67 

National Security Policy (Carter) 8 

NATO. Arms Coproduction (Nimetz) 67 

Nuclear Policy. Secretary Muskie Inter- 
viewed by the French Media (ex- 
cerpts) 13 

Oceans 

Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act 

(White House statement) 73 

Ocean Development in the 1980s (Picker- 
ing) 70 

Pakistan. Secretary Meets With Pakistani 
Foreign Minister (Muskie, Shahi) . . .74 
Poland 

Poland (Muskie) 49 

Secretary Muskie Interviewed on "Face 

the Nation" A 

Secretary Muskie's News Conference of 

September 15 D 

Presidential Documents 

Canada Approves Segment of Alaska Gas 

Pipeline (Carter) 23 

Hostage Convention (message to the Sen- 
ate) 75 

National Security Policy (Carter) 8 



News Conference of August 4 (excerpts) . . .11 

Trident I Missile Sale to the U.K. (Carter, 
Thatcher, White House statement). .48 

20th Report on Cyprus (message to the 
Congress) 49 

U.S. -Indonesia Nuclear Energy Agree- 
ment (message to the Congress) 31 

Refugees. Khmer Relief Efforts (Depart- 
ment press release. Department 
statement) 27 

Somalia. Access Agreement With Somalia 
(Moose, Department announcement) 19 

South Africa. Human Rights in South Af- 
rica (Derian) 56 

Terrorism. Hostage Convention (message 
to the Senate) 75 

Thailand 

Military Equipment to Thailand (White 
House announcement) 26 

Thai-Cambodian Border Situation (Ab- 
ramowitz) 24 

Trade. U.S. Trade Policy (Kopp) 34 

Treaties. Current Actions 83 

U.S.S.R. 

Export Restrictions on the U.S.S.R. 
(Cooper) 45 

Secretary Muskie Interviewed by the 
French Media (excerpts) 13 

Secretary Muskie Interviewed on "Face 
the Nation" A 

Secretary Muskie's News Conference of 
September 15 D 

United Kingdom. Trident I Missile Sale to 
the U.K. (Carter, Thatcher, White 
House statement) 48 

United Nations 

Jerusalem and the Peace Negotiations 
(Muskie, text of resolution) 78 

Securing the World's Common Future 
(Muskie) 76 

U.S. Relationship With the U.N. 

(McHenry) 80 

Vietnam. Accounting for MIAs: A Status 
Report (Armaco.st) 29 

Name Index 

Abramowitz, Morton I 24 

Ahmad, Sharon E 20 

Armacost, Michael A 29 

Carter, President ..8, 11, 23, 31, 48, 49, 75 

Cooper, Richard N 32, 45 

Derian, Patricia M 51, 56 

Draper, Morris 66 

Kopp, Harry 34 

Lake, William T 50 

McHenry, Donald F 80 

Moose, Richard M 19 

Muskie, Secretary 13, 16, 49, 74, 

76, 78, A, D 

Newsom, David D 60 

Nimetz, Matthew 67 

Pickering, Thomas R 70 

Rosen, Gerald A 36 

Saunders, Harold H 1, 64 

Shahi, Agha 74 

Thatcher, Margaret 48 

Twinam, Joseph W 36 



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Department 



V of State ^^ J ^ 

buUetin 



e Official Monthly Record of United States Foreign Policy / Volume 80 / Number 2044 



November 1980 




CONTENTS 



FEATURE 



1 



24 



U.S. -China Agreements (Vice Premier Bo, Preside))! Carter, Texts n))d 

S))))i))ia)'ies of Ag)'ee)))e))ts. White HoDse Fact Sheet) 
U.S., China Sign Civil Aviation Agreement 



lie President 

2 News Conference of Sep- 
tember 18 (Excerpts) 

lie Secretary 

2 Essentials of Security: Arms and 
More 

2 Question-and-Answer Session 

Following Pittsburgh Address 

3 The United States and the 

World's Refugees 
3 U.S. Nuclear Strategy 
3 The Challenge of Peace 
3 News Conferences in New York 



liervjew 

Deputy Secretary Christopher 
Interviewed on "Face the Na- 
tion" 

ms Control 

4' Report on CTB Negotiations 

Erope 

4! CSCE Review Meeting in Ma- 
drid (Ruza))))e L. Ridgicai/) 
Coup d'Etat in Turkey ( Depart - 
)))ent StateiDoit) 






Middle East 

52 Conflict in Iran and Iraq (Wn)-- 

)V)) Ch)-istoplier) 

53 Iran-Iraq Conflict (Preside))t 

Carter, White Hoxse State- 
)))e))t) 

54 U.S. Hostages in Iran (Secre- 

tanj's Letter to I)-a)))a)) Pri)))e 
Minister Rajai) 

54 AWACS Aircraft to Saudi 

Arabia (Defc))se Depa)i)))e)it 
State))ie»t) 

55 Iran Chronology, September 

1980 

South Asia 

55 Nuclear Fuel Shipment to India 
( Ex'cha))ge of Letters Betiveoi 
Se))ator F)~a))k Churcli a))d 
Secretary Muskie, Wl)ite 
House Stateme)it) 

United Nations 

57 Obligations of Peace (Sec)-etari/ 
Mi)skie) 

60 United Nations Day, 1980 

(P)-ocla)))ati<))) ) 

61 Iran-Iraq Conflict (Do)iald F. 

McHoirij) 

62 World Conference on the U.N. 

Decade for Women Held in 
Copenhagen (Sarah Wed- 
di»gton, Prog)-a))))))e of Ac- 
tio)), Revioc a))d Assess)))e))t 
of U.S. Participation, List of 
Resol»tio)is Adopted) 



Treaties 

87 Current Actions 

Chronology 

89 September 1980 

Press Releases 

90 Department of State 

Index 



Boston Fl.u1._ i^iLrarv 
Superinteadeat of DocuiAents 

DEC 1 8 1830 

DEPOSITORY 



Special (See Center Section) 

Dealing With the World's Realities (Secretary Muskie) 

Question-and-Answer Session Following Memphis Address (Seo-etary Muskie) 



FEATURE 




Seated: President Carter and Chinese Vice Premier Bo Yibo sign U.S. -China agreements. Standing from 
left to right: Yang Xuziang, Head of Chancery, P.R.C. Embassy; Vice President Mondale: Secretary Mus- 
kie; Chai Zemin, Ambassador to the U.S. from China; Myron Klutznick, U.S. Secretary of Commerce; and 
Arthur Rovine, Assistant Legal Adviser for Treaty Affairs, Department of State. 



i.S.-China Agreements 



Feature 



In a ceremony at the White House 
■yepteniber 17, 1980, President Car- 
and Vice Premier Bo Yiho of the 
pie's Republic of Chitia signed four 
emeiits — civil air transport, textile, 
■itinie transport, and consular. 
Following are remarks made by the 
ndent and the Vice Premier on that 
sio)i, te.rts of the agreements, a 
te House fact sheet on significant 
•ts leading to the agreements, and 
maries of the four agreements. 

lARKS AT SIGNING 
flEMONY' 

ridont Carter 

e IV here today to share some good 
' \\ ith each other. With the four 

iiii'iits that we are about to sign, the 
! alization of relations between the 
■i] States of America and the 
lis RepubHc of China is at last com- 

rhat relationship is a new and vital 
n f(ir peace and stability in the inter- 
t iial scene. In addition, it holds a 
•J ise of ever-increasing benefits in 
i> and other exchanges for both the 
' States and for the People's Re- 
f China. I am personally commit- 
1 I the proposition that our relation- 
i| \ ill not be undermined but will be 
•(uthened. Both the United States 
^1 'hiiia have made firm and written 
I atments which form the basis of this 
'I, ship. These commitments have 
ip|)ort of the people of my country 
' \ (lur countiy, and, therefore, they 

iionored. 
\'hat we have accomplished together 
ic the beginning of diplomatic rela- 
1 it ween our countries has been ex- 
iiiiaiy But as I said to Vice Premier 
Xiaoping when he was here in Jan- 
''79, our aim is to make these ex- 
•s not extraordinary but ordinaiy — 
I'l' words, to make the benefits of 
i\\ relationship a routine part of the 
ilay lives of the citizens of this coun- 
m1 of the People's Republic of China, 
s exactly what these four agi'ee- 
w ill do. Let me say a brief word 
each of them. 

irst, the civil aviation agreement: 
i.ureement will mean regularly 
tiled, direct flights between the 
il States and China, beginning in 
■n* near future. I have instructed 



the Civil Aeronautics Board to move 
quickly to name the first of the two U.S. 
airlines which, along with the Chinese 
carriers, will fly the new routes. At the 
airports in New York or Los Angeles or 
San Francisco or Honolulu a few months 
from today, we will heai' flights an- 
nounced for Shanghai and for Beijing, as 
well as London and Paris. 

Second, the maritime agreement; 
For the first time in more than 30 years, 
all U.S. ports will be open to Chinese 
merchant ships, and American ships will 
have access to all Chinese ports of call. 
This will mean a stronger American 
maritime industry. It will mean revenue 
for U.S. shippers from the gi'owing 
Chinese market for American goods, and 
gi'owing trade and commerce will benefit 
the people of both China and the United 
States. 

Third, the textile agreement: By 
permitting orderly mai'keting in this 
counti-y of Chinese textile products, this 
agreement will benefit American retailers 
and consumers without damaging our 
own textile industn', which was fully rep- 
resented in these negotiations. 

The fourth agi'eement is the consular 
convention. It spells out the duties of 
consular officers in providing services to 
citizens of both our countries. One im- 
mediate benefit is to insure the protection 
of the rights and interests of American 
citizens in China. We have two Consu- 
lates in China already, and now we will 
open three more. These offices will pro- 
mote trade, travel, and cultural and edu- 
cational exchange. They will serve the 
needs of hundreds of thousands of Ameri- 
cans who will be visiting China in the 
next few years. 

On this side of the Pacific Ocean, 
China now has two Consulates in the 
United States — one in San Francisco and 
one in Houston. Soon, thanks to this 
agreement, thei'e will be new Chinese 
Consulates in New York, Chicago, and 
Honolulu as well. 

These agi-eements, as you well know, 
are the frait of some veiy hard work. A 
year ago, when Vice President Mondale 
visited China, both nations pledged an ef- 
fort to complete the political and legal 
framework of normalization by the end of 
1980. We have met that goal with 3V2 
months to spare. The negotiators on both 
sides deserve the thanks and the appreci- 
ation of us all. 



I'm privileged to lead my great na- 
tion in taking this step. I consider it one 
of the most important achievements of 
my Administration — but it's an achieve- 
ment with a biparti-san histoiy President 
Nixon concluded the Shanghai com- 
munique of 1972, and President Ford ac- 
cepted and supported the principles of 
that communique. My Administration, 
working closely with the Congi-ess, has 
taken the decisive steps which made that 
goal a reality. 

One result has been the activity by 
private and public organizations on both 
sides to build human contacts between 
our peoples after 30 years of near-total 
mutual isolation. Another was the estab- 
lishment of the Joint Economic Commit- 
tee, which is meeting here this week 
under the chairmanship of Vice Premier 
Bo and Secretaiy [of the Ti-easury G. 
William] Miller Our economic ties, like 
oui' cooperation in science and technology, 
grow broader and closer eveiy day. Ti'ade 
between the United States and China this 
year will be nearly four times what it was 
2 years ago. China will buy some $3 bil- 
lion worth of American goods. That 
means jobs for American workers and 
opportunities for American businesses. 
And it means help for China's efforts to 
modernize and to develop its economy. 

Almost 700,000 American citizens 
trace their roots to China. There are 
strong bonds of blood kinship and history 
between the United States and China. 
Yet both countries have acted not out of 
sentiment but out of mutual interest. 

In a few moments, normalization be- 
tween our two countries will be a fact. 
We are building something together — a 
broadly based consultative relationship 
that will enable us to expand our coopera- 
tion as the years go by. 

Both oif us will gain from this rela- 
tionship; so, I firmly believe, will the 
peace of the world. America and China, 
so recently at odds, will have shown the 
world something about the possibilities of 
peace and friendship. In a world that 
badly needs a good deal of both, this is an 
achievement of which we can all be 
proud. 

Vice Premier Bo Yibo 

[as t7-anslated] 

Today, in the field of Sino-U.S. economic 
cooperation, President Carter and I have 
completed a task of major significance. 



Tiber 1980 



Feature 



Starting from today, the economic rela- 
tions between our two countries will have 
moved from ordinaiy exchanges to insti- 
tutionalization. Just as President Carter 
pointed out in his veiy warm message to 
the Chinese Ti-ade Exhibition which 
opened in San Francisco a few days ago, 
the cornerstone of our relationship is the 
communique on the establishment of dip- 
lomatic relations between our two coun- 
tries which was solemnly declared to the 
whole world by the heads of government 
of our two countries on December 15, 
1978. 

Since that time, the relations be- 
tween our two countries in various fields 
have developed rapidly on the basis of 
both sides abiding by the obligations 
undertaken in the communique. It is our 
firm opinion that these friendly relations 
should continue to develop forward. 
Here, it is my pleasure to declare that 
with the signing of the Consular Conven- 
tion, we'll be setting up three more Con- 
sulates General in your country. This will 
give a further impetus to the friendly 
contacts and trade and economic coopera- 
tion between our two peoples. Facts have 
proven and will continue to prove that 
such relations are not only beneficial to 
the two peoples but also to the peace and 
stability of the world. 

Not long ago, we held the third ses- 
sion of the fifth National People's Con- 
gress. Our newly elected Premier Zhao 
Ziyang explicitly pointed out that we will 
continue to cari-y out unswervingly the 
domestic and foreign policies which we 
have set forth in recent years. Thi'ough 
this session of the People's Congress, the 
whole series of the effective new policies 
which we have been can-ying out have 
been or will shortly be fully legalized and 
institutionalized. 

All our people are, with full confi- 
dence, working hard to build our countiy 
into a highly democratic and civilized 
modern nation. For this purpose, we 
need peace, we need stability, we need 
friendship, we need cooperation. It is my 
conviction that the American people too 
need peace, need stability, need friend- 
ship, need cooperation. Let our two great 
nations and two great peoples on both 
sides of the Pacific advance hand-in-hand 
and make common efforts for world peace 
and stability and for the prosperity and 
strength of our two peoples. 



TEXTS OF AGREEMENTS' 

Civil Air TVansport Agreement 

AGREEMENT BETWEEN 

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 

AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE 

PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 

RELATING TO CIVIL AIR TRANSPORT 

The Government of the United States of 
America and the Government of the People's 
Republic of China. 

Desiring to develop mutual relations be- 
tween their countries, to enhance friendship 
between their peoples, and to facilitate inter- 
national air transport; 

Acting in the spirit of the Joint Com- 
munique of December 1.5, 1978 on the Estab- 
hshment of Diplomatic Relations between the 
United States of America and the People's Re- 
public of China; 

Observing the principles of mutual respect 
for independence and sovereignty, non- 
interference in each other's internal affairs, 
equality and mutual benefit and friendly coop- 
eration; 

Recognizing the importance of reasonable 
balance of rights and benefits between both 
Parties under this Agreement; 

Being Parties to the Convention on Inter- 
national Civil Aviation opened for signature at 
Chicago on December 7, 1944; 

Have agreed on the establishment and op- 
eration of air transportation involving their re- 
spective territories as follows: 

Article 1 
Definitions 

For the purpose of this Agreement, the 
term: 

(a) "Aeronautical authorities" means, in 
the case of the United States of America, the 
Civil Aeronautics Board or the Department of 
Transportation, whichever has jurisdiction, 
and in the case of the People's Republic of 
China, the General Administration of Civil 
Aviation of China, or in either case any other 
authority or agency empowered to perform the 
functions now e.xercised by the said au- 
thorities; 

(b) "Agreement" means this Agreement, 
its annexes, and any amendments thereto; 

(c) "Convention" means the Convention 
on International Civil Aviation, opened for 
signature at Chicago on December 7, 1944, in- 
cluding 

• any amendment which has entered into 
force under Article 94 (a) of the Convention 
and has been ratified by both Parties, and 

• any annex or any amendment thereto 
adopted under Article 90 of the Convention, 
insofar as such annex or amendment is effec- 
tive for both Parties; 

(d) "Airline" means any air transport en- 
terprise offering or operating international air 
services; 

(e) "Designated airline" means an airline 



I 

designated and authorized in accordance ' 
Article 3 of this Agreement; 

(f) "Air service" means scheduled air 
vice performed by aircraft for the public 
transport of passengers, baggage, cargo ( 
mail, separately or in combination, for rei 
eration or hire; 

(g) "International air service" means 
air service which passes through the air s 
over the territory of more than one State; 

(h) "Stop for non-traffic purposes" m 
a landing for any purpose other than takii 
or discharging passengers, baggage, carg 
mail. 

Article 2 
Grant of Rights 

(1) Each Party grants to the other P 
the rights specified in this Agreement to 
ble its designated airline(s) to establish ai 
operate scheduled air services on the roul 
specified in Annex I to this Agreement. £ 
route(s) and services shall hereinafter be 
ferred to as "the specified route(s)" and "1 
agreed services" respectively. 

(2) Subject to the provisions of the 
Agreement, the designated airline(s) of e,- 
Party, while operating the agreed service 
the specified route(s), shall enjoy the folk 
rights: 

(a) to make stops at points on the 
specified route(s) in the territor>- of the o 
Party for the purpose of taking on board 
discharging international traffic in passer 
baggage, cargo and mail; and 

(b) subject to the approval of the : 
nautical authorities of the other Party to 
stops for non-traffic purposes at points or 
specified route(s) in the territory of the o 
Party 

(3) Nothing in paragraph (2)(a) of thii< 
tide shall be deemed to confer on the des: 
nated airline(s) of one Party the right oft 
on at one point in the territory' of the otht* 
Party traffic in passengers, baggage, carji 
mail destined for another point in the ten 
of the other Party (stopover and cabotags ' 
fie), except the non-revenue traffic in per; 
nel of such airiine(s), their families, bagga 
and household effects, articles used by tho 
representative offices of such airline(s) an< 
craft stores and spare parts of such airlinr 
for use in the operation of the agreed serv 
Any exchange of rights between the Part 
allow the designated airline(s) of either Pi 
to carrj' on-line stopover traffic between t 
points on the specifieil route(s) in the terr 
of the other Party shall be subject to conS' 
tions at an appropriate time in the future. 

(4) The operation of the agreed servi 
by the designated airline(s) on routes over 
third countries shall be conducted on rouf 
available to the airlines of both Parties, 
otherwise agreed. 

(5) Charter air transportation shall; 
governed by the provisions of Annex II. 



Department of State Ba 



Article 3 
Designation and Anthorization 

(1) Each Party shall have the right to des- 
ate in writing through diplomatic channels 
he other Party two airlines to operate the 
eed services on the specified route(s), and 
vithdraw or alter such designations. In the 
ration of the agreed services, the desig- 

d airlines may operate combination or all- 
jo service or both. 

(2) Substantial ownership and effective 
trol of an airline designated by a Party 

II be vested in such Party or its nationals. 

(3) The aeronautical authorities of the 

T Party may require an airline designated 
he first Party to satisfy them that it is 
lified to fulfill the conditions prescribed 
er the laws and regulations normally 
lied to the operation of international air 
■ices by the said authorities. 

(4) On receipt of such designation the 

■r Party shall, subject to the provisions of 
igraphs (2) and (3) of this Article and of 
cle 7, grant to the airline so designated the 
•opriate authorizations with minimum 
edural delay. 

(5) When an airline has been so desig- 

d and authorized it may commence opera- 
; on or after the dateis) specified in the 
opriate authorizations. 

Article 4 
Revocation of Authorizations 

1) Each Party shall have the right to re- 

, suspend, or to impose such conditions as 
y deem necessary on the appropriate au- 
izations granted to a designated airline of 
ther Party where: 

(a) it is not satisfied that substantial 
rship and effective control of that airline 
ested in the Party designating the airline 

nationals; or 

(b) that airline fails to comply with the 
land regulations of the Party granting the 
B specified in Article 2 of this Agreement; 

(c) that other Party or that airline 
rwise fails to comply with the conditions 

forth under this Agreement. 

2) Unless immediate revocation, suspen- 
)r imposition of the conditions mentioned 

■agraph (1) of this Article is essential to 

nt further non-compliance with subpara- 
is Kb) or (c) of this Article, such rights 

3e exercised only after consultations with 

her Party. 

Article 5 

Application of Laws 

1) The laws and regulations of each Party 
[ig to the admission to, operation within 
eparture from its territory of aircraft en- 
I in the operation of international air ser- 
hall be complied with by the designated 
j(s) of the other Party, while entering, 
and departing from the territory of the 
n^arty. 



(2) The laws and regulations of each Party 
relating to the admission to, presence within, 
an<l departure from its territoi-y of passengers, 
crew, baggage, cargo and mail shall be appli- 
cable to the designated airline(s) of the other 
Party, antl the passengers, crew, baggage, 
cargo and mail carried by such airline(s), while 
entering, within and departing from the terri- 
tory of the first Party. 

(3) Each Party shall promptly supply to 
the other Party at the latter's request the 
texts of the laws and regulations referred to in 
paragraphs (1) and (2) of this Article. 

Article 6 
Technical Services and Charges 

( 1 ) Each Party shall designate in its terri- 
tory regular airports and alternate airports to 
be used by the designated airline(s) of the 
other Party for the operation of the agreed 
services, and shall provide the latter with such 
communications, navigational, meteorological 
and other auxiliary services in its territory as 
are requiretl for the operation of the agreed 
services, as set forth in Annex III to this 
Agreement. 

(2) The designated airline(s) of each Party 
shall be charged for the use of airports, 
equipment and technical services of the other 
Party at fair and reasonable rates. Neither 
Party shall impose on the designated airline(s) 
of the other Party rates higher than those im- 
posed on any other foreign airline operating in- 
ternational air service. 

(3) All charges referred to in paragraph 
(2) of this Article imposed on the designated 
airline(s) of the other Party may reflect, but 
shall not exceed, an equitable portion of the 
full economic cost of providing the facilities or 
services in question. Facilities and services for 
which charges are levied shall be provided on 
an efficient ami economic basis. Reasonable 
notice shall be given prior to changes in 
charges. Each Party shall encourage consulta- 
tions between the competent charging au- 
thorities in its territory and the airline(s) using 
the services and facilities, and shall encourage 
the competent charging authorities and the air- 
line(s) to exchange such information as may be 
necessary to permit an accurage review of the 
reasonableness of the charges. 

Article 7 
Safety 

(1) Mutually acceptable aeronautical facil- 
ities and services shall be provided by each 
Party for the operation of the agreed services, 
which facilities and services shall at least equal 
the minimum standards which may be estab- 
Ushed pursuant to the Convention, to the 
extent that such minimum standards are 
applicable. 

(2) Each Party shall recognize as valid, 
for the purpose of operating the agreed ser- 
vices, certificates of airworthiness, certificates 
of competency, and licenses issued or rendered 
valid by the other Party and still in force, pro- 
vided that the requirements for such certifi- 
cates or licenses at least equal the minimum 
standards which may be established pursuant 
to the Convention. Each Party may, however, 



Feature 



refuse to recognize as valid, for the purpose of 
flight above its own territory, certificates of 
competency and licenses granted to or ren- 
dered valid for its own nationals by the other 
Party 

(3) Each Party may request consultations 
concerning the safety and security standards 
maintained by the other Party relating to 
aeronautical facilities and services, crew, air- 
craft and operations of the designated airlines. 
If, following such consultations, one Party is of 
the view that the other Party does not effec- 
tively maintain and administer safety and se- 
curity standards and requirements in these 
areas that at least equal the minimum stand- 
ards which may be established pursuant to the 
Convention, to the extent that they are appli- 
cable, the other Party shall be informed of 
such views together with suggestions for ap- 
propriate action. Each Party reserves its 
rights under Article 4 of this Agreement. 

Article 8 

Aviation Security 

The Parties reaffirm their grave concern 
about acts or threats against the security of 
aircraft, which jeopardize the safety of persons 
or property, adversely affect the operation of 
air services and undermine public confidence 
in the safety of civil aviation. The Parties 
agree to implement appropriate aviation secu- 
rity measures and to provide necessary aid to 
each other with a view to preventing hijack- 
ings and sabotage to aircraft, airports and air 
navigation facilities and threats to aviation se- 
curity. When incidents or threats of hijackings 
or sabotage against aircraft, airports or air 
navigation facilities occur, the Parties shall as- 
sist each other by facilitating communications 
intended to terminate such incidents rapidly 
and safely. Each Party shall give sympathetic 
consideration to any request from the other 
Party for special security measures for its air- 
craft or passengers to meet a particular 
threat. 

Article 9 
Representative Offices 

(1) For the operation of the agreed ser- 
vices on the specified route(s), the designated 
airline(s) of each Party shall have the right to 
set up representative oS'ices at the points on 
the specified route(s) within the territory of 
the other Party. The staff of the representative 
offices referred to in this paragraph shall be 
subject to the laws and regulations in force in 
the countn,- where such offices are located. 

(2) Each Party shall to the maximum ex- 
tent practicable ensure the safety of the repre- 
sentative offices and their staff members of the 
designated airhne(s) of the other Party, as well 
as safeguard their aircraft, stores, and other 
properties in its territory for use in the opera- 
tion of the agreed services. 

(3) Each Party shall extend assistance 
and facilities to the representative offices and 
their staff members of the designated airline(s) 
of the other Party as necessary for the effi- 
cient operation of the agreed services. 



3mber 1980 



Feature 



(4) The designated airline(s) of each Party 
shall have the right to convert and remit to its 
countr>' at any time on demand local revenues 
in excess of sums locally disbursed. Conversion 
and remittance shall be effected without 
restrictions at the prevailing rate of exchange 
in effect for current transactions and remit- 
tance and shall be exempt from taxation on the 
basis of reciprocity Wherever the payments 
system between the Parties is governed by a 
special agreement, that special agreement 
shall apply. 

Article 10 
Personnel 

(1) The crew members of the designated 
air!ine(s) of either Party on flights into and out 
of the territory of the other Party shall be na- 
tionals of the Party designating such airline(s). 
If a designated airline of either Party desires 
to employ crew members of any other national- 
ity on flights into and out of the territory of 
the other Party, prior approval shall be ob- 
tained from that other Party. 

(2) The staff of the representative offices 
of the designated airline(s) of each party in the 
territory of the other Party shall be nationals 
of either Party, unless otherwise agreed. The 
number of such stafl' shall be subject to the ap- 
proval of the competent authorities of both 
Parties. Each designated airline shall be per- 
mitted such number of staff as is adequate to 
perform the functions described in this 
Agreement associated with the provision of 
the agreed services, and in no event shall be 
less than that permitted to any foreign airline 
performing comparable services. Each Party 
shall by diplomatic note notify the other Party 
of the authorities which shall be considered the 
competent authorities for purposes of this 
paragraph. 

Article 11 
Market Access 

(1) Matters relating to ground handling 
pertaining to the operation of the agreed ser- 
vices may be agreed upon between the airlines 
of both Parties, subject to the approval of the 
aeronautical authorities of both Parties. 

(2) The sale, in the territory of each 
Party, of air transportation on the agreed ser- 
vices of the designated airline(s) of the other 
Party shall be effected through a general sales 
agent(s). The designated airline(s) of each 
Party shall serve as general sales agent(s) for 
the designated airline(s) of the other Party un- 
less such airline(s) is offered and declines such 
agency. The terms and conditions of each gen- 
eral sales agency agreement shall be subject to 
the approval of the aeronautical authorities of 
both Parties. The Parties shall ensure that, if 
either Party designates a second airline for 
provision of the agreed services, both desig- 
nated airlines shall be given the opportunity to 
act as general sales agents for the designated 
airline(s) of the other Party on the same terms 
and conditions. 

(3) Notwithstanding paragraph (2) of this 



Significant Events Leading to the Agreements 



WHITE HOUSE FACT SHEET^ 



In the almost 2 years since normalization, 
several significant events have given im- 
petus to the process of rapprochement be- 
tween the United States and China. 

• Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping visited 
Washington, D.C., in January 1979 to 
begin the process of building a long-term 
structure for the relationship. All of the ac- 
cords which have been and are being signed 
now result from initiatives taken at that 
time by the President and Deng. In par- 
ticular, the Joint Economic Commission 
(JEC), which is holding its first regular 
meeting this week in Washington, was the 
result of the Carter-Deng talks. 

• Secretaries [former Secretary of the 
Treasury, W. Michael] Blumenthal and 
[former Secretary of Commerce, Juanita] 
Kreps, [former] Special Trade Representa- 
tive [Robert] Strauss, and others visited 
China in the spring of 1979 to broaden con- 
tacts on economic issues and to begin ad- 
dressing, in detail, some of those matters 
which have now come to successful conclu- 
sion. Some of their Chinese counterparts, 
including Vice Premier Fang Yi, Trade 
Minister Li Qiang, Finance Minister Jiang 
Jingfu, and others have visited the US. 

• Vice President Mondale's visit to 
China in August 1979 gave added impetus 
to the negotiations, particularly on civil 



aviation. The Vice President also form; 
opened the first U.S. Consulate in Chin 
nearly 30 years when he cut the ribbon 
Guangzhou (Canton) on August 31, 197 
Since that time, we have also opened ii 
Shanghai and the Chinese have opened 
San Francisco and Houston. The new C 
sular Convention spells out, in detail, t 
functions which consular officers may p 
form. Its signing will prepare the way 
China to open three more consulates in 
United States — in New York, Chicago, 
Honolulu — and for the United States ti 
open three more in China. 

• Defense Secretary [Harold] Brow 
traveled to China in January of this ye. 
and his Chinese counterpart. Vice Pren- 
Geng Biao, came to the United States i 
May and June. The purpose of these vis 
was to establish a normal range of cont. 
between our respective defense establis 
ments, corresponding to contacts in oth' 
fields. In March the Department of Sta' 
published guidelines permitting the exf 
to China of selected items of military st 
port equipment. Many U.S. companies 
have sought and received licenses to mii 
sales presentations to the Chinese, and* 
number of deals may be concluded in thi 
coming months. The purpose of the curr< 
visit by Deputy Secretary of Defense V 
Ham J.] Perry and his delegation to Chi 
is to learn more about Chinese capabiliK 
and needs. However, the United Statesi 
does not sell arms to China. 



Article, the designated airline(s) of each Party, 
in its representative office(s) in the territory of 
the other Party, may sell air transportation on 
the agreed services and on all of its other ser- 
vices, directly or through the agents of its own 
appointment. Any person shall be free to pur- 
chase such transportation in the currency of 
that territory or, in accordance with applicable 
law, in foreign exchange certificates or freely 
convertible currencies. In addition the repre- 
sentative office(s) may be used for manage- 
ment, informational, and operational activities 
of the designated airline(s). 

(4) The general sales agent for a desig- 
nated airline appointed in accordance with 
paragraph (2) of this Article shall be respon- 
sive to the preferences expressed by the 
traveling and shipping public regarding airline 
selection, class of services and other related 
matters. 

Article 12 

Capacity and Carriage of Traffic 

(1) The designated airlines of both Parties 
shall be permitted to provide capacity in 
operating the agreed services as agreed by the 
Parties and set forth in Annex V of the 
Agreement. Within two and one-half years 
after the commencement of any agreed service 



under this Agreement, the Parties shall col 
suit with a view to reaching a new agreem( 
which shall apply to the provision of capacii 

(2) In keeping with the principles set 
forth in the Preamble to this Agreement, en 
Party shall take all appropriate action to em 
sure that there exist fair and equal rights fd 
the designated airlines of both Parties to op 
ate the agreed services on the specified rou' 
so as to achieve equality of opportunity, re* 
sonable balance and mutual benefit. 

(3) The agreed services to be operated' 
the designated airlines of the Parties shall 
have as their primary objective the provisio 
of capacity adequate to meet the traffic re- 
quirements between the territories of the t\ 
Parties. The right to embark on or disembai 
from such services international traffic des- 
tined for or coming from points in third coui 
tries shall be subject to the general principl 
that capacity shall be related to; 

(a) traffic requirements to and froHH) 
territory of the Party which has designated 
the airline and trafi'ic requirements to and 
from the territory of the other Party; 

(b) the requirements of through airlil 
operation; and 

(c) the traffic requirements of the a^ 
through which the airline passes after takB$ 
account of local and regional services. 



Department of State Bulltt 



(4) Each Party and its designated air- 
) shall take into consideration the inter- 
of the other Party and its designated air- 
,) so as not to affect unduly the services 
h the latter provides. 

5) If, after a reasonable periofl of opera- 
either Party believes that a service by a 
Tiated airline of the other Party is not 
mant with any i)rovision of this Article, 
'arties shall consult promptly to settle the 
jr in a spirit of friendly cooperation and 
al understanding. 

6) If, at any time, either Party is of the 
that traffic is not reasonably balanced. 
r*arty may request consultations with the 

Party for the purpose of remedying the 
lanced situation in a spirit of friendly 
ration and equality and mutual benefit. 

Article 13 

Pricing 

1) Each Party may require the filing with 
'onautical authorities of fares to be 
ed for transportation of passengers to 
<om its territory. Such filing shall be 
sixty (60) days prior to the date on which 
ires are proposed to go into effect. In ad- 
the aeronautical authorities of both 
s agree to give prompt and sympathetic 
eration to short-notice filings. If the 
itent authorities of a Party are dissatis- 
ith a fare, they shall notify the compe- 
thorities of the other Party as soon as 
,e, and in no event more than thirty (30) 
'ter the date of receipt of the filing in 
n. The competent authorities of either 
Umay then request consultations which 
le held as soon as possible, and in no 
ei more than thirty (30) days after the date 
■1 ipt of the request by the competent au- 
~ nf the other Party. If agreement is 
i iluring consultations, the competent 
11 ifs of each Party shall ensure that no 
ri insistent with such agreement is put 
' lict. If agreement is not reached during 
- 1 at ions, the fare in question shall not go 

lilt, and the fare previously in force 
1. main effective until a new fare is 
a shed. 

I If the competent authorities do not 
r .■< dissatisfaction within thirty (30) days 
I lir ilate of receipt of the filing of a fare 
I n accordance with paragraph (1) above, 
1 111' considered as approved. 

I Notwithstanding paragraph (1) above, 
1 arty shall permit any designated airline 
1 uiil institute promptly, using short- 
1 imicedures, if necessary, a fare for 
I'll passenger services between a point 
- in the United States of America and 
If points in the People's Republic of 
|iri)vided that; 

la) the fare is subject to terms and con- 
) as agreed in Annex IV to this Agree- 
1 uiil such fare would not be less than 70 
■ I 1 if the lowest normal economy fare ap- 
liir sale by any designated airline for 
liflween the same point or points in the 
States of America and the same point 
i- ts in the People's Republic of China; or 



(b) the fare on the specified route(s) 
(hereinafter, the matching fare) represents a 
reduction of an approved fare but is not below 
any approved fare or any combination of fares, 
whether or not approved, for the provision of 
international air service between the United 
States of America and the People's Republic of 
China (hereinafter, the matched fare), and is 
subject to similar terms and conditions as the 
matched fare, except those conditions relating 
to routing, connections, or aircraft type, pro- 
vided that: 

(i) if the matched fare is for services 
provided in whole or in part by a designated 
airFme over the specified route(s), the desig- 
nated airline(s) of the other Party shall be 
permitted to institute a matching fare over the 
specified route(s); 

(ii) if the matched fare is for services 
provided in whole or in part by a designated 
airline over a route(s) other than the specified 
route(s), the designated airlinets) of the other 
Party shall be permitted to institute a match- 
ing fare over the specified route(s) which is not 
less than 70 percent of the lowest comparable 
approved fare, excluding discount fares; 

(iii) if the matched fare is offered solely 
by a non-designated airline(s) over the 
specified route(s), a designated airline shall be 
permitted to institute a matching fare over the 
specified route(s) which is not less than 70 per- 
cent of the lowest comparable approved fare, 
excluding discount fares; and, 

(iv) if the matched fare is offered solely 
by a non-designated airhne(s) over a route 
other than the specified route(s), a designated 
airline shall be permitted to institute a match- 
ing fare over the specified route(s) which is not 
less than 80 percent of the lowest comparable 
approved fare, excluding discount fares. 

The Parties shall review the practice of 
matching of fares before the end of three years 
after commencement of any agreed service. 

Each Party also agrees to apply subpara- 
graph (b), mutatis inutandis, to fares of the 
designated airline(s) of the other Party for the 
provision of international air service between 
the territory of the first Party and a third 
country. 

If, under the terms of subparagraph (b), a 
designated airline institutes a lower normal 
economy fare than the fare, or fares, put into 
effect pursuant to paragraph (1) of this Article, 
the normal economy fare for the purpose of es- 
tablishing the 30 percent zone of pricing flexi- 
bility set forth in subparagraph (a) shall re- 
main unchanged absent mutual agreement of 
both Parties. 

Nothing in subparagraph (a) or (b) shall be 
construed as requiring a designated airline to 
institute any specific fare. 

(4) (a) Each Party may require the filing 
with its aeronautical authorities of rates to be 
charged for transportation of cargo to and from 
its territory by the designated airline(s) of the 
other Party. Such filing shall be made forty- 
five (45) days prior to the date on which the 
rates are proposed to go into effect. In addi- 
tion, the aeronautical authorities of both Par- 
ties agree to give prompt and sympathetic 
consideration to short-notice filings of the 
designated airlines. 



Feature 



(b) The competent authorities of each 
Party shall have the right to disapprove cargo 
rates. Notices of disapproval shall be given 
within twenty-five (25) days after receipt of 
the filing. A rate which has been disapproved 
shall not go iirto effect, and the rate previously 
in force shall remain eft'ective until a new rate 
is established. 

(c) A Party shall not require the desig- 
nated airline(s) of the other Party to charge 
rates different from those it authorizes for its 
own airline(s) or those of other countries. 

(5) Notwithstanding the provisions of this 
Article, each Party shall permit any desig- 
nated airline to file and institute promptly, 
using short-notice procedures, if necessary, a 
fare or rate identical to that offered by any 
other designated airline in accordance with the 
provisions of this Article for transportation be- 
tween the same points and subject to compar- 
able terms and conditions. 

(6) Each Party shall by diplomatic note 
notify the other Party of the authorities which 
shall be considered the competent authorities 
for purposes of this Article. 

Article 14 
Customs Duties and Tbxes 

(1) Aircraft of the designated airline(s) of 
either Party engaged in the operation of the 
agreed services, as well as their regular 
equipment, spare parts, fuel, oils (including 
hydraulic fluids), lubricants, aircraft stores 
(including food, beverages, liquor, tobacco and 
other products for sale to or use by passengers 
in limited quantities during the flight) and 
other items intended for or used solely in con- 
nection with the operation or servicing of the 
aircraft, which are retained on board such air- 
craft shall be exempt on the basis of reciproc- 
ity from all customs duties, inspection fees and 
other national charges on arrival in and depar- 
ture from the territory of the other Party. 

(2) The following shall also be exempt on 
the basis of reciprocity from all customs duties, 
inspection fees and other national charges, 
with the exception of charges based on the 
actual cost of the service provided; 

(a) aircraft stores introduced into or 
supplied in the territory of a Party and taken 
on board, within reasonable limits, for use on 
aircraft of a designated airline of the other 
Party engaged in the operation of the agreed 
services, even when these stores are to be 
used on a part of the journey performed over 
the territory of the Party in which they are 
taken on board; 

(b) ground equipment and spare parts 
including engines introduced into the territory 
of a Party for the servicing, maintenance or 
repair of aircraft of a designated airline of the 
other Party used in the operation of the agreed 
services; and 

(c) fuel, lubricants and consumable 
technical supplies introduced into or supplied 
in the territory of a Party for use in an aircraft 
of a designated airline of the other Party en- 
gaged in the operation of the agreed services, 
even when these supplies are to be used on a 



v.viber 1980 



1 



Feature 



part of the journey performed over the terri- 
tory of the Party in which they are taken on 
board. 

(3) Aircraft stores, equipment and 
supplies referred to in paragraph (1) of this Ar- 
ticle retained on board the aircraft of the des- 
ignated airhne(s) of either Party engaged in 
the operation of the agreed services may be 
unloaded in the territory of the other Party 
with the approval of the customs authorities of 
that other Party The aircraft stores, equip- 
ment and supplies unloaded, as well as aircraft 
stores, equipment and supplies introduced into 
the territory of the other Party referred to in 
paragraph (2) of this Article, shall be subject 
to the supervision or control of the said au- 
thorities, and if required to fair and reasonable 
storage charges, up to such time as they are 
re-exported or otherwise disposed of in ac- 
cordance with the regulations of such au- 
thorities. 

(4) The exemptions provided for by this 
Article shall also be available where a desig- 
nated airhne of one Party has contracted with 
another airline, which similarly enjoys such 
exemptions from the other Party, for the loan 
in the territory of the other Party of the items 
specified in paragraphs (1) and (2) of this Arti- 
cle. The treatment by a Party of a sale of any 
such item within its territory shall be deter- 
mined by agreement of the Parties. 

(5) Each Party shall use its best efforts to 
secure for the designated airline(s) of the other 
Party, on the basis of reciprocity, an exemption 
from taxes, charges and fees imposed by state 
or provincial, regional and local authorities on 
the items specified in paragraphs (1) and (2) of 
this Article, as well as an exemption from fuel 
through-put charges, in the circumstances des- 
ignated in this Article, with the exception of 
charges based on the actual cost of the services 
provided. 

Article 15 

Provision of Statistics 

The aeronautical authorities of both Par- 
ties will consult from time to time concerning, 
and will provide, as agreed, statistics of traffic 
carried on the agreed services between the 
two countries. 

Article 16 
Consultations 

(1) The Parties shall ensure the correct 
implementation of, and satisfactorj' compliance 
with, the provisions of this Agreement in a 
spirit of close cooperation and mutual support. 
To this end, the aeronautical authorities of the 
Parties shall consult each other from time to 
time. 

(2) Either Party may, at any time, re- 
quest consultations relating to this Agreement. 
Such consultations shall begin at the earliest 
possible date, in no event later than sixty (60) 
days from the date the other Party receives 
the request unless otherwise agreed. 

(3) If any dispute arises between the Par- 
ties relating to the interpretation or applica- 
tion of this Agreement, the Parties shall, in a 



Civil Aviation 
Agreement — A Summary 

Designations 

Each side may designate one airline to op- 
erate on the agreed route. A second airline 
may be designated by either party 2 years 
after airline service begins. 

Routes 

The designated airlines may operate on a 
route to and from New York, San Fran- 
cisco, Los Angeles. Honolulu, Tokyo, or 
another point in Japan, Shanghai, Beijing. 
A second route between China and the 
United States will be discussed during the 
first 2 years after the commencement of 
service by either side. If a second route is 
not agreed upon, a second designated air- 
line may operate on the first route. 

Capacity and Carriage of Traffic 

The first designated airlines of each side 
may operate two round-trip frequencies a 
week on the agreed route. The second des- 
ignated airline may operate tw-o frequen- 
cies: or, if either side does not designate a 
second carrier, then its first carrier may 
operate an additional two flights a week. 
Both sides agree that there shall be a rea- 
sonable balance of traffic carried by the 
airlines of both sides. 

Pricing 

Both parties must agree on the initial fares 
for airline service. The designated airlines 
of either party may introduce lower fares 
without either government's approval if the 
new level is not less than TCJ of the lowest 
normal economy fare approved for sale. 

Charters 

Charter flights may be operated by airlines 
of either party with prior approval on the 
basis of comity and reciprocity. 

Entry into Force and Termination 

The agreement enters into force upon sig- 
nature and remains in force for 3 years. 
After the third year, the agreement may be 
terminated by either party giving 12 
months written notice of intention to ter- 
minate. 



spirit of friendly cooperation and mutual 
understanding, settle it by negotiation or. ; 
the parties so agree, by mediation, concilia 
tion, or arbitration. 

Article 17 
Modification or Amendment 

(1) If either of the Parties considers it 
sirable to modify or amend any provision o 
this Agreement or its annexes, it may at ai 
time request consultations with the other 
Party, and such consultations shall begin 
within a period of ninety (90) days from ths 
date of receipt of the request by the other 
Party unless both Parties agree to an extei 
sion of this period. 

(2) Any modification or amendment to 
this Agreement or its annexes agreed upon 
a result of the consultations referred to in 
paragraph (1) of this Article shall come intc 
force when it has been confirmed by an ex- 
change of notes through diplomatic channel 

Article 18 

Entry into Force and Termination 

This Agreement shall enter into force ( 
the date of its signature and shall remain ir 
force for three years. Thereafter, it shall co 
tinue in force but may be terminated by eit 
Party by giving twelve months' written noi 
to the other Party of its intention to termi- 
nate. 



Do.NE at Washington, this seventeenthii 
day of September 1980 in duplicate, each co( 
in the English and Chinese languages, botM 
texts being equally authentic. 

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: 

.Ji.M.MY Carter 

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE 
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA: 

Bo YiBO 



ANNEX I 



I. First Route 



A. For the United States of America: 

The first airline designated by the Unit 
States of America shall be entitled to operai 
the agreed services on the following route, b 
both directions: 

New York. San Francisco, Los Angeles/ 

Honolulu, Tokyo or another point in 

Japan. Shanghai, Beijing. 

B. For the People's Republic of China: 

The first airline designated by the 
People's Republic of China shall be entitledtl 
operate the agreed services on the following 
route, in both directions: 

Beijing, Shanghai, Tokyo or another poil 
in Japan, Honolulu, Los Angeles, San 
Francisco, New York. Anchorage may b« 
utilized as a technical stop in both direc- 
tions on this route. 



Department of State Bulll 



Feature 



Second Route 

The Parties shall consult during the first 
years following the commencement of any 
ed service to decide on a route for opera- 
by the second designated airline of each 
y. If the Parties have been unable to agree 
1 a second route by the end of the second 

the second designated airline of each 
y shall be entitled to commence operation 
e agreed services on the first route in both 

tions. and to operate such services there- 
■ until the Parties agree upon a second 
?. In such circumstances, the Parties shall 
nue to consult and to exercise their max- 
1 effort to reach agreement upon a second 
', it being understood that the establish- 
, of a second route is a mutually shared 
'tive of both Parties. In the meantime, the 
ies shall take overall review of the 
fied routes. 

Extra Section 

;n case any of the designated airline(s) of 
r Party desires to operate additional see- 
on its specified route(s), it shall submit 
:ation to the aeronautical authorities of 
jther Party three (3) days in advance of 
(operation, and the additional sections can 
jhimenced only after approvals have been 
^ed therefrom. 



11) On or after the effective date of this 
t ^ment, each Party is entitled to designate 
le irline for operation of the agreed ser- 
c Beginning two years after the com- 
e Client of any agreed service, a second 
;S iiated airline of each Party may also 
)n lence the operation of the agreed ser- 
ici If either Party does not designate a sec- 
id irline, or if its second designated airline 
- i"t commence or ceases to operate any 

V, that Party may authorize its first des- 
.. (I airline to operate the agreed services 
a rc.s|)ects as if it were also designated as a 
I airline. 

-i Kach designated airline may at its op- 
1 init any point or points on the above 
1 ^ on any or all flights in either or both 
■f Inns, provided, however, that the agreed 
■ r It operates begins or terminates at a 
1 I'll the specified route in the territorj' of 
Illy designating the airline. 
- Before operation of service through 
I I point in Japan, referred to in Section I 
u ^ Annex, that point shall be agreed upon 
Parties. If a designated airline of either 
desires to change the point served in 
, that airline shall furnish six (6) months' 
to the aeronautical authorities of the 
Party. Such change shall be subject to 
ncurrence of that other Party. 
I) Subject to the provisions of Annex V, 
;signated airline(s) of each Party may 
a change of gauge in the territory of the 
Party or at an intermediate point or 
i on the specified route(s) provided that: 

(a) operation beyond the point of 



change of gauge shall be performed by an air- 
craft having capacity less, for outbound ser- 
vices, or more, for inbound services, than that 
of the arriving aircraft. 

(b) aircraft for such operations shall be 
scheduled in coincidence with the outbound or 
inbound aircraft, as the case may be, and may 
have the same flight number; and 

(c) if a flight is delayed by operational 
or mechanical problems, the onward flight may 
operate without regard to the conditions in 
subparagraph (b) of this paragraph. 



ANNEX II 

Charter Air TVansportation 

(1) In addition to the operation of the 
agreed services by the designated airlines of 
the two Parties, any airhne(s) of one Party 
may request permission to operate passenger 
and/or cargo (separately or in combination) 
charter flights between the territories of the 
Parties as well as between a third country and 
the territory of the Party to which the re- 
quests are addressed. Each Party may provide 
to the other Party by diplomatic note a list of 
airlines qualified under the laws of the first 
Party to provide charter air transportation. 

(2) The application for charter flight(s) 
shall be filed with the aeronautical authorities 
of the other Party at least fifteen (15) days be- 
fore the anticipated flight(s). The flight(s) can 
be operated only after permission has been ob- 
tained. Permission shall be granted without 
undue delay in the spirit of equality of oppor- 
tunity for the airlines of both Parties to oper- 
ate international charter air transportation, 
mutual benefit ami friendly cooperation. 

(3) The aeronautical authorities of each 
Party shall minimize the filing requirements 
and other administrative burdens applicable to 
charterers and airlines of the other Party. In 
this connection, the charterers and airline of a 
Party shall not be required by the other Party 
to submit more than the following information 
in support of a request for permission to oper- 
ate a charter flight or series of flights: 

(a) Purpose of flight; 

(b) Nationality of registration, owner 
and operator of aircraft; 

(c) Type of aircraft; 

(d) Either (i) identification marks and 
call signs of the aircraft, or (ii) flight number; 

(e) Name of captain and number of 
crew members; 

(f) The proposed flight plan (the air 
route, date, hours and destination); 

(g) The identity of the charterer or 
charterers; 

(h) The number of passengers, and/or 
the weight of cargo, on board; and 

(i) The price charged by the airline to 
each charterer 

The information contained in the applica- 
tion for charter night(s) and required by sub- 
paragraphs (d). (e) and (h) may be changed, 
subject to notification prior to each flight. 
Such changes shall be contained in the flight 
plan. 

(4) In the event that either Party should 
have reasons to disapprove a particular char- 
ter flight or series of charter flights, it shall, 



under normal circumstances, give timely 
notification of the reasons therefor, and the 
applicant may, where appropriate, resubmit an 
application for approval of the requested flight 
or flights. 

(.5) Neither Party shall require the filing 
by airlines of the other Party of prices charged 
to the public for charter transportation 
originating in the territory of the other Party, 
or a third country. 

(6) The provisions of Articles 2(4), 4, 5, 6, 
7, 8, 9(2) and (4). HI, 11(1), and 14 and Annex 
III of this Agreement shall apply, iiiutatis 
nnUandis. to charter air transportation. 



ANNEX III 
Technical Services 
I. Airports for Scheduled Service 

(1) In accordance with Article 6, para- 
graph (1) of this Agreement, airlines desig- 
nated by the Government of the People's Re- 
public of China are assigned the following reg- 
ular and alternate airports in the United 
States; 

Regular Airports 

New York, New York; 

JFK International Airport 
Los Angeles, California; 

Los Angeles International Airport 
San Francisco. California: 

San Francisco International Airport 
Honolulu. Hawaii: 

Honolulu International Airport 
Anchorage, Alaska: 

Anchorage International Airport 

Alternate Airports 

Baltimore, Marjdand: 

Baltimore-Washington International Airport 
Boston, Massachusetts: 

Logan International Airport 
Newark, New Jersey: 

Newark International Airport 
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: 

Philadelphia International Airport 
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania; 

Greater Pittsburgh Airport 
Moses Lake, Washington: 

Grant County Airport 
Oakland, California: 

Metropolitan Oakland International Airport 
Ontario, California: 

Ontario International Airport 
Stockton, California: 

Stockton Metropolitan Airport 
Hilo, Hawaii: 

Hilo International/General Lyman Airport 
Seattle, Washington: 

Sea-Tac International Airport 
Kansas City, Kansas: 

Kansas City International Airport 
Fairbanks, Alaska; 

Fairbanks International Airport 
Washington, D.C.; 

Dulles International Airport 

(2) In accordance with Article 6, para- 
graph (1) of this Agreement, airlines desig- 
nated by the Government of the United States 



' 



mber 1980 



Feature 



of America are assigned the following regular 
and alternate airports in China: 

Regular Airports 

Beijing: 

Capital Airport 
Shanghai: 
Hongqiao Airport 

Alternate Airports 

Guangzhou: 

Baiyun Airport 
Hangzhou: 

Jianqiao Airport 
Tianjin: 

Zhangguizhuang Airport 

II. Airports for Charter Air IVansportation 

Aircraft of the airline(s) of each Party en- 
gaged in the operation of charter air transpor- 
tation approved by the aeronautical authorities 
of the other Party may utilize airports appro- 
priately identified in the Aeronautical Infor- 
mation Publication of that other Party as 
available for international flights, and such 
other airports as may be approved by such 
aeronautical authorities. 

III. Air Routes 

All flight operations by aircraft of the des- 
ignated airline(s) of one Party operated in the 
airspace of the other Party shall be over estab- 
lished airways/prescribed routes or as cleared 
by the appropriate air traffic control service. 
Each Party will make reasonable efforts to en- 
sure that air routes entering and within their 
sovereign airspace are as direct as practicable 
in the interest of economy, efficiency and fuel 
conservation, including the establishment of 
arrangements with controlling authorities of 
adjacent airspace as appropriate. 

IV. Aeronautical Information 

(1) The aeronautical authorities of both 
Parties shall provide each other with their 
Aeronautical Information Publication. 

(2) Amendments and additions to the 
Aeronautical Information Publication shall be 
sent promptly to the aeronautical authorities 
of the other Party. 

(3) The International NOTAM Code shall 
be used in the transmission of Notices to Air- 
men (NOTAMs). When the NOTAM code is 
not suitable, plain English shall be used. Ur- 
gent NOTAMs shall be transmitted by the 
quickest available means to the aeronautical 
authorities of the other Party 

(4) Aeronautical information and 
NOTAMs shall be made available in the Eng- 
lish language. 

V. Meteorological Services 

Mutually acceptable meteorological ser- 
vice shall be provided in accordance with 
standards and recommended practices, to the 
extent to which they are applicable, developed 
pursuant to the Convention of the World 
Meterological Organization and International 
Civil Aviation Organization. 



VI. Radio Navigation and Communication 

(1) For the operation of agreed services 
on the specified routes, the Parties recognize 
the requirement for the establishment of 
point-to-point aeronautical communications be- 
tween the two countries. The Parties shall 
hold consultations as to the measures and pro- 
cedures for the establishment of such com- 
munications. 

(2) The English language and internation- 
ally accepted codes and procedures in force 
shall be applied in air-gi-ound and point-to- 
point communications. 



ANNEX IV 

Conditions of Discount Fares 

Discount fares within the zone of pricing 
flexibility described in paragi-aph (3) of Article 
13 of this Agreement shall be subject to condi- 
tions of the type generally applicable to same 
or similar fares in other international air 
transportation markets. Such discount fares 
shall be subject to conditions in not less than 
four of the following categories: 

• Round tri]) requirements; 

• Advance-purchase requirements; 

• Minimum-Maximum length of stay re- 
quirements; 

• Stopover restrictions; 

• Stopover charges; 

• Transfer limitations; 

• Cancellation refund penalties; 

• Group size restrictions; 

• Return travel conditions; 

• Ground package requirements. 



ANNEX V 

Capacity and Carriage of Traffic 

(1) The Parties agree that each designated 
airline shall have the right to operate two fre- 
quencies per week. If a Party does not desig- 
nate a second airline, its first designated air- 
line shall, upon the commencement of service 
by the second airline of the other Party or 
upon the passage of two years from the com- 
mencement of any agi-eed service, whichever 
is earlier, be entitled to add to its operation 
two frequencies per week. For purposes of this 
Agreement a frequency is; one (1) round trip 
flight of an aircraft having a maximum certifi- 
cated take-off gross weight not less than 
710,000 pounds but not more than 800,000 
pounds; one and one-half (IV2) round trip 
flights of an aircraft having a maximum cer- 
tified take-off gi-oss weight equal to or greater 
than 430,000 pounds but less than 710,000 
pounds; and two (2) round trip flights of an air- 
craft having a maximum certificated take-off 
gross weight less than 430,000 pounds. If a 
designated airline uses only aircraft having a 
maximum certificated take-off gross weight of 
less than 710,000 pounds, it shall be entitled to 
one additional round trip flight of an all-freight 
configured aircraft having a maximum certifi- 
cated take-ofi' gross weight of less than 4:30,000 
pounds for every two frequencies. All unused 
frequencies may be accumulated by a desig- 
nated airline and used at its discretion at any 



time. Any increase in frequencies during t 
first three years after commencement of a 
agreed service in excess of the frequencies 
mentioned above shall be subject to prior . 
sultation and agreement between the Part 

(2) With a view to realizing the object 
set forth in Article 12, paragi-aph (2), the I 
ties agi-ee that there should be a reasonabl 
balance of the traffic carried by their respt 
tive designated airhne(s) on the specified 
route(s) in terms of number of passengers 
tons of cargo taken up and put down in the 
territoi-y of the other Party 

The consultations referred to in Articl 
paragi-a]3h (6) shall take place as soon as pi 
ble, and in no event later than thirty (30) c 
following the date of receipt of the request 
the latter Party The Parties shall underta 
to reach agi'eement within thirty (30) days 
to effective measures for remedying the im 
anced situation and fully implement such 
agi-eed measures. In considering the measi 
to be undertaken, the Parties shall take ini 
account all relevant factors, including comr 
cial decisions of the designated airlines, loa 
factors and actions of third parties. In case 
agi-eed measures fail to remedy the imbalai 
within three months after their implement; 
tion, the Parties shall meet together to loor 
into the cause of such failure and agree upoi 
measures for remedying the imbalanced sit 
tion. In case the Parties fail to reach agi-ee '- 
ment on effective remedial measures, they ■ 
shall look into the cause of the imbalance ai « 
consider amendments to this Agreement w- 
may be required to eliminate such cause. 

(3) The provision of paragraph (2) of tl 
Annex is valid for three years from the dati 
commencement of any service under this 
Agreement. Not later than six months prio 
the end of this three-year period, the Parti 
shall consult with a view to agreeing to the 
means to achieve reasonable balance of tri 
referred to in paragraph (2) of this Annex, 



ACCOMPANYING LETTERS 

Beijing 
September 8, 1980 

Mr. Lin Zheng 

Leader 

Civil Aviation Delegation 

of the Government of China 

Dear Mr Lin: 

1 have the honor to refer to the Agree- 
ment between the Government of the Unite- 
States of America and the Government oft! 
People's Republic of China relating to CiviL 
Ti'ansport initialed today by our two goverrH 
ments. During the course of negotiations M 
ing to the initialing of the Agi-eement, both ; li 
sides discussed questions relating to the coiH i 
duct of business in the territory of the otherfn 
Party and other operational matters of the 
designated airlines. I understand that agree- r, 
ment was reached that the designated air- 
line(s) of each Party shall have, in the f 

territorj- of the other Party, the rights and t 
privileges as set forth below: ^ 



Department of State Bulle 



Feature 



1. With respect to the representative of- 
s(s) referred to in Article 11, paragi-aph (3) 
he Agreement, the designated airhnels) of 
ti Party shall have: 

(a) the right to issue, reissue, reconfirm 
exchange tickets for transportation on the 

?ed services, for connecting air services, 
for transportation over any other route or 
es outside of the agreed services which are 

rated by such airline(s); and 

(b) the right to make, reconfirm, or 
ige reservations for ])assengers wishing to 
el over the routes of such airHne(s) 

ther or not such reservations are for 
sportation on the agreed services. 

2. The designated airline(s) of each Party 
1 also have the right to import, maintain, 
e, and distribute informational materials 
uding, but not limited to, time tables, 
dules. brochures, sales and tour literature, 
idars. displays, etc.) and to advertise in 
same manner and through the same or 

iar media as the designated airline(s) of 
|)ther Party 

3. With respect to operational matters, 
lesignated airline(s) of each Pai'ty shall 

(a) the right to import, install, and op- 
•; telex, eomputei; VHF radio, and hand- 
Iradio sets (walkie talkie) and related 
Oment for reservations, load planning and 
^gement, and for other operational pur- 
h, subject to the approval of the appropri- 
luthorities, where necessary; 

(b) the right to supervise load planning 
ni ictual loading and unloading of its aircraft 
hi igh its own employees or representatives; 

ic) the right to import company-owned 
e. les and to operate such vehicles on air- 
'01 roadways and aircraft servicing ramps, 
ul 'ct to the approval of the appropriate au- 
K tics, where necessa^'; 

(d) the right to inspect fuel storage and 
"imping equipment on a quarterly basis 

' II ki- samples at each source for export and 
-il '(|uent laboratoiy analysis; and 

(e) the right to film, under whatever 

i\ -N ision is necessai-y, the aircraft appi'oach 
IB til the runways of all regular airports and 
iiiii' airports contemplated for the opera- 
1 the agreed services, for purposes of 
■•• iraming, subject to the approval of the 
1 ipriate authorities. 

1 Kach Party grants to the other Party 
assurance that the following authoriza- 
01. permits, and information will be pro- 
la!. on the basis of reciprocity, in a timely 
i^l'n to each airline designated to operate 
ligi'eed services: 

\ (a) airport security permits for as- 
§ d foreign and locally employed company 
i|lauthorizing them to move freely beyond 
<i|rt customs and immigration screens into 
i(^>rminal loading areas and onto the airport 
1*1 areas; 

I'l (b) written information on the proce- 
(j; to be employed by the airport au- 
ifities at each regular airport and alternate 
tSirt contemplated for the operation of the 
i^I'd services in the event of an emergency 



imber 1980 



such as a crash, a hijacking, or a bomb threat, 
establishing the order of action in a given situ- 
ation for units responsible for tower control, 
firefighting, medical assistance and transpor- 
tation, perimeter security and other emer- 
gency and security functions in effect; and 

(c) written information on aeronautical 
laws, including the rules and regidations 
thereunder and amendments thereto, each des- 
ignated airline is expected to follow. 

5. The appropriate authorities of each 
Party shall use their best efforts to assist the 
designated airline(s) of the other Party to re- 
ceive housing for the staff of such airline(s) 
comparable in cost and quality to the best ob- 
tained by or provided to other foreign airlines. 

6. The designated airline(s) of each Party 
shall have the right to train the personnel of 
any appointed agent in the procedures of that 
airline for passenger, cargo, and aircraft han- 
dling and in procedures relating to reserva- 
tions, ticketing, marketing, management, and 
sales promotion, subject to prior agreement. 

This letter will be effective on the date the 
Civil Air Ti-ansport Agreement is signed. 

I would be gi-ateful for your confirmation 
that this is also your understanding of the 
agreement we have reached. 

Sincerely, 

B. BOYU HiGHT 

Chairman 

Civil Aviation Delegation 
of the Government 
of the United States 

Attachment: Initialed Translation 

Beijing 
September 8, 1980 

Mr B. Boyd Hight 

Chairman 

Civil Aviation Delegation of 

the Government of the United States 

Dear Mr Hight: 

I have the honor to refer to the Civil Air 
Ti-ansi)ort Agreement initialed today by our 
two governments and to your letter of today's 
date which reads as follows: 

"I have the honor to refer to the Agree- 
ment between the Government of the United 
States of Amei'ica and the Government of the 
People's Republic of China relating to Civil Air 
Ti-ansport initialed today by our two govern- 
ments. During the course of negotiations lead- 
ing to the initialing of the Agreement, both 
sides discussed questions relating to the con- 
duct of business in the territory of the other 
Party and other operational matters of the 
designated airlines. I understand that agree- 
ment was reached that the designated air- 
line(s) of each Party shall have, in the terri- 
tory of the other Party, the rights and privi- 
leges as set forth below: 

1. With respect to the representative of- 
fice(s) referred to in Article 11, paragraph (3) 
of the Agreement, the designated airhneCs) of 
each Party shall have: 

(a) the right to issue, reissue, reconfirm 



and exchange tickets for transportation on the 
agreed services, for connecting air services, 
and for transportation over any other route or 
routes outside of the agi'eed services which are 
operated by such airline(s); and 

(b) the right to make, reconfirm, or 
change reservations for passengers wishing to 
travel over the routes of such airline(s) 
whether or not such reservations are for 
transportation on the agreed services. 

2. The designated airline(s) of each Party 
shall also have the right to import, maintain, 
store, and distribute informational materials 
(including, but not limited to, time tables, 
schedules, brochures, sales and tour literature, 
calendars, displays, etc.) and to advertise in 
the same manner and through the same or 
similar media as the designated airline(s) of 
the other Party. 

3. With respect to operational matters, 
the designated airline(s) of each Party shall 
have: 

(a) the right to import, install, and op- 
erate telex, computer, VHF radio, and hand- 
held radio sets (walkie talkie) and related 
equipment for reservations, load planning and 
management, and for other operational pur- 
poses, subject to the approval of the appropri- 
ate authorities, where necessary; 

(b) the right to supervise load planning 
and actual loading and unloading of its aircraft 
through its own employees or representatives; 

(c) the right to import company-owned 
vehicles and to operate such vehicles on air- 
port roadways and aircraft servicing ramps, 
subject to the approval of the appropriate au- 
thorities, where necessaiy; 

(d) the right to inspect fuel storage and 
fuel pumping equipment on a quarterly basis 
and take samples at each source for export and 
subsequent laboratorj' analysis; and 

(e) the right to film, under whatever 
supervision is necessai->', the aircraft approach 
view to the runways of all regular airports and 
alternate airports contemplated for the opera- 
tion of the agreed services, for purposes of 
pilot training, subject to the approval of the 
appropriate authorities. 

4. Each Party grants to the other Party 
the assui'ance that the following authoriza- 
tions, permits, and information will be pro- 
vided, on the basis of reciprocity, in a timely 
fashion to each airline designated to operate 
the agreed services: 

(a) airport security permits for as- 
signed foreign and locally employed company 
staff authorizing them to move freely beyond 
airport customs and immigration screens into 
the terminal loading areas and onto the airport 
ramp areas; 

(b) written information on the proce- 
dures to be employed by the airport au- 
thorities at each regular airport and alternate 
airport contemplated for the operation of the 
agreed services in the event of an emergency 
such as a crash, a hijacking, or a bomb threat, 
establishing the order of action in a given situ- 
ation for units responsible for tower control, 
firefighting, medical assistance and transpor- 
tation, perimeter security and other 



Feature 



emergency and security functions in effect: and 

(c) written information on aeronautical 
laws, including the rules and regulations 
thereunder and amendments thereto, each des- 
ignated airline is e.xpected to follow. 

5. The appropriate authorities of each 
Party shall use their best efforts to assist the 
designated airline(s) of the other Party to re- 
ceive housing for the staff of such airline(s) 
comparable in cost and quality to the best ob- 
tained by or provided to other foreign airlines. 

6. The designated airline(s) of each Party 
shall have the right to train the personnel of 
any appointed agent in the procedures of that 
airline for passenger, cargo, and aircraft han- 
dling and in procedures relating to reserva- 
tions, ticketing, marketing, management, and 
sales promotion, subject to prior agi-eement. 

This letter will be effective on the date the 
Civil Air Transport Agi'eement is signed. 

I would be grateful for your confirmation 
that this is also your understanding of the 
agreement we have reached." 

I have the honor to confirm that the above 
constitutes an agreed understanding between 
our two governments concerning the rights of 
the designated airline(s) of each Party in the 
territorj' of the other Party. 

This letter will be effective on the date the 
Civil Air Transport Agreement is signed. 

Sincerely, 

Li.N- Zhe.n'g 

Leader 

Civil Aviation Delegation 

of the Government 

of China 

Beijing 
September 8, 1980 

Mr. B. Boyd Hight 

Chairman 

Civil Aviation Delegation 

of the Government of the United States 

Dear Mr Hight: 

I have the honor to refer to the Agi-ee- 
ment between the Government of the People's 
Republic of China and the Government of the 
United States of America Relating to Civil Air 
Transport, initialed today by our two govern- 
ments. During the course of negotiations lead- 
ing to the initialing of the Agreement, both 
sides discussed questions relating to the utili- 
zation of full traffic rights at a point or points 
in Japan in the operation of the agreed ser- 
vices. It is my understanding that agreement 
was reached that the utilization of full traffic 
rights at Japan by the designated airlines of 
both sides shall be governed by the following 
terms: 

(1) The first designated airline of each 
Party unless otherwise agreed, shall be per- 
mitted to operate two frequencies' with full 
traffic rights at Japan immediately upon the 
commencement of the agreed services. Two 
years following the commencement of any 
agreed service, the second designated airline 
of each Party, unless otherwise agreed, shall 
be permitted to operate two frequencies with 



10 



full traffic rights at Japan. These rights shall 
continue until otherwise agreed by the Parties. 

(2) If, two years after the commencement 
of any agreed service, the United States does 
not designate a second airline, or if one of the 
United States' two designated airlines does not 
operate all of the Japan frequencies authorized 
by paragraph (1) above, the Parties shall con- 
sult with a view to agi'eeing on the utilization 
of the unused Japan frequencies by the United 
States. 

(3) The designated airline(s) of the 
People's Republic of China shall operate more 
than two Japan frequencies only if, and to the 
same extent that, the designated airline(s) of 
the United States are operating singly or in 
combination more than two Japan frequencies. 

(4) Not later than two and one-half years 
following the commencement of any agreed 
service, the Parties shall review their respec- 
tive utilization of Japan frequencies. If, upon 
such review, the number of Japan frequencies 
operated by the U.S. designated airline(s) ex- 
ceeds the number of Japan frequencies which 
the Government of the People's Republic of 
China and the Government of Japan have 
agi-eed upon for the Chinese designated air- 
line(s), the Parties shall consult with a view to 
agi-eeing upon an alternative opportunity or 
opportunities for the Chinese designated air- 
line(s). 

(.5) If, by 90 days prior to the end of the 
third year following the commencement of any 
agreed service, the Parties have not agi-eed 
upon an alternative opportunity or opportuni- 
ties, the People's Republic of China shall be 
entitled to select point services^ for operation 
in the fourth year and thereafter equal to the 
difference between the number of Japan fre- 
quencies operated by the U.S. designated air- 
line(s) and the number of Japan frequencies 
authorized for the Chinese designated air- 
Hne(s). The Chinese designated airhne(s) shall 
be entitled to operate such point services at 
one or more intermediate and/or beyond points 
selected at the sole discretion of the People's 
Republic of China. A list of intermediate 
and/or beyond points so selected shall be fur- 
nished to the Government of the United States 
through diplomatic channels not later than 60 
days prior to the commencement of operations. 
The number of point services operated by the 
Chinese designated airline(s) shall be reduced 
by one for each new Japan frequency which 
the Chinese designated airline(s) is authorized 
to operate subsequent to the selection of point 
services. 

This letter will be effective on the date the 
Civil Air Transport Agreement is signed. 
Sincerely, 

Li.v Zheng 

Leader 

Civil Aviation Delegation 

of the Government 

of China 

Beijing 

September 8, 1980 



Mr Lin Zheng 

Leader 

Civil Aviation Delegation 

of the Government of China 

Dear Mr Lin: 

I am in receipt of your letter of today's 
date relating to the Agi'eement between th( 
Government of the United States of Ameri( 
and the Government of the People's Republ 
of China Relating to Civil Air Ti-ansport ini 
tialed today by our two governments, and 
more particularly relating to the utilization 
full traffic rights at a point or points in Japs 
in the operation of the agreed services. You: 
letter reads as follows: 

"I have the honor to refer to the Agi-ee 
ment between the Government of the Peopl 
Republic of China and the Government oft! 
United States of America Relating to Civil 
Ti-ansport, initialed today by our two gover 
ments. During the course of negotiations le: 
ing to the initialing of the Agreement, both 
sides discussed questions relating to the uti 
zation of full traffic rights at a point or poin 
in Japan in the operation of the agreed ser- 
vices. It is my understanding that agreemei 
was reached that the utilization of full traffii 
rights at Japan by the designated airlines ot< 
both sides shall be governed by the followim 
terms: 



(1) The first designated airline of each , 
Party, unless othei-wise agreed, shall be per 
mitted to operate two frequencies' with full 
traffic rights at Japan immediately upon th( 
commencement of the agreed services, Two^ 
years following the commenceinent of any 
agreed service, the second designated airlin 
of each Party, unless otherwise agreed, shal 
be permitted to operate two frequencies wit 
full traffic rights at Japan. These rights sha 
continue until othei'wise agreed by the Parti 

(2) If, two years after the commencemel 
of any agreed service, the United States doa 
not de.signate a second airline, or if one of thl 
LInited States' two designated airlines doesi 
operate all of the Japan frequencies authorize 
by paragraph (1) above, the Parties shall con 
suit with a view to agreeing on the utilizatioi 
of the unused Japan frequencies by the UnitiS 
States. 

(3) The designated airHne(s) of the 
People's Republic of China shall operate mor 
than two Japan frequencies only if, and to thi 
same extent that, the designated airlineis) of 
the United States are operating singly or in 
combination more than two Japan frequencies 

(4) Not later than two and one-half yean 
following the commencement of any agreed 
service, the Parties shall review their respeCi 
tive utilization of Japan frequencies. If, upon 
such review, the number of Japan frequencies 
operated by the U.S. designated airline(s) ex- 
ceeds the number of Japan frequencies which 
the Government of the People's Republic of 
China and the Government of Japan have 
agreed upon for the Chinese designated air- 
line(s), the Parties shall consult with a viewti 
agreeing upon an alternative opportunity or 
opportunities for the Chinese designated m 
airline(s). 



Department of State B 



ullet.'d 



Feature 



(5) If. by 90 (lays prior to the end of the 
ci year following the commencement of any 
■6(1 service, the Parties have not agreed 
1 an alternative opportunity or opportuni- 
the People's RejHiblic of China shall be 
tied to select point services^ for operation 
le fourth year and thereafter equal to the 
rence between the number of Japan fre- 
icies operated by the U.S. designated air- 
s) and the number of Japan frequencies 
orized for the Chinese designated air- 
s). The Chinese designated airline(s) shall 
ititled to operate such point services at 
jr more intermediate and/or beyond points 
ted at the sole discretion of the People's 
iblic of China. A list of intermediate 
or beyond points so selected shall be fur- 
d to the Government of the United States 
igh diplomatic channels not later than 60 
prior to the commencement of operations. 
umber of point services operated by the 
ise designated airline(s) shall be reduced 
,e for each new Japan frequency which 
hinese designated airline(s) is authorized 
lerate subsequent to the selection of point 
ices. 

fhis letter will be effective on the date the 
Air Transport Agreement is signed." 

have the honor to confirm that the above 
tutes an agreed understanding. 
Ms letter will be effective on the date the 
lAir Transport Agi'eement is signed. 

Sincerely, 

B. Bovi) HiGHT 

Chairman 

Civil Aviation Delegation 
of the Government 
of the United States 

Ihment: Initialed Ti-anslation 

Beijing 
September 8, 1980 

n Zheng 

r 

Wiation Delegation 

'the Government of China 

Mr. Lin: 

have the honor to refer to the Civil Air 
Dort Agreement initialed today by our 
vernments. With respect to paragi-aph 
Lnne.x V to the Agreement, it is my 
itanding that in case the first designated 
of the People's Republic of China does 
srate more than two B-747SP aircraft 
;ek during the period of one year follow- 
commencement of the agreed services, 
s same period the designated airline of 
lited States of America will limit its 
ole capacity to an average of 120 tons of 
,d per week, measured quarterly. Pay- 
ill be measured by the actual tons of 
Jger, cargo and mail traffic, embarked or 
oarked in the People's Republic of China 
•rly. 

his letter will be effective on the date the 
Ur Transport Agreement is signed. 

Sincerely, 



iber 1980 



B. Boyd Hight 

Chairman 

Civil Aviation Delegation 
of the Government 
of the United States 

Attachment: Initialed Translation 

Beijing 
September 8, 1980 

Mr B. Boyd Hight 

Chairman 

Civil Aviation Delegation of 

the Government of the United States 

Dear Mr. Hight: 

I am in receipt of your letter of today's 
date relating to the Agreement between the 
Government of the United States of America 
and the Government of the People's Republic 
of China relating to Civil Air Transport ini- 
tialed today by our two governments, and 
more particularly relating to Anne.x V (1) set- 
ting forth a capacity regime to govern the op- 
erations of the designated airline of each Party 
during the first year following the commence- 
ment of the agreed services by the first desig- 
nated airline of the People's Republic of China. 
Your letter reads as follows: 

"I have the honor to refer to the Civil Air 
Transport Agreement initialed today by our 
two governments. With respect to paragi-aph 
(1) of Anne.x V to the Agreement, it is my 
understanding that in case the first designated 
airline of the People's Republic of China does 
not operate more than two B-747SP aircraft 
per week during the period of one year follow- 
ing its commencement of the agreed services, 
for the same period the designated airline of 
the United States of America will limit its 
available capacity to an average of 120 tons of 
payload per week, measured quarterly. 
Payload will be measured by the actual total 
tons of passenger cargo and mail traffic, em- 
barked or disembarked in the People's Repub- 
lic of China quarterly. 

This letter will be effective on the date the 
Civil Air Ti-ansport Agreement is signed." 

I have the honor to confirm that the above 
constitutes an agi'eed understanding. 

This letter will be eft'ective on the date the 
Civil Air Ti'ansport Agreement is signed. 

Sincerely, 

Lin Zhe.n'g 

Leader 

Civil Aviation Delegation 

of the Government 

of China 

Beijing 
September 8, 1980 

Mr B. Boyd Hight 

Chairman 

Civil Aviation Delegation of 

The Government of the United States 
Dear Mr Hight: 

With reference to Anne.x V, paragraph (2) 
of the Agreement between the Government of 



the People's Republic of China and the Gov- 
ernment of the United States of America relat- 
ing to Civil Air Transport initialed today, I 
have the honor to confirm, on behalf of my 
Government, the following discussion between 
the civil aviation delegations of our two coun- 
tries in the course of their negotiations. 

In the operation of the agreed services 
on the specified routes by the designated air- 
lines of the Parties, it is deemed that traffic 
will no longer be reasonably balanced 
whenever, on a semi-annual basis, the traffic 
carried by the designated airline(s) of one 
Party shall exceed 56.25 percent of the total 
traffic carried by the designated airlines of the 
two Parties. 

This letter will be effective on the date the 
Civil Air Ti-ansport Agreement is signed. 

Sincerely, 

Lin Zheng 

Leader 

Civil Aviation Delegation 

of the Government 

of China 

Beijing 
September 8, 1980 

Mr Lin Zheng 

Leader 

Civil Aviation Delegation 

of the Government of China 

Dear Mr Lin: 

I am in receipt of your letter of today's 
date with respect to Annex V, paragraph (2) of 
the Civil Air Transport Agreement initialed 
today by our two governments, and acknowl- 
edge the contents therein. 

This letter will be effective on the date the 
Civil Air Transport Agreement is signed. 

Sincerely, 

B. Boyd Hight 

Chairman 

Civil Aviation Delegation 
of the Government 
of the United States 

Attachment: Initialed Translation 
September 17, 1980 

Mr Lin Zheng 

Leader 

Civil Aviation Delegation 

of the Government of China 

Dear Mr Lin: 

I have the honor to confirm that the Gov- 
ernment of the United States of America is 
prepared, within its authority, to make clear in 
its official publications and statements that 
"China Airlines" is an airline from Taiwan and 
is not the national flag carrier of China. 

Sincerely, 

B. Boyd Hight 

Chairman 

Civil Aviation Delegation 
of the Government 
of the United States 



11 



Feature 



Textile Agreement'' 

AGREEMENT RELATING TO 

TRADE IN COTTON, WOOL, AND 

MAN-MADE FIBER TEXTILES AND 

TEXTILE PRODUCTS BETWEEN 

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 

AND THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF 

CHINA 

The Government of the United States of 
America and the Government of the People's 
Republic of China, as a result of discussions 
concerning exports to the United States of 
America of cotton, wool, and man-made fiber 
textiles and textile products manufactured in 
the People's Republic of China, agree to enter 
into the following Agreement relating to trade 
in cotton, wool, and man-made fiber textiles 
and textile products between the United 
States of America and the People's Republic of 
China (hereinafter referred to as "the Agree- 
ment"): 

1. The two Governments reaffirm their 
commitments under the Ag)-eement on Trade 
Relations between the United States of 
America and the People's Republic of China as 
the basis of their trade and economic relations. 

2. The term of the Agreement shall be the 
three-year period from Januaiy 1, 1980 through 
December 31, 1982. Each "Agreement Year" 
shall be a calendar yean 

3. (a) The system of categories and the 
rates of conversion into square yards equiva- 
lent listed in Annex A shall apply in im- 
plementing the Agreement. 

(b) For purposes of the Agreement, cate- 
gories 347, 348 and 645, 646 are merged and 
treated as single categories 347/348 and 645/ 
646 respectively. 

4. (a) Commencing with the first Agree- 
ment Year, and during the subsequent term of 
the Agreement, the Government of the 
People's Republic of China shall limit annual 
exports from China to the United States of 
America of cotton, wool, and man-made fiber 
textiles and textile products to the specific lim- 
its set out in Annex B, as such limits may be 
adjusted in accordance with [jaragraphs 5 and 
7. The limits in Annex B include growth. Ex- 
ports shall be charged to limits for the year in 
which exported. The limits set out in Annex B 
do not include any of the adjustments permit- 
ted under paragraphs 5 and 7. 

(b) With respect to Category 340, 200,000 
dozens of the quantity exported in 1979 shall 
be charged against the Specific Limit for that 
Category' for the first Agreement Year. 

(c) With respect to Categoiy 645/646, 
48,000 dozens of the quantity exported in 1980 
will be entered without charge. 

5. (a) Any specific limit may be exceeded 
in any Agreement Year by not more than the 
following percentage of its square yards equiv- 
alent total listed in Annex B, provided that the 
amount of the increase is compensated for by 
an equivalent SYE decrease in one or more 
other specific limits for that Agreement Year 



Category 

331 

339 

340 

341 

347/348 

645/646 



Pertenlage 

6 
5 
5 
5 
5 
6 



(b) No limit may be decreased pursuant to 
sub-paragraph 5 (a) to a level which is below the 
level of exports charged against that categoi-y 
limit for that Agreement Year. 

(c) When informing the United States of 
adjustments under the provisions of this para- 
graph, the Government of the People's RepubUc 
of China shall indicate the categoiy or categories 
to be increased and the category or categories to 
be decreased by commensurate quantities in 
square yards equivalent. 

6. The Government of the People's Re- 
public of China shall use its best efforts to 
space exports from China to the United States 
within each category evenly throughout each 
Agi-eement Year, taking into consideration 
normal seasonal factors. Exports from China 
in excess of authorized levels for each Agi-ee- 
ment Year will, if allowed entry into the 
United States, be charged to the applicable 
level for the succeeding Agreement Year 

7. (a) In any Agreement Year, exports 
may exceed by a maximum of 11 percent any 
limit set out in Annex B by allocating to such 
limit for that Agreement Year an unused por- 
tion of the corresponding limit for the previous 
Agreement Year ("carryover") or a portion of 
the corresponding limit for the succeeding 
Agi'eement Year ("carryfoi-ward") subject to 
the following conditions: 

(1) Carryover may be utilized as avail- 
able up to 11 percent of the receiving Agree- 
ment Year's limits provided, however, that no 
carryover shall be available for application 
during the first Agreement Year; 

(2) Cari-yforward may be utilized up to 
seven percent of the receiving Agi-eement 
Year's applicable limits and shall be charged 
against the immediately following Agreement 
Year's corresponding limits; 

(3) The combination of carryover and 
carryforward shall not exceed 11 percent of the 
receiving Agreement Year's applicable limit in 
any Agreement Year; 

(4) Cari-yover of shortfall (as defined in 
sub-paragi-aph 7 (b)) shall not be applied to any 
limits until the Governments of the United 
States of America and the People's Republic of 
China have agreed upon the amounts of short- 
fall involved. 

(b) For purposes of the Agreement, a 
shortfall occurs when exports of textiles or 
textile products from China to the L'nited 
States of America during an Agreement Year 
are below any specific limit as set out in Annex 
B, (or, in the case of any limit decreased pur- 
suant to paragraph 5, when such exports are 
below the limit as so decreased). In the 
Agi-eement Year following the shortfall, such 
exports from China to the LInited States of 
America may be permitted to exceed the ap- 
plicable limits, subject to conditions of sub- 
paragraph 7 (a), by carryover of shortfalls in 
the following manner: 



(1) The carryover shall not exceed t 
amount of shortfall in any applicable hmit; 

(2) The shortfall shall be used in th; 
category in which the shortfall occurred. 

(c) The total adjustment permissible 
under paragraph 7 for the first Agreement 
Year shall be seven percent consisting sole; 
carryfoi-ward. 

8. (a) In the event that the Governmf 
of the United States believes that imports 
from the People's Republic of China classif 
in any categoiy or categories not covered I 
Specific Limits are, due to market disrujrti 
threatening to impede the orderly develop- 
ment of trade between the two countries, t 
Government of the United States may reqi 
consultations with the Government of the 
People's Republic of China with a view to 
avoiding such market disruption. The Gov- 
ernment of the United States of America s 
provide the Government of the People's Rt 
public of China at the time of the request v 
a detailed factual statement of the reasons 
justification for its request for consultation 
with current data, which in the view of the 
Government of the United States of Ameri 
shows 

1) the existence or threat of market 
ruption, and 

2) the contribution of exports from 
People's Republic of China to that disniptii' 

(b) The Government of the People's Rl 
public of China agi-ees to consult with the (* 
ernment of the United States within 30 da; 
receipt of a request for consultations. Both 
sides agi'ee to make every effort to reach 
agi-eement on a mutually satisfactory resoH 
tion of the issue within 90 days of the recei< 
of the request, unless this period is extend 
by mutual agi-eement. 

(c) During the 90 day period, the Gov- 
ernment of the People's Republic of China 
agi-ees to hold its exports to the United Sta 
of America in the category or categories sui 
ject to this consultation to a level no greate 
than 35 percent of the amount entered in th 
latest twelve month period for which data, 
available. 

(d) If no mutually satisfactoiy solutiort 
reached during these consultations, the 
People's Republic of China will limit its ex- 
ports in the category or categories under th 
consultation for the succeeding twelve men 
to a level of 20 percent for man-made fiber 
cotton product categories (and of 6 percent 
wool |M-oduct categories) above the level of 
ports entered during the first twelve of the 
most recent fourteen months preceding the 
date of the request for consultations. 

9. To prevent inadvertent or frauduler 
circumvention of the Agreement, to ensure 
curate record keeping, and to facilitate proj; 
entiy into the United States of the productf 
covered by the Agreement, a Visa System 
shall be established as soon as practicable a 
an administrative arrangement under the 
Agreement. 



12 



Department of State Bull 



Feature 



10. The Government of the United States 
America shall promptly supply the Govern- 
nt of the People's Republic of China with 
inthly data on imports of textiles from 

ina, and the Government of the People's 
public of China shall promptly supply the 
vernment of the United States of America 
h quarterly data on exports of China's tex- 
s to the United States in categories for 
ieh levels have been established. Each Gov- 
iment agrees to supply promptly any other 
tinent and readily available statistical data 
[uested by the other Government. 

11. (a) Tops, yarns, piece goods, made-up 
icles, garments, and other textile man- 
ctured products (being products which de- 

s their chief characteristics from their tex- 
components) of cotton, wool, man-made 

!rs, or blends thereof, in which any or all of 

se fibers in combination represent either 
chief value of the fibers or 50 percent or 
•e by weight (or 17 (percent or more by 

,ght of wool) of the product, are subject to 
Agreement. 

(b) For purposes of the Agreement, te.\- 
5 and textile products shall be classified as 
on, wool or man-made fiber textiles if 
illy or in chief value of either of these fi- 

>. 

(c) Any product covered by sub- 
ngraph 11 (a) but not in chief value of cot- 
wool, or man-made fiber shall be classified 

-i I) cotton textiles if containing 50 percent 
« lore by weight of cotton or if the cotton 
!c ponent exceeds by weight the wool and the 
11 -made fiber components; (II) wool textiles 
f t cotton and the wool equals or exceeds 17 
X ent by weight of all component fibers; (III) 
n -made fiber textiles if neither of the fore- 
5C g apphes. 

12. The Government of the United States 
)f merica and the Government of the 

■"« )le's Republic of China agree to consult on 
w question arising in the implementation of 
h Agreement. 

IH. Mutually satisfactory administrative 
'■ ntrements or adjustments may be made to 
' \ (■ minor problems arising in the im- 
itation of this Agi'eement, including dif- 
ris in points of procedure or operation. 
II. If the Government of the People's Re- 
1 (if China considers that, as a result of a 
.. ation specified in this Agreement, China is 
e r placed in an inequitable position vis-a-vis 
t rtl country or party, the Government of 
II 'I'ople's Republic of China may request 
'I illations with the Government of the 
111 States of America with a view to tak- 
. ppropriate remedial action such as rea- 
I lie modification of this Agreement and the 
iiiment of the United States of America 
agree to hold such consultations. 
l.'i. At the request of either Government, 
I wo Governments will undertake a major 
w of the Agreement at the end of the sec- 
\greement Year. 
li. Each Government will take such 

■ ures as may be necessary to ensure that 

■ pecific Limits established for any catego- 
mder this Agreement are not exceeded, 
ilations will l3e based on the date of ex- 
iViim the People's Republic of China. 



Neither Government shall act to restrain the 
trade in textile products covered by the 
Agreement except in accordance with the 
terms of the Agreement. 

17. Either Government may terminate the 
Agreement effective at the end of any Agree- 
ment Year by WTitten notice to the other Gov- 
ernment to be given at least 90 days prior to 
the end of such Agreement Year Either Gov- 
ernment may at any time propose revisions in 
the terms of the Agreement. 

In Witness 'Whereof, the authorized 
representatives of the Contracting Parties 
have signed this Agi'eement. 

Done at Washington, in duplicate, in the 
English and Chinese languages, both texts 
being equally authentic, this seventeenth day 
of September, 1980. 

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: 

JiM.MY Carter 

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE 
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA: 

Bo YiBo 



ANNEX A 

M and B = Men's and Boys' 

W G, and I = Women's, Girls', and Infants 

n.k. = not Knit 



Category Description 

YARN 

Cotton 

300 Carded 

301 Combed 



Wool 

400 



Tops and Yarns 



Conversion Unit of 
Factor Measure 



4.6 Lb. 
4.6 Lb. 

2.0 Lb. 



Man-made Fiber 

600 Textured 

601 Cont. cellulosic 

602 Cont. noncellulosic 

603 Spun cellulosic 

604 Spun noncellulosic 

605 Other yarns 

FABRIC 



Cotton 

310 
311 
312 
313 
314 
315 
316 
317 
318 



Ginghams 

Velveteens 

Corduroy 

Sheeting 

Broadcloth 

Printcloths 

Shirtings 

Twills and Sateens 

Yarn-dved 



3.5 
5.2 
11.6 
3.4 
4.1 
3.5 



1.0 
1.0 
1.0 
1.0 
1.0 
1.0 
1.0 
1.0 
1.0 



Lb. 
Lb. 
Lb. 
Lb. 
Lb. 
Lb. 



SYD 
SYD 
SYD 
SYD 
SYD 
SYD 
SYD 
SYD 
SYD 



EDITOR'S NOTE: 

DPR = dozen pair 

SFT = square feet 

SY'D = square yards 

SYE = square yards equivalent 



Textile Agreement — 
A Summary 



This agreement provides a framework for 
insuring the orderly development of textile 
trade between the United States and China 
in a manner consistent with the interests of 
both nations. It assures China secure mar- 
ket access while protecting the United 
States from the disruptive market condi- 
tions that could be caused by sharply rising 
or fluctuating trade levels. 

The agreement applies to textile prod- 
ucts exported from China during the period 
January 1, 1980, through December 31, 
1982. It establishes agreed levels of trade 
for six textile products. It provides for 
some flexibility in the transfer of unused 
quota between categories and between 
years. The agreement also sets out a con- 
sultation mechanism for categories of tex- 
tile products which are not subject to spe- 
cific ceilings and for which levels may be 
established later upon agreement between 
the two governments. 

This agreement supersedes the seven 
unilaterally imposed quotas now in effect. 
Details on this transition will be announced 
in the Federal Register. 

China is now the number five supplier 
of textile products to the United States — 
accounting for 8'* by volume of U.S. tex- 
tile imports — and the number two supplier 
of cotton textile products to the United 
States— 12^!^ of U.S. imports. 



319 
320 

Wool 

410 
411 

425 

429 



Duck 

Other Fabrics, n.k. 

Woolen and worsted 

Tapestries and 

upholstery 

Knit 

Other Fabrics 



Man-Made fiber 

610 Cont. cellulosic, n.k. 

611 Spun cellulosic, n.k. 

612 Cont. noncellulosic, 
n.k. 

613 Spun noncellulosic, n.k. 
Other fabrics, n.k. 

614 Knit 

625 Pile and tufted 

626 Specialty 
627 



APPAREL 



1.0 
1.0 

1.0 
1.0 

2.0 
1.0 

1.0 
1,0 

1.0 
1.0 



1.0 

7.8 
1.0 
7.8 



SYD 
SYD 

SYD 
SYD 

Lb. 
SYD 

SYD 
SYD 



SYD 

SYD 

Lb. 

SYD 

Lb. 

SYD 

Lb. 



Cotton 

330 
331 
332 
333 



Handkerchiefs 
Gloves 
Hosiery 

Suit-type coats, 
M and B 



1.7 


Dz. 


3.5 


DPR 


4.6 


DPR 


36.2 


Dz. 



-J-iimber 1980 



a 



13 



Feature 



334 


Other coats, 
M and B 


41.3 


Dz. 


631 
632 


Gloves 
Hosiery 


3.5 
4.6 


DPR. 
DPR. 


650 


Dressing gowns, 
incl. bath and beach 


51.0 


D 


k 


335 


Coats, W, G, and I 


41.3 


Dz. 


633 


Suit-type Coats, 


36.2 


Dz. 




robes 








336 


Dresses (incl. uni- 
forms) 


45.3 


Dz. 


634 


M and B 
Other Coats, 


41.3 


Dz. 


651 


Pajamas and other 
nightwear 


52.0 


D 




337 


Playsuits, Sunsuits 


25.0 


Dz. 




M and B 






652 


Underwear 


16.0 


D 






Washsuits, Creep- 






635 


Coats, W, G and I 


41.3 


Dz. 


659 


Other Apparel 


7.8 


L, 






ers 






636 


Dresses 


45.3 


Dz. 












338 


Knit shirts, (incl. T- 


7.2 


Dz. 


637 


Playsuits, Sunsuits, 


21.3 


Dz. 


MADE-UPS AND .MISC. 










Shirts. other 








Washsuits, etc. 


















sweatshirts) 






638 


Knit Shirts (Incl. 


18.0 


Dz. 


Cotton 






D 




M and B 








T-Shirts), M and B 






360 


Pillowcases 


1.1 


N. 


! 


339 


Knit shirts and 


7.2 


Dz. 


639 


Knit Shirts and 


15.0 


Dz. 


361 


Sheets 


6.2 


N. 






blouses (incl. 








blouses (Incl. 






362 


Bedspreads and 


6.2 


N- 


! 




T-Shirts, other 








T-Shirts), 








Quilts 






i 




sweatshirts) W, G 








W, G and I 






363 


Terry and other pile 


0.5 


N 


i 




and I 






640 


Shirts, n.k. 


24.0 


Dz. 




tow^els 






s 


340 


Shirts, n.k. 


24.0 


Dz. 


641 


Blouses, n.k. 


14.5 


Dz. 


369 


Other Cotton manu 


4.6 


L 




341 


Blouses, n.k. 


14.5 


Dz. 


642 


Skirts 


17.8 


Dz. 




facturers 






t 


342 


Skirts 


17.8 


Dz. 


643 


Suits, M and B 


.54.0 


Dz. 


Wool 

464 

465 










345 

347 


Sweaters 
Ti-ousers. slacks, 
and shorts (outer) 
M and B 
Ti'ousers, slacks 
and shorts (outer) 


36.8 

17.8 


Dz. 
Dz. 


644 
645 
646 


Suits, W G and I 

Sweaters, M and B 

Sweaters, W, G and 

I 

Trousers, slacks 

and shorts (outer), 


54.0 
36.8 
36.8 


Dz. 
Dz. 
Dz. 


Blankets and auto 

robes 

Floor Covering 


1.3 

0.1 


L 

S)i 


L 


348 


17.8 


Dz. 


647 


17.8 


Dz. 


469 


Other Wool man- 
ufactures 


2.0 


L 






W, G and I 








MandB 






Man-made Fiber 








349 


Brassieres, etc. 


4.8 


Dz. 


648 


Ti'ousers, slacks 


17.8 


Dz. 


665 


Floor Coverings 


0.1 


SX 


; 


350 


Dressing gowns, 
incl. bathrobes. 


51.0 


Dz. 




and shorts (outer), 
W, G and I 






666 
669 


Other Furnishings 
Other man-made 


7.8 
7.8 


Li 

Li 






and beach house 






649 


Brassieres, etc. 


4.8 


Dz. 




manufactures 










coats, and dusters 
























351 


Pajamas and other 


52.0 


Dz. 






















nightwear 












ANNEX B 










352 


Undei-wear (incl. 


11.0 


Dz. 






















union suits) 










SPECIFIC LIMITS 








359 


Other apparel 


4.6 


Lbs. 




















Wool 

431 








Cate- 




First .Agreement 


Second .-Agreement 


Third .AgreemU 




Gloves 


2.1 


DPR 


gor 


V Brief Description 




Year 




Year 


Year 






432 


Hosiery 


2.8 


DPR 


331 


Cotton Gloves 


3.213,600 dozen 


pair 


3,310,008 dozen 


3,409,308 deal 




433 


Suit-Type coats. 


36.0 


Dz. 






11,247 


600 SYE 




11,585,028 SYE 


11,932,578 


SYl 




434 


M and B 
Other Coats, 
M and B 


54.0 


Dz. 


339 


Knit Shirts & 
Blouses W G, & I 


720,000 dozen 
5,184,000 SYE 




912,000 dozen 
6,566,400 SYE 


865,280 doa 
6,230,016 SYJ 




435 


Coats, W, G and I 


54.0 


Dz. 


340 


Shirts, M & B, 


540,000 dozen 




561,600 dozen 


584,064 deal 




436 


Dresses 


49.2 


Dz. 




not knit 


12,9(30,000 SYE 




13,478,400 SYE 


14,017,536 SY* 




438 


Knit Shirts and 


15.0 


Dz. 






















Blouses, n.k. 






341 


Blouses, W, G, & I 


381,300 dozen 




455,100 dozen 


443,456 doz^ 




440 


Shirts and Blouses, 


24.0 


Dz. 




not knit 


5,528,850 SYE 




6,598,950 SYE 


6,430,112 


SYJ 






n.k. 






347/348Ti-ousers 


1,440,000 dozen 




1,824,000 dozen 


1,730,560 do^ 




442 


Skirts 


18.0 


Dz. 






25,632 


000 SYE 




32,467,200 SYE 


30,803,968 


SYl 




443 


Suits, M and B 


.54.0 


Dz. 




















444 


Suits, W, G and I 


.54.0 


Dz. 


645/646 Sweaters 


550,000 dozen 




566.500 dozen 


583,495 doB 




445 


Sweaters, M and B 


14.88 


Dz. 






20,240,000 SYE 




20,847,200 SYE 


21,472,616 SYl 




446 


Sweaters, W, G and 

T 


14.88 


Dz. 




















447 


Ti-ousers, slacks 
and shorts (outer) 


18.0 


Dz. 






















M and B 




















If ■ 


448 


Trousers, slacks 
and shorts (outer) 
W, G and I 


18.0 


Dz. 
















1 

'« 1 


459 


Other Wool Apparel 


2.0 


Lb. 
















Man-made Fiber 






















630 


Handkerchiefs 


1.7 


Dz. 





















14 



Department of State Bullet'^ 



Feature 



B laritime TVansport Agreement 

AGREEMENT ON 

MARITIME TRANSPORT 

BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 

AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE 

PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 

The Government of the United States of 
merica and the Government of the People's 
epubhc of China 

In conformity with the sjjirit of the Joint 
omniunique on the Establishment of Diplo- 
atic Relations between the United States of 
merica and the People's Republic of China of 
ecember 15, 1978; and 

Recognizing the importance of maritime 
lations for both countries; and 

In consideration of the significance of 
aritime transport in the development and 
cilitation of trade between both countries; 
d 

For the purpose of strengthening their 
loperation in the field of maritime transport; 
id 

In accordance with the principle of ecjual- 
■ and mutual benefit 

Have agreed as follows; 

Article 1 
For purposes of this Agreement: 

a. The term "vessel" shall mean any mer- 
ant ship engaged in commercial maritime 
ipping or merchant marine training. The 
"m "vessel" shall not include warships; ves- 
s carrying out any form of state function 
cept for those mentioned in the preceding 
itence; or fishing vessels; fishery research 
ssels or fisherv' support vessels. 

b. The term "vessel of a Party" shall mean 
vessel flying the national flag of and regis- 

ed in the United States of America or the 
lople's Republic of China respectively. 

c. The term "member of the crew" shall 
ian a person working on board a vessel of a 
rty who actually performs duties or services 
mected with the operation or maintenance 
the vessel, holding appropriate identity 
juments issued by the authorities of that 
rty as provided in Article .5. and whose 

irie is included on the crew list of the vessel. 

Article 2 

a. The Parties agree that when vessels of 
her Party, for the purpose of transportation 
passengers and cargo, enter into or depart 
m the ports, mooring places and waters of 

! other Party, the latter shall adopt all ap- 
)priate measures to provide favorable 
atment to such vessels with regard to serv- 
ig of vessels, port operations, the simplifi- 
-ion and expedition of administrative, 
itoms and all required formalities. The con- 
ions under which vessels of one Party may 
ter the ports of the other Party are set forth 
letters, exchanged between the competent 
thorities, which accompany this Agreement. 

b. Each Party undertakes to ensure that 
inage duties upon vessels of the other Party 



will be as favorable as the charges imposed in 
like situations with respect to vessels of any 
other counti-y. 

Article 3 

This Agreement shall not apply to the 
vessels of one Party in the transportation of 
passengers and cargo between the ports of the 
other Party However, the right of vessels of 
either Party to engage in commercial passen- 
ger and cargo services in accordance with Ar- 
ticle 2 shall include the right to pick up or dis- 
charge passengers and cargo at more than one 
port of the other Party if such passengers and 
cargo are destined for or are proceeding from 
another country on the same vessel. 

Article 4 

a. Each Party shall recognize the nation- 
ality of the vessels which fly the national flag 
of the other Party and hold certificates of their 
nationality issued according to the laws and 
regulations of the other Party 

b. Each Party shall recognize the tonnage 
certificates and other ship's documents issued 
by the competent authorities of the other 
Party to the extent permitted by applicable 
laws and regulations. 

c. Each Party shall inform the other 
Party of any changes in its system of tonnage 
measurements. 

Article 5 

Each Party shall recognize the identity 
documents of crew members issued by the 
competent authorities of the other Party. 
Those issued by the United States of America 
shall be the "U.S. Merchant Mariner's Docu- 
ment", while those issued by the People's Re- 
public of China shall be the "Seaman's Book". 
Should any change in the identity document of 
a Party occur, such change shall be communi- 
cated to the other Party. 

Article 6 

a. Members of the crew of vessels of 
either Party shall be permitted to go ashore 
during the stay of their vessel in the ports of 
the other Party, in accordance with its appli- 
cable laws and regulations. 

b. Each Party may deny entry into its 
territoiy of a member of the crew of a vessel of 
the other Party in accordance with its appli- 
cable laws and regulations. 

c. Members of the crew of vessels of 
either Party requiring hospitalization shall be 
permitted to enter into and remain in the ter- 
ritoiy of the other Party for the period of time 
necessary for medical treatment, in accordance 
with applicable laws and regulations of that 
Party. 

d. Members of the crew of vessels of 
either Party holding documents as stipulated 
in Article 5 of this Agi-eement may enter the 
territory or travel through the territory of the 
other Party for the purpose of joining national 
vessels, for repatriation or for any other rea- 
son acceptable to the competent authorities of 



the other Party, after complying with the ap- 
plicable laws and regulations of that Party. 

Article 7 

a. Should a vessel of either Party be in- 
volved in a maritime accident or encounter any 
other danger in the ports, mooring places and 
waters of the other Party, the latter shall give 
friendly treatment and all possible assistance 
to the passengers, crew members, cargo and 
vessel. 

b. When a vessel of one Party is involved 
in a maritime accident or encounters any other 
danger and its cargo and other property is re- 
moved therefrom and landed in the territory' of 
the other Party, such cargo and other property 
shall not be subject to any customs duties by 
that Party, unless it enters into its domestic 
consumption. Storage charges incurred shall 
be just, reasonable and non-discriminatory. 

c. Each Party shall promptly notify the 
consular officials, or in their absence the dip- 
lomatic representatives, of the other Party 
when one of its vessels is in distress, and in- 
form them of measures taken for the rescue 
and protection of the crew members, passen- 
gers, vessel, cargo and stores. 

Article 8 

a. Each Party recognizes the interest of 
the other Party in carrying a substantial part 
of its foreign trade in vessels of its own flag 
and both Parties intend that their national flag 
vessels will each cari7 equal and substantial 
shares of the bilateral trade between the two 
nations. 

b. Each Party, where it directs the selec- 
tion of the carrier of its export or import car- 
goes, shall provide to vessels under the flag of 
the other Party a general cargo share and a 
bulk share equal in each category to those ves- 
sels under its flag, and consistent with the in- 
tention of the Parties that their national flag 
vessels will cari-j- not less than one-third of 
bilateral cargoes. 

c. Whenever vessels under the flag of one 
Party are not available to carry cargo offered 
for carriage between ports served by such 
vessels with reasonable notice and upon rea- 
sonable terms and conditions of carriage, the 
offering Party shall be free to direct such cargo 
to its national flag or third flag vessels. 

d. When bulk cargo is carried between 
the United States and the People's Repubhc of 
China such cargo shall be carried at a mutually 
acceptable rate. Each Party, where it has the 
power to select the carrier, shall offer such 
cargo to vessels of the other Party at rates, 
terms and conditions of carriage which are fair 
and reasonable for such vessels. 

Article 9 

Each Party recognizes the interest of the 
other, through domestic legislation or pohcy, in 
regulating the conduct of cross-traders in their 
respective foreign ocean commerce and agrees 
to respect each other's laws and policies in this 
regard. 



i/ember 1980 



15 



Feature 



Maritime Agreement — 
A Summary 



The agreement's most important provisions 
deal with port access and cargo sharing. It 
also provides for facilitation of crew list 
visa procedures, assistance to vessels in 
distress, conversion and remittance of lo- 
cally earned revenues, technical and infor- 
mation exchanges, and for an annual re- 
view of how the agreement is being im- 
plemented. The agreement will go into ef- 
fect when signed and will run for 3 years. 

Cargo Sharing 

Article 8 of the agreement provides that 
the parties intend that their national-flag 
vessels shall each carry a substantial share 
— at least one-third — of bilateral cargo. In 
instances where one party carries more 
than one-third, the other party is entitled 
to carry an equal amount of such cargo, 
subject to the availability of ships. When 
national-flag vessels of one party are not 
available to carry cargo which is fairly of- 
fered, such cargo may be directed to the 
vessels of the other party or third-flag ves- 
sels. Carriage of bulk cargoes shall be at 
mutually acceptable rates. 

Port Access 

Article 2 and the accompanying e.xchange 
of letters set forth the following arrange- 
ments with respect to port access: 

• For Chinese-flag vessels — access to 
55 specified U.S. ports on a 4-day notice 
basis; entry into all other U.S. ports will 
ordinarily be granted upon submission of 
7-day advance information to U.S. au- 
thorities and 

• For U.S. -flag vessels — 7-day notice 
access to 20 specified Chinese ports. The 
two parties will review both port lists 
periodically with a view to expanding them. 

We expect that the agreement will offi- 
cially foster expanded U.S. and Chinese 
shipping services linking the two countries 
and that it will provide further momentum 
to the growth of Sino-American trade. 

Two-way trade between the People's 
Republic of China and the United States 
totaled $2.3 billion in 1979 and is expected 
to reach about $4 billion this year. By 1985 
annual U.S. -China trade should reach at 
least $10 billion. 

The United States has been exporting 
to the People's Republic of China about 
three times as much as it imports, accord- 
ing to Commerce Department figures. 



Article 10 

Payments for transportation services 
under this Agreement shall either be effected 
in freely convertible currencies mutually ac- 
cepted by firms, companies and corporations 



16 



and trading organizations of the two countries, 
or made otherwise in accordance with agree- 
ments signed by and between the two parties 
to the transaction. Parties to such transactions 
may convert and remit to their counti^y, on 
demand, local revenues in excess of sums 
locally disbursed. Conversion and remittance 
shall be permitted promptly without restric- 
tions in respect thereof at the rate of exchange 
applicable to current transactions and remit- 
tances. Neither Party may impose restrictions 
on such payments except in time of declared 
national emergency. 

Article 11 

The Parties agree to enter into such tech- 
nical personnel and information exchanges 
necessary to facilitate and accelerate the 
movement of cargo at sea and in ports and to 
promote cooperation between their respective 
merchant marines. 

Article 12 

a. For the implementation of this Agree- 
ment the competent authority of the United 
States of America shall be the Department of 
Commerce while that of the People's Republic 
of China shall be the Ministi-y of Communica- 
tions. Each Party shall authorize its competent 
authority to take action under its laws and 
procedures, and in consultations with the com- 
petent authority of the other Party, to imple- 
ment this Agreement. 

b. The Parties agree that representatives 
of the competent authorities will meet annu- 
ally for a comprehensive view of matters re- 
lated to the Agreement as may be desirable. 
Such meetings will be held at a time and place 
agreeable to both Parties. The Parties also 
agree to engage in such consultations, ex- 
change such information, and take such action 
as may be necessary to ensure effective opera- 
tion of this Agreement. 

Article 13 

This Agreement shall be in force for three 
years from the date of signing and shall expire 
on September 17, 1983. This Agreement may 
be extended, subject to negotiations between 
the Parties prior to the expiration date. The 
Agi-eement may also be terminated by either 
Party on 90 days written notice. 

I.n; Witness Whereof, the undersigned, 
duly authorized by their respective Govern- 
ments, have signed this Agi-eement. 

Done at Washington, this seventeenth day 
of September 1980 in duplicate, each copy in 
the English and Chinese languages, both texts 
being equally authentic. 

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: 

Ji.MMY Carter 

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE 
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA: 

Bo YiBo 



ACCOMPANYING LETTERS 

September 17, 1980 

Mr Dong Huamin 

Director 

Bureau of Foreign Affairs 

Ministi-y of Communications 

Beijing, People's Republic of China 

Dear Mr. Dong: 

In connection with the Agreement on 
Maritime Ti-ansport concluded on this date be 
tween the Government of the United States o 
America and the Government of the People's 
Republic of China, and. in particul3r. Article I 
of that Agreement. I have the honor to con- 
firm that the following conditions apply to the 
enti7 of vessels of each Party into the ports oi 
the other Party: 

1. Vessels flying the flag of the United 
States of America may enter all ports of the 
People's Republic of China which are open to 
international merchant shipping listed in 
Annex A to this letter subject to seven days' 
advance notice of such entiy to the appropriati 
authorities of the People's Republic of China b 
accordance with regulations concerning entry 
by foreign vessels to China. 

2. Ves.sels flying the flag of the People's 
Republic of China may enter ports of the 
United States of America in accordance with 
regulations concerning entry by foreign ves- 
sels. Enti-y into ports listed in Annex B to thifj 
letter will be subject to four days' advance 
notice of such entry to the appropriate au- 
thorities of the United States of America. Re^ 
garding ports not included in this Annex B, 
appropriate authorities of the United States o;i 
America will be informed not less than seven 
working days prior to an intended entiy into 
such ports. It is understood that entiy into 
these ports will ordinarily be granted, but thai 
authorities of the United States may deny 
such entry for reasons of national security. 

3. It is further understood that, in view o:< 
the expectation of both our governments that 
the relations between our countries will con- 
tinue to gi-ow, the list of ports contained in the 
Annexes to this letter will be reviewed period- 
ically during the term of the Agreement withaii 
view toward increasing the number of ports omi 
these lists. 

I request that you confirm these proposed 
conditions. 

Respectfully, 

Samuel B. Nemirow 
Assistant Secretary 
United States Department 
of Commerce 



ANNEX A 
List of Chinese Ports 



1. Dalian 

2. Qinhuangdao 

3. Tianjin 

4. Yantai 

5. Qingdao 



Department of State BulletirHl 



Feature 



Lianyungang 

Wenzhou 

Shanghai 

Ningbo 

Fuzhou 

Xiamen 

Shantou 

Shanwei 

Huangpu 

Guangzhou 

Zhanjiang 

Beihai 

Haikou 

Basuo 

Shijiusuo (under construction) 



ANNEX B 
List of United States Ports 

'ortland, Maine 
toston, Massachusetts 
all River, Massachusetts 
ilew Yorl< (New Yorlv and New Jersey 
ports of the Port of New Yorl< 
Authority), New York 
ilbany. New York 
hiladelphia, Pennsylvania (including 

Camden, New Jersey) 
TOmington, Delaware 
altimore, Maiyland 
ichmond, Virginia 
[orehead City, North Carolina 
I'ilmington, North Carolina 
eorgetown. South Carolina 
avannah, Georgia 
oca Grande, Florida 
lort Everglades, Florida 
'once, Puerto Rico 
?. ampa, Florida 
^ lohile, Alabama 
iilfport, Mississippi 
lu Orleans, Louisiana 
uniside, Louisiana 
:it(in Rouge, Louisiana 
lange, Texas 
caumont, Texas 
nit Arthur, Texas 
aheston, Texas 
nuston, Texas 
ni]ius Christi, Texas 
iiiwnsville, Texas 
mhorage, Alaska 
ka^way, Alaska 
-. etchikan, Alaska 
%'!eattle, Washington 
i.l ellingham, Washington 
.longview, Washington 
■ jverett, Washington 
. 'acuma, Washington 

-.1 ortland (including Vancouver, Washing- 
ton), Oregon 
J storia, Oregon 

,^ oos Bay (including North Bend), Oregon 
.'lureka, California 
->,]tockton, California 
■i-l-in Francisco (including Alameda, Oak- 
;l land, Berkeley, Richmond), California 
■fjacramento, California 
OS Angeles (including San Pedro, Wil- 
mington, Terminal Island), California 



Consular Convention — 
A Summary 



The U.S.-P.R.C. Consular Convention is 
the first treaty concluded between our two 
governments. It establishes a comprehen- 
sive framew^ork for our consular relations. 

The 42 articles of the convention spell 
out the rights and duties of consular offi- 
cers and expand consular protections and 
services for citizens of both nations. The 
convention is a major step in fully nor- 
malizing relations between the United 
States and China. 

The convention amplifies and clarifies 
the general principles contained in the 
U.S. -China agreement on consular rela- 
tions signed in Washington on January 31, 
1979. These include the mutual obligation 
to notify consular officers of the arrest of 
one of their nationals, the right of consular 
officers to communicate with their nation- 
als, and to attend trials and other legal 
procedures. 

There are now American Consulates 
General at Guangzhou (Canton) and Shang- 
hai and Chinese Consulates General at San 
Francisco and Houston. With the signing of 
the convention, the United States and 
China are each free to open three additional 
consulates general. These new offices will 
provide more convenient and accessible 
service to both peoples and further pro- 
mote the development of bilateral trade. 

The significance of the new convention 
lies not only in the specifics of the text but 
also in the placing of a keystone in the 
edifice of fully mature and normal relations 
between the United States and China. 



46. Long Beach, California 

47. Honolulu, Hawaii 

48. Erie, Pennsylvania 

49. Cleveland, Ohio 

50. Toledo, Ohio 

51. Bay City, Michigan 

52. Chicago, Illinois 

53. Kenosha, Wisconsin 

54. Milwaukee, Wisconsin 

55. Duluth, Minnesota/Superior, Wisconsin 

September 17, 1980 
Mr Samuel B. Nemirow 
Assistant Secretary 
United States Department of Commerce 

Dear Mr. Nemirow: 

I have the honor to acknowledge the re- 
ceipt of your letter dated today, the contents of 
which follow: 

"In connection with the Agreement on 
Maritime Transport concluded on this date be- 
tween the Government of the United States of 
America and the Government of the People's 
Republic of China, and, in particular. Article 2 
of that Agreement, I have the honor to con- 
firm that the following conditions apply to the 



entry of vessels of each Party into the ports of 
the other Party. 

1. Vessels fl.ving the flag of the United 
States of America may enter all ports of the 
People's Republic of China which are open to 
international merchant shipping listed in 
Annex A to this letter subject to seven days' 
advance notice of such enti^ to the appropriate 
authorities of the People's Republic of China in 
accordance with regulations concerning entry 
by foreign vessels to China. 

2. Vessels flying the flags of the People's 
Repubhc of China may enter ports of the 
United States of America in accordance with 
regulations concerning entiy by foreign ves- 
sels. Enti-y into ports listed in Annex B to this 
letter will be subject to four days' advance 
notice of such entiy to the appropriate au- 
thorities of the United States of America. Re- 
garding ports not included in this Annex B, 
appropriate authorities of the United States of 
America will be informed not less than seven 
working days prior to an intended entry into 
such ports. It is understood that entry into 
these ports will ordinarily be gi-anted, but that 
authorities of the United States may deny 
such entity for reasons of national security. 

3. It is further understood that, in view of 
the expectation of both our governments that 
the relations between our countries will con- 
tinue to grow, the list of ports contained in the 
Annexes to this letter will be reviewed period- 
ically during the term of the Agreement with a 
view toward increasing the number of ports on 
these lists. 

I request that you confirm these proposed 
conditions." 

I confirm the above contents of your letter 
as correct. 

With my highest considerations, 

Respectfully, 

Dong Huamin 

Director 

Bureau of Foreign Affairs 

Ministry of Communica- 
tions 

People's Republic of China 

Consular Convention 

CONSULAR CONVENTION BETWEEN 

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 

AND THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC 

OF CHINA 

The Government of the United States of 
America and the Government of the People's 
Republic of China, 

Desii'ing to regulate and strengthen their 
consular relations, in order to promote the de- 
velopment of friendly and cooperative relations 
between the two countries, and thus to facili- 
tate the protection of their national interests 
and the protection of the rights and interests 
of their nationals, 

Have decided to conclude this Consular 
Convention and have appointed as their 
plenipotentiaries the following: 

For the United States of America: 
Jimmy Carter, President 



mber 1980 



17 



Feature 



For the People's Republic of China: 
Bo Yibo, Vice Premier 

Who. having examined and exchanged 
their respective full powers, which were found 
in good and due form, have agreed as follows: 

Article 1 

Definitions 

For the purpose of the present Conven- 
tion, the terms listed below shall have the fol- 
lowing meanings: 

1. "Consulate" means a consulate general, 
consulate, vice consulate, or consular agency; 

2. "Consular district" means the area as- 
signed to a consulate for the exercise of consu- 
lai- functions; 

3. "Head of a consulate" means the consul 
general, consul, vice consul or consular agent 
who is charged by the sending State to head a 
consulate; 

4. "Consular officer" means any person, 
including the head of a consulate, who is 
charged by the sending State with the per- 
formance of consular functions; 

5. "Consular employee" means any person 
who performs administrative, technical, or 
service functions at a consulate; 

6. "Member of a consulate" means any 
consular officer or consular employee; 

7. "Members of the family" means the 
spouse, minor children and other relatives of a 
member of a consulate who form a part of his 
household; 

8. "Consular premises" means buildings 
or parts of buildings, as well as the grounds 
ancillary thereto, used exclusively for the pur- 
poses of a consulate, regardless of ownership; 

9. "Consular archives" means all corre- 
spondence, codes and ciphers, documents, rec- 
ords, files, tapes and books of a consulate, as 
well as any article of furniture intended for 
their storage or safekeeping; 

10. "Vessel of the sending State" means 
any vessel sailing under the flag of the sending 
State, in accordance with the law of the send- 
ing State, excluding militai-y vessels; 

11. "Aircraft of the sending State" means 
any aircraft flying under the nationality and 
registration marks of the sending State, in ac- 
cordance with the law of the sending State, 
excluding militaiy aircraft; 

12. "Law" means 

• for the People's Republic of China, all 
national, provincial, municipal, autonomous 
region and local laws, ordinances, regulations 
and decisions having the force and effect of 
law; 

• for the United States of America, all 
federal, state or local laws, ordinances, regula- 
tions and decisions having the force and effect 
of law. 

Article 2 
Opening of Consulates 

1. A consulate may be established only 
through agreement between the sending and 
receiving Slates. 

2. The determination of the seat of the 
consulate, its classification, and its consular 



district, as well as any changes pertaining 
thereto, shall be through agreement betw-een 
the sending and receiving States. 

A RTICLE 3 
Appointment of the Head of a Consi)late 

1. The sending State shall foi-ward to the 
receiving State through diplomatic channels a 
written notification of the appointment of the 
head of the consulate. This notification shall 
contain the full name, nationality, sex and rank 
of the head of the consulate, a brief biography, 
the date on which he will begin to exercise his 
functions, the classification and seat of the 
consulate, and the consular district. 

2. Upon receiving notification of the ap- 
pointment of the head of the consulate, the re- 
ceiving State shall, if there is no objection, 
confirm it in w-riting without delay. The head 
of the consulate may enter upon the perform- 
ance of his functions only after the receiving 
State has provided such confirmation. 

3. The receiving State may permit the 
head of a consulate to exercise his functions on 
a pi-ovisional basis prior to his confirmation by 
the receiving State. 

4. The receiving State shall, immediately 
after granting recognition, including pro- 
visional recognition, take all measures neces- 
saiy to enable the head of the consulate to 
exercise his functions and to enjoy the rights, 
facilities, privileges and immunities granted 
under this Convention and under the law of 
the receiving State. 

5. If for any reason the head of a consu- 
late is unable to exercise his functions, or if the 
position of the head of consulate is vacant, the 
sending State may place its consulate under 
the temporaty charge of a consular officer of 
the same or of another consulate in the receiv- 
ing State or a member of the diplomatic staff 
of the diplomatic mission of the sending State 
in the receiving State. The sending State shall 
notify the receiving State in advance of the full 
name of the person appointed as acting head of 
a consulate. 

6. A person appointed as acting head of a 
consulate shall enjoy the same rights, facili- 
ties, privileges and immunities enjoyed by a 
head of a con.«;ulate under this Convention. 

7. Entrusting a member of the diplomatic 
staff of the diplomatic mission of the sending 
State with the functions of head of a consulate 
does not limit the privileges and immunities to 
which such person is entitled by virtue of dip- 
lomatic status, subject to the provisions of Ar- 
ticle 33, paragi'aph 4 of this Convention. 

Article 4 

Appointment of Members of a Consulate 

1. The sending State may staff its consu- 
late with the number of members of a consu- 
late it considers necessaiy. The receiving State 
may, however, require that the number of such 
members of a consulate be kept within the lim- 
its which it considers to be reasonable, having 
regard to existing circumstances and condi- 
tions in the consular district and the needs of a 
particular consulate. 



2. Consular officers shall be nationals 
the sending State only, and shall not be pe 
manent residents of the receiving State. 

3. The sending State shall communic; 
advance, in writing, to the receiving State 
full name, functions and class of each cons 
officer other than the head of the consulat 
arrival, final departure or termination off 
tions, as well as all other changes affecting 
person's status while assigned to the const 

4. The sending State shall also notify 
receiving State in writing of: 

(a) the designation of all consular e 
ployees. their full name, nationality and fi 
tions. their arrival, their final departure o 
termination of their functions, as well as o 
changes affecting their status while assign 
to the consulate; 

(b) the arrival and final departure 
members of the family of a member of a cc 
late and when any such individual becomei 
ceases to be a member of the family; 

(c) the employment or dismissal of 
consular employee who is a national or per 
nent resident of the receiving State. 

Article 5 

Performance of Consular Functions by) 
Diplomatic Mission 

1. The provisions of this Convention i< 
ing to consular functions, rights, facilities, 
privileges and immunities shall apply in thi 
case of consular functions being performec 
a diplomatic mission. 

2. The names of the members of the d 
lomatic mission entrusted with the perforri 
ance of consular functions shall be commur> 
cated to the receiving State. 

3. The members of the diplomatic mis 
referred to in paragraph 2 of this Article s. 
continue to enjoy the privileges and im- 
munities gi-anted them by virtue of their d| 
lomatic status, subject to the requirements 
Article 33, paragraph 4, of this Convention 

Article 6 

Terminating Functions of 
Members of a Consulate 

1. The receiving State may at any timi 
and without having to explain its decision, 
notify the sending State through diplomatid 
channels that the head of a consulate is perl 
sona non grata or that any other member c 
consulate is unacceptable. In such a case, tl 
sending State shall recall such person or te; 
minate his functions in the consulate. 

2. If the sending State refuses or fails 
within a reasonable time to cari-y out the ol 
gation contained in paragraph 1 of this Art) 
the receiving State may either withdraw rel 
ognition from the person concerned or refua 
to consider him as a member of the consulal 

3. The functions of a member of a consj 
late shall come to an end, among other thinl 
upon the: I 

(a) notification by the sending State* 
the receiving State that his functions have 
come to an end; 



18 



Department of State Bull& 



Feature 



(b) withdrawal by the receiving State of 
rrcognition; or 

(c) notification by the receiving State to 
the sending State that the receiving State has 
ii-ased to consider the person as a member of 
the consulate. 

Article 7 

Facilitiesfur the Operation of a Consulate 
and Protection of Consular Officers 

1. The receiving State shall take all nec- 
essary steps for the establishment of the 
proper conditions for the normal operation of a 
consulate and shall accord full facilities for the 
performance of the functions of the consulate. 

2. The receiving State shall afford appro- 
priate protection to consular officers to pre- 
vent any attack upon their person, freedom or 
dignity and further shall take all measures 
necessar>' to ensure that consular officers are 
able to perform their functions and enjoy the 
rights, facilities, privileges and immunities 
provided them under this Convention. 

Article 8 

Acquisition of Consular Premises 
and Residences 

1. The sending State or its representative 
shall be entitled to purchase, lease or acquire 
in any other way, land, consular premises and 
I'esidences as appropriate for consular pur- 
|)oses, except residences for members of a con- 
sulate who are nationals or permanent resi- 
dents of the receiving State, and to construct 
(jr improve buildings for such purposes. 

2. In e.xercising the rights provided under 
])aragi'aph 1 of this Article, the sending State 
shall comijly with the law of the receiving 
State, including the law relating to land, con- 
struction, zoning and town planning. 

3. The receiving State shall, in conformity 
with its law, facilitate a consulate of the send- 
ing State in the acquisition of suitable consular 
premises. When necessary, the receiving State 
shall assist the sending State in the acquisition 
of residences for members of a consulate. 

Article 9 
Use of the National Flag a>id Emblems 

1. The sending State shall be entitled to 
display the national emblem and the designa- 
tion of the consulate on the consular premises 
n the languages of the sending and of the re- 
;eiving States. 

2. The sending State shall be entitled to 
fly the flag of the sending State on the consu- 
lar premises and on the residence of the head 
bf the consulate, as well as on the means of 
transport of the head of the consulate used in 
the performance of his official duties. 

3. In exercising the rights provided by 
this Article, the sending State shall observe 
the law and customs of the receiving State. 

Article 10 

Inviolability of Premises and Residences 

1. The consular premises shall be inviola- 
te. The authorities of the receiving State may 



not enter the consulai' premises without the 
consent of the head of the consulate or the 
head of the diplomatic mission of the sending 
State or a person designated by one of those 
persons. 

2. The receiving State is under a special 
duty to take all steps necessary to protect the 
consular jjremises against any intrusion or 
damage and to prevent any disturbance of the 
peace of the consulate or impairment of its 
dignity. 

3. The provisions of paragraph 1 of this 
Article shall apply likewise to the residences of 
consular officers. 

Article U 

Inviolability of Archives 

The consular archives shall be inviolable 
at all times and wherever they may be. Docu- 
ments and objects of an unofficial character 
shall not be stored in the consular archives. 

Article 12 
Freedom of Communications 

1. A consulate shall be entitled to ex- 
change communications with its government, 
with diplomatic missions of the sending State 
and with other consulates of the sending State, 
wherever situated. For this purpose, the con- 
sulate may employ all ordinai-y means of com- 
munication, including diplomatic and consular 
couriers, diplomatic and consular bags and 
codes and ciphers. The consulate may install 
and use a wireless transmitter only with the 
prior consent of the receiving State. 

2. The official correspondence of a consu- 
late, regardless of the means of communication 
employed, as well as sealed consular bags and 
other containers, provided they bear visible 
external marks of their official character, shall 
be inviolable. They may contain nothing other 
than official correspondence and articles in- 
tended exclusively for official use. 

3. The authorities of the receiving State 
shall neither open nor detain the official corre- 
spondence of a consulate, including consular 
bags and other containers, as described in 
paragi-aph 2 of this Article. 

4. The consular couriers of the sending 
State shall enjoy in the territory of the receiv- 
ing State the same rights, privileges, facilities 
and immunities enjoyed by diplomatic couriers 
of the sending State. 

5. If a master of a vessel or captain of a 
civil aircraft of the sending State is charged 
with an official consular bag, the master or 
captain shall be provided with an official 
document showing the number of containers 
forming the consular bag entrusted to him; he 
shall not, however, be considered to be a con- 
sular courier. By arrangements with the ap- 
propriate authorities of the receiving State, 
and in compliance with the safety regulations 
of the receiving State, the sending State may 
send a member of the consulate to take posses- 
sion of the consular bag directly and freely 
from the master of the vessel or captain of the 
aircraft or to deliver such bag to him. 



Article 13 

Immunity of Members of a Consulate from the 
Jurisdiction of the Receiving State 

1. Members of a consulate and their fam- 
ily members shall be immune from the criminal 
jurisdiction of the receiving State. 

2. Members of a consulate and their fam- 
ily members shall be immune from the civil 
and administrative jurisdiction of the receiving 
State respecting any act performed by them in 
the exercise of consular functions. 

3. The provisions of paragraph 2 of this 
Article shall not apply to civil procedures: 

(a) resulting from contracts that were 
not concluded by a member of a consulate on 
behalf of the sending State; 

(b) relating to succession in which a 
member of a consulate was involved as 
executor, administrator, heir or legatee in a 
private capacity; 

(c) concerning a claim by a third party 
for damage caused by a vessel, vehicle or air- 
craft; 

(d) concerning private immovable prop- 
erty in the jurisdiction of the receiving State, 
unless the member of a consulate is holding it 
on behalf of the sending State for the purposes 
of the consulate; 

(e) relating to any private professional 
or commercial activities engaged in by a mem- 
ber of a consulate in the receiving State out- 
side of his official functions. 

4. No measures of execution shall be 
taken against any of the persons mentioned in 
this Article, except in the cases under para- 
gi'aph 3(d) of this Article, and then under the 
condition that these measures shall not in- 
fringe upon the inviolability of their person or 
residence. 

.5. Members of a consulate and their fam- 
ily members may be called upon to attend as 
witnesses in the course of judicial or adminis- 
trative proceedings. In the event of the refusal 
of a consular officer or a member of the offi- 
cer's family to give evidence, no coercive 
measure or penalty may be applied to such 
person. Consular employees and members of 
their families may not decline to give evidence 
except with respect to matters mentioned in 
paragi-aph 6 of this Article. 

6. Members of a consulate are under no 
obligation to give evidence concerning matters 
relating to the exercise of their official func- 
tions or to produce official correspondence or 
documents. They are also entitled to decline to 
give evidence as expert witnesses with regard 
to the law of the sending State. 

7. In taking testimony of members of a 
consulate, the authorities of the receiving 
State shall take all the appropriate measures 
to avoid hindering the performance of their of- 
ficial consular duties. Upon the request of the 
head of a consulate, such testimony may, when 
possible, be given orally or in writing at the 
consulate or at the residence of the person 
concerned. 



>Jovember 1980 



19 



Feature 



Article 14 



Waiver of I m ni ii nity 

1. The sending State may waive the im- 
munity from jurisdiction of members of a con- 
sulate and of members of their families pro- 
vided in Article 13 of this Convention. Except 
as provided in paragraph 2 of this Article, such 
vifaiver shall always be express and in writing. 

2. In the event a member of a consulate 
or a member of his family initiates legal pro- 
ceedings, with respect to which he would enjoy 
immunity from jurisdiction under this Conven- 
tion, no immunity may be invoked with regard 
to any counterclaim directly related to the 
principal claim. 

3. Waiver of immunity from jurisdiction 
vrith respect to civil proceedings shall not be 
held to imply waiver of immunity with respect 
to the execution of judgment, for which a sep- 
arate waiver shall be necessary. 

Article 15 

Exemption from Seri'ices and Obligations 

Consular officers and consular employees 
and members of their families who are not na- 
tionals of the receiving State and who are not 
aliens lawfully admitted for permanent resi- 
dence in the receiving State shall be exempt in 
the receiving State from obligations and serv- 
ices of a military nature, from any kind of 
compulsory services, and from any contribu- 
tions that may be due in lieu thereof. They 
shall Hkewise be exempt from obligations relat- 
ing to the registration of aliens, from obtaining 
permission to reside, and from compliance with 
other similar obligations applicable to aliens. 

Article 16 

Exemption of Real and Movable Property 
from Thxation 

1. The sending State shall be exempt from 
all dues and taxes and similar charges of any 
kind in the receiving State, for which it other- 
wise would be liable, with respect to: 

(a) the consular premises and resi- 
dences of members of a consulate referred to 
in Article 8 of this Convention; 

(b) transactions or documents relating 
to such immovable property. 

2. The sending State shall be exempt 
from all dues and taxes and similar charges of 
any kind on movable property which is owned, 
held or leased or otherwise possessed by it and 
which is used exclusively for consular pur- 
poses, as well as dues and taxes in connection 
with the acquisition, possession or mainte- 
nance of such property. 

3. The provisions of subparagraph 1(a) of 
this Article shall not apply to payment for spe- 
cific services rendered. 

4. The exemptions accorded by this Arti- 
cle shall not apply to such dues and" taxes if 
under the law of the receiving State they are 
payable by a person contracting with the send- 
ing State or with a person acting on behalf of 
the sending State. 

5. The provisions of this Article also 



20 



apply to all immovable property used for the 
official purposes of the diplomatic mission of 
the sending State, including residences of dip- 
lomatic mission personnel. 

Article 17 

Exemption of Members of a Consulate 
from Thxation 

1. Except as provided in paragi-aph 2 of 
this Article, a member of a consulate and 
members of his family shall be exempt from 
payment of all dues and taxes and similar 
charges of any kind. 

2. The exemption provided by paragi-aph 
1 of this Article shall not apply with respect to: 

(a) indirect taxes of a kind normally in- 
cluded in the price of goods and services; 

(b) dues and taxes imposed with re- 
spect to private immovable property located in 
the territoiy of the receiving State, unless an 
exemption is provided by Article 16 of this 
Convention; 

(c) estate, succession and inheritance 
taxes and taxes on the transfer of property 
rights imposed by the receiving State, except 
as provided in paragraph 3 of this Article; 

(d) dues and taxes on private income 
earned in the receiving State; 

(e) charges for specific services ren- 
dered; 

(f) dues and taxes on transactions or on 
documents relating to transactions, including 
fees of any kind collected by reason of such 
transactions, except for fees and charges 
exemption from which is provided in Article 16 
of this Convention. 

3. If a member of a consulate or a mem- 
ber of his family dies, no estate, succession or 
inheritance tax or any other tax or charge on 
the transfer of movable property at death shall 
be imposed by the receiving State with respect 
to that property, provided that the presence of 
the property was due solely to the presence of 
the deceased in the receiving State in the ca- 
pacity of a member of a consulate or a member 
of his family. 

Article 18 

Exemptions from Customs Duties 
and Inspection 

1. All articles, including motor vehicles, 
for the official use of a consulate, shall, in con- 
formity with the law of the receiving State, be 
exempt from customs duties and other dues 
and taxes of any kind imposed upon or by rea- 
son of importation or exportation. 

2. Consular officers and members of their 
famihes shall be exempt from customs duties 
and other charges imposed upon or by reason 
of importation or exportation of articles in- 
tended for their own personal use, including 
articles for the equipment of their households. 

3. Consular employees and members of 
their families shall be exempt from customs 
duties and other charges imposed upon or by 
reason of the importation or exportation of ar- 
ticles for their own personal use, including ar- 
ticles for the equipment of their households, 
imported at time of first arrival at a consulate. 



4. Articles designed for personal use shall 
not exceed the quantities required for direct 
use by the person accorded an exemption by 
this Article. 

5. Personal baggage of consular officers 
and members of their families shall be exempt 
from customs inspection. It may be inspected 
only in cases where there is serious reason to 
believe that it contains articles other than 
those mentioned in paragraph 2 of this Article, 
or articles the importation or exportation of 
which is prohibited by the law of the receiving 
State or articles which are subject to the law 
of quarantine. Such inspection must be under- 
taken in the presence of the consular officer 
concerned or member of his family or his rep- 
resentative. 

Article 19 

Immunity from Requisition 

Consular premises as well as the official 
means of ti-ansport of the consulate are not li- 
able to any form of requisition. If for the needs- 
of the national defense or other public pur- 
poses expropriation of consular premises, resi- 
dences or means of transport becomes neces- 
sai-y, all possible measures must be taken by 
the receiving State to avoid interference with 
the performance of consular functions and 
promptly to pay ajjpropriate and effective 
compensation to the sending State. 

Article 20 

Freedom of Movement 

Subject to the law of the receiving State 
concerning zones, entry into which is prohib- 
ited or regulated for reasons of national secu- 
rity, the receiving State shall ensure freedom 
of movement and travel in its territory to 
members of a consulate and members of their 
families. 

Article 21 

Exclusion from the Enjoyment of Rights, 
Facilities, Privileges and Immunities 

Members of a consulate and members of 
their families who are either nationals or per- 
manent residents of the receiving State shall 
not enjoy the rights, facilities, privileges and 
immunities provided by this Convention, e.x- 
cept immunity from the obligation to give evi- 
dence concerning matters relating to the exer- 
cise of their official functions as provided in 
paragraph 6 of Article 13 of this Convention. 

Article 22 

Functions of Consular Officers 

1. The functions of a consular officer con- 
sist of: 

(a) protecting the rights and interests 
of the sending State and of its nationals, in- 
cluding juridical persons; 

(b) rendering assistance to and cooper- 
ating with nationals of the sending State, in- 
cluding juridical persons; 

(c) contributing to the development of 



I 



( 



Department of State Bulletin 



Feature 



momic, commercial, cultural, scientific and 
irist relations between the sending and the 
eiving States; 

(d) promoting in various ways the de- 
opment of friendly relations between the 
ding and the receiving States; 

(e) ascertaining by all lawful means 
iditions and developments in the political, 
imercial, economic, cultural, educational 

scientific-technological life of the receiving 
te, and reporting thereon to the govern- 
it of the sending State. 

2. A consular officer shall, if authorized 
the sending State, be entitled to cari-y out 
functions described in this Convention, as 
1 as other consular functions which are not 
hibited by the law of the receiving State or 
vhich the receiving State does not object. 

Article 23 
Execution of Consular Functions 

1. A consular officer shall be entitled to 
:ute his functions only within the consular 
riot. A consular officer may e.xecute his 
itions outside the limits of the consular 
rict only with the advance consent of the 
living State given separately in each 
ance. 

2. In e.xecuting his functions, a consular 
Iter may approach orally or in writing: 

(a) the competent local authorities in 
iconsular district; 

(b) the competent central authorities of 
(receiving State, if and to the e.xtent al- 

d by the law and customs of the receiving 
•e. 

3. With the advance approval of the re- 
ct ing State, the sending State may perform 
cc ular functions in the receiving State on 

If df .if a third State. 

1- .\ consulate may levy in the territory 
I receiving State consular fees authorized 
I the law of the sending State for consular 
.c . Any such sums levied shall be exempt 
ri 1 all dues and taxes in the receiving State. 

Article 24 

Representation Before the Authorities 
of the Receiving State 

1. A consular officer shall be entitled, in 
rdance with the law of the receiving State, 
ike appropriate measures for the protec- 

of the rights and interests of nationals of 

pending State, including juridical persons, 
re the courts and other authorities of the 
iving State, where, because they are not 
sent in the receiving State or for any other 
ion, these nationals are not in a position to 
ertake timely defense of their rights and 
rests. 

2. The measures referred to in paragraph 
this Article shall cease as soon as the na- 
al appoints his own representative or the 
onal assumes the defense of his rights and 
rests. 

3. Nothing in this Article, however, shall 
onstrued to authorize a consular officer to 
,s an attorney-at-law. 



Article 25 

Functions u-ith Regard to Tracel Documents 

A consular officer shall be entitled to: 

1. issue to nationals of the sending State 
passports or similar travel documents, as well 
as make amendments in them; 

2. issue visas or other appropriate docu- 
ments to persons wishing to travel to or 
through the sending State. 

Article 26 

Functions Regarding Citizenship 
and Cii'il Status 

A consular officer shall be entitled to: 

1. register nationals of the sending State; 

2. accept applications and issue or deliver 
documents on matters of citizenship: 

3. accept applications or declarations re- 
lating to civil status from nationals of the send- 
ing State; 

4. register births and deaths of nationals 
of the sending State. 

Article 27 

Notarial Functions 

A consular officer shall be entitled to: 

1. receive and witness statements made 
under oath or affirmation, and, in accordance 
with the law of the receiving State, to receive 
the testimony of any person for use in connec- 
tion with a legal proceeding in the sending 
State; 

2. draw up or authenticate any act or 
document, as well as copies or extracts 
thereof, of a national of the sending State, in- 
cluding a juridical person, for use outside the 
receiving State or of any person for use in the 
sending State, or perform other notarial func- 
tions; 

3. authenticate documents issued by com- 
petent authorities of the receiving State for 
use in the sending State. 

Article 28 

Legal Force of Documents Prepared 
by a Consular Officer 

The acts and documents certified or 
legalized by a consular officer of the sending 
State, as well as copies, extracts and transla- 
tions of such acts and documents certified by 
him, shall be receivable in evidence in the re- 
ceiving State as official or officially certified 
acts, documents, copies, translations or ex- 
tracts, and shall have in the receiving State 
the same validity and effect as the documents 
certified or legalized by the competent au- 
thorities of the receiving State, provided they 
have been drawn and executed in conformity 
with the law of the receiving State and with 
the law of the countiy in which they are to be 
used. 

Article 29 

Serving Judicial and Other Legal Documents 

A consular officer shall be entitled to 



serve judicial and other legal documents in ac- 
cordance with international agreements in 
force between the sending and receiving 
States or, in the absence of such agreements, 
to the extent permitted by the law of the re- 
ceiving State. 

Article 30 

Notification on the Establishment of 
Guardianship or Trusteeship 

1. The competent authorities of the re- 
ceiving State shall notify the consulate in writ- 
ing of instances in which it is necessaiy to es- 
tablish a guardianship or trusteeship over a 
national of the sending State who is not of age 
or lacks full capacity to act on his own behalf, 
or over property of a national of the sending 
State when for whatever reason such property 
cannot be administered by the national of the 
sending State. 

2. A consular officer of the sending State 
may, on matters mentioned in paragraph 1 of 
this Article, contact the appropriate au- 
thorities of the receiving State, and may pro- 
pose appropriate persons to be appointed to 
act as guardians or trustees, in accordance 
with the law of the receiving State. 

Article 31 

Notification Regarding the Death of a 
National of the Sending State 

Whenever the competent authorities of 
the receiving State learn that a national of the 
sending State has died in the receiving State, 
they shall immediately notify the appropriate 
consular officer of the sending State and, upon 
his request, send him a copy of the death cer- 
tificate or other documentation confirming the 
death. 

Article 32 

Notification Regarding the Estate 
of a Deceased National 

1. Whenever the appropriate local au- 
thorities of the receiving State learn of an es- 
tate resulting from the death in the receiving 
State of a national of the sending State who 
leaves in the receiving State no known heir or 
testamentai-y executor, they shall as promptly 
as possible so inform a consular officer of the 
sending State. 

2. Whenever the appropriate local au- 
thorities of the receiving State learn of an es- 
tate of a decedent, regardless of nationality, 
who has left in the receiving State an estate in 
which a national of the sending State residing 
outside the receiving State may have an inter- 
est under the will of the decedent or otherwise 
in accordance with the law of the receiving 
State, they shall as promptly as possible so in- 
form a consular officer of the sending State. 

Article 33 

Functions Relating to Estates 

1. A consular officer shall be entitled to 
take appropriate measures with respect to the 
protection and conservation of the property of 
a deceased national of the sending State left in 



'ember 1980 



21 



Feature 



the receiving State. In this connection he may 
approach the competent authorities of the re- 
ceiving State with a view towards protecting 
the interests of a sending State national, not a 
permanent resident of the receiving State, un- 
less such a national is otherwise represented. 
He may also request the competent authorities 
of the receiving State to permit him to be 
present at the inventoi-ying and sealing and, in 
general, to take an interest in the proceedings. 

2. A consular officer shall be entitled to 
safeguard the interests of a national of the 
sending State who has, or claims to have, a 
right to property left in the receiving State by 
a deceased person, irrespective of the latter 's 
nationality, and if that interested national is 
not in the receiving State or does not have a 
representative there. 

3. A consular officer of the sending State 
shall be entitled to receive for transmission to 
a national of the sending State who is not a 
permanent resident of the receiving State any 
money or other property in the receiving State 
to which such national is entitled as a conse- 
quence of the death of another person, includ- 
ing shares in an estate, payments made pur- 
suant to employees' compensation law, pension 
and social benefits systems in general, and 
proceeds of insurance policies, unless the 
court, agency, or person making distribution 
directs that transmission be effected in a dif- 
ferent manner The court, agency, or person 
making distribution may require that a consu- 
lar officer comply with conditions laid down 
uith regard to: 

(a) presenting a power of attorney or 
other authorization from such national residing 
outside the receiving State; 

(b) furnishing reasonable evidence of 
the receipt of such money or other property by 
such national; and 

(c) returning the money or other prop- 
erty in the event he is unable to furnish such 
evidence, 

4. In e.xercising the rights provided by 
paragraphs 1 through 3 of this Article, the 
consular officer must comply with the law of 
the receiving State in the same manner and to 
the same extent as a national of the receiving 
State and, irrespective of the provisions of Ar- 
ticle 13 of this Convention, shall be subject in 
this respect to the civil jurisdiction of the re- 
ceiving State. Further, nothing in these Arti- 
cles shall authorize a consular officer to act as 
an attomey-at-law. 

Article 34 

Provisional Custody of Money and Effects of 
a Deceased National of the Sending State 

If a national of the sending State, not a 
permanent resident of the receiving State, dies 
during a temporary stay in or transit through 
the receiving State, and the deceased person 
did not leave a legal representative in the re- 
ceiving State, the consular officer shall be en- 
titled immediately to take provisional custody 
of the money, documents and personal effects 



that were in the national's possession for ti'ans- 
fer to an heir, executor, or other person au- 
thorized to receive such property, to the extent 
permitted by the law of the receiving State. 

Article 35 

Communication tvith Nationals 
of the Sending State 

1. A consular officer shall be entitled, in 
his consular district, to communicate and meet 
with any national of the sending State, and, 
when necessary, to arrange for legal assistance 
and an interpreter The receiving State shall in 
no way restrict access between a consular offi- 
cer and a national of the sending State. 

2. If a national of the sending State is ar- 
rested or placed under any form of detention 
within the consular district, the competent au- 
thorities of the receiving State shall immedi- 
ately, but no later than within four days from 
the date of arrest or detention, notify the con- 
sulate of the sending State. If it is not possible 
to notify the consulate of the sending State 
within four days because of communications 
difficulties, they should tiy to provide notifica- 
tion as soon as possible. Upon the request of a 
consular officer, he shall be informed of the 
reasons for which said national has been ar- 
rested or detained in any manner. 

3. The competent authorities of the re- 
ceiving State shall immediately inform the na- 
tional of the sending State of the rights ac- 
corded to him by this Article to communicate 
with a consular officer 

4. A consular officer shall be entitled to 
visit a national of the sending State who has 
been arrested or placed under any form of de- 
tention, including such national who is in 
prison pursuant to a judgment, to converse 
and to exchange correspondence with him in 
the language of the sending State or the re- 
ceiving State, and may assist in arranging for 
legal representation and an interpreter These 
visits shall take place as soon as possible, but, 
at the latest, shall not be refused after two 
days from the date on which the competent au- 
thorities notified the consulate that said na- 
tional had been placed under any form of de- 
tention. The visits may be made on a recurring 
basis. No longer than one month shall be al- 
lowed to pass in between visits requested by 
the consular officer. 

5. In the case of a trial of, or other legal 
proceeding against, a national of the sending 
State in the receiving State, the appropriate 
authorities shall, at the request of a consular 
officer, inform such officer of the charges 
against such national. A consular officer shall 
be permitted to attend the trial or other legal 
proceedings. 

6. A consular officer is entitled to provide 
to a national to whom the provisions of this 
Article apply parcels containing food, clothing, 
medicaments and reading and writing mate- 
rials, 

7. A consular officer of the sending State 
may request the assistance of the authorities 
of the receiving State in ascertaining the 
whereabouts of a national of the sending State. 



if 



The authorities of the receiving State shall d< 
evei-ything possible to provide all relevant an 
available information. 

8. The rights contained in this Article 
shall be exercised in accordance with the law 
of the receiving State. Nevertheless, such lav 
shall be applied so as to give full effect to the ' 
purposes for which these rights are intended. 

Article 36 
Rendering Assistance to Vessels 

1. A consular officer shall be entitled to 
provide any type of assistance to vessles of th 
sending State which are in the territorial or 
inland waters, ports or other anchorages of tl 
receiving State. 

2. A consular officer may board a vessel 
of the sending State as soon as permission has 
been granted the vessel to make contact with! 
the shore. On such occasions, he may be ac- 
companied by members of the consulate. 

3. The master and members of the crew 
may meet and communicate with the consular 
officer, observing, however, the law relating t 
the port and the law relating to crossing the 
border. 

4. The consular officer may request the 
cooperation of the authorities of the receivini 
State in carrying out his functions with regari 
to vessels of the sending State and with reganl 
to the master, members of the crew, passen 
gers and cargo. 

Article 37 
Rendering Assistance to Master and Crew ' 

1. In accordance with the law of the re- 
ceiving State, the consular officer shall be 
entitled: 

(a) to investigate any incident occurrin 
aboard a vessel of the sending State, to ques- < 
tion the master and any member of the crew 
with reference to these incidents, to inspect 
the vessel's papers, to receive information in 
connection with the voyage and destination of < 
the vessel and also to render assistance in con-i 
nection with the entry, stay and departure of ^ 
vessel of the sending State; 

(b) to settle disputes between the mas-l 
ter and a crew member, including disputes 
concerning wages and employment contracts, 
to the extent that this action is authorized by 
the law of the sending State; 

(c) to take steps connected with the 
signing on and the discharge of the master aiid 
of any crew member; 

(d) to take steps for hospitalization for 
repatriation of the master or a member of the 
crew of the vessel; 

(e) to receive, draw up or certify any 
declaration or other document provided for by 
the law of the sending State in regard to the 
vessel of the sending State or its cargo. 

2. The consular officer may, if permitted 
by the law of the receiving State, appear to- 
gether \A'ith the master or a crew member 



22 



Department of State Buiieti| 



Feature 



fore the courts or other authorities of the 
ceiving State in order to render them any 
jistance. 

Article 38 

Protection of Interests in Case of 
Investigations 

1. When the courts or other competent 
thorities of the receiving State intend to 

ce compulsoi"y actions or to start an official 
estigation aboard a vessel of the sending 
te which is in the internal or territorial 
ters of the receiving State, or on the shore 
th regard to the master or member of the 
!W, those authorities must notify the appro- 
ate consular officer of the sending State. If, 
lause of the urgency of the matter, it has not 
en possible to inform the consular officer be- 

initiation of the actions involved, and the 
isular officer or his representative has not 
m present when the actions were carried 
, the competent authorities of the receiving 
,te shall promptly provide him with the full 
ivant particulars of the actions taken. 

2. E.xcept at the request of the vessel's 
>ter or the consular officer, the judicial or 
(er competent authorities of the receiving 
,te shall not interfei'e in the internal affairs 
he vessel on questions of relations between 

members of the crew, labor relations, dis- 
ine and other activities of an internal 
racter, when the peace and safety of the re- 

^rmg State are not violated. 

3. The provisions of paragraph 1 of this 
icle shall not be applied, however, to ordi- 
y customs, passport and sanitary controls, 
in accordance with treaties in force between 
I two States, to the saving of human life at 

, prevention of pollution of the sea, or 
ither activities undertaken at the request 
or with the consent of, the master of the 
sel. 



Article 39 
Assistance to Damaged Vessels 

1. If a vessel of the sending State is 
:cked or gi-ounded. or suffers any other 
lage in the internal or territorial waters of 
receiving State, the competent authorities 

the receiving State shall inform the consu- 
i as soon as possible and inform it of the 

.sures taken for saving the passengers, the 

sel, its crew and cargo. 

2. A vessel which has suffered a misfor- 

e and its cargo and provisions shall be sub- 
; to customs duties on the territoiy of the 
eiving State unless they are delivered for 
in that State. 

Article 40 

Fiinctions with Regard to Aircraft 

The relevant provisions of Articles 36 
ough 39 of this Convention shall also apply 
■ivil aircraft on the condition that such ap- 
ation is not contrary to the provisions of 



any bilateral or multilateral agreement in force 
between the two States. 

Article 41 
Observing the Law of the Receiving State 

1. All persons enjoying privileges and 
immunities under this Convention are obliged, 
without prejudice to their privileges and im- 
munities, to observe the law of the receiving 
State, including traffic regulations, and to re- 
spect the customs of the receiving State, and 
may not interfere in the internal affairs of the 
receiving State. 

2. Consular officers and consular em- 
ployees who are nationals of the sending State 
may not carry on any profession or undertake 
any activity for personal profit on the territoiy 
of the receiving State other than their official 
duties. 

3. All means of transportation of the con- 
sulate or of members of a consulate and their 
families shall be adequately insured against 
civil actions by third parties. 

Article 42 
Entry into Force and Renunciation 

1. The present Convention shall be sub- 
ject to ratification. The exchange of instru- 
ments of ratification shall take place as soon as 
possible at Beijing. 

2. The present Convention shall enter 
into force after the expiration of thirty days 
following the date of the exchange of instru- 
ments of ratification. 

3. The present Convention shall remain in 
force until the expiration of six months from 
the date on which one of the Contracting Par- 
ties gives to the other Contracting Party writ- 
ten notification of its intention to terminate 
the Convention. 

Done at Washington this seventeenth day 
of September, 1980, in duplicate in the English 
and Chinese languages, both texts being 
equally authentic. 

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: 

Jimmy Carter 

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE 
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA: 

Bo YlBO 



ACCOMPANYING LETTERS 

September 17, 1980 

His Excellency 
Chai Zemin 

Ambassador of the 
People's RepubHc of China 

Excellency: 

I have the honor to confirm on behalf of 
the Government of the United States of 



America that in the course of negotiating the 
Consular Convention between the United 
States of America and the People's Republic of 
China, the two sides reached agreement on the 
following questions: 

1. The two governments agree to facili- 
tate the reunion of families and will process all 
applications as quickly as possible under mutu- 
ally agreed arrangements and in accordance 
with each .side's laws and regulations. 

2. The two governments agree to facili- 
tate travel between their respective countries 
of persons who may have a claim simulta- 
neously to the nationality of the United States 
of America and the People's Republic of China, 
but this does not imply that the governments 
of the two countries recognize dual nationality. 
Exit formalities and documentation shall be 
dealt with in accordance with the laws of the 
countiy in which such person rsides. Entry 
formalities and documentation shall be dealt 
with in accordance with the laws of the coun- 
try of destination. 

3. All nationals of the sending State en- 
tering the receiving State on the basis of 
travel documents of the sending State contain- 
ing properly executed entiy and exit visas of 
the receiving State will, during the period for 
which their status has been accorded, and in 
accordance with the visa's period of validity, be 
considered nationals of the sending State by 
the appropriate authorities of the receiving 
State for the purpose of ensuring consular ac- 
cess and protection by the sending State as 
provided for in Article 35 of the Consular Con- 
vention between the United States of America 
and the People's Rejjublic of China. If judicial 
or administrative piYjceedings prevent the 
above-mentioned pei'sons from leaving the 
counti-j' within the visa's period of validity, 
they shall not lose the right of consular access 
and protection by the sending State. Such per- 
sons shall be permitted to leave the receiving 
State without the necessity of obtaining docu- 
mentation from the receiving State other than 
the exit documentation normally required of 
departing aliens. 

4. Both governments agree that persons 
residing in one countn' who are entitled to re- 
ceive financial benefits from the other counti-y 
shall receive their benefits under mutually 
agreed arrangements and in accordance with 
each counti-y's laws and regulations. 

If your Excellency confirms the above by 
a note in reply on behalf of the Government of 
the People's Republic of China, this note shall 
constitute an integral part of the above- 
mentioned Consular Convention and shall 
come into effect simultaneously with the Con- 
sular Convention. At that time, the Annex on 
Practical Arrangements to the Agi-eement Be- 
tween the Government of the United States of 
America and the Government of the People's 
Republic of China on the Mutual Establish- 
ment of Consular Relations and the Opening of 
Consulates-General, signed on Januai-y 31, 
1979 will cease to be in effect. 

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assur- 
ances of my highest consideration. 

Edmund S. Muskie 
Secretai^ of State 



Ivember 1980 



23 



Feature 



September 17, 1980 

The Honorable 

Edmund S. Muskie, 
Secretaiy of State. 

Excellency: 

I have today received a note from Your 
Excellency, which reads as follows: 

"I have the honor to confirm on behalf of 
the Government of the United States of 
America that in the course of negotiating the 
Consular Convention between the United 
States of America and the People's Republic of 
China, the two sides reached agreement on the 
following questions. 

1. The two governments agree to facili- 
tate the reunion of families and will process all 
applications as quickly as possible under mutu- 
ally agreed arrangements and in accoi'dance 
with each side's laws and regulations. 

2. The two governments agree to facili- 
tate travel between their respective countries 
of persons who may have a claim simulta- 
neously to the nationality of the United States 
of America and the People's Republic of China, 
but this does not imply that the governments 
of the two countries recognize dual nationality. 
Exit formalities and documentation shall be 
dealt with in accordance with the laws of the 
counti7 in which such person resides. Entry 
formalities and documentation shall be dealt 
with in accordance with the laws of the coun- 
tiy of destination. 

3. All nationals of the sending State en- 
tering the receiving State on the basis of 
travel documents of the sending State contain- 
ing properly executed entry and exit visas of 
the receiving State will, during the period for 
which their status has been accorded, and in 
accordance with the visa's period of validity, be 
considered nationals of the sending State by 
the appropriate authorities of the receiving 
State for the purpose of ensuring consular ac- 
cess and protection by the sending State as 
provided for in Article 35 of the Consular Con- 
vention between the United States of America 
and the People's Republic of China. If judicial 
or administrative proceedings prevent the 
above-mentioned persons from leaving the 
counti-y within the visa's period of validity, 
they shall not lose the right of consular access 
and protection by the sending State. Such per- 
sons shall be permitted to leave the receiving 
State without the necessity of obtaining docu- 
mentation from the receiving State other than 
the exit documentation normally required of 
departing aliens. 

4. Both governments agree that persons 
residing in one counto' who are entitled to re- 
ceive financial benefits from the other country 
shall receive their benefits under mutually 
agreed arrangements and in accordance with 
each countiy's laws and regulations. 

If your Excellency confirms the above by 
a note in reply on behalf of the Government of 
the People's Republic of China, this note shall 



constitute an integral part of the above- 
mentioned Consular Convention and shall 
come into effect simultaneously with the Con- 
sular Convention. At that time, the Annex on 
Practical Arrangements to the Agi-eement Be- 
tween the Government of the United States of 
America and the Government of the People's 
Republic of China on the Mutual Establish- 
ment of Consular Relations and the Opening of 
Consulates-General, signed on January 31, 
1979 will cease to be in effect." 

On behalf of the Government of the 
People's Republic of China, I have the honor to 
confirm the above contents. 

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assur- 
ances of my highest consideration. 

Chai Zemin 
Ambassador of the People's 
Republic of China 

September 17, 1980 

His Excellency 
Chai Zemin 

Ambassador of the 
People's Republic of China 

Excellency: 

I have the honor on behalf of the Govern- 
ment of the United States of America to con- 
firm that during the course of negotiations 
concerning the Consular Convention between 
the United States of America and the People's 
Republic of China, both sides reached agree- 
ment on the following matter: 

Aside from the consulates whose opening 
has already been agreed upon, the United 
States and Chinese Governments agi-ee to the 
establishment of three additional consulates 
general in each other's territon'. 

If your Excellency by return note con- 
firms the above on behalf of the Government 
of the People's Republic of China, this note and 
your Excellency's note in reply will constitute 
an agreement between the Government of the 
United States of America and the Government 
of the People's Republic of China which shall 
take effect from the date of the Embassy's note 
in reply." 

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assur- 
ances of my highest consideration. 

Edmu.n'd S. Muskie 
Secretary of State 

September 17, 1980 

The Honorable 

Edmund S. Muskie, 
Seci'etai-y of State 

I have today received a note from your 
excellency, which reads as follows: 

"I have the honor on behalf of the Gov- 
ernment of the United States of America to 
confirm that during the course of negotiations 



k! 



concerning the Consular Convention betweei 
the United States of America and the People 
Republic of China, both sides reached agree- 
ment on the following matter: 

Aside from the consulates whose openin] 
has already been agi-eed upon, the United 
States and Chinese Governments agree to th 
establishment of three additional consulates 
general in each other's territory. 

If your excellency by return note confirc 
the above on behalf of the Government of the 
People's Republic of China, this note and youi 
excellency's note in reply will constitute an 
agreement between the Government of the 
United States of America and the Governmei 
of the People's Republic of China which shall 
take effect from the date of the Embassy's no 
in reply." 

On behalf of the Government of the 
People's Republic of China, I have the honor 
confirm the above contents. 

Accept, Excellency, the assurances of m; 
highest consideration. .^ 

His Excellency 
Chai Zemin, 

Ambassador of the : 
People's Republic oi 
China 



'Text from 'Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Sept. 22, 198(W 

2 Press release 257 of Sept. 17, 1980. 

^Text from White House press relea.M 
of Sept. 17, 1980. 

^For the purposes of this understanding! 
"frequency" shall have the same meaning as th.| 
set forth in Annex V, paragraph (1) of the 
Agreement. 

'The term "point service" means one 
weekly frequency with full traffic rights at a 
point. ■ 



U.S., China Sign 
Civil Aviation 
Agreement 



The agreement between the Govern- 
ment of the United States of America 
and the Government of the People's 
Republic of China relating to civil air 
transport signed on September 17, 



24 



Department of State Bulletin: 



THE PRESIDENT 



1980, is an agreement between the gov- 
ernments of our two countries, wiiich 
establishied diplomatic relations on 
January 1, 1979. As stated in the joint 
communique issued by the two govern- 
ments in anticipation of establishing 
diplomatic relations, the United States 
recognizes the Government of the 
People's Republic of China as the sole 
legal government of China. Within this 
context, the people of the United States 
maintain cultural, commercial, and 
other unofficial relations with the 
people of Taiwan. The Government of 
the United States of America acknowl- 
edges the Chinese position that there is 
out one China and Taiwan is a part of 
^hina. 

Under this agreement, air services 
ivill be provided on the Chinese side by 
hina's national carrier, the Civil Avia- 
ion Administration of China (CAAC), 
hose aircraft will bear the national flag 
if the People's Republic of China. 
'China Airlines" (Taiwan) continues to 
•rovide service between the United 
States and Taiwan, under a nongov- 
rnmental arrangement between two 
irivate entities, the American Institute 
n Taiwan and the Coordination Council 
or North American Affairs. The 
Jnited States does not recognize the 
ag of Taiwan as the flag of a sovereign 
tate but regards it as an insignia or 
narking identifying an aircraft as 
toming from Taiwan. 



News Conference of September 
18 (Excerpts) 



1980. 



'Press release 257A of Sept. 17, 



Although attention is naturally focused 
on domestic politics, events around the 
world and here at home still demand my 
attention and action in ways that affect 
the well-being of American citizens. 

Yesterday we completed the nor- 
malization of relations with the People's 
Republic of China with four 
agreements — for trade, for consulates, 
for normal airline service, and for tex- 
tiles. We've opened a new era of normal 
relationships now between our two 
great countries. 

Also yesterday, the second an- 
niversary of the signing of the Camp 
David accords, I met with Israeli 
Foreign Minister [Yitzhak] Shamir and 
Egyptian Foreign Minister Hassan Ali 
as efforts continue in our quest for a 
lasting peace in the Middle East, which 
is so important to the future of Ameri- 
cans and to the entire world. They have 
been, since that meeting with me, con- 
ducting negotiations or discussions with 
our own Ambassador [Sol M. Linowitz, 
Personal Representative of the Presi- 
dent for the Middle East Peace 
Negotiations] responsible for the dis- 
cussions for peace. 

We're preparing now for prelimi- 
nary exchanges with the Soviet Union 
on the control of theater nuclear 
weapons in Europe. These talks should 
begin next month, and Secretary Mus- 
kie will be addressing this important 
subject in his discussions with Foreign 
Minister Gromyko of the Sovet Union in 
New York in the near future. 

We've also been concentrating on 
the slow, difficult, diplomatic effort to 
free our hostages in Iran. 



Q. Earlier this week you raised 
expectations on the release of the 
hostages, and then you seemed to 
back off. What is today's prospect for 
an early release of the hostages, and 
aside from the Shah's assets over 
which we have no control, are all of 
the latest Iranian demands negoti- 
able? 



A. I've not changed my position on 

the prospects for the hostages' release. 
I do not predict an early resolution of 
the issue, because it's not in my hands, 
unilaterally. It has to be done through 
very careful negotiations with the Ira- 
nians and quite often because of unilat- 
eral decisions to be made by them. 

One of the major obstacles to prog- 
ress, in the past, has been the absence 
of any viable government in Iran. Only 
in recent weeks — in fact in some in- 
stances in the last few days — have they 
had a Parliament or a speaker of the 
Parliament who could speak for them or 
a Prime Minister. They have had a 
President for a long time. The Presi- 
dent himself, Bani-Sadr, has been con- 
sistently in favor of the hostages being 
released. 

Now that their government is in- 
tact and now that the Ayatollah Kho- 
meini has made a public statement for 
the first time outlining to some degree 
the demands to be pursued by Iran, ob- 
viously the situation has improved. 

Our position has been consistent. 
We have two goals in mind that have 
not changed since the first day the hos- 
tages were taken. One is to preserve 
the honor and integrity of our nation 
and to protect its interests. That's 
never changed. And the second goal has 
also never changed, and that is not to 
do anything here in this country that 
would endanger the lives or safety of 
the hostages nor interfere with their 
earliest possible release back to free- 
dom. 

This is an issue that's been con- 
stantly on my mind and on the minds of 
the American people. 

Q. Does an apology rule out the 
question of honor? 

A. Yes. The United States is not 
going to apologize. 

We have long said that there would 
be a legitimate forum provided for the 
Iranians, who consider themselves to 
be aggrieved in many ways, to present 
their case. We encouraged the U.N. 
mission to go to Iran, to investigate the 
situation there, to have hearings in 



ovember 1980 



25 



The President 



Iran, and to let there be a public ex- 
ploration of Iran's claims or complaints. 
At the time we filed our suit in the 
World Court, in The Hague, we also in- 
vited Iran to participate with us — not 
in a combative way, but in a friendly 
way — to give them that forum, which 
would have been well covered by the 
world press, to express their concerns 
or their complaints about us or others 
in the past. So, this is not a new de- 
velopment at all. Our position has been 
very consistent. 

I cannot predict what will happen 
in the near future, but we are pursuing 
every possible legitimate avenue — as 
we have for many months — to reach 
some agreement with Iran — with those 
two constraints that I described to you 
concerning our nation's honor and the 
safety of the hostages — to relieve this 
problem between us, which is obviously 
damaging to the United States and also 
very damaging to the people of Iran. 



Q. In the context of your deci- 
sions about the MX missile and Presi- 
dential Directive .59, I'd like to ask if 
it's realistic for any American Presi- 
dent to believe that he could limit his 
response to a Soviet nuclear first 
strike against U.S. missiles if that 
first strike incurred, let's say, 20-.50 
million casualties. Could you limit 
your response under those circum- 
stances, or would you have to fire off 
everything that was left? 

A. When anyone decides to run for 
President of our country with any ex- 
pectation of being elected, the question 
of the use of atomic weapons has to be 
addressed, because it's crucial for our 
nation, for our allies, and for our poten- 
tial adversaries to know that, if neces- 
sary, atomic weapons would be used to 
defend our nation. And that knowledge 
is the deterrent that would prevent a 
potential adversary from attacking our 
country and, therefore, destroying 100 
million or more American lives. 

I have done everything I possible 
could, as President, not only to main- 
tain peace — and I thank God we've 



been successful so far — but to lay the 
groundwork for continued maintenance 
of peace and the avoidance of ever 
having to use atomic weapons. 

There is a likelihood — I can't say 
how strong it might be; it's not an in- 
evitability, but it's certainly a 
likelihood — that if an atomic exchange 
of any kind should ever erupt, it might 
lead to a more massive exchange of in- 
tercontinental and highly destructive 
weapons that would result in tens of 
millions of lost lives on both sides. That 
very knowledge, which I have very 
clearly in my mind, is shared by the 
Soviet leaders, and I have discussed 
this common knowledge with President 
Brezhnev in Vienna when we signed the 
SALT II Treaty. 

The policy of our two countries 
ever since President Ei.senhower and 
President Truman were in office and 
everyone since then. Democratic or 
Republican, has been to try to reduce 
the dependence on atomic weapons and 
to have balanced atomic forces and, 
lately, to reduce constantly on an equal 
basis the arsenals that we have. 

I cannot tell you what would hap- 
|)en if an exchange should take place. I 
would try to defend my nation's integ- 
rity and its security and the integrity 
and security of our allies without resort 
to atomic weapons, but if necessaiy to 
defend the freedom and security of 
Western Europe and this country, then 
I would use atomic weapons. I pray to 
God that that time will never come, but 
it's important for our people, our allies, 
and the Soviet Union to know that, if 
necessary, those weapons will be used. 
The best weapon of any kind is one 
that's never used, and the best soldier 
is one that never dies in war. 

But the only way I know to main- 
tain peace for my country and for those 
who depend on me is to be strong and to 
let potential attackers know that if they 
should attack us, their attack would be 
suicidal. 



Q. Yesterday, after meeting with 
Dr. Burg of Israel [Yosef Burg, Is- 
raeli Minister of Interior and Chief 
Negotiator for the Palestinian au- 
tonomy negotiations] and [Foreign 



Minister] Hassan Ali of Egypt, you 
said, without elaboration, that unan- 
ticipated progress had been made in 
restarting those trilateral talks here 
in Washington on Palestinian au- 
tonomy. 

But Dr. Burg said today those 
initial discussions would not include 
the issue of Jerusalem. Given the im- 
portance of that issue, what progress 
has been made this week, and what's 
the cause of your optimism? 

A. When Sol Linowitz went to 
Jerusalem and to Egypt a few weeks 
ago and met with Foreign Ministers 
Shamir and Gen. Hassan Ali, and also 
with Prime Minister Begin and Presi- 
dent Sadat, we were pleasantly sur- 
prised, after a fairly long dearth of di- 
rect contacts between Israel and 
Egypt, to find both nations eager to get 
back to the negotiating table. 

Yesterday, after they left my of- 
fice, Sol Linowitz, Mr. Shamir, and 
Gen. Ali sat down to continue top-level 
negotiations to try to find a basis for 
carrying out the comprehensive peace. 

Following Sol Linowitz' trip to the 
Middle East, President Sadat an- 
nounced, both before and after he ar- 
rived, that he was eager to see a sum- 
mit conference later this year. Prime 
Minister Begin had not, until that time, 
made that statement. Prime Minister 
Begin called me on the telephone to say 
that the Linowitz mission had been re- 
markably successful, to thank us for 
what he had contributed, and to say 
that he would be eager to meet with me 
and President Sadat at a summit con- 
ference either before or after the 
American elections were concluded. 

We will work that out. I am deter- 
mined that the prospect for a summit 
meeting will not interfere with the sub- 
stantive negotiations that must precede 
it. And I think the fact that yesterday 
and today the Foreign Ministers of the 
two countries are negotiating again in 
the presence of the American Ambas- 
sador assigned that task is, indeed, en- 
couraging in itself. 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Sept. 22, 
1980. ■ 



26 



Department of State Bulletin 



1 



m SECRETARY 



»sentials of Security: Arms and More 



Secrctnri/ Mm^kie's address before 
World Affairs Council in 
sbnrqh on September IS. 19S0J 

cent months the atmosphere has 
1 unusually thick with pronounce- 
ts about an American militaiy de- 
'.. We cannot let such funereal fore- 
3 go unanswered. They are wrong on 
'acts, and they can be dangerous in 
• effect. 

I am here today to take sharp issue 
the evangalists of American weak- 
— to affairm that America today is 
ng and gi'owing stronger. If our na- 
Itruly was neglecting its defenses, it 
id be the duty of all informed people 
mnd the alarm. Rut false declarations 
eakness only intensify the dangers 
ace. They can cause our friends to 
t us and our enemies to discount us. 
' can distract us from other work 
3sai7 to make our society stronger 
Dur world more secure. 

li Defense Record 

! US evaluate the defense record, but 

- evaluate it fairly. Let us weigh the 
,a-West balance realistically. And let us 
iv due regard to our own strength as 

e as that of our opposition. 

)ui- allies are stronger, our alliances 
u Her than those of the Soviet Union. 
n onomic power, the United States and 
lU'IATO allies outstrip the Warsaw 
I' more than two to one. Taken to- 
■t •!■, we devote more to defense than 
laVarsaw Pact, including the Soviet 
n II. Our alliances have the added de- 

I ability that is derived when values 
.( lurposes are truly shared. Unlike the 
•a aw Pact, NATO members and Japan 
re Hies by choice. The purpose of our 
liices is not to camouflage the ambi- 
n of one member but to defend the 
aom of all. 

I At least one-foui'th of the Soviet Un- 
n gTound combat forces are tied down 
1 e long common border with China, 
hi'iations on our borders are friends. 

Technology is another American ad- 

' lue. "Faster," "more accurate," 
( advanced" — these generally are 

- 1 hat apply to American weapons 
\inerican systems. Soviet technology 
iiiued behind. 

\iiil our security is also advanced by 
■ intent of our foreign policy — by the 



international principles we support. On a 
global basis, we stand for essential pre- 
cepts of national sovereignty and human 
rights. Certainly we live in a tumultuous 
woi'ld, characterized by the unremitting 
nationalism and surging human aspira- 
tions of more than 100 new nations. But if 
such an environment is unsetthng to us, 
it will prove to be even more perilous for 
nations seeking to dominate others and 
dictate their systems. Such imperial con- 
cepts are the wave of the past. They col- 
lide head-on with the historic trends now 
underway vii-tually eveiywhere in the 
world — from the patriots in Afghanistan 
to the nationalists in eveiy nation of the 
Third World, fi'om the democratic forces 
in Zimbabwe to the gallant workers of 
Poland who have inspired us all. 

In sum, our technology, our solid se- 
curity partnerships, our identification 
with national independence and human 
freedom — all of these assets should 
strengthen our confidence as we assess 
the sufficiency of our defenses. 

They do not, however, give us cause 
for complacency. Our militaiy posture 
continues to require our diligent atten- 
tion. In the Soviet Union, we face a rival 
that has engaged for more than a genera- 
tion in a steady buildup of its military 
forces, both conventional and strategic. 
In strategic nuclear forces the Soviets 
have attained a rough equivalence. In the 
conventional area they have increased the 
danger to our Asian and European allies. 
They have aimed foi- the status of global 
power — the capacity for direct involve- 
ment even in distant regions. And now in 
Afghanistan they have shown no hesi- 
tancy in applying their power in a brutal 
attempt to crush a sovereign neighbor. 

The question facing Americans is not 
whether we should respond to these de- 
velopments; all agree that we must. The 
real question is whether we will continue 
with a well-conceived and measured re- 
sponse tailored to the actual threats we 
face or whether we will nui off wildly in 
all directions at once, spending vastly 
gi-eater sums to little, if any, effect. 

Let me briefly survey what the re- 
sponse thus far has been. In overall 
terms our arms spending is no longer 
dropping. It is growing. Our defense 
spending declined in 7 of the 8 years just 
before President Carter took office — a 
total drop of more than 37%. 

Since Pi'esident Carter's inaugura- 
tion, however, defense spending has in- 



creased 4 years in a row — for overall 
growth of 10% after inflation. And if the 
President's 5-year plan is carried out, the 
increase by 1985 will e.xceed 27%. 

To make it absolutely clear that we 
are not proposing to squeeze our Armed 
Forces, let me just note here that this 
5-year defense program calls for appro- 
priations of over $1 trillion between now 
and 1985. 

Even so, there are those who pro- 
nounce that effort insufficient. They in- 
sist upon a still larger arms budget. They 
will not tell us what it would contain. 
They leave those decisions for later They 
simply want "more" — of whatever, as if 
shoveling out the ta.xpayer's money is a 
desirable end in itself. That is a formula 
not for gi-eater security but for guaran- 
teed waste — a failing to avoid in defense 
just as much as in any other part of the 
budget. 

Instead we need a carefully struc- 
tured defense program that responds ef- 
fectively to specific dangers. And that is 
what we have. In conventional forces, the 
Carter Administration began promptly in 
1977 to address the military deficiencies 
of NATO — matters which previously had 
received abundant discussion and pre- 
cious little concrete attention. 

Today the NATO Long-Term De- 
fense Program, an American initiative, is 
in its thii'd year Problems ranging from 
readiness and prompt reinforcement to 
integrating air defenses are no longer 
simply being studied: they are being 
solved. These NATO improvements are 
undei^written by an alliance agreement to 
increase defense spending by at least 3% 
each year — another initiative of the 
United States. 

We are engaged in a broad moderni- 
zation of the Army's weapons and equip- 
ment. We have begun the first full-scale 
modernization of tactical air forces since 
the Vietnam war And our shipbuilding 
program will produce 97 new ships over 
the next 5 years, building toward a newer 
and more capable fleet of 550 ships, in 
contrast to 476 in 1977. 

With these progi-ams moving for- 
ward, we have also begim bolstering our 
ability to respond to emergencies outside 
the major alliance regions — including the 
vital Middle East-Persian Gulf area. Our 
naval presence there today is the 
strongest ever We have negotiated new 
agi-eements for access to ports and air- 
fields. We are prepositioning equipment 
and supplies in the Indian Ocean area. A 
new cargo aircraft is being developed. 
The elements of a rapid deployment force 
have been designated, and exercises are 
underway. 

Our programs in the area of nuclear 



iber 1980 



27 



The Secretary 



weapons reflect this same commitment to 
the deterrence of war through the assur- 
ance of strength. Last year, NATO 
adopted our i-ecommendations for 
modernizing theater nuclear forces in 
Europe. On intercontinental or strategic 
nuclear forces, the hard decisions have 
been made. A sweeping modernization of 
all three parts of our nuclear triad — land, 
sea, and air — is moving ahead. 

• For the strategic bomber forces, 
President Carter took the soundest 
course, even though it meant also taking 
some political heat. Instead of sinking bil- 
lions of dollars in a B-1 bomber with a 
doubtful future, he decided to equip our 
e.xisting bombers wth air-launched cruise 
missiles. In place of an old concept highly 
vulnerable to Soviet countei'moves, he 
selected an array of advanced technolo- 
gies that can surmount foreseeable Soviet 
defenses. 

• At sea, the Ti-ident .submarine 
program was put back on track. The first 
of those modern submarines will join the 
fleet next yean Portions of the e.xisting 
fleet already have the Ti-ident I missile, 
with major improvements in range and 
power 

• And on the land, the new MX 
missile, with mobile basing, will over- 
come the chief source of potential nuclear 
instability — the growing vulnerability of 
missiles fi.xed in silos. As with our 
bomber forces, Pi'esident Carter rejected 
second-best suggestions and made sure 
we had the best plan before construction 
began, so we would not have to waste 
time and money later fixing the mistakes. 

SALT II 

Along with these programs — cruise mis- 
sies. Trident, the MX — there is a fourth 
progi'am I want to mention — a "secret 
weapon," if you will. Let me list some of 
its capabilities. By itself, this secret 
weapon would knock out about one-fourth 
of all long-range Soviet missiles and 
bombers that we project for 1985. It 
would do that without launching a nuclear 
war; indeed, without even firing a shot. 
In the process, it would eliminate thou- 
sands of individual warheads and bombs 
that the Soviet arsenal could othei-wise 
have aimed at our countiy. The secret 
weapon has surveillance capabilities. 
With it, we will be able to keep better 
track of Soviet forces and progi-ams. 

For all of its military effectiveness, 
there is no incompatibility whatsoever 
between this secret weapon and our other 
strategic progi-ams. MX, Ti-ident, and 
air-launched cruise missiles can all go 



ahead as planned. Adding this weapon 
will not require massive new appropria- 
tions. In fact, in the long run, money will 
be saved. Nor does it worry our allies. On 
the contrary, they know about it, and they 
strongly support it. Their only concern is 
that we might not adopt it. 

Of course the weapon I am i-efening 
to is not a weapon at all. It is an agree- 
ment—the SALT II Treaty. But it, 
nonetheless, will make all the contribu- 
tions to our security I have just de- 
scribed. There is nothing soft oi' innocent 
about it. It is an integral part of a hard- 
headed strategy of American defense. 
And it should be recognized as such. In- 
deed, it may well be that some of those 
who oppose SALT II would support it — 
even insist on it — if it were a defense 
expenditure that could buy the same 
results. 

The contribution of SALT to our de- 
fense underscores the second of two mes- 
sages I want to leave here today. The 
first, as I have suggested, is that oui- de- 
fenses — alone and in combination with 
our allies — are second to none. We are 
determined to see that they remain so. 
That determination is not just stated in 
words; it is backed up in the budget. The 
second message is that simply spending 
more money and building more arms — 
even accumulating vast military power — 
will not be enough to assure our security 
in today's world. 

Enhancing U.S. Security 

Even our defense posture itself depends 
upon other international assets and skills. 
Recall NATO's Long-Term Defense Pro- 
gram, its agreement on greater defense 
efforts, the decision on theater nuclear 
forces, our access to facilities in the In- 
dian Ocean. Actions such as these cannot 
be manufactured out of either unilateral 
announcements or unspecified new spend- 
ing. They are the products of careful 
negotiation and steady leadership — 
endeavors every bit as vital to our 
defense as arms. 

And those endeavors have other ap- 
plications indispensable to our security. 
True security in a nuclear age demands 
steps that lessen the risk that war will 
happen. That is the mandate of arms con- 
trol — in combination with a strong de- 
fense, to help achieve a stable balance 
and to avoid miscalculation by either side. 
For we know that nuclear war would 
mean catastrophe for every side. In such 
times it would only jeopardize our secu- 
rity to reject arms control and embrace 
doctrines — including the chimera of nu- 
clear superiority — that invite a nuclear 
arms race. 



Our security is also advanced by a 
vigorous diplomacy — fashioning a ma- 
ture, stable basis of cooperation even 
with countries, such as China, that hav 
different systems fi'om oui's. We must n 
retreat from those efforts, confuse then 
or be confused by them. 

Our security has been enhanced by 
the success of peacemaking in Zimbabw 
That effort deprived our adversaries of 
conflict to exploit. Some Americans 
wanted to disrupt the peace process by 
prematurely ending our participation in 
international sanctions. We can all be 
grateful they did not prevail. 

Our security is still more deeply in^ 
volved in the Middle East, where the 
Camp David process has produced the 
first real peace agreement since Israel 
came into being. Only patient, persisteii 
and imaginative diplomacy can reconcile! 
the remaining issues — the same kind of( 
diplomacy that hammei'ed out the accoril 
at Camp David. Bellicose pronounce 
ments or assaults on the negotiating prt* 
cess that offer no concrete alternatives 
neither advance that enterprise nor serl 
the cause of peace. 

And our security is affected by a 
broad range of economic issues that ariB 
cannot touch. We could never have 
blasted a new trade agreement into be- 
ing. We cannot threaten stagnating 
economies to make them prosper or in- 
timidate hungry people into health. 

Yet our fate ultimately turns on sue 
questions, even as it rests on the balana 
of power. If we neglect such challenges, 
our fate may be to slide into oblivion, 
rather than being blown there. But we 
will get there all the same. 

In short, our security in the future 
requires the same priorities that have 
marked our foreign policy in the recent 
past. On defense, we must continue the 
steady, prudent improvement of our 
Armed Forces. We must specifically re- 
pudiate the false mes.sage that ours is a i( 
frail nation. And our security requires 
something moi'e. It i-equires a realistic 
undei'standing of the nature of the world 
we share, a commitment to peace as wel. 
as power, a capacity to work construc- 
tively with others to advance common 
purposes and meet the full range of chaH 
lenges ahead. 

I am convinced that the American 
people understand the need for such a 
balanced American approach to the 
woiid. I believe they support a defense 
posture of strength and confidence and a 
foreign policy of construction and 
hope. 



'Press release 262. 



I 



28 



Department of State Bullet- 



The Secretary 



iQuestion-and-Answer Session Following 
Pittsburgh Address 



CJ. You mentioned that in the next 5 
years our shiphuilding; program will 
produce 97 new ships, bringing: the 
fleet to 550 ships in contrast to 476 in 

U»77. 

A. Yes, those are the numbers. 

Q. How does the Navy plan to 
provide manpower for the extra 97 
new ships when they cannot now not 
et enough people to operate and 
naintain the present 475 ships? 

A. This Congress, with the support 
f the Administration, has acted, or is 
n the process of acting — I haven't fol- 
owed the appropriations process that 
losely — to increase the compensation 
,nd benefits of people in the military. 

Our lack has been in the skilled 
Teas, those who have been in the 
ervice awhile and the Warrant Officer 
rades — people whose skills are highly 
esired and salable in the private 
ector — and there has been a tendency 
Dr us to lose those skills. The Congress 
as recognized that it is terribly impor- 
.nt that we improve the attractions, 
he benefits, and the prerequisites for 
ose jobs. I hope we can turn that one 
'ound. It is a problem, a serious 
roblem, but it is not being neglected. 

Q. Do you see the stockpiling of 
S. military hardware in Norway to 

trengthen the northern flank of NATO 
counter any possible Soviet expan- 

ion into this area for the oil-rich North 

ea? 

A. You're referring to the 
.ockpiling of military supplies and 
quipment in Norway? That is part of 
16 prepositioning exercise that I de- 
:ribed in my formal presentation; that 
; to equip the rapid deployment force 
5 move quickly into action in the event 
f difficulties in the Persian Gulf-Middle 
ast area. We have adopted the policy 
f stockpiling, and Norway has indi- 
ated its willingness to participate in 
nat program. 

Q. If the "Swiss connection" is 
ot successful in communicating with 
16 Iranian Government, what avenue 
ould the I'nited States investigate? 
nd would the Vatican, through 
rchbishop Capucci, be an acceptable 
Iternative? 



A. We have not been limited to any 
one channel in the 4 months that I've 
been Secretary of State. There are a 
number of channels, and it is not useful 
for me to try to identify them. Only re- 
cently, of course, have we 
supplemented the indirect channels 
that we've used to get information, to 
communicate views to the various Ira- 
nian leaders as they emerge in their 
developing political institutions. But 
recently on the election of a Prime 
Minister, I sent a letter of my own, 
which is the first direct contact be- 
tween our government and theirs, in 
the hope that with their political in- 
stitutions falling into place that we 
might be approaching the time when di- 
rect contact and negotiations might 
emerge. You've mentioned two chan- 
nels of communication, possible com- 
munication, and there are several, if 
not many, others. 

Q. Jimmy Carter is seeking to be 
reelected President this year. Do you 
see any alterations of the policy on 
the security of Israel? 

A. I don't think the election will 
make any difference. Events may. 

As you know, the Camp David 
process has been under assault from a 
number of quarters — those who wish to 
see it fail and those who might wish to 
see it succeed but doubt that it will — so 
that the process is constantly under 
pressure and attack. There is an incli- 
nation on the part of both Israel and 
Egypt to respond to these outside pres- 
sures and attacks in ways that can 
undermine the continuing nature of the 
negotiations. 

It has been our effort to keep both 
parties focused on the process and to 
continue with it. The important point to 
remember, that I've made all over the 
world, is that it is the only negotiation 
that has ever been put in place with re- 
spect to the Middle East since the crea- 
tion of the State of Israel. More than 
that, it's the only negotiation with both 
Palestinian rights and Israel's security 
at the top of the agenda. 

A great deal of work has been ac- 
complished by these negotiations. The 
obvious one, of course, is the Treaty of 
Peace with Egypt which 3 years ago 
would have been regarded as an impos- 
sibility. And in addition, with respect 



to the autonomy talks for the West 
Bank and Gaza, which started about 16 
or 18 months ago, a lot of the woi-k, a 
lot of the authorities with respect to the 
self-governing authority contemplated 
for the West Bank and Gaza, have been 
agreed upon. 

They are now down to the really 
tough issues, involving land, water, se- 
curity, the powers of the self-governing 
authority, and so on, and it has been 
agreed that the talks will be resumed. 
Therefore, we think that the process 
that has already demonstrated that it 
can achieve results should be continued 
to be supported and will be, whatever 
happens in the election, so far as I 
know. 

Q. To set my question in context, 
I would like to tell you that I'm a 
resident of Hawaii, studying at Pitt. 
Recently, a number of people who are 
representatives of the emerging coun- 
tries of the South Pacific met in Hon- 
olulu because of the overriding con- 
cern about the American desire to 
store nuclear waste in the Pacific. 

I would like to know^ what the 
present posture is of our country re- 
garding this issue. And secondly, 
what is the current .Administration's 
posture regarding the development or 
involvement in the development ef- 
forts of the emerging countries of 
the South Pacific? 

A. With respect to the disposal of 
nuclear waste, I guess we're going to 
have to find another planet. Nobody 
wants it. None of the 50 States do; 
other countries do not, so I guess the 
honest answer to your question is that 
we don't know what the answer is at 
this point. We continue to search for it. 

The second part of your question 
had to do with development and what 
role we are playing. Let me say that 
your question touches upon one of my 
great frustrations as Secretary of 
State, and before that as a member of 
Congress for 22 years. That has to do 
with the failure of the American people 
to understand — largely because nobody 
has tried really effectively to give them 
the facts — and the failure of the Con- 
gress to adequately support assistance 
programs aimed at helping southern 



Dvember 1980 



29 



The Secretary 



hemisphere countries largely in their 
development efforts. 

I have been making these kinds of 
speeches, that is foreign aid speeches. I 
try to find a different phrase than 
"foreign aid." One of my table partners 
reminded me that I had said something 
about it that was picked up in The 
Economist to the effect that SO'/f of our 
foreign aid dollars are spent in this 
country and produce American jobs — 
and that is a correct fact. 

Although that is correct and 
perhaps an inducement to people to 
support foreign aid, the importance of 
foreign aid to me is as a tool in in- 
fluencing the future direction of human 
affairs on this planet. And it's the kind 
of investment we should be making in 
our own interest. Our own defense, our 
own security, our own prospects for a 
better future are enhanced to the ex- 
tent that we can contribute to a meet- 
ing of those problems of the world's 
disadvantaged people that create insta- 
bility. 

We can't expect to be prosperous, 
peaceful, strong, and free of fears in an 
unstable world. The entire southern 
hemisphere of this planet is a potential 
powder keg in the sense that disadvan- 
taged people will not take their situa- 
tion permanently. Disadvantaged 
people can be, and are, exploited by 
those who seek power for that purpose. 
So that when we concentrate wholly 
upon — the speech should have been 
modified to have added that secret 
weapon because I think it is an impor- 
tant one. 

With respect to the countries of 
Southeast Asia; those in the Indochina 
Peninsula are not all poor, of course. 
Indonesia and Malaysia have some of 
the prime resources of this planet 
available for their own development, 
but other countries do not. 

Africa perhaps is the poorest in 
terms of resources, and development 
there and resources of the kind I am 
describing are important. Let's take 
Zimbabwe. I've mentioned Zimbabwe 
here is this speech. Zimbabwe, if it is to 
continue on its moderate course — its 
moderate racial course, its moderate 
internal political course — has got to 
meet the aspirations and the problems 
of its people. Zimbabwe is a rich nation 
in resources, so the potential is there. 
It is a country that has been torn by 
war for all these years. They need out- 
side help to get started, investment to 
get started, and, frankly, there isn't a 



nickel in our foreign aid program avail- 
able for that purpose. If they succeed, 
their success may well moderate the 
whole racial issue in the southern half 
of Africa. 

To me, that is an investment worth 
consideration by the United States and 
by our people. There are other exam- 
ples: Poland. We've all, I'm sure — 
unless you're different than the people 
I've run into up to now — have been 
cheered by the success of the Polish 
workers. Now, Poland has horrendous 
economic problems which have been 
exacerbated by that event. 

We have announced some CCC 
[Commodity Credit Corporation] cred- 
its — $660 million, which is an addition 
of only $110 million over what we were 
going to provide anyway — but we don't 
have another penny available in our 
foreign aid program to be of assistance 
when they put together their economic 
plans and turn to us and other Western 
nations for help. These kinds of situa- 
tions are situations which we cannot 
afford to ignore in our own interest, 
and yet, we tie our own hands by failing 
to respond to the opportunities. That's 
the best question I've been asked 
today. 

Q. I have been doing a great deal 
of reading and have a great concern 
about the acceleration of new, mod- 
ern airplanes and equipment, and yet 
not having the people power — I dare 
not say manpower or I'll be run out of 
town — to operate the highly-technical 
airplanes, where sometimes the less 
complicated, older vintage planes are 
becoming more effective. 

What are we going to do when we 
keep on accelerating, developing, and 
exploring highly sophisticated planes 
with nobody to operate them? I think 
the attempt of the rescue mission in 
Iran is an exemplary, unfortunate ex- 
perience. Would you address that? 

A. The breakdown in Iran was not 
really due to an inability of the crew to 
operate the craft. It was just that they 
were extended to the outer limits of 
their capability, and there were not 
enough back-up helicopters assigned to 
that mission, so I don't think that inci- 
dent gets at the first point that you 
made. 

Secondly, I don't know of any way 
to stop the momentum of technological 
development. 

Q. I think you misunderstood me. 
I will rephrase that. Who is going to 
operate the sophisticated planes if it 



appears we don't have enough people 
trained to do it? 

A. But we are operating these 
sophisticated planes, and we can train 
them. To the extent that the manpower 
isn't being attracted into the military, 
you've got a point. But that has nothing 
to do with the complexity of the tech- 
nology; it has to do with our failure to 
provide the inducements to attract 
people into the service, and we intend 
to so something about that, if that's 
your point. 

It is the same point that was raised 
earlier with respect to our ships, and ii 
is a very appropriate and valid point. If 
that's your point, I finally got it. 

Q. I read recently in the news- 
paper that you had sent a message to 
the Iranian Foreign Minister con- 
cerning the hostages, and you had re- 
ceived a reply back. Could you kind ol 
outline what that message said or if it< 
was particularly optimistic? 

A. I haven't received a reply yet. 

Q. You haven't? 

A. No. 

Q. The newspapers said that you 
had. 

A. No. Let me describe what has 
happened with respect to my letter. I 
sent it upon the election of the Prime 
Minister. It was delivered, through one 
of the channels that I referred to ear- 
lier, to the Prime Minister. He dis- 
closed that he had received a letter 
from me: did not immediately disclose 
its contents but obviously regarded it 
as a serious matter, and he said that he 
would consider it and reply in due 
course. 

Subsequent to that time, in what 
appeared to have been an impromptu 
speech, he read the contents of my let- 
ter, embroidered it with some of the 
usual rhetoric that we get in Iranian 
reactions to anything the United States 
does but in such a way to suggest, to 
me at least, that in due course I may 
get a formal written response. 

We have gotten indications from 
other Iranian sources that they regard 
the letter as a serious contact and one 
to be dealt with seriously. Whether or 
not that will produce at some point a 
contact and the start of our negotia- 
tions, or talks, we will have to be pa- 
tient and wait and see. I hope so. 



Press release 262A of Sept. 19, 1980. 



30 



Department of State Bulleu 



The Secretary 



rhe United States and the World's 
Refugees 



Secretary Miiakie's address before 
le American Liitlieran Church in 
tinneapolis on October 6, 1980.^ 

want to talk today about refugees — 
bout the new tidal wave of refugees that 

sweeping across the world, impelled by 
ar, famine, and by ruthless suppressions 
'the human spirit. 

That wave of refugees has especially 
luched America — for our nation, as an 
tstoric haven of refuge, has traditionally 
een a beacon for the homeless and per- 
tcuted. But today the influx of refugees 

the United States has become so heavy 
id constant that we face serious ques- 
ons of refugee policy, questions that 
lallenge both heart and head. These 
lestions concern you — because you 
Ive, to your eternal credit, chosen to 
by a leading role in helping refugees. 

ra of Refugees 

iry accurately, and very sadly, ours can 
called an era of refugees. In recent 
Ijars, more than 1.5 million people 
brldwide have fled their homes as refu- 
■jes — of war, civil um-est, persecution, 
i d hunger. 

• Roughly 6 miUion are victims of 
' r in Indochina — boat people from 

etiiam aiifl refugees from war-ravaged 
J mpuchea. 

• More than 1 million Afghan refu- 
i ?s are estimated to be in Pakistan, 

t 'ir numbers swelled by the Soviet ag- 
j 'ssion against that country. 

• In Africa, the refugee population 
t -feds 3 million; the figure for the 

I (idle East is roughly 2 million. 

• And closest to home, we find that 

r 'i-e than 1 million people in the Western 
1 misphere have left their homes in re- 
c it years in search of asylum from strife 
jppression. 

Of all the world's people, these may 
the most pitiable. For these migrant 
llions — most of them women and chil- 
n — are cruelly cut off from home and 
ntry, their families often divided or 
troyed. It has become commonplace, 
len discussing immigi'ants or refugees, 
ite the words of Emma Lazai-us 
ved on the base of the Statue of 
)erty: 

Give me your tired, your poor, 
Your huddled masses yearning to breathe 
free, 



vember 1980 



The wretched refuse of your teeming 
shore; 

Send these, the homeless, tempest- 
tossed, to me: 

I lift my lamp beside the golden door 

However commonplace they may 
have become, these words describe pre- 
cisely the refugees of today. These help- 
less people are quite literally tired and 
poor; quite literally huddled — in crowded 
camps and holding centers around the 
world; quite literally wretched; quite lit- 
terally homeless. And in the case of the 
boat people of Indochina and Cuba, they 
have been quite literally tempest-tossed 
— in rotting junks and leaking boats: ves- 
sels both of hope and of despair 

In a few cases, the sojourns of refu- 
gees have ended with their return home. 
The settlement of the Zimbabwe conflict 
this year, for e.xample, made it possible 
for nearly 200,000 refugees to return 
home. And in our own hemisphere, a 
similar number of Nicaraguans returned 
home when the civil war there came to an 
end. But such reconciliations are all too 
rare. 

More typically, the odyssey of a ref- 
ugee is painful and protracted. And the 
impact of large refugee migi'ations on the 
world community and on individual coun- 
tries is tremendous. 

• Last year, the U.N. High Commis- 
sioner for Refugees collected more than 
$343 million for refugee relief and re- 
settlement. The great bulk of these funds 
came from the industrial democracies of 
the West and Japan; the United States 
alone contributed more than $90 million. 
Yet these funds are inadequate to the 
task at hand. 

• Countries of first asylum like Thai- 
land, Pakistan, and Somalia, are increas- 
ingly hard-put to stretch their resources 
to accommodate refugees. 

• Today, as large refugee populations 
swamp the inadequate machinery for 
dealing with them, more than 1 million 
refugees worldwide languish in camps 
and holding centers. They live under con- 
ditions that range from desperate to 
barely adequate. 

And the United States especially has 
felt the impact of these recent refugee 
waves. 

• In the past 5 years, our nation has 
received more than 600,000 refugees for 



resettlement — a number that dwarfs the 
figure for any other country. 

• This year alone, we have received 
some 125,000 unexpected Cuban entrants 
in a swift and sudden influx between May 
and September 

Let me say here that the role of in- 
stitutions like the American Lutheran 
Chui-ch in this effort is not simply 
worthwhile; it is crucial. In the past few 
years your church and its individual con- 
gregations have sponsored more than 
35,000 refugees for resettlement. No one 
can compile statistics to quantify the end- 
less compassion, the numberless acts of 
love and generosity that mark this effort; 
they are beyond all counting. It is part of 



We arc a nation of immi- 
grants and their sons and 
datigliters: No nation with such a 
history can ti(rn its back on its 
own traditioyis without losing 
so)uethi)ig of its soul. 



my purpose today to thank you person- 
ally — you and all those like you across 
America who have done this service to 
your nation and to these people in need. 
I also want to thank the citizens of 
Minnesota and the six Midwestern States 
who have extended their hospitality, their 
patience, and their resources to settle 
thousands of I'efugees over the past few 
years. 

Practical Burdens 

The practical burdens of helping refugees 
establish new lives in the United States 
are, as you know, enormous. The sheer 
numbers of recent years and the unpre- 
dictability of recent refugee waves have 
made careful planning difficult. They 
have given our national refugee programs 
an air of permanent emergency. The 
arrival of unorganized boat flotillas from 
Cuba over a short span of weeks last 
spring made it necessary, for example, to 
press widely scattered military reserva- 
tions into sudden service as receiving 
centers. 

Our social service progi'ams — na- 
tional, State, and local — have been hard 



31 



The Secretary 



7 




Afghan refugees at Pishin Camp, Pakistan 



pressed by this sudden surge of refugees. 
In the fiscal year which ended last 
month, the Department of Health and 
Human Services devoted more than .$600 
million to refugee activities — $36 million 
of which had to be requested in emer- 
gency supplemental legislation. And the 
State and local social-service machinery' of 
Florida — to name the most affected State 
— has been severely tested by the influx 
of Cuban and Haitian entrants. 

You who have served in refugee 
sponsorship programs know the challenge 
of finding jobs in stressful economic times 
for refugees who may not speak English 
and whose skills may not be readily 
transferable to our job market. 

Perhaps because of such problems, 
public opinion is not always receptive to 
large waves of refugees and immigi'ants. 
This was ti-ue earlier in this centurv', and 
it is true today. For all too many of our 
citizens, the first impulse upon facing 
such problems is to pull up the bridge and 
lock the gates. I was disturbed, for 
example, to read the results of a recent 
poll, mentioned in the current issue of 
Foreign Affairs. It showed only 19% of 
respondents in favor of increasing the 
number of refugees received by the 
United States; 80% favored actually re- 
ducing the number of legal immigrants 
who can enter our country each year. 

I find it easy to understand such 
frustration. But we must keep in mind 
that this question of refugees is one 
whose moral dimension is as compelling 
as its practical aspect. It is a question 
which penetrates to the heart of our his- 
tory- as a nation of immigrants and to the 
heart of our purpose as a nation which 
cherishes and upholds human rights. 



We are a nation of immigrants and 
their sons and daughters: No nation with 
such a history can turn its back on its 
own traditions without losing something 
of its soul. And no nation which sees itself 
as a champion of human rights can keep 
its credibility unless it is willing to wel- 
come — in the name of human rights — 
those who have been oppressed and 
persecuted. 

For these reasons, I would argue 
that the difficulties we have encountered 
in receiving and resettling refugees are 
difficulties we must face and overcome — 
without reversing our long tradition of 
hospitality to refugees. I would argue 
also what is apparent in our national life: 
that we are richer, stronger, more tal- 
ented and vibrant as a society because we 
welcome refugees and immigrants. Ear- 
lier waves of refugees and immigrants 
brought figures like Einstein and Tosca- 
nini, with their great gifts, to America. I 
have no doubt that recent arrivals, like 
the Indochinese and the Cubans, will 
make similar contributions — contribu- 
tions that will richly justify our nation's 
generosity. 

U.S. Approach 

To agree that we should be open and 
generous, however, is not to say that the 
United States can accept — or should ac- 
cept — unlimited numbers of refugees and 
immigrants or bear unlimited burdens. In 
fact, we cannot. And one of the most 
serious national debates of the next few 
years will be about refugee and immigra- 
tion policy. What limits should we set and 
how? What shall we do about the problem 



9 
lit 



Ivi 



:[« 



of massive unlawful entry into the Unite 
States? How can we balance our tradi- 
tions of openness with practical limits, 
and how can we enforce these limits fairl 
and equitably? How can we assure that 
our refugee and immigration policies are 
free of the taint of racial bias and equita- 
ble to people of all origins? 

Finding answers to such questions 
will not be easy. But I have no doubt thai|i' 
our nation, which is both generous and 
practical, can find answers — and devise 
laws — which bring into balance our 
ideals, our interests, and our capabilitiesi|«ii 
A national commission on immigi-ation 
and refugee policy, chaired by Father 
Theodore Hesburgh of Notre Dame Uni- 
versity, is working toward this end. 

Meanwhile, our government is work | 
ing overtime to deal with refugee prob- 
lems at home and abroad. 

• We have worked closely with Stat 
and local governments, as well as private 
voluntaiy organizations, to minimize the 
disruption to communities and to the live< 
of the refugees themselves. I am proud 
that we have successfully resettled from 
temporaiy camps some 105,000 of the 
nearly 12.5,000 Cubans who have fled to 
the United States since April. 

• We are working to prevent heavy 
concentrations of refugees in already 
hard-pressed communities. To this end, ' i 
the Federal Government has established* 
refugee receiving centers at widely dis- 
persed locations over the countiy, so thai- 
no one State or community need bear to 
heavy a burden. 

• The Department of Health and 
Human Services and its Office of Refuge' 
Resettlement have launched a massive el 
fort to help states and communities with 
the costs of resettling refugees. In this 
fiscal year, for example, the department 
has channeled more than $20 million to 
the State of Minnesota for cash assist- 
ance, medical care, and social services to 
refugee families. And the six Midwestern 
States of this region — Minnesota, Wis- 
consin, Michigan, Illinois, Ohio, and 
Indiana — have received $52 million in 
Federal assistance for refugee progi-ams. 
This is a national challenge to which the 
nation's government is responding. 

• More needs to be done, however, 
to help areas which have borne the brunt 
of refugee emergencies. For that reason, 
the Administration has supported the 
Stone-Fascell proposal before the Con- 
gress to reimburse States and com- 
munities for up to 100% of the cost of 
their refugee relief efforts. 



32 



Department of State Bulleti" 



The Secretary 



• Diplomatically, through the United 
ations and elsewhere, we continue to 
ress the need for broad international ef- 
■rts to deal with refugee problems. We 
ive stressed as well the responsibility of 
1 nations to help in the search for long- 
rni solutions to the political problems 
hich lie behind the global refugee crisis. 

• Here I would also mention the im- 
ii'tance of strong and generous foreign 
sistance efforts. Especially in Africa 

111 Latin America, our efforts to help 
Ivc human problems and build strong 
(iiiKimies can help alleviate the condi- 
1 ms which create refugees. We can 
I hi'r export more of our assistance or 
J port more refugees. 

Which brings me to my final point. 
' timately, we and the world can deal 
Uh the human ti'agedy of refugee mi- 
{ ations only by removing their root 
( jses — by overcoming poverty, by end- 
i i; abuses of human rights within na- 
t ns, by resisting military aggression, 
i 1 by building peace among nations. 

We are a long way from having a 
\ rid that is so just, so humane, so pros- 
I 'ous and stable that no person is forced 
t flee from home and country. But surely 
t ' effort to build such a world deserves 
) ir contribution and mine — and de- 
s 'ves the work of all people who cherish 
h -nan dignity and the sanctity of human 
li. 



U.S. Nuclear 
Strategy 



'Press release 272. 



Statement before the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee on Sep- 
teniher 16, 1980. i 

I am pleased to have this opportunity to 
join Secretary of Defense Harold Brown 
to discuss our nuclear targeting strategy 
with you. When I was a member of this 
coTnmittee, I strongly believed we had a 
responsibility to concern ourselves with 
issues of strategic nuclear policy. Over 
the years, I probed a series of Adminis- 
tration officials and outside experts on 
how changes in our nuclear doctrine, 
forces, and strategy affected our security 
and international stability. I did not leave 
those concerns behind when I became 
Secretary of State. Indeed, it is a central 
part of my responsibilities to insure that 
foreign policy consideration — in the 
broadest sense — are taken into account in 
decisions about defense programs and 
doctrine. 

As Secretary of State, I am particu- 
larly concerned with the ways in which 
our strategic doctrine bears on our over- 
all foreign policy toward our allies and 
adversaries. To support our basic foreign 
policy and national security objectives, 
our nuclear strategy should satisfy the 
following conditions. 

• It should insure that potential ad- 
versaries are fully convinced of our de- 
termination to resist nuclear aggression 
on any scale, at all times, and in all cir- 
cumstances. 

• It should avoid stimulating a cycle 
of superpower misperception and miscal- 
culation that could undermine strategic 
stability. 

• It should be fully consistent with 
our arms control objectives, so that we 
preserve the opportunities to strengthen 
security and stability by means of equita- 
ble and verifiable arms control agree- 
ments. 

• It should encourage and justify the 
willingness of our friends and allies to 
link their security with our own. 

I believe the countervailing strategy 
meets these tests. 

The countervailing strategy under- 
scores and unmistakably communicates to 
the Soviets two fundamental truths. 
First, they could derive no conceivable 
benefit from initiating the use of nuclear 
weapons, no matter how limited or ex- 
tensive the attack and no matter at what 
stage in a conflict they might be 



launched. Second, nuclear conflict cannot 
be an instrument for achieving national 
policy goals, either for us or the Soviet 
Union; there surely will be no victor in a 
nuclear war 

Our strategy and our capability to in- 
flict massive destruction in retaliation 
provide the bases for convincing the 
Soviets of both propositions. The coun- 
tervailing strategy builds on and com- 
plements this traditional doctrine. It en- 
hances our ability to launch selective as 
well as massive retaliatory attacks and to 
cover the full range of targets the Soviets 
value. It makes clear our capacity to re- 
spond to any Soviet nuclear attack — 
whatever its magnitude and form — at an 
appropriate scale, intensity, and focus. 
We have moved in this direction in order 
to insure that the Soviets — whatever 
their notions about nuclear war or the 
utility of nuclear weapons — do not mis- 
takenly conclude they could achieve some 
advantage by initiating the use of nuclear 
weapons or by launching limited strikes. 
As such, the countervailing strategy 
is not a radical departure from previous 
policy. It is rather the result of a gradual 
evolution of our doctrine over a period of 
years in response to changing conditions 
and new knowledge. The credible capac- 
ity to devastate the Soviet Union under 
any circumstances remains its corner- 
stone. Thus, we will continue to include 
the full spectrum of political and military, 
as well as urban-industrial, targets in our 
planning. Presidential Determination 59 
does not signify a shift to a warfighting 
strategy nor to a first-strike doctrine. It 
does underscore — and I believe strength- 
ens — the credibility of our capability 
to retaliate against any nuclear attack 
under any circumstances, be it a mas- 
sive strike against the United States or a 
more limited one against our forces or 
our allies. 

The public reaction of the Soviets is 
what one would expect. They claim the 
countervailing strategy is a warfighting 
strategy and a U.S. effort to achieve a 
first-strike capability that would under- 
mine strategic stability. They also charge 
that Presidential Determination 59 is the 
real explanation for NATO's decision on 
theater nuclear forces (TNF) moderniza- 
tion and reflects a U.S. intent to confine 
any nuclear war to Europe while the 
United States remains immune from at- 
tack. These claims are neither surprising 
nor true. 

But we should expect the Soviets to 
try to use Presidential Determination 59 
to split us from our allies and deprive us 



kember 1980 



33 



The Secretary 



of European support for our post- 
Afghanistan efforts. We can expect the 
Soviets to focus their energies on under- 
mining the NATO consensus in favor of 
TNF modernization. 

These Soviet accusations, in fact, 
ring hollow in view of their own doctrine, 
their attention to nuclear warfighting, 
and the size and character of their stra- 
tegic nuclear forces. Moreover, they have 
never been particularly comfortable with 
what they regard as our "city-killing" phi- 
losophy of nuclear deterrence. I do not 
believe they genuinely regard this evolu- 
tion in our nuclear strategy as a move to 
a first-strike, warfighting doctrine. The 
central purpose of our deterrence policy 
is to underscore the consequences for the 
Soviets if they should ever initiate the 
use of nuclear weapons. 

We want to make sure the Soviets 
get that message. But we also want to in- 
sure that they get the message right. We 
need to remain fully alert to the risks of 
misperception and miscalculation, to the 
danger that the Soviets may see provoca- 
tion where we intend none. I do not want 
anyone to wrongly conclude that we sud- 
denly have become confident about our 
ability to orchestrate nuclear e.xchanges 
and control escalation or that we have be- 
come complacent about the use of nuclear 
weapons. 

We will continue to emphasize to the 
Soviets that our intentions are peaceful 
and that we pose no threat to their 
legitimate security interests. At the same 
time, we will continue to insist that they 
respect the interests and rights of others 
and remind them of the consequences if 
they resort to nuclear weapons. 

In this connection, I need hardly add 
that we do not regard the countervailing 
strategy as in any way a substitute for 
arms control or as a symptom of disen- 
chantment with the arms control process. 
On the contrary, the countervailing strat- 
egy is fully consistent with the SALT II 
Treaty and our longer term arms control 
objectives. Nothing in the countervailing 
strategy changes or challenges our belief 
that nuclear arms control can make a sig- 
nificant contribution to our security and 
to international stability. Nothing in the 
evolution of our nuclear doctrine has led 
us to reassess the benefits of equitable 
and verifiable arms control agreements 
with our chief adversary. In particular, I 
continue to believe strongly that SALT II 
would make a crucial contribution to our 
national security. We will ask the Senate 
to act on ratification at the earliest feasi- 
ble time. 



The allies share our concern about 
the need to deter the full range of Soviet 
nuclear threats as well as our continued 
commitment to arms control and to the 
maintenance of strategic stability. By 
reinforcing allied confidence in the credi- 
bility of our nuclear guarantee, the coun- 
tervailing strategy will strengthen al- 
liance cohesion and solidarity as well as 
directly reduce the likelihood of conflict. 
The countervailing strategy reflects and 
supports the NATO strategy of flexible 
response by underscoring the availability 
of a full spectrum of nuclear responses. 

We have discussed the evolution of 
our nuclear strategy and its relationship 
to fle.xible response in the normal course 
of consultations with our allies. The de- 
tailed discussion of the countervailing 
strategy in Secretary Brown's annual re- 
port to the Congress last January pro- 
vided an excellent basis for our dialogue 
this year Secretar>' Brown also gave an 
extensive briefing to the NATO Nuclear 
Planning Group this past June. 

In the course of these consultations 
and in the aftermath of press reports 
about Presidential Determination .59, the 
allies have indicated they understand the 
countervailing strategy and appreciate 
the ways in which it strengthens the U.S. 
strategic linkage to their security. I do 
not want to leave the impression that we 
take their support for granted: It has to 
be earned and then protected in the face 
of Soviet efforts to undermine alliance 
solidarity. I do want to emphasize, how- 
ever, that the allied leaders appreciate 
the rationale behind the countervailing 
strategy. I am confident that, in the 
course of our continuing consultations, 
their support will be sustained. 

Nuclear strategy and doctrine are 
properly sober subjects. This should not, 
however, obscure the important positive 
contribution that the countervailing 
strategy makes to our most basic foreign 
policy objectives. 

I am confident that the countervail- 
ing strategy not only strengthens deter- 
rence but also establishes a firmer basis 
for our diplomacy with the Soviets. It 
underlines our determination to respond 
to any challenges to our vital interests, at 
the same time it confirms that we pose no 
threat to the legitimate interests of other 
states. As such, it leaves the Soviets no 
room for doubt about our will or our 
peaceful intentions. 

The countervailing strategy, of 
course, will not transform the basically 
adversarial relationship we have with the 
Soviets. But it reduces the chances for 
superpower miscalculation and increases 



Soviet incentives to cooperate on manag 
ing and containing the competition be- 
tween us. It therefore contributes to the 
prospects for reaching arms control 
agreements that limit the dangers of wai 

F'or like reasons, the countervaihng 
strategy reaffirms to our allies and 
friends that the United States is commit 
ted — in equal measure — to protecting oi 
mutual security interests and to interna- 
tional stability. I expect it will serve to 
solidify our relationship with them and t 
strengthen our role as leader of the West 
ern alliance. 

Let me conclude my opening state- 
ment by briefly addressing the question 
of the involvement of the State Depart- 
ment and the Secretary of State in the 
formulation of the countervailing strat- 
egy. I have carefully reviewed the recorc 
I have concluded that Secretary Vance 
and the State Department were involvec 
as the major concepts of the pohcy were 
being developed and were in a position t 
make their views known. 

The development of the main lines c 
the strategy was substantially complete! 
well before I took office, and it had al- 
ready been outlined in public statements 
especially in Secretary Brown's January 
1980 report to the Congress. Given my 
Senate responsibilities, I was, of course 
aware of the direction of the Administra 
tion's strategic thinking. In fact, I had 
addressed some of the same concerns an 
concepts in a speech I delivered last yea;' 

That said, the preparation and is- 
suance of a presidential determination 
that codifies our nuclear strategy is itsel 
an important action that has a significan 
foreign ])olicy dimension. It, therefore, 
clear that I, as Secretary of State, and 
the State Department should have been 
appropriately involved in the action. 

I consider the situation that devel- 
oped here to be an unintended exception 
to this Administration's record of sub- 
stantially increased State Department ins 
volvement in national security issues. I 
have discussed this episode with the 
President as well as with Secretary 
Brown and Dr Brzezinski [Zbigniew 
Brzezinski, Assistant to the President fo: 
National Security Affairs]. The Presidem 
has assured me that I and others at the 
Department as needed will be fully con- 
sulted on the foreign policy implications 
of such major national security policy de 
cisions. 



' Press release 259. The complete trai 
script of the hearings will be published by 
the committee and will be available from 
the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. 
Government Printing Office, Washington, 
D.C. 20402. ■ 



til 



34 



Department of State BulletM 



The Secretary 



The Challenge 
>f Peace 



Secrctaru Miiskie's addresx at 
'titrr Dame Uiilremiti/ hi Suiitli Bend, 
itliniia, oil October 11. 19S0J 

'act' is the absence of war among na- 
jiis. But it is much more. Nations are 
.niposed of people. Meaningful peace 
ust also be found in their lives. A nation 
hose government lives peacefully with 
^ neighbors but wars on its owti people 
not a nation at peace. 

Preserving the working for peace is 
us a challenge of extraordinaiy com- 
exity. Alexander Hamilton once WTote 
at hostility among nations is caused by 
eir love of power or their desire for 
eeminence and dominion; the compe- 
ions of commerce; or the personal at- 
L'hments, enmities, interests, hopes, 
(1 fears of national leaders. 

Human nature has changed little in 
e 200 years since. But human technol- 
y has changed dramatically. And today 
ace has never been more fragile. It can 
destroyed, and with it our collective 
ture, in the miscalculation of a single 
iment. 

To preserve peace, and to expand it, 
iuires more than our best efforts. We 
t'd also to understand the ways in 
lich a peace is built and the ways in 
lich it can be shattei'ed. There is no 
ulit that in a dangerous world, the first 
luirement of peace is militaiy strength 
• the sti'ength to assure our allies and 
■ ter our adversaries; the strength to 
event attack or, if necessary, to defeat 
the strength to resist coercion. 

But too many voices would have us 
lieve that militaiy power in itself can 
(itect our interests and bring order to 
umiily world. So much more is 
eded. Peace also requires prudence. It 
gained through patient and persistent 
Kjlomatic efforts. And it is secured 
i-( lugh human progress. Let me tell you 
: ly each is so important. 

Slitary Preparedness 

|ie bedrock of our security is most cer- 
nly our militaiy strength and the 
ength of our alliances. We live in a 
rd world which requires hard meas- 

For almost two decades, our princi- 
[ adversaiy, the Soviet Union, has been 
[lilding its militaiy strength by 4% or 
ore eveiy year. Yet for much of that 
|!riod, American defense expenditures 
fcreased. 

President Carter has reversed that 



decline. We ai-e now cariying out the 
most comprehensive militaiy moderniza- 
tion program since the early 1960s. 

Each element of our strategic nu- 
clear forces is being sharply improved to 
make sure that we can deter any level or 
kind of nuclear attack. The new Trident 
submarine and Ti-ident missile will dra- 
matically increase the firepower of our 
undei-water nuclear forces. The area of 
the ocean in which they can hide will ex- 
pand tenfold. The new mobile MX missile 
will render any plan for a disabling first 
strike against the United States even 
more hopeless than it already is. Our 
bomber forces, with new air-launched 
cruise missiles, will be able to remain 
safely beyond the range of Soviet de- 
fenses and deliver massive explosive 
force with extraordinaiy accuracy. 

We are strengthening our other ca- 
pabilities as w^ell. We are enhancing the 
preparedness of our gi'ound forces; 
modernizing our tactical air forces; build- 
ing a lai'ger and more capable navy; in- 
creasing our sea and airlift capabilities so 
we can respond more quickly to emergen- 
cies wherever they arise. And with the 
leadership of Birch Bayh as chairman of 
the Senate Select Committee on Intelli- 
gence, America's intelligence resources 
are being strengthened. 

Our alliances are growing stronger. 
Through American leadership the NATO 
alliance is committed to a new defense 
improvement program, to an annual 3% 
increase in defense expenditures, to 
modernize our theater nuclear forces 
in Europe. The United States also seeks 
to strengthen the alliance by supporting 
strongly the early reintegration of Greek 
militaiy forces into NATO. 

Plainly, any notion that we are ne- 
glecting our defense posture is absurd. 
American and allied military forces — 
today — are a match for any adversary or 
combination of adversaries. And through 
these new progi'ams, our forces will re- 
main that way, despite the Soviet 
buildup. Our defenses will remain the 
foundation of peace. 

But as we do what is necessary to 
protect ourselves, let us not be so blinded 
by the importance of power that we 
forget w^hat else is necessary to build a 
more peaceful world. 

Prudent Policies 

First, we need the perspective of pru- 
dence. It is prudent to make sure that 
our purposes are clear. We are deter- 
mined to defend our vital interests — in 
Europe, in Asia, in the Middle East and 
Persian Gulf, in this hemisphere. But we 
must be clear — to ourselves and to others 



— that we seek no dominion, no control 
over the affairs of other peoples. 

Nor must we pretend that we can re- 
capture the military superiority we once 
held ovei' the Soviet Union. Such 
superiority may sound gi'and in speeches. 
But the Soviets will no more allow us to 
gain such a position than we will allow it 
to them. A search for superiority would 
simply create a massive, dangerous new 
arms race. Peace lies in maintaining a 
prudent balance. 

It is this sense of prudence that 
should also lead us to ratify the SALT II 
Treaty and pursue further balanced arms 
control agreements. What piiident person 
would want a world without SALT? 

• A world in which the Soviets can 
deploy 750 more nuclear weapons sys- 
tems that allowed under the treaty; 

• A world without restraints on the 
number of nuclear weapons each of those 
missiles and bombers carries; 

• A world where we have to spend 
tens of billions of dollars on nuclear 
weapons that could go to our conventional 
forces — or to the needs of human beings 
in this countiy and abroad; 

• A world of greater tension be- 
tween the United States and the Soviet 
Union. 

I think the answer is clear. That is 
why we will seek ratification of the 
SALT II Ti-eaty as soon as possible next 
year. And that is why we must always 
make it clear to the Soviet Union that 
while we will continue to oppose aggres- 
sion in Afghanistan or elsewhere — and 
we will — our purpose is to help establish 
patterns of mutual restraint that allow an 
improved relationship between us. We 
and the Soviets, as the two superpowers, 
have a responsibihty to all humankind: 
Even as we compete, we must always be 
willing to pursue, as well, the works of 
peace. 

Peace also depends on the prudence 
of statesmen w^hen conflicts erapt — when 
crises require cool thinking as well as 
strength. At such times, we need to 
understand that the use of force is a last 
resort. Our first recourse must be to the 
instiuments of diplomacy. 

And we need to be clear on the dif- 
ference between threats to our vital 
interests and foreign internal strife that 
may affect our interests but is not suscep- 
tible to the use of American force. Amer- 
ican forces are in the Persian Gulf, for 
example, to defend vital interests of the 
United States and our allies in the region. 
They are not there to interfere in the 
domestic affairs of any nation. 

I raise this point because the air is 



Dvember 1980 



35 



The Secretary 



now filled with after-the-fact prescrip- 
tions of belligerence. We are told that 
greater American niilitaiy might could 
have prevented the course of events in 
Iran or in Nicaragua. But the fact is that 
in the world as it is, American militaiy 
forces cannot provide a satisfaetoiy solu- 
tion to the internal problems of other na- 
tions. If we tried to order the affairs of 
other nations by force, we would be 
endlessly at war all over the globe. And 
how would we then differ from the Soviet 
Union and its actions in Afghanistan or 
Ethiopia? 

In dealing with disputes both among 
and within nations, our wisest course is 
to work to resolve crises before they 
erupt — through patient and persistent 
diplomacy and through support for 
human progress. 

Peace Among Nations 

Today, the people of Israel and Eg>'pt live 
in gi-eater security than at any point in a 
generation. Certainly, both face threats 
from beyond their borders. But they live 
at peace with each other 

The Camp David accord that pro- 
duced this historic peace treaty was an 
act of courage and statesmanship by 
President Sadat and Prime Minister Be- 
gin. And especially, it was the pi'oduct of 
President Carter's determined, persis- 
tent efforts to find a formula that could 
encompass the concerns of both sides. 

Now, we are engaged in the ne.xt 
step — negotiations on the fimdamental 
issues of a comprehensive peace in the 
area. Progress has been slow. It will con- 
tinue to be. But there is progi'ess. The 
talks continue. There can be more prog- 
ress, if we persist. 

In this region, and in others, we 
must recall the words of John F. Kennedy 
"We can push a button to start the next 
war," he reminded us, "but there is no 
push-button magic to bring a just and 
lasting peace." That peace will only come 
if we are as patient as we are determined; 
if we are steady in our course, because it 
is the only course that offers practical 
progress. 

Peace Within Nations 

We must also recognize the unbreakable 
connection between peace and human 
progi-ess. A nation cannot be at peace if 
its people are not at peace — if their polit- 
ical, economic, and social rights are not 
protected and advanced. No person who 
cherishes his or her own rights can rest 
comfortably when the cancer of discrimi- 
nation persists or spreads, as we have 



seen recently with an alarming increase 
in ugly incidents of anti-Semitism in vari- 
ous countries. This is a development that 
all people of decency deplore. It is a de- 
nial of the most fundamental human 
rights. 

There is a veiy practical connection 
between human rights and our own secu- 
rity. People around the world are demand- 
ing that they see in their own lives the 
benefits of national economic growth. In 
many countries, they are insisting on 
greater participation in the affairs of 
their governments. These are facts. We 
welcome them for they match our own 
national traditions. 

These demands for progress are de- 
mands for change — demands that can 
create instability. But when they go un- 
met, governments can lose legitimacy in 
the eyes of their people. Vicious cycles of 
violence and repression and radicalism 
are too often the result. 

This is why no one should auto- 
matically equate stability and the status 
quo. We must come to grips with the cur- 
rents of change in the world. Contrast, 
for a moment, the peace within such 
democratic nations as Costa Rica, the 
Dominican Republic, Peru, Nigeria, and 
Ghana to the events we have seen in 
Iran and Nicaragua, where repression 
and economic inequities led to an agony of 
violence. It is, therefore, in our national 
interest to support human rights and de- 
mocracy. 

Nowhere, in recent years, has the 
wisdom of this approach — the direct con- 
nection between peace and progi'ess — 
been better demonstrated than in our 
policies toward Rhodesia. Despite the 
pressures in this country' to support the 
minority regime there. President Carter 
held firm for a settlement based on free 
elections and racial justice. Because of 
the efforts of many nations, such a 
settlement was achieved. And today, 
after free elections, the new nation of 
Zimbabwe knows more peace than any- 
one had imagined possible. Our challenge 
now is to support the economic, human 
progi'ess there that can preserve this 
peace in the years to come. 

Conclusion 

Every American cherishes peace. In such 
difl'icult and complex times, it is not sur- 
prising that there are different views on 
how peace is to be nurtured and pre- 
served. Here is what I believe. 

• Peace is hard. It will require great 
sacrifice and courage in the years ahead 
— the strength to deter aggression and 
the wall to tend to our defenses. 

• Peace is also fragile. Without pru- 
dence it can easily be shattered. Without 



care and patience and steadiness, its web 
cannot be spun. 

• And peace is a human condition, 
not merely the technical absence of war 
among nations. So long as injustice 
exists, peace will only hold if there is con- 
stant, visible, tangible human progress. 

I believe that on our understanding 
and application of these points will de- 
pend our nation's contribution to peace in 
the difficult decade ahead and thus our 
own future safety and success. 



1 Press release 282. 



News Conferences 
in New York 



SEPT. 25, 19801 

I assume you have distributed the an- 
nouncement we have on the TNF [thea- 
ter nuclear forces] talks. ^ 

Let me say with respect to the 
Gromyko meeting that Mr. Gromyko 
emphasized the importance of complete 
confidentiality, of being able to speak 
freely, and I don't want to prejudice thi 
dialogue which ought to continue. So I 
am going to have to be cagier than I 
usually am about that, and I may even 
be noncommunicative. We did not cover 
as many subjects as I thought we 
might, which suggests that we dis- 
cussed some of them more comprehen- 
sively than I had expected we might. 
It was, I think — both sides were 
relaxed — a hard-hitting discussion. One 
recalls the two speeches we made to the<i 
General Assembly. One would expect 
them to be hard-hitting but not abusive^ 
in any sense — verbally abusive or 
physically. I think it was a chance for 
both of us to get points before the other 
that we found disturbing, and we did 
so, both using frankness and candor to 
make clear the depth of our concerns 
about the other's policies and actions. 

Q. Can you address yourself more 
than you did in the statement outside 
the Soviet mission this morning about 
we're both neutral to how the two of 
you approached the Iraqi-Iranian 
problem and where either our indi- 
vidual efforts or their individual ef- 
forts or our collaborative efforts 
stand at trying to defuse that fight- 
ing? 

A. Since I opened up that subject 
that much, I ought to say this much 
more about it lest there be some confu- 
sion. We really each stated what we 



f 



36 



Department of State Bulletin, 



The Secretary 



id publicly about our positions. 

Ours is clear, that we are neutral in 
lis matter, that we think urgently that 
16 hostilities should cease, and that 
16 parties take their differences to the 
egotiating table. We welcome a meet- 
ig of the Security Council to support 
ich for the purpose of calling for 
;ase-fire negotiations and also to pur- 
le our respective diplomatic channels 
) seek to influence both Iraq and Iran 
any way we can — our influence in 
•an is obviously limited — to influence 
lem to implement a cease-fire. Mr. 
romyko stated their position which is 
milar: It did not respond to or reject 
16 Security Council or the diplomatic 
'fensive idea. Whether as events un- 
Id, we do pursue parallel lines, only 
me will tell. 

Q. Since the Soviet Union is the 
irgest supplier of arms to Iraq and 
nee, therefore, presumably it would 
ive some leverage by stating its neu- 
ality, in effect, the Soviets are al- 
wing the fighting to continue, 
'ley 're not exerting a positive influ- 
iice and, therefore, in effect they are 
king sides on the side of Iraq. Is 
1 at a correct analysis? 

A. I think there are competing 
. alyses, but I don't think it is useful 
r me to get into them. I think you 
I ght to take that up with Mr. 
t'omyko. 

Q. Let me put it another way. 
'ould you have preferred that the 
liviets become less neutral and fall in 
Ihind the U.N. effort? 

A. The problem of undertaking to 
iluence the course of action other 
(Lintries may take in this situation, 
jien the pressures they may feel in 
lis situation, can be a counterproduc- 
te proposition. 

I stated my view to Mr. Gromyko 
; 1 did my government's view, which is 
1,' view, because I regarded that as 
ipresenting the maximum that I 
sould do in trying to influence his ac- 
tais. His actions he'll decide. I don't 
tink it is useful for me to try to 
teulate beyond what he said to me. 

Q. Trying to conceive, trying to 
iiagine what advantage the Soviets 
" )uld gain from the war ending, if we 
1 n assume there's a lot we have to 
ise — or the West has to lose — in the 
' ir continuing, from your point of 
' 'w what possible interest do they 
I ve in helping to end the war? Why 
: ould they? Where do they stand to 
■ic if the war continues? We stand to 
se, the West stands to lose oil 



supplies. What do they stand to lose? 

A. The whole world stands to lose 
in this area, which is such an unstable 
area, so potentially explosive. Hos- 
tilities erupt which could escalate. It 
could even escalate to the point where 
the ultimate, unthinkable hostilities 
may take place. 

We have discussed the Middle East 
in these terms since the invention of the 
nuclear weapon, and we have always 
regarded the Middle East as the most 
sensitive and the most unstable area, 
therefore the most dangerous. I doubt 
that the Russians have lost that percep- 
tion. I am sure we haven't. And the 
whole Middle East conflict has been put 
in this context. Nobody gains. That's 
the way in which it ought to be viewed. 
Nobody gains. I don't believe even the 
Iraqis and the Iranians have gained 
from the outbreak of hostilities of this 
kind. If that isn't the perception, then I 
don't understand why there appears to 
be widespread understanding in this in- 
stitution that action ought to be taken, 
although there is reluctance about tak- 
ing the initiative. Nevertheless, there 
is widespread understanding. It must 
be there's widespread appreciation of 
the fact that nobody, including the 
Soviet Union, gains from the continua- 
tion of these hostilities. 

Q. Can't the Soviets gain by frag- 
mentation of Iran? Isn't there some 
dividend in that for them, that and, of 
course, isn't there for us? 

A. I don't believe they've gained 
very much at this point from their in- 
tervention in Afghanistan. And, if the 
situation that has developed is tempt- 
ing them into a similar situation, you 
know they have already had a world 
reaction to their Afghanistan interven- 
tion. Would it be in their interest — I 
doubt it — to confirm that the world's 
interpretation of their intervention in 
Afghanistan is justified? 

Q. If the premise is that the Soviet 
Union sees the danger of escalation in 
that part of the world as clearly as we 
do and that their views of noninter\en- 
tion and neutrality are parallel with 
our own, why shouldn't it be compara- 
tively easy to achieve a joint statement 
to that effect which would have consid- 
erable effect — a joint Soviet-American 
statement that neither side will inter- 
vene and that there should be no other 
intervention in Iran, that a cease-fire 
should take place, should be encour- 
aged between Iran and Iraq? We seem 
to be operating through a pane of glass. 

A. That's true. I'm learning, as 
perhaps you are, that that's the nature 



of this institution. It operates through 
panes of plate glass. 

But, with respect to your sugges- 
tion, in the first place our position in 
this conflict is a very delicate and sensi- 
tive one given our problem in Iran. 
Their perception, at least as they have 
announced it, of our involvement in it is 
totally false and unfounded. Neverthe- 
less, for us to be perceived as taking an 
initiative, which if executed at a given 
moment would find them at a disadvan- 
tage, surely would not be helpful to our 
interests. How the Soviets might inter- 
pret the impact of their joining in such 
an initiative, I would not undertake to 
define. But there is that problem. We 
are not in a position to take the lead 
here at this point. That's not misun- 
derstood around here. So we're under- 
taking to move as we have for so long 
now in the Iranian situation — quietly, 
through diplomatic channels and pri- 
vate consultations, to achieve our ob- 
jectives. We can't do it by beating the 
drum or shouting from the rooftops. 

Q. Will you be meeting Mr. 
Gromyko again or will he be going to 
Washington to discuss this with the 
President? 

A. No. This morning's meeting 
went beyond the time that was sched- 
uled so that each of us could raise what 
we regarded as the highest priority 
items. If there had been others, I think 
we would have continued longer. There 
was the possibility that we might have 
adjourned to come back this afternoon 
if we hadn't finished. 

Q. You've now had two meetings 
with Mr. Gromyko over several 
months' period. How would you now 
describe the state of relations? 

A. I think our two speeches to the 
General Assembly do that. We each 
find fault — serious fault — with the 
other's policies to the point where we 
each question the other's intentions and 
have doubts about it. Yet I think it's 
important that we are able to express 
those questions and doubts to each 
other face-to-face, to do it in a reason- 
able, if hardened, way. We've slipped 
back from the days of maximum ac- 
commodation as a result of Afghanistan 
from our point of view, and as a result 
of U.S. actions which they identify as a 
cause of their disillusionment. And it's 
going to be a slow process to climb out 
of it, to climb back up to a more normal 
relationship. We both, I think, indi- 
cated today that that is our objective. 
Each of us would prefer normal re- 
lationships. But we see problem A, B, 



wember 1980 



37 



The Secretary 



and C stand in the way of acquiring ac- 
tion by the other, and this is basically 
the nature of the discussion. We cannot 
influence changes in policy on the other 
side in one discussion or two. That has 
never been the nature of the discus- 
sions between the Soviet Union and the 
United States, even in the most halcyon 
days. 

Q. Is it correct that the United 
States wanted and would like to see 
an urgent Security Council meeting, 
and is it correct that the Soviet Union 
doesn't want it? 

A. I don't believe either of those 
formulations is a precise statement. 

Q. How would you answer it? 

A. By asking me to respond to your 
formulation of our position would put 
me in one of two uncomfortable posi- 
tions. If I were to say yes, I can see the 
headlines now putting us out front. If I 
was to say no, then I can see the head- 
lines saying the United States doesn't 
want a Security Council meeting. 
There's no way for me to answer that 
question. 

I have already stated what our po- 
sition is. I said that we cannot be out 
front at this point. We are supporting 
the idea of a Security Council meeting. 
We are working hard at undertaking to 
encourage it. But we think the initia- 
tive has to come as a result of what I 
think is a A'idespread consensus here 
in the General Assembly that that's 
what ought to come. And I do not be- 
lieve from the reports I get that the 
Soviets are resisting it. It's when you 
put adjectives in front of these things 
that I have trouble with your questions. 

Q. Did Gromyko lay down any cir- 
cumstances, ground rules, or condi- 
tions under which the Soviet Union 
would participate in the Security Coun- 
cil action or resolution? 

A. We didn't go beyond what I've 
already told you. 

Q. Did you get in any discussion 
at all of contingencies should the gulf 
be closed to tanker traffic? 

A. We did not. 

Q. Then the subject didn't come 
up? Either from you or — 

A. In our general discussion we 
stated conditions here in this area of 
the world in general. We identified the 
sensitive areas in an overview sort of 
way, including this one. Obviously, in 
the two discussions I have had with 
him, Afghanistan, because of its geog- 
raphy related to the gulf, is the reason 



why we're concerned. So that point was 
repeated, and I don't think the repeti- 
tion necessarily related to this, but ob- 
viously it had a connection with the 
present hostilities. 

Q. Actually, what I'm trying to 
find is whether you attempted to 
make clear to him the seriousness 
with which the United States regards 
keeping open the free navigation. 

A. Oh, yes. Well— 

Q. [Inaudible] 

A. You reporters ask code ques- 
tions, too, as well as we give code an- 
swers. But obviously this is a sensitive 
area of the world and was in May in 
Vienna, not only because there's oil 
here but because there are sea lanes 
that carry it to the outside world. That 
is the geopolitical fact in this area. But 
if what you are trying to get out of me 
with that question is whether or not we 
specifically discussed particular threats 
involved in these hostilities to the gulf, 
then no. 

Q. Can you describe what you and 
Prince Sa'ud [of Saudi Arabia] talked 
about, and why the meeting was moved 
up? I mean, did they have an obvious 
concern about the hostilities that are 
going on? Did he want us to do some- 
thing or did you want him to do some- 
thing or did you just discuss the general 
state of affairs out there? 

A. I assume he came here because 
there was action here that affects his 
country. And his previously scheduled 
visit was scheduled at a time when that 
action hadn't occurred. But we didn't 
discuss why he came. I rather under- 
stood why, and he rather understood 
that he didn't have to explain. But with 
respect to what we discussed, that's 
confidential. He asked me to keep it 
confidential. It is confidential. 

Q. Did the Saudi King today en- 
dorse Iraq? Did you two discuss that? 
The wires are reporting that King 
Khalid said that Saudi Arabia is fully 
supportive of Iraq. 

A. Having said that the conversa- 
tion was confidential, there's no way I 
could answer your question. 

Q. Is there any other way you can 
verify that for us outside of this chan- 
nel? 

A. No. 

Q. Maybe we can ask about a New 
Y^ork Times article that says here that 
most Arabs at the United Nations 
favor an Iraqi victory? That's the 



headline. Do you get that impression? 

A. I find it very misleading to draw 
my intelligence from newspaper head- 
lines. 



Q. No. I'm trying to make it con- 
venient for you to share your intelli 
gence with us. 

A. And if my intelligence were 
shareable with the Neiv York Times 
headlines, it wouldn't be intelligence. 






Q. Are we concerned that the 
Arabs are going to get themselves 
lined up behind Iraq and thereby 
make it more difficult to resolve the 
Iraqi-Iranian issue because the poten 
tial — at least Islamic mediators are 
all lined up behind Iraq — and is therfl 
any hope for some kind of Islamic 
peacekeeping effort out there? 

A. It's never useful to assume the 
worst. People can be for one side or 
another in a conflict — and still the con- 
flict is a bad thing in and of itself — and 
seek to end it. It's different in a football 
game. A football game is fun to watch 
whether you are for one side or the other- 
but not a war. 

Q. Can you tell us what you have 
talked about with your Western col- 
leagues in connection with assuring tht: 
security, the best you can. of the Strai 
of Hormuz and the gulf and traffic 
through it? 

A. We've shared our perception of 
the seriousness of the matter. As a mat- 
ter of fact, the EC [European Com- 
munities] Nine communique clearly iden- 
tifies their concern and matches our owti. 

Q. What about doing something 
about it? I mean, there has been a lot<i 
of talk of contingency plans, on con- 
sultations on contingencies for de- 
fense and international naval forces 
and the rest. What is there to all this, 
if anything? 

A. There are at least three levels ot 
which obviously anyone in a position of' 
responsibility needs to consider a 
problem of this kind. One, what are thei 
possible options? At that level one con- 
siders — sometimes considers — ideas 
that are viable and ideas that are not. 
It's not particularly useful if one wants t 
constructive, creative dialogue to re^ 
veal necessarily the range of ideas that I 
are discussed at that level. 

The next level of discussion in- 
volves a narrow list of options usually, 
but on an as-if basis. In other words, I 
think it's inappropriate and negative to 



I' 



38 



Department of State Bulletirl 



The Secretary 



e talking in many cases about possible 
ctions that might be taken in situa- 
ons which have not yet occurred. 

And then finally there's the de- 
isionmaking level of which circum- 
;ances may have evolved to the point 
here some action is needed. I just 
jally don't think it's useful to speculate 
[1 the first two levels. 

Q. Can you talk about the TNF 
usiness? Is there somethinK more 
lan just that announcement? Is 
lerc an agreement on what weapons 
/stems can be discussed? 

A. I think what will happen — as 

ni know, the U.S. position is that the 
ibject of discussion ought to be long- 
inge theater nuclear missiles. The 
]viet position is that we ought to dis- 
iss medium-range theater nuclear 
eapons in organic connection with 
rward-based systems. I think this an- 
luncement indicates that each side 
ill jjresent its view of what the scope 
the discussions ought to be. 
Q. Has presented it already? 

A. No, will. This is not a substan- 
I'e discussion. 

Q. Was there an occasion at to- 
ly's meeting where these two well- 
lown positions were restated? 

A. Of course. It was on that basis 
at this formulation was agreed to so 
at it's clearly open to each side to 
ess whatever case it wishes to press, 
other words there's no point in try- 
g to achieve a partial agreement in 
vance as a precondition. The talks 
)uldn't have started. 

So what we've said to each other is, 
! )k, we can make our arguments after 

■ e talks start; and that's what will 

1 ppen. What progress will be made 
1 mains to be seen. We both thought it 
' IS important to get the talks started, 
I begin to get the tires gripping, and 
( see where we go. This is an impor- 
'nt agreement in my judgment. I think 
1 identifies the fact that both sides, 
( en at a time of relatively deteriorated 
ilationships, agree on the importance 
' arms control. That's a very impor- 
•nt point to make. Just how far we 
jve from this is a question. How this 
ight affect SALT II ratification is a 
i-estion. And you ought not to forget 

■ at both sides in their formulations of 
e issue that ought to be discussed 

re have related it in different ways to 
e ratification of SALT II. So that 
I'll if we should reach agreement in 



this area on limitations on some sys- 
tems, implementation of that agree- 
ment will rest on ratification of 
SALT II. 

Q. Awhile ago you referred to the 
possibility that if this conflict in the 
Persian Gulf continued, it might 
eventually get to the final unthinka- 
ble. Looking back on what you 
learned in the past few days and in 
your discussion today, do you feel 
that at least at this point things be- 
tween the two of us — the two sides 
that have the power of this final 
unthinkable — are going along about 
as can be expected at this stage, and 
do you see a tangible danger rather 
than a general philosophical danger 
of this crisis moving toward that kind 
of a final point? 

A. No, I do not at this point see 
any tangible danger. I don't know 
whether I would want to use that par- 
ticular phraseology. But your thought I 
would agree with; that is, that we must 
always worry, especially in this kind of 
area, that a minor — this isn't minor — 
that a conflict of this kind might esca- 
late to a war. I don't think that's going 
to happen on the basis of my present 
perceptions of the attitudes of the 
member nations and my perception of 
attitudes of the Soviet Union and our- 
selves and on the perception that I 
gather that all nations see a need for a 
cease-fire and/or limitation of this war. 
So I think that at this moment, at this 
point, I do not see that danger as mate- 
rializing. If that changes, then we have 
different — 

Q. You mentioned the three levels 
of responsibility. Did you mean to 
suggest that the — you said that the 
first two weren't proper subjects for 
speculation. Do you mean to say that 
what is operating now in those two 
levels are not in the third level of de- 
cision? 

A. All we've had in the gulf up to 
this point — and on this I'm not up to 
speed on the latest intelligence; I may 
not be — is, first, that Iran declared the 
waters within its 12-mile limit a war 
zone, with the result of a dramatic es- 
calation of insurance rates which itself 
is an inhibition on shipping. Secondly, 
the Iranians have gone so far as to hail 
a couple of ships to ascertain their des- 
tination and cargo, seeking presumably 
to create uncertainty that would inhibit 
other shipping. 

Those two actions which are 
known, if no more, would operate as a 
restraint on shipping. Obviously that's 



not sufficient to generate — to trig- 
ger — a military response. So you have 
to watch what happens. The Iranians 
may go no further than they have gone. 
That's what I'm saying. And so we're 
watching carefully their ability to go 
beyond that. One ought not to escalate 
the e.xpectations of what might happen 
or what the response ought to be, be- 
cause to indulge in that speculation 
sometimes has the force of a self- 
fulfilling prophecy. 

Q. Do you mean to leave us with 
the impression that out of this meet- 
ing today there was no kind of agree- 
ment by the two of us to work to- 
gether on any sort of effort to make 
peace between Iraq and Iran? 

A. One never knows. By sharing 
views, sometimes two people follow 
parallel courses of action without 
reaching agreement; that is one of the 
possible benefits of ongoing dialogue. 
But in the present state of relations be- 
tween us, reaching e.xplicit agreements 
involves a lot of it and requires time- 
consuming discussions that may not be 
productive, so you do the best you can. 
But here, at this point, I'm not going to 
try to prejudge what the Soviets' posi- 
tion is or what ours is with respect to 
whatever actions may or may not be 
taken by the Security Council. I'm sim- 
ply indicating that both have started 
out so far as I know from similar posi- 
tions. And what particular tactics or 
means each uses to implement positions 
taken, we'll have to wait to see. 

Q. Are you ruling out the possi- 
bility that the Soviets were behind 
what is happening, that, in fact, they 
were the incitement behind the 
Iraqis? 

A. I have no evidence to suggest 
that they're behind the Iraqis. 

Q. There's an Iraqi thing floating 
around that Bazargan — that the Ira- 
nians, through Bazargan — are of- 
fering to release the hostages for 
spare parts. The Iraqis are putting 
that out. And I wondered if you 
wanted to escalate it to a Secretary of 
State denial? Have you got a message 
from Iran? 

A. No such message has been re- 
ceived, and no answer to a nonmessage 
has been given. 

Q. On Poland? 

A. I had a meeting with the Polish 
Foreign Minister today. At this point 
it's only an outline of the situation in 
Poland, their economic situation, and 



Dvember 1980 



39 



The Secretary 



the things they're trying to do to deal 
with it. But at this point they ex- 
pressed appreciation for CCC [Com- 
modity Credit Corporation] credits but 
made no supplementary request at this 
point. Obviously they are going to do so 
at some point when they've got their 
own plans in place. I indicated we 
would look on with sympathy to the 
idea of being of help. Resources are 
limited as I've been saying publicly now 
for some time. But it was a very good 
meeting, and I thought he was very 
clear and forthcoming and practical on 
what they need to do. 

Q. Did he give you any assurance 
that the accords would be carried out? 

A. We discussed the legislation — I 
guess it's been passed now — the court 
processes that were being used and the 
standards that are being applied. 

Q. Do you have any reason to be- 
lieve that the Iraqis decided to launch 
this whole effort because they felt 
after Khomeini's letter that we and 
the Iranians might be on the verge of 
somehow working something out and 
that now was a good time to do it? 

A. I've no reason to believe that. 



OCT. 2, 19803 

I am completing what has for me been a 
most valuable 9 days of meetings with 
heads of governments and foreign 
ministers from countries on every con- 
tinent. Many of them I have met for the 
first time. Such meetings have given 
me valuable insights into their personal 
and official points of view. 

Through larger sessions with the 
Foreign Ministers of ASEAN [Associa- 
tion of South East Asian Nations], Af- 
rica, and Latin America, I have gained 
a glimpse of the strength and impor- 
tance of regional cooperation in each of 
these areas. The war between Iraq and 
Iran has been at the forefront of con- 
cern in many of these conversations. 

My being here was fortuitous in 
that it enabled us to meet directly with 
countries of the immediate area. I val- 
ued particularly my two meetings with 
His Highness Prince Sa'ud of Saudi 
Arabia, and my meetings with the 
Foreign Ministers of Bahrain and the 
representatives of Oman. My meeting 
with the Foreign Minister of Iraq was 
probably only possible because we both 
happened to be here in New York. I re- 
gret that I did not have a response from 
my offer to meet a representative of 
Iran. 



40 



The meeting with [Soviet] Foreign 
Minister Gromyko enabled us to con- 
tinue our periodic sessions and to ad- 
vance the talks on theater nuclear 
forces and arms limitations in Europe. I 
was able to have a series of meetings 
with our principal European allies. The 
various conversations gave me an op- 
portunity not only to reiterate our 
interest in sound, bilateral relations 
with each of these countries but also to 
stress the continuing interest of the 
United States in maintaining a firm in- 
ternational stand against the Soviet in- 
vasion of Afghanistan and in furthering 
the process of peace in the Middle East. 

I come away from this — my first 
extensive series of meetings with 
foreign ministers — impressed by the 
degree to which the role of the United 
States is important to each one, even 
when we may disagree on fundamental 
issues. While each recognized that we 
were in an election period, nearly all 
stressed their strong desire of con- 
tinuity of U.S. attention to the needs of 
peace and development throughout the 
world. 

Q. May we please have your over- 
view of the current state of 
diplomatic efforts to resolve the war 
between Iran and Iraq? 

A. The latest development is, of 
course, the proposed cease-fire offered 
by Iraq. I'm not sure if there has been a 
formal response from Iran at this point. 
My belief is that there has not. I would 
hope that that initiative, or other initia- 
tives, might lead as soon as possible to 
a cease-fire and beginning of negotia- 
tions of the issues involved in those 
hostilities. 

Q. Does it seem to be a substan- 
tive offer or a public relations move 
by Iraq? 

A. No. I take it to be a response 
solicited by [Pakistani] President Zia 
representing the Islamic conference in 
response to that initiative. 

Q. The United States is sending 
radar planes to Saudi Arabia. One of 
your deputies has said the United 
States cannot condone the dismem- 
berment of Iran, and President Carter 
is talking about some sort of a naval 
task force to protect the Strait of 
Hormuz. In light of all that, is it not 
more difficult now for the United 
States to maintain its professed neu- 
trality, particularly when the Ira- 
nians are saying, "Stay out of the war 
or we'll kill the hostages?" 



(1 



)i 



A. I prefer to describe the situat 
as it appears to be at the moment an 
not speculate on hypothetical pos- 
sibilities which one could frame in he 
rendous terms. Whenever hostilities 
begin in any part of the world, and 
especially in this one, the risks of est 
lation and the consequences of escala 
tion obviously pose very difficult pro 
lems for all concerned. 

At the present moment, hostiliti 
seem to have diminished somewhat- 
the intensity of hostilities — the broat' 
risks seem to have diminished some 
what, and I would hope that we womjo 
continue in that direction rather thai 
the direction which your question 
suggests. 

Q. Among oil analysts, some ai 
saying now that there has been tre 
mendous damage heaped upon Iraqi 
and Iran by their bombing in the oi< 
facilities. They are also suggesting; 
that there is no end in sight perhan 
to this war. They are also suggestir 
that unless Saudi Arabia and Abu 
Dhabi come in with maybe 2 million 
barrels of oil a day in extra produc 
tion, that in 9 months to a year, th* 
Western allies or the United States 
could begin to experience shortfallsa 
oil, higher prices, and greater inflai 
tion. 

Has the Administration begun 
put into effect any kind of plan tha 
would offset or prepare us for the 
eventuality of oil shortfalls? 

A. Obviously, in a situation of thl||P 
kind, with all the uncertainties as to t 
future — and your question is made u 
of an exposition of uncertainties — it 
difficult to project what the need for' 
planning would be or what the goal o 
the planning should be. 

I don't have any personal assess- 
ment or any assessment made by anyj 
authoritative person or body as to thi' 
extent of the damage that is being im '' 
posed upon the oil facilities of the twi 
combatants, nor do I have any crysta- 
ball as to how long the infliction of 
damage on each other's facilities will 
continue. Unless one has answers to 
those questions and to the additional 
question of what the production 
elsewhere in the world is likely to be i 
this period, it is very difficult to comfl 
up with hard and fast answers to que! 
tions like that. 

Q. It was reported by the State 
Department that in your talks with 
Foreign Minister Hammadi [of Iraq] 
he brought up the issue of the hos- 
tages. There have been reports that f ' 
brought it up in the context of Iraqi , 



Department of State Bulle. 



i 



(t 



The Secretary 



rs of some potential exchange of 
' hostages for military equipment, 
you confirm or deny that? 

A. Do I confirm or deny what? That 
subject was raised? 

Q. The subject was raised. We 
»w that because the State Depart- 
nt said it, but in what context was 
aised? Why did the Iraqi raise the 
ject of the hostages? 

A. They can characterize their con- 
n better than I can. As far as I'm 
earned, we have not indulged in 
culation as to the basis upon which 

hostages might be released. If and 
»n the time comes that we are in- 
'ed in negotiations on that subject 
ran — we are not involved in negoti- 
ins on that subject — one might 
::ulate on a long list of possible re- 
"•ements that might be presented by 

esentatives of Iran. I don't think it 

ieful to do so here or with Mr. 
nmadi, and I said the same thing to 

Q. Yesterday the Iranian Charge 
liracterized the AWACS (airborne 
v; ning and control system] presence 
iSTovocation and a demonstration 
h this country — the United 
>t es — is not really neutral. Today 
>adi .Arabia is quoted as boosting its 
)r luction of oil for shipment to the 
V :t. Was there any negotiating 
roig on between those two factors — 
h presence of the AWACS and the 
iU sequent boost in oil production by 
isdi Arabia? 

A. No. 

Q. After this enormous series of 
i teral meetings, do you share the 
It of the President of the 35th ses- 
( that this session might bring a 
') ribution to disarmament and de- 
.'I e? 

A. That, obviously, is a goal which 

ithin the Charter of the United 
ions, and I would hope that the 
ed Nations might be affected. One 
•t always reassured by actions 
n here, but at least the existence of 
nstitution with that objective al- 
i holds out hope, as far as I'm con- 
ed. 

Q. Governor Reagan has been 
precise about what he is prepared 
9 were he is in power concerning 
islamic nations' attempt to expel 
si from the United Nations. What, 
isely, are you prepared to recom- 
d? A veto, if such an attempt is 



A. When one is out of power, it is 
easy to be precise; when one is in 
power, one must consider not only pub- 
lic, but private, initiatives that one 
might take to avoid that result. We are 
just as strong in our conviction that Is- 
rael has a right to be a member of this 
body as Mr. Reagan is. 

Q. In your talks with the Foreign 
Ministers of Greece and Turkey, was 
there any progress made for the rein- 
tegration of Greece into NATO? Are 
the prospects now better than they 
were before your talks with the two 
Foreign Ministers? 

A. Those discussions and negotia- 
tions are going on within the military 
structure of NATO. I am not a party to 
those negotiations, nor would it be ap- 
propriate for me to try to characterize 
them. As a matter of fact, I have delib- 
erately stayed uninformed as to the de- 
tails so that there be no question that 
what the issue involves is a military 
question rather than a political one. 

Q. The Soviet Union has been ask- 
ing that no country interfere in the 
Iraqi-Iranian crisis. Would you be able 
to shed some light for us about what 
deals the Soviet Union might take — 
what sort of steps might they take — if 
the war continues or was escalated? 
What is the U.S.S.R.'s position, in your 
estimate? 

A. The U.S.S.R. position, as 
stated to me by Mr. Gromyko, is con- 
sistent with what I perceive its public 
position to be and that is to stand off 
and away from the conflict in a neutral 
posture. That was his position as stated 
to me, and as far as I can see, their ac- 
tions have been consistent with that. 

Q. Would you comment on re- 
ports from Tehran that the Iranian 
Parliament has formed a commission 
on the hostages and they are also re- 
fusing to address deals with the 
United States on Israel. 

A. The commission idea was raised, 
I think, 2 or 3 weeks ago. I commented 
on it at that time as potentially a con- 
structive step forward in that it ap- 
pears to put in place an institution with 
authority to recommend, maybe to de- 
cide, the Iranian position on returning 
the hostages. 

Q. What about the composition of 
that commission? We're told that 
they're all hardliners. 

A. I don't think it is useful for me 
to speculate, to try to characterize per- 
sons as to views and positions and rec- 
ords. I am not fully informed. 



Q. In your discussions with the 
foreign ministers, there has been a lot 
of talk about the United States being 
weak. Do you get that perception? Do 
they have that perception of the 
United States? Do they still believe 
that we are a world power? 

A. I can't recall anyone raising any 
question about that. [Laughter] 

Q. Do they have any fears that we 
are not maintaining our position as a 
world power, as a voice of democracy? 

A. No. They expressed no such 
fears. I must say that I had no difficulty 
in arranging meetings with all those 
who came to meet with me; indeed, we 
were not able to fit in all those who 
wished. So I do not detect in their at- 
titude for the prospects of meeting with 
the United States Secretary of State 
any lack of interest in our influence or 
power. As a matter of fact, from time to 
time I got the notion that they exag- 
gerate our ability to influence the ac- 
tions of other nations and especially to 
deal with the internal affairs of other 
nations. 

Q. There have been rather in- 
teresting changes in the text of the 
address by President Zia of 
Pakistan — between the prepared text 
and the delivered text — particularly 
in relation to the remarks concerning 
the Soviet Union. Have you been 
made aware of these changes? Have 
you made any inquiries why they in- 
troduced these changes, and how do 
you assess these changes? 

A. The ever-helpful press has 
brought those changes to my attention. 

Q. Since the President goes to 
Washington tomorrow, do you feel 
that there is any connection between 
that visit and the changes? 

A. I think it is better to try to make 
that determination after we have met 
with President Zia and his representa- 
tives than to speculate about it before I 
meet with them. He should be the best 
authority. 

Q. Are we any closer to having a 
meeting with other countries on the 
problem of oil supplies in the Persian 
Gulf, as President Carter mentioned 
last week in his messages to other 
countries? And on the same point, do 
you think it is more or less likely that 
you would need some kind of interna- 
tional naval force to keep the strait 



3mber 1980 



41 



The Secretary 



A. With respect to the first part of 
your question, discussions at the tech- 
nical level and on a contingency basis 
are under way. With respect to the pos- 
sibilities of such a contingency arising, 
they seem to have diminished in the 
last couple of days, and there has been 
no interruption of shipping and no ap- 
parent effort in this period to interrupt, 
and, indeed, some evidence of deliber- 
ate restraint with respect to that. So it 
may well be that the risk of that exact 
contingency arising has diminished. 

Q. The United States has a mili- 
tary presence in the Middle East 
crisis area. Is Turkey expected to con- 
tribute to these efforts of the United 
States with its armed forces or with 
its bases on its soil? 

A. I have heard no such expecta- 
tions. 

Q. If Iran this afternoon accepted 
the cease-fire, what would be the 
next step? Would there be a U.N. 
peacekeeping force along that line? 

A. Of course the initiative that has 
been taken, which triggered the Iraqi 
proposal of the cease-fire, was taken by 
the Islamic conference, and I would ex- 
pect that the Iranian response might be 
to that initiative. If so, it could well be 
that the negotiations still might be 
taken under the same initiative. That is 
not inconsistent, of course, with the ac- 
tion taken by the Security Council, but 
it may well unfold in a parallel way. 

Q. Radio Oman reported yester- 
day that a top-level Soviet military 
mission had completed several days of 
conferences with Jordanian leaders 
and had met directly with the King. 
Radio Oman went on to say that the 
meeting was directed toward better 
bilateral relations between Moscow 
and Oman and might lead the way to- 
ward Soviet munitions being supplied 
to King Hussein's forces. If that takes 
place, wouldn't that be a major set- 
back for the United States in that re- 
gion? 

A. King Hussein was in the United 
States recently for similar discussions 
at some length, and no such develop- 
ments followed. I think to speculate 
along the lines of your question, or to 
suggest that I speculate, would be 
counterproductive, counterinfluential. 

Q. In your meeting with Prince 
Sa'ud of Saudi Arabia, how do you de- 
scribe his country's security needs at 
the moment? 

A. My discussions with Prince 
Sa'ud were on a confidential basis, so I 



feel that you would have to put that 
question to him if you have an oppor- 
tune time. 

Q. Did you in any way, or has the 
U.S. Government in any way, asked 
the Saudis and Abu Dhabi to increase 
their oil production in the West? 

A. No. Obviously, the question 
would occur to them as it has to us, and 
this is evidently in the public press. 
There have been no direct discussions. 

Q. Were you informed that the 
Saudis were going to increase the oil, 
or is there any other confirmation of 
that report which, as far as I can tell, 
just comes from the Japanese news 
stories? 

A. That is a question to be put to 
the Saudis. It is their decision, not 
mine, and I'm not in a position to an- 
swer. 

Q. Did the last event show that 
the opening of negotiations, among 
other things and energy, is even more 
important after your bilateral meet- 
ing? Is there any chance that the 
United States would change its posi- 
tion toward global negotiations? 

A. With respect to global negotia- 
tions, I, myself, discussed that in my 
speech to the General Assembly, and I 
refer you to that for a complete answer. 
May I say that we are interested in con- 
tributing to a constructive resolution of 
the issues raised in that debate. But we 
are also rather concerned that the in- 
tegrity of the specialized agencies be 
preserved. We think it ought to be pos- 
sible to achieve both objectives. 

Q. Suppose Iran releases the hos- 
tages very soon. Is the United States 
ready to negotiate supplying Iran with 
spare parts and ammunition for the 
fighters and the American-made 
machine guns, or whatever? 

A. I have no way of knowing what 
may be on the Iranian agenda for 
negotiations dealing with the release of 
the hostages. I have not found it useful 
in the last 4 months to try to speculate 
about such agenda items publicly, and I 
see no reason to change that position 
now. 

Q. Did you meet the Foreign 
Minister of Poland? 

A. I did not. [The Secretary cor- 
rected this, stating that he did, in fact, 
meet with the Foreign Minister of Po- 
land during his New York visit.] 

Q. Was there a reason why it did 
not take place? Was there no request 



from the Polish, or no request from 
you? 

A. I have met with the represents 
tives of Poland in Washington before 1 
came to New York. This isn't the only 
place the Secretary of State meets witl 
representatives of other countries. It 
may just seem that way this week. 

Q. Are you satisfied with the wa 
that the Security Council has pro- 
ceeded on the Mideast war question?^; 
Do you think that it looks as though 
they've got any handle on it at all? 

A. Do you mean the Iraqi-Iranian 



Q. Yes. 



A. There has been a lot of discus- 
sion. Members have not been inactive 
It has been difficult to find a handle hi 
all of the considerations that affect thit 
interests of various members, and the* 
finally chose to pursue an Islamic initif< a 
tive before the Security Council reallj 
acted. It is a difficult one to get a han t 
die on, but I would like to emphasize 
that the effort over all of those days 
was constant as members sought a wai 
to get a handle on the problem. 

Q. A top-level Iranian diplomat 
this morning linked the Iraqi plan of 
what he called "aggression on Iran" 
with a U.S. plan to invade Iran. He 
referred to recent articles that were 
banned by the Carter Administration e 
including Jack Anderson's article, 
about an American plan to invade 
Iran. He says that, indeed, that plan 
of aggression by Iraq against Iran is 
linked generally to the American plai> 
of aggression of invading Iran. And, 
therefore, he said that the United 
States is involved in the Iraqi-Irania* 
conflict. What is your comment on 
that? 

A. Number one, that I couldn't de( ; 
tect much logic in your question. And, 
number two, I would say that the 
United States does not have, has not 
had, and will not have any intention ol 
invading Iran. Our concern is the re- 
lease of the hostages. We respect the 
right of the Iranian people to establish^ 
their Islamic Republic. We recognize 
the fact that they have done so, and we 
are perfectly willing to discuss our fu- 
ture relationships on any basis that 
they wish. 

So all of those reports are false. 
There is absolutely no substance to SUIJ 
accusation that we were involved in 
collusion with Iraq in connection with 
this current fighting. There never has 
been; no basis for it; and, as a matter oi 



Cll, 



'? 



Department of State Bulll 



INTERVIEW 



r 



ct, there is a lot of basis for the oppo- 
,e conclusion. 

Q. When you met Mr. Gromyko, 
d you discuss Poland? 

A. No, we did not. May I say that 
th respect to the talks with Mr. 
'omyko, we did not cover all of the 
ms in an informal way that we had 
licated that it would be desirable for 
to discuss. Time did run out on us. 
18 fact that Poland was not discussed 
i not reflect a lack of interest on both 
les in discussing it. 

Q. Did you receive any answer 
)m Iran for your offer to give them 
cual time like you gave the Iraqis to 
bar their position in the Iranian- 
Itqi crisis? 

.A. As I said in my opening com- 

r nts this afternoon, I have not heard. 

Q. Through any intermediaries 
hve you been in touch with Iran and 
feived any assurances that they will 
rt move to try and attempt to block- 
a? the Strait of Hormuz? 

A. We have had no contact with 
n. As I say, I made observations 
•lier of the fact that there has been 
attempt by Iran to block that ship- 
g or to harass the shipping. The 
^est they came to it was to hail one 
two ships to determine their cargo 
1 destination, and that was several 
'S ago. So I have no evidence to indi- 
e that they intend to ti-y to inteiTupt 
se shipping lanes. 



il. Do you have intention to meet 
h Mr. Gromyko before he leaves? 
there any specific date for another 
eting with Mr. Gromyko? 

.\. No. There is no specific date, 

we did agree that these meetings 
[11 time to time could be useful and 
t the two we have had were useful. 

have only one agreement out of it at 
< point, but at least I think we used 

I iine frankly and even bluntly with 
i; other to explain our respective 
nts of view on the issues which have 
ated problems for us. 



' Press release 270. 
*At their meeting on Sept. 25, Secre- 
/ Muskie and Soviet Foreign Minister 
myko had an exchange of views re- 
ding the beginning oidiscussions on 
stions of limiting nuclear arms which 
:e raised in previous contacts between 
parties. As a result, an agreement was 
:ned that representatives of the United 
tes and the II.S.S.R. would meet in 
leva the week beginning Oct. 13, 1980, 
rder to begin the discussion of this 
stion. 
' Press release 271. ■ 



Deputy Secretary Christopher 
Interviewed on "Face the Nation" 



Following are excerpts from Dep- 
uty Secretary Warren Christopher's 
intenyiew on September 28, 1980, ivith 
George Herman, CBS News (mod- 
erator); Robert Pierpoint, CBS News; 
and William Beecher, The Boston 
Globe. 

Q. Considering all the facts in the 
Iran-Iraq dispute and fighting at the 
moment, is it your opinion and that of 
the State Department that this is 
likely to be a long-term war, or is it 
something which is likely to wind 
down or peter out in a matter of a 
week or two? 

A. We can't tell for sure, but our 
strong hope and our aim is that there 
would be a cessation of hostilities at the 
earliest [wssible time. 

Every interest of the United States 
is served by that — our interest is sta- 
bility in the area, our interest in keep- 
ing the oil flowing, our interest in the 
safe return of the hostages. So we're 
working to try to have an early cessa- 
tion of the hostilities. We hope that will 
be the situation, but since the parties 
have not shown any desire at the pres- 
ent time for a cease-fire, I couldn't con- 
fidently predict that it will end at an 
early date. 

Q. Is it your impression at the 
State Department that this fight — 
this war — between Iran and Iraq is a 
long-term battle in the sense that 
either side is pressing for something 
like unconditional surrender, or is it 
a limited war to gain certain very 
small limited objectives? 

A. We hope it is a limited war, but 
it's been a classic case of escalation so 
far. What began as a ground skirmish 
escalated into air exchanges and then 
that escalated into air attacks on civil- 
ian targets, on economic targets. And 
the way it's gone, we can't confidently 
predict how long it will go. 

An analysis of yesterday's ac- 
tivities indicates that the Iranian Air 
Force is still flying, still fighting. To- 
day's activities indicate that the Iraqis 
are being very effective in Khuzistan 
Province having either taken or coming 



close to taking several important cities 
there. So the conflict continues at a 
pace that is a fairly strong one. 

Q. Is there any danger that now 
the war has gone beyond the point 
where American analysts thought 
Iraq had met its initial war objec- 
tives, that it will broaden those objec- 
tives and decide to try to annex the oil 
fields of Iran in Khuzistan Province? 

A. I think that is one of the pos- 
sibilities that has to be considered. 
That is one of the reasons why we think 
it's in all the world's interest for there 
to be a very early cessation of the 
hostilities — a cessation and then 
negotiation between the parties. We 
certainly couldn't condone any taking of 
the land or territory of another gov- 
ernment by force. 

Of course the conflict in that area is 
ages old. It's gone on for centuries. It's 
gone on recently. But we think the time 
has come for a cease-fire there — 
cessation of hostilities and a negotiated 
settlement between the parties. 

Q. The President of Pakistan has 
been in Iran and now I believe is in 
Iraq trying to get some agreement on 
mediation or cessation of hostilities. 
Does the State Department have any 
indication of any degree of success by 
President Zia or any other individual 
or institution that might be calming 
down this situation? 

A. No. We're following his trip 
with a good deal of hope. We think that 
it's desirable that an Islamic leader is 
meeting in both of those capitals. He 
may have a special capacity to deal with 
the parties involved, but we don't have 
any indication that he's yet been suc- 
cessful. 

Q. What do you think it's going to 
take in a military sense or strategic 
sense for one side or the other, or 
both sides, to come to the bargaining 
table and talk about peace? 

A. I hope that they will come to a 
realization that the war is not serving 
their purposes, that their oil fields — 
their main asset — are being injured 
very severely, that the civilian casual- 
ties are mounting and come to their 



member 1980 



43 



Interview 



senses and stop this aggression, stop 
this war, and come to the bargaining 
table. 

Q. You talk about the escalation, 
of strikes against civilian targets and 
air targets. Are you of the belief that 
this war is accidental, that it was not 
planned by one side or the other but 
just happened accidentally? 

A. I think what started out to be a 
more limited war has escalated perhaps 
beyond the initial intention of the par- 
ties. Now we don't know for sure what 
the intention of the Iraqis may have 
been when this commenced, but I have 
a strong feeling myself that the skir- 
mishes and then the airstrikes did es- 
calate very rapidly. 

And, of course, that is the danger 
and that is why we work so hard to 
prevent skirmishes between countries 
because we know that the escalation 
can go back and forth to the danger of 
the economy of the country and to the 
danger of the citizens. 

Q. Everyone is concerned about 
the continued flow of oil from the 
Persian Gulf. So far the war has not 
threatened to close the Strait of Hor- 
muz through which that oil must 
travel, but President Carter has said 
that come what may, those straits 
will be kept open. 

Let's be clear on this. Is he saying 
that the U.S. Navy, with or without 
support of the British and French 
fleets in the Indian Ocean, is pre- 
pared to keep that strait open if 
someone tried to close it? 

A. What the President has said and 
what he meant is that the Strait of 
Hormuz is an international waterway 
through which nations are entitled to 
send their ships through the right of 
free passage. We intend to keep that 
strait open. We think that other nations 
have a very strong interest in doing so. 
Actually, the European countries have 
a stronger interest in that oil than the 
United States does. But working with 
our allies, we intend to see that what is 
necessary is done to keep that strait 
open. 

Q. But both the Soviet Union and 
Saudi Arabia have suggested that they 
would be very unhappy about a West- 
ern military fleet acting as policemen 
in the Persian Gulf. How does that af- 
fect our thinking, if at all? 



A. Of course we would want to con- 
sult with the nations in the gulf, such as 
Saudi Arabia, but it is in their interests 
as well as in the interests of the West 
that the strait remains open. After all, 
they are the sellers of the oil which 
passes through that strait just as we're 
the purchasers of the oil. 

Q. Is there a possibility that an 
allied force can be made up without 
the United States because of the 
feelings against the United States 
which run so strongly both in Iran 
and Iraq? 

A. The French have very signifi- 
cant assets in that area as do the 
British. Of course the United States is 
the predominant naval power in that 
area. We have capacity beyond that of 
any other country or any combination of 
countries. 

Q. But the other countries have 
need beyond what we have there for 
this oil. 

A. Yes. Western Europe is more 
dependent upon the oil from the gulf 
than the United States is. I believe we 
get only about 11% of our oil from the 
gulf. 

Nevertheless, the oil from that 
area is extremely important to the 
world's economy as a whole. The 
United States, Western Europe, coun- 
tries of South America are all depend- 
ent on that area for major imports of 
oil. 

Q. What have our allies said? The 
Japanese and the West Germans have 
indicated because of constitutional 
problems that they could not join in a 
military action with the I'nited States 
to keep the straits open. But what 
have the French and what have the 
British, for example, told us? 

A. We've been consulting with 
them, and I think we all recognize a 
common need to keep that strait open. 
I've been at the Department since early 
this morning, and there is no indication 
that ships are not passing through 
there in a normal and customary way at 
the present time. We'll deal with the 
contingency of somebody trying to 
block it when that comes up. 

Q. What about the implications 
of this war on the 52 American hos- 
tages in Iran? For 10 months the 
leaders of Iran appeared to think that 
they had more to gain than lose by 



holding on to those hostages, but 
given the defeat they're having in tl 
war, the effect on the economy of 
their oil fields being in flames, the 
Russians continuing to build up aloi 
their northern border, perhaps theii 
perception of what their interest is 
might be changing. What do you 
think about that? Is there a chance 
now that they might be disposed to 
settle the hostage issue? 

A. I certainly hope so. It seemed 
me that in the last few weeks the Ira 
nians have been coming to the point 
where they've been getting ready to 
address the hostage issue. One of the 
many reasons why we're working so 
hard and so strongly believe in the 
early cessation of the hostilities is to 
enable the Iranians to turn back to ao 
dressing the hostage issue. 

I think we have to recognize that 
the Iranian Government now is proba 
bly preoccupied with the war itself 
There are some objective reasons wh; 
they ought, in their own self interests, 
immediately to solve the hostage crisil 
But I think we ought to look for them 
do that in the context of a cessation c 
hostilities. 

Q. Is there any discussion at ai 
level between the Iranian Governme 
and the U.S. Government or throug 
third parties which it would have to.' 
be now, I presume, of military aid fc 
Iran, particularly in the area of spai ,, 
parts and ammunition which we kno j 
they're using up at a great rate in r< 
turn for the hostages? 

A. We've said for a long time thai 
in the context of and in conjunction 
with the release of the hostages, we 
would be prepared to talk with the Ir 
nians about a resumption of more or 
less normal commercial relations, of 
lifting the sanctions. Unfortunately, 
that subject is not under negotiation i '^ 
the present time. 

Q. So the answer to my questior 
basically is, no, there has been no 
discussion of that? 



A. That's correct. 

Q. President Carter said that tht 
United States is not involved in this 
war between Iran and Iraq, but in ai 
indirect sense, of course, we are be- 
cause Iran, for example, is strongly 
anti-American, Iraq is strongly 



■« 



I 



44 



Department of State Bullet- 



>PECIAL 



dealing With the World's Realities 



Secretary Muskie's remarks before 
( Economic Club of Memphis and the 
iHiphis in May International Festi- 
'/, Inc. in Memphis on October 6, 



lis event is called a "town meeting," 
; (I I look forward to an exchange every 
1 as questioning and lively as the town 

-etings in my native New England. 

Before we get to the most interesting 
|rt of our meeting — our discussion of 

lies you wish to raise — let me make a 
1 V remarks about a basic question be- 
J-e us: how our nation will deal with a 
■V'rld of rapid change and new challenge. 
1 r more than 200 years, America has 
t'ived and prospered, not by recoiling 
f m change in the world but by working 
t shape it. We have known that change 
ii he necessary companion of human 
p igress. We have moved ahead by see- 
u the world as it is and as it can be, not 
b looking back to a simpler world we 
P lember The beginning of wisdom is 
a lerstanding — understanding that we 
a living today at a time of the most ex- 
ti sive change in human history. 

Let me begin by mentioning some of 
tl se changes and challenges. 

• The Soviet Union has become — 
a) intends to remain — a military super- 
pi ler. Soviet use of its military power, in 
A hanistan and elsewhere, has created 

Hi ' risks to world peace. 

• In less than a half a generation, we 
hi e seen the birth of more than 100 new 
IB ons. Each is struggling to meet grow- 
n sometimes violent, demands by its 

' I lie for rapid economic and political 
'1 JTess. 

• Regional rivalries have taken on 
M danger with the spread of sophisti- 
■a d weapons and the willingness of the 

( lets, Cubans, and others to exploit 
1 n. 

• Our domestic economy, to a 
Titer extent than ever before, is part 

global economy. Nations with new 
lomic power are exerting new influ- 
iin our daily lives. 

• And while the prosperity of our 
"" itional allies in West Europe and 

in adds tremendously to our collective 
igth, it also has increased the poten- 
i for strains among us. 



Some of these new realities are 
threatening. Others have the potential 
for good or for harm, depending in no 
small measure on how we seek to shape 
their direction. But all of them are 
realities. We cannot wish them away. We 
cannot reverse them with rhetoric. We 
must address them, all of them, cre- 
atively and without illusion. 

For a few moments this evening, I 
want to talk about how the United States 
is dealing with these new realities — 
about where we are and where we are 
headed. 

First, we are building our military 
strengrth. 

For nearly two decades the Soviet 
Union has been building its military 
strength by 4% or more each year 
Meanwhile, our underlying military base 
declined. 

Today, the United States is engaged 
in the most far-reaching military modern- 
ization since the early 1960s. We are up- 
grading each arm of our strategic nuclear 
forces — land, sea, and air The President 
has ordered full development of a power- 
ful new land-based missile — the MX. The 
first of our sophisticated new Trident 
submarines was launched this year We 
will start equipping our B-52s with new 
cruise missiles in 1982. 

At the same time, we are building 
the defense forces of our alliances. In 
1978, at American initiative, we and our 
NATO partners launched a long-term 
military improvement program. That 
program is well underway. In late 1979, 
we and our NATO allies agreed to a pro- 
gram for modernizing our nuclear 
weapons in Europe in order to meet a 
decade-long Soviet buildup. We will pro- 
ceed with that program while we seek 
fair and verifiable negotiated limits with 
the Soviet Union. And we are building 
our military capacity to respond swiftly 
to serious crisis wherever it might arise, 
including the vital Persian Gulf area. 

There should be no mistake. This 
modernization program involves heavy 
costs. In the past 4 fiscal years, the 
United States has increased defense ex- 
penditures by 10%. The President's de- 
fense program will increase expenditures 
by another 17% over the next 4 years. 
This modernization program is necessary 



to assure that we maintain a military bal- 
ance with the Soviet Union in the years 
ahead. It is a steady and reliable Ameri- 
can defense program, not a wasteful and 
wanton effort to achieve an unachievable 
"superiority"— an effort that would only 
produce the dangers of a massive new 
arms race. 

Secondly, the United States today is 
exercising its leadership to strengthen 
the international stand against Soviet 
aggression. 

The Soviet effort to destroy the na- 
tional independence of Afghanistan 
through military force must be sternly re- 
sisted by the international community. It 
is an attempt to use naked military power 
to deny a people and a nation their free- 
dom. By precedent and by proximity, it 
increases the Soviet threat in a region of 
the world vitally important to the United 
States, to the industrialized democracies, 
to the entire world. 

By the stands we have taken — on 
grain, on the sale of technology, on the 
Olympics — we have conveyed, clearly 
and concretely, the seriousness of the 
American people. Most Americans sup- 
port the steps we have taken. For they 
understand that we cannot express our 
national resolve without individual sac- 
rifice — from farmers, from businessmen, 
from athletes, from all of us. Yet we see, 
in the Senate and elsewhere, efforts to 
reverse the grain embargo. 

There is a short answer: We cannot 
fight Soviet aggression more by sacrific- 
ing as Americans less. The firm actions 
the United States has taken in recent 
months are intended not to provoke con- 
frontation but to avoid confrontation by 
discouraging future Soviet adventures. 
These actions are taken to preserve the 
only basis on which a relaxation of ten- 
sions can proceed — demonstrated Soviet 
restraint. As the President has said, we 
must be prepared to sustain those meas- 
ures as long as Soviet troops remain in 
Afghanistan. 

We must also seek Soviet restraint 
through balanced and enforceable agree- 
ments that limit the growth of arms. Now 
that the Soviets have dropped their pre- 
conditions, we will move ahead this 
month with preliminary talks to limit 
long-range theater nuclear forces. 

And we will work for ratification of 



smber 1980 



Special 



the SALT II Treaty— an agreement that 
is strongly in our national interest — when 
it is feasible early next year Rising ten- 
sions do not weaken the case for SALT; 
instead they remind us why arms control 
is essential — to curtail the arsenal aimed 
at us, to avert a futile arms race, to les- 
sen the chance that a fatal miscalculation 
will reduce both nations to rubble. 

For we strengthen our long-term se- 
curity, not through rhetoric, but through 
a clear and lasting demonstration that we 
have the national will to oppose aggres- 
sion. And we also strengthen our security 
through a willingness to seek concrete 
agreements that limit the nuclear threats 
we face. 

Third, the United States today is deeply 
engaged in the search for peaceful, ne- 
gotiated solutions to potentially explo- 
sive regional disputes. 

For the first time since its creation, 
Israel and Egypt — its most powerful 
Arab neighbor — live not in fragile truce 
but in solid peace. And for the first time, 
negotiations are underway on the basic 
issues that must be resolved to achieve a 
broader peace in this part of the Middle 
East. 

The agreement we reached with 
Panama, after 14 years of negotiation, 
has provided a sounder future for the 
canal and has improved our position 
throughout Latin America. 

Our unwavering support for negoti- 
ations in Rhodesia helped bring an end to 
a bloody civil war there, a majority rule 
government, and a decent hope for peace 
free from outside interference. 

Each step we take today toward eas- 
ing these international tensions is a step 
toward preventing broader conflict to- 
morrow. I believe the American people 
want us to persist in these efforts. 

Fourth, the United States today is 
working to strengthen our economic 
position in the world, for the sake of 
our consumers and businessmen, our 
farmers and our workers. 

We have reached a major interna- 
tional trade agreement that makes sure 
we can compete fairly. We are pursuing a 
program for increased American produc- 
tivity. More than ever before, through 
summits and constant consultations, we 
are coordinating our economic policies 
viath our major allies, for the benefit of 
all. 



And perhaps most important, we 
have improved our energy position. U.S. 
oil imports are down 25% since 1977; our 
domestic energy production is up; and, 
with our allies, we have improved 
energy-sharing arrangements in case of 
serious world shortages. We must go fur- 
ther down the road of conservation and 
increased production. But the thin margin 
of safety we have achieved, and need dur- 
ing the Iran-Iraqi conflict, shows that we 
are on the right road. 

Fifth, the United States today has a 
foreign policy that is asserting our na- 
tional commitment to human rights. 

America's strength in the world not 
only depends upon our military power It 
rests more on what we stand for as a na- 
tion. We stand for human freedom. 
Human freedom unites us as a people. 
Human freedom distinguishes us ft"om our 
adversaries. And standing for human 
freedom is deeply in our national interest. 

As we Americans know, freedom and 
stability strengthen each other. Repres- 
sion can break the ties between a gov- 
ernment and its people, increasing the 
potential for violent change. We have 
seen how the turmoil of convulsive 
change — as in Iran — can directly affect 
our own nation. We will not rest until all 
of our people are home from Iran, safe 
and free. This has been a dark chapter for 
those throughout the world who value 
human rights. 

But as we look at the world clearly, 
we also see a resurgence of the demo- 
cratic values we support. In Portugal, 
Spain and Greece, in Nigeria and Ghana 
and Zimbabwe, in Ecuador and Peru, 
democracy has restored to the people 
control of their own destinies. We should 
find in this movement renewed confi- 
dence that the current of democracy and 
human freedom continues to run strong in 
the world, and that it is in our interest to 
support it and be a part of it. 

Sixth and finally, the United States 
today is building stronger relationships 
with countries of growing importance 
on the world scene. 

One out of four of the world's people 
live in China. And today we are building 
a new relationship with their govern- 
ment, based upon normalized relations. 

In less than 20 years, four out of five 



people in the world will live in the devel- 
oping world. The economic progress and 
long-term stability of developing nations 
is increasingly important to our own dail 
lives. We cannot expect to have their 
support on matters important to us if we 
are not prepared to provide practical 
support on issues of importance to them 
— defending their national independence 
and building their economies and 
societies. 

Thus, in our own interest, the next 
several years must be a time when we 
move ahead — not slide backward — in de 
veloping our relations with the nations ol 
Africa, Latin America, Asia, and the 
Middle East. 

These pohcies, and these accom- 
plishments, are helping to shape a world 
of change. There inevitably will be debat 
about specific decisions that have been 
made. But I am firmly convinced that, fc 
all the frustrations in dealing with this 
new world, America is on the right road 
— the road of engagement and progress, 
not isolation and reaction. 

Our course makes sense. We need to 
continue, not turn back. As an American 
novelist once put it, "We cannot walk 
backward into the future." If we try, the 
future will belong to others. With a 
steady increase in American strength, 
with American praginatism harnessed to 
American ideals, we will continue to 
move forward into a future we help 
create. 



'Press release 273. 



B 



Department of State Bulletin, 



iluestion-and-Answer Session 
•ollowing Memphis Address 



Special 



You indicated that one of your 
eatest concerns was the lack of pas- 
ge for the foreign assistance appro- 
iations bill, and you indicated that 
u felt this was a significant alter- 
itive to increased defense spending. 

I would like to know what the 
rrent status is of many of the 
oblems that you brought up at that 
ne in terms of Nicaragua, the Cam- 
dian refugees, the World Bank, the 
lean Development Bank, disaster 
Hef — have those been dealt with, or 
ijthat still a real problem? 

A. Let me cite two rather current 
uations in which America could use 
resources in the pursuit of our own 
ional interest and stability in the 
rid: One is Zimbabwe, and the sec- 
1 is Poland. 
In Zimbabwe we have seen years of 
converted into peace and the re- 
(nsibility for maintaining that peace 
ted in the hands of a government 
eh, a few months ago, might have 
m regarded as extreme but which 
h! proven in practice to be moderate. 
B the challenge of this government is 
' ustify its policies of moderation with 
t success or failure in dealing with the 
(II ds of the people of a war-ravaged 
:cntry, for economic development and 
jjortunity. 

Zimbabwe is a country of great re- 
lO-ces, but the infrastructure has 
I n largely destroyed; so investment 
- ceded — capital from the world's pri- 
i' sector and also government. The 
r irtunate fact is that in terms of our 

L'rt for foreign assistance, the re- 
•> ces which we have available to be 
i ^sistance are largely in the form of a 
r.er at the present time. If we could 
e- make the Zimbabwe experience 
k, we might then be able to move on 
invert the South Africa problem 
one of peaceful change for justice 
. equality. 

The Libya problem: The whole 
■ hern area of Africa could be con- 
ed peacefully rather than in a vio- 
r, revolutionary way, but the impor- 
i e of the investment should be clear. 
Poland: I suppose most Americans 
T' cheered at the courage and the 
istence and the willingness to take 
- on the part of the Polish workers 
■eking to change their system suffi- 
iy to give them a voice and an in- 



The government is struggling with 
enormous economic problems, and 
whether or not they are dealt with ef- 
fectively could well make the difference 
in the struggle of the Polish workers for 
a greater measure of freedom and influ- 
ence over their own lives, or slipping 
back into the period from which they 
have tried to emerge. 

There are examples of this all over 
the world. I see them as doors of oppor- 
tunity; opportunity to help influence 
the course of human events in those 
areas — those countries and others — to- 
ward the kind of world that measures 
up to the American view of what brings 
stability and peace to a people. 

If you were to sit in my seat in the 
State Department on a day-to-day basis 
you would be as frustrated as I at the 
number of times we have to turn away 
from similar doors of opportunity. We 
have not had a foreign aid appropria- 
tions bill since 1979. We have been 
operating throughout this fiscal year 
with a continuing resolution which 
means that we are permitted the 
amounts that were provided in the 1979 
appropriation, or the amount requested 
by the Administration for 1980 — 
whichever is the smaller figure. 

We never did get a 1980 appropria- 
tions bill, and there is a question as to 
whether or not we will get a 1981 ap- 
propriations bill. 

Now the Congress and the Ameri- 
can people find it relatively easy to 
support tens of billions of dollars of in- 
creases in defense spending. Some of 
this, of course, is necessary. But we 
completely overlook this much cheaper 
route to bringing stability and order to 
the world. 

Q. I understand we still have de- 
ployed in Europe roughly 225,000 men 
in the forward areas as part of the 
overall NATO force. How long will 
this deployment be required? 

Now it's my understanding that 
the original bill passed by the Con- 
gress in 1951 called initially for a U.S. 
SACEUR [Supreme Allied Com- 
mander, Europe] who would, at the 
end of 5 years turn the command over 
to either a German or a Frenchman or 
a Turk or an Italian. And, of course, I 
think we have a dynasty of .31 years of 
American SACEURs, and these troops 



have remained in place for about the 
same length of time. 

Also, the German deployments 
now are about 490,000-500,000 troops. 
I think there is a lot of comment, 
countrywide — or criticism of that fact 
at least, to have to continue to main- 
tain those troops in Europe. 

A. I think the number of troops in 
Europe is closer to 300,000, and the 
figure which you mentioned is lower. 
They are an essential part of our com- 
mon defense in Europe. 

There was a point, which you will 
recall at which there was considerable 
pressure to withdraw our troops from 
Europe. Senator [Michael J., now Am- 
bassador to Japan] Mansfield sponsored 
an amendment that I think came within 
one or two votes of passing, 1 year to 
that effect. 

But then we began to develop a 
different perception of the Soviet 
Union, the nature of its threat, and the 
importance of restraint upon the Soviet 
Union. So our common effort as a 
NATO alliance has grown and 
strengthened in recent years — 
especially the last 3^2-4 years — so the 
presence of American troops is now — 

I am not sure that it wouldn't be 
sufficient if they had been at 150,000- 
200,000 at the beginning, and were still 
at those figures. But to sharply reduce 
American troops in Europe would be a 
signal — not only to our European 
friends but to the Soviet Union — that 
we were becoming less interested, less 
concerned about defense of Europe 
than we were. That kind of shift, I 
think, would have a very negative ef- 
fect upon our own security interests. 

Now we are undertaking, through 
the mutual and balanced force reduction 
talks, to bring about a reduction of both 
Soviet and allied troops in Europe — and 
that means principally Americans. We 
have been stalled on a couple of issues 
that are somewhat technical, and I 
won't take the time, unless further 
questions seek the information, to dis- 
cuss those technical points. 

Our view, at the moment, is that 
the best chance — due to the tensions in 
Europe and the risks of war with the 
Soviet Union in Europe — is to work to- 
ward a mutual reduction of forces and 



.^mber 1980 



Special 



not a unilateral reduction of forces by 
the United States. 

Our European allies have com- 
mitted themselves, as I indicated in my 
prepared remarks, to a strengthening 
and modernizing of our defense, so that 
it can truly match the Soviet military 
presence in Europe and establish a sta- 
bility which will insure deterrence and 
at least a nonwar climate. 

Q. Many citizens in Memphis are 
concerned for the nearly one-quarter 
of the world's population that are 
desperately hungry. 

The President's Commission on 
World Hunger recently brought for- 
ward their final report and identified 
this as a crucial national security 
issue. They also recommended that 
the United States place as its primary 
focus the elimination of hunger in de- 
veloping nations. 

In view of what you said about 
our great difficulty in providing 
foreign assistance at this time, I 
think a situation which places us in a 
place behind 10 or 12 other nations in 
the world in the percentage of gross 
national product which are devoted to 
that aid would be [inaudible]. 

In view of the commission's rec- 
ommendations about the seriousness 
of the situation, do you have some 
specific proposals, or dreams perhaps, 
of what you would like to see happen? 

A. There are three main objectives 
that we seek to pursue with our foreign 
aid programs. One of them is food, not 
only the direct provision of food 
through the PL 480 program and other 
means but also that technical assistance 
to enable or to help countries to develop 
their own food production and to be- 
come self-sufficient. And those pro- 
grams, the latter ones, have been 
enormously successful. 

India is one of the most successful 
examples of that. With the so-called 
miracle rice we have enabled India to 
reach the point where it can provide for 
its own food needs — not at our standard 
of consumption but at a standard which 
avoids the kind of starvation that other 
countries are faced with, and it even, 
from time to time, exports food. 

So there are ways that we em- 
phasize in our foreign assistance pro- 
grams to help countries produce their 
own food. That is a very important part 
of it. 

The same is true with education. 
We see education as the way of in- 
creasing the ability of these countries 
to govern themselves. 

I was interested in one of my 



meetings with the foreign ministers — 
well, I shouldn't mention a country be- 
cause I don't want to be too negative in 
my public comments about them — but 
it's a young black country in Africa, and 
the issue I raised with him was this: We 
are about to accredit an American Am- 
bassador to his country and our Foreign 
Relations Committee in the Senate 
takes the position that if we are going 
to send an Ambassador to his country, 
his country ought to accredit an Am- 
bassador to ours. 

And do you know what his answer 
was? They didn't have enough young 
people, college educated, in order to 
staff an embassy in Washington D.C. 
They were a slave country until they 
achieved independence, so they do not 
have the trained personnel in order to 
provide the leadership, the technical 
know-how, and expertise to govern 
their domestic agencies and at the same 
time send trained representatives and 
competent staff to represent their 
interests abroad. That is just a little, I 
think, down-to-earth and moving 
example of what these emerging coun- 
tries are struggling with, and we need 
to be able to help them. 

He was not apologizing. He said: 
"Given the level of your concern and 
your interests, we will try next year to 
find somebody, and it will be somebody 
young, recently educated, to send to 
Washington as our Ambassador." But 
he said: "If we send somebody as Am- 
bassador, we want to be able to send 
him sufficient staff to represent our 
country effectively." 

So food, education, the ability to 
produce their own food — these are 
among the highest objectives of our 
foreign assistance program. 

Q. In your remarks before, you 
spoke about a world that is changing 
and a challenge for peace — and that 
calls to mind the United Nations. You 
spoke of, as I said, a challenge and a 
change and a peace — and this calls to 
my mind the United Nations. 

What do you think, or what do 
you see as the future of the United 
Nations in the light of its many dif- 
ficulties in settling international dis- 
putes? And would you comment on 
what, if anything, the United States 
can or should be doing to strengthen 
the United Nations and to insure that 
it carries out the mandate in its 
original charter? 

A. The United Nations, to many, 
has been a disappointment because it 



has not developed as the peacemaking 
and peacekeeping organization that 
many hoped it might become. I suspe 
that the public support in this countr 
for the United Nations is at a low poi 
compared to the high point of our ex- 
pectations. 

The United Nations is a forum — 
and perhaps the only forum — availabl 
to many of these small, developing 
countries to express their frustration, 
not only about the kind of world in 
which they find themselves struggling! 
to advance the objectives of economic 
and political developments of their ow 
peoples but, also, it's the only place 
where they can be heard. If the U.N 
forum did not exist, where would coui 
tries like Belize or some of the other 
150-odd countries — where else would 
they be heard? Where could their voic- 
es be raised? Where could their prob- 
lems and their frustrations be spelled 
out? 

Now the diversity in this world, 
especially on the North-South axis — th 
Northern Hemisphere being by and 
large the industrialized part of the 
world and the Southern Hemisphere 
being the developing part of the 
world — the issues as between these tw^ 
hemispheres are now becoming, in- 
creasingly, the focus of attention, not 
only of the developing countries but oi* 
the industrialized North as well. 

The United Nations has been en- 
gaged this year, in a special session jus 
a few weeks ago, in an effort to create I, 
what is called "global negotiations"^a 
mechanism within the U.N. frameworl „ 
which makes it possible for the de- . 
veloping nations and the industrialized ; 
nations to work out an accommodation 
of their objectives, which takes into ac 
count the limitation of the planet's re- 
sources, the desperate circumstances ir 
which so many of the world's people 
live, and ways of accommodating and 
closing that gap. j 

The United Nations is beginning ( 
now an evolutionary process which may 
be its most significant development, if 
we look back on this period 10 years 
from now, because this is at the heart 
of it. 

In 20 years four of every five per- 
sons on this planet will live in those de- 
veloping countries, and if we haven't by 
that time put in place institutions that 
will enable them to deal with the human 
problems of their people, then our own 
will be in jeopardy. 

So the United Nations, although it 
has been a disappointment in a sense, if 
on an evolutionary path — beginning 



Department of State Bulletit" 



Special 



vith the high hopes following World 
Var II which never fully materialized 
or some of the reasons that I outlined 
IS taking place on this planet since then 
hrough this period where these 
merging nations are beginning to take 
.dvantage of this forum, express their 
oncerns, their opinions, and their 
lews, and to vote in the United Na- 
ions, often in ways that give us frus- 
rations and run counter to our own 
bjectives — to perhaps a new era in 
/hich a better balance of view, of re- 
ources and opportunities will emerge. 

Now I am not going to be living in 
hat world. You are, and others are, 
lUt that is what we must be pointing 
oward . 

I think of energy, air, water — all of 
'Shese, the precious and limited re- 
ources, opportunities — freedom — all of 
his is what everybody born on this 
lanet strives for, and I think the 
'nited Nations is the only means avail- 
ble to us, with all of its shortcomings, 
) harness our energies and our ideals 
nd move in that direction. So I hope 
e will stick with it, but I must say, I 
et frustrated when I see the United 
ations doing some of the things it 
I oes. But what it is doing is not that 
luch different from our own national 
gislature. It doesn't always make 
»nse either. [Laughter and applause.] 

Q. In view of the fact that Israel 
ill never be secure until the Pales- 
nians have a homeland too, why 
n't the U.S. Government working 
ith a large number of Israelis and a 
rge number of Palestinians who 
ave formed a peace movement and 
-e ready to live side by side in 
;ace — this instead of continuing 
ilitary support of Israeli settle- 
ents which we admit are a deterrent 
I peace? 

A. I am not sure I accept the as- 
imptions that underlie your question. 

1'hat we undertook to do — and when I 
ly "we," I was not a part of that proc- 
_is; it began in previous Administra- 
ons and was continued by President 
arter — is to create a negotiation and a 
gotiating process in which these op- 
jsing sides might find a way to ac- 
mmodate their conflicting interests. 

Now, unfortunately, that process is 
jposed by moderate and radical Arab 
lUntries, and it is attacked by others. 
Interestingly enough, it is the only 
jgotiation that has ever been created 
that part of the world with respect to 
16 Israeli-Arab conflict since Israel 



became a state. It's the only negotia- 
tion going in which both Palestinian 
rights and Israel's security are at the 
top of the agenda. It is the only negoti- 
ation going which, by its terms in the 
Camp David accords, invites all other 
interested parties to be participants. 

The Palestinians are not excluded 
from this negotiation. They are specif- 
ically invited to be part of it, as well as 
other Arab states in the area — Jordan 
and so on. 

And so what we are trying to do 
with the Camp David process is to work 
out as much by way of agreement be- 
tween the three parties to it — Egypt, 
Israel, and the United States — and to 
accomplish enough to attract the other 
parties to it, and at some point to 
thrash out its provisions for Palestinian 
rights. 

I don't know of any other way to do 
it. I've had to deal these last 5 months 
with U.N. resolutions — I think eight of 
them in all — the aim of which has been 
to frustrate the Camp David process, if 
not destroy it, by offering simplistic 
resolutions which offered no substi- 
tutes. I mean, these resolutions are not 
self-implementing or self-executing; 
they offered no solutions. 

If they succeeded in killing the 
Camp David process, I don't know who 
else, or where, another negotiation 
could be created. And without that kind 
of a negotiation I would foresee simply 
an escalation of the emotions in the 
conflicts of the Middle East. 

You have to begin somewhere. 
Camp David was such a beginning. 
That doesn't mean that it's ordained to 
be successful. It's an uphill struggle, 
and it may go down to defeat. If it does, 
somebody is going to face very difficult 
problems. 

As far as the settlements are con- 
cerned, this Administration is opposed 
to the settlements. We have said so 
clearly and for the reasons that you 
suggest. 

Q. I believe many people share 
with me in my confusion about the 
place of the SALT II Treaty that's 
signed between the United States and 
the Soviet Union. Does it agree and 
meet with the interests and security 
of the United States and the world or 
not? 

If it is wise? It's not approved. 
And if it is not wise, and we don't say 
it gladly, we will not approve it. In 
such a case we can find some other 
peaceful alternative rather than this 
[inaudible] waste. 

A. I am not sure I understood all of 



your question, but I gather that you are 
confused, and you say you are joined by 
others who are equally confused about 
the SALT II Treaty and whether it's 
good or bad in terms of our national se- 
curity interest. 

Q. Yes, and what is the fate of 
this treaty? Is it going to be approved 
or not? 

A. And so the second question is 
whether or not the treaty is going to be 
approved or not. 

With respect to the treaty, one 
must see it as part of the process which 
began with the SALT I Treaty and is 
seen as part of a process which will 
culminate in a SALT III treaty. 

The objective of the entire process 
is to stabilize the arms race, prefera- 
bly at some lower level of armament 
than the two superpowers are now 
building with respect to nuclear arms. 

SALT II is a complicated treaty, 
and I can't dispose of it in 2 or 3 min- 
utes. But let me give you three or four 
specific benefits. It imposes restraints 
upon the Soviet Union which are impor- 
tant to our national security interests. 
It forces them to dismantle, I think, 150 
or more systems that are now in place. 
It limits the number of warheads that 
they can place on a given launcher. 

Why is that important? Through 
almost an accident of the decisionmak- 
ing process in both countries, the Rus- 
sians have built much bigger missiles 
than we and, as a result, they could 
place upon their launchers many more 
warheads than we can on ours — it 
might be the difference between 10 and 
30 — so that without building more 
launchers, without the restraint of 
SALT II, they could add warheads. It's 
warheads that kill, not launchers. 

So by 1985, without a SALT 
treaty, they could double the number of 
warheads on their launchers. Now this 
treaty limits them to 10 and it limits us 
to 10. That is a very important re- 
straint. 

This treaty requires, that for the 
purpose of enabling each side to verify 
the nuclear weapons of the other side 
and their development and capabilities, 
that encryption be limited. 

What do I mean by "encryption?" 
That is, as these missiles are tested on 
each side, the other side can read the 
signals that are transmitted back from 
the missile to their launch points so 
that the launching country can read its 
capabilities and performance. These 
signals can also be picked up by the 



Dvember 1980 



Special 



other side and, thus, we are able to 
read when they launch their weapons 
what performance capabilities they are 
testing and may be achieving. And they 
can do the same with us. Encryption 
scrambles those signals so the other 
side can't read them. 

This treaty limits and restricts the 
ability of each side to use encryption 
with respect to those signals. Thus, this 
treay protects our ability to monitor 
what the Soviet Union is doing in de- 
veloping new weapons and new capa- 
bilities in existing weapons — an impor- 
tant protection for us. 

This treaty does not limit any on- 
going program that we have underway, 
so that our programs like MX [missile 
experimental], cruise missiles, and the 
more advanced technologies that we 
have underway would not be limited. 

In fact, this treaty would enable us 
to improve our capabilities within mar- 
gins. We are interested only in surviv- 
able weapons; we are interested in in- 
creasing the lethal nature or character 
in total of our weapons, so that this 
treaty has a way of imposing restraints 
upon the Russians, stabilizing the arms 
race, and preparing the ground for 
SALT III and the final negotiations. 

I was a member of the Foreign 
Relations Committee and, as such, I 
had to study this treaty carefully, and 
that is the conclusion I reached. I know 
that other Senators have reached other 
conclusions, but the point is, from my 
point of view, if we were to reject the 
SALT II Treaty on the ground that we 
should have gotten more than we got 
out of the negotiations for this treaty, 
we then face the formidable task of 
going back to the Russians and asking 
them to give up more than they have 
already yielded— but at the same time 
we retain what we got out of the treaty. 
Now that is a tough negotiation to try 
to get, even between two businessmen 
in this country, let alone between the 
United States and the Soviet Union. 

Rejection of the treaty, especially 
in the present climate created following 
the invasion of Afghanistan, could well 
mean the end of the SALT process, and 
the cost to us in terms of an arms race 
would be horrendous. 

Q. What would the State Depart- 
ment policy be if the security of South 
Africa were threatened at the present 
time, taking into account the possible 
Soviet interest that might be involved 
as well as the repressive nature of the 
present government of South Africa. 



A. I don't see any conceivable cir- 
cumstances in which South Africa's se- 
curity would be threatened, except by 
its failure to open up its society to its 
own people. 

It is a very self-sufficient nation 
with tremendous resources. It has de- 
veloped them and industrialized. And 
indeed, one of the frustrations of the 
situation is that the strength of the 
South African economy is of importance 
to the front-line states adjoining, which 
are all black and which are a part of the 
movement of black majority rule in the 
countries north of South Africa. They 
feel that sanctions on South Africa 
would hurt them because they are so 
tied into the South African economy. 
Now South Africa has seen this 
coming a long time and it is pretty 
self-sufficient economically. It is well 
able to defend itself against any 
foreseeable threats, and I can't see the 
Soviet Union targeting South Africa as 
a high-priority target from the Soviet's 
point of view. 

Q. According to newspaper ac- 
counts, since the taking of our hos- 
tages in Iran almost a year ago, in 
addition to several thousand Iranian 
students and illegal aliens that have 
been deported from this country, 
newspaper accounts indicate that 
some 11,079 Iranian political exiles 
have been admitted to the United 
States since that time. 

At the same time, the newspaper 
account indicates that there are an 
estimated 100 Iranian Jews who have 
asked for political exile to the United 
States who are being held in limbo in 
Paris and in London. 

According to this newspaper re- 
port, the State Department says that 
it is not in the interest of the United 
States and the human rights interest 
to let them in. It is not part of our na- 
tional interest, as we do not want to 
offend Khomeini's government. 

1 wonder how we can allow 11,079 
Iranian refugees into the United 
States but cannot allow these 100 
Jewish Iranian refugees in at the same 
time? 

A. There are implications in your 
question, and I don't have the back- 
ground of that particular figure or an 
analysis of what went into it. I find it 
very difficult to believe that the fact 
that those Iranians are Jewish is the 
reason why they are being denied— if 
they are in fact being denied — entrance 
into the United States. 



Q. But this was a published arti- 
cle in the Memphis newspaper, and 
it's very clear. 

A. Occasionally, I have read pub- 
lished articles in newspapers that I 
knew personally were not accurate. 
[Laughter and applause.] 

But I will take your question seri- 
ously and pursue it, and if you will 
leave your name and address I will per- 
sonally try to dig into that particular 
issue and find out what there is to the 
newspaper story and, if it reflects State 
Department policy accurately, why that 
policy was adopted. I will be glad to do 
that. [Applause.] 

Q. Do you feel that our govern- 
ment has any real plans to develop 
credibility in the Arab world, in view 
of the fact that, to them, what we 
seem to be worrying about is Soviet 
aggression to Afghanistan, and what 
the Arabs are worried about, from 
their perception, is an Israeli aggres- 
sion — and not deferring — hanging 
onto these lands taken in the 1967 war- 
and the annexing of East Jerusalem. 

They seem to have no success in 
extricating the Israelis from the West 
Bank or doing anything to reconcile 
the differences between Israel and 
Palestine. Do you think that there is 
any chance — since they regard one 
section is bad enough — that we could 
ever count on any support of the Arab 
world in resisting Soviet expansion? 
And perhaps then to Iraq — Iraq or 
Iran. 

A. With respect to our general re- 
lations with the moderate Arab states, 
I think they are in a very healthy state 
at the present time, and I say that fol- 
lowing 2 weeks which I spent at the m 
United Nations, meeting some 47 f 
Foreign Ministers over that period of 
time. This is an occasion which Ameri- 
can Secretaries of State take to meet, 
within a short time, the Foreign Minis- 
ters of many countries who come for the 
General Assembly. I have had the op- 
portunity to talk to the Foreign Minis- 
ters and, in some cases, to Prime Minis- 
ters of the moderate Arab states and 
some which are not so moderate. 

But in any case, their interest in 
our views, their interest in being sup- 
portive, their interest and their concern 
about the Soviet invasion of Afghani- 
stan are all at a high level. 

They will all say, frankly, that they 
think we ought to be more effective in 
dealing with the Israeli-Arab issues, 
and all of them except Egypt are 
pessimistic — I think that is the accurate 



Department of State Bulletin 



1 



Special 



ord to use — about the prospects of 
16 Camp David process. But 
evertheless, they support us. 

Some of you may have seen Prince 
au'd of Saudi Arabia on "Face the Na- 
on" Sunday. I had two good talks with 
rince Sau'd, and he represents the 
oyal Family of Saudi Arabia. There 
■e aspects of our policy that they do 
iticize, and they do criticize some as- 
sets of our Middle East policies, but, 
jvertheless, they have a strong iden- 
Fication with us in many other areas 
eluding their very deep concern about 
e Soviet aggression in Afghanistan. 

If you will just look at your maps 
fain, you will find that Afghanistan is 
t far removed from Iran as a threat 
the Persian Gulf, and it is the Per- 
Tin Gulf which is the heart of the oil 
1 sources of these moderate Arab 

Mtf.'^. 

So they are very much with us on 
tat policy, and they are frank with us 
id critical of us with regard to the 
1 lestinian issues. 

There is no question — and I say 
t s as an American as well as Secre- 
t -y of State — that a resolution of the 
I'aeli-Arab issues is critical, not only 
f im Israel's point of view and that of 
t > neighbor states but that of the 
Iiited States as well. 

It is a block, in some ways, to the 
kid of rallying to our policies that we 
n ^ht otherwise get from nations which 
8' concerned about this. Yes, that is 
t e. 

Q. Some of us can still remember 
tl ■ Kellogg-Briand treaty of the 
1 !0s; its consequences in this coun- 
ti are, notably, many carriers in 
Jiian as a result of our agreeing not 
tdncrease the number of battleships 
tilt we had — and regrettably — with 
funds who are dead as a result 
tireof. 

Not that we are opposed to such 
tlaties, but that we find, as I think 
sine of the Senators, your former 
CI leagues, are saying, that we 
T en't taken proper precautions. 

.\nd I know you have talked about 
■i l>T II before this evening, but it 
y hers us very severely that we 
I n't taking these precautions to 
y- vent the Russians from spreading 
lo new and novel fields where they 
. I do what they intended to do out- 
■i e the scope of the treaty. And that 
(illy seriously bothers us, those of 
I who have been through these 
) iods. 



A. With respect to your first point, 
there are two Kellogg treaties that I 
remember. There was a Kellogg treaty 
which undertook to limit naval ships — 
and I don't know that that had much to 
do, one way or another, with the out- 
break of World War II or whether it 
existed or had not existed. 

I think it had as much to do with 
the outbreak of World War II as the 
other, Kellogg-Briand treaty, which 
undertook to outlaw war. That was 
signed about 1928 or 1929, and we have 
bad more wars since that time, and 
more people killed in wars, than in all 
the previous history of mankind. 

So treaties do not necessarily 
achieve their objectives any more than 
some of the legislation that we enact. 

But nevertheless, we are dealing, 
in the case of nuclear armaments, with 
a destructive force that man has never 
had to deal with before; to do nothing 
about restraining that force and to open 
the door to unlimited competition in de- 
veloping nuclear technology for 
weapons — is simply to doom mankind 
to a hopeless future. 

There are many difficulties in- 
volved: One is that the defense re- 
quirements of the Soviet Union and the 
United States are not the same. We 
don't have a long China border to de- 
fend. They do. Our NATO allies are 
next door to them. They have no allies 
except Cuba, which is not comparable, 
next door to us. 

So undertaking to restrain Ameri- 
can nuclear weapons that are located in 
Europe, which they fear are aimed at 
them just as much as our central sys- 
tems located in this country, is a dif- 
ficult negotiating problem, and we 
never did negotiate it. We sort of by- 
passed it on both sides. Now we are in 
the middle of it as we have agreed to 
negotiate those weapons in separate 
talks at this point. 

So the question of weighing the 
relative benefits or shortcomings of the 
treaty from our point of view is not an 
easy judgment to make. Now that the 
prospects of SALT II are diminished so 
greatly because of the failure of the 
Senate to ratify it last year and because 
of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, 
our military Joint Chiefs of Staff are in- 
creasingly supportive of the treaty be- 
cause they see the consequences of a 
world in which there is no SALT 
treaty. So there is that problem to be 
concerned about. 



In addition, there is the cost of es- 
calation. These weapons cost in the bil- 
lions of dollars. If we now unleash the 
scientists on each side — you know they 
constantly advance nuclear technology, 
make it more complicated, more sophis- 
ticated — then the problem of control- 
ling such weapons becomes more com- 
plicated and more sophisticated and 
maybe impossible. 

I can remember in 1969 or 1970 
making a speech on the Senate floor 
urging that we not deploy the MIRV 
[multiple independently-targetable 
reentry vehicle]. To those who don't 
know what the MIRV is, it is that 
launcher which can throw a multiple 
number of targets and individually 
target them when they arrive over 
targets. They are independently 
targeted warheads, so you can send a 
launcher with 10 warheads, and it could 
be put on 10 different targets, each 
precisely targeted. 

We launched that before the 
Soviets had developed it. We deployed 
it before the Soviet had deployed it — 
before, indeed, they had tested it and 
achieved it. 

I urged, at the time, that we not 
deploy it on the grounds that once we 
deployed it, we would never be able to 
persuade the Russians to do without it; 
so we would have escalated the arms 
race to a new level. 

And that is what happened. The 
MIRV has done more to complicate 
negotiations over arms control than any 
other single technological advance. 

Now if we suspend the SALT proc- 
ess for reasons that I have indicated 
and permit the technology to go for- 
ward, each side is going to go full 
speed. And if there is no control, we 
are going to put tens of billions of dol- 
lars into nuclear arms — more sophisti- 
cated, more advanced — so controlling it 
would be even more difficult. 

Now as between the choices, I take 
the SALT II Treaty: given the re- 
straints it imposes on the Soviet Union, 
the relatively less restraint it imposes 
on us; we can still go forward with the 
cruise missiles which we have de- 
veloped; the Trident submarine which 
we have developed; we are now work- 
ing on a new bomber — the Stealth 
bomber — which we have developed; we 
can go forward with all of those things, 
which may be a bad thing in the long 
run, but at least it does not put us be- 
hind the eight ball so far as new tech- 
nology is concerned. 



ember 1980 



Special 



And so you have got to strike that 
balance. It's a judgment call, and it may 
not work because frankly, if SALT II 
were to be ratified, each of us could still 
destroy the other. 

So SALT II is justified: One, as a 
restraint, and secondly, as a step that 
would lead to the third step — SALT 
III — which hopefully would reduce the 
level of nuclear arms and, thus, reduce 
the danger. SALT II doesn't really re- 
duce the ability of either side to destroy 
the other. 

Q. Do you feel that there is a pos- 
sibility that the nations of the world 
will ever come to trust each other so 
much that they will stop completely 
the race for armaments; that they will 
believe in the treaty of the people of 
the other country; that you feel you 
can have a dream you can build a fu- 
ture world where the people of all the 
nations can live happily and freely, 
can live with complete brotherly love; 
where all the people of the world can 
grow and develop themselves in com- 
plete freedom without being attacked 
for their personal liberty or their per- 
sonal beliefs? 

A. I am not sure I understand what 
you are asking. 

Q. Do you feel that we can — that 
you can believe that we can build a 
future world where all the people of 
the world can live — 

A. Happily together? 

Q. Yes. 



A. Let me make one observation — 
the tremendous obstacle that stands be- 
tween us, where we are, and that 
world. 

There are 15 million refugees in the 
world today. Fifteen million are scat- 
tered over this globe — all of them 
people who have fled their homes and 
their country for one reason or another 
— oppression, lack of liberty, lack of 
opportunity, hunger, persecution — 
what else? 

From Cambodia to Somalia to 
Pakistan to Latin America to Africa — 
millions of people on the march away 
from home, away from conditions they 
find unacceptable. 

It's those marching feet that tell us 
more about the disturbed nature of this 
planet and the lack of circumstances 
which human beings find acceptable 
than anything else I could say. I spell 
out that as one number. 

If we can find a way to create cir- 
cumstances all over this planet from 
which people do not find it necessary to 
flee, then we may be approaching the 
ideal state which you describe. 

That doesn't mean that all people 
must live in the kind of style that 
Americans have gotten used to. Many 
of them can be happy with much, much 
less, but they cannot live in circum- 
stances where children have hunger, 
where the life span is less than 40, 
where most people do not get a full 
meal as much as once a day, and where 
their children have no better prospects 
for the future than themselves. 

Human beings are not going to ac- 
cept life at that level. Not only will 
they flee from it, but there are always 



(I 



those who seek to exploit that dissatis 
faction and mobilize them behind vio- 
lent movements to bring change — 
mobilize them behind wrong-headed 
policies to bring change. 

So, it's a very, very challenging 
task that lies ahead of us. 

But on the other hand, my op- 
timism, at the age of 66, tells me that 
we have made enough progress in 
enough places toward alleviating cir- 
cumstances like that — so that if we 
simply, by our will, add a prayer, use 
our resources wisely, we can make 
more progress. 

We are not going to achieve it in 
my lifetime. The great religious leaders* 
didn't in their lifetime, but they left be-i 
hind them a legacy of ideals and objec- 
tives, and practical suggestions for 
everyday living that still work when we* 
practice them — and I think they can 
work again. 



1980. 



Press release 273 A of October 11, 



i 



I 



Department of State Bulletin 



Interview 



jainst whatever our policies are in 
le Middle East. 

How can the United States — is it 
9t a no win situation? Are we not in- 
)lved in that sense that no matter 
hich side wins — Iran or Iraq — it's 
)ing to denigrate American interests 
the whole area? 

A. As I said to you, we do have 
rong interests in that area. President 
arter was not wrong early this year 
hen he emphasized the importance of 
e Persian Gulf to the United States. 

It happens at the present time that 
e furtherance of those interests is 
!st pursued by seeking a cessation of 
istilities. It also happens at the pres- 
it time that it's not helpful for us to 
ioose sides between the two parties, 
it being neutral doesn't mean that 
i've being passive. We're working 
I rough diplomatic means to try to 
ling the hostilities to a conclusion. I 
(ink that out of this situation can come 
cessation of hostilities and I hope a 
iturn to a kind of normality in that 
I rt of the world. 

Q. You spoke earlier about the 
(calation of the war aims of Iraq as 
sen by our analysts here. 

What is the danger that if Iraq 
sirts to carve up Iran that Iran's 
I rthern neighbor — the Soviet 
hion, which after World War II had 
t>ops in the northern provinces of 
lirdistan and Azerbaijan — should 
tcide to join in this car>ing up proc- 
€i? And what would that mean for 
t? United States? Might we get in- 
>lved at that point? 

.4. We certainly would be strongly 
c posed to any dismemberment of Iran. 
1? think it's in the interests of the 
\l rid for Iran to maintain a basic ter- 
porial integrity. 

,j As far as threats from the north, I 
i nk the Soviets understand that the 
^lited States would regard any effort 
them to move into Iran with the ut- 
ist gravity. 

Q. Does this understanding come 
t of the Muskie-Gromyko talks in 
w York? 

A. They've understood it well be- 

•e that, and I think that they under- 

ind it especially at the present time. 

Q. Would they be able, in fact, to 
anything in a military sense in 
V{'w of the problems they have in Af- 
anistan and also in a more vital 



area perhaps to them, Poland? What 
is the Soviet posture right now, 
militarily? 

A. Certainly they have some dif- 
ficulties around the world. Afghanistan 
has turned out to be a very difficult 
military endeavor for them; 80,000 
troops are tied down within the country 
of Afghanistan, about half that many on 
the border. In addition, they have to 
look west of them in Poland and recog- 
nize a very difficult situation there. 

I hope that they will understand 
their own self-interests in restraint 
with respect to Iran. 

Q. Speaking of the Soviet Union 
on the flanks of Poland, we are aware 
from stories that Soviet divisions both 
in East Germany and in the western 
part of the U.S.S.R. have, in recent 
days, been increasing their capability 
to move if called upon. Did Mr. 
Gromyko in his talks with Secretary 
of State Muskie the other day give 
any assurances that the Soviet Union 
did not intend to invade Poland to 
crush the nonviolent worker revolt 
there? 

A. I don't want to get into the de- 
tails of those conversations. The Soviet 
Union up to this point has shown con- 
siderable restraint with respect to Po- 
land. The courage of the Polish work- 
ers, fortunately, has been matched 
by restraint by their government and 
by the Soviet Union. 

There have been some movements 
near the Soviet-Polish border. We're 
watching those very closely. There's 
not any indication at the present time 
that they intend to move in, but we will 
be very watchful. 

Q. Do you take seriously the re- 
peated Kremlin warnings to the 
workers of Poland that unfriendly 
and hostile forces are financing them 
and taking control of their move- 
ment? 

A. Yes. I think that we have to be 
watchful about that. There's been a 
major change in Poland — a major re- 
form and advance. It's very desirable 
from the standpoint of the West that 
there be peace in the Polish situation 
and that those reforms be accomplished 
in an atmosphere of tranquillity. We 
can only hope that the Russian Gov- 
ernment and the others involved will 
exercise the restraint that they have up 
to the present time. 



Q. Is the Russian monolith big 
enough to handle trouble in Poland, 
trouble in Afghanistan, trouble in 
Iran, Iraq, all at the same time, 
militarily speaking? 

A. Let me put it to you this way. 
My feeling is, and I can't prove this, 
but my strong feeling is that one of the 
reasons for the Soviet restraint with 
respect to Poland is the firm stand that 
the United States took in Afghanistan 
and the way that they are tied down in 
Afghanistan. 

I don't want to try to assess their 
total military capability, but the prob- 
lems that they're having there in Asia, 
I think, are one of the reasons for their 
restraint in Europe. 

Q. If 1 month from now or 6 
months from now or 8 months from 
now the Soviet Army should move 
into Poland, what options are avail- 
able to the United States and its allies 
in that kind of crisis? 

A. I think the Soviet Union recog- 
nizes that if they would take an action 
of that kind, it would have the most 
profound effect on the whole set of re- 
lationships in Europe. 

I certainly think it would mean the 
end of what the Europeans call detente. 
Once they're on notice of that, I think 
the Soviet Union will recognize in their 
own interests that they should not try 
to invade a country with the sense of 
independence that Poland has. 

I don't want to speculate on the 
contingencies of their effort to do that, 
but I do express the strong hope, in- 
deed perhaps feeling, that they will 
show restraint with respect to Poland 
and continue to show restraint with re- 
spect to Poland. 

Q. Apparently the U.S. Govern- 
ment has decided to send a 
representative — and I don't know 
whether it's an official and I don't 
know who it is and maybe you can tell 
us — to Hanoi to talk to the Viet- 
namese Government. And not only 
would I like to know who he is and 
what he's doing, but what subjects is 
he going to bring up? 

I know that he's going to talk 
about American soldiers who may 
have died there. I thought that sub- 
ject was pretty well over. What is this 
about? 

A. To the best of my knowledge 
that's a limited endeavor to talk purely 
about the MIAs [missing-in-action]. It 



bvember 1980 



45 



Interview 



is an endeavor that has gone on for 
some time. We have reports of people 
who have said that there are bodies 
there that have not yet been returned 
to the United States. There is an occa- 
sional report of somebody who perhaps 
is still living, and we investigate those, 
and we follow them up as well as we 
can. But I wouldn't attach great signifi- 
cance to this report. It does not have 
political overtones. It is not a political 
negotiation. 

Q. But is there, in fact, an 
American representative who is going 
to go? 

A. That's what I've been told. 

Q. .And is he going to go before 
the election? 

A. I don't know the timing of it. 

Q. I just wonder if it doesn't have 
poUtical overtones in the domestic 
sense and if it isn't a move by the Car- 
ter Administration to show once 
again that we're still trying to do 
something in an area where it's been 
pretty well proven we can't do any- 
thing. 

A. Those efforts with respect to 
the MIAs have gone on rather continu- 
ously and for a long period of time. So I 
wouldn't attach political significance 
domestically to it either. 

Q. What do you make of Fidel 
Castro's move to cut off the flow of 
refugees to the United States, which 
has been a political thorn in the side 
of the Administration for some time? 

A. I'm glad it's happened. 

Q. How about the timing of it? 

A. As to the timing of it, I would 
have to say that Fidel Castro, like 
other leaders of their country, gener- 
ally do things when it's in their own 
self-interest. And I assume that there 
was some combination of factors that 
caused him to feel that at this point in 
hi.story he wanted to cut off that flow. 

Obviously there's a real problem 
for a closed society when that many 
people want to leave. Obviously there's 
a real problem for a country in its 
internal control when that many people 
want to leave. 

So I don't know what was in Mr. 
Castro's mind, but I do think it will be 



helpful here so we can get some sense 
of regularity about immigration from 
Cuba to the United States and also 
handle the Cuban refugees who are now 
here. 

Q. Is it some kind of harbinger of 
improved relations with the Castro 
government? 

A. It certainly removes a very 
thorny issue between us. On the other 
hand, there's a long way to go before 
the United States has normal relation- 
ships with Cuba. 

Q. Aren't we having discussions 
with the Cuban Government? I think 
that Mr. Watson, the President's 
Chief of Staff, said that for the last 
several weeks we had been discussing 
some problems, apparently including 
this one. 

A. Yes, that's correct. We have an 
interest section in Havana — an active 
interest section, and they've been dis- 
cussing with the Cubans a number of is- 
sues, mainly refugee issues. 

If you recall, we had about 400 ref- 
ugees who were in our interest section. 
Little by little, they've been able to 
leave, and that part of the problem has 
been resolved. Now perhaps it appears 
that the Mariel problem — the boat 
people problem — is on the way to being 
solved. 

Q. What about the return of 
criminals? 

A. That problem is also under dis- 
cussion. 

Q. The Senate voted the other day 
to stop the grain embargo to the 
Soviet Union on the basis that Ameri- 
can farmers were punished more than 
the Russians. Is the President pre- 
pared to veto any legislation calling 
for an end to the embargo? 

A. Let me say that I am deeply 
disappointed with that vote, and I hope 
that the House of Representatives will 
not go along with it. One doesn't pre- 
dict too early a Presidential veto, but I 
will say to you that no one should mis- 
understand the President's determina- 
tion about carrying forward the grain 
embargo. 



It's been a very successful part ol 
our effort. Nine months ago on this 
program I emphasized the importance 
of our endurance with respect to our 
position on Afghanistan and I em- 
phasize it again. We should maintain 
the embargo. It's hurting the Russians 
It's hurt them very badly with respec 
to their livestock production. 

The 17 million tons that we de- 
prived Russia of last year — they've 
been able to replace only about half of 
and at greater costs and with considei 
able shipping difficulties. 

So I'm disap]3ointed in the Senate 
vote and I hope the House will revers 
it and the President, I would say, is de 
termined on the issue. 



Q. Is the United States leading 
the attempt to mediate, or are we 
leaving that to others in Iran-Iraq? 

A. We are certainly trying very 
hard to use the forces that we can fine* 
On the other hand, other countries hav 
some special ability in this area that wi» 
lack because we don't have good rela- 
tions with either of the countries in- 
volved. ■ 



46 



Department of State Bulletf'' 



RMS CONTROL 



teport on CTB Negotiations 



Oh Jiih/.n. 19S(/. the United 
ates, the Soviet Ihiioii, and the 
lited Kingdom presented the foUoiv- 
7 progress report to the U.N . Coni- 
'ttee on Disarnianient in Genera on 
'ir tripartite negotiations on a coin- 
ehensive test ban (CTB). 

This report on the status of the 
gotiations between the Union of 
viet Socialist Republics, the United 
ngdom of Great Britain and Northern 
;land, and the United States of 
nerica on a treaty prohibiting nuclear 
lapon test explosions in all environ- 
nts and its protocol covering nuclear 
plosions for peaceful purposes has 
en jointly prepared by the three par- 
is to the negotiations. 
2. The three negotiating parties 
well aware of the deep and long- 
Snding commitment to the objective 
o:his treaty that has been demon- 
s ated by the Committee on Disarma- 
r nt and its predecessor bodies. They 

■ lionize the strong and legitimate 

li ei'e.st of the Committee on Disarma- 
nnt in their activities, and they have 
norted to the Committee on Disarm- 
a ent previously, most recently on 31 
■I y, 1979. They welcome the opportu- 
n \' to do so again, just as they wel- 
11- the continued support and en- 
j I'agement that their negotiations de- 
r ,^ from the interest of the Committee 
1 nisarmament. 

• !. Since the last report to the 
'_ iiniittee on Disarmament, the three 
i t'gations have completed two rounds 
I u'i,r()tiations. The negotiations re- 
•I \('iied on 16 June, 1980. 

4. The negotiating parties are 
I king a treaty that for decades has 
' n t,nven one of the highest priorities 
V hv field of arms limitation, and the 
■^' ii't Union, the United Kingdom and 
I'nited States continue to attach 
1 1 importance to it. The desire to 
i ii\e an early agreement, which is so 
• fly shared by the international 
cmiunity, has been repeatedly ex- 
!■ ssed at the highest level of all three 

■ iTnments. 

'>. Global interest in the cessation 
iiiclear weapon.s tests by all states 

ln'en recorded by a succession of 
ilutions of the United Nations Gen- 
I Assembly and by the final docu- 
ii of the Special Session on Disarm- 
■nt of the United Nations General 



Assembly. It has been stated in the 
preambles to a number of international 
arms limitation treaties now in force, 
and its significance will again be under- 
lined in the forthcoming second Review- 
Conference of the Treaty on the Non- 
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. 

6. The objectives which the 
negotiating parties seek to achieve as a 
result of this treaty are important to all 
mankind. Specifically, they seek to at- 
tain a treaty which will make a major 
contribution to the shared objectives of 
constraining the nuclear arms race, 
curbing the spread of nuclear weapons 
and strengthening international peace 
and security. 

7. Given the importance of these 
objectives, it is understandable that the 
international community has repeatedly 
called for the earliest possible conclu- 
sion of the treaty. At the same time, it 
is important to note that this treaty is, 
in many respects, a difficult one to 
negotiate. Many of the issues are novel, 
sensitive and intricate. The treaty di- 
rectly affects vital national security 
concerns and the process of negotiation 
requires considerable and painstaking 
work. 

8. In spite of these challenges, 
however, the Soviet Union, the United 
Kingdom and the United States have 
made considerable progress in 
negotiating the treaty. 

9. The negotiating parties have 
agreed that the treaty will require each 
party to prohibit, prevent and not to 
carry out any nuclear weapon test ex- 
plosion at any place under its jurisdic- 
tion or control in any environment; and 
to refrain from causing, encouraging or 
in any way participating in the carrying 
out of any nuclear weapon test explo- 
sion anywhere. 

10. The negotiating parties have 
agreed that the treaty will be accom- 
panied by a protocol on nuclear explo- 
sions for peaceful purposes, which will 
be an integral part of the treaty. The 
protocol will take into account the pro- 
visions of Article V of the Treaty on the 
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. 
In the protocol, the parties will estab- 
lish a moratorium on nuclear explosions 
for peaceful purposes and accordingly 
will refrain from causing, encouraging, 
permitting or in any way participating 
in the carrying out of such explosions 
until arrangements for conducting them 
are worked out which would be consist- 
ent with the treaty being negotiated, 



the treaty banning nuclear weapon 
tests in the atmosphere, in outer space 
and under water and the Treaty on the 
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. 
Without delay after entry into force of 
the treaty, the parties will keep under 
consideration the subject of arrange- 
ments for conducting nuclear explosions 
for peaceful purposes, including the as- 
pect of ])recluding military benefits. 
Such arrangements, which could take 
the form of a special agreement or 
agreements, would be made effective 
by appropriate amendment to the 
protocol. 

11. To ensui-e that the tready does 
not detract from previous aiTns limitation 
agreements, there will be a provision 
stating that the treaty does not affect 
obligations com])atible with it that have 
been assumed by ])arties under other 
international agreements. Such other 
agreements include the treaty banning 
nuclear weapon tests in the atmos- 
phere, in outer space and under water 
and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation 
of Nuclear Weapons. The three 
negotiating parties have agreed that 
the treaty will provide procedures for 
amendment, and that any amendments 
will require the approval of a majority 
of all parties, which majority shall in- 
clude all parties that are permanent 
members of the Security Council of the 
United Nations. They have also agreed 
that, as in other arms limitation agree- 
ments, there will be provision for with- 
drawal from the treaty on the grounds 
of supreme national interests. They 
have also agreed that the treaty should 
enter into force upon ratification by 
twenty signatory governments, in- 
cluding those of the Soviet Union, the 
United Kingdom and the United States. 

12. The parties are considering 
formulations relating to the duration of 
the treaty. They envisage that a con- 
ference will be held at an appropriate 
time to review the operation of the 
treaty. Decisions at the conference will 
require a majority of the parties to the 
treaty, which majority shall include all 
parties that are permanent members of 
the Security Council of the United 
Nations. 

13. The negotiating parties, recog- 
nizing the importance of verification, 
have agreed that a variety of verifica- 
tion measures should be provided to 
enhance confidence that all parties to 
the treaty are in strict compliance with 
it. Such measures in the treaty itself. 



■mber 1980 



47 



Arms Control 



and the additional measures under 
negotiation to facilitate verification of 
compliance with the treaty, must first 
be agreed in principle, and then drafted 
in detail, which is of course a laborious 
process. It must be done with care be- 
cause the implementation of these 
measures will have important impact 
not only on ensuring compliance with 
the treaty, but also on political rela- 
tions among its parties. 

14. It has been agreed that the 
parties will use national technical 
means of verification at their disposal in 
a manner consistent with generally rec- 
ognized principles of international law 
to verify compliance with the treaty 
and that each party will undertake not 
to interfere with such means of 
verification. 

15. It has long been recognized 
that cooperative seismic monitoring 
measures can make an important con- 
tribution to verifying compliance with 
the treaty. The Committee on Disarm- 
ament and its predecessors have played 
a leading role in developing such meas- 
ures. On the basis of the work done in 
the past few years under those aus- 
pices, the negotiating parties have 
agreed to provisions establishing an in- 
ternational exchange of seismic data. 
Each treaty party will have the right to 
participate in this e.xchange, to contrib- 
ute data from design