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bulletin
Official Monthly Record of United States Foreign Policy / Volume 81 / Number 2055
October 1981
U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY / 1
Middle East / 13, 52
East Asia / 35
Afghanistan / 63
El Salvador / 72
Dvpartmvnl of Slulv
bulletin
Volume 81 / Number 2055 / October 1981
The Department of State Bulletin ,
published by the Office of Public
Communication in the Bureau of Public
Affairs, is the official record of U.S.
foreign policy. Its purpose is to provide
the public, the Congress, and
government agencies with information
on developments in U.S. foreign
relations and the work of the
Department of State and the Foreign
Service.
The Bulletin's contents include major
addresses and news conferences of the
President and the Secretary of State;
statements made before congressional
committees by the Secretary and other
senior State Department officials;
special features and articles on
international affairs; selected press
releases issued by the White House,
the Department, and the U.S. Mission
to the United Nations; and treaties and
other agreements to which the United
States is or may become a party.
ALEXANDER M.HAIG, JR.
Secretary of State
DEAN FISHER
Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs
PAULE.AUERSWALD
Director,
Office of Public Communication
MARTIN JUDGE
Chief, Editorial Division
PHYLLIS A. YOUNG
Editor
JUANITA ADAMS
Assistant Editor
The Secretary of State has determined that
the publication of this periodical is
necessary in the transaction of the public
business required by law of this
Department. Use of funds for printing this
periodical has been approved by the
Director of the Office of Management and
Budget through January 31, 1986.
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CONTENTS
FEATURE
U.N. General Assembly:
1 A New Era of Growth (Secretary Haig)
2 United Nations Day, 1981 {Proclamation)
5 U.S. -Soviet Union to Resume Arms Talks (Department Statement)
fe Secretary
3 U.S. Strategy in the
Middle East
£ Interview on "Issues and
Answers"
£ News Conference of August 28
S Interview on "Good Morning,
America"
ica
!* Regional Strategy for Southern
Africa {Chester A. Crocker)
K Libyan Interference in Chad
(Chester A. Crocker)
>< Internal Situation in Zimbabwe
(President Reagan's Letter to the
Congress)
ns Control
U Policy Problems of Arms Control
(Eugene V. Rostow)
Crtada
fc U.S. -Canada Meeting on Hyde
3:
Park Agreement
Pacific Salmon Issues (U.S.,
Canada press release)
E st Asia
3 U.S. Interests in Southeast Asia
(John H. Holdridge)
U.S. Relations With China (John
H. Holdridge)
North Korea Fires at U.S. Plane
(Department Statement)
onomics
Approach to Foreign Economic
Issues (Myer Rashish)
U.S. International Economic
Policy and Its Impact on LDCs
(Myer Rashish)
49 Multilateral Development Banks
and U.S. Human Rights Policy
(Ernest B. Johnston)
50 Japan to Continue Imports of
Fruits and Vegetables
Europe
51 Soviet Military Exercise (Depart-
ment Statement)
51 Third Report on Cyprus (Message
to the Congress)
52 10th Anniversary of the
Quadripartite Agreement
(Department Statement)
Middle East
52 U.S. Proposes Air Defense
Package for Saudi Arabia
(James L. Buckley. President
Reagan's Letter to the Congress.
Background Paper)
57 U.S. Planes Attacked by Libyan
Aircraft (Lt. Gen. Philip J.
Gast, Caspar W. Weinberger.
Department Statements)
61 Secretary's Interview for CBS
News (Secretary Haig)
61 U.S. Lifts Suspension of Aircraft
to Israel (Secretary Haig)
62 Situation in the Middle East
(Philip C. Habib)
Refugees
62 Refugee Advisory Panel Report
South Asia
63 Afghanistan: 18 Months of Oc-
cupation (Eliza Van Hollen)
64 U.S. Assistance for Afghan
Refugees
United Nations
66 New World Information Order
(Elliott Abrams, James F.
Buckley)
70 Namibia (Contact Group Com-
munique)
71 Security Council Meets on
Lebanon-Israel Border Dispute
(Text of Resolution)
Western Hemisphere
72 El Salvador: The Search for
Peace (Background Paper)
78 Cuban and Haitian Migration
(Thomas 0. Enders)
79 The Situation in Guatemala
(Stephen W. Bosworth, Stephen
E. Palmer)
Treaties
81 Current Actions
Chronology
84 August 1981
Press Releases
85 Department of State
Publications
86 Department of State
86 GPO Sales
Index
U.N. General Assembly Hall.
Feature:
U.N. General Assembly
A New Era of Growth
by Secretary Haig
Address before the 36th session
of the U.N. General Assembly
in New York on September 21, 1981. x
a
s
The United Nations— this parliament of
man— offers us a unique opportunity to
examine the human condition. We are
each called upon to declare our national
purposes. And we are all obligated to
address those problems that obstruct the
vision of the charter.
Let us begin with the vision. The
Charter of the United Nations reflects
cherished dreams of a world distin-
guished by peaceful change and the
resolution of international disputes
without resort to force. The United
States believes in these dreams. They
offer the best chance of justice and
progress for all mankind. They promise
a world hospitable to the values of our
own society including a certain idea of
man as a creative and responsible in-
dividual; democracy; and the rule of law.
The ideals of the United Nations
are, therefore, also American ideals. The
charter embodies American principles. It
will always be a major objective of our
statecraft to make of the United Nations
an instrument of peace.
We all know that the realization of
our dreams cannot depend on hope
alone. Obstacles to progress must be
overcome through united efforts. The
threats to peace are many, suspicions
persist, and the price for inaction is
great. Truly we face a difficult agenda.
As I make these comments, I am
reminded that an observer once said of
this annual debate: "Every year ... a
great and sacred orator . . . preaches
before the assembly of nations a solemn
sermon on the text of the charter." To-
day, however, I would like to focus in-
stead on an issue of compelling interest:
international development.
International development reflects
the worldwide search for economic prog-
ress, social justice, and human dignity.
Short of war itself, no other issue before
us will affect more people, for good or
ill, than this search. And peace itself
cannot be truly secured if the aspira-
tions of mankind for a better life are
frustrated.
Development is, therefore, an endur-
ing issue. It has preoccupied the United
Nations from the beginning. It will sur-
vive the agenda of this assembly and
every assembly far into the future. And
although great progress has been made,
we face today a crucial choice of
strategy that will dramatically affect the
prospects for future success.
A Choice for the 1980s
Since the Second World War, the prog-
ress of development has been uneven
but nonetheless widespread. Enormous
economic growth has been registered.
For example, in the last three decades,
average incomes have actually doubled.
There have also been great advances in
health. Life expectancy has increased
dramatically even in the poorest coun-
tries and infant mortality has been
reduced.
This experience, however, has not
been fully shared by all countries and
United Nations Day, 1981
A PROCLAMATION1
The United Nations rose from the ashes of the
Second World War. As we observe another
United Nations Day on October 24, 1981, we
are thankful that the world has since been
spared another major conflagration.
The United Nations has assisted in bring-
ing stability to troubled areas and will surely
do so again. United Nations peacekeeping
forces are on duty in the volatile Middle East
and have contributed to maintaining the peace
in other places.
The problems addressed in this world
forum are diverse, and the United Nations
cannot resolve all matters it considers. But it
has helped. This year it held a major confer-
ence for the purpose of pledging assistance to
refugees in Africa. The United States made a
substantial pledge, consistent with our historic
support for United Nations refugee programs.
The United Nations is the world's meeting
place. It brings together representatives of
virtually all countries to discuss a multitude of
subjects. These meetings afford opportunities
for bilateral discussions, often at a high level,
as an extra benefit. Today, much of the world's
diplomacy takes place under the aegis of the
United Nations.
The United States will continue to play a
prominent role and champion the values and
ideals that originally inspired the United Na-
tions. We will further those activities that
strengthen the capacity of the institution to
serve the good of mankind.
Now, Therefore, I, Ronald Reagan,
President of the United States of America, do
hereby designate Saturday, October 24, 1981,
as United Nations Day. I urge all Americans to
use this day as an opportunity to better ac-
quaint themselves with the activities and ac-
complishments of the United Nations.
I have appointed Mr. Robert Anderson to
serve as 1981 United States National Chairman
for United Nations Day, and welcome the role
of the United Nations Association of the
United States of America in working with him
to celebrate this special day.
In Witness Whereof, I have hereunto
set my hand this twenty-eighth day of Sep-
tember, in the year of our Lord nineteen
hundred and eighty-one, and of the Independ-
ence of the United States of America the two
hundred and sixth.
Ronald Reagan
the prospect for the future is now cloud-
ed by recent trends. The pattern of in-
creasing economic growth, critical for
development, has been slowed by infla-
tion, high energy prices, severe balance-
of-payments problems, heavy debt, and
slower growth of markets. Political tur-
moil and instability have diverted
precious resources into arms and con-
flict. The necessary synthesis between
traditional values and modernization,
never easy to achieve, has grown more
difficult under the impact of accelerating
change.
Let us dispense with illusions. We
must choose today between two futures:
a future of sustainable growth, an ex-
pansion of world trade, and a reduction
of poverty or a future of economic
stagnation, rising protectionism, and the
spread of poverty. As the World Bank
has put it: "By the end of the century,
the difference between the two cases
amounts to some 220 million more ab-
solutely poor people."
Clearly, our task is to give fresh im-
petus to development by devising now a
new strategy for growth. Such a
strategy begins by recognizing the
highly complex and difficult situation we
face.
• The poorest developing countries
require long-term and generous conces-
sional aid from developed and other
developing countries to raise productivi-
ty through broadly based education and
training, improvements in health and
nutrition, and better infrastructure.
They also need sound economic policies,
particularly in the agricultural sector.
Ultimately, the objective must be to in-
volve them in the international economic
system, thereby strengthening oppor-
tunities and incentives for self-sustaining
growth.
• The middle tier of developing
countries have made significant prog-
ress. Nevertheless, they still suffer from
widespread poverty. They are also
acutely vulnerable to any economic
downturn— especially volatile commodity
markets— because of their narrow range
of exports. These countries need foreign
capital and assistance in developing the
'Text from White House press release of
Sept. 29, 1981. ■
experience and credit worthiness to b
row on international capital markets.
Technical support and manpower trai
ing are important to insure that their
populations are productive and com-
petitive. They also need an open intei
tional trading system to encourage e;
port development.
• The more advanced of the
developing countries are able to mair
tain living standards and economic p<
formance comparable to what some c
today's industrial countries achieved
than a generation ago. Their further
development can be sustained best bj
Intern ational development
reflects the worldwide
search for economic
progress, social justice, and
human dignity. Short of
war itself, no other
issue before us will affect
more people, for good or ill,
than this search.
strong international economy with ar
open capital and trading system. The
must be able to pursue national polic
that take advantage of international
portunities and foster domestic adjus
ment. These countries also play a kei
role in helping poorer nations, both
directly and as policy models.
• The capital-surplus, oil-exportii
countries need a stable and prosperoi
international market for their oil exp
and a favorable environment in whicl
invest their financial assets and to
develop their domestic economies. T?
international system must continue b
evolve to reflect the growing imports
of these countries, as they assume in
creasing responsibility for the manag
ment of that system and for assisting
poorer nations.
• Finally, the industrial countriei
are suffering from low rates of grow
and high rates of inflation. They are
ing to increase savings and investmei
in order to create employment, imprc
the environment, eliminate pockets o
poverty, and adjust to the changing
competitiveness of their exports. The
Dfinartmfint nf Statfi Bull
Feature:
U.N. General Assembly
t sell more abroad to pay for the in-
sed cost of imported energy.
In a slowly growing world, these
iplex and diverse requirements would
ime potent sources of conflict. But
struggle for the world product can
voided. The international economy
help all countries to achieve their ob-
ves through a strategy of growth
:h creates the resources and the
loyment needed for progress. And
cannot be the task of any single
3n.
As the report of the distinguished
mission on international develop-
t issues, chaired by Willy Brandt,
its out: "Above all, the achievement
;onomic growth in one country
mds increasingly on the performance
thers."
iciples for a Strategy of Growth
on this view of a differentiated and
■dependent world that we must build
w strategy for growth. But our
tegy must also be informed by the
)ns of the past. Such lessons, ex-
ted from hard experience, offer the
3 for principles to guide us through
e austere times.
First, development is facilitated
n open international trading
em. Developed and developing coun-
; together face the challenge of
ngthening the GAIT (General
eement on Tariffs and Trade) and
international trading system to
,te mutual export opportunities.
Today the trading system is under
"mous stress— rising protectionist
isures, new and subtle types of im-
; barriers, restrictive bilateral ar-
jements, export subsidies and invest-
it policies which distort trade. These
especially troublesome in a period of
i growth. Unless they are reduced or
iinated, the international trading
em will be seriously weakened. Such
tback to the world economy would
ct the most suffering on the develop-
countries.
The industrialized countries have a
:ial responsibility to work for a more
n trading system with improved
s. We also look to the more suc-
iful developing countries to play a
U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations
Jeane J. Kirkpatrick
was born in Duncan,
Okla. She earned
undergraduate
degrees from Stephens
College (1946) and
Barnard College
(1948) and her M.A.
(1950) and Ph.D.
(1968) degrees in
political science from
Columbia University. Her postgraduate work
was done at the University of Paris under a
French Government fellowship in the In-
stitute of Political Science. She speaks fluent
French and Spanish.
Prior to her appointment as U.S. Perma-
nent Representative to the United Nations,
Ambassador Kirkpatrick was a Leavey
University Professor at Georgetown Univer-
sity in Washington, D.C., where she was pro-
fessor in the Department of Government. She
was also Resident Scholar at the American
Enterprise Institute for Public Policy
Research. Throughout her professional
career, she has held a series of positions as
professor, lecturer, and researcher at col-
leges, universities, and foundations. During a
6-month period in 1970, she was a profes-
sorial lecturer at the Institute for American
Universities at the University of Aix-
Marseilles, Ajx -en-Provence, France.
A prolific writer and researcher, Am-
bassador Kirkpatrick has authored numerous
books, monographs, and articles on American
political issues and foreign policy. Her most
recent books and monographs include The
New Presidential Elite (1976), Political
Woman (1974), Leader and Vanguard in
Mass Society: A Study of Peronist Argentina
(1971), and Dismantling the Parties: Reflec-
tions on Party Reform and Party Decomposi-
tion (1978). Recent articles include "U.S.
Security and Latin America," Commentary
(January 1981); "Dictatorship and Double
Standards," Commentary (November 1979);
"Why Reagan?" Washington Star
(November 2, 1980); "Public Opinion and
Foreign Policy," The Washington Quarterly
(Autumn 1980); and "Patterns of Partisanship
in Post-Gaullist France: An Overview," in
Howard Penniman's (ed.) France at the Polls
II, published by the American Enterprise In-
stitute (1980). Ambassador Kirkpatrick has
also published numerous book reviews in
Commentary, The Journal of Politics, The
American Political Science Review, and The
New Republic.
Ambassador Kirkpatrick has been in-
volved in numerous professional organiza-
tions including member of the International
Research Council, Center for Strategic and
International Studies, Georgetown Universi-
ty; Board of Trustees of the Robert A. Taft
Institute of Government; former member of
the Executive Council, International Political
Science Association; and cochairman, Task
Force on the Presidential Election Process,
Twentieth Century Fund.
She has been active in Democratic Party
politics as co-Vice Chairman of the Coalition
for a Democratic Majority and a member of
the Democratic National Convention's Na-
tional Commission on Party Structure and
Presidential Nomination (the Winograd com-
mission) in 1975-78. During the 1980
presidential campaign, she was a member of
Ronald Reagan's foreign policy advisory
group.
Ambassador Kirkpatrick was sworn in as
U.S. Permanent Representative to the United
Nations on Feb. 4, 1981, the first woman to
serve as chief U.S. representative to that
world body. In this capacity, she also serves
as a member of the President's Cabinet. ■
U.S. Contributions to the United Nations
1970
1978
Regular
Budgets
$117,114,000
$173,728,000
Peacekeeping
Operations
6,438,000
38,031,000
Special
Programs
202,880,000
237,731,000
Total
326,431,000
449,490,000
The total U.S. contributions to the
United Nations of over $700 million (cur-
rent dollars) for 1978 were about 4% of
the Federal budget, or an expenditure of
approximately $3.20 per citizen. ■
:ober 1981
fuller role in strengthening the trading
system. It will be difficult for each of
our countries individually to open
markets further unless we are commit-
ted to doing so collectively.
For our part, the United States has
long supported open markets. Despite
current complications, America remains
a strong advocate of free trade.
Although our gross national product is
only one-third of the Western in-
dustrialized group's total, the United
States imports roughly one-half of all
manufactured goods exported by
developing countries. Earnings of non-
OPEC developing countries from ex-
ports to the United States amount to
$60 billion— more than double the
foreign aid coming from all Western
developed countries.
We call upon all members of the in-
ternational community to join in
resisting growth in protectionism.
Developing nations must have the
greatest possible opportunity to sell
their commodities and manufactured
product. Let us also work together to
achieve a successful conclusion of the
multifiber agreement.
A dynamic and successful trading
system requires a smoothly functioning
international financial system. We must,
therefore, continue to work with other
countries to encourage their support for
the International Monetary Fund and
their constructive participation in the
Fund's programs to facilitate adjust-
ment. We will continue to cooperate
with our developing country colleagues
to strengthen the Fund. We share the
view that the responsibilities of develop-
ing countries should be increased to
keep pace with their growing economic
importance.
Second, foreign assistance coupl-
ed with sound domestic policy and
self-help can faciliate the development
process. The United States has long be-
lieved in assistance as an effective tool
in helping to promote development. Over
the last three decades the United States
has given more than $130 billion in con-
cessional assistance. Over the last
decade alone, the total has exceeded $50
billion. In 1980, the American people
provided $7.1 billion, almost twice as
much as any other donor.
The United States has also been the
major force in the creation and support
of the multilateral development banks.
The banks represent an important, and
to many countries essential, feature in
the international financial system. In the
last 5 years, the United States has
authorized and appropriated an average
of $1.5 billion per year for support of
the multilateral banks. There is no ques-
tion about their value as development in-
stitutions. As intermediaries they help to
mobilize the resources of international
capital markets to lend to developing
countries. The banks' loans for key proj-
ects are important catalysts for produc-
tive domestic and foreign private invest-
ment.
We recognize that many of the
poorer developing countries must con-
tinue to rely heavily on concessional
assistance for some time to come.
Moreover, certain kinds of vital develop-
ment programs will not pay the quick
and direct financial returns needed to at-
tract private capital. For this reason, a
continuing bilateral assistance program
and continuing support for the
multilateral banks will be essential.
Given today's economic conditions
and the limitation on aid budgets in
many countries, it is especially impor-
tant that concessional assistance be
utilized as effectively as possible; that it
focus on countries which need it most
and use it best; and that it be a more ef-
fective catalyst for mobilizing other
foreign and domestic resources. We
must also recognize that a strategy for
growth that depends on a massive in-
crease in the transfer of resources from
developed to developing countries is
simply unrealistic.
Third, regional cooperation and
bilateral consultations can be effective
in promoting development. The United
States is working with other regional
states to promote economic progress in
the Caribbean area. We are convinced
that the example of the recent multina-
tional cooperation in the case of Jamaica
and the broader Caribbean Basin in-
itiative holds promise for other regions.
We are already committed to a close
working relationship with ASEAN
[Association of South East Asian Na
tions]. We have benefited considerab
from a better understanding of
ASEAN's views on multilateral issue
and ways to strengthen our bilateral
commerical ties. The U.S. -ASEAN
Business Council is a model of how (
private sectors can work together fo
mutual benefit.
In Africa we look forward to a c
working relationship with the Econo
Community of West African States,
attempts to strengthen economic tie;
within the region. Constructive cons
tions on trade and investment issues
have already occurred. We believe tl
mutually beneficial cooperation can 1
strengthened to our common benefit
Similar consultations with the devek
ing countries of southern Africa are
desirable. We have a strong interest
the economic health and stability of
these nations. Commerical relationsl
along with foreign assistance will he
us to attain that objective.
The United States has also wort
with the capital-surplus members of
Organization of Petroleum Exportin
Countries on both a bilateral and
multilateral basis. We have been abl
combine resources to attack develop
ment problems of common interest,
as food production. This cooperation
should be continued and expanded.
Finally, we plan to make bilater;
consultative groups between our go^
ment and those of developing count]
more effective and to give full suppc
to similar private sector arrangemei
The U.S. Chamber of Commerce an<
counterparts in many developing coi
tries have developed particularly goi
relationships. We fully support thesi
forts and those of the private volunt
agencies; we are searching for mear
work more closely with them.
In all of these cases, the United
States recognizes the need to be ser
sitive to the diverse character of th<
societies involved and to the interna
tional circumstances in which devek
ment must occur.
Fourth, growth for developme
best achieved through reliance on
centives for individual economic p
formance. The individual is the begi
ning, the key element, and the ultirr
Department of State Bu
Feature:
U.N. General Assembly
eficiary of the development process.
; greatest potential for development
in the hard work and ingenuity of
farmer, the worker, and the en-
Dreneur. They need incentives to pro-
e and the opportunity to benefit from
ir labors.
Suppression of economic incentives
mately suppresses enthusiasm and in-
tion. And the denial of personal
idom can be as great an obstacle to
ductivity as the denial of reward for
ievement. History cautions against
imes that regiment their people in
name of ideals yet fail to achieve
ter economic or social progress,
ise governments that have been more
citous of the liberties of their people
e also been more successful in secur-
both freedom and prosperity.
The United States can offer what it
ws best from its own experience. We
e seen that policies which encourage
rate initiatives will promote better
>urce allocation and more rapid
nomie growth. Within a framework
ically hospitable to market incentives,
ugn private investment can supple-
it indigenous investment and con-
ute significantly to development.
But our goal is not to impose either
economic values or our judgments
inyone. In the final analysis, each
ntry's path to development will be
ped by its own history, philosophy,
interests.
Fifth, development requires a cer-
i measure of security and political
t>ility. Political insecurity is a major
rier to development. Fear and uncer-
ity stifle the productivity of the in-
dual. Scarce resources are
andered in conflict. The close rela-
lship between security and develop-
nt cannot be ignored. We are,
refore, committed to maintain and,
3re possible, to increase programs
ential to deter international aggres-
l and to provide the domestic securi-
lecessary to carry out sound
nomic policies. We have no intention
Droviding foreign assistance, moral
afort, or the prestige of international
itical platforms to countries that
ter international violence.
The United Nations has a key role to
y in resolving conflict and promoting
U.S.-Soviet Union to Resume Arms Talks
DEPARTMENT STATEMENT,
SEPT. 24, 19811
At their meeting on September 23,
1981, the U.S. Secretary of State, Alex-
ander M. Haig, Jr., and the U.S.S.R.
Foreign Minister, Andrei A. Gromyko,
exchanged views regarding arms control
involving those nuclear arms which were
earlier discussed between the U.S. and
the U.S.S.R. representatives in Geneva.
They agreed on the need to hold for-
mal negotiations on such arms and on
behalf of their governments agreed to
begin these negotiations on November
30 in Geneva, Switzerland. The U.S. side
will be represented at the negotiations
by a delegation headed by Ambassador
Paul Nitze, and the Soviet side will be
represented by a delegation headed by
Ambassador U.A. Kvitsinsky.
Both sides believe in the importance
of these negotiations for enhancing
stability and international security and
pledged to spare no effort to reach an
appropriate agreement.
1 Read to news correspondents in New
York by Department spokesman Dean
Fischer. ■
U.S. Delegation to the
36th U.N. General Assembly
Representatives
JeaneJ. Kirkpatrick
Kenneth L. Adelman
Andy Ireland, U.S. Representative from
the State of Florida
Benjamin A. Gilman, U.S. Represent-
ative from the State of New York
John Sherman Cooper
Alternate Representatives
Charles M. Lichenstein
Jose S. Sorzano
William Courtney Sherman
Bruce Caputo
George Christopher ■
tober 1981
international stability. We welcome the
Secretary General's effort to promote in-
tercommunal talks and a just settlement
on Cyprus. We support a continuing role
by the Secretary General's represent-
ative in the Iraq-Iran conflict. And
South Korea's attempt to initiate a
dialogue with the north epitomizes the
search for peaceful settlement that is
the heart of the charter.
One of the greatest dangers to the
charter today and to development itself
is the willful violation of the national in-
tegrity of both Afghanistan and Kam-
puchea by the Soviet Union and Viet-
nam. Their behavior challenges the
basic rights of all sovereign states. The
world's hopes for peace, for security, and
for development will be jeopardized if
"might makes right" becomes the law
of nations.
The United States will continue to
support security and stability as essen-
tial to progress. This is the basis of our
active and continuing efforts to
strengthen and expand the cease-fire in
southern Lebanon. We shall also assist
the negotiations specified by Resolutions
242 and 338 in order to bring a just and
lasting peace to the Middle East. Our
policy is to remain a credible and
reliable party in the negotiations to
bring independence to Namibia on the
basis of U.N. Resolution 435 and in a
fashion acceptable to both the nations
concerned and the international com-
munity.
The United States also believes that
efforts to control arms, either among
regional states or between the super-
powers, can make an important con-
tribution to the security that facilitates
development. But these efforts do not
occur in a vacuum. The international
community has tended to overestimate
the beneficial effects of the Strategic
Arms Limitation Talks in dampening
regional conflict. We have also tended to
underestimate the impact of such con-
flict on the negotiations themselves.
The United States is strongly com-
mitted to balanced and verifiable arms
control. We are equally committed to
the peaceful resolution of regional
disputes. Clearly, the restraint implied
by arms control must become a more
widespread phenomenon if such
agreements are to survive and to make
their proper contribution to a more
secure environment for development.
In Pursuit of Growth
The United States is confident that a
strategy for growth guided by these
principles can succeed. We believe that
three areas of action deserve immediate
international attention.
First, a global expansion of trade.
Plans could be formulated for the 1982
GATT ministerial with the special con-
cerns of growth in mind. A major priori-
ty should be to integrate more fully the
developing countries into the interna-
tional trading system on the basis of
shared responsibilities and benefits.
Second, an increase in investment.
Our common objective should be to
stimulate domestic and international
private investment. We must encourage
and support the individual investor.
Third, stronger international
cooperation in food and energy. The
recent U.N. Conference on New and
Renewable Sources of Energy recom-
mended that the developing countries be
assisted in assessing their energy
resources and determining the best way
to exploit them. The U.N. Development
Program and the World Bank have im-
portant followup responsibilities. And
we must all work to engage more effec-
tively private participation in exploration
and production in oil-importing develop-
ing nations.
Domestic and international action
must also go hand in hand to achieve
food security. The United States con-
tinues to be the largest donor of food aid
and places a paramount emphasis on its
bilateral program to help developing
countries increase food production.
Greater a'ttention should be given to
scientific and technological research that
will yield more bountiful food supplies.
I have outlined today the broad prin-
ciples that guide America's approach to
new strategy for growth. In the immedi-
ate future, and prior to the Cancun sum-
mit, we will announce specific proposals
to deal with this and other issues of
development.
Dialogue for the Future
These broad principles reflect our vie
that the United States can and will cc
tinue to make an essential contributic
to the process of development. We dc
not claim to have all of the answers. '.
we do believe that our collective resp<
sibilities for the future allow no more
time to be lost in sterile debates and
unrealistic demands. The time has co:
for a reasoned dialogue with promise
the future.
The search for economic progress
social justice, and human dignity has
always been supported by the Amerk
people, themselves an example of sue
cessful development. Our initiatives a
resources, through bilateral program!
the United Nations and other multi-
lateral agencies, have made major co
tributions to the process of moderniz;
tion throughout the world. For the
United States, support of developmei
constitutes a practical imperative.
At the Ottawa summit the Unitei
States reaffirmed its willingness to j<
its partners in exploring all avenues •
consultation and cooperation with
developing countries. In October, Pr(
dent Reagan will go to the summit
meeting in Cancun, Mexico. He looks
forward to a genuine and open exchs
of views on questions of economic
development and international coope
tion. The Cancun summit offers a no
opportunity to gain fresh understand
of the problems we face together. TI
United States will join in a construct
and cooperative spirit.
Our objective is to bring about a
era of growth. But the purpose of be
growth and development goes beyon
materialism. As Winston Churchill s;
"Human beings and human societies
not structures that are built, or
machines that are forged. They are
plants that grow and must be treatei
such."
Despite the difficulties of the mo
ment, we should go forward in a spii
of optimism. We have the vision be-
queathed to us by the charter. We h;
the potential of the peoples represen
in this room. Let us go forward toge
to achieve a new era of growth for a
mankind.
1 Press release 320.
Department of State Bu
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i
IE SECRETARY
.S. Strategy in the Middle East
Secretary Haig
ement before the Senate Foreign
'.tions Committee on September 17,
; is a welcome opportunity to review
progress in foreign policy during the
. 9 months of the Reagan
linistration. I would like to focus
icularly on the Middle East, because
lave just met with three of our best
ids from that critical region. And I
| that the subject is very much on
• minds because of the impending
ite over arms sales to Saudi Arabia.
That debate is also very much on my
i because so much is at stake in
• decision. I am deeply conscious of
concerns that have made these pro-
;d sales so controversial.
For our part the President's decision
not arrived at lightly. What is at
e here is far more than an impor-
improvement in the military
ibility of a friendly nation. What is
take is this nation's capacity to
;lop a strategy that can move the
:e process forward and protect our
I interests in an unstable area ex-
ed not only to historic Arab-Israeli
lries but increasingly to threats from
Soviet Union and its proxies.
If we fail to develop such a strategy,
consequences for the United States
its industrialized allies could be
itantial, but for our friends in the
on— and for Israel in particular— the
sequences are even more significant.
alanced Policy
II say more later about the specific
ortance of the decision on the Saudi
is sales. But first I want to make
ie broader observations about this
ninistration's foreign policy. That is
purpose for which I was asked to
ie here today. Moreover, the specific
es of arms for Saudi Arabia cannot
udged in isolation from the other
ensions of American foreign policy.
When I came before this committee
lonths ago for confirmation hearings,
ated that this Administration was
:ted to office with a mandate for
nge in U.S. foreign policy. But
nge, even important and overdue
nge, must be balanced by the need
consistency.
Balancing the need for change with
the need for consistency has been a cen-
tral concern of this Administration. That
is why we have confirmed the U.S. com-
mitment to the two-track decision,
agreed to in December 1979 by all the
NATO allies, as the basis for developing
the Reagan Administration's approach to
TNF [theater nuclear force] arms con-
trol. That is why we have moved
cautiously — despite our known reserva-
tions about where the SALT process has
brought us— while we review ways to
put strategic arms control negotiations
on a sounder footing. And that concern
for the consistency of U.S. policy has
shaped our thinking on Namibia, on
China, on the Middle East peace pro-
cess, and on many other issues.
There is also another kind of balance
that we must maintain, and that is
balance among the different elements of
recognizes that peaceful progress in the
developing world will become impossible
if we fail to impose effective restraints
on the use of force by Cuba, Libya, and
other Soviet proxies.
Middle East Challenge
Nowhere is the maintenance of balance
among the different elements of our
foreign policy more important than in
the Middle East, that complex and
unstable region in which we have so
many important economic, political,
strategic, and even spiritual interests.
Let me cite just a few of the
developments that challenge the United
States.
• The oil fields in the Persian Gulf,
so vital to the United States and our
We cannot compensate for the neglect of one essential element by overem-
phasis on another. Single-purpose solutions to complex problems are often
appealing but seldom correct. President Reagan's foreign policy is based on
such a balanced and comprehensive strategy.
our foreign policy. We cannot compen-
sate for the neglect of one essential ele-
ment by overemphasis on another.
Single-purpose solutions to complex
problems are often appealing but seldom
correct. President Reagan's foreign
policy is based on such a balanced and
comprehensive strategy. The rebuilding
of America's economic and military
strength, the deepening of cooperation
with our friends and allies, the promo-
tion of peaceful progress in the devel-
oping countries, and our insistence on
more responsible behavior by the Soviet
Union are mutually reinforcing elements
of an integrated strategy.
This Administration recognizes, for
example, that we cannot succeed in com-
bating Cuban subversion in this
hemisphere or in Africa, unless we
address the fundamental conditions that
the Cubans seek to exploit. We are
doing that in our Caribbean Basin
initiative; in our economic assistance to
such critical countries as El Salvador,
Jamaica, and Zimbabwe; and in our
efforts to achieve independence for
Namibia. At the same time, our policy
European and Japanese allies, are
threatened by the military presence of
the Soviet Union and its proxies in
Afghanistan, South Yemen, Ethiopia,
and Libya.
• The new entente between Libya,
Ethiopia, and South Yemen — three of
the Soviets' closest friends in the
area — is only the most recent of many
threats to the security of our friends in
the region.
• The Arab-Israeli dispute divides
some of our closest friends.
• Iran, which once served as a
buffer between the Soviet Union and the
gulf and helped to maintain regional
security, is torn by war and violence.
The danger to Iran's independence and
integrity poses a threat to U.S. security
that would make Iran's own wanton
assault on international order pale by
comparison.
• Ancient poverty and sudden
wealth, venerable tradition and modern
progress, coexist uneasily.
American interests in the Middle
East can be protected only by a strategy
ober 1981
13
The Secretary
that neglects neither regional complex-
ities nor the threat of external interven-
tion. As I explained in April during my
visits to Cairo, Jerusalem, Amman, and
Riyadh, the United States regards the
peace process and the effort to counter
Soviet and regional threats as mutually
reinforcing. If our friends are more
secure, they will be more able to take
risks for peace. If there is progress in
the peace process, security cooperation
will be facilitated— cooperation that is
essential to deter intervention by the
Soviet Union and its proxies.
We support Israel and Egypt, not only
as security partners but as partners in
the historic peace process that they
themselves began. In his discussions
with Prime Minister Begin last week, as
in his earlier discussion with President
Sadat, President Reagan made clear the
U.S. interest in the peace process and
our commitment to .the Camp David
accords. The participation of U.S. troops
in a Sinai peacekeeping force is one
measure of our determination to see
peace succeed. Phil Habib's efforts as
the President's personal emissary to
defuse the crisis in Lebanon constitute
another. We are pleased that Egypt and
Israel have agreed to resume the
autonomy talks, now scheduled to start
in Egypt on September 23-24.
We welcome the restraint that Israel
has shown, under difficult circumstances,
making it possible for Ambassador Habib
to negotiate a cessation of hostilities on
the Israeli-Lebanon border. We welcome
the good offices provided by Saudi
Arabia that facilitated his task. We hope
that violence on that front can be avoid-
ed. We look forward to rapid movement
in the autonomy negotiations. And we
shall work diligently to restore stability
to Lebanon.
However, even the most rapid pos-
sible progress on the Arab-Israeli
dispute would not do away with the
many other conflicts in the Middle East
such as the Iran-Iraq war, the tension
between the two Yemens, or possible
anarchy in Iran. And we would not have
removed the threat of intervention by
the Soviet Union or its proxies in these
conflicts.
Our ability to protect our friends
from the insecurity that these conflicts
produce will make them bolder in the
peace process. It is also essential to pro-
tect vital U.S. interests.
Although we are building up U.S.
military capabilities so that we can
better contribute to the security of the
region, the use of U.S. military force
can only be considered as a last resort.
And to deter major Soviet threats, for
which the U.S. role is indispensable, we
also need the help of our friends, both in
the region and outside it, whose
interests are engaged by the threat to
Middle East security.
That is the reason why we are pur-
suing intensified strategic cooperation
with Israel, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and
many other concerned countries. The
form and content of our cooperation is
different in each case. We are sensitive
to both the political and military limita-
tion on the contributions that different
countries can usefully make. We are not
seeking to construct formal alliances or
a massive structure of U.S. bases. We
are pursuing a sophisticated strategy,
one guided as well by a sense of
urgency.
Our broad strategic view of the
Middle East recognizes the intimate con-
nections between that region and adja-
cent areas: Afghanistan and South Asia,
northern Africa and the Horn, and the
Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean.
We recognize that instability in Iran or
other areas in the region can influence
the prospects for peace between Israel
and its neighbors.
Success will, therefore, require a
very broad effort. We are working with
our European allies for a strong Turkey,
not only to strengthen the security of
NATO's southern flank but also because
Turkey is a strategic bridge between
Europe and Southwest Asia. We are
assisting Tunisia, the Sudan, and others
that are targets of Qadhafi's expan^
sionism. And our renewed cooperation
with Pakistan reflects not only our con-
cern over turmoil in Iran and aggression
in Afghanistan but our appreciation of
the role a secure Pakistan can play in
promoting regional stability.
Saudi Security
Our proposals to enhance the security of
Saudi Arabia are a key element in our
Middle East policy. The proposed arms
sales will increase the Saudis' ability to
defend themselves against local threats;
they will directly assist U.S. forces
deployed in the region, just as U.S.
AW ACS [airborne warning and control
system] do now; and they demonstrate
our commitment to assist the Saudis
against even greater dangers. Our
friendship with Saudi Arabia is not
based solely on its role as an oil suppli*
Saudi Arabia is proving itself an essen
tial partner in our broader interests.
Saudi assistance has been important in
the past to states that broke away froi
the Soviet embrace. Saudi Arabia has
provided important assistance to
moderate states such as Sudan and
Pakistan, and, indeed, more will be re-
quired. It has played an essential
diplomatic role in negotiating the recei
cease-fire in Lebanon. It has played a
key leadership role in the newly forme
Gulf Cooperation Council. We expect
Saudi cooperation in fostering peace ai
stability to broaden as the Saudis feel
themselves more secure.
Security cooperation is not a com-
modity to be sold or haggled over; it is
process that must be based on mutual
confidence and mutual security interes
The question is whether the necessary
basis of cooperation can survive if the
seriousness of our commitment to Sau
Arabia's security is compromised. To
deny Saudi Arabia this basic means of
self-defense is to deny it the sovereign
status and respect essential to an en-
during partnership.
Some suggest that there can be nc
security cooperation as long as there a
deep divisions on other issues. There i
no question that we have differences
with Saudi Arabia on the peace proces
just as we have differences with Israe
and Egypt on other issues. But
American diplomacy in the Middle Eas
has long been based on the need to wc
effectively with countries divided by
deep differences.
That is a difficult role to play; but
is the reason that the United States h;
played a uniquely positive role in the
Middle East, a role that has not only
served American interests but the in-
terests of the moderate countries in tl
region and our European and Asian
allies as well. It is an approach that
emphasizes common concerns and see
remedies to common problems.
Our approach to Saudi Arabia has
been shaped by the profound insecurit
caused by events of the last 5 years,
particularly the fall of the Shah. It ha
been influenced by discussions conduc
by the previous Administration with t
Saudis and by previous U.S. actions,
including the deployment of AWACS
aircraft to Saudi Arabia during the
Yemen crisis of 1979 and again durinj
the Iran-Iraq war.
14
Department of State Bulle
The Secretary
Our approach has also been shaped,
ever, by an appreciation of Israeli
;erns over the proposed Saudi
cage. We are taking steps to
riate these concerns. We are deter-
ed to maintain the qualitative edge
; is vital to Israel's security. A stable
onal balance, moreover, enhances
:rrence against Soviet moves.
Our discussions last week with
ne Minister Begin enhanced each
's understanding of the other's posi-
on this and other issues. We are
leheartedly and permanently corn-
ed to the security of Israel. Without
rong Israel, our hope to improve the
;pects for peace and security in the
on cannot be fulfilled. A secure
di Arabia and a strong U.S. -Saudi
tionship are central to these same
s.
We must not let our friends' worries
it one another diminish our commit-
t to their security or hinder our
s to extend strategic cooperation
them. We are taking steps to
re that Israeli concerns are met,
as we are seeking to assure
crate Arab nations that our devel-
g strategic cooperation with Israel is
:ted against Soviet intervention and
igainst the Arabs. But unless we
ible to work effectively with all of
friends in the region, our security,
security of Israel, and peace itself
be endangered.
Interview on "Issues and Answers"
Press release 312.
Secretary Haig was interviewed on
ABC's "Issues and Answers" by ABC
News correspondents Sander Vanocur
and Barrie Dunsmore in Washington,
D.C., August 23, 1981. i
Q. You were once Chief of Staff at the
White House. Had you been Chief of
Staff at the White House last week,
would you have gone and telephoned
President Reagan and told him about
the engagement off the Libyan coast?
A. It's hard to say. I think each
situation has its own unique factors. No
one is the same as the one before. I
think, in this instance, Ed Meese
[Counsellor to the President] was exactly
right. I spoke to Ed very briefly after
we first learned of the incident. I think
we both concluded that, until we knew
more, it would not be worthwhile to
notify the President. And I think Ed did
so before the issue became a matter of
public knowledge, and when we had the
full facts before us — myself and Bill
Casey [Director of Central Intelligence].
Q. You took some abuse at the
time of the assassination attempt on
President Reagan.
A. I've taken a lot of abuse over a
number of years.
Q. Yes. This was the most recent
and the most vociferous, about trying
to establish command authority in a
very tense situation. It is unclear to
me, at this time, what the command
authority structure is in the U.S.
Government on national security mat-
ters. Is Mr. Meese in charge of it? Is
it yourself? Is it Cap Weinberger
[Secretary of Defense]? Is it the Na-
tional Security Council Director, Mr.
Allen?
A. I think it is very clear, that none
of the names that you have mentioned
are confused about it. It's the President.
The President was aware of this situa-
tion. He had personally approved the ex-
ercise. He had personally approved the
rules of the engagement, which were
standard, but which were strongly re-
affirmed by the President.
Everything that the President per-
sonally approved was followed in a very
coherent way. I must say, the other
evening, with two of your principals out
of town, when the situation developed,
we had a task force in the State Depart-
ment working closely with the National
Military Command Center, in constant
contact with myself; with Cap Wein-
berger; with Ed Meese; with Bill Casey,
Director of CIA; and with Dick Allen.
And, we were all in constant communi-
cation throughout the period. So, I don't
know how we could have had a more
successfully managed crisis, if you will.
And, incidentally, both Cap and I spoke
to the Vice President, who is vacation-
ing in Maine, as you know, and who
followed the events minute by minute.
Q. Isn't everything you just said
going to give ammunition to the peo-
ple who say this was not a surprise to
the United States? It was anticipated?
A. I don't think the resort to
violence is ever anticipated. But I
wouldn't suggest for a moment that we
were naive about the possibility, given
the track record of Mr. Qadhafi [Libyan
chief of state] over a number of years.
Surely, we anticipated that it could hap-
pen and we were ready if it were to hap-
pen.
Q. Now that you have had a
chance to analyze all of the data, do
you believe that this was a premedi-
tated action taken on the advice of
Colonel Qadhafi, or was it something
that the pilot did on the spur of the
moment?
A. I don't believe it was the spur-of-
the-moment pilot accidental action, if
you will. I think the tapes that have
been revealed and the exchanges that
occurred after the event would suggest
that the pilots were on a targeted mis-
sion. They clearly announced the fact
that the one aircraft had released its
missile. I'm not one who believes these
kinds of things, in a disciplined organiza-
tion, even one of varied nationalities
such as may be the case in Libya, are
not pretty carefully managed and con-
trolled.
Q. What would be the purpose of
their doing that and what do you
think the consequences are likely to
be? If you expected that it was pre-
meditated, you must be waiting for
the other shoe to fall.
A. No. I think the incident is behind
us. I think it was a testing incident. It
ober 1981
15
The Secretary
may have been an accidental one. We
can't discount that. But, I am inclined to
believe it was a testing incident. We
have had others in the past over the last
5 years, not only in the disputed area in
which this incident occurred but beyond
there, where there has been harassing
and provocative actions taken by Libyan
aircraft. There have been what I call
transmissions of highly provocative
character which suggested that Libyan
aircraft were targeted against aircraft
of the United States which were transit-
ing in international air space.
We must be prepared, of course, as
we are for some additional challenges or
provocations, if you will. But, I am in-
clined to believe that the action taken,
which was cleared by the President
beforehand, was a clear delegation of
authority to our local commanders, will
be an effective termination of similar
events in the near future. And I would
hope so.
Q. In terms of what happened this
past week, how is this going to affect
what you refer to as this strategic
consensus that is emerging in the Mid-
dle East? You have now President
Sadat, who has offered us the use of
facilities at Ras Banas. You have
Prime Minister Begin coming in
September and the speech he made in
the Knesset, which got very little at-
tention. He revived what he said
before about the possibility of a
defense pact with the United States.
What is emerging here? There is a
strategic shift, somehow, is there not?
A. Yes. And, you will recall I men-
tioned this against some skeptical back-
ground in May, at the time of my visit
to the Middle East— April and May. At
that time, I was not talking about con-
structing a consensus but recognizing
that one was developing as a result of
historic events — the war between Iraq
and Iran, the collapse of the Shah, the
Soviet blatant interventionism in
Afghanistan — have all alerted a number
of Arab states not only to the historic
frustrations of the Middle East peace
process but also to the vulnerability of
the area to Soviet interventionism. I
think these are welcome historic
developments which are going to offer
improved opportunity for the peace pro-
cess itself.
Q. The key to the peace process is
Lebanon. I believe you received— the
State Department received— a letter
from Prime Minister Begin Monday
night in which he has asked you when
is [the President's special emissary to
the Middle East] Philip Habib coming
back. Have you answered him yet?
A. No. I am preparing a response to
Mr. Begin's letter, which was a very
detailed and welcome letter. Of course,
we are prepared to send Phil back in as
soon as the President feels that his
presence there is going to make a con-
structive contribution to the process.
August is a difficult month, not only in
Europe but in the Middle East as well,
when many of the key officials are
traveling and on vacation even though
there is tension in the area. We are
working now, within the United Nations,
to strengthen the UNIFIL [U.N. Interim
Force in Lebanon] role along the Israeli
border with Lebanon. We are working,
along with our European partners and
certain Middle Eastern moderate Arab
states, to strengthen the central govern-
ment of Lebanon. And we are working,
of course, within the four-party Arab
League followup group, the group that
Phil Habib had worked so actively with
in the two phases of his visits. And, all
of this is in place and moving. I think as
soon as it is going to be beneficial for
Phil to go back, the President will send
him there.
Q. Just one more question about
Libya. It is part of State Department
folklore that, at one time, you gave an
off-the-record interview in which you
described Colonel Qadhafi as a cancer
which has to be removed. Did you ever
say anything along those lines?
A. If I were to have said that on
background, and I now say it on fore-
ground, then I would be violating the
background rules, which some apparent-
ly feel free to do. Let me say this. I
have made no bones about the concern I
have felt, and that I know President
Reagan feels, for the lawlessness which
has characterized Mr. Qadhafi's interna-
tional behavior, his support for terror-
ism, blatant invasion of neighboring
states where today his forces occupy
Chad, efforts to subvert and to replace
existing governments along all of his
borders, and activity in support of ter-
rorism even in this hemisphere.
I think these are unacceptable norms
of international behavior. And it is in
our interest and the American people's
interest, and in the international com- I
munity's interest, to no longer overlook
these illegal activities whether they
come from Libya, Cuba, or the Soviet
Union.
After all, one must bear in mind th
Libya today is armed far beyond its
defense needs, and it is the Soviet Unk
that provides the means to permit this
situation to develop. It isn't an exclusiv
preoccupation of Mr. Qadhafi or [Cubai
President] Mr. Castro, or, for that mat
ter, the Soviet leadership, but a situa-
tion which the time has long since
passed, where the free world, and the
United States as a leader in the free
world, must stand up and be heard on
these issues.
Q. That takes us to the subject o
U.S.-Soviet relations. Last week on
this program, an adviser to Presiden
Brezhnev, Dr. Georgiy Arbatov, said
that he was not at all optimistic aboi
the prospects for your meeting with
Andrei Gromyko next month. How d
you read that reaction, and what is
your own assessment of that meetinj
A. That's a disappointing commen
tary from a Soviet official, who I woul
be more interested in suggesting that
perhaps there is some hope for progre
in a dialogue which has been rather
strained over the last 7 months. My 01
view is that there has been no lack of
communication between ourselves and
the Soviet leadership— over 50 official
contacts in 7 months, a half a dozen
written formal communications with I
Soviet leadership including one persor
one from the President. I think the
problem is not communication. The pr
lem is that the Soviet leadership, thus
far, has not liked what they have hear
from this Administration.
I have made it clear in my speech
New Orleans 2 weeks ago, that we an
prepared to meet the Soviet leadershi
halfway. And, we are anxious for an i
provement in the dialogue. But, such
improvement can only follow some
reigning in, some restraint, if you will
of what has been 6 years of unaccept-
able Soviet international behavior.
Q. Getting back to the meeting
with Gromyko next month, what an
your basic objectives for that meetii
A. I think it is important for our
viewers to recognize that this is the fi
ministerial-level meeting with this Ad
ministration and Soviet leadership.
16
Department of State Bulle
The Secretary
•ly, one of the major items on the
da is the theater nuclear force arms
•ol negotiations, which I anticipate
>e a large portion of our discussion
and hopefully we will fix a date
i location for the resumption of
: talks which are already bracketed
between mid-November and mid-
mber.
Secondly, I would expect to discuss
nber of world crisis situations, ten-
spots— Afghanistan, Kampuchea,
it proxy interventionism, trade,
der arms control aspects of our rela-
hips, and any subject that the
S leadership, itself, wants to raise.
But I think these are the general
3 that there will be an exchange of
s on. I don't anticipate that we are
y to have any wowing break-
ighs in a meeting engagement of
kind. More than likely, what we will
is some rather stiff exchanges, one
expressing its concerns to the other
hopefully, that would be followed
I by additional ministerial discus-
;, which I would hope would
lately lead to a summit-level
ing between our President and
ident Brezhnev.
Q. Is it possible to have any mean-
ul negotiations on the question of
ting nuclear weapons in Europe
n you aren't, at the same time,
ing about limited strategic nuclear
pons that both sides have?
A. Clearly, I think this is a possibili-
jst as we have been able to carry on
:egic discussions without the involve-
t of theater systems. We can, now,
nto the theater area. We are talking
it long-range systems, the SS-20
the corresponding Western systems,
Pershing and the ground-based
;e and air-launched cruise. All of
e things will be discussed, and I
i constructively. And we certainly
ir into these talks with a very
)us intent of getting meaningful,
need, verifiable, and equitable arms
rol agreements.
Q. Is it possible to really plan a
j-term negotiating strategy
lout some important decisions hav-
been made on some weapons
ems, bombers, and, of course, the
missile which was discussed this
k in California? You come down
he side of making it a land-based
.pon.
A. I don't make it a habit, although
some do, of raising in public forums the
recommendations I will make to the
President on issues on which he hats yet
to make his decision. Let me say this.
Sure, these decisions which the Presi-
dent is about to make with respect to
the modernization of our strategic inven-
tories will have a profound impact on
future SALT [Strategic Arms Limitation
Talks] negotiations, strategic discus-
sions.
Let me say this, as well, because
there has been a lot of speculation in the
press recently about who is voting for
what and who is being rolled and who is
winning and who is losing. I have never
seen, in the five Administrations that I
have served at a fairly high level and
have been always been involved in these
strategic issues, a case where in a brief
period of 7 months, the Secretary of
Defense has pulled together so compre-
hensive an approach and so comprehen-
sive a package for the President to con-
sider. I personally could do nothing but
compliment Cap Weinberger for the way
he has approached it.
Now, there are a number of deci-
sions, a number of options, that are
available to the President to make a
decision on. He has not done so yet, and
I think we are all best served in this Ad-
ministration, and frankly in the press, to
reserve our judgments until the Presi-
dent makes these decisions. I am one
who has always supported a triad of
capabilities— land-, sea-, and air-based
systems. And I feel confident that the
ultimate mix the President approves will
have those fundamental characteristics
inherently in them.
Q. One decision the President has
made concerning weapons is the sale
of AWACS [airborne warning and con-
trol system] reconnaissance planes to
Saudi Arabia, an enhancement for the
F-15s that were approved several
years ago. An announcement is sup-
posed to come out tomorrow, giving
the legislative timetables, September 9
informal notification, September 28
formal notification. It is going to be
controversial. In view of what you
have— a sense of optimism about the
Middle East— aren't you pushing big,
massive chips forward on a controver-
sial issue like this?
A. There is no question that this a
controversial issue. We went into it with
our eyes wide open. We got on a fast-
moving train in that regard. There had
been discussions along these lines for a
number of months and years before this
Administration came in. But the bottom
line in the question is this: This is a fun-
damental improvement of the U.S.
strategic position in the Middle East. It
is going to be an enhancement of our
ability to control events. And it is going
to be a profound improvement to allies'
ability to preserve and protect the vital
oil resources of that region.
We intend to proceed, and we intend
to win. I think it is very important that
we do so for the vital interest of this
country.
Q. It would be less confronta-
tional, though, wouldn't it, if when
Prime Minister Begin is here you can
offer something to him, maybe not the
defense pact he has raised now, the
prepositioning of U.S. military
material that would lessen Israel's op-
position and mollify its concerns?
A. I suppose one can suggest such
courses of action. But my experience
with the Government of Israel and its
leadership is not that they are going to
be bought off with respect to concerns
by goodies that we might offer to
enhance their own capability. I think
their concerns are understandable. I
think in the period ahead it is our
responsibility to explain to them why
this system is not going to be an unac-
ceptable risk to their security interest.
After all, we have obligations to Israel,
and it wouldn't be in America's interest
to provide potential aggressors with the
capability to aggravate our own ability
to fulfill our responsibilities.
So, we are not going to do that.
Now, that doesn't discount the impor-
tance of maintaining the qualitative edge
in Israel. And we are, indeed, prepared
to discuss that issue and to address it in
final terms, so it has a de facto relation-
ship. But I think it would be wrong to
suggest that we are indulging in
rewards or payoffs for Israeli ac-
quiescence in a decision which stands on
its own merits as the right one.
Q. We have alluded to this a cou-
ple of times on the broadcast, but I
would like to put the question to you
this way. In recent weeks, a U.S.
Senator and a senior member of the
State Department have told me that
there is a monumental ideological bat-
tle going on for the soul of this Ad-
ministration, that you are on the side
nhor 1QR1
17
The Secretary
of the moderates and they don't give
you much chance of prevailing. How
would you analyze that? What can you
tell us about that?
A. I suppose that is the most un-
precedented label I have received yet,
that I am on the side of the moderates. I
have usually been accused of being
somewhat to the right of Ghengis Kahn.
But, that being the case, let me tell you
nothing could be farther from the truth.
I have never worked with an Ad-
ministration— I have worked with
five — in which the philosophic compati-
bility was more uniform and more in
tune with the views of the President of
the United States, who, after all, is the
elected official and whose views must be
the deciding factor in any policy issue.
No. I don't accept that premise at
all. And I have seen a lot of speculation
and scorekeeping about Cap Weinberger
and myself. I have never seen a situa-
tion in which a Secretary of Defense and
a Secretary of State were in closer gee
with respect to the broad philosophic
and policy directions that this country
should take.
Now, it doesn't mean that, as a
Secretary of State with diplomatic and
foreign policy responsibilities, that I am
not going to differ from time to time
with a man who must manage the
defense establishment of the United
States. But, the bottom line that unites
the both of us is the vital interest of this
country. And I can assure you Cap and I
are in very close gee on those subjects.
Q. I will give you one example. On
the subject of how we deal with the
Europeans, you certainly seem to be
much more concerned about taking
European consideration into account
on a decision. And Mr. Weinberger
seems to think that the Europeans,
because of the new pacifism, they real-
ly almost don't have to be worried
about.
A. No. I think that would be a bum
rap to hang on Cap, just as it would that
I am preoccupied with their concerns. It
is a foreign policy matter for me to be
sensitive to European concerns and to
be sure that, to the best of our ability,
we meet those concerns. After all, the
reality of the current strategic environ-
ment is interdependence. The United
States no longer has the luxury of pro-
ceeding alone. We see it every day from
Medfly today to air controllers, which
are seemingly domestic questions, but
which have profound international im-
plications. Surely, we have to do this.
And it is my responsibility to alert
the President to concerns in this area. It
is not Cap's. Were he to be a proponent
for that, he would probably be out of his
own reservation. But it doesn't mean
that we are in fundamental difference on
any issue. And I am not aware that we
are.
Q. You were fond, back when you
took office, of quoting the Jackson
subcommittee hearings on national
security, when you were the vicar of
the President on foreign policy before
your vestments got a little ruffled. In
that, they quote "the success of a
Secretary in influencing his colleagues
is directly related to the President's
confidence in him and reliance on
him." Do you now, after a stormy
passage, have that?
A. I am very, very comfortable with
my relationship with President Reagan.
There hasn't been an issue that I have
been confronted with since I have been
here that I haven't had a hearing and, in
most cases, that I have not been sus-
tained. Where I haven't, and I think of
two particular cases— and that's all — I
understood completely why the Presi-
dent, with his broader responsibilities,
had to go the way he did.
'Press release 287 of Aug. 24, 1981.
News Conferenc
of August 28
Secretary Haig held a news con-
ference at the Department of State on
August 28, 1981. 1
Q. With respect to the proposed sal<
of AWACS [airborne warning and 1
trol system] aircraft to Saudi Arabii
we've been told there will be restric
tions on the use of those aircraft.
Could you tell us what those restric
tions are, including whether they
would prevent Saudi Arabia from us
ing the planes near Israel?
A. First, I wouldn't like to descril
the transfer conditions or transfer ar-
rangements that we will work out wit
the Government of Saudi Arabia as
necessarily restrictions; I think that's
the wrong term. And I would want to
underline that there are certain ar-
rangements which will become known
when the consultations start on the H
We feel we have an obligation to disci
these matters with the members of th
Senate and the House. Until that time
happens, we have, of course, urged
everyone — as I have been urging — th;
they hold their judgments on this adm
tedly controversial sale until they hav<
the benefit of the full briefings that wi
be provided, which will include transfe
arrangements, with which I must say
day that we in the executive branch ai
very happy.
Q. The Administration acted fin
ly in pledging to protect its aircraft
against attack, yet in this hemisphei
El Salvador is under attack with arr
which we say are supplied by Cuba.
Will the Administration act firmly b;
going to the source of those arms to
cut off the flow?
A. That is a good question for the
declining hours of the summer months
think we've made it very clear that we
have two problems in El Salvador. Oni
is to do all possible to assist the politic
process in Salvador — the quest for soc
justice, if you will — through the
measures that will be taken developme
tally — internal economic growth,
political improvements — which will per
mit a pluralistic structure to emerge.
Secondly, we have recognized clearly
that that process cannot proceed undei
a set of security conditions which are
fed from outside Salvador, led first anc
foremost by Cuba, with a provision of
18
Department of State Bulleti
The Secretary
5 than ample funds and resources
i the Soviet Union. We feel we must
with this set of circumstances as
That involves the moderate level of
tance we have provided to El
ador internally to provide for its
internal security at a level which is
;ively one-third of what we have
providing for economic develop-
t for Salvador. At the same time we
onsidering a number of other
sures involving the problematical
ce — Cuba. It would be premature
ne to go futher than that other than
11 you that we are considering a
ber of proposed actions in that area.
4- Last March the Administration
that you expected to have those
tary advisers in El Salvador out of
e by next week, September. Most
lose men are still there and now
re adding more, and the other day
i [Dean Fischer, State Department
esman | said it was an emergency
ition. What's happened to your
:egy there? It doesn't seem to be
ring.
A. It's a two-sided strategy. Clearly,
abjective observer — and I know
•e one — recognizes that that issue is
;ly dependent on the activities of the
"nal powers that continue their
hief inside El Salvador: provision of
iments, command and control and
■tion, and possibly even advisers in
lin guerrilla areas. There are some
rts of that.
Clearly, you cannot establish
.teral conditions and provide for
3 that are causing the problems a
i blanche to continue on with their
ity. We have, incidentally, with-
m some of the advisers as their
c has concluded. We continue to
training outside El Salvador as a
advantageous approach to this
lem.
^n the meantime, while we had some
cening off following the failure of
offensive in January, we have seen a
dy increase. Not as dramatic as it
prior to the offensive in January,
we've also seen a change in tactics.
,t we've witnessed is a guerrilla
ement resort to straight terrorism,
rinds of activities which reflect their
re and frustration in major force
ations. They've now gone into an
•t in which the main victims of their
aty are the innocent noncombatants,
people of El Salvador, in food
•ibution, in a very sophisticated ter-
>t approach to destroying the power
in El Salvador.
rhe simple facts are that as long as
this external assistance and provocation
and instigation and direction in leader-
ship continue, we have an obligation to
deal with it internally along the two
lines that I mentioned, and we must also
deal with it externally. i
Q. In a few days we'll mark 1 year
since the beginning of the Solidarity
movement in Poland. And, since that
occurred, there have been two occa-
sions— one in December in the past
Administration and one the Friday you
left for the Mideast trip — when it
looked like an invasion was imminent.
A two-part question: Why, in your
estimation, have the Soviets not
moved into Poland? Two, what is your
judgment about what they're likely to
do in the future?
A. I think it's difficult to predict
such situations with unusual precision. I
do think that the Soviet leadership — and
I welcome the decisions they've made —
have concluded, for whatever reason —
and there are a host of reasons — that it
was not in the Soviets' interests to inter-
vene. That could involve a number of
merging factors. One would be the cost
of intervention in bloodshed. One could
be the consequential obligations of a
post-Poland that had been suppressed
and which would have to be sustained in
economic and human terms. Thirdly, I
would hope that the very unified, very
vigorous stand of the Western world —
especially the NATO alliance, the major
European powers — have also con-
tributed to the decision not to intervene.
We would hope that situation would con-
tinue, and today it looks somewhat bet-
ter in that sense.
I don't think anyone can predict in
the period ahead what directions the in-
ternal situation in Poland will take.
Clearly, it is a very serious situation to-
day economically, with shortages of food
and hard cash. This will require gener-
osity and care on the part of both the
East and the West.
We know today that there are inter-
nal tensions which are somewhat
different than they were in the earlier
period of this crisis between Solidarity
and the government itself. Our basic ob-
jective is to do all we can to permit the
situation to evolve and to have that
situation evolve based on the wishes and
the desires of the people of Poland.
Q. This week South Africa made a
deep military penetration into Angola
which was denounced by a number of
countries, and even your own depart-
ment saw fit to deplore the action. I
wonder if you could tell us what im-
pact this incident will have on your
policy of improving relations with
South Africa, and also what effect you
think it will have on your effort to
solve the Namibia problem?
A. Let me set the record straight in
the context of the statement we made
here on that situation. We said we
deplore any escalation of violence in
southern Africa regardless of its source.
That's somewhat different from what I
think your question suggests. Clearly,
any such escalation of violence inhibits
and makes more difficult the peace proc-
ess that we are seeking to push forward
with respect to the early independence
of Namibia on the basis of U.N. Resolu-
tion 435.
But we've also said with respect to
this particular incident that a number of
factors have to be weighed in drawing
value judgments — not just the act of the
South African Government but also the
fact that in Angola today, 6 years after
its independence, there remains a large
contingent of Cuban forces and Soviet
advisers; that we have watched the ship-
ment of quantities of Soviet armaments
into Angola; and that these armaments
have been used to refurbish SWAPO
[South West Africa People's Organiza-
tion] elements that move back and forth
freely across that frontier and inflict
bloodshed and terrorism upon the inno-
cent noncombatant inhabitants of
Namibia.
All of these factors must be assessed
in considering both the implications of
this recent incident, which we view as
deplorable in the context of its escala-
tion of the violence and the inhibitions
that it presents to us as we are continu-
ing to seek that independence of
Namibia today, with some progress I
may add.
Q. With respect to the aerial
challenge with Libya and North
Korea, is it your view that the radical
"Communist" states are perhaps
testing the Reagan Administration?
Or, can it be seen the other way, that
the Reagan Administration is testing
the other states? Or does it just hap-
pen to be a couple of coincidences?
A. I wouldn't happen to view it
from either perspective. I think the
situation in the bay off Libya was a test
that was made of the proper, legitimate
exercise of the use of international
waters and air space. As I say, in the
>ber 1981
19
The Secretary
past there have been similar near misses
or what I call "high-risk provocations"
taken by Libyan air forces and not ex-
clusively against U.S. forces exercising
their legitimate rights. It's unfortunate
that that incident occurred, and it
brought about the consequences we saw.
With respect to Korea, it's impor-
tant to bear in mind that this opera-
tional flight, which was challenged by a
missile firing, is one of countless such
flights that have taken place over a
number of years. Never before has one
been challenged in this way. In this in-
stance it appears— and I would say
rather convincingly— that the North
Koreans fired a missile while the aircraft
was in international airspace— and the
aircraft never departed from inter-
national air space or the territorial air
space of South Korea.
Q. Why then, if this was never
done before, do you think the North
Koreans chose to fire this?
A. It's not the first time that they
have done such a thing. I recall my first
experience in the Nixon Administration
in February of 1969 where North Korea
engaged an unarmed American recon-
naissance aircraft well out over inter-
national waters, so this is not an unusual
incident. It's an unfortunate one, and
one which we are prepared to deal with
if necessary.
Q. I think I have asked this ques-
tion a few months ago. This week you
have met with the Ambassadors of
Canada and Australia on the Sinai
force. When do you expect a positive
commitment from Canada, Australia,
and New Zealand on the Sinai force on
their participation in it, and how will
it affect their relations with the
United States if they do not par-
ticipate?
A. First, let me say we have made
it a policy not to provide day-to-day
checklists on who is contributing forces
and who is not, and the current state of
the dialogue between ourselves and
those states which we hope to see be
donors to this force. I'm very pleased,
incidentally, with the progress we're
making. We have made substantial prog-
ress in putting such a force together. It's
not yet totally complete. I'm also very
pleased that the Egyptian and the
Israeli side yesterday agreed to the
establishment of some implementing
committees, forums, interlocking com-
mittees, that will work to implement the
withdrawal of Israeli forces. I think it's
still best not to dot the "i's" or cross the
"t's" on the dialogues that are continuing
with potential donors.
Q. But could you tell us if the
United States is using a big stick,
whether the countries—
A. Not at all. We wouldn't conceive
of such a thing.
Q. Were you surprised by the an-
nouncement that Egypt and Israel
agreed to resume the autonomy
negotiations, and do you expect these
negotiations to become an issue on the
agenda when Prime Minister Begin
comes to Washington, September 14?
A. To the last part of your question,
yes, I do expect them to be on the agen-
da. With respect to the first part of your
question, we were pleasantly surprised.
We very much welcome the agreement
to sit down at an early date and to get
on with the autonomy discussions. We
have been behind such an outcome for a
number of weeks now, and we've dis-
cussed it both sides. So when I use the
term "pleasantly surprised," that has to
do more with the timing and the venue,
and it's an unimportant aspect. I do
know that we will discuss this with
Prime Minister Begin, of course.
Q. Does the United States have
evidence that Libya has been sending
major new supplies to the PLO
[Palestine Liberation Organization] in
southern Lebanon, and, if so, does
this mean the PLO is violating the
spirit of the cease-fire?
A. I presume you are referring to
the comments of Prime Minister Begin
yesterday about the 18 guns. First, let
me say that our not having the evidence
of this does not mean that it is not so.
Probably, it may be true. Any increased
provision of armaments into this area at
this time is a serious aggravation of the
cessation-of-hostilities situation that we
are seeking now to strengthen and
broaden through a number of measures.
Those measures include communication
and efforts with those nations which
have provided this armament to cease
and desist from doing so.
I also want to emphasize that I drew
encouragement from Prime Minister
Begin's comment that as long as these
weapons were not fired, there would be
no counteraction from Israel. I think
that is a positive aspect of his state-
ment, which we welcome.
Q. Are you concerned that the
need to cut back on the projected
defense spending will make it more
difficult for you and the Administra^
tion to reestablish American credibi
ty, especially with our allies?
A. Let me be very careful about
your question. It assumes some sub-
stantial cutbacks. There has been no
decision as of this session, that I am
aware "of, to do that. On the other hai
I think it is also important that we
recognize that we have taken a numb
of very, very severe austerity measur
on the domestic side. Clearly, the De-
partment of Defense as well as the
Department of State have to bear the
share of responsibility for greater
efficiency and belt-tightening and, if y
will, a higher state of efficiency.
I'm confident that Cap Weinberge
[Secretary of Defense], who is primar
charged with the esoterics and the
details of this issue, recognizes, as do
that with budgets of the high level we
are talking about there are grounds fi
certain adjustments. What the Presid
decides to do on this issue remains to
seen. I think it is very, very importan
to answer your question, however— tl
the underpinnings of President Reagc
foreign policy require a rectification o
the slackening of the American defen
effort, which his current policies em-
body, and which I am absolutely confi
dent he will continue to pursue in the
days ahead.
Q. Going back to Korea, do you
have any intention to change your
basic posture toward North Korea I
cause of the firing of this missile? I
also wonder whether you regard th
instance as an isolated and indepen
ent provocation to the United State
and, if not, why not?
A. It would be hard to characteri
it as an isolated and independent pro1
cation. We have experienced those ov
the years, so there could be nothing
isolated about it. One need only look
back in the history books. I cited one
stance. We all remember the tree-
chopping incident and a number of ot
very dangerous and unfortunate skin
ishes along the demilitarized zone. So
there is nothing unusual about this in
terms of past North Korean perfor-
mance.
In the case of this instance, how-
ever, it would be far too early to say
whether or not it is an isolated incide
or whether we are going to see more
All I can say in that regard is that wi
20
Department of State Bulle
The Secretary
: going to continue to conduct our
;hts in accordance with past pro-
lures, and we will be prepared to take
! necessary measures to protect our
men and aircraft in that process.
Q. I would like to go back to the
tin American area for just a minute,
i there are two parts to this. Could
i say at what level the discussions
jut how to handle the problem of
reused Soviet arms shipments are
ng conducted? Has the National
curity Council met on this? Has the
esident been involved in the discus-
ns? The second part of the question
are any of the measures that you
erred to earlier that are under con-
eration — military measures?
A. Let me get the last part of your
:stion. Are any of what military
asures?
Q. You referred earlier to certain
ds of measures that the Ad-
listration had under consideration
deal with the increasing flow of
is from the Soviet Union through
oa.
A. Let me assure you, we're look-
at a whole array of political, econom-
and security-related measures that
;ht be appropriate. Let me assure you
), with respect to the first part of
ir question, that the President has
n fully engaged in his concerns about
i situation. We are fully aware, those
is in the bureaucracy, of his con-
ns, we hope we are being responsive
;hem, and we are going to continue to
.1 with this problem as it unfolds.
Clearly, the first step in any such ex-
ise is to be sure the communications
ween ourselves and those who are in-
ved in the incidents and the opera-
is that give us concern are aware of
t concern. Surely my meeting with
viet] Foreign Minister Gromyko in
jtember at the United Nations will be
>h a venue for expressing that con-
n, and I intend to do so.
Q. May I continue with a question
Salvador? The conflict over there
s generated a fantastic amount of
ugees, a lot of them in this country
thout proper documents. Are we
itemplating any changes in our
licy about deporting them, and if so,
lich changes?
A. We have just, incidentally,
:eived the report of a commission
lich we sent to Asia to review our
refugee policies. It has been traditional
American policy to offer refuge for truly
political refugees, and we intend to live
by that obligation, which is an historic
and fundamental aspect of the American
way.
There have been controversies from
time to time about whether or not a,
refugee is truly a political refugee, seek-
ing a refuge, or whether he is an eco-
nomic refugee, seeking just to better his
personal, individual condition. This is
always a very difficult problem that we
will continue to be plagued with and
which we will continue to refine our own
thinking on. With respect to genuine
refugees, American snores have always
been open to them, and I know they will
remain that way.
Q. What about with respect to El
Salvadorans themselves?
A. From whatever source, that are
legitimate refugees.
Q. Do we consider them political
refugees?
A. You've asked me to dot some
"i's" and cross some "t's" that would not
be appropriate.
Q. Both President Reagan and
yourself have affirmed the U.S. inten-
tion to implement the Taiwan Rela-
tions Act. Can you tell us, after the
Administration has been in office for 8
months, what concrete steps this Ad-
ministration has taken to implement
the act, particularly with regard to
such issues as better access by
Taiwan's representatives to U.S.
officials, additional offices for
Taiwan's Coordination Council in this
country, and weapons sales?
A. Let me just answer your ques-
tion, which is a sensitive one— and I'm
sure you knew it — with my assurances
to you that we have been in the process
of implementing the Taiwan Relations
Act with the good sense consistent with
both the letter and the spirit of that act,
and that includes a number of steps in
the areas that your question touched
upon. I won't go beyond that.
Q. The Administration has now
formulated plans for emergency
resource mobilization, which will in-
clude, in the latter stage, setting up
an independent body for the im-
plementation of defense production.
What role does the Department of
State play in this?
A. In the first place, there is a lot
yet to be done, and a lot of consideration
is yet to be concluded. I think you know
that I have had a longstanding record in
expressing concern about the declining
American mobilization and industrial
base. It has had a profound impact on
the nation's ability or lack of ability to
implement our foreign policy effectively.
I have held discussions in the past
with Cap Weinberger and with the
President on the urgent need to address
this issue at a national level, so that ap-
propriate remedial steps can be taken. I
don't have to dot all the "i's" and cross
all the "t's" on that, but sometimes it
takes the United States 4 years to re-
spond to an urgent security request
from a trusted ally. The impact of that
is devastating.
There have been a number of in-
terim measures taken which we have
supported, especially in our security
assistance program for next year where
we have asked for a $100 million pool to
be established that would provide cer-
tain equipment that could be drawn
down on in the case of emergency in-
stead of diverting from our own force
structure. So we are intimately and
heavily engaged in this process, as we
should be.
Q. Will the plan be put into opera-
tion relatively quickly because of the
failure of the Reagan economic pro-
gram?
A. I don't accept your premise in
any way. I'm an optimist. I would hope
that you might become one.
Q. In your meetings with Mr.
Gromyko, will you be offering or en-
couraging greater U.S.-U.S.S.R. trade
relations or enhanced relations?
A. With the Soviet Union?
Q. Yes, most particularly in the
field of agriculture.
A. I would emphasize that this
meeting between Mr. Gromyko and
myself is what you might call a meeting
engagement. This is the first ministerial-
level meeting between the Soviet Union
and the United States in this Ad-
ministration. We have a very complete
agenda which has been discussed at the
ambassadorial level. First and foremost
on that list, of course, is the desire to
arrive at specific modalities to launch
the theater nuclear arms control
negotiations, sometime between mid-
November and mid-December. But these
discussions will involve some of the
:tober 1981
21
The Secretary
areas we've touched upon here, areas of
political concern— Afghanistan; Kampu-
chea; Third World interventionisms,
either directly or by proxy; trade; and a
host of other bilateral relationships. As
you know, I addressed this with some
specificity in my recent speech in New
Orleans [August 11, 1981]. I refer you to
that because it is a pretty good road
map on what we would intend to raise.
Q. Both the recent incidents in-
volving shootings at American planes
have taken place inside zones that
those countries doing the shooting
have claimed as their own, and which
we have disputed. Does this Ad-
ministration feel it is taking a harder
line in pressing our disputing of their
claims, or is this just a coincidence
that it happens to have happened
twice in the matter of a little more
than a week?
A. I wouldn't give you an adjectival
description of this Administration's
policy other than to reiterate that we in-
tend to meet our international obliga-
tions with respect to American rights
abroad with respect to the provision of
international law.
The United States as the leader of
the free world has an obligation to be
strong advocate of adherence to ac-
cepted rules of international law and in-
ternational behavior. That is the policy
of President Reagan, and it will be pur-
sued. Whether you call that a hardening
from the past, I leave to your
judgments.
Q. As you know, in the past week
or so, there has been a lot of discus-
sion about strategic concepts, whether
the ICBM [intercontinental ballistic
missile] force is, in fact, vulnerable to
a Soviet first strike — there was the ar-
ticle in Strategic Review.
There is also sentiment expressed
by some people in the Pentagon that
the MX in any foreseeable mode of
deployment would not be survivable. I
just wonder whether you see the in-
evitability that the ABM [antiballistic
missile system] will have to be
deployed to protect our missile force,
or whether you have rethought any of
the basic premises that you've had in
your strategic policies.
A. As I said last Sunday [August
23] on "Issues and Answers," I've been
very, very encouraged by the approach
that Cap Weinberger and the Defense
Department have taken to this issue of
America's strategic weapons needs. It
has involved the most comprehensive
review, across the entire spectrum, of
potential strategic needs. I must tell you
also that in a large measure, there is a
high level of consensus for the large ma-
jority of the proposals that have thus far
crystalized.
The difficult area is, of course,
strategic ballistic systems and their in-
terrelationship with vulnerability. Let
me say there is no system that America
deploys that is invulnerable. All of our
systems are vulnerable. The real ques-
tion is the maintenance of a flexible,
redundant, responsive, strategic
American posture, one which includes
land, sea, and air deployments; one
which includes a mix of air-breathing
and ballistic capability. Ballistic capabili-
ty is extremely important, not only in
war-fighting terms, with which we hope
we will never have to be confronted, but
most importantly in deterrent terms, in
arms control terms, and also in crisis
management terms.
All of these questions are under
review. The President has not made his
decision. He will very shortly, and I'm
confident it will be a very astute balance
of all these conflicting needs.
One must remember that the United
States has been engaged in these re-
views for over a decade; and in many in-
stances we have deferred decision after
decision, to the point where today we
are facing a window of vulnerability in
the decade of the 1980s.
I think it is very important— and
that is why I am so pleased and encour-
aged by the Defense Department's ap-
proach to this situation — that we ap-
proach it comprehensively, as we are dq-
ing, and hopefully that we retain the
essential ingredients that we have to.
Q. May I repeat one part of the
question? Do you think we are in-
evitably moving toward the deploy-
ment of an ABM system that would
require the abrogation of the ABM
Treaty?
A. It is too early to say. There are a
number of complications associated with
it. But first and foremost, we have to
know that it will provide the enhanced
invulnerability, or I'll say enhanced pro-
tection. Nothing is invulnerable. But it
will provide such kind of an enhance-
ment. And we don't know that yet.
Interview on "Good
Morning, America"
Secretary Haig was interviewed on
ABC-TV's "Good Morning, America " bi
David Hartman and Lynn Sherr on
August U, 1981. l
Q. It is reported this morning that
Polish leaders are on their way to
Moscow right now, and it has also
been reported to us in the last 24
hours that the United States is con-
cerned about the situation in Poland,
and perhaps it is at its most
dangerous point ever — low point. Ho
dangerous is the situation there, and
what can be done about it?
A. I think we had a situation in
which the tensions associated with
Polish reform have continued over an
extended period, and I wouldn't
necessarily say this is the most
dangerous. I think the character of the
tensions has changed somewhat. We
now have some internal problems with
the union, Solidarity, and the govern-
ment at odds from time to time over tt
nature of reforms. This is being com-
plicated by severe food shortages and 1:
distribution problems with respect to e|
isting food commodities.
Q. Do we for one moment believe
that, indeed, it is a short working
visit and these are routine talks as hi
been reported?
A. I think these are never routine
talks. I think clearly the government ol
ficials in Poland are hopeful to continui
on in a manner in which they can detei
mine the outcome of events without ex
ternal advice or intervention from the
Soviet leadership.
Q. As former NATO commander,
what do you make of their deci-
sion—the Soviets— to move up these
military maneuvers on the Polish
border which has just been an-
nounced?
A. I think these are thus far nor-
mal, and they have gone through the
proper notification procedures under tl
CSCE [Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe] provisions. In
other words, they have informed the
■Press release 292.
22
Department of State Bullet
The Secretary
st that there will be maneuvers in ex-
3 of 25,000 and this is essentially nor-
and is not a source of increased
■t on our part at this juncture.
Q. You sound particularly cautious
responding to these questions on
land. Are you doing this purposely
(ause the United States should not
involved in this right now?
A. I think that has always been the
s. In the past we have been con-
ned on occasion by Soviet readiness
isures, and on those occasions, we've
free and, in fact, obligated to corn-
it, sometimes vigorously. On this oc-
ion, the problems are internal, and
hope that both the unions and the
ernment will work out their dif-
;nces and without further erosion of
situation internally in Poland.
Q. I wonder if we could turn to
situation in the Middle East for
t a minute. At the meeting yester-
with the Israel Ambassador, will
F-15s and F-16s be sent to Israel
I when?
A. I think the meeting yesterday
firmed what the President had
.self announced yesterday. That is
t he anticipates making a decision
ly next week, and I think that deci-
1 will be made early next week. The
; that it hasn't been made yet means
t value judgments on what it will be
aid be premature.
Q. Mr. Brzezinski, former NSC
.tional Security Council] head, has
i recently — this week — that we
jht to start talking to the PLO
lestine Liberation Organization],
at do you think of that comment?
A. I think we've all been very clear,
ecially during President Sadat's
t — when this issue surfaced once
.in — that we know and the PLO
iws what the requirements are for
ler recognition or participation in the
.ce process and that recognition on
ir part of Israel's right to exist and
eptance of the provisions of U.N.
solutions 242 and 338. And I think it';
)ortant that Americans understand
t when the United States makes such
Dmmitment, whether it be with the
,te of Israel or with our Arab friends,
t we not treat these commitments
ltly, and we don't pretend to.
Q. Turning to the decision to pro-
duce neutron weapons, the Soviets
this week have been criticizing the
decision. They've suggested that it is
provocative, that if we are really in-
terested in arms reduction that we
wouldn't have done this, and that they
might now consider producing
weapons of their own. How do you
respond to their criticism?
A. I respond to them simply as a
reflection of ongoing Soviet propaganda.
During my time in Europe as NATO
commander when this neutron issue first
surfaced under President Carter about
1977 or 1978, as the President pointed
out yesterday, the Soviets expended
$100 million in purely propaganda pur-
poses. I recall their awarding their Am-
bassador in the Netherlands a very high
award for his accomplishments in
defeating the efforts at that time to pro-
duce and deploy. On this occasion, as
you know, we are not deploying the
system, merely carrying out the man-
date of the Congress and the FY 1981
Department of Energy funding bill
which will now assemble the components
which have been under production for
some time now.
Q. With the neutron bomb decision
and some other things, there has been,
as you obviously know, talk of a crisis
of confidence in Europe about this
country. We have perhaps been look-
ing like the bad guys. Are we going to
continue to look that way? Is there
any kind of new peace offensive that
will be coming out of this country?
A. I don't think it is true that we are
facing a crisis of confidence in Europe at
all. I think we do have a situation in
which Europe is going through stresses
and strains — especially economic in
character — but beyond that, there is an
antinuclear wave of emotion which we've
seen in the past. I don't think this
represents a crisis of confidence as such.
And it's also true that some of our
European friends have been somewhat
disturbed by the American rhetoric
which has been more anti-Soviet than
they've been accustomed to. But, I've
always said deep in their hearts, they go
to bed at night and say, thank God,
America is willing and ready to lead
again to provide the kind of protection
they have come to expect from us over
some 35 years of association. I don't see
this, and I don't predict a peace offen-
sive from the United States. I think
we've laid out clearly our requirements
with respect to our relationships with
the Soviet Union — that is that we ex-
pect the Soviet Union to join with us in
a sense of reciprocity and, above all, to
manifest greater restraint in their inter-
national conduct. One can only look at
lessons of history as we see
Afghanistans, Kampucheas, Soviet in-
tervention in Africa through Cuban
proxies, in Angola, Ethiopia, Southern
Yemen.
'Press release 279.
tober 1981
23
AFRICA
Regional Strategy for Southern Africa
by Chester A. Crocker
Address before the American Legion
in Honolulu on August 29, 1981. Mr.
Crocker is Assistant Secretary for
African Affairs.
I am pleased and honored to be ad-
dressing the American Legion on a sub-
ject of vital national and international
significance. Africa is an integral and in-
creasingly important part of the global
competitive system. The United States
did not cause this to come about, but it
is a reality, one which many Americans
have only recently begun to perceive.
Africa is part of the large, interdepend-
ent world system within which the posi-
tion of the United States is critically im-
portant. And thus, the quality and the
maturity of our relationship with
African states is a potent force for inter-
national as well as our own national
security and well-being.
The Reagan Administration has
established some tough goals for our
country in the area of foreign affairs
just as it has in the area of domestic
policy. They are goals which are sup-
ported by the American people and
which are based upon the values which
we as a nation have subscribed to for
over 200 years. As Secretary of State
Haig has said:
• We will be consistent in the pur-
suit of U.S. interests;
• The United States will be reliable
as a force for peace and stability; and
• There will be balance in our ap-
proach to individual issues and orches-
tration of policy in general.
U.S. Objectives in Africa
We, whose job it is to help shape and
implement this Administration's foreign
policy, take these principles seriously,
and I believe that progress is evident.
Let me enumerate what this Administra-
tion has set forth as its objectives in
Africa.
• America seeks to promote peace
and regional security in Africa and to
deny opportunities to all those who seek
contrary objectives.
• We will support proven friends
and be known as a reliable partner in
Africa as elsewhere.
• We support open market oppor-
tunities, access to key resources, and ex-
panding African and American
economies.
• The United States actively sup-
ports regional security and peaceful
solutions to the problems of southern
Africa.
• We seek to expand and assist that
group of nations whose development
policies produce economic progress and
which have working democratic institu-
tions.
• The United States will do its
share in meeting Africa's humanitarian
needs and in supporting basic human
liberties, in keeping with both American
principles and American interests.
To reach those objectives, we must
each day address a number of natural
and manmade problems. Let me touch
on just a few of them in the African con-
text.
We are concerned about the in-
fluence of the Soviet Union and its sur-
rogates in Africa. The Soviets seek to
exploit for their own ends existing dif-
ferences and actual conflict, and they
seek to create and sustain situations of
conflict from which they can profit.
They are aided in these efforts by their
client states (such as the Cubans and the
East Germans) but also by less tradi-
tivities and to help African states resisl
them.
I would like here to emphasize a
point I have made elsewhere on this su
ject, and that is that the United States
has no desire nor, for that matter, any
mandate to act as the policeman of
Africa. But let there be no misunder-
standing: This country will not hesitate
to play its proper role both in fostering
the well-being of friends in Africa and i
resisting the efforts of those whose
goals are the opposite. Without a
minimum of regional political order, ou
other regional interests — humanitarian
economic, commerical — cannot be pur-
sued.
Equally important, without politica
order, African states will fail in their
crucial tasks of nation building,
economic development and, in general,
assuming Africa's rightful place in the
community of nations. As leader of the
West, the United States has a respon-
sibility to help shape the strategic con-
text that impinges on Africa. As I stat<
at the outset, Africa is an integral part
of the world political system. It is time
for us Americans to recognize this real:
ty and cease indulging in the romantic
lusion that Africa is somehow uniquely
buffered from the effects of destabiliza
tion whether it is of external or region;
origin.
It is time for us Americans to recognize [that Africa is an integral pari
of the world political system] and cease indulging in the romantic illu-
sion that Africa is somehow uniquely buffered from the effects of
destabilization. . . .
tional partners who also pursue their
own aims to the detriment of their
neighbors. Under the leadership of Col-
onel Qadhafi, Libya has been trans-
formed into a leading Third World
arsenal of Soviet-supplied hardware.
Libyan arms and cash are at the center
of a skillful and sinister campaign of
subversion that has become a major
source of African instability. The activi-
ties of the Soviets and their partners
threaten the security of Africa in every
corner of the continent, and in accord-
ance with our objectives the United
States is working to frustrate these ac-
We are also alert to the danger in-
herent in the economic crises which an
affecting Africa. Several factors have
combined to produce one of the most
serious economic situations since Afrie
countries became independent. The
causes are several: Policies which
bloated government's role in the
economy and distorted the pricing
mechanism; severe droughts that cut
food production; the recession in the
Western industrialized countries which
sharply reduced Africa's export earn-
ings; and the higher oil prices which
hurt the poor countries even worse tha
the industrialized ones.
24
Department of State Bullet
Africa
|The result is that, across Africa to-
countries which are already among
poorest in the world are facing stag-
economies, debt burdens which
cannot meet, oil import bills which
lp most of their foreign exchange
ings, food shortages which threaten
ne in some cases, and spiralling
i for basic necessities that create
social tensions. We are well aware
others are eager to exploit these
ions. African governments, still in
;arly stages of institutional maturi-
re easily shaken, often overthrown
e face of such crises. Some of the
rnments so threatened today are
3 which have consistently supported
Jnited States in such international
.tions as Iran and Afghanistan, and
i of those which today provide us
access to key military facilities in
-each to the Persian Gulf,
rhe United States cannot be the
icial "angel" for Africa, any more
we intend to be Africa's policeman,
we have no intention of allowing
economic threat, any more than the
at of terrorism or subversion, to
rmine basic American interests in
?a. This Administration aims to
; this threat by emphasizing our
lgths— specifically by helping bring
>oorer African nations more into the
istream of the free market economy
ih is the soundest and surest way to
'th. Strengthening our own
omy is a vital part of this, for this
les us to fulfill our international
icial responsibilities, and it increases
)otential markets for African coun-
Dur bilateral assistance program will
n indispensable element in Africa
ng this period. Under the Reagan
ministration, our bilateral aid will be
eted on areas where our interests
most clearly manifest and focused
e to produce policy changes of broad
lasting impact. These changes in-
e giving a much greater opportunity
le private sector, both within these
ltries and from abroad.
Multilateral assistance agencies,
1 as the World Bank, provide the
. of assistance resources to Africa,
more than we can or need to provide
;erally. This Administration will play
rong role in these institutions,
ling for combining this aid with the
1 of basic structural and policy
lges that are essential if Africa is
to reel from one economic crisis to
ther. We believe that, if helped
iugh this crisis period with the right
of aid, policy reform, and a strongly
vigorated role for the private sector,
African peoples will opt for the growth
and the freedom — the personal, eco-
nomic, and political freedom — that is in-
herent in the free world's international
economic system.
Southern Africa
But it is to southern Africa that I would
like to direct the thrust of my remarks.
The African policy of this Administra-
tion places a very high priority on ad-
dressing the problems and opportunities
of this key region. We have dedicated a
substantial effort, engaging the energy
and attention of the highest levels of
government, to reviewing the regional
situation, weighing our options, and con-
sulting in depth with all the key players
including our allies and the governments
of southern Africa. During the early
months of this year, we concluded that
U.S. and Western interests can only be
advanced by serious and determined
U.S. leadership aimed at strengthing the
region's security and backing its
development potential. We have defined
a new regional strategy, responsive to
our national security, economic-commer-
cial, and political interests. That
strategy is based on three basic realities
of southern Africa.
First. U.S. economic interests in
sub-Saharan Africa are heavily concen-
trated in the southern third of the conti-
nent. Nearly $3 billion of direct invest-
ment, or about 60% of the sub-Saharan
total, is located there. Our southern
African trade totals over $6 billion. This
concentration of our interests reflects
southern Africa's tremendous mineral
wealth and the relative sophistication of
the area's economies— especially those
of South Africa and Zimbabwe.
Southern Africa accounts for over 40%
of sub-Saharan Africa's GNP, 70% of its
industrial and 60% of its mining output,
80% of the steel, and 85% of the elec-
tricity consumed. The area contains im-
mense deposits of many strategic
minerals which are vital to industrial
economies like ours, including: the
platinum group (86% of world reserves),
manganese (53%), vanadium (64%),
chromium (95%), and colbalt (52%) as
well as a dominant share of world gold
and diamond output and internationally
signficant output of coal, uranium, cop-
per, and other minerals. Many of these
minerals are vital to Western defense
and high technology industries.
There is no longer much debate
about southern Africa's economic
significance. With regional stability the
area can prosper and serve as a focal
point of African economic progress.
Trade and private investment flows
from the United States and other
Western nations can reinforce this
potential and provide a solid basis of
mutual interest for U.S. -African re-
lations. If there is a slide toward
regional turmoil, however, southern
Africa's potential economic dynamism
becomes a mirage. This Administration
strongly supports southern African
economic development through en-
couragement of trade and investment
throughout the area and through the
provision of timely and carefully tailored
foreign assistance. Equally important,
we support regional development by an
active diplomacy aimed at addressing
outstanding conflicts and thus discourag-
ing the recourse to violent solutions and
foreign intervention.
Second. A second reality is that
southern Africa is an increasingly con-
tested arena in global politics. The
worldwide significance of the region
derives from its potential— unless na-
tions of the area can find a basis to
resolve outstanding conflicts and coex-
ist—to become a cockpit of mounting
East- West tension. Despite the ending
of the drawn-out struggle in Rhodesia
and the successful transition to
independent Zimbabwe, there remains a
combination of local and external
pressures that could lead to expanded
conflict and polarization. Since
Portugal's departure from its ex-colonies
in 1975, the U.S.S.R. and its clients
have shown every interest in keeping
the pot of regional conflicts boiling. Six
years after Angola's independence,
substantial Cuban combat forces plus
Soviet advisers remain there, as par-
ticipants in a still unresolved and tragic
civil war.
This external factor inevitably
shapes the calculations of Angola's
neighbors. Warsaw Pact countries have
arms agreements with four nations of
the area and provide the bulk of exter-
nal military support to guerrilla groups
aimed at Namibia and South Africa.
Faced with large-scale foreign interven-
tion, the pressure of African guerrilla
groups, and strains in its relations with
its traditional Western partners, South
Africa has significantly expanded its
defense potential in recent years. The
republic, through a sustained self-
sufficiency drive, is now an important
ober 1981
25
Africa
regional military power. It has clearly
signaled its determination to resist guer-
rilla encroachments and strike at coun-
tries giving sanctuary.
Let us make no mistake. This is an
explosive combination. The potential
damage to Western interests is en-
hanced by southern Africa's geopolitical
importance along the strategic sea
routes around Africa and by its growing
importance as a source of critical
minerals. It is imperative that we play
our proper role in fostering the region's
security and countering the expansion of
Soviet influence. We intend to do so by
building the confidence necessary for
equitable and durable solutions to con-
flicts and by encouraging the emergence
and survival of genuine democratic
systems and productive economies. We
will not lend our voice to support those
dedicated to seizing and holding power
through violence. If the peoples of
southern Africa are to have the chance
to build their own futures, it is essential
that military force not become establish-
ed as the arbiter of relations between
states or the means of effecting needed
political change. In this respect,
southern Africa could become a crucial
arena for defining the rules of interna-
tional conduct in the decade ahead.
Third. The third reality is that
southern Africa is a highly complex
arena which must be understood on its
own regional merits if we are to succeed
in our efforts. There are powerful
linkages — transport systems, labor
migration, electric power grids, flows of
capital and expertise, active and vital
trade ties — that bind together the states
of southern Africa. Interdependence is
reinforced by the presence in the region
of six landlocked states. Economic
pragmatism is strengthened by the
many nearby examples of negative
growth rates and falling living stand-
ards. But there are also deep-rooted
sources of conflict within the region
itself. The political basis for regional
cooperation is strikingly absent. The
racial and ethnic pluralism of these
societies — and the raw emotions
generated by colonialism and white
minority rule — make it difficult for them
to come to terms with themselves and
their neighbors.
• The legally entrenched apartheid
policies of South Africa are anathema to
its African-ruled neighbors. They seek
lessened dependence on South Africa
and increased political pressures on it
for domestic change. All parties are
aware of the enormous price that will be
exacted if the pressures in and around
South Africa degenerate into destructive
revolutionary violence.
• Angola has been plagued since in-
dependence by continuing ethnic and
factional struggle, complicated by
foreign intervention, that spills into
neighboring countries and diverts atten-
tion from needed development. It is
unlikely that the struggle between the
MPLA [Popular Movement for the
Liberation of Angola] government and
opposition forces— chiefly UNITA [Na-
tional Union for the Total Independence
of Angola], led by Jonas Savimbi— can
be resolved militarily. Cuban troop
withdrawal and national reconciliation
would be supported by all Angola's
neighbors, but these in turn are in-
timately related to the question of
Namibia.
• The low-level guerrilla conflict
over Namibia's status has gradually ex-
panded in recent years, as Western-led
efforts to find a negotiated basis for in-
dependence from South African control
continue. All parties accept the principle
of independence, and some measure of
agreement exists about the procedures
for a transfer of power. But talks under
U.N. auspices led by the Western con-
tact group states (United States, United
Kingdom, France, Germany, and
Canada) had stalled by early 1981. It is
clear that Namibia is a focal point of
regional conflict and African diplomatic
concern. It is also clear that the war
could continue and expand unless the
core concerns of all parties, including
South Africa, are addressed in a settle-
ment.
Thus, it is clear that southern Africa
contains within itself the seeds of grow-
ing violence. To ward off this possibility
we must have a realistic strategy, one
that assures our credibility as a regional
partner. We cannot and will not permit
our hand to be forced to align ourselves
with one side or another in these
disputes. Our task, together with our
key allies, is to maintain communication
with all parties — something we in the
West are uniquely able to do— and to
pursue our growing interests throughout
the region. Only if we engage construc-
tively in southern Africa as a whole can
we play our proper role in the search i
negotiated solutions, peaceful change,
and expanding economic progress.
In South Africa, the region's domi-
nant country, it is not our task to choo:
between black and white. In this rich
land of talented and diverse peoples, in
portant Western economic, strategic,
moral, and political interests are at
stake. We must avoid action that ag-
gravates the awesome challenges faciiij
South Africans of all races. The Reagai
Administration has no intention of
destabilizing South Africa in order to
curry favor elsewhere. Neither will we
align ourselves with apartheid policies
The Reagan Administration has no ii
tention of destabilizing South Africa
in order to curry favor elsewhere.
that are abhorrent to our own multi-
racial democracy. South Africa is an in
tegral and important element of the
global economic system, and it plays a
significant economic role in its own
region. We will not support the severii
of those ties. It does not serve our in-
terests to walk away from South Afric
any more than it does to play down tin
seriousness of domestic and regional
problems it faces.
The Reagan Administration
recognizes that the future of southern
Africa has not yet been written. It
would be an act of political irresponsib
ty and moral cowardice to conduct
ourselves as though it had been. We
need policies that sustain those who
would resist the siren call of violence
and the blandishments of Moscow and
its clients. The United States enjoys
fruitful ties with most of the African
states in this region— Zaire, Zimbabwe
Zambia, Botswana, Malawi, Lesotho,
Swaziland, and Tanzania. We seek to
strengthen and expand these relation-
ships through diplomatic efforts on thi
interrelated conflicts in Namibia and
Angola, through strong programs of
foreign assistance, and by fostering ej
panded trade and investment.
The United States also seeks to
build a more constructive relationship
with South Africa, one based on share
interests, persuasion, and improved cc
munication. There is much ferment in
26
Department of State Bulle
Africa
th Africa today centered on the
stion of how all South Africans can
•e fully share and participate in the
nomy and political process. We
)gnize that a measure of change is
iady underway in South Africa. At
h a time, when many South Africans
ill races, in and out of government,
seeking to move away from apart-
1, it is our task to be supportive of
process so that proponents of
>rm and nonviolent change can gain
hold the initiative.
Namibia and Angola. Let me now
Itch out for you briefly what we are
mg to achieve in Namibia and
;ola. Much has been said and written
;his subject over the past 6 months
ime of it has even been accurate. We
eve that our straightforward and
istic approach is increasingly
erstood at home and abroad.
On Namibia, I would emphasize that
Administration did not inherit a
lk slate. We inherited a longstanding
highly contentious issue over which
itern-led diplomatic efforts had
:hed an apparent impasse. We im-
liately recognized that the Namibia
otiations formed a central part of
developing relationship with black
ica and South Africa, as well as an
ortant item on the allied agenda.
nibia, we concluded, was an issue
;— unless resolved— could bedevil
;e relationships and offer splendid
ortunities to our adversaries.
All parties shared our view that
th Africa held the key to a settle-
it and agreed further that the new
erican Administration was uniquely
tioned to explore with the South
icans conditions under which they
ild be prepared to turn that key. We
)gnized that U.N. Security Council
olution 435 represented a significant
omatic achievement, having been
eed to in principle by all parties. The
e was to identify the obstacles to its
lal implementation and develop a
ms to address those obstacles. In ex-
iive consultations with all parties on
;e continents, Secretary Haig, Depu-
iecretary Clark, and I have explored
issue. We believe that progress has
n achieved, and we are now working
ely with our European and Canadian
is in the contact group to shape con-
e proposals to put before the parties
outhern Africa.
A Namibia settlement is, we believe,
desirable and obtainable at an early
date. To succeed, it must be interna-
tionally acceptable— under U.N. auspices
and in accordance with Resolution 435,
which must form the basis of a settle-
ment. That framework, in our view, can
and should be supplemented by addi-
tional measures aimed at reassuring all
Namibian parties of fair treatment and
at answering certain basic constitutional
questions prior to elections that will lead
to independence. A Namibia settlement,
to be successful, must offer a genuine
and equitable resolution of the conflict
and lead the way toward an in-
dependence that strengthens, not under-
mines, the security of southern Africa.
Our diplomacy recognizes openly the
intimate relationship between the con-
flicts in Namibia and Angola. We have
repeatedly made clear our position that
progress toward a Namibia settlement
could set the stage for withdrawal of
Cuban forces from Angola. There is lit-
tle debate about the logic of this proposi-
tion, which the Angolan Government
itself accepts in part. But we do not
share the view that there is anything
automatic or predictable about that rela-
tionship, as some would argue. The
assumption that Cubans will depart— or
that UNITA will evaporate like the
morning dew— as South Africa
withdraws from Namibia is pro-
blematical. What if the civil strife in
Angola continues after Namibia's in-
dependence? We also wonder how a
young government in the fragile new
state of Namibia can be expected to sur-
vive and prosper with a seemingly
endless civil war on its northern border,
with substantial Soviet-Cuban presence
nearby and with the consequent pros-
pect of new sequence of intervention in-
volving perhaps both South Africa and
Communist forces.
Clearly, the relationship between
Namibia and Angola cuts both ways.
One of our first priorities has been to in-
ject some greater logic and candor into
this discussion and to stimulate creative
thinking about how progress on each
front might contribute to progress on
the other. I would like to emphasize that
we are not laying down preconditions to
any party. But there is a factual rela-
tionship on the ground that cannot be
denied. We believe that movement on
Namibia can reinforce movement toward
Cuban withdrawal and vice versa.
Furthermore, we are convinced that
a satisfactory outcome can only be based
on parallel movement in both arenas. In
our dialogue with the front-line states,
including the MPLA government in
Angola, we have repeatedly underscored
our sincere commitment to a process
with benefits for all— one that need
threaten no one. Thus, as we make clear
our view that UNITA represents a
significant and legitimate factor in
Angolan politics, we have also main-
tained our mutually fruitful commercial
ties with Luanda as a symbol of the
future relationship that could one day be
possible.
In conclusion, I believe the objec-
tives and strategy defined here repre-
sent an approach responsive to regional
realities and consistent with U.S. na-
tional security and foreign policy in-
terests. The time has come for us as a
nation to erase any shadow of doubt
about the importance of Africa to U.S.
interests and to demonstrate by our ac-
tions that we can conduct a serious and
sustained diplomacy in Africa. ■
ober 1981
27
Africa
Libyan Interference in Chad
by Chester A. Crocker
Statement before the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee on July 8. 1981.
Mr. Crocker is Assistant Secretary for
African Affairs. 1
I am grateful for the opportunity to ap-
pear before this committee to discuss a
matter of serious concern to us: the
growing intervention of Libya in Africa
and elsewhere.
Under Col. [Muammer] Qadhafi,
Libya has adopted a diplomacy of
subversion in Africa and in the Arab
world. It is a diplomacy of un-
precedented obstruction to our own in-
terests and objectives. Qadhafi has tried
in every way he could think of to ob-
struct our efforts to achieve peace in the
Middle East. He has sponsored subver-
sion from Africa to the Philippines. He
has actively supported international ter-
rorism, using assassinations abroad as
an instrument of his policy.
From the outset of this Administra-
tion, both President Reagan and
Secretary Haig have expressed clearly
our serious opposition to a wide range of
Libyan misconduct, including support
for international terrorism and in-
terference in the internal affairs of other
countries.
Qadhafi's Expansionist Goals
Africa has increasingly become victim of
Qadhafi's diplomacy of subversion. His
goals seem to be farreaching, possibly to
bring about the creation of an Arab-
Islamic bloc including Muslims of Africa
and the Middle East. Qadhafi sees
himself as the spokesman of this group.
He has no respect for existing, interna-
tionally recognized boundaries; in fact,
his vision of a pan-Islamic entity is ex-
pressly intended to eliminate these
boundaries. His first targets in the crea-
tion of such an entity may well be the
nations of the Sahel— Chad, Niger, Mali,
Mauritania, Senegal— and parts of
Algeria. Thus Libya's announcement last
December of a merger with Chad was
not mere hyperbole; it was a real ex-
pression of Qadhafi's expansionist goals
to absorb his Arab and Muslim
neighbors in a Libyan-dominated state.
In order to achieve his aims on the
African Continent, Qadhafi has used a
variety of methods.
• He has drawn people from
neighboring states — often under false
pretexts — into Libyan military con-
tingents.
• He has funded African political
parties.
• He has given financial assistance
to African opposition newspapers.
• He has provided budgetary sup-
port to certain African Governments.
• He has used Libyan diplomatic
and commercial airlines facilities to sup-
port clandestine operations.
• He has intervened with military
force in the internal affairs of African
nations.
• He has been charged by several
African nations with the impressment of
their nationals for military training.
Let me give some examples of
Qadhafi's diplomacy of subversion in
Africa. Presidents [Seyni] Kountche of
Niger, [Moussa] Traore of Mali, and
[Jaafar] Nimeiri of Sudan have charged
the Libyans with attempts to overthrow
their governments. The Governments of
Senegal and The Gambia have charged
the Libyans with imprisoning their na-
tionals and putting them into military
training against their wills.
Qadhafi has long been involved in
the civil strife of Uganda, using Libyan
troops in support of Idi Amin. The
civilian, democratically elected govern-
ment of Ghana charged Libya with inter-
nal subversion when it expelled Libyan
diplomats. And we are now noticing an
increased Libyan presence and financial
investment in the Indian Ocean nations.
Libya's military intervention in Chad is
perhaps the most dramatic of Qadhafi's
recent actions.
Sub-Saharan African nations have
not been the only victims of Libyan in-
terventionism. Last year, apparently at
Qadhafi's direction, a number of armed
guerrillas sought to take over the cen-
tral Tunisian town of Gafsa. This
outrageous inervention in Tunisian af-
fairs, apparently with the expectation
that the Tunisians would rise in support
of the infiltrators against their own
government, has profoundly troubled the
government of a country with which we
have long enjoyed a very close and
special relationship. Tunisia was thus r
quired to prepare itself militarily for a
possible repetition of this type of inci-
dent. Tunisia hopes to be able to do thi
without subtracting from the resources
that it has devoted to its successful
economic development program. For
this reason the Administration has
sought a greatly increased FMS [foreig
military sales] program for Tunisia.
Qadhafi has also meddled in the Mi
die East. He has long supported Pales-
tinian terrorist organizations' attacks o
Israel and elsewhere. Most recently, in
what can only be seen as an effort to ii
terfere with a reasonable solution to th
most recent tragedy in Lebanon, Libya
has introduced sophisticated weapons
and trained personnel into Lebanon du
ing the highly volatile period of the las'
few weeks. Whereas other Arab states
have counseled together and with us tc
seek a peaceful solution, Libyan efforts
seem clearly designed to create the op-
posite outcome in Lebanon.
Libya has been supporting the
POLISARIO [Popular Liberation From
for Rio de Oro and Saguia] guerrillas ii
the Western Sahara. These efforts hav
been of special concern to the Govern-
ment of Morocco. In preparation for th
OAU [Organization of African Unity]
summit in Nairobi last week, however,
the Libyans seemed willing to abandon
their public support for the POLISARI
for tactical reasons. In fact, during the
summit meeting the Libyan represent-
atives said nothing in support of the
POLISARIO and offered no interven-
tions in favor of the admission of the
SDAR [Saharawi Democratic Arab
Republic]. The OAU summit concluded
with a resolution calling for the im-
plementation of a cease-fire and referei
dum in the Western Sahara. We have
seen this as a very positive outcome of
the OAU summit and praised King
Hassan for his initiative in leading
toward this outcome. We will be watch
ing very carefully to see if Libya will
support this resolution. King Hassan
says the referendum can be prepared
within 3 or 4 months. President Chadli
Bendjedid of Algeria has welcomed the
Moroccan initiative as a helpful step. A
the candidate to be the next President
the OAU, we hope Libya will give full
support to the resolution and to the
peaceful process that it will initiate. W<
will be watching, along with all of Afru
and much of Europe, to see if Libya
28
Department of State Bulleti
Africa
s up to its obligation to the OAU to
port the settlement of the Western
lara problem. The obvious first
ponsible step would be for Libya to
e the POLISARIO to accept the
se-fire.
Perhaps the most bizarre and per-
ous Libyan policy under Qadhafi has
n the claim to a right to murder
yan dissidents on foreign soil any-
2re, a claim repeated by Qadhafi
in this spring and one which seems
iave led to the assassination of
yan nationals in several countries.
Before turning to the Libyan role in
id, let me point out one pertinent
ect of Libya's policies. I am referring
;he acquisition of highly sophisticated
ipons systems far in excess of Libya's
itimate defense requirements. In
'8, Libya's imports of arms totaled
9 billion, second only to Iran.
In the period 1974-78, Libya im-
ted $5 billion worth of arms, of
:ch $3.4 billion originated in the
net Union. Libya and the Soviet
ion share many common goals in
•ica in what might be called a "mar-
%e of convenience." Libya pays for
iet arms with hard currency. These
le arms give Libya the ability to pro-
. its power throughout the continent,
der Qadhafi, the instruments of
ence have become central to Libya's
cies.
ad
i Libyan intervention in Chad has
n the most disturbing manifestation
iate of Qadhafi's intentions in Africa,
■yan interest in its southern neighbor
iased on ancient religious and tribal
; which have given rise to longstand-
, if disputed, territorial claims.
Under Qadhafi, Libya began its ter-
>rial occupation of Chad by laying
|m to the Aouzou Strip, the northern-
st part of Chad which is reputed to
rich in minerals. In 1973 Libyan
ops entered the region, and by 1975
poli officially declared its annexation
Libya.
Libya entered Chad in force in Oc-
•er 1980 at the request of the nominal
id of the Chadian Government,
akouni Oueddei. By late 1980 there
re 7,000 Libyan troops in Chad and,
date, there has been no significant
taction in the Libyan presence. At one
nt Qadhafi announced the merger of
ad with Libya, which outraged most
"ican opinion. Despite his later asser-
tion that he is ready to leave Chad any
time upon the request of the Chadian
Government, he has also publicly stated
that he will not be forced out of Chad.
African Reaction to Invasion
Initial African reaction to the Libyan in-
vasion of Chad and the merger an-
nouncement was very negative, produc-
ing considerable OAU efforts to secure
Libyan withdrawal. In an emergency
meeting in Lome, Togo, in January, an
OAU ad hoc committee issued a com-
munique condemning the proposed
merger and calling for the immediate
withdrawal of Libyan troops. Libya rein-
forced its forces in Chad after the Cen-
tral African Republic requested French
troops to protect its border with Chad.
In the intervening months, however,
various African attempts to negotiate a
Libyan withdrawal from Chad failed. At
last month's Nairobi summit meeting,
the OAU called for a peacekeeping
force but did not condemn Libya's troop
presence. We regret that the member
states did not issue a strong, unified
condemnation of Libyan military in-
tervention in Chad. We know that many
African countries are deeply concerned
about Libyan activities in Chad and the
dangers they pose.
Shortly after the Chadian invasion,
Qadhafi made a speech in which he said:
"We consider [Niger] second in line to
Chad," a statement which many con-
sidered to be an implied threat to Niger.
Several African states spoke up forceful-
ly at the OAU summit. Yet we must also
recognize the vulnerability of many
African states and their economic and
military weaknesses, making difficult
unified opposition to Libyan aggression
and subversion.
Nevertheless, there has been an
African reaction and a strong one in
some cases. Senegal, Equatorial Guinea,
and The Gambia broke diplomatic rela-
Internal Situation in Zimbabwe
LETTER TO THE CONGRESS,
JULY 7, 19811
In accordance with the provisions of Section
720 of the International Security and
Development Cooperation Act of 1980, I am
submitting the following report on the inter-
nal situation in Zimbabwe.
In the period that has elapsed since the
last Report to Congress on Zimbabwe, the
country has continued to gain political and
economic momentum in an atmosphere that
can be characterized as both dynamic and
stable.
The overwhelming response from
Western donor nations and international
organizations at the March Donors' Con-
ference, which resulted in $2 billion pledged
over the next three to five years, will allow
the government to move forward immediate-
ly with its economic development program
and its plans for reconstruction and land
resettlement. The success of the conference
vindicated Prime Minister Mugabe's decision
to turn to the West for economic and political
support and allows the West to play a role in
the emerging political/economic structure.
Recently there has been a significant in-
crease in the volume and stridency of public
exchanges between the governments of South
Africa and Zimbabwe. The exchanges derive
primarily from a concern of both countries
that the other is giving support to anti-
government groups. Despite this develop-
ment, there remains a strong basis for
cooperation, given the extensive interrela-
tionship between the two countries in trade
and communications.
The disarmament process in Zimbabwe is
now well on its way to being completed. Ap-
proximately 18,000 former guerrillas in seven
camps around the country have been com-
pletely disarmed. While it is likely that arms
caches and illegally armed men are still pres-
ent in the country, the disarmament that has
occurred represents one of the most signifi-
cant achievements since independence.
There has been some concern expressed
by the business community lately on the
foreign investment climate in Zimbabwe, with
particular reference to the possibility that the
government may decide to participate in the
sale of Zimbabwe's minerals through a
Minerals Marketing Board. Prime Minister
Mugabe has publicly stated that his govern-
ment's policy is to provide an acceptable and
effective marketing system for all minerals
and metals produced in Zimbabwe with a
view to increasing sales and profits. The
Prime Minister made a general reference to
the Marketing Board again in his May 1
speech but no determination has yet been
made about the functions the Board will per-
form.
Sincerely,
Ronald Reagan
'Identical letters addressed to Charles S.
Percy, chairman of the Senate Foreign Rela-
tions Committee, and Clement J. Zablocki,
chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Com-
mittee (text from Weekly Compilation of
Presidental Documents of July 13, 1981).B
tober 1981
29
ARMS CONTROL
tions with Libya in 1980. Mauritania,
Mali, Nigeria, Ghana, and Niger ob-
jected strenuously to the transformation
of Libyan embassies into People's
Bureaus last year and reacted by expel-
ling the Libyan diplomats from their
countries. Kenya and Upper Volta re-
fused to allow the establishment of Peo-
ple's Bureaus. Sudan has long con-
sidered Libya responsible for a series of
unsuccessful coup attempts, most
recently in 1977, and has been extremely
concerned about the presence of Libyan
troops in Chad. On June 25, 1981, accus-
ing the Libyans of involvement in an ex-
plosion at the embassy of Chad in Khar-
toum, Sudan expelled all Libyan
diplomats.
U.S. Policy
The U.S. Government believes that a
continued Libyan military presence in
Chad, rather than bringing peace to that
war-ravaged country, insures the con-
tinuation of the civil war and proves a
threat to neighboring states. Libya
should follow through immediately on its
announced intention and expeditiously
withdraw its troops from Chad.
We have stated that the Libyan
military presence in Chad is an African
problem requiring an African solution.
More generally, it is up to African states
in the first instance to stand firm
against further Libyan efforts at subver-
sion. Similarly, the governments of
Africa, not our own, have the task of
making people aware of the dangers in-
herent in Libyan blandishments, covert
activities, and financial promises.
At the same time, however, we
recognize that African nations need
assistance against Qadhafi's diplomacy
of subversion and support for interna-
tional terrorism. Qadhafi's general pat-
tern of unacceptable conduct worldwide
convinced this Administration that the
United States could no longer carry on
"business as usual" with Qadhafi's Libya
and led to the closing of their People's
Bureau in Washington in May of this
year. We want to help African nations
threatened by Qadhafi's diplomacy. In
our FY 1982 budget, this Administration
added substantial funds for military
assistance to Tunisia and Sudan, two
countries directly threatened by Libya.
We are seeking ways to help, with both
economic and military support, others
similarly threatened.
Policy Problems of Arms Control
'The complete transcript of the hearings
will be published by the committee and will
be available from the Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of-
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■
by Eugene V. Rostow
Statement before the Senate Armed
Services Committee on July 24, 1981.
Mr. Rostow is Director of the Arms Con-
trol and Disarmanent Agency (ACDA).1
I am honored to appear before this com-
mittee in the first of what I hope will be
a long series of meetings and consulta-
tions on many aspects of the respon-
sibilities we share. I look forward to our
collaboration.
At this point, I shall try not simply
to repeat the ideas of the three recent
expositions of Administration policy in
the field of arms control — President
Reagan's statement of July 16 on non-
proliferation policy; Secretary of State
Haig's speech of July 14, 1981, at the
Foreign Policy Association in New York;
and the opening statement I presented
on June 22 at my confirmation hearings
before the Foreign Relations Committee.
Instead, I shall open our conversation by
commenting on some of the main policy
problems of arms control as I am begin-
ning to see them from my desk.
Arms Control— An Integral Part
of Foreign and Defense Policy
Let me start with the principle on which
all three of the statements to which I
have referred are based — that arms con-
trol agreements are an integral and
potentially a useful part of our foreign
and defense policy but not a substitute
for it and by no means "the political
centerpiece or the crucial barometer" of
Soviet-American relations, in Secretary
Haig's phrase. No proposition about
arms control is more nearly self-evident.
But I have been startled during my
first few weeks on the job to discover
how many people do not believe it. Both
at home and abroad, a substantial
number of people are convinced that
there is magic in arms control
agreements and, indeed, even in the
process of negotiating with the Soviets
about nuclear arms and that if we sign
an agreement with the Soviet Union
about strategic nuclear arms— any
agreements— the risk of war, and
especially the risk of nuclear war, will
diminish. I cannot tell you how often I
hear variations of this theme: "But if we
insist on verification," people say, "or on
reductions in the size of nuclear arsenals
or the disclosure of data by the Soviet
Union or whatever, the Soviets will say
'no,' " as if that were a conclusive objec
tion to the suggestion I had put for-
ward. The implicit premise of these
remarks, of course, is that it is better t
have even a bad agreement than no
agreement at all and that we must, in
the end, agree to whatever terms the
Soviet Union lays down in order to hav
the security blanket of an arms control
agreement.
It is difficult to understand how su<
views could have survived our recent e:
perience with arms control. Manifestly,
arms control agreements cannot and dc
not guarantee the peace. The Versailles
treaty and the naval arms limitation
. . . arms control agreements
cannot and do not guarantee the
peace.
agreements of the 1920s and 1930s did
not prevent the Second World War. No
did the SALT I agreements, or the proi
ess of negotiating SALT II keep the
Soviet Union from radically enlarging il
sphere of influence through the
systematic use of war as an instrument
of national policy.
The pace of Soviet expansion has
been accelerating for the last decade;
the state system itself is now crumbling
before our eyes under the impact of tha
pressure. With Soviet campaigns of ex-
pansion activity under way in Asia, the
Middle East, Africa, and the Caribbean;
with Europe, Japan, China, and the
United States itself under threat, we
have reluctantly become conscious of th
strategic goals and the aggressive
nature of Soviet foreign policy and the
menacing weight of the military buildup
on which it rests. We have become con-
scious as well of the fact that we are
close to a turning point — that unless we
and our allies act decisively now to
restore the stability of the state system,
and back our policy with clearly ade-
quate deterrent force, our capacity to
protect our vital national interests in
peace will become problematical.
President Reagan has said that "the
first and foremost" objective of our
30
Department of State Bulletir
Arms Control
sign and defense policy is "the
iblishment of lasting world peace." I
Dhasize the word "establishment." It
ully justified by the transformation of
balance of power and of the political
lation which has taken place since
0 or so.
President Reagan's thesis that the
iblishment of peace is our most vital
ional interest is not a simple idea; it
ins far more than the fact that at
given moment the guns may be
nt. For the United States to be truly
>eace as a free nation within a
erally peaceful society of nations re-
"es us to face problems of world
.lie order we have long preferred to
e for granted or to ignore. Peace is
a political condition which just hap-
s; it is not even the natural state of
■rnational society. On the contrary,
ce is a system, based on accepted
;s and the essential cooperation of
great powers in enforcing those
!S generally and fairly. It must be
ieved by the sustained effort of
ernments. Peace will be restored on-
? we and our allies actively encourage
mrture it, and enforce it by devising
carrying out policies of global and
ional stability and persuading the na-
s that in the nuclear world there can
10 real alternative to the principle of
,ual restraint in international affairs.
To pursue such policies effectively,
must create the "objective
ditions" for peace— the articulation
lear goals for our foreign and
ense policies and the organization of
>ng regional coalitions to see that
ie goals are fulfilled. To that end, the
ninistration has revitalized the policy
ontainment which has been the
irtisan cornerstone of U.S. foreign
defense policy since 1947. The Presi-
t and the Congress together are
ring vigorously to rebuild our
.tary forces, to strengthen our
inces, and to forge new relationships
h other nations which share our con-
n about the threat to world public
er posed by the Soviet Union and its
Elites, proxies, and proteges. Our
3S are taking important steps to
lance their contribution to our pro-
,.m of collective diplomacy and securi-
As this committee knows very well,
lomacy without force behind it is im-
ent. With the world in disarray,
ice can be achieved only be deterring
stopping aggression, not by wishing it
ay.
Our problem is to define the role of
arms control in the quest for peace. As
Secretary Haig said on July 14:
"... the search for sound arms con-
trol agreements should be an essential
element of our program for achieving
and maintaining peace." That sentence,
along with the arms control principles
the Secretary spelled out in his Foreign
Policy Association speech, provides a
clear compass for our policy in
negotiating arms control agreements
and a standard for judging arms control
agreements when they are reached.
Negotiations must never be allowed
to decouple us from our allies or to in-
terfere with the process of restoring the
military balance. The instructions to our
negotiators will make it clear that agree-
ment, however desirable, should rest on
the bedrock of what is necessary to
carry out the national strategic policy
objectives. It has sometimes seemed that
we have put the cart before the horse by
allowing arms control considerations to
influence our policy with regard to
weapons procurement and even
strategy. This is a risk we must guard
against at all costs, particularly as the
pressures of Soviet arms control prop-
aganda mount. Sound strategic planning
must not be sacrificed on the altar of
SALT or START [strategic arms reduc-
tion talks].
Policy Differences on the
Nuclear Weapon
At the threshold, we face the dilemma
which has haunted arms control negotia-
tions from the beginning— the United
States and the Soviet Union have dif-
ferent policies with regard to the
in the negotiations now before us about
long range theater nuclear weapons and
strategic nuclear weapons.
U.S. doctrine is that the goals of our
nuclear forces are deterrence and stabili-
ty. Our nuclear arsenal exists to make
certain that neither the Soviet Union
nor any other country could use or bran-
dish nuclear weapons in world politics
for aggressive purposes. Our purpose is
to maintain a credible second-strike
capability so that the United States, its
allies, and its vital interests are pro-
tected at all times against nuclear attack
or the threat of nuclear attack. With an
assured second-strike capability, we
should be able to use military force in
defense of our interests if it should
become necessary to do so, not only in
Europe but in many other strategically
critical parts of the world as well. In my
view — and here I speak for President
Reagan — this is and must remain the
minimal goal of our nuclear arsenal and
our minimal goal in arms control
negotiations.
The Soviet Union has not yet
adopted this position. On the contrary,
the mission of its nuclear forces is in-
timidation and coercion — and, if
necessary, victory in nuclear war. The
Soviet Union has been building one
nuclear weapon system after another in
an obvious effort not only to equal but
to surpass the United States and thus to
paralyze the U.S. nuclear arsenal.
Achieving such a position, they believe
and say, would permit them to expand
their domain almost at will, using covert
methods of subversion or conventional
forces under the protective cover of
what they consider to be superiority in
nuclear arms.
Negotiations must never be allowed to decouple us from our allies or to
interfere with the process of restoring the militarg balance.
nuclear weapon and different objectives
in negotiations about possible
agreements to limit the mad spiral of
nuclear arms accumulation. The two na-
tions have similiar interests in opposing
nuclear weapons proliferation, and the
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968
was not exceptionally difficult to
negotiate. This has not been the case
with the SALT agreements, as we all
know. Unless the Soviet Union comes to
accept a different philosophy about the
objectives of its foreign policy and the
role of the nuclear weapon in world
politics, we can anticipate a stormy time
During the SALT period, the Soviet
Union made great progress toward this
end. I need not recite the litany of new
weapons deployed by the Soviets in the
last 10 years. In general terms, the most
threatening features of this buildup have
been the massive increase in hard-
target-kill-capable intercontinental
ballistic missile (ICBM) reentry-vehicles;
the growth in the destructive potential
of Soviet strategic forces as a whole; the
deployment of mobile, highly-accurate,
and MIRVed [multiple independently-
targetable reentry vehicle] long-range
tnhor 1QR1
31
Arms Control
theater nuclear forces; and the con-
tinued development of their already ex-
tensive strategic air defenses.
The United States failed to respond
adequately to the Soviet build-up, partly
because we placed excessive faith in
arms control as a solution for our
strategic problems. As a result, two legs
of our strategic triad are now
threatened — the survivability of Ameri-
can ICBMs to a Soviet first-strike is in
question and bomber penetration of the
Soviet Union will be assured only by a
vigorous U.S. modernization effort. In
addition, large-scale Soviet SS-20
deployments threaten Europe and the
Far East and, if unanswered, would in-
crease the hazards to NATO of
resistance to Soviet aggression. The
Soviets now lead the United States in
important measures of strategic
strength — leads which translate into
coercive power through perceptions of
U.S. weakness.
The Soviet strategic buildup is aimed
not at strategic stability but at strategic
instability. Soviet strategic programs are
designed to threaten the survivability of
our strategic forces. This emphasis in
Soviet military doctrine and action is in
itself a repudiation of the doctrine of
mutual assured destruction, which many
Americans thought both sides had
adopted in 1972. The Soviet lead in
heavy and accurate ICBMs, capable of
destroying a large part of our nuclear
ICBM force in a first strike, undermines
the basis for reciprocal restraint in a
crisis. Such a situation is a recipe for
nuclear blackmail. It is no accident that
one now hears discussion of such distur-
bing options as launch-on-warning of
missile attack.
What are the broader effects of this
buildup and of the delayed U.S. response
to it? I believe the Soviet strategic
buildup operates on three levels.
First, on a day-to-day basis, the
Soviet drumbeat acts on the collective
psyche of the United States and its
friends and allies. There is great fear
abroad, not only of nuclear war but of
American inadequacies and, ultimately,
of abandonment by the United States.
That fear cannot be diminished if the
Soviets run while we continue to walk.
Second, the Soviets may feel em-
boldened to undertake conventional ag-
gression, like their invasion of
Afghanistan, secure in the belief that
their strategic forces can checkmate
ours. Certainly Soviet behavior in recent
years suggests that their pursuit of
strategic instability has had its predict-
able consequences — unprecedented risk-
taking and aggression in conventional
and covert conflict. Given the global
nature of our foreign policy interests,
and local Soviet conventional superiority
in certain areas, strategic instability is a
very dangerous condition. It matters lit-
tle, after all, if the Soviets turn out to
be wrong about the American response
to nuclear blackmail; a devastating con-
flict could result just the same.
Third, the Soviets have had little in-
centive to negotiate serious arms reduc-
tions. They view the SALT process as
having been enormously successful — at
least in the short-term.
Posture Toward Negotiations
The situation as I have described it has
not developed suddenly but has grown
day by day throughout the SALT period.
Neither the SALT II Treaty nor
Congress together are making the deci
sions to restore our deterrent capabilit
both nuclear and conventional. These
decisions are indispensable in themselv
from the point of view of security.
Moreover, fair and balanced arms con-
trol agreements would be inconceivablf
without them.
I might add a word here on the
much-mooted subject of "linkage." Pres
dent Reagan has not laid down par-
ticular criteria of Soviet behavior as a
precondition for negotiations. He has i:
structed us to approach arms control o
ly as a vital problem in foreign policy
and national security, through which %
and the Soviet Union might jointly
stabilize our relations and contribute t<
the restoration of world public order. I
his Foreign Policy Association speech,
Secretary Haig pointed out that certaii
forms of Soviet behavior directly affec
the possiblity for success in arms con-
trol. For example, in 1968, when I last
. . . the linkage we seek between Soviet behavior and arms control
should not be merely a transitory or isolated Soviet action . . . but ft
restoration of world order sustained by deterrence.
cosmetic amendments to it would have
changed the situation. Somewhere along
the way we lost our bearings and forgot
what we wanted from arms control. Not
only did we accept greater threats to
our forces, but we agreed to ceilings and
definitions that would permit the Soviets
far greater capabilities against us than
now exist. We settled for superficial
limitations while the threat grew by
leaps and bounds.
In this situation, what is our posture
toward arms control negotiations? Ob-
viously, the profound changes in the
strategic environment since 1972 require
the United States to review the arms
control policies which have failed and to
devise new ones better adapted to the
world as it is. That process of review is
now going on throughout the executive
branch, under forced draft. Some of the
issues are complex. We are working on
new measures of destructive power to
replace deployed launchers as the count-
ing unit of the new agreements, trying
to solve the riddle of verification, and
tackling a number of other fundamental
problems. A review of this character
takes time. I can assure you that I am
doing everything I can to speed it along.
At the same time, the President and
was in the government, the Soviet
Union invaded Czechoslovakia, and
President Johnson cancelled a trip to
Moscow to discuss strategic arms limit
tion, among other things. Under the ci
cumstances, it would have been un-
thinkable for the President to go. As
Secretary Haig remarked, this kind of
linkage is a fact of life. That problem
aside, the linkage we seek between
Soviet behavior and arms control shoul
not be merely a transitory or isolated
Soviet action — the sight of a dove on t
troubled waters or the visits of Russia]
ballet companies to American cities — h
the restoration of world order sustaine
by deterrence. The process of seeking
arms control agreements could and
should play a positive part in that effoi
No arms control agreement can coi
tribute to the goal of a peaceful world
unless we have confidence that the
Soviet Union is abiding by its terms. M
must insure that arms control limita-
tions are verifiable. The problem of
verification is fundamental to mean-
ingful progress on arms control.
Reciprocal restraints can only be in-
duced if each party has confidence that
the other is, indeed, reciprocating. But
the scale and complexity of the Soviet
nuclear arsenal and the changing
32
Department of State Bulleti
Arms Control
nology of nuclear weapons are
ling us to the limits of national
nical means of verification. The
et leadership must understand that
r secrecy about weapons production
deployment is counterproductive,
cat and mouse game must end. The
iet Union is now our equal— at
t— in military strength. If they can-
be more forthcoming given the pres-
"correlation of forces," it is difficult
nagine what level of military
priority would be required to induce
e cooperation. We are considering
possibility of early discussions with
Soviets on general principles of
ivior in arms control verification and
pliance matters. These would not be
atiations but talks looking to
;ements further down the line,
laps as part of the START
eements. And we have undertaken a
lamental review of the technical
jets of verification, monitoring, and
pliance in relation to existing and
;pective arms control agreements.
At this stage, I can offer two prin-
ss which will guide our thinking on
fi cation.
First, we shall not confine ourselves
egotiating only about aspects of the
ilem which can be detected by na-
al technical means. We shall begin
levising substantive limitations that
strategically significant and then
jtruct the set of measures necessary
lsure verifiability. These may well in-
e procedures of cooperation between
United States and the Soviet Union,
I as detailed data exchanges and pro-
>ns to enhance our confidence in
i obtained by national technical
.ns.
Second, we shall seek verification
/isions which not only insure that ac-
threats to our security resulting
n possible violations can be detected
timely manner but also limit the
lihood of ambiguous situations
eloping. Ambiguity can never be
linated entirely. But we shall do our
t to keep it to a minimum. Am-
ious provisions result in compliance
stions and compliance questions,
n if ultimately resolved, strain the at-
iphere for arms control negotiations.
Given the importance of verification
the viability of arms control across
board, Soviet willingness to consider
perative measures to improve the
! Lf lability of specific limitations may
II litmus test of their commitment to
ious limitations.
ntw 1QR1
An important element of our review
of U.S. arms control policy will be to set
priorities among our objectives so that
specific approaches and goals for the
next agreement can be devised.
We shall be analyzing several arms
control issues in the months ahead, us-
ing these principles as our guideposts.
On theater nuclear forces, the substan-
tive position we are developing is
consistent with our requirements. It is
important to move ahead quickly in
order to meet the threat of Soviet
Backfires and SS-20s.
In SALT— or should I say START—
the weapons systems necessarily covered
are more varied, the technical issues
associated with them are more complex,
and there is a close relationship between
our arms control posture and weapons
procurement decisions not yet made,
such as the MX and a new strategic
bomber. I continue to hope and expect
that our preliminary discussions with the
Soviets will culminate in negotiations by
early next spring.
But, in my view, there is little to be
gained and much to be lost by haste in
this area. We ought neither to rush to
the table nor rush to an agreement.
Once talks begin, we must be prepared
to negotiate persistently and patiently
and not raise expectations of rapid prog-
ress.
I should note other arms control
areas in which study is underway within
ACDA and the government as a whole.
• The Threshold Test Ban Treaty
and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty
have been signed— but not ratified— for
7 and 5 years, respectively. While all op-
tions are being considered, I personally
believe we should either request the ad-
vice and consent of the Senate to ratify
these agreements or return to the
negotiating table soon if some changes
are deemed necessary. I believe there is
merit in these treaties and that we
should move forward on them.
• The Antiballistic Missile Treaty
review is scheduled for 1982. We will be
taking a particularly close look at the
agreement in light of the ICBM basing
mode decision when it is reached. I
should urge caution, however, on those
who favor a precipitous withdrawal from
the agreement.
• Antisatellite arms control is also
under review. There were three rounds
of negotiations in the previous Ad-
ministration, and some progress was
made toward an agreement. We are
reviewing the net effects of an an-
tisatellite arms agreement and studying
the verification questions in this complex
and novel field.
Spread of Nuclear Weapons
The underlying basis of our nonprolifera-
tion policy cannot be different from that
in other areas of our foreign policy. Our
watchwords are, again, stability and
reciprocal restraint in the peaceful pur-
suit of world public order. The Presi-
dent's statement on nonproliferation,
issued on July 16, makes this clear.
First, as the President said, we
must attempt to address the underlying
motivations which are driving a number
of nations to consider acquiring nuclear
explosives. Regional instabilities and the
general deterioration of the international
environment have contributed
significantly to the insecurities that lead
states to flirt with the nuclear explosives
option. Unless we, our allies, and other
nations move decisively to restore world
public order, both generally and
regionally, there is little or no chance
over the long run to prevent nuclear
proliferation on a large scale. In this
context, we are examining the
possibilities of encouraging the negotia-
tion of a treaty which would make the
Middle East a nuclear weapons free
zone. It seems to have a great deal of
promise, and we are giving it a high
priority on our agenda.
Second, there must be international
norms and guidelines that can provide
reasonable assurance that countries are
not acquiring nuclear explosives and
that nuclear programs are not being
used for such purposes. While these
safeguards can never be perfect and will
always need improvement, they deter
most nations from seriously considering
the nuclear weapons option and give us
early warning of developments in the
other direction. We must move vigorous-
ly in this area. Without such a regime,
the possibility of proliferation will under-
mine U.S. efforts to restore regional or
international stability. In this regard,
the President declared support for the
NPT, the treaty of Tlatelolco, and
strengthened International Atomic
Energy Agency safeguards. In addition,
the principal nuclear-supplier nations
must further improve cooperation in
restraining commercial exports — with
33
CANADA
particular emphasis on regions of in-
stability— to insure that exports of
nuclear technologies do not contribute to
the risk of proliferation.
Third, the President declared that
reestablishing the United States as a
reliable partner for peaceful nuclear
cooperation is essential to our non-
proliferation goals. Our ability to gain
support and to exercise influence in this
critical area will diminish if we do not
remain an active and responsible sup-
plier of the nuclear programs of other
countries.
The President's statement reflects
the continuity of our policy in its em-
phasis on the importance of non-
proliferation as one of the critical
challenges facing the United States in
international affairs.
Arms Control and Propaganda
The Soviet Union continues to make
arms control an important feature of its
unremitting worldwide propaganda and
disinformation campaign against us.
Countering that campaign must be an
important aspect of ACDA's work, in
close cooperation with the International
Communication Agency and other agen-
cies of the government. You will all
recall the case of the enhanced radiation
warhead, the so-called neutron bomb, a
few years ago. The Soviet Union scored
a stunning propaganda victory in that
episode and a very damaging one. It did
not deserve its victory. The Soviet argu-
ment was ridiculous. But our response
was inadequate, and they prevailed. I
have the neutron bomb affair very much
in mind when I read Soviet propaganda
to the effect that we are unwilling to
negotiate arms control agreements and
are seeking nuclear war. We shall not be
outdone again.
To strengthen the prospects for suc-
cess in establishing peace, reaching
useful arms control agreements, and
minimizing the spread of nuclear
weapons, it is essential that the Con-
gress continue its support of the military
budget proposed by President Reagan.
The executive and legislative branches
should continue their partnership in
rebuilding America's armed forces.
Weapons systems procurement must not
be delayed for arms control negotiations
or vice versa. We cannot hope to achieve
the promise of peace without the
discipline of power and perseverance.
We shall need both. We must be strong
enough to convince the Soviet Union
that its best course is to respect the fun-
damental rules dealing with the interna-
tional use of force and to embark on a
cooperative effort at arms reductions.
The Soviet Union is now engaged in
a vicious and cynical campaign of prop-
aganda and intimidation. It is aimed at
separating the United States from its
allies and derailing Western rearmament
programs. It shall not succeed. We do
not accept the responsibility for the cur-
rent sorry state of U.S. -Soviet relation-
ships. The Soviet Union bears that
responsibility. They invaded
Afghanistan; they continue to threaten
intervention in Poland; they support ag-
gressive and unacceptable actions
through their surrogates. They have
continued to build weapons — at every
level — while we have exercised
restraint.
The Soviets must be made to see
that their future is better and more
secure under a regime of reciprocal
restraint and international order. If we
can succeed, and with your help we can,
then we shall reverse the long history of
disappointment with the results of arms
control negotiations. Our goal will be to
subordinate the international use of
force and the arms race to the rule of
law and to induce respect for the rules
of reciprocal restraint in world affairs.
The ACDA statute makes it the duty of
the agency "to provide impetus" toward
the goal of achieving a world political
system in which "the use of force has
been subordinated to the rule of law."
The pressures of nuclear reality are in-
exorably pressing the nations to realize
that the rule of law is the only possible
way they can assure their own security
and the future of mankind. As my whole
career attests, I find the mandate of the
ACDA statute altogether congenial.
'The complete transcript of the hearings
will be published by the committee and will
be available from the Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of-
fice.Washington, D.C. 20402.B
U.S.-Canada
Meeting on Hyde
Park Agreement
U.S. and Canadian officials met in
Washington on July 21, 1981, to discus
the proposed Hyde Park landfill settle-
ment agreement now pending before tl
Federal District Court in Buffalo, New
York. The meeting was hosted by the
Department of State in response to a
Canadian Government request to discu
and exchange views on the proposed st
tlement agreement.
The proposed agreement, if ap-
proved by the court, would settle the
joint Federal and State of New York
lawsuit against Hooker Chemicals and
Plastics Corp. concerning the migratioi
of chemicals from Hooker's Hyde Park
landfill site located in the town of
Niagara, New York. Hooker disposed o
approximately 80,000 tons of chemical
wastes at the site from 1953 to 1974.
U.S. officials outlined the terms of
the proposed settlement, including
remedial measures, and explained the
legal procedures and mechanisms whicl
would insure the agreement's effective
implementation. Canadian officials
presented their concern that measures
under settlement would not adequately
prevent further leakage of toxic
substances into the Niagara River. The;
reiterated their view that all reasonable
and practical means must be undertake
to prevent the release into the Great
Lakes system of any toxic materials,
consistent with commitments of the
Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement.
Canadian officials expressed satisfactioi
with the meeting and will review the in
formation presented. U.S. officials set
forth their view that the settlement
agreement will protect the public health
and the environment.
The wider problems of disposal of
toxic wastes in the Niagara region and
in the Great Lakes basin were also
discussed, and information was ex-
changed on other issues relating to
water quality in the Niagara River. A
formal arrangement was proposed for
exchange of information on a regular
basis and for consultations to review tfo
general situation in the Niagara region
and specific issues which may arise.
There was agreement that the
meeting represented a useful step in
continuing and cooperative efforts to
protect and improve the water quality o
the Niagara River.
34
Department of State Bulletin
EAST ASIA
The Canadian delegation included
resentatives of the Department of
ernal Affairs, Environment Canada,
the Province of Ontario. The U.S.
■gation included representatives of
Departments of State and Justice,
Environmental Protection Agency,
New York State Attorney General's
:e, and the New York Department of
'ironmental Conservation.
U.S. Interests in Southeast Asia
.s release 246.1
acific Salmon
sues
NT PRESS RELEASE,
G. 13, 19811
. and Canadian federal officials met
lune 19, 1981, in Washington, D.C.,
onsider recommendations made by
r special negotiators dealing with
teral Pacific salmon issues. The
;ial negotiators, Dr. Dayton L.
jrson for the United States and Dr.
nael P. Sheppard for Canada, recom-
ided in a progress report issued June
hat both countries continue efforts
each a comprehensive agreement to
/ide for cooperative management
enhancement of the Pacific salmon
iurce. At the same time they recom-
ided that both countries implement
ain interim arrangements for the re-
nder of 1981 and for 1982 to im-
/e conservation of the Pacific salmon
ks in a manner that will be of
ual benefit.
Participants at the June 19 meeting
;d that support for the recommenda-
s appears widespread in both coun-
3. In both the United States and
ada, federal and state fishery
lagement agencies have expressed
eral concurrence with the approach
immended by the special negotiators,
y have also indicated that they will
k to enact the provisions of the in-
m arrangements during 1981 and
actively work to finalize 1982
lagement regimes so that they are in
formance with the recommendations.
After reviewing the recommenda-
,s of the special negotiators and
ng the support they have received in
i countries, the Governments of the
ted States and Canada wish to reaf-
i their support for the efforts of the
by John H. Holdridge
Statement before the Subcommittee
on East Asian and Pacific Affairs of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee on
July 15, 1981. Ambassador Holdridge is
Assistant Secretary for East Asian and
Pacific Affairs. 1
Having recently returned from a long
trip with Secretary Haig to East Asia
and, just last night, from the first days
of the U.N. conference on Kampuchea in
New York, I am pleased to have this op-
portunity to discuss with you this Ad-
ministration's policy toward Southeast
Asia.
Objectives
The following objectives shape our
specific policies in that important region
of the world.
• We firmly support the progress
and stability of our friends and allies in
the Association of South East Asian Na-
tions (ASEAN) as the heart of our policy
toward the entire region.
• In cooperation with ASEAN we
seek to restrain the aggressive ambi-
tions of Vietnam.
• We seek to curb the growing
Soviet military presence and influence in
the region.
By any yardstick — population,
economic size and dynamism, social and
political values, strategic location — the
United States has great interests in the
five nations of ASEAN. The ASEAN
countries — Thailand, Malaysia,
Singapore, Indonesia, and the Philip-
pines— have a total population of over
250 million people. Their economies, all
spurred by the forces of the free
market, are among the fastest growing
in the world. Taken as a whole, ASEAN
constitutes the fifth largest trading part-
ner of the United States. All of the
ASEAN nations share a basic pro-
Western political and philosophical
orientation, though two are our allies
and three are members of the non-
aligned movement. It is these strategic,
political, and economic interests which
dictate our support for the ASEAN
countries, support which the Reagan Ad-
ministration has renewed and in-
vigorated. This positive, active support
for ASEAN is the most effective means
of curbing the ambitions of Vietnam and
the Soviet Union.
Bilateral Relations with ASEAN
Countries
American support for the progress and
prosperity of ASEAN has expression in
both our bilateral relations with each
member and in our association with the
organization. Since President Reagan
has taken office we have made a special
effort to emphasize the value we place
on strong ties with each country. Vice
President Bush has just attended the in-
auguration of President Marcos of the
Philippines. Secretary Haig decided
within a week of taking office that he
would travel to Manila to meet with his
ASEAN colleagues in June. We have
special negotiators to reach a com-
prehensive agreement. The governments
concur in the belief of the special
negotiators that a long-term agreement
for cooperative management and
enhancement of the Pacific salmon
resource is urgently required to insure
adequate conservation and optimum
utilization of the stocks and that the
fishing communities on both sides are
deeply committed to reaching an accord.
In addition the governments con-
sider that the 1981 and 1982 interim ar-
rangements recommended by the special
negotiators will build on the progress of
the negotiators and materially assist
both sides in achieving a long-term
agreement. The governments intend to
work during 1981 and 1982 to insure
that all relevant fisheries are conducted
in accordance with the recommendations
of the special negotiators. The govern-
ments are also studying the desirability
of incorporating the recommendations
into formal arrangements.
The governments acknowledge that
proposed research projects are impor-
tant to the success of long-term ar-
rangements and note that the special
negotiators have recommended that cer-
tain projects be conducted in 1982. Both
governments are at present considering
the projects recommended for next year.
1 Press release 278 of Aug. 13, 1981.1
ober 1981
35
East Asia
renewed our defense commitments to
Thailand and the Philippines and af-
firmed that we will meet our treaty
obligations in the event of aggression by
enemies of those countries. Our air and
naval facilities in the Philippines form a
vital part of our worldwide forward-
defense system. Prime Minister Lee
Kuan Yew of Singapore visited
Washington last month to meet with
President Reagan, and leaders of other
ASEAN countries, including President
Suharto of Indonesia, will come during
the next year or so. Senior officials of
the Administration are planning trips to
the ASEAN capitals in the near future,
as, I am happy to note, are many con-
gressional leaders.
The ASEAN countries will benefit
by increases in economic and military
assistance this Administration has re-
quested from the Congress. Although
economic assistance to the Philippines,
Thailand, and Indonesia is a relatively
small percentage of the total U.S. an-
nual appropriated for foreign aid, it
plays a vital role in each country's own
development program. For the first time
under this Administration, all of the
ASEAN nations receive some form of
bilateral military assistance. We plan
significant increases in foreign military
sales credits for Thailand, Indonesia, the
Philippines, and Malaysia in FY 1981
and beyond. There will also be a major
increase in the number of students
trained from all five countries under the
international military education and
training program (IMET). In addition,
the ASEAN nations themselves buy con-
siderably more U.S. arms and training
than we finance through aid, and we will
be responsive to requests for future pur-
chases as outlined in the new arms
transfer policy.
Our economic ties with ASEAN are
growing tighter as they keep pace with
the rapidly expanding economies of the
member countries. Total trade now ex-
ceeds $21 billion a year, with a surplus
in ASEAN's favor of over $3 billion.
ASEAN countries are a principal source
for U.S. imports of tin, rubber, timber,
sugar, palm oil, and copra; and two of
them export crude oil to the United
States. The dynamic ASEAN economies
provide an attractive and important
market for U.S. industrial and agri-
cultural exports. U.S. investment in the
five ASEAN states now totals over $4.5
billion; these countries all recognize the
access to capital and technology which
foreign investment brings and they ac-
tively promote American investment.
I would like to touch on one final
element in our bilateral relations, often
overlooked but becoming more impor-
tant and with great potential for our
future ties. That is the social and
cultural nexus formed by the tens of
thousands of citizens of the ASEAN
countries who receive their education in
the United States every year. These
educational ties profoundly influence for
the better the way the ASEAN leaders
and people perceive this country, and we
encourage them.
Relations with ASEAN as an
Organization
ASEAN was founded in 1967 on the
basis of common interests. The aggres-
sive behavior of Vietnam since 1975 has
given great impetus to its solidarity, and
the organization has become a signifi-
cant force in world politics. U.S. policy
has been and will continue to be to en-
courage this trend.
ASEAN's unity of purpose lies
behind its effectiveness as a political
organization. The member countries ap-
proach international issues with dif-
ferent philosophical perspectives borne
of their diverse history. Each has its
own view of the ideal way to achieve a
solution in Kampuchea, put a stop to the
refugee flow, or deal with China. Yet
time and again, after the issues have
been aired and the options pondered,
ASEAN has managed to come up with a
common approach to the problems it
confronts. Unity has become an im-
perative for the ASEAN countries, and
the effectiveness of their organization is
best seen in the search for a solution to
the Vietnamese occupation of Kam-
puchea. A unified stance on Kampuchea
at the United Nations and elsewhere ha
greatly strengthened ASEAN's hand
against Vietnam and has preserved for
it the diplomatic initiative.
Because ASEAN is a cohesive, effe(
tive organization, it is our policy to con-
sult with it formally on all major issues
in Southeast Asia and on some outside
the region. I or other Administration of
ficials meet regularly with the am-
bassadors of the ASEAN countries, the
ASEAN Washington committee, either
at our initiative or theirs. We increas-
ingly deal with ASEAN as a group at
the United Nations and other interna-
tional fora. The Secretary of State now
meets regularly with the ASEAN
foreign ministers following their annual
meeting, as Secretary Haig did in
Manila last month. We also have a for-
mal annual dialogue session on economi
issues at the subcabinet level where we
have developed a program of multi-
lateral aid, narcotics assistance, and
cultural exchange.
The past 2 years have seen the crea
tion of a most significant instrument foi
the ASEAN-U.S. relationship, the
ASEAN-U.S. Business Council. The
free-market economies of the ASEAN
countries and the United States mean
that the private sector plays a major
role in bilateral economic relations be-
tween the member countries and the
United States. For the same reason, as
ASEAN develops over the years into a
vehicle for economic integration of the
John H. Holdridge
was born in New York
City on August 21,
1924. He received his
B.A. degree from the
U.S. Military Academy
(1945) and then served
overseas with the U.S.
Army (1945-47).
Ambassador
Holdridge joined the
Foreign Service in 1948. Following Chinese
language training at the Foreign Service In-
stitute, he went on to Chinese language-area
studies at Cornell University; he had addi-
tional China studies at Harvard beginning in
September 1949.
He went to Bangkok (1950) as an infor-
mation officer, followed by assignments to
Hong Kong (1953) as political officer, and
Singapore (1956) as chief of the political sec-
tion. He returned to the Department of State
in 1958 as an international relations officer
and in 1960 was made officer-in-charge of
political affairs in the office of Chinese rela-
tions. Ambassador Holdridge returned to
Hong Kong (1962) as chief of the political
section. In 1966 he was Deputy Director of
Research and Analysis for East Asia-Pacific
in the Department of State; in 1968 he
became director of that office.
Ambassador Holdridge was assigned to
the National Security Council in April 1968.
In April 1973, he went to Beijing as Deputy
Chief of the U.S. Liaison Office. He was U.S
Ambassador to Singapore from July 1975 un
til 1978 when he served as national in-
telligence officer for East Asia in the Na-
tional Intelligence Council. He was sworn in
as Assistant Secretary for East Asian and
Pacific Affairs on May 28, 1981.
Ambassador Holdridge is a recipient of
the Department of State Superior Honor
Award (1967) and the Christian Herter
Award (1975). In 1979 he was awarded an
honorary degree (LL.D.) by Elmira College.
36
Deoartment of State Bulletin
East Asia
nber states, cooperation and coor-
ition among businessmen from
lin and outside the member countries
;t grow. The ASEAN-U.S. Business
ncil, formed by the ASEAN
mbers of Commerce and Industry
the Chamber of Commerce of the
ted States, provides a forum for such
Deration. ASEAN-U.S. Business
ncil activity also contributes to in-
ising public consciousness of ASEAN
his country. Recent council- supported
ferences have carried the ASEAN
le to Kansas City, San Francisco,
Detroit.
ochina
)uld like now to turn to Vietnam and
npuchea because it is the topic of
•t intense discussion between the
ted States and ASEAN at the mo-
it. It was the main theme of the re-
; ASEAN foreign ministers con-
nce in Manila, and, of course, of the
. conference in New York this week,
key issue which guides the attitudes
ard Vietnam of the ASEAN coun-
5 and the United States is Hanoi's
ipation of Kampuchea. It is in-
rable to acquiesce in a situation
.ted by an invading army and
jetuated by a massive occupation by
ign troops. We hold no brief for the
Pot regime thrown out of Phnom
'h by the invading Vietnamese. It
abominable in its treatment of the
ner people, and we can under no cir-
stances favor its return to power.
> does not mean, however, that
er we or the ASEANs can accept
status quo created by Hanoi in Kam-
lea.
MIA Problem. There are, of course,
;r issues that bear on our relations
\ Vietnam, including accounting for
nany MIAs [missing-in-action] as
Bible and the continuing flow of
igees from Indochina. This Ad-
istration is committed to obtaining
fullest possible accounting for
ericans missing in action in
theast Asia. All reports suggesting
presence of American prisoners in
tnam and Laos are carefully checked.
le of these reports has yet been
stantiated, but all reports, from
igee and other sources, are given
ous, continuing, high-priority atten-
. The Vietnamese and Lao Govern-
lts continue to assert that no
ericans are held captive. However,
they have done little to substantiate that
assertion by providing information even
on the cases of persons known to have
been captured alive, whose fate has
never been disclosed. We are convinced
that these governments do have con-
siderably more information available to
them, and we will continue to press
them to provide the accounting of our
missing people which we have so long
sought.
Refugees. The outflow of refugees
from Indochina, while not as large as a
few years ago, continues. Fortunately,
because countries like Thailand,
Malaysia, and Indonesia grant first
asylum to these refugees and because
we and other countries continue to take
in substantial numbers for resettlement,
the refugee problem is manageable for
the time being. It is vital, however, that
American hospitality toward these
refugees continues. This is not only in
keeping with our humanitarian tradition,
but it contributes to the economic and
political stability of the ASEAN coun-
tries by helping them carry what would
otherwise be an intolerable burden.
Vietnamese Occupation of Kam-
puchea. But the central issue in U.S.
policy toward Vietnam is the occupation
of Kampuchea, and that is why we will
continue to keep pressure on Hanoi. In
this we and ASEAN are in full agree-
ment: The course of action most likely to
result in. the removal of Vietnamese
troops from Kampuchea is to make the
occupation as costly as possible for
Hanoi. We will continue a process of
diplomatic isolation and economic
deprivation until Hanoi is prepared to
follow the will of the world community
as expressed in two consecutive U.N.
General Assembly resolutions and agree
to troop withdrawal, free elections, and
an end to outside interference in Kam-
puchea. This policy of isolation and
pressure is, of course, supplemented by
the presence on Vietnam's northern
border of hundreds of thousands of
Chinese troops and the continuing guer-
rilla activity of several resistance groups
inside Kampuchea.
When Hanoi is prepared to with-
draw from Kampuchea and when it is no
longer a source of trouble to the entire
region, the economic and political
pressures which now weigh heavily upon
that country can be lifted. It is Vietnam
which has chosen its current isolation
and its heavy dependence on the Soviet
Union. Only Vietnam can end that isola-
tion. It is in no one's interest to have a
permanently hostile Vietnam on the
borders of ASEAN and neither ASEAN
nor the United States seeks permanent
hostility. But I want to make it clear
that the United States will not consider
normalizing relations with Vietnam until
Vietnam changes its present policies.
Conclusion
This Administration is convinced that
the overwhelming preponderance of
U.S. interests in Southeast Asia lies in
the ASEAN countries and that our ef-
forts should be toward strengthening
bilateral ties with those countries as well
as with the organization itself. Our con-
cern with Vietnam is a function of the
threat which Vietnam poses to ASEAN
through its aggression in Kampuchea
and through its relationship with the
Soviet Union. The latter has established
its military presence in Vietnam and is
clearly bent upon expanding its political
influence in Laos and Kampuchea.
ASEAN understands fully the nature of
this bargain between Vietnam and the
Soviet Union, which is costing the Rus-
sians millions of dollars per day, and the
threat it poses to the region's non-
Communist states. Our policies in the
region are supportive of ASEAN not
only because of our concern over Viet-
nam and the Soviet Union but, more
positively, because ASEAN represents
by far the best hope for continued
stability and prosperity in Southeast
Asia. We welcome ASEAN's success.
We will encourage it, and we will
strengthen it with every appropriate
means.
■The complete transcript of the hearings
will be published by the committee and will
be available from the Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of-
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■
ober 1981
37
East Asia
I.S. Relations With China
by John H. Holdridge
Statement before the House Foreign
Affairs Committee on July 16, 1981. Am-
bassador Holdridge is Assistant
Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Af-
fairs. l
I am pleased to have been invited here
today to try to answer your questions
about U.S. policy toward the People's
Republic of China and Taiwan. To begin,
let me review our strategic interests in a
sound, healthy relationship with China.
• Our security and that of Japan,
South Korea, and our ASEAN [Associa-
tion of South East Asian Nations]
friends has been demonstrably enhanced
by the growth of close U.S. -China ties.
We gain very positive benefits both in
the Asian and in the global balance of
forces.
• In the Taiwan Strait, tensions are
at an all-time low.
• China is supportive of our global
and regional efforts to strengthen our
defense posture and alliance structure
against expansionism by the Soviets and
their proxies.
• Throughout most of the Third
World we no longer compete with the
Chinese as rivals. Instead our policies
are often complementary.
• In short, the U.S. -China relation-
ship is a major component in our global
and regional security policies.
• The number of bilateral agree-
ments with China has grown rapidly in
the past 2Vz years. Trade— including the
provision of most-favored-nation
status — textile, civil aviation, and
maritime agreements have been signed.
A consular convention has been ap-
proved by the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee and submitted to the full
Senate for action. Joint economic, com-
merce, and science committees have
been formed and meet regularly to coor-
dinate cooperation in their respeotive
fields. China is eligible for Customs
Cooperation Council and Eximbank
credits as well as OPIC [Overseas
Private Investment Corporation] in-
surance in order to help support U.S.
exports to China. An active consultative
relationship has taken shape, through
which our two countries seek to discuss
and, when appropriate, coordinate our
remarkably convergent policies over
practically the entire spectrum of global
and regional issues.
Both sides have welcomed these de-
velopments and look forward to further
improvement in the relationship. They
form the healthy substance necessary
for a viable, long-term relationship.
Without going into unnecessary detail,
the results have been dramatic. In the
first quarter of this year, China became
our third leading export market in Asia,
behind Japan and the Republic of Korea.
It is now our third largest agricultural
market in the world. Our ships and
planes have begun regularly scheduled
service to the other's shores, and
tourism is expanding, as is educational
exchange and cooperation in science and
technology. All of this has been ac-
complished without detracting from our
continued nonofficial relationship with
the people of Taiwan, whom we are
treating with the dignity befitting old
friends.
Reagan Policy Review
The starting point for this Administra-
tion's policy toward China can be found
in President Reagan's statement of last
August 25, that our China relationship is
global and strategic and one that we
should develop and strengthen in the
years ahead. In this context, we under-
took an extensive policy review to assess
our China relationship on the premise
that China is not our adversary but a
friendly, developing country with which,
without being allied, we share important
strategic interests.
• We decided to liberalize further
our export controls over dual-use
technology sales to China and, perhaps
more importantly, to implement the new
procedures effectively.
• We are considering possible legis-
lative changes to amend U.S. laws which
treat China as a member of the Soviet
bloc. We intend to work closely with the
Congress on this.
• We concluded that we should re-
vise the regulations on international
traffic in arms to permit the licensing of
commercial sales to China on a case-by-
case basis.
Export Controls
Our export control policy toward China
is designed to strengthen our economic
involvement in China's modernization b;
raising the level of technology that will
be routinely approved for sale to China,
Our interest in a successfully moderniz-
ing China is clear. Only the interests of
our adversaries would be served by a
weak China that had failed to moderniz
or a China that, in its frustration, had
turned away from moderation and
cooperation with the West.
Our export controls for China shoul
reflect its role as a friendly, nonadver-
sary state, clearly differentiating China
from the Soviet bloc and minimizing thi
regulatory burden on U.S. companies.
We want to help U.S. companies emplo
their technology edge fully and gain
greater opportunities in the China
market. Participating in China's
economic development benefits businesi
and strengthens bilateral ties. We wanl
to have China look to us as a trusted
supplier. Shackling U.S. business woulc
not only cost us money but cause us to'
miss a unique opportunity to build a
viable relationship with a quarter of th<
world's population.
Legislation
Some statutes remain on the books
which inhibit the expansion of our rela-
tions with China. Some of these laws
were enacted to protect against the dif
Acuities arising from interaction be-
tween market and nonmarket economic
and should be viewed in this context.
Nevertheless, a number of these statut
prohibit cooperation with China by the
U.S. Government or private industry
due to Beijing's earlier association with
the Soviet bloc. As Secretary Haig in-
formed the Chinese during his recent
trip to Beijing [June 14-17], the Reaga:
Administration is currently reviewing
such legislation and will seek appro-
priate congressional action to end past
discrimination no longer consistent witl
our present strategic relationship. We
will consult with the Congress closely c
this subject.
In particular, we are reviewing the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, the
Agricultural Trade Development and
Assistance Act (PL 480), the Trade
Agreements Extension Act (which pro-
hibits imports of seven categories of fu
from China and the Soviet Union), and
the Trade Act of 1974.
The restrictions excluding China
38
Department of State Bulleti
East Asia
[m development assistance, PL 480,
i the export of furs are based
marily on that country's previous
ationship with the Soviet Union and
j not consistent with the current
ibal situation. Thus, we believe these
/s should be amended. Ending these
itraints would not entail any specific
3. obligations but would bring our
/s up to date and remove self-imposed
;traints that are not shared by our
npetitors from Europe or Japan. By
.ng so we would be improving our
xibility. Such steps as sales of PL 480
ains or extensions of development
iistance would still be done on a case-
case basis, if at all. Indeed, we have
current plans to offer such assistance
China and would only consider such a
p following review of its economic
isequences and appropriate consulta-
ns with Congress.
On the other hand, the restrictions
our relationship with China created
the Trade Act of 1974— including
•se on extension of the generalized
tern of preferences (GSP), trade
•eement requirements, and market
ruption— appear to be based primarily
the special concerns arising from the
traction of market and nonmarket
nomies. We see no reason to change
tutes for China which simply
ognize that nonmarket economies
Tate differently than market
nomies. This does not mean that we
re foreclosed extending GSP to China
in appropriate time, but this would
y be done in the context of China's
ang met the conditions that the law
uires of nonmarket economy coun-
ts.
nitions Control
2 steady development of our relations
h China over the last several years,
well as our evolving strategic
>peration, make it inappropriate for
to maintain the tight controls on
nitions exports to China that we do
such exports to adversaries. A flat
>hibition on sales to China, a friendly
intry, chiefly benefits its opportunistic
I aggressive neighbor. This decision is
; a decision to sell any specific
apons systems or military technology;
vill merely enable Beijing to make re-
2sts to purchase from U.S. commer-
1 sources any items on the U.S. muni-
ns list, including weapons. We are by
means committed to approving such
requests but only to considering them on
a case-by-case basis just as we do for all
other friendly nations.
We do not expect this to lead to a
sudden or uncontrolled surge of U.S.
weapons sales to China. First of all, our
own intentions are to move slowly, with
appropriate caution and to insure that
any weapons are only defensive in
character. The Secretary made clear in
Beijing that, as far as defensive exports
are concerned, we intend to proceed in a
gradual and careful way, bearing fully in
mind the concerns of and, as appro-
priate, consulting the Congress, our
friends, and allies. Thus, we are not
seeking to press arms on China or to
move recklessly.
Secondly, we do not believe the
Chinese will come forward with massive
requests. There are budgetary and
foreign exchange constraints and prac-
tical difficulties in integrating the most
sophisticated technology into their own
systems.
Neither we nor the Chinese seek an
alliance or an otherwise dramatically ex-
panded security relationship. While they
view our willingness to consider military
equipment transfers as one measure of
our intent to pursue a long-term
strategic association with them, they
also recognize that we still treat them in
a different fashion from our close allies,
particularly in the sharing of sensitive
technology. For us, the critically impor-
tant thing is that we are now willing, for
the first time, to deal with China in this
area similarly to the way we deal with
other friendly nations— in the Middle
East, Latin America, Africa, and Asia.
Foreign Military Sales
In your letter inviting me here, you have
asked that I address the question of
foreign military sales (FMS) for China.
In the absence of FMS eligibility, the
legislated $100-million ceiling on com-
mercial exports of defense equipment
and services would act as a barrier to
large Chinese purchases. The time may
come when we will need to address this
question, but we are not seeking to
make China eligible for FMS cash sales
at this time. FMS credits or FMS-
guaranteed loans to China are even
more premature though we will be
prepared to address such issues on their
merits, should they arise.
Conclusion
We see these initiatives as natural
developments in the positive evolution of
our relations with China over the last
decade. We intend to implement these
policies in a measured, controlled man-
ner, reflective of third-country interests.
We do not see a closer relationship with
North Korea Fires
at U.S. Plane
DEPARTMENT STATEMENT,
AUG. 27, 19811
We now have confirmation that early
yesterday, the North Koreans fired a
missile at a U.S. Air Force plane flying
in South Korean and international air
space. This flight was one of a number
of routine flights which have been con-
ducted over a period of years in this
area.
The U.S. Government expresses its
serious concern at this act of lawlessness
which constitutes a violation of interna-
tional law, the Korean armistice agree-
ment, and accepted norms of interna-
tional behavior.
The U.N. Command in Seoul has
called for a Military Armistice Commis-
sion meeting to protest directly to the
North Koreans this violation of the 1953
armistice agreement. The U.N. Com-
mand side requested that the meeting be
held this Saturday, Korea time, and the
North Korean side has not yet re-
sponded.
In addition we are contacting the
Governments of China and the Soviet
Union to request that they convey our
deep concern over this incident to North
Korean authorities and that North
Korea avoid any repetition of such
dangerous activity.
Both nations have treaties of friend-
ship and cooperation with North Korea.
China is a signatory of the military ar-
mistice agreement and a member of the
Armistice Commission. We believe it im-
perative to use these channels to im-
press upon the North Koreans the
seriousness with which we view this inci-
dent.
We intend to continue to fly these
routine flights and will take whatever
steps are necessary to assure the future
safety of our pilots and our planes.
'Read to news correspondents by Depart-
ment spokesman Dean Fischer. ■
itober 1981
39
ECONOMICS
China as directed against the interests
of any other country. Instead, we
perceive an historic opportunity to build
constructive, friendly relations with a
country which is a future world power
occupying a strategic position in the
Asia-Pacific region and on the Eurasian
landmass. Our long-term objective is to
enhance greatly the stability of the
region by strengthening U.S. -China ties.
As I have indicated, this in no way
means that we will ignore Taiwan. We
want to continue to improve the
substance of our unofficial relations with
the people of Taiwan. On his trip, the
Secretary told the Chinese that we
would continue to manage these rela-
tions— as we have since normaliza-
tion— on the basis of the joint communi-
que. As we have consistently stated, our
own law establishes a basis for the con-
tinuation of these unofficial relations. It
is clear that we have certain differences
over Taiwan, which, of course, include
the sale of defensive arms. We listened
to Chinese views, and we made our
views known. I think both sides came
away from these meetings with a
greater awareness of the other's sen-
sitivities over Taiwan.
Both the Chinese and we realize that
for the foreseeable future the political
significance of the steps we have taken
will far outweigh the immediate military
and economic consequences. These are,
however, very important gestures aimed
at consolidating a long-term relationship
in which we will hope to be able to con-
tinue to engage our Chinese friends in a
positive foreign policy dialogue — par-
ticularly in Asia— and to build a network
of reinforcing ties which, while leaving
us free to pursue internal and foreign
policy goals independently, will
nonetheless insure cooperative and
friendly U.S.-China relations well into
the 21st century.
'The complete transcript of the hearings
will be published by the committee and will
be available from the Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of-
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402.H
Approach to Foreign Economic
Issues
by Myer Rashish
Statement before the Joint Economic
Committee of the Congress on July 14,
1981. Mr Rashish is Under Secretary for
Economic Affairs. 1
I am pleased to appear before this com-
mittee in its consideration of foreign
economic policy. This committee and
you, in particular, Mr. Chairman
[Representative Henry S. Reuss], have
played a prominent leadership role in
making the American people aware of
the importance of a vigorous U.S. inter-
national economic policy to the health of
the U.S. economy and to our foreign
policy objectives.
We both are concerned about many
of the same issues. From our respective
vantage points in the executive and
legislative branches, we share a respon-
sibility for establishing the crucial
linkages between foreign economic
policy, on the one hand, and both U.S.
foreign policy objectives and domestic
economic policy objectives on the other.
It is the close connections among these
three policy dimensions that I wish to
emphasize in my presentation today.
I am sure that the committee will
agree that in today's world economic
issues are increasingly becoming the
very stuff of foreign policy. This is cleai
ly illustrated by the intensive prepara-
tions now underway for the Ottawa
summit [July 19-21]. The economic and
political issues which the heads of
government will be discussing at
Montebello, just outside of Ottawa, are
so closely intertwined as to be in-
separable.
On the other hand, foreign economii
issues are increasingly tied to the opera
tion of the domestic economy. Trade
now represents nearly twice as high a
percentage of our gross national produc
than it did 10 years ago. In 1970 U.S.
exports constituted 4.5% and today thej
constitute 8.4% of our GNP. U.S.
monetary policy and its implications for
the macroeconomic policies of our chief
trading partners are among the chief
concerns of the political leadership in
Europe and Japan. Inevitably, the Ad-
ministration's goals for the domestic
economy will affect — and be affected
by — developments on the international
scene.
Myer Rashish was
born on November 10,
1924, at Cambridge,
Mass. He attended
Boston Latin School
(1941) and received his
A.B. degree in
economics from Har-
vard (1947). Mr.
Rashish was an in-
structor in economics
at M.I.T. (1946-47) and at Williams College
(1947-49). While at Williams he also acted as
a visiting lecturer in economics at Tufts Col-
lege. He was assistant professor of economics
at Bowdoin College, Brunswick, Maine
(1949-51).
Mr. Rashish joined the Department of
State in 1952 as an economist with the Office
of International Finance and Development
Policy and the following year became the
director of the international section for the
Midcentury Conference on Resources for the
Future. During 1954-56, he acted as the
economic consultant to the Committee for
National Trade Policy, Inc.
From 1956 to 1960 Mr. Rashish was the
chief economist and the staff director for the
Subcommittee on Foreign Trade Policy of the
House Ways and Means Committee. In addi-
tion he served as the secretary for President
elect Kennedy's task forces on foreign
economic policy and the balance of payments.
In 1961 he became special assistant to the
Under Secretary of State for Economic Af-
fairs, after which he went to the White
House as assistant for international trade
policy.
Beginning in 1963 Mr. Rashish was a
self-employed consulting economist. As a con
sultant to the congressional Joint Economic
Committee, he organized a program of U.S.
foreign economic policy for the 1970s for the
Subcommittee on Foreign Economic Policy.
From 1971 to 1976, he was a consultant to
Senator Abraham Ribicoff in connection with
the latter's chairmanship of the Subcommit-
tee of Foreign Trade of the Finance Commit
tee.
In 1976 President Ford appointed Mr.
Rashish to the Advisory Committee for Tradi
Negotiations, to which he was reappointed b)
President Carter in April 1978 and June
1980. He was elected chairman of that com-
mittee in January 1980.
Mr. Rashish was sworn in as Under
Secretary for Economic Affairs on June 29,
1981.
40
Department of State Bulletin
Economics
Ultimately, our responsibility is to
ft and implement a U.S. foreign
icy which takes into account all our
erests— our security needs, our
ource requirements, our trade and in-
itment concerns, our need for good
rking relations with the many coun-
ts a world power must deal with in
lay's interdependent world. Of course,
i success of such a foreign policy is
jendent on a dynamic domestic
momy. The President's economic
overy program is thus central to our
eign economic policy, and the role the
ite Department plays in foreign policy
its on close coordination with the
;ncies primarily responsible for our
-nestic economy.
I would like to illustrate this general
Droach to foreign economic policy by
efly reviewing with you five principal
;as of concern:
• Energy supply and independence;
• Trade;
• International investment and
ance;
• Support for economic develop-
nt; and finally
• The very special economic ties we
/e with our closest allies and
ghbors.
ergy
rile rapid oil price rises and occasional
)ply interruptions can cripple
>nomic growth and increase infla-
nary pressures in consuming coun-
ts, it is the national security implica-
ns of the unhealthy dependence of the
ited States and the other major in-
itialized countries that are most
turbing to this Administration. It is
possible to think about such widely
parate issues as the Middle East
ice process, the present condition of
'. international monetary and commer-
1 banking systems, or the financial
vency of key developing countries
;hout reaching back to the dependence
the international system on imported
and on a small group of oil suppliers.
To reduce that dependence, this Ad-
nistration is emphasizing, in the first
,tance, market-oriented policies to
hance supply and to restrain demand,
key element has been the President's
cision to implement a realistic energy
icing policy. Oil price decontrol and
entual deregulation of natural gas
ices are essential steps in eliciting in-
cased production and discouraging in-
cident use of energy. Other important
supply-oriented policies are now under
development. We aim to accelerate leas-
ing of off-shore oil, resolve regulatory
and institutional problems inhibiting the
use of nuclear power, and remove im-
pediments to increased production, use,
and export of coal. Our extensive coal
resources need to be developed; we are
confident that private industry will be
able to expand output and improve in-
frastructure for delivery of coal exports
as long as government provides a
reasonable regulatory climate.
The U.S. response to market forces
in energy has been impressive. Oil con-
sumption in the first half of 1981 is run-
ning at 16 million barrels per day, the
lowest level since 1973. Oil imports for
the half year are running just over 5
million barrels per day, 3V2 million bar-
rels per day below the 1977 peak. The
decline in U.S. domestic oil production
has, at least temporarily, been halted.
Yet increased production and more
efficient energy use in the United States
addresses only part of the energy prob-
lem. Preparedness to adjust to energy
market disruptions is vital. Supplies can
be disrupted, as we have seen, by
political conflict and social upheaval and
by sudden demand surges. The obvious
examples of these dangers stem from
the Middle East; less visible is prospec-
tive West European dependence on the
Soviet Union for substantial amounts of
natural gas which has the potential for
unhealthy influence.
We must be prepared to counter
these threats to our energy security by
national action and international
cooperation. Nationally, an effective
strategic petroleum reserve is crucial.
The reserve is the basis for crude oil
security, to be used in response to a ma-
jor oil supply interruption and in the
framework of a response coordinated
with our partners in the International
Energy Agency (IEA).
Purchases of crude oil for the
strategic petroleum reserve were re-
sumed in October of last year at a rate
of about 100,000 barrels per day. The fill
rate has accelerated sharply in the past
6 months. Since the beginning of FY
1981, 70 million barrels have been added
to the reserve, bringing the total in
storage as of June 30 to 163 million bar-
rels. The current oversupply of crude oil
in world markets and resulting lower
prices have enabled us to achieve a
faster than anticipated fill rate. We now
expect to have approximately 200
million barrels in storage by the end of
FY 1981, taking into account contracts
already signed and projected purchases.
This will be an important step toward
our currently scheduled 1989 target of
750 million barrels.
While a petroleum reserve is one ele-
ment of our energy and national security
policy, other elements, involving interna-
tional cooperation, are also required. It
would be a serious mistake to believe
that U.S. energy supply or national
security could be maintained in a world
in which our allies were crippled and the
world trading economy sundered by
serious price shocks or supply disrup-
tion. For this reason, cooperative efforts
with other industrialized countries are
fundamental to our energy security
policy. The International Energy Agency
is the prime forum for this cooperation.
The IEA emergency oil-sharing system,
designed to counter catastrophic short-
falls, is the keystone of this energy
security policy. In addition, we have
learned also from the recent past that
smaller, or even threatened, shortfalls
can also lead to harmful price rises, and
IEA consultations are underway to try
to find appropriate contingency
measures for these situations.
A sound energy policy also requires
good relations with reliable producers.
Investment climates need to be im-
proved; discriminatory policies, such as
those in our neighbor to the north,
favoring domestic investment can reduce
optimal energy investment to everyone's
detriment.
We will not relax our search for
energy security in the face of the cur-
rent oversupply of crude oil on world
markets. This quest for energy security
will probably bring us into contact with
almost every conceivable aspect of
foreign and economic policies, and we
are prepared to insure that our policies
reflect that critical objective.
Trade
Current challenges in the trade field
arise out of the success— in both foreign
policy and economic terms — of the basic
policies adopted after World War II.
The U.S. goal then in establishing the
General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT) and urging our trading
partners to establish a more open and
market-oriented trading system was to
increase both world prosperity and inter-
national interdependence through the
:tober 1981
41
Economics
expansion of trade. World trade expand-
ed fivefold between 1970 and 1980,
while OECD [Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development] exports
as a share of GNP rose from 10.7% to
16%. By 1979 the average tariff levels in
the developed countries had fallen to
10.6%. The cuts agreed to in the Tokyo
Round of multilateral trade negotiations
will further reduce tariff levels to 4.5%.
We need to continue this expansion
of trade which has contributed so much
to our prosperity and added stability to
the international environment. Last
week, Ambassador Brock [William E.
Brock, U.S. Trade Representative]
presented to the Senate Banking and
Finance Committees a comprehensive
Administration policy statement outlin-
ing our approach to trade. The approach
emphasizes that it remains important to
strengthen the institutions which have
served us well in the trade field, prin-
cipally GATT. We will be facing a
number of new challenges, however.
U.S. trade with the Soviet Union
and Eastern Europe has expanded con-
siderably during the 1970s, with these
countries providing significant markets
particularly for U.S. agricultural prod-
ucts. Our exports of wheat and coarse
grains to the U.S.S.R. in 1979-80 came
to 15.2 million tons. While we recognize
the important contribution these exports
have made to the U.S. economy, we can-
not view economic exchanges in isola-
tion. This Administration is determined
to insure that economic relations with
the East are consistent with broad U.S.
political and strategic objectives.
On the other hand, we recognize
that continued economic ties between
these countries and the United States
and the rest of the world can be in our
interest, particularly to the extent that
these ties serve to reinforce the East's
stake in the orderly functioning of the
world economy and to encourage them
to engage in responsible international
behavior. For both economic and
political reasons, therefore, this Ad-
ministration intends to maintain a pru-
dent level of economic relations with due
regard for security interests and for the
differences between our market-oriented
economy and their centrally planned
systems.
• We need to balance our desire to
increase exports against our other in-
terests, including the need to avoid hav-
ing U.S. exports contribute to the
military potential of the recipient coun-
try.
Major Developing Country
Trading Partners of U.S., 1980
($ billion)
U.S.
U.S.
Imports
Exports
Brazil
3.7
4.3
Hong Kong
4.7
2.7
Israel
.9
2.0
Korea
4.1
4.7
Mexico
12.5
15.1
Nigeria
10.9
1.1
Saudi Arabia
12.5
5.8
Singapore
1.9
3.0
Taiwan
6.9
4.3
Venezuela
5.3
4.6
TOTAL
63.4
47.6
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Highlights q)
U.S. Import and Export Trade. December 1980
• The United States cannot have an
effective policy on trade with these
countries unless our policy is in harmony
with that of our major trading partners.
We need to achieve a common percep-
tion of the balance between security and
commercial interests for the Western
allies as a whole.
• The problems of fair trade are
peculiarly difficult to deal with in the
case of countries which do not apply
market pricing principles within their
own economies. The concepts of dump-
ing and subsidies have no place in their
system, but the U.S. Government must
deal with them as they impact trade in
the United States.
• In the trade field as in the
political sphere, there are important dif-
ferences among the East European
countries. Some are more open to inter-
national trade than others; some have
moved toward instituting a genuine pric-
ing system and effective tariffs; four are
members of the GATT. In addition, they
are at differing levels of economic
development. This Administration will
make every effort where possible to
tailor our approach to the individual
country.
Our trade with other countries is
less likely to raise security issues but is
of crucial importance nonetheless. We
are concerned that trade be conducted
according to mutually agreed "rules of
the game." One of the major ac-
complishments of the Tokyo Round was
to make a start at dealing with the non-
tariff barriers which, in an era of
relatively low duties, act as the major
impediment to international trade. The
"codes" agreed to during these negotia-
tions are being put into effect. We need
to make them work as effectively as
possible and to develop greater interna-
tional discipline and a body of case law
in such key fields as the use of export
subsidies, dumping, and international
bidding for government procurement.
In addition, a number of areas im-
portant to U.S. trade have hitherto not
been the subject of much international
discipline. Trade in services and the
potential trade distortions from the in-
vestment performance criteria and in-
centives adopted by a number of coun-
tries are but two examples that come to
mind. Trade in services is one of the
most dynamic components in our
economy. Our 1979 export receipts in
this area totaled more than $76 billion.
That is almost a fourfold increase over
the 1971 level of $19.1 billion. Services
account for 27% of U.S. exports and
employ 70% of the nonagricultural U.S.
work force.
In both areas we need to develop an
international consensus which will
facilitate trade and discourage back-door
means of protectionism.
The emergence of China as an im-
portant actor in the world trade arena
poses challenges and opportunities for
U.S. businessmen and policymakers, as
well as for the world trading system as
a whole. China's exports increased from
$8 billion in 1977 to over $13.5 billion in
1979. China's imports over the same
period grew even more rapidly from
$6.6 billion to $14.7 billion.
Another challenge we must meet
stems from the increasingly important
role of the developing countries in world
trade. Our trade with the developing
countries has expanded rapidly over the
past decade: imports by 25% per year,
exports by 18% per year, compared with
15% increases in trade with the
developed countries. The less developed
countries as a group account for 37% of
our exports and 47% of our imports and
they are now a more important trading
partner for the United States than the
European Community, Canada, or
Japan. Within this group, a small
number of countries often referred to as
the "newly industrializing countries"
(Mexico, Brazil, Singapore, Hong Kong,
Taiwan, Korea, and Israel) accounts for
over half of trade between the United
States and non-oil less developed coun-
tries (LDCs). The United States needs to
respond to their competition in a way
42
Department of State Bulletin
Economics
ch will encourage world prosperity
will increase the stake these coun-
s have in an orderly world trading
tem. Given their importance as an ex-
t market, maintaining an open U.S.
rket is essential to our export expan-
I strategy as well. This Administra-
1 will be encouraging the developing
mtries generally and the more ad-
iced, in particular, to take on the
:iplines of the international trading
tem.
The other non-oil developing coun-
•s urgently need to increase their ex-
its in order to finance increasingly ex-
isive imports. Export earnings are a
re significant source of development
tnce than aid, both in terms of the
ount of money involved and by virtue
.he economic efficiency which a suc-
sful export industry represents,
hough U.S. aid totaled $4.7 billion in
9, in that year U.S. imports from
Cs totaled $92.5 billion and nearly
F of this— $43.7 billion— came from
non-OPEC [Organization of
roleum Exporting Countries] LDCs.
?ping our market open to the exports
developing countries and providing
very modest degree of incentive em-
lied in our generalized system of
ferences scheme are integral parts of
broader policy with respect to these
ntries.
Although my main theme today is
"foreign" aspects of foreign
nomic policy, I cannot leave the sub-
t of trade without a word about the
opetitiveness of U.S. industry. U.S.
jrts to continue the progress made so
in developing a more orderly trading
tem and to respond to the new
dlenge of the developing countries
1 ultimately fail unless they are
•ked by a vigorous U.S. ecopomy. In
• response to the difficulties caused by
Dort competition in sensitive sectors,
need to insure that we encourage
momic efficiency rather than reward
akness. Adjustment assistance and
'eguard measures can ease the prob-
ns firms and workers face as our
momy adapts to new circumstances,
t we will be relying primarily on
irket forces to bring about the
cessary adjustment.
On the export side, the overall
alth of the economy, once again, will
the key factor in determining how
:11 our products do. The amount and
,'ectiveness of investment, our ability
control inflation, and the growth in
oductivity are all crucial.
The Administration is also reviewing
various aspects of U.S. law and policy
which have had the unintended side ef-
fect of discouraging exports, such as the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and the
operation of our export controls. The
Administration is also working interna-
tionally to reduce barriers to U.S. goods.
International Finance and Investment
In an increasingly interdependent world,
the smooth operation of the financial
system is a vital prerequisite to increas-
ing world trade, and both are equally
essential to prosperity. The 1979-80 oil
price increase resulted in an OPEC cur-
rent account surplus of about $120
billion last year, nearly double the 1979
level. The counterpart to this enormous
surplus was a $47 billion deficit among
the non-oil developing countries.
Whether OPEC's surpluses will remain a
"sword of Damocles" hanging over the
international financial system depends
considerably on the future path of oil
prices and on the ability of deficit coun-
tries to use the current lull in rising
energy costs to implement the structural
reform of their economies necessary to
right their external accounts.
It is expected that the OPEC
surplus and the industrialized countries'
deficit will moderate this year to about
$100 and $20 billion respectively. The in-
dustrialized countries should be able to
finance their deficits with little trouble.
For the most part, these countries are
U.S. Trade With Developing
Countries, 1980
($ billion and percent)
U.S.
Imports
U.S.
Exports
World TOTAL
241.2
(100)
220.7
(100)
Developing Countries
Subtotal
114.4
(47)
82.3
(37)
OPEC
52.1
(21)
17.8
(8)
Non-oil
Exporters
62.3
(26)
64.5
(29)
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Highlights oj
U.S. Import and Export Trade, December 1980
following slow growth and anti-
inflationary policies and thus adjusting
to the higher relative costs of oil.
The non-oil LDCs' combined current
account deficit is likely to rise
somewhat, to upward of $95 billion. We
do not expect this to cause a generalized
debt problem. However, those countries
that do not move to implement sound
economic policies will find access to ex-
ternal finance more limited and more
costly than previously.
The international financial system
can ill afford a repetition of the policies
of the mid-1970s when many countries
tried to finance growth through
domestic credit expansion and external
borrowing. Even with a lull in the rising
price of energy and the possibility that
OPEC's surplus will dwindle rapidly,
1981 is quite different from 1973-75.
Many countries already have incurred
considerable new debt, and a larger pro-
portion is on commercial terms. Interest
rates are higher both in nominal and
real terms. Thus, those countries depen-
dent on external finance from commer-
cial sources must run that much faster
just to be able to service a given level of
debt. Debt service now absorbs 20% of
these countries' export earnings, up
from 13% in the mid-1970s.
The private markets are quite liquid
and the supply of funds to creditworthy
countries is unlikely to be a problem.
However, many banks are reaching their
own external limits on exposure, and
they will be increasingly selective in add-
ing new exposure.
It is essential that we begin to ex-
plore longer term solutions to the recy-
cling problem. Private banks will un-
doubtedly continue to play the predomi-
nant role in the recycling process.
However, the International Monetary
Fund (IMF), through access to its own
resources and its influence on the
judgments of the private market, will
play a more pivotal role in countries
with balance-of-payments problems.
To do so, the IMF has been given
more flexibility. Resources available
from the IMF have been increased and
the terms of repayment extended in
some cases in recognition of the longer
periods required to implement effective
adjustment programs under current in-
ternational economic conditions. The
guidelines for conditionality — domestic
programs required of borrowers under
IMF programs — have been modified to
take more explicit account of the
;tober 1981
43
Economics
underlying causes of the financing prob-
lems as well as the borrowing countries'
social, political, and economic priorities.
The Fund borrowing of $5-6 billion
over the next several years — including
from Saudi Arabia— will help bolster the
IMF's ability to supply balance-of-
payments financing and, to the extent
that others can be involved, bring the
surplus OPEC countries more directly
into the recycling process.
We are encouraging this expansion
of the IMF's role and resources. We
believe that a multilateral institution like
the IMF is especially well placed to en-
courage developing countries to adjust
their economic policies, as we believe
they must, to current international
realities. The economic stakes for the
countries concerned are very high. So
are the foreign policy and economic
stakes for the United States if failure to
encourage adequate adjustment were to
result in the economic collapse of coun-
tries important to the United States.
With this in mind, the Reagan Ad-
ministration has also reviewed its ap-
proach to international monetary policy.
Our basic principle is that the
marketplace should be allowed to work.
Accordingly, we will intervene in foreign
exchange markets only when necessary
to counter disorderly market conditions.
We believe that this is consistent with
the Administration's efforts to address
economic fundamentals rather than at-
tempt in vain to fine-tune our approach.
We hope that the emphasis on basics
will reduce the likelihood of disorderly
foreign exchange markets.
Given the size of the U.S. economy
and its international trade and financial
linkages, U.S. monetary and fiscal
policies are legitimately of major con-
cern abroad. Right now we are going
through a difficult transitional phase.
The clash between our anti-inflationary
monetary policy and deep-seated infla-
tionary expectations has temporarily
produced very high interest rates, caus-
ing painful effects in our own economy
and complicating policy choices for our
economic partners. High U.S. rates have
added to downward pressures on the ex-
change value of some foreign currencies
and have contributed to the increase in
interest rates abroad, even though some
policymakers abroad would have pre-
ferred lower rates in support of invest-
ment and economic recovery. I would
like to underline, however, that domestic
economic conditions and political factors
in the United States and many of our
key trading partners have been the prin-
cipal cause of exchange rate and interest
rate developments. Lower interest rates
can be attained on a sustainable basis
only by reducing the rate of inflation
and the inflationary expectations which
are built into present high nominal
rates.
We are sometimes charged with
placing an undue burden on monetary
policy in the anti-inflationary fight and
thus aggravating the interest-rate prob-
lem. While monetary control surely is a
necessary condition for reducing infla-
tion, the Administration has also pro-
posed a restrictive fiscal package and
expects to have the smallest deficit as a
share of GNP among the major coun-
tries. Over the next few years fiscal
policy will be guided by the commitment
to balanced budgets.
These issues have been discussed
with our partners in the OECD, in the
summit preparatory meetings as well as
bilateral meetings. Much progress has
been made in enhancing mutual
understanding, and, given the common
objective of restoring vigorous, noninfla-
tionary growth, I believe a further con-
vergence of views is probable at the
summit. ,
Turning briefly to investment policy,
we believe that market forces rather
than government fiat result in the most
efficient distribution of investments.
Consistent with this view, U.S. invest-
ment policy has for many years been
based on the principle of nonintervention
in the private sector decisionmaking
process. As a corollary, the U.S.
Government has avoided actively pro-
moting or discouraging private invest-
ment overseas. Our policy supports a
general principle of national treatment
for foreign enterprises— i.e., foreign
enterprises should be treated no less
favorably than domestic investors in like
situations.
U.S. investment overseas has been
increasing in recent years. By the end of
1979 — on a balance-of-payments
basis — the stock of U.S. direct invest-
ment abroad had reached an estimated
$192.6 billion, up 15% from the previous
year's figure of $167.8 billion. U.S. in-
vestment in Europe and Canada account
for over half of U.S. investment
abroad— about $122 billion— and invest-
ment in developed countries comes to
about 72% of the total. We should also
keep in mind that receipts from those in-
vestments totaled nearly $38 billion in
1979.
The United States has maintained
an open investment climate, and we
believe that the attractiveness of the
U.S. investment climate has led to a
largely beneficial increase in investmen
in this country. As a general principle,
foreign investors should not receive an;
special advantages which are not
available to domestic investors in the
U.S. economy.
Most OECD countries maintain a
similar open investment climate, thougl
we are concerned about trends in the
other direction in Canada and have bee
discussing this issue with the Canadian
Government. Developing countries are
some cases more restrictive. We want 1
remove U.S. Government impediments
to U.S. investment abroad, for example
in the tax and regulatory area. We alsc
want to insure that U.S. investors
overseas receive fair and equitable trea
ment. We will, for instance, seek great
international discipline in the use of in-
vestment incentives and performance r
quirements. We will continue to work,
bilaterally and multilaterally, for the
goal of an open investment system — or
that is based to the extent possible on ;
common framework and understanding
of the basic ground rules.
Support for Economic Development
Support for economic development in
poorer countries has been an important
element in U.S. foreign policy for the
past 30 years, and given the economic
and strategic picture of some key
developing countries it is likely to re-
main so for some time to come.
This Administration has been takin
a careful look at our economic policies
toward developing countries, to make
sure that U.S. policies accord closely
with our tangible economic and security
interests in such sensitive areas as the
Caribbean basin, the Middle East, the
areas bordering Afghanistan and the
Persian Gulf, and others. Aid allocation
will reflect these interests as well as
humanitarian concerns.
Historically, U.S. aid has been ex-
tended both as direct bilateral assistanc
and through multilateral institutions.
The Administration is examining the
balance between these channels, in an
attempt to insure that our choice of aid
tools reflects the different interests our
aid programs should serve. We plan to
complete by September a review of U.S
44
Department of State Bulleth
Economics
icy on participation in future
ilenishments or expansions of
ltilateral development banks.
U.S. budget revisions have affected
areas, including foreign assistance.
r essential aid expenditures in FY
$2 will nonetheless be about 15%
jve the current fiscal year.
This Administration believes it im-
tant to emphasize, however, that
Hiomic development includes other
ments besides aid. One of the most
portant steps this Administration can
:e for development is to restore and
intain a growing U.S. economy
;hout inflation. This encourages the
/elopment process through linkages
it are often more important than ex-
nal aid flows. The most important
ong these are:
• Markets open to the exports of
^eloping countries;
• Domestic economic policies that
ilitate overall growth and investment
these countries; and
• Access to capital markets.
Even within the broad category of
ernal financing of development, con-
ization on the relatively small official
contributions sometimes leads us to
get the much larger flows from the
it of our economy. U.S. imports from
/eloping countries in 1979 were nearly
ie times our official aid flows. The
■ne type of relationship holds for all
> Western aid-giving nations as a
jup. U.S. direct investment in the
veloping countries runs at or above
j level of aid, and LDC use of private
Dital markets results in commercial
nk loans and bond issues far ex-
jding development assistance. In 1979
me, commercial banks provided $37
Qion to the LDCs, while flows of of-
ial development assistance from all
nors in the Development Assistance
immittee of the OECD were $22
lion.
These factors suggest that the
lited States should pay greater atten-
m to the role of the private sector in
e development process. U.S. business
involved directly in trade, investment,
chnology transfer, and financing in the
•veloping world, and the private sector
many developing countries could, with
;e proper encouragement, play a much
•eater role. The Administration, in con-
ization with the business community,
reviewing what can be done to
icilitate private sector involvement in
ie development process while fully
;specting its private character.
Relations between developing and
developed countries have also been the
focus of a great deal of international
debate in recent years. The United
States has been an active participant in
this dialogue, as I am sure you are all
aware. We participated in last year's ef-
fort to work out a suitable agenda and
procedures for global negotiations.
Because we took this process seriously,
we felt that it was essential to include
provisions that would protect essential
U.S. interests and preserve the integrity
of existing international institutions. In
view of the continuing disagreements
among the countries concerned on how
such negotiations should be set up, the
Administration proposed to the U.N.
General Assembly last May that the
issue of global negotiations be deferred
until the next General Assembly in the
fall.
Cancun Summit
As an indication of the importance we
attach to these issues, President Reagan
has accepted an invitation from Presi-
dent Lopez Portillo of Mexico to attend
an international meeting on cooperation
and development in Cancun on October
22 and 23. We view this meeting as a
useful opportunity for President Reagan
to meet with heads of government from
22 industrialized and developing coun-
tries for an exchange of views on global
economic problems and opportunities.
The 11 cosponsoring nations have told
us they plan an open and informal
meeting with no set agenda and no com-
munique. We expect that the discussion
will include such vital issues as food,
energy, trade, population growth, and
world ecological developments. The
heads of government may also consider
whether global negotiations are a useful
forum for addressing them, though we
hope the focus at Cancun will be more
substantive than procedural.
We prefer to postpone any decision
on global negotiations until the heads of
government have had a chance to ex-
change views at Cancun. We plan to
work closely with the Ottawa summit
countries and other participants to in-
sure that the Cancun summit is as con-
structive as possible.
Economic Relations with Key Friends
The Administration attaches special im-
portance to our economic relations with
certain key friends whose ties to the
United States are particularly intimate
and long standing. We have moved,
through close cooperation at all levels of
our governments, to strengthen our
economic ties with our neighbors on the
North American Continent. These rela-
tions received a strong boost from the
warm rapport that President Reagan
has developed with his counterparts in
Canada and Mexico.
One of the duties which I have
assumed is that of the President's per-
sonal representative for economic sum-
mits. The preparatory process for the
July 19-21 Ottawa summit was launched
in earnest in February when the per-
sonal representatives of the seven par-
ticipating countries plus the European
Community met in London. Since then
the representatives have met three
times— in late April, early June, and
early July. In these meetings we
developed a work program and reviewed
papers presented by individual personal
representatives on relevant topics. The
preparatory process has been very im-
portant in crystallizing the key issues
and improving communications among
our governments. As a result, the im-
portance on domestic economic recovery
in all our countries emerged as a domi-
nant theme. There is a general consen-
sus that our capacity to strengthen our
security, to expand assistance to
developing countries, and to resist pro-
tectionist actions all hinge upon control-
ling domestic inflation and expanding
output.
In addition to domestic economic
policies, such issues as economic rela-
tions with the Soviet Union and Eastern
Europe, our relations with developing
countries, and energy and trade will be
central issues for discussion. Obviously,
when the heads of government meet,
they will touch on international political
issues of concern at that moment. The
summit will provide President Reagan
with an excellent opportunity to explain
his domestic economic recovery program
and to provide the framework within
which he will pursue his policies on these
various international issues. This summit
should result in a greater understanding
of U.S. policies, and we and our allies
hopefully will come away with a commit-
ment to common approaches for dealing
with some of the issues. In our prepara-
tory work to date, I sense that our allies
share this view. We will, of course,
discuss U.S. policy on these issues with
others of our allies who are not par-
ticipating in the summit.
The Ottawa summit scheduled for
;tober 1981
45
Economics
July 19-21 is the seventh annual
meeting of the heads of government. In
comparison with previous summits, we
expect the discussion to be more
freewheeling and the communique less
detailed. With this session, the first
round of summits will have been com-
pleted. We believe that these summits
have been valuable thus far as a forum
for an intimate exchange of views
among heads of government.2
Conclusion
Given the complexity of global U.S. in-
terests, it is risky to pick out a few
guiding themes for U.S. foreign
economic policy. Let me conclude by try-
ing to do so nonetheless.
First, in all aspects of our foreign
economic policy the United States needs
to integrate to the fullest our economic
and our security interests.
Second, the Administration believes
in the efficiency of the marketplace and
had considerable skepticism about the
effectiveness of government efforts to
supplant it. This belief will affect the
Administration's views on the policy
tools it believes our government and
others should use in pursuit of our
economic and foreign policy objectives.
Third, the Administration is per-
suaded that a more effective integration
of the world economy is essential to our
well-being both economically and
politically. Vigorous and fair trade, a
world investment climate which en-
courages the development of productive
enterprises, smoothly functioning finan-
cial markets, and the sound economic
expansion of the developing countries —
these are the key requirements for a
more integrated world economy.
Moreover, they contribute to an interna-
tional environment in which the United
States can more effectively pursue its
broader foreign policy goals.
Fourth, we are aware of' the
economic interdependence between the
United States and our allies and the
ramifications U.S. economic policy has
for political relations. We believe that
the President's economic recovery plan
will lay the foundation not only for a
more vigorous U.S. economy but also for
stronger and healthier ties with our
allies. We have also sought more directly
in these first months to bolster our
general economic relationship with the
other members of the Western alliance.
Our initiatives to enhance energy securi-
ty, to place East- West trade in a
broader political context and to reduce
tensions resulting from trade issues
have resulted in a generally good spirit
of mutual cooperation within the
alliance.
Looking toward the Ottawa summit,
our allies generally support our desire to
move away from a discussion of detailed
economic issues that characterized past
summits to a more general and free-
wheeling discussion among heads of
state which would seek to highlight the
areas of shared perceptions. We are con-
fident that this spirit will help the sum-
mit countries — and the Western alli-
ance— meet the challenges of the next
decade.
I have sought to provide the commit-
tee with a broad brush view of the Ad-
ministration's international economic
policies. Nevertheless, I would like to ,
reiterate that the Administration is still
in the process of reviewing important
elements of that policy. As we progress
in fleshing out our policies in these
critical areas, I will, of course, be
prepared to keep the committee fully in
formed and to come back and discuss
these vital issues with you.
■The complete transcript of the hearings
will be published by the committee and will
be available from the Superintendent of
Documents. U.S. Government Printing Of-
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402.
documentation on the economic summi
was published in the Bulletin of August
1981.1
U.S. International Economic Policy
and Its Impact on LDCs
by Myer Rashish
Address before the Korean-American
Association in Seoul, Korea on June 23,
1981. Mr. Rashish is Under Secretary
for Economic Affairs.
I am very pleased to be able to be with
you this evening to speak to the Korean-
American Association. I would like to
use the occasion of the first U.S. -Korea
economic consultations of this Ad-
ministration to outline for you the inter-
national economic policy of the Reagan
Administration. After that, I would like
to focus on our relations with the
developing countries, and with Korea in
particular, in the context of overall in-
ternational economic policy.
Before passing to the main topic,
however, I would like to underline the
major role that the United States will
continue to play in meeting its interna-
tional and regional security com-
mitments. These security commitments
are necessary for a stable economic
growth environment throughout the
world, and especially, here in Northeast
Asia. Both of our nations make major
sacrifices for the maintenance of inter-
national security, and I want to assure
you that Korea's contributions to the ef-
fort are recognized in Washington.
Having fought side by side in two
major armed conflicts and having main-
tained a close defense relationship for
many years, the United States and
Korea are both intensely aware of the
dangers to both economic and political
stability of armed conflict. The impor-
tance we attach to our alliance and to
mutual security was reaffirmed in the
February 2 summit meeting between
President Chun [Doo Hwan] and Presi-
dent Reagan. It was highlighted again i
the April security consultative meeting
between Minister of Defense Choo
Young Bock and Secretary of Defense
[Caspar W.] Wienberger in San Fran-
cisco. We continue to accord the highes
priority to the deterrence of hostilities
on the Korean Peninsula, a priority
which reflects our conviction that peace
in Northeast Asia is fundamental to ouj
own security interests and relationships
STRUCTURE OF U.S.
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
POLICY
Since January 20, the Reagan Ad-
ministration has been conducting a
careful and thorough examination of ou
international economic relations. This
review stems from the President's view
that international economic policy is in-
creasingly becoming the very stuff of
foreign and security policy. While some
elements of this examination are still
underway, the broad outlines of the
structure of our international economic
policy have taken form.
Domestic Economy
We intend to get our own economic
house in order. We consider a sound
46
Department of State Bulleti
Economics
economy to be a basic prerequisite
i healthy international economy,
momic growth and structural change
oughout the developing world have
dually increased the relative share of
developing countries in world out-
, but the United States continues to
ount for nearly one-fourth of the
il. This preponderance inevitably
ans that our economic trends have
>ortant international repercussions.
Briefly, the Reagan Administration
jnds to carry out economic measures
it will:
Sharply cut government spending
eestablish fiscal integrity;
Restore incentives to the private
tor by moderating tax burdens;
• Eliminate excessive regulation of
U.S. economy; and
• Control the growth of the money
•ply-
s is an ambitious economic program,
il its implementation will require some
'icult adjustments. Nevertheless, in
y 5 months in office, the Administra-
1 has already demonstrated that it is
h willing and able to take the difficult
ps that are necessary to restore the
5. economy to a path of noninfla-
lary economic growth.
ergy
! are giving highest priority to energy
)ur international economic relations,
e cannot look back over the past 8
its without appreciating the over-
ing impact of uncertain supply and
h and rising energy prices on the
rid economy in general and on a
intry like Korea, in particular. The
;rgy problem has led to slow economic
>wth, has intensified inflation, created
ious balance-of-payments difficulties,
■med the development prospects of
st developing countries, and ad-
•sely affected the national security of
: United States and other countries.
To respond to this problem, this
ministration is emphasizing, in the
it instance, market-oriented policies
enhance supply and restrain demand.
iey element was the President's early
:ision to implement full decontrol of
nestic oil prices; this has reinforced
• strong performance in conserving oil
i stimulating exploratory drilling.
stitutional and
gulatory Problems
i are also making increased efforts to
olve institutional and regulatory prob-
is inhibiting the use of alternatives to
imported oil, particularly nuclear energy
and coal. We are also increasing our
ability to cope with possible supply
disruptions in imported oil. We are in-
creasing our own national strategic
petroleum reserve, and we are urging
our friends and allies to strengthen their
ability to protect their economic systems
from the effects of another oil supply
disruption. In this regard, we consider
that national inventories can play a key
role in cushioning the impact of inter-
ruptions and allowing alternative solu-
tions, where appropriate, to be
formulated.
Trade
We continue to support an open inter-
national trading system. Much progress
has been made over the past decade in
reducing barriers to international trade.
The Tokyo Round of tariff negotiations
laid the basis for progress on the "rules
of the game" regarding nontariff issues,
such as export subsidies, dumping, and
international bidding for government
contracts. We need to implement the
codes agreed at the Tokyo Round in
these areas, in order to develop greater
international discipline and a body of
case law to assure fair treatment.
We need also to move beyond the
Tokyo Round in the next few years to
other trade areas that have hitherto not
been the subject of much international
discipline. Trade in services and poten-
tial trade distortions from the invest-
ment performance criteria and
incentives adopted by a number of coun-
tries are but two examples that come to
mind. In both areas we need to develop
an international consensus that will
facilitate trade and discourage backdoor
protectionism.
While the United States, like all
other countries, occasionally finds itself
in situations where it is forced to make
difficult decisions in the trade field, I
would like to point out that the United
States continues to be the most open
market in the world for imports. This
access has been particularly important
to the development of low-income coun-
tries and is most apparent in trade in
manufactured goods.
In 1979, the U.S. market absorbed
nearly half of all OECD [Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment] country imports of manufactures
from the developing world — a share
much larger than our share of the
aggregate GNP of the OECD countries.
Altogether, non-OPEC [Organization of
Petroleum Exporting Countries]
developing countries provided 23% of all
U.S. imports of manufactured goods in
1979.
Korea has been one of the countries
that has particularly benefitted from this
openness. Our imports from Korea rose
from $370 million in 1970 to $4.4 billion
in 1980, thus making an important con-
tribution to the structural transforma-
tion of the Korean economy.
Developing Countries
The fourth element of our international
economic policy is a continued strong
commitment to the economic develop-
ment efforts of developing countries. We
are continuing to maintain a large
foreign aid program. Despite the
widespread cuts in our overall budget,
which I mentioned earlier, the Reagan
revision of the FY 1982 budget proposes
an 18% increase in foreign aid
appropriations over the previous year.
We have also reaffirmed our intention of
fulfilling the commitments made by the
previous Administration to the
multilateral development banks.
I would like to note, however, two
important changes in the direction of
our aid policies.
First, we intend to tie our foreign
aid policies more closely to our overall
economic, political, and security
interests. This is one element of our ef-
fort to restore coherence to our foreign
policy and to reassure our friends and
allies of our continued support for their
efforts.
Second, we intend to increase our
support for private sector participation
in the LDC [less developed countries]
development effort. Quite often, the
private sector can accomplish what the
public sector cannot do efficiently. The
Administration will be looking for new
ways of making it attractive for
American business to be involved in the
economic development of lower income
countries.
As a signal of his concern about the
problems of developing countries and his
willingness to search for solutions to
these problems, President Reagan
recently accepted a personal invitation
from Mexican President Lopez Portillo
to attend a North-South summit meeting
later this year in Cancun, Mexico, to be
hosted by Mexico and Austria. We hope
that the Cancun meeting will provide an
opportunity for constructive interchange
on the important policy problems facing
developed and developing coun-
tries—such as energy issues and the
tober 1981
47
Economics
recycling process. Economic relations
with the developing countries in the con-
text of the world economy will also be a
topic for discussion at the summit
meeting of leaders of the major in-
dustrial countries, scheduled for next
month in Ottawa.1
Effects of U.S. Policy on LDCs
As I have just outlined, our international
economic policy has four major
elements: sound domestic economic
policy, action on energy, liberal inter-
national trading arrangements, and
financial support for the efforts of the
developing countries. Let me now
suggest for you how these four policy
elements are likely to affect the devel-
oping countries.
I would first note that the fourth
element— financial support for LDC
development efforts— may well be less
important than the other three for the
future growth of the developing coun-
tries. The development process is one in
which the efforts of the country itself
are paramount, as demonstrated by
Korea's own successful experience, and
one in which foreign aid can play only a
supporting role.
There is significant evidence, for
example, that those LDCs which have
invested heavily in human as well as
physical capital and have pursued
export-oriented development strategies
have been the most successful. It is also
clear that those countries that have pur-
sued a rational pricing strategy have
allocated resources most efficiently. And
those that have striven to see a broad
spectrum of the population share in the
benefits of real development have seen
their policies amply rewarded. In most
cases, development strategies involving
these three approaches have involved
the emergence of vigorous business sec-
tors. These policy choices have to be
made by the developing countries
themselves.
Even within the broad category of
external financing of development, con-
centration on the relatively small official
aid contributions sometimes leads us to
forget the much larger flows from the
rest of our economy. U.S. imports from
nonoil developing countries in 1979 were
$58.6 billion, more than 10 times our of-
ficial aid flows. The same type of rela-
tionship holds for all the Western aid-
giving nations as a group. U.S. direct
investment in the developing countries
runs at or above the level of aid, and
LDC use of private capital markets
results in commercial bank loans and
bond issues far exceeding development
assistance. In 1979 alone, commercial
banks provided $37 billion to LDCs,
while total flows of official development
assistance from all OECD countries
were $22 billion.
The phenomenal gains in trade
experienced by many LDCs over the
course of the last 3 decades have been,
in good measure, a result of the sus-
tained growth in the OECD countries
and a determination, especially in the
United States, to keep markets as open
as possible. The growth slowdown in the
United States and worldwide during the
last few years has hurt LDC growth
prospects directly. The sooner we and
other industrialized countries can
achieve an equilibrium of higher growth
and lower inflation, the better will it be
for LDC growth prospects and the more
LDCs will be able to see positive results
from export-oriented development
strategies.
Let me digress for just a moment on
the issue of trade to make two points:
First, it has always struck me as a
bit disingenuous to advise developing
countries to pursue export strategies if
developed countries are unwilling to
accept increases in manufactured im-
ports. In this regard, I am heartened by
the fact that in the United States we
have let the free market operate with a
minimum of restraints so that $1 out of
every $5 of manufactured imports
originates in the Third World.
Second, it is also unrealistic to
expect many developing countries to
follow the Asian export example unless
currently successful LDC exporters are
willing to import from the other devel-
oping countries.
KOREA
As a corollary to these observations, we
intend to attempt to inject a more
realistic attitude into consultations and
discussions in international forums. Over
the past few years the debates in such
forums have often tended toward
rhetorical posturing. Some would claim
that we live in a bipolar world — of
North and South or of developed and
less developed— when casual observation
would suggest just the opposite conclu-
sion: that there is a continuum of coun-
tries, ranging from very poor to very
rich.
Korea is proof that a country's posi-
tion on this continuum is not fixed. In
only two decades Korea has risen from a
country with one of the lowest per
capita incomes in the world to a position
of considerable industrial strength and
economic maturity. This is convincing
evidence that a country's real economic
interests lie in the promotion of a
healthy international market economy.
We believe that greater prosperity
for the countries of the world will not b
the result of agreements between
negotiating teams disputing the meanin
of abstract texts in some international
forum but, rather, of difficult decisions
by individual governments and hard
work by their citizens, combined with a
open international system that provides
a framework for international coopera-
tion on concrete problems.
Oil Price Increases
If oil price increases have created havo
for the Korean economy, the effect has
been so much the worse for countries
where the economy is not as developed
as yours. The two successive OPEC
price shocks of 1973-74 and 1979-80
have forced all developing countries to
allocate more and more of their meage
financial resources to pay for their oil
imports and to service their increasing
debt burden.
If the maturities on which the oil
revenues of OPEC producers are lent I
developing countries are too short to
allow them to play a useful supporting
role in development investment, we
must find a way to lengthen these
maturities. It is in devising cooperativ<
and creative solutions to such real prol
lems that we achieve real progress.
GNP Growth
Korea stands out as one of the world's
economic miracles of the past 2 decad<
GNP growth has averaged more than
9% per year— a fivefold increase in to
output in 20 years. The fruits of this
growth have been widespread
throughout the economy and accom-
panied by substantial improvements ir
income, housing, education, and healtl
in both urban and rural areas.
The growth of Korean participatic
in the world economy, evidenced by tr
annual growth rate in the volume of il
exports of 25% between 1960 and 198
played a central role in this process.
Total exports have grown from $40
million in 1960 to above $17.5 billion i
1980.
There has been a tremendous
change in Korea's industrial capabilitii
over the period. As its comparative
advantage has shifted from low-skill,
48
Department of State Bulle
Economics
Hior-intensive products to increasingly
mhisticated manufactured goods and
ftchinery, the international economy
Ds been sufficiently open and flexible to
Ike room for these products.
)NCLUSION
should be clear that our policies seek
maintain the kind of international
stem that has been important in sup-
rting Korean self-help efforts over the
st 2 decades. In this regard, Korea
ould stand as an example to other
veloping countries of what can be
rieved by initiative, broad-based
man resource strategies, and sound
onomic policies. We hope that the
veloping world will produce more
>reas over the next decade.
But Korea will need to assume
sater responsibilities in the inter-
tional economic system commensurate
th its growing capabilities by liberal-
rig its trade regime, maintaining a
spitable and nondiscriminatory
siness and investment climate, and by
changing technical knowhow with
ler, less-advanced, developing coun-
es. This will contribute to closer
momic relations between the United
ates and Korea in the future. The
owth of the U.S. economy, together
;th the openness of our economy to
ernational trade and service, should
ovide Korea with export markets for
products, just as the growth of the
>rean market should provide oppor-
aities for U.S. producers and in-
stors.
Closer economic relations increase
2 need for periodic consultation,
deed, the breadth and complexity of
2se relations are the reason for my
esence in Korea. I expect to have
ink discussions with our delegation's
irean counterparts, which will reflect
I close economic relationship.
The February 2 meeting of the
esidents of Korea and the United
ates was an opportunity to reaffirm
i spirit of cooperation and friendship
lien bind our two countries. That spirit
II permeate my meetings here. I
lieve that both sides have made every
'ort to assure that the framework of
r economic relations is such that it
II sustain increasing prosperity for
th our peoples.
Multilateral Development Banks
and U.S. Human Rights Policy
'Ottawa economic summit was held July
21, 1981 (see August 1981 Bulletin).*
by Ernest B. Johnston, Jr.
Statement before the Subcommittee
on International. Development Insti-
tutions of the House Committee on
Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs on
July 21, 1981. Mr. Johnston is Deputy
Assistant Secretary for Economic and
Business Affairs. '
The International Financial Institutions
Act of 1977 (Public Law 95-118)
requires the U.S. executive directors of
the World Bank and the regional banks
to oppose loans to any country whose
government engages in a consistent pat-
tern of gross violations of internationally
recognized human rights, unless the
assistance is directed specifically to pro-
grams which serve the basic human
needs of the citizens of that country.
This provision is also applicable to coun-
tries which provide refuge to individuals
committing acts of international
terrorism by hijacking aircraft.
The previous Administration's votes
in the multilateral development banks
(MDBs) were guided by a number of
policy considerations, among which
human rights figured prominently. In
recent years the United States has voted
negatively or abstained on 118 loans to
15 countries because of human rights
concerns. On no occasion have we
received sufficient support from other
countries to prevent approval of a loan.
When this Administration took
office, the United States had op-
posed— on human rights grounds — by a
"no" vote or an abstention, the most
recent loans for nonbasic human needs
purposes to 11 countries — Chile,
Vietnam, Afghanistan, Laos, People's
Democratic Republic of Yemen,
Argentina, Guatemala, Republic of
Korea, Paraguay, Philippines, and
Uruguay.
After a review of the current human
rights situations, the Department recom-
mended that the Treasury instruct U.S.
executive directors not to oppose on
human rights grounds loans to five of
those countries — Korea, Argentina,
Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay. Before
discussing the reasoning behind these
decisions, I would like to present the
Administration's human rights policy in
more general terms.
Human Rights Policy
Last week Mr. [Walter J.] Stoessel,
Under Secretary of State for Political
Affairs, described to the Subcommittee
on Human Rights and International
Organizations how we view the issue of
human rights in the context of our
general foreign relations. I would like to
describe the main themes of policy on
this issue and submit that statement for
the record.
The American people have been
deeply committed to human rights.
Indeed, such values lie at the very core
of our institutions. The protection and
promotion of human rights under this
Administration will continue as impor-
tant goals of our foreign policy, right-
fully reflecting the broad consensus of
all Americans.
Another quality valued by the
American people is effectiveness. In pur-
suing our human rights goals, we should
use the instruments we feel are most
likely to gain real improvements in
human rights conditions. In selecting
these instruments we must also consider
the heritage and institutions of the coun-
tries we are seeking to influence.
Our success in improving the human
rights conditions in other countries will,
of course, be affected by the example we
set for the world. We must maintain our
record of constant improvement in the
protection of the rights of our own
citizens. We must pursue our commit-
ment to these principles with consist-
ency and strength in order to gain the
trust of our friends and allies and the
respect of our adversaries. This
Administration intends to provide such
an example.
Our approaches to other govern-
ments on human rights will be both
public and private and will use normal
diplomatic channels as well as other
opportunities. Greater emphasis will be
given to private approaches, however,
because we feel they have greater poten-
tial for results. Public condemnation can
often lead to increased resistance to
change as a face-saving reaction. Never-
theless, there are occasions when public
expressions of concern are useful, and
the Administration will use this
approach whenever it is needed, as well
as when it is required under statutory
human rights provisions.
:tober 1981
49
Economics
Interagency Group on Human Rights
and Foreign Assistance
This subcommittee has expressed con-
cern over the recent Administration
decision not to oppose, on human rights
grounds, several multilateral develop-
ment bank loans currently proposed for
Paraguay, Uruguay, Chile, and
Argentina.
In 1977 the interagency group on
human rights and foreign assistance was
established to provide guidance re-
garding specific decisions on bilateral
and multilateral loans. A staff level
interagency working group was also
formed to prepare recommendations to
this policy level committee. As operating
procedures improved and decisions had
established precedents, more issues
came to be resolved at the working
level. The full committee met 13 times in
its first year, nine times in 1978, five
times in 1979, and only twice in 1980.
The working group met approximately
once a month.
Under this Administration, the inter-
agency working group has continued to
meet on a regular basis and review all
proposed loans and projects of the
MDBs, assessing information about
human rights from a wide range of
sources. It carefully considers reports of
international human rights organizations
and from American embassies and
recommends, in accordance with section
701, whether the United States should
vote against or abstain on a loan.
In arriving at its decisions, the
working group examines the human
rights climate and trends in the country
seeking the loan, the nature of the loan
under review — with particular attention
as to whether the loan is directed
specifically to basic human needs —
bilateral U.S. assistance, and the effec-
tiveness of our vote in the context of our
other efforts to promote human rights in
that country. The legislative
requirements that affect the eventual
recommendation have to be our first
consideration. In cases where the
working group is unable to decide or
where there are issues of particular
importance — which there almost always
are when there is a change in our voting
pattern — the matter goes to the top
levels of the Department for resolution
and subsequent recommendation to the
Secretary of the Treasury.
On April 17, the Treasury Depart-
ment informed Congress, in accordance
with the International Financial Institu-
tions Act of 1977, of the Admin-
Japan To Continue Imports
of Fruits and Vegetables
Following discussions between U.S. and
Japanese officials in Washington and
Tokyo, the Government of Japan will
continue to accept for import into Japan
fruits and vegetables covered by
phytosanitary certificates. In practice,
this means that import prohibitions will
apply only to those fruits and vegetables
which come from areas in California
federally regulated for the Mediterra-
nean fruit fly (Medfly). This is consonant
with procedures governing movement of
these same fruits and vegetables in
interstate commerce within the United
States.
The United States is sending a
technical team to Japan August 19,
1981, to meet with Japanese officials for
the purpose of consultations on the
regulated areas and plant procedures, as
well as the list of fruits and vegetables
host to the Medfly, and other related
matters.
As we have previously stated, the
U.S. Government recognizes the
legitimate concerns of the Japanese
Government in this matter, and we
intend to continue to work cooperatively
with the Government of Japan to deal
effectively with those concerns. We are
very appreciative of the positive and
constructive manner in which the
Government of Japan has worked with
both the Department of Agriculture and
the Department of State on this matter.
Secretary [of Agriculture John R.] Block
and Deputy Secretary [of State William
P.] Clark in particular express their per-
sonal appreciation for this cooperation.
Press release 284 of Aug. 19, 1981.
istration's intention to vote in favor of a
nonbasic human needs loan to Korea.
During the period from June to
December 1980, the United States had
abstained on seven loans to Korea-
valued at a total of $374 million— from
the World Bank and the Asian Develop-
ment Bank. This decision was reached
by consensus at the working group level
and reviewed at the policy level. Begin-
ning with a vote on April 21, we have
approved four loans to Korea with a
total value of $213 million.
On July 1 , we informed Congress of
our intention not to oppose on human
rights grounds certain MDB loans for
nonbasic human needs projects in
Argentina, Chile, Paraguay, and
Uruguay. As we explained when we
announced our intention, we decided to
vote for the loans in view of the prog-
ress that has been made in the area of
human rights in each of these countries
We do not believe that the present situ;
tion in any of them currently requires i
to oppose loans under the statute. It is
our view that, in this way, we could bes
encourage further progress on human
rights.
In the case of Paraguay, the numbt
of people with claim to political prisone
status is down from 600 5 years ago to
about a half dozen at the present time.
The last reported disappearance was in
1979, and the U.N. Human Rights Corr
mission dropped Paraguay from the
countries under active review in its
February session. In Uruguay there
have been very few new arrests and co
victions in recent years and the numbei
of prisoners is declining. The situation ;
Chile began to improve significantly in
late 1976, but concern about the
Letelier-Moffitt case kept the United
States from acknowledging that
progress. Concern over that case was
right, but we feel it is now important ti
give a positive signal to Chile to
encourage continuing improvement.
The level of violence in Argentina,
to which terrorist activity was a major
contributing factor, peaked in the years
1976-78. Thousands of persons disap-
peared during that period, but in 1979
there were 44 confirmed cases, last yea
only 12, and there have been no con-
firmed disappearances in many months
The number of prisoners held under
executive powers has dropped from
8,000 to about 900, and releases con-
tinue.
Conclusion
Human rights problems clearly remain
in these countries. But if we are to hav
a human rights policy that encourages
further progress, we should recognize
the improvements that have occurred.
The fight for human rights in any
country involves domestic political
struggles. If we do not recognize prog-
ress we weaken those factions in any
particular country who are arguing tha
progress has some beneficial inter-
national results. We must work for fur-
ther human rights progress and use oui
most effective tools to attain it.
50
Derjartment of State Bulleti
EJROPE
,
Soviet Military Exercise
IPAKTMENT STATEMENT,
PT. 4, 19811
August 14 the Soviet Union notified
CE [Conference on Security and
operation in Europe] signatories of an
jrcise to take place September 4-12 in
Byelorussian and Baltic military
tricts and on the Baltic Sea. The
viet notification did not include the
mber of troops taking part in the
jrcise. This information is required
der the Helsinki Final Act confidence-
lding measure on prior notification of
jor military maneuvers.
In the past the Soviet Union has
/ays given information on the number
participating troops in its notifica-
ns. Thus the Soviet notification of the
•rent exercise is inconsistent with its
n past practice. We have inquired
jut the omission of this information in
s case but have received no troop
are or explanation from the Soviet
ion.
The failure of the Soviet Union to
ivide the number of participating
ces is inconsistent with the Final Act
jor maneuver confidence-building
asure.
This matter should be of concern to
These decisions are not unprec-
ented. The previous administration
o changed from opposing to
proving loans in a number of coun-
es. Those changes were based on an
sessment of the human rights situa-
ns in the countries at the time the
ms were presented and the fact that
;re had been improvements.
In casting our future votes in the
iltilateral development banks on loans
all countries, we will observe
itutory requirements of the Inter-
tional Financial Institutions Act. We
II also take into account financial and
momic factors that are of importance.
i will continue to give special atten-
n to which kind of vote is most likely
encourage improvement in human
hts conditions. Our guiding goal must
to have the United States make effec-
e contributions to the progress of
man rights wherever we can.
all those participating in the Madrid
CSCE followup meeting. It raises a
question of Soviet willingness to imple-
ment fully the provisions of the Final
Act confidence-building measures, and it
underscores the necessity that any con-
ference on disarmament in Europe man-
date embody the proposed Western
criteria (i.e., confidence-building
measures must be militarily significant,
verifiable, politically binding, and
applicable to the whole Continent of
Europe, including all of the European
territory of the Soviet Union).
DEPARTMENT STATEMENT,
SEPT. 8, 19811
Subsequent to my statement on
September 4 regarding the notification
of the Soviet exercise now taking place
in the Baltic and Byelorussian military
districts, TASS has advised that the
number of Soviet forces participating in
that exercise is 100,000.
In view of this announcement of the
size of the Soviet exercise, it is now
clear that the Soviet Union has failed to
observe the Helsinki Final Act provision
on prior notification of major military
maneuvers. That provision calls upon
the notifying party to include in its
notification the numerical strength of
the forces taking part in the maneuver.
A major military maneuver is defined in
the Final Act as one involving more
than 25,000 men.
We deeply regret that the Soviet
Union did not provide this information
in its original notification and that it has
not yet officially replied to our inquiries
on this question.
The signatories to the Final Act can
only view with concern the failure of the
Soviet Union to comply with the provi-
sion on prior notification of major
military maneuvers. It raises serious
questions about the Soviets' professed
interest in measures designed to build
confidence and to enhance stability in
Europe. As I said on Friday, this
underscores the necessity that any man-
date for a conference on disarmament in
Europe embody the proposed Western
criteria for confidence-building
measures.
We also note the continuing failure
of the Soviet Union to implement the
humanitarian provisions of the Final Act
as evidenced by the lack of progress on
reunification of divided families and by
the arrest of numerous individuals
seeking to exercise rights recognized by
the Soviet Government when it signed
the Final Act. The overall Soviet record
raises deep concern about the
seriousness of the Soviet Union's com-
mitment to fully implement the Final
Act.
'The complete transcript of the hearings
I be published by the committee and will
available from the Superintendent of
:uments, U.S. Government Printing
ice, Washington, D.C. 20402.B
'Read to news correspondents by Depart-
ment spokesman Dean Fischer. ■
Third Report
on Cyprus
MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS,
JULY 23, 19811
In accordance with the provision of Public
Law 95-384, I am submitting the following
report on progress made during the past
sixty days toward reaching a negotiated set-
tlement of the Cyprus problem.
The intercommunal negotiations between
Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot represen-
tatives are continuing under the chairman-
ship of the United Nations Secretary
General's Special Representative on Cyprus,
Ambassador Hugo Gobbi. During the period
since my last report, the Greek and Turkish
Cypriote prepared for and held elections, and
the pace in intercommunal negotiations
slowed with one negotiating session held on
June 2. Elections having been completed,
regular intercommunal sessions resumed on
July 8 and we anticipate the parties will con-
tinue meetings on a regular basis. Both sides
have continued to negotiate in a congenial
atmosphere.
We also note with pleasure that the Com-
mittee on Missing Persons held its inaugural
meeting on July 14. Although procedural
questions delayed the initial session, these
now appear largely to have been overcome.
As I noted in my report of May 19, although
the problem of missing persons in Cyprus is
not officially an issue for the intercommunal
negotiations, it is an important humanitarian
concern for both communities. Consequently,
progess on this issue could be conducive to
facilitating a positive negotiating atmosphere
and we hope the Committee will be able to
proceed with its substantive mandate in the
near term.
More importantly we hope that during
the coming months the parties, under the
aegis of United Nations Secretary General
Waldheim, will seek to move vigorously on
the issues dividing them. During almost a
year of steady negotiating, the parties have
examined in detail the complex issues
separating them. We hope they can now
tober 1981
51
MIDDLE EAST
begin to attack the problems and advance
toward a just, fair and lasting resolution of
the Cyprus question.
Sincerely,
Ronald k
U.S. Proposes Air Defense
Package for Saudi Arabia
■Identical letters addressed to Thomas P.
O'Neill, Jr., Speaker of the House of
Representatives, and Charles H. Percy, chair-
man of the Senate Foreign Relations Com-
mittee (text from Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents of July 27, 1981. ■
10th Anniversary of
the Quadripartite
Agreement
DEPARTMENT STATEMENT,
SEPT. 3. 19811
We wish to draw your attention to the
fact that today is the 10th anniversary
of the signing of the Quadripartite
Agreement on Berlin of September 3,
1971. It is with satisfaction that we note
the beneficial effects which this agree-
ment has had for stabilizing the situation
in and around Berlin.
The Quadripartite Agreement
recognized and reaffirmed Four Power
rights and responsibilities for the city
and, in particular, confirmed the impor-
tant legal basis for defense by the
Western allies of the freedom of the
Western sectors of Berlin; it agreed to
the maintenance and development of ties
between Berlin and the Federal Republic
of Germany; it brought about 10 years
of stability and relative peace to Berlin;
and it made possible the alleviation of
many of the human divisions which have
resulted from the unusual situation in
Berlin, the Federal Republic of Ger-
many, and the German Democratic
Republic, particularly through its provi-
sions on the facilitation of travel, visits,
and communications. On .this point we
would note that there is ample room for
further progress. We were especially
disappointed by last year's increase in
the minimum exchange requirements
affecting visitors traveling to both East
Berlin and the German Democratic
Republic.
The United States is fully committed
to the strict observance and full
implementation of the Quadripartite
Agreement and will continue to make its
contribution to the maintenance of peace
and calm in Berlin.
Following are President Reagan's
letter to the Congress of August 5, 1981,
a statement by Under Secretary for
Security Assistance, Science, and
Technology James L. Buckley of August
21f, and a background paper on the
defense enhancement package made
available to the press by the Department
of State on August 2h-
LETTER TO THE CONGRESS,
AUG. 5, 19811
One of the essential elements of the
Administration's Southwest Asia strategy will
come before Congress for review in the near
future. It is to provide Saudi Arabia with a
package of equipment and training to
improve its air defense capabilities. The
package will include five E3A AWACS air-
craft as well as enhancements for the F-15
aircraft which we have agreed to provide.
I am convinced that providing Saudi
Arabia with this equipment will improve the
security of our friends, strengthen our own
posture in the region, and make it clear both
to local governments and to the Soviet
leadership that the United States is deter-
mined to assist in preserving security and
stability in Southwest Asia.
We have not previously submitted this
package to the Congress, although it was
decided upon in principle some time ago, for
two reasons: the priority we needed to place
on securing passage of our economic pro-
gram, and the necessity of working out a set
of understandings with the Saudi leadership
which will ensure that the equipment pro-
vided will be employed to our mutual benefit
and that the U.S. technology and systems in-
volved will be fully protected.
I am aware that information from a
variety of sources has been circulating on
Capitol Hill regarding this sale and that
many Members have been under some
pressure to take an early position against it. I
hope that no one will prejudge our proposal
before it is presented. We will make a strong
case to the Congress that it is in the interest
of our country, the Western Alliance and
stability in the Middle East. Meanwhile, as
the Congress prepares for its August recess,
I would appreciate your support and
assistance in urging that Members do not
prejudge this important issue until they have
had the opportunity to hear the Administra-
tion's views.
Sincerely,
Ronald Reagan
UNDER SECRETARY BUCKLEY,
AUG. 24, 1981
Today we advised the Congress of our
decision to sell certain air defense equi]
ment to Saudi Arabia. This proposed
sale is a cornerstone of the President's
policy to strengthen the strategic
environment of the Middle East. As
such it is an earnest of our commitmen
and determination to defend the area.
We confront a very dangerous situ;
tion in the Persian Gulf today. The
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the
Iranian revolution, the Iraq-Iran war,
and an increased Soviet influence in
Ethiopia and South Yemen are all in-
dicative of the growing threat to U.S.
and Western interests that is posed by
the Soviet Union and its proxies. The
President and this Administration are
determined to reverse this dangerous
trend, to protect interests vital to the
United States and its friends, and to
work with countries in the area to
enhance regional security.
We are convinced that providing
Saudi Arabia with the proposed equip-
ment will not only help it meet its own
legitimate needs but will strengthen oi
own posture in the region and make it
clear to both local governments and to
the Soviet leadership that the United
States is committed to assist in pre-
serving security and stability in
Southwest Asia.
We recognize that the Israeli
Government has expressed concern
about Saudi acquisition of this equip-
ment. Let me reaffirm that this
Administration remains committed to
the security of Israel and will insure tl
Israel maintains its substantial militan
advantage over potential adversaries.
short we will not allow the regional
balance of forces to be affected by the
sale.
By the same token, the restoration
of U.S. strength and credibility in the
region and progress in resolving
regional disputes offer the best long-
term guarantee of security to Israel as
well as to other states in the area
wishing to remain free of Soviet
pressure. The items we propose to sell
to Saudi Arabia will significantly
'Read to news correspondents by Depart-
ment spokesman Dean Fischer. ■
52
Department of State Bullet
Middle East
US MR FORCE
w
A aircraft with airborne warning and control system (AWACS) rotating rotodome.
)rove its defense capabilities and con-
fute significantly to the pursuit of
■5. strategic goals.
The President believes that this sale
•ssential to the protection of vital
!. interests. The arrangements under
ich it will be made will enhance the
urity of all friendly states without
Dardizing the interests of any one of
m.
For your information, although we
[e today provided the Hill with infor-
tion about the proposed sale, the
day informal notification period will
begin running until the Congress'
jrn on September 9. We expect to
formal notification on September 30,
ich means that congressional action
st be taken by October 30.
CKGROUND PAPER,
G. 24, 1981
i proposed Royal Saudi Air Force
>AF) enhancement package consists
101 ship-sets of F-15 conformal fuel
ks (CFTs), 1,177 AIM-9L Sidewinder
isiles, 6 KC-707 aerial refueling air-
£t (with an option for two more), and
I-3A airborne warning and control
■tern (AWACS) aircraft, all with
ociated spares, support and training,
I related ground equipment. The total
ft of the package is $8.5 billion.
The proposed sale to Saudi Arabia
Droves Saudi early warning and air
'ense against attacks on Saudi Arabia,
-ticularly on Saudi oil facilities critical
the United States and its Western
es, as well as to the future prosperity
Saudi Arabia itself. Thus, the sale
;ponds to the legitimate security
luirements of a country that is central
the success of our regional security
ategy. The sale will also serve our
broader strategic interests, enhancing
gulf security by laying the groundwork
for greater overall U.S. -Saudi defense
cooperation and for a more effective
gulf air defense network. Finally, it will
demonstrate our reliability as a security
partner, help rebuild confidence in the
United States as an arbiter of regional
tensions, and increase Saudi willingness
to work with us to achieve a durable
Middle East peace.
The proposed package must be
measured against four primary U.S.
objectives for the region:
• Continuation of stable and secure
access to regional oil;
• Prevention of the spread of Soviet
influence;
• Security of friendly states in the
region, including Israel; and
• Demonstration of our constancy
and resolve in supporting overall
regional security.
U.S. policy must respond to events
of the past several years which have
adversely affected America's interests.
These events include:
• The fall of the Shah and the
resulting instability in Iran;
• The Iran-Iraq war, which
demonstrated the willingness of regional
adversaries to attack each other's oil
facilities;
• The upgrading of Soviet power
projection capabilities, a growing Soviet
naval presence in the Indian Ocean, and
increased Soviet military presence in the
region (e.g., Afghanistan, South Yemen,
Ethiopia, Syria, and Libya);
• The availability and the active use
of Soviet proxies in local conflicts and in
support of Soviet clients; and
• The Soviet willingness to use their
own forces directly, as they have done in
Afghanistan.
In this environment, Saudi Arabia
finds itself threatened from a variety of
sources. These threats are worsened by
the Saudi recognition of its own limited
military capability to defend its vast and
coveted petroleum resources. As the
anti-Communist leader of the conserva-
tive gulf states and as the largest oil
producer in the Persian Gulf, Saudi
Arabia is vulnerable to military threats
arising out of the Iran-Iraq conflict,
from radical states in the area, and
especially from Soviet or Soviet-inspired
direct and indirect military action.
In response to these threats, the
proposed air defense package makes a
major contribution to Saudi security and
to our vital regional security objectives.
AIM-9L Missile
The AIM-9L is a short range, air-to-air
infrared (heat-seeking) missile. It incor-
porates an all-aspect guidance and con-
trol system which allows head-on attack.
The major improvements of the AIM-9L
over the AIM-9P, currently possessed
by the Saudis, include improved seeker,
providing all aspect and better look-
down capabilities; increased
maneuverabilty; and improved warhead
lethality.
Availability. Currently in production.
• U.S. deployment date: currently in
active inventory.
• U.S. initial operational capability
date: both U.S. Air Force and U.S.
Navy have current capability.
• U.S. quantity on hand: approx-
imately 4,000 (U.S. Air Force and U.S.
Navy inventories).
• Production availability: 30 months.
• Estimated unit cost: $98,000 (does
not include spares, support, training,
etc.).
• Other purchasers: Israel, U.K.,
Germany, Norway, Italy, Japan,
Australia, and Greece.
Anticipated Deployment Locations.
Dhahran, Taif, and Khamis Mushayt.
Quantity Required. 1,177.
Estimated Additional Manpower
Requirements. Nine contractor per-
sonnel based on increased stockpile
requirements.
Estimated Additional Training
Requirements. Minimal aircrew and
ground handling/load crew training
procedural changes from AIM-9P-3.
Estimated Program Cost. $200 million.
tobfir 1981
53
Middle East
Security of the Flow of Oil
The Persian Gulf is the major source of
the world's oil exports. Saudi Arabia is
by far the largest oil producer in the
gulf, accounting for some 63% of the
total gulf production. Loss of Saudi oil
for a prolonged period of time would
have a disastrous impact on the
economy of the West. Control or denial
of access to Saudi oil by the Soviet
Union or other hostile powers would
undermine our security worldwide and
risk splintering the NATO alliance.
At the same time, these oil facilities
are highly vulnerable to air attack. They
are even now within range of Iranian
and other potentially hostile forces.
Nearly all of the Saudi oil-pumping sta-
tions, crude oil-processing facilities,
refineries, storage facilities, and loading
terminals are located within 40 miles of
the Persian Gulf coast in the Dhahran-
Ras Tanura areas. Destruction of certain
of these facilities could cut off com-
pletely the flow of oil for more than a
year. Clearly, it is imperative for the
economic security of the West that these
oil facilities be protected.
The problem of defending the oil
fields is greatly complicated by the
demographic and geographic realities of
Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia is a country
equal in size to all of the United States
east of the Mississippi River. At the
same time, it has a small population of
under 6 million with which to defend
itself. Thus, Saudi Arabia must max-
imize the efficiency of its limited armed
forces through the use of high
technology.
The chances of success of an air
attack against Saudi Arabia are in-
creased because the Saudi terrain is flat,
particularly in the area of the oil fields.
It presents no features which would
enhance the employment of ground-
based radars. Moreover, the oil fields
are on the Persian Gulf coast, so that an
enemy air force would not have to cross
any portion of Saudi Arabia to attack
critical targets.
With current Saudi capabilities, an
attack of low-flying aircraft would not
be detected by ground-based radar until
it was within 2-4 minutes of the oil
fields. Even under the best conditions of
training and readiness, no air force in
the world could respond to this threat in
time to prevent a successful attack on
the oil facilities. It does not serve U.S.
national interests, let alone those of
Conformal Fuel Tanks
(CFTS)for the F-15
CFTs are streamlined fuel tanks
attached to the sides of the F-15
fuselage, with an empty weight of about
2,000 pounds and a total fuel capacity of
approximately 9,750 pounds per set.
The CFTs attach to the aircraft in a
manner that enables rapid installation
and removal (about 90 minutes are
required to install and check out CFTs).
The CFTs retain the capability to
mount and fire four AIM-7 Sparrow air-
to-air missiles, similar to the fuselage
installation. In addition, the CFTs have
been designed with an optional capa-
bility to carry air-to-surface munitions.
Changes to the U.S. Air Force and
Saudi F-15s are required to allow the
CFT to carry air-to-surface munitions.
The Saudis could not perform these
modifications without U.S. approval and
assistance.
Availability. U.S. Air Force production
contract is expected to be awarded in
January 1981 for initial quantity of 75
ship sets pending congressional ap-
proval. The U.S. Air Force plans to
fund additional CFTs in FY 1983-87.
• U.S. first delivery date: June
1983.
• Production availability: 27 months
after contract award.
• Commercial availability: Yes.
• Estimated unit cost: $900,000
(does not include spares, support equip-
ment, technical data, or training).
• Other purchasers: Israel.
Anticipated Deployment Locations.
RSAF F-15 operation locations:
Dhahran, Taif, and Khamis Mushayt.
Quantity Required. 101 ship sets.
Additional Manpower and Training
Requirements. None.
Estimated Program Cost. $110 million.
Saudi Arabia, for the RSAF to be able
only to engage an enemy after it has
destroyed one of our most essential
energy sources.
Proposed Package
Given the nature of our interest in the
continued flow of oil, the threat to that
interest, and the inadequacies of the cur-
rent Saudi air defense capability, it is
vital to help Saudi Arabia improve its
V-
H
air defense by approving the four item fl
in the proposed air defense enhanceme
package.
AIM-9L Sidewinder Missies. The
RSAF must be able to defend the oil
facilities against a numerically superiot
attacking force. With the AIM-9P
Sidewinder missile currently in the
Saudi inventory, Saudi aircraft must
maneuver to a position behind the targ
in order to launch their missiles. AIM-
missiles will allow the RSAF to
intercept an attacking enemy from all
directions, including head-on. This
capability will greatly improve the
chances of shooting down attacking air
craft before they are able to bomb the
oil facilities or other Saudi targets.
(Quantity to be sold: 1,177. Total cost:
$200 million.)
Conformal Fuel Tanks (CFT) and
KC-707 Tankers. Saudi F-15s must be
based so that they are not vulnerable t
a surprise enemy attack and so that th<
can sustain combat even if bases in
eastern Saudi Arabia are put out of ac-
tion. This requires that the RSAF sta-
tion some of its F-15s at Taif and
Khamis Mushayt air bases in the
western part of the country. In order
for these western-based aircraft to pro-
vide extended air cover for the oil field
in the east, they must have increased
range and an aerial refueling capability
CFTs add substantially to the range of
each F-15, while KC-707 tankers allov>
F-15s to remain on-station for extende
periods of time. Extended range and e.
durance of F-15 aircraft will make op-
timal use of the limited Saudi defensive
resources. (Quantity to be sold: 101 set1
of CFTs, 6-8 KC-707s. Total cost: $11'
million for CFTs; $2.4 billion for 8
KC-707s.)
Airborne Warning and Control
System. AW ACS is the most crucial
part of the package because it provides
the early warning without which there
could be no successful defense of the oi
facilities. AWACS will allow the RSAF
to detect attacking enemy air-
craft— depending on the altitude— 150
miles or more from the oil fields, a
sevenfold improvement over ground-
based radars. The RSAF will then have
enough time to scramble interceptor air-
craft which can, with AIM-9L missiles,
engage the enemy head-on, preventing i
from reaching the oil fields. AWACS
will also provide enough warning time t
54
Department of State Bulletii
Middle East
t surface-to-air missile batteries and
,llow them to shoot down attacking
raft that might penetrate the screen
■•-15 interceptors. Without AWACS,
early-warning capability will not
it, no matter how many ground
irs might be employed. AWACS will
in important part of the Saudi air
;nse system, which will include
und-based radars, command and
rations centers, and communications
lities. (Quantity to be sold: 5. Total
;: $5.8 billion.)
vention of Soviet Expansion
Ir the past decade, the Soviet Union
I relentlessly sought to improve its
c tii m in the region. Basic Soviet goals
Ihe Southwest Asia region during the
ter half of the 1980s will remain
I'ntially the same as they are today.
1 se are to:
I • Increase Soviet influence in the
| on and to decrease that of the West;
I • Destabilize an ti- Soviet govern-
lits in the region and replace them
;i governments that are pro-Soviet;
. • Improve Soviet military
i abilities to threaten Western sea and
b inks from the Persian Gulf in order
] ain concessions from countries in the
a on and to destabilize Western
!i ope;
• Assist allies with Soviet military
|»es to preserve pro-Soviet govern-
lits; and
• Maintain a credible military
< ;ure in and near the region, thereby
l ring a Soviet stake in regional
< tical alignments and events.
Although it has experienced set-
i <s in Egypt, Sudan, and Somalia, the
I .S.R. has increased its influence in
gia, retains influence in Iraq, has
E roved its strategic position in the
I n of Africa and on the Arabian
I insula, and has moved in force into
U hanistan. The turmoil in Iran and
* anon offers additional opportunities
B the spread of Soviet influence. In
n environment, the need for a
l)rous U.S. security policy for
I thwest Asia and the Persian Gulf is
lious.
I An important part of this effort is
I perception by regional states that
I United States is prepared to help
Im meet their legitimate defense
Huirements. Failure to allow the
Saudis to buy the equipment both we
and they agree they need will be seen as
a lack of a serious commitment by the
United States. Such an impression will
make it far less likely that Saudi Arabia
and others will agree to the kinds of
security cooperation, joint planning,
combined exercises, and advance
preparations needed if the United States
is to defend shared interests in the Per-
sian Gulf region. Saudi Arabia has iden-
tified the air defense package as an
indicator of American concern for Saudi
security and of our "special
relationship." This perception is rein-
forced by the strong military contribu-
tion which we agree this sale makes to
our collective interests in the region.
KC-707 Tankers
The KC-707 is an aerial tanker version
of the Boeing 707 jet transport. The
KC-707 provides in-flight refueling for
Saudi F-5 and F-15 aircraft, with both
boom and probes and drouge refueling
capabilities. The KC-707 will be pro-
duced on the same production line as the
E-3A AWACS and will share airframe,
engines, and maximum commonality of
aircraft systems.
Availability. KC-707 aircraft will be
available through foreign military
sales beginning in 40-44 months, at a
rate of approximately one aircraft per
month. Total program includes:
• Eight new production KC-707 air-
craft;
• 3 years of initial spare parts;
• Common and peculiar support
equipment;
• Continental U.S. training; and
• 3 years of contractor aircraft
maintenance and aircrew and
maintenance training.
Anticipated Deployment Location.
Initially at Riyadh (approximately 1
year) with later move to Al Kharj
which will be the permanent main
operation base.
Quantity Required. Saudi Arabia has
requested six KC-707s with an option
to buy two additional aircraft.
Additional Manpower and Training
Requirements. Aircrew: 96, two
crews for each of eight aircraft. Per-
sonnel can be converted from C-130
program plus new pilot training
assets.
Estimated Program Cost: $2.4 billion.
In addition, Saudi acquisition of
AWACS and associated ground equip-
ment will provide the basis for a
comprehensive military command, con-
trol and communications, and logistics
infrastructure which could be compatible
with U.S. tactical forces capabilities and
requirements and could become the
nucleus of support for U.S. forces if we
are asked by regional states to respond
in a crisis. The sale also serves our
broader strategic interests in the gulf
region by establishing a foundation for
stronger U.S. -Saudi defense cooperation
and for a more effective, cooperative air
defense network in the area, with
AWACS as the keystone element. Both
of these advances will help deter Soviet
aggression in the gulf.
Failure of the United States to
respond to what we and the Saudis
agree are legitimate security re-
quirements will impel Saudi Arabia to
look elsewhere for support; European
suppliers are eager to meet Saudi air
defense needs. (The Saudis have shown
interest in the British Nimrod and the
French Mirage 2000/2000.) Failure of
the United States to complete the sale
would result in a weaker U.S. -Saudi
security relationship or, worse, could
incline Saudi Arabia to seek an accom-
modation, over the long term, with
radical regional forces that are inimical
to U.S. interests.
Threat to Israel
The security of the State of Israel has
been and will continue to be a para-
mount interest of the United States. The
air defense package has been designed
to meet Saudi defense requirements
while minimizing the impact on the
Arab-Israeli balance.
We recognize that the proposed air
defense enhancement package for Saudi
Arabia is of concern to Israel. However,
the effect of the sale on Israeli security
will be limited by several important fac-
tors.
Superiority of the Israeli Air
Force. Israel has increased its margin of
military superiority over its Arab adver-
saries since the 1973 war. With or
without the enhancement items, the
RSAF realistically poses no significant
threat to the security of Israel. This
assessment is true even in the context of
a general regional conflict. The air
defense package helps Saudi Arabia to
defend itself against regional threats but
tober 1981
55
Middle East
-
E-3A Aircraft
The E-3A is a modified Boeing 707 air-
craft with added surveillance radar,
computer, and communications equip-
ment. It provides an overall air
surveillance capability with command,
control, and communication functions
and can detect and track aircraft at high
and low altitudes, over both land and
water. The E-3A airborne warning and
control system provides real time and
longer-range target detection, identifica-
tion, and tracking.
The most prominent feature of the
E-3A is the large rotating rotodome
that houses radar antennas. The E-3A
has been fitted with an air refueling
receptacle that allows extended time on
station.
Radar Range. Radar detection ranges
for low-flying (200-ft. altitude) small
fighter aircraft is 175 nautical miles
from normal AWACS mission altitude
(29,000 ft.). Medium-size targets can
be seen at 240 nautical miles if they
are above the radar horizon. Detection
range for high-altitude bomber-size
target aircraft is 360 nautical miles.
Ground targets (tanks, trucks) cannot
be detected or tracked. Only airborne
targets moving at speeds greater than
80 mph are seen. Small maritime
targets can be detected and tracked in
low-moderate seas; medium-large
maritime targets can be detected and
tracked in moderate-high seas.
Crew Size. Normal crew is 17: 4 in-
flight crew and 13 in-mission crew
(controllers and technicians).
Availability
• Through foreign military sales
beginning 48 months after approval.
• Aircraft cost is estimated to be
$1.7 billion, including spares, technical
data, support equipment, and training.
• Other purchasers: NATO.
Anticipated Deployment Location.
Riyadh for approximately 1 year and
then Al Kharj.
Quantity Required. RSAF has re-
quested five E-3A aircraft.
Estimated Additional Manpower
Requirements.
• Aircrew: 170, two cockpit and
mission crews for each aircraft.
• Five E-3A aircraft require
approximately 360 maintenance per-
sonnel. This would allow Saudi Arabia
to maintain one 24-hour AWACS orbit
for 1 week during periods of high
tension.
Estimated Program Cost. $5.8 billion.
will not measurably increase Saudi of-
fensive potential. The Israeli Air Force
is far more capable than other, more
likely, Saudi adversaries, such as Iran or
South Yemen.
Saudi Arabia fully recognizes that
Israeli's air defense system (including
pilots, aircraft, surface-to-air systems,
and crews) is exceptionally capable and
that undertaking Saudi missions into
Israeli airspace, either to engage Israeli
aircraft or strike Israeli targets, would
be prohibitively costly. Moreover, Saudi
aircraft are already theoretically capable
of reaching Israeli targets from existing
Saudi airbases, with or without CFTs or
tanker aircraft.
Topography of the Region. As
mentioned, AWACS deployed near the
oil fields will greatly increase Saudi
warning of an air attack. To provide
coverage of Israel, however, the
AWACS would have to be deployed
along Saudi Arabia's northernmost
border or over Jordan or Syria. Even
then, because Israeli and Jordanian ter-
rain is very rugged, AWACS radar
coverage would be masked in some
areas. Consequently, Saudi deployment
of AWACS near Israel would provide
little improvement in Saudi warning
time but would dramatically increase the
vulnerability of AWACS to Israeli attack
and destruction.
Five AWACS aircraft would provide
the Saudis with the capability to main-
tain one continuous (24-hour) AWACS
orbit, and that for a limited period. This
fact means that any AWACS
deployments to other parts of Saudi
Arabia would necessarily come at the
expense of full coverage of the eastern
province.
Limitations of AWACS. Saudi
AWACS will be an overwhelmingly
defensive system; it is essentially a
!:
flying air defense radar. AWACS cam
detect ground targets nor can it collec
electronic, signal, or photographic
intelligence.
If the Saudis chose to expose their
AWACS by operating close to Israel,
the aircraft could collect data on Israe
air activities. However, this informatic
would be highly perishable, most of it
being valuable only for a few minutes
following its collection. Therefore,
without a sophisticated computerized
communications network in other Aral
countries— which only the United Stat
could provide— little, if any, of this
information could help in a collective
Arab attack on Israel. Information
derived from AWACS could be sent in
the clear to other Arab forces, but sue
communications could be easily jamme
by Israel.
Data on advancing Israeli aircraft
could not be supplied in a timely manr
or with enough accuracy to enable oth
Arab forces to react effectively.
Although AWACS-derived informatioi
could provide some warning of preemi
tive Israeli airstrikes, such warning
would not alter the overall Israeli
military superiority or the likely out-
come of a war between Israel and the
Arab states.
U.S. Personnel. The nature of th«
AWACS is so complex that U.S. con-
tractor personnel will be required to
maintain key elements of the system f
its entire life. It is, therefore, extreme
unlikely that any unauthorized use of
AWACS could go undetected. The
withdrawal of U.S. support for the
Saudi AWACS would quickly result in
the system becoming nonoperational.
Thus, the proposed air defense
package has the unique qualities of be;
most effective against hostile aircraft
over the oil fields, while being of
marginal value in any hypothetical wai
against Israel.
Conclusion
The proposed sale of the air defense
enhancement package to Saudi Arabia
serves our national security interests i
five ways.
First, the sale clearly helps the
Saudis defend themselves. The AWAC
and other elements will bolster Saudi
early warning and air defense
capabilities and enable them to defend
their oil facilities from air attack.
56
Department of State Bullet
Middle East
Second, the sale will help restore
credibility as a reliable security part-
in the region, something that is
■ntial if local countries are to believe
; the benefits of embracing our
,tegy outweigh the costs.
Third, it helps meet some of our
military needs in the gulf. To be
to respond to air threats to gulf oil
lities if called upon, we must have
lable an early warning air defense
vork. The Saudi AW ACS could be
foundation of such a network.
Fourth, with AWACS and the other
ancements, we will be providing an
msive logistics base and support
astructure, including spare parts,
lities, trained personnel, and
;ialized test and maintenance equip-
lt which is fully compatible with
ipment which would be deployed with
. forces. Having such access in Saudi
bia would, therefore, facilitate
loyment of U.S. tactical air forces to
region in time of need, if so re-
sted.
Fifth, insofar as the sale highlights
commitment to Saudi security and is
specifically tied to our broader
tegy of countering Soviet and
iet-proxy threats in the region, it
also provides a positive foundation for
more extensive U.S.-Saudi security
cooperation over time.
We cannot force our regional friends
to cooperate directly with us. But we
can and must take steps with each that
demonstrate our seriousness and our
commitment to regional security. This
package not only will improve the defen-
sive capabilities of key regional states to
protect our mutual vital interests, it will
also contribute to restoring the image of
U.S. power and the value of U.S. friend-
ship in the area. In the long run, it is
the restoration of U.S. power and
credibility that offers the best guarantee
against Soviet threats to the region and
radical efforts to undermine the peace
process. Selling AWACS and other
enhancement items to Saudi Arabia con-
stitutes a necessary step in the process
of working toward these broader goals.
'Identical letters addressed to Senate
Majority Leader Howard H. Baker, Jr.,
Senate Minority Leader Robert C. Byrd,
Speaker of the House of Representatives
Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr., and House Minority
Leader Robert H. Michel (text from Weekly
Compilation of Presidential Documents of
Aug. 10, 1981). ■
MACS and Saudi
lound Environment
di Arabia plans to upgrade the
,ting ground environment portion of
air defense system, which was
aired in the late 1960s. The ground
ironment improvements package
ompassing modernization of the
*\F command, control, and com-
lication system will be included in
1 full RSAF enhancement package
It to Congress.
I These ground environment
lancements are necessary, in com-
1 it ion with the five E-3A AWACS
I -raft, to provide the RSAF with an
irtive, fully integrated air defense
Iveillance and command, control, and
limunication system.
I The planned improvements in the
luli ground environment system are
led on a 2-year command, control,
II communication master plan study
I ducted by the U.S. Air Force for the
AF. The planned upgrade includes
new hardened command and control
facilities, new data processing and
display equipment for those facilities,
and improvements to the ground radar
surveillance network through replace-
ment of existing radars and addition of
new sites to extend coverage.
The AWACS would significantly
augment ground environment
surveillance capability and provide com-
mand and control flexibility through its
interface with ground environment by
means of ground entry stations. The sta-
tions, located at command and control
facilities and other selected locations for
optimum radio coverage, provide com-
munications and processing equipment
for data exchange compatibility between
AWACS and ground environment data
processing systems.
The ground environment improve-
ments will take about 6 years to com-
plete. The total cost of this program to
the Saudis is estimated to be $1.5 billion.
The Saudis plan for the radars to be
jointly acquired and operated by the
RSAF (10 systems) and the Presidency
for Civil Aviation (12 systems).
U.S. Planes Attacked
by Libyan Aircraft
Following are a news briefing by
Secretary of Defense Casper W.
II rinliergcr mid I.I. Gen. Philip •/. Gast,
USAF. Director <>f Operations of the
Joi ill Chiifs if Staff held August 19.
1981, anil I h m> State Department
statements of August 19.
NEWS BRIEFING,
AUG. 19, 1981
Secretary Weinberger. Two U.S. Navy
F-14 aircraft, involved in a previously
announced routine exercise in inter-
national airspace over international
waters in the south central Mediterra-
nean, were attacked early this morning
by two Libyan SU-22 fighter aircraft.
After being fired upon, the F-14s,
based on the U.S. aircraft carrier
Nimitz, took action in response and shot
down both Libyan aircraft at 1:20 a.m.,
EDT, this morning. The U.S. Govern-
ment is protesting, through diplomatic
channels, this unprovoked attack which
occurred in international airspace over
60 nautical miles from the nearest land.
The exercise is continuing as planned.
The President was notified this
morning and approved the actions taken
and the continuance of the exercise. The
entire National Security Council net-
work was alerted in connection with this
event immediately after it happened, in-
cluding the Vice President and the other
members of the National Security Coun-
cil. The congressional leadership was
notified, and, of course, we regret very
much that the Libyans took this
action and brought about these conse-
quences.
Q. You said in international
waters. The Libyans, of course, are
claiming those waters as their own.
Was our being there in any way a
provocation to them?
Secretary Weinberger. No, I
couldn't consider it a provocation
because they are international waters;
there's no basis for any claim in the area
where this incident took place that they
were national waters or anything other
than international waters.
Q. Were there any casualties?
tober 1981
57
Middle East
Secretary Weinberger. A Libyan
pilot of one of the planes was seen to go
down by parachute, and the American
pilots have returned to the Nimitz and
had no injuries and, of course, no
damage to the planes.
Q. Were the American pilots
involved in this exercise told if fired
upon to fire back?
Secretary Weinberger. They were
following the international rules of
engagement that would govern this kind
of situation, and they carried out their
instructions and carried them out
extremely well.
Q. You said the President was
notified and approved of the action.
He didn't have to approve of their
returning the fire, did he?
Secretary Weinberger. No, no, that
was within the discretion of the com-
mander. Gen. Philip Gast is here with
me this morning — Director for Opera-
tions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff — and
would be glad to take specific questions.
Q. When you say within the
discretion of the commander, do you
mean the flight commander or the on-
scene pilots or —
Secretary Weinberger. Initially,
the commander of the operation, Gen.
Gast.
Q. Was an attack unanticipated?
Secretary Weinberger. I think so.
Yes, there's no reason to suppose that
we would be attacked in international
waters in an unprovoked way when an
exercise had been commenced, had
been formally notified with a formal
notice to airmen and to mariners, as re-
quired, and in an area where we have
exercised many times before. I think we
ought to have an answer to this question
by the general.
Gen. Gast. Under these conditions
of operations such as this, that if an
enemy aircraft conducts a hostile
act — in this case did take on fire of our
two aircraft — the aircraft flight com-
mander has the authority to defend
himself. In this case, that's exactly what
he did.
Q. Are you saying that he was
adhering to the rules that U.S. air-
craft would be adhering to anywhere
in the world with no specific instruc-
tions?
Gen. Gast. That's right, those are
normal procedures.
58
DEPARTMENT STATEMENT,
AUG. 19, 19811
Two U.S. Navy F-14 aircraft involved in
a previously announced routine exercise
in international airspace over interna-
tional waters in the south central
Mediterranean were attacked by two
Libyan SU-22 fighter aircraft. After be-
ing fired upon, the F-14s from the air-
craft carrier U.S.S. Nimitz took action
in response and shot down both Libyan
aircraft at 1:20 a.m. EDT, August 19,
1981. The U.S. Government is pro-
testing, through diplomatic channels,
this unprovoked attack which occurred
in international airspace approximately
60 nautical miles from the nearest land.
Q. What was the nature of the
Libyan attack?
Secretary Weinberger. Two Libyan
fighter planes came out and fired at the
American planes.
Q. With rockets?
Secretary Weinberger. Rockets,
yes, I guess they were rockets —
Gen. Gast. Yes, they were missiles,
Atoll missiles.
Q. How many aircraft total were
involved in this?
Secretary Weinberger. Two
Libyan, two American.
Q. Were the Libyan planes
threatening the Nimitz!
Secretary Weinberger. No, they
were not near the Nimitz. They were
attacking these aircraft.
Q. How far was the Nimitz from
the scene?
Secretary Weinberger. I don't
know precisely.
Q. Was there any effort or was
this exercise viewed in any way as an
attempt to challenge the Libyan asser-
tions with respect to their territorial
waters that they claim? There was
some publicity, some press accounts,
suggesting that the Administration
was going to present some kind of a
challenge to the Libyans on this
matter and then we have this event.
Secretary Weinberger. I wouldn't
describe it that way. We regard these as
international waters. We've had naval
and air exercises there before. This on
was scheduled for some time, and the
notification went out in the perfectly
normal fashion — notice to airmen, not]
to mariners — and the exercise took
place as scheduled and is continuing a;
scheduled.
Q. Has there been any followup i
tion by either side and is any content
plated by the United States in furthe n
retaliation?
Secretary Weinberger. No, we're
continuing with the exercise. We have
no plans to do any followup. I think
there's been some continuation of
patroling in the area by other aircraft
but nothing like this incident.
Q. I gather that at the same time
as these exercises are going on, the
Egyptian military is also conducting
exercises near Libya?
Secretary Weinberger. Not to ou i
knowledge.
Q. When you say the exercise coi
tinues, does that mean that America
planes will continue to fly within th»
airspace that Libya claims?
Secretary Weinberger. Within th
space we contend is international
waters, yes, they will. The exercise is
supposed to conclude, I believe, about
1:00 p.m. EDT.
Q. Normally we understand the
3-mile limit as the acceptable limit. 1
that the case the United States so
regards in the case of Libya — the
3-mile limit as international waters?
Secretary Weinberger. Without
answering specifically that particular
question, we certainly regard air space
60 miles from the nearest land as beinj
international waters.
Q. Are other Libyan aircraft now
patroling in the region?
Secretary Weinberger. I think
there are some, yes.
Q. Since Libya obviously disagree
with the United States and the Unite
States disagrees on the extent of in-
ternational waters, wouldn't it be a
prudent course — the exercise would
end at 1:00 p.m. anyway— to suggest
to stop them to avoid the possibility <
another confrontation?
Secretary Weinberger. No, I thin!
it would be very imprudent to do that.
There would be an acknowledgment, a
claim, that has no foundation, had some
Middle East
iring or some influence on the situa-
a. The exercise has been planned for
)ng time and will continue and will be
npleted about 1:00 p.m. our time.
Q. Was the general the all-night
ty officer?
Gen. Gast. I was on duty last night.
Q. Could you tell us how far in
|?ance of the incident you had any
son to think something might be
|»ut to happen?
| Gen. Gast. Nothing in advance, nor
the pilots.
Q. You didn't know until it was
!r?
Gen. Gast. No, shortly thereafter,
did the pilots have advance informa-
Q. What was shortly thereafter?
hid you tell us what time it
mpened, and what time you knew?
1 Gen. Gast. About 1:20 a.m. EDT,
I I knew about 1:26 a.m. EDT.
Q. How far from the F-14s did the
i yans come before they were picked
L
Gen. Gast. They were within visual
j.ge — about 5 or 6 miles, but they
i -e seen on radar shortly before.
Q. How long did the encounter
le?
Gen. Gast. About 1 minute.
Q. What did they fire? Do you have
i; idea?
Gen. Gast. Our AIM-9s.
Q. I mean what did the Libyans
'i ■?
Gen. Gast. Atoll missiles.
Q. Both planes fired and both
> nes were shot down?
Gen. Gast. One aircraft fired.
Q. What do you call the SU-22s?
I Gen. Gast. Fitter
Q. One Libyan plane fired?
i Gen. Gast. One Libyan aircraft
I'd a missile; then the other one was
paging. That was why defensive
■ ion was taken.
i Q. Is there any information on the
■uonality of the pilots of the Libyan
■ craft?
Gen. Gast. We believe they are
Libyan.
Q. You say the United States is
protesting. Where is that protest
going?
Secretary Weinberger. The protest
is going to Libya; that goes through
diplomatic channels, which in this case is
Belgium.
Q. Are you aware of any reply?
Secretary Weinberger. No reply
yet. I don't believe that it's been actually
delivered. But the protest was filed by
the State Department within an hour
after the incident and essentially recites
the text of this statement and goes into
additional detail about the formal notice
to mariners and matters of that kind
and lodges a strong protest against the
unprovoked attack.
Q. Are there any further exercises
planned in that area after 1:00 p.m.
today?
Secretary Weinberger. Not as part
of this particular exercise.
Q. Tomorrow or the next day?
Secretary Weinberger. Not that
soon. But that, again, is normal. You
don't do these every day or every week.
There aren't any others specifically
planned in the immediate future.
Q. What weapons were used by the
U.S. F-14s?
Gen. Gast. The AIM-9 missile,
which is a heat-seeking missile.
Q. How did American pilots first
know that the Libyans were in the air
and that they were under attack?
Gen. Gast. They picked them up by
radar as they were coming toward them.
Q. The planes' radar or the ship's
radar?
Gen. Gast. No, the aircraft radar.
Q. About 5 or 6 miles?
Gen. Gast. No, they saw them out
30, 40 miles on radar as they were clos-
ing and then they got a visual range on
them.
Q. Do you recall some of the other
incidents— I believe there were
challenges by Libya [inaudible] and
there were at least some allegations
that some missiles may have been
fired previously at American planes?
Gen. Gast. We have no evidence
that missiles were fired.
Q. Were there things that were
regarded as challenging actions by the
Libyans previously?
Gen. Gast. No, not to my knowl-
edge. There was some indication that
there were, but we have not been able to
confirm that there was, in fact, hostile
intent.
Q. Were the American planes fly-
ing toward the Libyan coast or in
what direction?
Gen. Gast. At this position, at this
time, they happened to be because the
Libyans were flying directly north, and
our aircraft were on a cap. As they were
turning south, they picked the Libyans
up coming toward them.
Q. What was the nature of what
the two F-14s were doing? I realize it
was part of the exercise, but what
was their particular configuration?
Gen. Gast. They were up to fly
patrols. The purpose of the aircraft are
to clear the area, to assure that no other
aircraft enter into the missile firing
range area, and that is the purpose for
DEPARTMENT STATEMENT,
AUG. 19, 19812
The United States considers 3 nautical
miles (4.8 kilometers) as the legally per-
missible maximum extent of the ter-
ritorial sea under international law.
Although many countries claim more
than 3 miles, some as many as 200 (320
kilometers), the position of the United
States is that we are not bound by inter-
national law to recognize claims in ex-
cess of 3 miles.
The oceans beyond the territorial
seas are high seas on which all nations
enjoy freedom of navigation and
overflight, including the right to engage
in naval maneuvers such as those recent-
ly concluded in the Mediterranean.
While we have indicated in the past
that we would accept a 12-mile ter-
ritorial sea as part of a comprehensive
Law of the Sea treaty, this would only
be in the context of a treaty protecting
U.S. navigation and other oceans' in-
terests. At this time our entire law of
the sea policy remains under review.
Itober 1981
59
Middle East
DEPARTMENT STATEMENT,
AUG. 19, 19812
The U.S. Government protests to the
Government of Libya the unprovoked at-
tack against American naval aircraft
operating in international airspace ap-
proximately 60 miles from the coast of
Libya. The attack occurred at 0520 GMT
on August 19, 1981. The American air-
craft were participating in a routine
naval exercise by U.S. Navy forces in in-
ternational waters. In accordance with
standard international practice, this ex-
ercise had been announced on August 12
and 14 through notices to airmen and
to mariners. Prior notification of air
operations within the Tripoli flight infor-
mation region has also been given in ac-
cordance with these notifications. The
exercise, which began on August 18, will
conclude at 1700 GMT August 19.
The Government of the United
States views this unprovoked attack
with grave concern. Any further attacks
against U.S. forces operating in interna-
tional waters and airspace will also be
resisted with force if necessary.
which they were there. If they are in-
bound, as we practice always, we in-
tercept them and attempt to dissuade
them from proceeding into the area
where the missile firings may be occur-
ring.
Q. But that intercept did not take
place because as soon as the Lib-
yans—
Gen. Gast. The intercept was about
to begin when the MiGs pulled in and
fired a missile at our aircraft — the Fit-
ters did, rather.
Q. Is the Nimitz on any kind of
alert status now because of this?
Secretary Weinberger. All ships on
a naval exercise of this kind are always
on high alert.
Q. But anything additional because
of the incident?
Secretary Weinbeger. No.
Q. Any reaction from the Russian
fleet?
Secretary Weinberger. No reaction
from anybody at this time.
Q. What would you say would be
the consequence for U.S. -Libyan rela-
tions of this even if there is not a
followup military action?
Secretary Weinberger. Libyan-U.S.
relations were certainly not any way I
could describe of the best in the im-
mediate past, and I think that this will
not do anything to improve them. If a
country makes an unprovoked attack on
your forces or on your citizens in inter-
national waters, it certainly is not a
good way to restore good relations.
Q. You said that they carried out
their mission extremely well. It
seemed as though you are almost
proud of the way-
Secretary Weinberger. I don't
think it's necessary to try to do any
amateur psychoanalysis at this time. It
seems to me that the mission of the
planes was to fly patrol and, if attacked,
if fired upon, to respond. That's exactly
what they did, and I would say again
without leaving myself open to any
other interpretations that I think they
carried out their mission extremely well.
Q. If American planes fly within
the claimed airspace of other na-
tions—friendly nations— is it a prac-
tice to notify them in advance?
Secretary Weinberger. If there is
going to be any kind of area of the
ocean — of the international waters —
that would be affected by naval exercise
that involves firing or anything that
would make it in any way dangerous for
mariners or for airmen to be within that
space, a customary notice is sent out,
which was done in this case. That was
the practice that would be followed
wherever naval exercises of this kind
are carried out. Just as if we fired a
missile from Vandenberg, for example,
we would notify around the impact
zone — 5, 7 days notice I believe it
is — and that was the practice that was If'
followed here.
Q. Who precisely notified whom?
Were you the receiving end of the
message, and from whom did it come'
What did you then do?
%
■
Gen. Gast. We followed the chain <
command. A fleet net— a radio net, a
communications net— is provided. They
informed their headquarters in London,
in turn in Europe, the U.S. command,
which informed me, and then I informe
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff and the Secretary immediately.
Q. Who informed London? Was it -
commander of the 6th Fleet or was it
the skipper of the carrier?
Gen. Gast. It was the commander
of the task force.
Q. And then to Stuttgart and ther
to Washington?
Gen. Gast. Yes.
Q. And then who did you tell?
Gen. Gast. I told the Chairman an<
the Secretary of Defense.
Q. Are you hoping this is the end ^
of this?
Secretary Weinberger. Yes.
Q. You still say, despite the earlu '
protests of the Libyan Government,
that we were flying in their airspace,
that this was an unanticipated inci-
dent?
Secretary Weinberger. We had
given the notification that we were go-
ing to do naval exercises in waters that
we claim, we believe, and, in fact, are
under all of the laws that we
know— international waters, the high
seas. We followed the rules that are re-
quired under those circumstances,
served the proper notices, and had no
reason to suppose that anybody would
fire on any of our planes or ships.
'Read to news correspondents by acting
Department spokesman Alan Romberg.
2Made available to news correspondents
by acting Department spokesman Alan
Romberg. ■
60
Department of State Bulletin,
Middle East
cretary's Interview
CBS News
'•ecretary Haig was interviewed by
News correspondent Richard Roth
ontecito, California, on August 19,
I. What have we told the Libyans?
\. We, shortly after the incident,
a very strong protest to the Libyan
rnment through the intermediate
mentation we have in Libya, and
was delivered in the early hours of
norning. It was a strong protest
iise of the aggressive actions taken
ibya. I think it is important we
jnize that for a number of years,
ig such routine air and naval exer-
, the Libyans have been engaged
rassing actions designed to
mstrate even beyond the disputed
nile zone, well out into the Mediter-
\ in, they've been engaged in harass-
Jctions.
U. In that context, the U.S.
ii rnment has said that is was
3 Hiding to an unprovoked attack,
i t was not a complete surprise,
d inly, that the Libyans might
c se to do something to respond to
a J.S. naval maneuvers.
V. That's correct due to past history
; lumber of years. These are routine
ii exercises of the kind we've con-
• 'd all during the latter part of the
ft 5 up through the last year —
I —where we had two, and in each
ii nee the Libyans have reacted in a
■ provocative way. We regret very
I I that in this instance they went so
Is to launch an unprovoked attack.
J. What do you see as the reason
r heir decision to escalate?
\. I think it's always the case when
El (vocation occurs and it's not
S mded to perhaps as vigorously as it
1 1, that it elicits additional risk-
Lg. I think President Reagan has
1 1 it clear that we are going to insist
a international law is upheld and our
I s to abide within that law are going
1 upheld.
I. Do you mean, in the past have
J forces been fired on by the
Sans?
I A. There have been a number of in-
puts extremely dangerous in the past,
Isay, not only within international
waters and airspace but into the con-
tested zone — the 200-mile zone uni-
laterally claimed by Libya — but even
beyond that into the Mediterranean
where there isn't even a contested ques-
tion.
Q. Have we been fired on in the
past and not responded?
A. I would prefer not to charac-
terize specifically the nature of the prov-
ocations but to make clear they have not
been exclusively involved with just
American units; there have been other
free nations' activities similarly pro-
voked.
Q. Wasn't the existence of our
naval exercises there, at a time when
Libya has been publicly making
known — once again restating — its
claim to the 200-mile limit, wasn't our
existence there a challenge of a sort to
the Libyans?
A. You might characterize it any
way you want. I would say it's a
challenge to the United States and our
rights under international law to con-
duct our maritime affairs accordingly.
Q. Were we then challenging the
Libyans' claim to the 200-mile limit?
A. It's not a question of challenging
anything. It's a question of living by
recognized international law. Admittedly
there's been controversy between 3-mile,
12-mile, and even 200-mile claims, all of
which are unilaterally proclaimed. But
the basic international law was initially 3
miles. It's now been generally accepted
as 12 and anything beyond that is not
accepted.
Q. What is the reason, then, for
holding exercises in that particular
area when there is a dispute between
Liyba and —
A. It's a traditional area for exer-
cises, and this exercise is routine and
normally scheduled and, of course,
cleared through the National Security
Council process, as we always do with
exercises of this character. We were
totally within our rights to conduct these
exercises.
Q. During that clearance process,
you and your aids must have raised
the issue of whether or not Libya
would respond as it has in the past.
A. There's no question that past ex-
perience with the Libyan Government
has suggested that we were keenly
aware of the possibility. We hoped that
such a thing would not happen, but, un-
fortunately it did.
Q. What happens now? What's the
next step diplomatically? Have we
heard, for example, back from the Lib-
yans through the Belgians?
A. No, we have not heard yet from
the Libyan Government. We have, of
U.S. Lifts Suspension of Aircraft to Israel
SECRETARY'S ANNOUNCEMENT,
AUG. 17, 19811
On June 7, 1981, Israel conducted an at-
tack on Iraq's nuclear reactor. On June
10, 1981, we reported to the Congress
about the Israeli attack and informed
the Congress that the scheduled delivery
of four F-16 aircraft to Israel was being
suspended. That suspension has con-
tinued in force, and now fourteen F-16
aircraft as well as two F-15 aircraft are
affected by it.
The Administration conducted an in-
tensive review of the implications of the
Israeli action for the agreement which
governs Israeli use of U.S.-supplied
military equipment. The review included
candid discussions with Prime Minister
Begin and Israeli Ambassador Evron.
The Administration, in its review,
has also taken account of events and
trends in the Middle East, particularly
the events in Lebanon leading to a
cease-fire there. The cease-fire is a very
positive new element in the region, one
which the Administration hopes will con-
tinue and which perhaps will make possi-
ble other steps toward peace in that
troubled area.
Following our discussions with the
Government of Israel, consultations with
the Congress, and completion of the Ad-
ministration's review, the President has
lifted the suspension of military aircraft
deliveries to Israel.
'Made at the Century Plaza Hotel in Los
Angeles (text from White House press
release which also includes the Secretary's
question-and-answer session with reporters
following this announcement.) ■
ober 1981
61
course, registered protests with the
United Nations, with the Secretary
General, Mr. Waldheim, with the Presi-
dent of the Security Council. We've
notified all of our stations abroad on
precisely the character of this incident
and its outcome. We have, early this
morning— at 4:00 a.m. or shortly
thereafter— given our picture of the
situation to the Soviet Union so that
they would be aware. Some of their
naval vessels have been in the area in a
characteristic trailing mode which has
become sort of routine in maritime exer-
cises of this kind. We are hopeful that
the incident will remain just that, and
it's a very unfortunate one, but one in
which we intend in the future — and I
know it's the President's view— to exer-
cise our legal rights and obligations.
Q. But when we informed the
Soviets afterwards, this was done
through Washington.
A. Yes. We called in their Deputy
Chief of Mission. Mr. Walter Stoessel,
our Under Secretary for Political Af-
fairs, laid out precisely the character of
the incident, the actions we had taken
thus far, and our hopes that restraint
and moderation would be displayed on
all sides.
Q. Was there any response from
the Soviet diplomat?
A. No. I wouldn't normally divulge
such exchanges if there were.
Q. There apparently hasn't been
anything yet from Moscow by way of
any rhetorical reaction, at least.
A. No. But I would anticipate one
and it would be uncharacteristic if they
did not have one.
Q. What happens next in terms of
U.S. relations with Libya?
A. This remains to be seen, of
course. We make no bones about our
concern with respect to Libyan interna-
tional activity: their invasion and con-
tinued occupation of Chad, the threaten-
ing actions being taken with respect to
other neighboring states in Northern
Africa, their support for international
terrorism — all of this requires, we
believe, a new level of moderation and
restraint which has thus far not been
evidenced.
Q. Is there a signal in this
American action — carrying out of the
exercises and the response to the Lib-
yan actions — is there a signal to other
countries that's involved here? You say
you express it as some kind of foreign
policy statement as well as just an in-
cident.
A. I don't want it portrayed that
way. It's a clear manifestation that this
Administration — President Reagan's in-
tentions to insist that our rights and our
obligations in the international communi-
ty be met in the period ahead. In that
sense I suppose you could describe it as
a signal, but more importantly it is a
routine matter in which imprudence on
the part of the other side brought about
an unfortunate act.
'Press release 286 of Aug. 24, 1981. I
Situation in
the Middle East
The following statement was made by
Philip C. Habib, the President's special
emissary to the Middle East, to reporters
at the White House on July 27, 1981,
following his report to the President on
the cessation of hostilities between
Lebanese and Israeli territory.1
I have just reported to the President on
the mission which he directed me to
undertake not long ago. This is a satisfy-
ing moment. An end to hostile military
actions and the consequent bloodshed in
the Israeli-Lebanon area has now taken
place. The situation, however, remains
fragile and sensitive. That is normal and
in the nature of such things. The prog-
ress achieved so far must not be lost.
Everyone involved must exercise the
greatest care and caution.
The end of armed attacks, which has
been achieved, could be a first important
step on the road to greater calm and
security in the area. This will be in-
dispensable if future progress is to be
made toward a broad and lasting peace
in the Middle East. What has been ac-
complished could not have been done
without the help and understanding of
many people. The final result, I believe,
is the interest of all the parties involved.
'Text from Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents of Aug. 3, 1981.
REFUGEES
Refugee Advisor
Panel Report
■■
A special refugee advisory panel
established by Secretary Alexander M,
Haig, Jr., concluded that a substantial
flow of Vietnam boat refugees must b<
anticipated, and planned for, for the
foreseeable future.
In a report to Secretary Haig on t
Indochinese refugee situation, the blue
ribbon panel, headed by former Assist-
ant Secretary of State Ambassador M;
shall Green, concluded after a 25-day
trip to Asia that by and large the U.S.
repatriation and resettlement policies
and programs are correct and are beir.
implemented effectively and humanely
It found that the exodus of lowland hi
refugees and Hmong hill tribesmen is
substantially down and that the numbs
of Khmer now entering the resettleme
stream from Kampuchea is negligible.
The Vietnamese boat people are still a
riving on Southeast Asian shores at a
rate of over 8,000 per month, howevei
and the future prospect is for a contin
ing, possibly increased, flow. The pane
concluded that resettlement of substar
tial numbers of Vietnamese boat and
other Indochinese refugees would be
necessary for some time to come.
Under these circumstances, the
panel expressed the hope that the
Association of South East Asian Natk
(ASEAN) would take the lead in inser
ing the Indochinese refugee issue on til
agenda of the forthcoming session of ('
U.N. General Assembly, with a view to
obtaining Vietnam's acceptance of ord>
ly departure programs for those
qualified for resettlement in other com
tries. Such a step was urged on the
grounds of helping to reduce loss of lif
and dangers to the stability and peace
the area.
The panel also suggested in anothe
section of its report that a second inte:
national conference on Indochinese
refugees might be held, similar to the
one convened by the U.N. Secretary
General in July 1979.
The panel noted that while there is
continuing widespread domestic suppoi
for the U.S. refugee program for In-
dochinese as well as appreciation of thi
foreign policy interests the program
serves, there have been criticisms over
the past few years and some worrisom>
aspects have been identified — perhaps
;■
62
Department of State Bulled i
SOUTH ASIA
t notably the charge that an increas-
aroportion of Indochinese refugees
motivated to leave their homeland
e by "pull factors," such as economic
erment, than "push factors," such as
ecution. The panel recognized that
vations must, nevertheless, be
ng to induce people to flee in small
s at great peril and with con-
-able loss of life. The panel conclud-
lat the integrity of the definition
status of "refugee" must be pre-
ed in accord with international in-
•nents and the Refugee Act of 1980.
en declared that the people fleeing
i Vietnam are unwilling to return
would undoubtedly face persecution
■ they to do so; moreover, Vietnam
not accept them back; they are,
;fore, entitled to refugee status. The
1 came to the same conclusion
rding the Hmong but called for
■w of the situation regarding the
ind Lao and many Khmer fleeing
re economic conditions in Kam-
ea.
"he panel's overall conclusion
i -ding domestic, resettlement in the
3d States was that problems, par-
irly in the areas of welfare and
idary migration, necessitate an im-
(jate and comprehensive study.
n other recommendations the panel
|i:
Improved international consulta-
1 , continued support for interna-
n 1 organization efforts, and greater
its to encourage third country reset-
bnt;
Continued attention to Kam-
i ea food relief requirements;
Support for the efforts of the
3 High Commissioner for Refugees
1 1CR) to arrange voluntary repatria-
i] if Khmer and Lao and local reset-
I ;nt in ASEAN countries where
iole;
Balanced reporting by interna-
I I broadcasters; and
UNHCR monitoring of austere
I r,ee camps set up by the Thai
ii rnment.
Afghanistan: 18 Months of
Occupation
Jj n addition to Ambassador Green,
I • members of the panel were James
Ine, former deputy director of the
ligration and Naturalization Service;
Hauser, a New York attorney and
ier U.S. delegate to the U.N.
an Rights Commission; and Richard
eler, senior vice president of
orp. The panel began its trip at
1CR headquarters in Geneva July 7;
it traveled to the ASEAN nations,
The following paper was written by
Eliza Van Hollen of the Bureau of In-
telligence and Research in August 1981.
It is a sequel to "Afghanistan: A Year of
Occupation, " published in the March
1981 issue of the Bulletin.
After IV2 years of Soviet occupation, the
Soviets and the Democratic Republic of
Afghanistan (DRA) have not been able
to make headway in establishing the
authority of the Babrak regime. Indeed,
they appear to be losing ground to the
guerrilla freedom fighters (mujahidin),
who are maintaining impressive momen-
tum.
On the other hand, the Soviets show
no signs of abandoning their long-term
objective of legitimizing a pro-Soviet
government in Afghanistan and sup-
pressing the resistance. They acknowl-
edge that it will take longer than
originally anticipated but seem to believe
time is on their side.
Political Developments
Events of recents months underline
Soviet and DRA awareness of the over-
riding importance of the political aspects
of the struggle. The decision to broaden
the leadership by divesting Babrak Kar-
mal of the prime minister's job, the ef-
fort devoted to convening a National
Fatherland Front assembly, and the
special attention being paid to nationali-
ty and tribal sensitivities all reflect ma-
jor political objectives of the regime and
its Soviet sponsors. Nevertheless, these
actions even taken together do not have
the potential to turn the tide against the
mujahidin.
Reorganization of the Government.
The initial purpose behind relieving
Babrak of the prime ministership (while
he remains President of the Revolu-
tionary Council and Secretary General
of the party) seems to have been to
broaden the Parcham-dominated leader-
ship by naming a Khalq prime minister
and so to reconcile the increasingly
alienated Khalq faction of the People's
Democratic Party of Afghanistan
(PDPA). The Soviets have long tried to
heal this factional split. They have
reason to be concerned about losing
Khalq support because of the Khalq
strength in Afghanistan's Armed
Forces.
But the bitter political struggle over
the prime minister's job and other atten-
dant changes in government and party
bodies has exacerbated the longstanding
feud. This friction forced the authorities
to postpone the sixth plenum of the par-
ty from May 13 to June 11. In the end,
the crisis apparently was resolved only
by widely reported secret visits to
Moscow by Babrak and other leaders.
The outcome— naming another Par-
chami, Sultan Ali Keshtmand, as prime
minister— indicated that the Khalq-
Parcham feud continues and that the
Soviets were not prepared to shift their
support from Babrak and his faction to
the Khalqis. The Parchamis picked up
more strength in other areas of the
reorganization as they increased their
representation in important party and
government bodies. Key Khalqis,
however, also improved their political
standing, and it is clear that the Soviets
are still blocking a wholesale purge of
the Khalq leadership by the Parchamis.
The naming of Keshtmand as prime
minister may portend further splintering
of the political leadership because Kesht-
mand could pose a serious political
threat to Babrak. The two are said to be
rivals within the Parcham wing and not
friendly.
Other factors presage further weak-
ening of the political fabric. Resistance
successes against Afghan and Soviet
military units and the mujahidin's
enhanced capability to endanger regime
sympathizers in towns and cities, most
notably in Kabul, will cool the en-
thusiasm of opportunists and probably
even of ideological loyalists. Many
former party members have already
Hong Kong, and Japan. In the course of
its trip, the panel met with top officials
and representatives of international
organization and voluntary agencies and
visited numerous refugee camps.
Members of the panel also visited
Philadelphia and Orange County,
California, to look into U.S. reset-
tlements problems.
Press release 277 of Aug. 13, 1981.
ber 1981
63
South Asia
been driven into the opposition; their na-
tionalist sensitivities, offended by Soviet
domination of Afghanistan's civil and
military administrations, proved
stronger than Marxist doctrine. This has
been particularly true of Khalq military
personnel, but Parchamis have also been
affected. In mid-July, for example, a
considerable number of Parcham
families lost their sons when military
school cadets were sent into a major bat-
tle against the mujahidin. This could
seriously damage Parcham loyalty, par-
ticularly as many in Kabul believe that
Soviet soldiers killed many of the
Afghan cadets to keep them from
retreating or defecting.
National Fatherland Front. As
party loyalists lose heart, the failure of
plans to demonstrate popular support
for the Babrak regime by forming the
National Fatherland Front (NFF) is not
surprising. The NFF's constituent
assembly— originally scheduled for
March 21, the Afghan new year's day—
was envisioned by DRA officials as a
conclave of representatives of all
elements of the Afghan population with
emphasis on the tribes. It was to be in
the tradition of Afghanistan's Loya
Jirgas (assemblies of tribal chiefs) which
have been convened at historic turning
points in Afghanistan's political develop-
ment. The purpose of the envisioned
NFF Jirga was to endorse, and thus
legitimize, the Babrak regime.
The NFF organizing committee,
however, was stymied from the first.
Despite its efforts in the provinces and
tribal areas to persuade or coerce promi-
nent figures to cooperate, lack of enough
nonparty participants to make a credible
showing prevented the committee from
scheduling a meeting in March. The
assembly was postponed until April,
then May, and once again put off until
June.
When the NFF assembly convened
on June 15, with much official fanfare, it
lasted only 1 day instead of the original-
ly scheduled 4-day propaganda spectacu-
lar. Many of the participants who were
described as tribal representatives were
actually party and government func-
tionaries. Those prominent nonparty
persons who collaborated with the NFF
now regret it; they have become prime
targets for assassination by the
resistance. The assassinations of a
religious leader from Ghazni and a
prominent retired general have received
much publicity, and resistance spokes-
men have announced a target list of 30
NFF participants. These assassinations
starkly underline the dangers of
associating with the regime.
Nationality and Tribal Policy. The
reorganization of the former Ministry of
Tribes and Border Affairs into the new
Ministry of Tribes and Nationalities
highlights a key element of Babrak's
policy under Moscow's guidance. The ob-
jective is to discourage a unified na-
tionalist opposition to Kabul by em-
phasizing the separate cultural and
political aspirations of ethnic minorities
and tribal groups.
Setting the tribes against one
another has been a traditional means of
maintaining the government's control,
but in the current crisis this tactic has
had little success. Instances of tribal col-
laboration with the Babrak regime ap-
pear to have been of limited duration;
weapons and bribe money have been ac-
cepted from the government but then
used to bolster the resistance. Indeed,
the presence of a common foreign
enemy has led tribes to bury their tradi-
tional rivalries and to join in a united
effort as they did in the 19th century.
The Soviets, consistent with their
nationalities policy in Soviet Central
Asia, probably believe that Kabul's tribal
and ethnic strategy will eventually
prevail. In view of the resistance movi 8>
ment's successes, however, the many
tribes and ethnic groups engaged in tr
ing to drive the Soviets out of Afghan
stan are unlikely to abandon their effo
in the foreseeable future.
Military Situation
A combination of political restraints ai
operational realities is the principal
obstacle to the success of Moscow's
military policy in Afghanistan. The fac
that the Soviets have not increased tb
troop strength beyond 85,000, in spite
the continuing military standoff, may
reflect concern about the political cost id
both in the international arena and in le
the effort to enhance Babrak's image it
with the Afghan populace. A massive al
military effort would doom the politica p
strategy and undercut the Soviets'
primary military goal of maintaining
adequate stability while building up tb
Afghan forces to fight the mujahidin.
This policy has failed badly. The
situation has become progressively mo
unstable, and the Afghan forces are in1
creasingly unreliable. Aggressive
resistance tactics have forced the
U.S. Assistance for
Afghan Refugees
The State Department announced July
9, 1981, that the United States has
responded to appeals from international
relief organizations and the Government
of Pakistan with an additional commit-
ment of $21 million for humanitarian
assistance to Afghan refugees in
Pakistan.
The Government and people of
Pakistan have generously received and
assisted the Afghans. An ongoing inter-
national relief program supports
Pakistan's effort in aiding the world's
fastest growing refugee population, now
estimated to number about 2 million
Afghans.
Total U.S. Government contributions
for Afghan relief in FY1981 are ex-
pected to reach $93 million. In FY 1980
the U.S. Government gave $44 million to
assist Afghan refugees.
This new pledge consists of $12
million for the programs of the U.N.
High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR), $1 million for the medical
programs of the International Commit-
tee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and $8
million to the Government of Pakistan
for the transportation of food and otb
relief supplies to refugees in Pakistan'
Northwest Frontier and Baluchistan
Provinces.
Hundreds of thousands of Afghan
refugees fled their homeland shortly
after the Soviet invasion of Afghanist;
in December 1979. Continued persecu-
tion and fighting in Afghanistan since
the invasion have forced additional ter
of thousands of Afghans to seek refug
in Pakistan each month. Most of the
refugees arrive destitute and in poor
physical condition, after long flights oi
foot through mountainous terrain. The
are almost completely dependent on tr.
Government of Pakistan and interna-
tional assistance for the essentials of
survival— food, shelter, clothing, and
medical care.
The U.S. contribution reflects our
historic tradition of assistance to victir
of persecution and aggression and our
concern for the strains that refugee
populations place on the societies and
economies of developing countries like
Pakistan.
Press release 221 of July 9, 1981.
64
Department of State Bullet |
South Asia
ifcqets to involve themselves in military
^rations throughout the country on a
Bly basis. Suffering from excessive
^cern with bureaucratic procedures
hi from a lack of zeal, Soviet forces
|/e not been able to deal decisively
ji.h guerrilla ambush operations along
(major roads and with expanded guer-
la operations against military and
jj/ernment targets.
I Soviet offensives to take important
jistance strongholds and to penetrate
Id territory held by the resistance have
led repeatedly. The most striking re-
lit example is the mid-July effort to
\ve resistance guerrillas out of the
Sjhman Mountains, only 12 miles
j-thwest of Kabul. Heavy casualties
ire sustained by both sides, including
ndreds of villagers in the area, but the
Uibined Soviet- Afghan force was
iced to retreat. It was impossible for
) authorities to cover up this defeat so
foe to Kabul, particularly as the dead
I uded at least 70 military school
jets.
Other instances of the failure of
■ net offensives include repeated at-
i lpts to penetrate the Panjshir Valley,
I important resistance stronghold that
p 3S access to the main north-south
'( d in the strategic Salang Pass area,
f 1 an unsuccessful attempt in June to
; e a key guerrilla redoubt in the
v >tern province of Nangarhar. Fur-
■ rmore, most of the central uplands of
\ fhanistan, the area known as the
I iarajat, remain inaccessible to Soviet
fcps.
Even though Soviet forces have not
> n very effective against the in-
;i gents, Soviet casualties probably are
1 heavy enough by themselves to in-
l e the Soviets to seek a negotiated
t hdrawal of their forces. Soviet
I ualty figures are not known, but it is
c ient that they have lost a con-
:j arable number of men and many
i ks and helicopters.
I That the Soviets are aware of the
rd to improve their performance is
i ected in the measures they have
i en to reorganize and tailor their
sices to guerrilla warfare. It is unlikely,
I vever, that they will be able to deal
» isfactorily with sagging morale. The
I net soldier whose father fought
heroically at Stalingrad does not have a
cause in Afghanistan, but his opponent
is fighting a holy war.
Efforts to build up the Afghan
forces have had even less success. Defec-
tions continue, and the morale of those
who remain is extremely low. The
government's refusal to release soldiers
who have completed their extended
tours of duty is causing particular
unhappiness. The seriousness of the
military manpower shortage has been
made abundantly clear in many ways;
party members have been ordered to the
"hot" fronts, forced conscription con-
tinues throughout the country, and
militia and regular units are suffering
unnecessarily heavy casualties because
of inadequate training.
Resistance
The mujahidin forces are active every-
where in Afghanistan. Drawn from all
tribes and ethnic groups, most of them
follow local leaders and fight in their
own areas. Others, however, are
affiliated with the political groups in
Peshawar. Rivalries between organiza-
tions have led to some major clashes in
recent months between mujahidin bands
over territorial rights, but there have
also been many instances of joint opera-
tions and sharing of equipment and
resources. When word spreads that a
mujahidin unit is threatened, many
others will converge on the area to
render assistance.
The resistance fighters recently have
been particularly active in the areas
north of Kabul and even in the Kabul
suburbs. The most dramatic operation
occurred in early June when large quan-
tities of ammunition and petroleum
stores were blown up at Bagram airbase
near Kabul. There have been many
other instances of mujahidin aggressive-
ness in recent months along major sup-
ply and convoy routes and against
government-held provincial and district
centers. During the spring and early
summer, the government has been
forced to abandon additional districts to
resistance control. Although the mu-
jahidin still cannot take and hold a ma-
jor city or provincial capital, they have
made life increasingly dangerous for
government sympathizers in all urban
centers.
Mujahidin mobility generally serves
to protect them from heavy casualties,
although occasionally they are trapped
and must stand and fight. There con-
tinue to be reports that the Soviets are
using potent chemical agents to flush out
guerrillas and make them targets for
helicopter gunships. More often it is the
noncombatant villager sympathizers who
bear the full brunt of Soviet retaliation.
The continuing heavy flow of refugees to
Pakistan, totaling over 2.2 million as of
late June 1981, is a constant reminder of
the daily destruction, suffering, and
upheaval produced by Soviet military
operations.
Efforts continue to unite exile
resistance groups. Representatives of
the six major groups signed an agree-
ment in Peshawar in late June to set up
a coordinating council. There are already
signs, however, that the council is
destined to be short lived.
The guerrilla fighters inside Afghan-
istan, however, seem to flourish despite
the competition among exile groups.
Babrak and his Soviet sponsors may be
counting on traditional tribal and ethnic
rivalries to undermine the mujahidin.
But nationalist reaction to foreign oc-
cupation and the religious fervor of a
holy war have proved to be powerful
forces in motivating the resistance
movement. ■
ober 1981
65
UNITED NATIONS
New World Information Order
Following are statements by Elliott
Abrams, Assistant Secretary of Interna-
tional Organization Affairs, on July 9,
1981, and James F. Buckley, Under
Secretary for Science, Technology, and
Security Assistance, on July 13. Mr.
Abrams testified before the Subcommit-
tees on International Operations and
Human Rights and International
Organizations and Mr. Buckley testified
before the Subcommittees on Interna-
tional Operations and International
Economic Policy and Trade, all subcom-
mittees of the House Foreign Affairs
Committee. 1
ASSISTANT SECRETARY ABRAMS,
JULY 9, 1981
UNESCO [United Nations Educational,
Scientific and Cultural Organization] is
one of the principal centers in the U.N.
system for the increasingly important in-
ternational communications debate. This
debate is driven by the aspirations of
developing contries to increase their
communications capacity, as well as by
the vast technological changes in the
communications field which are imposing
problems and opportunities on developed
and developing countries alike. It in-
volves important interests of the
member states and generates high emo-
tion— on our part because basic
freedoms are threatened, on the part of
the developing countries because they
see the developed world perpetuating its
technological superiority and turning
this to political advantage.
UNESCO is deeply infected by inter-
national partisan politics. On many
issues, the actions of the member states
and the Secretariat have recklessly
pushed the organization into activities
clearly outside its field of competence.
In a speech on June 2, I told the
Chicago Council on Foreign Relations
that this trend had seriously undermined
the credibility and effectiveness of the
organization.
A QUESTION OF UNESCO's ROLE
The international communications
debate is a prime example of UNESCO's
ill-considered and misplaced activities.
This is a debate which should properly
be focused on the legitimate communica-
tions needs of the developing countries
and the ramifications of the technologi-
66
cal choices we all face in the communica-
tions field. Instead, the debate has been
sidetracked into an ideological assault on
the very free press values which
UNESCO is mandated to defend.
There is no doubt that the debate, as
it is now skewed, jeopardizes U.S. First
Amendment interests. The Administra-
tion takes a very serious view of this
danger.
Responsibility of the Secretariat
While UNESCO cannot be blamed
for ideas and activities proposed by the
member states, the Secretariat of the
organization has actively promoted com-
munications activities which are both
questionable and highly controversial. It
has catered to intellectual fashions on
communication issues, particularly when
any rationale has been advanced to
justify restrictions on press freedoms. It
is ironic that, at the very moment when
technology is increasing the access of all
peoples to information, UNESCO is
cooperating with efforts to limit access.
This is a serious indictment of the
organization and its Secretariat and is
completely contrary to UNESCO's true
purposes.
Thus, the Secretariat must accept
some responsibility for the polarization
of the organization and the increasing
skepticism with which UNESCO is
viewed. It ought to re-examine its role
in this sector. Above all, it should not
plunge blindly ahead into divisive and
questionable activities but should focus
the work of the organization on ac-
tivities which do enjoy true consensus
support among the member states. This
is the way to prepare the ground for
steady, broadly agreed advances.
The UNESCO Secretariat is familiar
with the criticisms I have made about its
role. I hope it also understands that the
United States does not wish to limit
itself to criticism alone. We are
prepared to play a positive role on inter-
national communication issues in
UNESCO whenever the work of the
organization is based on a true consen-
sus.
Countering Soviet Propaganda
Another serious complicating factor for
us in UNESCO is the Soviet attempt to
exploit developing country frustrations^
with existing world communication pat i
terns. We know — and so do the great
majority of developing countries — that
Soviet intentions have nothing to do
with communications development. The
have everything to do with the Soviets' a
comprehensive attack on U.S. interests
We must be ready to combat in-
sidious Soviet propagandizing against
multinational corporations, including tr
news agencies, and against other U.S.
interests. The Soviet big lie can still be
effective if we let it go unanswered.
U.S. POLICY
The policy of the Administration is clea
We will not abandon the field to our
adversaries or compromise our fun-
damental First Amendment interests.
We will remain in UNESCO and provic
aggressive leadership on communieatio
issues as long as there is any hope of j
returning UNESCO to its mandated
responsibility to defend the free flow ol
ideas.
In April of this year, I reorganized
the Bureau of International Organizatii
Affairs to improve the way it handles i
formation issues arising in UNESCO
and the U.N. General Assembly. We
have centralized all bureau resources
devoted to these issues in a new, en-
larged Office of Communications and
UNESCO Affairs. On the instructions
Under Secretary James Buckley, the
Department of State is reorganizing ar
reprograming resources to provide effe
tive interagency coordination and direc
tion. However, reorganization and ra-
tionalization will not do the whole job.
We cannot go on the offensive if we do
not have additional resources. We need
congressional support to upgrade the ir.
ternational communications function.
Your subcommittees can play an impor
tant role in providing that support.
First Amendment Freedoms
U.S. policy is devoted to vigilant protec
tion of our First Amendment freedoms.
In the 1981-83 program and budget of
UNESCO, we have identified a series o)
activities which threaten these, includin;
licensing of journalists and journalistic
codes of ethics. We are firmly opposed
to both as a matter of principle. The
program also includes activities with a
built-in bias against commercial advertis
ing. We reject this bias. In the Ad-
ministration's view, commercial advertis
ing is an essential ingredient of a free
market and a free press, providing the
Department of State Bulletir
United Nations
ns to support an independent role
he press.
We have repeatedly and strenuously
ested antifree press activities within
UNESCO system. Most recently, I
with UNESCO Director General
adou-Mahtar] M'Bow on May 29 to
Tate the seriousness with which the
Government views them. U.S. In-
ational Communication Agency
ctor Charles Wick met with the
ctor General in June to make the
point.
Private Media
1 private media, too, have given a
ling answer to persistent attacks on
rree flow of information. Organized
lly by the Fletcher School of Law
I Diplomacy of Tufts University and
iiVorld Press Freedom Committee, a
rerence of Independent News Media
I held May 15-17, 1981, at Talloires,
(ice. The participants, approximately
leople from 20 developed and
i loping countries, adopted a declara-
) which describes press freedom as a
u : human right. We strongly endorse
i ieclaration of Talloires. We will pur-
[i t in the U.N. system as a basic
a >ment of U.S. values.
tVe intend to work as closely as
I ible with the media as we develop
. policy in this area. In meetings
u as the one organized by the Inter-
L >nal Organizations Bureau on June
5 ittended by over 50 media and in-
I ry representatives, we hope to draw
i| larly on the experience and advice
: ie people who are in the front lines
' ie battle for freedom of the press,
I in the government and in the
i Congress
i attitude of Congress forms a vital
jedient of the U.S. approach toward
i -mation issues. Let me comment on
I 'mpact of congressional resolutions
I and 142.
• H. Con. Res. 137 expresses the
le of the Congress that the establish-
I I of a new world information order
br the aegis of UNESCO would
jrict the freedom of the press.
]• H.Res. 142 expresses the sense of
I House that UNESCO should cease
Irts to attempt to regulate the flow
lews and information around the
Id.
Although mindful of U.S. treaty
Rations and the legal and practical
problems which could arise through our
unilateral reduction or cessation of
assessed payments to UNESCO, we sup-
port the resolutions because they give
voice to convictions which are deeply felt
in U.S. society. They lend credibility to
our diplomatic representatives both in
UNESCO and in our bilateral relations.
There can be no doubt now that defense
of our First Amendment values is one of
the most important thrusts of U.S.
foreign policy and one on which all
elements of the U.S. Government and
society are united.
No restrictive practices have as yet
been enacted under UNESCO auspices,
and I see no reason at this time for
reduction of payments or other action
against the organization. The U.S. per-
manent delegation to UNESCO in Paris
and the International Organizations
Bureau are closely monitoring UNESCO
communications activities with these
resolutions in mind. I will keep the Con-
gress fully informed of any movement
toward implementation of restrictions on
press freedoms.
Communications Development
Program
In addition to strong defense of our
First Amendment freedoms, the U.S.
policy has a positive side. Developing
countries need better technology and
training in the communications field. Ac-
cordingly, the United States has taken a
leading role to bring UNESCO's new
communications development program,
the International Program for the
Development of Communications
(IPDC), into being. The IPDC is the first
headed by William G. Harley, was large-
ly successful in achieving this objective.
We insured that the procedures for the
IPDC give precedence to consensus,
thereby protecting minority interests.
We avoided the establishment of a cen-
tralized international voluntary fund for
communications development and the
calling for a pledging conference. We
elected the Norwegian representative as
council chairman and placed one other
Western member (France) on the bureau
of the council. The United States will
take France's place on the bureau next
year. There were few extraneous
political detours.
Still, the IPDC is in its infancy. It is
too early to tell whether the program
will live up to our expectations. We have
made the point in UNESCO that this is
a testing time for the IPDC. If it evolves
along the intended lines, the IPDC
should be able to win the confidence of
Western public and private sector aid
donors who are the crucial elements in
the international communication
development effort. If the IPDC is
sidetracked into the political arena, it
will fail. A major opportunity will have
been lost, not only by the developing
countries but also by UNESCO.
U.S. Opposition
I am frequently asked what I think
about the new world information order.
We oppose interpretations of a new
world information order which seek to
make governments the arbiters of media
content. We oppose interpretations
which seek to place blame for current
communications imbalances on the
We oppose interpretations of a new world information order which seek to make
governments the arbiters of media content.
systematic effort to coordinate
fragmented international development
assistance activities, with no additional
costs to donor nations. This is a proper
area for U.S. leadership.
The intergovernmental council of the
IPDC met for the first time June 15-22,
1981 in Paris. We saw the meeting as an
opportunity to translate previous
agreements on the nonpolitical nature of
the IPDC into the rules of procedure of
the new body. The IPDC would be a
fresh start for UNESCO, with emphasis
on technology transfer and deemphasis
on ideology and politics. Our delegation,
policies of Western governments and
media. We oppose interpretations which
seek to translate biases against the free
market and free press into restrictions
on Western news agencies, advertisers,
and journalists. Attempts to justify such
restrictions as a necessary adjunct of the
development process are spurious.
The fullest development of individual
human and national potential can be
achieved only with freedom of choice in
the information field. We reject any
linkage of a new world information
order with the new international
:i>ber 1981
67
United Nations
economic order and the radical restruc-
turing of the international economic
system which it includes.
We are asked why the U.S. opposes
efforts to codify the new world informa-
tion order. Promoters of a charter of the
new order claim that defining objectives
can help to advance the international
communications debate. We think this is
a mistake. An attempt to negotiate a
charter of the new world information
order will only plunge UNESCO into
years, perhaps decades, of divisive
political arguments and is unlikely to ob-
tain general agreement. The effort will
reinforce differences among the member
states. We think it is far better to avoid
such futile ideological efforts and to con-
centrate, instead, on practical work
which enjoys general support.
CURRENT STATUS OF THE ISSUE
Let me now turn to developments in
UNESCO since the February hearing of
the Subcommittee on International
Operations. It is too early to draw any
firm conclusions, but there is some
reason to believe that a more
understanding attitude could be evolving
with respect to U.S. concerns.
Director General M'Bow assured me
that he was fully aware of these con-
cerns. We have noted a possibly related
slowdown in the tempo of UNESCO
communication activities. The IPDC
meeting was the only important
UNESCO meeting in the communica-
tions sector since February. At least one
potentially controversial meeting, to be
held in Eastern Europe, was cancelled.
Only one other UNESCO-related
communications meeting is listed for this
year. This is a nongovernmental round-
table discussion of communications
issues being organized jointly by the
organization and the Swedish National
Commission for UNESCO. It is to be
held in Stockholm in September. I find it
interesting that the agenda of the
Stockholm meeting has been revised
several times and that the meeting may
yet be postponed, perhaps to the spring
of 1982. The preparations for this
meeting are another indication of a more
thoughtful approach by the Secretariat.
I understand that representatives of
several U.S. nongovernmental organiza-
tions, including the World Press
Freedom Committee, will be represented
at the Stockholm meeting.
We hope this reduced pace of activi-
ty will continue. A pause in currently
mandated activities and a reassessment
of priorities are both particularly ap-
propriate at a time when the organiza-
tion is preparing its medium-term plan
for the period 1984-89. We have the op-
portunity now, which we and other
member states will be pursuing, to make
more substantial changes in the scope
and direction of UNESCO's communica-
tions activities.
CONCLUSION
I think it fair to say that the uncom-
promising position of the Adminstration
in matters of principle, including the
First Amendment, the supportive at-
titude of the Congress as demonstrated
by these resolutions, and systematic
representations by the government and
private media are having their effect on
UNESCO. We are far from having
returned the organization to its proper
role in the communications sector, but
there is evidence now that UNESCO is
pausing in its pursuit of trouble. I have
made it clear that, in the Administra-
tion's view, it is not so much the future
of press freedom that is at stake as the
future of UNESCO. We must work
closely together — the executive and
legislative branches and, while respect-
ing the independence of the press, the
private media in order to consolidate our
defense of press freedom. Speaking for
myself and the Adminstration, I pledge
my full cooperation in this task.
UNDER SECRETARY BUCKLEY
JULY 13, 1981
International communications and infor-
mation policy is of great importance to
the United States. This area involves
issues which touch the basic foundation
of our way of life, our economic well-
being, our political relations around the
world, and our national security.
The issues are growing in impor-
tance at an explosive rate, pushed by
technological advancements, particularly
those applied to satellites and computers
and supported by American ingenuity in
finding practical, marketplace uses for
these new capabilities. Our commitments
to the free flow of information, the free
transfer of data across national bound-
aries, and a market free of artificial
restraints are at the heart of these
policy issues.
UNESCO
b
s
<1
Our system of government is based on
these commitments. Yet in UNESC0 \
are challenged on the free flow of new
on the free access of reporters to the
sources of news, and by the threat of ]
quiring special licenses for reporters. I
the OECD [Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development] we are
working to minimize restrictions on tb
transborder flow of data and informa-
tion so important to the conduct of dai
business in the Western World. In the
United Nations we are attempting to
negotiate principles regarding direct
television broadcasts from satellites an
remote sensing by satellites to permit
these new technologies to serve the
needs of mankind. In the International
Telecommunication Union (ITU) we ar-
working on the practical management
the electromagnetic frequency spectra
to meet the continually growing needs
the people of the United States and of
peoples all over the world. Bilaterally,
we engage with other governments to
insure access to foreign markets for
American providers of information anc
communications goods and services an
to minimize interference from foreign fi
radio operations.
International Challenges
Our people and our system of govern-
ment have much to gain from these m
technologies and services. However,
other governments which regulate the
flow of information feel threatened by
such vast increases in the availability c
data and information, the global natur
of data development and information t
change, and the instantaneous transmi
sion or "real time" availability of data
and information. The American ability
develop the next generation of
technologies and to market new prod-
ucts rapidly is envied by most other
countries in the world. Where this con-
cern or envy leads to fair competition,
we cannot complain. Where the result
the imposition of new barriers to com-
merce, we have no alternative but to
seek to eliminate them.
It is hardly enough merely to con-
clude that international communication
and information policy issues are an in-
tegral part of U.S. foreign policy. The
point that should be recognized is that
our basic policies in these areas are
under attack and that these issues will
be of increasing importance to U.S. in-
ternational interests in the years ahead
68
Department of State Bulleti>
United Nations
Fronting the Challenge
ignition of this situation did not oc-
ust recently or just in the past 2
s. In UNESCO we began in the
is to confront the challenge to the
;iple of the free flow of information
though UNESCO's charter en-
ages such open exchange among
iles. In the United Nations in the
Is, we began negotiations on prin-
S concerning direct broadcasting
remote sensing from satellites. The
ntial implication of vastly expanded
border data flows, a result of the
understanding of the international trade
consequences of national restriction on
the transborder flows of data and infor-
mation. The work of the Subcommittee
on International Operations has focused
attention on the importance of the ITU
conferences, particularly the 1979 World
Radio Administrative Conference and,
recently, the region two medium fre-
quency broadcasting conference, and, on
the issues in UNESCO relating to the
new world information order. This ac-
tivity has greatly assisted in advancing
the interests of this government and the
American people in these issues.
in UNESCO we are challenged on the free flow of news, on the free access
^porters to the sources of news, and by the threat of requiring special
ises for reporters.
png of telecommunication and corn-
technologies, were addressed by
)ECD beginning in 1974, and
||rts of that work and of the future
i] rtance of their development were
Jrted to Congress in 1976. For many
Is we have been heavily involved in
Irork of the ITU; the 1979 World
] inistrative Radio Conference re-
i d special attention because it dealt
i an extensive list of issues.
)ur trade in communications and
1 >uter hardware and software is a
a r positive contributor to our balance
ivments. Actions by foreign govern-
E ;s to follow restrictive procurement
i ies or to seek protection for their
f it computer industries, to establish
I rary valuation procedures or to
E ict investments by U.S. data service
It Dther firms would have significant
I ct on this trade.
, )ur exports of information services,
n >r than hardware possibly by a fac-
[ f four, is very sensitive to foreign
H ssive communications tariffs,
persome technical interface re-
d'ments, and by requirements for
ii cate facilities in market countries.
i e we recognize the right of
I reign states to regulate telecom-
Jications within their borders, we
ligly favor international norms which
I'Ort open trade on a worldwide
I Through its Subcommittee on
j.'rnment Information and Individual
■its, the House of Representatives
I mittee on Government Operations
I contributed significantly to an
Role of the Department of State
The nature of international affairs is
such that we are continually required to
integrate new issues into the overall
fabric of our foreign policy. The
emergence of new technologies, such as
those bearing on international com-
munications and information activities,
are almost always out in front of
diplomacy. It is a continuing process to
develop our foreign policy in ways which
will take into account the national in-
terest in new technologies as they prove
their social and economic value and
become accepted in our
society.
I have reported to the Congress on
the activities and intentions of the
Department of State in the area of inter-
national communications and informa-
tion policy issues. On March 26, 1981, I
testified before the Subcommittee on In-
ternational Operations that the Depart-
ment was reviewing its internal
organization to deal with activities in
this subject area. I reported that the
Department would continue its role in
interagency coordination with the objec-
tive of insuring more effective develop-
ment and implementation of U.S. policy.
Since that time the Department has
taken several steps which I believe con-
stitute substantial progress in this area.
• Secretary Haig has designated me
as the senior officer in the State Depart-
ment responsible for the coordination of
U.S. policy in this area. In recognition of
the importance we attach to insuring
that policy responsibilities will be
suitably vested in a senior level official,
we have initiated action to amend the
Department's Foreign Affairs Manual to
provide explicitly that the Under
Secretary for Security Assistance,
Science, and Technology will be charged
with supervising this functional area.
Specifically, the responsibilties assigned
to my office include:
— Direction of the formulation and
coordination of the Department's policy
on international communications and in-
formation issues;
— Oversight and coordination of the
functions of all bureaus and offices con-
cerned with international communica-
tions and information policy;
— Exercise on behalf of the
Secretary of State of the authority with
respect to telecommunications assigned
to the Secretary by E.O. 12046 (March
27, 1978), the determination of U.S.
positions, and the conduct of U.S. par-
ticipation in negotiations with foreign
governments and in international bodies
and coordination with other agencies as
appropriate, including the Federal Com-
munications Commission (FCC);
— Chairman of an interagency senior
group on international communications
and information policy which can insure
coordinated development of policy by the
interested departments and agencies of
the executive branch and which includes
participation of the FCC; and
—Adviser to the Secretary and
Deputy Secretary on the conduct of
foreign policy in the area of interna-
tional communications and information,
coordinating as appropriate with the
other Under Secretaries on matters
relating to the responsibilities of those
officers.
• With the encouragement and sup-
port of other agencies concerned with
international communications and infor-
mation policy issues, I have convened an
interagency committee under the Na-
tional Security Council committee struc-
ture established by President Reagan.
This group consists of senior-level of-
ficials and serves as the forum for
discussion and coordination of our policy
objectives. We held a meeting of that
group today. Its membership is broad
and, I believe, fully representative of the
concerns which must be included in a
coordinated policy.
The agenda for our meeting includ-
ed, for example, consideration of
challenges to the free flow of informa-
tion in recent UNESCO forums and at
meetings of the Intergovernmental
Bureau of Informatics; the progress
OECD has made, following its successful
negotiation and approval of voluntary
personal privacy guidelines, in examin-
ing issues arising out of nonpersonal
n.ber 1981
69
United Nations
data flows; issues related to our par-
ticipation in the ITU's regional con-
ference on AM broadcasting which I
discussed with the committee last
month; preparatory work for other ITU
conferences to be convened over the
next several years; and possible
legislative proposals to enhance the op-
portunities for more competitive
markets in equipment and services in in-
ternational commerce.
We are, of course, not starting de
novo on these particular areas. Various
interagency committees have been work-
ing, many of them for several years, to
develop policy initiatives in conjunction
with private sector advisory groups. The
next few meetings of the senior-level in-
teragency group will give me a firsthand
opportunity to insure that we are, in-
deed, drawing the strands together and,
if not, to develop a more effective ap-
proach.
The departments, agencies, and of-
fices regularly included in the interagen-
cy committee are: the Departments of
Commerce, Defense, and State, the
Agency for International Development,
the International Communication Agen-
cy, the Board for International Broad-
casting, the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration, the Federal Com-
munications Commission, the Office of
Management and Budget, the Office of
Science and Technology Policy, the Of-
fice of the U.S. Trade Representative,
the National Security Council staff and
the White House Domestic Policy staff.
Other departments, agencies, and offices
will be included in the work of the com-
mittee and its subgroups as appropriate
to the issues at hand.
• To improve the performance of
the department in dealing with these
new issues, we are establishing a coor-
dinator for international communications
and information policy who will report
directly to me. The coordinator will be
responsible for assisting in the duties
that I have outlined and, in addition, will
have the following duties:
— Maintaining continuing liaison
with the bureaus and offices of the
Department concerned with interna-
tional information and communications
policy, with a view to insuring that
policy issues requiring consideration by
the Under Secretary are presented on a
timely basis and that implementing ac-
tions are promptly undertaken; and in
this connection, also maintaining liaison
with the offices of the other Under
Secretaries;
— Chairing a departmental steering
Namibia
CONTACT GROUP COMMUNIQUE,
JULY 22, 19811
The Foreign Ministers of the Western
five contact group— Canada, France, the
Federal Republic of Germany, the
United Kingdom, and the United
States— took advantage of their
presence in Ottawa on July 20 and 21 to
discuss the question of Namibia. They
agreed upon the urgent need to continue
the effort to bring about the in-
dependence of Namibia in accordance
with Security Council Resolution 435 in
a manner that will command interna-
tional approval. The U.S. Secretary of
State Alexander Haig discussed with his
colleagues the results of Deputy
Secretary [William P.] Clark's mission to
South Africa, Namibia, and Zimbabwe
June 10-13.
The ministers considered measures
which would complement and strengthen
the existing U.N. plan and provide the
confidence necessary for all parties to
proceed. The ministers decided to con-
vene a followup meeting of senior of-
ficials next week in Paris to formulate
proposals to carry forward the settle-
ment process in consultation with all
parties concerned. They decided to meet
again in New York during the U.N.
General Assembly session in September
to review further how the process can
best be pursued.
'Made available to news correspondents
by Department spokesman Dean Fischer. ■
group comprised of representatives of
bureaus and offices having responsibility
for international communications and in-
formation policy and chairing such in-
teragency meetings as may be necessary
to insure proper policy coordination;
— Arranging meetings of the in-
teragency senior-level group on interna-
tional communications and information
policy with the responsibilities for
preparing the agenda for such meetings
in consultation with participating depart-
ments and agencies as well as with in-
terested bureaus, offices, and principals
of the department, insuring that conclu-
sions reached at such meetings are
provided to those concerned with policy
implementation, and monitoring subse-
quent actions;
[I
— Coordinating the activities and |
assisting as appropriate interagency
working level task forces and commit- f
tees concerned with specific aspects of
international communications and infoi
mation policy and maintaining a currer
register and schedule of meetings of
such groups;
— Maintaining liaison with the prin
cipals and staffs of other interested
departments and agencies, including th
relevant offices of the Executive Office
of the President;
— As appropriate, maintaining
liaison with the members and staffs of
committees of the Congress concerned
with international communications and
information policy and providing
testimony before such committees;
— Maintaining appropriate liaison
with representatives of the private sec-
tor to keep informed of their interests
and problems, meeting with them and
providing such assistance as may be
needed to insure that matters of conce
to the private sector are promptly con-
sidered by the appropriate bureaus or
offices of the Department or, where
appropriate, assisting in securing con-
sideration of such matters by other
executive branch departments and age
cies;
—Assisting in arranging meetings
such private sector advisory groups as
may be established to provide advice a
insuring that the Under Secretary is iA
formed of the views of advisory group
which may assist the Bureaus and of-
fices of the Department in connection
with international communications anc
information policy issues; and
— Insuring timely preparations for
meetings with representatives of other
governments and meetings of interna-
tional organizations.
• I have asked the Under Secretar.
for Management [Richard T. Kennedy]
to review the delegation of internation;
communications and information respo
sibilities to Department bureaus, and tl
workload and resources given to meet
those responsibilities. My preference is
not to centralize those responsibilities i
a single functional area. I believe the e
isting multibureau distribution assures
that our policy in this area is consonarr
with and supportive of our broad foreif
policy objectives. Centralization runs th.
risk of a more parochial vision and a lo:
of contact with the totality of our in-
terests. Nonetheless, there may be roor
for some improvement in our internal
structure and some need to realign or
augment resources. I expect that the
Under Secretary for Management's
study will identify such opportunities.
70
Department of State Bulleti ,
United Nations
1957
1957 proposes, inter alia, to
)lish a cabinet committee, chaired
le U.S. Trade Representative with
authority for coordination and the
ulation of policy and with extensive
sight responsibilities. The commit-
authority would include determina-
of positions and policies in interna-
,1 communications and information,
jntly within the purview of the
irtments of State and Commerce.
Apparently, some believe that the
Ration of authorities in Executive
r 12046 is insufficiently precise to
■e the coordinated development of
y and effective implementation. We
ve that, in practice, the Executive
- is proving effective for integrating
nterests of the several agencies into
lerent overall approach,
""he report of the House Committee
overnment Operations argues that
ommittee proposed in H.R. 1957
d be comparable to that of other
tet-level committees and councils,
ever, this is apparently based on a
nderstanding of the function of
■ groups. In no case have the
(risibilities of the interested depart-
B b and agencies been transferred to
Imittees or councils. On the contrary,
b ommittees and councils operate in a
i ler similar to that of the Interagen-
mimittee on International Com-
I cations and Information Policy
I I has begun meeting under my
I manship.
Moreover, that report reflects a fur-
E misunderstanding of how the policy
r ulation process works in the ex-
it ve branch. It appears to assume
b decisions are made by voting. In
I what is needed is either a "meeting
le minds" supporting a proposed
i y or a presentation of differing
Is to the President for resolution. To
1 ive certain of the interested Depart-
I £ and agencies of their respon-
Ities and to seek to substitute the
I of a committee represents an essen-
| unworkable proposition.
lie report of the Committee on
Irnment Operations maintains that
liroposed committee would not be
lamed with day-to-day management
I e Federal establishment. However,
legislation explicitly contemplates
I the proposed committee would coor-
l;e policies and activities of all
■■ral agencies involving international
■nunications and information ac-
les and that it would also be directed
I'commend, whenever appropriate,
disapproval or modification of any agen-
cy policy determination. I have serious
questions about what responsibility is in-
tended to be left to the heads of the in-
terested departments and agencies.
The potential magnitude of the con-
fusion becomes more clear when it is
recognized that the proposed committee
would be composed of seven individuals,
one of whom is not a member of the ex-
ecutive branch. This would mean a
number of departments and agencies in-
volved with these issues would not be
represented at all; for example, NASA
and USICA, whose role is seriously
underestimated by the report of the
committee on government operations.
The problem is not helped by the bill's
provision that responsibilities previously
assigned to the Secretaries of State and
Commerce and the Director of ICA — as
well as other responsibilities of the pro-
posed committee — might be reassigned
by the committee to its own staff.
A major question regarding H.R.
1957 is whether the committee is
necessary and whether it would offer a
useful and practical approach to the
problem. The Administration's view is
that this committee structure would not
be helpful in dealing with the range of
issues here under consideration.
The question of interagency leader-
ship is treated differently in H.R. 1957
than in Title II of S. 821. Although
there are differing views on perform-
ance, the fact is that the Department of
State is the only agency positioned to
knit together the interactions among
these issues and to insure their proper
reflection in our overall foreign policy.
CONCLUSION
This Administration believes it is on the
right road in meeting the needs of the
United States in the important area of
international activity. We have taken
steps that are fully within our
authorities. We believe enactment of
legislation along the lines of H.R. 1957
and its companion piece, Title III of S.
821, is unnecessary. In fact, such enact-
ment could deprive the executive branch
of the flexibility required to insure the
most effective development and coor-
dination of U.S. policy on the basis of
actual experience.
I think it is fair to say that all of the
concerned agencies without reservation
share a commitment to insure that the
United States is well positioned to meet
Security Council Meets
on Lebanon-Israel
Border Dispute
The Security Council met on July 17,
1981, to vote on the Lebanon-Israel
border dispute. Following is the text of
the resolution unanimously adopted by
the Council on July 21, 1981.
SECURITY COUNCIL
RESOLUTION 490
The Security Council,
Reaffirming the urgent appeal made by
the President and the members of the Secu-
rity Council on 17 July 1981 (S/14599) which
reads as follows:
"The President of the Security Council
and the members of the Council, after hear-
ing the report of the Secretary-General, ex-
press their deep concern at the extent of the
loss of life and the scale of the destruction
caused by the deplorable events that have
been taking place for several days in
Lebanon.
"They launch an urgent appeal for an im-
mediate end to all armed attacks and for the
greatest restraint so that peace and quiet
may be established in Lebanon and a just and
lasting peace in the Middle East as a whole."
Taking note of the report of the
Secretary-General in this respect,
1. Calls for an immediate cessation of all
armed attacks;
2. Reaffirms its commitment to the
sovereignty, territorial integrity and in-
dependence of Lebanon, within its interna-
tionally recognized boundaries;
3. Requests the Secretary-General to
report back to the Council on the implemen-
tation of this resolution as soon as possible
and not later than 48 hours from its adoption.
the challenges to the free flow of infor-
mation, to secure and protect radio fre-
quency spectrum needs, and to par-
ticipate fully in the expanding global
market for telecommunications and in-
formation goods and services. I can
pledge to you that I will personally work
to insure that these objectives are met.
'The complete transcript of the hearings
will be published by the committee and will
be available from the Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of-
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■
lber 1981
71
WESTERN HEMISPHERE
El Salvador: The Search for Peace
The tragedy of El Salvador has deep
roots in both Salvadoran history and the
contemporary international scene. This
study summarizes some of the facts,
analyses, and rationales about the many
internal and external forces involved in
El Salvador that underlie U.S. Govern-
ment efforts in support of a peaceful out-
come. The following background paper
was released by the Department of State
in September 1981.
Summary
During the late 1970s, traditional
authority structures in El Salvador,
already eroded by social changes and
development problems, began to
disintegrate under pressure from left-
and rightwing terrorism.
In an effort to stimulate a more
democratic process, middle-grade army
officers overthrew the existing
authoritarian regime in October 1979. In
January 1980, the Christian Democratic
Party entered the government and
helped launch far-reaching reforms.
Although most Salvadorans welcomed
socioeconomic reforms as long overdue,
extremist groups reacted by intensifying
violence. Thousands died in conditions
sometimes bordering on anarchy.
In late 1979 and early 1980, Fidel
Castro brought the leaders of El
Salvador's fragmented violent left to
Havana and helped them to unite into a
single guerrilla directorate. In January
1981, using arms obtained clandestinely
through Cuba and Nicaragua, the guer-
rilla command launched an all-out offen-
sive. But the population ignored guer-
rilla appeals. Government forces re-
mained united and fought well. The of-
fensive failed.
Today, although most guerrilla fac-
tions and some small rightwing groups
continue to attempt to impose their
views by force, the overwhelming ma-
jority of Salvadorans seek an end to
violence. The Salvadoran Government
has outlawed paramilitary forces and is
attempting to develop a peaceful
political process. In March 1981, Presi-
dent Duarte appointed an independent
Central Elections Commission to
prepare elections for a Constituent
Assembly in 1982. In July, legislation
was approved under which all parties
that accept democratic procedures will
be eligible to participate.
The United States supports self-
determination for the people of El
Salvador. As a concerned neighbor com-
mitted to representative democracy, the
United States favors an end to violence
and seeks to facilitate a process leading
to free and open national elections.
The Politics of Violence
In 1980, about 12,000 Salvadorans died
violently — most of them victims of con-
flicts among absolutist factions with
deep roots in Salvadoran history.
A Tragic Precedent. On Jan-
uary 22, 1932, a peasant uprising touch-
ed off by Augustin Farabundo Marti and
his embryonic Communist Party turned
into a ghastly massacre. Thousands died
in a few days in a bloody confrontation
in which no quarter was asked or given.1
The savagery of 1932 was inter-
preted by the authorities to mean that
only strong governments could maintain
order. The president at the time of the
uprising, Gen. Maximiliano Hernandez
Martinez, remained in power until 1944.
The army became El Salvador's
strongest institution; military com-
manders dominated succeeding govern-
ments in concert with the landed
wealthy.
Signs of Progress. During the
1950s and 1960s, political violence was
rare. Economic growth averaged more
than 5% a year, outstripping population
growth, which averaged about 3% a
year. Export-oriented agribusinesses
and small manufacturing enterprises
boomed. But there were no new lands to
be developed — and most of the popula-
tion still lived at subsistence levels.
Urban growth stimulated the rise of
reformist political parties. The most suc-
cessful was the Christian Democratic
Party (PDC). In 1964, Jose Napoleon
Duarte, one of the party's founders, was
elected mayor of San Salvador. In 1968,
the PDC captured 19 of the 52 seats in
the unicameral National Assembly and
won majorities in 78 of the nation's 261
municipalities, including the three
largest cities.
Elections Frustrated. In 1972,
Duarte ran for the presidency, with
Guillermo Manuel Ungo of the small
72
social-democratic National Revolution
Movement (MNR) as his running mat
Duarte's charismatic campaign receiv
strong support from peasants and
workers as well as the new middle
classes. On election day, Duarte ap-
peared to have won a plurality in the
popular vote. Five days later, howevc
the candidate of the governing Natioi
Conciliation Party (PCN), Col. Arturc
Armando Molina, was proclaimed pre
dent. After an attempted opposition
coup within the army failed, Duarte \
arrested, tortured, and sent into exil<
Tensions Mount. Molina increas*
public services and promoted some la
reforms but was hamstrung by conse
vative resistance to change. Underlyi
problems of unemployment and incon
maldistribution were exacerbated by ■]
rising energy costs, unstable coffee
prices, and a severe drought that re-
duced growth.
The Roman Catholic Church, whil
after Vatican Council II had become ;
creasingly committed to work among
underprivileged, began to call for
greater social justice. The election of
Col. Carlos Humberto Romero to the
presidency in 1977 was disputed. Opj
tion parties boycotted the 1978 Natic
Assembly elections. Archbishop Osca
Arnulfo Romero regularly detailed
abuses against the poor in statement
during Sunday mass.
Terrorism. In the spring of 1977
Foreign Minister Mauricio Borgonov(
an M. I. T. -trained moderate, was kid-
napped, then murdered by leftists;
Father Rutilio Grande, a Jesuit parisl
priest known for his support of work:
class causes, was assassinated by
rightists.
Violence and counterviolence
escalated steadily thereafter. Leftist
radicals, often students, and rightist
members of ORDEN, a conservative
organization with thousands of peasai
members and close ties to local securi
forces, seemed to take turns in attem
ing to prove that violence was
cleansing. A clandestine group of far
rightists calling themselves the White
Warriors Union (UGB) claimed credit
the assassination of many teachers an
priests. And on the extreme left, terj
rorism became a deliberate weapon in
the hands of a new breed of specialist
in violence.
Department of State Bullet
i
I
Western Hemisphere
The Violent Left. Twice during the
y 1970s, groups of radical activists
junced the electoral approach
lused by the Moscow-line Communist
y of El Salvador (PCES) and broke
y to seek an armed path to power.
The largest of these was the
.bundo Marti Popular Liberation
:es (FPL), named after the in-
itor of the bloody 1932 rebellion. It
founded in 1970 by Salvador
etano Carpio, a Cuban-trained
ier Communist Party Secretary
eral.
While the FPL advocated violence as
of "prolonged war" tactics, the
Die's Revolutionary Army (ERP), a
ip of young Maoists and Castroites
led by Joaquin Villalobos, was united
larily by the view that attacks on
ic officials could spark an immediate
ilar revolution. Still a third tactical
pective was embodied in the Armed
es of National Resistance (FARN),
9 h splintered from the ERP in 1975.
n the late 1970s, these organiza-
j; carried out several spectacular
Bissy seizures and kidnapped or
ulered several Salvadoran, U.S.,
U >pean, and Japanese businessmen,
H ell as the Swiss charge d'affaires
ii the Ambassador of South Africa.
The "Popular Forces." The use of
i >rism enabled the violent left to ob-
ii large sums of money — perhaps
ii 100 million — in ransom and protec-
) payments. Part of these funds were
i to subsidize demonstrations and
i. ical agitation to broaden their own
u and further intimidate advocates of
I eful reform.
The FPL helped to organize a broad
ii tion of worker, student, and teacher
I ps into the Popular Revolutionary
[» (BPR). The FARN attracted
i ral peasant organizations and unions
: the United Popular Action Front
jJ-'U). The more impatient ERP was
9 successful in broadening its reach:
S 8 February Popular League (LP-28)
1 lined largely student based.
The Nicaraguan Example. El
lador's violent left received a major
jhological boost in July 1979 when
i Nicaraguan National Guard dis-
1 ;d under pressure.
131 Salvador's professional army was
ji praetorian force like Somoza's
|-d. Nonetheless, what before only a
I fanatics had believed possible — that
ISalvadoran Army could be openly
l:ked and defeated — could suddenly
Kortrayed as an historic inevitability,
leover, having backed the San-
Istas with men and money, the FPL
and the ERP felt that they had earned
Nicaraguan support for an escalated
armed struggle.
The growing militancy of the violent
left moved Archbishop Romero to warn
in August 1979: "When I returned from
Rome in April, I found their bombs in
the cathedral. Our popular groups have
been taken over by the far left. They
want the church to support everything,
not only justice but all their strategies."
As traditional political and social
relationships disintegrated, El Salvador
began to fragment into a series of
armed camps. The economic elite was
split between advocates of harsh repres-
sion and moderate reform. Gen. Romero
had neither the will to impose draconian
measures nor the credibility to under-
take reforms. Except for scattered in-
dividuals like the exiled Duarte, there
was an acute absence of credible or will-
ing alternative leadership.
Actual armed gangs, whether of left
or right, were still small. But thousands
of Salvadorans associated with the
"popular forces" on the left were now
juxtaposed against the thousands of
Salvadorans associated with ORDEN
and similar groupings on the right.3
The 1979 Revolution
On October 15, 1979, an informal
grouping of young and middle-grade
army officers overthrew Gen. Romero.
In a shakeup that led to the exile, retire-
ment, or reassignment of some 10% of
the officer corps, Cols. Jaime Abdul
Gutierrez, Adolfo Arnoldo Majano, Jose
Guillermo Garcia, and Eugenio Vides
Casanova emerged as the new leaders of
the military high command.
The army manifesto of October 15
denounced abuses of power by govern-
ment officials, proclaimed a commitment
to fundamental social reform, and called
for a transition to elections and a
democratic political system. Three
civilians joined Gutierrez and Majano in
a new governing junta. They were
Roman Mayorga from the Jesuit univer-
sity, Mario Andino from the business
community, and Guillermo Ungo from
an opposition coalition known as the
"Popular Forum."
Public response was immediate and
positive. Archbishop Romero, in his
October 21 homily, called upon all
Salvadorans to give the new government
a chance and warned against further
violence. The junta outlawed ORDEN,
released political prisoners, and formed
a widely representative cabinet. Duarte
returned from his Venezuelan exile.
Peaceful change, however, suited
neither those who believed one more
push would destroy the army nor those
opposed to all reforms. Calling for the
immediate dissolution of the security
forces, the ERP and the FPL staged
violent disturbances. At the opposite ex-
treme, rightists conspired to mount a
countercoup to prevent the October 15
manifesto from being carried out.
Lacking unity or experience, the junta
gradually disintegrated, unable to con-
trol the violence or establish its author-
ity.
In January 1980, the Christian
Democratic Party announced it would
help form a new government on the
basis of an open political process and
socioeconomic reform. An overwhelming
majority of officers, loyal to their new
leaders and the October manifesto and
aware of the dangers of civil war, ac-
cepted the Christian Democratic pro-
gram, including land reform.4
Land Reform. For generations, a
few hundred families had owned about
60% of all farm lands. Decree 153 of
March 6, 1980, "The Basic Law of Land
Reform," was the first step in trans-
ferring ownership of about half of that
property to peasant cooperatives and in-
dividual tenant farmers.
The basic provision of Decree 153,
known as Phase I, provided for the con-
version of large estates — more than
1,235 acres — into peasant cooperatives.
Another provision, known as Phase II,
was designed to distribute medium-sized
estates. A "land-to-the-tiller" program
(Decree 207), known as Phase III, was
approved in April 1980 to benefit
landless peasants by enabling each fam-
ily of renters or sharecroppers to ac-
quire as many as 17.3 acres of lands
they themselves were cultivating.
To strengthen small business and
broaden the availability of credit in sup-
port of land reform, all banks were put
under partial government ownership. A
previous measure had created a govern-
ment board to market coffee and sugar
for export; cotton, the third major cash
crop, remains in the hands of a private
cooperative.
Within a month of the March 6
decree, 278 estates had been trans-
formed into producer cooperatives
owned by the farmers working them.
The army's break with the landowners
became evident as troops protected
government technicians and peasant
beneficiaries.
This ambitious reform program,
MDer 1981
73
Western Hemisphere
though greatly hampered by right- and
leftwing violence, is significantly
broadening participation in the
Salvadoran economy. Production of ex-
port crops has declined; the production
of basic grains and other items for local
consumption has remained steady or in-
creased. Both titling and compensation
under Phases I and III have been slow
and have severely strained El Salvador's
technical, administrative, credit, and
security resources. Accordingly, Phase
II apparently will be postponed at least
until after elections in 1982.
Many aspects of the reforms remain
controversial. But thousands of El
Salvador's poorest citizens who never
before had an opportunity to work their
way out of a subsistence existence now
have a chance to do so.
The Far Right Reacts
Having lost control of the government,
opponents of change resorted to private
death squads and vigilante bands in a
running but losing battle against the
reforms.
In early 1980, Maj. Roberto
D'Aubuisson, a National Guard officer
forced into retirement in October 1979,
began to denounce the Christian
Democratic- military coalition as a
"Communist" movement bent on
destroying the traditional fabric of
Salvadoran society. D'Aubuisson's
demagogy did not shake the new high
command's commitment to reform. But
it proved a rallying point for those land-
owners, local bosses, and security force
members hostile to the reforms.
Christian Democrats and Catholic
activists became prominent targets of a
variety of rightist operations, many of
which were coordinated by a clandestine
"Maximiliano Hernandez Brigade"
named for the man who crushed the
1932 revolt. On March 24, 1980— shortly
after the land reforms were decreed —
Archbishop Romero was shot and killed
while saying mass. Since then, several
priests and foreign missionaries and
more than 60 Christian Democratic
mayors and local officials have been
assassinated, as well as several hundred
trade unionists and thousands of ordi-
nary Salvadorans — often in conditions
made all the more appalling by the im-
possibility of knowing which of the pro-
liferating groups on the extremes of the
right and left were responsible.
The violent right had a natural
recruitment base in former members of
the White Warriors Union and ORDEN.
Retired and active duty police and
military personnel linked to individual
landowners or personally opposed to the
government were another source of sup-
port. At the same time, guerrilla attacks
against individual uniformed personnel
provoked strong reactions. Retired and
technical military personnel have been
assassinated while going about civilian
pursuits. In October 1980, guerrillas at-
tacked an officer's home, burning it to
the ground. Trapped inside, the officer
and his wife and three children burned
alive. In the first half of 1981, some
1,300 uniformed men were wounded or
killed by guerrillas, sometimes by execu-
tion.
The resulting dynamic has led some
security force personnel to commit
abuses that play into the hands of the
guerrillas. In some instances, this has
meant tolerance of clandestine death
squads financed by the extreme right. In
others, it has meant shooting first and
asking questions later. Abuses of
authority are apparently most common
in the Treasury Police and the National
Guard, whose men are scattered in small
local units vulnerable to rightwing blan-
dishments and guerrilla provocations.
On December 2, 1980, four
American Catholic women— three nuns
and a lay social worker— were abducted
and murdered. In January, two
American labor specialists from the
A.F.L.-C.I.O. were assassinated
together with the head of El Salvador's
land reform institute.
While the January murders were
apparently the work of private killers,
the U.S. presidential mission that
studied the murders of the four church-
women reported circumstantial evidence
of security force "complicity, either in
the murder or afterwards." 5 On May 9,
1981, the Ministry of Defense announced
the detention of six security force
members in connection with the murder
of the churchwomen. Both investigations
continue.
The control of rightist violence and
the administration of justice are severely
hampered by the disruption of the
judicial system and the guerrilla war.
Judges and investigators are in personal
jeopardy. Jails are inadequate to handle
normal criminal cases let alone the
perpetrators of political violence.
The Salvadoran Government has
taken a variety of measures in an effort
to assure that the legitimate forces of
order do not conduct themselves
■
according to traditions rooted in the
authoritarian past or the even crueler ,,
standards established by their new opf|
nents on both extremes.
• In October 1979, ORDEN, the
paramilitary organization previously
used against government critics, was
outlawed.
• In October 1980, a military code
conduct was adopted explicitly pro-
hibiting abuses against noncombatants
• In December 1980, Duarte becan
president of the junta, with a mandate
to consolidate the reform process and
strengthen institutional procedures to
resolve conflicts peacefully.
• The high command is working to
enforce discipline within the security
forces and strengthen military judicial rr
procedures. A number of officers symj. r
thetic to the violent right have been
removed from command positions or
sent out of the country.
These and other measures are
gradually reducing institutional violenc
But the cycle of violence and counter-
violence will be broken only when a
democratic solution thwarts those who
seek a solution by killing.
The Communists Interfere
While the Christian Democrats and tb
new military high command were
launching the reforms, Cuba and sevei
other Communist countries were be-
ginning a concerted effort to impose a
Marxist-Leninist dictatorship by force.
In meetings in Havana in Decembi
1979 and May 1980, Fidel Castro help
the FPL, ERP, and FARN to unite I
the Moscow-line Salvadoran Communi
into a guerrilla alliance (the DRU or
United Revolutionary Directorate).
From then on, with Communist Party
Secretary General Jorge Shafik Hands
as the emissary, Cuba worked with thi
DRU to obtain arms from Vietnam,
Ethiopia, the Palestine Liberation
Organization, and Eastern Europe.6
Cuba's Strategy. Creating a unifia
military command and supplying mode
armaments were only part of a broad
political-military strategy. This strateg
also included training an ideologically
committed military cadre in Cuba and
developing a concerted international
propaganda campaign to discredit non-
violent solutions.
Only the external elements of this
Cuban strategy proved successful. Tho
elements that depended on conditions i
side El Salvador failed.
74
Department of State Bullet |
Western Hemisphere
Propaganda. The effort to discredit
:rate solutions is led by the
ocratic Revolutionary Front (FDR),
nized in April 1980 as an umbrella
tion including some small non-
dst-Leninist parties, the FDR is in
tice controlled by the DRU, which
-ols the guns and reviews all FDR
ions, organizational arrangements,
oersonnel appointments. Given an
of legitimacy by some prominent
idorans in exile, the FDR carries
xtensive propaganda activities in
Jnited States and Europe with the
tive of hindering or preventing any
gn support not benefiting the guer-
Infounded claims and accusations
eplayed to regional and world audi-
by Cuba's Radio Havana or Prensa
ia, the official Soviet press agency
S), Radio Moscow, and East Euro-
i media. For example, a false 1980
|-t of a U.S. soldier killed in El
k.dor that echoed widely in Cuban-
V 't propaganda was traced finally to
i alvadoran Communist Party. This
1 r was used to breathe life into an
3 bigger lie: that hundreds of U.S.
i >rs were in El Salvador, building
• bases, destroying villages, and
n ng peasants into Vietnam-style
3 jgic hamlets. (Then as now there
I no U.S. combatants, bases, or
j ;gic hamlets in El Salvador.)
rms. In December 1980, the guer-
i began to employ U.S. -made M-16
M-14 rifles, M-79 grenade launch-
I .nd Chinese-made rocket-propelled
side launchers. In January 1981,
I doran authorities destroyed air-
i flying arms from Nicaragua to El
L dor and captured a pilot involved
t s traffic; Honduran authorities cap-
B a truck carrying weapons and am-
U tion destined for the guerrillas.
I of the M-16s on the truck were
II dually traced directly to Vietnam,
li e they had been left behind when
5 units withdrew.
I 'he Guerrillas Falter. After the
j h 1980 reforms, the guerrillas
I I themselves unable to build the
liar army" their strategy and pro-
nda called for. Occasionally paying
•oercing recruits, they began to use
t military measures and terrorism
ist the general public.
n the summer of 1980, the
/DRU called for general strikes
i times— in June, July, and August,
irst was inconclusive, the second
;o be postponed, and the third was a
total failure despite all-out efforts, in-
cluding bombing places of work and
burning buses and assassinating their
drivers in an effort to prevent people
from going to work.
The guerrillas responded to their
repeated failures to enlist popular
support by falling back on Augustin
Farabundo Marti's 1932 instructions to
apply "merciless terror." 7 A 1980 guer-
rilla document entitled On Armed Insur-
rection noted that "the people use dif-
ferent forms and methods of struggle
but the combat, armed, and violent
forms are those that play the funda-
mental role, the determining role . . . ." 8
On October 29, 1980, however, a let-
ter to the DRU coordinator in Managua
complained that the people were "be-
coming progressively confused and are
being affected by the defeatist attitude
Duarte and his lackeys are trying to in-
still among the people."
The guerrillas — and their Cuban and
Soviet sponsors — stuck to their original
plan. On January 10, 1981, broadcasting
from a clandestine radio station in
Nicaragua, the guerrillas proclaimed
that "the decisive hour has come to in-
itiate the decisive military and insurrec-
tional battles for the seizure of power." 9
Using the modern weapons smuggled to
them from Vietnam and other distant
countries, guerrilla units struck at 40-50
locations, downed two helicopters, over-
ran one isolated National Guard post,
and forced the army to draw heavily on
its ammunition reserves.
But El Salvador's people again ig-
nored the guerrilla appeals. The army
remained united and fought well. At
great cost to both sides, the offensive
was contained.
A Democratic Outcome?
The pattern inside El Salvador since
early 1981 suggests that the foundations
for an improved future are present.
• Many of the weaknesses of El
Salvador's institutions derive from tradi-
tional power groups and patterns now
on their way out.
• The centrist coalition between the
Christian Democratic Party and the new
military leadership — formed in the midst
of predictions that it could not last — is
now almost 2 years old, demonstrating
that change can come about by institu-
tional means.
• Excesses and failures have pricked
the bubble of guerrilla claims of invin-
cibility and popular support. On
March 8, Apostolic Administrator Rivera
y Damas spoke for millions of ordinary
Salvadorans when he said: "The groups
on the left have made violence an abso-
lute end in itself and magnified their
adherence to Marxism. That is why most
of the public has turned its back on
them. . . . Terrorism is not liberation."
• After years of fruitless bloodshed,
the resilience of Salvadorans is evident
in an emerging national consensus
against violence. The church, the trade
unions, agrarian organizations, profes-
sional bodies, and modern businessmen
are now all increasingly engaged in
seeking a peaceful solution to the con-
flict.
The Government. The December
1980 reorganization improved govern-
ment efficiency. Gutierrez is Vice Presi-
dent and military commander. Jose
Antonio Morales Ehrlich, a former
Christian Democratic mayor of San
Salvador, has special responsibilities for
implementing the land reform. Jose
Ramon Avalos Navarrete, a politically
independent physician, is responsible for
public health and social welfare. Foreign
Minister Fidel Chavez Mena was largely
responsible for the peace treaty that
ended the 1969 war with Honduras.
Defense Minister Col. Jose Guillermo
Garcia has played a key role in main-
taining military unity behind the reform
program of the October 1979 manifesto.
And the charismatic Duarte has
emerged as a national leader of courage
and skill.
Business. As the conflict escalated,
and particularly after they had lost con-
trol of the government, many of El
Salvador's traditional wealthy fled the
country. Most modern and middle-class
businessmen, however, stayed behind.
Many of them are now organized in the
"Productive Alliance."
Important differences still divide
most businessmen from the reformist
Christian Democrats and the nationalist
army. A private sector symposium held
in San Salvador July 24-26, 1981,
opposed further reforms and called for
greater business representation in
government. For the first time,
however, the symposium resolution also
"recognized" the need to be "construc-
tive" about existing reforms.
The Catholic Church. On Jan-
uary 18, 1981, Apostolic Administrator
Rivera y Damas criticized the govern-
ment for still not bringing institutional
ber 1981
75
Western Hemisphere
violence under control. He also criticized
the guerrilla offensive, saying that all
peaceful means had not been exhausted,
that the people were not convinced that
the guerrillas would be an improvement,
and that the guerrillas had no chance of
success. Asked in a May interview why
some priests apparently still supported
the guerrillas, Rivera y Damas said that
few did so— three were with guerrillas
inside El Salvador, and a dozen were
conducting propaganda activities abroad.
The Guerrillas. Anticipating at least
some gains from their planned January
offensive, the guerrillas late in 1980
created a new "vanguard" organization,
the Farabundo Marti National Libera-
tion Front (FMLN). The FMLN amounts
in practice to the DRU plus the tiny
"Revolutionary Party of Central
American Workers" but still excluding
the non-Marxist-Leninist groups in the
FDR, with which the FMLN maintains
relations it terms "direct."
The failure of the January offensive
made it necessary to down play the
guerrillas' military image. Accordingly,
on February 3, 1981, the Political-
Diplomatic Commission of the FMLN/
FDR prepared a "Proposal for Interna-
tional Mediation." The objectives of this
"negotiating maneuver" were explicitly
stated: to "gain time in order to improve
our internal military situation."
After the documents setting forth
this maneuver became public, FDR
leaders in exile acknowledged their
authenticity but asserted a readiness to
undertake a "comprehensive process of
political negotiations." Nonetheless,
guerrilla forces continue to receive
military supplies from abroad, and their
chief strategists spurn the government's
efforts to seek a democratic political
solution.
The loss of any hope of the quick
victory promised by their leaders in
January has forced the guerrillas to fall
back on a destructive strategy of pro-
longed war through economic attrition.
Guerrilla forces are exacting a heavy
toll, particularly through sabotage, and
remain entrenched in certain isolated
parts of Morazan and Chalatenango Pro-
vinces near the Honduran border, where
they can maintain external supply lines.
Electoral Preparations. On
March 5, 1981, President Duarte ap-
pointed an independent three-man Cen-
tral Elections Commission to prepare an
electoral law and oversee procedures for
the election of a Constitutent Assembly
in 1982 that would set the stage for a
general presidential election, presumably
in 1983.
The following Sunday, Bishop
Rivera y Damas called for a dialogue
between the opposition and the govern-
ment in support of free elections. "The
church," he continued, "looks very
favorably on the political willingness of
the junta to discover a political solution
to the problem .... We are sure that if
the elections are as they have been
promised — authentically free and
democratic — the Salvadoran people will
demonstrate that it is a modern people
who desire changes, but with respect for
human values."
On July 10, the Salvadoran Govern-
ment approved a provisional electoral
law providing for the automatic re-
registration of previous political parties
upon receipt by the Central Elections
Commission of a list of their current
bylaws and board of directors. Two FDR
affiliates — the social-democratic MNR
and the Communist-front National
Democratic Union (UDN)— could thus
automatically validate their legal status
for the Constituent Assembly elections.
The law also provides that parties must
abide by Salvadoran law and permits
any group of 25 citizens to gather 3,000
signatures and register as a new
political party.
The Central Elections Commission
announced on July 8 that it had already
sent invitations to the Organization of
American States, the United Nations,
the International Committee of the Red
Cross, the European Parliament,
Amnesty International, and other
organizations to send observers "not on-
ly for the day of the elections, but also
in anticipation of them, observing the
entire process."
Political Life. Sensing that elec-
tions may prove a viable solution to the
crisis, pre-1979 parties are stirring
again, and new ones are beginning to
emerge. In addition to the Christian
Democrats, these include the old offi-
cialist Party of National Conciliation
(PCN) and new groups such as the
Popular Democratic Unity (UPD) and
Democratic Action.
The Salvadoran Peasant Union
(UCS) held a national congress April 9.
Thousands of agricultural workers and
leaders throughout El Salvador traveled
to San Salvador to participate. At the
end of May, 2,500 delegates, including a
sizable number of women, came to San
Salvador from all parts of the country to
participate in the Christian Democratic
Party's fourth national congress.
Public opinion in San Salvador
shows a dramatic drop in support for
political groups associated with the gi
rillas. In fact, on May 1, 1981, the sar
day that a clandestine guerrilla radio
near the Honduran border called on
workers and peasants to destroy the
"oppressors and establish their own
government," the MNR published a
statement in San Salvador calling for
"halt to the violence" and "an end to t
civil war."
The savage events of recent years
have created enmities that will not be
forgotten soon. Salvadoran society is
deeply fragmented and widely armed.
The healing process, once begun, will
long and difficult. But the best indica-
tion that El Salvador's people will yet
have the last word is that both the gu
rillas and the far right seem afraid of
the results of the Salvadoran people's
expressing their preferences.
76
The U.S. Role
The position of the United States is
Salvadorans should be allowed to resc
their own problems without coercion
dictation from any source.
During the 1970s, reflecting gene I
policy trends, U.S. economic and
military assistance to El Salvador de- 1
clined sharply from a peak during the I'
Alliance for Progress. Military
assistance was terminated in 1977. U
economic assistance increased modest
after the 1980 reforms created a
framework for cooperation insuring t
aid would reach the needy and the po f
Although military trucks and radios
were also sold on credit, no transfers I
arms or ammunition were authorized. I
On January 16, 1981, in response
the Communist-armed guerrilla often- p
sive, the Carter Administration resun |jl
arms sales for the first time in 3 year i
Helicopters and some military trainer I
were also sent. Subsequently, the
Reagan Administration authorized ad> 1
tional military supplies and services t<
total of $35 million and doubled
economic assistance to more than $10
million. In mid-1981, 55 U.S. military
trainers were in El Salvador under
orders to perform no duties of a com!
nature or any training that could eng;
them in combat.
Current Policy. On July 16, 1981
Assistant Secretary of State for Inter
America Affairs Thomas O. Enders
noted that U.S. assistance was prever
ing the guerrillas from turning their
foreign arms supplies to new advanta;
but that El Salvador remained a divid
Department of State Bulleit:
Western Hemisphere
ltry. The U.S. Government, Enders,
inued, believes that:
'Only Salvadorans can resolve these
;ions. Neither we nor any other
ign country can do so. It is,
efore, critical that the Salvadoran
rnment itself is attempting to over-
e these divisions by establishing a
5 democratic system.
'We wholeheartedly support this
tive. Not out of blind sentiment,
Dut of a desire to reproduce
ywhere a political system that has
ed Americans so extraordinarily
and certainly not because we
trestimate the difficulties involved.
'Rather we believe that the solution
; be democratic because only a genu-
pluralistic approach can enable a
nundly divided society to live with
! without violent convulsions,
ually overcoming its differences.
How can a country beset by so
/ troubles get from here to there?
first thing to say is that promises
; be kept. One can debate endlessly
t El Salvador's land reform. . . .
. . the issue is no longer whether
reform is advisable or not. The
now is how to consolidate and
?ct what has been done. . . .
Second, there must be
I mstrable progress in controlling
• ;liminating violence from all
lees. . . . Cuban and Nicaraguan
I lies to the guerrillas must stop . . .
| Salvadoran Army leadership is
e 2d, both to fight rightist death
u Is and to control security force
lice. . . .
Third, all parties that renounce
a nee should be encouraged to
i cipate in the design of new
il ical institutions and the
s ;ss of choosing representatives
them. . . .
I It is only realistic to recognize that
I'mists on both left and right still op-
I elections. . . . We should recognize
a El Salvador's leaders will not — and
0 d not — grant the insurgents
Jigh negotiations the share of power
• ebels have not been able to win on
Battlefield. But they should be— and
a -willing to compete with the insur-
|; at the polls.
■ Elections are quintessential^ mat-
Ijf internal policy. But there may be
1 other nations can assist. If re-
l;ed by the government of El
Salvador — and desired by those in-
volved— other countries might be invited
to facilitate such contacts and discus-
sions or negotiations on electoral issues
among eligible political parties. The
United States is prepared, if asked, to
join others in providing good offices to
assist the Salvadorans in this task,
which could prove critical to the search
for a political solution to the conflict.
"We have no preconceived formulas.
We know that elections have failed in
the past. We have no illusions that
the task now will be anything but dif-
ficult. But we believe that elections open
to all who are willing to renounce
violence and abide by the procedures of
democracy can help end El Salvador's
long agony ....
"[Finally,] . . . the search for a
political solution will not succeed
unless the United States sustains its
assistance to El Salvador. . . .
"Should members of the guerrilla
command believe that they can make
gains by military means, no participation
in elections, no meaningful negotiations,
no political solutions are likely to be
forthcoming. The point is not that sus-
tained U.S. assistance might lead to a
government military victory. It is that a
political solution can only be achieved if
the guerrillas realize they cannot win by
force of arms. . . .
"Our help for El Salvador is really
very small, but it is vital. . . . We can
help by:
• Extending economic and military
assistance to counter the disaster visited
upon El Salvador by enemies of
democracy;
• Standing by our friends while they
work out a democratic solution; and
• Identifying and seizing oppor-
tunities to help such a solution actually
take shape."
1 Thomas P. Anderson, Matanza:
El Salvador's Communist Revolt of 1932
(Lincoln, University of Nebraska Press, 1971)
puts the death toll at 10,000 — mainly
peasants in the western provinces where the
revolt achieved some initial successes.
2 cf. Stephen Webre, Jose Napoleon
Duarte and the Christian Democratic Party
in Salvadoran Politics, 1960-1972 (Baton
Rouge, Louisiana State University Press,
1979).
3 Although estimates are necessarily im-
precise, ORDEN's membership was usually
put at 30,000-60,000, while the BPR and
FAPU each claimed some 40,000 members or
sympathizers.
4 Arguing that the failure of the October
junta proved that the military would never
accept reforms, one of that junta's five
members, Guillermo Ungo, threw in with the
violent opposition.
6 See Report to the President of Special
Mission to El Salvador (December 12, 1980,
released December 23, 1980).
6 This arms flow was documented in
Communist Interference in El Salvador
(Department of State Special Report No. 80,
February 23, 1981). West German Socialist
Party Vice Chairman Hans Jurgen
Wischnewsky told a June 19 press conference
in Bonn that Fidel Castro had personally ad-
mitted Cuban deliveries of arms to El
Salvador.
7 Anderson, op. cit, p. 92.
8 This document and the letter quoted in
the next paragraph were among the battle
plans, records of DRU meetings, and reports
of arms shipments found in caches recovered
from the PCES in November 1980 and from
the ERP in January 1981.
9 See "A Call by the General Command
of the FMLN to Initiate the General Offen-
sive," reproduced as Appendix 11, pp. 82-83,
of the FMLN-FDR booklet El Salvador on
the Threshold of a Democratic Revolutionary
Victory, distributed in the United States in
English during February-March 1981. ■
Der 1981
77
Western Hemisphere
Cuban and Haitian Migration
by Thomas 0. Enders
Statement before the Subcommittee
on Immigration and Refugee Policy of
the Senate Judiciary Committee on
July 31, 1981. Ambassador Enders is
Assistant Secretary for Inter-American
Affairs. l
I am pleased to appear this morning to
discuss the international and foreign
policy aspects of Cuban and Haitian
migration, in the light of the new im-
migration policy announced by the Presi-
dent, and to support the legislative
changes he is requesting. I would like at
the outset to make clear that, although
the domestic impact of migration from
either country is much the same, the
foreign policy significance is quite
different.
Your committee asked us to discuss
the possibility of future mass migrations
to the United States. Emigration of a
few dozen or a few hundred people may
occur from a number of foreign coun-
tries. A sudden, massive outflow of tens
of thousands in a short period of time is
likely only from a totalitarian state.
In other words, in one case we are
dealing with a friendly government — the
Government of Haiti — interested in en-
forcing its laws and respectful of the
laws of its neighbors and desirous of
cooperating with the United States in
bringing illegal migration under control.
Migration occurs as the result of
separate decisions by private individuals
without the support or sanction of their
government.
In the other case— in the Mariel
boatlift of last year— we were faced by a
deliberate decision of the Cuban Govern-
ment to permit and, indeed, in many in-
stances to force the departure of large
numbers of its citizens for the United
States. The offers of several countries to
receive these Cubans and the efforts of
international agencies to arrange a safe
and orderly system of departures were
rejected or ignored.
The steps we take to halt illegal
migration to the United States and to
arrange the return of citizens of these
countries who are not eligible for admis-
sion will obviously be different in these
two very different circumstances.
The Case of Haiti
In the case of Haiti, we face a con-
tinuing problem. Illegal migrants from
Haiti constitute a significant social and
economic problem for the United States,
particularly in the State of Florida. Over
20,000 Haitians entered the United
States illegally in the last year, many of
them from dangerous sea voyages in un-
seaworthy craft. However, the Govern-
ment of Haiti has assured us of its
determination to enforce its own laws
against illegal migration and of its inten-
tion to cooperate with the United States,
to the maximum extent of its ability, in
joint efforts to halt the flow. We are ac-
tively engaged in both diplomatic and
technical discussions with the Govern-
ment of Haiti to determine how we may
improve the cooperation of our two
governments.
One thing that has become clear is
that Haiti will not be able to do the job
alone, without U.S. assistance. The
economic and security assistance re-
quests for FY 1982 that are now before
the Congress will be essential to enable
the Haitian Government to deal with a
severely strained economy and to im-
prove the capability of its Coast Guard
to prevent the departure of small boats
with illegal migrants.
In addition the U.S. Coast Guard
will be assisting foreign governments
that request such assistance to interdict
on the high seas their flag vessels
suspected of attemping to violate U.S.
immigration laws. Arrangements will be
made for expeditious screening and
processing of any asylum requests at sea
so that aliens who are not legitimate
candidates for asylum can be returned
promptly to their country aboard inter-
dicted vessels. We envision that such in-
terdiction would be done selectively and
given maximum publicity in Haiti, with
the cooperation of the Haitian Govern-
ment, in order to have maximum impact
on intending migrants without entailing
excessive expenditure or enforcement
effort.
Legislation to facilitate seizure and
forfeiture of vessels bringing aliens to
the United States in violation of U.S.
laws would also assist greatly in dealing
with Haitian migration. Indeed, the U.S.
Government technical team which visit-
ed Haiti last week observed that the
traffic in migrants is now highly orga-
nized, using sizable ships. Confiscation
of these ships, once they have been
seized, would be a powerful deterren
against those who are cynically profi1
from the traffic in Haitian migrants.
The Case of Cuba
Some 125,000 Cubans entered the
United States between April 21 and !
tember 26, 1980. This was an un-
precedented event — the deliberate us
of innocent human beings to impose
political and economic costs on a
neighboring country. By the end of tl
fiscal year, it is estimated that the
Mariel boatlift will have cost the Unit
States over $700 million. Such politic
inspired exoduses have little in comir
with legitimate immigration and refu
issues; rather they are the ultimate ii
manipulation — exploiting the sufferir
of an oppressed people to commit an I
friendly act against another country.
Federal, state, and local govern-
ments were unprepared to deal with
Mariel boatlift of 1980. Although we
estimate that between 1 and 2 millioi
Cubans would like to leave the island
approximately 200,000 Cubans have
been approved by Cuban authorities :
emigration. We must and we will be
prepared to respond to any attempt 1
Castro to repeat last year's sudden
exodus.
Let me make clear that we propc
no change in this country's traditiona
policy of welcoming individual refuge
from persecution and tyranny, whetl
from Cuba or other repressive regim
But our experience of last year ampl
proved that we simply cannot respon
the same way when we are faced wit
sudden influx of tens of thousands, ii
eluding the inmates of jails and asylu
Key Planning Elements
There are four key elements in our p
ning for any contingency of this kind
First, Castro and the Cuban peof
must be in no doubt or uncertainty
about the nature of our response to a
new Mariel. If they believe we are un
prepared to handle an illegal immigra
tion emergency, if they believe we wi
vaccilate between attempting to stop
migration and welcoming it, and if th<
believe we will in the end welcome th>
arrivals and resettle them in America
communities, then the temptation to
deal us another blow will be very gre;
The President, by asking Congress fo
I
78
Western Hemisphere
uthority to declare an immigration
gency and to take the actions
ssary to respond to it, has clearly
led his determination that there be
istaking of our intentions. It is im-
int that the Congress send the same
1 in its action on the President's
ative proposals.
econd, it is vitally important to
Castro the one means of transpor-
a by which a massive flood of illegal
ants can be brought to this coun-
boats. The 1980 experience was
possible by the U.S. citizens and
ents who took thousands of
registered boats to Cuba. Cuba has
toats it could spare for a new
ift. If U.S. residents do not take
to Cuba, there can be no migration
Cuba on the scale of Mariel. I am
lent they will not do so if the U.S.
rnment is clear that it disapproves,
3 clear that such action is illegal,
f it is clear that boatowners will
heir boats and be subject to pros-
m and heavy fines if they attempt
ilp a foreign government create an
^ration emergency. Again, adoption
President's legislative proposals
H have a major impact.
hird, there are some boats in
I , and some may reach there from
s nited States despite out best
Is. The Coast Guard, with support
1 the Navy if necessary, would be
Lble to interdict on the high seas
I vessels that we have reasonable
| to believe may be engaged in
| porting illegal aliens to the United
| s in violation of our laws. Cuba has
B n the past made use of third coun-
| ag vessels to carry migrants. In the
ji if third country vessels, interdic-
r rould, of course, take place only
B the prior consent of the flag state.
■ iroposed legislation would facilitate
r arning these vessels away from the
n (1 States before they have been
■ .o unload their passengers on our
lory and turning them back toward
I port of departure or another point
lie of the United States.
ourth, for those Cubans and Hai-
I who do, by one means or another,
r> i in the United States, our policy
I be one of immediate detention and
I pt exclusion of those found to be
Inissable to this country. To do
I wise is to encourage others to
r
'hese are the four elements of a
l-ssful policy to prevent new massive
l<es of illegal aliens — a clear
Administration and congressional rejec-
tion of illegal immigration, seizure and
forfeiture of vessels used for illegal
boatlifts, interdiction of illegal boatlifts
on the high seas, and detention and ex-
clusion of those who arrive by that
means.
These are not, of course, cost-free
policies. Effective interdiction, whether
of the continuing Haitian boatlift or a
potential Cuban one, means additional
operating costs for the Coast Guard. Ex-
pedited exclusion proceedings require
additional manpower. Detention of the
continuing flow of illegal migrants, plus
prudent preparation for any sudden in-
crease, requires, as the Attorney
General said yesterday, "additional
resources for the construction of perma-
nent facilities." The Administration will
ask your approval of the resources need-
ed, and I hope that your committee will
support our request.
I do not wish to convey the impres-
sion that discouraging Cuba from the
temptation of unleashing a new human
wave against this country or stopping it
once it is started will be easy tasks for
which we have found a simple formula.
On the contrary, they will require dif-
ficult and delicate balances of diplomatic
pressures, effective law enforcement ac-
tions, and well-coordinated Federal,
state, and local policies. A clear consen-
sus of congressional and public opinion
in support of this approach will be in-
dispensable if it is to succeed.
President Reagan, in his statement,
quoted the report of the bipartisan
select commission that Mariel brought
home to most Americans the fact that
U.S. immigration policy was out of con-
trol. The Administration's proposals are
designed to bring coherence and control
back into our policy and to insure
respect for our laws both at home and
abroad. We will well serve our foreign
policy objectives by doing so.
lrThe complete transcript of the hearings
will be published by the committee and will
be available from the Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Printing
Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■
The Situation in
Guatemala
Statement submitted by Stephen W.
Bosworth, Deputy Assistant Secretary
for Inter-American Affairs, and Stephen
E. Palmer, Acting Assistant Secretary
for Human Rights and Humanitarian
Affairs, to the Subcommittees on Human
Rights and International Organizations
and on Inter-American Affairs of the
House Foreign Affairs Committee on
July 30, 19811
We are pleased to have the opportunity
to discuss with you the situation in
Guatemala, the Administration's policies
toward that country, and the serious
issue of human rights.
Guatemala stands out in Central
America because of its size — the most
populous of the Central American
republics — its economic potential — a
GNP of over $7 billion with substantial
industrial development and mineral
resources — and its importance for
regional stability.
Guatemala has serious social,
economic, and political problems. The
country's economy, though growing,
faces declining prices for primary prod-
uct exports, investor uncertainty ag-
gravated by the insurgency, and great
disparities in income and opportunity
between Guatemala's richest and poorest
citizens.
Political Problems
Political problems complicate economic
and social difficulties. Although govern-
ments have been relatively stable, there
is little consensus over the society's
goals, the role of government or the
limits of dissent. In the past several
years, insurgency and increasing
violence have blocked the peaceful
resolution of such issues.
Guatemalan guerrilla groups are led
by self-proclaimed Marxist-Leninists.
They support neither democracy nor
human rights and have engaged in a
campaign of violence and terror.
Guatemalan insurgents— over 2,000
strong — are heavily supported and in-
fluenced by our adversaries. As in El
Salvador, Cuba has systematically en-
couraged and sponsored the unification
of Guatemalan Marxist guerrilla groups
and has provided increased assistance
ler 1981
79
Western Hemisphere
and guerrilla training in return. Many of
the insurgents active in Guatemala have
received some training in Cuba, in-
cluding training in the use of heavy
weapons. Cuba's international propa-
ganda broadcasts support Guatemalan
guerrillas and claimed on June 6, 1981,
that the guerrillas had inflicted over
1,000 casualties on the Guatemalan
troops. Guatemalan insurgents have also
received weapons from Nicaragua and
collaborate closely with Salvadoran guer-
rillas.
Human rights violations in
Guatemala are inextricably linked to the
problem of violence in that society.
Guatemala's violence stems from both
endemic social and economic factors and
from the willful efforts by both right
and left to polarize the country. The
most recent cycle of violence began in
October 1978, when the leftist opposi-
tion exploited an economic issue to lead
street riots in which 30 people were
killed. The country's rightist elements
reacted in turn to this disruption of
public order. Since then political violence
in Guatemala has left more than 100
killed each month. Centrist groups, in-
cluding Christian Democrats, have been
victims of the violence, and extremist
views have come to dominate reactions
from both sides. Many of these
casualties are caused by the right. But
the left pursues a calculated policy of in-
creasing armed violence, which has in-
cluded atrocities such as kidnapping of
children, murdering business managers,
and plundering property, intended to
provoke government and rightist reac-
tions.
In response to escalating violence
over the past 3 years, the United States
systematically distanced itself from the
Guatemalan Government— publicly and,
at times, confrontationally.
These policies did not, however, im-
prove the status of human rights in
Guatemala. On the contrary violence
escalated, polarization intensified, and
the insurgency grew. The cycle of prov-
ocation from the left and overreaction
from the right has become well-
established. Both left and right have
engaged in excesses and violations of
commonly accepted human rights. The
United States is deeply concerned over
this violence. We were most saddened to
learn that in the past several days,
violence claimed the life of an American,
Father Stanley Rother.
New U.S. Policy Approach
The Administration is convinced of the
need to try a new, constructive policy
approach to Guatemala; the policies of
the past clearly failed. They have neither
advanced our security interests nor
prevented a deterioration in the human
rights situation. We believe we must try
to play a positive role in advancing both
these concerns.
As Under Secretary [for Political Af-
fairs Walter J.] Stoessel testified before
the Subcommittee on Human Rights and
International Organizations on July 14,
human rights is a principal goal of our
foreign policy. The Administration's ob-
jective is to make our security interests
and our human rights concerns mutually
reinforcing so that they can be pursued
in tandem. Guatemala is a case in which
we have both security and human rights
concerns and where we are seeking to
make these two concepts mutually rein-
forcing.
In Guatemala improved human rights
will not be possible unless the overall
level of violence and provocations by the
insurgents are reduced. At the same
time, improvement will require greater
self-confidence on the part of the
government, essential to assert its con-
trol over the right and its own security
forces.
Therefore, we believe traditional
diplomatic means are more appropriate
in Guatemala today than public threat or
censure. Traditional diplomacy and
dialogue can bring about positive
change, while censure often accentuates
the tensions that contribute to viola-
tions.
In late May, after Ambassador at
Large Vernon Walters' trip to
Guatemala, we informed the House Sub-
committee on Inter-American Affairs
that we intended to go ahead with the
sale of trucks and jeeps to Guatemala.
He promised to consult with the Con-
gress before any major changes in policy
with regard to Guatemala. Guatemala
has asked to purchase helicopter and air-
craft spare parts. As Ambassador
Walters told the subcommittee in late
May, the Department is considering this
request. No final decision has yet been
reached. We should note that the
Guatemalan Air Force uses helicopters
as a means to maintain communication
in large areas which are not well served
by roads or landing strips and for both
transporting troops and mercy missions.
•
It would be naive to expect
dramatic, immediate results from ouil*-
new policy approach, given the existi
climate of violence and the insurgent
efforts to increase violence. But we a
convinced that dialogue is the only a]
proach which can be effective in
diminishing overreaction by governm
forces and toleration of illicit rightist
tivity. There have been some positive
developments in the past several wee
The Guatemalan security forces have
made inroads in guerrilla operations
And they have done it while taking c
to protect innocent bystanders.
We are concerned about human
rights violations in Guatemala and th
need to restore due process. While tl
problem can only be solved in the em
Guatemalans, we must seek to prom<
the conditions which will contribute t
their ability to solve the problem.
We would now like to respond to
those specific questions you have rais
which we have not already answered
this statement.
We are familar with the Amnest
International report on Guatemala ai
have taken it into account. The Depa
ment policy is and has been not to cc
ment publicly on reports of private
groups. We do, of course, recognize
contributions private organizations c
make in the field of human rights.
The Department has not made a
termination in this Administration on
previous one that any government, i i
eluding the Guatemalan Government
engaged in a pattern of gross and cc
sistent violation of human rights. W<
have taken the legal requirements oi
Section 502B of the Foreign Assistai
Act into account and have applied th
in good faith.
Regarding the sale of trucks and.
jeeps to Guatemala, the Administrati
assessed foreign policy export contro
to insure that such controls do not in
pair U.S. trade without providing coi
responding advantages to our foreigi
policy. In April, after review of this
issue and with applications pending f
U.S. companies for the export of tru<
jeeps, and other products to Guatem;
we recommended that the Commerce
Department drop cargo trucks, jeeps
and several other items from its list <
crime control and detection equipmer
subject to special licensing procedure
80
Department of State Bulle
TREATIES
ur opinion, the removal of these
is from the crime control list and
ement instead under regional stabili-
ontrols is not inconsistent with con-
sional intent and does not under-
e the provisions of the Foreign
istance Act or of the Export Ad-
istration Act,
Although the executive branch has
requested any foreign military sales
S) credits for Guatemala since 1977,
lave provided physiological testing
in FMS cash basis to help select stu-
t pilots for the Guatemalan Air
:e. Such agreements for the sale of
ing services were signed in April
) and again in July 1981. This
ing helps determine whether the stu-
can physically stand rapid changes
tmospheric pressure and helps him
n how to deal with these changes.
. sort of testing, which helps to pre-
; serious air crashes, has been pro-
d to the Guatemalans and to most
n American air forces.
Presidential elections are scheduled
uatemala for March 7, 1982. These
;ions will determine which of the
lidates nominated in the next several
ths will serve as president for the
ar term beginning in 1982. We
I 've strongly in the importance of
I and open elections as a way to
II erate the problems which face
, :emalan society and hope that the
u paign will evolve in a climate that
i contribute to the resolution of
I :emala's serious problems.
■ The complete transcript of the hearings
ii )e published by the committee and will
t 'ailable from the Superintendent of
c ments, U.S. Government Printing
E e, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■
Current Actions
MULTILATERAL
Agriculture
Convention on the Inter-American In-
stitute for Cooperation on Agriculture.
Done at Washington Mar. 6, 1979. Entered
into force Dec. 8, 1980. TIAS 9919.
Ratification deposited: Venezuela,
July 31, 1981.
Antarctica
Recommendations relating to the fur-
therance of principles and objectives of the
Antarctic treaty (TIAS 4780). Adopted at
London Oct. 7, 1977.1
Notifications of approval: ( .K .
U.S.S.R., June 28, 1979.
Recommendations relating to the fur-
therance of principles and objectives of the
Antarctic treaty (TIAS 4780). Adopted at
Washington Oct. 5, 1979.1
Notification of approval: Argentina,
June 23, 1981.
Atomic Energy
Agreement amending the agreement of
Sept. 22, 1980 (TIAS 9863), concerning the
transfer of a research reactor and enriched
uranium to Malaysia. Signed at Vienna
June 12 and July 22, 1981. Entered into
force July 22, 1981.
Commodities
Agreement establishing the Common
Fund for Commodities, with schedules.
Done at Geneva June 27, 1980. '
Signatures: Costa Rica, July 29, 1981;
Greece, July 21, 1981; Nigeria, July 20,
1981.
Ratification deposited: Haiti, July 20,
1981.
Conservation
Convention on the conservation of Ant-
arctic marine living resources, with annex
for an arbitral tribunal. Done at Canberra
May 20, 1980.1
Ratification deposited: South Africa,
July 23, 1981.
Consular
Vienna convention on consular re-
lations. Done at Vienna Apr. 24, 1963.
Entered into force Mar. 19, 1967; for the
U.S. Dec. 24, 1969. TIAS 6820.
Accession deposited: Bhutan, July 28,
1981.
Cultural Property
Convention on the means of prohibiting
and preventing the illicit import, export,
and transfer of ownership of cultural prop-
erty. Adopted at Paris Nov. 14, 1970, at
the Kith session of the UNESCO general
conference. Entered into force Apr. 24,
1972.;'
Ratification deposited: Pakistan,
Apr. 30, 1981.
Customs
Convention establishing a Customs Coopera-
tion Council, with annex. Done at Brussels
Dec. IB. 1950. Entered into force Nov. 4,
1952; for the U.S. Nov. 5, 1970. TIAS
7063.
Accession deposited: Niger, July 1, 1981.
Customs convention on the international
transportation of goods under cover of TIR
carnets, with annexes. Done at Geneva
Nov. 14, 1975. Entered into force Mar. 20,
1980.2
Senate advice and consent to accession:
U.S. July 30, 1981.
Education— UNESCO
Convention on the recognition of studies,
diplomas, and degrees concerning higher
education in the states belonging to the
Europe Region. Done at Paris, Dec. 21,
1979. '
Ratification deposited: Yugoslavia, May 22,
1981
Energy
Agreement on an international energy pro-
gram. Done at Paris Nov. 18, 1974.
Entered into force provisionally Nov. 18,
1974; definitively, Jan. 19, 1976. TIAS
8278.
Definitive accession deposited: Portugal,
June 29, 1981.
Finance
Agreement establishing the International
Fund for Agricultural Development. Done
at Rome June 13, 1976. Entered into force
Nov. 30, 1977. TIAS 8765.
Accession deposited: Equatorial Guinea.
Fisheries
International convention for the conservation
of Atlantic tunas. Done at Rio de Janeiro
May 14, 1966. Entered into force Mar. 21,
1969. TIAS 6767.
Adherences deposited: Angola, July 29,
1976; Cape Verde, Oct. 11, 1979.
Maritime Matters
Amendments to the convention of Mar. 6,
1948, as amended, on the Intergovernmen-
tal Maritime Consultative Organization
(TIAS 4044, 6285, 6490, 8606). Adopted at
London Nov. 17, 1977. '
Acceptance deposited: Greece, July 28,
1981.
Amendments to the convention of Mar. 6,
1948, as amended, on the Intergovernmen-
tal Maritime Consultative Organization
(TIAS 4044, 6285, 6490, 8606). Adopted at
London Nov. 15, 1979. •
ober1981
81
Treaties
Acceptances deposited: China, July 29,
1981; Greece, Norway, July 28, 1981.
Senate advice and consent to ratification:
July 30, 1981.
Narcotic Drugs
Single convention on narcotic drugs. Done at
New York Mar. 30, 1961. Entered into
force Dec. 13, 1964; for the U.S. June 24,
1967. HAS 6298.
Accession deposited: Rwanda, July 15,
1981.
Convention on psychotropic substances. Done
at Vienna Feb. 21, 1971. Entered into force
Aug. 16, 1976; for the U.S. July 15, 1980.
TIAS 9725.
Ratification deposited: Rwanda, July 15,
1981.
Nuclear Material— Physical Protection
Convention on the physical protection of
nuclear material, with annexes. Done at
Vienna Oct. 26, 1979.1
Senate advice and consent to ratification:
U.S., July 30, 1981.
Signatures: Bulgaria, June 23 1981 ;3 Fin-
land, June 25, 1981.
Patents— Microorganisms
Budapest treaty on the international recog-
nition of the deposit of microorganisms for
the purpose of patent procedure, with
regulations. Done at Budapest Apr. 28,
1977. Entered into force Aug. 19, 1980.
TIAS 9768.
Accession deposited: Philippines, July 21,
1981.
Plants— Plant Varieties
International convention for the protection of
new varieties of plants of Dec. 2, 1961, as
revised. Done at Geneva Oct. 23, 1978. '
Ratification deposited: South Africa,
July 21, 1981.
Pollution
Protocol relating to intervention on the high
seas in cases of pollution by substances
other than oil. Done at London Nov. 2,
1973.1
Ratification deposited: Poland, July 10,
1981.
Postal
Constitution of the Universal Postal Union
with final protocol. Done at Vienna July 10,
1964. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1966.
TIAS 5881.
Accession deposited: South Africa, June 11,
1981.
Additional protocol to the constitution of the
Universal Postal Union with final protocol
signed at Vienna July 10, 1964. Done at
Tokyo Nov. 14, 1969. Entered into force
July 1, 1971, except for article V of the
additional protocol which entered into force
Jan. 1, 1971. TIAS 7150.
Accession deposited: South Africa, June 11,
1981.
Second additional protocol to the constitution
of the Universal Postal Union of July 10,
1964, general regulations with final pro-
tocol and detailed regulations. Done at
Lausanne July 5, 1974. Entered into force
Jan. 1, 1976. TIAS 8231.
Accession deposited: South Africa, June 11,
1981.
Money orders and postal travellers' checks
agreement with detailed regulations with
final protocol. Done at Lausanne July 5,
1974. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1976.
TIAS 8232.
Accession deposited: Guyana, June 19,
1981.
Property — Industrial Designs
Locarno agreement establishing an interna-
tional classification for industrial designs,
with annex. Done at Locarno Oct. 8, 1976.
Entered into force Apr. 27, 1971; for the
U.S. May 25, 1972.
Notification of denunciation deposited:
U.S. July 21, 1981; effective July 21, 1982.
Refugees
Protocol relating to the status of refugees.
Done at New York Jan. 31, 1967. Entered
into force Oct. 4, 1967; for the U.S. Nov. 1,
1968. TIAS 6577.
Accession deposited: Philippines, July 22,
1981.
Rubber
International natural rubber agreement,
1979. Done at Geneva Oct. 6, 1979.
Entered into force provisionally Oct. 23,
1980.
Accession deposited: Iraq, July 1, 1981.
Safety at Sea
International convention for the safety of life
at sea, 1974, with annex. Done at London
Nov. 1, 1974. Entered into force May 25,
1980. TIAS 9700.
Accessions deposited: Nigeria, May 7,
1981; Libya July 2, 1981.
Terrorism
International convention against the taking
of hostages. Adopted at New York Dec. 17,
1979. '
Senate advice and consent to ratification:
July 30, 1981.
UNIDO
Constitution of the United Nations Industrial
Development Organization, with annexes.
Adopted at Vienna Apr. 8, 1979. '
Ratification deposited: Mali, July 24, 1981.
Signature: Democratic People's Republic
of Korea Aug. 10, 1981.
Whaling
International whaling convention and schp
ule of whaling regulations, as amended t
the protocol of Nov. 19, 1956. Done at
Washington Dec. 2, 1946. Entered into
force Nov. 10, 1948. TIAS 1849, 4228. 1
Adherence deposited: Philippines, Aug.
1981.
Wheat
1981 protocol for the first extension of th(
food aid convention, 1980. Done at
Washington Mar. 24, 1981. Entered ink
force July 1, 1981.
Ratifications deposited: Federal Republi
of Germany,4 July 30, 1981; Luxembour
July 29, 1981.
1981 protocol for the sixth extension of th
wheat trade convention, 1971. Done at
Washington Mar. 24, 1981. Entered intx
force July 1, 1981.
Accession deposited: El Salvador, July 2
1981.
Ratifications deposited: Federal Republi
Germany," July 30, 1981; Peru, Aug. 1»
1981.
Women
Convention on the elimination of all forms
discrimination against women. Adopted
New York Dec. 18, 1979. Entered into
force Sept. 3, 1981.2
Accession deposited: Saint Vincent and
Grenadines, Aug. 4, 1981.
Ratifications deposited: Haiti, Mongolia!
July 20, 1981; Philippines, Aug. 5, 1981
Signatures: U.K., July 22, 1981; Peru,
July 23, 1981.
World Heritage
Convention concerning the protection of 1
world cultural and natural heritage. Do
at Paris Nov. 23, 1972. Entered into fo
Dec. 17, 1975. TIAS 8226.
Ratification deposited: Cuba, Mar. 23,
1981.
BILATERAL
Anguilla
Agreement relating to the establishment i
Peace Corps program in Anguilla. Effec
by exchange of letters at Washington F
19 and June 24, 1981. Entered into fore
June 24, 1981; effective May 1, 1981.
Australia
Agreed record of conclusions reached in
bilateral negotiations in the GATT
multilateral trade negotiations, Tokyo
Round, exchange of letters clarifying co
elusions, and related letters of Feb. 4 ai
Mar. 26, 1980. Done at Washington
Mar. 29, Oct. 22 and 26, 1979. Entered
force Mar. 31, 1980. TIAS 9975.
Austria
Arrangement within the context of the mi
lateral trade negotiations concerning
82
Department of State Bulle
Treaties
icultural products, and related letters of
30 and Apr. 14, 1980. Done Apr. 12
Oct. 17, 1979. Entered into force
1, 1980. TIAS 9977.
;d record of discussions and memoran-
l of understanding within the context of
multilateral trade negotiations concern-
the Austrian motor vehicle tax, and
ted letters of Jan. 30 and Apr. 14,
0. Done at Geneva Apr. 11, 1979.
ered into force Jan. 1, 1980. TIAS
4.
la
y on Pacific Coast albacore tuna vessels
port privileges, with annexes. Signed
Vashington May 26, 1981.
ruments of ratification exchanged:
wa, July 29, 1981.
ered into force: July 29, 1981.
randum of understanding within the
:ext of the multilateral trade negotia-
s regarding the staging of certain tariff
ictions. Signed at Washington Sept. 17
21, 1979. Entered into force Sept. 21,
9. TIAS 9978.
randum of understanding within the
■ext of the multilateral trade negotia-
5 relating to the agreement of Sept. 17
21, 1979, regarding the staging of cer-
tariff reductions. Signed at
hington Oct. 9, 1979. Entered into
k Oct. 9, 1979. TIAS 9978.
n j*ena Commission
« agreement within the context of the
l ilateral trade negotiations, and related
t of Apr. 14, 1980. Signed at Lima
j 14, 1979. Entered into force Jan. 1,
S ). TIAS 9979.
Ii ibia
!i i concerning the status of Quita Sueno,
V cador, and Serrana, with exchange of
I s. Signed at Bogota Sept. 8, 1972.
I Ate advice and consent to ratification:
I 31, 1981.5
i lican Republic
t ment relating to the multilateral trade
H jtiations. Effected by exchange of let-
■ at Santo Domingo Dec. 21, 1979, and
I 2, 1980. Entered into force Jan. 2,
.« I. TIAS 9981.
il jean Communities
■ 'ment relating to certain chemicals in
1. schedule XX to the GATT. Signed
I. 21, 1979. Entered into force Dec. 21,
B 9. TIAS 9985.
■ -ment relating to staging of a chemical
I:ession in U.S. schedule XX to the
j IT. Signed at Brussels Dec. 27, 1979.
I ered into force Dec. 27, 1979. TIAS
■ >ment relating to modification of U.S.
|;dule XX to the GATT, pursuant to arti-
■ XXVIII. Signed Jan. 2, 1980. Entered
I. force Jan. 2, 1980. TIAS 9987.
Agreement within the context of the multi-
lateral trade negotiations regarding trade
in certain agricultural products, and related
letter of Oct. 28, 1980. Done at Geneva
Apr. 12, 1979. Entered into force Jan. 1,
1980. TIAS 9982.
Agreement within the context of the multi-
lateral trade negotiations concerning tariff
concessions for table grapes, and related
letter of Oct. 28, 1980. Effected by letter
signed at Brussels July 27, 1979. Entered
into force Jan. 1, 1980. TIAS 9983.
Agreement within the context of the multi-
lateral trade negotiations concerning beer
containers and beer, and related letter of
Oct. 28, 1980. Signed Oct. 31, 1979.
Entered into force Jan. 1, 1980. TIAS
9984.
Finland
Letter and arrangement within the context of
the multilateral trade negotiations concern-
ing cheeses, and related letter of Jan. 30,
1980. Done at Geneva Apr. 12, 1979.
Entered into force Jan. 1, 1980. TIAS
9988.
Agreement relating to article XII of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,
and related letter of Jan. 30, 1980. Ef-
fected by letter signed at Geneva Apr. 12,
1979. Entered into force Mar. 13, 1980.
TIAS 9989.
Agreement within the context of the multi-
lateral trade negotiations regarding
alcoholic beverages, and related letter of
Jan. 30, 1980. Effected by letters at
Geneva and Washington Apr. 12 and Dec.
4, 1979. Entered into force Mar. 13, 1980.
TIAS 9990.
Project agreement for cooperation in the
field of icebreaking technology. Signed at
Washington July 23, 1981. Entered into
force July 23, 1981.
Memorandum of understanding concerning
cooperation in the field of transportation.
Signed at Washington July 23, 1981.
Entered into force July 23, 1981.
Hungary
Agreement within the context of the multi-
lateral trade negotiations on nontariff mat-
ters, and related letters of May 30, 1980.
Effected by letters done at Geneva Aug. 31
and Dec. 27, 1978, and Jan. 10, 1979.
Entered into force Jan. 1, 1980. TIAS
9991.
Agreement amending the Nov. 18, 1978,
agreement (TIAS 9992) on tariff matters.
Effected by exchange of letters at
Budapest Sept. 4 and 18, 1980. Entered in-
to force Sept. 18, 1980. TIAS 9992.
Agreement relating to revision of provision
in the tariff schedules of the U.S. Done at
Budapest June 13, 1979, and May 30, 1980.
Entered into force May 30, 1980. TIAS
9992.
Iceland
Agreement within the context of the
multilateral trade negotiations concerning
cheese and other agricultural products, and
related letter of Jan. 30, 1980. Effected by
exchanges of letters at Washington May 10
and 25, June 12, [undated], Sept. 18 and
Oct. 15, 1979. Entered into force Jan. 1,
1980. TIAS 9993.
India
Memorandum of understanding setting forth
mutual trade concessions and contributions
to the multilateral trade negotiations, and
related letters of Sept. 4 and Oct. 30, 1980.
Signed at Geneva Mar. 24, 1979. Entered
into force Apr. 24, 1980. TIAS 9994.
Japan
Agreement within the context of the
multilateral trade negotiations concerning
Japanese importation of peas and beans.
Effected by exchange of letters at Geneva
July 11, 1979. Entered into force Apr. 25,
1980. TIAS 9995.
Agreement within the context of the multi-
lateral trade negotiations relating to
agricultural and wood products, with an-
nex. Effected by exchange of letters at
Geneva July 11, 1979. Entered into force
Apr. 25, 1980. TIAS 9996.
Malawi
Agreement between the U.S. and Malawi
amending the agreement for sales of
agricultural commodities of Dec. 30, 1980.
Effected by exchange of notes at Lilongwe
May 22, 1981. Entered into force May 22,
1981.
Morocco
Agreement amending the agreement of Sept.
24, 1980, establishing a Provisional Com-
mission on Educational and Cultural Ex-
change. Effected by exchange of notes at
Rabat June 19, 1981. Entered into force
June 19, 1981.
Norway
Arrangement within the context of the multi-
lateral trade negotiations concerning
cheeses, and related letter of Jan. 30, 1980.
Signed at Geneva May 17, 1979. Entered
into force Jan. 1, 1980. TIAS 9997.
Agreement within the context of the multi-
lateral trade negotiations regarding an in-
crease in Norway's global quota for turkey
rolls, and related letter of Jan. 30, 1980.
Effected by letter done at Geneva June 28,
1979. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1980.
TIAS 9998.
Pakistan
Memorandum of understanding relating to
concessions and contributions to be made to
the multilateral trade negotiations, with
related letters, and related letter of Jan.
28, 1980. Done at Geneva Apr. 2 and 11,
and Aug. 2 and 30, 1979. Entered into
force Aug. 30, 1979. TIAS 9999.
*>ber1981
83
Treaties
CHRONOLOGY
-
Poland
Agreement relating to tariff and nontariff
matters within the framework of the
multilateral trade negotiations, and related
letters of June 27 and Oct. 20, 1980. Ef-
fected by exchange of letters at Geneva
Feb. 28, 1979. Entered into force Jan. 1,
1980. TIAS 10001.
Portugal
Agreement relating to beef and cheese within
the context of the multilateral trade
negotiations, and related letters of Feb. 4
and 12, 1980. Effected by exchanges of let-
ters at Washington June 12 and 18 and
Nov. 5 and 7, 1979. Entered into force Jan.
1, 1980. TIAS 10002.
Romania
Agreement relating to tariff and nontariff
matters within the framework of the multi-
lateral trade negotiations, and related let-
ters of Sept. 30. 1980. Effected by letters
done at Bucharest and Washington Mar. 2
and Nov. 8, 1979. Entered into force
Jan. 1, 1980. TIAS 10000.
Agreement amending the agreements of
Jan. 6 and 25, 1978, as amended (TIAS
9166, 9211, 9212, 9570), relating to trade
in cotton textiles, and Sept. 3 and Nov. 3,
1980, (TIAS 9911) relating to trade in wool
and man-made fiber textiles and textile
products. Effected by exchange of letters
at Bucharest July 13 and 20, 1981. Entered
into force July 20, 1981.
St. Vincent and the Grenadines
Agreement relating to the establishment of
a Peace Corps program in St. Vincent.
Effected by exchange of letters at
Bridgetown and St. Vincent May and June
26, 1980. Entered into force June 26, 1980.
Somalia
Agreement concerning the provision of train-
ing related to defense articles under the
U.S. international military education and
training (IMET) program. Effected by ex-
change of notes at Mogadishu Apr. 5 and
June 6, 1981. Entered into force June 6,
1981.
South Africa
International express mail agreement, with
detailed regulations. Signed at Pretoria and
Washington May 25 and June 29, 1981.
Entered into force July 1, 1981.
Sweden
Agreement within the context of the multi-
lateral trade negotiations concerning cheese
and other agricultural products, and related
letters of Jan. 30 and Feb. 19, 1980. Done
at Geneva June 13, July 5 and 10, 1979.
Entered into force January 1, 1980. TIAS
10003.
Switzerland
Agreement within the context of the multi-
lateral trade negotiations regarding motor
vehicles, and related letter of Nov. 19,
1980. Effected by letter done at Bern Apr.
11, 1979. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1980.
TIAS 10004.
Arrangement within the context of the multi-
lateral trade negotiations concerning
cheeses, with exchange of letters, and
related letter of Nov. 19, 1980. Done at
Geneva and Bern Apr. 12, 1979. Entered
into force Jan. 1, 1980. TIAS 10005.
Commitment of Switzerland within the con-
text of the multilateral trade negotiations
concerning access to its market for beef,
and related letter of Nov. 19, 1980. Done at
Geneva and Bern Apr. 12 and July 10,
1979. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1980.
TIAS 10006.
Agreement within the context of the multi-
lateral trade negotiations concerning the
treatment of certain chemicals. Effected by
exchange of letters at Geneva and
Washington Dec. 18 and 21, 1979. Entered
into force Dec. 21, 1979. TIAS 10007.
U.S.S.R.
Memorandum of understanding to extend the
agreement of Oct. 20, 1975, (TIAS 8206) on
the supply of grain by the U.S. to the
U.S.S.R. Signed at Vienna Aug. 5, 1981.
Entered into force Aug. 5, 1981.
Uruguay
Memorandum of agreement relating to pro-
vision of Federal Aviation Administration
services to the Government of Uruguay.
Signed at Washington and Montevideo
Mar. 19 and 20, 1981. Entered into force
Mar. 20, 1981.
Zambia
Agreement for sales of agricultural com-
modities, relating to the agreement of
Aug. 4, 1978, with minutes of negotiation.
Signed at Lusaka July 22, 1981. Entered
into force July 22, 1981.
1 Not in force.
2 Not in force for the U.S.
3 With reservation.
4 Applicable to Berlin (West).
5 With understanding. ■
August 1981
nit1
'■
i!
August 1
Secretary Haig and Foreign Ministers of 8
industrialized and 14 developing countries
tend a preliminary meeting on cooperation
and development in Cancun, Mexico, Aug.
1-2.
Gen. Omar Torrijos Herrara of Panam
killed in a plane crash in western Panama.
Torrijos had ruled Panama since 1968.
Iran's Ayatollah Khomeini confirms
Mohammed Ali Rajai as the new President
August 3
Israel and Egypt sign an agreement
establishing the 2,500-member multination
force and observers in the Sinai; Secretarj
Haig on behalf of the U.S. as a witness.
First meeting of the new session of th
Law of the Sea Conference reconvenes.
James L. Malone, Assistant Secretary of
Oceans and International Environmental a
Scientific Affairs, heads the U.S. delegatic
August 5
Egyptian President Sadat makes official v
to Washington, D.C., Aug. 5-6.
A three-man military junta assumes co
trol of the Government of Bolivia, making
this the 190th government Bolivia has had
its 156-year history.
August 10
U.N. Conference on New and Renewable
Sources of Energy is held in Nairobi, Ken;
Aug. 10-21. U.S. delegation is headed by
Ambassador James Stromayer.
August 11
Two F-15 jet fighter aircraft scheduled foi
delivery to Israel are placed under the san
suspension as 10 F-16s which were to haw
been shipped earlier.
August 13
20th anniversary of the construction of thi
Berlin Wall.
August 17
President Reagan announces completion ol
review regarding Israeli use of U.S.-supplt
military equipment and lifts 10-week suspe
sion on the shipment of F-15 and F-16 jet:
craft to Israel.
August 18
U.S. completes its obligations under the
agreement that won freedom for U.S.
hostages in Iran. A transfer of $2 million ii
Iranian assets will go to the Iranian Goven
ment and the remainder to an internationa
tribunal in the Netherlands which will rule
claims against Iran by U.S. companies.
August 19
Two U.S. Navy F-14s shoot down two Sovi
built Libyan jets after being fired on by on*
of the Libyan planes. The incident occurs
over international waters 60 nautical miles
off the Libyan coast.
84
Department of State Bullel|
PRESS RELEASES
st 21
[nd Mexico announce an agreement that
lited States will purchase 110 million
of oil from Mexico for its strategic
mm reserve.
hniversary of 1968 Soviet invasion of
pslovakia.
it 24
eagan Administration notifies Congress
decision to sell five airborne warning
■ntrol systems (AWACS) planes and
air defense equipment to Saudi Arabia.
it 25
ian President Sadat and Israeli Prime
er Begin meet in Alexandria, Egypt,
11th round of summit talks for discus-
>out normalization of relations and
'or resumption of Palestinian autonomy
e State Department and HIAS, a
refugee aid organization, state they
• Israel's plan to refuse aid to Soviet
wishing to emigrate to countries other
srael. Israel contends that the refusal
jiiet Jews to settle in Israel jeopardizes
■ permission for others to emigrate.
)i overnment pays most resettlement
S or emigrating Soviet Jews.
Lt26
Japan agreement prohibits U.S. export
'i an of produce coming from parts of
0 -nia quarantined because of Medflies.
0 :e from other States may pass through
i. 'nia en route to Japan if snipped in
i containers. Produce from noninfested
1 }f California must be treated before
) 'nt.
' e office of William Wilson, U.S. envoy
\ Vatican, asks the Italian Government
t :e appropriate action" in protest to an
f by Soviet writer Vladimir Katin which
f 'ates by innuendo" the U.S. Govern-
l ind its envoy in the May 13 attack on
n ohn Paul II.
1 ntagon officials report that North
» fired a surface-to-air missile at an
• can SR-71 reconnaissance aircraft near
] militarized Zone: the U.S. plane, which
lot hit, was flying in South Korean and
l itional airspace.
It 28
ji int declaration, Mexico and France
>iize El Salvador's guerrilla-led opposi-
I ; a "representative political force."
ij -all for free elections and a restruc-
i of the military forces.
jit 29
I ant Secretary for African Affairs
l?r states that the United States will not
I ides between blacks and whites in
I Africa or try to undermine the South
I n Government "in order to curry favor
liere."
August 30
Iranian President Mohammed Ali Rajai and
Prime Minister Mohammed Javad Bahonar
are killed by a bomb planted in the Prime
Minister's offices.
August 31
Hajatolislam Hashemi Refsanjani, speaker of
parliament, and Ayatollah Abdulkarim
Mussavi Ardabeli, Chief Justice of Iran, are
named to run Iran until new presidential elec-
tions can be held.
U.S. vetoes a U.N. Security Council
resolution condemning South Africa for its
incursions into Angola. The resolution
demanded immediate withdrawal of South
African forces, but made no reference to the
Cuban military presence in Angola, Soviet
supplied materiel for SWAPO, or SWAPO
raids into Namibia from Angola.
An explosion damages European head-
quarters of the U.S. Air Force at Ramstein,
West Germany, injuring 20 people.
A series of bombings in Lima, Peru,
damages the U.S. Embassy, the U.S. Am-
bassador's residence, and four companies
with U.S. connections: There were no in-
juries. ■
Department of State
Press releases may be obtained from the
Office of Press Relations, Department of
State, Washington, D.C. 20520.
Subject
Program for the state of Egyp-
tian President Sadat, Aug.
4-9.
Haig: remarks en route to
Cancun, July 31.
Haig: interview on the "Today"
Show.
Haig: departure statement,
Cancun, Aug. 2.
Davis R. Robinson sworn in as
the Legal Adviser (bio. data).
Parker W. Borg sworn in as
Ambassador to Mali (bio.
data).
Frederic L. Chapin sworn in as
Ambassador to Guatemala
(bio. data).
Haig: press briefing on the visit
of President Sadat.
Robert Carl McFarlane sworn in
as Counselor of the Depart-
ment of State (bio. data).
U.S., Romania amend textile
agreements, July 13 and 20.
U.S., Malaysia establish admin-
istrative arrangement to
textile agreement, July 17
and 20.
Haig: address before the Amer-
ican Bar Assoc, New
Orleans, Aug. 11.
No.
Date
*260
8/3
261
8/4
262
8/5
263
8/5
*264
7/31
*265
8/6
*266
8/6
267
8/6
*268
8/11
*269
8/11
*270
8/11
271
8/12
271A8/12 Haig: question-and-answer
session following address
before ABA, Aug. 11.
*272 8/12 U.S. Organization for the Inter-
national Radio Consultative
Committee (CCIR), study
group CMTT, Sept. 2.
*273 8/12 U.S. Organization for the
International Telegraph and
Telephone Consultative Com-
mittee (CCITT), study group
A, Sept. 3.
"274 8/12 Arthur W. Hummel, Jr., sworn
in as Ambassador to China
(bio. data).
*275 8/12 Shipping Coordinating Com-
mittee (SCC), Subcommittee
on Safety of Life at Sea
(SOLAS), working group on
ship design
and equipment, Aug. 27.
276 8/12 Anniversary of the Berlin Wall.
277 8/13 Refugee advisory panel reports
to Secretary Haig.
278 8/13 U.S., Canada press release on
Pacific salmon issues.
279 8/14 Haig: remarks on "Good
Morning, America."
*280 8/17 SCC, SOLAS, panel on bulk
cargoes, Sept. 2.
*281 8/17 SCC, SOLAS, working groups
on subdivision, stability, and
load lines and safety of
fishing vessels, Sept. 10.
*282 8/17 SCC, SOLAS, working group on
standards of training and
watchkeeping, Sept. 16.
*283 8/19 Julius Walker sworn in as
Ambassador to Upper Volta
(bio. data).
284 8/19 Japanese imports of fruits and
vegetables from California.
*285 8/24 SCC, SOLAS and tonnage sub-
committee, Sept. 9.
286 8/24 Haig: interview on CBS News,
Aug. 19.
287 8/24 Haig: interview on "Issues and
Answers," Aug. 23.
*288 9/3 SCC, SOLAS, working group on
radio communications,
Sept. 24.
*289 8/28 U.S., Macau establish textile
visa system, Aug. 21.
*290 8/28 U.S., Singapore amend textile
agreement, Aug. 7 and 13.
"291 8/28 U.S., Singapore amend textile
agreement, Aug. 7 and 13.
292 8/28 Haig: news conference.
*Not printed in the Bulletin. ■
ber1981
85
PUBLICATIONS
Department of State GPO Sales
Free, single copies of the following Depart-
ment of State publications are available from
the Public Information Service, Bureau of
Public Affairs, Department of State,
Washington, D.C. 20520.
Secretary Haig
A Strategic Approach to American Foreign
Policy, address before the American Bar
Association, New Orleans, Aug. 11, 1981
(Current Policy #305).
News conference, Aug. 6, 1981 (Current
Policy #304).
Relationship of Foreign and Defense Policies,
statement before the Senate Armed Serv-
ices Committee, July 30, 1981 (Current
Policy #302).
Africa
Background Notes on Mali (Aug. 1981).
East Asia
U.S. Relations with China, Assistant
Secretary Holdridge before the House
Foreign Affairs Committee, July 16, 1981
(Current Policy #297).
U.S. Interests in Southeast Asia, Secretary
Haig before the international conference
on Kampuchea in New York, July 13,
1981, and Assistant Secretary Holdridge
before the Senate Subcommittee on East
Asian and Pacific Affairs, July 15, 1981
(Current Policy #295).
Economics
U.S. Trade with the European Community,
1958-80, report by the Bureau of In-
telligence and Research, June 28, 1981
(Special Report #84).
International Commodity Agreements: New
Wave or Ebb Tide?, report by the Bureau
of Intelligence and Research, June 1981
(Special Report #83).
Europe
Implementation of the Helsinki Final
Act — 10th Semiannual Report, Decem-
ber 1, 1980-May 31, 1981 (Special Report
#85). Background Notes on Iceland (July
1981).
Food
World Hunger, Deputy Assistant Secretary
Michael Calingaert before the House
Agriculture Committee, July 22, l'.iSl
(Current Policy #299 1.
Security Assistance
Conventional Arms Transfers, Under
Secretary Buckley before the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, July 28,
1981 (Current Policy #301). ■
Publications may be ordered by catalog or
stock number from, the Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office,
Washington, DC 201,02. A 25% discount is
made on orders for 100 or more copies of any
one publication mailed to the same address.
Remittances, payable to the Superintendent of
Documents, must accompany orders. Prices
shown below, which include domestic postage
are subject to change.
Background Notes: These short factual sum-
maries describe the people, history, govern-
ment, economy, and foreign relations of each
country. Each contains a map, a list of prin-
cipal government officials and U.S.
diplomatic and consular officers, a reading
list, and information for tourists. (A complete
set of all Background Notes in stock— $31
domestic; $37 foreign. A 1-year subscription
service for about 60 updated or new
Notes— $16; $20 foreign; plastic binder— $2.)
Single copies vary in price. To order use the
country name and date. Notes issued before
April 1981 cost $1; $1.90 for foreign. The
following Notes were published in June 1981.
China June 20pp.
Pakistan May 8pp.
University Collaboration for
Economic, Technical and Social
Development. Agreement with Egypt.
TIAS 9875. 26pp. $1.75. (Cat. No.
S9.10:9875.)
Economic Assistance— Administrative
Decentralization. Agreement with
Egypt. TIAS 9876. 23pp. $1.75. (Cat.
No. S9.10:9876.)
Atomic Energy— Technical Information
Exchange and Cooperation in Nuclear
Safety Matters. Agreement with Den-
mark. TIAS 9877. 13pp. $1.25. (Cat. No.
S9.10:9877.)
Defense— Trident I Missile System. Agree-
ment with the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland. TIAS
9879. 6pp. $1. (Cat. No. S9.10:9879.)
Technical Cooperation in Statistics and
Data Processing. Agreement with Saudi
Arabia. TIAS 9880. 3pp. $1. (Cat. No.
S9. 10:9880.)
Aviation— Research and Development Ac-
tivities. Agreement with France. TIAS
9881. 11pp. $1.25 (Cat. No. S9. 10:9881.)
Peace Corps. Agreement with Papua New
Guinea. TIAS 9882. 9pp. $1.25. (Cat. No.
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Saint Lawrence Seaway — Tariff or
Tolls. Agreement with Canada. TIAS
9883. 8pp. $1.75. (Cat. No. S9. 10:9883.)
Narcotic Drugs — Salary Supplements.
Agreement with Mexico. TIAS 9884.
5pp. $1.50. (Cat. No. S9.10:9884.)
Shipping— Jurisdiction Over Vessels in
United States Deepwater Ports. Agree-
ment with Panama. TIAS 9885. 7pp.
$1.75. (Cat. No. S9.10:9885.)
t
Atomic Energy— Research Participation)
and Technical Exchange in Loss o<*
Fluid Test (LOFT). Agreement witbfl,
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S9. 10:9888.)
Maritime Boundary. Agreement with
Venezuela. TIAS 9890. 11pp. $2.25.
No. S9. 10:9890.)
Extradition and Mutual Assistance in
Criminal Matters. Agreement with
Turkey. TIAS 9891. 76pp. (Cat. No.
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Prisoner Transfer. Agreement with Tur!
TIAS 9892. 40pp. $2.75. (Cat. No.
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Atomic Energy— Peaceful Uses of Nucl
Energy. Agreement with Australia.
TIAS 9893. 29pp. $2.25. (Cat. No.
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Agricultural Commodities. Agreement l
Honduras. TIAS 9894. 9pp. $1.75. (0
No. S9.10:9894.)
Trade Matters. Agreement with Brazil.
TIAS 9895. 4pp. $1.50. (Cat. No.
S9.10:9895.)
Colorado River Waters— Emergency Dt"
liveries to Tijuana. Agreement with fc
Mexico. TIAS 9896. 9pp. $1.75. (Cat \
S9.10:9896.)
Plant Protection— Mediterranean Fruit '
Fly. Agreement with Mexico. TIAS f
9898. 9pp. $1.75. (Cat. No. S9.10:98<|
Atomic Energy— Application of Safegu t
Pursuant to the Non-Proliferation "
Treaty and the US-IAEA Safeguan I
Agreement of November 18, 1977. 1
tocol with Portugal and the Internal t
Atomic Energy Agency. TIAS 9899. I
$1.50. (Cat. No. S9. 10:9899.)
Atomic Energy— Application of Safegu !;
Pursuant to the Non-Proliferation
Treaty and the US-IAEA Safeguan
Agreement of November 18, 1977.
tocol with Switzerland and the Inter:
tional Atomic Energy Agency. TIAS
9900. 6pp. $1.50. (Cat. No. S9.10:99('
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Belgium. TIAS 9903. 48pp. $3.00 (C:
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Provisional Commission on Educationa
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with Morocco. TIAS 9904. 5pp. $1.50
(Cat. No. S9. 10:9904.)
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Agreement with Mexico and the Inte li
tional Atomic Energy Agency. TIAS
9906. 23pp. $2.25. (Cat. No. S9.10:9SP
Finance — Consolidation and Reschedul:'
of Certain Debts. Agreement with
Zaire. TIAS 9907. 36pp. $2.50. (Cat. I
S9.10:9907.)
Oil Supply Arrangement. Contingency It P
plementing Arrangements with Israe I
TIAS 9908. 7pp. $1.75. (Cat. No.
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Finance — Consolidation and Reschedulh
of Certain Debts. Agreement with
Turkey. TIAS 9909. 21pp. $2. (Cat. M
S9.10:9909.)«
.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1981 — 36>l
86
Department of State Bulle
UEX
tober 1981
«l. 81, No. 2055
nistan
nistan: is Months of Occupation (Van
Men) 63
distance for Afghan Refugees H4
i. Regional Strategy for Southern
'nru (Crocker) 2-1
jlture. Japan to Continue Imports of
uits and Vegetables 50
Control
Problems of Arms Control (Rostow) .30
ary Haig Interviewed on "Issues and
iswers" 15
ary Haig's News Conference i if
igusl 28 18
3o\ if! Union to Resume Arms Talks
epartment statement) 5
x Advisory Panel Report 62
nterests in Southeast Asia (Holdridge) 35
a.
■ Salmon Issues (U.S., Canada
sss release) 35
anada Meeting on Hyde Park Agree-
ait ' .34
Libyan Interference in Chad
;bcker) 28
ary Haig's News Conference of Au-
st28 18
.elations With China (Holdridge) ... .38
unications. New World Information
vder (Abrams, Buckley) 66
<ess
lach to Foreign Economic Issues
ashish) 4U
and Haitian Migration (Enders) ... .78
al Situation in Zimbabwe (letter to the
•ngress) 29
i Interference in Chad (Crocker) . . . .28
iteral Development Banks and U.S.
tman Rights Policy (Johnston) 49
Vorld Information Order (Abrams,
ickley) 66
Problems of Arms Control (Rostow) .30
■ tuation in Guatemala (Bosworth,
liner) 79
Report on Cyprus (message to the
mgress) 51
oterests in Southeast Asia (Holdridge) 35
"roposes Air Defense Package for Saudi
■aliia (Buckley, letter to the Congress,
ckground paper) 52
delations With China (Holdridge) ... .38
Cuban and Haitian Migration
inders) 78
is. Third Report on Cyprus (message to
e Congress) 51
oping Countries
v Era of Growth (Haig) 1
nternational Economic Policy and Its
tpact on LDCs (Rashish) 46
>mics
pach to Foreign Economic Issues
.ashish) 40
interests in Southeast Asia (Holdridge) 35
nternational Economic Policy and Its
ipact on LDCs (Rashish) 46
lvador
Ivador: The Search for Peace (back-
•ound paper) 72
Secretarj Haig's Nous Conference of Au-
gust 28 18
Energy. Approach to Foreign Economic
Issues ( Rashish) 40
Foreign Aid
Approach to Foreign Economic Issues
(Rashish) 40
U.S. International Economic Policy and Its
Impact on LDCs (Rashish) 46
Germany. 10th Anniversary of the
Quadripartite Agreement (Department
statement) 52
Guatemala. The Situation in Guatemala
(Bosworth, Palmer) 79
Haiti. Cuban and Haitian Migration
(Enders) 78
Human Rights
Multilateral Development Banks and U.S.
Human Rights Policy (Johnston) 49
The Situation in Guatemala (Bosworth.
Palmer) 79
Immigration. Cuban and Haitian
Migration (Enders) 78
Information Policy. New World Informa-
tion Order (Abrams, Buckley) 66
Israel
Security Council Meets on Lebanon-Israel
Border Dispute (text of resolu-
tion) 71
Situation in the Middle East(Habib) 62
U.S. Lifts Suspension of Aircraft to Israel
(Haig) 61
Japan. Japan to Continue Imports of Fruits
and Vegetables 50
Korea
North Korea Fires at U.S. Plane (Department,
statement) 39
Secretary Haig's News Conference of Au-
gust 28 18
Lebanon
Security Council Meets on Lebanon-Israel
Border Dispute (text of resolution) .... 71
Situation in the Middle East(Habib) 62
Libya
Libyan Interference in Chad (Crocker) ... .28
Secretary's Interview for CBS News 61
U.S. Planes Attacked by Libyan Aircraft
(Gast. Weinberger, Department state-
ments) 57
Middle East
Secretary Haig Interviewed on "Good
Morning, America" 22
Secretary Haig Interviewed on "Issues and
Answers" 15
Secretary Haig's News Conference of Au-
gust 28 18
U.S. Strategy in the Middle East (Haig) ... 13
Military Affairs
North Korea Fires at U.S. Plane (Department
statement) 39
Secretary Haig Interviewed on "Good
Morning, America" 22
U.S. Planes Attacked by Libyan Aircraft
(Gast, Weinberger, Department state-
ments) 57
Multilateral Development Banks and U.S.
Human Rights Policy (Johnston) 49
Namibia. Namibia (contact group
communique) 70
Poland
Secretary Haig Interviewed on "Good
Morning, America" 22
Secretary Haig's News Conference of Au-
gustus 18
Presidential Documents
Internal Situation in Zimbabwe (letter to the
( \ ingress) 29
Third Report on Cyprus (message to the
( 'ongress) 51
United Nations Day, 1981 (proclamation) . . .2
U.S. Proposes Air Defense Package for Saudi
Arabia (Buckley, letter to the Congress.
background paper) 52
Publications
Department of State 86
GPO Sales 86
Refugees
Refugee Advisory Panel Report 62
U.S. Assistance for Afghan Refugees 64
U.S. Interests in Southeast Asia
(Holdridge) 35
Saudi Arabia
U.S. Proposes Air Defense Package for Saudi
Arabia (Buckley, letter to the Congress,
background paper) 52
Security Assistance
Secretary Haig Interviewed on "Issues and
Answers" 15
Secretary Haig's News Conference of
August 28 18
U.S. Interests in Southeast Asia (Holdridge) 35
U.S. Lifts Suspension of Aircraft to Israel
(Haig) 61
U.S. Proposes Air Defense Package for Saudi
Arabia (Buckley, letter to the Congress,
background paper) 52
South Africa. Secretary Haig's News
Conference of August 28 18
Treaties. Current Actions 81
U.S.S.R.
Policy Problems of Arms Control
(Rostow) 30
Secretary Haig Interviewed on "Issues and
Answers" 15
Soviet Military Exercise (Department
statements) 51
U.S.- Soviet Union to Resume Arms Talks
(Department statement) 5
United Nations
Namibia (contact group communique) 70
A New Era of Growth (Haig) 1
New World Information Order (Abrams,
Buckley) 66
Security Council Meets on Lebanon-Israel
Border Dispute (text of resolution) .... 71
United Nations Day, 1981 (proclamation) . . .2
Zimbabwe. Internal Situation in Zimbabwe
(letter to the Congress) 29
Name Index
Abrams, Elliott 66
Bosworth, Stephen W 79
Buckley, James L 52, 66
Crocker, Chester A 24, 28
Enders, Thomas 0 78
Gast, Philip J., Lt. Gen 57
Habib, Philip C 62
Haig. Secretary 1, 13, 15, 18, 22, 61
Holdridge, John H 35, 38
Johnston, Ernest B 49
Palmer, Stephen E 79
Rashish, Myer 40, 46
Reagan, President 29, 35, 51. 52
Rostow, Eugene V 30
Van Hollen, Eliza 63
Weinberger, Caspar W 57
Superintendent of Documents
U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington, D.C. 20402
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uvpartmvnt
bulletin
)fficial Monthly Record of United States Foreign Policy / Volume 81 / Number 2056
November 1981
Department of State
bulletin
Volume 81 / Number 2056 / November 1981
The Department of State Bulletin ,
published by the Office of Public
Communication in the Bureau of Public
Affairs, is the official record of U.S.
foreign policy. Its purpose is to provide
the public, the Congress, and
government agencies with information
on developments in U.S. foreign
relations and the work of the
Department of State and the Foreign
Service.
The Bulletin's contents include major
addresses and news conferences of the
President and the Secretary of State;
statements made before congressional
committees by the Secretary and other
senior State Department officials;
special features and articles on
international affairs; selected press
releases issued by the White House,
the Department, and the U.S. Mission
to the United Nations; and treaties and
other agreements to which the United
States is or may become a party.
ALEXANDER M. HAIG, JR.
Secretary of State
DEAN FISCHER
Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs
PAUL E. AUERSWALD
Director,
Office of Public Communication
MARTIN JUDGE
Chief, Editorial Division
PHYLLIS A. YOUNG
Editor
JUANITA ADAMS
Assistant Editor
The Secretary of State has determined that
the publication of this periodical is
necessary in the transaction of the public
business required by law of this
Department. Use of funds for printing this
periodical has been approved by the
Director of the Office of Management and
Budget through January 31, 1986.
NOTE: Contents of this publication are not
copyrighted and items contained herein
may be reprinted. Citation of the
Department of State Bulletin as the
source will be appreciated. The Bulletin is
indexed in the Readers' Guide to Periodical
Literature.
For sale by the Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Printi
Office, Washington, D.C. 20402
Price: 12 issues plus annual index —
$19.00 (domestic) $23.75 (foreign)
Single copy— $3.25 (domestic) $4.10 (for
Index, single copy— $2.25 (domestic) $2.
CONTENTS
FEATURE
1 U.S. Recognition of Serbian Independence (Ronald D. Landa)
The President
Challenges of World Development
14
16
News Conference of October 1
(Excerpts)
The Secretary
17 Interview on "Issues and
Answers"
Economics
20 East- West Trade Relations (Myer
Rashish)
24 North American Economic Re-
lations (Myer Rashish)
28 New Challenges in International
Investment (Robert D. Hormats)
34 International Commodity Agree-
ments (Dennis T. Avery)
Europe
44 Secretary Haig Visits Europe
(U.S. -Yugoslav Press Statement,
Address. Question-and-Answer
Session, News Conference)
51 President's Letter to President
Brezhnev (Department State-
ment)
52 Forgery, Disinformation, and
Political Operations
56 NATO and Nuclear Deterrence
(Richard Burt)
Middle East
60
63
66
67
71
74
77
Saudi Security, Middle East
Peace, and U.S. Interests
(Secretary Haig)
Saudi Arabia and U.S. Security
Policy (Joseph W. Twinam)
Secretary's News Conference of
October 7
Death of Egyptian President
Sadat (Secretary Haig, Presi-
dent Reagan)
Visit of Israeli Prime Minister
Begin (Menahem Begin,
President Reagan)
Secretary Haig's News Con-
ference on Prime Minister
Begin's Visit
Secretary Interviewed for "Good
Morning, America"
Military Affairs
79 Reported Use of Chemical
Weapons (Walter J. Stoessel,
Jr.)
Nuclear Policy
79 Nuclear Cooperation Agreement
with Egypt (Harry R. Marshall,
Jr.)
South Asia
82 Economic and Security Cooper-
ation with Pakistan: A Critical
Partnership (James L. Buckley,
M. Peter McPherson)
United Nations
86 Namibia (Western Five Statement)
Western Hemisphere
87 Brazil and the United States
Today (Thomas 0. Enders)
Treaties
90 Current Actions
Chronology
92 September 1981
Press Releases
94 Department of State
Index
7 '
^f-e
Iheyi^VrHy.
/)
m
FEATURE
•j^
U.S.
Recognition
of
Serbian
Independence
One hundred years ago representatives
of the U.S. and Serbian Governments
met in Belgrade to sign consular and
commercial treaties whereby the United
States extended formal recognition to
the newly independent state of Serbia.
While Serbia had attained autonomy
within the Ottoman Empire in 1830 and
Turkish troops had withdrawn from the
country in 1867, it was not until 1878
following the treaties of San Stefano '
and Berlin ending the war between the
Ottoman Empire and Russia, that
Serbia, as well as Romania and
Montenegro, became fully independent.
The United States had little direct
interest in the Balkans at this time and
delayed extending recognition until the
major European powers had done so.
American interests were essentially com-
mercial—to secure markets for
American machinery, pork products, and
armaments and to help counteract any
tendency for Serbia to become too
closely bound in its commercial relation-
ships to Austria-Hungary.
The Americans responsible for
negotiating the treaties were of strik-
ingly different backgrounds. One was
John A. Kasson, Assistant Postmaster
General in the Lincoln Administration
and Congressman from Iowa, with little
diplomatic experience. The other was
Eugene Schuyler, one of the first
American experts on Russia and eastern
Europe who had spent 9 years at
various consular and diplomatic posts in
Russia and who had played a prominent
role in the Bulgarian independence
movement in 1876. '
To commemorate the signing of
Eugene Schuyler
(1840-1890)
Born in Ithaca, New York.
Graduated from Yale University (1859).
Thereafter studied languages and
philosophy at Yale and was among the
first group of Yale students to receive a
Ph.D. degree from that institution
(1861). Appointed consul at Moscow in
1867. Appointed consul at Revel in 1869
and later that year became secretary of
legation at St. Petersburg, where ht
served until 1876. From 1876 to 187
was consul general and secretary of
legation at Constantinople, and was
sul at Birmingham (1878-79) and co
general at Rome (1879-80). From 1!
to 1882 Schuyler was diplomatic agt
(later charge d'affairs) and consul
general at Bucharest. From 1882 to
1884 he was consul general and min
resident to Romania, Serbia, and
Greece. Served as diplomatic agent
consul general at Cairo (1889-90).
/
have the honour to present to Your Ma-
jesty the letter of the President of the
United States of America accrediting me
as their Minister Resident and Consul
General near the Government of Your
Majesty. The President has instructed
me to express to Your Majesty his friend-
ly feelings and his wishes for the welfare
and happiness of Your Majesty and of
the Serbian people.
He believes that in establishing a
Legation at Belgrade, he will do much for
the increase of the commercial and
friendly relations between the two coun-
tries.
I have the honour at the same time to
present to Your Majesty a letter from the
President (which the delays of my
journey have prevented me from present-
ing sooner) in which, on the part of the
American people, he congratulates Your
Majesty on the assumption of the dignity
and title of King of Serbia, and in which
he begs Your Majesty to believe in the
sincere wishes of the American people for
the peace and welfare of the Serbian na-
tion, whose longings for independence,
after centuries of struggle, have at last
been realized.
The President has also instructed me
to express to Your Majesty his sen-
timents of horror at the attempt recently
directed against your person, his con-
gratulations for your happy preserva-
tion, and his wishes for your good health
and long life.
Eugene Schuyler Upon
Presentation of Credentials
to King Milan of Serbia,
November 10, 1882
(Phot,
Eugene Schuyler: Selected ,
by Evelyn Schuyler Sch
Department of State Bu
;e two treaties, the following article
written by Ronald D. Landa, Office
he Historian, Bureau of Public
lirs.
ly Contacts
in Ottoman troops were withdrawn
n Serbia in 1867, the U.S. consul at
harest, Romania, Ludwig J.
pkay, suggested that the United
,es appoint a "consular agent" at
jade. He acknowledged that the
;ed States might have "no direct in-
st to watch over there," but he
ened to point out that all the major
opean powers had appointed consuls
;ral at Belgrade.2
The Department of State authorized
okay to nominate a "suitable person"
;his position.3 He asked the Serbian
)matic representative in Bucharest,
j& Magazinovic, to recommend some-
possibly an American citizen. U.S.
ular agents served without pay, and
azinovic's inquiries revealed that
e was no one willing to assume the
tion. Magazinovic informed Czapkay
the Serbian Government instead
erred that Czapkay himself be
ed consul at Belgrade, since Serbia
the same relationship with Turkey
id Romania.
[n reporting this information to the
irtment of State, Czapkay went so
is to suggest that if he were
)inted consul at Belgrade, he should
iltaneously be named consul at the
garian capital of Pest, which had no
consular representation. Czapkay
suggested that he be allowed to
e his residence to Pest, claiming
the climate in Bucharest and
jade was very unhealthy. Moreover,
:ost of living in those two cities was
, and there were no consular fees to
btained.4 Czapkay did not mention
, although he was an American citi-
living in California at the time of his
)intment to Bucharest, he had been
i in Hungary.5 The Department of
e rejected Czapkay 's request to
sfer his consular office to Pest and
red his comments regarding the ap-
tment at Belgrade.6
In the spring of 1868 Czapkay
applied for and received a leave of
absence from his post at Bucharest to
visit various spas in Austria-Hungary.
Just before departing, he learned of the
assassination on June 10 of the Serbian
Prince, Michael Obrenovic. In a note of
sympathy which he gave to Magazinovic,
Czapkay recalled that only 3 years
before, President Lincoln had met a
similar fate. He expressed assurances
that Prince Michael's death "will excite
the most profound sympathy on the part
of the Government and people of the
United States of America." The property
and archives of the consulate were left
in the hands of Magazinovic.7 The
curious situation thereby developed
where a Serbian official, with whose
government the United States had no
official relations, served informally as
charge d'affaires for the United States.
Czapkay eventually returned to the
United States to attend to personal
business. In 1869, when the Department
of State failed to respond to a request
for an extension of his leave of absence
and ignored a plea from his wife to the
Secretary of State that he be given the
consular post at Pest, Czapkay resigned
his position at Bucharest. It was later
learned that Magazinovic, apparently in
1869, had left Bucharest without trans-
ferring the consular powers to another
agent.8 Thus the initial U.S. -Serbian of-
ficial contacts came to an end.
Response to Serbian Independence
Between 1875 and 1877 the inhabitants
of Bosnia-Herzegovina staged an insur-
rection against the Ottoman Empire and
were aided by Serbia and Montenegro.
On the eve of Serbia's declaration of war
against Turkey in June 1876, the U.S.
consul general and secretary of legation
at Constantinople, Eugene Schuyler,
visited Belgrade and was greatly moved
by the war fervor. Schuyler noted that
he could hardly control his own emotion
when he thought "of the ruin that might
come upon the country, the bombard-
ment of this pretty town, and the ter-
Feature
U.S.
Recognition
of
Serbian
Independence
rible cruelties that would be perpetrated
in consquence of this popular enthu-
siasm." The American diplomat was able
to talk with the 22-year-old Prince
Milan, who had become Prince following
a brief regency in the wake of Michael's
death in 1868. The Prince was "hand-
some and well-built and singularly in-
telligent and well-informed," said
Schuyler, who found Milan better
acquainted with events in America than
many Americans in Paris.9 By 1877
Turkey managed to defeat Serbia and
Montenegro, who were forced to sue for
peace.
In 1877 Russia declared war on
Turkey on behalf of the Balkan Slavs.
Following a 9-month campaign, from
which Russia emerged victorious, the
other major European powers, meeting
at Berlin in the summer of 1878,
negotiated a settlement which, among
other things, acknowledged the complete
independence of Romania, Montenegro,
and Serbia.
The breakdown of communication in
the Ottoman Empire during the war
prompted the U.S. minister in Vienna,
John A. Kasson, to assume responsi-
bility for the interests of U.S. citizens in
Romania and Serbia. Kasson, a 56-year-
old lawyer from Iowa, had helped draft
the Republican Party platform in 1860
and had been named Assistant Post-
master General in Lincoln's Administra-
tion. He had represented Iowa in the
U.S. House of Representatives (1863-67
and 1873-77). In the interim he had
served in the Iowa State legislature and
briefly as U.S. commissioner to nego-
tiate postal conventions with various
European powers.
Kasson closely followed the pro-
ceedings at Berlin. Based on his analysis
of the provisions of the treaty of Berlin
as they applied to Romania and Serbia,
he strongly urged the Department of
State in August 1878 to establish con-
sular relations with these two princi-
palities.10 A consul had earlier been
appointed at the Romanian port of
Galatz,11 but no appointments to Serbia
were made. In November 1878 Kasson
reported that Italy and Austria-Hungary
had already appointed ministers pleni-
potentiary at Bucharest, that Germany
was intending to do the same, and that
Russia had appointed a minister resi-
>mber1981
(Photo from TheMmmn w a Balkan Diplomatist bj
Chedomille Mijatovich)
Queen Natalija
(1859-1941)
Married Prince Milan in 1875. They
had one son, Alexander. Became Queen
in 1882 when the Kingdom of Serbia
was proclaimed. Differed with her
Austrophile husband because of her sym-
pathies for Russia. They had a terrible
fight on Easter of 1887, which led to a
divorce the following year. The divorce
caused great political controversy. She
left Serbia in 1891 and returned only as
a guest of her son. She later broke with
Alexander, converted to Roman
Catholicism, and spent her remaining
years in a convent on the French
Riviera.
dent. Kasson noted further his
understanding that only ministers resi-
dent would be appointed to Belgrade.12
What he did not understand was the
story in the Vienna newspapers that the
United States, through a special envoy,
had acknowledged the independence of
either Romania or Serbia or both.
Although he doubted the authenticity of
the account, he asked the Department of
State to clarify its policy toward the two
countries. Kasson stated his reluctance
to continue informal representation of
American interests there without ex-
plicit approval. Whereas several months
before, he had recommended the estab-
lishment of consular representation at
Bucharest and Belgrade, he said the
time had come "to annex those now
independent principalities to some
jurisdiction for United States diplomatic
purposes, and to adjust the right of
intervention for the interests of
American citizens when necessary."13
But Secretary of State William M.
Evarts replied that the United States
did not intend, at least for the present,
to open diplomatic relations with the
Danubian principalities. It would con-
tinue to appoint consuls at places "where
it may be found such officers are
needed," as it had recently done at
Galatz. Evarts avoided answering
Kasson's request for instructions as to
whether he should continue to look after
the interests of Americans in Romania
and Serbia, expressing the hope that no
such cases would arise while the Depart-
ment of State was considering the ques-
tion of representation.14
Despite Evarts' reluctance to estab-
lish diplomatic relations, Kasson con-
tinued to report on developments in the
Danubian area. In March 1879 he sent
to Washington two lengthy despatches
on the government, finances, military
organization, and commerce of the two
countries. He noted that Great Britain
had recently signed a commercial treaty
with Serbia by which it secured the
privileges of "most-favored-nation" treat-
ment. The Austro-Hungarian Govei
ment was opposed to this treaty, as
as to other commercial treaties Ser
might enter into, because of its des
keep Serbia within its special spher
influence. Because of Vienna's effoi
improve transportation into and thi
Serbia, Kasson thought that in the
few years there would be "marked
ress" in Serbia's financial and comn
cial resources and a "largely increai
demand for certain classes of manu
tures."16
That summer Kasson returned
Washington for consultations16 and
apparently argued strongly for the
establishment of diplomatic relatioi
with the two Danubian principalitie
When he returned to Vienna in Au,
1879, an instruction from Secretar
Evarts awaited him indicating that
recent changes in the map of easte
Europe seemed "to open an era of
political and material development
cannot but react beneficially upon t
countries which have now, or may
hereafter, have close relations of o
merce and friendship with the com
now entering the family of nations
Kasson was instructed to visit Beh;
and Bucharest to determine what i
of diplomatic intercourse was desir
the Serbian and Romanian Govern
ments, what grade of diplomatic aj
would be acceptable to them, and "
far these governments are prepare
enter upon reciprocal action towar
us." In discussing the possibility of
tiating treaties with these two coui
Kasson was told to use as models i
1871 treaty between the United St
and Italy on commerce and naviga
an 1878 consular treaty with Italy,
an 1871 trademarks convention wii
Austria-Hungary.17
Kasson journeyed to Belgrade
October 1879 to confer with Serbia
Foreign Minister Jovan Ristic. He
drafted a commercial treaty to pre;
to Ristic but found that the foreign
minister had prepared one of his o'
calling for a 2-year provisional com
cial arrangement while negotiation:
tinued toward a final treaty. Kasso
Department of State Bulk
Feature
U.S.
Recognition
Serbian
Independence
/
• -a,
£ is wit/i heartfelt pleasure that I receive
the letters of the President of the United
States of America which accredit you in
Serbia as Minister Resident and Consul
General. I am delighted to see friendly
relations inaugurated between our two
countries, and I can assure you that I
and my Government will heartily
endeavor to consolidate and combine
them.
The sentiments of friendship which
the illustrious President of the United
States of America expresses and the
wishes which he attests for me and my
people are particularly dear to me and
entirely respond to the feelings which we
bear to your country.
Nor am I less moved, Mr. Minister,
by the congratulations which you bring
me on the occasion of the proclamation of
royalty in Serbia, and I beg you to inter-
pret my feelings of sincere gratitude to
the illustrious President of the United
States of America. You will please also
convey to him, Mr. Minister, the
assurances that I was deeply touched by
the sentiments which he caused to be ex-
pressed to me by your amiable agency on
the occasion of the attempt which was
directed against my person.
I congratulate myself, Mr. Minister,
that the choice of the Government of the
United States has fallen upon you whom
I have already long had the opportunity
of knowing and appreciating, and you
may be sure that it will be a real
pleasure to me and my government to
facilitate the mission which has been con-
fided to you.
King Milan's Response
to Eugene Schuyler,
November 10, 1882
King Milan Obrenovic
(1854-1901)
Educated in France. Following the
assassination of Prince Michael in 1868
and the establishment of a regency, he
became Prince of Serbia in 1872. In
1882 he was proclaimed King of Serbia.
He abdicated the throne on March 6,
1889.
bmher 1981
Cedomilj Mijatovic
(1842-1932)
Politician, author, historian. Studied
at Leipzig and Zurich and in 1866
became a university professor in
Belgrade. Served as Minister of Finance
in 1873 and on several subsequent occa-
sions. Was Minister of Foreign Affairs
(1880-81 and 1888-89). An intimate
friend of Milan Obrenovic. After King
Milan's abdication in 1889, Mijatovic was
Serbia's minister in London and Con-
stantinople. He wrote romantic short
stories for youth and was the first to
study systematically Serbian economic
history. He also translated English
historical works.
hst by Chedomille Mijatovich)
objected that such a treaty "could h
be put into execution before it woul
expire by its own limitations" and sj
that the United States desired a
"durable treaty, which should regul
fully the principles of the relations t
established between the two countri
and the international rights to be
accorded to their respective citizens
Ristic seemed inclined to accept
Kasson's point of view, although he
alluded to the heavy commercial pn
sure which Austria-Hungary, throuj
which all Serbian commerce had to
was exerting on Serbia. Minister of
Finance Vladimir Jovanovic present
Kasson another draft document wh
more closely resembled the one thai
American minister had prepared.
Kasson deleted from Jovanovic's dr
the provision for the adjustment of
international tariff and added articl
relating to consular affairs and the
safeguarding of the religious rights
Americans in Serbia. This revised c
a combined commercial and consuls
agreement, was submitted to the S<-
bian Government for its considerati
While in Belgrade Kasson was
ceived with "great cordiality" by Pr
Milan. Kasson, like Schuyler 3 year
before, reported that the Prince, di
their 30-minute meeting, struck hin
very knowledgeable, so much so thu
Kasson overestimated Milan's age I
years.
He inquired of the character of the
merce which might be developed betwei
two countries, and declared with a smile
already American 'graisse' (probably m«
lard) was imported into Serbia, althougl
was an abundant article of their own pr
tion. We also spoke of agricultural macl
and tools for the soil, of American arms I
etc. He left me with the impression of t li
wish that my negotiations with his Mini
might be successful. He is a young man
perhaps thirty five years, with a handsc
and intelligent face, and I believe persu;
political sagacity, which is much needed
relation to his neighbors.19
In Belgrade Kasson met an
American attempting to negotiate i
arms contract to equip the Serbian
army; he expressed an earnest wis!
a consulate be established there to ;
and advise American businessmen.2
Kasson also obtained statistics on S
bian exports and imports, which he
ed were not completely accurate
English and other foreign goods
duced into Serbia were credited to
ria-Hungary, the last country
igh which they were transported,
nt these statistics to the Depart-
of State, along with a list of
rn diplomatic and consular
sentatives in Serbia and Serbian
matic representatives abroad.21
n a separate despatch he trans-
d a report on conditions in Serbia
thered from his notes and observa-
during his visit. This report
ibed the organization of the
•nment, the financial condition of
a, industry, agriculture, ways of
lunication, and the education and
:gence of the people. Kasson said
le had formed "a most favorable
)n of the natural mental vigor of
aople," but the Serbs were almost
iever. Their faults "were not those
ipidity, but rather those of 'smart-
" and he attributed this to the in-
:e of Turkish rule. Direct contact
Western civilization and manners,
>n hoped, would lead to improve-
in this regard.22
efore leaving the city Kasson was
iy Jovanovic that the Serbian
•nment had accepted the commer-
rticles of the draft treaty, but that
msular articles would have to be
ted further with Foreign Minister
, who was ill but who had to leave
ade on business as soon as he recu-
ed. Kasson agreed to Jovanovic's
:stion that the negotiations be con-
d in Vienna with the Serbian
■e d'affaires. Although Ristic was
e to meet with Kasson, he did
mit a note to Kasson listing his ob-
ns to the consular provisions, most
iich, Kasson believed, were based
lisapprehensions, and were easily
ved, in the judgment of the
tary who brought them." 23
n the American side, the only
as question regarding a treaty with
r Serbia or Romania was an accusa-
)y an American Jewish organization
the Romanian Government was
i of violating the rights of Jews
te a provision in the treaty of
n guaranteeing religious liberty in
ewly independent states. Secretary
ts informed Kasson of these objec-
Feature
U.S.
Recognition
of
Serbian
Independence
Map by Bill Hezlep,
Bureau of Intelligence and Research,
Department of State
. . . the value of Serbian plums sent
to the United States is not far from, a
million dollars annually. Mr.
Milanovitch, one of the large plum
dealers in Belgrade, assures me that he
has himself sent to America in one year
as many as two and a quarter million
pounds, worth on the average about
$80,000. Generally, the prunes are
roughly dried and packed in casks or
mats, but two or three dealers have lately
undertaken to dry the plums by artificial
heat, as in France, and export them in
neat boxes, so that while being superior
in quality they present a better ap-
pearance and bring a higher price. The
plums in Serbia are of excellent quality,
and if orders could be sent directly to
Belgrade, not only could a better class of
prunes be obtained, but they could be put
upon the market in New York more
cheaply than at present.
Despatch from Eugene Schuyler
to the Department of State,
March 29, 1883
member 1981
tions and of the fact that the U.S.
Government "has ever felt a deep in-
terest in the welfare of the Hebrew race
in foreign countries, and has viewed
with abhorrence the wrongs to which
they have, at various periods, been sub-
jected by the followers of other creeds in
the East." The Secretary was not in-
clined to make the establishment of rela-
tions conditional upon the government's
protection of the rights of Jews, but he
told Kasson that "any terms favorable to
the interest of this much-injured people
which you may be able to secure in the
negotiations now pending with the
Government of Roumania would be
agreeable and gratifying to this Depart-
ment." 24
Kasson responded to Evarts by ex-
plaining the principles behind his in-
cluding an article on religious liberty in
the draft treaty which he had just
presented to the Serbian Government.
He admitted that it had been his first in-
clination to incorporate in the treaty, by
explicit reference, the provisions of the
treaty of Berlin on the question of
religious liberties. Further reflection,
however, led him to deal with this ques-
tion in a separate and independent pro-
vision. He thought that it was "more
becoming to the national dignity that
our stipulations should be direct, and
that no reference should be made to a
foreign international contract, which
might even in a remote degree, involve
my government in the constructions to
be given to that instrument by its
signers, or in the principles upon which
that act of foreign intervention existed."
Kasson pointed out that the treaty of
Berlin was not an agreement with the
Danubian principalities "but a treaty be-
tween aliens imposing conditions of inte-
rior legislation upon the independence of
a weaker neighbor." More importantly,
Kasson thought it unwise "to associate
the United States Government with the
European Powers in that system of
foreign intervention and control of other
countries, which from the time of the
partition of Poland, has been the occa-
sion of so much oppression against the
rights of independence and liberty."
Kasson was convinced that "with the
exception of always possible isolated in-
stances of injustice" in the principalities,
the only cause for concern was "the ex-
tent and the mode of granting to the
Hebrews the rights of citizenship,"
which was a question "so peculiarly per-
taining to interior administration as to
render foreign judgment upon it inad-
missible." The provisions on religious
liberty in the Serbian draft treaty, the
text of which Kasson enclosed with his
despatch, were designed "to secure to
American citizens of all faiths, protec-
tion of person and property, equally
with that given to natives, full rights of
trade, and full liberty for the exercise by
them of the rights of religious faith and
of public worship." 25
Throughout 1880 Kasson's negotia-
tions with the Serbian envoy in Vienna
proved unproductive, as Serbia, out of
deference to Austria-Hungary, delayed
commercial negotiations with other
countries until it had concluded a com-
mercial treaty with Austria-Hungary.26
For much of the summer and fall
Kasson was back in the United States
successfully campaigning for reelection
to the House of Representatives. In
October 1880 the Ristic ministry fell and
was replaced by a new ministry in which
Cedomilj Mijatovic was Foreign Minister
and Finance Minister. The change was
welcomed by Kasson, who said that the
new government was considered liberal
in foreign relations and inclined to the
most-favored-nation system of treaties.
It was even reported that Mijatovic's
wife, who was close to Princess Natalija,
had relatives in the United States.27
In December 1880 the Serbian envoy
at Vienna notified Kasson that the new
government would welcome a U.S. diplo-
matic representative at Belgrade.
Evarts instructed Kasson to reply that
the United States would be happy to
appoint a representative at Belgrade
(Department of Stah
William M. Evarts
(1818-1901)
Born in Boston. He graduated 1
Yale (1837) and attended Harvard 1
School (1838-39). Was admitted to
bar and practiced in New York. Ev
was chief counsel for President Joh
in the impeachment trial of 1868 an
torney General in President Johnso
Cabinet (1868-69). He served as
Secretary of State from March 187'
til March 1881, and as such defined
American policy with regard to an i
mian canal, took a strong stand tow
Mexico in defense of American lives
property, and directed the negotiati
treaties with China relating to com-
merce and immigration. Evarts was
delegate to the International Monet
Conference at Paris in 1881 and ser
one term as Senator from New Yor
beginning in 1885.
Department of State Bull
Feature
U.S.
Recognition
of
Serbian
Independence
inquire as to the rank of the Ser-
presentative to be sent to the
States.28 But the Serbian envoy,
ructions, told Kasson that his
ment sincerely regretted that "the
condition of our finances does
iw it to nominate its representa-
ar the United States of America;
ndulges the hope that the great
althy Republic will not for that
be less disposed to nominate its
■ntative at Belgrade." Kasson
Cvarts' attention to this "dignified
ching appeal" and urged that the
States lend its moral support to
'ernment of Serbia by appointing
sentative at Belgrade.
>ia is struggling to establish its in-
nce with the civilization of Western
under many difficulties arising from
1 intervening neighbors, and from the
imposed on it by the provisions of
in Congress. It would seem to have a
jht to the generous consideration of
•, richer, and more disinterested
5 of the family of nations.29
the same time Serbia indicated
iness to resume the treaty
tions with the United States. In
BO Eugene Schuyler had been
diplomatic agent and consul
I to Romania and empowered to
E te commercial and consular
with that government. Kasson
it, in view of his own imminent
to the United States to resume
; in the House of Representatives
similarity of the questions under
on in the treaties proposed with
i countries, Schuyler should also
usted with the Serbian negotia-
lition of Serbian Independence
ion on the Serbian request for a
tion of treaty negotiations and
iointment of a U.S. diplomatic
ntative fell to the new U.S.
•nt, James A. Garfield, and his
try of State, James G. Blaine. In
881, a month after taking office,
sent Schuyler a copy of the draft
areviously submitted to the
Government, a copy of Kasson's
nts on the draft that he had left
e Department of State during his
Washington in the fall of 1880,
and a copy of a recent act of Congress
regarding trademarks. Schuyler was
asked to give his views as to the expe-
diency of concluding a commercial treaty
with Serbia and what form it might
take.31
Schuyler answered that the United
States should negotiate separate com-
mercial and consular treaties, so that
one could be denounced, if necessary,
without affecting the other. His initial
impression was that Serbian-American
trade was very limited, involving only
the export to the United States of Ser-
bian dried plums and the importation of
various articles of American origin by
way of Germany and Austria-Hungary.
Moreover, he felt the chances for a
marked increase in trade were not
bright. Despite the construction of a
new railroad by Serbia to connect with
the line running from the Greek port of
Salonica, which would permit articles to
be sent directly to Serbia without pass-
ing through Austria-Hungary, Schuyler
believed that Austria-Hungary would
continue to exert great commercial in-
fluence over Serbia and might even, in
time, annex it.
As for Kasson's draft treaty,
Schuyler proposed a number of revi-
sions. The most prominent was the ex-
clusion altogether of the article
guaranteeing religious liberty, which
would be needed, said Schuyler, only if
there was reason to think that this right
would be infringed. Quoting pertinent
passages from the Serbian Constitution
that protected the free exercise of
religion, except for the right of non-
Orthodox faiths to educate and prose-
lytize, Schuyler argued further that Ser-
bia could not be expected by treaty to
grant rights that were forbidden by its
constitution.32 Secretary Blaine
approved all of Schuyler's suggested
changes and authorized him to negotiate
separate consular and commercial
treaties with Serbia and to insert an
article regarding trademarks in the con-
sular treaty. Schuyler was advised not
to sign any treaty without first sub-
mitting the text to the Department of
State for approval.33
(Department of State photo)
James G. Blaine
(1830-1893)
Born in West Brownsville, Pa.
Graduated from Washington College
(1847) and taught school in Kentucky
and Philadelphia, where he also studied
law. One of the founders of the
Republican Party. Served in the Maine
legislature (1859-62) and was speaker
1861-62. He was elected to the U.S.
House of Representatives (1863-76) and
was Speaker of the House (1869-75). He
was Senator from Maine 1876-81. An
unsuccessful candidate for the
Republican presidential nomination in
1876 and again in 1880. Blaine was
Secretary of State from March to
December 1881. Was the Republican
presidential candidate in 1884. He was
again Secretary of State from March
1889 until June 1892. As Secretary, he
convened and presided over the first
Pan American Conference in 1889.
jmber 1981
' here are no large proprietors placed in
Servia. The people of the country are
generally poor, and cultivate only so
much soil as their own family can
manage with their rude implements, as
simple in the workshop as they are on
the farm. The rudeness extends to their
wagons and to all their draft apparatus.
Notwithstanding this, I saw at Belgrade
great activity in the wagon and iron
John A. Kasson
(1822-1910)
shops, extending late into the night; and
I was told that the iron smiths worked
double sets of hands, covering night and
day. In agriculture, and all the indus-
tries connected with it, there is in Servit
a new and almost raw but fertile world,
which western enterprise must soon
enter and develope by persistently urgim
upon the people the advantages of new
methods of culture.
Despatch from John A. Kasson
to Secretary of State Evarts,
November 20, 1879
Born in Vermont, graduated from
the University of Vermont (1842). Was
admitted to the bar and moved to
Missouri in 1850 and to Des Moines,
Iowa, in 1857. Was a delegate to the
Republican National Convention in 1860
and helped draft the platform. Became
first Assistant Postmaster General in
the Lincoln Administration. At his sug-
gestion, Lincoln called a postal con-
ference which met in Paris in 1863 and
to which Kasson was a delegate. This
conference eventually led to the
establishment of the International Post?
Union. In 1867 Kasson acted as U.S.
commissioner in the negotiation of six
postal conventions. Served in the U.S.
House of Representatives (1863-67), tht
Iowa State legislature (1868-72), and
again in the U.S. House of Represen-
tatives (1873-77 and 1881-84). He was
minister to Austria-Hungary (1877-81),
and in 1884 he was appointed minister
to Germany, where he served as the
American representative at the interna-
tional conference to regulate the status
of the Congo. In 1889 Kasson was one
of the American representatives at the
Berlin conference to regulate the status
of Samoa. He also was a member of the
British-American joint commission whicl
made an unsuccessful effort to solve the
Alaskan boundary dispute.
(Library of Congress Photo)
10
Department of State Bullel
Feature
U.S.
Recognition
of
Serbian
Independence
n June 1881 Schuyler went to
rade to resume the negotiations,
n Prince Milan returned to the
a\ from a trip abroad, the Council
inisters convened on June 28 to
iss the draft treaties that Schuyler
^iven to Foreign Minister Mijatovic.
r that day, Schuyler and Mijatovic
;ly reached agreement and initialed
Iraft treaties on behalf of their
rnments. Mijatovic wanted to sign
reaties immediately, but Schuyler
med him that the texts had to be
oved in Washington.34 Thus the
y negotiations that had sputtered
lore than a year and a half under
on and the previous Serbian
rnment were concluded with
rkable ease.
Sefore returning to Bucharest,
yler had an audience with Prince
l, who asked him to thank Presi-
Garfield for resuming the negotia-
. During his stay, Schuyler revised
stimate of the potential for Serbian-
rican trade as a result of statistics
showed the United States already
mporting Serbian dried plums in
mount of nearly $1 million annual-
e now became convinced that there
other openings for American trade
Serbia.35
laving submitted copies of the ini-
1 treaties to the Department of
• for approval, Schuyler spent most
e summer in Bucharest awaiting a
. Washington, though, was preoc-
d with the shooting on July 2 of
dent Garfield and his death 11
s later. On September 23, shortly
the President died and after
yler had sent several anxious
rams to the Department of State
srning the fate of the agreements,
ceived a cable approving the texts
e treaties.36 He set out for Belgrade
ctober 9, and on October 14 he and
;ovic signed the consular and com-
ial treaties. By this act the United
:s formally recognized the inde-
ence of Serbia.37 That day Prince
conveyed to Schuyler his con-
ices on the death of President Gar-
field, and the Prince and Mijatovic ex-
pressed their great desire that the
United States have "a regular if not per-
manent representative at Belgrade."
Schuyler was certain that such an
appointment was warranted by
American interests, which he said were
greater in Belgrade than in Bucharest.
From one-half to two-thirds of the Ser-
bian plum crop, he said, was being ex-
ported to the United States by way of
Budapest and Trieste. He also said that
on the basis of the treaties just signed, a
fast-working American, whom he did not
identify, had obtained "an exclusive con-
cession for a pork-packing establishment
on the American plan and with
American machinery and processes,"
which would probably pave the way for
other American enterprises being
started in Belgrade.38
Establishment of Diplomatic Relations
Shortly thereafter, Schuyler returned to
the United States to await Senate advice
and consent to the treaties. Secretary of
State Frelinghuysen had asked that he
prolong his stay in the event his exper-
tise was required by the Senate. The
Senate finally ratified the treaties on
July 5, 1882.39 Schuyler also received a
new commission as minister resident
and consul general to Romania, Serbia,
and Greece. He was to reside at Athens
and was to visit Bucharest and Belgrade
at least once a year.40
The presentation of his credentials
as the first U.S. diplomatic represent-
ative to Serbia and the formal exchange
of the ratified treaties was delayed by
an assassination attempt October 25,
1882, on Milan, who had been pro-
claimed king earlier that year. The for-
mal presentation did not take place until
November 10, 1882.
Accompanied by one of the king's
aides and escorted by a troop of cavalry,
Schuyler was driven from his hotel to
the palace in a court carriage. Upon
arrival at the palace, the guard pre-
sented arms and a band played "Hail
Columbia." Schuyler was received in a
solemn ceremony by King Milan, to
whom he gave his letter of credence and
a letter from President Arthur con-
gratulating him on the assumption of
the title and dignity of King of Serbia,
and with whom he briefly exchanged
formal remarks. Following the audience,
Schuyler had a private talk with the
king and was subsequently presented to
Queen Natalija. He was then returned to
his hotel in the same manner that he
had arrived.
On November 15 a dinner was given
by the king in Schuyler's honor, at which
several Serbian ministers and foreign
diplomats were present. The king pro-
posed a toast to President Arthur, and
Schuyler responded with a toast to the
king and the royal family. That evening
Schuyler also exchanged with the Ser-
bian foreign minister the official ratifica-
tions of the treaties.41 Schuyler reported
that the Serbian-American treaties were
being used as models by Serbia in nego-
tiating similar treaties with other coun-
tries.42
Formal relations between the United
States and Serbia, one of the six
republics of present-day Yugoslavia,
were thereby inaugurated.43 In 1883
Edward Maxwell Grant, whom Schuyler
said was the only American he could
find residing in Belgrade, was appointed
vice consul there.44 Schuyler was re-
called to Washington in 1884, and his
successors at Athens repeatedly com-
plained of difficulties in properly cover-
ing events in Serbia and Romania while
residing in Athens.45 In 1883 a Serbian
consulate general was established at
New York,46 but it was not until 1917
that Serbia sent a minister to the United
States.47
Even after leaving Serbia, Schuyler
maintained an active interest in the
affairs of the country. In an 1889 article
surveying Serbian history, Schuyler
commented with much favor on the
recently-promulgated Serbian Constitu-
tion.
On comparing the new constitution, the
definitive text of which lies before me as I
write, with the old one and with other con-
stitutions of Europe, what strikes one is the
great advantage it has over the old, and then
that it is one of the most liberal constitutions
in Europe. One might have perhaps a hesita-
tion in accepting all its good qualities, were it
not that the Serbians are an honest,
straightforward, conservative and law-abiding
11
A Minnesotan in Search of Serbian Treasure
On one of my visits to Belgrade I hap-
pened to hear some vague rumors about
an unfortunate American who had been
seeking for treasure in several of the old
ruined castles of Serbia. I heard enough
to interest me deeply, and seized the
first occasion for obtaining accurate in-
formation. What I am now about to tell
was chiefly derived from Mr.
Miyatovitch, afterwards Minister of
Foreign Affairs, but at that time
Minister of Finance. . . .
In July, 1875, a man, evidently a
foreigner, came to the Ministry of
Finance at Belgrade. When he obtained
an interview with the Minister, and was
asked why he came to Serbia, and why
especially he wished to see the Minister
of Finance, he said — in a strange
German-English dialect — that he was a
citizen of the United States and owned a
farm in Minnesota which he worked
with his children; but that he was unfit
for hard work, as he had served in the
war as a private, had been wounded,
and was then receiving a pension of six
dollars a month. . . .
He then said that he was of Serbian
origin; that his name was August Boyne
de Lazar; that he was born in Chemnitz
in Saxony in 1818; and that after the
revolution in 1848, in which he was im-
plicated, he had emigrated to the United
States. He claimed to be descended from
a family closely related to that of Prince
Lazar; which was once so rich and
powerful that it owned Sokol, Shabatz,
and other towns in the Shumadia — that
wonderful forest-country, even the name
of which is derived from a word expres-
sing the rustling of the leaves. When he
said this, the Minister, who is well-
versed in history, remembered an old
tradition that the Obolitch family had
owned property in this region; and he
advised the American, if he searched at
all, to confine himself to the delta be-
tween the Sava and the Drina, where
these towns are situated. . . .
Boyne spent a whole year in that
part of the country, and then began to
explore the districts of Morava and
Kraguyevatz. He occasionally returned
to Belgrade; and the Minister, who had
become more and more interested in him
and had been greatly impressed by his
straightforwardness, his earnestness,
and his simple piety, assisted him from
time to time with food, linen, clothes,
and even money. Boyne had gradually
learned a little Serbian, and wherever he
went tried to do good to the people
about him; leaving a most favourable
opinion of him on all with whom he had
to do. What particularly struck my
friend the Minister was that he general-
ly prayed aloud, and that his prayers
were extemporized, and suited to par-
ticular circumstances. "I was deeply
touched," the Minister said, "when he
prayed for Serbia, the Prince, the whole
Serbian nation; and especially for the
children of this nation who frequent the
schools, upon whom he implored the
Almighty's blessing. ..."
In May, 1876, Boyne was full of
hope, and said that he had found certain
signs of an old ruined castle not far
from Kraguyevatz. He came again to
Belgrade in June during a period of
great heat, on foot and utterly destitute;
and was almost immediately taken ill.
The Minister was absent at the time; but
a lady went to see him in the wretched
cottage where he had found a lodging,
and provided him with linen and other
necessaries. This friend on a later visit
found that everything had been stolen
from him in the weak state in which he
was; and therefore had him transferred
to the hospital. . . . When the Minister
returned to Belgrade he went to see
poor Boyne, and found him dying. He
expired on the morning of August 3,
1876, and was buried among the poor in
the highest spot of the cemetery of
Belgrade, whence there is a lovely view
over the Danube. The body of this
unknown and friendless American, the
possible descendent — and the last — of
the hero King Lazar, was followed to
the grave by one mourner only — the
Serbian Prime Minister. . . .
Eugene Schulyer, "The Minnesota Heir
of the Serbian King: A Consular Ex-
perience," in Evelyn Schuyler Schaeffer,
Eugene Schuyler: Selected Essays (New
York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1901),
pp. 303-320.
I
people, who have done so well under an i
perfect constitution that they may be fai
trusted to work this one rightly. The Stan
ment of rights of Serbian citizens is vera
clearly expressed, and they are fully equs
those of Americans or Englishmen.48
While an American and a Yugos
scholar, looking back on the period
U.S. recognition of Serbian inde-
pendence, agreed that Kasson was
sentimental in his dealings with Serl
than was Schuyler, whom they con-
sidered a Slavophile,49 one must crec
each with great determination, ener^
and vision in helping to establish
Serbian-American relations.
J
12
'See Edward Younger, "The Early
Diplomatic Career of John A. Kasson," u
published Ph.D. dissertation, George
Washington University, 1942, and Younj
John A. Kasson: Politics and Diplomacy!
Lincoln to McKinley (Iowa City: State
Historical Society of Iowa, 1955). Regarc
Schuyler's career, see Marion Moore
Coleman, "Eugene Schuyler: Diplomat E>
ordinary from the United States to Russi
1867-1876," Russian Review, VII (Autui
1947), pp. 33-48; and Ronald J. Jensen,
"Eugene Schuyler and the Balkan CrisisA
Diplomatic History, V (Winter 1981),
pp. 23-37. A biographical sketch by
Schuyler's sister, with extracts from his
and letters to his family and friends, is i i
Evelyn Schuyler Schaeffer, Eugene. SchU
Selected Essays (New York: Charles
Scribner's Sons, 1901). Professor Jenseni
George Mason University is currently atl
work on a biography of Schuyler.
2Despatch 21 from Bucharest, May 1
1867. (National Archives, Record Group
Despatches from U.S. Consuls at Buchan
vol. 1)
'Instruction 13 to Bucharest, June I
1867. (Ibid., Instructions to U.S. Consuls*
46)
4Despatch 39 from Bucharest, Decent
10, 1867. (Ibid., Despatches from U.S. <|
suls at Bucharest, vol. 1)
5A copy of Czapkay's certificate of
naturalization, dated August 7, 1866, at ,
Francisco, and a long letter to Secretary.
State Seward from the Hungarian patrio
Louis Kossuth, dated January 20, 1866,
recommending Czapkay for the consular
at Bucharest, are ibid., Letters of Applic
tion and Recommendation During the
Administrations of A. Lincoln and A.
Johnson.
instruction 35 to Bucharest, June 2f
1868. (Ibid., Instructions to U.S. Consulal
49)
'Despatch 52 from Bucharest, June 1
1868, and despatch 55 from Bucharest, J.
1, 1868. (Ibid., Despatches from U.S. Cd
at Bucharest, vol. 1)
8Despatch 71 from Czapkay at San I
Department of State Bullet
:■
i
Feature
U.S.
Recognition
of
Serbian
Independence
icisco, April 9, 1869, and despatch 73
San Francisco, June 30, 1869, (ibid.);
er from Mrs. L. J. Czapkay to Secretary
ate Seward, December 15, 1868 (ibid. ,
ers of Application and Recommendation
ng the Administrations of A. Lincoln and
jhnson); letter from Adolph Buchner,
larest, December 26, 1869, to Secretary
ate Hamilton Fish (ibid., Despatches
U.S. Consuls at Bucharest, vol. 1).
Schuyler's letter to Miss King, Belgrade,
28, 1876, quoted in Schaeffer, Eugene
yler: Selected Essays, pp. 57-59.
"Despatch 105 from Vienna, August 3,
. (Foreign Relations of the United States,
(Washington: Government Printing
e, 1878), pp. 50-51)
'Timothy C. Smith was appointed consul
alatz on May 23, 1878. (Register of the
rtment of State (Washington: Govern-
Printing Office, 1879), p. 30)
2Despatch 126 from Vienna, November
878. (Foreign Relations of the United
s, 1879 (Washington: Government Print-
)ffice, 1879), p. 38)
Hbid.
'Instruction 67 to Vienna, December 2,
(National Archives, Record Group 59,
matic Instructions of the Department of
!, Austria, vol. 1).
5 Despatches 180 and 181 from Vienna,
h 31, 1879. (Foreign Relations of the
id States, 1879, pp. 58-61).
'Kasson left Vienna on May 15 and
rently met in June with Secretary of
• Evarts. In a letter written in the
;d States on July 5, Kasson said he
led to return to Washington later in the
h to receive "instructions touching the
al business of which the Secretary spoke
i." (National Archives, Despatches from
;d States Ministers to Austria, vol. 27)
on arrived back in Vienna on August 28.
'Instruction 121 to Vienna, July 30,
. (Foreign Relations of the United States,
pp. 79-80) In this instruction, Evarts
commented on Kasson's "lively apprecia-
of the importance of beginning an "in-
;e intercourse" with Romania and Serbia.
'Despatch 255 from Kasson at Belgrade,
oer 29, 1879. (National Archives, Record
p 59, Despatches from United States
iters to Austria, vol. 27)
mid.
Hbid.
'Despatch 258 from Vienna, November
879. (Ibid.)
2Despatch 261 from Vienna, November
879. (Ibid.)
3Despatch 258 from Vienna, November
879. (Ibid.)
■•Instruction 138 to Vienna, November
879, with enclosed letter of October 30,
, from Myer S. Isaacs and others to
stary of State Evarts. (Foreign Relations
e United States. 1880 (Washington:
■rnment Printing Office, 1880), pp.
6.
5Despatch 271 from Vienna, December
879. (National Archives, Record Group
)espatches from United States Ministers
ustria, vol. 27)
;mber 1981
26Regarding the negotiation of the com-
mercial treaty between Serbia and Austria-
Hungary, which was ratified by Serbia in
June 1881, as well as the "secret convention"
of June 28, 1881, by which Serbia in effect
signed away its right to determine its own
foreign policy, see Michael Boro Petrovich, A
History of Modern Serbia, 1804-1918, vol. II
(New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovitch,
1976), pp. 411-415.
"Despatch 395 from Vienna, December
17, 1880 (National Archives, Record Group
59, Despatches from United States Ministers
to Austria, vol. 28); unofficial letter from
Eugene Schuyler at Bucharest to Secretary
of State Evarts, December 6, 1880. (Ibid.,
Despatches from United States Ministers to
Romania, vol. 1)
2SNote from Filip Hristic, Serbian
Minister in Vienna, to Kasson, December 23,
1880, transmitted to the Department of State
as an enclosure to despatch 401 from Vienna,
December 25, 1880. (Ibid., Despatches from
United States Ministers to Austria, vol. 28);
Instruction 209 to Vienna, January 13, 1881.
(Ibid., Diplomatic Instructions of the Depart-
ment of State, Austria, vol. 3)
"Despatch 426 from Vienna, February
23, 1881, with which was enclosed Hristic s
note of February 13 to Kasson. (Ibid.,
Despatches from United States Ministers to
Austria, vol. 28)
30Despatch 414 from Vienna, January 19,
1881. (Ibid.)
"Instruction 33 to Bucharest, April 12,
1881. (National Archives, Record Group 59,
Diplomatic Instructions of the Department of
State, Romania, vol. 1)
32Despatch 66 from Bucharest, April 30,
1881. (Ibid., Despatches from United States
Ministers to Romania, vol. 1)
"Instruction 39 to Bucharest, May 23,
1881. (Ibid., Diplomatic Instructions of the
Department of State, Romania, vol. 1)
34Despatch 77 from Schuyler at Belgrade,
June 30, 1881. (National Archives, Record
Group 59, Despatches from United States
Ministers to Romania, vol. 2)
3Hbid.
"Despatch 92 from Bucharest, October 8,
1881. (Ibid., Despatches from United States
Ministers to Romania, vol. 1)
37 John Bassett Moore, A Digest of Inter-
national Law, vol. I (Washington: Govern-
ment Printing Office, 1906), pp. 115-116. For
the texts of the treaties, see Charles I.
Bevans, Treaties and Other International
Agreements of the United States of America,
1776-1949, vol. 12 (Washington: U.S. Govern-
ment Printing Office, 1974), pp. 1227-1237.
"Despatch 94 from Schuyler at Belgrade,
October 16, 1881. (National Archives, Record
Group 59, Despatches from United States
Ministers to Romania, vol. 1)
"Letter from Frelinghuysen to Schuyler,
February 25, 1882. (Ibid., Diplomatic Instruc-
tions of the Department of State, Romania,
vol. 1)
40Instruction 1 to Athens, July 5, 1882.
(Ibid., Diplomatic Instructions of the Depart-
ment of State, Greece, vol. 1)
■"Despatches 1 and 2 (Serbian Series)
from Schuyler at Belgrade, October 28 and
November 16, 1882. (National Archives,
Record Group 59, Despatches from United
States Ministers to Romania, vol. 2)
42 Despatch 5 (Serbian Series) from
Schuyler at Belgrade, November 17, 1882.
(Ibid.)
43Dr. Milan Bulajic, former Yugloslav
Consul General in New York, marks the
beginning of diplomatic relations as the ex-
change of notes between Kasson and Hristic
in Vienna in February 1881. (Milan Bulajic,
"Establishment of Yugoslav-American
Diplomatic Relations,' The Diplomatic Corps
of Belgrade, 1971/2, pp. 21-22.
"Despatches 1 and 5 (Serbian Consular
Series) from Schuyler at Athens, March 13
and August 20, 1883. (National Archives,
Record Group 59, Despatches from United
States Consuls at Belgrade, vol. 1).
45Charles Jelavich, "American Percep-
tions of Serbia in the 1870's and 1880's,
unpublished paper in the author's possession,
p. 14.
46Gerhard Janssen was recognized as
Serbian consul general at New York on
February 12, 1883. (Register of the Depart-
ment of State (Washington: Government
Printing Office, 1883), p. 49) National
Archives, Record Group 59, Certificates of
Consular Recognition, vol. 1) According to
one source, Janssen had been previously
recognized as Serbian consul general at New
York on August 8, 1879. (Register of the
Department of State (Washington: Govern-
ment Printing Office, 1879), p. 44) No other
documentation regarding this earlier appoint-
ment has been found in Department of State
files.
"Ljubomir Mihajlovic presented his
credentials as Envoy Extraordinary and
Minister Plenipotentiary of Serbia on January
26, 1917. (Register of the Department of
State, (Washington: Government Printing
Office, 1918), p. 192)
ieThe Nation, vol. 48 (1889), p. 91.
49These were the conclusions reached by
Kasson's biographer, Edward Younger, and
Dr. Bozidar Sane, Secretary of the Yugoslav
legation during World War II, who was
preparing a study of Yugoslav-American rela-
tions, during a conversation on March 2,
1942. (Younger, "The Early Diplomatic
Career of Jonn A. Kasson, ' p. 93)B
For their assistance in the prepara-
tion of this article, the author wishes to
thank Professors Charles Jelavich of
Indiana University and Ronald Jensen
of George Mason University; Ruzica
Popovitch and Robert V. Allen of the
Library of Congress; Frances C. Rowsell,
who helped with the picture research;
Vincent J. Hovanec of the U.S. Embassy,
Belgrade; the staff of the Exhibits Serv-
ice, International Communication Agen-
cy; and Milan Bulajic, Director, Office
for International Legal Services,
Yugoslav Federal Secretariat for
Foreign Affairs.
13
THE PRESIDENT
Challenges of World Development
President Reagan's address before the
annual meeting of the Board of Govt r-
nors of the International Monetary Fund
(IMF), International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (World
Bank), International Development
Association (IDA), and International
Finance Corporation (IFC) in
Washington. D.C., on September 29,
1981J
I believe your meeting can strengthen
the national resolve and international
cooperation required for the global
economic recovery and growth that
we're all striving to achieve, and I'm
very grateful for this opportunity to ad-
dress your distinguished group.
It's customary to begin a speech
before this annual meeting with a por-
trait of the serious problems and
challenges we face in the world
economy. Those problems and challenges
are certainly there in force, and I will
get back to them in a minute and review
them. But first, let me just take a mo-
ment to salute the institutions that you
represent. The IMF and the World Bank
group have contributed enormously to
the spread of hope of a better life
throughout the world community. In the
process, they have proved themselves
capable of change, of adapting to new
circumstances and the needs of new
members.
Your institutions have worked tire-
lessly to preserve the framework for in-
ternational economic cooperation and to
generate confidence and competition in
the world economy. They have been in-
spired by the ideal of a far better world
in which economic growth and develop-
ment would spread to all parts of the
globe. For more than three decades,
they have worked toward these goals
and contributed to results that are now
clearly visible to all.
This past decade in particular has
tested the mettle and demonstrated the
strength and merit of the World Bank
and IMF. As the development report of
the World Bank itself notes:
The 1970s witnessed international
economic convulsions at least as serious as
any that may be thought highly probable in
the next 10 years. The world's economy, its
capacity to withstand shocks, has been
severely tested and the tests were not passed
with entire success. But parts of the develop-
ing world have come through remarkably
well.
We need to recognize our progress
and talk about it more in our conversa-
tions with one another. This in no way
denies the immense problems that we
face. But without some sense of what
we've achieved, without some encourage-
ment to believe in our mission, we will
succumb to defeatism or surrender to ill-
advised solutions to problems that can
never yield to grandiose schemes.
To look at the challenges before us,
let us recall that vision we originally set
out to reach through international
cooperation. The Second World War had
left us with the realization, born out of
the suffering and the sacrifices of those
years, that never again must human in-
itiative and individual liberties be denied
or suppressed. The international political
and economic institutions created after
1945 rested upon a belief that the key to
national development and human pro-
gress is individual freedom (both political
and economic. The Bretton Woods in-
stitutions and the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade established generaliz-
ed rules and procedures to facilitate in-
dividual enterprise and an open interna-
tional trading and financial system. They
recognized that economic incentives and
increasing commercial opportunities
would be essential to economic recovery
and growth.
We who live in free market societies
believe that growth, prosperity, and,
ultimately, human fulfillment are created
from the bottom up, not the government
down. Only when the human spirit is
allowed to invent and create, only when
individuals are given a personal stake in
deciding economic policies and benefiting
from their success (only then can
societies remain economically alive,
dynamic, prosperous, progressive, and
free.
Trust the people. This is the one ir-
refutable lesson of the entire postwar
period, contradicting the notion that
rigid government controls are essential
to economic development. The societies
which have achieved the most spectacu-
lar broad-based economic progress in the
shortest period of time are not the most
tightly controlled, not necessarily the
biggest in size, or the wealthiest in
natural resources. No, what unites them
all is their willingness to believe in the
magic of the marketplace. Everyday 1
confirms the fundamentally human an
democratic ideal that individual effort
deserves economic reward.
Nothing is more crushing to the
spirit of working people and to the
vision of development itself than the
absence of reward for honest toil and
legitimate risk. So let me speak plain!
We cannot have prosperity and succe:
ful development without economic fre
dom; nor can we preserve our person;
and political freedoms without econon
freedom. Governments that set out tc
regiment their people with the stated
jective of providing security and liber
have ended up losing both. Those whi
put freedom as the first priority find
they have also provided security and
economic progress.
The United States is proud of its
contributions to the goals and institu-
tions of postwar development. You ca
count on us to continue to shoulder oi
responsibilities in the challenges that
face today. We see two of overriding
portance: restoring the growth and
vitality of the world economy and ass
ing that all countries, especially the
poorest ones, participate fully in the j
cess of growth and development. But
us remember, the most important cor
tribution any country can make to wci
development is to pursue sound eco-
nomic policies at home.
Regrettably, many industrial coui
tries, including my own, have not ma<
this contribution in the recent past.
We've overspent, overtaxed, and over
regulated, with the result being slow
growth and soaring inflation. This "st
flation," as the IMF annual report not
is one of the two basic problems we
must quickly overcome. The United
States has set its course to economic
recovery. Our program is comprehen-
sive, and as I reminded the American
people last Thursday evening, it will r
quire effort and patience, but the rew;
is worth working for.
By reducing the rate of governme
spending, honoring our commitment t
balance the budget, reducing tax rate;
to encourage productive investment a.
personal savings, eliminating excessiv
government regulation, and maintaini
a stable monetary policy, we are con-
14
Department of State Bulle I
The President
:ed that we will enter a new era of
;ained, noninflationary growth and
sperity, the likes of which we haven't
i for many years. And as the world's
;est single market, a prosperous,
wing U.S. economy will mean in-
ised trading opportunities for other
ons.
America now receives half of all
-OPEC developing-country exports
manufactured goods to all the in-
trialized countries, even though we
Hint for only one-third of the total
3S national product of those in-
trialized countries. Lower U.S. infla-
and interest rates will translate into
eased availability of financial
>urces at affordable rates. Already,
tal markets in the United States are
e accessible to the developing coun-
3 than capital markets anywhere else
ie world. No American contribution
do more for development than a
ving, prosperous U.S. economy.
The domestic policies of developing
ltries are likewise the most critical
ribution they can make to develop-
t. Unless a nation puts its own
icial and economic house in order,
mount of aid will produce progress,
y countries are recognizing this fact
taking dramatic steps to get their
lomies back on a sound footing. And
ow it's not easy — I have a few scars
rove that fact — but it must be done.
Only with a foundation of sound
•estic policies can the international
iomic system continue to expand and
-ove. My own government is corn-
ed to policies of free trade,
■stricted investment, and open
tal markets. The financial flows
>rated by trade investment and
ate lending far exceed official
:lopment assistance funds provided
eveloping countries. At the same
, we're sensitive to the needs of the
income countries. They can benefit
international trade and growth in
industrial countries because they ex-
many raw materials and primary
lucts the industrial world needs. But
also depend upon our aid to
ngthen their economies, diversify
r exports, and work toward self-
ciency.
The United States recognizes this,
r three decades we've provided more
$130 billion in concessional
stance. The American people have
/en themselves to be as compas-
ate and caring as any on Earth, and
will remain so.
We strongly support the World
Bank. And because of our strong sup-
port, we feel a special responsibility to
provide constructive suggestions to
make it more effective. We believe these
suggestions will permit it to generate in-
creased funds for development and to
support the efforts developing countries
are making to strengthen their econo-
mies.
Taking into account our budgetary
constraints, we're committed to pro-
viding the Bank and IDA resources for
them to continue and improve their con-
tributions to development. We know
that stimulating private investment is
also critically important. The Interna-
tional Finance Corporation plays the
leading role in the Bank family in sup-
. . . the most important con-
tribution any country can
make to world development
is to pursue sound economic
policies at home.
port of such investment. Given the im-
portance of this role, we hope it can be
enhanced. We believe all facets of the
Bank can play a more active role in
generating private resources and
stimulating individual initiative in the
development effort.
The IMF also plays a critical role in
establishing conditions to encourage
private capital flows to deficit countries.
By reaching agreements with the IMF
on a sound, comprehensive stabilization
program and by demonstrating its deter-
mination to implement that program, a
borrowing country signals private
markets of its intent to solve its own
economic problems.
We're committed to a pragmatic
search for solutions to produce lasting
results. Let us put an end to the divisive
rhetoric of "us versus them," "north ver-
sus south." Instead, let us decide what
all of us, both developed and developing
countries, can accomplish together.
Our plans for the Caribbean Basin
are one example of how we would like to
harness economic energies within a
region to promote stronger growth. The
design and success of this undertaking
depends upon the cooperation of many
developed and developing countries. My
colleagues and I also look forward to the
upcoming summit meeting at Cancun,
Mexico. That occasion will provide us
with fresh opportunities to address the
serious problems we face and encourage
each other in our common mission.
In conclusion, each of our societies
has a destiny to pursue. We've chosen
ours in light of our experience, our
strength, and our faith. We each are
ultimately responsible for our actions
and the successes and failures that they
bring. But while individually responsible,
we're also mutually interdependent. By
working together through such institu-
tions as the IMF and World Bank, we
can all seek to collaborate on joint prob-
lems, share our insights, and encourage
the common good.
These institutions have reflected a
shared vision of growth and develop-
ment through political freedom and eco-
nomic opportunity. A liberal and open
trade and payment system would
reconstruct a shattered world and lay
the basis for prosperity to help avoid
future conflicts. This vision has become
reality for many of us. Let us pledge to
continue working together to insure that
it becomes reality for all.
'Text from White House press release.
mber1981
15
The President
News Conference of October 1
(Excerpts)
This morning Congress was notified of
our intention to sell AWACS [airborne
warning and control] aircraft and F-15
enhancement items to Saudi Arabia. I
have proposed this sale because it
significantly enhances our own vital na-
tional security interests in the Middle
East. By building confidence in the
United States as a reliable security part-
ner, the sale will greatly improve the
chances of our working constructively
with Saudi Arabia and other states of
the Middle East toward our common
goal— a just and lasting peace. It poses
no threat to Israel now or in the future.
Indeed, by contributing to the security
and stability of a region, it serves
Israel's long-range interests.
Further, this sale will significantly
improve the capability of Saudi Arabia
and the United States to defend the oil
fields on which the security of the free
world depends.
As President, it's my duty to define
and defend our broad national security
objectives. The Congress, of course,
plays an important role in this process.
And, while we must always take into ac-
count the vital interests of our allies,
American security interests must remain
our internal responsibility. It is not the
business of other nations to make
American foreign policy. An objective
assessment of U.S. national interests
must favor the proposed sale, and I say
this as one who holds strongly the view
that both a secure State of Israel and a
stable Mideast peace are essential to our
national interests.
Q. Since Saudi Arabia has agreed
to an American presence on AWACS,
what do you think is the possibility
now of Senate acceptance of the sale?
And you seem to have been telling us
right now that Israel should keep its
hands off what we consider American
national security matters in the Mid-
dle East.
A. No, and let me hasten to add, I
don't mean that in any deprecating way
because, in my meeting with President
Sadat and Prime Minister Begin, both of
them were fine meetings. I think we've
arrived at a very great understanding,
and we're going forward with strategic
discussions of our relations with Israel.
But I don't think that anyone — I sup-
pose what really is the most serious
thing is the perception that other coun-
tries must not get a perception that we
are being unduly influenced one way or
the other with regard to foreign policy
and I —
Q. What about the chance of the
sale going through in the Senate?
A. I believe that the chance is good.
I think that many of the things that
we've had to report now on the terms of
that sale meet most of the objections
that some of those have had.
Q. Will you be willing to accept
larger cuts in your 1982 defense
budget if Congress prepares it to total
along those lines?
A. I would hesitate to say that I
would or that they should do this
because these cuts were not just made
on the basis of saying, "Oh, let's take a
percentage of the money away from
them."
We went into what in the planned
military buildup that we believe is essen-
tial to our national security. What does
each cut mean? What must we
eliminate?
I would like to call to your attention
that before the program even went into
effect, or before this $2 billion cut for
1982, Caspar Weinberger, the Secretary
there, had already come up himself with
$3V2 billion in cuts in defense spending.
Q. Why didn't you go for that?
A. We found because he was able to
find where he believed he could make
the additional cuts trying to be helpful
without any important setback to our
military buildup.
Q. Are you aware that the same
people at the Pentagon and the State
Department who now want you to sell
AWACS planes to Saudi Arabia [in-
audible] wanted that very same
weapons system sold to the Shah of
Iran just before the Shah fell? Given
the fact that when the Shah fell, the
United States launched top secret
military equipment in Iran in its in-
itial F-16 fighters, can you now
guarantee the Congress and the pe:
of the United States that the AW A'
system, if it's sold to the Saudis, w
not compromise American security
would not fall into the wrong hand
A. I can make that guarantee th.
it will not compromise our security. I
don't believe that it will fall into ener
hands, but it would not compromise (
security even if it did.
With regard to 4lk years ago, I
wasn't here then and Iran — I have tc
say Saudi Arabia, we will not permit
be an Iran.
Q. There's been talk about limi
nuclear war. Do you believe that
either the Soviet Union or the Unit
States could win a nuclear war? Is
there a winnable nuclear war?
A. It's very difficult for me to th
that there is a winnable nuclear war,
where our great risk falls is that the
Soviet Union has made it very plain
among themselves that they believe i
winnable. And believing that, that
makes them constitute a threat and
which is one of the reasons why I'm
dedicated to getting them at a table,
for arms limitation talks but for arm
reduction talks.
Q. Can you be sure our Europe
allies and anyone else in Europe ar
not seeking military superiority ov
the Soviet Union or, in fact, is thai
the policy?
A. We are seeking whatever is
necessary to insure that that "windo1
vulnerability" I've spoken of has beer
closed and that the risk has been re-
duced of there being a war at all. An'
think our allies, largely in Europe, d<
know that. I also do think that there
groups among our allies, as there arc
here in America, who are increasing!
vocal in carrying their own message
it is one there of pacifism and neutra
and so forth. I think they're very
unrealistic, and if we listen to them,
think we'd all be in trouble.
Q. You said a few minutes ago
that you would not allow, you woui
not permit what happened in Iran
several years ago to happen in Sau<
Arabia. How would you prevent th;
Would you take military interventii
if that was necessary to prevent it?
i
16
Department of State Bullejl
THE SECRETARY
A. I'm not going to talk about the
fics of how we would do it, except
,y in Iran I think the United States
;o take some responsibility for what
ened there — with some very short-
I policies and let a situation come to
ling point; there was no need to do
But in Saudi Arabia, I just would
;o your attention that it's not only
Jnited States, it's the whole
iern world. There is no way, as long
ludi Arabia and the OPEC nations
in the east — and Saudi Arabia's
nost important, it provides the bulk
e energy that is needed to turn the
Is of industry in the Western
i — there's no way that we could
1 by and see that taken over by
ne that would shut off that oil.
^. I'd like to take you pretty far
Wall Street to the People's
lblic of China. There is a standing
ation here for you, as the
rican President, to go to China,
eijing they are talking about that
ibility. In Cancun at that summit
;rence later this month you will
iere and the head of government
e People's Republic of China will
iere. What is your thinking now
t traveling to Beijing?
Ia. That's something that I look for-
I to with interest, but I don't think
I while yet.
I. They think in the spring of
i year. Is that possible?
\\. That may be a little earlier than
I luld happen. And then I remember
I all of you say that Presidents only
i when they're in trouble and I
want to be in trouble next spring.
;hter]
Secretary Interviewed on
"Issues and Answers"
from White House press release.
Secretary Haig was interviewed on
ABC's "Issues and Answers" by ABC
Neuts correspondents Sander Vanocur
and Barrie Dunsmore in Washington,
D.C., September 20. 1981.'
Q. The Administration's $8.5 billion
arms proposal to sell weapons to the
Saudi Arabians is in deep difficulty on
the Hill. Now, as someone who was
reported last winter to have urged
caution, at times delay notification,
while the Defense Department was
practically negotiating the agreement
with the Saudis, aren't you now, as
the point man for the Administration
on the Hill, rather in the position of
the good soldier fighting with a battle
plan that is not yours?
A. Not at all. This is an issue that
has been analyzed, studied, negotiated
by two Administrations, not by one. And
we have concluded that now is the time
to proceed on this very important issue,
to do so in the interests of the peace-
keeping process in the Middle East,
where we are going to require the co-
operation and the help of all of the par-
ties. And that's the essence of this issue.
Q. Is there not a double standard
here when you urge the Senators, as
you did on Thursday before the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, to vote
for this package because the President
has to have the authority to go before
other governments and they can be
convinced that he can negotiate a trea-
ty? And this, from you, for a presi-
dent, who as a candidate opposed the
Panama Canal Treaty and opposed the
SALT II Treaty, both negotiated by
his predecessor. Is there not only a
double standard but hypocrisy in this?
A. No. And, as a matter of fact,
there is not a double standard issue at
all. The issue is, does this sale meet the
vital interests of the American people.
And the facts are that it does in a very
profound way. It does not mean that
there are not risks for Israel in this sale.
We recognize that. But the greater
risks, at this juncture in the Middle East
peacekeeping process, would be not to
proceed with this sale. It's not a ques-
tion of double standard. It's a question
of whether this is the right step to take
in the interests of the American people,
and we believe that it is.
Tiber 1981
Q. On Thursday, Senator Glenn, to
whom you paid respectful attention,
said, if you modified the pro-
posal— gave the AWACS [airborne
warning and control system] recon-
naissance planes to the Saudis at half
price but you shared a joint command
with the United States — he said that
would go through the Senate in 20
minutes. And he said afterward, after
you had testified, that he'd help the
Administration in any way. Now, if
passage is desired, and if passage is
dependent, as Senators say it is, on
some modification like the Glenn pro-
posal, is the Administration thinking
about asking Senator Glenn to perhaps
talk to the Saudis? He's respected by
them. And see if he can put the deal
together?
A. Not at all. It is very easy for a
Senator — and a very respectable and
very competent Senator like Senator
Glenn — to sit off on the side. He has not
been involved in the months and months
of discussions associated with this sale.
To offer perhaps what is in his view a
more desirable package — that's very
understandable, and we welcome his
suggestions.
On the other hand, we've been
through this process, and two Admini-
strations have been through this proc-
ess. We are convinced that the Govern-
ment of Saudi Arabia, the people of
Saudi Arabia, could not enter into an ar-
rangement of the kind described by
Senator Glenn without a serious blow to
their sovereignty and national pride.
After all, Saudi Arabia is a country
that has experienced the vicissitudes of
colonialism, and like so many other
areas in the region, or countries in the
region, including Egypt, they are very,
very opposed to the establishment of
American bases or pervasive American
influence in their country. And I under-
stand that, and I think we Americans
have learned that lesson.
Q. This past week, a couple of
times you made the point that U.S.
policy should not be subject to a
foreign veto. To what extent do you
feel that [Israeli] Prime Minister
Begin's lobbying here, his charts and
his graphs which he took to the key
committees of Congress, may be a fac-
tor in the ultimate defeat of this
issue?
17
The Secretary
A. Now, first, let's be sure we
understand what I said and what I
meant by external vetoes. In the first
place, it is true that the leadership of
Israel is concerned about this sale. And
we understand that. And they have a
perfect right, in fact they have an
obligation, to express those concerns
and to do it at home and to do it here.
American citizens have a right to object
to this sale if they feel on substantive
grounds it is incorrect.
The basic issue here is, the Ameri-
can Administration— and I must add,
two Administrations, essentially — have
concluded that the overall, broad Ameri-
can interests in the Middle East, the
continuation of a peace process that is
going to require, in fact demand, risk
taking on all parts— my golly, Camp
David, itself, was an assumption of risks
by both Israel and Egypt that brought
about the breakthrough— and there are
risks involved in this particular sale, and
there will be, indeed, risks in the peace-
making process.
The issue is, the United States must
make these judgments. It bears the
responsibility for a broader set of con-
siderations, than does the Government
of Israel. We must follow through.
Q. On the flight home from
Europe, you indicated that if this deal
were defeated it would have serious
implications on future U.S. Mideast
policy. Does that mean that if the
United States cannot establish a mili-
tary presence in Saudi Arabia through
this deal, which seems to be at least
part of the reason for it, that it might
render moot the whole idea of closer
strategic ties with Israel?
A. No. That's not the issue. The
issue here is the participation, the good
will of Saudi Arabia in the peacekeeping
process from this point on is an absolute
essential for success. We've seen what
Saudi Arabia has contributed in the re-
cent Lebanon crisis, not once, but in
both crises that we witnessed this past
spring and summer. And we need that
kind of cooperation and those resources,
that leadership, that diplomacy, that the
Saudi Government has provided. If this
sale were to fall through, certainly that
kind of cooperation and confidence
would be jeopardized.
Q. One more question on the Mid-
dle East. Do you have any indication
as to who was behind the recent
bombings in Lebanon which seem to
be taking a terrible toll at this point?
A. No, we do not. We have watched
this very carefully. There are splinter
groups in the Palestinian movement, the
PLO [Palestine Liberation Organization].
There are some who are responsive to
Libya, to Syria, and to the Soviet Union.
And it has been basically a Libyan role
in this whole peacekeeping process to be
a spoiler. So one must take that into
consideration. On the other hand, there
are Christian elements that are equally
concerned about the internal situation.
Q. I want to take you back to the
AWACS, not because of itself, but it
tells you a lot about how this Ad-
ministration has been conducting its
foreign policy. The Carter Administra-
tion looked with favor— those were
the words that Secretary Brown used
in his letter to Prince Sultan, the
Defense Minister of Saudi Arabia.
Earlier this year, you were having
your battles with Senator Helms and
other jurisdictional battles, the De-
fense Department, the Secretary of
Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chairman, General Jones, were run-
ning away with this while the State
Department wasn't even out of the
box. And now you have come to a
point where the President risks a
grave defeat and a blow to his
prestige. Now, how did this happen?
Where was the State Department
throughout all this?
A. I don't think that is correct. We
certainly were out of the box. This is an
issue which the previous Administration
had been wrestling with and not too
differently than we have. As a matter of
fact, in December, before the new Ad-
ministration inauguration, the previous
Administration had suggested to us that
they were prepared to move forward
with the package. Now, not in the same
context that we had. They were going to
go forward with the augmentation of the
F-15 capabilities and commit to addi-
tional studies to develop an aerial
surveillance capability.
A lot of that had already, as you
pointed out, at military levels brought
forward a growing consensus that
AWACS was the right system. Now, we
asked the previous Administration not
to go forward. We felt that if we were
going to have to see this controversial
issue through — and it had been con-
troversial earlier — then we had the
responsibility, and I think the obligation,
to take the onus for putting it forward.
And it was in that context that we
recommended going slowly on the
AWACS portion of it. And we have
i
18
done that. We've been involved in ex>
sive discussions with Saudi Arabia, a
we have concluded them, and we feel
that the conditions that they have
agreed to — the transfer arrangemenl
if you will — meet the objective, balan
concerns of so many of the critics. Ai
it is our hope that they will listen to
these arrangements. And I think thei
concerns will be satisfactorily met.
Q. You must admit that after
Thursday, and the introduction of t
Packwood resolution with 50 signa
tures, and Senator Packwood says
has six more, and with Senator Gle
who says he approves the F-15 par
but not the AWACS sale, that's 57,
you are between the rock and the h
place. Is there no compromise?
A. I know that gives a certain tr
to this from the standpoint of Washi)
ton press analyses, and to that degre
is so. But let me tell you, that list th;
Senator Packwood has put forward i
also replete with soft spots. I could
name for you today a dozen Senator;
Q. Please do it today.
A. — who have already conveyec
that their assent to that letter is soft
and they are ready to reconsider and
objectively look at what we have to
offer. I'm not going to put the names
forward at this point.
Q. Once men and women put tl
names to a document of this gravit
is not it very difficult to get them t
remove their names? And what is 3
pressure going to be?
A. It's not a question of pressur
It's a question of objective analysis b
honest men who want to do what is
right for their country, for the Amei
people, and for our foreign policy. A
it is our view that when they hear th
Administration's case, and only some
of them have now done so, we'll hav<
completed by the end of this month.
Why I am very, very confident that ;
number of these men, who put their
name on an expression of concern —
a vote — will reconsider and join the
President in this important initiative
Q. Do you want a vote before t
President meets Prince Fahd, [Dep
Prime Minister] of the Saudi Govei
ment in Cancun in October, on Oc-
tober 22d?
A. This vote could come forwarc
after that time, with the 20-, 30-day
notification provision, or it could be
taken well before that, if that's the w
Department of State Bulli j
Al
The Secretary
;he Senate and the House. We would
>e to get this behind us as soon as
sible, just as a matter of principle.
Q. This past week American
lysts were saying that the latest
iet message to Poland was omi-
is, that it seemed to be designed to
Pole against Pole, perhaps as a
text for getting the Soviets to go
;o restore order. What is your view
that particular analysis?
A. I think, clearly, and we made our
n rather sharply 2 days ago, is that
re are interventionist implications in
Soviet note, and we don't welcome
)n the other hand, it is also not a bla-
t threat of the kind some might be
n more fearful of.
It is true that the situation in Poland
ay has now pitted the political
horities against the Solidarity move-
it. In that sense, the tensions have
nged somewhat, from Solidarity to
iet pressure, externally. Now, all of
je things are in a state of transition.
1 we continue to insist — as I will
m I meet [Soviet] Foreign Minister
myko this coming week in New
k — that we anticipate and expect
insist that there not be any Soviet
rventionism in Poland, that the
sh people have a right to work out
Rr differences. We think they can do
the government versus the union
/ement, Solidarity.
Q. There are reports that follow-
the recent Soviet maneuvers in the
tic that many of the soldiers and
i ipment remain. Just how ready are
B Russians to invade if they decided
hlo so?
I A. We don't see signs of intense
1 taxations as we have on two previous
I isions. On the other hand, the exer-
, which included some 100,000 in the
lorussian area of Russia adjacent to
Polish border and along the sea
s, coastal areas — the troops have
e back to garrison, essentially, but
ly of the communications and the
imand and control facilities for that
rase remain in place and it will be
lewhat later before they go back,
i I suppose there are some political
notations to that.
Q. In December of 1980, the
TO countries agreed on a number
neasures they would take if Poland
re to be invaded. Are those still in
ce and are we still ready to react
y strongly in the event of an inva-
n?
A. Absolutely. And I wanl to em-
phasize that the coordination and co-
operation within the NATO framework
and in other related frameworks has
been consistent and steady and it has
followed each upturn and downturn of
tension very, very closely. And it has
this past week.
Q. Would you negotiate, for exam-
ple, the reduction of weapons in
Europe if the Russians were to in-
vade?
A. We have made it clear that
Soviet interventionism in Poland would
have a profound impact on any pros-
pects for arms control negotiations with
the Soviets.
Q. Following up on arms control,
you and Foreign Minister Gromyko are
going to be playing in New York this
week to principally one audience.
Western Europe. The Soviets are try-
ing to continue to portray the idea
they want to negotiate. And the
United States is trying to portray, not
just to domestic critics at home but to
its European allies, it wants to
negotiate while it goes ahead with
plans to install this new generation of
Pershing and cruise missiles in
Western Europe. The Carter Ad-
ministration came up with this plan.
The Europeans bought it. And there
weren't the outcries, political outcries,
then that there are now. Is this occa-
sioned by the fact that this Admini-
stration seems, rightly or wrongly, to
give the impression it is not willing to
negotiate with the Soviet Union?
A. No. I don't think that's the case.
I would say that there has been a grow-
ing concern in Western Europe about all
matters nuclear, and that's a change, if
you will, in the atmosphere in Western
Europe itself.
Secondly, it goes without saying that
this Administration has taken a far
more rigorous stance against Soviet in-
terventionism worldwide then did its
predecessor. We have also taken a
stronger stance with respect to
American defense needs. It is under-
standable that our Western European
partners, who have been hearing 10
years of one set of American rhetoric,
are affected by our new posture.
But I can assure you, my discussions
with European leaders — and I mean
each and every one of these leaders that
I have had the opportunity to meet
with — are very, very encouraging with
respect to what we are doing and the
way we are doing it. They are, at the
same time, nervous about the lack of
progress on arms control, per se, and
they hope to see some progress in the
period ahead. We hope for the same
thing.
Q. What is the bait you are going
to offer the Soviet Union? After all,
this comes at a time when their
economy is under terrible stress, even
worse than in the past, though they
have admitted that, if they have to,
they will keep up with the arms race.
But what is the U.S. bait to them on
the placement of this new generation
of missiles, vis-a-vis the placement
already in place of the SS-20s that the
Soviet Union has aimed at Western
Europe? What's the offer? What's the
quid pro quo?
A. I wouldn't presume to go into
the details of the American and, indeed,
Western negotiating position because we
have coordinated our positions very,
very carefully with our European part-
ners and will continue to do so. We
haven't completed, incidentally, putting
our final opening position together in
that respect.
But it isn't a question of a bait or a
deal. It's a question of mutual interest
on the part of both sides, the Soviet
Union and the American side, to arrive
at just, verifiable, equitable arrange-
ments which will take the burden of
armaments off the shoulders of our
peoples.
Now, this remains the basic ap-
proach to sound arms control. And the
enhancement of the American people's
security must be the fundamental prem-
ise of the American approach. That
means we must not, as frequently as has
been the case in the past, arrive at
agreements that open up channels for
future growth in armaments but rather
to seek genuine reductions, as President
Reagan has so repeatedly stated as his
objective.
Q. A week ago today you were in
West Berlin, and many thousands of
people were on the streets demon-
strating against U.S. policy. The
Europeans generally do not seem to
feel that this Administration is actual-
ly serious about arms control reduc-
tions. And among other things, they
point to the men who have been ap-
pointed to negotiate these reduc-
tions— General [Edward] Rownev for
SALT, Mr. [Paul] Nitze for the theater
negotiations. How can you reassure
the Europeans that this Administra-
tion is really serious?
ember 1981
19
ECONOMICS
A. First, I am not aware that Mr.
Nitze has formally accepted what is ap-
parently an offer to take on the TNF
[theater nuclear force] negotiating job.
But let me tell you also about General
Rowney. He has been involved in three
American Administrations, in every
aspect of our arms control negotiations
with the Soviet Union. He is well known
to the Soviet leaders and, I think, highly
respected as a man who knows his stuff.
Now, arms control is not controlled
by the demeanor of a particular
negotiator. After all, our negotiators are
responsive to the views and the direc-
tions of an American president. I think
too often in the past we have had a
negotiator or another who was perhaps
overly enamoured with a Nobel Peace
Prize rather than genuine progress in
the interests of the security of the
American people and world peace. This
remains to be seen. We hear a lot of
positive rhetoric from the Soviets. Thus
far we suspect that a great deal of that
is propaganda designed to do precisely
what you mentioned, split our European
partners out from ourselves. Now, we
don't want that to happen. We aren't go-
ing to let it happen. But we are ready to
talk seriously.
Q. You have said that we
shouldn't expect too much out of that
meeting with Mr. Gromyko. What
might be the best thing that could
happen and the worst thing?
A. I wouldn't draw alternative best
outcomes, worst outcomes. I think this
is the first time that at the ministerial
level we are meeting, and there are a
host of important issues on our agenda,
not the least of which is the TNF discus-
sions themselves. And I hope if we can
establish a new base of communica-
tion— if we can convince the Soviet side
that we are serious about a dialogue.
But that dialogue is going to be depend-
ent on corresponding Soviet inter-
national behavior and reciprocity be-
tween the Soviets and ourselves. If we
have accomplished that, we com-
municate that fact, it will have been a
successful session.
Q. As you begin this dialogue
with Foreign Minister Gromyko,
would you wish that the budget proc-
ess had been completed and that you
would not be facing the Soviet Union
with talk of reductions in the U.S.
defense budget?
A. Oh, absolutely. And let rue say
this. I think it is vitally important that
the American people and that the Amer-
20
East-West Trade Relations
by Myer Rashish
Statement before the Subcommittee
on International Economic Policy of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee on
September 16. 1981. Mr. Rashish is
Under Secretary for Economic Affairs.1
The Administration's trade policy
toward the Eastern bloc— indeed our
overall economic relationship with the
East— cannot be divorced from our
broad political-security objectives vis-a-
vis these countries. As a result, our
trade policy contains some basic and sig-
nificant aspects which do not charac-
terize our trade policies toward other
countries. Essentially this is due to the
political-military situation in which we
find ourselves today.
In the first instance and most impor-
tantly, the Soviet Union and its Warsaw
Pact allies remain the principal threat to
Western security. This prevents us from
being able to deal with the Soviet Union
and Eastern Europe as we can deal with
most other countries in the world. Our
economic policies must support our key
objectives of deterring Soviet adven-
turism, redressing the military balance
between the West and the Warsaw Pact,
and strengthening the Western allianc
Economic relations must reflect and
reinforce our political goals of influ-
encing the behavior of Communist
governments in ways which serve the
vital interests of the United States ano
its allies.
In formulating our economic polici
we must also keep in mind that trade
may enhance Soviet military capabiliti
directly and transfer technology not
otherwise available which may make a
significant contribution to the military
East-West trade also contributes more
broadly to Soviet ability to support
military programs at levels that West<
countries find increasingly difficult to
match. Furthermore, certain economic
relations with the East may lead to
levels of dependence which increase
Western vulnerability to political
influence and coercion by the Soviet
Union.
On the other hand, our trade ties
offer certain opportunities. There are,
course, the obvious benefits to our
economy from increased exports. In
addition, we must always keep in min-
that our economic relations may offer
opportunity to influence future Soviet
and Eastern European economic and
ican Congress understand that any sub-
stantial reduction in America's defense
spending will have a fundamental dele-
terious impact on our ability to deal
effectively with the Soviet Union, whose
own growth in armaments has been un-
paralled in modern history and whose in-
ternational aggressiveness has become a
matter of increasing concern to all of us.
I think we have to negotiate from
strength. Any other course would be
sterile and futile.
Q. Am I to assume, then, you and
Secretary of Defense Weinberger are
for once together on an issue and will
this issue come out the way you two
want it or will budget director
Stockman get the cuts he is seeking in
the defense budget?
A. I think the President has already
made his position rather clear on this. It
has resulted in some belt tightening in
the Pentagon, as it should. But the basic
reductions are modest in character and
it keeps the momentum of the continu-
ing growth of American military power
high on the agenda. It is up now to th
Congress, and I would hope that we \
continue to have the unified support c
both parties on this vital matter.
Q. There's been a report that th
head of the American Interests Sec-
tion in Havana has been recalled, ar
there is a lot of speculation that the
United States is on the verge of tot;
ly breaking relations with Cuba. Is
that something that is likely to hap-
pen?
A. No. The return of our repre-
sentative from Havana is merely a
periodic consultation call.
Q. He will be going back?
A. Yes.
Q. When you talked about peopl
courting Nobel prizes in negotiation
you weren't referring to your forme
colleague, Henry Kissinger?
A. Not at all. Not at all.
'Press release 318 of Sept. 21. 1981.
Department of State Bulle j
Economics
tical behavior. Keeping these con-
rations in mind, it is very important
, the United States systematically
ew our policies regarding economic
tions with the Soviet Union and
tern Europe.
We will work closely with our allies
isure, in the words of the Ottawa
mit declaration, that "... in the field
last- West relations, our economic
lies continue to be compatible with
political and security objectives." It
•ctremely difficult to carry out an
ctive East- West trade policy uni-
rally. We cannot allow East-West
ie to become a source of dissension
division in the alliance.
In undertaking our review, we are
;ing to develop a prudent and careful
"oach which would, at the same time,
rove our ability to deny the Soviet
m equipment and technology to fur-
its military objectives while allow-
us to broaden certain economic ties
will permit us to exercise greater
rage and influence on Soviet
ivior.
.S.R.
sviewing East- West trade policy, the
linistration has given priority atten-
to our relations with the Soviet
>n. One of our major goals has been
liminate the transfer of Western
pment and technology which con-
ites significantly to Soviet military
labilities. There is a need to
3 ngthen multilateral controls on the
I sfer of technology. At the July
I .wa summit meeting we agreed to
h a special high-level meeting of the
li rdinating Committee for East- West
I ie Policy (COCOM) to discuss how to
I we the effectiveness of controls on
N e with the East. We are now devel-
■ g our position for this important
lion.
I An additional area of concern has
B i the increasing importance of Soviet
I materials— particularly energy— for
I economies of many allied countries.
\ continue to have serious reserva-
s about the west Siberian pipeline
iect which, if completed, would
stantially increase the share of Soviet
as a proportion of Western Europe's
consumption and has the potential
significantly increased Soviet polit-
leverage as a result. We plan to
■t with European leaders in the
dng months to discuss alternatives
ways to reduce vulnerability to
sible Soviet pressure.
U.S. Trade with China, COMECON, and
Others, 1970, 1980
1970
1
980
Exports
Imports
Exports
Imports
China
None
Neg.
$4 billion
$1 billion
COMECON
$4 million
$2 million
$4 billion
$1 billion
(European
members:
Bulgaria,
Czechslovakia,
East Germany,
Hungary, Romania,
U.S.S.R.)
Japan
$5 billion
$6 billion
$21 billion
$31 billion
Western
Europe
$14 billion
$11 billion
$68 billion
$46 billion
(incl.
Yugoslavia)
Sources: Department of Commerce, General Imports: World Area by Commodity Groupings
(Dee. 1970); Exports: World Area by Commodity Groupings (Dec. 1970); EM 450/455, Dec. 1980;
IM 150/IM 155, Dec. 1980.
If the Soviets act responsibly and
with restraint in the international arena,
we are prepared to continue and expand
our trade in nonstrategic areas on the
basis of mutual advantage. The removal
of the partial grains embargo and the
1-year extension of the U.S. -Soviet
grains agreement is a clear indication of
our readiness in this respect. However,
even in the area of nonstrategic trade
we cannot divorce our policies from
overall Soviet behavior. While it is the
Reagan Administration's goal to reduce
foreign policy trade controls, we are not
prepared to forswear the use of these
controls as part of an overall response
to future Soviet aggressive action.
Eastern Europe
In developing U.S. policy toward the
countries of Eastern Europe we must
take into account the distinctive
character of each country in the area
and the fact that each of these nations
has its own internal dynamic. Our goal
is to encourage evolutionary change,
increased assertion of national self-
interest, and greater respect for the
rights of individual citizens by East
European governments. Throughout
Eastern Europe our economic and trade
ties constitute a key component of our
bilateral relationship. However, we must
continue to deny equipment and tech-
nology that would contribute signifi-
cantly to the Warsaw Pact's warmaking
capabilities or could otherwise be
diverted to the Soviet military.
The state of our bilateral relations
varies from country to country.
Yugoslavia, Poland, Romania, and
Hungary receive nondiscriminatory or
most-favored-nation (MFN) tariff treat-
ment and are eligible for government-
supported credits from the Export-
Import Bank and the Commodity Credit
Corporation. This summer the Admin-
istration renewed bilateral trade
agreements with Hungary and Romania
and proposed to the Congress that MFN
for these countries be extended for
1 additional year in accordance with the
provisions of Section 402 of the 1974
Trade Act. (No such extensions are re-
quired in the case of Poland and
Yugoslavia, to which MFN treatment
had been extended before enactment of
the 1974 act.)
In each instance the granting of
MFN has been an important stimulus to
an improved bilateral relationship. In
the case of Poland, Yugoslavia, and
ember 1981
21
Economics
Romania our relationship has grown to
the point that our bilateral trade
exceeds $1 billion per year and the
exchange of presidential visits has
become a frequent phenomenon. We
have consulted particularly closely with
Poland during its current economic dif-
ficulties and have granted debt relief
and emergency credits for the purchase
of agricultural commodities.
While Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and
the German Democratic Republic do not
receive MFN tariff treatment and are
not eligible for U.S. Government-
supported credits, our trade relations
with each of these countries have con-
tinued to expand in recent years. These
countries are becoming more important
markets for U.S. exports and partic-
ularly for agricultural commodities. We
are currently involved in intensive
negotiations with Czechoslovakia to
settle outstanding claims of American
citizens against that country. We are
encouraged by the constructive attitude
which the Czechs have shown in these
negotiations and are hopeful that a final
agreement can be reached in the near
future.
China
The 1979 trade agreement with the
People's Republic of China, extension of
MFN, and the granting of government-
supported credits have helped to fuel an
expansion of our economic relations
which has made China our most impor-
tant trading partner among the centrally
planned economy countries. Our total
trade with China reached $4.8 billion in
1980. U.S. exports to China were $3.7
billion or approximately half the total of
all U.S. exports to Communist countries.
We have a strategic interest in a
secure, stable, and friendly China which
is able to resist Soviet pressures. To
advance this interest, we have
eased— but not eliminated— restrictions
on the sale of advanced equipment and
high technology to China. Nevertheless,
we will continue to operate on a case-by-
case basis taking into account our secu-
rity interests. We will also consult with
Congress and will seek appropriate con-
gressional action to end economic
discrimination against China no longer
consistent with our relationship. In this
connection we are considering recom-
mending amendments to the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961, the Agricultural
Trade Development and Assistance Act
(PL 480), and the Trade Agreements
Extension Act (which prohibits imports
22
Major Items in U.S.-Soviet Trade, 1980
U.S. Export
>
Total
$1,500 million
Corn
662
Wheat
336
Special industrial
machinery
105
Articles of rubber
and plastic
64
Road vehicles and
parts
58
Inedible crude
material
(except fuel)
56
Agricultural and
construction
tractors
52
Industrial machinery
49
Soybeans
45
U.S. Imports
Total
Special inorganic com-
pounds and aluminum
oxide abrasives
Silver, platinum,
platinum group metals
Nonmonetary gold
Uranium and thorium
Nickel and nickel
alloys
Artworks
Petroleum and products
Distilled alcoholic
beverages
Base metals and alloys
Ores and concentrates
of base metals
$453 mil
95
90
88
44
35
28
17
9
7
7
Source: Department of Commerce, EM 450/455, Dec. 1980; IM 150/IM 155, Dec. 1980.
Major Items in U.S.-Chinese Trade, 1980
U.S. Exports
U.S. Imports
Total
$4 billion
Total
$1 billi
Wheat
1.
Wearing apparel and
.249
Cotton
.7
accessories
Corn
.2
Textiles yarns, fabric,
.143
Manmade fibers
.2
articles
Aircraft
.15
Petroleum and products
.134
Soybeans
.15
Inedible crude materials
.126
Fertilizers
.15
Chemicals and related
.107
Textile yarn, fabric, articles
.13
products
Paper, paperboard
.13
Artworks
.038"
Synthetic resins, rubber,
.12
Brooms, brushes,
.03&
plastic materials
basketwork
Source: Department of Commerce
, EM 450/455
Dec. 1980; IM 150/IM 155, Dec.
1980.
Department of State Bulk
Economics
even categories of furs from China
. the U.S.S.R.). We have also pro-
ed to the Chinese the establishment
i new joint commission on commerce
. trade.
ja, Vietnam, North Korea, and
npuchea
■y tight controls remain on trade with
>a, Vietnam, North Korea, and
npuchea. Export licenses for these
ntries are issued only in exceptional
:umstances, particularly when
nanitarian concerns are involved. We
be reviewing these controls in the
r future as part of a general review
ill foreign policy trade controls. Given
>a's increasingly adventuristic mili-
/ activities in support of Soviet
ansionism, Vietnam's continued mili-
/ occupation of Kampuchea, and ex-
ne North Korean truculence, any
ralization of these controls is un-
ly.
Iiefits for U.S. Economy
live previously noted the important
I economic benefits which accrue to us
li result of our trade relations with
liy Communist countries. However,
Imust not lose sight of the fact that
I principal returns on our East-West
lie relationships are those which
|-ue to the U.S. economy. Our exports
| he centrally planned economies
I 'hiding Yugoslavia) totaled $7.6
Jon in 1980 or roughly 3.4% of total
lorts. For the American farmer this
Ide was especially significant;
{ icultural sales were $5.05 billion or
11% of our total agricultural exports.
1 $5.1 billion surplus we enjoyed in
I trade with the Communist world last
Ir made a significant contribution
I arc! improving the overall U.S.
Lnce of payments. Exports to the
jtrally planned economies generate
|roximately 300,000 American jobs.
Most of the U.S. restrictions on
ie with the Communist world are
osed for reasons of national security.
Mi't believe that I need to elaborate
the need to have national security
trols on trade with these countries,
•eign policy controls imposed in the
it-West trade area are relatively few.
i most important of these are the
trols pertaining to the sale of oil and
exploration and production tech-
agy and equipment to the U.S.S.R.
ler foreign policy controls include
trictions on the sale of crime control
ember 1981
equipment (controlled for export to all
countries other than NATO members,
Japan, Australia, and New Zealand) and
our very tight controls on trade with
Cuba, Vietnam, North Korea, and Kam-
puchea. If all these controls were to be
suddenly eliminated, the effect on U.S.
exporters and our economy would be
modest.
We maintain foreign policy controls
to make clear to Communist govern-
ments that we will not completely
insulate our economic relations from
their behavior in other areas. When
Communist governments take actions
that are particularly repugnant to us, it
is important that we react, preferably
with the cooperation of our allies, in an
area which will hurt them. While
economic actions of this sort will invar-
iably have costs, to us as well as to
them, failure to take action when pro-
voked may have a far higher price tag in
the long run. Our readiness to take
strong retaliatory action, including
measures in the economic sphere, has
helped to discourage inclinations to try
to resolve the current situation in
Poland by the use of outside military
intervention.
It is critical that our export control
policies be consistent and predictable.
We are very much aware of how impor-
tant these factors are for our exporters
and for foreign customers of U.S. prod-
ucts. There have been difficulties in this
regard in the past which this Admini-
stration will try very hard to remedy.
Our objectives are to make export con-
trols less burdensome to the busi-
nessman by speeding up the processing
of export license applications and loosen-
ing controls of equipment not critical to
defense-related industries.
Attitudes of U.S. Allies
Let me now turn to the attitudes of our
major allies. Our NATO allies and Japan
share our general political objectives in
dealing with the Soviet Union, the other
Warsaw Pact countries in Eastern
Europe, and China. However, we do not
always see eye-to-eye with our allies on
the use of restrictive trade policies to
promote these political objectives. There
are several reasons for these dif-
ferences. Geographic proximity, the
need for raw materials, and marketing
possibilities have turned Western
Europe and Japan naturally toward
trading with the COMECON [Council of
Mutual Economic Assistance] countries
and China. Many of our NATO allies
have more extensive commercial links
with the Soviet Union and Eastern
Europe than does the United States,
partly because of the belief that strong
economic ties can moderate political
attitudes and behavior among the
Communist states. Unfortunately, in the
case of the U.S.S.R., such moderation
has not occurred and the era of detente
has been a period of unprecedented
growth of the Soviet military coupled
with increased adventurism worldwide.
The Japanese and the West Euro-
peans provide extensive government-
supported export credits and/or
insurance to promote their exports
worldwide including to Communist coun-
tries. The Federal Republic of Germany
has a special trading relationship with
the German Democratic Republic. Our
allies, in general, extend non-
discriminatory (most-favored-nation)
tariff treatment to exports of Com-
munist countries. For purely commercial
reasons the European Community main-
tains quantitative restrictions against a
fairly narrow range of Communist coun-
try products.
Our NATO allies have cooperated
with the United States to control the
export of strategic equipment and
technologies to the Communist countries
in Europe and Asia for over 30 years.
Agreed controls are negotiated in the
informal multilateral organization,
COCOM. The COCOM embargo does not
extend to oil and gas equipment and
associated technology for the U.S.S.R.
except to the extent that items
embargoed for other reasons might also
have oil and gas applications, for ex-
ample, computers to process seismic
data.
Our experience has demonstrated
that export controls are more effective if
supported by collective action. This was
illustrated clearly by the U.S. economic
sanctions imposed on the Soviet Union
following that country's invasion of
Afghanistan. Our major allies supported
some, but by no means all, of those
measures. It seems clear that those
actions would have been more effective
had the support for the U.S. efforts
been greater. Because of that experience
the United States, as well as our allies,
are convinced of the need for contin-
gency planning for future Soviet aggres-
sion. We have already worked with our
allies on contingency planning in NATO
and bilaterally. The Ottawa summit
underscored the determination to con-
tinue such consultations.
23
Economics
There are relatively few areas where
unilateral action by the United States
without similar actions by other impor-
tant suppliers can seriously limit the
Communist countries' access to major
products or technologies. This is true
even with regard to many advanced
products and technologies, where a U.S.
monopoly or supremacy has diminished
over the years. For this reason we will
continue in our effort to coordinate our
own export controls with those of our
major allies in COCOM and in other
fora.
I have stressed the need to consult
with our allies on coordinating our
export controls. I should add, however,
that the Administration is prepared, if
necessary, to consider unilateral controls
either to protect our national security or
to further overriding national objectives.
I do not believe that either Congress or
the American public would want us to
adopt any other policy.
Application of U.S. Export
Controls Abroad
Let me say just a few remarks about the
problems caused by the application of
U.S. export control regulations and law
outside the United States. Our export
control regulations apply not only to
direct export from the United States but
also to reexports from third countries of
U.S. -origin items, exports of the prod-
ucts of U.S.-origin technologies, and ex-
ports of non-U. S. -origin items by U.S.
subsidiaries. But we must approach the
extraterritorial application of U.S.
export control regulations in foreign
jurisdictions with considerable caution.
Many of our closest allies have shown
that they are extremely sensitive to our
attempts to apply U.S. laws to conduct
of persons within their territories,
though in many instances they do coop-
erate with us. For example, the British
alert their firms to the possible need for
U.S. reexport licenses for certain types
of embargoed equipment. Overzealous
efforts on our part to apply our regula-
tions abroad, forcing a showdown over
conflicting interpretations of inter-
national law and sovereign rights, could
end this kind of cooperation. It would
certainly cause friction in our bilateral
relations, with detrimental effects on the
operations of U.S. firms overseas.
Conclusion
Thank you for giving me and my col-
leagues from the other agencies the
opportunity to appear before you today
and provide an overview of our current
thinking on East- West economic policy.
Our economic policies are and will likely
remain an important factor in our rela-
tionships with Communist governments.
Where trade is pursued on the basis of
mutual advantage with appropriate
national security precautions, it can
bring important benefits to our domestic
economy as well as serve our overall
foreign policy goals. We must not forget
that the effectiveness of our East-Wes
economic policies will be greatly en
hanced by close consultation and
cooperation with our allies. The deveh
ment of mutually compatible policies wf
be one of our major goals as we procee ■
in the months ahead.
■lo;
w
'The complete transcript of the hearing,
will be published by the committee and wiH
be available from the Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of- l>
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■
North American Economic Relation
by Myer Rashish
Address before the Center for Inter-
American Relations in New York on
September 22, 1981. Mr. Rashish is
Under Secretary for Economic Relations.
It is a pleasure for me to be here this
afternoon and speak to you on the topic
which gives its name to your organiza-
tion: that is, inter-American relations. I
also feel a sense of challenge — a
challenge drawn from concern that I
adequately convey both the priority this
Administration places on good relations
with its closest neighbors and also the
perception, virtually rampant in
Washington, that, on a number of
fronts, the relationships are sliding
dangerously toward crisis.
The North American Community
Let me begin with the obvious, perhaps,
and try to characterize the importance
President Reagan assigns to the
development of a strong North
American community. You may recall
that in Ronald Reagan's statement when
he announced for the presidency, he
devoted one-fourth of the text to rela-
tions with Canada and Mexico. He refer-
red to a North American accord, a sort
of neighborhood in which we could all
prosper. Even before his inauguration,
President Reagan began to activate the
words in that statement by meeting with
President Lopez Portillo on the bridge
between El Paso and Ciudad Juarez. His
first trip outside the United States was
to Ottawa to meet with Prime Minister
Trudeau.
24
The influence of inter-American co
cerns is not limited to trips and bilater
meetings. Next month, President
Reagan will travel to Cancun, Mexico,
participate in an historic meeting of
heads of state and government from
around the world to discuss one of the
most difficult and unyielding issues we
face: the development of the poorer ns
tions on this globe. It is in no small
measure due to President Lopez
Portillo's role as co-host and Prime
Minister Trudeau's heartfelt champion
ing of a process of dialogue with the
developing countries that President
Reagan will be in Cancun. Perhaps it i
symbolic of this Administration's prior
on inter-American relations that the
President will have attended two majo
summit meetings in North America du
ing his first year — the economic sumrr
in Ottawa in July and the developmenl
summit in Cancun in October.
I have devoted some time to the A
ministration's priority to inter-Ameria
relations; nevertheless, I must hasten
get to the substance of the relationship
lest you begin to recall the old saying:
"The road to hell is paved with good in
tentions."
I am frequently asked by the
bureaucracy of the State Department 1
decide if I will head the U.S. delegatioi
to a meeting of the joint commission
with one country or another. We have,
in may cases, established these joint
commissions to highlight, and on occa-
sion draw attention to, the bilateral rel
tions between the other country and th
United States. No such decision or con
mission or other formal institution of
statehood is required to highlight the ii
escapable fact that Canada, Mexico, an
Department of State Bulletin
Economics
United States are bound into an in-
iate relationship. We have a basic in-
dependence dictated by geography
1 history — a relationship so extensive
t intergovernmental affairs are only
tip of the iceberg. In formulating
icy, in examining the North American
(imunity through the optic of govern-
nt, we must not lose sight of this
lity.
In any intimate relationship, friction
latural. My speciality is not physics,
I think I am correct if I say that the
feet lubricant, the key to perpetual
tion, has not yet been discovered.
r do we seek to live in a vacuum. Ac-
nulated over time, this means that
re are and will be problems in the
;r-American relationship. The origin
! nature of those problems between
United States and Canada are dif-
jnt from those between the United
tes and Mexico — and will require dif-
;nt approaches, different solutions.
With Canada, the United States has
in an overwhelming economic and
ural force— drawn in part from the
imon cultural heritage between the
ted States and a large segment of
lada. Among the developed countries,
lada is a relatively recent entrant to
family of sovereign nations; it is still
bang its separate identity— not ours,
n British, not French. The strains of
I process are evident in domestic
|t iggles, such as the constitutional
[ e, as well as in the international
ina. Canada is a proud member of the
[ iily of industrialized nations, host of
[ most recent summit of the world's
V it powerful economies; it cannot be
E tent if it sees itself in the role of
I er bearer for the United States.
f With Mexico the relationship suffers
f-e from a legacy of suspicion—
I orically rooted and deep-seated
I'trust of the motives of the United
I tes. Mistrust, combined with a cer-
■ i neglect of the importance to our
r i interests of a strong and eco-
» nically healthy neighbor to the south,
■ produce hostility and alienation,
larly, such a state of affairs cries out
I repair. This Administration will heed
Ise cries.
■ plications for Policy
w? What policy measures can begin
correct the misperceptions, to
ablish new attitudes toward the
_ited States, to create a climate in the
lited States which will support a
aningful "community" approach to
Canada and Mexico in U.S. Merchandise
Trade, 1980
U.S.
Exports
U.S. Imports
Total
$220.7 billion
Total $240.8 billion
CANADA
Japan
MEXICO
United Kingdom
West Germany
35.3
20.79
15.1
12.6
10.it
CANADA 41.4
Japan 30.7
MEXICO 12.5
West Germany 11.68
United Kingdom 9.75
Source: Department of Commerce
Sur
>ey
ofCv
rrent Business, June 1981.
inter-American relations? In the few
minutes I have here today I can do little
more than scratch the surface. I will
naturally concentrate on economic policy
issues, although the one lesson driven
home to me most forcefully these past
several months is that economic and
political issues are not separable in the
context of public policy. Let me, then,
touch on four points: our policy at home,
policy issues with Canada, policy issues
with Mexico, and cooperation among the
three— the United States, Canada, and
Mexico.
U.S. Domestic Policy
I turn first to elements of U.S. domestic
policy, which will have profound effects
on international economic relations in
general, and the outlook for inter-
American relations more particularly.
Parenthetically, I might note that it is
appropriate to start with domestic
policy— since in the final analysis the
course of the relationship will depend on
policies each nation will follow to meet
its own goals and objectives. President
Reagan's top priority upon taking office
was to act forcefully to get the U.S.
economic house in order. To master
inflation, restore incentives for dynamic
private sector investment, spur produc-
tivity—to create an economic environ-
ment in which the American people can
once again look to the future with
confidence and enthusiasm. The fruits of
success will be manifest in varied ways.
But perhaps most significantly the
United States will be able to promote
more actively the open global trade and
investment system upon which economic
development is predicated.
Canada
I now turn to Canada. The ties between
the people of the United States and
Canada are probably as extensive as in
any bilateral relationship in the world.
Our mutual involvement cuts across vir-
tually all facets of both our societies. A
few facts might serve to illustrate this
closeness.
• Two-way trade in 1980 exceeded
$77 billion. This is by far the largest
bilateral trading relationship in the
world.
• The countless lakes and streams
that cross the border are but one part of
the common environment we share.
• There is a vast exchange of people
(70 million persons each year) and goods
across the border, a rich cultural and
economic interplay, and a host of
transportation ties.
• Some of the world's most valuable
fishing grounds extend across our ocean
boundaries.
• There is a tremendous two-way
movement of capital and foreign direct
investment: the fundamental economic
statistics such as inflation, interest
rates, and unemployment of the two
economies are closely interrelated.
Let me concentrate on the explora-
tion and development of energy
resources and their delivery to our
respective markets, one of the most im-
portant parts of the U.S. -Canada rela-
tionship. By yearend 1980, U.S. direct
investment in Canada's petroleum sector
amounted to some $10.5 billion.
Canada's national energy program, an-
nounced last October, is of utmost im-
portance and concern. The program calls
for a substantial increase in Canadian
ownership and control of energy produc-
|/ember1981
25
Economics
tion and exploration, traditionally
dominated largely by U.S. companies.
Through tax incentives and other
policies which discriminate in favor of
Canadian firms over foreign companies,
the Canadian Government seeks to in-
crease Canadian ownership of the
energy industry to 50% by 1990. The na-
tional energy program also imposes
restrictions on the price of oil and gas in
Canada, holding Canadian prices below
world levels.
We cannot and do not challenge
Canada's basic right as a sovereign na-
tion to formulate its own social and
economic objectives. However, we have
an obligation to help protect the
legitimate rights of U.S. investors in
Canada. We believe that Canadian in-
vestment policies unjustly discriminate
against U.S. and other foreign investors.
These policies clearly represent a major
departure from the principle of "national
treatment" for all enterprises established
in a country, regardless of their nation-
ality.
For many years, the United States
has made efforts in many fora to sup-
port an open international investment
system and to minimize government in-
tervention in the decisionmaking process
related to individual investments. We
believe that Canadians have benefited
significantly from the open climate that
has traditionally existed between our
two countries. However, Canada's
policies since the mid-1970s have been
moving in an increasingly restrictive
direction. The Foreign Investment
Review Agency has made entry, expan-
sion, and diversification of U.S. com-
panies in Canada problematic. The
national energy program in all its facets,
including the energy security act an-
nounced in June in draft form and the
Alberta-Ottawa accord of September 1,
contains elements which are highly
discriminatory toward U.S. investors.
Extension of the program to take in
energy companies' downstream opera-
tions would give us additional cause for
alarm.
I hasten also to point out that these
policies appear to be counterproductive
and even contrary to Canada's summit
commitments. As of late spring, the
number of oil rigs operating in Canada
had decreased almost 50%. Total spend-
ing on oil and gas exploration had drop-
ped by almost 25% from year-earlier
figures. Yet the major industrialized
countries have pledged to work toward
energy self-sufficiency. Canada's policies
have, if anything, retarded exploration
and development of Canadian energy
resources. In particular, Canada's
policies have caused American com-
panies to walk away from potentially
productive resources because of
politicoeconomic barriers. Numerous
companies are disturbed by the trend in
Canada's energy policies and have gone
Major Items in U.S.-Canadian Trade, 1980
U.S. Exports
U.S. Imports
Total
$34 billion
Total
$41 billion
Road vehicles and parts
7.6
Natural and manufactured
gas
4.1
Special industrial
2.55
Passenger motor vehicles
3.8
machinery
Chemical and related
2.1
Paper and paper board
3
products
Industrial machinery
1.98
Petroleum and products
2.8
Power generating
1.8
Standard newspaper print
2.6
machinery and
equipment
Electrical equipment and
1.3
Wood, lumber, cork
2.1
parts
Petroleum and products
.95
Motor vehicles and
handling equipment
parts
1.7
Coal, coke, briquettes
.88
Pulp and waste paper
1.6
Civil engineering and
.75
Metalliferous ore
contractor equipment
and scrap
1.0
Aircraft
.7
Fertilizer and fertilizer
materials
.9
Source: Department of Commerce, EM 450/455
Dec. 1980; IM150/IM155, Dec
. 1980.
;
26
elsewhere to explore for and develop
energy resources.
We have systematically raised our
concerns in numerous consultations witi
our Canadian friends — at all levels froro
the President's meetings with Prime
Minister Trudeau on down. I have par-
ticipated in several meetings between j
senior U.S. and Canadian delegations
where the Canadian national energy pre
gram and related investment issues
were at the center of the discussion. I
Members of Congress are hearing with
increasing frequency from their constit-
uents on these questions. Our concern i
clear, and we fervently hope we have i
been able to communicate it clearly.
Let me step back for a moment to
the process of formulating U.S. policy
on these issues. We must evidently star)
with the nature of the U.S.-Canadian
relationship as I discussed it a moment
ago. Canada is a full partner in the
leadership of the free world; it has
assumed responsibilities to and for the
global economic system. That is the
essence, the "spirit" of the economic
summits; their raison d'etre if you will.
We look to Canada to formulate its
policy consonant with those respon-
sibilities; for our part, we accept in-
evitable difference in approach, and we
must respect Canadian values. On
several tough issues, we are in the mid-
dle of a solution. For both sides, flexibil
ty and communication must be the
watchwords if we are to avoid ir-
reparable damage to the relationship.
Mexico
I will now turn to our relations with
Mexico. Not surprisingly, most of the
issues important in our relations with
Canada — trade, energy, investment,
fishing — are equally important to our |
relations with Mexico. U.S. trade with
Mexico is smaller than with Canada,
which historically has been our number
one trade partner. But in the last few
years trade with Mexico has grown so
rapidly that in 1980 Mexico became oufl
third largest trading partner, eclipsed
only by Canada and Japan.
In the last 2 years, trade has risen
more than 50% a year. Naturally much'
of the increase has been due to in-
creased Mexican production and export
of oil and gas, but it has not been a on|
sided increase. As Mexico has used o
sales to develop its economy, its appetit
for imports has grown. U.S. exports to>
Mexico have expanded even more rapid-
ly than our imports. Consequently, Me*
ico's trade deficit with us has been
Department of State Bulletin s
'l
il i
Economics
pning, to nearly $3 billion in 1980.
|iough a part of the increase in the
le deficit was attributable to in-
!sed grain imports by Mexico
lting from poor weather, the fact re-
is that Mexico has been buying
tal equipment and other industrial
ts in expanding quantities in order
Deed its economic development. This
;ates that Mexico is seeking to use
il revenue to increase its industrial
so that the fruits of exploitation of
atural resources can contribute to
■run development and, at the same
, avoid economic dislocations such
anaway inflation brought about by
I nues that the Mexican economy can-
(ibsorb.
It should also be a signal to us of the
^rgence of a Mexican industrial base
I will become more competitive and
l to make further inroads into the
J'rican market. As a consequence,
je relations with Mexico are likely to
1 even larger in the future. Mexico
lit begin now to look beyond its oil
* nues and plan for an economy based
rade in a wide range of manufac-
li goods and raw materials. It will be
lig on, progressively, the obligations
ii responsibilities for the free flow of
k s and capital throughout the world
« omy, which we already expect from
Ida.
n this vein, we welcome Mexico's in-
e ;ed participation in world affairs
I especially Mexico's concern for
i lopments in the hemisphere. Presi-
i Lopez Portillo in his 1979 address
e General Assembly called for a
D il approach to solve the world's
• ?y problems. Mexico last year joined
il Venezuela in an effort to help the
I iporting countries of Central
n rica and the Caribbean not only to
1 with the problem of payment for oil
(! irts but also to pay for energy
!; lopment strategies to reduce their
!] ndence on imported oil.
To be candid, however, I must also
gil that some aspects of Mexico's ex-
t: g trade and investment policies pose
1 lems for us. For example, Mexico
I >ses performance requirements in
Isectors. The 1977 Mexican auto-
ti ve decree requires producers to ob-
ti the foreign exchange requirements
J led for their operations (e.g., for im-
Jed components and indirect foreign
Siange costs such as interest and divi-
1 payments made abroad) through
export of completed vehicles and
a s and allocates foreign exchange
Ing the producers on the basis of, in-
wMa, the percentage of domestic
Major Items in U.S. -Mexican Trade, 1980
U.S. Export
s
U.S. Import
i
Total
$14.8 billion
Total
$12.5 billion
Chemical and related
1.4
Petroleum and products
6
products
Road vehicles
1.3
Electrical machinery
.55
Cereals and cereal
1.2
Telecommunications and
.7
preparations
sound reproduction
equipment
Special industrial
1.1
Natural and manufactured
.55
machinery
gas
Electrical equipment
.9
Vegetables and fruits
.49
Industrial machinery
.9
Fish
.35
Transport equipment
.6
Coffee, cocoa, tea, spices
.3
Aircraft
.4
Nonferrous metals
.3
Wearing apparel
.2
Source: Department of Commerce, EM 450/455
Dec. 1980; IM150/IM155, Dec. 1980.
materials incorporated in their products.
Such requirements generate effects
similar to import quotas on components
and other inputs, and they are distorting
U.S. -Mexican trade patterns in this
area. We have held, and will continue to
hold, extensive consultations on this
issue.
The issue of migration is also a ma-
jor concern to the United States and to
Mexico. What had been a steady flow of
immigrants across our southern border
has turned into a torrent, especially
after the end in 1964 of the temporary
worker agreement known as the bracero
program. Mexico is, of course, the
source of the largest number of illegal
immigrants. There are many reasons for
this flow, including historic migration
patterns, wage differentials, and
Mexico's rapid population growth in re-
cent years.
Over the long run the best solution
is the development of the Mexican
economy so that all who seek work in
Mexico can find it. The Mexican Govern-
ment has set forth a development pro-
gram that would eliminate the high
unemployment and even higher
underemployment. As I have pointed
out, the development of the Mexican
economy will depend in part on its abili-
ty to sell its products. Barriers to entry
to the U.S. market will reduce Mexico's
ability to cooperate with us to solve the
immigration problem, and a solution will
be that much more difficult to find.
President Reagan's Camp David
meeting with President Lopez Portillo
enabled both leaders to consult and
discuss these bilateral issues at length.
The two presidents established a joint
trade commission which is meeting for-
mally today in Mexico City. We hope it
will provide the structure within which
our trade relations with Mexico can
flourish. By yearend, Secretary Haig
and Foreign Secretary Castaneda will
recommend to the presidents other ways
in which the management of our rela-
tions could be improved.
The United States is earnestly seek-
ing mechanisms that would permit us to
assure special treatment of the needs of
Mexico. Mexico, on the other hand, is
exemplary of the newly industrializing
countries which must progressively take
on broader global commitments, moving
away from the preferential treatment
granted to the poorer developing coun-
tries. It should not be many years before
we look to the north and to the south
with the expectation of finding
neighbors of equal stature in the world
economy.
Cooperation in the Caribbean Basin
Let me now turn to an issue which in-
volves the three of us— Canada, Mexico,
and the United States— working
together for the broader community of
the Western Hemisphere. I refer, of
course, to our recent Caribbean Basin
initiative. We have become increasingly
concerned over the serious political,
social, and economic problems faced by
many countries in Central America and
the Caribbean. We are currently seeking
to cooperate with the states of the
Caribbean Basin in a practical way to
develop programs to stimulate more
rapid growth in the region.
(Bimber1981
27
Economics
The U.S. portion of this initiative
will focus in large part on enhancing the
role of the private sector in these
economies. Growth of a modern, efficient
private sector is imperative to create
productive employment in the region
and to generate exports which earn
foreign exchange. We have no precon-
ceived blueprint for determining the ac-
tions, joint and separate, which should
be taken to increase regional productive
capacity and achieve needed economic
revitalization.
We are now engaged in a series of
consultations with basin countries and
other potential participants, especially
Mexico and Canada, to determine those
trade, aid, and investment measures
which will help to reach our long-term
goal of increased economic prosperity
for the region. We intend to take these
measures, in combination with the ef-
forts of the regional governments
themselves, to reduce internal con-
straints to economic growth.
Conclusion
To conclude, I would make four quick
points.
First, we do not have the luxury of
rewriting history or rearranging
geography. The United States, Canada,
and Mexico have an inescapable and in-
timate relationship in which govern-
ments are only the tip of the iceberg.
Second, we are three vibrant, vital
democracies pursuing individual iden-
tities, goals, and objectives. We must
recognize the basic interdependence of
the North American community. And we
must handle the inevitable problems
with mutual respect for each other and
for international rules.
Third, in our dealing with one
another,, we cannot escape the fact that
rigidity is a prime factor in breakage. A
giant bridge appears from a distance to
be fixed and motionless, while in fact it
sways ever so slightly in the wind, ac-
commodating the pressures of changing
directions while accomplishing its task.
So we must be flexible in our dealings
with our neighbors— never sacrificing
our own obligation, while respecting the
values and goals of the other.
Fourth, I feel obliged to note that
small irritants can become serious prob-
lems. And serious problems can fun-
damentally threaten our common objec-
tives in this North American community.
At the moment, sentiment is strong in
favor of countermeasures against Cana-
dian energy and investment policies. The
dangers are real. As I outlined at the f:
beginning of my remarks, President
Reagan is committed to a U.S. posturj11
which attaches a high priority to good
relations with both Canada and Mexic
To succeed, that commitment must be
three-way street. ■
I
New Challenges in
International Investment
by Robert D. Hormats
Address before the plenary session of
the Economic Policy Council of the U.N.
Association on September 18, 1981. Mr.
Hormats is Assistant Secretary for
Economic and Business Affairs.
This evening I would like to discuss, in
general, international investment issues
and describe, in particular, two major
challenges before us in the 1980s. The
first challenge relates to the need to
establish new international under-
standings to avoid short-term nation-
alistic approaches to investment. We
risk today in the international invest-
ment area a deterioration in the climate
similar to that experienced in the world
trading arena in the 1930s. During that
period, countries adopted nationalistic
trading policies based on short-term
economic perspectives. The economic
and political costs have been well-
documented in history. Following World
War II, nations have made a major
effort to avoid narrowly nationalistic
trade policies. We have made consider-
able progress in developing an inter-
national framework for trade matters.
Although we still have some distance to
go, the direction and emphasis of our
effort is correct.
In the investment area, however, no
comparable framework has emerged,
and there is a tendency on the part of
developed and developing nations alike
to move in the wrong direction — to in-
crease intervention in the investment
area to accomplish short-term objectives.
This can only come at the expense of
broader long-term interests. A major
goal of the 1980s must be to reverse this
trend through international understand-
ings and rules leading to a more open
and less interventionist investment
climate.
The second challenge is to create,
through cooperation among developed
28
and developing nations, an internatioi
environment in which investment can
make a greater contribution to the
development process. Investment can
a powerful impetus to development ai
is particularly important at a time of
tight aid budgets. The developing cou
tries themselves have a major respon
sibility to improve their investment
climates through respect for interna-
tional laws and norms. And the inten
tional community can play a helpful r
in facilitating investment to those cou
tries which offer an attractive invest-
ment climate. The overall world
economy can benefit as a result.
International Investment Climate
International investment capital was
readily available until the mid-1970s,
foreign direct investment activi-
ties—except for several major exproi
tion cases early in the decade— procei
ed at a healthy pace. Since the
mid-1970s, there have been importan
changes in international trends and
forms of investment. The pace of inte
national direct investment flows has
slowed, particularly to many developi
countries, and the 1980s are likely to
a time of capital scarcity and com-
petition for foreign investment. It als
appears that what capital is available
will be more expensive than we were
customed to in the 1970s. Increasing!
many countries are turning to invest-
ment incentives to attract foreign inv
ment in specific industries. A number
are also utilizing performance re-
quirements to boost exports or increa
local content. In addition, the recent i
crease in foreign investment in the
United States, coupled with instances
discrimination against U.S. investmen
abroad, is generating concerns which
increasing pressures for more restrict
U.S. policies on inward investment. W
Department of State Bullel
Economics
Id to deal with these issues in ways
Jch maintain and expand the fun-
fientally open international invest-
lit system so necessary for global
momic efficiency.
estment Flows
rief review of international invest-
lt trends will help to put these issues
lerspective. Although foreign invest-
it has played an important role in the
irnational economy since the last half
he 19th century, most was in fixed-
rest portfolio investments until the
Os. After World War II, the global
nomic climate improved dramatically
generated an upsurge in private
ct investment. U.S. private invest-
lt in Europe increased markedly and
a key element in Europe's recovery.
investment in some developing
ntries also expanded and played a
lificant role in the economic growth
nany of those countries. The benefits
ncreased direct investment flows
e and continue to be: additional
>loyment, additional capital to ex-
d plant capacity or create new
lities, transfers of new and improved
inology and management skills, in-
sed production, and greater com-
ition.
The period from the early 1960s to
mid-1970s witnessed a rapid develop-
it of international direct investment
1 in absolute terms and relative to
growth of other economic aggre-
ss such as trade, domestic invest-
lt, and gross national product (GNP).
United States remained the prin-
.1 country of origin, although some
•opean countries began to be more
ve as direct foreign investors.
International direct investment was
vily oriented toward developing
aral resources at the outset of this
iod. However, direct investment in
lufacturing sectors developed con-
■rably as the period progressed. Over
1960-73 period, the average annual
wth rate of total outward inter-
ional direct investment flows from
13 largest OECD [Organization for
momic Cooperation and Develop-
it] countries was over 12% a year,
s figure was approximately IV2 times
average growth of OECD gross
riestic product and practically the
ne as the growth of international
ie (14%).
This period also witnessed the rapid
wth of multinational enterprises with
ensive international operations,
se enterprises have developed highly
sophisticated production techniques and
investor-supplier arrangements. Often,
each subsidiary or subcontractor
specializes in the production of a par-
ticular product or component. Product
lines in the so-called world industries,
such as the "world cars," often result
from coordinated production activities in
a number of countries.
U.S. direct investment abroad grew
from $11.8 billion at year-end 1950 to
some $140 billion by the mid-1970s, and
$213 billion by year-end 1980. Most of
this increase was channeled to the
developed countries which, by the
mid-1970s, accounted for some 70% of
the total, compared with less than 50%
in 1950. There are two primary reasons
for this trend. Investors were attracted
by the relatively stable, hospitable in-
vestment climates in the developed coun-
tries, particularly the virtual absence of
risk to investment due to political tur-
moil. In addition, the generally booming
economies of the developed countries
offered the prospect of higher profita-
bility for investments in those countries
than in the developing countries.
The period since the mid-1970s
stands in quite sharp contrast with the
period which preceded it in a number of
important aspects.
A slowdown in the real growth of
direct investment flows has occurred.
Using only capital flows as a measure,
the average annual growth rate of out-
ward direct investment from the 13
largest OECD countries in the period
1974-79 was slightly less than the
1960-73 period (11.9% versus 12.6%).
Considering the markedly higher rates
of inflation during the most recent
period, there has been a sharp decelera-
tion in real terms. It is noteworthy,
however, that international direct invest-
ment has remained more buoyant than
domestic investment, thus suggesting
that multinational enterprises may have
been better able to adapt to new and
less favorable economic circumstances.
This could be due to wider ranging
operations and product lines of the
multinational enterprises, which may
enable them more easily to redirect their
activities away from unprofitable ven-
tures to more profitable activities. In ad-
dition, they probably have better access
to the financial and research and
development resources needed to remain
competitive during periods of economic
turbulence.
There has been an increase in the
foreign share of international direct
investment. While U.S. direct invest-
ment abroad still predominates, its share
of total investment flows from OECD
countries has fallen. As a percentage of
outward direct investment of the 13
largest OECD countries, the U.S. share
has decreased from a peak of approxi-
mately 60% in the mid-1960s to about
35% in the late 1970s.
Particularly noteworthy is the
change in U.S. -Economic Community
(EC) investment patterns. During the
1950s and 1960s, European integration
and an inceasingly overvalued dollar
toward the latter part of the period in-
duced considerable U.S. investment in
Europe. At the end of the 1970s, the in-
ducement effect of European integration
wore off, and a decline in the value of
the dollar caused a reversal of the trend.
More broadly, both Europe and
Japan gradually shifted from postwar
reconstruction to a more active role in
the international economy. With this
came increased foreign investment.
Overall, West Germany's share of OECD
direct investment flows grew from 7.2%
during the 1961-67 period to 17% dur-
ing the 1974-79 period. Japan's share
grew from 2.4% to 13.0%, including ex-
tensive manufacturing investments in
the Pacific basin, and France's share ex-
panded from 6.9% to 7.8%.
There recently has been a sharpen-
ing of differences in the ability of
developing nations to attract invest-
ment. Taken together, the average an-
nual growth rate of international direct
investment flows from the 14 major
members of the OECD's Development
Assistance Committee to developing
countries has increased over the last few
years in current and real terms. Fur-
thermore, the total share of developing
countries as host countries for the
foreign direct investment of almost all
major investing countries has increased
since 1974, thus reversing the generally
declining trend of earlier periods. But
this investment has been concentrated
heavily in a few economies — in par-
ticular, in the Republic of Korea,
Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong, and
Brazil, which have emphasized export-
ed growth. Such investment has played
a major role in the rapid growth of
manufacturing in these economies.
In contrast to the experience of
these countries, international direct in-
vestment has tended to stagnate in
other developing countries, with the ex-
ception of the oil-producing countries. It
ember 1981
29
Economics
is of particular concern that U.S. and
European direct investment in minerals
has stagnated in recent years. The
primary reasons for this are the slack
demand for metals and minerals, due to
the economic downturn in the developed
countries, and increased investor percep-
tion of the political risk of investing in
some mineral-rich developing countries.
In view of the long lead times involved
in developing new minerals resources, a
global shortfall in exploration and new
mine and smelter capacity could result
in future shortages and/or sharply rising
metals and minerals prices when the
developed country economies turn up-
ward again and world demand for these
items increases. Such shortages and
price increases could, in turn, constrain
future global economic growth.
While there are sectoral reasons for
low foreign investment in many develop-
ing countries (the temporary fall in de-
mand for metals and minerals is a good
example), there are other "investment
climate" factors, such as questionable
national economic policies, fear of
political instability, and negative policies
toward foreign investment. Increased
perception of political risk among poten-
tial investors is a key factor. Unclear
and restrictive investment laws and
regulations, and the unpredictability of
their application, are other important
elements, as are the increased use of
performance requirements and restric-
tions on equity holdings.
New Forms of Investment
There have also been important changes
in the characteristics of international
direct investment. Recent OECD studies
indicate that borrowed funds — essential-
ly local currency borrowing — now repre-
sent a key source of financing for many
firms, especially U.S. enterprises. In ad-
dition, an increasing number of medium-
sized and sometimes even small-sized
firms have begun to invest abroad in re-
cent years. The development and inter-
nationalization of firms engaged in pro-
viding services necessary to direct in-
vestment, such as banks, has grown at a
rapid pace since the beginning of the
1970s.
Enterprises are also diversifying
their forms of investment. European
state-owned enterprises have become in-
creasingly significant investors in the
OECD countries and in many less
developed countries (LDCs). In addition,
the "traditional" wholly owned subsidiary
form of operation is being increasingly
replaced by nonequity forms of foreign
30
direct investment, such as management
contracts, licensing arrangements, etc.
The emerging trend seems to be a
tendency toward flexible and pragmatic
forms of ownership, management, and
control. These increasingly complex ar-
rangements often involve several forms
of control, cross control, or joint ac-
tivities. The emergence of new and more
flexible forms of interfirm relations is
particularly noticeable in developing
countries that are now endowed with
substantial financial resources of their
own or which can borrow abroad on
their own account. A country in this
position may put less emphasis on at-
tracting foreign capital than on attract-
ing foreign technology and management
capacities.
Private Sector Role in
Developing Countries
Slower rates of global economic growth
since the mid-1970s have hit most
developing countries extremely hard.
Adjustments to the soaring costs of
energy and other resources, high in-
terest rates, the decrease in the rate of
growth of foreign investment in most
developing countries, and sluggish world
demand for many developing country ex-
ports have caused major problems for
developing countries in addition to the
traditional ones many already faced.
The United States has a strong in-
terest in the economic development of
developing countries. Taken together
they are a larger market for U.S. ex-
ports than Europe and Japan combined.
Foreign private direct investment flows
can be a major — and increasingly impor-
tant— supplement to other forms of
resource transfers, principally official
development assistance, in stimulating
growth in developing nations.
There appears to be an increasing
perception by many developing nations
that increasing foreign direct investment
will be vital to their prosperity in the
1980s, particularly as aid prospects ap-
pear less promising. Many developing
nations are seeking actively to attract
foreign investors. Their success will de-
pend largely on their investment
climates. Clear and consistent
investment-related laws and regulations,
in conformity with the principles of
international law, and according most-
favored-nation and nondiscriminatory
treatment of investment, along with
other steps in the direction of a more
open investment environment, will be
determining factors in the decisions of
many investors.
;
■
The U.S. Government is also seekiii
ways to facilitate U.S. private sector ir»
volvement in LDCs. Steps we have
taken or proposed include improved
treatment of foreign-sourced personal
income; amendment of our Foreign Coi
rupt Practices Act so as to define bette
the proscribed conduct; support for ex-
port trading company legislation; and
renewal of OPIC's [Overseas Private Ir
vestment Corporation] legislation with
broadening of the scope of its activities
in developing nations. We are also con-
sidering proposals for the expansion of!
trade and development program grants
for project feasibility studies and projei
design.
Another important step involves th
negotiation of bilateral investment
treaties with developing countries
desirous of attracting U.S. investors.
Such treaties would enhance the attrac
iveness of investing in those countries
establishing a common frame of
reference and legal base to deal with tl
entry and duration of investment, com-
pensation, and arbitration in the event
of expropriation; treatment of establisl
ed investment; repatriation and other
transfer of assets; and dispute settle-
ment.
We are also seeking to give new
vitality to and broaden the internationi
effort to enhance private sector invest-
ment in those developing countries
where the environment is conducive to
private sector growth. We believe the
World Bank can play a highly effective
role as a catalyst for increasing intern;
tional flows of direct investment to
developing countries through cofinanci
with the private sector. Even if the
Bank finances only a part of a project,
its participation improves the climate (
confidence between foreign investors
and the country in which the investme
is taking place. Within the Bank, the I
ternational Finance Corporation (IFC)
has a particularly important role to pta
For the last 25 years, the IFC has bee:
working to encourage the growth of pi'
ductive private investment in developii
countries. Its equity participation in a
small portion of an investment can at-
tract private participation in the larget
portion of that investment. The IFC
should receive greater support from
developed and developing nations alike
Domestically, the new legislative
authority for OPIC will permit it great
freedom to support private investment
in middle-income developing countries.
At the same time, we should consider
the possibility of working with other
Department of State Bulleti
Economics
eloped and developing countries to
iblish a multilateral insurance agen-
This could help to facilitate invest-
it in developing countries and give
ater confidence to new investors
n countries which do not have their
1 national insurance agencies. Similar
is have been considered before, but
haps the timing now is more pro-
ous because the desire among poten-
investors and potential recipients is
ater. We also welcome the increased
:rest shown by private firms in issu-
political risk insurance in developing
ntries and are exploring ways in
ich we can cooperate more closely
h them in this field.
We have become increasingly con-
ned over the serious political, social,
I economic problems faced by many
ntries in Central America and the
ibbean. We are currently seeking to
perate with the Caribbean Basin
tes in a practical way to develop pro-
ms to stimulate more rapid economic
wth in the region. The U.S. portion
his initiative will focus in large part
enhancing the role of the private see-
in these economies. Growth of a
Biern efficient private sector is im-
ijative to promote productive employ-
lit in the region and to generate
a hange-earning exports. We have no
■ conceived blueprint for determining
I actions, joint and separate, which
1 uld be taken to increase regional pro-
I live capacity and achieve needed
a nomic revitalization. We are now
8;aged in a series of consultations with
I in countries and other potential par-
i pants to determine those trade, aid,
li investment measures which, when
( en in combination with the efforts of
I regional governments themselves to
1 uce internal constraints to economic
I >wth, will help to reach our long-term
|tl of increased economic prosperity
I the region.
jjier Current Issues
ipital Shortage. As I mentioned at
| beginning of this discussion, we ex-
;t the 1980s to be a time of capital
rcity and, therefore, competition for
eign investment. As the global
>nomy expands, increasing amounts of
>ital will be needed to sustain this
wth. Particularly for developing
intries, which, other things being
aal, normally should expect the
;hest growth rates, capital scarcity
iy well become an even more im-
rtant constraint on growth than
retofore. This constraint is due to in-
creased investor perception of the risks
attached to investments in some
developing countries and to the real
limits on the global amounts of capital
available for both domestic and foreign
investment.
Performance Requirements and
Investment Incentives. A central issue
in the 1980s is the increasing interven-
tion by host governments in the
decisionmaking process of potential
foreign investors. More and more often
governments are attempting to
manipulate foreign investment to sup-
port their national economic goals.
These forms of intervention, practiced
by both developed and developing coun-
tries, take two broad forms.
• Incentives. Some countries offer
significant tax, credit, and other incen-
tives to attract foreign investors. When
such incentives distort decisions of
foreign investors, there is a shift of pro-
duction as well as jobs, technology, ex-
ports, etc., to the host country providing
the incentives. Other countries com-
peting for the investment on closer to
economic terms lose out.
• Performance requirements. These
include various performance commit-
ments: minimum employment and ex-
port levels, local value-added and con-
tent requirements, technology specifica-
tions, buy-back and marketing arrange-
ments, etc. Most result in a shift of pro-
duction to the host country on a
noneconomic basis. Increasingly, host
countries are combining the use of in-
vestment incentives and performance re-
quirements. This is leading to the
development of unique bargaining situa-
tions in which the economic interests of
the capital-exporting countries may be
ignored and trade and investment flows
are distorted.
Performance requirements are not
instituted solely by developing countries.
For example, Canada's Foreign Invest-
ment Review Agency has leveled certain
requirements on U.S. and other foreign
firms. As a condition of entry into
Canada, one company was recently re-
quired to promise to bank with Canadian
banks and utilize exclusively Canadian
advertising agencies and public account-
ants. Another firm was required to
promise it would purchase a specific
percentage of its input requirements
from Canadian suppliers. Pressure was
put on a third enterprise to move certain
manufacturing operations from the
United States to Canada. Unfortunately,
there are many other examples.
I am frankly surprised that a major
developed country, provider, and host
for so much international investment
would adopt such nationalistic and short-
sighted policies. Furthermore, such
policies, if unchallenged, are likely to en-
courage other countries to adopt, or in-
creasingly resort to, similar measures.
Canadian firms will not be immune to
the countereffects of such measures. It
is puzzling to me how Canada can ex-
pect to have it both ways — seeking
benefits from participating in the
Western industrial club, while claiming
special rights to promote indigenous
development by curtailing the foreign
economic activity of its close trading and
investment partners.
Our neighbor to the south, Mexico,
also imposes performance requirements
in key sectors. The 1977 Mexican
automotive decree requires producers to
obtain the foreign exchange require-
ments needed for their operations (e.g.,
for imported components and indirect
foreign exchange costs such as interest
and dividend payments made abroad)
through the export of completed vehicles
and parts and allocates foreign exchange
among the producers on the basis of, in-
ter alia, the percentage of domestic
materials incorporated in their products.
Performance requirements directly
related to trade are of particular con-
cern since valued-added requirements
can generate effects similar to import
quotas on components and other inputs.
While such quotas would generally be
prohibited under the GATT [General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade]
trading rules, there are no applicable in-
ternational rules when countries use
their investment policies to achieve the
same purpose.
Other requirements, such as
minimum export requirements, are in-
consistent with both the GATT and the
subsidy code, but because they are tied
to investment agreements they may be
very difficult to sort out. The net effect
of these investment policies is to skew
foreign investment in order to attain
short-term industrial policy goals and to
distort international trade patterns.
Governments which do these things
undermine international trading rules.
We believe it is time to strengthen
multilateral discipline and restraint over
such government actions which distort
international investment and thus inter-
national trade and production decisions.
In the short-run, narrowly nationalistic
actions are indeed tempting to us all. In
the long run, we all benefit from an
ivember 1981
31
Economics
open, well-functioning international
economy. If, however, the system has to
cope with too many short-term
pressures, its long-run viability cannot
be assured. That is the risk we face to-
day. It is, therefore, clearly in the in-
terest of all concerned to improve the in-
ternational investment system by pro-
moting its efficiency and openness and
reducing various nationalistic actions.
There are a number of fora where
these issues can be addressed. Specific
situations can be dealt with bilaterally.
For example, we have held, and will con-
tinue to hold, high-level consultations
with Canadian and Mexican officials. In
this regard, the U.S.-Mexico Joint.
Bilateral Trade Commission, which will
next meet September 21, provides an
excellent framework in which to discuss
such issues.
In the GATT, we have proposed ac-
tion on trade-related performance re-
quirements such as value-added/local
content rules and minimum export
quotas. The 1982 GATT ministerial
represents an excellent opportunity to
establish the political momentum needed
to address seriously such problems. The
GATT's past attention to this subject
has not been commensurate with its im-
plications for the trading system.
In addition, the Development Com-
mittee of the International Monetary
Fund and World Bank has completed an
initial review of investment incentives,
and the World Bank staff now proposes
a major study on the matter. We are
also seeking to strengthen and expand
OECD work in these areas. Based on
their 1976 investment understandings,
the OECD countries could also seek to
build a broader and deeper commitment
to eliminating performance requirements
and investment incentives. Certainly the
developing countries, particularly the
newly industrializing countries, should
be brought into such a consensus via
subsequent or parallel work.
The ultimate goal would be the
development of an international invest-
ment framework consisting of meaning-
ful understandings, and perhaps commit-
ments, on these issues in various fora.
We recognize that this will not be an
easy task. A key factor is that the
plethora of incentives and performance
requirements and other restrictions dif-
fer qualitatively, thereby making more
complex the problems involved in
negotiating their elimination.
Services. As I noted in my discus-
sion of investment trends, international
investment in the services sector — bank-
ing, insurance, etc.— is increasing at a
rapid rate. The growth of the services
sector can play an important role in
facilitating other types of investment.
For example, international banks and in-
surance companies may be the only
enterprises in their sectors with suffi-
cient resources and expertise to finance
and insure some foreign direct in-
vestments, particularly in developing
countries. However, many countries do
not accord these forms of investment
the same treatment they accord to cor-
responding domestic enterprises. In-
stead, they provide special protection to
their domestic banks and insurance
firms. We believe that international
direct investment, including investment
in the services sector, should receive
fair, equitable, and nondiscriminatory
treatment.
Treatment of Investment. The
United States believes in two basic
tenets for treatment of investment: the
national treatment principle and the
most-favored-nation treatment principle.
The national treatment principle holds
that foreign investors should be treated
no less favorably than domestic in-
vestors in like situations. The most-
favored-nation treatment principle holds
that the investors of one foreign country
should be treated no less favorably than
the investors of other foreign countries.
The two principles have the common
characteristics of reducing instances of
discrimination directed at foreign invest-
ment.
We have worked bilaterally and
multilaterally to achieve the widest
possible acceptance of these principles
and to extend the application of such
treatment to a wider range of enter-
prises. A particularly important step in
this process took place in 1976 when the
United States joined other OECD
member governments in participating in
the consensus adopting a declaration
and related decision on national treat-
ment. The declaration and decision were
reviewed and reaffirmed in 1979 by a
consensus of OECD countries in which
the United States also participated. The
declaration states, in part:
. . . that member countries should, consis-
tent with their needs to maintain public
order, to protect their essential security in-
terests, and to fulfill commitments relating to
international peace and security, accord to
enterprises operating in their territories and
owned or controlled directly or indirectly by
nationals of another member country . . .
treatment under their laws, regulations and
administrative practices consistent with inter-
national law and no less favorable than that
accorded in like situations to domestic enter-
prises . . .
Since the declaration and related
decision on national treatment were
adopted in 1976, progress has been
made toward refining the concept, in-
cluding a listing of those exceptions
which now exist and their rationales.
Continuing work is in progress with a
stated goal of extending the applicatioi
of national treatment over time. We
strongly support a more active OECD
effort in this area. The very existence <
the declaration and related decision on
national treatment has probably had
some effect in discouraging member
countries from implementing measures
which would constitute new derogatior
from the principle. Moreover, at the re
quest of the United States, joined by
several other OECD member countries
the consultation procedures of the
OECD instruments were used for the
first time in March 1981, to hold forme
OECD consultations on the discrim-
inatory policies of Canada's national
energy program. National treatment is
clearly in the interests of all concerned
as it is a critical element in fostering a
attractive climate for foreign invest-
ment.
In addition, we believe strongly th;
investors should be accorded treatmen
consistent with international law, in-
cluding nondiscriminatory treatment a
prompt, adequate, and effective compe
sation in the event of expropriation. Ir
vestor confidence that host countries
would adhere to international law and
norms would significantly facilitate in-
vestment flows.
It is, in my judgment, the respon-
sibility of the U.S. Government to pro-
vide full support for American investoi
who desire it in order to insure that th
principles of national and most-favorec
nation treatment and their rights unde
international law are adhered to by ho:
governments. American investments
abroad make a positive contribution to
our own economy and to that of host
nations. The U.S. Government cannot
remain neutral while its citizens, who i
vest in other countries relying on their
good faith to adhere to international
principles and laws, find their interests
threatened by derogations from such
principles and laws. We believe in the
concept of fair play. We practice it, an«
our investors abroad should expect no
less.
Codes of Conduct. Over the last
half decade, the United States has bee)
participating in the development of in-
ternational codes of conduct relating tc
multinational enterprises. The OECD
and the International Labor Organiza-
32
Department of State Bullet
Economics
have developed general codes for
tinational enterprises. The U.N. Con-
nce on Trade and Development
(CTAD) has promulgated a more nar-
ly focused code on restrictive
ness practices. In addition, a U.N.
king group has completed draft pro-
ms on about two-thirds of an overall
I. code relating to the activities and
>onsibilities of transnational corpora-
s and governments. However, hard
es remain to be resolved, such as
le on nationalization and compensa-
, and it is not certain whether the
otiations will be successful. Negotia-
s on a code of conduct relating to
transfer of technology are presently
led and the matter has been referred
he U.N. General Assembly for fur-
• consideration.
In the U.S. view, guidelines which
■m standards of good practice for
1 enterprises and governments can
:ribute to improved relations be-
en firms and governments and may
t the tendency for unilateral govern-
it intervention in investment mat-
. Through appropriate provisions on
onalization and compensation,
?diction, and dispute settlement they
' also be able to reduce conflicts be-
en governments over investment
■es, thereby facilitating the liberal
.ate for international investment
pj;h we seek. However, the United
l;es can support only guidelines or
Bes that are voluntary; do not
i riminate against multinational enter-
% es in favor of purely national enter-
I es; are balanced to include
E rences to the responsibilities of
K ernments as well as of multinational
.- irprises; and apply to all enterprises
- irdless of ownership — whether
I ate, government, or mixed.
1 It appears that international interest
(1 eveloping codes of conduct may well
( liminishing as other investment
les, such as capital scarcity, have
|3me more urgent. The principal in-
Itment issue is no longer controlling
n tinational enterprises but attracting
n?stment by them.
Foreign Investment in the United
Ites. The value of foreign direct in-
Itment in the United States has in-
lased in recent years— 28% in 1978
l>.5 billion), 23% in 1979 ($54.5
I on), 20% in 1980 ($65.5 billion). (U.S.
|>ct investment abroad, by contrast, is
■ 3 billion.) Roughly one-third of the
Isign direct investment in the United
Ites is in manufacturing ($24 billion),
lolesale and retail trade account for
about 20%, and petroleum 19%. Real
estate holdings by foreigners, while
often publicized, amount to only about
$2.5 billion. The largest single sources of
foreign investment have been the
Netherlands ($16 billion), the United
Kingdom ($11 billion), and Canada ($9
billion). Less than $1 billion comes from
the Middle East.
This investment has had a positive
effect on many sections of our economy.
It has helped to create jobs, added plant
capacity and created new facilities, and
brought in advanced technology and
management skills. Moreover, additional
inward investment flows will assist our
economic revitalization efforts.
However, the recent rapid growth in
this investment coupled with restrictions
on and discrimination against U.S. in-
vestment in other countries are tending
to generate pressures in the United
States to control inward investment
and/or regulate it on a more reciprocal
basis. The reaction to Canada's restric-
tions against foreign investors, par-
ticularly in the energy sector, and the
spate of new investments sought by
Canadian firms in the U.S. minerals sec-
tor feed such pressures. There have
been calls for prohibition on investment
in specific sectors, greater screening of
foreign investment, and the establish-
ment of a reciprocity principle in U.S.
treatment of investment.
Clearly, for the many reasons men-
tioned earlier, I believe that we should
react strongly to unfair treatment of
U.S. investment abroad. However, for a
number of reasons, it is necessary to
react in ways which genuinely serve our
interests. Policies which would restrict
inward investment, or retaliatory
countermeasures, should be used only
after all of their implications are
weighed.
First, the ultimate results might
adversely affect the United States as
much as, or more than, other countries.
We need to be cautious about limiting
foreign investment because of the
benefits from such investment. A secure
and stable investment climate is one of
the major strengths of our economy and
a major source of our prosperity. Short-
sighted or arbitrary actions which raise
doubts among potential foreign investors
would be harmful to our domestic
economic interests. In the long run we
might be the losers, not the country that
we retaliated against.
Second, we must take into account
the fact that the United States is also a
large investor abroad and has been a
major force in international trade. U.S.
policies concerning foreign investment in
the United States have a significant im-
pact on the policies of other countries,
and U.S. restrictions could invite
retaliatory actions by others.
I, therefore, believe that while
counterreactions of the type mentioned
might in extreme cases be useful, we are
clearly better served by policies that aim
at the elimination of foreign practices
that deviate from international norms
than by policies of retaliation that could
weaken these norms. With this principle
in mind, we intend to take steps
necessary to protect our rights and in-
terests.
Conclusion
Many of the issues I have discussed to-
day were nonexistent or only nascent
just a decade ago. They have come to
the fore over the last few years as a
result of real economic forces, which are
reflected in the investment trends I have
outlined. The issues, such as investment
incentives and performance require-
ments, must be addressed if we are to
maintain and strengthen the open inter-
national investment system essential to
global economic efficiency.
By their very nature, many of these
problems will not lend themselves to
easy solutions. In particular, urgent
short-term national economic goals vary
widely, thereby making more difficult
the achievement of an international con-
sensus on some of the issues. However,
all countries have a stake in the long-
term economic implications involved,
and I believe that this common stake in
the international economic system pro-
vides a good basis upon which to pro-
ceed in addressing these problems in
earnest.
International fora, such as the
OECD, the GATT, and specialized U.N.
agencies will provide important arenas
in which to tackle the problems involved.
We must move soon from the discussion
phase to a serious effort to develop and
implement multilateral understandings
and rules which reduce distortions of in-
vestment and move toward a more open
global investment climate. This must be
a major goal for the decade of the
1980s. ■
Iember1981
33
Economics
International Commodity Agreements
The following report was prepared
by Dennis T. Avery, senior agricultural
analyst, Office of Economics, Bureau of
Intelligence and Research, in May 1981.
SUMMARY
In 1976, the less-developed countries
(LDCs) undertook a major effort spon-
sored by the U.N. Conference on Trade
and Development (UNCTAD IV) to
organize international agreements for
their important commodity exports.
They hoped that such agreements would
help stabilize and/or enhance their earn-
ings.
The resulting UNCTAD integrated
program for commodities has not suc-
ceeded significantly in altering the terms
of trade for commodity producers, and
little prospect remains that it will suc-
ceed in doing so. Theoretically, such
agreements could produce modest
benefits by facilitating the commitment
of a more appropriate level of resources
to production over time. It has proven
extremely difficult to realize these
benefits in practice, however, due to the
continuing vagaries of supply and de-
mand and continuing competition for
market shares.
Raising commodity prices to ar-
tificially high levels attracts added pro-
duction, both from agreement members
and from nonmembers. It also
discourages consumption and encourages
substitution. These powerful reactions
all work toward creating surpluses of
targeted commodities and explain why
commodity agreements have been unable
to sustain higher price levels. In fact,
price stabilization efforts can themselves
stimulate output if producers believe
that their risk of low prices has been
decreased.
Recent commodity agreements have
tried several means for dealing with
market competition problems: keeping
price goals modest, signing up all major
producers, and enrolling importer na-
tions, which agree not to increase their
purchases from nonmembers. It has
been a practical impossibility to include
all producers and potential producers of
major commodities, however. It has also
been difficult to get importers to agree
with producers on appropriate stabiliza-
tion mechanisms and price levels for the
agreements.
Competition from synthetics and
substitutes has been an even more in-
tractable problem. Modern technology
has produced major competitors for
nearly every commodity, from synthetic
rubber and plastics to high-fructose corn
sweetener and glass-fiber telephone
cable. Only the beverages — coffee, tea,
and cocoa — have so far escaped serious
inroads from synthetics and substitutes.
Commodity agreements have also
exhibited some serious limitations as an
aid mechanism. Their benefits are
distributed on the basis of commodity
production, rather than need, so they
assist only indirectly in reaching
economic, political, or social goals within
the recipient country. They also en-
courage added production, which either
boosts donor costs or dilutes benefits.
There is little prospect that interna-
tional commodity agreements can over-
come their inherent limitations and pro-
vide greater benefits for commodity ex-
porters in the future. Prices can be ex-
pected to continue to fluctuate widely
around the trends dictated by demand,
competition, and long-term production
costs.
HISTORY OF AGREEMENTS
IN CORE COMMODITIES
The 10 core commodities listed by UNC-
TAD IV (cocoa, coffee, copper, cotton,
hard fibers — sisal, abaca, and coir — jute,
rubber, sugar, tea, and tin) share some
important characteristics: all have
volatile prices, and all are produced
mainly in the LDCs. Each, however, has
distinctive characteristics.
Coffee
Coffee is widely produced in Latin
America and Africa. The major causes
of coffee price volatility are on the sup-
ply side — primarily weather and a rather
erratic expansion of production to match
slowly rising demand. At any given
time, demand is quite inelastic. Like all
tree crops, coffee's supply responses are
lagged. It takes 4-5 years to bring new
trees into production and more than 20
years for trees to pass out of produc-
tion.
The world coffee market has been
characterized by brief periods of short
supply (and high prices) followed by
often lengthy periods of oversupply (and
low prices). The boom periods have
typically lasted only a couple of years,
but periods of depressed prices have }
lasted far longer.
The most recent coffee price boom
was triggered in 1975 by a severe free
in Brazil, the largest coffee producer.
The freeze not only ruined the 1975 en
but damaged many trees, thus cutting
back Brazilian coffee production for
several years. World coffee production
dropped from 77 million bags in 1975 t
less than 71 million in 1977. The short
supply sent coffee prices zooming, fron
66« per pound in 1974 to $2.40 in 197?
High coffee prices stimulated inves
ment in coffee production, mostly the
replacement of older trees. By 1978, iri
consequence, world coffee production
was back to its prefreeze level and still
climbing. The World Bank expects this
oversupply to be relatively short lived.
There are no longer any large tracts o:
virgin land suitable for new coffee pro
duction, and fewer smallholders are in-
terested in growing coffee. With norm
weather, the Bank expects prices to
decline in real terms by perhaps 15-20
through the 1980s, recovering to near
their current levels by 1990.
Coffee producers have long sought
to stabilize their prices at relatively hij
levels. Brazil made a number of solo e!
forts to cut back surplus coffee produc
tion in the years before World War II.
The first international coffee agreeme:
dates from the war years when the
European market (10 million bags a
year) had suddenly been lost and pro-
ducers feared a price slump. The Inter
American Coffee Agreement successfi;
ly froze prices at 13.4C per pound.
After the war, output and stocks
were down, demand recovered, and co
fee experienced 9 consecutive years of
rising prices from 1946 to 1954. Coffei
prices of more than 90C per pound
stimulated considerable new planting i
Brazil, Central America, and Africa. B
1955, 15 countries had joined the Latii
American Coffee Agreement, which se
up a buffer stock in an effort to raise
prices in the face of a rising tide of coi
fee. Nonetheless, by 1961 coffee stocks
equaled 1 lk years of normal world con-
sumption, and prices were down to 384
under severe pressure. In 1964, consur
ing nations (including the United State
were brought into a new International
Coffee Agreement. Export quotas held
the enormous stocks off the market foi
34
Department of State Bulletin
Economics
rie, and prices immediately jumped
early 50C a pound. Production re-
ided, however, and with heavy
ks overhanging the market, prices
>ped steadily for several years.
:ks peaked in 1968. Then diversifica-
to other crops, some stock spoilage,
3 years of light crops helped to
;e the oversupply.
The agreement transfered an
mated $600 million per year from
ee consumers (mainly in the United
tes) to producers during the late
Os and early 1970s. U.S. support for
agreement ended after prices
ped in 1970 and again in 1972. The
iucers claimed the price boosts were
to frost damage, but at least in 1972
e were substantial stocks available
ch might have been sold to dampen
e increases. When the exporters
sequently demanded still-greater
e boosts to compensate them for the
aluation which balance-of-payments
olems had forced on the U.S. dollar,
Burning nations decided the agree-
■ it was not serving their interests.
i The current coffee agreement dates
■ n 1976. It relies exclusively on ex-
p t quotas, which initially protected a
I e range of 63-770 a pound. Because
b price of coffee remained well above
jj ; range as a result of the 1975
I; zilian freeze, quotas were never put
) effect. Economic provisions of the
I aement were renegotiated, and ex-
p t quotas became effective in October
5 0. Quotas remain in effect within a
115-1.55 price range. The agreement
a i not be able to defend $1.15 in the
a i of projected increases in coffee pro-
) tion in the 1980s.
I oa has had one of the most volatile
k -e patterns of any commodity, due to
B astic demand, weather-induced pro-
j tion variability, and the lagged sup-
j response to price changes typical of
U crops. In the 1970s, the annual
k rage of cocoa prices ranged from 54<f
I pound to $3.79 per pound.
I Favorable growing conditions pro-
:ed a crop of 1.6 million tons in 1972.
)r weather in 1973 and 1977 cut pro-
:tion below 1.4 million tons. That pro-
•tion variation and its impact on
cks was enough, when combined with
inelastic demand for cocoa, to pro-
;e wide swings in cocoa prices. Only
•y high prices seem to produce Con-
ner resistance and increase use of
:oa substitutes and extenders.
Attempts at international coopera-
tion in cocoa pricing date from the
1960s. Production had been growing
somewhat more rapidly than demand
throughout much of the period following
World War II. In 1962, when an associa-
tion of the five largest producers was
founded to control supply, some
nonmembers were continuing to
stimulate cocoa production. Export
quotas were added to the producer
agreement, but they were overwhelmed
by a record crop in 1964-65. After three
huge, successive crops between 1970 and
1972 produced very low prices, a U.N.
cocoa conference adopted a broader In-
ternational Cocoa Agreement. Quotas
and a buffer stock were set to defend a
price range of 23-32$. Before any buffer
stock was accumulated, however, bad
weather cut production. Prices jumped
to 86<t and stayed above the target
range from 1973 through 1979. The
relatively high prices reflected low
stocks, a 3% annual growth in con-
sumption, the delayed effect of limited
plantings during the 1960s, and some
bad weather.
The International Cocoa Agreement
was renewed first in 1977 (with a new
price range of 65-81C) and again in
1980. The 1980 renewal was achieved
only after prolonged negotiation in
which the producers agreed to lower
their minimum price goal from $1.20 to
$1.02 per pound (both well above
prevailing market prices). The agree-
ment's prospects are clouded by the
abstention of the largest producer (Ivory
Coast) and the largest consumer (the
United States).
The World Bank projects growth of
cocoa production during the 1980s at
3.1% a year. Recent high prices have
stimulated replanting of older cocoa
groves in such traditional areas as the
Ivory Coast and Ghana. New com-
petitors, including Brazil and Malaysia,
are expanding their cocoa plantings. The
World Bank expects cocoa demand to
grow marginally more slowly than pro-
duction. In these circumstances con-
tinued downward pressure on prices
may be expected. It appears doubtful
that the buffer stock of the cocoa agree-
ment and its financing arrangements
will be sufficient to sustain prices at the
target levels during this period.
Sugar
Several factors contribute to the volatile
price pattern in the world sugar
markets.
• Production varies unpredictably
with weather and periodic outbreaks of
crop disease.
• The supply response to price in-
creases has lagged and may overshoot
because it takes several years to bring
on efficient new production and the
associated large-scale refining capacity.
• Demand for sugar is inelastic,
magnifying the price impact of supply
problems.
• Much of the world's sugar produc-
tion and consumption is insulated from
price changes by subsidies, leaving the
remaining sugar to trade in a relatively
thin market where price responses are
amplified.
The developed non-Communist coun-
tries currently produce about 30% of the
world's sugar (mostly from subsidized
sugar beets). Developing countries pro-
duce about 40%, and the Communist
countries produce about 30%.
Sugar consumption is no longer in-
creasing in many of the developed non-
Communist economies, because con-
sumption levels are already high and
substitute sweeteners are becoming
more important. High-fructose corn
sweetener is displacing millions of tons
of sugar in the United States, Japan,
and Canada. Furthermore the European
Community's (EC) common agricultural
policy has stimulated production of
millions of tons of European beet sugar,
which is being exported under subsidy.1
Markets in the U.S.S.R. and
Eastern Europe are approaching satura-
tion. Sugar consumption is already high
in the developing countries which export
sugar. Only among the developing-nation
importers is per capita sugar consump-
tion still increasing in line with con-
sumer incomes.
Sugar was one of the first com-
modities for which control via interna-
tional agreement was tried. Under the
Chadbourne plan of 1931, the chief
world exporters agreed to restrict ex-
ports and gradually reduce stocks over a
5-year period. However, heavy stocks
and declining consumption depressed
prices, while nonmember production
more than offset the members' export
cutbacks.
A broader International Sugar
Agreement, signed in 1937, included the
United States, the United Kingdom, and
much of Europe and set quotas for their
domestic production. The agreement
was never tested because World War II
intervened. It was not until well after
the war that low sugar prices again
became a serious concern.
member 1981
35
Economics
The 1954 edition of the International
Sugar Agreement included most of the
major exporters and importers. It had a
price range of 3.25-4.35C per pound,
protected by export quotas. The Suez
crisis in 1956 sent prices above 6<t, but a
large 1957-58 world sugar crop pushed
prices to the floor level. The agreement
was renewed in 1958, and Brazil and
Peru, the two major exporters that had
remained outside the agreement, were
brought in. Production increased again
in 1959, consumption faltered, and
stocks continued to rise. In 1961, after
the United States stopped imports of
Cuban sugar in an anti-Castro move,
Cuba demanded a huge increase in its
export quota. The agreement broke
down when the other exporters refused
the demand.
The International Sugar Agreement
was revised in 1969 and reactivated for
a 5-year period until it was finally ter-
minated in 1973. The agreement was
undercut by the need to offer attractive
quotas to attract new members, by sub-
sidized sugar production in the
developed countries, and by an uncertain
mechanism for limiting Cuban sugar
reexported through Communist coun-
tries. Prices varied from 3.2C in 1969 to
9.5« in 1973.
After termination of the agreement,
prices peaked again in 1974, averaging
30<t a pound, and then fell back to about
8<t for several years. These low prices
led to the current agreement, which
went into effect in 1978.
The current International Sugar
Agreement comprises 59 producing and
consuming nations including the United
States. The agreement has been commit-
ted to keeping sugar prices within a
specified range, currently 13-23C per
pound. Producer nations agree to apply
export quotas when prices are low, and
consuming nations agree to limit im-
ports of nonmember sugar. When prices
are high, exporting member stocks total-
ing 2.5 million tons are released accord-
ing to a prearranged price schedule. The
agreement cut export quotas by
12V2% — or 2.2 million metric tons — for
both 1978 and 1979, when sugar prices
averaged 7.8<C and 9.9C per pound,
respectively. In 1980, with the national
stocks drawn down, sugar prices rose
well above 40<t per pound.
Despite broad producer and con-
sumer membership, the International
Sugar Agreement faces serious prob-
lems. Expanded production of high-
fructose corn sweetener and its lineal
descendents will displace millions of tons
of sugar from key markets in the years
ahead. The EC is likely to continue ma-
jor exports of subsidized beet sugar in
the world markets, because it will be
reluctant to join the agreement without
a quota that recognizes those exports. In
addition, the World Bank projects that
sugar production will increase more
rapidly than consumption in the develop-
ing countries over the next decade. The
general outlook for sugar stability is
poor.
Tea
Tea prices have been notable in the com-
modity world for their relative stability.
This is due in no small part to produc-
tion factors: tea is a leaf crop and thus
is less subject to variations in weather
than such fruit crops as coffee and
cocoa. Tea growers also have more
latitude to vary production with prices:
When prices are good, growers can in-
crease production both by applying more
fertilizer and by harvesting more leaves
per bud. New tea plantings reach bear-
ing age faster than most trees. Oddly,
the fact that tea does not store well for
long periods may also work in favor of
price stability. Other crops have gotten
into major difficulties because they have
built up carryover stocks to high levels
in the annual hope that the next year
would offer better markets. The tea in-
dustry tends to sell this year's tea this
year without relying on such uncertain-
ties.
Tea demand is relatively stable and
inelastic in the short run. The World
Bank projects that world tea demand
will grow by about 3.5% per year to
1990, with production growing slightly
faster than that. Developed-country
markets are already saturated, and the
rapidly growing consumption in the
U.S.S.R. and China is expected to taper
off in the years ahead. Tea demand in
the developing countries has been grow-
ing at about 4.4% per year.
Tea prices were somewhat more er-
ratic in the 1970s than earlier, reflect-
ing, in part, increases in energy prices
affecting tea growers' fuel, fertilizer,
and marketing costs. Sri Lanka has also
suffered some poor tea crops, decreasing
supply, and tea demand shot up tem-
porarily after the Brazilian freeze drove
coffee prices up in 1976-77.
India and Sri Lanka are the two
largest tea exporters, but Bangladesh,
Indonesia, Africa, and Latin America
have all been increasing their exports
recently.
Tea producers had a long-lived In-fll,
ternational Tea Agreement from 1933 -L.
1955. In its early years it featured ex-jl
port quotas and a virtual prohibition oil
new plantings. Despite the agreement, I
there was little change in tea prices unit
the threat of World War II in 1939. IX
agreement continued after the war,
without restrictions on production or
marketing. In 1950 export quotas were
issued, but no attempt was made to '
restrict supplies significantly. The agreL
ment was permitted to expire after
1955. It had virtually no impact on the ,,
tea market in its last 15 years of ex-
istence.
Natural Rubber
Rubber price fluctations arise primarily
from the demand side, in sharp contras
to most other crops. The major use of
rubber has been in automotive products
and prices have been very sensitive to
changes in general economic activity.
Natural rubber demand has also been
dramatically affected by the relative
price and availability of synthetic rub- ,
ber.
Sales of elastomers have been grofl|
ing at roughly 6.5% per year since the
early 1950s. Until recently, however,
synthetic rubber gained most of the
market growth, expanding at more thai
9% a year. Natural rubber production
grew at less than 3% annually. Recentl
the demand for natural rubber has bee:
stimulated by the demand for radial
tires, which require a high proportion (
natural rubber, and by higher oil prices <
which increase the cost of synthetic ruli
ber. The impact of high energy prices <
autos and driving is expected to hold
back elastomer demand during the coir
ing decade. Even so, natural rubber pr
duction may not keep up with demand
unless additional investments are made
in the next few years.
Rubber production is centered in
Southeast Asia, with 80% coming from
Malaysia, Indonesia, and Thailand. Sri
Lanka, India, Liberia, and Nigeria haw
accounted for another 12%. Most rubbe
is now produced on small farms rather
than on large plantations.
Rubber has a long history of interro
tional market control efforts. The
Stevenson plan was inaugurated in 192!
restricting rubber exports from Ceylon,
Malaya, and the Straits Settlement (all
British dependencies). Rubber prices in-
creased sharply at first. However,
growers in other areas stepped up plani
ings sharply. By 1927, when the plan
i
36
Department of State Bulletii
"
Economics
dropped, the British dependencies'
e of the rubber market had declined
about 70% to 54%, with no long-
i increase in price. But temporarily
er prices had stimulated the
ilopment of synthetic rubber and the
er reclaiming industry.
The Depression and larger world
tings kept rubber prices low through
and produced the International
ber Regulation Agreement. This
ement at first raised prices, at the
of building producer stocks. Rubber
and increased significantly in the
few years, carrying prices up with
id permitting the liquidation of those
■cs. The agreement continued in
3 until the Japanese conquest of
■er-producing areas catalyzed an ex-
ve increase in the synthetic rubber
stry.
Perhaps because of the direct com-
(j:ion from synthetic rubber, there
a; no further rubber agreements until
B), when negotiations for the Interna-
Dil Natural Rubber Agreement were
I hided. It entered into force previ-
ew ally in late 1980 and will enter into
i] e definitively when full financing of
I large 550,000-metric ton buffer stock
;sured. This could occur as early as
a 1981; then, if warranted by market
»! litions, the buffer stock could begin
, ket operations to defend a price
ti je of 150-270 Malaysian/Singapore
> s per kilo (approximately 32-58 U.S.
f s per pound). The World Bank ex-
I s natural rubber prices to flucutate
r ind a level of 52« per pound (in 1977
I irs) through 1990.
3 ■ is employed principally in sacking,
li istrial cloth, and carpet backing. It
i i tough competition in these markets
I a synthetics — polypropylene and
c ethylene. As a result, world jute de-
u id has been essentially stagnant for
5 'ears. Large variations in jute pro-
ution have, however, triggered big
I -t-term swings in jute fiber prices.
i ply disruptions and high prices due
I ivil disturbances in Bangladesh in
i early 1970s gave added momentum
] ynthetics by curtailing jute supplies
j raising prices for a time. Jute pro-
Ition is concentrated in India,
lgladesh, and China; because China is
it importer, the world market is left
ndia and Bangladesh.
Jute market efforts have been
:ussed for years under the Food and
-iculture Organization (FAO) In-
tergovernmental Group on Jute, Kenaf,
and Allied Fibers. In recent years
UNCTAD discussions have also focused
on jute, and a non-price-stabilizing
cooperative arrangement, the Interna-
tional Jute Organization, is currently be-
ing negotiated. The organization would
promote jute in world markets and
foster research and development related
to the raising and processing of the
fiber.
While producers still hope for addi-
tional international measures to stabilize
jute prices, a recent World Bank study,
sion in the U.S.S.R. and China has
raised the Communist countries' share of
the world production 12 percentage
points to 39%. The industrialized non-
Communist countries' share of the
market has dropped from 32% in 1961
to about 18% now. The developing coun-
tries are expected to continue expanding
cotton production: some potential cotton
land now is in less-valuable crops, their
technology is improving, and many of
them have expanding textile manufac-
turing industries. For the next decade,
cotton is projected to capture nearly half
Table 1
Primary Commodity
Rubber
Cotton
Tin
Jute
Sugar
Copper
Bauxite
Cocoa
Coffee
Tea
Competitors
Synthetic rubber, plastics.
Other natural and synthetic textile fibers.
New technology that permits thinner tin plating; plastic can lin-
ings; aluminum, paper, and plastic containers.
Polypropylene and polyethylene fibers and sheets.
Corn sweeteners (especially the recently developed high-fructose
corn sweetener), and noncaloric sweeteners.
Microwave communications; steel-reinforced aluminum and glass-
fiber cables; plastic plumbing pipe; electronic replacements for
electric devices.
Other metals and plastics that offer some of aluminum's
lightweight and weather-resistent properties; aluminum re-
cycling efforts.
Cocoa flavorings; vegetable oils used as extenders.
Other beverages.
Other beverages.
(A Dynamic Simulation Model of the
World Jute Economy. Staff Working
Paper No. 391. May 1980) suggests that
there may be little benefit to exporters
from jute price stabilization. The study
found that increased price stability
would be enough in itself to induce ex-
pansion in jute production, which would
push prices down and leave returns to
the producing nations approximately
where they had been. The study also
suggested that higher jute prices would
encourage synthetic fibers to take over
more of the market.
The rising cost of competing
petroleum- and gas-based synthetics will
support some increase in jute prices dur-
ing the 1980s.
Cotton
Cotton is an annual crop produced in
more than 75 countries and exported by
more than 60 nations. Over recent
decades, cotton production has been
shifting from the developed to the
developing countries, which now produce
44% of the world's cotton. Rapid expan-
of the increase in textile fiber demand,
with production growing at an annual
rate of about 2%.
The International Cotton Advisory
Committee has reached no consensus on
ways to raise or stabilize cotton prices
without encouraging the substitution of
synthetic fibers. (During the 1960s the
United States used price supports to
maintain artificially high prices for cot-
ton producers, resulting in a sharp
decline in cotton's share of the textile
fiber market.)
Hard Fibers
The hard fibers include sisal, abaca
(Manila hemp), and coir (coconut husk
fiber). Sisal is produced primarily in
Kenya, Tanzania, and Brazil and is used
importantly in twine. Abaca has pro-
duced the finest natural hemp cordage
because of its strength (especially when
wet), durability, and flexibility. It is pro-
duced primarily in the Philippines (84%)
and in Ecuador (15%) from a plant close-
ly related to the banana. There are two
types of coir: brown coir, produced
ember 1981
37
Economics
mainly in Sri Lanka by beating the
husks of ripe coconuts, and white coir,
produced mainly in India from the husks
of green coconuts allowed to ret (soak)
in salt water. All of the hard fibers are
relatively labor-intensive, and working
conditions in these industries are
disagreeable (especially for coir).
However, hard fiber production is often
politically important in producing coun-
tries, because it typically provides a ma-
jor source of employment in otherwise
barren regions.
The producers of the hard fibers
probably were included in the UNCTAD
IV list on the basis of their generally
low position on the world economic lad-
der. The hard fibers face stiff competi-
tion from synthetics, however, and there
is little likelihood that real prices could
be significantly increased without
substantial losses in sales volume. Re-
cent UNCTAD efforts have focused on
finding new uses for hard fibers.
Tin
Almost half of the world's mine output
of tin comes from Southeast Asia (main-
ly Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia),
with Bolivia, the U.S.S.R., China,
Australia, and Brazil accounting for
most of the remainder. The United
States is the largest consumer (about
25% of the world's total consumption),
followed by Japan, West Germany, and
the United Kingdom. The main end uses
for tin are in tin plate (primarily for
food and beverage containers), solders,
and bronze.
World tin consumption in the post-
World War II period has grown more
slowly than use of most other metals
(i.e., at 1.7% per annum from 1955 to
1974, compared with 4.8% for copper,
8.3% for aluminum, and 4.6% for zinc).
The main reason for this slow growth
has been the increasing substitution of
tin-free steel and aluminum in can
manufacturing and the growing use of
nonmetal containers. Technical innova-
tions have also produced thinner tin
coatings, reducing the quantity of tin
needed per can.
Tin consumption usually responds
quickly to changes in income or
economic activity, but adjustments in
mine output are costly and time consum-
ing. Efforts to stabilize the resulting
price fluctuations date back to 1921,
when the colonial governments of the
Federated Malay States and the Dutch
East Indies agreed to voluntary produc-
tion controls.
The first International Tin Agree-
ment, which included both producer and
consumer nations, was ratified in 1956
and was subsequently renewed in 1961,
1966, 1971, and 1976. The present
agreement was scheduled to expire in
June 1981 but was recently extended
through June 1982 to allow more time
for negotiating a sixth agreement. The
agreement uses both a buffer stock and
export controls in its efforts to stabilize
prices between preset ceiling and floor
levels.
Although the International Tin
Agreement is frequently cited as the
most successful example of an interna-
tional commodity agreement, its record
is a mixed one. Because of the small size
of the tin buffer stock (25,000 metric
tons under the first agreement, 20,000
under the following three agreements,
and up to 40,000 under the present one)
relative to world tin consumption of
about 200,000 tons annually, the Inter-
national Tin Council which administers
the agreement has been considerably
more successful in defending floor prices
than ceiling prices. The International
Tin Council imposed export controls in
1958-60,1968-69, 1973, and 1975-76.
Market prices fell below the council floor
only once (for 2 weeks in 1958), but they
broke through the ceiling in 1961,
1964-65, 1966, 1973-74, and 1976.
Prices remained above the ceiling from
January 1977 to October 1980. (The buf-
fer stock has been depleted since
January 1977.)
The United States did not join the
International Tin Agreement until 1976,
but sales of tin from the U.S. stockpile
had a moderating effect on prices after
they rose especially far above the Inter-
national Tin Council ceiling during
1963-66 and 1973-74. The U.S.
stockpile currently totals about 200,000
tons, which is well above the official
stockpile requirements of 42,000 tons.
The United States joined the fifth Inter-
national Tin Agreement in 1976 primari-
ly for foreign policy reasons.
Copper
Copper is one of the major commodities
in world trade, with more than $6 billion
worth traded in 1978. The United States
is the largest producer (18% of the
world's total in 1978), followed by Chile
(14%), the U.S.S.R. (12%), Canada (9%),
Zambia (9%), Zaire (6%), and Peru (5%).
The United States is also the world's
largest consumer.
Because of its superior electrical
conductivity, malleability, and anticor*
sion properties, copper is used in elec-
trical wires and cables, plumbing tubes
and radiators. Copper is almost ir-
replaceable is some uses, but in others
faces competition from aluminum,
plastics, steel, and glass fibers.
Four major copper-exporting coun
tries — Chile, Zambia, Zaire, and
Peru — created the Intergovernmental
Council of Copper Exporting Countrie
in 1967 to prop up copper prices. In-
donesia and Mauritania have since join
as full members, and Australia, Papua
New Guinea, and Yugoslavia have
become nonvoting associate members,
The council's influence on the world co
per market has been minor. Lack of si
cess in sustaining a minimum price lev
has been due primarily to its limited a
trol over world copper supplies and to
the dependence of the member countri
on copper revenues, which inhibits the
from cutting back production significa;
ly for extended periods.
Copper is, nevertheless, frequent]}
cited as a candidate for international
price stabilization, because it meets
several basic requirements for a buffe)
stock arrangement: organized termina
markets which facilitate gaging price
movements, a fairly standard and
homogeneous product, the absence of
storage problems, and a high value-to-
volume ratio. The major copper-
producing and consuming nations, in-
cluding the United States, have held
more than a dozen meetings since 197
under UNCTAD auspices to consider
possible ways to deal with instability i
the copper market. The world copper
market is so big that the cost of an ef-
fective buffer stock is estimated at
almost $2 billion.
The United States is about 80% s&
sufficient in copper, and U.S. economii
interest in a copper agreement is low t
negative. For foreign policy reasons,
however, the United States has main-
tained a willingness to consider pro-
blems of the copper market in a
multilateral, consumer/producer settinj
UNCTAD IV's REMAINING
TARGET COMMODITIES
Bananas
Bananas earn more foreign exchange
per acre than any other major crop.
They are, however, highly perishable.
Marketing requires careful coordination
of production, shipping, and distribu-
38
Economics
h — which explains the strong position
Irge, integrated fruit companies in
wrorld banana economy. Bananas can
Brown in virtually any high-rainfall
u of the tropics. Yields are so high
1 only 200,000 hectares are needed to
fit world import requirements. As a
■It, most of the world's bananas
le to market under preferential quota
iems. About 80% of world banana ex-
Is come from Latin America and the
Ibbean. Most of the rest move from
■Philippines to Japan in a trade flow
I has developed within the last 15
I's. World exports are expected to
I during the 1980s, especially for
Italian and Asian producers favorably
Ited for the booming Middle Eastern
Ikets. Central American exports will
Iv slowly. Integrated marketing re-
lements make it difficult to set broad
Ima-pricing arrangements.
It
me mid-1970s beef production cycles
faced simultaneously in all major pro-
long regions, bringing on a sharp drop
International prices. Developing coun-
I exports were hard hit by new trade
II iers in Japan and the European
c ununity (the Community was actual-
■ net exporter in 1974-75). Since that
D ■, production cycles have moved into
: rebuilding phase with world supplies
n h smaller. Increases in domestic
ii t processing and consumption have
s iced developing countries'
i jndence on exports of fresh meat.
I Food and Agricultural Organization
i issued guidelines for international
> )eration in the livestock and meat
i or, which call for nondiscriminatory
c art regulations under normal condi-
( s and for preferential treatment of
1 Z exports when temporary trade
! rictions are necessary. The world
i ket for meat is strong enough that
! ■ommodity agreement seems likely.
I inclusion of meat on the UNCTAD
was probably a response to the
rt-term problem which coincided with
UNCTAD thrust.
pical Hardwoods
pical hardwood timber ranks third
)ng the non-oil foreign exchange
ners for the LDCs. It is expected to
n short supply during the 1980s,
h prices rising 30-40% and produc-
i extending to hitherto-untouched
3sts in Brazil, Papua New Guinea,
I the central African interior. Recent-
ly, groups of exporting countries have
moved to coordinate their policies and
ship more of their exports in the form of
sawed wood, veneers, and plywood. Pro-
ducers and consumers have agreed that
such measures as buffer stocks and sup-
ply management mechanisms are inap-
propriate and technically infeasible for
directly stabilizing tropical timber
markets and prices. Additional meetings
have been scheduled to work toward an
arrangement based on other measures,
but the rapid rate of market growth ap-
pears to rule out a commodity agree-
ment.
Vegetable Oils
Demand for fats and oils has been grow-
ing steadily with world population and
per capita income. The supply of
vegetable oils, produced from a wide
variety of field and tree crops, varies
widely from year to year. Vegetable oils
compete directly with animal fats and
oils. Production is relatively unrespon-
sive to price stimuli, because such tree
crops as coconuts and olives are
harvested virtually regardless of price
and because fats and oils from soybeans
and livestock products are really
byproducts. Fats and oils markets are so
broadly competitive that a commodity
agreement would be unlikely.
EVALUATION
Despite Third World countries' rapid
growth in manufactured exports, com-
modity exports still account for more
than half of the export earnings for the
Third World countries which do not ex-
port oil. For some, returns from one to
two commodities weigh heavily in the
country's foreign-exchange receipts or
budget. The prices for most of these
commodities are historically volatile. In
addition, commodity-exporting countries
have perceived themselves at an increas-
ing disadvantage in trading with
manufacturing nations.
The LDCs at the UNCTAD IV ses-
sion in 1976 put forward international
commodity agreements as a means of
stabilizing prices and LDC earnings
from commodity exports. Implicit in the
strategy, at least for some, was the idea
that such agreements would also raise
real returns for commodity exports, in
effect transferring resources from rich
commodity-importing nations to poor
commodity-exporting nations. The
UNCTAD resolution euphemistically ex-
pressed this as securing prices
"remunerative and just to producers and
equitable to consumers."
A weighted 30-year index of non-fuel
commodity prices would indicate that, if
there has been a discernible trend in
volatile commodity prices, it has been
downward. Moreover, the World Bank's
projections indicate only a slight upward
trend in real commodity prices over the
next decade.
Price Volatility in Major Commodities
The prices of primary commodities
typically are volatile, on occasion rising
as much as 750% in a few months or
falling precipitously. For a variety of
reasons, commodity prices are far more
variable than prices of most manufac-
tures or other classes of goods or serv-
ices.
Demand for most primary com-
modities is not very responsive to short-
term price changes. People usually buy
about the same amounts of food and
beverages unless prices rise very high or
fall very low. Some substitution natural-
ly takes place, but such items as grain,
potatoes, and sugar are regarded as
basic necessities. Tea and coffee take on-
ly a small portion of consumer budgets
and are objects of strong preference pat-
terns. Purchasers of raw materials tend
to be unresponsive to price changes,
because the price of an individual
material is likely to be a minor factor in
the cost of the finished product. For ex-
ample, the price of tin has little effect on
the cost of a can of tomatoes, and the
price of copper for electrical wiring has
little influence on the cost of a new
house. Unlike price changes, business
cycles can have a strong effect on de-
mand for raw materials.
The supply of most major com-
modities responds poorly in the short
term to price changes. In most cases,
primary commodity producers cannot
readily change their production
schedules. Increases in production re-
quire planning, investments, and time.
Developing a new copper mine, for ex-
ample, takes several years. Tree crops
probably have the most lagged response
to a price increase, because the trees
take up to 12 years to reach bearing
age. Conversely, production is slow to
decline when prices fall. Many of the
resources used in commodity production
cannot be shifted quickly to alternative
uses.
Production of some commodities
varies with extraneous factors. The out-
put of commodities produced as
ember 1981
39
Economics
byproducts may be more responsive to
changes in the prices of associated prod-
ucts than to changes in their own prices.
Vegetable oil, for example, is produced
as a byproduct of soybean meal; cobalt
as a byproduct of copper. The supply of
practically all primary commodities pro-
duced in agriculture is subject to un-
predictable and sometimes sharp varia-
tions resulting from the vagaries of
nature. Droughts, severe winters, and
wet harvest seasons can slash yields. A
freeze in a coffee-growing area may af-
fect harvests for several seasons. Crop
diseases and insect infestations can
develop quickly.
Competition from new producing
areas and competition from synthetics
and substitutes tend to put a ceiling on
commodity prices over the long term.
Most agricultural commodities and some
minerals can be produced fairly widely,
although costs vary from place to place.
Potential competitors could begin pro-
duction if the long-run outlook
strengthened. For example, Africa has
long been the leading cocoa producer,
but recently Brazil and Malaysia have
been increasing their cocoa plantings.
Most raw materials must compete with
synthetic substitutes: synthetic rubber
versus natural rubber, synthetic fibers
versus cotton and jute, glass fibers and
microwave relays versus copper cables,
and plastic coatings versus tin plating.
Commodity Agreement Goals
One view of commodity agreements is
that they should mute short-term fluc-
tuations in the market, following instead
the long-term trends in supply and de-
mand. Such agreements:
• Would preserve the price
mechanism for adjusting to changes in
supply and demand fundamentals while
narrowing the range of short-term fluc-
tuations around the trend line;
• Would help forestall overreactions
to short-term price variations;
• Would facilitate financial planning
in developing countries dependent on the
revenues from commodities;
• Could lead to a greater and more
reliable supply because of an improved
investment climate; and
• Might marginally improve the
competitive position of the commodity
by reducing the volatility of consumer
prices.
A second view of commodity
agreements concedes value to stabiliza-
tion but adopts a long-term goal of rais-
ing producer prices. The industrialized
countries tend to be importers, and the
LDCs exporters, of the commodities
identified by UNCTAD for special atten-
tion. Sustaining prices of these com-
modities above market-clearing levels
thus would result in a transfer of
resources from developed to developing
nations.
A stabilizing-type agreement, which
is theoretically self-financing, would
have to deal alternately with surpluses
and shortages. An agreement designed
to raise prices above market levels
would have to deal with the tendency of
higher prices to increase production and
depress consumption. Efforts to cope
with or somehow avert persistent
surpluses would have to be financed by
industrialized-country consumers or
governments or a combination of both.
Commodity Agreement Mechanisms
International commodity agreements
have been used since the 1920s in a wide
variety of situations. By using one of
two mechanisms — buffer stocks and ex-
port quotas — most agreements have at-
tempted to control the amount of a com-
modity reaching the market. The buffer
stock mechanism requires a fund that
can be used to buy up stocks of the com-
modity when prices slump; the stocks
are sold when prices rise above agree-
ment objectives. Export quotas defend a
price floor, reducing total supply by
limiting the amount of the commodity
that each member nation is permitted to
market. Export controls generally re-
quire producing nations to stockpile or
limit production individually, but
stockpiling can be costly and limiting
production can be politically painful.
Some producers may elect to remain
outside an agreement. The cooperation
of consuming-country members may
strengthen a commodity agreement; con-
sumers can be asked to agree not to im-
port commodities marketed in violation
of the agreement. Some commodity
agreements contain consultative provi-
sions intended to facilitate planning and
minimize price fluctuation due to faulty
assessment of demand. Market-
development measures sometimes are in-
cluded.
Not all commodities lend themselves
equally well to the commodity agree-
ment concept. The most fundamental
success factor is relative inelasticity of
demand: the less elastic the demand, the
more producer revenues can be raised
by withholding supply. Otherwise, falling
sales volume can offset price gains.
Other success factors include perishg
ty, transportation costs, industry cor
centration, the range of production
costs, and the existence of a
homogeneous product and organized
ternational market. Low storage anc
transportation costs generally enhan
an agreement's chances for success
(bananas and fresh meat would be pc
candidates for a buffer stock
agreement). Success also depends on
proportion of a product's production
reaches the market; so an industry vi
fewer and more concentrated produc
likely would have a greater market
share than one with widely dispersec
production. It also helps if producers
costs are generally equal, so that no
group of producers feels it can affon
expand its market share through prii
competition.
The Integrated Program for
Commodities
The integrated program for commod
had an immediate goal of establishinj
ternational agreements covering the
"core" commodities of special import!
to the Third World. The integrated p
gram for commodities also planned e
tual development of measures for eig
additional commodities: bananas, bau
ite, iron ore, manganese, meat,
phosphates, tropical timber, and
vegetable oils. Integrated program f(
commodities operations were to be
financed by a common fund, projecte
$6 billion, to be contributed by both i
porter and exporter governments. Al
$4.5 billion of the fund was earmarks
for buffer stock operations. The re-
mainder was to be used for lending
operations in support of other com-
modities for which buffer stocks wen
not considered suitable.
After 4 years, the integrated pro
gram for commodities has made little
progress. Only one new agreement h;
been signed since the UNCTAD IV c<
ference — the International Natural R
ber Agreement. It entered into force
1980, and its buffer stock will probab
become operational in 1981. The suga
and coffee agreements, already in eff
at the time of the UNCTAD conferen
have been renewed but face market c
ditions that make their long-term
economic effectiveness questionable. r
International Cocoa Agreement has b
renewed but without the largest pro-
ducer (Ivory Coast) and the largest cc
sumer (the United States). Negotiatio
40
Department of State Bulle
Economics
>> underway to replace the fifth Inter-
's ional Tin Agreement, which is due to
« ire in June 1982. The International
1 eat Agreement remains in effect, but
psa consultative mechanism,
hout economic provisions. Prices for
10 core commodities have continued
fluctuate widely.
Enthusiasm for the common fund
p| waned among the LDCs, because
fund's size is much smaller than
finally envisioned ($750 million in-
id of $6 billion). The fund has been
led down drastically because only a
i ■ commodity agreements now seem
ly to associate with it and because at-
i tion has shifted from stabilization of
imodity prices to stabilization of com-
dity export earnings. The latter goal
uires less intervention, because lower
:es often are associated with in-
ased supply rather than reduced de-
nd.
Has the integrated program for
imodities failed? Or will it merely re-
re more time to develop than
CTAD IV envisioned? Does recent
ierience with commodity agreements
icate eventual success? Have flaws
srged in commodity agreement
igns? Is intransigence on the part of
sumers or producers to blame for the
jgrated program for commodities'
n progress? Should the Third World
ouble its efforts on the integrated
gram for commodities or turn to
er means of increasing its income?
These questions bear importantly on
development strategies and potential
many Third World nations and on the
srests of developed ones as well,
imately, these questions will be
essed in the broadest possible
nomic, political, and sociological
ms. However, the primary focus of
s paper is economic constraints shap-
the potential of commodity
-eements to affect international
rkets and producer incomes.
abilization Success of Commodity
:reements
en a quick reading of commodity
reements history suggests that inters
tional commodity agreements have
oduced little price stability. Economic
idies strongly support this conclusion,
ton D. Law in International Com-
•>dity Agreements (Toronto, 1975.)
termined that the average coffee price
tctuation was at least 50% greater
ring the agreement years of 1965-72
an in the preceding nonagreement
riod of 1950-63. For sugar, he found
the fluctuation at least 75% greater for
12 recent years of control than for 11
noncontrol years, even eliminating the
years when the U.S-Cuban confrontation
disrupted the sugar market. Only in
wheat and tea did Law find more stable
prices during the tenure of international
agreements — and the wheat stability
resulted primarily from national
stockpiling by the United States and
Canada. Gordon W. Smith and George
R. Schink, writing on "The International
Tin Agreement: A Reassessment" in The
Economic Journal of December 1976,
concluded that the U.S. tin stockpile has
lent far more stability to the tin market
than has the International Tin Agree-
ment, in large part because it is many
times larger than the agreement's tin
buffer stock.
Those commodities with the most
volatile market fundamentals — least
elastic demand, longest supply response
lags, greatest vulnerability to business
cycles, etc. — have had volatile price pat-
terns even when commodity agreements
have been in effect. Tea, on the other
hand, has had a relatively stable and
uneventful price history both with and
without a commodity agreement.
Limitations of Stabilization Schemes
The potential gains to be had from
stabilization are relatively modest and
enormously difficult to achieve.
In the first place, stabilization gains
depend importantly on committing a
more appropriate level of resources to
production over time. It is extremely
difficult, however, to determine the cor-
rect level at any given moment. Demand
for many commodities swings in pro-
nounced and erratic cycles. With other
commodities, supply is the more impor-
tant variable. For most, the overall
market is growing, slowly — and
judgments of when to add new produc-
tion are extremely important. Produc-
tion of most commodities must be
developed in sizable units to achieve
economies of scale, and this, too, com-
plicates stabilization. Once such
resources as ore deposits, groves of
trees, and specialized processing
machinery have been committed, they
have little alterative use in the short or
even medium term. Even with an inter-
national agreement, it is difficult to im-
prove resource efficiency.
Any benefits achieved from stabiliza-
tion must also be balanced against the
costs involved. To the extent that they
rely on export controls, commodity
agreements may raise production costs
by locking in the production patterns
that exist at the time of negotiation. In
order to maintain peak efficiency, these
patterns normally would tend to change
with new technology, new opportunities
for resources, new entrants into the in-
dustry, and other factors. The recent
shift of cotton production from the
developed to the developing countries is
such a change, which might well have
been hindered by a strong commodity
agreement. If the agreements encourage
less efficient use of a nation's resources,
that loss of efficiency must be balanced
against the gains in stability.
Finally, of course, producer pro-
ponents of commodity agreements need
to bear in mind that the benefits of
stability in a commodity are shared be-
tween producers and consumers. Ezriel
Brook and Enzo Grilli indicate in an arti-
cle, "Commodity Price Stabilization and
the Developing World," in Finance and
Development, March 1977, that the
source of market instability is a key fac-
tor in the distribution of these benefits,
with producers gaining the principal
benefits only when instability results
from production factors.
On a more pragmatic level, stabiliza-
tion itself can affect resource commit-
ment and lead to increased — and
sometimes surplus — production. Effec-
tive stabilization in the short run
reduces producers' risks — and thus en-
courages them to expand output to the
point where their variable costs are
covered by the minimum price. This
phenomenon has been frequently
documented in connection with
agricultural price-support policies in the
developed nations (notably the United
States). It is also noted in a World Bank
study of the international jute market.
This tendency toward increased produc-
tion undermines even the most limited
goal that has been outlined for commodi-
ty agreements — protecting exporters
with a floor price.
Because agreements require a
political consensus, the economic founda-
tion of some agreements is shaky from
the start. Export quotas are often the
first area of compromise, because pro-
ducing nations threaten not to join
unless they receive attractive quotas.
The second area of compromise, of
course, is price objectives. Producers
argue for higher prices; consumers for
lower. For example, the recently re-
newed cocoa agreement has not been
signed by Ivory Coast, the largest pro-
ducer, because the price range is too
vember 1981
41
Economics
low, while the United States, as the
largest consumer, refuses to join
because it believes the price is too high
and that consequently the agreement, will
be overwhelmed by surplus cocoa. Some
may have believed the price range was
unrealistic but signed the agreement
anyway to avoid seeming obstructionist.
They may have assumed the costs to
them would be small, because such
agreements have a history of breaking
down.
Competition among producers has
probably been the most important factor
in the collapse of stabilization efforts.
Producer incomes, of course, are deter-
mined not only by prices but also by
sales volume. So even when the agree-
ment sets a price range, producers con-
tinue to compete for market shares.
Often producing nations are under
balance-of-payments pressure.
Sometimes they attempt to market some
of their production by subterfuge outside
the agreement. Market pressure almost
always comes from producers who are
not party to the agreement.
Have Commodity Agreements
Enhanced Producer Prices?
Economic theory holds that raising com-
modity prices to artificially high levels
will attract additional production, en-
courage substitution, and cut back quan-
tities demanded. These reactions create
surpluses, and they basically explain
why the price increases achieved by in-
ternational commodity agreements have
been limited to the short run. In fact,
many of the short-term gains have turn-
ed into long-term losses.
Historically, price enhancement was
tried first by individual companies,
which found they lacked the market
power to maintain high prices. It has
been tried by cartels of companies,
which found their prices undercut by
producers outside the cartels. It has
been tried by governments, which found
themselves undercut by producers in
other nations. It has been tried by
groups of producer nations, which found
their markets invaded by nonmember
nations. Finally, it has been tried by
broad alliances of producer and con-
sumer nations, which have not yet
discovered mutual interests strong
enough to survive long-term pressures.
Jere R. Behrman, writing "Stabiliz-
ing Prices Through International Buffer
Stock Commodity Agreements" in Na-
tional Development, May 1980, found
that most of the organized international
arrangements that have attempted to
raise prices have been unsuccessful. He
documented 51 attempts, which lasted a
median 2V2 years each. Even those
which have been successful in the short
run have not lasted long; 4 years has
been their median duration. These
relatively successful efforts have been
associated with "higher concentrations
of production and foreign trade"; more
inelastic demand; fewer possibilities of
short-term substitution; small cost dif-
ferences among producers; and less
government involvement.
The Problem of Increased Production
Increased production has plagued nearly
every commodity agreement. No matter
how high the proportion of existing pro-
duction included in the agreement, out-
put by producers both inside and outside
the agreement tended to increase with
the expectation of price enhancement
and/or stability. Behrman concluded that
organizations that had succeeded for a
time broke down most often due to com-
petition among the members, with com-
petition from nonmembers the second
most frequent cause.
The international commodity
agreements have tried to deal with the
nonmember competition problem in tw< |
ways: by signing up nonmembers and I
including importing nations in the
agreements. Neither approach has
worked very well. Frequently
nonmembers can only be enticed into tl
agreement through attractive quotas oi
other inducements that dilute the
benefits available for the existing
members. When importers are includec
in the agreements, it is often difficult t
agree on price objectives (the recent
cocoa and coffee negotiations illustrate
this).
Competition From Synthetics and
Substitutes
The problem of synthetics and
substitutes may be even more intract-
able in the long run. Modern technolog
has produced major competitors for
nearly every primary commodity (see
Table 1). Sugar is the most recent com
modity to come under heavy attack fro 1
a synthetic product (the new high-
fructose corn sweeteners), and copper
probably under the most varied attack,
from a whole host of technological in-
novations.
For some commodities, the syn-
thetics and substitutes have essentially
set the long-term market prices for the
primary commodities — as in rubber am
jute. In most markets, the substitutes
are an important price factor, as in tin
sugar, and copper. The beverages — col
fee, cocoa, and tea — are the only majo
commodity group whose markets have
not been seriously constrained by out-
side competitors, although cocoa has ft
the impact of extenders.
International Commodity Agreements
as Aid Mechanisms
One of the arguments made for interna
tional commodity agreements is that
Table 2
Past and Projected Rates of Export Growth by Broad Product Groups
(in constant 1975 prices)
Fuel and Energy
Agricultural Products
Non-fuel Minerals
Manufactures
Total Merchandise
Percent of LDC Exports
Percent Share
World
LDCs
World
LDCs
of Increase
1960-75
1960-75
1975-85
1975-85
1960
1975
1985
1960-75 1975-8!
6.3
6.2
3.6
3.4
39
40
30
42 18
4.2
2.6
4.4
3.1
43
27
20
16 12
3.9
4.8
4.2
5.8
7
7
7
6 6
8.9
12.3
7.8
12.2
11
26
43
36 64
7.1
5.9
6.4
6.4
100
100
100
100 100
Source: World Bank, World Development Report, 1978, Tables 13 and 25, and unpublished projections for future WDR issues.
42
Department of State Bulletii k
Economics
y can transfer income from wealthy
;ions to poor ones. However, com-
dity agreements have some serious
itations as aid mechanisms.
• Price benefits are distributed
ong recipient nations on the basis of
ir production rather than their need.
• A commodity agreement price
icy fails to target any economic,
itical, or social goals within a reci-
nt country. Coffee price supports, for
imple, may benefit the plantation
ners more than the coffee workers. A
Agency for International Develop-
nt grant, on the other hand, can be
geted more selectively.
Producing nations will be en-
iraged to increase production, increas-
the costs of the aid and/or diluting
benefits.
The International Coffee Agreement
;he late 1960s and early 1970s came
sest to the idea of transferring
(ources from wealthy importing states
developing exporters. It probably
nsferred $500-600 million per year.
n in this agreement, however, the
ducer-consumer compromise broke
vn rather quickly. Coffee drinkers
elled when they felt prices had risen
c high.
'. iclusions and Policy Implications
I j prices of primary commodities prob-
li / will continue to fluctuate widely in
response to demand, competition, and
long-term production costs. Recent in-
ternational commodity agreements have
not succeeded beyond the limited goal of
protecting modest price floors for
relatively short time periods, and there
is little prospect that future commodity
agreements will be more effective. Even
if an agreement got full government
financing, competition among producers
for increased market shares and exter-
nal competition from substitutes might
drive costs to politically untenable levels.
Moreover, the benefits of true stabiliza-
tion are seldom sufficient to overcome
the diversity of interests among affected
nations.
There is virtually no evidence to in-
dicate that primary commodities can be
utilized to generate much larger
amounts of development capital for
LDCs. The International Tin Agreement
is often pointed to as the most suc-
cessful of the agreements. It has effec-
tively defended its floor price over a
long period (aided by Malaysia's ability
to shut down its gravel-pump tin produc-
tion when prices are unattractive). The
real price of tin has also trended up-
ward, albeit erratically. However, tin
producers have often been squeezed be-
tween rising labor costs and the prices
of competing materials. If tin is, indeed,
the outstanding success story among re-
cent international commodity
agreements, then such agreements hard-
ly seem to offer LDCs a powerful force
for economic growth.
Based on analysis of supply and de-
mand projections for primary com-
modities and on the lack of success in
UNCTAD's integrated program for com-
modities, expansion of manufacturing
appears to be a far more promising
development strategy than reliance on
exports of primary products under the
aegis of international commodity
agreements. In "The Changing Composi-
tion of Developing Country Exports,"
staff working paper 314 of January
1979, the World Bank notes that LDC
exports have shifted dramatically
toward manufactured goods in the last
15 years. Manufactures now account for
nearly half of LDCs' non-oil exports. If
the expansion of manufacturing con-
tinues over the next few years, the
World Bank projects it will lead to an
export growth rate for LDCs roughly
equal to that of the rest of the World.
The Bank notes that the greatest suc-
cess to date has been achieved by the
most advanced LDCs, but that this
situation is changing rapidly as increas-
ing numbers of LDCs move toward
manufacturing (see Table 2).
'Although a major exporter of subsidized
beet sugar, the EC is not a member of the
agreement. Discussions over EC entry into
the International Sugar Agreement are cur-
rently stalled, because agreement controls
would require substantial modification of EC
policy concerning sugar subsidies and ex-
ports. ■
ivember 1981
43
EUROPE
Secretary Haig Visits Europe
Secretary Haig departed
Washington, D.C., on September 11,
1981, to visit Marbella, Spain (September
12) where he met with Saudi Crown
Prince Fahd; Belgrade (September
12-13); West Berlin (September IS); Bonn
(September 13-1 U); and returned to
Washington on September H.
Following are texts of the joint
U.S. -Yugoslav press statement, the
Secretary's address before the Berlin
Press Association, the question-and-
answer session held after that address,
and his news conference in Bonn. 1
U.S.-YUGOSLAV
PRESS STATEMENT,
BELGRADE,
SEPT. 15. 19812
At the invitation of Josip Vrhovec,
Federal Secretary for Foreign Affairs of
the Socialist Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia, Alexander M. Haig, Jr.,
Secretary of State of the United States
of America, paid an official visit to
Yugoslavia from 12 to 13 September
1981.
The President of the Presidency of
the S.F.R. of Yugoslavia, Sergej
Kraigher, received Secretary of State
Haig, who conveyed President Reagan's
greetings to the Presidency of the
S.F.R. of Yugoslavia.
Secretary of State Alexander Haig
laid flowers on the grave of President
Tito.
The talks were held in the friendly,
open, and constructive manner which
characterizes relations between the two
governments. The two sides exchanged
views on the further promotion of
bilateral relations between the two coun-
tries and on current international issues.
The two Secretaries expressed their
satisfaction at the development of rela-
tions and the expansion of cooperation
between the two countries on the bases
established during numerous meetings at
the highest level and in joint statements
of 1971, 1975, 1978, and 1980. The prin-
ciples of independence, sovereignty,
equality, and noninterference formulated
in these meetings and tested in everyday
practice of mutual relations were reaf-
firmed again as a lasting foundation for
long-term cooperation between the two
countries.
Current questions of interest for the
further development of bilateral
cooperation were also covered during
the talks. Special attention was devoted
to how economic cooperation could be
strengthened, a more balanced trade
achieved, and financial and industrial
cooperation promoted.
Attention was also devoted to the
need of exerting additional efforts to
eliminate the danger of terrorism in in-
ternational relations, a problem figuring
on the agenda of the United Nations and
other international fora. The Yugoslav
side expressed its satisfaction at the
steps which are being taken by the
Government of the United States of
America to prevent anti-Yugoslav ter-
rorism on American soil. Secretary of
State Haig stressed his government's
determination to continue this course.
The two sides stated their view-
points on the current international situa-
tion; they concluded that the interests of
peace, security, and development require
greater efforts by all countries. They
agreed on the need to settle disputes by
peaceful means and to surmount major
problems of the contemporary world.
They devoted special attention to the
problems of development and to North-
South relations. In this connection, they
also exchanged views on the forthcom-
ing summit at Cancun.
The two sides stressed the impor-
tance of a continuing dialogue for the
further advancement of the relations
between the two countries on the basis
of equality and mutual respect.
In this context, Secretary of State
Haig expressed respect for the inde-
pendent nonaligned position and policy
of the S.F.R. of Yugoslavia on the inter-
national scene.
Secretary Haig thanked President
Kraigher and his host, Federal
Secretary Vrhovec, and the other
Yugoslav officials he met for the warm
hospitality extended to him and to his
party. Secretary of State Alexander
Haig extended an invitation to Federal
Secretary Josip Vrhovec to pay an of-
ficial visit to the United States of
America. The invitation was accepted
with pleasure.
i!
ADDRESS BEFORE THE
BERLIN PRESS ASSO.,
WEST BERLIN,
SEPT. 13, 19813
A European philosopher once wrote th
"all politics imply a certain idea of man
Twenty years ago, the construction of
the Berlin Wall gave the world dramat
evidence of one view of the human con
dition. This year, as we mark the 20th
anniversary of that wall, I want to
discuss another concept of man, the on
we cherish — the one we are pledged tc
defend.
Our idea of man begins with, is
founded upon, and could not exist
without a deep respect for the rights o
the individual — rights such as freedom
of expression, freedom of religion, andi
the freedom to choose.
A free man is a creative man.
Civilization flourishes when artists and
scientists, philosophers and poets,
scholars and workers can develop their
talents undisturbed. The ability of free
men to work together, whether in
political parties, press associations, fre
enterprises, or labor unions, is essentia
to the creativity of a free society. It is
also the best basis for sustained
economic growth.
But history has taught that there i i
a fine line between the liberty to creatl
and the license to destroy. The
democracies of the West are, therefore
constantly searching for the proper
balance between liberty and license, be
tween responsibility and recklessness.
This creative tension keeps our legal a:
political institutions alive and vigorous.
A pluralistic society with a balance
between individual freedom and the
common good is in itself a revolutionar
idea. Democracy has enabled us to
create unprecedented opportunities for
our citizens. But democracy is also the
heritage of all men. The idea of man as
a creative and responsible individual ha
given a distinctive shape to modern
history. Repeated attempts at repressk
have left it stronger and more appealin
than ever. I believe that the democratic
revolution, with its proof in the perforr
ance of our own societies, is the best
hope for human progress. The
democracies of the West have a unique
privilege — and a compelling obliga-
tion— to promulgate their own revolu-
tionary doctrine throughout the world.
44
Department of State Bulletir
Europe
What is the condition of the
mocratie revolution today? What is its
ture? Let us face reality. We are besel
a multiple challenge to our idea of
an:
First, the danger of a loss of faith in
e capabilities of democratic societies to
al with the challenges of the 1980s;
Second, the danger of adopting a
iuble standard toward international
havior; and
Third, the danger of posing a false
diotomy between the desire for con-
med social progress and the need to
pend resources in defense of the
est.
le Loss of Faith
iday, throughout our alliance, both the
ality of our societies and the future of
r transatlantic relationship are being
tly debated. This is neither unusual
r unhealthy. Democracies have never
en short of critics, and the Atlantic
iance, a free association of nations,
s always been distinguished by the ex-
ange of opinions.
Nonetheless, both the substance and
ne of our debates of late have begun
take a disturbing turn.
' Too many are prophesying a
ture devoid of hope.
• Too many are denigrating
mocracy as weak and indecisive,
•able to cope with the challenge of the
-80s.
> The ever-present critics of NATO
■e once again acting as though the
iance was about to crumble.
Every healthy society goes through
riods of the most arduous soul
arching. But when this becomes com-
Jsive, an end in itself, dire consc-
iences inevitably follow. Excessive
Lrospection, as the American people
.ve sadly learned, paralyzes the will
,d thereby threatens the peace. On
>ch occasions, we must remind
irselves of our values. We must work
restore the balance in society that
akes for creativity. And we must be
reful not to cross the fine line between
■>erty and license. That betrays the
omise of freedom.
• Democracy and the rule of law
knnot survive if we are not prepared to
?fend them.
• Pluralism cannot work if the
terests of one group are advanced at
ie expense of the common good.
• Society cannot advance if violence'
and sabotage come to be regarded as
legitimate methods of achieving personal
and political goals.
Excessive introspection and
pessimism offer no solution to our prob-
lems. We must adopt, instead, a more
tolerant and optimistic attitude. Despite
its difficulties, democracy alone, of all
the world's political systems, honors the
diversity of man. Democracy alone,
The Soviet Union has occupied
Afghanistan. . . .
despite its defects, nurtures the crea-
tivity of man. And democracy alone
safeguards those rights that enable the
individual and his society to grow in
peace. That is why our alliance has
always been able to surmount its prob-
lems. We believe in the genius of the in-
dividual.
Berlin is a good place to strengthen
faith in democratic pluralism. This
thriving city is a superb example of the
success of the West. But there is an
alternative on the other side of the
Berlin Wall. It is a sad spectacle: a
revolution that has lost its appeal.
Slogans that once moved men now bore
them. Institutions that purportedly
offered hope for millions instead oppress
them. Cynicism and pessimism are per-
vasive; writers, artists, poets,
philosophers— the creative spirits of
society— have fled westward in un-
precedented numbers, unable to be
heard in their own countries. The people
of Poland today are engaged in a
danger-fraught effort to extend the
boundaries of freedom so long denied
them.
Armed with this perspective, what
have we in the West to apologize for?
There is concrete evidence throughout
Europe today that offers hope for the
democratic revolution. The people of
Greece, Spain, and Portugal have, over
the past decade, affirmed before the
world that individual rights and
democracy are the keys to the future.
Their optimism and defense of diversity
are widely admired and deserving of
support.
The Double Standard
There is a second danger to the
democratic revolution today that must
be confronted. I detect a growing double
standard in the West toward
appropriate norms of international
behavior: One is a supercritical standard
applied to those who cherish diversity,
tolerate dissent, and seek peaceful
change. Another is a more tolerant
standard applied to those who abhor
diversity, suppress dissent, and promote
violent change.
• The Soviet Union has occupied
Afghanistan since 1979. The Afghans'
religion, culture, and national life are in
danger of destruction. One-fifth of the
entire nation has been exiled. The people
of Afghanistan cherish their freedom.
They are not going to give up their
struggle. But why are the voices of cons-
cience among us which cry out against
this aggression so muted?
• Vietnam, which inspired such
widespread concern in the West not long
ago, has enslaved its southern popula-
tions, has seized Kampuchea, and now
threatens the peace of Southeast Asia.
• Libya, a country which finances
terror and assassinations in countries
far from its borders, has invaded and
occupied its neighbor Chad and calls it
"unification."
Where are the demonstrations
against these outrages? The phrase
"national liberation" has been used to
justify international terror and violence.
Vietnam . . . has enslaved its
southern population, has seized
Kampuchea, and now threatens
the peace of Southeast Asia.
Can a nation be liberated when its
people are deprived of liberty? Can a
nation be free when its independence is
subordinate to the will of a foreign
power? Can a people be uplifted when
innocent civilians are the targets of
terror?
Despite its professions of peace and
good will, the Soviet Union has engaged
in an enormous military buildup beyond
all requirements of self-defense. It has,
as well, armed and encouraged its
proxies to promote violent change that
serves its strategic objectives. All of this
has occurred despite continuing efforts
by the West for arms control and a
relaxation of tensions. Where are the
protests against such Soviet actions?
Democracies invariably expect more
of themselves than of their adversaries.
Our openness, our free press, our
democratic institutions subject our
actions to a relentless criticism that they
do not experience.
Dvember 1981
45
Europe
This is a source of strength and
health for democracies. But when it
paralyzes essential efforts to defend
freedom, as it did in the 1930s, not only
freedom, but peace too, is endangered.
It is Soviet tanks, not NATO's defense
against those tanks, that threaten the
peace of Europe. It is the rapid expan-
sion of Soviet nuclear weaponry in the
European theater that has forced NATO
to respond. We have made clear that we
are equally prepared to respond in a
positive way to Soviet restraint. We
would welcome the reduction of
armaments on both sides. But the hopes
for such reductions will be doomed if our
people succumb to a double standard
Libya . . . has invaded and oc-
cupied its neighbor Chad. . . .
that falsely blames the troubled state of
the world not on aggression but on the
effort to defend against it.
When democracies become too feeble
or too fearful to resist aggressive dic-
tatorships, then who is there to defend
democracy? To us here today, children
of the 20th century, this is more than a
rhetorical question. Are we going to be
blind again?
Once more, terror and intimidation
are being used to silence those who
speak out; once more attacks on
synagogues and churches have become
the instrument of perverted political
causes; once more a totalitarian regime
is invoking the slogans of self-
determination to advance its imperial
ambitions. And at the very time when
the United States is being accused of
delay on arms control, others appear to
be violating one of the oldest arms con-
trol agreements— that prohibiting the
use of toxins.
For some time now, the inter-
national community has been alarmed by
continuing reports that the Soviet Union
and its allies have been using lethal
chemical weapons in Laos, Kampuchea,
and Afghanistan. As a result of this
deep international concern, last fall the
United Nations established an impartial
group of medical and technical experts
to investigate the matter. In spite of this
international attention and action,
however, reports of this unlawful and in-
human activity have continued.
Moreover, we now have physical
evidence from Southeast Asia which has
been analyzed and found to contain
abnormally high levels of three potent
mycotoxins — poisonous substances not
indigenous to the region and which are
highly toxic to man and animals.
The use in war of such toxins is pro-
hibited by the 1925 Geneva protocol and
related rules of customary international
law; their very manufacture for such
purposes is strictly forbidden by the
1975 Biological Weapons Convention.
We are, therefore, taking steps to insure
that this evidence is called to the atten-
tion of states and that it is provided to
both the Secretary General of the
United Nations and to the group of ex-
perts investigating this problem under
his auspices. Tomorrow, in my capital,
the United States will have more to say
on this subject.
Once again, the double standard
threatens to impose blinders on our view
of the world. The democratic revolution
is impugned and criticized. A forgiving
and accepting eye is turned toward
adversaries. But this assault is not
without cost. The Western alliance
either shares the vision of a world of
peaceful change where international
disputes are settled without resort to
force, or it is no alliance. If we become
divided on the basic question of our pur-
poses, if we come to distrust our own
motivations, then the future is indeed
bleak. As Abraham Lincoln once said:
( )ur defense is in the preservation of the
spirit which prizes liberty as the heritage of
all men in all lands everywhere. Destroy this
spirit and you have implanted the seeds of
despotism around your own doors.
Social Progress Versus Defense
There is a third danger to democracy.
We are debating today how to prevent
the Soviet military buildup from up-
setting the balance of power. It is
Where are the demonstrations
against these outrages?
agreed by all knowledgeable students
that our margin of safety has narrowed.
But the democracies are torn by the
argument that our security will actually
be compromised by greater defense
efforts. We are told that the resources
required for defense will come at the ex-
pense of social peace. A dollar more for
the military, so goes the argument in my
own country as well as here in Europe,
is a dollar less for welfare, for health,
and for other necessary social benefits.
p
.:
We have heard this reasoning
before. Its premise is a lack of con-
fidence that a democratic society can
provide for both social progress and an
adequate defense. Yet the democracies
have proven time and time again since
the Second World War that they can
achieve these objectives. The West has
been able to defend itself. And behind
that shield, we have registered extra-
ordinary social progress. Clearly, the
two are complementary. If we are not
prepared to defend ourselves, then we
shall lose the chance to reform our
societies, and if we are not prepared to
seek social justice, then we shall lose th
will — and the reason — to defend
ourselves. Austere economic conditions
will make our task unusually difficult
over the next few years. Nevertheless,
we dare not cast aside the lessons of
history.
I cannot, here today, ignore the
question of a realistic approach to arms-
control. I have said elsewhere that the
purpose of arms control must be to
reduce the risks of war. But arms con-
trol does not proceed in a vacuum. It is
part and parcel of a coherent allied
security policy. That policy stresses the
essential role of balance in the military
field as the very basis for successful
arms control. NATO's 1979 two- track
decision on theater nuclear forces
reflects this philosophy. The Soviet
SS-20s, as [West German] Chancellor
Schmidt has pointed out, were a Soviet
initiative. They are being deployed
steadily. They cannot be wished away.
Nor can a reduction in the threat be
negotiated if we lack the determination
to deny Soviet supremacy. The com-
mencement of formal talks on this issu«
will be high on the agenda of my
meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister
Gromyko later this month. These talks
can succeed only if NATO proceeds witj
its plans to modernize its theater
nuclear forces.
The willingness to defend our value
remains their essential guarantee.
Surely these are things worth fighting
for. The idea of a man as a creative anc
free individual is worth a fight.
Future of the Democratic Revolution
We have recently observed the 20th
anniversary of the Berlin Wall and the
10th anniversary of the signing of the
Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin. Tb
progress achieved in the decade betwee
these two events was made possible by
Western determination to maintain the
security and the freedom of the city,
46
Department of State Bulletii
Europe
iik' at the same time seeking practical
provements in the lives of its in-
bitants.
The Quadripartite Agreement is a
minder of what East and West can
hieve by negotiation. And it is a
minder to us that such success can
ly be achieved by Western persever-
ce and unity. The unity of the
estern allies, the Federal Republic of
rmany, and the Berliners themselves,
s been one of the major reasons for
i continued freedom and prosperity of
rlin over the past 35 years,
nericans are proud of their role in
lintaining the freedom of Berlin and in
otecting stability in and around the
y. Our commitment in Berlin remains
e of the cornerstones of American
gagement in Europe.
It has been said before that free
rlin is an island of liberty in a sea of
alitarianism. Here there is a free
ess; on the other side of that hideous
ill there is none. Here there is
■edom of speech; a few kilometers
ay there is none. In free Berlin, you
■ct those who are to govern; in East
rlin elections are a mockery. And
re Berliners are free to assemble and
demonstrate on behalf of their beliefs;
.st Berliners could not conceive of
;h liberty.
It has not escaped my notice that
' presence here today has brought into
i streets West Berliners who think
s well of me and my country than I
mid wish. In one sense I obviously
Ijret those demonstrations. But in a
I- more important sense, we should all
< iw deep satisfaction from what they
ll us about the strength of democracy
I d the commitment to democratic
I ititutions in this part of Berlin. All the
sguish, all the struggle, and all the
I termination that the allies, the
Ideral Republic of Germany, and West
I rliners have expended over the years
I keep this city free have been worth
I? price.
Many years ago Voltaire, in
leaking of another revolution, said,
J disagree with what you say, but I wiH
J fend to the death your right to say it."
It behalf of my country— and on behalf
I the several hundreds of thousands of
ly countrymen serving in our armed
Irces in Europe— let me close by saying
I at even when we disagree with what
|»u say, we are prepared to defend to
e death your right to say it.
QUESTION-AND-ANSWER SESSION,
WEST BERLIN,
SEPT. 13, 19814
Q. Egon Bahr, one of the leading
social democratic figures, of the
leading government party, has stated
in connection with the production of
nuclear neutron warheads, that the
United States is treating the Federal
Republic as a nuclear protectorate. I
wonder how the President and you are
reacting to such statements?
A. I don't make it a habit of visiting
West Germany or West Berlin or any
other of our allied countries and becom-
ing engaged in a dialogue which would
smack of criticism of internal political
affairs. But I think it is important that I
answer your question, at least to this
degree: memories are short about the
ERW [enhanced radiation weapon] an-
titank system. It is 40,000 Soviet tanks
threatening West European partners,
decided not to deploy the system and to
produce its components.
After President Reagan assumed of-
fice, this production activity had reached
a maturation point where it then became
either fundamentally not cost-effective
and thus, perhaps at great cost, to
either keep the separated system or to
bring them together with greater effi-
ciency in the production schedule. Presi-
dent Reagan made that decision — a
courageous one — and that decision was
to proceed with the joining in the pro-
duction process of the components which
have been under production for a
number of years. He has decided to
stockpile those unified components in
the United States. There has been no
decision to make deployment, and,
should there be such a decision, ap-
propriate consultation will follow. I hope
that the underpinnings of your question
have been adequately answered while
avoiding the pitfalls that your premises
might have engendered.
Q. I have a question which refers
to your skeptical description of our
society as licentious and irrational
and, perhaps after you saw the
demonstration, as underestimating
Communist aggression. My question
is: Is it in your opinion licentious and
irrational for a nation which during
this century was frightfully drained in
two wars, and which is still being
penalized by the division of the coun-
try, to be very actively and seriously
for peace and for the prevention of
fratricide?
jvember 1981
A. Thank you very much for a very
thoughtful question. Be assured that I
do not come here to West Berlin as a
pedantic articulate of a single American
view but, rather I hope, as an objective
observer of a number of trends. The ob-
jective that you and I share in common,
I think, is a universal objective to all
Western nations which participated in
the great Holocaust and the tragedy
that your question describes, which
sacrificed and which have sacrificed
repeatedly even since the conflict to pro-
tect the right, the privileges, and the in-
dividual liberties of our people,
sometimes with prudence and vision,
sometimes perhaps with something less.
The real question at hand here is are
we pursuing policies which are going to
effectively prevent the tragic outcome
that you describe, or can we mislead
ourselves, as we have in the past, by
registering misleading signals to those
who would breach the peace? Here is
perhaps where you and I part ways. It's
my view that the best prevention of
miscalculations on the part of Eastern
leaders in Moscow is their assessment of
our firm determination and our credible
abilities to defend the rights which you
and I so cherish, and that when we
mislead them, either by our own internal
rhetoric or disunity or confusion, we are
most likely, not less, to bring about the
very outcome you and I seek to prevent.
Q. In light of the discrepancies
which have come to light during the
last few months between the Federal
Republic and the United States of
America, what are the main themes of
your discussions you will have in
Bonn?
A. As an individual who has served
here in Europe as a NATO commander
and, therefore, with ecumenical at-
tributes, I could think back over the last
5 years, and I suppose there is nothing
unusual about the level of disagreement.
I made the comment early last year, this
year, that if I were to make a prediction
as to what would be the greatest area of
potential difficulty in the Western world
at large and in the transatlantic sense in
particular, it would have been the grow-
ing consequences of our economic dilem-
mas, and clearly, that has proven to be
the case. And it should be no surprise.
I don't think it's unusual that in
times of economic difficulty, we would
be looking one to the other for relief and
there is no question that the U.S.
behemoth — the economic behemoth — its
policies and its travails — are immediate-
ly transmitted in this global area of in-
47
Europe
terdependence to our friends and allies
abroad, and incidentally, in a global
sense as well. I think it was the
Chancellor yesterday who attributed two
problems as he saw it: escalating oil
costs and we all know that to be the
case, it has been the case for some time;
the other, an American policy of high
American interest rates.
I beg to differ with the Chancellor,
and I seldom do that, that that is the
policy of the U.S. Government; it is not,
because we are plagued with it to the
same degree that you are here in
Western Europe.
The question really before us in that
area is whether we are going to ar-
tificially manipulate that issue, thereby
extending and perhaps deepening and
broadening the very factors that have
brought us to this dilemma today:
runaway inflation, declining productivi-
ty, and, perhaps in some respects, over
management. I must say that the
mainstream of relationships — bilateral
between West Germany and
Washington — could never be better and
have not, in my recent memory, been on
a higher plane. We have a number of
very important issues facing us, not just
the economic. These consultations that I
will conduct tonight and tomorrow
morning will focus clearly on the upcom-
ing U.N. General Assembly meeting that
we will jointly, although in separate
fora, have with Foreign Minister
Gromyko and it's important that we
speak as a united Western world; discus-
sions of the very important Cancun sum-
mit coming up in Mexico in October,
where for the first time Western in-
dustrialized states will sit down at the
table with the so-called developing
world. It is an extremely important in-
itial meeting.
We will discuss arms control and the
formal initiation of the TNF [theater
nuclear forces] talks with the Soviet
Union before the end of this year. And
in that regard for the first time,
American negotiators are going to have
to be very carefully constrained by
European considerations because we're
dealing with systems which have a direct
effect on European security. That means
there are going to be intense, intimate,
and continuous consultations between
American negotiators and our West
European partners, and we will discuss
that at some length.
Q. Could you clarify for us a por-
tion of your speech in which you are
talking about the chemical and
biological weapons? Are you saying
48
that the physical evidence from
Southeast Asia seems to suggest il-
legal biological weapons? Are you say-
ing that it looks as though these were
supplied by the Soviet Union?
A. What I am saying is just exactly
what I said: that we now have firm
evidence of the utilization of such
weapons in Southeast Asia. I am not go-
ing to jump ahead of a formally sched-
uled presentation in Washington tomor-
row which will provide for you far
greater detail on the subject. I was us-
ing it in my text today to underline the
dangers of the double standard. I'm
sorry, I will not go further.
Q. In your speech, you mentioned
Poland briefly. Poland lies only 80
kilometers, as you know, to the east
of us. Could you possibly give us your
opinion as to why the Soviet Union ap-
pears until now to have shown some
restraint in their policy toward Poland
and has not intervened militarily as
was, of course, and still is, an immi-
nent possibility? And the second part
of my question would be: Do you see
any danger to the situation of Berlin
should the Soviet Union abandon this
reticence?
A. That's a very interesting ques-
tion. I think it would be hard for
anyone, short of the Kremlin leaders
themselves, to finitely offer a value
judgment on why thus far — and I
welcome that fact — the Soviet leader-
ship has stayed detached, certainly in a
direct degree to the events in Poland to-
day. One could surmise and speculate on
a number of motivations for that
restrained policy, which, again I
underline, we welcome. It could be a
recognition of the consequences of such
an intervention in military, political, and
economic terms, and in all of those
categories the cost would be horrendous.
We have made, in the West, very
clear our position on this issue, and that
is what we feel, and we have been
unified from the first moments of this
developing crisis, that the Polish people
have the right and must be able to work
out their internal arrangements in
accordance with their own desires and
procedures. Perhaps that, too, and that
unity of Western articulation has made a
contribution to the welcomed Soviet at-
titude. One can only register once again
how strongly Western leadership feels
about that and the great consequences
and lasting consequences that would
follow some change in the current Soviet
policy.
Q. We have all welcomed the an-
nouncement that there will be a
presentation tomorrow on the Soviet
Union using chemical weapons. I
remember when you were at NATO
not so long —
A. I used the term mycotoxins.
Q. — when you were at NATO no
so long ago after Chancellor Schmidt
broached the subject of the SS-20 foij
the first time in 1977 in London, som
of my colleagues would have liked to
see a picture of an SS-20. They still
want to. Do you think we'll see one i
the coming few weeks?
A. I've seen them, and I can attest
to the fact that they are there. Now yo
will see some information that is about
to be furnished on this subject and a
number of other military-related threat
topics in the very near future.
Q. But there are certain bits in
this about the lack of protest, about
the lack of demonstrations. But do
you think that public opinion in
Europe is being given proper evident
on topics like [inaudible] internation;
terrorism or chemical warfare? I can
see any hardcore, if I may say, infor-
mation on these subjects.
A. I get your message, and I thint
it's clear that some of the misinforma-
tion or, more importantly, disinforma-
tion running rampant not only here in
Western Europe but in my own countr
and throughout the free world suggest
that the time has come for us to do a
somewhat better job of laying out pre-
cisely what we are faced with so that
our people can make objective judg-
ments instead of having to rely on mis.
formation for their source of judgment
Q. The President called it the wii
dow of vulnerability; the Secretary o
Defense says we are facing a dan-
gerous decade. The question is the
nuclear supremacy, the nuclear deter
rence. One gets the impression in
Washington that leading personalitie
in the Administration have the feelin
that the Soviet Union has nuclear
superiority and could strike against
the United States and wipe out your
land-based system. I just wonder
whether that is so or whether the
United States does still hold the
nuclear deterrence in a very effective
way.
A. I just hope that, when you use
that term "leading officials in the
American Government" that I was in-
cluded in that elite group. I suppose
Department of State Bulleti
Europe
fere's an old saying: "It ain't what you
1 but the way that you do it." It was a
feg. Frequently, rhetoric can be the
feree of perception as well as reality.
Let me say a word about the stra-
|ric nuclear balances which your ques-
bn focused upon. It is very important
r the American people, who have to
Jtit the bills, if you will, for the
rategie improvements we are seeking
(understand that there is a reason for
I? sacrifices that President Reagan is
Icing them to make — to rearm — and
I substantial. You will note that the
Icision was announced last evening
lit the President is going to maintain
Id retain an extremely high level of
mense spending despite all the eco-
Imic anguish that we are jointly ex-
Iriencing.
I Foremost in that allocation of funds
111 be modernization decisions with
fcpeet to America's strategic nuclear
fever. What we have been pointing out
i Washington — those in that
J.tinguished elite you referred to — is
lit we have not lost the strategic
llance that exists between the Soviet
liion and ourselves. I like to think we
111 have a nodule of edge there,
I >ecially in terms of reliability,
I'hnical quality of systems. What we
me been dramatically pointing atten-
t n to is the fact that the trends, if they
e i not reversed or had they been
Imbedded in the so-called SALT II Trea-
I which has been rejected — and I am
Iry thankful for that — would have
red us and will in the future, if we
I n't take remedial steps, with im-
6 lances which will become increasingly
cngerous during the period 1982
| chaps to the later 1980s and beyond
jit if we don't take appropriate steps.
We pointed out also that because of
lomalies in heavy ballistic 19s — high-
j'ld ballistic systems, land-based — and
I I limitations of American land-based
litems — we all know the number,
lout a thousand Minutemen,
l:ans — that if we don't take moderniza-
I n steps we are going to be at a severe
l;advantage in that particular category.
}> particular category is very impor-
lit, because (a) it's instantaneous in its
fcponse character and (b) it is capable
| growth, and the Soviet Union had the
Isdom to foresee that many years ago
lien they went with huge systems.
I >w that they have fractionalization at
leir disposal they have a potential for
Ipid expansion of warhead capacity.
le have to deal with this, and I don't
fent our views or I don't want the audi-
Ice to believe that we, in our rhetoric
today, are suggesting that we are not up
to today's threat. We are, 1ml we've got
to take additional steps if we are to be
up to tomorrow's threat.
NEWS CONFERENCE,
BONN,
SEPT. 14, 19815
First, I want to express my great
pleasure at this opportunity to meet
with our West German and European
allies and my traveling press corps from
the United States. This has been an ex-
tremely valuable visit for me although a
very short one. It's a visit which is
designed to continue with the very, very
close level of consultation that has been
initiated with Foreign Minister
Genscher. From the outset of the
Reagan Administration, I have met the
Foreign Minister on frequent occasions
in Washington, Cancun, Rome, and else-
where. And we have spoken regularly
over the telephone, and we exchange
messages consistently. The reason for
this is the conviction of President
Reagan that the German-American rela-
tionship is a fundamental aspect of the
entire American relationship here in
Europe, the NATO alliance, and the
framework of the Atlantic Community
as well.
I've used this visit as an opportunity
to exchange views on a very busy and a
very important upcoming diplomatic
season. First, the General Assembly of
the United Nations session which will
commence this month in New York. And
this visit provided an opportunity for me
to exchange views with my old friend
and colleague and the dean of our
Western diplomatic corps, Foreign
Minister Genscher, on the discussions
that will take place in New York — and
most particular those that will take
place with Foreign Minister Gromyko of
the Soviet Union — to be sure that our
views were both coordinated and com-
patible. And as always, they are pre-
cisely that.
Secondly, this was an opportunity to
exchange views on the very important
and highly dynamic process of medium-
range missile discussions and the two-
track decision arrived at in December of
1979 and reaffirmed this past spring in
Rome.
Third, we had an opportunity to ex-
change views on the very, very impor-
tant and significant meeting — and really
perhaps the first such meeting — in Can-
cun between the leaders of the de-
veloped world and the developing world.
And I benefited immeasurably from
Foreign Minister Genscher's insight into
this important conference. As you know,
this visit also afforded me an opportu-
nity yesterday in West Berlin to
underline unequivocally the unswerving
and continuing support of the United
States of America and of President
Reagan's Administration for the con-
tinued freedom, vitality, and well-being
of the free city of West Berlin.
I think that describes the purposes
of our discussions well enough.
Q. [Inaudible; concerned enhanced
radiation weapon consultation process
between U.S. and European partners.]
A. Let me assure you that any
criticism we receive directly or indirectly
from our friends and allies here in
Western Europe is a matter of impor-
tant concern to President Reagan and to
myself. Your question involves the
recently announced American decision to
continue on with the procedures ap-
proved some years ago by President
Carter to produce the components of the
neutron antitank system. At that time,
you'll recall, there was also controversy.
Many at that time felt here in Western
Europe that we should have proceeded
with both the production and deploy-
ment. Subsequently, we decided to con-
struct the components.
That production process, if you will,
had become mature this past spring, and
it required a decision to continue on with
it with the efficient merger of the two
components and the stockpiling of the
system in the United States, or cost-
effective considerations would have been
thrown out the window. And it was in
the light of that that President Reagan
decided to continue on with the process
initiated by President Carter to merge
the components of the system, to
stockpile them in the United States, and
not to make a decision to deploy this
system to Europe. Since this was a
unilateral U.S. decision which did not af-
fect our European partners, we notified,
prior to the announcement, our Euro-
pean partners of this decision. Beyond
that I think it is very important that
everyone in Western Europe understand
that should at some point it become
desirable to deploy such systems, such
deployments will only follow the most
careful consultation with those nations
upon whose soil the system would be
deployed. And that is especially true
here in West Germany. I hope I've
answered your question, and I apologize
for going into such great detail.
Member 1981
49
Europe
Q. You didn't answer my question
completely.
A. I think I've just done so by
outlining for you specifically how we got
from where we were to where we are
today. I also made it very clear that we
are always concerned by criticism, either
guarded or direct, from our European
partners, and we respond to that
criticism. I certainly have explained
while here precisely what I just ex-
plained to you when this subject was dis-
cussed in our consultative meeting. I
don't know what more you want in
answer to your question.
Q. Under what circumstances
could it be desirable to deploy neutron
warheads in Western Europe and how
much of a veto West Germans and
allies have, and also [inaudible] report
today deployment of the TNF beyond
December 1983 in West Germany?
A. With respect to your first ques-
tion, I think it's very premature to
speculate when, under what condition
the deployment of the American systems
now being stockpiled would be made. I
think it is sufficient to say that should,
in the future, conditions suggest that it
would be in our mutual benefit to do so,
that there will be complete and total
consultation with respect to it with those
nations upon whose soil such deployment
was contemplated.
With respect to the second part of
your question, I read that story with
some interest and, I must say, with
some surprise this morning and believe
it was a Washington or Rome byline
from a Washington correspondent,
which confuses me as to where it came
from. But be that as it may, there is ab-
solutely no truth to the story. The TNF
two-track procedure is precisely on
schedule. We are proceeding along the
two lines agreed to in December 1979
and reaffirmed this past spring in Rome
which called for plans to deploy cruise
and improved Pershings and the early
initiation of medium-range arms control
talks with the Soviet Union. That would
be a topic, incidentally, which will surely
come up in my meeting with Mr.
Gromyko at the United Nations this
month, in which I anticipate both the
time — the specific time for the initiation
of these talks — and the location of these
talks will be agreed upon. And that
visualizes, as you know, a commence-
ment— a formal commencement — of the
negotiations before the end of this year.
I am very confident that that will re-
main on track.
Q. Is the so-called zero option ac-
ceptable to the United States?
A. I think that it is premature to
get too definitive on this subject,
because sometimes the terminology itself
means different things to different peo-
ple on either side of the demarcation
line. But I think I can affirm that we
have not rejected this zero-option pro-
posal, and under ideal conditions such a
proposal might be very worthy of ex-
ploration and consideration.
Q. [Inaudible; concerned
F.R.G.-U.S. coordination on arms to
Saudi Arabia.]
A. I'll fill in my half of the answer
by reaffirming once again that both the
Carter Administration and President
Reagan's current Administration have
been continuing with a process of a pro-
vision of certain aircraft to the Govern-
ment of Saudi Arabia and that we are
now contemplating a continuation of
that process with the enhancement of
the aircraft already agreed to and a cer-
tain aerial reconnaissance known as
AW ACS [airborne warning and control
system aircraft] capability which will
also be provided to Saudi Arabia.
As you know, this is a somewhat
controversial issue in my own country.
President Reagan is committed to pro-
viding— to making this sale with Saudi
Arabia. We feel it is a vitally important
step to be taken in the broadening of
our regional interests and activities in
the Middle East, that it will contribute
to peace and stability in the area which
has been threatened by external or
proxy activity increasingly in recent
months and years. And I would include
in such activity the activity we're
witnessing today in Afghanistan; the
changing circumstances in Iran; Soviet
proxy activity through Cuban forces in
Ethiopia; the Southern Yemen situation;
and the efforts made recently to over-
throw Northern Yemen. All of these
represent and constitute serious threats
to overall Western interests. It is the
President's view that the provision of
this additional capability to Saudi Arabia
will strengthen Western interests. And
we would include in that ultimately the
interests of the State and people of
Israel as well.
Q. [Inaudible; concerned the Haig-
Gromyko talks and how many SS-20
missiles are they going to discuss.]
A. I haven't done my latest
arithmetic, but I believe the statistics
are in the neighborhood of over a thou-
sand warheads, and I think it was some
750-800 SS-20 warheads.
Q. [Inaudible; concerned NATO
two-track decision and what comes
first, deployment or talks.]
A. Let me emphasize that what we
are talking about was precisely what
was agreed upon in December 1979 anc
reaffirmed in Rome on the dual track.
And the answer to your question is not
preconceived notion on the part of the
United States but rather a direct
measure of the progress we make with
the Soviet Union and their willingness 1
arrive at some point as soon as these
discussions begin, at some arrangement
which have the effect of influencing the
track of the two-track decision you are
asking about. And I think my answer Ui
the zero-option question is clearly
related.
Q. [Inaudible; concerned Saudi
Arabian eight-point program for a
Middle East solution and other Midd!
East questions.]
A. I think we had three questions
there. One was the American comment
on Crown Prince Fahd's recent eight-
point peace proposal for the Middle
East. The second question, I think, I in
terpret to be as whether or not the Mic
die East remains an exclusive realm foi
the Soviet Union or the United States,
assume you mean by that a con-
dominium arrangement? And the last
question was the neutrality of Malta.
With respect to the eight points, we, oil
course, welcome any proposals from
whatever source that would offer a pro
pect for a lasting peace in the Middle
East.
I discussed the eight-point proposal
with His Royal Highness the Crown
Prince in Spain on Saturday morning a
some length. I think we have a shared
prospective on these eight points. We,
on our side, as a result of the meetings
in Washington between President Sada
and Prime Minister Begin, rededicated
to continuing within the Camp David
framework with the autonomy talks
which will commence under, I think, an
increased impetus and momentum this
September 21 and 22 in Cairo where thj
United States will be a full partner and'
will be represented. And I am hopeful
there will be progress along those lines
With respect to the exclusive realm
or condominium question, it would be
presumptuous and incorrect to suggest
that the Middle Eastern area or region
is the exclusive purview of two super
powers that you mentioned. Review the
Middle East as an area of responsibility
for the people of that region, first and
foremost. But we are also concerned
50
Department of State Bulleti |
Europe
ien external threats develop to the in-
pendence and sovereignty and
:edom of the peoples of that region,
>m whatever source.
Third, with respect to Malta, the
iltese orientation is a measure of the
cision of the people of Malta to make
d not for some outside visitor from
ishington.
Q. Yesterday in your speech you
ggested strongly that the Soviets
e using chemical weapons in
utheast Asia. Can you offer us
ything more in the way of proof?
lid how do you react to the Soviet
nials?
A. As I pointed out yesterday, a
;her detailed statement is being made
Washington today with respect to this
uation. I happen to have gone over
! text of that statement this morning,
m very comfortable with it, but that
;he venue, that is the location where
s issue will be discussed further. And
I emphasized yesterday, all the
dence now held by the United States
)eing transmitted to the United Na-
ns for introduction into the special in-
itigating committee that has been
med. And I would like to leave it
ht there.
Q. Regarding the peace move-
nt, is it a dangerous tendency?
A. No, I think I commented on that
a vject at some length yesterday in my
i?ech in West Berlin. Clearly, very
ious and knowledgeable people are
remely concerned today as they
i tch the level of armaments grow, and
v at could be described as a mindless
I y between East and West. We are all
a -iously concerned about these trends.
^ lere we sometimes have dif-
t ences — and they are genuinely held
d ferences — is how best to prevent the
U lization of these armaments; it's not
| armaments themselves. They are not
I I in their own rights. It's the use to
liich they may be put. And these are
• ferences between serious people.
It has always been my view that
iiflict emerges when imbalances, real
I perceived, develop between people
lth genuine differences. And one can
lly say that we are in a competitive
jige with the Soviet Union today — and
J '11 remain so for an extended
Iriod — and, therefore, if the West
lilaterally refrains from maintaining its
l;ention to necessary military balances,
I' may be, indeed, inviting the use or
lb weaponry which concerns us so
Iich today. History is replete with
stark examples of such self-decision. So
I don't view this as anything more than
an objective assessment by honest peo-
ple how best to achieve the same out-
come. It is the obligation of those in
government and those who hold other
views to reiterate those views as
thoroughly and convincingly as they can.
I attempted to do that to some degree in
West Berlin yesterday.
Q. Has there been anything in the
talks with Chancellor Schmidt and
Foreign Minister Genscher which
could alter the way in which America
approaches the upcoming talks with
Mr. Gromyko?
A. I think we always benefit from
the kinds of consultations that we have
been conducting here in Bonn and with
our other European partners. They
always have an impact on our judgments
with respect to positions we take in
East- West relations and alliance-related
matters, and, indeed, with Third World
relationships as well. The answer to
your question is, "of course." And that's
the way it should be if consultation is to
be true consultation.
Q. There is nothing you could
specify?
A. I would not give you a check list.
I would also be less than frank if I were
to suggest to you that, fundamentally,
our basic views do not converge. There
are nuancial differences, differences in
concern about one issue or another and I
think you know some of them — some
are in the economic area, some are in
the rhetorical area. But I think, basical-
ly, there is a fundamental convergence.
And from that I draw nothing but great
encouragement as a result of my visit
here.
Q. [Inaudible; concerned the
United States having global interests,
with Europe being only one of several
areas Washington has to deal with.]
A. Who were you quoting, please?
Mr. Allen [Richard V. Allen, Assistant
to the President for National Security
Affairs). Then it goes without question, I
agree. Let me not leave you with a dum-
dum response. It is true that America is
a global power. It is true that the United
States has responsibilities in Asia, in
Latin America, in the Middle East, and
that in the pursuit of those respon-
sibilities it involves sacrifice and
resources from the United States. And I
think what Mr. Allen was pointing out
to a European audience was that
America's sacrifices and burdens in the
security area are not exclusively here in
the NATO context. That's always been
so, and I think all of us here in
Europe — and I use that word "us" think-
ing in my former position — benefit im-
measurably from that, very importantly.
And especially as the world becomes in-
creasingly independent, there is no con-
flict between that reality and the part-
nership concept which must underlie not
only the NATO alliance but the Atlantic
community of nations as well — those of
us who share common values.
1 Press releases related to this trip and
not printed here are Nos. 306, 308, 309, and
310 of Sept. 15, 1981, and 313 of Sept. 17.
-Press release 307 of Sept. 15.
^Press release 300 of Sept. 12.
4Press release 300A of Sept. 15.
5Press release 314 of Sept. 17. ■
President's Letter
to President Brezhnev
DEPARTMENT STATEMENT,
SEPT. 22, 19811
On September 22, President Reagan
sent a letter to Soviet President
Brezhnev outlining his views on the
future of U.S. -Soviet relations and
describing his desire for a constructive
relationship with the Soviet Union that
will lead to a free and more peaceful
world community.
I cannot give you a copy of the let-
ter. What I can do is give you a sense of
its contents and perhaps put it in the
general themes in which the President
addressed President Brezhnev. The
general thrust of it is as follows.
The United States is vitally in-
terested in the peaceful resolution of in-
ternational tensions and in a stable and
constructive relationship with the Soviet
Union. To achieve better U.S.-Soviet
relations, the United States is fully
prepared to discuss with the Soviet
Union the entire range of issues dividing
the countries; to seek significant,
verifiable reductions in nuclear weapons;
to expand trade; and to increase con-
live m be r 1981
51
Europe
tacts at all levels of our societies.
However, the United States is more in-
terested in actions than in words which
further the cause of peace.
It is necessary to emphasize that a
truly stable and constructive relationship
must be built upon restraint and
reciprocity, quite frankly, we believe,
elements which have been missing from
many Soviet actions in recent years.
These are two aspects of such Soviet ac-
tions which have been of particular con-
cern to the United States:
• The U.S.S.R.'s unremitting and
comprehensive military buildup over the
past 15 years, a buildup far exceeding
Soviet defensive needs and one which
carries disturbing implications of a
search on the part of the Soviet Union
for military superiority and
• The Soviet Union's pursuit of
unilateral advantage in various parts of
the world through direct and indirect
use of force in regional conflicts — the
role of Cuba in Africa and Latin
America is particularly destabilizing.
Needless to say, the United States is
also highly concerned about the situation
in Poland. It is our strongly held view
that this situation can only be dealt with
by the Polish people themselves. Any
other approach would have serious con-
sequences for all of us.
Despite these disturbing trends, the
United States is committed to a dialogue
with the U.S.S.R. on critical, geopolitical
issues and to negotiations that would
lead to genuine arms reduction.
We are looking forward to the com-
ing meeting in New York between
Secretary of State Haig and Foreign
Minister Gromyko, as we are hopeful
that these meetings will start just such a
process. Specifically, we hope the
meeting will produce agreement on the
time and place for negotiations between
our two countries on theater nuclear
forces. The United States is strongly
committed to achieving a military
balance in this area — a balance which
has been upset by the unprecedented
buildup of Soviet SS-20 missiles.
We, our allies, and other nations
have proposed negotiated solutions to
significant problems that threaten world
peace, such as the presence of occupa-
tion forces in Afghanistan and Kam-
puchea. As we have stated at the CSCE
[Conference on Security and Coopera-
tion in Europe] meeting in Madrid, we
also are prepared to participate in
negotiations to fashion a coherent
system of commitments on European
security that are both verifiable and
militarily significant. We have made or
we support concrete proposals for prog-
ress in all three of these areas, but the
Soviet Union has turned its back on all
of these proposals for negotiations.
While committed to a stable and
peaceful world, the United States is not
willing to accept a position of strategic
disadvantage which will endanger our
free society. The United States does not
want to tax our citizens and economy
with a costly, burdensome arms race,
but we will invest whatever is necessary
to maintain a secure strategic posture.
The United States is fully prepared to
take into account legitimate Soviet in- Ii
terests, if the Soviets are willing to do
the same with ours.
In sum, the United States is hopefu
that we can succeed in establishing a
framework of mutual respect for each
other's interest and a mutual restraint
the resolution of international crises, a
framework that will create a more solic
and enduring basis for U.S. -Soviet rela-
tions than we have ever had before.
'Made available to news correspondents
in New York by Department spokesman
Dean Fischer. ■
Forgery, Disinformation,
and Political Operations
The following paper was prepared in Oc-
tober 1981 by the Department of State in
response to requests for information
from a number of individuals, private
groups, and foreign governments.
In late 1979, agents of the Soviet Union
spread a false rumor that the United
States was responsible for the seizure of
the Grand Mosque of Mecca.
In 1980, a French journalist was con-
victed by a French court of law for acting
as a Soviet agent of influence since 1959.
In August 1981, the Soviet news
agency TASS alleged that the United
States was behind the death of Panama-
nian leader Omar Torrijos.
These are three examples of a stream
of Soviet "active measures" that seek to
discredit and weaken the United States
and other nations. The Soviets use the
bland term "active measures" (aktivuyye
meropriyatiya) to refer to operations in-
tended to affect other nations' policies, as
distinct from espionage and counterintel-
ligence. Soviet "active measures" include:
• Written or spoken disinformation;
• Efforts to control media in foreign
countries;
• Use of Communist parties and
front organizations;
• Clandestine radio broadcasting;
• Blackmail, personal and eco-
nomic; and
• Political influence operations.
None of this is to be mistaken for the
open, accepted public diplomacy in which
virtually all nations engage extensively.
Public diplomacy includes providing press
releases and other information to jour-
nalists, open public broadcasting, and a
wide variety of official, academic, and
cultural exchange programs. By contra
Soviet "active measures" are frequently
undertaken secretly, sometimes violate
the laws of other nations, and often in-
volve threats, blackmail, bribes, and ex
ploitation of individuals and groups.
Soviet "active measures" do not al-
ways achieve Moscow's objectives. In
some cases, Soviet operations have faile
because of ineptitude or because target*
individuals or governments have re-
sponded effectively. However, Soviet "a
tive measures" have had some success,
and they remain a major, if little under-
stood, element of Soviet foreign policy.
The approaches used by Moscow in
elude control of the press in foreign couh
tries; outright and partial forgery of
documents; use of rumors, insinuation, .
tered facts, and lies; use of internationa
and local front organizations; clandestine
operation of radio stations; exploitation
a nation's academic, political, economic,
and media figures as collaborators to in-
fluence policies of the nation.
Specific cases of Soviet "active
measures" included here are: the Soviet
anti-theater nuclear force (TNF) cam-
paign in Europe; the Soviet anti-"neutrc
bomb" campaign; Soviet activities in suj
port of the leftists in El Salvador; the
Soviet campaign against the U.S.-Egyp
relationship and the Camp David proces
"Active measures" are closely inte-
grated with legitimate activities and
Soviet foreign policy. Decisions on "activ
measures" in foreign countries are made
at the highest level of authority in the
U.S.S.R.— in the Politburo of the Com-
munist Party Central Committee — as ai
52
Department of State Bulle
'
Europe
1 other important decisions of Soviet
reign policy.
The activities are designed and exe-
ited by a large and complex bureaucracy
which the KGB and the International
epartment of the Communist Party of
le Soviet Union (CPSU) Central Com-
ittee are major elements. The Interna-
jnal Information Department of the
PSU Central Committee is also deeply
lgaged in such activities. Actual opera-
)ns abroad are carried out by official
id quasi-official Soviet representatives,
eluding scholars, students, and jour-
lists, whose official Soviet links are not
ways apparent. The highly centralized
ructure of the Soviet state and the
ate's pervasive control and direction of
II elements of society give Soviet leaders
lipressive free use of party, government,
Sid private citizens in orchestrating "ac-
we measures."
The open societies of the industrial
rmocracies and many developing na-
|>ns, and the ease of access to their news
ledia, often give Soviets open season for
Ictive measures." Many Western and
I veloping countries ignore or downplay
(iviet "active measures" until Soviet
1 cinders lead to well-publicized expul-
nns of diplomats, journalists, or others
i solved in these activities. The Soviets
le adept at making their policies appear
1 be compatible or parallel with the
1 ;erests of peace, environmental, and
< ner groups active in Western and de-
■ loping societies.
By contrast, the Soviet Union denies
i cess to its mass media for foreigners
1 10 might criticize Soviet society or the
i*eign policies of the U.S.S.R.
While the United States remains the
) imary target, Moscow is devoting in-
^ easing resources to "active measures"
! ainst the governments of other indus-
1 alized countries and countries in the
i veloping world. Moscow seeks to dis-
ipt relations between states, discredit
I ponents of the U.S.S.R., and under-
lie foreign leaders, institutions, and
j lues. Soviet tactics adjust to changes in
Lernational situations but continue, and
j some cases intensify, during periods of
iduced tensions.
jlctive Measures" Techniques
lie tactics and emphasis of Soviet "ac-
J'e measures" change to meet changed
l.uations. For instance, Soviet use of
larxist-Leninist ideology to appeal to
f reign groups often turns out to be an
Lstacle to the promotion of Soviet goals
I some areas; it is now being deem-
Hiasized though not completely aban-
Lined. At the same time, some religious
themes — notably the Soviet assertion
that the Islamic religion occupies a favor-
able position in the U.S.S.R. — have as-
sumed greater significance, as Moscow
courts Islamic countries in Africa and the
Middle East.
Similarly, while Soviet-dominated in-
ternational front groups still are impor-
tant in Soviet "active measures" abroad,
Moscow is broadening its base of support
by using more single-interest groups and
fronts formed for particular purposes to
promote its goals.
Soviet "active measures" involve a
mix of ingenious and crude techniques. A
brief sample of types of activities includes
the following.
Efforts to Manipulate the Press in
Foreign Countries. Soviet agents fre-
quently insert falsely attributed press
material into the media of foreign coun-
tries. In one developing country, Soviets
used more than two dozen local jour-
nalists to plant media items favorable to
the U.S.S.R. Soviets have also used the
Indian news weekly Blitz to publish
forgeries, falsely accuse Americans of
being CIA personnel or agents, and dis-
seminate Soviet-inspired documents. In
another country, the Soviets used local
journalists to exercise substantial control
over the contents of two major daily
newspapers.
Forgeries. Soviet forgeries — com-
pletely fabricated or altered versions of
actual documents — are produced and cir-
culated to mislead foreign governments,
media, and public opinion. Recent Soviet
forgeries are better and appear more fre-
quently than in the past. Among
forgeries that Soviet agents have pro-
duced and distributed are bogus U.S.
military manuals and fabricated war
plans designed to create tensions be-
tween the United States and other coun-
tries. In some cases, the Soviets used ac-
tual documents passed to the KGB by
U.S. Army Sergeant Robert Lee Johnson
(who was eventually arrested and con-
victed as a Soviet agent) as models for
style and format in Soviet forgeries. In
one case, Soviet agents, seeking to dis-
rupt NATO theater nuclear force modern-
ization, circulated a forged "top secret"
letter from Secretary of State Cyrus
Vance to another Western foreign
minister.
Disinformation. Soviet agents use
rumor, insinuation, and distortion of facts
to discredit foreign governments and
leaders. In late 1979, Soviet agents
spread a false rumor that the United
States was behind the seizure of the
Grand Mosque of Mecca. In another case,
Soviet officials "warned" officials of a
West European country that the CIA had
increased its activities in the country and
that a coup was being planned. Some-
times these disinformation campaigns ap-
pear in foreign media suborned by the
Soviets, enabling Moscow to cite foreign
sources for some of the distortions and
misstatements that often appear in the
Soviet media. A recent and particularly
egregious example was the August 1981
TASS allegation that the United States
was behind the death of Panamanian
General Omar Torrijos.
Control of International and Local
Front Organizations. Moscow controls
pro-Soviet international front organiza-
tions through the International Organi-
zations Section of the International
Department of the CPSU Central Com-
mittee. Front organizations are more
effective than openly pro-Soviet groups
because they can attract members from a
broad political spectrum. Prominent
among these fronts are the World Peace
Council, the World Federation of Trade
Unions, the World Federation of Demo-
cratic Youth, and the Women's Interna-
tional Democratic Federation. Moscow's
agents use Soviet "friendship" and cul-
tural societies in many countries to con-
tact people who would not participate in
avowedly pro-Soviet or Communist or-
ganizations. The function of front,
"friendship," and cultural groups is to
support Soviet goals and to oppose
policies and leaders whose activities do
not serve Soviet interests.
To complement organizations known
for pro-Soviet bias, the Soviets some-
times help establish and fund ad hoc front
groups that do not have histories of close
association with the Soviet Union and can
attract members from a wide political
spectrum.
Clandestine Radio Stations. The
Soviet Union operates two clandestine
radio stations: the National Voice of Iran
(NVOI) and Radio Ba Yi, which broad-
cast regularly from the Soviet Union to
Iran and China. Moscow has never pub-
licly acknowledged that it sponsors the
stations, which represent themselves as
organs of authentic local "progressive"
forces. The broadcasts of both of these
Soviet stations illustrate the use of "ac-
tive measures" in support of Soviet for-
eign policy goals. For instance, NVOI
broadcasts to Iran in 1979-80 consistently
urged that the American diplomatic
hostages not be released, while Soviet of-
ficial statements supported the hostages'
claim to diplomatic immunity.
svember 1981
53
Europe
Economic Manipulation. The
Soviet Union also uses a variety of covert
economic maneuvers in "active measures"
operations. For example, a Soviet am-
bassador in a West European country
warned a local businessman that his sales
to the U.S.S.R. would suffer if he went
ahead with plans to provide technical as-
sistance to China. In another industrial-
ized country, Soviet agents sought to in-
crease local concern over the stability of
the dollar by driving up the price of gold.
This was to be accomplished by manipu-
lating a flow of both true and false infor-
mation to local businessmen and govern-
ment leaders. The gambit failed because
the Soviet officials who attempted to
carry it out did not fully understand the
financial aspects of the operation.
Political Influence Operations.
Political influence operations are the most
important but least understood aspect of
Soviet "active measures" activities.
These operations seek to exploit contacts
with political, economic, and media fig-
ures in target countries to secure active
collaboration with Moscow. In return for
this collaboration, Soviet officials offer
inducements tailored to the specific re-
quirements or vulnerabilities of the in-
dividual involved. In 1980, Pierre-Charles
Pathe, a French journalist, was convicted
for acting as a Soviet agent of influence
since 1959. His articles — all subtly push-
ing the Soviet line on a wide range of in-
ternational issues — were published in a
number of important newspapers and
journals, sometimes under the
pseudonym of Charles Morand. The jour-
nalist also published a private newsletter
which was regularly sent to many news-
papers, members of parliament, and a
number of foreign embassies. The Soviets
used Pathe over a number of years to try
to influence the attitudes of the promi-
nent subscribers to his newsletter and to
exploit his broad personal contacts.
In other cases, Soviet officials estab-
lish close relationships with political fig-
ures in foreign countries and seek to use
these contacts in "active measures" oper-
ations. Capitalizing on the host govern-
ment official's ambition, his Soviet con-
tact claims to be a private channel to the
Soviet leadership. To play upon his sense
of self-importance and to enhance his
credibility within his own government,
the host government official may be in-
vited to meetings with high-level Soviet
leaders. The Soviets then exploit the
local official to pass a mixture of true,
distorted, and false information — all cal-
culated to serve Soviet objectives — to
the host government.
Use of Academicians and Jour-
nalists. Soviet academicians, who often
are accepted abroad as legitimate coun-
terparts of their non-Soviet colleagues,
frequently engage in "active measures."
Unlike their free world counterparts,
they must play two roles— their legiti-
mate academic pursuit of knowledge for
its own sake and their political activities
on behalf of the Kremlin. Soviet aca-
demicians are obliged to obey instructions
from bodies which plan and control Soviet
"active measures" activities. Similarly,
Soviet journalists often engage in "active
measures" operations in addition to serv-
ing as representatives of Soviet news
agencies. One KGB officer in an industri-
alized country used his journalistic cover
to pass forgeries, as well as to publish
numerous propaganda articles aimed at
influencing the media of the host country.
Case Studies
The Soviet Anti-TNF Modernization
Campaign in Europe. The Soviet cam-
paign in Europe against NATO TNF
modernization is a good illustration of
Soviet use of "active measures." After a
long and unprecedented buildup of Soviet
military strength in Europe, including the
deployment of new SS-20 nuclear mis-
siles targeted on Western Europe, the
NATO ministers in December 1979 de-
cided to modernize NATO's TNF capabili-
ties. The Soviets immediately began an
ongoing, intensive campaign to develop
an environment of public opinion opposed
to the NATO decision. (Of course, not all
opposition to the TNF modernization de-
cision is inspired by the Soviet Union or
its "active measures" activities.)
In this campaign, Soviet diplomats in
European countries pressured their host
governments in many ways. In one
European country, the Soviet ambassador
met privately with the Minister of Com-
merce to discuss the supply and price of
oil sold by the Soviet Union to that coun-
try. During the discussion, the ambas-
sador gave the minister a copy of Leonid
Brezhnev's Berlin speech dealing with
TNF. He suggested that if the host gov-
ernment would oppose TNF moderniza-
tion, the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Af-
fairs might persuade the Soviet Ministry
of Foreign Trade to grant more favorable
oil prices.
Moscow has spurred many front
groups to oppose the TNF decision
through well-publicized conferences and
public demonstrations. To broaden the
base of the anti-TNF campaign, front
groups have lobbied non-Communist par-
ticipants, including antinuclear groups,
pacifists, environmentalists, and others.
■:
In some cases, the activities of these
broad front groups have been directed b\,
local Communist parties. Soviets have
predictably devoted the greatest re-
sources to these activities in NATO coun-
tries where opposition to the TNF mod-
ernization decision is strongest.
In the Netherlands, for example, th(
Communist Party of the Netherlands
(CPN) has set up its own front group —
Dutch Christians for Socialism. In
November 1980, the Dutch "Joint Com-
mittee— Stop the Neutron Bomb— Stop
the Nuclear Armament Race," which has
ties to the CPN, sponsored an interna-
tional forum against nuclear arms in
Amsterdam. The forum succeeded in at
tracting support from a variety of quar-
ters, which the CPN is exploiting in its
campaign to prevent final parliamentary
approval of the TNF decision.
The Soviet Campaign Against En-
hanced Radiation Weapons (ERW). Th<
Soviets, throughout 1977 and early 1978,
carried out one of their largest, most ex-
pensive, and best orchestrated "active
measures" campaigns against enhanced
radiation (neutron) weapons. (Again, not!
all opposition to the U.S. decision to pro-
duce the enhanced radiation weapon is
Soviet inspired.)
This Soviet campaign has had two
objectives: first, to halt deployment of
ERW by NATO; second, to divide NATO
encourage criticism of the United States
and divert Western attention from the
growing Soviet military buildup and its
threat to Western Europe and the world.
• Phase one occurred throughout th
summer of 1977. The Soviets staged an
intense propaganda blitz against ERW
and the United States, involving numer-
ous demonstrations and protests by vari<
ous "peace councils" and other groups.
This phase culminated in a Soviet-
proclaimed international "Week of
Action."
• Phase two began in January 1978
with Soviet propaganda exploitation of a
letter from Leonid Brezhnev to Western
heads of government warning that pro-
duction and deployment of ERW consti-
tuted a serious threat to detente. A bar-
rage of similar letters from members of
the Supreme Soviet went to Western par
liamentarians. Soviet trade union official
forwarded parallel messages to Western
labor counterparts.
• Phase three came in early 1978
with a series of Soviet-planned confer-
ences, under different names and covers
designed to build up the momentum of
anti-ERW pressure for the U.N. Special
Session on Disarmament of May-June
\
54
Department of State Bulletinl
Europe
1)78. These meetings and conferences,
kid throughout February and March,
lere organized either by the World Peace
lounci] or jointly sponsored with estab-
phed and recognized independent inter-
ptional groups.
The Soviet campaign succeeded in
implicating allied defense planning and
cusing criticism on the United States,
top Hungarian Communist Party offi-
al wrote that "the political campaign
gainst the neutron bomb was one of the
ost significant and successful since
forld War Two." The propaganda cam-
lign did not end in 1978; it was incorpo-
.ted into the anti-TNF effort. With the
cent U.S. decision to proceed with
RW production, the Soviets have begun
new barrage of propaganda and related
ctive measures."
Soviet "Active Measures" Toward
1 Salvador. Complementing their overt
iblic support for the leftist insurgency
El Salvador, the Soviets have also en-
iged in a global "active measures" cam-
lign to sway public opinion. These ac-
idities include a broad range of standard
ichniques, including forgeries, disinfor-
iation, attempted manipulation of the
ress, and use of front groups. The obvi-
i is dual purpose has been to increase
. pport for the insurgency while trying
i discredit U.S. efforts to assist the
I jvernment of El Salvador.
In 1980, Salvadoran leftists met in
avana and formed the United Revolu-
mary Directorate (DRU), the central
ilitical and military planning organiza-
m for the insurgents. During the same
hriod, the Salvadoran Revolutionary
jmocratic Front (FDR) was estab-
l.hed, with Soviet and Cuban support, to
: present the leftist insurgency abroad.
'ie FDR and DRU work closely with
' ibans and Soviets, but their collabora-
Im is often covert.
The FDR also supported the estab-
i ;hment of Salvadoran solidarity commit-
les in Western Europe, Latin America,
lanada, Australia, and New Zealand,
laese solidarity committees have dis-
Iminated propaganda and organized
jeetings and demonstrations in support
j the insurgents. Such committees, in
1'operation with local Communist parties
lid leftist groups, organized some 70
pmonstrations and protests between
lid-January and mid-March 1981 in West-
jn Europe, Latin America, Australia,
|id New Zealand.
The FDR and DRU are careful to
mceal the Soviet and Cuban hand in
fanning and supporting their activities
id seek to pass themselves off as a fully
[dependent, indigenous Salvadoran
movement. These organizations have had
some success in influencing public opinion
throughout Latin America and in West-
ern Europe. The effort of the insurgents
to gain legitimacy has been buttressed by
intense diplomatic activity on their be-
half. For example, at the February 1981
nonaligned movement meeting in New
Delhi, a 30-man Cuban contingent, coop-
erating closely with six Soviet diplomats,
pressed the conference to condemn U.S.
policy in El Salvador.
At another level, the Soviet media
have published numerous distortions to
erode support for U.S. policy. For exam-
ple, an article in the December 30, 1980
Pravda falsely stated that U.S. military
advisers in El Salvador were involved in
punitive actions against noncombatants,
including use of napalm and herbicides.
In another particularly outrageous dis-
tortion, a January 1, 1981, article in the
Soviet weekly Literaturnaya Gazeta
falsely stated that the United States was
preparing to implement the so-called
centaur plan for "elimination" of thou-
sands of Salvadorans.
Campaign Against the U.S.-
Egyptian Relationship and the Camp
David Process. In the Middle East,
Moscow has waged an "active measures"
campaign to weaken the U.S. -Egyptian
relationship, undermine the Camp David
peace process, and generally exacerbate
tensions. A special feature of Middle East
"active measures" activities has been the
use of forgeries, including:
• A purported speech by a member
of the U.S. Administration which insulted
Egyptians and called for "a total change
of the government and the governmental
system in Egypt." This forgery, which
surfaced in 1976, was the first of a series
of bogus documents produced by the
Soviets to complicate U.S. -Egyptian
relations.
• A forged document, allegedly pre-
pared by the Secretary of State, or one of
his close associates, for the President,
which used language insulting and offen-
sive to President Sadat and other Egyp-
tians and also to other Arab leaders, in-
cluding King Khalid of Saudi Arabia. This
forgery was delivered anonymously to the
Egyptian Embassy in Rome in April
1977.
• A series of forged letters and U. S.
Government documents, which criticized
Sadat's "lack of leadership" and called for
a "change of government" in Egypt.
These forgeries surfaced in various loca-
tions during 1977.
• A forged dispatch, allegedly pre-
pared by the U.S. Embassy in Tehran,
which suggested that the United States
had acquiesced in plans by Iran and Saudi
Arabia to overthrow Sadat. This forgery
was sent by mail to the Egyptian Em-
bassy in Belgrade in August 1977.
• A forged CIA report which
criticized Islamic groups as a barrier to
U.S. goals in the Middle East and sug-
gested tactics to suppress, divide, and
eliminate these groups. This forgery sur-
faced in the January 1979 issue of the
Cairo-based magazine Al-Dawa.
• A forged letter from U.S. Ambas-
sador to Egypt Herman F. Eilts, which
declared that, because Sadat was not
prepared to serve U.S. interests, "we
must repudiate him and get rid of him
without hesitation." This forgery surfaced
in the October 1, 1979 issue of the Syrian
newspaper Al-Ba'th .
Conclusion
The Soviet Union continues to make ex-
tensive use of "active measures" to
achieve its foreign policy objectives, to
frustrate those of other countries, and to
undermine leadership in many nations.
On the basis of the historical record,
there is every reason to believe that the
Soviet leadership will continue to make
heavy investments of money and man-
power in meddlesome and disruptive op-
erations around the world.
While Soviet "active measures" can
be exposed, as they have often been in
the past, the Soviets are becoming more
sophisticated, especially in forgeries and
political influence operations. Unless the
targets of Soviet "active measures" take
effective action to counter them, these
activities will continue to trouble both in-
dustrialized and developing countries. ■
ovember 1981
55
Europe
NATO and Nuclear Deterrence
by Richard Burt
Address before the Arms Control
Association Conference in Brussels on
September 23, 1981. Mr. Burt is Director
of the Bureau of Politico-Military
Affairs.
NATO's decision of December 1979 to
deploy long-range cruise and ballistic
missiles in Europe and to pursue an
arms control negotiation with the
U.S.S.R. concerning theater nuclear
forces (TNF) have stimulated a debate
which now transcends the military and
political rationale upon which that deci-
sion was based. At issue are not com-
parative range, accuracy, and mobility of
U.S. and Soviet systems; the proper
components of a Eurostrategic balance;
or the comparative advantage of sea-,
air-, or land-based systems. Today many
who challenge the decision of December
1979 do so not on the grounds that
there are better means of linking the
U.S. strategic deterrent to Europe, but
because they believe that Europe's
security should not depend upon nuclear
deterrence of any type. To such fun-
damental objections, it avails little to
argue the merits of ground-launched
cruise missiles over sea- and air-
launched cruise missiles or to explain
why it makes sense to replace the Persh-
ing I with the Pershing II. To counter
such objections, one must begin with a
vision of Europe and of Europe's place
in the world.
The View from Moscow
The Soviet Union sees Western Europe
as an appendage of the two super-
powers. Europe is relegated to a second-
class status, its security a dependent
function of the Soviet Union's. East
Europeans may be forced to accept such
discrimination, but certainly we in the
West are not.
This anti-European vision of Europe
is expressed in myraid ways. Soviet
commentators tell us that the new U.S.
Pershing missile represents an unaccept-
able threat to the Soviet Union because
it would provide the Soviet Union only a
5-minute warning of an attack. Yet what
warning time of a comparable Soviet
nuclear attack does Western Europe
have? Thirty seconds, perhaps.
The same sort of patronizing atti-
tude is inherent in the Soviet concept of
56
"forward-based systems." Somehow this
term, even in Western parlance, refers
only to American forces. It is never
taken to mean Soviet missile and air
forces massed in East Germany, Poland,
Hungary, or Czechoslovakia, which
threaten Western Europe. In other
words, the American military presence
in Western Europe is depicted as an un-
natural, historical aberration while the
Soviet military hegemony over Eastern
Europe and its preoccupation with West
European security policies is viewed as a
natural Soviet right.
The Soviet Union thus presumes
that Western Europe should have more
sympathy for problems of Soviet securi-
ty than the Soviet Union does for that of
Western Europe. And, remarkably,
often we do on this side of the Atlantic
and on mine, for frequently we do not
dismiss these self-serving Soviet proposi-
tions with the derision they deserve. On
the contrary, we elevate them to the
status of intellectually respectable
arguments and give them serious con-
sideration in our domestic debates.
That the Soviet Union should put
forward such propositions is evidence of
how the Soviet Union treats its allies,
and how it thinks about Western
Europe. That anyone in the West finds
merit in them is evidence that the
Soviets have begun to affect how we
think of ourselves.
Nothing more graphically illustrates
the Soviet Union's vision of Europe than
their position on theater nuclear arms
control. For a decade the Soviet Union
insisted that U.S. forces in Western
Europe should be counted in SALT
[Strategic Arms Limitation Talks], but
not Soviet forces in Eastern Europe.
Only when confronted by the alliance's
LRTNF [long-range theater nuclear
forces] decision of 1979 were the Soviets
forced by NATO's cohesion and resolve
to fall back from this position, simply to
adopt a new series of equally patronizing
proposals.
In 1979 the Soviets claimed a
nuclear balance existed in Europe. But
they kept deploying SS-20 missiles
targeted against Western Europe. In
1980 the Soviets again said a balance ex-
isted and offered a moratorium on new
missiles. But they kept deploying
SS-20s. In 1981 the Soviets once again
claim a balance exists. They again offer
a moratorium. But they still keep
deploying SS-20s.
If any one of these Soviet
statements regarding an existing
balance were correct, the other two
would, by definition, have to be wrong,
for the West has deployed no new
missiles since 1979, while the Soviets
have during this same period deployed
over 500 SS-20 warheads, not to speak
of significant numbers of other new
missile and nuclear-capable aircraft now
targeted on Europe.
In fact, none of the three Soviet
claims was true. Few in the West have
ever thought they were. The Soviet
technique in this instance is, however,
more subtle than just their traditional
resort to disinformation and deception,
for in offering a moratorium at widely
disparate levels, the Soviet Union is
really asserting that it has a right to
nuclear as well as conventional
superiority in Europe. The Soviet Union
is insisting that Western Europe does
not have a right to call upon American
strength to counterbalance Soviet power
and geographical advantage. This is the
message behind the moratorium. Like
other forms of subliminal advertising, it
takes root slowly and imperceptibly.
More remarkably yet, the Soviet
Union has attempted to attribute to the
United States a view of Europe which is
its own. The Soviet Union, in training,
in doctrine, and in the structure of its
forces, is prepared to fight a nuclear
war in Europe. I am not suggesting tha
the Soviets intend to provoke a war. Bu
if a war comes, the Soviets are ready to
escalate rapidly to the nuclear level.
They have trained and equipped their
forces to prevail in such an environment
And they have structured and positionec
their forces to limit the conflict to ter-
ritory outside the U.S.S.R.
The United States, on the other
hand, has for 30 years linked its fate
with that of its European allies. In 1979
the United States responded positively
to the desire of those allies to have
deployed in Europe new systems, which
could reach deep into the Soviet Union,
to demonstrate that it could not
devastate Europe from a Russian sanc-
tuary— that any war in Europe would
result in unacceptable damage to the
U.S.S.R.
The United States took this step in
the full knowledge that the Soviet Union
would most likely respond to an attack
on its homeland by U.S. systems in
Europe with an attack on the United
Department of State Bulletin fc,
Europe
ites. Thus the emplacement of long-
lge U.S. cruise and ballistic missiles in
irope makes escalation of any nuclear
,r in Europe to involve an intercon-
ental exchange more likely, not less,
is is why our allies asked for such a
ployment. This is why the United
ites accepted. This is why the deploy-
:nt strengthens deterrence.
Nevertheless, the LRTNF decision is
e of the most controversial security
ues to have gripped the nations of the
iance. On reflection, this should not be
"prising: Nuclear weapons raise pro-
ind moral, political, and strategic
)blems that must concern thoughtful
jple in healthy democracies. But in
view the LRTNF debate also clearly
nonstrates that we in the West are in
nger of losing sight of our vision — the
jstern vision — of European security,
vernments on both sides of the Atlan-
have not sufficiently explained to new
nerations of Americans and Euro-
ins how the Atlantic alliance con-
ues to offer a vision of Europe consis-
it with its security needs and its
itical values.
e Atlantic Vision
Iroughout modern history, Europe has
Ibn the battleground where mankind's
list intense, extended, and destructive
Inflicts have been waged. Twice in this
D ltury, war has devastated the contin-
tl it, leaving 50 million Europeans dead.
St since 1945, despite the proximity of
Bieavily armed hostile power, Europe
I i enjoyed a period of peace and pros-
p -ity unparalleled in the experience of
II .nkind. How was peace secured? How
n 5 it been maintained?
By the middle of the 20th century
t' ever-quickening pace of European
rt rfare was brought to a halt by two in-
ii/ations in Western strategic thought —
■ lective defense and nuclear deter-
I ice. In those early postwar years, the
■ions of Western Europe, along with
ti' United States and Canada, formed
I alliance based upon the principle that
I hreat to one was a threat to all. The
lective of their alliance was purely
Jrensive. Their strategy was one of
l;errence. These nations sought to
Irk together to minimize the risk of
r by maximizing the risk to any
tential aggressor of engaging in war.
particular, the United States, the
ongest member of the new alliance,
claimed that it would regard an at-
ik on its European allies as an attack
itself and committed its full military
power to deter such an attack. This com-
mitment remains today the foundation
of American defense and foreign policy
and the cornerstone of European
security.
NATO's Three Pillars
NATO is an alliance of nations
separated by 3,000 miles of ocean. The
geopolitical situation of each ally is in
some way unique; the threat it faces in
some way different. Adversary forces
are deployed throughout an area border-
ing directly on NATO's most populous,
developed, and vulnerable regions.
Geography thus provides the Warsaw
Pact significant advantages. The Soviet
Union can project military force in cen-
tral Europe more easily and more quick-
ly than can the United States. In conse-
quence, it has been difficult for NATO —
throughout its history — to provide a ma-
jor conventional force sufficient in itself
to insure its defense.
In order to defend this wide expanse
of territory and to deter aggression
against it at any point, NATO has come
to rely on strategy based upon three in-
terrelated types of forces. At one end of
the spectrum are NATO's conventional
forces. The role of these forces is to
meet any aggression at the level it oc-
curs, and, if possible, to force the enemy
to cease his aggression and withdraw.
At the other end of the spectrum are
America's intercontinental-range nuclear
forces, which represent the ultimate
guarantee of Western security. Between
the two are the alliance's nuclear
weapons deployed in Europe, which link
NATO's conventional forces and
intercontinental-range systems based on
U.S. soil. The presence of these nuclear
systems in Europe insures that the
deterrent value of America's strategic
forces fully underwrite the defense of
Europe. They underscore to a potential
aggressor that there are no cir-
cumstances in which it could gain a vic-
tory over NATO's conventional forces
without running the risk of nuclear
escalation.
The development of this strategy
was not without difficulty for the
alliance. In the 1950s, with the
nightmare of the 1939-45 war fresh in
people's minds, there was less concern
about lowering the nuclear threshold
and a greater willingness to accept the
risk of a nuclear exchange in order to
keep the conventional threshold as high
as possible. Thus early attempts to
bolster conventional defense in Europe
met with resistance from those who
feared that those efforts meant that the
United States no longer wished to
shoulder the responsibilities of the
nuclear umbrella. As Soviet nuclear
capabilities grew, however, concern
shifted to also encompass the now more
familiar worry that moves to strengthen
NATO's theater nuclear capabilities
have, as their ulterior motive, the
confinement of any nuclear weapon to
European territory.
These conflicting concerns led to the
development in the early 1960s of
NATO's strategy of flexible response.
This strategy tied U.S. strategic forces
firmly into a "seamless web" of conven-
tional, theater nuclear, and strategic
nuclear forces. The concept which
underlies the strategy of flexible
response is that neither Western Europe
nor the United States must bear all the
burdens or run all the risks of deterring
war — everyone must do their part. The
purpose of building up conventional and
nuclear forces in Europe in the 1960s
was not to supplant the deterrent role of
U.S. strategic forces but to make their
use in major conflict appear more credi-
ble, thus enhancing overall deterrence.
But NATO's flexible response
strategy was challenged, at its inception,
when the Soviet Union in the early
1960s began to deploy large numbers of
intermediate-range ballistic missiles
(IRBMs)— SS-4s and SS-5s— as well as
a formidable force of frontal aviation, all
of which was designed to target
Western Europe. The motivation for this
Soviet buildup was almost certaintly
political as well as military. Just as
NATO theater nuclear systems were
designed to link Europe more closely
with America's strategic arsenal, so
Soviet systems targeted upon Europe
were meant to break that link, to isolate
Europe, to threaten it from a Russian
sanctuary which Europe could not in
turn put at risk, and so to hold Europe a
nuclear hostage.
The expansion of the Soviet IRBM
force, coupled with Moscow's advantage
in conventional forces, brought to reality
a prospect which Europe had long
faced — the possibility that a nuclear
conflict might be limited to Europe. For
over a decade, however, this threat was
successfully met, not by an expansion of
U.S. nuclear forces in Europe, but by an
increase in the U.S. strategic arsenal in
the 1960s along with the development of
British and French nuclear systems.
During this period, and into the 1970s,
American strategic superiority provided
the margin of security which permitted
shortfalls in other areas of NATO's force
structure.
vember 1981
57
Europe
Changing Strategic Environment
The Soviet buildup has now continued
for more than a decade beyond the end
of the U.S. strategic buildup of the
1960s. It has continued through a period
when the West persued policies of
detente, when the United States cut its
military budgets, and when NATO
undertook virtually no nuclear force
modernization. These Soviet actions
have had a direct impact on the
alliance's ability to implement its deter-
rent strategy of flexible response.
Soviet force improvements have oc-
curred at all levels and in all areas. Ma-
jor improvements have occurred in the
conventional forces facing Europe, the
Far East, and the oil-rich regions of
Southwest Asia. Major improvements
have occurred in Soviet airborne and
seaborne forces capable of projecting
Soviet power into regions further afield.
Major improvements have also occurred
in Soviet intercontinental nuclear forces
and nuclear forces targeted on Europe.
In this latter area, the Soviets have
developed and are rapidly deploying new
generations of short-range, medium-
range, and long-range nuclear missiles,
as well as several new types of nuclear-
capable aircraft.
Thus, at the conventional level, the
Soviet Union threatens Europe directly
through its local superiority in numbers
and increasingly modernized forces, as
well as indirectly through its ability to
project force into other regions of vital
interest to Europe, such as the Persian
Gulf. The growth in the Soviet conven-
tional threat places a heavier burden on
NATO's nuclear deterrent to keep the
peace. Yet, at the same time the Soviet
Union has achieved parity in intercon-
tinental-range nuclear forces, it has
moved into position of clear superiority
in those nuclear forces deployed in or
targeted on Europe. In consequence,
NATO's deterrent is being eroded at a
time when the need for it is being
heightened.
Although the Soviets over the last
decade have enhanced their military
capabilities across the board, they have
given a high priority to the buildup of
their theater nuclear forces threatening
Europe. The deployment of the MIRVed
[multiple independently-targetable re-
entry vehicle] mobile SS-20 gives the
Soviet Union a capability to hit, ac-
curately and in great number, targets
located anywhere in Western Europe
from locations deep within the Soviet
Union, far beyond the range of any of
NATO's European-based systems. In the
58
spring of this year [West German]
Chancellor Schmidt wrote that the in-
troduction of the SS-20 "has upset the
military balance in Europe and created
for itself an instrument of political
pressure on the countries within the
range of the SS-20, for which the West
so far has no counterbalance."
Today, SS-20 missiles are still being
deployed in ever-increasing numbers.
There are currently 250 SS-20 missiles
deployed, carrying 750 warheads, along
with 350 SS-4 and -5 missiles, for a
total of 1,100 long-range missile
warheads. At the same time, the Soviets
have undertaken a comprehensive pro-
gram of improvement and modernization
of short- and medium-range missile
forces threatening Europe, including the
SS-21, -22, and -23, and of new air-
craft with nuclear capability and mis-
sions, such as the Backfire, Fencer,
Flogger, and Fitter.
NATO's Response
The comprehensive nature of the grow-
ing Soviet threat requires a comparably
comprehensive NATO response in order
to sustain NATO's deterrent strategy
and so maintain a stable peace. NATO
must improve its capability to meet and
defeat aggression at the conventional
level. To do so, NATO must maintain
and, where possible, increase current
force levels while regaining its tradi-
tional superiority in the quality of its
military equipment, training, and morale
of its force * with which the West has
hitherto compensated for Warsaw Pact
conventional advantages. The nuclear
threshold will not be raised by degrading
the capability of nuclear forces. Unfor-
tunately those who seem to worry most
about lowering the nuclear threshold
seem among those least inclined to sup-
port the conventional modernization
needed to raise it.
Yet improving NATO's conventional
posture is not enough. For NATO to
maintain the credibility of its deterrent
strategy, it must shore up the link be-
tween the intercontinental and
European-based nuclear systems. The
Soviet Union must never be allowed to
assume that there exists any level of
conflict at which it could conclude
hostilities victoriously, or that it can
limit a conflict to Europe. In particular,
the Soviet Union must never be permit-
ted to believe that under any cir-
cumstances Soviet territory could serve
as a sanctuary from which nuclear
strikes in Europe could be launched
without fear of retaliation in kind. To
allow even the perception of such a gap1
in the deterrent to emerge would offer
fresh opportunities for Soviet political
coercion.
The steps NATO has taken to sus-
tain its deterrent strategy include U.S.
and allied conventional force improve-
ment, now underway, and a deploymen
in the United States of a more sur-
vivable intercontinental missile system
designed to reduce the growing
vulnerability of the existing U.S. land-
based missile force. An equally critical
step in sustaining deterrence was the
alliance's decision of December 1979 to
modernize its long-range nuclear forces
by deployment of 464 ground-launched
cruise missiles and the replacement of
108 Pershing ballistic missiles with a
model of greater range.
This decision to modernize NATO's
long-range nuclear forces was a par-
ticularly important part of the overall
NATO response to the Soviet buildup.
The new systems will be mobile, and
they will disperse in times of crisis, thu
enhancing the survivability of NATO
nuclear forces and reducing the danger
of a Soviet preemptive attack. The ver
existence of NATO's nuclear forces cor
pel any aggressor to disperse its forces
more widely and adopt less efficient
modes of conventional attack even at 1
early stages of any conflict. These new
systems can also reach into the Soviet
Union. Thus their deployment to Euro)
will reinforce the Soviet leadership's
realization that Soviet territory cannot
be a sanctuary in wars from which Ion; ,
range missiles like the SS-20, or aircn
like the Backfire, could threaten
Western Europe with nuclear destruc-
tion. Finally, these systems, like other
NATO nuclear systems, will be based i
a number of member countries. They
thus demonstrate the concept of sharec
risk, shared effort, and shared security
upon which the Western alliance is
based.
When TNF modernization is seen i >
this broader context of Western deter-
rence strategy, the myths which have
come to surround alliance decision of
December 1979 melt away.
• The deployment of long-range
cruise and ballistic missiles to Europe
does not move NATO away from its e>
isting strategy of flexible response
Rather, the LRTNF decision is essentii
to sustaining NATO strategy. In par-
ticular, this deployment will link more
firmly the alliance's existing nuclear
forces in Europe to the U.S. strategic
deterrent.
Pi
Department of State Bullet :.«
..
Europe
j • This deployment was not thrust
I the United States upon the Euro-
pns. Rather it represents a considered
Jieriean response to a widely felt
iropean need for an evolutionary ad-
Jtment of NATO's capabilities to take
tount of the onset of strategic parity
p the massive and continuing buildup
[Soviet theater forces, such as the
1-20.
i • The deployment does not give the
lance a qualitatively new capability.
e United States has had systems in
rope capable of striking the Soviet
ion since 1952. This new deployment
1 permit NATO to retain that capabili-
and retain that element of our deter-
lt strategy despite improvements in
viet air defense, the aging of our own
items, an increasing need to commit
iTO's aircraft resources to conven-
nal roles, and large-scale new
loyments of Soviet TNF.
• This deployment does not increase
alliance's reliance upon nuclear
napons. Rather, in providing NATO a
1 re balanced theater nuclear force,
lis planned deployment has already
emitted a significant net reduction in
] er and more vulnerable nuclear
piapons located in Europe.
• This deployment does not repre-
b it a step toward the development of a
I .TO nuclear war-fighting capability. It
B .he Soviet Union which is developing
t! • capability to fight and win a nuclear
in r in Europe. This deployment will
I ce upon them the realization that
h iTO will not fight a war on their
I ms, will not permit them to
r ;ionalize a conflict to exclude their
b ritory, and will not permit them to
b d Europe a nuclear hostage.
I eater Nuclear Arms Control
Be 1979 LRTNF decision not only
p imises enhanced prospects for deter-
■ ice of war in Europe, it also holds out
1 ■ prospect of a serious effort to
irotiate reductions in U.S. and Soviet
i; ^ater nuclear forces. As a result of
fiiTO demonstrating the resolve to
ndernize its TNF, the Soviet Union
Us been persuaded to put on the
ajotiating table, for the first time,
J dear forces that threaten the allies.
1 thout modernization there would be
■ prospect of limiting the Soviet
■clear threat to Europe.
I I take no credit for noting that
jbrence Nightingale's injunction regard-
|j hospitals— that their first task was
I avoid spreading disease — applied
tmally to arms control. An arms con-
troller's first imperative is to limit arms
in ways which do not make wars more
likely. The Reagan Administration
believes that if arms control is to rein-
force the prospects for peace, it must be
closely integrated with defense and
foreign policies of its practitioners.
The United States is committed to
making arms control a coherent, sup-
portive part of its total national security
program. We recognize that arms con-
trol, properly pursued, helps to reduce
the threat we face and contributes to
stability and peace.
Last July, Secretary of State Haig
outlined the principles which will guide
the United States as it enters into
theater nuclear arms control as well as
other arms control talks.
• Arms control will be an instru-
ment of, not a replacement for, a
coherent alliance security policy.
• We will seek balanced arms con-
trol agreements.
• Arms control must include effec-
tive means of verification and
mechanisms for security compliance.
• Our strategy must consider the
totalilty of various arms control pro-
cesses, not only those that are being
specifically negotiated.
• We will demonstrate our
seriousness by insisting that whatever
the scope of negotiations, we are
prepared to accept reductions to the
lowest possible level based on equal,
balanced limits on comparable systems.
This very day Secretary Haig is
meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister
Andrei Gromyko. They will discuss, and
I hope agree, to begin theater nuclear
arms control negotiations in the next 2
months or so. Consistent with the prin-
ciples Secretary Haig outlined in July,
the United States will press in those
negotiations with all the strength, skill,
and pursuasion it can summon for
equitable, verifiable, and global limits in
theater nuclear forces at the lowest
possible levels. The burden will be on the
Soviet Union to move from propaganda
to real arms control, to abandon its one-
sided proposals, to reduce the number of
these weapons in Europe, and to reach
an agreement which will enhance the
security of East and West alike.
The U.S. position in these negotia-
tions is being worked out in closest con-
sultations with our NATO allies.
Throughout the spring and summer of
this year, NATO's special consultative
group and high level group have been
meeting regularly to establish a common
alliance view on the threat we face,
NATO's needs in the nuclear area, and
our arms control objectives. These
alliance consultations, of unparalleled in-
tensity, will continue once U.S. -Soviet
negotiations begin later this year, in
order to insure that we pursue an agree-
ment which is fully supported by the
alliance and which enhances the security
of all its members.
A Choice of Visions
Today I have tried to explain how, over
30 years, a viable alternative to
Moscow's view of Europe as a second-
class hostage to Soviet power has been
fashioned. This Atlantic alternative is
built upon ties of history, culture, and
commerce. It shares a concept of man's
place in society and of the manner in
which intercourse between societies
should be conducted. To survive,
however, this alternative has had to
create an alliance structure which can
bridge the ocean which provides its
name.
The Atlantic has been spanned by
the commitment to strategic unity,
through which each member accepts the
risk of war in order to protect its allies
and to secure its allies' protection. It has
been spanned by the integration of con-
ventional, theater nuclear, and strategic
forces in a single spectrum of deterrent
power. It has been spanned by a
strategy of flexible response, which com-
mits the alliance to escalate a conflict as
high as is needed to defeat any aggres-
sion, but permits it to confine a conflict
to as low a level as possible consistent
with that objective. And it has been
spanned by a common commitment to
seek meaningful and effective arms con-
trol.
The nuclear debate in Europe today
has become a battle for the soul of
Europe. The alternatives are clear. The
West can reaffirm its faith in collective
defense, deterrence, and serious arms
control and thus remain free. Or
America can turn in upon itself, and
Europe can rest its hopes for security
and its prospects for freedom upon
Soviet goodwill. For 30 years America
has rejected isolationism. For 30 years
Europe has rejected Soviet patronage.
For 30 years the West has instead
chosen unity, strength, and freedom.
There is no other choice. ■
Member 1981
59
MIDDLE EAST
Saudi Security, Middle
and U.S. Interests
by Secretary Haig
Statements before the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee. '
OCT. 1, 19812
For several months we have been work-
ing with the Saudis to develop ar-
rangements that will meet the concerns
that the Congress has expressed about
the proposed arms sales to Saudi Arabia.
These discussions have now been con-
cluded. We believe that the resulting
understandings which will come into ef-
fect after consummation of the sale will
insure the security of the airborne warn-
ing and control system (AWACS) and the
degree of continuing U.S. participation in
Saudi AWACS operations that respond to
the fundamental concerns about the sale
that have been raised during the course
of our consultations with the Congress.
Understandings on AWACS
The Saudis have agreed to insure an im-
portant U.S. role in the development of
the Saudi air defense system and to move
forward in other ways to deepen the
longstanding security cooperation be-
tween our two countries in which we
have played a key role in training the
Saudi Air Force. Within this framework,
we have reached understandings on a
number of specific provisions governing
the AWACS aircraft that provide impor-
tant benefits for U.S. security interests.
These arrangements have been reached
in the context of firm Saudi agreement on
information sharing, security of equip-
ment, no unauthorized transfer of data or
equipment, and use of the AWACS only in
a defensive mission within Saudi borders.
This means:
• There will be complete data shar-
ing with the United States on a continu-
ous basis.
• There will be no sharing of
AWACS data with any other parties
without U.S. consent.
• Only carefully screened Saudi and
U.S. nationals will be permitted to be in-
volved with these aircraft. Given the
shortage of Saudi aircrews and techni-
cians, this means that there will be an
American presence in the aircraft and on
the ground well into the 1990s.
60
• There will be no operation of Saudi
AWACS outside Saudi airspace.
• There will be extensive and elabo-
rate security measures for safeguarding
equipment and technology, including U.S.
inspection teams which will monitor the
performance of all equipment associated
with the AWACS sale and special facili-
ties which will be constructed to provide
round-the-clock security protection
against unauthorized entry.
• All of the agreed arrangements for
protecting the security of AWACS must
be approved by the United States at least
1 year before any AWACS are delivered
to the Saudis.
Taken together, this package of safe-
guards and agreements addresses the
fundamental concerns that have been
voiced about the sale and also reflects a
Saudi willingness to work with us and
engage our mutual concerns.
American Strategy
Far more is involved in the proposed
arms sales to Saudi Arabia than the tech-
nical capabilities of five aircraft. At stake
is whether the United States will be able
to pursue a coherent policy in a region
where the Arab-Israeli dispute divides
our closest friends and where the Soviets
and their proxies threaten our vital inter-
ests.
Our strategy must vigorously pursue
both peace and security. Progress toward
each of these twin goals supports prog-
ress toward the other. If our friends are
more secure, they will be more able to
take risks for peace. If there is progress
toward peace, the cooperation that is
vital for security will be easier.
The "consensus of strategic concern"
among our friends in the Middle East is
not a figment of the imagination. The
fragile cease-fire along the Israeli-
Lebanese border demonstrates a wide-
spread understanding of the need for
peace and a recognition that only the
Soviet Union and its proxies benefit from
violence. Israeli restraint and Saudi
cooperation have brought about a result
crucial to progress toward a wider peace
in the region. There are many people who
are alive in the Middle East today be-
cause of those efforts. We will continue,
through the efforts of Ambassador Habib
[Philip C. Habib, President Reagan's spe-
cial emissary to the Middle East] and thi
good offices of Saudi Arabia, to seek
progress toward peace in Lebanon.
The most important cooperation in
the Middle East today is the cooperatior
between Israel and Egypt in the peace
process. President Reagan has affirmed
his personal commitment to the Camp
David agreements and the process they
have set in motion. We welcome en-
thusiastically the decision by Egypt and
Israel to resume the autonomy negoti-
ations, and we look forward to the fruits
of those negotiations.
In the wake of the shocks of the las'
few years, countries in the region also
recognize the need for greater coopera-
tion to rebuild regional security. Develo]
ing Egyptian and Israeli security coopei
ation with the United States, the Gulf
Cooperation Council that has been newl
created under Saudi leadership, and
Saudi security assistance to a number o
threatened states, are all signs of this
growing recognition.
Our policy is to pursue enhanced se-
curity cooperation with all of our friend
in the region. We do not seek a massive
structure of bases, a pervasive presenci
and dependent client states. We respect
the sovereignty of our friends and want
to help them preserve their independ-
ence.
Vital U.S. Interests
Our regional strategy consists of the fol
lowing elements:
• Improving our own military post j,
tion in and near the region;
• Strengthening the defense capab
ities of our friends;
• Restoring confidence in the Unit
States as a reliable partner; and
• Pursuing a permanent peace in t
region.
The proposed sale contributes impc
tantly to each of these elements.
First, the information-sharing ar-
rangements will also provide U.S. force
early warning of hostile activities in the
gulf. Moreover, the associated infrastru
ture to support U.S. deployment, shoul
our assistance be requested in times of
crisis, would be in place.
Second, the package will bolster
Saudi capabilities to defend their counti
and their crucial oil facilities.
Department of State Bullet
Middle East
Third, it will also demonstrate that
;ake Saudi security needs seriously
can be counted on to help.
Fourth, a secure Saudi Arabia confi-
; of U.S. support will be better able
roceed with its policy of encouraging
iarties to move toward peace in the
on.
We must not underestimate the
;e and severity of the unpredictable
ats that arise in this turbulent re-
Twice in less than 2 years the
ted States has had to deploy AWACS
audi Arabia in response to unex-
ed threats — first during the Yemen
s in 1979 and then during the Iraq-
war. Qadhafi has threatened to de-
y Saudi oil facilities if the Saudis con-
e to maintain production levels that
arcut Libya's high oil prices. This
ning's Iranian air raid on Kuwait is
natic evidence of the continued threat
le region's stability.
For all these reasons, we believe the
»osed sales serve vital U.S. interests.
•ecognize that the sales raise ques-
5 about Israeli security and about the
promise of advanced U.S. technology,
oth cases, however, we believe that
e concerns have been effectively ac-
modated by the arrangements I have
described and by our security and in-
jence assistance to Israel.
The United States is fundamentally
E unalterably committed to the secu-
I of Israel. A strong Israel is required
\ lur interests and our hopes for peace
I security in the Middle East. For our
s we are determined to take steps to
c imize any adverse impact of the sale
I to maintain the qualitative edge upon
I _'h Israel depends.
' President Reagan would not have
] lorized this sale if he believed it
■ Id jeopardize Israel's security. On the
I rary, we believe that the risks for Is-
I are greater if U.S. -Saudi cooperation
i srupted and Saudi Arabia is left inse-
I ■ or forced to turn elsewhere for
iipment.
Consider the risks of not making the
. A veto would deal a serious setback
ur efforts to counter Soviet and
iet-proxy threats in the region and to
re forward in the peace process.
A veto would erode both U.S. and
di credibility. It is urgent to convince
1 countries that the United States has
military means to protect them and
will to do so. Strength and the capac-
for decisive action are universally ad-
pd and perhaps nowhere more than in
Middle East. Yet increasingly over
last few years, the states of this re-
gion have come to view us as vacillating
and irresolute. Unless we change that
perception, the costs of withstanding
Soviet and radical pressures will out-
weigh the benefits of cooperating with
us.
We have begun to reverse the trend
of rising doubts about the United States.
Our determination to rebuild our military
strength; our strategic discussions with
our regional friends; our commitment to
the Camp David peace process, including
our participation in the Sinai multilateral
peacekeeping force; our increased secu-
rity assistance to threatened states have
all begun to restore our reputation as a
reliable partner.
These positive trends will be dam-
aged if the sale is turned down. Saudi
confidence in the ability of the United
States to conduct a coherent and effective
foreign policy will be diminished. The
painstaking task of restoring confidence
and hope will, of necessity, have to begin
again.
The United States and Saudi Arabia
will remain bound together by common
desires to avoid regional conflict and to
counter Soviet threats. But if the Saudis
question our reliability, will they feel
more able to withstand pressure against
closer cooperation with us in regional de-
fense efforts? Will they feel more able to
run risks and join the peace process?
More willing to continue to help other
threatened states? As President Sadat of
Egypt himself said yesterday: "A refusal
to give the AWACS will raise a huge
question mark because Saudi Arabia is
one of the closest American friends in the
region."
The Saudis have shown sensitivity to
our concerns far more than other
suppliers would ask of them. We, for our
part, must also show sensitivity for
legitimate Saudi concerns about their
sovereignty and independence. Let me
emphasize that this is not simply a matter
of national pride on their part. It is a
matter of sustaining credible and con-
structive Saudi leadership as a moderat-
ing influence in the Arab world.
We must not lose the opportunity we
now have to work with a strengthened,
confident Saudi Arabia that enjoys in-
creasing influence in the Arab and Is-
lamic world. The large and continuing
U.S. role in the Saudi air defense pro-
gram, and the measures I have described
today, can and must be the foundation for
further cooperation to protect our com-
mon interests in the vital Persian Gulf
region.
Now it is for you to promote that
prospect by your favorable decision on
this crucial sale. Protecting our vital
interests against the Soviets and their
proxies demands no less. Building a last-
ing peace demands no less. In the end,
your approval will make the United
States and all of our friends in the area
more secure.
OCT. 5, 19813
I want to say a few words about two key
points of difference between those who
support the President's decision on arms
sales to Saudi Arabia and those who ap-
parently oppose it.
Given all the controversy, there is a
surprising amount of agreement. We are
united in our desires to strengthen peace
and security in the Middle East. We are
united in our commitment to preserving a
strong and secure Israel. We agree about
the need to improve our capability to deal
with the greatly increased military
threats to this vital region.
We agree about many specifics as
well. We all agree that having AWACS
(airborne warning and control system) in-
formation available to U.S. forces in the
Persian Gulf region is in our interests
now and will remain so in the future. We
all agree that it might be militarily desir-
able if we could have the degree of as-
sured joint control that would permit us
to put the most advanced technology
available on board these aircraft. We all
agree, as Senator Biden put it, that there
will be damage done if this proposed sale
is disapproved.
Why, then, is there so much dis-
agreement about what we should do,
when there is so much agreement not just
on broad objectives but on specific de-
tails? Obviously, when difficult consid-
erations must be balanced, there is plenty
of room for honest disagreement. How-
ever, it seems to me that some who op-
pose this sale may be in danger of com-
forting themselves with two dangerous
illusions.
First is the illusion that instead of
the proposed sale we could have some
kind of joint command arrangement that
would permit the sale of AWACS with all
of the most advanced and sensitive gear
on board.
Second is the illusion that, even if
this sale is not approved, the damage to
U.S. -Saudi relations can be easily re-
paired because we will still have so many
common interests.
member 1981
61
Middle East
I share Senator Glenn's desire to see
the best air defense capability possible,
one that can most readily assist our own
military operations in the event of a
major crisis in the Persian Gulf. But let
me say that we are in great danger of let-
ting the best become the enemy of the
good. The kind of joint command that he
is talking about is simply not possible
now. Therefore, there is absolutely no
point whatsoever in comparing the pres-
ent proposal with some imaginary, even if
highly desirable, joint command
arrangement.
The arrangements that would govern
these proposed sales are the product of
long and detailed discussions between the
United States and Saudi Arabia. At-
tached to my statement is a chart that
compares the arrangements for this sale
with the terms of a standard letter of
offer and acceptance that governs most
U.S. arms sales. As you can see, very
clearly, these arrangements go far be-
yond anything that is normally contained
in a military sales agreement.
The choice before you is not between
these agreed arrangements and some still
more favorable ones. The issue is
whether U.S. interests are better served
by the kind of surveillance system we are
proposing or by the kind of system that
would be supplied by Britain or by some
other third country.
• Is it better to have assured access
to the radar information of this system or
to have no assurance of access what-
soever?
• Is it better to have the assurance
that no information from this system will
be passed to third parties without our
consent or to have a system with no such
control at all?
• Is it better to have a system in
which Americans play a critical role and
from which third-country nationals are
excluded or to have a system in which our
place is taken by British or French — or,
for that matter, by any other third-
country nationals who might be brought
in to operate a non-U. S. system?
• Is it better to have AWACS early
warning information available to U.S.
forces in the region, from now into the
indefinite future, or to lose this early
warning when we withdraw the U.S.
AWACS that, at Saudi request, are cur-
rently deployed because of the Iran-Iraq
conflict?
• Is it better to have a system that
can be rapidly upgraded in an emergency
and which provides the infrastructure to
deploy additional AWACS aircraft of our
own if needed or to have none of those
62
Proposed Saudi AWACS Sale
Terms and Conditions
Use of AWACS
Security of
Technology
Standard Agreement
Defensive use only
Protect classified
equipment with
procedures similar
to U.S. procedures
Third-country
Transfers
No transfer of
equipment without
U.S. Government
approval
Information Sharing None
Saudi Additions to Standard
Agreement
1. No flights outside borders
(without U.S. prior consent)
1. U.S. Government approval of
security plan
2. U.S. Government inspections
3. High technology security
facilities
4. Only U.S. and Saudi personne
have access to equipment and
documentation
5. New information security
agreement
6. Computer software (machine
language) remains U.S. Gov-
ernment property
1. Third-country modifications tc
equipment forbidden
2. Third-country personnel forbii
den to perform maintenance
1. AWACS data exchanged be-
tween United States and Sauc
Arabia at all times
2. No AWACS data to other eoui
tries without prior and mutua
consent of United States and
Saudi Arabia
advantages and to create a political ob-
stacle to the deployment of our own
AWACS, both now' and in the future?
It seems to me that the answers to
all of these questions are simple and
obvious.
More advantageous arrangements
can be imagined, but they are just not
possible. At least not now. And they will
not be made more possible by defeating
the present proposal.
If the President receives your sup-
port on this proposal, I am optimistic that
our security cooperation with Saudi
Arabia will grow still closer in the future.
But the prospects for such cooperation
will be set back badly if this sale is de-
feated. Be under no illusions about that.
I urge you also not to comfort your-
selves with the illusion that the Saudis
have no place else to go; or with the
thought that damage to U.S.-Saudi rela-
tions can be repaired over time.
Without question, we will continue to
have far-reaching common interests with
Saudi Arabia even if this sale is defeats
It would be irresponsible for me to uttt
prophesies of doom, prophesies that coi
all too easily become self-fulfilling. But
make no mistake, it would be irrespons
ble in the extreme to succumb to illusio
about the real alternatives facing us.
The question is not whether Saudi
Arabia will join the ranks of our enemi(
The Saudis have been far ahead of us ii
recognizing and warning against the
Soviet threat to the Persian Gulf. The
question is whether Saudi Arabia will
withdraw from a moderating leadershij
role in Arab and Islamic councils and se
instead the protection that a lower prof
affords.
Over the last year, Saudi Arabia hi
increasingly emerged as a constructive
and moderating influence in the Arab
world. They have shown this in their di
plomacy in Lebanon, in their leadershif
in creating the Gulf Cooperation Counc:
and in their bilateral security and eco-
nomic relations with moderate states
throughout the region. That role entails
Department of State Bulle
Middle East
s — and may well entail still greater
i in the future — and it will not be
r for Saudi Arabia to run these risks
:y are publicly rebuffed by their
;st friend in the West.
The question is not whether damage
S.-Saudi relations can be repaired,
n time and the extent of our common
•ests. Should the Congress decide to
rule the President, you will find me
ring as hard as anyone to repair the
age to U.S. -Saudi relations. The
tion is whether we will have enough
For time is not necessarily on our
in the Middle East. We have made
irkable progress in the peace process
in building closer relations with our
ds in the region. We hope to continue
progress.
I But our enemies and the enemies of
le have not been idle. Just last week,
lian planes bombed oil facilities in
I ait, and the turmoil in Iran itself
is even larger dangers to U.S. inter-
land to world peace. Libya, Ethiopia,
■ South Yemen have recently joined
fcher in an unholy alliance aimed
£ lgh the Sudan at Egypt and through
0 h Yemen at Saudi Arabia. Qadhafi
t hreatened to destroy the oil facilities
H udi Arabia, and his planes have
iped the Sudan. The fragile cease-fire
J 'banon is the target of all those who
| se the Middle East peace process,
j! ley recognize that war in Lebanon
u 1 well make peace impossible.
: We need to work closely with our
1 ds, and we need to work quickly. Our
) fin for error and delay is dangerously
I This is not a time to impose severe
I n on our relations with one of our
I st friends in the region. I urge you
:. ep that in mind as you consider the
I ident's request for your support on
i ssue.
Saudi Arabia and
U.S. Security Policy
The complete transcript of the hearings
■e published by the committee and will
aifable from the Superintendent of
ments, U.S. Government Printing Of-
Washington, D.C. 20402.
Press release 327.
Press release 329. ■
Following is an address delivered by
Joseph W. Twinam; Deputy Assistant
Secretary for Near Eastern and South
Asian Affairs, on behalf of James L.
Buckley, Under Secretary for Security
Assistance, Science, and Technology,
before the National Conference of
Editorial Writers in Providence, Rhode
Island, on September 25, 1981.
I am very pleased to be with you and
thank you for graciously receiving me as
a literally last minute substitute for Jim
Buckley. Jim had wanted very much to
be with you and truly regrets that
responsibilities, not unrelated to the sub-
ject he wished to discuss with you,
prevent his being here. That subject,
consistent with your program chairman's
injunction that our topic be timely and
important, is the current household
acronym AW ACS [airborne warning and
control system], specifically, the Reagan
Administration proposal to provide
Saudi Arabia with AW ACS and other
air defense enhancement equipment.
First let me try to place this aircraft
and the other items of military equip-
ment we propose to sell to Saudi Arabia
in their proper perspective. Only in this
way can the importance of these sales,
and the reasons for the Reagan
Administration's commitment to them,
be fully understood.
The main goal of this Administration
in international affairs is to help achieve
a world in which nations are free to pur-
sue their own peaceful ends without the
threat of external aggression or
intimidation. We are confident that in
such a world our own interests will be
best protected, and the values and prin-
ciples we cherish will find more fertile
soil. We do not delude ourselves that the
path to these objectives is always easy
or obvious.
What is absolutely clear, however, is
that the free world has lost dangerous
ground these last few years. All nations
of the free world face, around the globe,
challenges which are of such scale that
they can be mastered only if the
strength and engagement of the United
States is brought to bear. Yet we cannot
do the job alone. We can only do it if we
are able to work in close cooperation
with other strategically important
nations throughout the free world.
The experience of the last few years
speaks for itself. Given the aims and
growing capabilities of our principal
adversaries, further retrenchment in
U.S. power and influence can only
guarantee greater global instability and
graver threats to our most vital
interests. The policies being pursued by
the Reagan Administration are intended,
first, to rebuild our ability to project
credible American power to distant
places, should the need arise, and
second, to work with other friendly
nations to restore or strengthen stability
in regions of critical importance to the
West. Our task is difficult, but it is a
manageable one, if we have the fore-
sight and determination to pursue it.
Regional Security
The Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf are
very far from our borders. But we have
a clear and substantial stake in the con-
tinued sovereignty and security of
nations there and in their continued
good relations with us and with the
West. We have the most direct interest
in helping them acquire the capability to
better defend themselves and, in the
process, to deter aggression. They need
our help for their own security, and we
benefit from cooperation with them.
We were painfully reminded during
the oil embargo of 1973 and 1974 that
the Persian Gulf is the source of much
of the energy on which the industrial
democracies will be critically dependent
until well into the next century. Until
the British withdrew their forces from
the area in 1971, the free world de-
pended primarily on Britain to maintain
stability in the gulf and to assure
Western access to its oil. But for long
before 1971, we had pursued an impor-
tant security assistance relationship with
Saudi Arabia. In the 1970s, we looked
primarily to Iran, in cooperation with
other gulf states, to pick up the burden
which the British had so ably carried.
This arrangement in turn lasted less
than a single decade. The fall of the
Shah in 1978 coincided with two other
ominous developments. The first was the
dramatic increase in Soviet military
capabilities during the 1970s. While the
United States was spending more than
$200 billion in Vietnam and deferring
basic modernization of its military
mber 1981
63
Middle East
forces, the Soviet Union was engaged in
the most massive buildup of military
hardware and infrastructure that the
world has seen.
The Soviet Union's invasion of
Afghanistan was the starkest possible
demonstration that the Soviets not only
now possess the military capability to
conduct major operations on their
southern flank without detracting from
their military posture on their eastern
and western fronts, but that they are
prepared to use that capability to sup-
port their political objectives— at least so
long as they can do so with relative
impunity.
The second development is the
growing capability of radical regional
states to attack and destroy critical oil
facilities in Saudi Arabia and other gulf
nations and to attempt to block Western
access to the gulf itself. I speak, of
course, of Ethiopia, South Yemen, and
Iran. The first two are now well-armed
Soviet proxies who last month joined
with Libya in a tripartite alliance
specifically aimed at Saudi Arabia and
Egypt. At the outbreak of the Iraq-Iran
war, Iran threatened to close the
Hormuz Strait— through which two-
thirds of the world's oil exports pass. It
also sent combat aircraft across the gulf,
underscoring Iran's capacity to threaten
neighboring oil-producing states. It was
in this context that the Saudis requested
that we deploy U.S. AWACS to Saudi
Arabia, and that we rapidly responded.
In short, in less than half a decade,
the Persian Gulf has been transformed.
From a secure source of the petroleum
degree to which we have been able to
work out cooperative security arrange-
ments with the front-line states of the
region.
Since the fall of the Shah, we have
worked to develop a new set of relation-
ships in the Persian Gulf and the Middle
East that can reestablish a reasonable
degree of stability, protect our friends in
the area, insure the security of the
West's principal sources of imported oil,
and establish an infrastructure consist-
ent with our rapid deployment forces
should a major emergency lead the
nations of the area to request our direct
support.
While insuring the security of Saudi
Arabia is obviously not the only element
in this effort, it is clearly a key one.
Saudi Arabia is the center of the
conservative forces in Islam. Its pro-
Western, anti-Communist positions offer
a nonradical approach to modernization.
Because of its special position as custo-
dian of the holy places of Islam, it has
an influence that reaches far beyond the
Arab world to a community of nations
encompassing 750 million Muslims. It
currently dedicates more than 5% of its
national income to aid a large group of
poorer countries, including nations such
as Sudan, Somalia, North Yemen,
Turkey, Pakistan, and Morocco, where
the United States has important stra-
tegic interests as well.
Thus, the success of U.S. policy in
the region depends on our ability to
develop a close working relationship
with Saudi Arabia. This in turn depends
on our own willingness to help the
. . . the addition of AWACS to the Saudi inventory would greatly
improve Saudi Arabia's ability to protect its eastern oilfields; but
it would not significantly improve Saudi ability to conduct at-
tacks against Israel. Nor would it improve Saudi ability to assist
other Arab nations to do so.
essential to Western economies, it has
become an area which is extremely
vulnerable to attack by regional forces,
as well as to a major offensive by newly
deployed forces of the Soviet Union.
It is against the former threat that
we seek to arm Saudi Arabia while we
modernize our own forces so as to better
cope with the latter threat should the
need arise. These two efforts, I might
add, are closely interrelated, because our
ability to project our forces in the event
of a major emergency in the Persian
Gulf will depend in large part on the
Saudis acquire, in their own right, the
capability to defend their own most
important asset. This we can do— and
the Saudis know it as well as
we— without in any way detracting from
our unshakable commitment to Israel's
security or lessening Israel's ability to
defeat an attack from any combination
of hostile forces in the region.
The Need to Improve Saudi Air
Defenses
The military threats against which th^
Saudis seek to improve their defenses,'
are real. An attack could plausibly corf'
from several regional sources: for
instance, from a spillover of the Iran-
Iraq war or from South Yemen or
Ethiopia, where a significant Soviet I
military presence underscores the
region's instability and the dangers ofi'
Soviet penetration. It is important to
understand in this context that an
indirect military thrust from South
Yemen, for example, could be as seriq
for the Saudis as a direct oilfield attai
because it could trigger a range of otl
threats— Saudi Arabia is very large ire
territory and small in population. Its J
military forces are relatively small and
widely dispersed.
Both we and the Saudis fully real
that the air defense enhancement pacl
age we have submitted to the Congres
will not enable the Saudis to defend
themselves against a direct Soviet
attack. Only we can do that. The pro4
posed sale, however, will vastly enhan
our ability to do so. It will, for exampl
insure the existence of an extensive
logistics base and support infrastructu
in Saudi Arabia— including spare
parts— facilitating U.S. reinforcement
would also greatly expand opportuniti
for close cooperation between Saudi,
U.S., and other regional forces in a
manner that could greatly upgrade th
air defenses of the entire area. But
equally important, the relationship be-
tween the United States and Saudi
Arabia that would be evidenced by thtj
sale could, in itself, represent a signify
cant deterrent to Soviet adventurism.
In the meantime, present Saudi aU
defenses are inadequate. Saudi oil
facilities, which lie on very flat land
adjacent to the Persian Gulf, are highi
vulnerable to surprise attack by low-
flying aircraft. Early warning is critiffl
With current Saudi ground radars,
except for the presence of the U.S.
AWACS, little warning is possible, an
severe damage could be inflicted on tU
facilities before Saudi interceptors col
respond.
The four elements of the currently
proposed sale— AWACS, air refueling
tankers, conformal fuel tanks for the
F-15s, and air-to-air missiles— would
significantly improve Saudi capability
defend against regional air attacks. ]
The AWACS aircraft, which
operates at around 30,000 feet, would]
provide sufficient warning of an air
64
Department of State Bull
•
Middle East
ck to enable Saudi fighters to
mble and intercept the enemy before
can carry out their attack.
The conformal fuel tanks and the air
eling tanker aircraft— equipment to
nd the range of Saudi F-15s— would
)le F-15s to defend east coast
oleum facilities while operating out
ases to the south and west that are
int and, therefore, safer.
Sidewinder air-to-air missiles, with
apability for head-on attack against
ile aircraft, are the only weapons
will permit Saudi interceptors to
ige and destroy attacking aircraft
•e they can destroy the oil facil-
even with the advance warning
ided by the AWACS.
In addition, of course, this sale
Id bring with it a very high degree
ng-term military and technical
boration between the United States
Saudi Arabia by insuring the sub-
tial presence of U.S. maintenance
support personnel in Saudi Arabia
ughout the life of the systems, that
ir many years.
lications for Israeli Security
lly, the Administration has carefully
ied the implications of this sale, and
ie larger relationship which it
jolizes, for Israeli security. We
gnize that any enhancement of
li military capabilities might in
ry complicate the task faced by
3li defense planners. Yet Israel en-
today— and will continue to enjoy
• our proposed sales are corn-
el—so decisive a superiority over
combination of regional forces that
jractical impact of our proposals on
all security would be small. By con-
, the longer run benefits which we
with our policy toward Saudi
)ia and other gulf states will im-
e Israel's security by reducing the
of conflict in the region and en-
:ing our ability to bring moderate
) states into the Middle East peace
ess.
The mythology that has grown up
.nd the AWACS is extraordinary.
trary to claims, the AWACS cannot
tct photographic intelligence. Nor
it collect any intelligence at all on
ind targets. The only information it
ids is the most perishable kind— air-
t tracks which become useless in a
ter of minutes if they cannot be
d upon. Neither do they have an
nsive capacity that could jeopardize
eli security, nor does the equipment
would be providing the Saudis repre-
sent the kind of highly advanced tech
nology whose capture by the Soviets
would jeopardize significant U.S. secu-
rity interests. In brief, the addition of
AWACS to the Saudi inventory would
greatly improve Saudi Arabia's ability to
protect its eastern oilfields; but it would
not significantly improve Saudi ability to
conduct attacks against Israel, nor
would it improve Saudi ability to assist
other Arab nations to do so.
With or without AWACS and the
other equipment in the Saudi air defense
package, Israel's highly effective air
defense systems, coupled with Saudi
vulnerability to retaliation from Israel,
provides the strongest possible deterrent
to any potential Saudi attack. The
Saudis, moreover, recognize that Israel's
air defense system— including pilots, air-
craft, surface-to-air systems, and
crews— is extraordinarily capable, and
that Saudi missions near or into Israeli
airspace could be suicidal.
Key Questions
The problem of safeguarding Israel's
security interests is not, of course, the
only one which has been raised in con-
nection with these sales. It is clear from
conversations with Members of Con-
gress and the public that at least three
other key questions must be addressed.
• What is there in the U.S.-Saudi
political relationship to justify this sale?
• If Saudi security is so important
to us, why don't we do the job
ourselves?
• Why is Saudi Arabia any more
dependable an anchor for our regional
strategy than Iran proved to be?
Let me address these questions
together, for they are closely inter-
related.
The Saudi leadership believes that
their country's national interest is best
served by the kind of security relation-
ship that we have proposed. The point to
keep in mind, however, is that this judg-
ment is made in the face of considerable
pressure, in large part Soviet and
radical Arab in origin. The Saudis'
capacity to resist such pressure is very
largely dependent upon their confidence
in the United States and in their own
military capability to deal with local
threats. These two are inseparable.
For compelling reasons, political and
nationalistic, the Saudis cannot move to
an explicit dependence upon the United
States for their defense in those areas;
they are clearly potentially capable of
looking after themselves. Such a policy
would severely undermine their leader-
ship and influence in the Arab world, an
influence which clearly serves our own
national interests.
What has to be understood, in short,
is that the only viable relationship today
is one that is built on the solid rock of
mutual respect for each other's sover-
eignty and of confidence in mutuality of
interests and is perceived as such. The
stationing of significant U.S. combat
forces on Saudi soil is simply not a fea-
sible alternative to strengthening their
capacity to look after their own defenses
to the best of their ability. No proud
sovereign nation should be expected to
delegate such responsibilities to another
and distant nation. We would not do so
in their shoes, and we cannot realis-
tically expect them to do more — espe-
cially as they have alternative sources
for entirely adequate substitutes, namely
the British Nimrod (similar to our
AWACS) and French fighter aircraft.
Finally, let me briefly turn to the
question of what the consequences
would be if Congress does not approve
the sale — consequences for the United
States, for Israel, for an enduring peace
in the Middle East. The downside risks
are large.
Although some complementarity of
Saudi and U.S. interests would remain,
their doubts about the value of U.S.
commitments would surely grow.
Almost certainly the Saudi ability to
accept the risks of embracing our
regional strategy and of supporting the
peace process would decline. Similarly,
Saudi willingness and capacity to exer-
cise a moderating political influence in
Arab councils would also inevitably suf-
fer. While we might succeed in muddling
through, failure to complete this present
transaction would be so large and so
important a signal that our adversaries
would be sorely tempted to take advan-
tage.
The result, inevitably, will be that
our regional security strategy will be
undermined. The chances of Soviet
political coercion and military intimida-
tion will grow as the prospects for con-
tinued Western access to oil will
diminish. With the damage done to the
credibility of presidential commitments
and his reputation for foreign policy
leadership, one can reasonably wonder
whether the damage — itself substan-
tial— would be confined to our national
security objectives in the Persian Gulf
and Middle East.
Ironically, Israel may pay as large a
price as we if this sale is defeated. It
almost surely will face a Saudi Arabia
)mber1981
65
Middle East
■"
which buys from the Europeans the
same military capabilities as we propose
to sell, but a Saudi Arabia which is less
responsive to U.S. influence, less willing
to work with us in the search for a
lasting peace, and less able to resist the
pressure of radical forces from inside
and outside the region. Indeed, if the
sale is defeated the only winners will be
those who would benefit from regional
turmoil and curtailed Western influences
and curtailed Western access to oil.
I have tried to outline the broad con-
text within which the President decided
to go ahead with this sale and its
political and strategic rationale. I have
touched more briefly on the specific
systems involved and on several other
important topics, which I am prepared
to discuss with you further in response
to your interests. ■
Secretary's News Conference
of October 7
Secretary Haig held a news con-
ference at the Department of State on Oc-
tober?, 198 1.1
Let me begin first by repeating our
shock and dismay at the tragic assassi-
nation of President Sadat yesterday.
President Sadat understood the quest
for peace and security demanded perse-
verence and courage. We must take
from this terrible event a fresh deter-
mination to complete his work.
Our pursuit of peace in the Middle
East must continue to be guided by the
Camp David accords. The Treaty of
Peace Between Egypt and Israel is a
lasting achievement in the interests of
both parties and of the entire region.
The autonomy negotiations, an equal
part of the accords, will receive our con-
tinuing and active participation in the
days ahead. We are full partners in this
process.
Efforts to achieve peace must not ig-
nore the threats from forces inside and
outside the region, forces whose in-
terests are antagonistic to the inde-
pendence of every country in the area.
Accordingly, the United States is
pledged to work with Egypt and with
our other friends in the region to build a
structure of relationships which will pro-
tect and advance our mutual interests in
the Middle East.
We have been greatly heartened to
hear from Vice President of Egypt
Mubarak and the Egyptian Government
that Egypt shares our views about the
importance of continuing the work
begun by President Sadat. The United
States looks forward to further coopera-
tion with Egypt as we strive to achieve
the peace and security in that area.
I think a brief reflection on Presi-
dent Sadat is in order, and perhaps the
statement made by him in 1975 to Peter
Jennings of ABC News would be bene-
ficial to reflect on. He said at that time
that he would like his tombstone to read:
"He has lived for peace, and he has died
for principles."
I think the essence of what I have
just touched upon in the formal state-
ment should be emphasized in several
key areas as we face the period ahead
without this gigantic personality at our
side.
First, it is clear that the successor
government in Egypt will be one
marked by continuity, and we were
greatly assured yesterday by a reitera-
tion of the Vice President that Egypt's
domestic and foreign policy will be one
of a continuation of the Sadat legacy.
Second, we are encouraged that the
constitutional process in Egypt is now
underway in strict accordance with that
constitution. I understand that shortly
the People's Assembly will select Vice
President Mubarak as the nominee to
succeed President Sadat. On Monday
there will be a referendum designed to
approve this selection, and by Wednes-
day the People's Assembly will deal with
it.
I think one of the questions that is
on everyone's mind is whether or not
this tragic event was the consequence of
a broadly based coup d'etat or rather the
actions of a more narrowly based fanati-
cal group within Egypt proper. Thus far
the intelligence that we have available to
this government, confirmed by that
available to our friends in Egypt, sug-
gests that it was an assassination, not a
coup d'etat, and that the base of this
assassination was a group of fundamejl
talists, religious fanatics, centered not |
exclusively but primarily in certain
military units.
I think it's important to emphasize :
at the outset the determination of this
government, of President Reagan
especially, to continue to build on the
friendship and the cordial relationships
between ourselves and the Governmenl
and the people of Egypt, the most
populous nation in the Arab world. In
this regard, I think I can commit this
government, with the approval of Presi
dent Reagan this morning, to a firm
dedication of continued American sup-
port to the Government and the people1
of Egypt. We would view with great j
concern at this juncture any efforts by
external powers to manipulate the trag
events of the last 24 hours.
I think it's also important to bear ii
mind that, while there is a backdrop of
propaganda from certain capitals in tht
region and elsewhere, that it is the U.S
view that the period ahead is one whicl
must be a reflection, an elucidation of
the reflection, of the desires of the
people of Egypt, and we intend to be a
strong partner with Egypt in insisting
on that reality.
Q. Opponents of the AW ACS [air
borne warning and control system]
sale to Saudi Arabia are saying the
assassination of Sadat underscores tl
instability in the Middle East and thi
danger that the AWACS could fall in
to unfriendly hands if we go ahead
with the sale. How do you respond tt
this?
A. First, I think in the context of i
what I've already just said, such events
such tragedies, are not unique to Egyp
or to the states of the Middle East. Ora
would only think back in our own histoi
here in the United States where an
American President has been assassi-
nated, American officials have been
assassinated, President Ford experi-
enced two attempts on his life, and moi
recently President Reagan has experi-
enced a similar attempt.
I think it is more important that wi
as Americans reflect on the growing
lawlessness and terrorism which is
characterizing the international environ
ment today. As I have said in the past
and would repeat again today, while
there is no direct link thus far that
would suggest external orchestration of
yesterday's tragic events, nations which
foster historic change by force, blood-
shed, and terrorism contribute to an en-
vironment of increasing lawlessness in-
66
Department of State Bull
-
Middle East
ionally in all of our countries. I
it would be a tragic distortion to
3t that what occurred in Egypt
day is a unique aspect of the Arab
Iith respect to your specific ques-
ld the sale of the AWACS, I think
know that President Sadat has
n out vigorously as recently as a
ago on the urgency and desira-
Df proceeding with this sale as a
^station that the United States
bove all, the American President
induct a coherent foreign policy,
ere we to draw back in the wake
terday's tragedy from proceeding
program which we have very
lly considered to be in the best in-
3 of the U.S. Government and fun-
ltal to the successful conduct of
reign policy in the region, we
make a mockery of what all Presi-
iadat stood for. It would suggest
iy who will be measuring our at-
5 and policies in the days ahead
quivocation and uncertainty have
>e a characteristic American style
conduct of its foreign policy, and
3 not going to do that. We believe
intinuing with this project is more
tant than ever.
Beyond showing the verbal
g rt which you have just given,
I is the United States prepared to
tl protect the present Egyptian
B tutional government if it
( les threatened?
I.. I don't think the climate today—
I a matter of fact, any climate— is
Bred by indulging in belligerent or
I ening language. Let me just em-
I e again that we feel that the
I ahead in Egypt should be shaped
I desires of the Egyptian Govern-
I ind the Egyptian people.
I . You suggest that one tribute
1 he United States could pay
4 1 be to continue the work of
jient Sadat. One of his last unful-
I projects was to set up a direct
Irue between the Palestinians and
k her parties to the peace process.
.1 United States considering
ling such a dialogue?
{.. 1 think the longstanding U.S.
Dn on that question needs no fur-
laboration. All the parties con-
i understand thoroughly that long-
ing policy, and I see no change in it
period ahead.
do want to emphasize, however,
vhat President Sadat was par-
rly concerned with was the
ssful completion of the Camp David
accords in which the return of the Sinai,
scheduled for next April, and the suc-
cessful completion of the autonomy
talks — the new rounds of which have
already begun with some encouraging
progress — become the focal point of
American diplomacy in the Middle East
in the near term; and the successful
completion of these would be, in my
view, the greatest testimony to the
historic contributions toward peace and
stability made by President Sadat.
Q. One of President Sadat's last
actions was sending Mr. Mubarak here
last weekend, as I understand it, to
urge greater U.S. support to countries
like the Sudan which he felt were
threatened by Libyan forces operating
out of Chad. In your opening state-
ment you seemed to elude to other
countries. Could you give us some
feeling of your estimate of the situa-
tion facing the Sudan or what the
United States is prepared to do about
helping out that country?
A. First, let me emphasize that the
visit here last weekend of Vice President
Mubarak, at the instructions of Presi-
Death of Egyptian President Sadat
President Anwar al-Sadat of Egypt-
was assassinated in Egypt on October 6,
1981, while reviewing a military parade.
Following are statements by Presi-
dent Reagan and Secretary Haig on Oc-
tober 6.
PRESIDENT REAGAN1
Today, the people of the United States
join with the people of Egypt and all
those who long for a better world in
mourning the death of Anwar Sadat.
President Sadat was a courageous man
whose vision and wisdom brought na-
tions and people together.
In a world filled with hatred, he was
a man of hope. In a world trapped in the
animosities of the past, he was a man of
foresight, a man who sought to improve
a world tormented by malice and pet-
tiness.
As an Egyptian patriot, he helped
create the revolutionary movement that
freed his nation. As a political leader, he
sought to free his people from hatred
and war. And as a soldier, he was
unafraid to fight. But most important,
he was a humanitarian, unafraid to
make peace. His courage and skill
reaped a harvest of life for his nation
and for the world.
Anwar Sadat was admired and loved
by the people of America. His death
today — an act of infamy, cowardly in-
famy— fills us with horror.
America has lost a close friend; the
world has lost a great statesman, and
mankind has lost a champion of peace.
Nancy and I feel that we have lost a
close and dear friend and we send our
heartfelt sympathy to Mrs. Sadat, to his
children, who were here such a short
time ago.
SECRETARY HAIG-
The death of President Anwar Sadat of
Egypt grieves me deeply, as it does all
Americans. His assassination closes a
unique career, marked by a blend of
courage and vision. At this tragic mo-
ment, let us remember the principles for
which he gave his life.
Anwar Sadat's vision was rooted in
a profound sense of reality. He saw that
the security and progress of both Egypt
and the Middle East depended on peace.
He believed that it was possible, in the
context of peace, to add a new and con-
structive chapter to Egypt's long history
and civilization. It was this sense of
civilization that guided his historic visit
to Jerusalem and the achievement of the
Camp David accords.
The quest for a comprehensive
peace, along with the modernization of
Egypt, became the cornerstones of his
policy. His tenacious pursuit of peace, so
much in the interest of Egypt and the
entire area, won him the support and
admiration of much of the world. Anwar
Sadat stood for creative, dynamic,
peaceful change. His actions were
dedicated to a world in which nations
could settle their disputes without war.
During this difficult transition
period, the United States will stand
firmly by Egypt. We are confident that
the Egyptian people and their constitu-
tional process will prevail. But this terri-
ble event must not disrupt the promise
of Anwar Sadat's historic achievements.
The best monument to his memory will
be the completion of his noble work. Let
us dedicate ourselves anew to the task
of peace.
'White House press release.
2Press release 338. ■
nber1981
67
Middle East
dent Sadat, touched upon a wide range
of current Middle Eastern problems.
They involved further emphasis on the
AWACS sale which we just talked about
and the significance and importance of
that. They involved a discussion of the
sense of urgency felt in Egypt for prog-
ress in the peace process within the
Camp David framework and a reitera-
tion of adherence to that framework.
They involved also expressions of con-
cern about the area you mentioned, but
they were not the exclusive preoccupa-
tion of our discussions over the week-
end.
It is clear that recent events suggest
that the Libyan proclivity for engaging
itself outside of its border to effect
historic change — invasion of Chad, some
indications of buildup along the border
of Sudan, and some clear evidence of ac-
tivities within Sudan are all matters of
great concern not only to the Govern-
ment of Egypt but to this government
as well. We are reviewing the situation
intensely in the light of our discussions
this past weekend and making our own
assessment of the dangers associated
with this kind of Libyan activity. But I
have nothing concrete to add to that up-
date.
Q. There are reports in this
building that you are not only going to
Cairo for the funeral of President
Sadat but that also you personally are
going on to several other countries in
the Mideast. Could you tell us where
you plan to go and what you plan to
do while you're there?
A. First, let me say with respect to
the delegation for President Sadat's
funeral, almost simultaneously with the
beginning of this press conference the
White House announced the composition
of that delegation, and it is true that I
will go with that delegation and head it
up as the senior representative from the
executive branch.
We will also include the appropriate
highest level representation from both
houses of the Congress, both sides of the
aisle. An unusually distinguished repre-
sentation from former Presidents Mr.
Carter, Mr. Ford — and 1 understand
that he has some scheduling problems to
deal with — and former President Nixon;
Henry Kissinger; and Mr. Sol Linowitz;
all of whom over past history have been
intimately involved with and wen
close associates and collaborators with
President Sadat,
With respect to any add-on ac-
tivities, it's too early to say. We're look-
ing at such possibilities to include my
staying on in Egypt for a brief period to
conduct discussions with what will clear-
ly be the new government and to re-
assure that government of our continu-
ing support and our full partnership in
the peace process. It may include some
additional stops as well, but I would
prefer to hold up on that.
Q. I wonder if you could address
yourself to an observation made by
one of your predecessors. Dr. Kissin-
ger, who you just said would be one of
the members going on the trip. He
said in an interview, and I'm quoting:
"Had the United States supported
moves against radicals in the area,
were it known in the area that radi-
cals get punished and moderates get
rewarded, then Anwar Sadat would be
alive tonight," and for whatever impli-
cations you read into that insofar as
the foreign policy of the United States
is concerned?
A. I think this goes right to the
heart of some of the statements I have
made, starting with the inauguration
period about the dreadful plague of in-
ternational terrorism and what has thus
far been the inability of the international
community to deal effectively with this
scourge. And to the degree that we have
been ineffective, to that degree we en-
courage those forces in the world who
seek what will be inevitable and even
desirable historic change by rule of
force, by bloodshed, by terrorism, in-
stead of by rule of law.
At the recent summit of the seven in
Ottawa, the United States actively
sought and succeeded in achieving a
series of findings with respect to inter-
national terrorism. We are now actively
engaged in implementing the commit-
ments made by those governments to
deal with international terrorism, hijack-
ing, and the like. I would say it behooves
all serious, civilized participants in the
international community to work collec-
tively together, more effectively than we
have in the past.
Q. Can you offer anything under
the headline of U.S. supporting moves
against radicals in the area?
A. I think without dotting a lot of
"i's" and crossing a lot of "t's," it could
be troublesome diplomatically and less
than prudent in the conduct of sound
diplomacy. One could reflect back on a
number of recent historic instances in
which it appeared that our failure to
react effectively could make a contribu-
tion to a process of encouraging radical
tactics and policies.
i,
I think it's very important that v
strip American foreign policy of thatju
proclivity, whether it be a result of a
lack of unity within the executive an
the legislative branches to formulate
conduct effective foreign policy whicl
mains the primary responsibility of t
President of the United States in cor
sulfation with the American Congres
Q. Considering the Palestine
Liberation Organization's (PLO) sti
ment in Beirut yesterday that "We
salute the hand that fired the bulle
as well as the long record of PLO t
rorism, why is the Reagan Admini-
stration allowing the PLO to conti!
maintaining an office at 1326 18th
Street here in Washington?
A. I think, in the first place, we
know the term PLO encompasses a
number of very varied attitudes with
respect to the peace process and inte
national civility, and we have never
treated that movement as a united,
totally synchronized operation.
Secondly, there were equally dist
ing protestations from Tripoli yesten
In fact, if one would go through the
news clippings, the drum beat was
astonishingly active and prolific and I
tentious and outrageous and escalate
in character.
Q. We have no embassy from
Libya. We have no office from Li by
A. No, and, as a matter of fact,
recently took action to close it,
Q. Why is the PLO considered
better than Libya?
A. I think I answered the questin
You have to know who you encompa
in PLO.
Q. A number of your predecess
and commentators have said that
unless the United States now takes
much more visible and active role i
the negotiating process that Egypt
will come under pressure from its
Arab neighbors to rejoin the fold, s
to speak — to rejoin the more radica
Arab camp — and that Israel will fe»
far more reticent about making any
concessions to a new government. '
said that Camp David negotiations
will receive our continuing and acti
participation.
A. Yes.
Q. But will the United States, ]j
personally, in the next several monl
take a much more visible, more acti
more aggressive role in seeing that
those negotiations come to a conclu
68
Department of State Bulk I
Middle East
j A. I don't like to characterize our
Inership and our role as more active,
■ressive, or whatever. I think the
racterization of whatever our role
Bbe and should be would be a direct
[sure of our assessment as to
Bther, whatever that role is, it is go-
Ito make a more positive contribution
lie process.
■For example, let me assure you that
liave taken a very active role in the
lext of the recent resumption of the
Inomy talks, in the context of the
Iblishment of an agenda with work
|llines within that framework. With
ect to what our public profile should
i the period ahead, that will be a
t outgrowth of the assessment I
tioned. After all, we don't just
me a public posture for posturing
but rather to make a positive con-
ition to the process, and that will be
ultimate criteria.
Q. The relationship that the
ited States has had with President
at has sometimes been based on
ciing more than a handshake; not
iything that has happened between
itwo countries has been actually
r.ten down. To what extent do you
I k that his departure might make it
it e difficult for you to establish the
;i tegic consensus that you have been
»uing in the Middle East? I'm think-
% particularly of the American use
Eases and facilities at Ras Banas
? other places.
. A. Please, again, let me emphasize
uilmost the 130th time that we're not
s ing a strategic consensus. We are
s ing to recognize that such a consen-
1 has developed in recent years as a
>: .equence of Soviet direct or indirect
: -ity in the region. If you want me to
t those events, I can do it. The litany
lear: Angola, Ethiopia, Southern
I len, Northern Yemen, Afghanistan
ifghanistan II. All of these activities
1 ? heightened the concern of the
j ers of the Arab world as they see a
I phase of what one might character-
its Soviet imperialism.
I It is vitally important that American
|.'y not ignore that reality, but at-
pt to shape our own policies in view
I and that is the effort we're about
i respect to the strategic consensus,
sorry I have to do that, but I con-
itly find some confusion about that.
Q. The other part of the question.
A. The other part of the question is
I think whenever an event with the
sequences and impact of the event
we have just witnessed occurs, doubts,
uncertainties, unsettlements result. That
underlies the fundamental importance of
reiterating, reverifying by actions and
words, America's objectives and
America's policies in the region.
That is not unrelated, as I pointed
out a few moments ago, to this current
AWACS sale. It is not unrelated to our
commitment to continue on with the
Camp David accords and whatever is
best suited to bring a successful comple-
tion of those accords in the days ahead,
and we intend to do so.
Q. In your opening statement, you
expressed great concern, said the
United States would have great con-
cern about any efforts by any external
powers to manipulate the situation in
Egypt. Do you see any indication that
there are such efforts underway, or
about to be underway? It sounds like a
message to Moscow. Have you com-
municated this to Moscow?
A. No, I don't want you to read
anything untoward into what I said. I
think we have taken similar stances in
the past in other locations and regions.
We have no evidence of external manip-
ulation of events. There is considerable
evidence, historically, of activities spon-
sored by Libya in Egypt, but not in this
particular instance. We have as yet un-
covered no evidence of their involve-
ment. But I think the level of their
rhetoric, as witnessed yesterday, and
the character of that rhetoric would give
one pause. And we would hope that they
would not be tempted; they certainly are
in external propaganda terms. They've
already succumbed to that temptation.
Q. You mentioned "external"
powers. I presume you would not con-
sider Libya an external power to the
region. Are you talking about the Rus-
sians—
A. I'm talking about external to
Egypt. I think the Soviet Union knows
our position, our friendship, and our
relationship with Egypt. They know we
consider that relationship absolutely
vital to our interests in the region, and
that we would treat it accordingly.
Q. You didn't mention that any
women were going on this funeral
delegation.
A. Oh, golly.
Q. Women are very interested in
peace, and also Mrs. Sadat has been a
world leader for human rights and
peace.
A. I agree with that. I think our
problem will be simply how much space
we have, and whether you make an ex-
ception—
Q. Oh, come on, sir, you have
enough space for the women.
A. In my heart, yes, always.
[Laughter]
Q. I mean about the delegation.
Q. To follow up [the] question on
the AWACS, Senator Baker has sug-
gested that there be a moratorium on
consideration of the AWACS for a
time.
A. No, not at all.
Q. Do you intend to let the clock
run to October—
A. You've misquoted Senator
Baker, and the record should be clear
here. What he was talking about was
the pending vote in the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee scheduled for
Wednesday of this week and the
desirability of slipping that a few days.
It is in no way a suggestion by Senator
Baker that some of the other sugges-
tions made by opponents to the AWACS
sale that it be withdrawn or suspended
for 60 days or taken off the agenda of
congressional action. I spoke to Senator
Baker about that a very few moments
ago, so I know of what I speak.
Incidentally, I'm sorry to have been
so flippant about the question on
women. I really haven't got the answer
on it yet. I will have to assess it in the
period ahead and see if we can, in fact,
do it. I know my own wife has become
close to Mrs. Sadat in every sense of the
word, and I know that is also true of
Senator Percy's wife, for example, who
has been very close to Mrs. Sadat.
Q. You would agree that we have
some qualified women who should go?
A. We have qualified women.
Period. [Laughter]
Q. Did the U.S. Government have
any kind of advance intelligence infor-
mation that Mr. Sadat's life might be
in jeopardy, and did the U.S. Govern-
ment provide any intelligence informa-
tion of that sort to the Egyptian
Government?
A. I would never make it a habit of
disclosing publicly those kinds of com-
munications, had there been any. But I
don't have to tell you that President
Sadat was on the "radical hit list" and
has been ever since the initial days of
Camp David — and perhaps even before
then.
ember 1981
69
Middle East
Q. Did we have any kind of con-
crete information, though, to impart
to the Egyptians —
A. I think that clearly the Egyptian
Government did. I can't speak for them,
but they took a number of actions in re-
cent weeks which confirmed that, surely,
they had some alarming information in
that regard and perhaps more than that.
Q. As you know, Colonel Qadhafi
was in Aden recently, and they signed
an agreement. They also set up this
so-called democratic front in North
Yemen and reportedly are agitating
about a half million Yemenis in Saudi
Arabia. How seriously do you consider
this Yemeni threat to the royal family
in Saudi Arabia?
A. We don't look at it exclusively as
a threat to the royal family; we look at
it as a threat to the Government of
Saudi Arabia and the people of Saudi
Arabia. We have had recent experience
which certainly gives us cause for con-
cern, and that was the earlier effort — I
think 2 years ago — to overthrow the
government in Northern Yemen by the
use of Southern Yemen forces and proxy
forces shipped over from Ethiopia —
Cubans and perhaps Ethiopians as well.
We saw a very heavy hand of Soviet
activity in the original overthrow of the
Southern Yemen regime before that
time, and so we watch with great care,
both bilaterally in our dealings with
Northern Yemen and multilaterally in
our dealings with Saudi Arabia, day-to-
day or hour-by-hour events in Northern
Yemen, and we view them with consid-
erable concern.
Q. How important is it now for
the April 1982 withdrawal of Israel
from the Sinai to come off on time?
And might it now be more important,
in some ways, for this new Egyptian
leadership to try to improve its rela-
tionship with its Arab neighbors,
which might mean a delay in the Camp
David peace process?
A. I think the answer to your ques-
tion is that yesterday's tragedy makes a
successful completion on schedule of the
Camp David accords more, not less, im-
portant. That is not to say that we
would not favor, or would be opposed to,
a strengthening and broadening of
Egyptian relationships with the other
Arab states. We think this will be a con-
sequence of the successful conclusion of
Camp David.
Q. The only movement in the en-
tire Middle East that is tied to Muslim
fundamentalism — there has been trou-
ble recently in Tunisia, Algeria, and
we know that played a part in what
happened to President Sadat yester-
day—simply by stating that the United
States is going to be firm against ter-
rorism and line up with the regimes in
the Middle East. How do you feel that
will, in any way, deal with the funda-
mental question of what's going on in
the Muslim world, and don't you think
that it might be counterproductive?
A. There are always, in such com-
plex situations, a host of contradictions.
That's the unfortunate burden of those
of us who have to conduct foreign
affairs: They are replete with contradic-
tions. The achievement of one more
desirable goal frequently clashes im-
mediately against a perhaps somewhat
less desirable goal, and it's the assess-
ment of foreign policy to try to deter-
mine which is the more important.
I think the overall trend of inter-
national terrorism, the danger it poses
for all free nations, demands a more
concerted, collective international effort
with effective safeguards and meaning-
ful sanctionary teeth to deal with it.
That means that when an aircraft is hi-
jacked or an assassination attempt oc-
curs, the perpetrators be dealt with in a
more effective way than heretofore.
Q. Could I try once more one
question that was asked before? It
seems one of the most dangerous
aspects of what is taking place in that
part of the world today is the possi-
bility of a Libyan invasion of the
Sudan. Once more, could you give us
your estimate of what that danger is
and what our reaction would be if it
takes place?
A. Again, I don't make it a habit of
laying out the contingencies which will
always be decided by the President at
the time, based on his assessment of all
the factors associated with it. I also
don't want to hype the suggestion that a
Libyan invasion of Sudan is imminent. I
would be more concerned about internal
mischiefmaking by Libya in Sudan prop-
er as the most imminent danger, and
there has been some activity assessed
already in that direction.
Q. Could I come back again to
[the] question about the April target
date for Israeli withdrawal from the
Sinai and its linkage, if any— or to
what extent — to the autonomy talks.
It seems to me that there is a political
\m
relationship between these two. An*
wonder if it is practical for the new
Egyptian Government, in the contes
of all the burdens that are going to
on it, to move substantially on the
autonomy talks in a timeframe in
which the Israelis will find it accepl
able to withdraw from the Sinai.
How do you see the linkage? Is
there a linkage? Can the one occur
without the other? More importantl;
can the withdrawal from the Sinai o
cur without jiggling progress on the
autonomy talks?
A. Of course, there is a linkage; i'
goes without question. I don't mean th
it is a rigid linkage in which simultane
is rigidly bound. That is our objective,
would hope that the successor goverm
ment in Egypt would, for the very
reasons I've already touched upon hen
this morning, join our assessment thai
puts a greater urgency for simultaneoi
completion of autonomy talks by the j
time of the withdrawal scenario in Ap
I think it would be very foolish am
self-defeating to put preconditions wit
respect to the two, and we have avoid
that always, and we would continue t(
But I was very encouraged, and rema
encouraged, that the Egyptian Vice
President committed the successor
government in his speech yesterday oi
Egyptian television to a continuation ij
the domestic and foreign policies of
President Sadat and especially the roi
toward peace.
Q. Given the needs of the Unite
States to reassure its allies in this
region, can you tell us why neither i
President nor the Vice President is
going to attend President Sadat's
funeral?
A. I don't presume to speak for tlJ
President on that. I think he's perfect
capable of doing so himself, but there
are a host of reasons which shouldn't i
quire unusual elaboration here. We celt
tainly have an extremely and unusua
high-level delegation going to go. 1 thi
recent events in this country and in
Egypt make a contribution to the Pres
dent's decision on this. I can't speak fO'
him.
I think there's also the matter of I
having to do some business which will
require a longer period at a time when
our own plate here at home is very, vj
full with AW ACS and other legislative
matters, so I think that's enough said|
the subject.
Now, I again remain just appalled!
that I was so lethargic and so overawe
by your question that I forgot to point
70
Department of State Bull
•
Middle East
lo you that our U.N. Ambassador
|e Kirkpatrick will be on the dele-
m to Egypt. [Laughter.]
Q. You said earlier on here that
e was no direct involvement or
Libyan participation in this plot,
he Egyptians share that view, and
ou believe the analysis by some
»le in town yesterday who said
, if there is any Libyan involve-
t, they suspect that there could be
e sort of Egyptian retaliation
nst Qadhafi?
A. It would be highly inappropriate
ne to make prognostications about
reign Egypt's scenarios for dealing
certain contingencies. I think
yone knows — and the Egyptians
reiterated in recent weeks very
•ly that they have certain obligations
immittal terms to the Government
idan and that they intend to meet
s obligations.
Q. I'm not talking about Sudan.
:alking about the possibility that
Itnafi is behind this in some way
Mthat Egypt might be compelled to
lliate.
! A. We have no evidence that he is,
i would be folly to the height for me
jneculate about what they will do if
lere.
Q. Do the Egyptians share that
i • that there is no evidence?
A. I think as of the latest reading I
I that they are pretty close to our
fi assessment of the situation. It
n n't mean it won't change in the
I k1 ahead. As you know, some of the
n etrators have been incarcerated and
livailable for interrogation, which is
|i rway.
Q. Looking ahead, given that Mr.
[lit is no longer with us, do you
||k this fact will make the Saudi
l.ionship more important to the
!ed States in the years ahead? Has
been given any thought?
I A. Absolutely. A great deal of
Ight. There's no question about it.
dtally important that the United
es is able to deal effectively with the
erate Arab regimes in an atmo-
•re of confidence and mutual trust,
/itally important for the peace proc-
for the stability of the region, and
le long-term interest of Israel.
Q. Has it made the Saudi relation-
more important in your view?
A. Of course.
Q. To follow up on a question
earlier, you said you thought that
there was some alarming information
gathered by Egyptian intelligence in
recent weeks concerning Mr. Sadat's
comings and goings. Can you
elaborate on that?
A. Mr. Sadat's comings and goings?
Q. Yes. You said in the followup
to a question over here on the side
that you had — you thought the Egyp-
tians had some alarming information
about some internal affairs.
A. I think they had evidence of plot-
ting by religious fanatic groups. Perhaps
that was a contributor to the roundup
that President Sadat instituted some
weeks ago. Perhaps yesterday's events
were further intensified as a result of
that roundup, which itself was an effort
by President Sadat, as 1 understand it,
to minimize sectarian divisions within
Egypt.
Q. Did President Sadat in his re-
cent visit or Vice President Mubarak
in his recent visit raise with you the
prospect of Egyptian military action in
Libya? And if they did what was your
response?
A. The answer to your question is
that I wouldn't tell you if they had. I
think that would be a terrible breach of
the kind of relationship we must have
with our friends. But because I haven't
answered, it should not heighten your
sense of alarm about that subject.
'Press release 339.
Visit of Israeli Prime Minister Begin
Israeli Prime Minister Menahem
Begin made an official visit to the
United States September 9-15, 1981.
While in Washington, D.C. (Sept. 9-11),
he met with President Reagan and other
government officials. Following are
remarks made at the welcoming
ceremony on September 9 and remarks
made on Prime Minister Begins depar-
ture from the White House on September
10.1 '
WELCOMING CEREMONY,
SEPT. 9, 198P
President Reagan
On behalf of the American people,
Nancy and I are honored and delighted
to welcome you and all those accompa-
nying you.
We're proud to stand beside you this
morning, joining a tradition of hospitali-
ty for Israel observed by our Presidents
for more than three decades. Your visit
is testimony to the warm friendships,
mutual respect, and shared values that
bind our people. Today and tomorrow,
we'll have an opportunity to meet, to
come to know each other, and to discuss
in detail the vital issues of peace and
security that concern both our countries.
I welcome this chance to further
strengthen the unbreakable ties between
the United States and Israel and to
assure you of our commitment to Israel's
security and well-being.
Israel and America may be
thousands of miles apart, but we are
philosophical neighbors sharing a strong
commitment to democracy and the rule
of law. What we hold in common are the
bonds of trust and friendship — qualities
that in our eyes make Israel a great na-
tion. No people have fought longer,
struggled harder, or sacrificed more
than yours in order to survive, to grow,
and to live in freedom.
The United States and Israel share
similar beginnings as nations of im-
migrants, yearning to live in freedom
and to fulfill the dreams of our
forefathers. We have both sought to
establish societies of law, to live in
peace, and to develop the full potential
of our lands. We share a devotion to
democratic institutions, responsible to
the wills of our citizens. Our peoples em-
brace common ideals of self-
improvement through hard work and in-
dividual initiative. Together, we seek
peace for all people. In partnership,
we're determined to defend liberty and
safeguard the security of our citizens.
We know Israelis live in constant peril.
But Israel will have our help. It will re-
main strong and secure, and its special
character of spirit, genius, and faith will
prevail.
The prophet Ezekiel spoke of a new
age — when land that was desolate has
become like the Garden of Eden and
waste and ruined cities are now in-
habited. We saw how miraculously you
transformed and made the desert bloom.
!mber1981
71
Middle East
We see how, despite dangers everyday,
your families continue working together
to build a better place to live and to
prosper in peace and freedom.
Our dream, our challenge, and, yes,
our mission is to make the golden age of
peace, prosperity, and brotherhood a liv-
ing reality in all countries of the Middle
East. Let us remember that whether we
be Christian or Jew or Moslem, we are
all children of Abraham, we are all
children of the same God.
You come at a time of testing and of
hope. The challenges we face are great
with the forces of aggression,
lawlessness, and tyranny intent on ex-
ploiting weakness. They seek to undo
the work of generations of our people,
to put out a light that we've been tend-
ing for these past 6,000 years. But we
understand their designs, and we're
determined to oppose them. Working
with all our friends in the Middle East,
we seek to reinforce the security of the
entire region. As we consult about these
problems, rest assured that the security
of Israel is a principal objective of this
Administration and that we regard
Israel as an ally in our search for
regional stability.
Equally important in our discussions
is the commitment of our two countries
to advance the cause of peace. Your
strong leadership, great imagination,
and skilled statesmanship have been in-
dispensable in reaching the milestones of
the past few years on the road toward a
just and durable peace in the Middle
East.
You and the members of your coali-
tion have earned our respect and ad-
miration. Many cynics said Israel would
never make peace with Egypt, but you
did. Then they said you would not honor
your commitment to return the Sinai to
Egypt, but you have. Now they say you
cannot go forward to work out a just
and durable peace with all your
neighbors; we know you will.
I look forward to receiving the
benefit of your views and advice on the
great tasks that remain before us. I'm
confident that the United States and
Israel will continue their close partner-
ship as difficult negotiations toward
peace are pursued. Let me also thank
you for helping our special Ambassador
Philip Habib, to arrange a cessation of
hostilities across your border with
Lebanon — still another considered step
for peace and one well taken.
I know your entire life has been
dedicated to security and the well-being
of your people. It wasn't always easy.
From your earliest days you were ac-
quainted with hunger and sorrow, but as
you've written, you rarely wept. On one
occasion, you did — the night when your
beloved State of Israel was proclaimed.
You cried that night, you said, because
"truly there are tears of salvation as
well as tears of grief."
With the help of God, and us work-
ing together, perhaps one day for all the
people in the Middle East, there will be
no more tears of grief, only tears of I
salvation.
Shalom, shalom: to him that is fan
off and to him that is near. And again.'
Mr. Prime Minister, welcome to
America.
Prime Minister Begin
My colleagues and I are grateful to you
and to Mrs. Reagan for your kind inviti
tion, for having given us the opportunil
to discuss with you and your advisers ii
ternational problems, bilateral issues,
the danger to freedom resulting from
Soviet expansionist policy in our region
and its periphery and elsewhere, and tl
defense of human liberty, which is the
essence of our lives, demotive of our e#
forts, the reason of our labors.
Our generation lived through two
World Wars, with all the sacrifices, the
casualties, the misery involved. But the
two wars also created and left after f
them, regrettably, two illusions. In the
early 1920s, the saying went around th
world, "that was the war to end all the
wars." It was not so to be. Only 25 yea
later another World War broke out, thr
most horrifying of all in the annals of
mankind, not only with the sacrifices ir
tens of millions of human beings but all
with atrocities unheard of in history.
Ultimately, mankind crushed the darke
tyranny which ever arose to enslave th
human soul, and then people believed
that it was the end of tyranny of man
over man. It was not to be.
After May 1945, there were 56 so-
called local wars in a period of 36 year
alone. In other words, blood-letting am
enslavement are going on. Country aft
country is being taken over by totali-
tarianism. In nearly 8 years, eight com
tries were so taken over, either by pro:
or directly. So it is obvious that liberty
is in danger, and all free women and
men should stand together to defend it
and to assure its future for all genera-
tions to come.
Israel is a small country, but a free
one. Its democracy was proved time an
time again — true democracy. It is an ir
tegral part of the free world. It is a
faithful and, through each democratic
regime, a stable ally of the United
States. We shall stand together, and
Israel will give its share in defending
human liberty.
Out of those 56 local wars, five wer
thrust upon little Israel since its incep-
tion. We waged them out of necessity t>
defend our people and to save its ex-
istence and to sustain our independence
E|
72
Middle East
is the simple reason why we not on-
nt peace, but we yearn for peace.
therefore, as you rightly said, at a
of great sacrifices and admittedly
taken — those are very serious
—we made peace. We signed a
treaty on this very lawn with our
em neighbor, but we strive to sign
treaties and make peace forever
our borders with all our neigh-
And with God's help, this noble
vill be achieved, too.
hank you for your heartwarming
rks about my people and my coun-
id touching words about my life,
i is only one of the uncountable
ands and milllions who have suf-
and fought and resisted and saw,
a long night, the rise of the Sun,
ay. I am one of them because this
generation. But your appreciation
r motives, our efforts, our
'ices is very dear to all of us
ise we see in you not only the
dent of the United States but also
efender of freedom throughout the
I.
Kay I extend to you on behalf of the
e and Government of Israel, our in-
on to come and visit our country
;s capital, Jerusalem. Then we hope
•ve shall be able to reciprocate the
erful hospitality, indeed, in the
of all Abraham, whom you men-
d, which was accorded to my col-
<es and to myself. Be assured the
<e of Israel will receive you not only
utmost respect but with deep cor-
I \RTURE REMARKS,
IT. 10, 19812
I dent Reagan
i Mme Minister and I have had 2
I of friendly and useful and produc-
I alks. I'm greatly encouraged by the
lion purpose that I have sensed
l.ghout our discussions and especial-
I 'ased by the friendship and com-
1 candor that have developed be-
ta us from the very outset of our
fing-
'our views, Mr. Prime Minister,
been invaluable, and your grasp of
s that concern us is truly im-
;ive. We've made progress in chart-
course that we'll be following in
eace process in the months ahead,
work together to maintain the
3 that was concluded between Israel
3gypt and to build on that peace
Droaden it.
The United States stands ready to
help advance the peace process in any
way that is useful to the parties con-
cerned. In our discussions about the
strategic situation in the Middle East,
it's only natural that we've found much
common ground. As friends and as part-
ners in peace, we share a determination
to oppose all forces that threaten the
freedom, integrity, and peace of our na-
tions.
The United States will remain com-
mitted to Israel's security and well-
being. We work together with you and
with our friends in the region to counter
Soviet aggression and to strengthen
security of all the countries in the area.
This is the first of what I know will
be many warm and productive meetings
between us. I'm delighted to have had
this opportunity to come to know you
and to discuss the partnership between
our two countries. Through our conver-
sations, I believe we've created new
bonds of understanding between the
United States and Israel, renewed and
strengthened our very special friendship.
While I know that you are going to
continue a few days longer, and while
we part, but you will be here longer, I
wish you a very pleasant, continued stay
in the United States and, above all, a
very safe return to Israel.
Prime Minister Begin
I subscribe without any qualification to
the appreciation of the talks we held in
Washington with the President and his
advisers. The American delegation and
the Israeli delegation spoke with candor,
in detail.
All of us made our work well-
prepared and, therefore, the results can
really be considered unanimously by
both the President and his advisers and
my colleagues and myself as very fruit-
ful. We draw a distinction — a clear
distinction— between problems of
defending our country when it becomes
necessary and the community of moral
values and of direct interests between
the United States and Israel, as far as
the threat to freedom of many nations in
the Middle East and elsewhere is con-
cerned.
As far as defense of Israel is con-
cerned, it is our problem. We will never
ask any nation to send its soldiers to de-
fend us. Our army will do its duty. We
hate war. We hate bloodshed. We want
peace. We gave great sacrifices for the
sake of peace. We hope to achieve that
peace with the other neighbors. But if it
should come at any moment when we
will have to defend our independence
and our liberty ami our land, then our
young people will do so as they did in
the past, in the spirit of self-sacrifice
and, I don't hesitate to say, in heroism.
But, there is another problem in out-
time: a clear community of interests vis-
a-vis a clear and present danger to every
free nation by a totalitarian and an ex-
pansionist regime. On this issue, we
work together, we will plan together, we
will execute those plans together, in
agreement, for the benefit both of the
United States and Israel and the free
world at large.
We are all grateful to you for the
wonderful hospitality you accorded to
us. To you and to your gracious lady,
Mrs. Reagan, I can only repeat again:
"We will be awaiting your visit to our
country and to Jerusalem." With God's
help you will come. And we shall give
you the heartiest reception by a people
who have got so great a respect for you
as anybody who came to see you, to
listen to you, to feel your warmth, your
friendship, your readiness to give
brotherhood to human beings, can feel.
I do not say goodbye. I say next
time, au revoir, in Jerusalem.
■Texts from Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents of Sept. 14, 1981,
which also includes toasts made at the state
dinner on Sept. 9.
-Made on the South Lawn of the White
House. ■
tmber1981
73
Middle East
Secretary Haig's News Conference
on Prime Minister Begin's Visit
Secretary Haig held a news con-
ference on September 10, 1981, to brief
news correspondents on President
Reagan's meetings with Israeli Prime
Minister Begin. i
I think as this visit draws to a conclu-
sion— at least the Washington phases of
Prime Minister Begin's visit — it would
serve a useful purpose to summarize
where we stand as of this afternoon.
There have been a number of
discussions — one-on-one between the
President and the Prime Minister,
confined-group discussions and larger
group discussions, discussions with State
Department officials here yesterday and
the Prime Minister and his delegation, a
very private session this morning with
the President, a larger plenary session
this morning, discussions with the
Secretary of the Treasury, discussions
with the Secretary of Defense.
All of these discussions, of course,
are eclipsed by the importance of the
personal discussions between Prime
Minister Begin and President Reagan,
bearing in mind that this is the first
meeting between the two leaders, both
of whom are at the early edges of ex-
tended periods of future responsibility
for the governing of their two countries
and peoples.
In that sense, the personal rapport
that was established between the two
leaders, the frankness and cordiality of
the exchanges between them, the com-
monality of threat assessment to both
the United States and Israel certainly
would have to lead to a value judgment
that this was an exceptionally successful
visit in every sense of the word. I think
both of the leaders have so described it
in their frequent appearances before the
press in both toasts and formal state-
ments.
In the area of bilateral relationships
between Israel and the United States,
this was an important visit. It has been
a very difficult few months — the situa-
tion in Lebanon and other events in the
Middle East — and it has provided a very
good opportunity for President Reagan
to reassure Prime Minister Begin of the
longstanding relationships between our
two governments which will continue in
the period ahead to reaffirm unequiv-
ocally America's continuing support for
the security and well-being of Israel.
Associated with that are a number of
other vexing doubts and questions of
historic character which were touched
upon and dispensed with clarity and
precision.
74
One of the very important aspects of
the meeting involved what I call "re-
gional discussions of strategic dialogue,"
if you will. This is something which has
been ongoing to a degree with certain
interruptions since the outset of this Ad-
ministration, starting with my visit to
Israel last spring, at which time we
discussed the importance of this
strategic relationship.
During this visit both leaders had an
opportunity and their responsible
Cabinet counterparts also had an oppor-
tunity to, as what I've described earlier,
"put some meat on the bones" of this
strategic relationship. We agreed during
this visit to launch a series of discus-
sions immediately which would be de-
signed to do precisely that and to deal
with a number of possible areas of col-
laborative strategic endeavor between
the two governments.
We've talked about having Cabinet-
level groups, primarily under the aegis
of the Secretary of Defense and [Israeli]
Minister of Defense Sharon, and the
respective military authorities, to con-
sider such things as some limited initial
prestocking, perhaps in the medical
area; some discussions of joint exercises
which would be appropriate in the
region; and some ongoing strategic plan-
ning which would focus on external
threats to the Middle East region, either
direct threats from the Soviet Union,
from Soviet proxies, or threats of the in-
direct kind — terrorism and the like.
These talks will commence immediately,
as I've pointed out, with a view toward
arrriving at some joint conclusions and
arrangements.
We also had an opportunity during
the visit to focus precisely — and this
focus will continue in the morning when
we will have a working breakfast with
the Prime Minister at which I will repre-
sent the U.S. side — to discuss the peace
process itself, the autonomy talks. In
this regard, the visit gave President
Reagan an opportunity to thank Prime
Minister Begin for the prompt agree-
ment that has been arrived at between
Egypt and Israel to get on with the
autonomy talks, scheduled now to be
held in Egypt on September 23-24.
It also gave President Reagan an op-
portunity to express his gratitude to
Prime Minister Begin for the restraint
under difficult circumstances, evidenced
by Israeli policy, which has permitted, in
contribution with other participants, the
cessation of hostilities along the nort
ern border of Israel and Lebanon
It gave us an opportunity to ex- *
change views on how we should proo
in the period ahead to strengthen the
arrangements and to jointly conclude
that the best interests of both Israel
the United States and peace and stat
ty in the region would be a political c
come.
Finally, of course — and I know
you're not interested in this subject-
there were exchanges of views which
were both frank and open, extensive,
serious, and above all cordial with
respect to the controversial question
the provision of AWACS [airborne
warning and control system] or air
capabilities to Saudi Arabia. In this
regard, that exchange which took pig
yesterday — of which much has alreac
been reported on and discussed — ga\
the Israeli delegation and the Prime
Minister himself an opportunity to e>
press their concerns about the provis
of this or any other sophisticated arn
ment to neighboring Arab states wit]
which Israel's relationship is uncertai
and a source of some concern. It gav
also an opportunity on the U.S. side
lay out with precision the reasons wl
we felt that in the long run provision
these armaments to Saudi Arabia ws
the best interests of regional stability
and the objective we have for achievi
a peace process of longstanding and
meaningful outcome.
In that context, it was very clear
that Prime Minister Begin recognize
that while he has both the right and
obligation to express his concerns, tl
this is a U.S. decision to make. It is ;
decision to be made in the context oi
President's obligation for the conduc
American foreign policy and our owr
perception of the broader aspects of
vital interests in the Middle East anc
do so in collaboration with the Ameri
Congress. During this visit it was cle
that the Prime Minister did not inter
pose himself in this process, and I do
not believe he intends to do so. Althc
I can't speak for him, he's been rathe
explicit on that himself.
In sum, I want to emphasize agai
that perhaps the successful character
this meeting is best underlined by thi
circumstantial events which have pre
ed it. The fact that the two leaders h:
had an opportunity to establish an
unusual degree of rapport and mutua
respect and cordiality and convergent
of thinking augers very, very well for
the difficult and important period ahe
with respect to the achievement of on
:
il
Middle East
ually held ultimate goals in which
ne Minister Begin has already made
substantial contributions. I'm talk-
about an acceptable lasting peace in
Middle East.
Q. Is there room for a strategic
■sensus in the Middle East between
lUnited States, Israel, and Saudi
Ibia after you heard Israel's expres-
ms of concern especially toward
di Arabia?
1 A. Again, I think it's awfully impor-
I when you ask this question to
»gnize that there is already a
Itegic consensus in the context of the
I I tried to describe it, perhaps not as
I as I might have last spring. I'm
^ing about a growing recognition
|ng all the states in the Middle East
Ion of their increasing vulnerability
ioviet aggression, whether it be
let of the kind we see in Afghanistan
indirect of the kind we've seen in the
liens, Ethiopia, and other regional
I think, and I have said, that it is
m clear that the very fact of this con-
suls has already made a contribution
pjhe Lebanon situation where there
83 been unusual contributions from
nsual sources which have, after all,
I =rht us, if nothing else, a period of
e :e and stability when the prospects
ft conflict were very, very urgent and
r linent. One must not look a gift
c ie in the mouth in that respect.
With respect to the longer term
ft icts of your question, this remains to
E een. I think it's very clear in the
i ussions we've held with the Israeli
e gation that they would welcome a
c nalizaion of relationships with Saudi
I bia. That does not exist today but
ti ' the future will tell.
Q. We understand that Prime
liister Begin suggested that the
geement regarding the military
b itegic cooperation would be in the
Dn of written agreements or a
■ norandum of understanding. What
(he Administration position regard-
1 such a formal agreement with
Lei?
A. We're not opposed to such a
norandum. In fact, I think the two
ss will attempt to draft one which
ild be no more than a launching pad
the kinds of discussions we are talk-
about. I would be less than frank
•e I not to suggest to you that there
real political and practical limitations
the degree of such collaborative ac-
1 in the near term. The political will
without saying. The practical are that
we are considering a number of things
today associated with a stepped-up
American defense budget associated
with our power projection capabilities
into the region, the rapid deployment
force, prestockage associated with that,
contingency planning associated with it.
All of those things require more
careful thinking in the light of budgetary
uncertainties which we are faced with
today, and the fleshing out of the 5-year
defense program that [Defense]
Secretary Weinberger has laid out for
the President.
So we have sort of focused on some
narrower things, and I would be less
than frank were I not to suggest to you
that our Israeli friends have had a
rather more fulsome assessment of
things that they would see as potential
collaboration in the period ahead, and
that's why these discussions will serve a
very useful purpose.
We must bear in mind, however,
that limitations exist which will be the
final governor of what will be achieved
in the near term, but the process we are
determined to start immediately and to
achieve what can be achieved in the light
of the limitations I outlined.
Q. What do you foresee here as
being possible in this strategic consen-
sus? Do you not anticipate any dif-
ficulty in your growing relations with
the moderate Arab governments such
as Saudi Arabia — Egypt more remote-
ly— but what effect do you expect
this to have in your relations with
them?
A. I wouldn't anticipate it would
have any effect because we have been in
the process of conducting discussions
with Egypt along these lines. We have
not looked for bases in Saudi Arabia.
Our relationships with them are
somewhat different as a sovereign na-
tion.
Clearly, we are talking about joint
planning in some respects, collaborative
studies and efforts which focus on the
external threats to the region, which all
of the nations of the region could be vic-
timized by and have in some instances
had a very direct exposure in the recent
past. So I do not see these as mutually
contradictory and, perhaps in a historic
sense, ultimately dependent on progress
which we hope to achieve in the peace
process, a converging set of interests.
Q. Perhaps you can clear up one
apparent contradiction. Today Prime
Minister Begin said he does not want
American troops. He wants American
tools that Israel can defend itself.
What, then, would the purpose and
what would be the focus and scope of
these joint military exercises?
A. I think, again, we're talking
about — and it is true, inciden-
tally— Prime Minister Begin has made
very clear in discussions I had in Israel
last spring and in his discussions with
the President this week that Israel is
dedicated to the proposition that it will
defend itself. It has been prepared, as it
has historically been prepared, to make
the necessary sacrifices to do precisely
that.
On the other hand, I think we all
know that potentially there is always a
great danger of major interventionism
by outside powers into the region where
it would be necessary for collaborative,
cooperative work by the nations of the
region that are threatened and by cer-
tainly the United States which has such
a vital stake in the outcome.
Q. And do joint military exercises
suggest that, in the event of outside
interference, Israeli and American
troops then would be prepared to fight
alongside each other against this ex-
ternal—
A. I wouldn't go beyond what I
have already said because perhaps
already from what I've said you're going
to be inclined to inflate this beyond its
more practical aspects. I think, clearly,
that as strategic partners we have a
common interest in defending our vital
interests. I won't put any more ominous
overtone on that other than to state it
as a simple fact, and it has always been.
Q. Is there at this point any con-
sensus between the United States and
Israel on strategy for proceeding in
the autonomy talks?
A. Is there a consensus? I think
there is certainly a consensus to get on
with the task immediately to maintain
that effort within the framework of the
Camp David accords. I don't have to tell
you that the work done earlier in the
previous Administration by Ambassador
Linowitz has been extensive, and in
some cases very explicit, and achieve-
ments have been made.
There was a quietus period, where
everything stalled out. I would hope we
would pick up from that, building on
what has already been established so
competently in that previous effort. It
remains to be seen very early on
because I think after this meeting on the
23d and 24th we will have an easier
grasp. But we would hope that meeting
'ember 1981
75
Middle East
would set an agenda for specific ac-
complishments, benchmarks, and a fixed
time schedule in which to achieve them.
Q. How will the United States be
represented at that meeting?
A. We feel it's best to be repre-
sented by those who have the most in-
timate feel for what has preceded and
the situation in the area. So it would be
our two local ambassadors, our Am-
bassador to Israel and our Ambassador
to Egypt, with a representative from the
State Department here, of course.
Following that meeting, we will then
make a decision as to what level would
be most appropriate for future meetings.
Q. You've made a reference before
to the phrase you have used about
"meat on the bones" of the rhetoric of
the strategic cooperation; and in the
course of some of your remarks today
you alluded to a few examples.
Now, given [the earlier] question
and your own anxiety about everybody
running with a different kind of
headline, so to speak, I wonder if
you'd be good enough to run down
some of that "meat" right now so we
could get it as clearly as possible.
A. I suppose the most self-defeating
thing you can do is to get out ahead of
the discussions which we are now pro-
gramed to take place. That is already
a constraint that I don't think serves
any purpose to violate today. It could be
any number of things, and it can be an
elaboration and an expansion of the
things I talked about already; it could be
some entirely different things. But all
these things are going to have to be
governed by the practical constraints of
American capabilities in the near term
and political considerations.
Q. Were there any Israeli requests
or agreements on additional military
and economic aid or new weapon
systems to help you flesh out these
bugs?
A. It goes without saying that
Israel, just like the United States and all
Western industrialized states today, is
suffering the consequences of runaway
inflation and declining productivity and
a general economic malaise which justify
some mention of additional Israeli needs
in the period ahead. There were ex-
changes, both with Secretary Regan —
our Secretary of Treasury — and the
Prime Minister and with the President
and the Prime Minister. During these
exchanges we made it very clear that
we, too, were faced with some very
serious constraints and that these con-
straints will have an effect on our flex-
ibility to deal with additional levels of
assistance in the period ahead. I would
say that it was nothing more than a
broad exchange of that kind.
Q. Is one of the issues that you're
discussing the passing on of in-
telligence information from American
spy satellites to the Israelis?
A. The answer to that is no, there
has been no such specific request. I
would be disingenuous if I were not to
suggest to you that the Prime Minister
is meeting with the Director of Central
Intelligence, and increased intelligence
assistance to Israel will clearly be one of
the topics. But we don't ever, in an
public venue, go into detail on that.
Q. This morning Prime Minister
Begin defended in great detail
President Sadat's recent crackdown
in Egypt in order to prevent a
Khomeini — in quoting him — "fanatic
to destabilize the stability in Egypt."
Do you agree with the President's
view that Sadat should —
A. I never make it the habit to be
presumptive enough to make value
judgments on the view of a head of state
of a friendly government, and I'm not
going to do that today, and I think
enough is said on that subject.
Q. Did you or any other American
officials at any time ask the Prime
Minister to show greater restraint in
his military operations toward other
countries in the Middle East? And, in
particular, did the Israeli air strikes
against Baghdad and Beirut come up?
What was his response to that?
A. No, they did not come up; and,
frankly, we viewed those circumstances
as circumstances that are now behind
us. Those circumstances themselves,
those events, generated actions and
counteractions which are also behind us.
We did focus, as I pointed out earlier,
on the strategic relationship — if you
will, the strategic partnership, the
alliance, in that sense of the word — bet-
ween Israel and the United States and
the mutuality of obligations incurred on
both sides in such a relationship. And I
think that's understood on both sides.
Q. Even though there is no link —
as you've said several times — between
the AW ACS and the new strategic
relationship, was the discussion — or
no direct link — was the discussion
about the strategic relationship at
least partly intended to assuage the
B
Israelis or make them feel that they i
are protected against any threat that <-
they perceive from the AWACS?
A. No. I think it would be really
spurious to suggest such a thing. I
discussed the strategic relationship dur
ing my visit to Israel last spring. Pc's a
dialogue, incidentally, that's been going
on for some 4 years; but usually it has
been confined to rhetoric.
Secondly, I want to make the point
very, very clearly that on this occasion
the Israeli side came to Washington wr
this high on their agenda of objectives,
So the connotation you've put on it in
your question would not be correct.
Q. So that I, at least for one,
don't go out of here reporting arms ti
China — arms sales that caused you
some concern —
A. All right. I'd be very upset if yffl
were to do that. [Laughter.]
Q. — about the way we all report*
ed it. I don't understand whether this
is some new breakthrough —
A. Not at all.
Q. — in strategic cooperation be-
tween Israel and the United States.
Have you agreed on these examples
that you used or have we simply
agreed to talk about it as a result of
this meeting? Can you put it in some
perspective?
A. Let me put it in a greater
perspective. As I say, there has been a
strategic dialogue under way between
the United States and Israel for at leas'
3-4 years. When I went to Israel in
May, I talked about expanding this and
giving it a greater sense of urgency an
specificity. In the intervening period I
think both sides thought about how tha
would do it.
In our case, we focused on the thre
areas of potential collaboration I spoke
to: some limited prepositioning, some
joint exercises — especially, perhaps, in
the naval area — and some planning
which could lead to further collabora- I
tion. The Israeli side did the same, and
they came with a somewhat fuller list.
Now, the question is: Did we agree
to anything in this visit? The answer tea
that is yes. We agreed to start an im- I
mediate dialogue and joint efforts whid
will include not only the three areas I j
spoke to but also any other proposals
that the Government of Israel may carl
to put forward.
Now, the only thing I'd want to cal
tion you on is that I wouldn't view this!
as some historic event of unusual
1
76
Department of State Bulletin
Middle East
ficance but, rather, as an important
nsus of view to get on with an im-
int task of mutual interest to both
rnments and that it will be conduct-
lder the constraints and restraints
I spoke to. That means it's going to
long-term evolutionary process.
Q. Does that mean, when you
;d about political constraints,
estic or political constraints in the
lie East such as one thinks of?
L I think both — in the broader
■ here at home. Anything that gets
to commitments and obligations in-
s coordination and consultation
the Congress. In the region, it's
important also that the objectives
ese things be viewed by neighboring
s, moderate Arab states, as being
llel to those kinds of things that are
itially available to them at some
In some instances there have been
ssions. But, of course, our relation-
with Israel is rather advanced in
regard.
^. Could I ask you a kind of a
% 's advocate question? Some people
I would have said that because of
B-
\. I'm trying to find out who is the
II now. [Laughter.]
^. This is an imaginary devil — or,
i ast, some editorial writers who
* said that because of the Israeli
ii ; on Baghdad and Beirut, and ob-
> dy the lack of consultation, that
e Jnited States should have used
e isit of Mr. Begin as an opportuni-
■ really be rather firm and tough
1 unrewarding.
[n fact, as you've said, those two
I sets apparently did not come up.
1 from talking to the Israelis,
I re rather pleased because they
i that they are on a very positive
K with the United States. Can you
i discuss the psychology of
jimacy dealing with the Israelis —
I it's more the carrot than, say, the
,->
A. I wouldn't want to characterize
liscussions as being either carrots or
s. I would characterize your ques-
as being a very neat devil's ad-
te question.
think my answer to the earlier
tion with respect to our strategic
nership, mutuality of obligations, the
that these subjects have been
issed in detail well before this visit
Id put to rest any advocacy for one.
nk the fact that there were exten-
sive exchanges on mutual interests,
mutual responsibilities and obligations —
and I can tell you in the case of the
AW ACS, for example, the expositions
were rather clear and concise and
unbending on both sides. So I would
hope that your "devil" will go back to the
prayer table [laughter] and look for
something else.
Q. As you know, the Saudi Ara-
bians, in particular, have taken a very
keen interest in the AWACS sale and
also in the progress of the autonomy
talks. If you should be in a position at
any time in the near future to discuss
these matters with anyone in authority
in Saudi Arabia, do you feel now that
you're in a position [laughter] —
A. That's a hypothetical.
Q. Just a hypothetical.
A. All right.
Q. I'm trying to be helpful.
[Laughter.] Do you feel that you're in
a position to reassure them on both
those counts: 1) that the AWACS sale
is on track; and, 2) that the govern-
ment of Prime Minister Begin is
serious about pursuing a settlement to
the autonomy problem?
A. In the hypothetical case I would
be speaking to any other interested par-
ty in the region. In the near future or
distant future, I think there is no ques-
tion about this Administration's clear
dedication to the proposition that the
successful transfer of the AWACS to
Saudi Arabia is in the vital interest of
this country. It will be a contributor to
regional stability. There will be suffi-
cient transfer arrangements associated
with this sale that will obviate the lesson
and diminish the concerns — legitimate
concerns — that anyone might have with
respect to its character. I will put that
aside.
With respect to the peace process, I
think it is very clear that both Prime
Minister Begin and President Sadat in
the recent meeting in Alexandria clearly
committed themselves to an autonomy
process, to the resumption of that proc-
ess, with a sense of urgency that has
been lacking in the recent past for a
host of reasons — perhaps, over which
neither side had control over — and that
we in the United States are going to be
an active partner in this process. We
seek the earliest possible achievement of
an autonomy agreement and that for
whatever reason, both Egypt and
Israel — and they may be differing
reasons — feel a similar sense of urgency
on the need to do this. I hope that it will
be done by April of this coming year.
Q. Could you clarify one phrase
you've used twice now before you
leave us? You talked about mutual re-
sponsibilities and obligations. Are you
talking in a legal, formal sense? Have
we incurred some new obligations and
responsibilities toward Israel, and
have they promised some obligations
toward us?
A. No, not in the sense of your
question; I think in the sense of the
understanding in a broader sense — the
spirit of partnership — and that is that
one side takes very careful consideration
of the interests of the other side in
whatever they do. And that is not a
legalistic obligation.
'Press release 298. I
Secretary
Interviewed for
"Good Morning,
America"
Secretary Haig was interviewed by
David Hartman and Steve Bell for
ABC-TV's "Good Morning, America" on
September 11, 1981. l
Q. Yesterday President Reagan and
Prime Minister Menahem Begin of
Israel concluded 2 days of talks in
Washington and in these talks, the
United States and Israel, it is being
reported this morning, agreed to what
is called a new "strategic collabora-
tion," including perhaps joint naval
maneuvers, the stockpiling of some
American supplies in Israel, and joint
planning to counter the Soviets.
We understand that this
"strategic collaboration," if you will,
is something that Israel has always
wanted, but perhaps other Administra-
tions have shied away from because
they were concerned about Arab reac-
tion. What do you say to the Arabs to
reassure them about this new report
this morning?
ember 1981
77
Middle East
'
A. I wouldn't describe previous Ad-
ministrations' attitudes quite so sharply.
There has been a dialogue underway
with Israel for almost 4 years on this
topic. I think there has been some
frustration on both sides that nothing
specific has been arrived at. We are
also, as you know, engaging in similar
discussions with some of the moderate
Arab regimes, and I won't be specific
but we do not see these as threatening
steps against moderate Arab coun-
tries— precisely the opposite. These are
coordinating actions which are designed
to deal with the external threats from
the Soviet Union or from Soviet proxies
perhaps, and there has been a rash of
that in the area as you know.
Q. Have you already had some
reaction from the Arabs that would in-
dicate that they are already reassured
about what we're reading and hearing
this morning?
A. No, nor have we sought any
because we've been engaged in similar
discussions with them. You'll recall when
the President sent me to the Middle
East this past spring, we talked about
strategic consensus to deal with external
threats.
That's a consensus which is already
in place. It is a consensus which, in-
cidently, has sustained us well in the
Lebanon crisis. So this doesn't require
any new spectacular approaches and is,
indeed, not that. It'll be limited and
moderated by practical realities and
political considerations.
Q. Another key element of your
strategic plan is the AW ACS [airborne
warning and control system] radar
planes for Saudi Arabia and other
sophisticated military equipment. And
while you were holding a news con-
ference yesterday reaffirming recom-
mitment, Prime Minister Begin was
on Capitol Hill arguing against the
sale of AW ACS. If Congress stops
AWACS or weapons deliveries to the
Saudis, would we still go ahead with
the Israeli strategic cooperation?
A. Let me tell you while I was
discussing it in a news conference,
Prime Minister Begin was asked ques-
tions with respect to the Israeli view on
the Hill. He's not here in this country
lobbying against the AWACS, not in any
sense of the word. He has stated that
himself repeatedly during his visit. He
feels that it is not Israel's role to in-
tervene in an issue which involves coor-
dination between the executive and
legislative branches which is underway.
That would be unacceptable interven-
tion. I know the Prime Minister feels
very strongly about that because I've
discussed it with him personally. Now he
does feel that he, when asked, must
answer from his own perspective. But
I'll add also that he has heard our
perspective in great detail, and we feel
that the logic underpinning this action is
compelling and will, indeed, in the long
run meet the vital interests of Israel.
Let me say also that this is not an
issue that just was created with the
Reagan Administration. There's been a
dialogue on this subject for a number of
years. We are not engaged in carrots or
sticks or threats or blackmail with
respect to the success or failure of this
issue. It stands on its own merits. The
relationship with Israel, on the other
hand, is historic. It is not going to be
derailed by particular differences or par-
ticular issues. It must not be. And now
that doesn't mean that we do not con-
sider this AWACS proposition an ex-
tremely important one. This is part of
the President's foreign policy. It is the
President of the United States who must
be responsible for American foreign
policy. And, indeed, we are both best
served— both governments — if that prin-
ciple is preserved.
Q. Last week on this program,
Senator Gary Hart said that we should
not give the Saudis strategic weapons
because they are an unstable regime
and also that they wouldn't be able to
protect against Soviet espionage.
A. I wouldn't describe the Saudi
regime as unstable in any sense of the
word. And it is precisely in the interests
of the Western world to continue to
work in collaboration with that regime
and that Saudi Arabia remains, as it
has, a sovereign nation, essentially
oriented toward Western interests. Cer-
tainly not only past and historic
performances by that government but
most recent performance, especially in
the Lebanon crisis, especially in the vital
area of Western oil needs, has under-
lined, as perhaps nothing else has here
before, the importance of that
American-Saudi Arabian relationship.
Q. There are a lot of concerns, as
you know, here about the Israeli at-
tacks on the nuclear reactor in Iraq
and also the bombing in Beirut recent-
ly. Did you get any assurances from
Prime Minister Begin that this kind of
attack is not going to happen again?
•'
A. We neither sought any nor pi
received any. These issues have been I
discussed in detail between our two IW
governments, and the events associati
with them are now behind us. Some c|6
those events were not particularly coi |
fortable for one side or the other. No1
we have talked about a strategic rela-
tionship— a new one, a reinvigorated
one, if you will — and that relationship
incurs automatically mutual obligatior
on both parties — a true partnership, i
you will — and that means that actions
taken by one side must always considc
the vital interests of the other, and I
think that understanding is very, verj
clear.
Q. The new agreement with
Israel, could it possibly lead to a foi
mal defense agreement?
A. I don't visualize that at all.
That's not the intent of these coor
dinating steps that we are talking abc
They are modest in character, and th(
are very finitely limited by both politii
and practical considerations.
Q. In the last week, as we all
know, President Sadat in Egypt has
put in jail some 1,500 people — politi
and/or religious critics. How concei
ed is our government about these
events right now in Cairo?
A. Our government's position on J
freedom of the press is well-known. V J
of course, regret this incident, and w<
have made our position on it clear in
Cairo.
Q. Is there any concern that the
Egyptian Government might have a
stability problem?
A. We don't anticipate anything c
that kind. There's nothing to suggest
that.
Q. What's the next step as far a I
the autonomy talks, the Camp David !
talks? When are you next going to s
down personally and get involved?
A. Personally, that remains to be
seen. I've been very actively involved 1
a number of weeks now — months — bu
we are very, very pleased that both
Egypt and Israel have agreed to con-
vene and resume these talks on the 23
and the 24th of this month in Egypt.
We'll see shortly thereafter at what le'
the United States will participate. We
are going to participate in those.
■Press release 299.
78
Department of State Bullet
.ITARY AFFAIRS
NUCLEAR POLICY
-ported Use of
lemical
capons
L
'he following statement was made to
ress by Walter J. Stoessel, Jr.,
r Secretary for Political Affairs, on
mber U, 1981.
;rday in Berlin, Secretary Haig
led that the United States, along
many other members of the world
iimity, has been for some time con-
;d over reports of use of lethal
ical weapons in Afghanistan and
least Asia. He announced that the
Government now had physical
nee from Southeast Asia found to
.in three potent toxic agents.
lS Secretary Haig promised, we are
g steps to provide this information
3 world community through the
■d Nations, its member govern-
s, and through the representatives
i national and international press
today,
l.eports of the use of chemical war-
ligents in Southeast Asia date back
176. The United States has publicly
3'ssed its concern about these events
limerous occasions over these years.
j ave privately and formally ex-
i ed our concern to the Soviet, Viet-
n se, and Laotian Governments, only
I told that our concerns are un-
cled.
l June 1980, we prepared a
5 age compendium of reports of
; ical weapons use, and we used that
i endium as a basis for supporting
5 December 1980 U.N. resolution to
; lish an impartial international in-
j Ration into reports of chemical
jons use. We followed that with an
d:e to the compendium in March
l.fter earlier unsuccessful attempts
■ tain physical evidence of chemical
■ ons use, we have recently un-
j-ed significant, though preliminary,
|mation to demonstrate clearly that
loncerns were entirely justified.
Specifically, we believe we have ob-
Id good evidence that rather than a
Itional lethal chemical agent, three
lit and lethal mycotoxins of the
lathecene group have been used. A
Itoxin is a poison typically produced
Iture by living organisms. Analysis
leaf and stem sample from Kam-
lea has revealed high levels of lethal
|)toxins of the trichothecene group.
The levels detected were up to 20 times
greater than any recorded natural out-
break.
Since normal background levels of
these toxins are essentially undetectable,
the high levels found are considered to
be abnormal, and it is highly unlikely
that such levels could have occurred in a
natural intoxication. In point of fact,
these mycotoxins do not occur naturally
in Southeast Asia.
The possession and use of toxins is a
violation of both the 1925 Geneva pro-
tocol and the 1972 Biological Weapons
Convention, as well as the rules of
customary international law of armed
conflict.
Over the past several years, a
number of medical doctors working on
this problem have visited Southeast
Asia. They visited the borders in ques-
tion, interviewed and examined
refugees, reviewed medical records in-
cluding public health data, and spoke
directly with eyewitnesses to events in
both Laos and Kampuchea.
Detailed analyses of this and other
information leads us to conclude that
mycotoxins, not traditional chemical
warfare agents, produced the bizarre ef-
fects which caused the reported deaths.
The test results we have recently ob-
tained, together with the information
provided by the physicians who have
visited Southeast Asia, represent strong
and compelling, but nonetheless
preliminary, evidence that the lethal
agents used are mycotoxins.
I want to caution you that there are
certainly other agents being used that
we have not yet identified. In-
capacitating and riot control agents, as
well as other possible lethal agents, may
be involved.
We are attempting to obtain addi-
tional information from Laos and Kam-
puchea in an effort to obtain cor-
roborative evidence. We are sharing this
information with the U.N. group of ex-
perts investigating chemical weapons
use, as well as our friends and allies
throughout the world.
The United States believes that in
the light of this new information, in-
creased efforts must be made to visit
the regions where chemical attacks are
being reported. We have, therefore,
urged the Secretary General's group of
experts to take steps immediately to
visit refugee camps and the areas of
reported attacks in Kampuchea and the
other regions in question to obtain
testimony firsthand from eyewitnesses
and victims of attacks, medical person-
nel, officials of refugee organizations,
and any other evidence available.
We have also urged that the utmost
effort be made to contact and obtain
testimony from the many victims and
eyewitnesses who have departed the
refugee camps and started new lives
elsewhere. ■
Nuclear Cooperation Agreement
With Egypt
by Harry R. Marshall, Jr.
Statement prepared for submission
to the Subcommittees on Europe and the
Middle East and International Security
and Scientific Affairs of the House
Foreign Affairs Committee on September
10, 1981. Mr. Marshall is Deputy Assist-
ant Secretary for Oceans and Interna-
tional Environmental and Scientific Af-
fairs. 1
I am pleased to be able to appear before
these subcommittees today to discuss
the agreement for nuclear cooperation
between the United States and Egypt.
On June 29, during the visit here of the
Egyptian Minister of Energy and Elec-
tricity, this agreement was signed by
Secretary Haig and Minister Abaza. We
consider this agreement important to
our interests in the vital and sensitive
Middle East region and supportive of
our nonproliferation policies. The agree-
ment will be potentially significant to
both countries in Egypt's development
of nuclear power.
Background to the Agreement
The concept of nuclear cooperation has
been discussed with both Egypt and
Israel since 1974. Our consideration of
this subject has, thus, spanned four Ad-
ministrations. In 1976 tentative agree-
ment was reached with both Egypt and
Israel regarding such cooperation, but
neither agreement was ever signed.
After the 1977-78 review of U.S.
nonproliferation policy by the previous
Administration, identical draft
lumber 1981
79
Nuclear Policy
agreements were provided to both these
countries, which incorporated all of the
provisions required by the Atomic
Energy Act, as amended, together with
special provisions which were considered
appropriate in view of the situation in
the Middle East. At that time, Israel in-
dicated that it did not wish to pursue an
agreement. Our discussions with Egypt
continued and resulted in the agreement
which is now under consideration. A
very significant event occurred over the
course of these discussions — Egypt
ratified the Nonproliferation Treaty
(NPT).
In December 1980, Egypt announced
that it intended to undertake a prompt,
major effort to establish a significant
program to meet its future energy
needs. This was to be accomplished, in
part, by acquiring several nuclear power
reactors for the generation of electricity.
At the same time, Egypt announced its
intention to ratify the NPT, which it had
signed in 1968, and to conclude a
safeguards agreement with the Interna-
tional Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
covering all of its peaceful nuclear ac-
tivities, as required by the treaty.
In February 1981, Egypt joined
what now numbers 112 non-nuclear-
weapon states which have renounced the
manufacture or acquisition of nuclear
explosives and agreed to accept IAEA
safeguards on all their peaceful nuclear
activities. The United States warmly
welcomed this step, and I cannot
overstate the importance we attach to it.
This far-sighted step of extraordinary
statesmanship reflects the wisdom and
commitment of President Sadat and his
government to the cause of lasting peace
and regional stability in the Middle East.
NPT adherence by a state of Egypt's
significance is a major advance in the
development of the international non-
proliferation regime of which the NPT is
the linchpin.
In taking this step, Egypt also an-
nounced that it intended to commit up
to $500 million annually from its oil
revenues for the development of alter-
native sources of energy, including
nuclear power. Egypt also expressed its
hope that, as envisioned by Article IV of
the NPT, its adherence would facilitate
support of this development by the
United States and other advanced
nuclear power states. A joint Egyptian-
U.S. assessment of Egypt's long-term
energy situation concluded in 1979 that
nuclear power was a feasible option to
help to meet Egypt's future energy re-
quirements. Egypt's intention to pursue
this option now, while it continues to
possess petroleum for its near-term
needs, is, in our view, prudent and well-
considered. We consider Egypt's expec-
tation that its adherence to the NPT
would facilitate nuclear cooperation to
be fully justified and in conformity with
similar expectations of the other NPT
parties.
We have long expressed our strong
preference that our existing cooperating
partners in nuclear energy be parties to
the NPT and that new partners
facilitate conclusion of the necessary
agreement with us by adhering to the
treaty. Our willingness to cooperate with
Egypt's desire to conclude this agree-
ment promptly in order to advance its
peaceful nuclear development is one
reflection of our recognition of Egypt's
decision to ratify the NPT. This is an at-
titude which we share with other
nuclear supplier states with which Egypt
is also concluding agreements and
discussing its plans for development of
nuclear power.
Specific Provisions
I would like to turn to a brief examina-
tion of the specific provisions of the
agreement we have signed with Egypt,
whose text and supporting documents
reflecting its review by the U.S. Govern-
ment have been transmitted to the Con-
gress by the President.
In large measure, this agreement is
substantially identical to the numerous
new and renegotiated agreements for
peaceful nuclear cooperation which we
have concluded with other countries and
the IAEA in the past few years and
which have previously been before the
Congress for review. These have includ-
ed agreements with Canada, Australia,
Morocco, Indonesia, Peru, Bangladesh,
and Colombia. Like those recent
agreements, it contains all of the provi-
sions required to be included by the
Atomic Energy Act, as amended. Provi-
sions of the agreement require
safeguards and adequate physical pro-
tection on items supplied by the United
States and nuclear material produced
through their use and U.S. consent to
arrangements for the storage,
retransfer, enrichment, reprocessing, or
alteration in form or content of material
or equipment subject to the agreement.
A peaceful-use assurance and full-scope
safeguards commitment are also includ-
ed. The Congress has established these
numerous requirements specifically with
a view to such agreements advancing
U.S. nonproliferation interests.
<\
This agreement reflects other
features not common to all of our otI»:i
agreements but shared with some of ,Q
them. These features further our no|
proliferation interests while serving t
common interests of both countries a
eluding this agreement. For example,
the only fuel authorized for transfer i
low-enriched uranium — the type used
power reactors. Other forms of specii
nuclear material may be exported onl
in small quantities for purposes such
laboratory use or in certain insignifici
forms. Egypt's principal interest in c<
eluding this agreement is to aid the
development of an electrical power
generating program. It had no fuel r<
quirement for other forms of special
nuclear material and so, like some otl
countries with which we have concluc
such agreements, sought no provisior
this agreement to permit transfer of
such material. We consider that this
feature is both appropriate to Egypt';
requirements and supportive of our n
proliferation interests in the region.
Moreover the agreement includes
certain special features which have n
been characteristic of our agreement
with states in other areas of the wor
but which we and Egypt agreed wen
desirable because of the sensitive siti
tion in the Middle East. These featui
relate to disposition of spent fuel
originally supplied by the United Sta
or irradiated in U.S.-supplied reactoi
Egypt has no present interest in in-
digenously reprocessing such fuel. TI
agreement recognizes this by providi
that it shall not be reprocessed in
Egypt.
The agreement also provides tha
the event of extraordinary cir-
cumstances of concern from a non-
proliferation standpoint, either party
may require that any such spent fuel
removed from Egypt to a mutually
agreed third country or, if the Unitei
States is prepared to receive it, to th
United States. The agreement does i
oblige us to accept this fuel. Before t
United States was to accept such spe
power reactor fuel, appropriate
agreements would have to be concluc
in accordance with Section 131 of th<
Atomic Energy Act and the 1978
Department of Energy authorization
for civilian applications. If, in the fut
arrangements are made under which
United States could accept such fuel,
this agreement would not conflict wit
such arrangements. Even if this is nc
the case, however, the agreement's p:
visions would serve the essential non-
proliferation interests of both countri
80
Department of State Bulk)
Nuclear Policy
Boviding for removal of spent fuel
I this sensitive region if cir-
■tanees necessitating this should
larise.
me believe that, taken as a whole,
Irovisions of this agreement provide
Bonal, well-considered framework
■^operation in nuclear energy with
It. It will facilitate the activities
ri Egypt desires to undertake to
■with its long-term energy needs for
lenefit of its people but does not ex-
Ito activities which could become
Itive from a nonproliferation stand-
I. It adequately balances the inter-
I'd interests, recognized in the NPT,
I? advancement of peaceful applica-
I of nuclear energy while preventing
|roliferation of nuclear explosives.
I;hus, consider that the agreement
live signed with Egypt will be a
II should we consider establishing
la cooperative relationship in
lar energy with other states in the
lie East. We are aware that other
liers are also actively interested in
I egion's market for nuclear power,
l^e intend to continue in our on-
V consultations with such other sup-
B , apprising them of the modalities
or relationship with Egypt and urg-
[I lat they consider a similar pattern
iny relationships they may decide to
i lish in this region. We believe that
M j] collaboration between suppliers
9 ustomers, such as is reflected in
p. greement with Egypt, will serve
b onproliferation interests of all
(Is, within and outside the region,
i 1 have an interest in this area.
he agreement does not inherently
.; lish any ceilings on the number of
|i ors or amount of fuel which may be
) ied under it, but the agreed minute
B specify that the agreement would,
b ! first instance, provide for supply
fie United States to Egypt of power
I ors and fuel of about 2,000
1 watts electric generating capacity.
|<t has indicated that this is the scale
I aperation which it desires initially
l;cuss with the Department of
ligy as supplier of enriched uranium
vith U.S. vendors of power reac-
]gypt has made it clear to us that it
>e discussing procurement of reac-
with other vendors as well. Egypt
igned an agreement for cooperation
France and is discussing reactor
lases with vendors in other coun-
Egypt and the Federal Republic of
lany have announced that they will
fly sign an agreement for peaceful
;ar cooperation. Actual orders for
reactors or fuel under any of these
agreements will be subject to later
Egyptian decisions, into which a number
of factors will enter, such as prices and
financing arrangements.
The U.S. agreement includes no
commitments or understandings regard-
ing any financial arrangements for possi-
ble future Egyptian purchases of U.S.
nuclear material or equipment. This
agreement will simply establish the
framework of governmental arrange-
ments, conditions, and provisions within
which such detailed arrangements may
later be made, if both parties and in-
terested private sector representatives
can agree.
As in the case of our other agree-
ments for cooperation, this agreement
also contains numerous other provisions,
which are described in detail in the
materials transmitted to the Congress
by the President. I would like to call at-
tention at this time to only one further
specific provision.
The agreed minute notes Egypt's
longstanding effort to promote the
establishment of a Middle Eastern
nuclear-weapons-free zone, including its
introduction of resolutions to advance
this idea at the U.N. General Assembly
for many years. Recent events have
demonstrated that this idea is gaining
growing credibility and acceptance
among other interested states within
and outside of this region. Israel, in par-
ticular, changed its longstanding posture
of abstention on this issue to one of sup-
port for consensus adoption of a U.N.
resolution favoring it just over a year
ago. The agreed minute reflects our
recognition of the contribution which
Egypt's promotion of this idea has made
to the development of a stable and
secure future for the region and reflects
also our own consistent policy of favor-
ing the establishment of such a zone
when the conditions necessary for its
success can be realized. As you know,
the Administration has reaffirmed U.S.
interest in this concept and is exploring
ways by which we might be able to fur-
ther it. The agreement is a further en-
dorsement of the contribution such a
zone might make to regional security
and international nonproliferation objec-
tives. The agreement's recognition of
Egypt's significant contribution in this
regard is just and proper.
In summary the Administration con-
siders this proposed agreement for
peaceful nuclear cooperation between
the United States and Egypt strongly
supportive of U.S. foreign policy, securi-
ty, commerical, and nonproliferation
interests in the Middle East and interna-
tionally. It is a part of the close, friend-
ly, and cooperative relationship we have
developed between our two countries.
We urge your subcommittees and the
full committee to favorably report this
agreement to the House of Represent-
atives.
'The complete transcript of the hearings
will be published by the committee and will
be available from the Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of-
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■
imber1981
81
SOUTH ASIA
Economic and Security Cooperation
With Pakistan: A Critical Partnership
k
Statements by James L. Buckley,
Under Secretary for Security Assistance,
Science, and Technology, and M. Peter
McPherson, Administrator of the Agency
for International Development (AID),
before the Subcommittees on Interna-
tional Security and Scientific Affairs,
International Economic Policy and
Trade, and Asian and Pacific Affairs of
the House Foreign Affairs Committee on
September 16, 198 1.1
UNDER SECRETARY BUCKLEY
Some months ago, your committee
reviewed the Administration's FY 1982
legislative and security assistance pro-
posals relating to Pakistan. As these
represented initial steps in a longer term
program whose details were still under
discussion, we appreciated your reasons
for deferring action at that time and
were gratified that you did so without
prejudice. We and the Government of
Pakistan have used the intervening
months to good effect and have now
reached agreement as to the basic
outlines of a new relationship.
As you will recall, our proposals for
FY 1982 are limited to economic
assistance because Pakistan felt the
need for caution in approaching a new
arms relationship with the United
States. With the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan, Pakistan has found itself
thrust into the unwelcome status of a
front-line state subject to all the hazards
that have been the common experience
of other countries which find themselves
in the same neighborhood with the
Soviet Union or its proxies. Entrance in-
to a new arms relationship with the
United States would significantly in-
crease the risks to which Pakistan was
exposed. It may or may not have been
just a coincidence that each of my own
visits to Islamabad — the first in June,
the last just a week ago — coincided with
Afghan attacks across the Pakistan
border.
Given these risks and the rocky
history of the past relationship between
our countries, the Pakistan Government
wanted to satisfy itself as to the ex-
istence of a public consensus in support
of the arms sale and economic support
package which we proposed. This it did
through a series of well-publicized and
82
widely reported hearings and debates in
which the advantages and risks of a new
relationship with the United States were
fully explored. In the meantime, over
the past 4 months, representatives of
our two governments have been en-
gaged in frequent, intensive, and highly
fruitful discussions focused on a common
concern over Soviet expansionism and
its implications for regional security.
Through its refusal, in the face of
Soviet pressures, to accept the
legitimacy of the puppet regime in
Kabul, Pakistan has demonstrated an
admirable willingness to stand by princi-
ple and assume the considerable risks of
Soviet displeasure. But the Pakistanis
have taken an even more decisive step.
The joint statement released following
my visit to Islamabad last June
represented a courageous decision on
their part to embark on a qualitatively
new relationship with the United States
which involved the risk of increased
Soviet hostility and pressure, including
military attack by proxy forces. This ac-
tion signaled a new confidence which
Pakistan places in the reliability of the
United States and the willingness of the
Congress and the American people to
defend their national interests abroad by
offering support to nations willing to
assume the risk of their own defense.
Basis for Relationship
Our relationship is based on the princi-
ple of sovereign equality. The United
States has expressly recognized
Pakistan's nonaligned status and the
restricted position it occupies in the
Islamic community of nations. As had
the previous Administration, we have
reaffirmed the validity of the 1959
bilateral agreement, and Pakistan has
expressed its satisfaction with the com-
mitment conveyed therein. We have
made no additional commitments beyond
those relating to the programs we are
discussing here today. We have one
overriding purpose, and that is to work
together to create a stronger, more self-
reliant Pakistan as it confronts Soviet
power in neighboring Afghanistan.
I cannot overemphasize the impor-
tance which we attach to this new rela-
tionship. Pakistan's strategic location
athwart the sea lanes to the Persian
Gulf has taken on added importance
with the advance of Soviet forces
through Afghanistan to its very borders.
A strong, stable, and independenl
Pakistan is an essential anchor to the
entire Southwest Asian region. The
430,000-man Pakistan Army is a high
professional force. Properly equipped
has the discipline and the will to prob
Pakistan's independence and territori.
integrity. Unfortunately, it no longer
possesses the weapons required for a
credible defense against the kind of
equipment with which the Soviets are
supplying the Afghan forces and can
expected to maintain in Afghanistan.
Thus, despite the quality of its persor
nel, Pakistan's military forces are not
equipped to defend their critical porti
of the approaches to the Persian Gulf
In assessing Pakistan's needs, we
have given equal weight to economic
well as military considerations. With
cooperation of the Congress, we prop
to address both the economic sources
national strength and Pakistan's direc
requirements for a credible military
deterrent. The multiyear aspect of ou
undertaking underscores the comprer
sive and long-term view we take of
Pakistani security requirements, as w
as the firm intention of the United
States to prove itself a reliable and c<
sistent partner.
I have already briefed members o
this committee on the overall dimensi
of the assistance programs for which
seek congressional action. Our im-
mediate request is for an appropriatk
of $100 million in economic support
funds in FY 1982 in addition to $50
billion for PL 480 assistance. Beginni
next year we will seek a series of ann
appropriations in support of a 5-year
program which would total about $3
million. This would be divided approx-
imately equally between economic
assistance and foreign military sales
(FMS) credit guarantees.
The goal of our economic assistan
program will be to provide both short
term balance-of-payments support ess
tial to Pakistan's immediate economic
stability and to foster longer term sell
sustaining growth. A key consideratio
in shaping the mix of economic and
military assistance over the 5-year
period was the need for an appropriat
balance to assure Pakistan's ability to
manage down-stream debt servicing 1
quirements. Mr. McPherson will provi
Department of State Bulle
South Asia
fcistan— A Profile
' raphy
310,527 sq. mi., excluding Jammu and
nir which are in dispute with India
t the size of California). Capital:
i abad (pop. 250,000—1972 census).
'< ■ Cities: Karachi (3.5 million), Lahore
lillion).
e
lation: 81.5 million (1980). Annual
th Rate: About 3% (1980). Ethnic
>s: Punjabi, Sindhi, Pushtan (Pathan),
hi. Religions: Muslim (97%), small
■ities of Christians, Hindus, and others.
uages: Urdu (official), English, Punjabi,
Pushtu, Baluchi. Literacy: 24%. Life
ctancy: 51 yrs.
nment
ial Name: Islamic Republic of Pakistan.
Martial law regime established in 1977.
iendence: Aug. 14, 1947. Branches:
tive — Chief Martial Law Administrator
dent), Cabinet. Legislative — 63-member
e and 200-member National Assembly.
ial — Military courts, provincial high
i, Supreme Court. Political Parties:
nded in 1977 following the imposition
rtial law. Some political activity was
quently allowed. In Oct. 1979, general
jns scheduled for Nov. were postponed
olitical party activity was banned.
age: Universal over age 18. Political
I visions: 4 Provinces, tribal areas,
Bil capital.
Jimy
](1980): $23 billion. Annual Growth
1(1978-80): 6.4%. Per Capita Income:
» Per Capita Growth Rate (1978-80):
latural Resources: Land, extensive
111 gas, limited petroleum, poor quality
ron ore. Agriculture: Wheat, cotton,
i ndustries: Cotton textiles, food proc-
;, tobacco, engineering, chemicals,
al gas. Trade (FY 1980): Exports— $2.3
i: rice, raw cotton, yarn, textiles, light
factured products. Partners — Far East
, EC (20%), Middle East (25%), U.S.
Imports — $4.8 billion: capital goods,
laterials, crude oil, consumer items.
■ers— Far East (28%), EC (25%), Middle
(25%), U.S. (8%). Official Exchange
Pakistan
^— ^ International boundary
® National capital
Railroad
Road
♦ International airport
5 1 9733 8-80
Rate: 9.9 rupees = US$1.00. Economic Aid Principal Government Officials
Received: Total— $27 .4 billion (1946-79).
U.S. only—US billion (1946-79). Pakistan: President and Chief Martial Law
Administrator— Mohammed Zia-ul-Haq;
Minister of Foreign Affairs— Agha Shahi.
Membership in International Organizations United States: Ambassador to Pakistan —
it m ai-id iriA t t <-■ i^ r Arthur W. Hummel, Jr.H
U.N., ADB, IDA, International Court of
Justice, Islamic Conference Organization,
INTELSAT, Colombo Pact, FAO, GATT,
G-77, IAEA, IBRD, ICAD, IFC, IHO, ILO,
IMCO, IMF, ITU, IWC, UNESCO, UPU,
WHO, WMO, WSG, WTO, nonaligned move-
ment.
mber 1981
83
South Asia
further details on the economic program
which we have discussed with the
Pakistanis.
Proposed Sale of Military Equipment
Given the immediacy of the threats with
which it must live, Pakistan's vital
military modernization program cannot
wait until October 1982 when our first
FMS credit may become available.
Pakistan is today under direct military
and diplomatic pressure to accommodate
to Soviet designs in the region. We
have, therefore, been discussing with
Pakistan a range of urgently required
military equipment for which orders
must be placed in the immediate future.
Items to be delivered in the near future
will be paid for in cash.
We have agreed to sell a total of 40
F-16 aircraft. These sales, I should
note, are not expected to result in a
significant adverse impact on U.S.
capabilities. The first six, to be paid for
in cash, will be delivered no later than
12 months following the signing of a let-
ter of offer and acceptance. The balance
of the aircraft would be provided on an
expedited basis over a subsequent period
of a year and a half, beginning 27
months following the signing of the let-
ter of acceptance and would probably be
financed by a mix of cash and credit.
Since the Pakistan Government
places particular importance on the
military need and symbolic commitment
implied in expedited deliveries of this
aircraft, let me spend a moment to urge
your support for this essential element
of our new relationship. Pakistan has
sought from the United States an air-
craft which combines comtemporary
technology and an affordable cost in
order to upgrade its existing limited
capabilities in the vital area of air
defense. The F-16 meets these re-
quirements. It is appropriate to
Pakistan's security environment, which
includes frequent violations of Pakistani
airspace, and it is an aircraft which the
highly competent Pakistan Air Force
can fly and maintain. Recently a great
deal of attention has been focused on the
F-16's offensive or strike capabilities.
We do not believe that Pakistan harbors
aggressive designs against any of its
neighbors. Furthermore, the numbers
and kinds of equipment we propose to
sell Pakistan are too modest to pose an
offensive threat to any one of them.
Over the coming weeks we expect to
begin the process in congressional
notification on a number of other pro-
posed sales of military equipment to
84
Pakistan. We expect that this will in-
clude such items as modern tanks, self-
propelled howitzers, armored personnel
carriers, and attack helicopters. In a
number of cases these early buys by
Pakistan will require considerable effort
on our part to adjust production and
delivery schedules but in no case will
there be serious adverse impact on U.S.
forces. We have agreed with Pakistan
on the major elements, though quite ob-
viously actual sales commitments will
depend on more detailed discussion as
well as such factors as equipment
availability, cost, and the availability of
funds. A list of potential Pakistani pur-
chases for the entire 6-year program is
available on a classified basis to the com-
mittee.
The equipment purchases being
discussed with Pakistan are relatively
modest and represent a military modern-
ization program Pakistan can afford
through its own resources and the FMS
credits we will seek from the Congress
in coming years. The program is so
modest, in fact, that it is bound to disap-
point those commentators who have ex-
pressed fears that our proposed sales to
Pakistan will spark an arms race on the
subcontinent.
Those fears simply do not stand up
under analysis. India possesses a very
large, well-equipped, well-trained
military establishment that provides it
with a decisive superiority over Pakistan
in the air as well as on the ground.
Given the large numbers of advanced
aircraft which the Indians already have
or will receive from the Soviets and the
United Kingdom, they will emerge 6
years from now with an even greater
edge over the Pakistanis notwithstand-
ing the addition of 40 F-16s to the lat-
ter's inventory. In fact, they should then
have an advantage over Pakistan, in
terms of modern fighter aircraft, of
about six to one.
These hard facts should dispel any
notion that the equipment we would pro-
vide Pakistan would upset the balance of
power on the subcontinent. On the other
hand, the mix of weapons we will be
providing will go a long way toward
meeting the mutual objective of our new
relationship, and that is to enhance
Pakistan's ability to deter attacks across
the Afghan border. We recognize, of
course, that even with our help Pakistan
cannot acquire an independent capability
to confront the full weight of a direct
and massive Soviet attack. Rather, the
intention of this program is twofold:
first, to give Pakistan the ability to han-
dle with its own resources a range of
i
limited cross-border threats from So- &
backed Afghan forces; and second, t< ;'
keep the Soviets from thinking that ! "
can coerce, subvert, or intimidate
Pakistan with impunity. Our intentio
to raise the cost of potential aggress:
and to demonstrate that a strong sec
ty relationship exists between the
United States and Pakistan that the
Soviet Union must take into account
its calculations.
The assistance we seek for Pakis
is, of course, contingent on congres-
sional action in amending the waiver
provision of section 669 of the Foreij
Assistance Act, otherwise known as
Symington amendment. The Admini;
tion is prepared to accept the amend
ment proposed by the Senate Foreig
Relations Committee for this purposi
I should emphasize that this Ad-
ministration is firmly committed to t
longstanding goals of nonproliferatio
expressed in legislation and by past ;
present Administrations. We believe "
deeply that the acquisition of nuclear
plosives by non-nuclear-weapons stat
would be contrary to the clear natior
interests of the United States. We h;
taken this vital national interest dire
into account in shaping our new rela
ship with Pakistan. The Pakistan
Government can be in no doubt abou
our concerns on this issue and the
serious consequences which would in
evitably flow from a Pakistani nucle;
explosion.
Our approach is based on a recofl
tion that a nation such as Pakistan r
be motivated to move toward acquis
of a capability to build nuclear weap*
because of a perceived threat to its i
tional security which it believes cann
be met by conventional and political
means. As praiseworthy as the inten
tions of the Symington amendment i
have been, it is clear that it has faile
stop the Pakistanis from pursuing th
nuclear programs. On the other hanc
the extent that it has kept us from h
ing that nation upgrade its conventic
defenses, it may have added to the sj
of insecurity that can only heighten
pressures to achieve a capacity to
develop nuclear weapons.
We urge the committee to join w
us in trying a different and more
positive approach. We believe that a
gram of support which provides
Pakistan with a continuing relations!
with a significant security partner ar
enhances its sense of security may
remove the principal underlying incei
tive for acquisition of the nuclear opt
Department of State Bulh
South Asia
such a relationship in place, we are
ful that we will be able, over time,
rsuade Pakistan that the search for
:lear weapons capability is neither
>sary to its security nor in its
ier interest as an important
ber of the world community. If we
ourselves this relationship,
iver, we will forfeit the opportunity
fluence future decisions.
Ve are all acutely aware of the vital
the United States and the West
in the volatile region of Southwest
. The chaos in Iran and the invasion
(ghanistan have added dramatically
e instability of the area. The Soviet
n continues to resort to intimida-
subversion, and outright aggression
Tsuit of its ambition to become the
late arbiter of the destinies of the
e region.
Ve are seeking nothing more nor
han to help restore stability to
hwest Asia and to protect our in-
ts in the Persian Gulf in part by
ncing our ability to project da-
iry power to the region; but most
cularly, by helping the indigenous
ns develop their own capabilities to
id their own interests.
Mike the Soviet Union, we do not
a position of dominance in
I hwest Asia. What we do seek, in
. tted pursuit of our own self-
:< est, is to prevent the Soviets from
h ving their goals. This we can do by
I: ng the nations of the area con-
Ite to regional defense by making
I better capable of looking after
1 selves. We believe this approach is
it >nly the one most likely to succeed
it .lso the one most consistent with
j >wn national principles of
j iterference in other people's affairs.
I Pakistan is a test case of this ap-
f ± to regional security. We propose
{ anced program of economic
I tance and military sales and credits
I -lp Pakistan play its essential role.
I appropriate to Pakistan's needs and
I nensurate with our interest in the
I . I urge the committee's understand-
jtnd support.
Mcpherson
lcome the opportunity to appear
re the subcommittees to present the
linistration's proposal for an
omic assistance program to
stan. Intensive consultations during
past 4 months, both in Washington
in Islamabad, have produced an
ne of a proposed assistance package
:h is responsive to both the an-
ticipated Pakistani needs and U.S.
Government objectives during the next 6
years.
As a result of my recent trip to
Pakistan, we reached agreement on the
utilization of $100 million in economic
support funds (ESF) which have been
requested for FY 1982. I might add here
that throughout these negotiations, we
made it clear that the figures and pro-
grams were only tentative since they
were still subject to review and approval
by the U.S. Congress.
Historic Economic Relationship
In order to put our current proposal in
proper perspective, a brief explanation
of our historical economic relationship
with Pakistan may be helpful. Since the
creation of Pakistan as a separate
Moslem nation in 1947, the United
States has provided over $5 billion in
economic assistance. The program began
modestly but reached annual com-
mitments approaching the $400 million
level in the early 1960s. Since that time,
our level of support has declined and has
even been curtailed on several occasions.
The early program focused on technical
assistance and disaster relief but in-
creasingly shifted to providing the basic
infrastructure required to facilitate the
continued growth of this young nation.
In latter years, we focused our efforts
on fundamental development problems
such as increased industrial and
agricultural production, improved public
administration, expanded social services,
and critical importation of raw materials
and essential capital equipment. We
suspended our economic assistance other
than food aid in April 1979 in accord-
ance with the provisions of the Sym-
ington amendment to the Foreign
Assistance Act (Section 669).
Nevertheless, the Pakistani people
continue to believe that a close relation-
ship exists between our two nations.
With mounting external threats to the
region and to Pakistan, there is a clear
opportunity for us to make this
historical relationship a more meaningful
one. By helping Pakistan strengthen its
economy, accelerate its development
progress, and improve the equitable
distribution of ensuing benefits, we will
enable Pakistan to maintain its integrity
as a nation and to stand fast against
potential external threats.
Pakistan has experienced solid
economic growth during the past 3 con-
secutive years with real growth averag-
ing about 6% per year. Growth in the in-
dustrial sector during the past year was
over 9% despite a comparatively poor
performance in the textile subsector.
Agricultural production was also strong
with a growth of 4.3%, largely due to
record sugar and wheat harvests.
The balance-of-payments situation,
however, remains an area of major con-
cern. The current account deficit for
Pakistani FY 1980-81 was over $1.1
billion, although this was better than an-
ticipated as a result of restrained im-
ports, sustained growth in remittances
from workers abroad, and continued ex-
port growth principally in agricultural
products. Ultimately, Pakistan was able
to cope with the short-term balance-of-
payments pressure following the suc-
cessful negotiation of a 3-year $1.7
billion extended fund facility agreement
with the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) and a short-term debt reschedul-
ing arrangement with the bilateral
creditors in the Pakistan donor consor-
tium.
The relatively favorable economic
performance Pakistan is experiencing
has been partly the result of continued
strong support by a number of major
donors. This assistance is coordinated
through the Pakistan donor consortium
group chaired by the World Bank. Dur-
ing the June 1981 consortium meeting in
Paris, the donors pledged $1.2 billion for
Pakistani FY 1981-82 which represents
a 20% increase over previous pledges.
Assistance from the Organization of
Petroleum Exporting Countries, which
is outside the consortium, has grown
steadily during the past 6 years and has
totaled over $1 billion, 50% of which
came from Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia
has indicated that it is prepared to
substantially increase its assistance to
Pakistan in conjunction with the U.S.
assistance program.
Proposed Economic Program
The proposed economic assistance
program has been developed with the
explicit objective of accommodating the
diverse political, economic, security, and
developmental interests we share with
Pakistan. Broadly stated, the major ob-
jectives are to provide balance-of-
payments support in order to help
address short and intermediate foreign
exchange shortfalls; initiate a long-term
development assistance relationship;
begin addressing key economic problems
with the objective of enabling Pakistan
to achieve self-sustaining growth and
improved ability to manage its debt
burden; and provide assistance com-
patible with IMF and World Bank pro-
grams.
3mber1981
85
UNITED NATIONS
The genera] areas of concentration
for this assistance program are agri-
cultural production, energy, population
and health, tribal area development, and
private sector mobilization. The greatest
emphasis is on various aspects of sup-
port for continuing growth in Pakistan's
key agricultural sector. In the coming
fiscal year, we would propose to spend
approximately 80% of the $100 million
in this area, including programs for the
import of fertilizer and agricultural
equipment, irrigation system improve-
ment, and rural electrification. We also
propose to resume support in the areas
of population and health, including the
control of malaria. New departures in
our overall strategy include programs to
assist in Pakistan's development of in-
digenous energy resources and specifi-
cally targeted development activities in
the less developed and politically sen-
sitive regions of the Northwestern Fron-
tier Province and Baluchistan. You
should, of course, understand that our
projections for FY 1983 and beyond are
at this point notional. They will be ad-
justed with experience and subject to
the close scrutiny of the Congress on an
annual basis.
During my August 1981 consulta-
tions in Pakistan, I had the opportunity
to meet with high government officials
including President Zia and Minister of
Finance Ghulam Ishaq Khan, as well as
Pakistani lawyers, businessmen, and
educators. I visited Afghan refugee
camps and talked to a number of
farmers and artisans. I was struck by
the interest evidenced in a renewed
economic assistance relationship and by
the frankness and responsiveness on the
part of all Pakistanis. I believe this is a
unique opportunity for this Administra-
tion to reshape its historic relationship
with Pakistan. We must remember that
the Pakistanis are a proud people,
fiercely independent and determined to
pursue their own course as an Islamic
nation. I believe we must establish this
relationship on the basis of equal part-
nership with the mutual interest in
Pakistan's independence and continuing
economic development.
We are all concerned in the eco-
nomic stability of Pakistan in order to
enable it to withstand the mounting
threats in the region. The program
which the Administration is proposing is
vital to the security and political in-
terests of the United States. This pro-
gram is directly responsive to key
economic constraints which face
Pakistan today. We hope that the Con-
gress will share the Administration's
policies with respect to Pakistan and will
support this new relationship by lifting
the Symington amendment restrictions
and funding the proposed FY 1982 eco-
nomic support fund program. I stand
ready to consult with the subcommittee
on a continuing basis as the specifics of
the Pakistan program are worked out
between our respective governments.
:The complete transcript of the hearings
will be published by the committee and will
be available from the Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Printing
Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.B
Namibia
The following statement was issued
by the Governments of Canada, France,
the Federal Republic of Germany, the
United Kingdom, and the United States
on September 2U, 1981.
The Foreign Ministers of Canada,
France, the Federal Republic of
Germany, the United Kingdom, and the
United States met in New York on 24
September to review the progress made
in their search for an early settlement of
the Namibian question.
The ministers noted that there have
been extensive discussions with
interested African governments and the
OAU [Organization of African Unity].
The ministers also noted that discussions
had taken place between the U.S.
Government and the South African
Government and that there had been a
recent exchange of messages between
the five and South Africa. It is,
therefore, now possible to identify more
clearly the issues involved and a process
for their resolution which would lead to
implementation of Security Council
Resolution 435.
The ministers noted that the stage
reached in their work and the consulta-
tions in which they have engaged have
enabled them to consider proposals to
deal with these issues and thus to cr<
the confidence necessary for all parti
to proceed.
In their consultations, the five
governments have developed propose t
for a timetable for further and final I
negotiations with the objective of
implementation of Security Council
Resolution 435 in 1982.
The five have now completed the I
initial consideration of possible consti
tional principles for the constituent
assembly. The five believe that these
proposals would be likely to secure tr
confidence of all concerned. Accordin
the five now intend to begin discussk
of these proposed constitutional prin-
ciples as well as a timetable and an
approach to other remaining issues w
the parties concerned starting in
October.
The foreign ministers recognized
and shared the desire of the inter-
national community to see early and
meaningful progress toward the impl'
mentation of the U.N. plan and the ir
pendence of Namibia. They reaffirm
their determination to pursue their ei
forts in cooperation with the parties (
cerned to resolve the remaining out-
standing issues and thus secure, with-
further delay, a peaceful solution to t
Namibian problem.
U.S. U.N. press release 59.1
86
Department of State Bullet
'ESTERN HEMISPHERE
razil and the United States Today
Thomas O. Enders
Address before the American
amber of Commerce in Sao Paulo,
azil, on August 19, 1981. Ambassador
.ders is Assistant Secretary for Inter-
%erican Affairs.
one can come back to Brazil — no one
l come back to Sao Paulo — without a
lse of exhilaration. For all the prob-
ns that must be faced and mastered,
all the difficult passages on the next
>r 3 years, it is impossible not to
ieve that the original promise of the
w world — the promise of change and
nativity and an exceptional des-
y — here remains intact.
For a decade — and more — Brazil has
?n moving steadily ahead: expanding,
ersifying, and modernizing its in-
itry and agriculture and drawing this
it nation together with ambitious
lertakings in communications,
nsportation, and frontier develop-
nt. This remarkable performance has
.ped Brazil's challenge today: to
nage wisely the forces unleashed by
very dynamism.
The United States, for its part, is in
midst of restoring its dynamism. The
jsident and Congress have just com-
ted a massive reordering of our
nomic priorities. The Federal budget
the new fiscal year has been cut back
$41.4 billion, with substantial further
s to be made in succeeding years;
sonal taxes, business taxes, above all,
es that affect investment have all
n slashed for this year, for 1982, and
lin for 1983. These measures will
irect from public to private use
haps as much as $750 billion by the
1 of FY 1986.
President Reagan's objective is not a
ful but temporary adjustment at a
•ticular stage in the business cycle. It
rather, a profound long-term change
restore the vitality of a productive na-
l. His policies spring from confidence
;he American future. And the support
has received shows that the United
ttes has the discipline and grit to
ve scarce resources from consump-
i to production — and to national
ense.
For a second major priority of the
jsident is to rebuild our military
wer. Unmatched in nearly every
lension of strength in the 1960s, we
saw our lead erode or disappear in sec-
tor after sector as we tried to signal to
the Soviet Union that we both would
benefit by shifting resources from
military to civilian uses. The Soviet
answer was to bolster their strategic
and theater capacities and seek means
to project military power into the
developing world.
Now we mean to establish beyond all
ambiguity that there is no alternative to
peace. We mean to make it apparent
that a challenge to us or to our allies
would have an unacceptable cost. We
are committing the resources to deter
either nuclear or conventional attack in
any of several theaters, particularly
Europe and the Middle East. The Presi-
dent's plans call for raising the share of
our total output going to defense from
5.7% to 7.0% between FY 1981 and
1986 — altogether a $184 billion increase
in constant 1981 dollars, for a
cumulative defense outlay in those years
of well over $1 trillion. At the same
time, the President is pushing policies to
increase domestic energy production in
the United States and reduce our
dependence on foreign oil imports.
Already last year, our imports were
down more than 25% from the 1977
peak. This year, they are running still
lower.
President Reagan has described this
new start as a "national renaissance."
The United States vibrates with a
renewed sense of national purpose — and
of international leadership. With these
policies firmly in place, and with the
support of the Congress for them
secure, we now have a framework from
which to address relations with others.
We have a president in charge of his
government, his constituency established
in the Congress and backed by a nation
responsive to his leadership. The result
is a foreign policy that reflects national
values and resolve and has greater flex-
ibility than at any time in the past
generation.
We have thus reached a juncture
when our countries are both conscious of
this potential — Brazil after a sustained
drive, the United States after fitful
years of uncertainty. Perhaps it is time
to revitalize our relationship, time to im-
prove coordination and cooperation, time
to consult on a widening range of issues,
time not for nostalgia but to build new
links.
We share with Brazil a Western
tradition, a commitment to providing op-
portunity for the betterment of the in-
dividual, and a belief in mutual tolerance
in a multiracial society. And Brazil's
abertura — the effort toward democracy
thai has inspired respect and
hope — strengthens this fundamental af-
finity. It is particularly appropriate then
that the United States, having set a new
course, should turn to Brazil.
We know, moreover, that Brazil is a
developing country — one of the most
successful in the world. It is impressive
how decisively Brazil is countering the
current account and debt service effects
of the two great oil shocks, developing
new sources of energy, improving the ef-
ficiency of energy consumption by
businesses and households, and achiev-
ing new exports in fulfillment of the
potential of this unique nation.
Although we are all aware that
Brazil's leaders must cope today with a
set of difficult economic problems, no
one can doubt that Brazil will sustain
high growth well into the next century.
In an increasingly fragile world, that is
a reassuring prospect — for Brazil's
history and foreign policy make clear
that Brazil's power will be dedicated to
world progress and peace.
Common Foreign Policy Concerns
In sum, Brazil and the United States are
among the relatively few states that
have the strength and coherence to con-
duct worldwide foreign policies. And
despite our often different perspectives,
our engagement on the world scene has
at least four critical common elements.
First, we face a common challenge
to foster world prosperity. For both of
us, the future depends on skillful
management of economic and political
relations with the rest of the world. As
Foreign Minister Guerreiro said earlier
this month at Cancun: "The developing
countries are increasingly relevant to
the very basic functioning of the world
economy."
This does not mean that our respec-
tive approaches or policies can or will be
the same. And specific aspects of the
U.S. economy, such as high interest
rates — I say aspects because it is not the
policy of the United States to keep in-
/ember1981
87
Western Hemisphere
terest rates high, that is only one of the
costs of excessive inflation — can create
problems in Brazil.
But there is a deeper complemen-
tarity. A strong, productive economy in
the United States will benefit all our
trading partners and all who rely on the
international monetary system to
finance trade, investment, and growth.
Brazil ranks high on both lists.
Our energy conservation increases
the overall supply available to countries,
like Brazil, that, despite their success in
reducing consumption, must also import
oil. And as we too achieve sustained
growth, we intend to maintain open
trading arrangements so that other
countries, and particularly developing
countries, can compete to benefit fully
from that growth. That is all the more
important now that the growth of world
trade has slowed so sharply.
And, it seems to me, the United
States and Brazil, as two of the most
important forces in the international
money market, have a common respon-
sibility to maintain conditions in which
the large-scale flow of capital from saver
to investor — the latter often being a
developing country— can be sustained. In
addition, the United States and Brazil
are among the only three or four coun-
tries that could make substantial inroads
on the pressing problem of world
hunger. Our great capacities to produce
beyond our own immediate needs create
common humanitarian and trading in-
terests that will endure through the
balance of this century and well into the
next.
Second, neither of us can be indif-
ferent to the fate of other countries in
the hemisphere. Neither of us would be
unaffected were one of our neighbors to
Brazil— A Profile
Geography
Area: 3,290,000 sq. mi. (slightly larger than
the continental United States). Capital:
Brasilia (pop. 1.2 million). Other Cities: Sao
Paulo (8.5 million), Rio de Janeiro (5.1
million), Belo Horizonte (1.8 million),
Salvador (1.5 million), Fortaleza (1.3 million),
Recife (1.2 million), Porto Alegre (1.1
million), Novo Iguacu (1.1 million), Curitiba
(1.1 million).
People
Population: 119 million (1980). Annual
Growth Rate: 2.5% (1980). Ethnic Groups:
Portuguese, Italian, German, Japanese,
African, American Indian; 60% white, 30%
mixed, 8% black, 2% Indian (1960 est.).
Religion: Roman Catholic (93%). Languages:
Portuguese (official), English. Literacy: 75%
of adult population (1978).
Government
Official Name: Federative Republic of Brazil.
Type: Federal republic. Independence: Sept.
7, 1822. Constitution: Jan. 24, 1967.
Branches: Executive — President (chief
of state and head of government).
Legislative -66-member Senate and
420-member Chamber of Deputies.
Judicial- Supreme Federal Tribunal.
Political Parties: Government
majority party — Social Democratic Party
(PDS). Opposition parties — Party of the
Brazilian Democratic Movement (PMDB),
Popular Party (PP), Democratic Workers
Party (PDT).'Workers Party (PT), Brazilian
Labor Party (PTB). Suffrage: Compulsory
over 18, except for illiterates. Admin-
istrative Divisions: 22 states, 4 territories,
federal district of Brasilia.
Economy
GDP: $237 billion (1980). Annual Growth
Rate: 8% (1980). Per Capita GDP: $1,995
(1980). Natural Resources: Iron ore,
manganese, bauxite, nickel, uranium, gem-
stones. Agriculture: Land — 17% arable,
cultivable, or pasture. Products — coffee, soy-
beans, sugarcane, cocoa, rice, beef, corn.
Industries: Steel, chemicals, petrochemicals,
machinery, motor vehicles, consumer dur-
ables, cement, lumber, shipbuilding. Trade
(1980): Exports— $20.1 billion: manufactures
(56%), coffee (13.8%), soybeans (11.2%), iron
ore (7.7%), sugar (6.4%). Major markets —
U.S. (17.3%), F.R.G. (6.7%), Japan (6.2%),
Netherlands (5.8%), Argentina (5.3%).
Imports — $23 billion: oil and other fuels
(44%), capital goods (30.3%), consumer goods
(19.1%). Major non-oil suppliers — U.S.
(17.7%), F.R.G. (6.9%), Japan (4.6%), Canada
(3.6%), Argentina (3.3%). Official Exchange
Rate: 90.95 cruzeiros = US$1. 00 (June 1981).
Membership in International Organizations
U.N., GATT, Group of 77, IMF, OAS, Rio
pact, IBRD, Latin American Integration
Association, International Sugar Organiza-
tion, International Cocoa Organization,
INTELSAT.
Principal Government Officials
Brazil: President— Gen. (ret.) Joao Baptista
de Oliveira Figueiredo; Foreign
Minister — Ramiro Elisio Saraiva Guerreiro;
Ambassador to the U.S.— Antonio Azeredo
da Silveira. United States: Ambassador to
Brazil — Langhorne A. Motley. ■
fall victim to an economic depression |
become subject to outside political
domination or be attacked from withi
by insurgent forces organized, trainee
and armed by a foreign power.
That is not to say that Brazil and
the United States would necessarily
have the same analysis of the situatic
or that we would foresee the same
remedy or above all that actions coor
dinated between our two countries al
without consultation with others wou
be either wise or appropriate. But it
seems to me that the stakes we each
have in the hemisphere are so great t
we should stay closely in touch when
problems arise.
The United States is troubled, foi
example, by the situation in the Carit
bean Basin. On the one hand, that co
tion common to many countries — higl
petroleum prices and low and falling
prices for all other commodities — has
spread depression throughout the are
On the other, one country — Cuba — is
tempting to manipulate the internal a
fairs of its neighbors by covertly feed
the forces of armed insurrection.
We believe it is important to insu
not only that those who menace the
Caribbean Basin be exposed, but that
socioeconomic vulnerabilities be ad-
dressed. We are actively exploring w;
to join with both affected and interes
countries to design and execute an ac
tion plan to restore sustained growth
a region that touches us both. Brazil';
innovations in the use of gasohol — if
they could be applied in the sugar-
producing areas of that region — migf
reduce energy dependence and increa
employment.
Third, we are both interested in
preserving the security of the south
Atlantic. One-half of the world's
maritime trade in oil is carried throug
the south Atlantic from the Middle E;
and West Africa. Maintaining the flov
vital.
It would be wrong to extrapolate
from this shared interest to suggest tl
a south Atlantic military pact of some
sort should be constructed. That is no
the policy of the United States. As I
understand it, it is also not the policy
Brazil. Indeed, the threat is only potei
tially military.
The immediate danger now is
political developments in Africa — the
risk that regional tensions and polariz;
tion might increase and ultimately
enhance Soviet-Cuban military oppor-
tunities along Africa's west coast. Tha
is why the United States has taken tht
lead to relaunch Namibia's independ-
88
Western Hemisphere
e, and why we seek an end to the
fe in Angola. The stakes are too
h, the threats to our interests too
at, and the costs to the peoples of
■ica too heavy for us to turn away
m these challenges. I suggest that we
, and perhaps enhance, existing chan-
3 of communication to make sure our
arate national efforts in the south
antic support or complement each
er and are adequate to the task.
Fourth, we share the same
.cerns about Soviet intervention in
jhanistan, the pressure which Soviet
ver exerts on Poland, and the impact
Soviet military ambitions on the
ance of power in Europe. We share
u concerns about oil supplies from
Middle East on which we both de-
id.
We are both aware that the 1980s
. be a particularly dangerous decade,
aet military power will be at a peak,
.le its economic vitality slips ineluc-
ly away. The U.S.S.R. must face a
iership change. Challenge to its
nination within its own sphere of in-
mce will intensify. We must be
.lant that the Soviet Union not seek
itary solutions to the growing circle
iifficulties in which it will be en-
;ed.
ateral Relations
me turn now to our bilateral rela-
ns. On the whole, I believe our
teral affairs are now being handled
i mutually supportive manner with
sitivity to each other's interests,
hough not always so in the past, that
s it must be. Yet the very richness of
ties also provides many openings for
ewal. When Foreign Minister
erreiro and Secretary Haig took ad-
itage of the meeting at Cancun to
Suss our relationship, they were con-
ling a practice long familiar to us and
izilian executive and congressional
iers. We have in place functioning
isultative mechanisms — on trade
les and for the promotion of coopera-
i in such areas as agriculture and
mce and technology. Our military
vices consult regularly — the annual
it (UNITAS) maneuvers have taken
ce without interruption for 22 years.
And alongside these extensive of-
al relations are our massive private
•tor ties. By the end of 1979, U.S.
ect investment in Brazil amounted to
jr $7.5 billion. U.S. -Brazilian trade
3W from $1.7 billion in 1970 to over
3 billion in 1980. This volume of trade
vember1981
leads naturally to problems on which we
consult constantly, but it also stimulates
production and raises living standards in
both countries, constantly creating new
opportunities.
Less noticed is the fact that the
eight daily flights between the United
States and Brazil carried over 600,000
travelers last year. Indeed, our citizens
seem to have a cultural fascination with
each other that goes way beyond Brazil's
appreciation of rock music or U.S. ap-
preciation of carnival. They not only en-
joy each other's music, art, literature,
and cinema, they identify with them. In-
teractions among our universities and
scholars are increasing annually.
In managing these extraordinary of-
ficial and private contacts, I think we
are both persuaded that we must deal
with each other on a basis of equality
and cooperation while respecting the
diversity manifest in our differences, in
our state of development, institutions,
and approach to world affairs.
One important way we can manifest
that respect is to handle each question
on its own merits, without attempting to
tie it to others. This is the way friends
act, confident of their strength and of
each other. And we are engaged in so
many affairs that linking problems in
one sector with problems in another
would risk impeding rather than advanc-
ing progress.
But I also believe that we should
consult more fully and widely on actions
that affect each other's national interest.
This is a practice that has emerged, if
somewhat fitfully, in the past, notably in
the commercial and financial fields
where further expansion of trade and in-
vestment are a major common interest.
But it has not always applied. There
have been lapses on both sides.
We should seek to give new meaning
and impetus to this goal. It is the objec-
tive of the Reagan Administration to
work closely with Brazil. And I hope
that we will keep in mind the impor-
tance of consulting on all the many
issues that affect us— for questions such
as the North-South dialogue or stability
in the Middle East can be as important
as matters that arise in a purely
bilateral vein.
Use of agreed international
mechanisms can supplement our
bilateral relations. The United Nations
and the Organization of American States
and their specialized agencies are impor-
tant avenues for multilateral coordina-
tion. And in the economic arena, the
General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade, the International Monetary
Fund, the Law of the Sea Conference,
and other international institutions often
provide a framework for practical prob-
lem solving essential to the world order
on which we both depend. But, as impor-
tant as it is to interact positively in the
multinational arena, it is the strength of
the bilateral relationship that will define
how constructively we can work
together in the decades ahead.
Nearly 160 years ago, the United
States was the first country to recognize
Brazil's independence. Today, we are
just as conscious that Brazil and the
United States, each in its own and
unique fashion, are moving toward an
exceptional destiny. For our part, we
believe that the world stands to gain far
more from a U.S. -Brazilian relationship
that builds on our common basic in-
terests than one that emphasizes
momentary differences. We both have
the skills and energetic populations, the
natural resources, the political stability,
and the strategic position that history
requires of great nations. The United
States and Brazil have a great part of
the world's potential for future growth.
Yet we both face difficult transitions
ahead, both economic and political.
Perhaps we can help each other — more
than we do now — to navigate these
passages. Perhaps the time has come to
update, to revitalize, to intensify our
relationship. For our part, we believe it
has. ■
TREATIES
Current Actions
MULTILATERAL
Automotive Traffic
Convention concerning customs facilities for
touring. Done at New York June 4, 1954.
Entered into force Sept. 11, 1957. TIAS
3879.
Notification of succession deposited: Solomon
Islands, Sept. 3, 1981.
Aviation
Convention on international civil aviation.
Done at Chicago Dec. 7, 1944. Entered into
force Apr. 4, 1947. TIAS 1591.
Notification of adherence: Grenada, Aug. 31,
1981.
Protocol on the authentic trilingual text of
the convention on international civil aviation
(Chicago, 1944, TIAS 1591), with annex.
Done at Buenos Aires Sept. 24, 1968.
Entered into force Oct. 24, 1968. TIAS 6605.
Notification of adherence: Grenada, Aug. 31,
1981.
Convention for the suppression of unlawful
seizure of aircraft. Done at The Hague
Dec. 16, 1970. Entered into force Oct. 14,
1971. TIAS 7192.
Accessions deposited: Qatar, Aug. 26, 1981;
United Arab Emirates, Apr. 14, 1981.
Convention for the suppression of unlawful
acts against the safety of civil aviation. Done
at Montreal Sept. 23, 1971. Entered into
force Jan. 26, 1973. TIAS 7570.
Accessions deposited: Qatar, Aug. 26, 1981;
United Arab Emirates, Apr. 14, 1981.
Coffee
International coffee agreement 1976, with an-
nexes. Done at London Dec. 3, 1975. Entered
into force provisionally Oct. 1, 1976;
definitively Aug. 1, 1977. TIAS 8683.
Accession deposited; Singapore, Aug. 28,
1981.
Commodities — Common Fund
Agreement establishing the Common Fund
for Commodities, with schedules. Done at
Geneva June 27, 1980.'
Approval deposited; China, Sept. 2, 1981.
Ratification deposited: Sri Lanka, Sept. 4,
1981.
Signatures: Lesotho, Nepal, Nicaragua,
Tanzania, Turkey, Yemen, Sept. 7, 1981;
Upper Volta, Aug. 20, 1981.
Conservation
Convention on international trade in en-
dangered species of wild fauna and flora,
with appendices. Done at Washington Mar. 3,
1973. Entered into force July 1, 1975. TIAS
8249.
Ratifications deposited: Colombia, Aug. 3 1 ,
1981; Philippines, Aug. 18, 1981.
Reservation withdrawn: Australia, Aug. 25,
1981.
Amendment to the convention of Mar. 3,
1973 on international trade in endangered
species of wild fauna and flora (TIAS 8249).
Adopted at Bonn June 22, 1979. '
Acceptances deposited: Pakistan, July 2,
1981; Suriname, Aug. 17, 1981; Zimbabwe,
July 14, 1981.
Convention on the conservation of Antarctic
marine living resources, with annex for an ar-
bitral tribunal. Done at Canberra May 20,
1980. >
Ratification deposited: U.K., Aug. 31, 1981.
Continental Shelf
Convention on the continental shelf. Done at
Geneva Apr. 29, 1958. Entered into force
June 10, 1964. TIAS 5578.
Notification of succession: Solomon Islands,
Sept. 3, 1981.
Customs
Customs convention on the international
transport of goods under cover of TIR
carnets, with annexes. Done at Geneva Nov.
14, 1975. Entered into force Mar. 20, 1978.
Accession deposited: Cyprus, Aug. 7, 1981.
Instrument of ratification signed by the
President: Sept. 4, 1981.
Ratification deposited: U.S., Sept. 18, 1981.
Enters into force for the U.S.: Mar. 18,
1982.
Customs convention on containers, with an-
nexes and protocol of signature. Done at
Geneva May 18, 1956. Entered into force
Aug. 4, 1959; for the U.S. Mar. 3, 1969.
TIAS 6634.
Notification of succession deposited: Solomon
Islands, Sept. 3, 1981.
Finance
Articles of agreement of the International
Bank for Reconstruction and Development
formulated at the Bretton Woods Conference
July 1-22, 1944. Entered into force Dec. 27,
1945. TIAS 1502.
Signatures and acceptances deposited:
Bhutan, Sept. 28, 1981; Vanuatu, Sept. 28,
1981.
Articles of agreement of the International
Monetary Fund, formulated at the Bretton
Woods Conference July 1-22, 1944. Entered
into force Dec. 27, 1945 (TIAS 1501).
Signatures and acceptances deposited:
Bhutan, Sept. 28, 1981; Vanuatu, Sept. 28,
1981.
Fisheries
Convention on fishing and conservation of
living resources of the high seas. Done at
Geneva Apr. 29, 1958. Entered into force
Mar. 20, 1966. TIAS 5969.
Motification of succession: Solomon Islands,
Sept. 3, 1981.
Health
Constitution of the World Health Orgam >
tion. Done at New York July 22, 1946.
Entered into force Apr. 7, 1948; for the
June 21, 1948. TIAS 1808.
Acceptance deposited: Dominica, Aug. 1J
1981.
High Seas
Convention on the high seas. Done at Ge
Apr. 29, 1958. Entered into force Sept
1962. TIAS 5200.
Notification of succession: Solomon Islan
Sept. 3, 1981.
Judicial Procedure
Convention abolishing the requirement o V
legalisation for foreign public documents,
with annex. Done at The Hague Oct. 5, 1
Entered into force Jan. 24, 1965; for the
Oct. 15, 1981.
Proclaimed by the President: Sept. 21, 1!
Maritime Matters
Amendments to the convention of Mar. 6
1948, as amended, on the Intergovernme
Maritime Consultative Organization (TIA
4044, 6285, 6490, 8606). Adopted at Lorn
Nov. 14, 1975. Enters into force May 22,
1982, except for article 51 which enters i
force July 28, 1982.
Acceptance deposited: Greece, July 28, II
Amendments to the convention of Mar. 6
1948, as amended, on the Intergovernme
Maritime Consultative Organization (TIA
4044, 6285, 6490, 8606). Adopted at Lorn
Nov. 15, 1979. '
Instrument of acceptance signed by the
President: Sept. 4, 1981.
Nuclear Material — Physical Protection
Convention on the physical protection of
nuclear material, with annexes. Done at
Vienna Oct. 26, 1979. »
Instrument of ratification signed by the
President: Sept. 4, 1981.
Peacekeeping
Agreement concerning U.S. participation
the multinational force and observers
established by Egypt and Israel. Effected
exchanges of letters at Washington Aug. I
1981. Entered into force Aug. 3, 1981.
Property, Industrial-Classification
Agreement concerning the international
classification of goods and services to whic
trade marks apply. Signed at Nice June 16
1957. Entered into force Apr. 8, 1961; for
the U.S. May 25, 1972. TIAS 7418.
Notification of withdrawal: Poland, July 2(
1981; effective July 20, 1982.
Racial Discrimination
International convention on the elimination
all forms of racial discrimination. Adopted
New York Dec. 21, 1965. Entered into fort
Jan. 4, 1969.2
Ratification deposited: Colombia, Sept. 2,
1981.
90
Department of Slate Bullet
Treaties
ugees
tocol relating to the status of refugees.
e at New York Jan. 31, 1967. Entered
force Oct. 4, 1967; for the U.S. Nov. 1,
i. TIAS 6577.
ession deposited: Chad, Aug. 19, 1981.
iery
plementary convention on the abolition of
ery, the slave trade, and institutions and
tices similar to slavery. Done at Geneva
t. 7, 1956. Entered into force Apr. 30,
?; for the U.S. Dec. 6, 1967. TIAS 6418.
fication of succession: Solomon Islands,
, 3, 1981.
rnational sugar agreement, 1977, with
sxes. Done at Geneva Oct. 7, 1977.
ered into force provisionally Jan. 1, 1978;
litively Jan. 2, 1980. TIAS 9664.
;ssion deposited: Colombia, Sept. 2, 1981.
■communications
io regulations, with appendices and final
ocol. Done at Geneva, Dec. 6, 1979.
:rs into force Jan. 1, 1982, except for
:les 25 and 66 and appendix 43, which
red into force Jan. 1, 1981, and the fre-
icy allotment plan for the aeronautical
ile (R) service and the directly related
isions contained in appendix 27 Aer2,
h shall enter into force at 0001 hours
: on Feb. 1, 1983.
atures: Afghanistan,3 Algeria,3 Angola,3
;ntina,3 Australia,3 Austria,3 Bahrain,3
jladesh, Belgium,3 Benin,3 Botswana,
,il,3 Bulgaria, Burundi, Byelorussian
et Socialist Republic,3 Cameroon,3
ida,3 Cape Verde, Central African
lblic,3 Chad,3 Chile,3 China,3 Colombia,3
go,3 Costa Rica,3 Cuba,3 Cyprus,3
hoslovakia, Denmark,3 Ecuador,3 Egypt,
alvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland,3 France,3
)n,3 German Democratic Republic,
nany, Federal Republic of,3 Ghana,3
ce,3 Guatemala,3 Guinea,3 Guyana, Haiti,
iuras,3 Hungary, Iceland,3 India,3 In-
sia, Iran,3 Iraq,3 Ireland,3 Israel,3 Italy,3
y Coast,3 Jamaica, Japan,3 Jordan,3
fa.,3 Korea, Democratic People's Republic,
?a, Republic of,3 Kuwait,3 Lebanon,3
tho, Liberia,3 Libya,3 Liechtenstein,3
smbourg,3 Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia,
,3 Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius,3 Mexico,3
aco, Mongolia, Morocco,3 Mozambique,3
, Netherlands,3 New Zealand,3
ragua, Niger,3 Nigeria,3 Norway,3
.n,3 Pakistan,3 Panama, Papua New
iea,3 Paraguay, Peru, Philippines,3
nd, Portugal,3 Qatar,3 Romania,3
.nda, San Marino, Saudi Arabia,3,
gal, Singapore,3 Somalia,3 Spain,3 Sri
ka,3 Sudan,3 Swaziland, Sweden,3
;zerland,3 Syria,3 Tanzania,3 Thailand,3
3, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey,3
nda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic,3
m of Soviet Socialist Republics,3 United
d Emirates,3 United Kingdom,3 Upper
a,3 Uruguay,3 Vatican City State,3
zuela,3 Yemen, People's Democratic
ublic,3 Yugoslavia,3 Zaire,3 Zambia,3
6, 1979.
Approvals deposited: Byelorussian Soviet
Socialist Republic,4 June 17, 1981; Japan,
Dec. 22, 1980; Ukrainian Soviet Socialist
Republic,4 May 12, 1981; Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics,4 Apr. 14, 1981.
Territorial Sea
Convention on the territorial sea and the con-
tiguous zone. Done at Geneva Apr. 29, 1958.
Entered into force Sept. 10, 1964. TIAS
5639.
Notification of succession: Solomon Islands,
Sept. 3, 1981.
Terrorism
International convention against the taking of
hostages. Adopted at New York Dec. 17,
1979. '
Accession deposited: Bhutan, Aug. 31, 1981.
Ratification deposited: Norway, July 2, 1981.
Instrument of ratification signed by the
President: Sept. 4, 1981.
Trade
Arrangement regarding international trade in
textiles. Done at Geneva Dec. 20, 1973. TIAS
7840.
Acceptance: Czechoslovakia, July 1, 1980.
Protocol extending the arrangement regard-
ing international trade in textiles of Dec. 20,
1973 (TIAS 7840). Done at Geneva Dec. 14,
1977. TIAS 8939.
Acceptance: Czechoslovakia, July 1, 1980.
Ratification deposited: Egypt, Sept. 1, 1980.
U.N. Charter
Charter of the United Nations and Statute of
the International Court of Justice. Signed at
San Francisco June 26, 1945. Entered into
force Oct. 24, 1945. TS 993.
Admitted to membership: Vanuatu, Sept. 15,
1981.
UNESCO
Agreement on the importation of educational
and cultural materials, and protocol. Done at
Lake Success Nov. 22, 1950. Entered into
force May 21, 1952; for the U.S. Nov. 2,
1966.
Notification of succession: Solomon Islands,
Sept. 3, 1981.
Protocol to the agreement on the importation
of educational, scientific, and cultural
materials of Nov. 22, 1950. Adopted at
Nairobi Nov. 26, 1976.1
Signature: U.S., Sept. 1, 1981.
UNIDO
Constitution of the U.N. Industrial Develop-
ment Organization, with annexes. Adopted at
Vienna Apr. 8, 1979.1
Ratifications deposited: Cameroon, Aug. 18,
1981; Swaziland, Aug. 19, 1981.
Whaling
International whaling convention and
schedule of whaling regulations. Done at
Washington Dec. 2, 1946. Entered into force
Nov. 10, 1948. TIAS 1849.
Notification of adherences deposited: Costa
Rica, July 24, 1981; Egypt, Sept. 18, L981,
Wheat
1981 protocol for the sixth extension of the
wheat trade convention 1971. Done at
Washington Mar. 24, 1981. Entered into
force July 1, 1981.
Ratification deposited: Egypt, July 27, 1981;
Iraq, Sept. 8, 1981.
Women
Convention on the political rights of women.
Done at New York Mar. 31, 1953. Entered
into force July 7, 1954; for the U.S. July 7,
1976. TIAS 8289.
Accession deposited: Egypt, Sept. 8, 1981.
Notification of succession: Solomon Islands,
Sept. 3, 1981.
Convention on the elimination of all forms of
discrimination against women. Done at New
York Dee. 18, 1979. Entered into force Sept.
3, 1981.2
Entered into force: Sept. 3, 1981.
Ratifications deposited: Laos, Aug. 14, 1981;
El Salvador, Aug. 19, 1981; Bhutan, Aug. 31,
1981.
World Health Organization
Amendments to articles 24 and 25 of the con-
stitution of the World Health Organization.
Adopted at Geneva May 17, 1976 by the 29th
World Health assembly.1
Acceptance deposited: Mauritius, Sept. 3,
1981.
BILATERAL
Belize
Agreement relating to the establishment,
operation, and maintenance of an upper air
(rawinsonde) observation station at Belize
International Airport, with memorandum of
arrangement. Effected by exchange of letters
at Belize and Belmopan Aug. 26, 1981.
Entered into force Aug. 26, 1981.
Canada
Treaty on Pacific Coast albacore tuna vessels
and port privileges, with annexes. Signed at
Washington May 26, 1981. Entered into force
July 29, 1981.
Proclaimed by the President: Sept. 4, 1981.
Agreement amending and extending the
agreement of Oct. 19 and Nov. 10, 1970, as
extended, concerning a cooperative project to
design, develop, and test an aircraft
"augmentor wing system" (TIAS 6982, 8109,
9031). Effected by exchange of notes at Ot-
tawa Aug. 14 and 19, 1981. Entered into
force Aug. 19, 1981; effective July 1, 1981.
Arrangement prohibiting the importation of
raccoon dogs. Effected by exchange of letters
at Ottawa and Washington Sept. 1 and 4,
1981. Entered into force Sept. 4, 1981.
/ember 1981
91
CHRONOLOGY
Chile
Memorandum of understanding for scientific
and technical cooperation in agricultural
research and development. Signed at San-
tiago Aug. 28, 1981. Entered into force
Aug. 28, 1981.
Egypt
Interim agreement concerning privileges and
immunities of U.S. military and related per-
sonnel in Egypt. Effected by exchange of
notes at Cairo July 26, 1981. Entered into
force July 26, 1981.
Agreement concerning privileges and
immunities of U.S. military and related per-
sonnel in Egypt, with related letter and
agreed minute. Effected by exchange of
notes at Cairo July 26, 1981. Enters into
force upon exchange of instruments of
acceptance.1
Indonesia
Agreement relating to establishment and
operation of a Landsat system. Signed at
Washington and Jakarta July 13 and 30,
1981. Entered into force July 30, 1981.
Italy
Agreement for scientific and technological
cooperation. Signed at Rome July 22, 1981.
Entered into force July 22, 1981.
Jamaica
Agreement amending the agreement for sales
of agricultural commodities of Feb. 6, 1981.
Effected by exchange of notes at Kingston
Aug. 5, 1981. Entered into force Aug. 5,
1981.
Liberia
Agreement amending the agreement for sales
of agricultural commodities of Jan. 8, 1981.
Effected by exchange of notes at Monrovia
June 12 and July 3, 1981. Entered into force
July 3, 1981.
Madagascar
Agreement for sales of agricultural com-
modities, with minutes of negotiation. Signed
at Antananarivo Aug. 19, 1981. Entered into
force Aug. 19, 1981.
Mexico
Agreement amending the agreement of
June 2, 1977 (TIAS 8952) relating to addi-
tional cooperative arrangements to curb the
illegal traffic in narcotics. Effected by ex-
change of letters Aug. 19, 1981. Entered into
force Aug. 19, 1981.
Netherlands
Agreement relating to selection of De
Nederlandsche Bank of Amsterdam by the
U.S. and Iran as the mutually agreeable cen-
tral bank to manage the depository of funds
in the security account established by the
Jan. 19, 1981, Declaration of the Government
of the Democratic and Popular Republic of
Algeria, with related technical agreements
signed Aug. 17, 1981. Effected by exchange
of notes at The Hague July 10, 1981.
Entered into force July 10, 1981.
92
Agreement relating to storage of prepo-
sitioned war readiness materials by U.S.
forces. Effected by exchange of notes at The
Hague Jan. 15, 1981.
Entered into force: Aug. 20, 1981.
New Zealand
Agreement relating to the multilateral trade
negotiations, and related letter of Feb. 4,
1980. Signed at Geneva May 21, 1979.
Entered into force Jan. 1, 1980. TIAS 10019.
Memorandum of understanding concerning
Communications Center support for the
Royal New Zealand Air Force Orion Moderni-
zation Unit. Signed at Washington July 24
and Aug. 3, 1981. Entered into force Aug. 3,
1981.
Nigeria
Agreement for cooperation in the field of
health. Signed at Washington Sept. 9, 1981.
Entered into force Sept. 9, 1981.
Agreement for the provision of technical
services in the preparation of a comprehen-
sive soil survey in Nigeria. Signed at Lagos
Sept. 22, 1980.
Entered into force: Aug. 1, 1981.
Agreement on the training of Nigerian
technical educators, with annexes. Signed at
Washington Sept. 9, 1981. Entered into force
Sept. 9, 1981.
Saudi Arabia
Agreement for technical cooperation in tax
administration and training. Signed at Riyadh
May 17, 1981. Entered into force Sept. 24,
1981.
Sierra Leone
Agreement amending the agreement for sales
of agricultural commodities of Mar. 25, 1981.
Effected by exchange of notes at Freetown
Aug. 17 and 18, 1981. Entered into force
Aug. 18, 1981.
Singapore
Agreement relating to the reciprocal accept-
ance of airworthiness certifications. Effected
by exchange of notes at Singapore Aug. 21,
1981. Entered into force Aug. 21, 1981.
Spain
Agreement concerning the grant of defense
articles and services under the military
assistance program. Effected by exchange of
notes at Madrid Aug. 28 and 29, 1981.
Entered into force Aug. 29, 1981.
Sudan
Agreement amending the agreement for sales
of agricultural commodities of Jan. 19, 1981.
Effected by exchange of notes at Khartoum
Aug. 27, 1981. Entered into force Aug. 27,
1981.
Swaziland
Agreement relating to establishment of a
Bureau of Foreign Broadcast Information
Service (FBIS) in Swaziland. Signed at
Mbabane Aug. 3, 1981. Entered into force
Aug. 3, 1981.
Thailand
Agreement amending the agreement of
Oct. 4, 1978, as amended (TIAS 9215, 941
9643, 9717, 9937), relating to trade in cot
wool, and manmade fiber textiles and tex
products. Effected by exchange of letters
Bangkok June 17 and July 28, 1981. Ente
into force July 28, 1981.
i
I-
:
Turkey
Agreement extending the agreement of J
8, 1976, as extended (TIAS 8371, 9006, 9
9810), on procedures for mutual assistanc
the administration of justice in connectior
with the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation a
the McDonnell Douglas Corporation matti^i;
Effected by exchange of letters at
Washington July 7 and Aug. 24, 1981.
Entered into force Aug. 24, 1981; effecth
July 8, 1981.
United Kingdom
Memorandum of understanding relating b
satellite-aided maritime distress alert syst
Signed at Washington July 23, 1981. Enb
into force July 23, 1981.
'Not in force.
2Not in force for the U.S.
3With statements).
4With declarations. ■
September 1981
September 1
The government of President David Dacki
the Central African Republic is overthrow
a bloodless coup. Army Chief Gen. Andre
Kolingba becomes the country's new leade
U.N. Conference on Least Developed
Nations is held in Paris September 1-14.
U.S. Agency for International Developmei
Administrator, M. Peter McPherson, head;
U.S. delegation.
September 2
Iranian Parliament approves nomination ol
Ayatollah Mohammad Reza Mahdavi Kani
be Prime Minister. Kani replaces Mohamm
Javad Bahonar who was assassinated in an
August 30 bombing.
September 3
Tenth anniversary of the signing of the
Quadrapartite Agreement on Berlin.
September 4
One among a group of bomb explosions
damages the U.S. Cultural Center in Maser
Lesotho. There is minimal damage and no
injuries.
By a vote of 117 to 22 (U.S.) and 6
abstentions, U.N. General Assembly votes t
prevent South Africa from participating in
the 8th emergency special session convened
dealing with Namibia.
Department of State Bullet
Chronology
>viet Union holds major military
lvers in the Baltic and Byelorussian
ry districts and on the Baltic Sea
4-12. Although the Soviets had notified
1 signatories earlier (Aug. 14) that such
ises would take place, they failed to
t the number of participants as required
the Helsinki Final Act's confidence-
ng measure on prior notification of
ry maneuvers.
mber 5
half of the U.S. and China, Director of
nternational Communications Agency
[inister Huant Zhen of the Chinese
lission for Cultural Relations with
n countries, sign the 1982-83 imple-
ng accord of the cultural agreement
en the two countries. Present also at
jming was Chief Justice of the U.S.,
n E. Burger.
?partment of State announces it has
first steps toward negotiating settle-
of claims of less than $250,000 by U.S.
lals against Iran. The Department will
ate an agreement settling such claims
imp sum from Iran and which will be
d by a domestic government agency,
countries agree that claims exceeding
mount be settled by the Iran-U.S.
s Tribunal established at The Hague,
ourt will begin receiving claims on
0.
j mber 6
I Prime Minister Begin makes official
lo the U.S. Sept. 6-16 and to
\ ngton, D.C., Sept. 9-15 to meet with
I lent Reagan, their first talks concerning
| iddle East.
> mber 8
I losts 6th round of U.S.-Nigeria bilateral
I -nic talks Sept. 8-9 to discuss ways of
t ding U.S. -Nigerian economic and com-
r il relations. Vice President Bush and
■ lan Vice President Alex Ekwueme chair
I eetings. The two delegations hold for-
1 Jks on agriculture, science and
I )logy, energy, and trade and invest-
and the Vice Presidents sign coopera-
greements on health and education.
mber 11
tary Haig visits Marbella, Spain, to
with Saudi Crown Prince Fahd, Sept.
Belgrade, Yugoslavia, Sept. 12-13; to
i to address the Berlin press (Berliner
Conference), Sept. 13; and to Bonn
13-14.
orwegian Lt. Gen. Frederik V. Bull-
in is appointed commander of the
rational forces and observers. Govern-
i of Egypt and Israel approve the
ntment in accordance with terms of the
;ol to the March 26, 1979, Egyptian-
i Treaty of Peace.
September 14
U.S., Japanese officials meet in Washington
Sept. 14-15 to discuss global and bilateral
economic issues, including trade and energy
policies. Under Secretary for Economic
Affairs, Myer Rashish, heads U.S. delegation
and Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs,
Kiyoaki Kikuchi, leads Japanese delegation.
By a vote of 117 to 0 with 25 abstentions
(U.S. and other 4 members of the Western
five contact group), the U.N. General
Assembly passes a draft resolution con-
demning South Africa for its "continued
occupation of Namibia," recognizing the
South West Africa People's Organization
(SWAPO) as the "sole and authentic
representative of the Namibian people," and
calls upon all states to impose sanctions
against South Africa. The Western five
states that its abstention does not imply "re-
jection" and its "objective remains to secure a
peaceful internationally recognized settlement
in Namibia."
September 15
Thirty-sixth regular session of the U.N.
General Assembly opens in New York. Ismat
Killani of Iraq is chosen President.
Vanuatu becomes 155th member of the
U.N.
In Heidelberg, West Germany, Gen.
Frederick Kroesen, U.S. Army European
commander, is injured when terrorists fire an
antitank grenade and gunshots at the car in
which he is riding. He is treated for super-
ficial wounds and released.
House Judiciary Committee approves a
resolution granting honorary U.S. citizenship
to Raoul Wallenberg, a Swedish citizen
credited with saving the lives of over 100,000
Hungarian Jews during World War II.
September 16
Pakistan formally agrees to a U.S. plan of a
6-year $3.2 billion economic assistance and
military sales package.
September 17
President Reagan visits Grand Rapids,
Michigan, to attend ceremonies related to the
dedication of the Gerald R. Ford Presidential
Museum. While there he meets with Cana-
dian Prime Minister Trudeau and Mexican
President Lopez Portillo for substantive talks
on bilateral and multilateral issues and makes
a courtesy call on former French President
Giscard d'Estaing, all attending the dedica-
tion ceremonies.
September 19
El Salvadoran President Jose Nepoleon
Duarte makes official visit to the U.S.
Sept. 19-29.
September 21
Belize, a British colony since 1862, becomes
an independent nation.
U.S., South African officials hold talks in
Zurich, Switzerland, aimed at clarifying set-
tlement proposals leading to the independ-
ence of Namibia. The talks are between
Chester A. Crocker, U.S. Assistant Secretary
for African Affairs, and Brand Fourie, South
African Foreign Affairs Director.
U.S. Government withholds about $2
million in Iranian assets — diplomatic and con-
sular property, including embassy operating
accounts — until Iran returns I'.S. Embassy
and other diplomatic and consular assets in
Iran held in violation of international law and
which the International Court of Justice
ordered Iran to return in March 1980.
President's Commission on Hostage
Compensation submits final report to the
President recommending the "adoption of an
additional title to the Hostage Relief Act,
providing separate authority for the payment
of a tax-exempt detention benefit of $12.50
per day of captivity" to U.S. nationals held
captive outside the U.S., including, specifical-
ly, those held hostage in Iran.
Secretary Haig addressed the U.N.
General Assembly at the 36th annual session
in New York.
The following newly appointed Am-
bassadors presented their credentials to
President Reagan: Lt. Gen. Ezaz Azim of
Pakistan; Lew Byong Hion of Korea; Enrique
Valenzuela of Chile; Fernando Gaviria of Col-
ombia; John Wycliffe Lwamafa of Uganda;
and Leslie N. Agius of Malta.
September 23
In Honduras, five U.S. mobile training team
personnel are attacked with automatic
weapons fire. Two are injured — one serious-
ly. Both are taken to Centro Medico hospital
in Tegucigalpa.
Secretary Haig, attending the opening
session of the U.N. General Assembly,
opened the first of two scheduled meetings
with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei
Gromyko. The talks are the first ministerial
level contacts between officials of the Reagan
Administration and the Soviet Union.
After 16 months, talks on Palestinian
autonomy resume in Cairo. Chief negotiators
are Egyptian Foreign Minister Kamal Hassan
Ali and Israeli Interior Minister Yosef Burg.
U.S. representatives are U.S. Ambassador to
Egypt, Alfred L. Atherton, Jr., and U.S. Am-
bassador to Israel, Samuel W. Lewis.
September 24
First round of Egypt, Israel, U.S. autonomy
talks end with the three countries pledging to
seek Palestinian cooperation and agreeing
that the next round be held in Tel Aviv the
last week in October.
Following the Haig-Gromyko talks in
New York, the U.S. and Soviet Union issue a
joint statement in which they agree "on the
need to hold formal negotiations" limiting
theater nuclear forces in Europe. Both par-
ties agree to begin negotiations November 30
in Geneva, Switzerland. The chief negotiator
will be U.S. Ambassador Paul Nitze and
Soviet Ambassador U.A. Kvitsinsky.
Seeking a settlement to the Namibia
question, foreign ministers of the Western
five contact group— Canada, France, F.R.G.,
U.K., and the U.S.— issue a joint statement
in which they develop proposals for a
timetable for "final negotiations" with the ob-
jective of implementing U.N. Security Coun-
cil Resolution 435 in 1982.
93
mber 1981
PRESS RELEASES
September 25
Belize becomes 156th member of the U.N.
On a private visit to the U.S., Kenyan
President Daniel Arap Moi visits Washington,
D.C., Sept. 24-26 for discussions with Presi-
dent Reagan on a wide range of issues, in-
cluding bilateral relations, and with other top
U.S. officials.
September 28
Secretary Haig holds second meeting with
Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko, continuing
talks on U.S., Soviet relations.
Former Venezuelan President Romulo
Betancourt dies. Vice President Bush will
head U.S. delegation to funeral to take place
in Caracas in October.
At the invitation of the El Salvador
Government, Everett E. Briggs, Deputy
Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Af-
fairs, visits San Salvador to discuss with the
government and the Central Electoral Coun-
cil ways in which the U.S. can assist in the
preparation period for elections in El
Salvador.
September 29
Defense Department releases 99-page report
on the Soviet military buildup and the need
for the U.S. and its NATO allies to modernize
their defense forces to meet the Soviet
challenge.
September 30
Conference on International Trade held in
Omaha, Nebraska.
U.S., Haiti agree to establish a bilateral
cooperation program to stop illegal migration
of Haitian immigrants into U.S.
President Reagan issues a proclamation
suspending entry of undocumented aliens into
the U.S. and calling for interdiction of vessels
carrying them. He also issues an Executive
order concerning the interdiction of illegal
aliens. ■
Department of State
Press releases may be obtained from the
Office of Press Relations, Department of
State, Washington, D.C. 20520.
No Date Subject
*293 9/4 Program for the official visit
of Israeli Prime Minister
Begin, Sept. 9-15.
*294 9/5 Claims against Iran.
*295 9/8 Zhao Wenjin retires as
caretaker of the U.S. Con-
sulate at Amoy.
*296 9/8 Abraham Katz sworn in as
Ambassador to the OECD
(biographic data).
*297 9/8 Advisory Committee to the
U.S. section of the Interna-
tional North Pacific
Fisheries Commission,
Sept. 26.
298 9/10 Haig: news conference.
299 9/11 Haig: interview on "Good
Morning, America."
300 9/12 Haig: address before the
Berlin Press Association,
Sept. 13.
300A 9/15 Haig: question-and-answer
session following Berlin
Press Association address.
"301 9/14 U.S., Thailand amend textile
agreement, June 17 and
July 28.
*302 9/14 Shipping Coordinating Com-
mittee (SCC), Subcommit-
tee on Safety of Life at Sea
(SOLAS), working group
on the carriage of
dangerous goods, Oct. 22.
*303 9/14 Advisory Committee on In-
vestment, Technology, and
Development, Oct. 7.
*304 9/14 Advisory Committee on In-
vestment, Technology, and
Development, Oct. 9.
*305 9/14 International Telegraph and
Telephone Consultative
Committee (CCITT), work-
ing group B, Sept. 29.
*306 9/15 Haig, Vrhovec: dinner toast,
Belgrade, Sept. 12.
307 9/15 U.S., Yugoslav press state-
ment, Sept. 12.
*308 9/15 Haig: arrival statement,
Berlin, Sept. 13.
*309 9/15 Haig: remarks at signing
"golden book," Rathaus
Schoeneberg, Berlin,
Sept. 13.
*310 9/15 Haig: departure statement,
Berlin, Sept. 13.
*311 9/17 Haig: address and question-
and-answer session, World
Bank, Sept. 16.
312 9/17 Haig: statement before the
Senate Foreign Relations
Committee.
*313 9/17
314 9/17
*315 9/17
*316 9/17
*317 9/18
318 9/21
*319 9/21
320 9/21
*321 9/22
•322 9/23
*323 9/23
*324 9/29
*325 9/29
*326 9/30
I
Haig: arrival statement.
Bonn, Sept. 13.
Haig: news conference,
Bonn, Sept. 14.
SCC, committee on ocea
dumping, Sept. 23.
Advisory Committee to 1
U.S. National Section
the International Com
sion for the Conservat
of Atlantic tunas,
Oct. 15-16.
Haig: interview on "Goot
Morning, America."
Haig: interview on "Issui
and Answers," Sept. 2<
President's Commission (
Hostage Compensatior
recommendations.
Haig: address before the
U.N. General Assembl;
New York.
First international con-
ference of liberators of
Nazi concentration can
Oct. 26-28.
Conference on Internatio
Trade, Omaha, Nebrasi
Sept. 30.
U.S., China amend textili
agreement, Sept. 18.
Haig: interview on the
"Today Show."
Foreign Policy Conferenc
for U.S. editors and br< 1
casters, Oct. 29.
Faith Ryan Whittlesey sv
in as Ambassador to S;
zerland (biographic dafc
:
*Not printed in the Bulletin.
94
>EX
vember 1981
.81, No. 2056
Control
) and Nuclear Deterrence (Burt) 56
ary Haig Interviewed on "Issues and
aswers" ' '
tary Haig Visits Europe (U.S.-Yugoslav
ess statement, address, question-and-
swer session, news conference) 44
Reported Use of Chemical Weapons
toessel) '•
I. Brazil and the United States Today
Inders) .-87
la. North American Economic Relations
ashish) -4
East-West Trade Relations
ashish) -20
nodities. International Commodity
greements (Avery) 34
ress
West Trade Relations (Rashish) 20
and Security Cooperation With
akistan: A Critical Partnership (Buckley,
cPherson) 82
Agreement With Egypt
larshall)
Security, Middle East Peace
iterests (Haig) 60
oping Countries
nges of World Development (Reagan) 14
Challenges in International Investment
formats) 28
omics
;nges of World Development (Reagan) 14
national Commodity Agreements
ivery) 34
Challenges in International Investment
formats) ~h
American Economic Relations
.tashish) 24
of Egyptian President Sadat (Haig,
Information Policy. Forgery. Disinformation,
and Political Operations 52
Israel
Secretary Haig Interviewed for "Good Morn-
ing. America" ••
Secretary Haig Interviewed on "Issues and
Answers" ■ 17
Secretary Haig's News Conference on Prime
Minister Begins Visit 74
Visit of Israeli Prime Minister Begin (Begin,
Reagan) ' '
Latin America and the Caribbean. North
American Economic Relations (Rashish) 24
Lebanon. Secretary Haig Interviewed on
"Issues and Answers" -17
Mexico. North American Economic Relations
(Rashish) 24
Middle East
Saudi Arabia and U.S. Security Policy
(Twinam) ^3
Saudi Security, Middle East Peace, and U.S.
Interests (Haig)
Secretary Haig's News Conference of
October 7
66
and U.S.
Secretary Haig Visits Europe (U.S.-Yugoslav
press statement, address, question-and-
answer session, news conference) 44
Military Affairs
Srsham . • • "9 NATO and Nuclear Deterrence (Burt) 5b
President Reagan's News Conference of
October 1 (excerpts) 16
Reported Use of Chemical Weapons
(Stoessel) -^
Namibia. Namibia (Western five statement) 8b
North Atlantic Treaty Organization. NATO
and Nuclear Deterrence (Burt) 56
Nuclear Policy. Nuclear Cooperation Agree-
ment With Egypt (Marshall) 79
Pakistan Economic and Security Cooperation
With Pakistan: A Critical Partnership
(Buckley, McPherson) ■ • • -82
Poland. Secretary Haig Interviewed on
"Issues and Answers" 1 '
Presidential Documents
Challenges of World Development (Reagan) 14
ea Jan) 67 Death of Egyptian President Sadat (Haig) . 67
',„,. Ooooeration Agreement With Egypt News Conference of October 1 (excerpts) . 16
Visit of Israeli Prime Minister Begin (Begin) 71
of
79
66
ar Cooperation Agreement
vlarshall)
■tary Haig Interviewed for "Good Morn-
rig, America" ■ ■ ■
■tary Haig's News Conference ol
October 7
West Trade Relations (Rashish) 20
0 and Nuclear Deterrence (Burt) 56
iirn Aid. Economic and Security Coopera-
ion With Pakistan: A Critical Partnership
Bucklev, McPherson) "
nany. Secretary Haig Visits Europe
U S -Yugoslav press statement, address,
uestion-and-answer session, news con-
erence)
Saudi Arabia
President Reagan's News Conference
October 1 (excerpts) • ■ ■ 16
Saudi Arabia and U.S.
(Twinam)
Saudi Security, Middle East Peace, ;
Interests (Haig) ....
Secretary Haig Interviewed f
ing, America"
63
.S.
60
r -Good Morn-
Secretary Haig Interviewed on "Issues and
Answers" I"
Secretary Haig's News Conference of
October 7 ,;';
Secretary Haig's News Conference on Prime
Minister Begin's Visit 74
Security Assistance
Economic and Security Cooperation With
Pakistan: A Critical Partnership (Bucklry.
McPherson) 82
President Reagan's News Conference of
October 1 (excerpts) 1 '»
Saudi Arabia and U.S. Security Policy
(Twinam) ,;:;
Saudi Security, Middle East Peace, and U.S.
Interests (Haig) 60
Secretary Haig Interviewed on "Issues and
Answers" ' '
Secretary Haig's News Conference of
October 7 66
Terrorism. Secretary Haig's News Conference
of October 7 66
Trade
East-West Trade Relations (Rashish) 20
New Challenges in International Investment
(Hormats) 28
Treaties. Current Actions 90
U.S.S.R.
East-West Trade Relations (Rashish) 20
Forgery, Disinformation, and Political Opera-
tions ^2
NATO and Nuclear Deterrence (Burt) 56
President's Letter to President Brezhnev
(Department statement) 51
Secretary Haig Interviewed on "Issues and
Answers" '■'
Secretary Haig Visits Europe (U.S.-Yugoslav
press statement, address, question-and-
answer session, news conference) 44
United Nations. Namibia (Western five state-
ment) 86
Yugoslavia
Secretary Haig Visits Europe (U.S.-Yugoslav
press statement, address, question-and-
answer session, news conference) 44
U.S. Recognition of Serbian Independence
(Landa) l
Name Index
Avery, Dennis T 34
Begin, Menahem 71
Buckley, James L 82
Burt, Richard 56
Enders, Thomas O 87
Haig, Secretary 17, 44, 60, 66, 67, 74, 77
Hormats, Robert D 28
Landa, Ronald D 1
Marshall, Harry R, Jr 79
McPherson, M. Peter 82
Rashish, Myer 20, 24
Reagan, President 14, 16, 67, 71
Stoessel, Walter J, Jr 79
Twinam, Joseph W 63
Superintendent of Documents
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bulletin
ffe Official Monthly Record of United States Foreign Policy / Volume 81 / Number 2057
December 1981
department of State
bulletin
Volume 81 / Number 2057 / December 1981
The Department of State Bulletin ,
published by the Office of Public
Communication in the Bureau of Public
Affairs, is the official record of U.S.
foreign policy. Its purpose is to provide
the public, the Congress, and
government agencies with information
on developments in U.S. foreign
relations and the work of the
Department of State and the Foreign
Service.
The Bulletin's contents include major
addresses and news conferences of the
President and the Secretary of State;
statements made before congressional
committees by the Secretary and other
senior State Department officials;
special features and articles on
international affairs; selected press
releases issued by the White House,
the Department, and the U.S. Mission
to the United Nations; and treaties and
other agreements to which the United
States is or may become a party.
ALEXANDER M. HAIG, JR.
Secretary of State
DEAN FISCHER
Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs
PAUL E. AUERSWALD
Director,
Office of Public Communication
MARTIN JUDGE
Chief. Editorial Division
PHYLLIS A. YOUNG
Editor
JUANITA ADAMS
Assistant Editor
The Secretary of State has determined that
the publication of this periodical is
necessary in the transaction of the public
business required by law of this
Department. Use of funds for printing this
periodical has been approved by the
Director of the Office of Management and
Budget through January 31, 1986.
NOTE: Contents of this publication are not
copyrighted and items contained herein
may be reprinted. Citation of the
Department of State Bulletin as the
source will be appreciated. The Bulletin is
indexed in the Readers' Guide to Periodical
Literature.
Fur sale by the Superintendent of
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$26.25 (foreign) Single copy-$3.75
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copy-$2.50 (domestic) $3.15 (foreign)
CONTENTS
FEATURE
1 The Cancun Summil (President Reagan's statement, Cochairmen's Summary,
I' ft sident's remarks)
rt President
U.S. Program for Peace
and Arms Control
Cooperative Strategy
for Global Growth
Bicentennial Observance
of the Battle of Yorktown
fts Secretary
Arms Control and Stra-
tegic Nuclear Forces
Interview for Newsweek
Address at Editors and
Broadcasters Conference
,ns Control
t Administration Supports Ratifi-
cation of Protocol I of Treaty of
Tlatelolco (Eugene V. Rostow)
iada
U.S. -Canada Relations
(Lawrence S. Eagleburger)
Canada— A Profile
;t Asia
Japan and the United Stales: A
Durable Relationship (John H.
Holdridge)
Developments in Indochina (John
H. Holdridge)
Visit of Thai Prime Minister
(President Reagan)
jnomics
U.S. Trade and Foreign Policy
(Robert D. Hormats, Myer
Rashish)
Energy
49 Soviet-West European Natural
Gas Pipeline (Robert D. Hor-
mats)
Europe
52 Atlantic Prospects, 1981-90,
(Walter J. Stoessel, Jr.)
55 NATO Nuclear Planning Group
Meets in Scotland {Ft mil Com-
munique)
56 U.S. Strategic Policy (President
Reagan)
56 U.S. Food for Poland (Department
Statement)
Foreign Aid
57 Role of the Private Sector in
Developing Countries (Robert D.
Hormats, M. Peter McPher son)
Immigration
62 Interdiction of Illegal
Aliens (Proclamation, Executive
Order)
Middle East
63 Secretary Haig Interviewed on
"Meet "the Press"
66 Security Situation in Egypt and
the Sudan (Department State-
ment)
66 12th Report on Sinai Support
Mission (Message to the Con-
gress)
Military Affairs
67 U.S. Strategic Weapons Program
(President Reagan)
United Nations
68 Prospects for Anns Control
(Eugene V. Rostow)
Western Hemisphere
72 U.S. Arms Transfer Policy To-
ward Latin America (Richard
R. Hurl, Tin, m, is 0. Enders)
Treaties
75 Current Actions
Chronology
78 October 1981
Press Releases
79 Department of State
80 U. S.U.N.
Publications
80 Department of State
Index
jW 2 7 1982
J
SPECIAL (See Center Section)
Atlas of United States Foreign Relations: Economics— Part 3
The Cancun Summit
President Reagan departed
Washington, D.C., October 21, 1981, to
juiii trailers of-Jl other mil ions and the
U.N. Secretary General attending the In-
ternational Meeting on Cooperation and
Development m Cancun, Mexico, October
22-23.
Following are the President's state-
ment made in thai meeting on October
.'.'. a summary of the sessions issued by
the cochairmen (Mexican President Jose
Lopez Portillo and Canadian Prime
Minister Pierre-Elliott Trudeau) on
October 23, and President Reagan's
remarks when he returned to the United
Stales on October J.;.
PRESIDENTS STATEMENT,
CANCUN,
OCT. 22, 19811
I am honored to be with all of you on
this historic occasion. In many ways,
this summit is not ours alone. It belongs
to the millions who look to us for help
and for hope. If they could speak to us
today, I believe they might tell us that
words are cheap, that cooperative action
is needed — and needed now. In their
name, let us join together and move for-
ward. Let us meet the challenge of
charting a strategic course for global
economic growth and development for
all nations.
Each of us comes to Cancun from a
different domestic setting where our ma-
jor responsibilities are found. My own
government has devoted much of the
past year to developing a plan of action
to strengthen our economy. For years
our government has overspent, over-
taxed, and overregulated, causing our
growth rates to decline and our inflation
and interest rates to rise. We have
taken bold measures to correct these
problems, and we are confident they will
succeed— not tomorrow nor next week
but over the months and years ahead.
We believe restoring sound economic
policies at home represents one of the
President Reagan is greeted by
Mexican President Lopez Portillo.
(White House photo by Karl Schumacher)
most important contributions the United
States can make to greater growth and
development abroad. The actions we are
taking will renew confidence in the
dollar, strengthen our demand for im-
ports, hold down inflation, reduce in-
terest rates and the cost of borrowing,
and increase resources for foreign in-
vestment.
I have also had a chance to study
and discuss with various leaders the
domestic problems you face. I know how
diverse and serious they are. For the
poorest countries, more food and energy
are urgently needed, while raising pro-
ductivity through education, better
health and nutrition, and the acquisition
of basic facilities such as roads and ports
represent longer term goals.
Middle-income countries need
foreign capital, technical assistance, and
the development of basic skills to im-
prove their economic climate and credit
worthinesss in international capital
markets. The more advanced developing
nations which already benefit from the
international economy need increasing
access to markets to sustain their
development.
And across the income spectrum,
many among you who are oil importers
face acute financial difficulties from the
large debt burdens resulting from the oil
price shocks of the 1970s. High interest
rates are exacerbating these problems,
Listening to opening remarks during the
inaugural session of the International
Meeting on Cooperation and Development.
From left are Secretary Haig, the Presi-
dent, and members of the Chinese delega-
tion.
(White House photo bj Michael Evans)
Feature
The
Cancun
A Summit
such that debt servicing and energy
costs are making excessive claims on
your foreign exchange earnings.
We recognize that each nation's ap-
proach to development should reflect its
own cultural, political, and economic
heritage. That is the way it should be.
The great thing about our international
system is that it respects diversity and
promotes creativity.
Certain economic factors, of course,
apply across cultural and political lines.
We are mutually interdependent but,
above all, we are individually responsi-
ble. We must respect both diversity and
economic realities when discussing
grand ideas. As I said last week in
Philadelphia, we do not seek an
ideological debate; we seek to build upon
what we already know will work.
History demonstrates that time and
again, in place after place, economic
growth and human progress make their
greatest strides in countries that en-
courage economic freedom. Government
has an important role in helping develop
a country's economic foundation. But the
critical test is whether government is
genuinely working to liberate individuals
by creating incentives to work, save, in-
vest, and succeed. Individual farmers,
laborers, owners, traders, and
managers— they are the heart and soul
of development. Trust them. Because
whenever they are allowed to create and
build, wherever they are given a per-
sonal stake in deciding economic policies
in benefiting from their success, then
societies become more dynamic, pros-
perous, progressive, and free.
With sound understanding of our
domestic freedom and responsibilities,
we can construct effective international
cooperation. Without it, no amount of
international good will and action can
produce prosperity. In examining our
collective experience with development,
let us remember that international
economic institutions have also done
much to improve the world economy.
Under their auspices, the benefits of in-
ternational commerce have flowed in-
creasingly to all countries. From 1950 to
1980, gross national product per capita
in 60 middle-income countries increased
twice as fast as in the industrial coun-
tries when real purchasing power is
taken into account.
International
Meeting on
Cooperation
and
Development
October 22-23, 1981
Cancun, Mexico
Standing
President Sergej Kraigher
(Yugoslavia)
President Julius K. Nyerere
(Tanzania)
Prime Minister Margaret Thatchei
(United Kingdom)
Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki
(Japan)
Executive President Forbes Burnh
(Guyana)
President Francois Mitterrand
(France)
Department of State Bullel
Minister Indira Gandhi
ia)
ent Alhaji Shehu Shagari
eria)
Minister Thorbjorn Faildin
eden)
lent Luis Herrera Campins
lezuela)
Secretary General Kurt Waldheim
Acting President Abdus Sattar
(Bangladesh)
President Chadli Bendjedid
(Algeria)
Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher
(Federal Republic of Germany)
Prime Minister Pierre-Elliott Trudeau
(Canada)
President Jose Lopez Portillo y Pacheco
(Mexico)
Deputy Prime Minister Crown Prince Fahd
(Saudi Arabia)
Foreign Minister Willibald Pahr
(Austria)
Foreign Minister Ramiro Saraiva
Guerreiro (Brazil)
Premier Zhao Ziyang
(China)
President Ferdinand E. Marcos
(Philippines)
ient Ronald Reagan
ited States)
gn Minister Simeon Ake
ry Coast)
:ember1981
Despite the mid-1970s recession, we
were able to liberalize the international
trading system under the leadership of
the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade. This created new trading oppor-
tunities for a number of developed and
developing countries. The International
Monetary Fund remains the centerpiece
of the international financial system. It
has adjusted its programs and increased
its resources to deal with the major
pressures and problems of our era. The
World Bank and other multilateral
development banks have dramatically in-
creased their resources and their overall
support for development.
Much remains to be done to help
low-income countries develop domestic
markets and strengthen their exports.
We recognize that. But we are just as
convinced that the way to do this is not
to weaken the very system that has
served us so well but to continue work-
ing together to make it better.
I am puzzled by suspicions that the
United States might ignore the develop-
ing world. The contribution America has
made to development— and will continue
to make— is enormous. We have provid-
ed $57 billion to the developing countries
in the last decade— $43 billion in
development assistance and $14 billion
in contributions to the multilateral
development banks. Each year, the
United States provides more food
assistance to developing nations than all
other nations combined. Last year we
extended almost twice as much official
development assistance as any other na-
tion.
Even more significant is the U.S.
contribution in trade. Far too little
world attention has been given to the
importance of trade as a key to develop-
ment. The United States absorbs about
one-half of all manufactured goods that
non-OPEC developing countries export
to the industrialized world, even though
our market is only one-third the total in-
dustrialized world market. Last year
alone, we imported $60 billion worth of
goods from non-OPEC developing coun-
tries. That is more than twice the official
development assistance from all OECD
[Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development] countries. Our trade
and capital markets are among the most
open in the world.
The range and breadth of America's
commitment extend far beyond conces-
sional assistance. We believe in pro-
moting development by maximizing
every asset we have. As the world's
largest single market, we can be a
powerful conductor for economic prog-
ress and well-being. We come to Cancun
offering our hand in friendship as your
partner in prosperity. Together, we can
identify the roadblocks to development
and decide the best ways to stimulate
greater growth everywhere we can. We
have yet to unleash the full potential for
growth in a world of open markets.
The United States is here to listen
and learn. And when we leave Cancun,
our search for progress will continue.
The dialogue will go on. The bonds of
our common resolve will not disappear
with our jet trails. We are prepared to
carry out the commitment in the Ottawa
summit declaration to conduct a more
formal dialogue — bilaterally, with
regional groups, in the United Nations,
and in specialized international agencies.
We take seriously the commitment at
Ottawa "to participate in preparations
for a mutually acceptable process of
global negotiations in circumstances of-
fering the prospect of meaningful prog-
ress."
It is our view that "circumstances of-
fering the prospect of meaningful pro-
gress" are future talks based upon four
essential understandings among the par-
ticipants.
• The talks should have a practical
orientation toward identifying, on a
case-by-case basis, specific potential for
or obstacles to development which
cooperative efforts may enhance or
remove. We will suggest an agenda com-
posed of trade liberalization, energy and
food resource development, and im-
provement in the investment climate.
• The talks should respect the com-
petence, functions, and powers of the
specialized international agencies upon
which we all depend with the under-
standing that the decisions reached by
these agencies within respective areas of
competence are final. We should not
seek to create new institutions.
• The general orientation of the
talks must be toward sustaining or
achieving greater levels of mutually
Department of State Bu
;ident Reagan meets with Algerian
;ident Chadli Bendjedid and other
ibers of the Algerian delegation.
s House photo by Michael Evans)
ident Reagan with Deputy Prime
ister Crown Prince Fahd of Saudi
bia.
e House photo hy Michael Evans)
President greets Mohammad Shamsul
|, Minister of Foreign Affairs for
gladesh and Acting President of
gladesh, Abdus Sattar.
e House photo liy Michael Evans)
beneficial international growth and
development, taking into account
domestic economic policies.
• The talks should take place in an
atmosphere of cooperative spirit similar
to that which has brought us together in
Cancun — rather than one in which views
become polarized and chances for agree-
ment are needlessly sacrificed.
If these understandings are ac-
cepted, then the United States would be
willing to engage in a new preparatory
process to see what may be achieved. I
suggest that officials of our governments
informally confer in the months ahead as
to appropriate procedures.
But our main purpose in coming to
Cancun is to focus on specific questions
of substance, not procedural matters. In
this spirit, we bring a positive program
of action for development concentrated
around these principles:
• Stimulating international trade by
opening up markets, both within in-
dividual countries and among countries;
• Tailoring particular development
strategies to the specific needs and
potential of individual countries and
regions;
• Guiding our assistance toward the
development of self-sustaining produc-
tive activities, particularly in food and
energy;
• Improving the climate for private
capital flows, particularly private invest-
ment; and
• Creating a political atmosphere in
which practical solutions can move for-
ward, rather than founder on a reef of
misguided policies that restrain and in-
terfere with the international
marketplace or foster inflation.
In our conversations, we will be
elaborating on the specifics of this pro-
gram. The program deals not in flashy
new gimmicks but in substantive fun-
damentals with a track record of suc-
cess. It rests on a coherent view of
what's essential to development — name-
ly political freedom and economic oppor-
tunity.
Feature
The
Cancun
i Summit
Yes, we believe in freedom. We
know it works. It's just as exciting, suc-
cessful, and revolutionary today as it
was 200 years ago.
I want to thank our hosts for ar-
ranging this historic opportunity. Let us
join together and proceed together.
Economic development is an exercise in
mutual cooperation for the common
good. We can and must grasp this op-
portunity for our people and together
take a step for mankind.
COCHAIRMENS SUMMARY,
CANCUN,
OCT. 23, 1981"
We, the cochairmen, had the great
honor to preside over a meeting of
heads of state and government designed
to focus on relationships between North
and South, particularly the serious
economic problems confronting the in-
ternational community. The U.N. Sec-
retary General attended as a special
guest.
We strongly believe that the very
fact that 22 leaders from some of the
world's most influential yet diverse coun-
tries were prepared to come to Cancun
and discuss these issues clearly demon-
strated the importance and gravity that
they attached to them. The North-South
relationship was seen as one of the most
serious challenges to be faced in the
coming decade, ranking with and linked
to the maintenance of world peace, as a
priority for the attention of all govern-
ments.
The spirit which prevailed among us
as we addressed these fundamental
issues was extremely constructive and
positive. It was clear from the outset
that we were not here — indeed, we
could nut be here — to take decisions on
behalf of the rest of the world. Our task
was, rather, to bring our voices to bear
at the highest level on the fundamental
issues, to identify the major problems,
and to try to evaluate and promote
possible solutions. With this end in
mind, we spoke openly and frankly to
one another and did not try to evade the
ember 1981
hard issues. Nor did we indulge in
recrimination or casting of blame on
others. We were not bound by tradi-
tional bureaucratic entanglements nor
did we allow ourselves to be shackled by
posturing or rhetoric. The atmosphere
throughout was receptive to new ideas
and approaches and a willingness to
listen and understand. We believe that
together we succeeded in creating a
spirit of genuine confidence and trust
among ourselves.
Our task now will be to insure that
we build upon this trust and understand-
ing, carry this momentum forward into
the future, and translate thought into
action and progress with the aim of
revitalizing the world economy and
accelerating the development of devel-
oping countries. It is in this light that
heads of state and government were
clearly determined to attack the prob-
lems on an urgent basis in the inter-
national institutions existing for this
purpose and to continue to give their
personal attention to this process.
Obviously there were differences of
view expressed. Among 22 very diverse
nations, it could not be expected that
interests would be identical or ap-
proaches necessarily the same. But what
struck us most forcefully were the many
areas of shared priorities and of com-
mon ground. Thus, while various roads
were suggested to solve the problems
facing us, in virtually every case the
basic objectives were shared by all of us.
All participants recognized the im-
portance of interdependence in terms of
the functioning of their economies,
reflected in the fact that the economic
prosperity of any country or group of
countries increasingly depends on the
existence of conditions for growth and
stability in other nations. They all
appreciated that many of the economic
problems which beset them individually
could only be solved through joint action
among states and that in this sense
there was a high degree of mutual self-
interest involved in promoting closer in-
ternational cooperation. There was a
strongly shared view that in the global
community the problems of economic
disparities among nations needed to be
seen as the responsibility of all and,
therefore, required concerted action.
The view was expressed that, in an in-
creasingly integrated world economy, no
country or group of countries can evade
their responsibilities. In this respect,
regret was voiced about the absence of
the Soviet Union from the meeting.
At the same time the importance of
strengthening and increasing the effec-
tiveness of cooperation among develop-
ing countries was seen as an element of
growing significance in international
relations. Many participants regretted
the amount of resources devoted to
armaments which could be better
employed for developmental purposes.
It was recognized that many of the
problems were deep and complex and
not subject to quick or simplistic solu-
tions. With a long and difficult period
ahead, leaders committed themselves to
working together to try to build an in-
ternational economic order in which all
states would be able to realize their
potential with equal opportunities, and
the developing countries, in particular,
would be able to grow and develop ac-
cording to their own values.
The heads of state and government
confirmed the desirability of supporting
at the United Nations, with a sense of
urgency, a consensus to launch global
negotiations on a basis to be mutually
agreed and in circumstances offering the
prospect of meaningful progress. Some
countries insisted that the competence of
the specialized agencies should not be
affected.
With respect to substance, we
focused on what we viewed as the major
issues and the challenges facing the
world economy under the headings of
food security and agricultural develop-
ment; commodities, trade, and indus-
trialization; energy; and monetary and
financial issues. Throughout the meeting
the discussion was pragmatic and direct,
touching both on broad approaches and
frequently on specific details. These
discussions made clear the political will
of all participants at Cancun to move
forward and to take action.
Food Security and Agricultural
Development
Discussions on this topic indicated
several general areas of understanding
and shared viewpoints regarding the
following principal questions.
Department of State Bulle
President holds meeting with
cutive President Forbes Burnham of
ana and other members of the Guyanese
gation.
e House photo bj Michael Evans)
Izanian President Julius Nyerere is
>ted by President Reagan.
phntii liy Michael Evans)
esident Reagan and other Cabinet
mbers— White House Chief of Staff,
mes Baker and Assistant to the Presi-
nt for National Security Affairs. Richard
len— meet with United Nations Secretary
neral Kurt Waldheim.
hiu- House photo by Michael Evans)
cember 1981
Feature
The
Cancun
.* a Summit
Persistent and widespread mani-
festations of hunger are entirely incom-
patible with the level of development
attained by the world economy and, in
particular, with existing food production
capacity. Within as brief a period as
possible, hunger must be eradicated.
This objective is clearly an obligation of
the international community and consti-
tutes a first priority both at the national
level and in the field of international
cooperation.
Sustained and long-term internal
effort on the part of the developing
countries to attain increasing self-
sufficiency in food production is the
basic element in obtaining a real answer
to the problem of hunger. Nevertheless,
this effort requires timely and sufficient
international technical and financial
support in coordination with internal
policies and strategies.
First, developing countries sin mid
define and put into operation, with the
aid of ample and effective international
support, national food strategies cover-
ing the entire cycle of food production,
productivity, distribution, and consump-
tion, that include effective action for the
rural development, by means of increas-
ing incomes of food producers which,
paradoxically, are the ones most af-
fected by hunger.
Food aid should be seen as a tem-
porary tool in emergency situations.
Such situations could well continue to
exist— perhaps unfortunately at an even
higher scale — over the next years; but
f< » >d aid should not be used as a perma-
nent replacement for the necessary
development of the required food pro-
duction in developing countries
themselves.
The rate of population growth in
some countries leads to increases in food
demand that are difficult to meet. The
experience of a certain number of coun-
tries has shown that development of a
population policy aids in solving some of
the most acute aspects of the food prob-
lem.
The workings of international
agricultural and food organizations
operating within the framework of the
United Nations need to be reviewed in
order to avoid duplication of work, to
use available resources more effectively,
and to improve their general efficiency.
A number of other points were men-
tioned during the course of the debate.
Among the more important were the
following:
A long-term program, geared to the
eradication of hunger by the year 2000,
should be prepared, including elements
of both internal effort and international
cooperation.
A number of steps could be taken to
improve the effectiveness of food secu-
rity mechanisms. Among these are the
negotiation of a new international grains
agreement; coordination of national food
reserves; expansion of the international
emergency food reserve, increasing the
predictability and continuity of contribu-
tions to it; and establishment of reserves
sufficient to cover the food security
needs of developing countries, especially
the least developed.
Task forces could be sent from
developed to developing countries in
order to assist the latter in developing
and implementing agricultural programs
and effectively disseminating high-
productivity agricultural techniques.
International trade conditions also
exert a considerable influence on the
agricultural and food situation of
developing countries. Trade barriers
raised against agricultural products
hinder the growth of agricultural activ-
ity and the achievement of food security
objectives.
The recent setting up of a "food
facility" within the compensatory financ-
ing scheme in the International Mone-
tary Fund constitutes an important step.
In the future, however, it would be
necessary for the resources allocated
and the terms of access to those
resources to be more compatible with
the needs of food-importing developing
countries.
The International Fund for Agri-
cultural Development (IFAD) requires
prompt replenishment of its resources so
that it may continue its operations
without interruption.
Commodities, Trade, and
Industrialization
Participants addressed a range of prob-
lems under this item.
Noting the slow progress in imple-
menting the UNCTAD [U.N. Conference
on Trade and Development] integrated
program for commodities, particularly in
the negotiation of new commoditj
agreements, they agreed on the need to
complete procedures for I fringing the
common fund into operation. Because
earnings from commodity exports are of
fundamental importance to the economic-
growth and stability of developing coun-
tries, a range of possible approaches was
suggested including more intensive ef-
forts to negotiate effective international
agreements to stabilize commodity
prices and other measures aimed at
stabilizing developing country earnings
from commodity exports.
The need to improve the generalized
system of preferences for developing
countries was also recognized, as well as
the need for continued efforts on the
part of governments to resist protec-
tionist pressures.
Several participants noted the con-
tribution which the proposed GATT
[General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade] ministerial meeting in 1982 could
make to addressing trade problems of
developing countries, including barriers
to trade in agriculture and obstacles to
the further processing of their raw
material exports.
A number of participants referred to
the importance of industrialization of
developing countries and the contribu-
tion which increased trade could make
to this objective. Restructuring of
developed country industries was iden-
tified as being relevant to this objective,
as was a positive result from the
renegotiation of the multifiber arrange-
ment.
The need to help developing coun-
tries improve their infrastructures, in-
cluding transportation and storage
facilities, was also raised, and a proposal
for mobilizing resources to this end was
presented.
Energy
It was recognized that energy is one of
the key problem areas of the 1980s that
must be tackled seriously and urgently.
The problem was characterized more as
a global one than as purely a North-
South issue.
In order to insure an orderly transi-
tion from the era of hydrocarbons to the
era of diversified energy sources, the
proposal for a world energy plan as a
framework providing an overall ap-
proach covering this complex process
was recalled and interest expressed in it.
The potential contribution of
regional energy cooperation schemes
was also pointed out in the discussion.
It was also recognized that energy
conservation must be pursued by major
oil-consuming countries. Development of
new and renewable sources of energy
also required emphasis, as was agreed at
the recent Nairobi conference.
Emphasized in the discussion was
the serious problem developing countries
face in meeting their large energy im-
port bills which for many represent a
good part of their limited foreign ex-
change earnings.
The need for increased energy in-
vestment, from both private and official
sources, in developing countries was
stressed. Support was expressed by
many participants for expanded energy
lending in developing countries by the
World Bank, and, in this respect, the
establishment of an energy affiliate was
advocated.
Some participants suggested the
need for better exchange of information
between energy-producing and consum-
ing countries in order to facilitate long-
term energy planning.
Monetary and Financial Issues
Participants reviewed the financial dif-
ficulties being experienced by developing
countries with regard to their balance-
of-payments deficits, their debt service
burden, and their development financing
needs.
They discussed conditions of access
by developing countries to the various
sources of financing and the role of the
relevant multilateral institutions, in par-
ticular the International Monetary Fund
and the World Bank, in the light of the
current economic and financial problems
facing developing countries.
Points raised by some participants in
the discussion included the impact of
high interest rates, the creation and
distribution of liquidity and role of the
special drawing rights as a main reserve
asset and in financing development, IMF
conditionality, the decisionmaking proc-
Toasts of friendship during a In in
meeting with Premier Zhao Ziyan I
China. Clockwise from left are CI
Foreign Minister Huang Hua, Pr€
Ziyand, the President, Secretary 1
Secretary of the Treasury Donald
and James Baker.
(White House photo l>\ Michael Evans)
Meeting with Foreign Minister Hai
Dietrich Genscher of the Federal R
of Germany.
(White House ph by Michael Evans)
Department of State Bullet
resident listens to discussion during
cond plenary session,
louse photo l>y Michael Evans)
Feature
The
Cancun
k Summit
ess in the international financial institu-
tions, access to capital markets, and the
respective role of private and official
sources of external capital in develop-
ment financing-.
Several suggestions were noted for
improved international financial coopera-
tion.
PRESIDENT'S REMARKS,
ANDREWS AIR FORCE BASE,
OCT. 24, 19811
Throughout these 3 days in Cancun, I
have participated in a unique and highly
productive exchange of views with
leaders of developed and developing
nations. I hope that I speak for the
many other world leaders there in say-
ing that Cancun was a substantial suc-
cess.
The spirit of this conference, as the
cochairmen described it, was extremely
constructive and positive. The exchange
was direct, frank, wideranging, and
free of recrimination. We dealt with
hard issues and yet succeeded in finding
many areas of snared priorities and of
common ground.
The fact that we could succeed
demonstrates the possibility for more
fruitful dialogue conducted with candor
and mutual respect. I believe that all
those who attended found our expecta-
tions fulfilled and even exceeded.
Together we succeeded in creating a
spirit of hope which we want to trans-
late into progress to revitalize the world
economy and accelerate the growth of
developing countries.
Last week in Philadelphia, I spoke of
the goal that motivates our effort — the
enhancement of human freedom and
economic opportunity. We evaluated the
record of what succeeds and proposed a
program to address the fundamental
problems facing the developing countries
and the world economy.
At Cancun we stressed many of
those same important themes and the
commitment of the United States to
work with those countries in their
development efforts. There was broad
agreement on steps which had to be
taken by the developing countries
themselves and by developed and
developing countries together to
stimulate the process of growth. There
was broad acceptance of many of the
approaches proposed in Philadelphia and
a strong desire to work with the United
States in these areas.
All participants recognized the fact
that economic prosperity in any country
or group of countries depends both on
individual countries' own efforts and on
close international economic cooperation.
We didn't waste time on unrealistic
rhetoric or unattainable objectives. We
dealt with pragmatic solutions to the
problems of growth; efforts to improve
food security and agricultural develop-
ment.
There was agreement with our pro-
posal that task forces should be sent to
developing countries to assist them in
finding new agricultural techniques and
transmitting to farmers techniques now
in existence. I have directed the Agency
for International Development to coor-
dinate these U.S. efforts and to report
to us on the progress made.
We also discussed ways to increase
trade and industrialization, and there
was strong support for working together
at the GATT ministerial. In addition,
ways were discussed in which the
developing nations can increase their
energy production, and monetary and
financial issues were reviewed.
I return home reminded again of the
importance of American leadership in
the world. At Cancun, we made a good
beginning toward more constructive and
mutually beneficial relations among
developed and developing nations and
toward a more prosperous world. We
have an enormous opportunity now to
advance mutually beneficial economic
relations with our developing country
partners.
I look forward to continuing our ef-
forts in the constructive spirit that
characterized the Cancun discussions.
By sustaining that spirit, the American
people, the people of the developing
nations, and the entire world will be
better.
■Text from White House press release.
2The summary was issued solely on behalf
of the two cochairmen and is not intended to
represent the views of other participants. It
is not a document of the U.S. Government. ■
mber1981
THE PRESIDENT
U.S. Program for
Arms Control
Peace and
Following is a speech by President
Reagan before the National Press Club in
Washington, D.C. on November 18,
1981.1
Back in April while in the hospital I had,
as you can readily understand, a lot of
time for reflection. And one day I decid-
ed to send a personal, handwritten letter
to Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev
reminding him that we had met about 10
years ago in San Clemente, California,
as he and President Nixon were con-
cluding a series of meetings that had
brought hope to all the world. Never had
peace and goodwill seemed closer at
hand. I'd like to read you a few para-
graphs from that letter.
Mr. President: When we met I asked if
you were aware that the hopes and aspira-
tions of millions of people throughout the
world were dependent on the decisions that
would be reached in those meetings. You
took my hand in both of yours and assured
me that you were aware of that and that you
were dedicated with all your heart, and soul,
and mind to fulfilling those hopes and
dreams.
I went on in my letter to say:
The people of the world still share that
hope. Indeed, the peoples of the world,
despite differences in racial and ethnic origin,
have very much in common. They want the
dignity of having some control over their in-
dividual lives — their destiny. They want to
work at the craft or trade of their own choos-
ing and to be fairly rewarded. They want to
raise their families in peace without harming
anyone or suffering harm themselves.
Government exists for their convenience, not
the other way around.
If they are incapable, as some would have
us believe, of self-government, then where
among them do we find any who are capable
of governing others? Is it possible that we
have permitted ideology, political and eco-
nomic philosophies, and governmental policies
to keep us from considering the very real,
everyday problems of our peoples? Will the
average Soviet family be better off or even
aware that the Soviet Union has imposed a
government of its own choice on the people
of Afghanistan? Is life better for the people
of Cuba because the Cuban military dictate
who shall govern the people of Angola?
It is often implied that such things have
been made necessary because of territorial
ambitions of the United States; that we have
imperialistic designs and thus constitute a
threat to your own security and that of the
newly emerging nations. There not only is no
evidence to support such a charge, there is
solid evidence that the United States, when it
could have dominated the world with no risk
10
to itself, made no effort whatsoever to do so.
When World War II ended, the United
States had the only undamaged industrial
power in the world. Our military might was
at its peak — and we alone had the ultimate
weapon, the nuclear weapon, with the un-
questioned ability to deliver it anywhere in
the world. If we had sought world domination
then, who could have opposed us?
But the United States followed a
different course — one unique in all the
history of mankind. We used our power and
wealth to rebuild the war-ravaged economies
of the world, including those nations who had
been our enemies. May I say there is ab-
solutely no substance to charges that the
United States is guilty of imperialism or at-
tempts to impose its will on other countries
by use of force.
I concluded my letter by saying:
Mr. President, should we not be con-
cerned with eliminating the obstacles which
prevent our people — those you and I repre-
sent— from achieving their most cherished
goals?
It's in the same spirit that I want to
speak today to this audience, and the
people of the world, about America's
program for peace and the coming
negotiations which begin November 30th
in Geneva, Switzerland. Specifically, I
want to present our program for pre-
serving peace in Europe and our wider
program for arms control.
Preserving Peace
Twice in my lifetime I have seen the
peoples of Europe plunged into the
tragedy of war. Twice in my lifetime
Europe has suffered destruction and
military occupation in wars that states-
men proved powerless to prevent,
soldiers unable to contain, and ordinary
citizens unable to escape. And twice in
my lifetime, young Americans have bled
their lives into the soil of those battle-
fields— not to enrich or enlarge our do-
main but to restore the peace and inde-
pendence of our friends and allies.
All of us who lived through those
troubled times share a common resolve
that they must never come again. And
most of us share a common appreciation
of the Atlantic alliance that has made a
peaceful, free, and prosperous Western
Europe in the postwar era possible.
But today a new generation is
emerging on both sides of the Atle
Its members were not present at t
creation of the North Atlantic allia
Many of them do not fully underst
its roots in defending freedom and
building a war-torn continent. Son-
young people question why we nee
weapons— particularly nuclear
weapons— to deter war and to assi
peaceful development. They fear tl
the accumulation of weapons itself
lead to conflagration. Some even p
pose unilateral disarmament.
I understand their concerns. Tl
questions deserve to be answered,
we have an obligation to answer th
questions on the basis of judgment
reason and experience. Our policies
resulted in the longest European p
in this century. Would not a rash d
ture from these policies, as some n
suggest, endanger that peace? Froi
founding, the Atlantic alliance has
served the peace through unity, de
rence, and dialogue.
First, we and our allies have s
united by the firm commitment tha
attack upon any one of us would bt
sidered an attack upon us all;
Second, we and our allies have
terred aggression by maintaining f(
strong enough to insure that any aj.
gressor would lose more from an ai'
than he could possibly gain; and
Third, we and our allies have e
gaged the Soviets in a dialogue abo
mutual restraint and arms limitatio
hoping to reduce the risk of war an
burden of armaments and to lower
barriers that divide East from Wesi
These three elements of our pol
have preserved the peace in Europe
more than a third of a century. The
preserve it for generations to come,
long as we pursue them with suffiek
will and vigor.
Today, I wish to reaffirm Ameri
commitment to the Atlantic alliance
our resolve to sustain the peace. An
from my conversations with allied
leaders, I know that they also remai
true to this tried and proven course.
NATO's policy of peace is based on
restraint and balance. No NATO
weapons, conventional or nuclear, w
Department of State Bull
The President
:
'er be used in Europe except in
sponse to attack. NATO's defense
ans have been responsible and re-
rained. The allies remain strong,
jited, and resolute. But the momentum
' the continuing Soviet military buildup
ireatens both the conventional and the
'i ldear balance. Consider the facts over
I e past decade:
The United States reduced the
ze of its armed forces and decreased
5 military spending. The Soviets steadi-
increased the number of men under
ms. They now number more than dou-
e those of the United States. Over the
.me period the Soviets expanded their
al military spending by about one-
ird.
The Soviet Union increased its in-
ntory of tanks to some 50,000 com-
ired to our 11,000. Historically a land-
iwer, they transformed their navy
om a coastal defense force to an open
<ean fleet, while the United States, a
apower with transoceanic alliances,
.t its fleet in half.
• During a period when NATO
■ployed no new intermediate-range
iclear missiles and actually withdrew
000 nuclear warheads, the Soviet
nion deployed more than 750 nuclear
arheads on the new SS-20 missiles
Dne.
Our response to this relentless build-
of Soviet military power has been
strained but firm. We have made deci-
3ns to strengthen all three legs of the
rategic triad— sea-, land-, and air-
sed. We have proposed a defense pro-
•am in the United States for the next 5
:ars which will remedy the neglect of
e past decade and restore the eroding
dance on which our security depends.
I would like to discuss more
ecifically the growing threat to
estern Europe which is posed by the
intinuing deployment of certain Soviet
termediate-range nuclear missiles. The
wiet Union has three different types of
ich missile systems— the SS-20, the
8-4, and the SS-5— all with a range
ipable of reaching virtually all of
restern Europe. There are other Soviet
eapons systems which also represent a
:ajor threat. The only answer to these
/stems is a comparable threat to Soviet
irgets. In other words, a deterrent pre-
;nting the use of these Soviet weapons
/ the counterthreat of a like response
jainst their own territory.
At present, however, there is no
juivalent deterrent to these Soviet in-
irmediate missiles. And the Soviets
mtinue to add one new SS-20 a week,
o counter this, the allies agreed in
Balance of Comparable US and Soviet
Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces
Delivery Vehicles
4,000
Soviet
—
3,000
2,000
Soviet
1,000
US
1975
1979, as part of a two-track decision, to
deploy as a deterrent land-based cruise
missiles and Pershing II missiles capable
of reaching targets in the Soviet Union.
These missiles are to be deployed in
several countries of Western Europe.
This relatively limited force in no
way serves as a substitute for the much
larger strategic umbrella spread over
our NATO allies. Rather, it provides a
vital link between conventional, shorter
range nuclear forces in Europe and in-
tercontinental forces in the United
States. Deployment of these systems
will demonstrate to the Soviet Union
that this link cannot be broken.
Deterring war depends on the
perceived ability of our forces to per-
form effectively. The more effective our
forces are, the less likely it is that we'll
have to use them. So, we and our allies
are proceeding to modernize NATO's
nuclear forces of intermediate range to
meet increased Soviet deployments of
nuclear systems threatening Western
Europe.
Arms Control Negotiations
Let me turn now to our hopes for arms
control negotiations. There is a tendency
to make this entire subject overly com-
plex. I want to be clear and concise. I
told you of the letter I wrote to Presi-
dent Brezhnev last April. Well, I've just
sent another message to the Soviet
leadership. It's a simple, straight-
forward, yet historic message: The
United States proposes the mutual
1981
reduction of conventional, intermediate-
range nuclear and strategic forces.
Specifically, I have proposed a four-point
agenda to achieve this objective in my
letter to President Brezhnev.
The first, and most important,
point concerns the Geneva negotia-
tions. As part of the 1979 two-track
decision, NATO made a commitment to
seek arms control negotiations with the
Soviet Union on intermediate-range
nuclear forces. The United States has
been preparing for these negotiations
through close consultation with our
NATO partners. We are now ready to
set forth our proposal. I have informed
President Brezhnev that when our dele-
gation travels to the negotiations on
intermediate-range land-based nuclear
missiles in Geneva on the 30th of this
month, my representatives will present
the following proposal: The United
States is prepared to cancel its deploy-
ment of Pershing II and ground-launch
cruise missiles if the Soviets will disman-
tle their SS-20, SS-4, and SS-5
missiles. This would be an historic step.
With Soviet agreement, we could
together substantially reduce the dread
threat of nuclear war which hangs over
the people of Europe. This, like the first
footstep on the moon, would be a giant
step for mankind.
We intend to negotiate in good faith
and go to Geneva willing to listen to and
consider the proposals of our Soviet
counterparts. But let me call to your at-
tention the background against which
our proposal is made. During the past 6
years, while the United States deployed
:ember1981
11
The President
Coverage of Europe From SS-20 Bases East of the Urals
no new intermediate-range missiles and
withdrew 1,000 nuclear warheads from
Europe, the Soviet Union deployed 750
warheads on mobile, accurate ballistic
missiles. They now have 1,100 warheads
on the SS-20, SS-4, and SS-5 missiles,
and the United States has no com-
parable missiles. Indeed, the United
States dismantled the last such missile
in Europe over 15 years ago.
As we look to the future of the
negotiations, it is also important to ad-
dress certain Soviet claims which, left
unrefuted, could become critical barriers
to real progress in arms control. The
Soviets assert that a balance of inter-
mediate-range nuclear forces already ex-
ists. That assertion is wrong. By any ob-
jective measure, as this chart indicates
[see page 4], the Soviet Union has an
overwhelming advantage, on the order
of six to one.
Soviet spokesmen have suggested
that moving their SS-20s beyond the
Ural Mountains will remove the threat
to Europe. As this map demonstrates,
the SS-20s, even if deployed behind the
Urals, will have a range that places
almost all of Western Europe, the great
cities, Rome, Athens, Paris, London,
Brussels, Amsterdam, Berlin, and so
many more; all of Scandinavia; all of the
Middle East; all of northern Africa — all
within range of these missiles, which in-
cidentally are mobile and can be moved
on shorter notice.
The second proposal I've made to
President Brezhnev concerns strategic
weapons. The United States proposes to
open negotiations on strategic arms as
soon as possible next year. I have in-
structed Secretary Haig to discuss the
timing of such meetings with Soviet
representatives.
Substance, however, is far more im-
portant than timing. As our proposal for
the Geneva talks this month illustrates,
we can make proposals for genuinely
serious reductions but only if we take
the time to prepare carefully. The
United States has been preparing
carefully for resumption of strategic
arms negotiations because we do not
want a repetition of past disappoint-
ments. We don't want an arms control
process that sends hopes soaring only to
end in dashed expectations.
I have informed President Brezhnev
that we will seek to negotiate substan-
tial reductions in nuclear arms which
would result in levels that are equal and
verifiable. Our approach to verification
will be to emphasize openness and
creativity— rather than the secrecy and
suspicion which have undermined
confidence in arms control in the past.
While we can hope to benefit from
work done over the past decade in
strategic arms negotiations, let us ag!
to do more than simply begin where
these previous efforts left off. We can
and should attempt major qualitative
and quantitative progress. Only such
progress can fulfill the hopes of our o
people and the rest of the world. And
us see how far we can go in achieving
truly substantial reductions in our
strategic arsenals. To symbolize this
fundamental change in direction, we \
call these negotiations START— Stral
gic Arms Reduction Talks.
The third proposal I have made
the Soviet Union is that we act to
achieve equality at lower levels of ci
ventional forces in Europe. The
defense needs of the Soviet Union har
ly call for maintaining more combat di
sions in East Germany today than wei
in the whole Allied invasion force that
landed in Normandy on D-day. The
Soviet Union could make no more con
vincing contribution to peace in
Europe — and in the world — than by
agreeing to reduce its conventional
forces significantly and constrain the
potential for sudden aggression.
Finally, I have pointed out to
President Brezhnev that to maintain
peace, we must reduce the risks of
surprise attack and the chance of wf
arising out of uncertainty or miscalc
lation. I am renewing our proposal foi
conference to develop effective measur
that would reduce these dangers. At t
current Madrid meeting of the Confer-
ence on Security and Cooperation in
Europe, we are laying the foundation
for a Western-proposed conference on
disarmament in Europe. This conferen
would discuss new measures to enhanc
stability and security in Europe. Agret
ment on this conference is within read
I urge the Soviet Union to join us and
many other nations who are ready to
launch this important enterprise.
All of these proposals are based on
the same fair-minded principles: sub-
stantial, militarily significant reduction
in forces; equal ceilings for similar typ<
of forces; and adequate provisions for
verification. My Administration, our
country, and I are committed to achiev
ing arms reduction agreements based c
these principles. Today, I have outlined
the kinds of bold, equitable proposals
which the world expects of us. But we
cannot reduce arms unilaterally. Succes
12
Department of State Bullet
The President
! Intermediate-Range Land-Based Miss
les
iet
us
Total
Warheads Number of Warheads
per Launchers on
Missile Deployed Launchers
Range
(km)
Total
Warheads
on
Launchers
Number of
Launchers
Deployed
Warheads
per
Missile Type
10 3 250 750
4,400
to
5,000
—
—
5 1 35 35
4,100
—
—
2,500
0 0
(464 planned) (116 launch-
ers, 4 missiles
per launcher
planned)
Ground-
launched
cruise missile
315
315
1,900
1,800
0 0 1
(108 planned) (108 planned)
Pershing II
600
1,100
0 0
(572 planned) (224 planned)
Total
inly come if the Soviet Union will
our commitment; if it will
j'nstrate that its often-repeated pro-
Ions of concern for peace will be
■hed by positive action.
Concept of Peace
•ervation of pdace in Europe and the
mit of arms reduction talks are of
amental importance. But we must
help to bring peace and security to
ins now torn by conflict, external in-
antion, and war.
The American concept of peace goes
beyond the absence of war. We
?ee a flowering of economic growth
individual liberty in a world at
:e. At the economic summit con-
nce in Cancun, I met with the
ers of 21 nations and sketched out
approach to global economic growth,
want to eliminate the barriers to
e and investment which hinder these
cal incentives to growth. And we're
king to develop new programs to
the poorest nations achieve self-
aining growth.
And terms like "peace" and "securi-
we have to say, have little meaning
for the oppressed and the destitute.
They also mean little to the individual
whose state has stripped him of human
freedom and dignity. Wherever there is
oppression, we must strive for the peace
and security of individuals as well as
states. We must recognize that progress
in the pursuit of liberty is a necessary
complement to military security. No-
where has this fundamental truth been
more boldly and clearly stated than in
the Helsinki accords of 1975. These ac-
cords have not yet been translated into
living reality.
Today, I have announced an agenda
that can help to achieve peace, security,
and freedom across the globe. In par-
ticular, I have made an important offer
to forego entirely deployment of new
American missiles in Europe if the
Soviet Union is prepared to respond on
an equal footing.
There is no reason why people in
any part of the world should have to live
in permanent fear of war or its specter.
I believe the time has come for all na-
tions to act in a responsible spirit that
doesn't threaten other states. I believe
the time is right to move forward on
arms control and the resolution of criti-
cal regional disputes at the conference
table. Nothing will have a higher priority
for me and for the American people
over the coming months and years.
Addressing the United Nations 20
years ago, another American President
described the goal we still pursue today.
He said, "If we all can persevere, if we
can . . . look beyond our own shores and
ambitions, then surely the age will dawn
in which the strong are just and the
weak secure and the peace preserved."
He didn't live to see that goal achieved.
I invite all nations to join with
America today in the quest for such a
world.
•White House press release.
amber 1981
13
The President
Cooperative Strategy for Global Growth
President Reagan's address befon the
World Affairs Council in Philadelphia
on October 15, 1981.1
I'm grateful for this opportunity to ap-
pear before your distinguished group and
to share with you our Administration's
views on an important upcoming event.
I'll be traveling next week [October
22-23] to Cancun, Mexico, to participate
in a summit that will bring together lead-
ers of two-thirds of the world's population
and the subject of our talks will be the
relationships among the developed and
the developing nations. And, specifically,
I hope we can work together to
strengthen the world economy and to
promote greater economic growth and
prosperity for all our peoples.
U.S. foreign policy proceeds from
two important premises: the need to re-
vitalize the U.S. and world economy as a
basis for the social and economic progress
of our own and other nations and the
need to provide adequate defenses to re-
main strong, safe in a precarious period
of world history. In this context, U.S. re-
lations with developing countries play a
critical role. These countries are impor-
tant partners in the world economy and
in the quest for world peace.
We understand and are sensitive to
the diversity of developing countries.
Each is unique in its blend of cultural,
historical, economic, and political charac-
teristics. But all aspire to build a brighter
future, and they can count on our strong
support. We will go to Cancun ready and
willing to listen and to learn. We will also
take with us sound and constructive ideas
designed to help spark a cooperative
strategy for global growth to benefit both
the developed and developing countries.
Such a strategy rests upon three solid
pillars.
First, an understanding of the real
meaning of development, based on our
own historical experience and that of
other successful countries;
Second, a demonstrated record of
achievement in promoting growth and
development throughout the world, both
through our bilateral economic relations
and through cooperation with our
partners in the specialized international
institutions such as the World Bank and
the International Monetary Fund (IMF);
and
Third, practical proposals for coop-
erative actions in trade, investment, en-
ergy, agriculture, and foreign assistance
that can contribute to a new era of pros-
perity and abundance exceeding anything
we may dream possible today.
Understanding Development
We very much want a positive develop-
ment dialogue, but sometimes this
dialogue becomes oversimplified and un-
productive. For example, some people
equate development with commerce,
which they unfairly characterize as sim-
ple lust for material wealth. Others mis-
take compassion for development and
claim massive transfers of wealth some-
how miraculously will produce new well-
being. And still others confuse develop-
ment with collectivism, seeing it as a plan
to fulfill social, religious, or national
goals, no matter what the cost to individ-
uals or historical traditions.
All of these definitions miss the real
essence of development. In its most fun-
damental sense, it has to do with the
meaning, aspirations, and worth of every
individual. In its ultimate form, develop-
ment is human fulfillment — an ability by
all men and women to realize freely their
full potential to go as far as their God-
given talents will take them.
We Americans can speak from expe-
rience on this subject. When the original
. . . development de-
pends upon economic
freedom. A mere handful
of industrialized coun-
tries that have histori-
cally coupled personal
initiative with economic
reward now produce
more than one-half the
wealth of the world.
settlers arrived here, they faced a wil-
derness where poverty was their daily
lot, danger and starvation their close
companions. But through all the dangers,
disappointments, and setbacks, they kept
their faith. They never stopped believing
Pf
%
■
I
li-
ft
b
II
that with the freedom to try and try
again, they could make tomorrow a
better day.
In 1630, John Winthrop predict*
that we would be a city upon a hill w
the eyes of all people upon us. By 18-
Alexis de Tocqueville was calling
America "a land of wonders, in whic
every change seems an improvemen
and what man has not yet done was
ply what he hadn't yet attempted to
And in 1937, Walter Lippmann could
draw the lesson that America, for th
first time in history, gave men "a wa
producing wealth in which the good 1
tune of others multiplied their own."
Free people build free markets t
ignite dynamic development for ever
one; and that's the key, but that's not
Something else helped us create the?
unparalleled opportunities for growtl
personal fulfillment. A strong sense <
cooperation; free association among i
dividuals, rooted in institutions of fai
church, school, press, and voluntary
groups of eveiy kind. Government to
played an important role. It helped e
cate slavery and other forms of discri
nation. It opened up the frontier thrc
actions like the Homestead Act and r
electrification. And it helped provide
sense of security for those who, throi
no fault of their own, could not suppc
themselves.
Government and private enterpi
complement each other. They have, t
can, and they must continue to coexie
and cooperate. But we must always a
Is government working to liberate an
empower the individual? Is it creatinj
centives for people to produce, save,
vest, and profit from legitimate risks
honest toil? Is it encouraging all of us
reach for the stars? Or does it seek to
compel, command, and coerce people ;
submission and dependence?
Ask these questions, because no
matter where you look today, you will
that development depends upon econo
freedom. A mere handful of industrial,
countries that have historically couple
personal initiative with economic rewa
now produce more than one-half the
wealth of the world.
The developing countries now gro
ing the fastest in Asia, Africa, and Lat
America are the very ones providing
more economic freedom for their peopl
freedom to choose, to own property, to
work at a job of their choice, and to in^
vest in a dream for the future.
14
Department of State Bulle
The President
Perhaps the best proof that devel-
ent and economic freedom go hand-
md can be found in a country which
es freedom to its people — the Soviet
in. For the record, the Soviets will
ittend the conference at Cancun.
: simply wash their hands of any re-
isibility. insisting all the economic
lems of the world result from
talism and all the solutions lie with
ilism.
The real reason they're not coming is
have nothing to offer. In fact, we
! just one question for them: Who's
ing whom? I can hardly remember a
when Soviet harvests have not been
led on "bad weather." And I've seen a
f harvest seasons, as the press keeps
inding me [laughter, applause],
y've had quite a long losing streak for
vernment which still insists the tides
story are running in its favor.
The Soviets, of course, can rely on
lers from America and other nations
?ep their people fed. But ironically
• have a reliable source of nourish-
t right in their own country — the 3%
1 cultivated land that farmers in the
et Union are allowed to farm on their
and market. Those who farm that 3%
nd produce nearly 30% of the meat,
, and vegetables in Russia; 33% of
eggs; and 61% of the potatoes.
Now, that's why this isn't a question
ast versus West, of the United States
.us the Soviet Union. It's a question
eedom versus compulsion, of what
ks versus what doesn't work, of sense
<us nonsense. And that's why we say:
5t the people, trust their intelligence,
trust their faith, because putting
)le first is the secret of economic sue-
everywhere in the world.
. and International Records of
ievement
iv I want to talk about the second part
ur message at Cancun: Our record —
that of the international economic
,em itself — is helping developing
ltries generate new growth and
;perity.
U.S. Development Record. Here
in it's time to speak out with candor,
isten to some shrill voices, you'd
lk our policies were as stingy as your
tadelphia Eagles' defense [laughter],
■re is a propaganda campaign in wide
ulation that would have the world be-
e that capitalist United States is the
se of world hunger and poverty.
And yet each year, the United States
vides more food assistance to develop-
nations than all the other nations
:ember1981
combined. Last year, we extended almost
twice as much official development as-
sistance as any other nation. The spirit of
voluntary giving is a wonderful tradition
that flows like a deep, mighty river
through the history of our nation. When
Americans see people in other lands suf-
fering in poverty and starvation, they
don't wait for government to tell them
what to do. They sit down and give and
get involved; they save lives. And that's
one reason we know America is such a
special country.
All that is just one side of the coin.
The other, only rarely acknowledged, is
the enormous contribution we make
There is a propaganda
campaign . . . that
would have the world
believe that capitalist
United States is the
cause of world hunger
and poverty . . . yet each
year, the United States
provides more food
assistance to developing
nations than all the
other nations combined.
through the open, growing markets of our
own country. The United States buys ap-
proximately one-half of all the manufac-
tured goods that non-OPEC developing
countries export to the industrialized
world, even though our market is only
one-third of the size of the total industri-
alized world. Last year, these same de-
veloping countries earned twice as much
from exports to the United States than
they received in aid from all countries
combined. And, in the last 2 years alone,
they earned more from exports to the
United States than the entire developing
world has received from the World Bank
in the last 36 years.
Even as we work to strengthen the
World Bank and other international insti-
tutions, let us recognize then the enor-
mous contribution of American trade to
development. The barriers to trade in our
markets are among the lowest in the
world. The United States maintains few-
restrictions on our customs procedures
and they are very predictable. In 1980,
51% of our imports from developing coun-
tries entered this country duty free.
American capital markets also are more
accessible to the developing countries
than capital markets anywhere else in the
world.
From all this two conclusions should
be clear: Far from lagging behind and re-
fusing to do our part, the United States
is leading the way in helping to better the
lives of citizens in developing countries.
And a major way that we can do that job
best, the way we can provide the most
opportunity for even the poorest of na-
tions, is to follow through with our own
economic recovery program to insure
strong, sustained noninflationary growth.
That's just what we're determined to do.
Every 1% reduction in our interest
rates due to lower inflation improves the
balance of payments of developing coun-
tries by $1 billion. By getting our own
economic house in order, we win, they
win, we all win.
International Achievements. Now-
just as there is need for a clearer focus on
the real meaning of development and our
own development record, there's a similar
need to be clear about the international
economic system. Some argue that the
system has failed; others that it's unrep-
resentative and unfair; still others say it
is static and unchanging. And then a few
insist that it's so sound it needs no im-
provement. Well, we need a better
understanding than that.
As I recalled recently before the an-
nual meeting of the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund, the post-
war international economic system was
created on the belief that the key to na-
tional development and human progress
is individual freedom — both political and
economic. This system provided only
generalized rules in order to maintain
maximum flexibility and opportunity for
individual enterprise and an open inter-
national trading and financial system.
The General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT), the World Bank, the
International Monetary Fund represent
free associations of independent countries
which accept both the freedom and disci-
pline of a competitive economic system.
Let's look at the record of international
growth and development under their
auspices.
• From 1950 to 1980, gross national
product per capita in 60 middle-income
countries increased twice as fast as in the
industrial countries when real purchasing
power is taken into account.
• In 1951 to 1979, industry and man-
ufacturing in developing countries also
expanded at a faster rate than their coun-
terparts in the industrial countries.
• Since 1960, export volume for the
developing countries, excluding OPEC,
15
The President
grew between 6% and 7% a year. Growth
was particularly strong in manufactured
exports, and even some low-income oil
importers participated in this trend.
• And concessional assistance grew
by 50% in real terms during the 1970s.
By any standard, this is a remark-
able record. It's not a basis for compla-
cency, however. We recognize that despite
the progress many developing nations
continue to struggle with poverty and are
seriously affected by disruption in the in-
ternational economy. But while much
progress remains to be made, we can take
pride in what has been accomplished —
pride in the efforts of those countries that
did most to utilize effectively the oppor-
tunities of the system and pride in the
system itself for being sufficiently flexible
to insure that the benefits of international
commerce flow increasingly to all coun-
tries.
Progress is also evident in the evolu-
tion of the international institutions
themselves. Today approximately two-
thirds of the members of GATT are de-
veloping countries, whereas only one-half
were developing countries when it was
created. Also, the resources of both the
World Bank and the IMF have increased
dramatically, as has the participation of
developing country members.
Certainly the record of the interna-
tional system is not perfect, but people
flirt with fantasy when they suggest that
it's a failure and unfair. We know that
much must still be done to help low-
income countries develop domestic mar-
kets, strengthen their exports. But the
way to do that is not to weaken the sys-
tem that has served us so well but to con-
tinue working together to make it better.
Program for Action
Now, this brings me to the third and final
part of our message in Cancun — a pro-
gram for action. This summit offers the
leadership of the world an opportunity to
chart a strategic course for a new era of
international economic growth and devel-
opment. And to do this, all countries, de-
veloped and developing alike, demon-
strate the political will to address the real
issues, confront the obstacles, and seize
the opportunities for development wher-
ever they exist. To cite that old proverb:
"Give a hungry man a fish and he'll be
hungry tomorrow; teach him how to fish,
and he'll never be hungry again."
The principles that guide our inter-
national policies can lead to the coopera-
tive strategy for global growth that we
seek. The experience of our own country
and others confirms the importance of
strategic principles:
First, stimulating international trade
by opening up markets, both within in-
dividual countries and between countries;
Second, tailoring particular devel-
opment strategies to the specific needs
and potential of individual countries and
regions;
Third, guiding assistance toward the
development of self-sustaining productive
capacities, particularly in food and en-
ergy;
Fourth, improving in many of the
countries the climate for private invest-
ment and the transfer of technology that
comes with such investment; and
Fifth, creating a political atmosphere
in which practical solutions can move
forward — rather than founder on a reef of
misguided policies that restrain and inter-
fere with the international marketplace
or foster inflation.
Developing countries cannot be
lumped together under the title as if their
problems were identical. They're diverse
with distinct resource endowments, cul-
tures, languages, and national traditions.
The international system is comprised of
independent, sovereign nations, whose
separate existence testifies to their
unique qualities and aspirations.
What we will seek to do at Cancun,
and elsewhere in subsequent meetings, is
examine cooperatively the roadblocks
which developing countries' policies pose
to development, and how they can best
be removed. For example, is there an im-
balance between public and private sec-
tor activities? Are high tax rates
smothering incentives and precluding
growth in personal savings and invest-
ment capital?
And then we must examine the ob-
stacles which developed countries put in
the way of development, and how they, in
turn, can best be removed. For example,
are industrial countries maintaining open
markets for the products of developing
countries? Do they permit unrestricted
access by developing countries to their
own capital markets?
And finally, we must decide how de-
veloped and developing countries to-
gether can realize their potential and im-
prove the world economy to promote a
higher level of growth and development.
Stimulating Trade. Our program of
action includes specific, practical steps
that implement the principles I've out-
lined. First, stimulating international
trade by opening up markets is absolutely
essential. Non-OPEC developing nations',
by selling their products in American
markets, earned $63 billion just last year.
This is more than twice the amount of
total development assistance provided to
all developing countries in that same
year. It's time for all of us to live up
our principles by concrete actions an'|ti
open markets and liberalized trade.
The most meaningful action that
could take to promote trade with dev
ing nations in the early 1980s is to
strengthen the GATT. It is through a
shared, reciprocal effort within GATT
that further liberalization of industri;
nations' trade regimes is most likely I
achieved. This will benefit developin}
countries more than any other single
step.
The United States will work for
successful GATT ministerial meeting
1982. We'll launch an extensive round
consultations with all countries, inclu
developing countries, to prepare for t
GATT meeting. We'll join with develo
countries in working for an effective
safeguards code that reflects our mut
concerns and interests. In addition, w
continue to support the generalized s;
tern of preferences, and we'll take the
lead in urging other developing count
to match us in expanding developing i
tions' access to markets.
Trade's contribution to developm
can be magnified by aligning trade op
tunities more closely with private in-
vestment, development assistance,
technology sharing. At Cancun, we w
make it clear that we're ready to coop
ate with other nations in putting in pi
this kind of integrated, complementar
effort.
Tailoring Development Program
to Specific Needs. Actually, we're al-
ready doing so, which brings me to th
second part of our program — tailoring
particular development strategies to t
specific needs and potential of individi
countries and regions. In our own hei
sphere, the United States has joined t
gether with Mexico, Venezuela, and
Canada to begin developing flexible,
imaginative, and cooperative program,
linking trade, investment, finance, for-
eign assistance, and private sector ac-
tivities to help the nations in the Cant
bean and to help them help themselves
We met initially in Nassau in July.
Consulting then took place with the Ct
tral American countries and Panama it
Costa Rica, and with the Caribbean co
tries in Santo Domingo. By year end,
expect to complete consultation and m<
forward with efforts that are tailored h
specific situations in individual countrii
Guiding Assistance Tbward Self-
Sustaining Productive Activities. Thi:
guiding our assistance toward the deve
opment of self-sustaining productive ac
tivities — particularly in food and energ
16
Department of State Bullet
The President
easing food production in developing
ltries is critically important — for
e, literally, it's a matter of life or
h. It's also an indispensable basis for
all development. The United States
always made food and agriculture an
ortant emphasis of its economic as-
ince programs. We have provided
sive amounts of food to fight starva-
, but we have also undertaken suc-
ful agricultural research, welcomed
isands of foreign students for instruc-
and training at our finest insti-
Dns, and helped make discoveries of
high-yielding varieties of the Green
olution available throughout the
Id.
Looking to the future, our emphasis
be on the importance of market-
toted policies. We believe this ap-
ch will create rising agricultural
luctivity, self-sustaining capacity for
arch and innovation, and stimulation
ib-creating entrepreneurship in rural
s. Specifically, we've encouraged
;ies which reduce or eliminate sub-
s to food consumers and provide
niate and stable price incentives to
r agricultural sectors to increase
luction. We'll emphasize education
innovative joint research and devel-
ent activities throughout the United
.es and developing countries' insti-
3ns. We will also encourage rural
lit, improved storage and distribution
ities, and roads to facilitate market-
Now that's a lot. But we need to do
e.
The focus will be on raising the pro-
livity of the small farmer, building the
icity to pursue agricultural research,
stimulating productive enterprises
, generate employment and purehas-
power. We will emphasize new
hods of plant improvement to develop
>s that tolerate adverse soils and
latic conditions, insects, and diseases;
■arch to increase the efficiency of
ig irrigation water; systems for the
Auction of several crops per year in
humid tropics; and methods of human
animal disease control to remove such
ous problems as the tsetse fly in Af-
which bars agricultural production in
t areas of potentially productive land.
Addressing the energy problems of
•eloping countries is also vital to their
tained economic growth. Their net oil
in 1980 was $46 billion, up from only
oillion in 1973. This puts tremendous
ssure on their balance of payments
1 threatens development.
The United States will emphasize
ding for energy-related activities in
years ahead, especially for private ef-
ts and the mobilization of developing
;ember1981
countries' resources. Our energy bilateral
aid program must stress technical assist-
ance rather than resource transfers. We
will support energy lending by multilat-
eral institutions provided the projects are
economically viable and they expand
developing-country energy production
through greater private investment.
We will also support selected ele-
ments of the programs of action of the
U.N. Conference on New and Renewable
Sources of Energy. They include inten-
sified energy training programs for tech-
nicians from developing countries and ef-
forts to help developing countries assess
and more efficiently utilize their re-
sources.
Improving Climate for Private In-
vestment. Fourth, improving the climate
for private capital flows, particularly pri-
vate investment. Investment is the life-
blood of development. Private capital
flows, commercial lending, and private
investment can account for almost 70% of
total financial flows to developing coun-
tries. It's impractical, not to mention
foolish, to attack these flows for ideologi-
cal reasons.
• We call upon all our partners in fi-
nance and development, business, banks,
and developing countries to accelerate
their cooperative efforts.
• We seek to increase cofinancing
and other private financing with the mul-
tilateral development banks. We want to
enhance the international activities which
foster private sector debt and equity
financing of investments in the develop-
ing countries. Its program is increasing in
both size and diversity and the bulk of In-
ternational Finance Corporation (IFC)
projects are privately financed in the de-
veloping countries from domestic and ex-
ternal sources.
• We will explore the development
of further safeguards for multilateral
investment and ways to build upon suc-
cessful bilateral experiences with these
countries. We believe it is important to
identify impediments to investment and
trade such as conditions of political insta-
bility and the threat of expropriation.
Working in concert with our trading
partners, we'll seek to remove these im-
pediments.
• We will attempt to promote a gen-
eral agreement of investment allowing
countries to harmonize investment
policies and to negotiate mutually benefi-
cial improvements in the investment cli-
mate.
• Finally, we'll make an effort to
identify developed and developing coun-
try tax measures which might increase
market-oriented investment from both
external domestic sources and in the de
veloping countries.
Promoting International Coopera-
tion. Fifth, and finally, let me turn to the
question of how we work together. To a
remarkable degree, many nations in the
world have now entered into an economic
dialogue. The choice before us is how to
organize and conduct it. Do we persist in
contentious rhetoric, or do we undertake
practical tasks in a spirit of cooperation
and mutual political will? I think our
country has signaled the answer to that
question.
We go to Cancun with a record of
success and contributions second to none
— determined to build on our past, ready
to offer our hand in friendship as a part-
ner in prosperity. At Cancun we will
promote a revolutionary idea born more
than 200 years ago, carried to our shores
in the hearts of millions of immigrants
and refugees, and defended by all who
risked their lives so that you and I and
our children could still believe in a
brighter tomorrow. It's called freedom,
and it works. It's still the most exciting,
progressive, and successful idea the
world has ever known.
Conclusion
In closing, I want to tell you about some-
thing a friend of yours and mine said in a
speech in Washington not too long ago.
Being a man of vision, wdth a great admi-
ration for America, he explained that he
had come on a mission from his native
land — a mission to secure economic prog-
ress for his people. And told his audience:
"I am dreaming. Really I am dreaming of
a drive like the drive of your grand-
fathers, the drive to the West. Water we
have, land we have, climate we have,
farming we have. But we need technol-
ogy, we need know-how, new ways of ir-
rigation, new ways of agriculture. All
this one can find here in America." And
then he pleaded: "Come and be my
partners, be pioneers like your grand-
fathers who opened the West and built in
200 years the most powerful countiy, the
richest country, the great United States
of America."
Those words were spoken at the
U.S. Chamber of Commerce in March
1979 by Anwar Sadat. This courageous
man of peace and hope and love has now
been taken from us. But his mission, his
dream remain. As we proceed to Cancun,
can we not join together so that the good
he wanted for all people of the world
would finally become theirs and his to
share?
'Text from Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents of Oct. 19, 1981.
17
The President
Bicentennial
Observance of
the Battle
of Yorktown
O
ii the afternoon of October 19, 1781,
Lord Cornwallis' British army marched
down a Virginia country road to the
surrender ground where ranks of vic-
torious American and French troops
waited. Unable to face the humiliation of
defeat, the British commander sent his
deputy. General Charles O'Hara, in his
place. O'Hara attempted to lessen the
blow by surrendering his sword to
French General Rochambeau. The
Frenchman shook his head, indicating
that General Washington was com-
mander in chief. The A merican com-
m.ander, no doubt disappointed by Corn-
wallis' absence, also refused to accept the
surrender. Military protocol would
prevail, and the British officer was
directed to take his orders from. General
Benjamin Lincoln, Washington's deputy.
This Yorktown victory effectively
ended America's war for independence,
although the final peace treaty between
the United States and Britain was not
signed until September 3, 1 783.
To commemorate the 200th anniver-
sary of this victory, President Reagan,
French President Francois Mitterrand,
and the Rt. Honorable Lord Hailshinn
(Lord Chancellor of the United Kingdom,)
attended ceremonies recreating this sur-
render at the Yorktown battlefield in
Virginia on October 19, 1981. Following
are President Reagan's remarks made on
that occasion.1
I open with something of an announce-
ment before my remarks. Since today is
a day to celebrate freedom, I feel it only
appropriate that I exercise one of the
more pleasant powers of the Presidency.
After consultation with Governor Dalton
[John Dalton of Virginia] and with his
approval, by the power vested in me as
President of the United States, I hereby
grant amnesty to the corps of cadets of
the Virginia Military Institute under the
terms and conditions to be specified by
the superintendent. [Laughter]
And now, this field, this ceremony,
and this day hold a special meaning for
people the world over, whether free in
their lives or only in their dreams. Not
long after the battle of Yorktown,
Lafayette wrote home to France.
"Here," he said, "humanity has won itu
battle, liberty now has a country."
It was an extraordinary moment it
history. The Continental Army, as
you've been told, had marched more
than 400 miles from the Hudson River
in New York to the tidewaters of
Virginia. They surprised and stranded
Lord Cornwallis on the tip of this pen
sula. When Admiral de Grasse and his
French fleet blockaded the Chesapeake
the trap was sprung. There could be n<
rescue by land or by sea.
18
Department of State Bulleti
The President
Nearly 8,000 British soldiers had
pt from Charleston to Richmond to
spot between the York and the
es Rivers, with far more victories
1 defeats. But as they were encircled
besieged by the Continentals, as
• withstood day after day of grueling
bardment, they must have known in
r hearts they were fighting for a
,e they could not win.
Their enemies were a band of col-
ts with bandaged feet and muskets
couldn't be counted on to fire, but
British were thousands of miles
i home and the Americans were
ting where they lived. Those rebels
not have had fancy uniforms or
l adequate resources, but they had a
lion for liberty burning in their
-ts.
In a masterly execution of a text-
i siege, General Washington and his
) bag army defeated the finest
ps King George could field.
The morning of the surrender must
i been very much like this one today,
first real chill of autumn was in the
The trees were turning brilliant with
hues of red and gold and brown. The
was bright and clear. Quiet had
lly returned to this lovely coun-
ide. How strange the silence must
? seemed after the thundering vio-
e of war.
And then the silence was broken by
ulfled beat of British drums, covered
i black handkerchiefs, as the Red-
s marched to surrender. The
santry was spectacular. The French
leir spotless white uniforms lined
side of the road. The ragged Con-
ntals were brown and dreary on the
;r side. But the journals of those who
e present mention that the Ameri-
5 stood every bit as straight and
illy as proud as any army could.
y had, on that day, a military bear-
that was not to be outdone by their
,rades in white and blue nor by King
rge's men in their brilliant red.
As the British marched between the
:d armies to the field of surrender,
•s streamed down many of their
;s. Their musicians played a tune
ular in England at that time, yes,
e World Turned Upside Down." And
t's just what the colonists had done.
French frigate De Grasse, named in
or of the French Admiral. On October
President Regan attended a luncheon
ted bv President Mitterrand on board
battleship.
ember 1981
19
The President
"One cannot help but note the
contrasts. . . the French are immaculate
in crisp, white uniforms, fleur-de-lis-
emblazoned standards. . . the Americans
wear clothing reduced to tattered
rags. . . yet there is nothing shabby in
their bearing. . . the humiliated redcoats
and their German mercenaries, in brand
new uniforms. . . slowly move down the
road between their conquerors, their
regimental colors cased."
Jan K. Herman
State Magazine
October 1981
But those Americans were not pro-
fessional soldiers at all. They had fought
for freedom from Quebec to Saratoga,
from Camden and Cowpens to German-
town, Valley Forge, and Mon-
mouth— towns and countrysides once so
anonymous that King George com-
plained he could neither pronounce them
nor find them on the map.
By Yorktown, they were veterans,
but they were still not soldiers. They
were farmers, backwoodsmen, trades-
men, clerks, and laborers — common men
from all walks of life, anxious to return
to their families and the building of a
nation. On that day in 1781 a philosophy
found a people, and the world would
never be the same.
We who traveled here today — and
I'm told we number more than 60,000 —
did not come just to admire the
strategies, battlements, and trenches of
a siege. We did not come to idealize
human suffering.
The wounds of this battle have long
since healed. Our nations have matured,
and bonds of friendship now exist be-
tween one-time enemies. The same has
been true of other wars since, which
makes you wonder if after all the
hatred, all the pain, and all the sacrifice,
we find ourselves able to be friends and
allies, why couldn't we find ourselves
able to be friends without first going to
war?
We have come to this field to
celebrate the triumph of an idea — that
freedom will eventually triumph over
tyranny. It is and always will be a warn-
ing to those who would usurp the rights
of others: Time will find them beaten.
The beacon of freedom shines here for
all who will see, inspiring free men and
%
captives alike, and no wall, no curtail
nor totalitarian state can shut it out.
The commemoration of this battl
marks the end of the revolution and 1
beginning of a new world era. The
promise made on July 4th was kept o
October 19th. The dream described ir
that Pennsylvania hall was fulfilled oi
this Virginia field. Through courage,
support of our allies, and by the
gracious hand of God, a revolution w;
won, -a people were set free, and the
world witnessed the most exciting
adventure in the history of nations: tl
beginning of the United States of
America.
But we didn't win this battle or tH
war by ourselves. From your country.
Mr. President [President Mitterrand],
came men and ships and goods. Genei
Rochambeau and Lafayette and Ad-
mirals de Grasse and de Barras were
among those without whose help this
battle and this war could never have
been won. France was first to our sid
first to recognize our independence, a
steadfast in friendship ever since. We
are bonded in spirit and, in fact, by
freedom. "Entre vous, entre nous, a la
vie, a la mort," Rochambeau said — be-
tween you, between us, through life, c
death.
And others came to our aid — Pole
Spaniards, Scots, Canadians, Swedes,
Germans, Dutch, Irish, and still more.
Our Revolution was won by and fi
all who cherish the timeless and unive
sal rights of man. This battle was a vi
dication of ideas that had been formin '
for centuries in the Western mind.
From the Mediterranean had conm
the philosophies of Greece and the law
of Rome. England contributed represer
■
20
Department of State Bullet!
The President
e government, and the French and
Poles shared their dreams of equal-
and liberty. On our own frontier, we
•ned dependence on family and
hbors, and in our Revolution free
i were taught reliance on other free
i.
We of the West have lived the cen-
truths, the values around which we
/ must rally — human dignity, in-
dual rights, and representative
locracy. Our nations share the foun-
ion of common law, separation of
/ers, and limited government. We
st unite behind our own common
se of freedom.
There are those in the world today,
;here always have been, who recog-
i human rights as only selective
ors to be doled out by the state. They
ach revolution against tyranny, but
y intend to replace it with the ty-
ny of totalitarianism,
i Once again, today, thousands of free
II and women have gathered on this
Itlefield in testimony to their beliefs.
I the struggle that took place here re-
tnd us all: The freedom we enjoy today
t not always existed and carries no
grantees. In our search for an ever-
l ,ing peace, let all of us resolve to re-
| in so sure of our strength that the
[ ;ory for mankind we won here is
ii er threatened.
Will we meet the challenge, will we
b st the challenge Joseph Warren put
i th to Americans 200 years ago? Will
I act worthy of ourselves? Each
I leration before us has struggled and
ii rificed for freedom. Can we do any
til
', The men and boys who fought on
1 5 field somehow understood that
[ 'ernment must be close to people and
> ponsive to them; that if all men are
I e to prosper, all will benefit.
Today, in our country, those con-
its are threatened by government's
ated size and the distortion of its true
ictions. Our people are struggling
ier a punishing tax burden many
les heavier than that which ignited
• first rebellion. Regulations that in-
lit our growth and prosperity would
incomprehensible to the colonists who
rolted because of the Stamp Act.
Our Founding Fathers devised a
item of government unique in all the
irld — a federation of sovereign States,
th as much law and decisionmaking
thority as possible kept at the local
level. This concept of federalism has
been the secret of America's success and
will be a priority again as we restore the
balance between the Federal, State, and
local levels that was intended in the
Constitution.
But of equal concern to me is the
uncertainty some seem to have about
the need for a strong American defense.
Now, that is a proper task for the
national government. Military inferiority
does not avoid a conflict, it only invites
one and then insures defeat. We have
been trusted with freedom. We have
been trusted with freedom and must in-
sure it for our children and for their
children. We're rebuilding our defenses
so that our sons and daughters never
need to be sent to war.
Where are the voices of courage and
vision that inspired us in the past? Are
we ever to hear those voices again? Yes.
Thomas Paine, a voice of patriotism,
said, "Those who expect to reap the
blessings of freedom must, . . . , undergo
the fatigue of supporting it." We always
have, and we always will. That's just
part of being an American.
Our Declaration of Independence has
been copied by emerging nations around
the globe, its themes adopted in places
many of us have never heard of. Here in
this land, for the first time, it was de-
cided that man is born with certain God-
given rights. We, the people, declared
that government is created by the
people for their own convenience.
Government has no power except those
voluntarily granted to it by we, the
people.
There have been revolutions before
and since ours, revolutions that simply
exchanged one set of rulers for another.
Ours was a philosophical revolution that
changed the very concept of govern-
ment.
John Adams wrote home from Phila-
delphia shortly before signing the
Declaration of Independence, and he
said, "I am well aware of the Toil and
Blood and Treasure, that it will cost Us
to maintain this Declaration, and sup-
port and defend these States. Yet
through all the Gloom, I can see the
Rays of ravishing Light and Glory. I can
see that the End is more than worth all
the Means — and that Posterity will
triumph — ".
It is that vision we recall today. We
have economic problems at home, and
we live in a troubled and violent world.
But there is a moral fiber running
President Reagan and President
Mitterrand
through our people that makes us more
than strong enough to face the tests
ahead. We can look at our past with
pride, and our future can be whatever
we make it. We can remember that say-
ing Thomas Paine said, "We have it
within our power to begin the world
over again." We only have to act worthy
of ourselves.
And as has been said already today,
God bless America.
■Text from Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents of Oct. 26, 1981,
which also carries remarks by Presidents
Reagan and Mitterrand at a luncheon hosted
by the latter on hoard the battleship Dc
Grasse on Oct. 18, and remarks and dinner
toasts by both Presidents and Lord Hailsham
at a dinner hosted by Virginia Gov. John
Dalton at Williamsburg that evening. ■
:ember1981
21
THE SECRETARY
Arms Control and Strategic
Nuclear Forces
Secretary Haig's statement before the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee on
November i, 1981.1
It is a pleasure to appear before you
today to discuss the foreign policy and
arms control implications of the Presi-
dent's strategic force modernization pro-
gram. Media attention and commentary
have tended to focus on the more tech-
nical aspects of the individual weapon
systems rather than on the implications
of the overall program for our foreign
policy. I, therefore, welcome the oppor-
tunity to explore the relationship be-
tween strategic nuclear forces and our
foreign policy and arms control objec-
tives.
I am sure that the committee appre-
ciates the historical significance of the
President's decisions — decisions which
will shape our strategic force policy and
programs from now until the 21st cen-
tury. These decisions followed what
probably was the most extensive review
ever undertaken of our strategic pos-
ture— the balance of nuclear forces be-
tween the United States and the Soviet
Union and the range of possible pro-
gram alternatives.
It is a tribute to [Defense Secretary]
Cap Weinberger's skill and expertise
that he has been able to sift through the
computer analyses, opinions, judgments,
hopes, and biases to develop for the
National Security Council and the Presi-
dent a comprehensive and coherent plan
for modernizing our strategic forces.
I, along with the other members of
the National Security Council, actively
participated throughout the review proc-
ess, which included a series of meetings
with the President. I am persuaded that
the resulting plan for strategic force
modernization is the best practical pro-
gram that can be achieved and is an
essential ingredient for accomplishing
our foreign policy and arms control
objectives. It has my full support.
Let me begin by taking a moment to
review the changes in the strategic
nuclear equation which have occurred
over the past generation. From the end
of World War II until the 1970s, U.S.
defense and foreign policy were under-
pinned by the reality of U.S. nuclear
superiority. Indeed, it probably would
not be too much to say that we took
nuclear superiority for granted and were
not fully conscious of the ways in which
it shaped our thinking and our strategy.
The strategic environment of the
1980s is quite different. It is one thing
to deter the use of a few nuclear
weapons by an adversary who is not
nearly as strong as we. It is quite
another to deter an opponent whose
strategic nuclear capabilities are at least
the equal of ours.
We are just beginning to come to
terms with the implications of this new
strategic environment. Inevitably, the
process includes some false starts and
mistaken ideas. For example, some will
say that we are locked in a "nuclear
stalemate" with the Soviet Union and
that we must concentrate on conven-
tional force improvements even at the
expense of strategic force moderniza-
tion.
I am afraid, however, that we do not
have the luxury of easy choices. We may
once have looked to our advantages in
nuclear forces to offset Soviet conven-
tional capabilities, but in the strategic
environment of the 1980s we have no
alternative but to pursue a comprehen-
sive and balanced program which
strengthens our conventional capabilities
and, at the same time, modernizes our
nuclear forces.
Role of Strategic Forces
I know that this committee appreciates
the interdependence of foreign and
defense policy. In today's environment,
foreign policy and defense policy cannot
be treated as separate issues. If, in the
past, we could sometimes afford the illu-
sion that defense policy and foreign
policy were unrelated — that military
power was applicable only after diplo-
macy had failed — we can no longer.
The Soviets understand this inter-
relationship and use it to their advan-
tage. They learned their lesson from the
setback they suffered in the Cuban
missile crisis and have built rapidly and
relentlessly to become a global military
power. They now have the capability—
and have increasingly demonstrated the
willingness— to project power and in-
tervene in the affairs of other nations,
either directly or through surrogates.
: -
(I
«
jsti
&
<tt>
i
Pi
I
li
I
i]
-
As massive as the growth in
Moscow's conventional forces has bee
however, it should not obscure the ex
pansion of their strategic nuclear fore
which likewise support Soviet coercioi
and intimidation. One of the most pro
found changes in the international
environment over the past 15 years h
been the growth in the number and
quality of Soviet strategic nuclear
weapons. There is no doubt they are
now our equal in strategic forces and
are superior in some respects. Throug
out, the Soviets have demonstrated th
appreciation of the fact that, even if
they are never used, military capa-
bilities—including strategic nuclear
forces — are central instruments of
foreign policy.
We have not always been as clear
eyed as the Soviets about these inter-
national facts of life. Particularly as o>
nuclear advantages have eroded, we
have tended to lose sight of the foreig
policy functions of strategic nuclear
forces. In my view, strategic nuclear
forces affect:
• The quality and credibility of
deterrence',
• Our ability and success in crisis
management; and
• The conduct and results of
American diplomacy.
First. The first function of nucleai
forces, of course, is to deter Soviet
nuclear attacks against ourselves, our
allies, and our friends and— in combins
tion with conventional forces— to detei
Soviet conventional aggression. But to
be effective, our deterrent must be
credible. Credibility, in turn, depends
upon the capabilities of our strategic
nuclear forces. It depends on having
forces which are flexible enough to be
able to respond to a broad spectrum of
threats so that whatever the circum-
stances and whatever the level of con-
flict, the Soviets never have an incenth
to launch a nuclear attack.
The President's plan strengthens oi
deterrent in the face of the changing
Soviet threat. The clearest example of
this is the decision to build and deploy
the MX missile. If we are to deter the
Soviet Union we must put at risk those
things— including their military
capabilities— which they value most. Tb
question is not whether we want to buil
a system with the unique capabilities
embodied in the MX, but whether we
can maintain an adequate deterrent
without it.
Second. The nuclear balance in-
evitably affects the political and
22
Department of State Bulletin
The Secretary
etiological environment within which
p international crises must be
naged. The confidence which we have
>ur nuclear deterrent cannot but in-
;nce how we will behave in a crisis.
strategic nuclear capabilities also
ect the perceptions of our adver-
les: Doubts about our strategic
;lear deterrent can only increase the
tnce that our political will would be
ted during crises.
Put simply, our own vulnerability to
;lear blackmail, as well as the suscep-
ility of our friends to political in-
lidation, depends upon our ability and
lingness to cope credibly with any
■net threat of escalation. A strong and
<ible nuclear capability enhances
bility by discouraging any Soviet
iptation toward adventurism at the
ne time that it strengthens our hand
responding to Soviet political-military
eats.
Third. Short of crisis, nuclear
apons perform an important function
the conduct of day-to-day diplomacy.
5t as broad military capabilities form
■ backdrop against which foreign
icy is conducted, the strategic nuclear
ance casts a shadow which affects
;ry geopolitical decision of signifi-
lce. The image of U.S. strength and
E; perception of U.S. commitment
p -meates into every region of the
I rid. The nuclear balance is a crucial,
i instated, factor for all those countries
1 ,o seek stable security arrangements
i the face of Soviet expansionism.
! This is particularly the case for our
I ies. The strategic force modernization
i are now undertaking is a key ele-
( 'nt in the continued health and unity
{ the Atlantic alliance. For more than
I years the fate of the United States
I d its European allies has been in-
i Darable. By correcting the percep-
ns— and reality— of emerging
balances in strategic forces, we will
derscore our commitment to resist
viet expansionist goals and reaffirm
e credibility of the "nuclear umbrella"
lich we extend over our allies.
These three functions of nuclear
capons— deterrence, crisis manage-
jnt, and day-to-day diplomacy— are
during. Our fundamental goals for our
-ategic forces have not changed. What
s changed is the level and character of
e Soviet threat— the number and qual-
i of their nuclear weapons. The Presi-
nt's plan is designed to counter this
olving threat by deploying forces that
ill strengthen deterrence and deny the
iviets any possibility of coercion.
The President's Strategic Force
Modernization Program
The President's decisions on strategic
force modernization support our foreign
policy in several important respects.
The decision to deploy the MX
missile demonstrates that we under-
stand the importance of a land-based
force in a strong and credible deterrent.
MX deployment— first in hardened silos
and later in a more permanent basing
mode— reaffirms our commitment to
maintain the diverse capabilities of the
strategic triad in the face of an evolving
Soviet threat.
The Trident II missile will provide
qualitative improvements in the capa-
bilities of the sea-based leg. The decision
to develop the Trident II is important
for the long-term viability of our sub-
land-based threat nor provide for wide-
spread alliance participation in the
defense of Europe.
Like sea-based cruise missiles, the
B-1H bomber also reflects the near-term
necessity to correel the growing imbal-
ance in strategic forces. At I he same
time, the President's decision recognizes
the long-term importance of bombers for
conventional missions. It will meet our
requirement for a modernized pene-
trating bomber until the Stealth aircraft
becomes available and. thereafter, will
continue to perform essential nuclear
and conventional roles. Just as B-52s
have performed useful missions for more
than a generation, the B-1B will serve
us into the 21st century.
The new emphasis on command and
control, along with strategic defenses,
Our fundamental goals for our strategic forces
have not changed. What has changed is the level
and character of the Soviet threat — the number
and quality of their nuclear weapons. The Presi-
dent's plan is designed to counter this evolving
threat by deploying forces that will strengthen
deterrence and deny the Soviets any possibility of
coercion.
marine deterrent and for enhancing the
effectiveness of our strategic triad.
The President's program also recog-
nizes that a secure strategic reserve-
that is, forces which can endure even in
the event of a large or extended nuclear
conflict— can be a critical element in
enhancing nuclear deterrence. He,
therefore, has decided to deploy sea-
based cruise missiles to improve the
resilience and effectiveness of our
strategic reserve weapons as well as
promptly to redress the growing im-
balance in strategic forces.
As the NATO alliance concluded
after the thorough study leading to its
1979 decision, however, sea-based
systems cannot counter the Soviet
theater nuclear forces (TNF) threat to
NATO. Land-based LRTNF [long-range
TNF] systems in Europe, therefore, are
absolutely necessary to fill the gap in
the continuum of deterrence resulting
from Soviet TNF buildup and to
strengthen the link between the defense
of Europe and U.S. strategic forces.
Sea-based cruise missiles, by contrast,
would not directly respond to the Soviet
.
are essential elements in the overall
modernization plan. Both have been long
neglected. Yet even small improvements
in command and control can result in
major improvements in the effectiveness
of our strategic weapons. Strategic
defenses also do much to reduce the
effectiveness of Soviet forces and — from
Moscow's perspective — make the out-
come of a Soviet attack much less
predictable.
The President's decision on ballistic
missile defense warrants special com-
ment. This decision does not commit us
to withdraw from the ABM Treaty nor
to modify it. It does expand research
and development, allowed within the
bounds of the treaty, to see if the new
technology in this field can enhance the
survivability of our land-based intercon-
tinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). Deci-
sions with respect to the treaty itself
will be taken only after long and hard
study and following close consultations
with the Congress and with our allies.
We are nowhere close to such a decision.
23
cember1981
The Secretary
The Alliance and Arms Control
Taken together, these programs
strengthen the alliance and insure its
vitality. By strengthening the bridge
between theater and strategic forces and
linking the defense of our homeland with
that of our allies, they provide tangible
proof that we consider European secu-
rity to be indistinguishable from our own.
As such, the strategic force moderniza-
tion program is the perfect complement
of our plans to deploy LRTNF systems
in Europe and will increase allied sup-
port for that vital program.
The allies share our view that any
real prospects for arms control can come
only from a position of strength.
They — like we — understand that
implementation of the TNF moderniza-
tion program is an indispensable part of
our effort to achieve a successful out-
come of the TNF negotiations with the
Soviets which begin later this month in
Geneva.
As you know, our objective in those
negotiations is a verifiable agreement
that would achieve significant reductions
on both sides, leading to equal ceilings
at the lowest possible levels — levels
which, ideally, could be zero.
In formulating the proposals we will
present to the Soviets on November 30,
we have engaged in a consultation proc-
ess with our allies of unprecedented in-
tensity. While these will be difficult
negotiations, there should be no doubt
that we will enter these talks with the
united backing of our allies and with
shared determination to reach an
equitable outcome.
As in upcoming TNF talks, we have
little hope of making any headway in
strategic arms control unless we begin
to take the steps needed to restore our
deterrent capability. We intend to main-
tain the strategic arms control process
but to seek agreements from a secure
and confident military position.
Moscow's strategic buildup has put
our crucial land-based missiles and
bombers at risk. Only a strong and
balanced program of strategic force
modernization will provide sufficient
incentive for the Soviets to negotiate
meaningful agreements. The B-l, for
example, will insure that the triad re-
tains the unique and important military
characteristics of the bomber— a tradi-
tional U.S. advantage— and should
increase Soviet willingness to negotiate
seriously. Likewise, deployment of MX
will break the Soviet monopoly on large,
accurate missiles and may, for the first
time, give them incentive to negotiate
real reductions in their ICBM force.
More than any other elements of the
plan, B-l and MX— and the degree of
Congress' support for them— will make
or break our attempt to negotiate a
reasonable arms control agreement.
If we fail to adopt the President's
program, however, we will have dimmed
our hopes of reaching an arms control
agreement on strategic forces. It is as
indispensable to the success of our
efforts at strategic arms control as TNF
modernization is to the success of the
talks beginning in Geneva. This plan will
give us the base from which to enter in-
to strategic arms negotiations which, if
successful, can help maintain a stable
strategic balance and a stable peace.
Conversely, if critics succeed in
pecking and nibbling at this or that
detail of the program rather than
treating it as a coherent whole, the
credibility of our commitment to meet
the Soviet challenge will be undermined,
and the prospects for meaningful stra-
tegic arms limitations will be jeopard-
ized.
We have made good progress in ad-
dressing the complex questions that
must be answered before we reopen
strategic arms talks with Moscow. The
Reagan Administration is analyzing— as
it must— a diversity of options and alter-
natives in formulating our negotiating
approach, ranging from relatively
straightforward modifications to the
SALT II Treaty to completely new ap-
proaches to limit Soviet strategic power.
As you know, while this review has
been underway, our policy has been not
to undercut existing agreements so long
as the Soviets exercise the same
restraint. This environment of mutual
restraint has provided a good basis for
our preparations to resume talks with
the Soviets to limit strategic arms.
We now hope that negotiations could
begin as early as next spring. But, as I
have said before, arms control negotia-
tions cannot be conducted in a political
vacuum. They must be closely related to
the overall state of U.S. -Soviet relations.
This is not a policy of mechanistic
linkage but a simple political fact of life.
Conclusion
The President's program of strategic
force modernization reaffirms the most
basic tenets of long-time U.S. policies
regarding nuclear weapons while cor-
recting the programmatic shortcomings
of the past. It recognizes the strategic
environment as it is, not as we would
wish it to be. It builds a foundation
which will allow us to negotiate chang
to improve that environment and in-
crease the prospects for peace and
stability.
I have been involved in strategic
force modernization issues for more
than 20 years. This is the first time I
have seen a President presented with
such a coherent and comprehensive
approach to force modernization and
deterrence. And it is certainly the firs
time I have seen a President take deci
sions that modernize all elements of tl
strategic triad and its supporting
infrastructure at one time.
This is an integrated, pragmatic,
achievable, and far-reaching program,
is the solid, essential basis for the
achievement of our foreign policy and
arms control objectives over the comin
years.
itii
i)
!«
it!
tit
j
'Press release 369. The complete
transcript of the hearings will be published
by the committee and will be available fron
the Superintendent of Documents, U.S.
Government Printing Office, Washington,
D.C. 20402. ■
Secretary
Interviewed
for Newsweek
Secretary Haig was interviewed by
John Walcott and Melvin Elfin of
Newsweek magazine on October 29,
1981. 1
Q. Can we take a look at where the
Administration has come in these 9
months since it took over foreign
policy and where there remain prob-
lems that need to be addressed in a
more forthright manner, or whatever?
I guess what we'd like to hear is your
own tour d'horizon before we get into
specifics.
A. I think this whole issue has had i
somewhat higher prominence than it
should have had. That is not to belittle
the fact that it acquired that prominence
and that significance, and, therefore, it
is an important issue. But in the historic
flow of our international problems it
doesn't represent that significant an
event.
If you look back over the last 10
months, the President has been at two
summits, one of which was unique in
24
Department of State Bulleti
"
The Secretary
racter, the other of which was a
ting engagement which had many,
ly complex overtones — the seven in
jwa. In both, he came out with a
atly enhanced prestige among the
ticipants, and both can be assessed as
ortant successes for the present.
We sit today with a better reiation-
i with our northern and southern
jhbors than has existed for an ex-
led period of time. That was one of
President's early priorities: he has a
jue and warm relationship with both
nadian Prime Minister] Trudeau and
xican President] Lopez Portillo. In
1 instances, there were fences to be
ided. And this has occurred in a
od when the economic situation, both
Sanada and in Mexico, could have
i anticipated to aggravate the situa-
With respect to Europe, let's talk
t-West first. It's true that we have
in a far more vigorous stand on the
iet Union. After all, I think that's
' the President is in the White
ise — one of the main things the
erican people expected of him. In
; context, we have gone ahead with
stantial increases in our defense
iding. As an underpinning to the
ousness with which he faces this
jlem, we have had a number of talks
I he ambassadorial level — myself and
\i irynin — and we have clarified very
E the issues of importance from the
\ erican point of view. I think we've
I )ointed the issues of importance from
I Soviet point of view.
[ I had 9V2 hours alone with Mr.
}: myko [Soviet Foreign Minister
I irei Gromyko] in New York, in two
I ;ions. It is clear that these talks were
I lk and productive as what I call ex-
| ages between the two powers which
t e devoid of rhetoric and polemics but
I m to substantive content. The read-
1 we've had subsequently is that the
I iets share our view that these were
d discussions in the context of laying
the concerns of both sides.
Nothing was rejected from the agen-
and what I call polemics and pos-
ng were not a part of this exchange,
have agreed to go ahead with the
F [theater nuclear forces] talks on
30th of November, and we agreed
tually to meet again to carry this out.
this coming meeting, I would an-
pate that they have a very good feel
the main regional issues that concern
and we have a good feel for those
t concern them. There is no reason to
iect that the situation will not con-
ae to move in a positive direction.
ember 1981
The President has conducted a
running correspondence with Mr.
Brezhnev, which has been at a high
level — and when I say "a high level," I
mean, again, devoid of polemic and ac-
cusations but, rather, substantive and
sincere in character. The responses have
been the same and increasingly so — two
major exchanges in that regard.
Q. When was the most recent one?
A. Just before the U.N. General
Assembly; and I referred to it in my
speech at the U.N. General Assembly.
At the U.N. General Assembly, the
United States intervention was well
received. For the first time, the United
States was applauded for an extended
period, and the American Secretary of
State was greeted by Third World and
developing world leaders with an
unusual degree of enthusiasm. The same
could not be said for the intervention of
the Soviet Foreign Minister.
Q. I just wanted to ask in this
general tone on U.S. foreign policy,
does the United States have the
psychological, financial, military, and
spiritual resources to conduct an
extended aggressive foreign policy
around the world?
A. I have fundamental confidence
that we do. I think it's not the same as
it might have been at the end of the
Second World War, where our resource
levels and our perception of our own
leadership responsibilities and effec-
tiveness had an historic high. That that
continues to exist, no, I don't think so.
On the other hand, I think of the ex-
periences of the 1970s — Vietnam, and
most particularly the post-detente disap-
pointments, the sense of humiliation the
Americans everywhere felt about our
lack of effective leadership abroad that
has generated a new sense of purpose in
the American people, certainly not at
the level of the historic post-World War
II high — and I wouldn't want to see it,
there, because those days are gone in
terms of relative assets with which to
affect it. But I do think Americans from
now on recognize that history continues
to place a heavy responsibility on the
United States of America to lead the
Western world and those who share our
values.
In many respects, the task, while
more complex, is not overwhelmingly
awesome either, because there are
beginning to appear serious problems
within the Eastern side. And they have
been through a period of extensive inter-
ventionist activity in Africa, the
Middle East, Southeast Asia, Afghan-
istan, for all of which they have paid a
price; 1 don't moan as an unmanageable
price in practical terms, but I mean a
political, psychological price.
\\ e see what is going on in
Europf — the economic crisis in the
Soviet Union and the frustrations of the
public sector, mi the consumer side, are
increasing. And they are facing an in-
evitable transition of leadership.
All of this suggests our larder is not
devoid of fundamental assets with which
we can manage a new relationship with
the Soviet Union that is based on
greater reciprocity and which will elicit
greater restraint in Soviet worldwide ac-
tivity. I remain very optimistic that this
is not only possible but is in the interest
of both superpowers. It remains to be
seen whether or not we are going to
succumb to atmospherics or whether we
are going to build this relationship on a
solid bedrock of some enduring
character.
The worst thing we can do would be
to precipitously rush into what is clearly
a receptive Soviet posture without
building that bedrock of understanding,
and that's what we have been in the
process of doing for 10 months — the
President's communications, my discus-
sions, and the meetings with Gromyko
and those that follow.
Q. Why do you think they are
receptive?
A. I think they are receptive for the
very reasons I have outlined. They need
American economic help; they need
American technology; they need
American food and credits; and they
need that from the West at large. They
recognize that they have become increas-
ingly estranged from the developing
world, which they championed for an ex-
tensive period with great success and
without great cost.
Q. Your ambassador to the Madrid
conference on the Helsinki review said
last week that the resumption of the
sale of grain could be taken as con-
fusing the Soviets as far as our at-
titude is concerned. Do you think it
was wise, looking back on it now, to
resume the sales on a unilateral basis
without getting something in return?
A. I think the issue itself should not
be overestimated. We were in a position
in which our failure to change our
posture would not only have caused
grievous problems here at home but
would have put us in an increasingly
25
The Secretary
isolated position with those who also do
trade with the Soviet Union. I don't
mean to suggest by that that there
weren't some who were very disciplined
in this area. More importantly, I think
relationships with the Soviet Union can-
not be simplistic.
I think you know that the President
has felt all along — and he has been
totally consistent on this question — that
food alone is not the vehicle for sending
the kind of political signals that were
called for in this case. Had he been
President at the time there was an em-
bargo, it would have been across-the-
board. I think he thought it was an
anomaly, and he had his position clear
on that through his campaign and after
he came into office. But it doesn't mean
I was a roaring enthusiast from the
foreign policy point of view, but he had
to look at it from much broader terms.
He did and made a decision; and it has
not had a pervasive impact on our ability
to conduct our relationships with the
Soviet Union since. I think that's a fact.
It isn't just grain the Soviets are in-
terested in. I do think the Soviets are in-
terested in arms control, generally. They
see the increase in American defense
spending as something that they are
going to have to adjust to themselves at
a time when they are less flexible in be-
ing able to do so.
Q. The President has gone "to the
mat" for the AWACS [airborne warn-
ing and control system ]. He has taken
great political risks. Is it now time, in
some sense, to turn around and ask
the Saudi Arabians to reciprocate?
We've taken some risks for them
politically. Is it time for them to
become a little more actively engaged
in the peace process?
A. First, let me tell you, this Ad-
ministration inherited the arms package
for Saudi Arabia. Memories are short.
Maybe not in the same sequencing or
with the finite composition of the hard-
ware, but the studies that developed the
conclusion that led to the arms package
were launched in the other Administra-
tion. And I discovered after the fact that
they were concluded during the last Ad-
ministration.
The great risk would have been for
the President, had he failed to carry out
the consistency of American foreign
policy on this very difficult issue — in
which honest people can differ on both
sides. It did get a life of its own and
took on far greater significance than the
sale of a piece of hardware should have.
Now you ask: "Are we going to de-
mand more of the Saudis?" We've
demanded quite a bit of the Saudis in
the process of getting this package
through. They've made unprecedented
commitments in the area of sharing
data, security relationships, continuing
American presence, support for the
system, confined use of the system
within their territory. Just read the
letter that was circulated around the
Hill yesterday. It's unprecedented!
Secondly, your questions would sug-
gest that perhaps they weren't already
taking risks for peace. They have been.
They were the active catalysts in
bringing about the lessening of tensions
in the first crisis in the Bekaa Valley,
through the Bayt ad-Din process, in
coordination with the Arab League
Secretary General, Kuwait, Syria, and
Lebanon. If that doesn't suggest that
they were very active and constructive,
they not only performed that task for
us, but in the wake of the shock the at-
tack on the Iraqi reactor and the escala-
tion of fighting between the PLO
[Palestine Liberation Organization] and
Israel along Israel's northern border,
they again, with resources and a high-
risk act of diplomacy, along with Phil
Habib [the President's special emissary
to the Middle East], brought about a
cessation of hostilities. And it remains
intact today. Memories are short: We
were probably hours away from a major
conflict in the Middle East, not once but
twice this past spring. It was managed
with great skill by the President, by Phil
Habib, and with the active cooperation
and support of the Government of Saudi
Arabia.
Beyond that, Saudi Arabia has been
of inestimable value in providing
resources to other threatened Arab
states — Sudan, Somalia, Pakistan,
Turkey. That is not to say we converge
on every issue and principle in the
Middle East.
You've asked whether or not we are
going to ask them to do more. We
already have. We've asked them to con-
tinue their very active and increasingly
difficult efforts to get national recon-
ciliation in Lebanon. The Bayt ad-Din
group will meet in Beirut on Novem-
ber 7 under active Saudi leadership.
Shortly after that, we are going to send
Phil Habib to the Middle East to try to
continue on with this process which is
highly volatile, highly fragile, and which
could be overturned at any given mo-
ment by any number of unpredictables
because of the number of interest
groups which have an active role in this
situation — the Christians, two separate
Christian groups, the PLO, the Syriai
the government, the Islamic fundame
talists of both the leftist and a rightis
orientation. This is the maze in which p
we are working.
We have been able not only to elki
increasing support from Saudi Arabia
for this process, but we have had verj
constructive help from France as well
France had been out of that act for ai
extended period, and that's been a cor
sequence of our diplomacy.
Q. Can we trace the relatively
positive statements that Arafat [Ya
Arafat, Chairman of the PLO Exec-
utive Committee] made in Tokyo dm
ing his Japanese visit about the Fah
peace plan to active Saudi influence
with Arafat?
A. There is no question but that ll!
the Saudis have had continuous com-
munication with Arafat and a cross-
relationship; there is no question but
that their communications with Arafal
were instrumental in the formulation <
the cease-fire — no question about that
Arafat is, himself, a leader who is
somewhat beleaguered. He has faction'
some of which are very leery about
him — more responsible [inaudible]. He
has just been to Moscow where all of t'
blandishments were again put forward
Q. I had dinner when I was in
Cancun with a couple of senior mem-
bers of the Saudi delegation there,
and I'll put to you the question that
they put to me, which was: "Does thi
United States understand that, come
next April, the Camp David peace
process we feel will at least be insuf:
cient, and we think it will be dead?"
These are their words: "The
Crown Prince has dropped a
lifeline" — meaning his peace plan.
"Does the United States recognize
that, and do they realize that now is
the time for the United States,
through us or however, to deal with
Arafat, because if they don't, the
Soviets will?"
A. The United States is fully behinc
the Camp David process. It is underway
it is the only process with momentum tc
day, and we have made substantial prog
ress. Here is another area of accomplish
ment! When we came in, the autonomy
talks were totally stalled out. There was
no prospect for bridging the gap be-
tween Israel and Egypt on the Sinai
disengagement modalities; no agreement
on the character of the MFO [multina-
tional force and observers]. The gap be-
tween the two was very wide, with
26
Department of State Bulletin
The Secretary
}) insisting- it should be a U.S. force,
Egypt insisting that there could he
merican participation, let alone
American participation.
This Administration, during my visit
April, bridged those gaps. We now
inly put in place an agreement for
VIFO, hut we've largely developed
VIFO itself, with a more broadly
d participation than anyone could
conceived possible. That's point
Point two is on autonomy. We made
ar from the beginning that we
ted these talks to resume, and we
ted progress; that we would be full
ners, but that the level of that part-
hip would depend on the seriousness
le parties and their commitment to a
< schedule that was workmanlike
promising. Their initial meeting
preempted us, but it wasn't the
lit of a lack of communication
use they knew our position well
rehand. They have since had a prin-
meeting at the ministerial level and
dng-level meetings which are in-
singly promising in the context of
lialogue between the two sides — the
i schedule they've laid out for
iselves and the agenda. At the mo-
t that it appears that raising the
of the American participation will
off rather than raise unjustified ex-
ations, we will do so.
Q. What does that mean?
A. It means either a special
3tiator or participation at the
isterial level.
Q. Have you made that decision
A. No. We're still assessing the
jress at these working meetings, and
are represented by our respective
)assadors in Cairo and Jerusalem.
But that is our objective. One cannot
judge the outcome of these autonomy
s. It's counterproductive to do so. I
jgnize that many of our European
tners are extremely skeptical about
is are many of the moderate Arab
es.
I think you do know that the objec-
ts of autonomy are limited. But
.in, this anguishing, historic issue is
</ going to be resolved by careful,
ctical steps in which confidence-
Iding on both sides is the absolute in-
ent aspect of the process. Without it,
are not going to have any success;
I the perfect can be again the enemy
she good!
What about the Saudi eight points?
Wo have looked at the eighl points, and
we have made the point thai there are
some promising and interesting aspects
to those eight points, in direct recogni-
tion of Israel's right to exist and
242 — not explicit, but implicit.
There are other aspects of those
eight points which we have traditionally
insisted cannot be a prion conditions
but have to be negotiated by the parties,
and that continues to he our view.
Q. The Saudis — at least when I
talked to them — were discussing that
plan as a starting point for talks, not
as a priori conditions.
A. We will discuss their views on
that plan with them. We are willing and
happy to do so. The President men-
tioned that yesterday in the Oval Office,
after the AW ACS vote. On the other
hand, I don't want that to be viewed as
any shift of American policy. Our policy
is the Camp David accords and to carry
them through to a successful conclu-
sion— and for differing reasons. In a
post-Sadat Middle East, I think most of
the modern Arab states and our Euro-
pean partners agree with that. The dif-
ference that exists between us and them
would probably be the version of what
has ultimately got to be done after
Camp David. I won't take a position; I
know the President won't take a position
because he wants to see what Camp
David brings.
Q. That's fair. I think, though, in
the next few months, there are a
couple of problems which clearly are
to be thought about, and that is, with
Sadat gone, Israel has lost the man it
considered its best friend in the Arab
world. That has raised the question of
how confident we can be and whether
there is anything we can do to see
that their withdrawal from the Sinai
proceeds on schedule. As you know,
there is some opposition to it in
Israel.
A. Of course, there has always been
some.
Q. And certainly, the murder of
Sadat can't make them any more com-
fortable about giving up that buffer.
A. That's right. On the other hand, I
think Israel also— Mr. Begin, in par-
ticular, recognizes that he has com-
mitted himself to a process, and I think
he is a man of his word. I think he is go-
ing to carry that process through with
all the energy in his fiber, from the
standpoint of his own perception of what
is acceptable and not acceptable. 1 have
discussed this with him, and 1 have no
doubts that he intends to meet his coin
initial date for withdrawal on the 26th
of April.
(J. He assured you of that?
A. Absolutely.
Q. On the other hand, [Egyptian
President) Mr. Mubarak has his prob-
lems. He is obviously going to be
under pressure from religious ele-
ments in his country; and it is clear to
me, after spending a couple of hours
with the Saudis, that they are going
to be all over him. They want him
back in the Arab camp. They have
good reasons for wanting that, and
they are going to work on that. The
question there is how comfortable we
are with his position in Egypt and
Egypt's position vis-a-vis Israel.
A. I think one must take Mubarak
at his word. I don't know how anyone
could have been more explicit, more
definitive in his intention to proceed in
the footsteps of President Sadat. That
does not mean that he is the same in-
dividual. He is a different leader; each
one has his own perceptions and his own
imperatives. But I think one of those im-
peratives is to successfully conclude
what is in place, or the consequences for
Egypt would be great jeopardy to the
leadership there, or the necessity to
manipulate a drastic shift in their
policies, neither of which are risk-free.
Q. Do you think he can deliver?
A. It's easy for him to deliver. He's
getting the Sinai back. I think that situa-
tion is in relatively good shape.
Q. What can or what should the
United States do at this point to try to
allay increasing Israeli anxieties in
the Middle East?
A. Above all, to make it clear that
the recent AW ACS debate has had abso-
lutely no effect on our longstanding,
historic relationship — it cannot and must
not. The President remains firmly com-
mitted to maintaining the qualitative
edge that Israel enjoys today, and I
know he intends to implement that
policy. There is no question about it!
Secondly, I think we are all best
served by moving as rapidly as we can
into this peace process and to carry for-
ward in it with all the vigor that both
sides can muster and with the full part-
nership of the United States.
The great specter over the whole
27
The Secretary
process is Lebanon because it is the
most complex, difficult, and attention-
strewn. It's volatile. There is required
not only the active help, leadership, and
risk-taking of Saudi Arabia in that proc-
ess, but it is also involved in an unusual
and laudible degree of restraint on the
part of Israel.
Q. That is the major specter. You
have a minor specter named Qadhafi —
increasingly vociferous, post-Sadat
assassination, remains what he was
when you spoke out against him. What
does the United States anticipate now
in this area? Any changes with
Qadhafi now?
A. I think one important aspect of
the Qadhafi phenomenon — and it is
replete with contradiction — is that there
is a growing awareness throughout the
region of the unacceptable nature of his
current performance, activity. Chad is a
good example, with the destabilizing ef-
forts that he has manipulated against
the Sudan, Somalia, some of the central
African republics; and even farther
south than that his fine hand is felt.
Q. You know about Uganda, with
Idi Amin?
A. Yes.
Q. Where else do we feel it?
A. We feel it in a number of areas.
There are reports of Libyan activity in
the recent coup attempt in The Gambia,
so there is a growing awareness there.
There are efforts now underway, under
French auspices but with African sup-
port, to put an OAU [Organization of
African Unity] force into Chad. Some of
the worrisome reports we read last
night proved to be fallacious. But that
situation is dangerous.
The contradiction in the situation is
that many of the Arab states are fearful
that too much high-profiled condemna-
tion of Qadhafi gives him a level of in-
fluence— politically and psycho-
logically— that his own demographic
assets do not justify. There is, unfor-
tunately, a certain degree of truth in
that. But you also have to make it clear
that what he is doing, by any standards
of acceptable international behavior, is
unacceptable. I am not going to lay out
any threats or go beyond the point of
just making that point.
Q. Yet, there is another contradic-
tion, which is that this character last
month sent 10 people to Italy to kill
the American Ambassador. Now he's
hatching a plan to sponsor attacks on
American Embassies in West Euro-
pean capitals. Yet, we're still buying
his oil; we're still doing business with
the guy. In fact, we're still helping to
buy the bullets he is trying to use to
kill Max Rabb. Isn't that also a con-
tradiction?
A. It is clearly a contradiction, but
it is not devoid of its own contradictions.
There again, very careful thought has to
be given as to whether or not the course
of action that I have seen your question
is promoting is, in effect, going to be
effective or whether third-country
transfers are going to merely have the
practical consequence of punishing
American firms without having any im-
pact whatsoever, in practical terms, on
Qadhafi and whether or not other reper-
cussions could outweigh the important
moral imperative that the question sug-
gests.
Q. I think it is important, since
we just talked about Qadhafi, that we
talk about his doppelganger in our
hemisphere, Castro. We promised long
ago that we would get to the
source — deal with some of the prob-
lems in Central America at the source.
I think two questions arise from that.
First of all, we seem to have made
very little progress in El Salvador
itself. The arms flow continues, as far
as I see; I don't see that the govern-
ment has made a great deal of prog-
ress in securing the situation. And
second of all, I don't see anything
being done to get to the source.
A. No. I would say to the contrary
that when this Administration came in,
El Salvador was in worse shape than it
is today. I don't mean to suggest by that
that, if one just does his bookkeeping, he
knows that what we have done has been
limited to a slight increase in economic
assistance, a slight increase in military
sales assistance, and something less to-
day, I think, than 50 advisers — technical
trainers, advisers isn't even a good term.
If anyone were to suggest that we have
taken dramatic steps with El Salvador
and had failed, I think they would be
guilty of the worst perversion of facts.
The simple facts are that the situa-
tion has become essentially stalemated.
The insurgents are not achieving
dramatic gains. They remain isolated
politically from the mainstream of
thought. They are not in the clarion call
for future freedom.
There has been some cutoff, and
there has been an increase in coopera-
tion from the other local states— Hon-
duras, Guatemala, Colombia, and
Venezuela — and a greater awareness ]
the problem. On the other hand, I sha,
the thrust of your question that in a
guerrilla conflict, stalemate could
ultimately be fatal because El Salvado
is experiencing grievous economic dif-
ficulties. These, combined with the con
tinual fighting and bloodshed, gene rati
excesses from the right to match those
of the left. Therefore, the situation
needs a reassessment, and it has been
getting just that. I'll go no further. Bukt
we still have Salvador; it did not becorr
a Nicaragua.
Q. But in the process, Nicaragua ,
has rapidly become Cuba.
A. Very predictable.
Q. You gave it a try. You didn't
cut the aid off in the beginning. Thei
were still some doors left open.
A. We're still giving it a try. It stii
remains a carrot. We haven't given up
hope on the forces of freedom in
Nicaragua. On the other hand, the situ^fu
tion is becoming increasingly grim.
Q. Just to switch it a little bit,
you used the phrase "trying to forge i
strategic consensus abroad."
A. No, no. Wait a minute. You guj '
used that! What I used was, I wanted ft
discuss the strategic consensus. I nevea
claimed that we would forge one. Soviel
actions forged the strategic consensus.
And what were they?
Let's not kid ourselves about this.
Angola, Ethiopia, southern Yemen,
northern Yemen, Afghanistan I,
Afghanistan II, the fall of the Shah
of Iran created a strategic consensus. I
said we had to use it, constructively, to
forge a better sense of protection
against external aggression from the
Soviet Union, and that this was in-
timately interrelated with the peace
process.
Q. I was just picking up the
phrase to introduce another subject.
A. Well, o.k., but I'm sorry. I get so
frustrated by this continual — look, the .'
strategic consensus exists. How in the ,
world do you think we had the action
that we had in Lebanon, if there hadn't
been one?
Q. That's a perfect introduction to
what I'm asking: Do we have a com-
parable strategic consensus in
Washington about foreign policy?
A. The answer to that is essentially
yes, if you're talking about the ability of
28
Department of State Bulletin
The Secretary
executive branch to conduct its
;y with the bipartisan support of the
srican Congress. Thus far, yes. It
l't been easy, but if one would look
c on recent years, it's been somewhat
e effective than heretofore. We
sn't lost a major foreign policy issue
he Hill, as close as yesterday was.
have a number of projects under-
— a new policy toward Pakistan; in-
tsed levels of defense spending, the
eign Assistance Act, which we hope
oing to go through and won't be
ther continuing resolution, which
/e had since 1979; we had the lifting
he Clark amendment — all highly dif-
lt and controversial questions.
Q. I'm talking about within the
v ninistration itself. Some of our
lies, some of our enemies, say we
flm to speak in discordant voices.
I A. I'm delighted with these little
aidillo courses rather than the pro-
Ind courses we are taking, which are
fundamentally important. Somebody
iii ht to ask himself that question.
I 're spending all our time wondering
I 'ther or not one spokesman or
I ther has nuanced somewhat dif-
imtly than his counterpart. In the
It place, it is important to recognize
h institutional Cabinet officers cull
1 ir problems from a different perspec-
6 '. It has always been so. I'm a guy
1 3 has had 20 years experience. I
I -ked for [former Secretary of
I ense] Bob McNamara right out of his
Lee. He and [former Secretary of
i te] Dean Rusk were always "pinging"
; ttle differently.
Q. I think there is one serious
uctural question, which is whether
s Administration has, in foreign
icy, an apparatus to pull together
those naturally discordant points of
w. In economic policy, there is this
incil that Reagan chairs, and they
■ able to hammer these things out.
A. Why aren't you worried about
• substance of our foreign policy?
Q. I can't worry about one
thout the other.
A. What you have to worry about
have we made any profound mistakes
foreign policy? Can you tell me one?
Q. No. As a matter of fact, I can't.
Q. What critics would say — I
.de a list; I never got around to ask-
5 you about them — Euro-pacifism,
it the people in those parades talk,
"United States, what does it stand
for? aid to Pakistan, military; aid to
Salvador, military aid; AWACS;
"Bright Star." "America's answer to
all problems," say the critics, "is a
military thrust."
A. Of course, nothing could be
farther from the truth. We weren't talk-
ing military thrust at Cancun. We
managed to go down there, and the
President preserved his principle. And
yet he managed to reflect a constructive,
sensitive concern for the agonies of the
developing world. He went down there
with a full menu of specific steps that
we could take to deal with them. That
isn't the sole thrust of America's foreign
policy, in no way.
The issues in Europe are not the
issues you're talking about. The issues in
Europe are religious and nuclear-based,
first and foremost, and are complicated
by some very grievous economic prob-
lems which add to the anxiety of the
people who bear these concerns.
Q. But haven't we aggravated
some of those problems with some of
the rhetoric?
A. Yes. I think so.
Q. There were rhetorical things.
A. Yes, but it's not the cause of
them; it does aggravate them. But let's
recall also that they were far mure
aggravated during the period when we
seemed to have detached ourselves from
international responsibility, when we
couldn't get our economic house here in
order.
Q. Or when we asked them to get
the neutron bomb —
A. And when we were pursuing
ephemeral piety and assuring those
aspects of our nationhood which in-
volved the application of national power.
■Press release 363 of Oct. 30, 1981.1
Secretary Addresses Editors
and Broadcasters Conference
Secretary Haig made brief remarks
and had a question-and-answer session
with those attending the National
Foreign Policy Conference for Editors
and Broadcasters at the Department of
State on October 29, 1981. '
I'm very pleased to have this chance to
meet with you briefly this evening.
I noticed in the last 24-48 hours
again some questions about our foreign
policy. I understand that Fritz Mondale
has renamed it the Stealth doctrine.
[Laughter] He insists that you can't see
it, it's invisible, but it still bombs.
[Laughter]
As I've said around town here for
the last week, I'm addressing you
tonight fresh from what is perhaps my
most important diplomatic triumph —
maybe my only one over the last 10
months. I want you to know that I
managed to successfully fly to Cairo
with three ex-Presidents and the tower-
ing ego of Henry Kissinger in an air-
plane with only one first-class cabin. I
solved it through great diplomatic skill. I
took the first-class cabin. [Laughter]
Whenever my ego soars, it's rapidly
plummeted back to Earth because when
I got back from Cancun on Saturday
night and walked through the living
room, I noticed that Archie Bunker was
on the television. He was talking to the
young waitress in his bar, pointing out
that they needed a new waiter, and she
said: "What criteria are you going to use
to hire him?" He said: "First I'm going
to ask him: 'Have you ever been ar-
rested?' Then I'm going to ask him if
he's ever been fired. And finally I'll ask
him if he's ever voted Democrat." And
the waitress responded: "Who are you
looking for — Alex Haig?" [Laughter]
Archie replied: "Don't be making no
smart remarks about a man like that
who handles da' English language so
beautiful, who is sometimes da' Presi-
dent." [Laughter]
I did want to say a few brief things
to get your juices flowing, and that is to
suggest that President Reagan does, in-
deed, have a foreign policy, and, like any
sound foreign policy, it is built on a
bedrock of American values and ideas. It
is designed to structure an international
environment that is hospitable to those
American values and ideals — and
especially the freedom and dignity of the
individual. It is a foreign policy that
recognizes that policies that forsake
ideals with exclusive preoccupation on
subjective national interests offends
America's sense of right.
On the other hand, it is a policy
ember 1981
29
The Secretary
which also recognizes that, if one sets
aside the realities of power in search of
ephemeral pieties, it will also offend our
sense of reality.
Clearly, what the fundamental objec-
tive of our foreign policy is today is to
structure a world environment in which
necessary and desirable historic change
occurs within the accepted rules of
Western civilization, international law,
and Western mores of international
behavior and that such change should
not l>e brought about exclusively
through resort to bloodshed, terrorism,
and so-called wars of liberation.
The foreign policy is, as you know,
structured on four pillars. Someone
recently described them as four shafts.
[Laughter]
The first is to recognize clearly that
we Americans cannot effectively have
our influence felt abroad if we preside
over an economic shambles here at
home.
Secondly, we recognize clearly that
the time has long since passed when we
must structure a new relationship with
the Soviet Union that is built essentially
on restraint in the international conduct
of both powers and reciprocity in our
mutual dealings of one with the other.
Third, it is a foreign policy that is
structured on the pillar of seeking to
refurbish and restrengthen traditional
alliances and friendships.
And, lastly, it is a foreign policy
which recognizes that in this decade of
the 1980s America must establish a just,
responsible relationship with the
developing world.
I'd like to talk very briefly about
several aspects of these pillars.
The first is East- West relations. I've
just completed some 9V2 hours of
meetings with Soviet Foreign Minister
Gromyko in New York at the General
Assembly. These were meetings from
which I personally — and I know the
President — have drawn some encourage-
ment. They were at once frank and far-
ranging, substantively complete, devoid
of polemic and diatribe, and focused on
the concerns that both nations share
with respect to the international
performance of the other.
At these meetings no subject was
excluded from discussion, and their con-
sequences were the formal initiation of
the theater arms talks in Geneva on the
30th of November and an agreement to
meet again early next year in Geneva.
I think in the intervening period
both sides have a fortuitous opportunity
to assess carefully the interventions of
the other. And if this dialogue continues
with the same level of give-and-take that
characterized our first exchanges, I
think we have some hope for progress in
setting aside some of the vexing dif-
ferences that have characterized
American-Soviet relationships in recent
years.
Another pillar I want to touch upon
very briefly is our relationship with our
allies in Western Europe. There's been a
great deal of attention recently to so-
called peace movements in Western
Europe. Some have described this as a
juggernaut trend toward pacifism or
neutralism. I have rejected and continue
to reject that thesis.
What we are witnessing is a unique
convergence of concerns about all things
nuclear — environmentalist, green par-
ties, joining with those who have tradi-
tionally been concerned about nuclear
weaponry and the growth of nuclear
weaponry, specifically in Western
Europe.
I think it's important that we in
America recognize first the character of
this movement in Western Europe,
recognizing that it is not necessarily
fenced and exclusively confined to
Western Europe, recognize its true
character and conduct our public exposi-
tion on matters nuclear with a keen sen-
sitivity to the concerns of Europe's
youth, the church movement, and other
potentially effective interest groups.
It is important to recall, however,
that the decision to modernize theater
nuclear weapons in Europe was taken at
the initiative of West European
leaders — specifically, Chancellor
Schmidt [of West Germany] in his ad-
dress in London in 1977 — where at that
time the great concern was decouple-
ment, a breakdown of the continuum, if
you will, between regional or theater
nuclear forces and central strategic
nuclear power and the need to
strengthen that theater capability to
keep that linkage specifically intact.
That is a very important aspect of the
process underway today.
More importantly, in arms control
terms, there can hardly be a justification
for the Soviet Union to sit down and
negotiate meaningful reductions if we
are going to unilaterally take care of
their concerns about Western nuclear
power while they continue —
uninhibited — to deploy the SS-20 which
threatens the capitals of Western
Europe.
I want to say a word also now,
before turning it over to your questions
and answers, to the subject of
I
yesterday's AWACS [airborne warnii !;
and control systems] vote.
We are, as you know, very gratif -
by the outcome of that vote. I want t
emphasize, however, that this was an
issue in which serious people dif-
fered— serious, well-motivated people
differed. It is an issue which is now
behind us, and I think in a constructs
way, because it will inevitably contril
to the stability and peace process in t.
region.
I think it is important that we as
Americans, as we always do once the
decision is made, join together and w<
together to meet, the profound chal-
lenges facing us in the Middle East to
day. Those challenges really confront
in several fundamental areas.
You've heard talk of the so-called
strategic consensus. Some in the press
seem to have interpreted that talk as
being an American, or even a Haig-
made, perception, something we were;
trying to construct in Western Europe
to divert Arab attention from longstai
ing frustrations associated with the
Arab-Israeli disputes.
Nothing could be farther from thd
truth. The strategic consensus exists. I
has been in place for some time as a
result of a number of actions taken byi
the Soviet Union and other radical
groups in the Middle East.
It began to crystallize in the wake!
Angola, Ethiopia, southern Yemen,
northern Yemen, the fall of the Shah's
regime in Iran, and, above all, in the
wake of the Soviet intervention in
Afghanistan.
It is a reality. It is a reality which
now finds many Arab leaders focused
not only on the historic frustrations of 1
the Arab-Israeli dispute but focusing
equally on their concerns about Soviet
Soviet-manipulated threats to their in-"
cumbencies. And I've made the point 1
that these two areas — the peace proces
itself and the strategic consensus — ara
mutually reinforcing phenomena. Prog-
ress in one contributes to progress in 1
the other.
It is very hard for nations to accept
risks for peace if they are preoccupied
by concerns about their security —
whether that threat comes from the
area that the risks are associated with
or some external threat.
How do we know this strategic conl
sensus exists? We've seen it in practice.
We saw it on two occasions this past I
spring: first, when the Syrian missiles J
were emplaced in the Bekaa Valley; an]
when Saudi Arabia, together with othel
30
Department of State Bulletin
The Secretary
) states — Kuwait, Syria, Lebanon,
secretary General of the Arab
rue — worked together to quiet the
and to seek positive steps to
)ve the causes of tension.
This same consensus withstood the
k of the Israeli attack on the Iraqi
tor and the outbreak of conflict be-
>n the Palestine Liberation Organiza-
(PLO) and Israeli forces in northern
?1 along the border. Had it not been
hat consensus, any one of those
ks would have been enough to put
Middle East area once again into
lict.
[n the period ahead we are going to
to continue to work — and work
increasing intensity — to achieve na-
il reconciliation in Lebanon because
situation is, itself, now intimately
ged in the peace process — the
ip David accords. And that must be
econd focal point of American diplo-
y — to move the peace process under
amp David framework forward.
When this Administration came in,
talks on the Sinai withdrawal ques-
were stalemated. There were pro-
d differences between Israel and
pt on the composition of a
ekeeping force, and there was some
)t as to whether the relinquishment
le Sinai would take place. Those dif-
nces have been resolved, and we are
he eve of establishing a more broad-
ased force than was heretofore con-
.plated.
Secondly, the autonomy talks were
lly stalled and the differences be-
an the two parties were so vast that
appeared unbridgeable. In the
sequent months, we have found both
ies at the ministerial level first
! 'ring a new round of talks with in-
sed enthusiam and working-level
s which have formulated a work
?dule, which I think is a source of
it optimism and encouragement to
f us. We in the United States are
lg to remain a full partner in this
cess.
At this very moment we feel that
parties are, indeed, in the process of
ieving breakthroughs. We will
nge the level of our participation to
itever is necessary to assist and
litate that progress.
In conclusion I want to say a brief
d about two summits already con-
ted by this Administration— the first
Ottawa and the second, and most re-
t, at Cancun— and the most unique,
eed.
In both instances the American
President emerged fundamentally suc-
cessful in the conduct of his business at
the summit. He did so. of course, with
tlic seven at Ottawa; and he did so
especially at Cancun where American
principles and fundamental benchmarks
for global development were retained
and reinforced and where at the same
time the American President evidenced
a sensitivity to the anguishing problems
of the developing world today in a man-
ner in which I think the prospects for
real achievement in the days ahead have
been greatly enhanced.
Q. In the last few speeches of
Fidel Castro, besides attacking you as
he always does, he said that Cuba had
the capacity of creating social and
political problems in the United
States, and he said also that they were
continuing with the policy of interna-
tionalism, which is to help the guer-
rillas. What are we in the United
States doing, and what else can we do
to stop the external interference in
the affairs of Latin America?
A. I was engaged in a period just
after the Cuban missile crisis working
for Jack Kennedy and Joe Califano and
Cy Vance, and I was military assistant
to Cy Vance when we were first seized
with the hemorrhaging of Cuban in-
terventionism in this hemisphere, and in
Central America specifically.
At that time, we were able, after
some anguishing 2 or 3 years of a great
deal of resources — American
resources — and with the full support of
the American Congress, to make the
risks associated with that activity seem
to be more costly than the continuation
and the advantages of that activity.
We are faced with very much the
same proposition today. It is clear that
Castro is increasingly entering into in-
terventionist activity in the hemisphere
through arms, training, subversion, and
terrorist activity. It is clear that the
United States is faced with the problem
of dealing effectively or realistically with
this problem in a very different environ-
ment.
We have been involved in extensive
studies on this subject which have been
completed and which are under review,
and until those reviews are complete and
they have been presented to the Presi-
dent, enough said.
Q. Saudi Arabia today called the
AW ACS vote a victory over Zionism,
and in Geneva the Saudis raised the
price of oil. In view of those things.
what did the United States really get
in return for the AWACS deal except
petrodollars?
A. Let me just make a few brief
remarks on what we have already got-
ten from Saudi Arabia.
I highlighted the active role of Saudi
Arabia in the peace process in Lebanon.
In both instances — the crisis in the
Bekaa Valley and the Zahle town crisis
and the crisis along the border of north-
ern Israel — the Saudi Arabians played
an indispensable and vital role in main-
taining the peace, as fragile as the peace
is at the moment.
Secondly, Saudi Arabia has been ac-
tive with resources and diplomacy in
shoring up threatened regimes in the
northern African littoral and throughout
the Middle East and Southwest Asia.
They have done that sometimes on their
own and sometimes in concert with us.
Thirdly, to answer your question
with respect to the petrodollar question,
as you know the Saudis have been at the
cutting edge, or the leading force, in try-
ing to get a unified and standard price.
They have been retaining their price at
the level of about $32 [per barrel]. Many
of the other Middle Eastern producers
have been substantially above that.
So yesterday's conference enabled
them to bring that price to a common
level, $34 a barrel, as I understand it. I
think that is an important achievement,
because the basic overall consequence of
it will be lower prices more than it is
higher prices.
They have also dealt with another
price of the higher quality oils, which I
think they settled at $38 a barrel. And,
as you know, some nations have been
well above that. They also got a concur-
rence or a consensus to hold that price
level through 1982.
No one applauds the astronomical
cost of energy today, but I think it
would be difficult to fault the Saudi
leadership in this particular area.
Q. What are the U.S. policy objec-
tives in regard to Iran, and what is
the likelihood of a situation develop-
ing that could lead to a more
pragmatic relationship between the
United States and Iran?
And if you will permit me a
somewhat related question, what ap-
proaches are being considered to the
religiously fundamentalist approach to
public policy issues that is found at
crucial levels in the Islamic world and
even to an important extent in Israel?
A. American policy with respect to
Iran, of course, must be predicted on the
;ember1981
31
The Secretary
strategic importance and the historic
relationship of that strategic importance
to American policy traditionally. We
make no bones about our discomfiture
with the current regime in Tehran. We
make no bones about it.
On the other hand, we have, for ex-
ample, in the conduct of the Iran-Iraq
conflict, taken an impartial view,
because we are concerned about the
long-term historic relationships. We seek
to pursue policies which will result in a
moderate or at least a regime in Tehran
which is compatible with the U.S.
policies and interests and values and
those of the rest of the Western world.
We are not enjoying such a regime to-
day.
I won't get into the other question
because it is a profound question with
many complex overtones. It is very dif-
ferent, depending on which movement
you are talking about and which center
of power may be engaged with that
movement.
It is an important historic
phenomenon. It is one that is replete
with mixed blessings. In some instances
it represents a threat to moderate in-
cumbencies, but I would suggest that
events in Afghanistan would also con-
firm that it is viewed as a threat in
Moscow, as well.
Q. You have been talking to the
Chinese Foreign Minister. Are you in-
itiating talks with the idea of selling
arms to mainland China as well as to
Taiwan?
A. My visit to Beijing last spring
touched upon a changed overall policy
with respect to the United States and
China in arms sales. We no longer carry
them in the category as an enemy; we
have moved them in the category of a
nonallied friendly state. That means that
we are willing to accept requests for
weaponry on a case-by-case basis. We
have not received any. Our discussions
thus far have not touched upon this sub-
ject.
Q. What is the U.S. criteria in con-
sidering a vote for the Secretary
General of the United Nations in light
of the fact that there is pressure
mounting for an African Tanzanian to
assume the post? And what is our
government's official policy toward
South Africa?
A. We go into the selection of the
Secretary General of the United Nations
with a very open mind. We simply want
the best qualified man for the job. As
you know, the various rounds of votes
are taken on a secret written ballot. I
think we are on our eighth now or ninth
ballot, and there has been somewhat of
a stalemate.
How people can attribute vetos to
one power or another, I am not quite
sure since these are secret written
ballots, and one has to be suspicious of
speculations as to who vetoed for whom.
But I would say that they are in a
recess at the moment on this subject, to
regroup and assess the situation of the
two candidates who are being con-
sidered—Mr. Waldheim and Mr. Salim
Salim of Tanzania. Whether new dark-
horse candidates will surface remains to
be seen, but it appears likely that some
will. I don't want to prejudge that issue.
Our official policy toward South
Africa is not to endorse the policies of
apartheid, by which we are appalled and
which we oppose.
We are engaged in a very active
communication with South Africa on the
subject of the independence of Namibia.
When we came into office, the talks on
the independence of Namibia were total-
ly stalled out. We have had 3 years of
sterile diatribe and no progress, so the
President felt that the most appropriate
way in which to proceed was to conduct
our negotiations through quiet
diplomacy and not headlines.
In that intervening period, after the
meeting in Geneva, we found that South
Africa had come to reject U.N. Resolu-
tion 435, had come to reject any U.N.
presence in Namibia in a transition
period, and had come to insist that a
very detailed constitution be written and
agreed to by the parties which would
guarantee minority rights and a number
of other vexing questions.
In the intervening period since then,
South Africa has come to accept 435, to
accept the U.N. presence in Namibia,
and we have just completed drafting a
set of broad principles on about a page
and a half which would be reinforcing
the provisions of 435. It is currently be-
ing negotiated by the contact group with
the front-line states and with South
Africa. That represents progress,
hopeful progress.
On the other hand, as that progress
has been achieved, there has been an in-
creasing level of interrelationships sur-
facing—empirical, not functional— be-
tween the continuing Cuban presence in
Angola 6 years after their intervention
and the objective of achieving an in-
dependent Namibia in 1982, and that is
our objective.
Q. With regard to AWACS, the
emphasis is being placed, on the ques-
tion of what the United States is get-
ting out of it, on the fact that ther
an increase in security for Saudi
Arabia.
If the AWACS aren't delivered
til 4 years have passed, and in view
the technology that Under Secretai
[for Security Assistance, Science, a
Technology James L.) Buckley
discussed earlier — the technology t
the Soviet Union is developing — wi
those AWACS represent less of a
strengthening in security in 4 years
than they would if they were delive
now?
A. I suppose you could describe i
that way in relative terms, but it is li
the M-l rifle or the jeep. It performs
very special function.
Between now and then, if the
Government of Saudi Arabia so wishe
the American AWACS which are thei
now will continue to be available.
When those AWACS are introduc
while the state of the art would suggt
that others will have comparable
systems — and especially the Soviet
Union — it does not lessen the vital im
portance that an AWACS can play in
the defense of Saudi Arabia and
especially the oil fields in eastern Saue
Arabia. And the AWACS would permi
for example, as we confirmed at the
time the Iranian aircraft bombed the (j
facilities in Kuwait several weeks
ago — the American AWACS picked u<
those aircraft the minute they left the
airfield in Iran and would have permit
ted defensive aircraft to be scrambled
and engaged before damage to the oil
fields. And that is the kind of a threat)
that we have those AWACS there to
protect against.
Q. Ex-President Carter and ex-
President Ford both said that they fc
that we had to address the subject o
Palestinian liberation and a state for
the Palestinians. Do you reflect the
AWACS decision in any way as a ste
in the direction of a settlement alonf
that line, or what is your outlook on
that?
A. I think both Presidents also
sttited that for the process of having |
Palestinian or PLO participation in tha
negotiations, the ticket for admission is
very clear. It has been long established
and it hasn't changed, and that is a
recognition of Israel's right to exist anfl
a recognition of the provisions of U.Nl
Resolutions 242 and 338. Nothing has I
changed. That remains American policy
Does the AWACS contribute in ail
way? I would say indirectly, yes. It con-
tributes because I would hope that it wi
32
ARMS CONTROL
■e the continued full participation of
i Arabia in the Lebanon peace proc-
hat I talked about which is indirect-
t intimately related to the peace
jss under Camp David,
festerday, the question was asked
e President about the [Saudi]
m Prince's eight points. We pointed
and the President pointed out, that
are aspects of that eight-point pro-
. made by Crown Prince Fahd by
h we are encouraged. There is an
ect or implicit recognition of Israel's
to exist and 242 in those eight
ps, although it is not explicit.
3ut we also pointed out that there
ither aspects of those eight points
we have always considered must
ie a priori conditions but issues
must be negotiated by the parties.
^. Since one of the most pregnant
js today is Poland and the crisis
oland, and since you have spoken
_-omyko with the President a little
e ago, what is the feeling and
t is the stand of the Russians to-
as to intervention, and if they do,
would America step in and do
.Hhing to help Poland out?
A. I think the United States and
Western partners have been very
cit and very definitive, if you will,
t the unacceptability of direct or in-
•t Soviet interventionism in Poland,
is been our position, and it remains
oosition, that this is an issue which
It be decided by the Polish people
Polish authorities. I think the Soviet
in is very aware of that.
The situation today is in one of those
ictic terms which such situations
,ys follow, while following a fun-
ental historic trend. I would say the
mc trend looks like there is more
tion underway at the moment, as we
■ seen the military forces dispersed
ughout the countryside with the
id objective of helping transporta-
, the movement of food, and ad-
bating local unrest.
We are watching the situation very,
i carefully, and I would say it is too
1 to say whether or not these recent
is would drift into a martial law
ation — in which I think the situation
Id then have taken a serious
,_or whether it will be just another
of those turns in the road in which
-e are pushes in one direction and
i retrenchments, and then pushes in
ther direction and retrenchment. It
ast a little early to say.
Administration Supports Ratification
of Protocol I of Treaty of Tlatelolco
'Press release 364 of Oct. 30, 1981.
by Eugene V. Rostow
Statement before the Senate Foreign
Filiations ( 'ommittee on September 22,
1981. Mr. Rostov is Director of the
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
(ACDA).1
I appreciate the opportunity to appear
before you today on behalf of the Ad-
ministration in support of ratification of
Protocol I of the Treaty for the Prohibi-
tion of Nuclear Weapons in Latin
America — known as the treaty of
Tlatelolco. In the statement on nuclear
nonproliferation policy made by the
President on July 16, 1981, he cited as a
specific U.S. objective continued support
for adherence to the treaty of Tlatelolco
by those countries for which it has not
yet entered into force. He also an-
nounced that he would promptly seek
the Senate's advice and consent to
ratification of Protocol I of the treaty.
As you know, the treaty of
Tlatelolco is the first treaty to seek to
establish a nuclear-weapons-free-zone in
any populated region of the world. It is
currently in force for 22 Latin American
and Caribbean states. The idea of
establishing a nuclear-weapons-free-zone
originated in a Brazilian proposal in
1962. It was followed by a joint declara-
tion in 1963 by the Presidents of Bolivia,
Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, and Mexico sup-
porting the establishment of such a
zone. This joint declaration received the
support of the U.N. General Assembly in
1963. The United States voted in favor
of the General Assembly resolution.
Detailed and extensive negotiations
among the Latin American nations
followed— culminating in regional
meetings in Mexico City with all the
countries of the region for signature of
the treaty on February 14, 1967. The
treaty has entered into force for most
Latin American states, but is not yet in
effect for Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and
Cuba. We believe that U.S. ratification
of Protocol I would improve the pros-
pects toward complete entry into force
of the treaty regime throughout the
region. U.S. action on Protocol I would
also remove a pretext for Cuba not
adhering to the treaty.
In addition to the basic treaty—
which would prohibit indigenous
development of nuclear weapons by
Latin American states— there are two
protocols. These are designed to keep
the territories of the region affected by
the treaty and its protocols free of
nuclear weapons bj preventing their
deployment in such territories by states
outside the treaty zone. Additional Pro-
tocol II involves an undertaking by
nuclear weapons states nol to use or
threaten to use nuclear weapons against
the parties to the treaty nor to con-
tribute in any way to acts involving a
violation of the basic provisions of the
treaty. The United States ratified addi-
tional Protocol II in 1971. It is the only
post-World War II arms control agree-
ment adhered to by China, France, the
United Kingdom, the United States, and
the Soviet Union.
Additional Protocol I, which is
before you today, represents the final
step informal U.S. support for the
nuclear-free-zone established by the trea-
ty. Under the protocol those states out-
side the treaty zone undertake to apply
the denuclearization provisions of the
treaty to their territories within the
zone. For the United States, the ter-
ritories primarily involved are Puerto
Rico, the Virgin Islands, and the
military base at Guantanamo. The
United Kingdom and the Netherlands
have already adhered to Protocol I;
France has signed the treaty and
ratification is under consideration by the
French Government.. U.S. ratification of
Protocol I is an essential step for full en-
try into force of the treaty throughout
the region.
Full entry into force of the treaty of
Tlatelolco is clearly in our nonprolifera-
tion and national security interests. U.S.
ratification will help maintain progress
toward full entry into force of this im-
portant treaty, will demonstrate our
continued commitment to prevent the
spread of nuclear weapons, and will also
emphasize our belief that the Tlatelolco
treaty regime is an important element of
U.S. nonproliferation policy. Like the
Treaty on the Nonproliferation of
Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the Tlatelolco
treaty commits adherents to refrain
from' developing nuclear weapons and to
apply International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) safeguards. An impor-
tant factor for some significant Latin
American states which have expressed
political objections to adhering to the
NPT is that Tlatelolco provides the most
promising alternative to the NPT to
Member 1981
33
CANADA
fulfill the important nonproliferation
goal of insuring comprehensive IAEA
safeguards on the nuclear programs of
all Latin American nations.
I have mentioned the benefits of the
treaty as an alternative method of
achieving the objectives of the NPT
within the region. I would also like to
note some additional features of arms
control significance unique to this
regional initiative.
First, it prohibits the testing of
nuclear weapons in the territories of the
parties within the zone. Argentina, Bar-
bados, Colombia, Grenada, Guyana,
Haiti, Jamaica, Paraguay, and Suriname
are not parties to the Limited Test Ban
Treaty; the treaty of Tlatelolco offers a
way to fill this gap. In fact, it goes
beyond the Limited Test Ban Treaty by
prohibiting even underground testing in
Latin America.
Second, the treaty goes beyond the
NPT by prohibiting the receipt, storage,
installation, or deployment of nuclear
weapons in the territory of treaty par-
ties or in the territories covered under
Protocol I. Thus, the treaty would oblige
any party to the treaty to refuse to
allow any outside nation to install, store,
or deploy nuclear weapons within the
territories of that state.
Third, in terms of verification, the
treaty not only requires IAEA
safeguards agreements but establishes a
regional control organization —
OPANAL [Organization for Prohibiting
Nuclear Arms in Latin America]— with
the right to obtain information from the
treaty parties concerning their nuclear
activities and to conduct special inspec-
tions in the territory of a party.
The treaty of Tlatelolco is also very
important in terms of U.S. national
security interests. The treaty and its ad-
ditional protocols prohibit the manu-
facture, development, deployment, or
stationing of nuclear weapons by any
country within the region, as well as any
such action by the nuclear-weapons
states or any state with responsibility
for territories within the zone. As you
know, the negotiating history of the
treaty makes it clear that transit and
transport rights of noncontracting par-
ties, such as the United States, will not
be affected by the provisions of the trea-
ty or its protocols. This fact is reflected
in the U.S. statement which accom-
panied our ratification of Protocol II in
1971.
The treaty of Tlatelolco is dedicated
to preventing the spread of nuclear
weapons and provides a means to
enhance regional security. It is a far-
34
sighted effort on the part of Latin
American nations and is a major con-
tribution to international security and
nonproliferation goals. A peaceful and
secure world is possible only when na-
tions can work together to create a
more stable environment. Tlatelolco is
an outstanding example of a major step
toward that goal and serves as a poten-
tial model for the establishment of
similar agreements in other regions of
the world. We are now actively studying
the possibilities of encouraging the
Egyptian initiative for a nuclear-
weapons-free-zone in the Middle East.
Our preliminary explorations of the sub-
ject indicate that the idea has promise as
an important countermeasure against
proliferation tendencies.
Our ratification will complete fd
U.S. participation in the treaty regi: *[l
and will promote hemispheric solida *'
and good relations with our Latin
American neighbors and will provide
significant benefits for national secu
and nonproliferation objectives. I rei
mend that the Senate take prompt a
favorable action on Protocol I of the
treaty of Tlatelolco, in recognition o!
this important regional arms control
tiative and for the important benefit,
represents to the United States.
'The complete transcript of the heari.
will be published by the committee and w
be available from the Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Printing ()
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■
U.S. -Canada Relations
[!
by Lawrence S. Eagleburger
Address before Ike Center for Inter-
American Relations in New York < 'ity
on October 1. 1981. Ambassador
Eagleburger is Assistant Secretary for
European Affairs.
Since the United States and Canada
appear to be at one of those watersheds
which we reach from time to time in our
relationship, I particularly appreciate
the opportunity to speak to you today. I
can only hope that what I have to say
will serve to improve the quality of our
dialogue, rather than the opposite. That,
at least, is my intention, for how we
manage to live together on this conti-
nent is too important, for both of us, to
become hostage to the vagaries of
special interests or the enthusiasms of
headlines.
The conventional symbol of the
uniqueness of the U.S. -Canada relation-
ship is our 5,500 miles of open, unde-
fended border. Yet that border was far
from peaceful in the early years. The
conversion of the U.S. -Canada border to
a peaceful and unguarded frontier began
with an international negotiation, a con-
structive act of statesmanship, the Rush-
bagot Agreement of 1817. That agree-
ment provided for disarmament on the
Great Lakes and set an example that led
to disarmament on land as well. It
proved the means to overcome hostility
and set the American and Canadian
peoples upon the path of peaceful resolu-
tion of their disputes.
Since 1817 the American and Cana-
dian people have built their relationship
on the foundation of constructive
diplomacy and statesmanship laid out!
the Rush-Bagot Agreement. I do notj
mean to suggest that we no longer ha
problems. Indeed, the newspapers hsd
been overly full lately of accounts of 1
ferences with Canada. You have heaa
some of them ventilated at this con-
ference. But can anyone really believi
that two such vibrant societies as oil
could possibly live in such close prox-
imity, with so many contacts and so J
much business, without inevitably fad
tough and sometimes intractable prol
lems? What is unique about our relatij
ship is not the number or quality of oil
differences but rather the habit we he
developed of handling them with real!
maturity.
In creating this tradition, the Uni
States and Canada have learned to
resolve peacefully even the most conj
tious issues. Indeed, much of the
U.S. -Canada border was established I
through a process of negotiation or an
tration. This was possible only because
both sides were willing to work hard t
find mechanisms and seek solutions ti
were mutually acceptable — 142 years ;
and 22 treaties or other agreements
were required to define and demarcate
the land border between our two coun-
tries.
Today, the United States and
Canada are following this same pattefi
in seeking to delineate offshore bound-
aries. The United States has ratified I
east coast boundary treaty which prol
vides for submitting the disputed boul
ary in the Gulf of Maine to internatiofl
arbitration. We hope for early Canada
Department of State Bulleti'
.
Canada
cation. We would also like to reach
sment with Canada on a means of
tig the disputed offshore boundaries
ie west coast and off Alaska and the
>n.
he great significance of the settle-
of these frontier disputes is that
Jnited States and Canada, as Adlai
enson once observed, "have long
• given up the idea of using force
have accepted in our relations with
mother, the rule of law, of media-
of peaceful adjustment." But
Dting these high principles in theory
t enough. We must work contin-
to implement them.
This, indeed, is my principal theme
y: that improving U.S. -Canada rela-
., or even maintaining them at a
factory level, requires a conscious
justained effort on both sides and at
•I levels. It requires, first of all, an
■t to understand each other better.
30 requires that each country formu-
its domestic policies with due regard
jssible significant adverse impacts
ie other. And most of all, it requires
we be able to talk — and listen — to
other as we lay out our concerns.
The alternative is to risk estab-
lg a pattern of action and reac-
— whether in our newspapers or our
aments— that would, in time, be
;ively painful to all of us. We have,
•xample, a responsibility to our
.le, on both sides, to avoid overreac-
; which could have negative conse-
nces not only for the United States
Canada but potentially for the free
■national trade and investment en-
iment on which both countries
lately depend.
In the United States, the will toward
■;r and more fruitful relations with
ada begins at the highest levels of
government. President Reagan has
t spoken of his special desire for
?r relations among the countries of
;h America. As a symbol of his
re for closer ties with Canada, he
e his first trip abroad as president
■ttawa. We, on the U.S. side, must
repared to make the sustained
rts in all areas of U.S. -Canada rela-
3 that are required to further the
rt President Reagan has personally
an.
Yet, I must admit that Americans do
always make as strong an effort as
should to understand our Canadian
;hbors and the ways their percep-
s differ from our own. We do not
ays appreciate the difficulties caused
Canada by the great disparity in the
of our two countries. We think of
ourselves as a friendly giant, as indeed
we are. Hut, as Prime Minister Trudeau
has pointed out, when a mouse is in bed
with an elephant, however well inten-
tioned the elephant, the mouse must be
conscious of the elephant's everj twitch.
While this image neglects cases in which
the mouse may be biting the elephant, it
conveys something of the feeling that
Canadians have about the relationship
and suggests why it is important always
to bear in mind the effects of our actions
on our neighbors. We must do better in
that regard than we have in the past.
Another important Canadian percep-
tion that is not always well understood
or appreciated by Americans is the
general feeling of unease that many
Canadians have about the high degree of
foreign ownership of Canadian industry.
Fifty-five percent of Canadian manu-
facturing is foreign controlled, and in
certain economic sectors the figure is
higher — 68% in petroleum and natural
gas and 76% in transportation equip-
ment, for example. We may feel that
unease about this phenomenon is unwar-
ranted. We know that the free flow of
foreign investment is a key factor in
development — in creating jobs and in-
creasing national income.
We also know that, in the modern
world, most multinational corporations
go to great lengths to insure that their
operations fully recognize goals and
objectives of the host countries where
they operate and contribute to those
goals. But we must also remember that
every country has the sovereign right to
Canada — A Profile
Geography
Area: 3.8 million sq. mi. (second largest coun-
try in the world). Capital: Ottawa (pop.
695,000). Other Cities: Toronto (2.8 million),
Montreal (2.8 million), Vancouver (1.1
million).
People
Population: 23.9 million (1980). Ethnic
Groups: British (45%), French (29%), other
European (23%), indigenous Indian and
Eskimo (1.5%). Religions: Roman Catholic
(46";,). I'nited Church (18%), Anglican (12%).
Languages: English. French. Literacy: 99%.
Government
Type: Confederation with parliamentary
democracy. Independence: July 1, 1867.
Constitution: British North American Act of
1867 and unwritten custom. Branches: Ex-
ecutive— British monarch (Chief of State
represented by Governor General), Prime
Minister (Head of Government), Cabinet.
Legislative— bicameral Parliament
(104-member Senate, 282-member House of
Commons). Judicial — Supreme Court.
Political Parties: Liberal. Progressive Con-
servative, New Democratic Social Credit.
Suffrage: Universal over 18. Administrative
Divisions: 10 Provinces, 2 Territories.
Economy
GNP (1980): $245.8 billion. Annual Growth
Rate (1980): 0.1%. Per Capita Income (1980
est.): $10,296. Natural Resources: Metals
and minerals, fish, forests, wildlife.
Agriculture: Wheat, livestock and meat,
feedgrains. oilseeds, dairy products, tobacco,
fruits, vegetables. Industries: Motor vehicles
and parts, fish and forest products,
petroleum and natural gas, processed and un-
processed minerals. Trade (1980): Ex-
ports— $64.7 billion: motor vehicles and
parts, lumber, woodpulp and newsprint,
crude and fabricated metals, natural gas,
crude petroleum, wheat. Partners
(1979)— U.S. (67.9%), EC (11.1%), Japan
(6.3%), Latin America (4.5%). Imports —
$57.9 billion: motor vehicles and parts, in-
dustrial machinery, crude petroleum,
chemicals, agricultural machinery. Parians
(1979)— U.S. (72.4%), EC (8.9%), Japan
(3.4%), Latin America (4.7%). Official Ex-
change Rate (floating): C$1.00= US$0,855
(avg. 1980). Development Assistance (FY
1980-81): $1.05 billion, or 0.43% of GNP.
Membership in International
Organizations
U.N., NATO. OECD, Commonwealth of Na-
tions, Agency for Cultural and Technical
Cooperation, International Energy Agency,
INTELSAT.
Principal Government Officials
Canada: Chief of Statt — Queen Elizabeth 11;
Governor General— Edward Schreyer; Prime
Minister— Pierre-Elliott Trudeau; Secretary
of State for External Affairs— Mark
MacGuigan; Ambassador to the U.S.— Peter
M. Towe. United States: Ambassador to
Canada — Paul Robinson. Jr. ■
;mber1981
35
Canada
set the terms under which foreign in-
vestment takes place within its borders.
Thus, we do not challenge the "Cana-
dianization" goals of, for example,
Canada's energy and investment policies.
Our concerns about these programs
relate to the means proposed to achieve
the objectives.
Canadians also sometimes feel that
we in the United States tend to ignore
their problems when we focus on our
domestic or international concerns. I
believe that this is more often a percep-
tion, or a misperception, than a reality. I
can assure you that this Administration
is listening and is trying to deal con-
structively with concerns raised by
Canada. This is not always easy, given
the intense domestic interests often
associated with the issues in question.
Canadian complaints of late have often
centered on the problems of transbound-
ary air pollution and our fisheries rela-
tionship.
Fisheries Relationship
In the fisheries area, the Administration
recognized when it came to office that
very serious concerns had developed in
Canada about the failure of the U.S.
Senate to ratify the east coast boundary
and fisheries agreements. President
Reagan withdrew the fisheries treaty, in
recognition of the fact that it was
unratifiable, and succeeded in achieving
ratification of the boundary treaty. His
action will make possible a fair settle-
ment of the boundary dispute with
Canada in the Gulf of Maine area, on the
basis of international arbitration, and
provide a foundation on which to build
the future fisheries relationship between
the United States and Canada.
The Administration has also worked
out with the Canadian Government a
negotiated settlement of a major dispute
over albacore tuna fishing on the west
coast. This dispute had led in 1979 to
Canadian seizures of U.S. fishing boats
and to a U.S. embargo of tuna imports
from Canada. The albacore tuna treaty,
which has been ratified by both coun-
tries and which went into effect on
July 29, permits U.S. and Canadian
albacore fishermen to fish in each
other's fishery zones for albacore tuna
and to have reciprocal access to a
selected list of each other's ports.
Environmental Concerns
On transboundary air pollution, the
United States and Canada are working
toward the same goals— goals that can
36
only be reached through bilateral coop-
eration. A series of joint U.S. -Canada
working groups have been busily en-
gaged for over a year now in defining
the dimensions of the problem and ex-
ploring possible approaches to deal with
it. Negotiations looking toward a U.S.-
Canada agreement on transboundary air
pollution have been formally opened,
while the U.S. Government has under-
way a renewal of its basic legislation in
this area, the Clean Air Act. As a
number of Administration spokesmen
have stated, Canadian interests will be
kept very much in mind during this
process.
We approach this problem with an
acute awareness of the high level of con-
cern in Canada about acid rain and
acidification of lakes, rivers, and
streams. We know that many areas in
the United States have comparable con-
cerns and, indeed, the original impetus
on this issue came from the U.S. Con-
gress. What we find disturbing about
the air pollution issue is the public-
perception of it in Canada, that virtually
all of the blame for acid rain must be
placed at our doorstep. This perception
is based on what we believe to be a
number of misconceptions. Let me
briefly try to set the record straight.
• The United States is an inter-
national leader and pace setter in con-
trolling air pollution. While our record is
not perfect, our accomplishments are
nevertheless noteworthy.
• A rough comparison of amounts
of sulfur dioxide generated in the United
States and Canada would show us to be
far ahead of Canada in controlling this
pollutant, which is considered the most
important source of acid rain. With 10
times the population of Canada and
more than 10 times the industrial base,
the United States could be expected,
without any pollution controls, to pro-
duce more than 10 times as much sulfur
dioxide as Canada. In fact, we produce
only about 5>/2 times as much. Even at
that level, we recognize, of course, that
we create problems for ourselves and
for our neighbors — problems that will
have to be resolved.
• The United States has strict man-
datory standards for new sources of air
pollution. Scrubbers to remove sulfur
dioxide are required on new coal-burning
power plants in the United States, but
not in Canada, although neither country
requires that they be installed on old
plants. The United States has equipped
84 coal-fired power plants with
scrubbers, and 34 more are being so
:■
equipped. Canada has built or has ur
construction a number of large new ■
burning power plants along the U.S.
Canada border that are not equippec
with scrubbers.
I do not cite these facts out of ar
desire to be critical of Canada's air p
tion control program. Such programs
are expensive and have to be designe
by each country in accordance with i
own national objectives and fiscal con
straints. But it is important for all cc
cerned to understand that dealing wi
transboundary air pollution is sometr
that will require a joint effort by botl
countries, and it is the responsibility
political leaders on both sides of the
border to make this situation clear to
their respective publics. The United
States must do its part but cannot be
expected to carry a disproportionate
share of the burden. Achieving an
equivalent level of control in the two
countries, at an acceptable level, shot
be our common objective.
An outstanding example of succes
ful cooperation in the environmental
area is the U.S. -Canada Great Lakes
water quality agreement. It has led tc
joint actions that have reversed a pat-
tern of deterioration that could have 1
to the biological death of some of the
Great Lakes. We should remember as;
we work on air pollution, that several
years of hard work were required to
reach agreement on dealing with wai
quality in the Great Lakes.
Bilateral Cooperation in Other Area
Most of the broad scope of our relatio(
ship with Canada covers areas of agra
ment and common perceptions, not
disagreement and dispute. We are coo.
erating closely and successfully, throui
the International Joint Commission, 1
whole host of problems involving tran|
boundary water pollution and water
levels and flows. In defense we are thdj
closest of allies, both within NATO anp
in defense of North America. In inter-
national affairs, the United States anci
Canada share common perceptions baa
on our common democratic heritage an
on our common commitment to freed!
We cooperate closely in many areas — ii
support of the peace process in the Mid
die East, in the Namibia contact group,
on international security and disarm-
ament matters, in opposing Soviet
threats to Poland, in calling for SovieM
withdrawal from Afghanistan, in pro-
grams for the resettlement of refugees
from Southeast Asia, and, closer to
home, in new initiatives to assist the I
peoples of the Caribbean Basin.
In bilateral relations, the sheer
Department of State Bullet/
■I
Canada
une of our interactions in all
s — trade, investment, culture,
•ism, family ties, transportation
s — is almost immeasurable. Most of
E transactions take place in harmonj
without giving fist' to problems thai
lire the assistance of governments.
en government attention to our bilat-
relations is required, the results are
t often positive.
nk Public Discussions
ve already alluded to some of the
ilems that exist in U.S.-Canadian
tions. 1 <lo not propose today to
te a catalogue of grievances. My col-
;ues, [Under Secretary for Economic
lirs] Mike Hashish and [Assistant
retary for Economic and Business
lirs] Bob Hormats, have set forth
e of our concerns in U.S. -Canadian
tions in recent speeches. And,
ikly, these views are broadly shared
he Administration and not confined
>wer level officials. I do want to say
ord about how one of those speeches
received in Canada.
Under Secretary Rashish's thought-
jxposition of some very real concerns
we have about the means chosen to
lenient Canada's energy and invest-
it policies, and the effects they would
e on U.S. interests, led to headlines
lanada such as: "US Attacks Enrage
eminent" and "The Bullying of
ada." To describe as "bullying" these
est efforts on our part to discuss our
timate concerns is nonsense. If we
to maintain a mature relationship, as
•lieve we must, the U.S. and Cana-
i Governments must continue to feel
i to speak frankly to each other. We
not be expected to remain silent
ut our important concerns, just as
would not expect Canada to remain
ut about its concerns.
Nor can we confine our exchanges
important issues entirely to private
•ussions behind closed doors. We
e an obligation as democracies to
p our legislative bodies ami our
ilics informed of the main lines of our
icy and of the positions we take on
■ei-s' policies that will have important
sets on our citizens. Moreover,
urate and frank public discussion con-
futes to diminishing the risks of
sunderstanding. And misunderstand-
can make differences appear larger
n they really are.
Canadian Energy and
Investment Policies
There is one other observation that I
wish to make about current problem
areas in our relationship with Canada.
The Canadian public is now aware of our
opposition to some aspects of ( 'anada's
energy and investment policies but may
not understand our reasons. Perhaps
this is because the basic "Canadianiza-
tion" objective lias been so well publi-
cized but less has been said about some
of the means proposed to achieve that
objective. We know that Canadians are
fair-minded people, and we know that
Canadians are strongly committed to
their international obligations and to
playing a responsible role m the world
trading system. Frankly, we have
trouble reconciling some of the means
contemplated to carry out Canadianiza-
tion with those ideals of fair play. Let
me cite several examples.
• We do not oppose "Canadian-
ization" of the oil industry, but we
believe it could and should be achieved
in ways that are consistent with
accepted international principles and are
equitable to those who have made a
major contribution in developing
Canada's energy resources.
• We would ask if Canada's pro-
posed national energy program offers
adequate or fair compensation, under
international standards. The government
proposes to acquire retroactively a 25%
interest in oil that has been discovered
on lands leased from the government. It
offers compensation amounting to only a
small fraction of the estimated market
value of the assets the government
would acquire. A "grandfather clause"
would avoid these problems of retroac-
tive application and compensation.
• We note that Canada has sub-
scribed to the OECD [Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment] investment code which endorses
the principle of nondiscriminatory or
"national" treatment of foreign invest-
ment. Under these circumstances, is it
really unreasonable for us to expect that
Canada should avoid such a major dero-
gation from the principle of nondiscrim-
inatory treatment as is now embodied in
the national energy program?
• With regard to the Foreign
Investment Review Agency (FIRA), we
fully accept Canada's right, within
accepted international standards, to set
rules designed to assure that proposed
new foreign investment is in Canada's
interest. Our concerns about FIRA's
performance review .-■ and t he new ( lorn
mittee on Industrial and Regional
Benefits relate to potential trade distort
inn' effects. To take an example, a re
duced tariff on an item, agreed to by
Canada in a mult ilateral I r.'ide negotia-
tion, would have no value to us if an
agency of the Canadian Government
were to tell Companies that to operate in
Canada they would have to agree to buy
such items only from Canadian sources.
This would impair our rights under the
General Agreement on Tariffs ami
Trade. Another concern is FIRA's
"extraterritorial" application to certain
mergers or acquisitions that take place
abroad. When the firm being acquired
has a Canadian subsidiary, FIRA asserts
the ri^hl t" rule whether the acquiring
firm may retain the Canadian subsid-
iary, even though there has been no
change in the percentage of foreign
ownership, hence, no new investment in
Canada.
Conclusion
I hope that these comments will be
accepted in Canada in the spirit of frank
and neighborly exchange in which they
are offered. All of our current problems
have to be considered in the context of a
uniquely positive and productive long-
term relationship. Living as we do, with
such a high degree of interdependence,
our only reasonable choice is to make
our relationship work to our mutual
advantage.
Speaking at Queens University,
Kingston. Ontario, in 1938, President
Franklin Roosevelt said: "We, as good
neighbors, are true friends, because we
maintain our own rights with
frankness, . . . because we settle our
disputes by consultation, and because we
discuss our common problems in the
spirit of common good." I would suggest
that the Roosevelt formula — frankness,
consultation, and concern for the com-
mon good — remains today as valid for
Canadians and Americans as it did in
1938. Indeed, I would suggest that
neither nation has much choice. As
Benjamin Franklin once observed:
"Either we hang together or we will
hang separately. "■
;ember 1981
37
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35
rH
EAST ASIA
Japan and the United States:
A Durable Relationship
by John H. Holdridge
Speech made befort tht Japan-
America Society of Washington, D.C. on
October 28, 1981. Mr. Holdridge is
Assistant Secretary for East Asian ami
Pat-fir Affairs.
For more than 30 years it has been a
fundamental principle of U.S. policy that
our most important and enduring in-
terest in Asia is the maintenance of a
close, collaborative relationship with
Japan. Let me emphasize at the outset
that this principle is as basic to our
thinking today is it has ever been. This
continuing priority of interest rests, of
course, both on the positive benefits the
relationship brings to the United States
and Japan — and the Pacific area — as
well as on concern about the perils a
noncollaborative relationship would
create for the entire region.
Certainly you know that our pursuit
of this interest has not always proceeded
smoothly and that the relationship fre-
quently has been subject to strains on
each side of the Pacific. Both in and out
of government, we have accordingly,
and naturally enough, tended to focus on
problems and irritants. We often have
heard warnings that the relationship
was frayed at the edges and in imminent
hazard of coming further unraveled.
This is hardly surprising. It is rare that
relations between any two countries are
wholly harmonious and stable, and it
would be both foolish and dishonest to
overlook their negative aspects. Yet,
given the changes in government and
the course of international developments
over the past 30 years, I believe that the
steadiness and reasonableness that have
characterized American-Japanese re-
lations are a credit to both sides.
Despite the ups and downs, our re-
lationship has steadily matured, tem-
pered by the recurring experience of
resolving difficult problems in a mutually
satisfactory way. It is that experience
which enables us to move ahead in
confidence. We obviously cannot take
our relations for granted, nor can we
discount real, and sometimes serious,
differences. But we can expect, if we
give proper consideration to Japanese
concerns in the pursuit of our national
interests, that Japan will do the same
for us. There is, I would contend, a solid
record of achievement to support such
confidence.
38
We surely ought to realize by now
that the U.S. -Japan connection is both
sturdy and resilient. It has withstood a
great deal of testing, and still it
flourishes. The source of strength is ob-
vious, but we often do not pay it suffi-
cient heed. It derives primarily from
shared recognition of a congruity of
political and economic interests. It also
derives from a basic identity of aims,
ideals, and values and, in recent years,
from growing personal acquaintance and
empathy between the two peoples.
Japan is the leading Asian member of
the democratic industrial community of
nations. Like the United States, it seeks
international peace, stability, and justice.
Like the United States, it both con-
tributes to the economic progress and
security of Asia — and increasingly to
other regions — and serves as an exam-
ple of what a practicing democracy, pur-
suing free enterprise economic prin-
ciples, can accomplish.
Since this is the first time I have
spoken publicly on our Japan relation-
ship, permit me now to share with you a
contemporary overview of the state of
that relationship.
Cooperation on International Issues
First of all I would point out, in the
broad range of international relations,
recent Japanese policies and actions
have supported or complemented our
own on almost all major issues and in
almost all geographic areas:
China. When I look back, it is
difficult to realize how seriously and how
recently the issue of China relations still
troubled our relationship — if not at the
government level, certainly in terms of
public opinion and media commentary.
Today, however, we are in close agree-
ment. Having earlier done so itself,
Japan welcomed our decision to nor-
malize relations with Beijing — while
maintaining strong unofficial trade, in-
vestment, and cultural ties with Taiwan.
Both Japan and the United States seek
to encourage China's pragmatic and
moderate approach to international
issues. Both wish to assist China in its
efforts to achieve sustainable economic
growth. It is the first time, probably in a
century or more, that our three coun-
tries have been so much in accord. This
is a circumstance that bodes well for all
of East Asia.
Korea. Both the United States an
Japan recognize the vital importance
peace and security on the Korean pen
sula. Relations between the Republic c
Korea and Japan are complicated by
their historical experience, but the
Japanese have joined with us in contir
uing efforts to assist in Korea's econor
development. Indeed, Japan's contribu
tions in the way of concessional and
commercial loans, official development
assistance, and direct investment have
been significant factors in Korea's rapi
development. Recently, Seoul has soug
to pursuade Japan to greatly expand i
economic assistance, having in mind
Korea's contribution to security in nor
east Asia. We are confident that Korei
requests will be given serious consider
tion by Japan and that a resolution wil
be reached in the spirit of compromise
and in recognition of the shared in-
terests of the two countries. However,
this is an issue which they must
themselves resolve, and we have made
clear that we will not intervene in beh;
of either.
U.S.S.R. Japan has attempted to
improve its relations with the Soviet
Union, recently announcing plans to
resume talks at the vice minister level
discontinued in 1978. Japan has also
sought to avoid being drawn into the
Sino-Soviet rivalry. At the same time,
has been resolute in asserting its
rightful claim to the Soviet-occupied
northern territories. And, while much
has been said recently about differing
U.S. and Japanese perceptions of the
Soviet threat, we both have recognized
the destabilizing effect of the Soviet
military buildup; we both have con-
demned the Soviet use of force directly
and through surrogates to achieve its
end; and we both have taken overt ac-
tion in response to Soviet aggression in
Afghanistan. Indeed, the Japanese
response to events in Afghanistan was
most resolute: They promptly con-
demned the Soviet invasion, joined the
Olympic boycott, and have actively par-
ticipated in the imposition of economic
sanctions.
ASEAN. From the start, the Unite<
States and Japan have worked in
parallel to assist the peaceful nations oil
Southeast Asia which united to form th<
Association of South East Asian Nation!
(ASEAN). Japan's relations with the
ASEAN countries have continued to be
manifested through economic means, inl
eluding a major contribution to the In-
dochina refugee relief program. Japan
has, however, also begun to play a
Department of State Bui
E.
East Asia
deal and diplomatic role in the area,
both seek to promote the economic
-being and independence of the
AN members, and our ap-
iches— for example, ministerial level
ndance at ASEAN meeting's — rein-
e each other. Japan has given firm
port to ASEAN's efforts to achieve a
ceful settlement in Kampuchea and
agreed to serve on the ad hoc com-
ee of the international conference on
npuchea.
Middle East. We are certainly
re of Japan's important interests in
Middle East. Recognition of the im-
tance of that region's stability to
an's welfare has led Japan to ex-
e, tentatively, independent initiatives
he area. A PLO [Palestine Liberation
anization] office was permitted to
n some years ago in Tokyo. More
ntly, despite reservations we ex-
ssed concerning possible adverse im-
ations, Japan agreed to a "private"
t by Arafat. Notwithstanding our dif-
nces of approach to the PLO issue,
are in full agreement in support for
I. Resolution 242 and for the Camp
'id agreement as the first step
ard a comprehensive peace settle-
it. Japan has also stood by the Egyp-
Government during the transition
iod following President Sadat's
issination.
Europe and Canada. As I indicated
slier, Japan has increasingly come to
i resent the Asian counterpart of the
] nsatlantic democratic industrial
Item. And, aware of its community of
hrest with the Western European
| ntries and Canada on a range of
iblems — resources, energy, food, en-
I jnment, and the like— its cooperative
f. ttions with these countries collective-
; lave expanded both economically and
I lomatically. This phenomenon has
■n reflected in active participation in
OECD [Organization for Economic
operation and Development] and in
■ regular economic summit
letings — most recently in Ottawa— oi
■ major Western democracies. Similar-
Japan has been an active and concern-
participant in the United Nations and
specialized agencies. It was in this
rit of growing cooperation with the
est that Japan stood with us in our
Sponse to the Afghanistan invasion. It
is in this spirit that Japan joined in
a condemnation of and coordinated
sponse, including the imposition of
onomic sanction, to the seizure of our
ibassy in Tehran.
Africa and Latin America. In
Africa and Latin America, Japan's in-
terests have been primarily economic,
although there have been indications
that Japan is striving to establish a
broader presence in these areas as well.
Japan is interested in assisting .African
countries on the Indian Ocean littoral, a
policy which complements our own
strategic efforts there. In April, Japan
pledged $33 million for assistance to
refugees in Africa. In the Caribbean,
Japan also recently embarked on a
bilateral aid relationshp with Jamica, ex-
tending a $10 million loan to that nation.
On the U.S. proposal for a Caribbean
Basin initiative, Japan has expressed in-
terest as a donor and participant.
All of this, it seems to me, con-
stitutes evidence of the fact that Japan
is moving — albeit prudently — toward
the assumption of a political role com-
mensurate with its status as a major
power with global responsibilities.
Moreover, it is worth noting not only did
Japan double its foreign aid between
1976 and 1980, but more and more it
has focused its assistance in areas of
strategic and political significance such
as Pakistan, Turkey, Thailand, and
Egypt. For our part, living in today's
multipolar world, it is important to be
able to count on such a large measure of
collaboration. We welcome Japan's
emerging role as an increasingly active
participant in global issues.
Continuing Consultation
All of this notwithstanding, some critics
charge that, despite rhetoric about in-
tensified collaboration between our two
countries, in fact, little real consultation
takes place. To the extent that we un-
doubtedly can do better in exchanging
views and discussing policy objectives
with all of our friends and allies, their
assertions have some merit.
But I also believe that their criticism
is found wanting in two important
respects. On one hand, it takes insuffi-
cient account of the fact that there are
always going to be decisions and infor-
mation that no sovereign nation can
share with another for a variety of prac-
tical bureaucratic, political, and security
reasons. On the other hand, within the
boundaries of such constraints, it fails to
give proper weight to the wide range of
consultation that, in fact, does take
place between the United States and
Japan.
In recent months a succession of
meetings have occurred between our
leaders in Washington, Tokyo, and other
world capitals. The President and Prime
Minister Suzuki have met twice;
Secretary of State llaig and foreign
Minister Sonoda have talked together
nine times; Secretary of Defense
Weinberger has conferred with Japanese
defense officials as has Deputy Defen e
Secretary Carlucci; the Secretary of
Agriculture and special trade represent-
ative have traveled to Japan; and the
Secretary of Commerce is there right
now. Moreover, there has been a series
of subcabinel exchanges and of visits
back and forth by members of our Con-
gress and of the Japanese Diet. And in
the State Department we have regular
specialist consultations with appropriate
Japanese counterparts on every major
region. Just this autumn we have con-
ducted or scheduled separate exchanges
on Asia, the Soviet Union, Western
Europe, Latin America, China, the
United Nations, and policy planning.
Talks on the Middle East and Africa are
set for dates later on.
I can assure you that these meetings
at all levels are characterized by candid
give-and-take and, in aggregate, cover
virtually every issue on either our
international or bilateral agendas. In
short, I believe that the consultative
process with Japan is among the most
active we maintain with any country.
Security and the Security Treaty
One of the subjects about which we con-
sult most often is that of security. But
before touching on some of the steps we
have taken to promote our common
defense interests, I want to say a few
words about the mutual security treaty
itself. Members of the Japan-America
Society are, of course, familiar with the
central place the treaty has occupied in
the U.S. -Japan relationship for these
many years. It has promoted the direct
defense interests of both countries, sym-
bolized Japan's link to the United States
and the West, and been a key factor in
maintaining regional stability. None of
this has changed. While you have heard
it before, let me confirm that the U.S.
Government is as strongly committed to
the maintenance of the mutual security
treaty with Japan as it ever has been.
Public discussion of Japanese
defense of late has focused almost ex-
clusively on the question of Japanese de-
fense spending. While this is an impor-
tant issue, preoccupation with it has
obscured some of the real progress
Japan has made in contributing to our
mutual defense interests. For example,
long-needed joint planning got underway
with the adoption of guidelines for
member 1981
39
East Asia
U.S. -Japan defense cooperation in 1978.
Since that time, regular discussions have
been held on how best to meet various
contingencies through cooperation in
such essential areas as logistics, com-
munications, command-and-control, and
intelligence. There have also been a con-
comitant series of joint naval, air, and
ground exercises between I .S. and
Japanese forces.
Another area that merits mention is
the extent to which the Japanese
Government contributes to the presence
of U.S. forces in Japan. This effort has
grown over the years and now comes to
about $1 billion annually. In 1977, Japan
agreed to share labor costs for our bases
and in 1978 expanded that share. At the
same time, Japan has done more and
more to replace our aging facilities
there. Nor can we overlook Japan's long-
term program of modernization for its
self-defense forces, a program entailing
major purchases of sophisticated U.S.
systems. We have also begun to move
toward a greater degree of cooperation
in the development of defense-related
technology, an approach that should
become increasingly important over the
next several years. In all these areas,
progress has thus been substantial and
gratifying.
Nevertheless, we continue to believe
that Japan can and should do more.
While it is true that we are not fully
satisified with Japan's present level of
defense expenditures, our ongoing
security dialogue with the Japanese does
not dwell on specific amounts and
percentages but more properly is fo-
cused on such fundamental questions as
our respective roles and missions. Cer-
tainly, the Japanese are willing to do
more to share our common security
burden. Prime Minister Suzuki's support
for heightened defense effort in his joint
communique with President Reagan last
spring was but one manifestation of that
will. I also recall his remarks before the
National Press Club in Washington that
Japan was willing to assume the respon-
sibility for defense of the home islands
out to a distance of 1,000 nautical miles.
We see urgent needs, especially in
protection of Japanese territory and
vital sealanes through stronger cap-
abilities in antisubmarine warfare and
air defense as well as improved combat
readiness. Still, we respect the obvious
fact that the final decisions are up to the
Japanese, just as the U.S. defense
budget is a product of our own deci-
sions. We are also certainly cognizant of
constitutional and policy constraints
with which the Japanese Government
40
I
must deal. We have no intention of call-
ing them into question, nor will we
disregard the sensitivities of Japan's
neighbors in the Asia/Pacific region.
I am confident that we will continue
to solidify a close defense relationship.
In so doing, we will continue to utilize
the many channels for consultation that
we possess, ranging from exchanges at
the level of the Secretaries of State and
Defense to the semiweekly meetings of
the joint committee charged with man-
aging our relations under the status-of-
forces agreement. Defense-ralated in-
cidents such as the tragic sinking of the
Nissho Maru may occur, but with good
will on both sides we should be able to
manage them in a way which prevents
damage to our mutual security interests.
The Economic Front
As members of this society are well
aware, the U.S. and Japanese economies
are intertwined to a degree never before
experienced in international trade. With
well over $60 billion in total bilateral
trade likely this year, this relationship
constitutes our largest single overseas
trading relationship. Over time we have
dealt successfully with a range of
specific trade issues that have emerged
from that relationship, including textiles,
steel, color television, and automobiles.
But on both sides we are alert to the
possibility that other such issues might
arise again, and concert to devise ways
of avoiding them or ameliorating their
impact.
This year will see a record U.S.
deficit with Japan with estimates as high
as $15 billion. Measured against total
trade, the amount seems a bit less over-
whelming, perhaps, but it is still a for-
midable sum.
In contrast to recent similar periods,
however, there are no specific issues on
which attention is focused right now.
Our recent discussions, consequently,
have centered on more general ways of
expanding our markets in Japan, such as
removal of nontariff barriers, changes in
Japanese consumption habits, and ways
in which we can work together to over-
come reluctance of Japanese manufac-
turers to change traditional procurement
practices.
At the same time, we are addressing
U.S. structural factors influencing our
own competitive position. The Ad-
ministration has established programs
encouraging capital investment, produc-
tivity improvements, and so on. In
Japan, Minister of International Trade
and Industry Tanaka earlier this year
encouraged Japanese producers to in-
crease imports of manufactured goods.
These policies and actions all will take
time, however, to show results. There
are no quick fixes.
In the Japanese view, some U.S. I
policies, tight money especially, have i
made the situation more difficult. Theslit;
policies, they say, have helped hold
down the value of the yen, making
Japanese goods even more attractive |
and U.S. goods less competitive, as w?
as encouraging capital to flow to the
United States.
In grappling with these issues, thl
United States continues to persist in it
dedication to free trade, in its resistaij
to protectionist pressures, and in its eii
phasis that ultimately it is the global
balance which is critical. We also give
credit to the substantial progress madi
so far. Japan's performance in GATT
[General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade] has been impressive, and there
has been considerable progress in opes
ing Japanese markets to such products)
as beef, citrus, and tobacco. We shall
continue to pursue our ultimate objec-1
fives of full liberalization. The opening*
of NTT (Japan's telephone and telegraj
corporation) procurement to foreign bi>
ders deserves special mention. And it I
appears, we have reached a forward- I
looking agreement on semiconductors^
Nevertheless, there is no ground ft
complacency. The fact remains that Ufl
markets are entered easily, and the
perception persists that Japanese
markets are closed. There are, in fact,,
still some real barriers in the form of I
maining quotas, in the application of I
standards, and so on.
We know that manufacturing, dist|
bution, and consumption are based on i
complex and traditional practices and
relationships. We assuredly do not ex-
pect Japan to change its socioeconomic
system. But we do hope that it will sus
tain progress toward internationalizing
attitudes and take the initative in seek-
ing ways to facilitate increasing import
As in other fields, we have estab- I
lished consultative mechanisms to deal!
with trade issues. We are now holding
economic consultations at the subcabine>
level twice a year. Those consultations^
in turn, have produced a new trade suft
committee, the U.S. side headed by
Deputy U.S. Trade Representative
David R. Macdonald. That subcommittei
hopes to meet before the end of the yea
to review trade policy issues, including
the bilateral balance. Additionally, the
Commerce Department leads a special
Trade Facilitation Committee, which
deals with specific trade complaints. The
senior working group of the Trade
Facilitation Committee may meet in
Department of State Bulletin
iclii
East Asia
ember following Secretary of Com-
ce Baldridge's current visit to
yo.
There are several bilateral matters
:h, because of time constraints, I can
tion only in a cursory way. But [do
t to underline the excellent progress
have had with the Japenese in our
ussion of spent nuclear fuel re-
essing. Indeed, we are signing a
interim agreement this week and
be following up with talks aimed at
■ventual agreement which will run in-
nitely. We are moving forward in
?r areas as well — civil aviation
otiations, fisheries talks, and scien-
and technological exchange.
elusion
urn, then, let me reiterate where I
k we are. The U.S. -Japan relation-
i, based on congruent interests and
red values, is still the core element of
Asia policy. Despite problems and ir-
nts, the relationship has stood up
I. It is tougher and more resilient
i we often realize.
Even though, or perhaps because,
an is taking on a gradually expand-
role in international affairs, we both
e benefited from close cooperation on
iriety of economic and political
tes. Much of this cooperation has
'n the product of a range of consulta-
is almost unparalleled in our relations
h other friends and allies.
There are, of course, areas of the re-
onship that require continuous tend-
While a good deal of progress has
aady been made, there is substantially
re that can be done to promote the
nmon defense. While our economic
; cannot be separated neatly out of
bal trends and developments, and
ile there are no major trade issues
nediately before us, we cannot rest
our laurels. Quite to the contrary, our
nomic policies and interchange re-
re close scrutiny and action to avoid a
>etition of past strains.
In my view, a continuing relation-
ip of mutual confidence and credibility
;ween Japan and the United States is
;ential to the maintenance of peace in
ist Asia. A solid foundation exists to
stain such a relationship. To insure
at the relationship will continue to
rve the national interests of each, we
ast be aware of our mutual depend-
ice; we must be considerate and pa-
int; we must be willing to hear each
her out. I think that our record to
te in sustaining and expanding this
;al relationship holds solid promise for
e future.!
Developments in Indochina
by John H. Holdridge
Statement before the Subcommittee
on East Asia anil Pacific Affairs of the
House Foreign Affairs Committee mi
October 22, 1981. Ambassador Holdridge
is Assistant Secretary for East Asian
and Pacific Affairs.'
I am pleased to appear here today to
discuss recent developments in Indo-
china. Since I last appeared on July 15
before this subcommittee on the subject
of Indochina, there have been a number
of important developments indicating a
consolidation of the international consen-
sus in opposing Vietnam's invasion and
occupation of Kampuchea. Those recent
events have demonstrated that the ob-
jectives of U.S. policy in Kampuchea are
shared by the overwhelming majority of
the world community. Those objectives
are:
• To preserve the security of the
ASEAN states [Association of South
East Asian Nations], and particularly
that of Thailand, which now directly
confronts Vietnam's army of occupation
in Kampuchea;
• The withdrawal of Vietnamese
forces from Kampuchea;
• Khmer survival and national self-
determination; and
• Reduction of Soviet military
influence and elimination of Soviet
military access in Indochina.
ASEAN Strategy and Kampuchea
The first principle of our Kampuchea
policy is to support the strategy adopted
by ASEAN. This Administration, like
the previous one, has given its whole-
hearted endorsement to the ASEAN-
sponsored U.N. General Assembly
resolutions on Kampuchea as the best
basis for a settlement of the Kampuchea
problem. Three events during the past
few months demonstrated the wide sup-
port which ASEAN's approach to the
Kampuchea problem enjoys in the
United Nations.
• In July, the U.N. -sponsored Inter-
national Conference on Kampuchea,
which was mandated by a U.N. General
Assembly resolution, was attended by 93
countries (79 as regular attendees and
14 as observers) representing over two-
thirds of the U.N. membership and the
majority of the nonaligned movement.
The conference declaration, approved by
consensus, provides the framework for a
negotiated settlement based on the with-
drawal of foreign troops, Khmer self-
determination through free elections,
and security guarantees for states in the
area. The conference created an ad hoc-
committee as a mechanism to pursue a
settlement and to recommend when
future sessions of the conference should
be convened. Vietnam did not attend the
July session of the conference, but the
door has been left open for Hanoi to join
the conference process at such time that
it recognizes that a political settlement
would be in its own best interest.
• In September, the U.N. General
Assembly voted overwhelmingly for the
third year in a row to seat the U.N.
delegation of Democratic Kampuchea.
The vote this year in favor of seating
them, 79 in favor versus 36 opposed and
31 abstentions, was actually greater
than in previous years. This diplomatic-
success is one more tribute to the ability
of the ASEAN states to persuade coun-
tries from every region of the world of
the soundness of their Kampuchea
strategy. This year, as in the past, the
great majority of U.N. member states
supported seating the Democratic Kam-
puchea delegation, not because of any
affection for the brutal Khmer Rouge
regime but rather because they wished
to block any move to confer legitimacy
on the regime installed in Phnom Penh
by the Vietnamese army and which is, of
course, a complete creature of Vietnam.
• The U.N. General Assembly
adopted yesterday [October 21] by a lop-
sided vote an ASEAN resolution on
Kampuchea which reiterates the call for
withdrawal of Vietnamese forces and
Khmer self-determination and endorses
the decisions of the International Con-
ference on Kampuchea in July.
The strengthening of the interna-
tional consensus opposed to Vietnam's
actions in Kampuchea is in part due to
growing international condemnation of
Vietnam's aggression and also in part is
a reflection of progress in the formation
of a coalition of Kampuchean resistance
groups. In the first week of September,
the leaders of the three main Kam-
puchean resistance elements— Son Sann,
Khmer Rouge Premier Khieu Samphan,
and Prince Sihanouk— met in Singapore.
They set up an ad hoc committee to
work toward formation of a coalition.
The committee has met six times in
cember1981
41
East Asia
Bangkok, and, although important
differences still must be ironed out, the
three groups have made some progress
toward a coalition.
The development of the non-
Communist Khmer resistance groups
will be a long process which will require
patience, as will all of the aspects of
ASEAN's Kampuchea strategy. Without
a viable non-Communist alternative, the
Kampuchean conflict would have but
two possible victors: Pol Pot or
Vietnam's Heng Samrin. The United
States will never support a strategy
which restores the former to power. Nor
can we accept Vietnam's aggression.
Pressures on Vietnam
A great variety of diplomatic, economic,
and military pressures have been
brought to bear on the Vietnamese by a
large consortium of countries. No one of
these pressures will persuade Hanoi that
it should negotiate, but we believe that
the combination— maintained with
firmness and resolve— will achieve the
objectives of ASEAN and of ASEAN's
supporters.
Vietnam today faces grave and
steadily worsening economic problems-
one of the lowest standards of living in
the world, a serious balance-of-payments
problem, an almost total lack of hard
currency. Hanoi has brought these prob-
lems upon itself through its own
disastrous mismanagement and through
its decision to give its colonialist adven-
ture in Kampuchea priority over the
welfare of the Vietnamese people. The
major Western countries, and increas-
ingly the multilateral organizations as
well, have not been willing to give
development assistance to Vietnam as
long as Hanoi squanders its own scarce
resources in maintaining an army of oc-
cupation in Kampuchea.
Hanoi has brought these disasters
upon itself. In pursuit of political ambi-
tions in Kampuchea, the Vietnamese
have chosen also to increase their
dependence on the Soviet Union. Ex-
tremely alarming indications of use of
chemical/biological weapons in Kam-
puchea and Laos also appear to be the
fruits of Soviet-Vietnamese military
cooperation in Southeast Asia.
The situation on the ground in Kam-
puchea patently refutes Hanoi's claims
about the "irreversibility" of the situa-
tion in Kampuchea. Political and military
resistance activity involving both Demo-
cratic Kampuchea and, increasingly, Son
Sann's KPNLF [Kampuchea People's
National Liberation Front] forces, has
spread to most of the country during the
course of 1981. Major roads are cut, am-
bushes are frequent, and the rail link to
the west frequently closed. While the
future of the non-Communist resistance
remains an open question and its ac-
tivities largely defensive, its numbers
are increasing and its training and
organization and discipline improving.
Vietnam's own forces are plagued by
malaria, inadequate food and medicines,
poor morale, and desertions. The fledg-
ling Heng Samrin puppet regime con-
tinues to lack acceptance by the Kam-
puchean people.
The ASEAN, European Economic
Community, Japan, and we ourselves
have made it clear to Hanoi that a
political settlement in Kampuchea could
eventually lead to better relations with
the West and even the resumption of
suspended foreign assistance, thereby
reducing Hanoi's now near-total depend-
ence on Moscow. The international com-
munity, led by ASEAN, has offered
Vietnam an honorable way to reverse its
disastrous policies. It would not jeopard-
ize any of Vietnam's legitimate interests
and would pave the way for stability and
prosperity throughout Southeast Asia.
Hanoi knows that it has this choice.
Thus far, there is no evidence that any
element of the Hanoi leadership is will-
ing to change the course of Vietnam's
bankrupt policies.
It is the policy of this Administra-
tion that normalization of relations with
Vietnam is out of the question as long as
Hanoi continues to occupy Kampuchea
and generally remains a menace to other
countries of the region. Despite the
absence of diplomatic relations, we do
maintain a dialogue with Hanoi to deal
with significant issues, including two
humanitarian issues — the accounting for
American prisoners-of-war and missing-
in-action (POW-MIAs) and the orderly
departure from Vietnam of persons in
whom the United States has a direct in-
terest. I will discuss the MIA issue at
the conclusion of my remarks.
Concerning the orderly departure
program, we are pleased that an ar-
rangement was worked out late last
year, through the mediation of the U.N.
High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR), which made possible the
movement to this country in December
and January of almost 2,000 Vietnamese
under the program. Very recently,
Hanoi has again shown interest in the
program, and the UNHCR interviews; >i
Ho Chi Minh City have resumed. The
dimensions of the program remain
small, however. The orderly departurel«
flights have begun again, and this pro4
gram will provide a safe means of exit
for at least a few people who otherwisi
might resort to perilous voyages as bo;
refugees.
42
Laos
Before concluding, I would like to say|
few words about Laos. As you know, &
continue to maintain a small Embassy
Vientiane, although in recent years reli
tions have been very limited because oil
Laos' close relations with Hanoi. We dc>
not seek the overthrow of the Lao
Government, with which we maintain
relations. Vietnam has 50,000 soldiers i
Laos and the principal Lao Communist
Party leaders seem to identify their owl
interests with those of Hanoi. Recently,
there have been signs that the Soviet
Union is attempting to develop its owni
separate presence in Laos, including a
marked increase in Soviet involvement
in military buildup there.
Despite these powerful foreign
influences, Laos does retain at least
some degree of autonomy, and many
officials there appear to welcome closer
relations with the West. Laos depends
for its economic survival on maintaining
a modus vivendi with Thailand. This
relationship with the Thais, who are
ethnic cousins of the Lao, gives Vien-
tiane some distance from Hanoi. We
maintain our Embassy in Vientiane to .
contribute to this effort and to offer
some small counterbalance to the Soviet
Vietnamese influence. We are exploring
a few possibilities for marginal improve
ment in our relations with Laos in ways-
which could conceivably increase Vien-
tiane's cooperation in POW-MIA mattefl
as well as meet some of the humani-
tarian needs of Laos.
POW-MIAs
I will conclude my remarks by address-
ing the subject of POW-MIAs, which rej
mains one of the most painful legacies A
our long involvement in Indochina. This)
Administration is committed to obtain-
ing the fullest possible accounting for al
the POW-MIAs. We will take every ap-l
propriate measure to achieve that ac-
counting. We have stressed to the Viet-I
namese and Lao Governments in the
strongest possible terms their humani- I
tarian responsibility to provide all infor-j
mation available to them. In July, the
Department of State Bulletin
J I
East Asia
knamese made a very small gesture
he right direction by returning the
pains of three Americans, but we are
winced that they have not told us
rything they know. In the case of
|is. the government there has actually
n less cooperative than Hanoi, but, as
Lid earlier, we are exploring some
as to induce a greater interest on
lir and Vietnam's part.
We view the MIA issue as a humani-
ian one which should not be linked
h political or economic matters. At
same time, we have made it clear to
h Laos and Vietnam that this is a
tter of utmost importance to the
lerican people, Congress, and Govern-
nt.
'The complete transcript of the hearings
he published by the committee and will
wailable from the Superintendent of
■umeiits, U.S. Government Printing ( >f-
Washington, D.C. 20402. ■
Visit of Thai
Irime Minister
Thai Prime Minister Prem
I isulanonda made a private visit to the
I ited States October 3-10, 1981. While
r Washington, D.C, October 5-8, he
i t with President Reagan and other
1 'ernment officials.
Following is President Reagan's
i st given at a luncheon at the White
\ use honoring the Prime Minister on
Vober 6V
[ behalf of the American people, it is a
E asure and an honor to welcome you
I i your colleagues to the White House
May. I have enjoyed this opportunity to
I ; to know you. Our conversations rein-
I ced for me the importance of main-
6 ning the security, stability, and
itional development of Thailand. Let
I • assure you that we value your
insel and views on trends and
relopments in your region.
Your country is truly named "Land
the Free." Blessed by nature, the Thai
ople are peaceful, hard-working, and
ve never menaced their neighbors,
essed equally by brilliant and dynamic
ders, their nation has remained inde-
ndent for more than seven centuries.
Thailand's relations with our own
untry date back more than 100 years
d have been characterized by warm
endship and close cooperation. Our
jcember 1981
sons and daughters have studied side-by-
side in each others' schools and univer-
sities; our soldiers have fought and died
together in two wars. We share a rela-
tionship that's truly rare between two
countries, especially since we're
separated by 12,000 miles of ocean.
Your open society and free enter-
prise system are a shining example for
the rest of Asia. The other day I had the j
great privilege of addressing the 36th
annual meeting of the International
Monetary Fund and the World Bank
that was held here in Washington. And
one of the points I made to that
distinguished audience was: the societies
which have achieved the most spec-
tacular, and broad-based economic prog-
ress, in the shortest period of time, are
not the most tightly controlled, not
necessarily the biggest in size or the
wealthiest in natural resources — what
unites them all is their willingness to
believe in the magic of the marketplace.
I could have been speaking about
your Thailand. You can be very proud of
what you and your government and your
people have achieved. The American
people are very proud to have con-
tributed in a small way to your success.
And let me just add that we intend,
within our means, to maintain this con-
tribution.
Now a menacing shadow threatens
your country. We've talked about that
this morning — threatens the world, for
that matter — the aggressive actions of
the Vietnamese Communists, backed by
Soviet sponsors, and they pose a menace
to your security, stability, and territorial
integrity. Supported by your ASEAN
[Association for South East Asian
Nations] partners, you stand in the front
lines of the great ideological struggle of
our century — one between free people
who wish to live in peace in societies of
law, and on the other side, the totali-
tarians who despise human freedom and
seek to subvert or destroy it everywhere
they can.
With Vietnamese occupation of
Kampuchea, you and your ASEAN part-
ners buried your differences and joined
together to face the common danger.
The outcome of the International Con-
ference on Kampuchea, in the over-
whelming vote to prevent the Viet-
namese puppet regime in that country
from gaining a U.N. seat, and the con-
tinuing efforts to rally the Khmer people
against the illegal occupation of their
country, all prove to be noble resources
of the ASEAN endeavor.
The nations in your region are coop-
erating to defend their security, and the
President Reagan with Prime
Minister Tinsulanonda
way is open for ultimate success. I can
assure you that America is ready to help
you and ASEAN to maintain your in-
dependence against Communist aggres-
sion. The Manila Pact in its clarification
nf our bilateral communique of 1962 is a
living document. We will honor the
obligations that it conveys.
The American people join me, I'm
sure, in conveying a warm greeting to
the royal family and the people of
Thailand. Nancy, my wife, would also
like you to convey a message. She looks
forward with great pleasure to the visit
of Her Majesty, Queen Sirikit, to the
White House on November 5th.
I'm going to depart a little bit from
normal custom here in proposing a
toast. In view of the tragedy that has
just happened, there is a — normally, you
know, we rise for a toast. In one city in
our land, Philadelphia, they have had a
tradition for years that you only stand
to toast the dead. So therefore. I'm
going to propose a toast today with all
of us still seated.2 And it is to you, Mr.
Prime Minister, to Their Royal High-
nesses, Their Majesties, the King and
Queen, and to the people, and to the
continuation of close relations between
our two countries.
'Text from Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents of Oct. 12, 1981.
-At the time of the luncheon toast, the
Egyptian Government had not officially an-
nounced the death of President Sadat, so the
President remained seated. ■
43
ECONOMICS
U.S. Trade and Foreign Policy
Statements by Myer Rashish, Under
Secretary for Economic Affairs, and
Robert D. Hor-mats, Assistant Secretary
for Economic and Business Affn irs
before the Subcommittee on Trade of the
House Ways and Means Committee on
October 29, 198 1.1
UNDER SECRETARY RASHISH
It is a pleasure to be able to speak to
you today on U.S. trade policy. As you
know, I feel especially strongly about
working with this subcommittee after
the years I spent as its staff director.
The ambitious scope of these hearings is
itself an indication of the growing im-
portance of trade to the United States.
The world trading system spins over our
entire globe a web of relationships which
are both competitive and complemen-
tary. This interweaving of interests
brings with it numerous advantages, but
also, inevitably some problems. Trade
policy is thus an integral element of
foreign policy. As the Cancun summit
graphically illustrates, today's foreign
policy is increasingly confronted with
economic issues in which trade policy is
an inextricable part.
These trade policy issues are of vital
importance to every American. At U.S.
urging, trade liberalization, economic
freedom with an international dimen-
sion, characterizes the postwar era in
economic relations. We made great
progress in the recently concluded
Tokyo Round in eliminating many re-
maining tariff barriers to trade expan-
sion. We now must take advantage of
the opportunities presented by reduc-
tions in tariffs and elimination of non-
tariff barriers by effectively promoting
American trade. We must also insure
that in doing so we safeguard our
crucial security interests. We must find
ways of assisting the developing coun-
tries to utilize more fully the oppor-
tunities which trade offers them for
rapid progress in development. We must
make progress in securing international
action to reduce further the nontariff
barriers to trade, particularly in the
service area. We must face up to the
hard problems in particular product
areas: textiles, steel, European Com-
munities' (EC) agricultural commodities,
automobiles. And we must look behind
trade in goods and services to facilitate
an undistorted flow of investment
among nations.
In considering the growing impor-
tance of trade to the United States, it is
useful to consider the evolution which
has taken place. Trade has, of course,
always been important; indeed, taxes on
imported tea and a famous tea party in
Boston harbor helped to launch us on
the path to nationhood. The continental
expanse of America has provided a
market more accessible and more attrac-
tive and more compatible than distant
markets overseas. The focus of most of
our businessmen for much of our history
has been inward, a disposition which
became increasingly pronounced in this
century.
That focus has changed to an extra-
ordinary extent in the short space of one
decade. In 1970 the ratio of U.S.
exports to gross national product (GNP)
was 4.3%, a percentage still low enough
to be considered of marginal importance.
Exports have grown since then at an un-
precedented pace and have doubled in
importance to our economy. Today the
ratio of exports to GNP is 8.2%, and
that percentage is destined to increase
still further in the decade of the 1980s.
What has happened in the United
States has happened elsewhere. Coun-
tries which were already heavily en-
gaged in trade have become even more
so. Countries which by reason of under-
development or large internal markets
were minor trading nations have become
trade oriented. Indeed, except for the
poorest nations, virtually all countries
have seen trade become of substantially
greater importance to their economic
growth and well-being with their exports
generally equal in value to 20% to 50%
or more of their GNP.
The rapid growth in world trade
brought with it not only unprecedented
prosperity but also specific problems of
adjustment. Our exports are someone
else's imports, just as theirs are for us.
But when we are confronted with
domestic problems arising out of rapid
import growth, as we have been recent-
ly, it is well to remember that the
overall story is one of rapid growth in
both the export and the import side of
our trade package.
In effect, what is happening in the
world economy today— slowly, unevenly,
hesitatingly— is a repeat of U.S. history
of 200 years ago. Restrictions on trade"
provide short-term advantages; in the
long run they retard growth. A conti-
nental trading economy is more efficien
and more productive than one compose*
of numerous states; a world trading
economy is more efficient yet. By 1979<
the average tariff levels in the develope
countries stood at 10.6%, a dramatic
drop from postwar levels. The cuts
agreed to in the Tokyo Round of
multilateral trade negotiations will
further reduce tariff levels to 4.5% by
1987. Though the world is not yet one
market, we have progressed farther
toward that goal than would have
seemed possible 35 years ago.
It is evident, I believe, that all the
agencies concerned with trade policy
agree on its importance and on the neeo
for continuing liberalization of the worlj
trade system. The special role of the
Department of State is to mesh our
trade and economic interests with our '
foreign policy. Our role is based on a
belief that unless our trade policy and
foreign policy develop in tandem, neithe
will achieve its objectives. It follows
from this that the State Department is ,
actively involved both in formulating ou|
approach to the trade policy issues we I
believe will loom large in the coming
years and in devising and implementing
measures to resolve our problems with
particular countries. We pay especially
close attention to the settings in which
we deal with other countries in pursuing
our trade interests, whether multilateral
forums for consultations such as the
Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD), the bilateral
economic commissions we have with
many countries, or special meetings
dealing with topics requiring particular
attention, such as the recent summit at
Cancun and at the September U.N. Cora
ference on the Least Developed Coun- I
tries in Paris. From the nadir of protec-'
tionism in the 1930s, we have success- I
fully moved to our present relatively
open world trading system by recogniz-
ing that trade liberalization is an incre- i
mental process in which an appropriate ;
political climate in the relevant fora can!
be as important as the underlying econ-j
omic realities.
Among the major areas of foreign
policy/trade policy interaction are East-
West trade; trade relations with the
developing countries and integration of I
the developing countries into the world
trading system; nontariff distortions and
barriers, where progress will require
multilateral efforts; and problems of
food and agricultural trade.
■H
li
44
Department of State Bulletin
Economics
t-West Trade
it-West trade involves both strategic
trade considerations. This Admini-
ition is determined to insure that
nomic relations with the East are
istent with broad U.S. political and
,iegic objectives. The importance that
Administration has placed on a
lew of economic relations with the
nmunist world has been reflected in
creation of a senior interdepart-
ltal group on East-West economic
:ters. I have chaired several meetings
his group which have dealt with such
stions as COCOM [Coordinating
nmittee for East-West Trade Policy]
trols and Western dependency on
iet energy sources.
In the trade field as in the political
ere, there are important differences
ing the East European countries,
only are they at differing levels of
nomic development but some are
■e open to international trade than
jrs. Continued economic ties between
se countries and the United States
the rest of the world can be in our
rest, particularly to the extent that
■ie ties serve to reinforce the East's
>ce in the orderly functioning of the
■Id economy and to encourage these
ntries to engage in responsible inter-
ional behavior. However, we must be
lant in insuring that this trade does
damage our own security.
In carrying out an East-West trade
cy compatible with our political and
urity objectives, we must work close-
vith our allies. The United States
s not have a monopoly in most areas
ligh technology and our policies must
Coordinated with those of our allies in
er to be effective. The COCOM high-
j] meeting agreed to at the Ottawa
limit is an important step in this
action. We need to achieve a common
•ception of the balance between
urity and commercial interests for
Western allies as a whole.
The problems of fair trade are
•uliarly difficult to deal with in the
,e of these countries— as the concepts
dumping and subsidies have no place
ernally in an administered price
item— but we must administer U.S.
/s in this area. Yet at the same time,
ne have moved toward instituting a
mine pricing system and effective
iffs; four are members of the General
■reement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT). This requires that we make
every effort possible to tailor our
approach to the individual country.
China
We are also witnessing the emergence
of China as a growing factor in world
trade. China's exports increased from $8
billion in 1977 to over $13.5 billion in
1979. China's imports grew even more
rapidly from $6.6 billion to $14.7 billion.
China's expanded role in world trade
poses challenges and opportunities for
the world trading system and for U.S.
businessmen and policymakers. U.S. ex-
ports to China in 1980 were $3.7 billion,
or approximately half our total exports
to all Communist countries. As China
expands its trade relations with major
trading nations, integrating China more
fully into the international trading
system will be deserving of careful
attention.
Developing Countries
With respect to the developing coun-
tries, this Administration is deeply com-
mitted to the effort to assist these coun-
tries in their development efforts. The
President's speech in Philadelphia earlier
this month spelled out eloquently the
complexity of development. It seems evi-
dent that trade is one of its major
driving forces. Indeed, one might almost
go so far as to say that the route to
development has been trodden most suc-
cessfully by a handful of countries which
have emphasized trade and that it is the
product of an open trading system and
internal policies which make it possible
to capitalize on an open trading system.
We have a strong record in maintaining
an open market. The developing coun-
tries supply 44% of our imports and buy
37% of our exports. Even if one ex-
cludes OPEC, the shares are still
high— 26% of our imports and 29% of
our exports. This is the most dynamic
export market we have.
As you know, I returned a few days
ago from Cancun, where President
Reagan participated in one of the most
impressive gatherings ever held of heads
of state and government from developed
and developing countries. The meeting
had been intended as an opportunity for
a serious and realistic discussion of the
problems of development without the
posturing which so often accompanies
highly publicized international meetings.
1 believe we can take great satisfaction
in having achieved this goal.
The President had private discus-
sions with all the developing country
leaders present at Cancun. 1 believe that
these meetings and the President's par-
ticipation in the plenary sessions have
done much to dispel the notion that the
United States lacks a positive approach
to development.
The plenary sessions focused on four
specific issues: on food security and
agricultural development, energy, money
and financial questions, and trade. The
discussion on trade took note of the
importance of trade and industrialization
in the development process. Several par-
ticipants laid particular stress on price
stabilization for international com-
modities. Many, including ourselves,
looked to the proposed GATT ministerial
in 1982 as a forum for addressing the
trade problems of developing countries
in a pragmatic way. The role of the
generalized system of preferences (GSP)
was favorably cited. We underlined the
benefit the developing countries receive
from our very open market.
In the trade area we are working in
a number of areas to follow up the con-
structive proposals which emerged from
Cancun.
• In our preparations for the GATT
ministerial, we intend to give a promi-
nent place to issues affecting trade with
developing countries. Our goal is a more
integrated and better disciplined interna-
tional marketplace in which access to ex-
port markets for all countries is improv-
ed. The proposed negotiations on a
safeguards code are one area in which
we and the developing countries share
similar concerns. We also share their
eagerness to see GATT expand its effort
to reduce nontariff barriers.
• We plan to consult extensively
and in depth with developing countries
on the GATT ministerial. Our goal here
is twofold. First, we believe that such
consultations are essential if the meeting
is to succeed in pointing us toward
mutually beneficial solutions to the
world's trade problems. Second, we
believe that it would strengthen both the
GATT system and the developing coun-
tries' trade potential for them to become
more actively involved in the GATT
process.
• The Administration intends to
seek an extension of GSP. This program
is relatively modest in relation to our
total trade— 3% of our imports come in
duty free under GSP or about 12% of
member 1981
45
Economics
our imports from non-OPEC developing
countries. All the evidence suggests,
however, that it has been an extremely
useful incentive to developing countries
to rely more on their own energies and
on the efficiency of the international
marketplace as a source of the economic
growth they need. We share your con-
cern about the high concentration of
GSP benefits among a few countries
which are relatively successful in inter-
national trade. Although I would note
that both the competitive-need provi-
sions of the law and our graduation
policy have brought the percentage of
benefits enjoyed by the top five bene-
ficiaries down considerably since the
first years of the program. We will be
working closely with you in developing
proposals for an extended GSP pro-
gram.
• Most fundamentally, of course,
the Cancun meeting underlined the im-
portance of the free trade posture the
Administration has adopted. There are
many other reasons why we must keep
our market as open as possible, but the
impact of our trade policies on develop-
ing countries is one we must not forget.
Before I leave the theme of our
trade relations with developing coun-
tries, I would like to underline one area
to which we have been devoting partic-
ular attention in recent months. As you
know, the economic health and political
stability of the Caribbean Basin area
have been very much on our minds. We
are convinced that more vigorous
economic expansion is essential to a
political evolution which avoids violence,
bloodshed, and repression.
We have had extensive consultations
with the countries of the area and with
other interested governments— Canada,
Venezuela, Mexico, and a number of
European countries— which share our
concern. We are developing a series of
interrelated proposals designed to
stimulate investment, especially in the
private sector, and to encourage trade
on which these small economies inevi-
tably must rely in order to experience
solidly based economic growth. We hope
that this coordinated approach will make
a real contribution to the economic
development of the area. Other donors
also expect to provide parallel support
for the area, through whatever means
fit in best with their development
policies. Making our support econom-
ically and politically meaningful may in-
volve some tough choices for the Ad-
ministration and the Congress. We in-
tend to work closely with you in moving
ahead in this area.
46
Our OECD Partners
Despite the impressive growth in the
developing countries' participation in
international trade, the other OECD
countries are likely to remain extremely
important trading partners for the
United States. Over half our trade is
with these countries. As these mature
economies expand, they, like us, face the
challenge of adjustment in industries
which are no longer competitive. They
are also devoting increased attention to
sectors where we have enjoyed a strong
competitive lead in world markets, serv-
ices, and high technology.
Effective consultations are essential
to the development of more effective
relationships with our trading partners.
In the case of Japan, it has been agreed
that subcabinet consultations will be held
semiannually, and that the work of the
subcabinet group will be supplemented
by meetings of a trade subcommittee
which was launched in September. We
expect this arrangement will make it
possible for us to address trade issues in
a more systematic and continuous
fashion. Semiannual high-level consulta-
tions are also held with the European
Communities. In addition, our regular
meetings with other OECD members
have provided a useful forum for discus-
sions of trade issues, e.g., trade in serv-
ices.
In discussing trade with Japan,,
there is a tendency to focus on t,iQ per-
sistent Japanese surplus in its trade in
goods and services with the United
States since the mid-1960s. The reason
for this is largely structural — the goods
the United States imports from Japan
match Japanese exports more closely
than American exports match Japanese
import requirements. Special temporary
conditions such as U.S. inflation, high
U.S. interest rates, a weak yen and
strong dollar, and a slowed Japanese
growth rate can exacerbate the im-
balance.
Countries must not be overly con-
cerned about bilateral trade or current
account imbalance as long as their
overall international positions are sus-
tainable in the long term. The United
States has enjoyed modest current
accounts surpluses for the past 2 years
and so far in 1981, though we anticipate
falling into deficit for next year. Japan's
current account has been in deficit the
past 2 years but is expected to
strengthen impressively in 1982 from
this year's moderate surplus.
Large economies like the United
States and Japan should be conscious i
the impact of their economic policies o
each other, on the rest of the world, ai
on the trading system as a whole. Japs
appears to be increasingly concerned t
find ways of preventing its trade sur-
pluses with the United States and EC
from reaching levels that strengthen
protectionist forces. I referred earlier
the trade subcommittee, under the aeg
of the U.S. -Japan subcabinet consulta-
tions, which will tackle this problem ar
head off troublesome issues before the;
generate irresistible pressure for prote
tion.
Japan's Ministry of International
Trade and Industry, for example, is
working hard to encourage the expan-
sion of manufactured imports. At the
same time, we must, on our side, place
Japan's trade surplus in the context of
our overall relatively favorable paymen
position and the knowledge that goven
ment action designed to eliminate our
bilateral trade deficit with Japan, if it
has the effect of restricting trade, woujj
result in a net loss of economic pros-
perity for both regions.
The growing surplus we have en-
joyed with the European Community
since the early 1970s has helped offset
our deficits with Japan and other coun-<
tries. This surplus reached an all-time
high of $17.4 billion this year. While ou<
balance in 1981 is likely to remain
favorable, our trade relations with the
Community will not be easy. Unemploy
ment, which has been increasing in all
10 member states, reached a
Community-wide level of 8.3% in
September. Protectionist pressures are
strong in many sectors.
One area of continuing concern will
be the adverse effects of the EC's com J
mon agricultural policy on U.S. agri-
cultural trade. As the EC disposes of
more and more of its excess production
through subsidized exports, we will have
to insure the rights and interests of ouif
exporters are protected. Steel is another
problem area, where we face excep-
tionally high levels of imports at a time
when Europe is cutting back employ-
ment in an effort to modernize its in-
dustry. These and other trade problems
will require close attention and careful
management in the months to come.
We will also have to work with
t.
Ii
Department of State Bulletin
id
Economics
>r trading partners on some of our
general trade concerns.
In an era of relatively low duties,
ariff barriers act as the major im-
ment to international trade. One of
najor accomplishments of the Tokyo
nd was to make a start at dealing
these nontariff barriers. The
es" agreed to during these negotia-
5 are being put into effect. We need
lake them work as effectively as
ible and to develop greater inter-
nal discipline and a body of case
and agreed procedures and rules in
key fields as export subsidies,
ping, and international bidding for
rnment procurement.
• The United States is much in-
sted in trade in services, as this is
of the most dynamic areas of our
lomy. Our 1979 export receipts from
ices totaled more than $76 billion,
:>st a fourfold increase over the 1971
1 of $19.1 billion. Services account
27% of U.S. exports and employ
i of the nonagricultural U.S. work
■e.
•• Investment performance require-
Xs and incentives which are increas-
y being adopted by a number of
ltries, largely in the developing
Id, are another source of potential
.e distortion harmful to our economic
I rests. Our goal is the maintenance of
r >pen investment system— one that is
led to the extent possible on a com-
I I framework and understanding of
I basic ground rules. In instances in
r ch investment is attracted by incen-
I s including protective tariffs, which
I r the marketplace's allocation of
I mrces, the trade consequences must
veighed along with the investment
llts. Performance requirements
ch mandate a specified level of
orts likewise may distort trade pat-
is, requiring a balancing of interests.
>ugh formulation of "rules of the
rie" will not be easy, with U.S.
rseas investment totaling $192.6
■ion by the end of 1979 (on a balance-
>ayments basis), the desirability of
?mpting to do so seems evident.
The close links between our trade
lis and our ability to cooperate with
key trade partners are only one
mple of the interdependence of our
itical relations and U.S. trade and
nomic policy. We believe that the
isident's economic recovery plan will
the foundation not only for a more
orous U.S. economy but also for
stronger and healthier lies with our
allies. In this type of an international
environment the United States can more
effectively pursue its broader foreign
policy goals.
The subcommittee will be going over
our trade policies in greal detail in the
next few days. It is evident that in the
post-Cancun period details will change
and new initiatives will be developed.
Yet there is a constancy in the sweep < if
trade policy and objectives which will
endure. I and the Department look for-
ward to cooperating with you now and
in the months ahead.
ASSISTANT SECRETARY
HORMATS
I appreciate your having invited me to
participate in these oversight hearings
on U.S. trade policy and the opportunity
to discuss the trade agenda for the
1980s. The next several years pose enor-
mous challenges for U.S. trade policy
and significant dangers to the inter-
national trading system. Pressures re-
sulting from slow growth, high
unemployment and inflation in many
countries, increased international com-
petition, and new trade and investment
distortions are imposing major and
growing strains on the international
trading system. As a result, that system
may be on the verge of its most serious
crisis in the postwar period.
It will be important for the United
States to develop — as Japan has already
done — its own vision for the 1980s in
order to define the longer term objective
of U.S. trade policy. That vision should
be based on an effort to expand our own
exports and to support an international
trading system which both opens new
opportunities for world trade and seeks
a reduction in the subsidies and other
distortions which limit those oppor-
tunities.
The challenge before us is enormous.
Our economic well-being depends on our
actively and forcefully promoting the
trade interests of our citizens and
strengthening the effectiveness of the
international trading system in order to
insure the health of the international
economy. Years ago the United States
took the view that, as the strongest
economy in the world and as a country
which had an international leadership
role, we could — either for political
reasons or because we did not think it
would matter much to our economy —
make trade concessions or ignore trade
actions by others which did, in fact,
adversely affecl our economic interests.
That day has long since passed. Today
we are in a more competitive world, and
roughlj 8% of our gross national prod-
uct ami millions of I I.S. jobs are ac-
counted lor by exports. < Ither countries,
both in order to stimulate jobs and off-
set oil-related trade deficits, are utilizing
governmental supports or incentives to
encourage exports or discourage im-
ports. And investment-related trade
distortions are on the increase. In many
cases free trade todaj is more of a myth
than a reality.
Trade Agenda for the 1980s
In light of this changed environment .
what should be the basis for our policies
in the 1980s— the vision of the 1980s
which we should seek to promote?
First, we need to work toward
reducing and eventually eliminating
the many nontariff barriers and export
subsidies which distort international
trade. This process was begun in the
multilateral trade negotiations. It must
be continued in this decade as well. The
types of distortion of greatest concern
fall into the two most important areas of
American competitiveness— high tech-
nology and agriculture. Together these
represent the strongest elements of U.S.
trade performance and will likely con-
tinue to do so in the decade ahead. But
our performance in these areas will be
strong only if we seek vigorously to pre-
vent others from imposing impediments
or providing subsidies which limit our
export opportunities.
Many countries protect or support
high technology industries for nation-
alistic reasons, believing that the capa-
city to produce the newest generation of
computers, integrated circuits, or similar
types of equipment is necessary to their
national economic health. In so doing,
they both limit U.S. export potential and
reduce the incentives for technological
innovation in their own economies. This
is particularly the case in Western
Europe. Japan takes the problem one
step further, using and abusing an in-
fant industry argument. It frequently
builds up a domestic industry through
government support or protection to the
point that the industry becomes a for-
midable international competitor, at
which time the Japanese call for free
trade in that particular sector. Assertive
U.S. actions will be needed in order to
:ember1981
47
Economics
tf
achieve a greater degree of international
consensus to limit the extent of govern-
ment intervention in these areas.
With respect to agriculture, the
multilateral trade negotiations made
some, but not nearly enough, progress.
Agricultural exports are vital to our
domestic economy. We are the most effi-
cient supplier in the world. Other coun-
tries, for domestic social or political
reasons, protect their agricultural sec-
tors or subsidize agricultural exports.
The inefficiencies which result penalize
their domestic consumers and taxpayers
and seriously distort world trade. A
hard look at this issue will be needed in
the future. Our goal for the 1980s must
be a more open and less interventionist
system of international agricultural
trade. In particular, we need a fresh and
more effective international approach to
the problem of agricultural subsidies.
Second, investment-related trade
distortions pose an enormous threat to
the world economy. We risk today, in
the international investment arena, a
deterioration in the climate similar to
that experienced in the world trading
arena in the 1930s. During that period,
countries adopted nationalistic trade
policies based on short-term economic
perspectives. Following World War II,
the world made considerable progress in
developing an international framework
for trade matters. Although we still
have some distance to go, the direction
and emphasis of our effort are correct.
In the investment area, however, no
comparable framework has emerged,
largely because there was an inter-
national consensus favoring a relatively
free flow of investment capital. Now, in
the aftermath of the economic down-
turns of the 1970s, there is a tendency
on the part of developed and developing
nations alike to move in the wrong
direction— to increase intervention in the
investment area to accomplish short-
term economic objectives. This can only
come at the expense of broader long-
term interests. A major goal of the
1980s must be to reverse this trend
through international understandings
and rules upholding an open and less
interventionist investment climate.
Third, a key objective for the
1980s will be to reduce barriers to
trade in services and prevent new
ones. As in the case of investment,
there are few understandings or rules
which regulate the degree to which
governments can intervene to limit the
access of foreign service industries to
their markets. This will not be an easy
process. The United States is very com-
petitive in this sector, and many other
countries do not share our desire to
open up trade and services. On the con-
trary, many seek to protect their service
industries from having to compete with
ours.
Services will also be difficult to
negotiate because of their complexity
and variety and because many in the
United States are state, rather than
nationally, regulated.
One area of particular importance —
which is intimately related to our
strength in high technology — is insuring
the free flow of data across borders. A
standstill on new impediments to trans-
border data flows and a common effort
to remove those which now exist will be
beneficial to our economy and the world
economy in the decade ahead. Impedi-
ments in this area, conversely, will be
detrimental to business in many coun-
tries.
Fourth, the GATT system needs to
be strengthened. The GATT code com-
mittees need to be made more effective.
The GATT will need to evolve new
structures for dealing with trade bar-
riers tied in with domestic policies,
including those related to trade in serv-
ices and to investment policies. In addi-
tion, a major effort needs to be made to
increase the participation of the de-
veloping countries in the GATT and, in
particular, in the various codes. The
trading system, and the developing
countries' own economic prospects,
would be strengthened by their assum-
ing greater responsibility for, and de-
riving commensurate benefits from, in-
creased participation in the world
trading system.
«'
U.S. Economy
Over the next decade we will face a
world which differs greatly from the
world in which the trade policies and
rules of the past were developed. Com
petition from Japan and the newly in- !l
dustrialized nations will be particular!
intense. We will need a strong domesi
economy to meet the competition. Oui
own domestic competitiveness will re-
quire increased investment, research i
development, and productivity. New
means of producing energy, new gene
tions of computers and semiconductor
and innovative methods of transmittin
data are just some of the areas in whi
American technology has played the
leading role. These developments, wid}
applied, can help to strengthen the con
petitiveness of traditional American in
dustries such as steel and autos and pi
vide major new lines of American ex-
ports.
In order to take full advantage of
our competitiveness and the oppor-
tunities we hope to create inter-
nationally for expanding trade, a majo
and highly creative export promotion
effort will be required. Strong support
for U.S. activities abroad, creative use '
of a host of U.S. export financing and
promotion programs, and identificatioi
of growing markets in the developing
world for special promotional efforts a
attention will be particularly important
'The complete transcript of the hearing
will he published by the committee and will
be available from the Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Printing
Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■
48
KERGY
feviet-West European
btural Gas Pipeline
tabert D. Hormats
^Statement before the Subcommittee
tnergy. Nuclear Proliferation, and
■fitment Processes of tin Senate Com-
?e on Governmental Affairs on
ber U, 1981. Mr. Hormats is Assist-
Secretary for Economic and
ness Affairs.'
i pleased to be here, along with my
agues from the Departments of
rgy and Commerce, to discuss the
>osed Western Siberia to Western
ope natural gas pipeline. As you
.v, this prospective project has been
subject of considerable international
domestic controversy.
This attention is well deserved,
es relating to the pipeline are among
most complex facing us and our
opean allies. This issue cuts across a
ber of policy areas including East-
it commerce, alliance politics, and
-gy security. The West European-
iet pipeline issue and the manner in
:h the Western alliance deals with it
have significant short- and long-
■n security, political, energy, and
nomic ramifications.
It is no secret that the United States
serious concerns about the pipeline,
ihin the executive branch, we have
lured a broad set of analytical ques-
s in the context of our deliberations
his project and East-West energy
tions more generally. Our strong
cern is that this project crosses the
?shold of a prudent level of European
endency on Soviet gas. But because
Europeans see this project as
ancing their energy security by per-
ting them to diversify away from oil
unpredictable suppliers, our simply
3cting to the project would be an in-
quate response. We, therefore, plan
suggest to the European countries
rnative ways in which European
rgy security can be enhanced, in-
iing measures they can take on their
n as well as those on which we and
y can cooperate.
My colleagues from other executive
ncies will discuss commerical factors
alternative energy options available
the Europeans. I will address my
nments to the energy security aspect
the pipeline and the role of gas in
rope's energy profile.
European Gas Consumption
During the 1970s, natural gas became
an increasingly important fuel in Euro
pean markets. A number of factors, in-
cluding the advent of advanced explora-
tion and production technologies, dis-
covery and development of additional
European gas reserves, and the decline
of the European coal industry, con-
tributed to the expanded production and
use of gas.
Of particular importance was the
economic and political volatility of inter-
national oil markets after 1973. After
the 1973 OAPEC [Organization of Arab
Petroleum Exporting Countries] oil em-
bargo, we and other industrial nations
recognized that we had become ex-
cessively dependent on insecure and ex-
pensive supplies of imported oil. A
reduction of this oil-import dependence
became a central element of the energy
policies of most industrial nations. We
pursued this objective vigorously in the
International Energy Agency and at an-
nual economic summit meetings. The oil
supply interruptions of 1979 and 1980
gave new impetus to reducing reliance
on oil.
The problem of oil-import depend-
ence was especially acute in Europe.
Most European nations were more
dependent on oil imports than we. Fur-
thermore, a much larger share of these
imports came from the politically volatile
gulf region. European leaders began to
view expanded gas use as an effective
way to reduce their national dependence
on unpredictable imported oil.
The volume of natural gas consumed
in Western Europe increased by about
50% between 1973 and 1980. This
growth rate significantly exceeded that
of total energy demand; thus gas's share
of the energy market increased rapidly.
In 1973 gas provided less than 10% of
total West European energy needs. By
1980 gas accounted for approximately
14% of total West European energy con-
sumption and 18% of the energy con-
sumption of the six countries (Austria,
Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, and
the Netherlands) currently involved in
the Siberian pipeline negotiations.
Gas use grew most rapidly in the
residential and commercial sectors,
where consumption rose by nearly 80%
between 1973 and 1979. Industrial gas
use expanded much more slowly but still
increased by 27% in this period.
Price competitiveness was probably
the conclusive selling point for European
gas consumers during the 1970s. In 1973
gas prices were approximately two-
thirds that of crude oil. But between
1974 and 1977, the price was closer to
one-half that of crude. This favorable
cost relationship and generally more
stable and predictable price encouraged
expanded gas consumption and substitu-
tion for oil.
Substantial growth in the gas
market enabled producers and con-
sumers to secure long-term supply
agreements which justified investments
in new exploration and development,
pipelines, LNG [liquefied natural gas]
tankers and facilities, distribution net-
works, and new or converted gas-
powered equipment. Furthermore, the
rapid expansion of consumption and in-
vestments created a new enthusiasm in
the gas industry and the impression that
the unprecedented rates of growth
would continue.
It appeared that European con-
sumers could use all gas made available
to them. The expectation that gas de-
mand would grow sent analysts off to
their computers to predict the scale of
future gas trade, and government and
industry officials off to the marketplace
and foreign capitals in search of new gas
sources which would meet future needs.
Role of Imported Gas
Before the gas boom of the 1970s, in-
digenous European production had met
almost all European gas demand.
Europe first began importing small
amounts of gas in 1965. Total West
European dependence on imported gas
was less than 5% in 1973. But it zoomed
to over 16% in 1980.
Growth in indigenous production,
largely in the North Sea and the
Netherlands, still satisfied more than
half of the increased gas demand from
1973 to 1980. However, gas discoveries
did not keep pace with rising consump-
tion, and the expected life of known
European reserves began to drop. In
1979, for example, experts estimated
that known European gas reserves
would last only 19 years at the then-
present rates of production.
More immediately, other technical
and political factors promised to limit
the amount of gas indigenous producers
could supply. Norway and the
Netherlands adopted conservative pro-
duction policies designed to extend the
life of their reserves. Many of the most
easily accessible European reserves
were nearing the end of their productive
lives. Other key European fields were
member 1981
49
Energy
Western Europe: Energy Consumption by Type of Fuel
(million barrels per day oil equivalent)
0 10 20 30
1973
40
— i —
1980
1990
Oil
Natural gas
Coal
Hydroelectric
Nuclear
Western Europe: Natural Gas Supply
(million barrels per day oil equivalent)
0 1 2
i 1 1
1973
1980
1990'
Domestic
production
ri'ljll Imports from
I1 1 ' i ' il USSR only
Net imports
i'i'i'i'i'i'i'i'i
I I I I I r I Ti1
1 1 1 1 1 1 i 1 1
.I i i i i , i i i i i i i i i , i ,
Includes imports from the USSR to be received under proposed revision ot deal.
already producing at the highest sus-
tainable rates.
Faced with a growing market and
rising prices, the European gas industry
increased drilling in deep water off-shore
areas and at more marginal on-land
sites. But this new indigenous produc-
tion promised only to maintain a con-
stant— or perhaps slightly falling — level
of European output. In 1980 European
governments projected that total Euro-
pean gas production would decline from
3. 1 million barrels per day of oil
equivalent (mmbdoe) in 1980 to 2.8
mmbdoe in 1990. European gas and
government officials, therefore, began to
consider how they could increase gas im-
ports.
For a variety of technical, financial,
and political reasons, the Soviet Union
seemed the most promising source of
imported gas. Soviet gas reserves are
massive, more than one-third of total
known world reserves. The Soviet gas
could be shipped to West European
markets by overland pipelines, a cheaper
and technically more reliable means than
LNG tankers. Energy sales to Western
Europe are an important source of
Soviet hard currency earnings (over 50%
in 1979), which finance Soviet purchases
50
of European machinery and manufac-
tured products. Expanded purchases of
Soviet gas promised to generate major
new orders and jobs for the ailing Euro-
pean steel and machinery industries in
particular. Finally, key European
leaders have viewed expanded East-
West commerce as a means for building
political ties and moderating Soviet
behavior.
From the Soviet perspective, Euro-
pean interest in Soviet gas was most
welcome. The Soviet Union will probably
have to cut back oil exports during this
decade due to increasing domestic de-
mand and a leveling off, or perhaps even
a decline, in production. Gas appears to
be one of the most readily available new
hard currency earners. In addition,
European purchases of Siberian gas
would help Soviets finance the in-
frastructure costs of gas exploration and
exploitation in outlying regions.
Soviet Gas
The setting which I have just described
gives insight into the European desire,
in 1978, to explore the prospects for a
Siberian pipeline. Indeed, at that time,
European leaders believed that their
political-economic interests justified
III
:"
iei
">
large, long-term gas contracts with t
U.S.S.R.
But since 1978 the economic fact!
affecting East-West gas trade have
changed dramatically. Overall energy
growth rates are down and markets £
soft. European gas demand fell last jj
for the first time ever, declining by 4
Although demand for gas outpaced th
of other fuels, it appears that the rate
substitution of gas for oil has slowec
Official estimates of future gas demal
have been revised downward and the
market is likely to be weak for a con-
siderable period of time.
These fundamental changes in wo
energy markets raise serious question
as to whether the volume of gas conte
plated for transmission through the
pipeline can, in fact, find a market in
Western Europe or, alternatively,
whether the Soviet price expectationsi
are not so high as to make the gas urn
competitive in most European market
While the Soviets may wish to set thej
free-on-board price as close as possible
to the Btu [British thermal unit]
equivalent of crude oil, in the current
market and for the foreseeable future
such a high price will almost certainly
make it impossible for the gas to be
competitive with other forms of energ
in Western Europe.
The Europeans and Soviets have
taken account, to some extent, of the
softening of the oil and gas market. M
the beginning of 1980, reports noted t
prospect that the Soviets and Europes
would construct a dual-strand pipeline
from Siberia to deliver over 4 billion
cubic feet per day (bcf/d) to Western
Europe. (This would be equivalent in
energy terms to about 700,000 barrels
oil daily.) The Soviets and West Euro-
peans are now considering constructin)
a dual-strand pipeline in two distinct
stages. The first strand could move
roughly 3.0 bcf/d or the equivalent of
about 500,000 barrels of oil daily. But
even this volume is likely to be difficult
to sell unless the price is extremely con
petitive.
Furthermore, in political terms, ths
risks involved in the pipeline project
seem greater now. In the wake of the il
vasion of Afghanistan and development
in Eastern Europe, Western countries
have become more attentive to the full
set of risks associated with East- West .
energy trade.
Energy Security Implications
Let's consider how the proposed
Siberian pipeline could alter the energy
security of the West European pipeline
Department of State Bulletir
IG
Energy
tern Europe: Dependence on Soviet Gas
■f total gas and ot total energy consumption)
1979
Original 4bct/d
Project
1990'
Revised 3bcf/d
Project
1990
Gas
Energy
Gas Energy
Gas
Energy
t Germany
14
2
29
6
24
5
ce2
0
0
23-28
4
17-2C
3
29
5
29
5
23
4
erlands
0
0
10
4
6
2
ium
32
8
19
5
ria
59
12
82
18
62
14
d on individual government estimates ot total gas and energy consumption.
ch-contracted volumes of Soviet natural gas were delivered to Italy in exchange lor Italian-contracted
om the Netherlands until February 1980.
;ipants. The table shows how Euro-
dependence on Soviet gas would
from 1979 to 1990 if the pipeline
built to deliver the equivalent of
700,000 barrels of oil daily. In most
ries dependence on Soviet gas
II more than double. The third col-
li of the table presents rough
I ates of comparable figures for the
i ntly planned scaled-down pipeline,
I I would deliver the equivalent of
[ 500,000 barrels of oil daily.
I»ne could argue, and many Euro-
I energy officials have, that pro-
I i levels of European dependence on
i st gas are small. With the scaled-
I I one-strand pipeline, dependence on
I >t energy will be 5% or less of total
by consumption in all countries ex-
| Austria. The Europeans conclude,
I 'fore, that the Soviets would not
I any real leverage as a result of this
line.
European officials further argue that
use of Soviet gas is a necessary
of their strategy to reduce their oil
jmption and to diversify their
;es of energy. They postulate that
jt gas imports, by reducing their
ndence on fuels from the Middle
, would, on balance, improve their
all energy security. They note that
Soviet Union has never in the past
off energy shipments to West Euro-
. countries for political reasons and
Middle Eastern suppliers have.
i contend that the only immediate
■natives to increased Soviet gas im-
s would be increased dependence on
nd gas from the least reliable Middle
:ern suppliers.
However, the volume of Soviet gas
>mber1981
as a percentage of total European
energy consumption is not a sufficient in-
dicator of economic and political
vulnerability. This is true for two major
reasons.
First, gas is a difficult fuel to re-
place on short notice. Unlike oil, there is
no spot market. Gas trade requires large
start-up investments in pipelines or LNG
facilities. Furthermore, it is much more
expensive and technically challenging to
hold large strategic stocks of gas as
compared to oil. Certain regions will be
very heavily dependent on Soviet gas
and might apply strong pressure on
nation&l governments to avoid actions
which could result in an interruption. In
the event of an interruption, Soviet gas
could not be readily replaced unless
there were excess capacity in other
parts of the European energy grid.
Second, as noted above, residential
and commercial consumers are par-
ticularly dependent on gas. A cutoff of
Soviet gas would be particularly onerous
for these politically sensitive sectors.
Thirty percent of gas from the pipeline
is earmarked for residential use.
Residential and commercial consumers
are the least able to absorb an abrupt
fuel supply interruption. Homeowners
have limited capacity to switch easily to
another fuel. Furthermore, gas prices
would probably rise precipitously in the
wake of a Soviet embargo and thus
place a harsh financial burden on
homeowners and commercial businesses.
Hence, West European vulnerability to
Soviet gas leverage could be substantial.
It is important to note that in the
past the Soviet Union has used energy
exports as a political lever, interrupting
supplies to Yugoslavia, Israel, and
China, among others. In addition,
technical or seasonal difficulties—
perhaps complicated by the need to
divert gas from export to domestic use
to make up for reduced deliveries of Ira-
nian gas— forced the Soviets to slow
some gas shipments to the West last
winter and spring. The probability of
further technical or seasonal interrup-
tions may increase as the Soviets try to
ship more gas from outlying and more
risky Siberian provinces to Western
Europe.
It is, of course, difficult to speculate
just how Soviet energy leverage might
be applied. But it is not unreasonable to
assume that the Soviets from time to
time would see the dependence of
Western Europe on Soviet gas as an op-
portunity to try to obtain political and/or
economic benefits. Even in the current
bargaining stage, the Soviets have effec-
tively used their leverage to secure most
generous terms and to force the Euro-
peans to underwrite much of the risk.
The Need To Minimize Vulnerability
In shaping our policy on this issue, we
recognize the major differences between
the United States and Europe in terms
of vulnerability and the strong European
determination to reduce dependence on
oil and unpredictable suppliers thereof.
We recognize also that the final decision
on the pipeline is Europe's and that the
consequences of their decision, for good
or ill, will by felt primarily by Euro-
peans, not Americans.
But we are Europe's friend and ally.
To the degree that the pipeline affects
Europe's political well-being and to the
extent that it opens Europe to the
threat of disruptions or indeed to actual
disruptions of gas supplies, it also af-
fects us. We, therefore, feel an obliga-
tion to present our concerns and our
suggestions for improving European
energy security through expansion of
the supply of more reliable energy
resources, diversification of European
energy supplies, and better coordination
of Western energy planning and policies.
We believe, in short, that there are
alternatives to Soviet gas which better
serve European economic, security, and
political interests. We also are aware of
reports that strand one of the pipeline
has been virtually agreed upon. An-
ticipating this, the Europeans
themselves are developing a mechanism
to respond to interruptions through a
safety net based on:
• The flexibility of indigenous Euro-
pean gas production;
51
EUROPE
• Their ability to substitute other
fuels (oil or coal) for gas used in electric
power plants and industry;
• Significantly expanded stored gas
reserves; and
• The integration of European
national gas grids.
Conclusion
The United States, at the Ottawa sum-
mit, expressed its desire to expand the
Western dialogue on energy security.
We plan to discuss with our European
partners alternatives to Soviet gas
which would limit potential Soviet
leverage and improve the security of
energy supplies. In addition, we need to
continue to consider in the International
Energy Agency and in the economic
summits coordinated long-term energy
supply strategies, which will provide
Western countries attractive alter-
natives to further dependence on Soviet
resources and set a common Western
understanding for energy trade with the
Soviet Union. I am confident that a
cooperative effort working toward com-
plementary U.S. and European energy
futures will be able to head off potential
tensions and build a stronger and more
stable economic foundation for the
Western alliance.
In summary, let me state that the
central element of our policy on the
pipeline is our serious concern about its
implications for European vulnerability.
We want to work with the Europeans to
suggest what they can do, and what we
can do together, to find alternatives
which are more secure and economic
than Soviet gas. We want to do this in a
way which is based on a common assess-
ment of the risk and a common ap-
proach to avoid it and in a way which
strengthens the U.S. -European relations
rather than weakens them. We do not
regard this as an issue which should be
resolved by the United States attempt-
ing to dictate what Europe should do
but rather by a process in which we
raise the genuine and serious concerns
we have, put forward our suggestions,
and attempt to help Europe to find
alternatives and thus to minimize its
vulnerability to energy supply interrup-
tions.
■The complete transcript of the hearings
will be published by the committee and will
be available from the Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Printing
Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■
Atlantic Prospects, 1981-90
0
by Walter J. Stoessel, Jr.
Address before the Atlantic Institute
in Brussels on October 2k, 1981.
A mbassador Stoessel is Under Secretary
for Political Affairs.
I am pleased and honored to have been
asked to speak today in observance of
the Atlantic Institute's 20th anniversary.
The institute has long and ably strength-
ened the transatlantic ties that unite us,
by providing a meeting place and plat-
form where we could exchange ideas
and deepen our understanding of the
challenges which confront us. And it is
thanks in good measure to leaders such
as my old and dear friend Marty Hillen-
brand [Ambassador Martin J. Hillen-
brand], who has dedicated himself for so
long to the strengthening of Atlantic
relations, that the institute has played so
important and constructive a role.
It also is indicative of the relevance
of the institute's deliberations that the
theme of this conference be "Conflict or
Cooperation in the 1980s." The question
could not be more timely, or the
answers more vital. We have had both in
the past, and we will inevitably have
both in the future. The mix — of how
much conflict and how much coopera-
tion— will be determined by the health
and vitality of the Atlantic alliance itself
and by how we adapt to new challenges.
What do we see as we look at the
alliance today, and how can we judge
the prospects for future years?
First of all, we note the durability
and continuity of the alliance. How
many Americans and West Europeans
would have believed, when the North
Atlantic Treaty was signed on April 4,
1949, that in 1981 the Atlantic alliance
would still be the centerpiece of our
respective foreign policies? After 32
years there remain:
• A formal American guarantee
coupling the security of the United
States to that of Western Europe;
• An integrated military force in-
cluding an American military presence
here of some 300,000 men; and
• An elaborate structure of planning
and consultation through which we
devise and implement together a wide
range of policies— in short, the Atlantic
system with which we are now so
familiar.
r
!
52
Just as the Soviet threat has en-
dured, so too has the alliance formec
cope with it. The challenges remain,
although they have changed in form
dimension. The prospects are that th
threat will continue for the foreseeab
future and that American involvemei
will also continue as an essential reqt
ment to balance that threat.
The durability of the alliance is n
markable in view of the almost annmjra
"crises" it has lived through, and whl
and so many of you have personally t
perienced. Repeated commentaries, a ..
least since the mid-1960s, have founder
the alliance troubled, irrelevant,
anachronistic — and its prompt demist,
has been regularly predicted. Certaini
the doubters of all kinds have had the
"lessons of history" on their side. Afti
all, what other alliance of this diversii
has endured for decades as a success}
deterrent to war? The answer: none!
The alliance's survival is all the more
remarkable given the turbulence of th
world surrounding it. At the same tiri
we cannot and do not ignore trends I
within the alliance which, if left un-
addressed, would detract from our col
sion and effectiveness. We have dealt
effectively with similar "crises" in past
periods of the alliance, and we, there-
fore, should also face the present peri
with confidence. The consequences ofl
noring our problems are as undesirabl
as they are avoidable.
Quite simply, the effectiveness ofl i,
alliance results from the fact that the!
fundamentals have not changed.
• We in the Atlantic democracies'
are united by shared history, culture, .
values, and interests.
• The Soviet threat to West EurJ
pean security and political independent!
persists.
• West European and American |
security is indivisible.
• The health and vitality of our
alliance is such that our arguments cow
cern how best to shape the alliance, ni
whether there should be an alliance, j
If these fundamentals represent o«
shared past, what do we see as we looji
toward our common future?
• We believe that our shared heriJ
tage and values will continue to unite us
• We believe that the original
raison d'etre of the alliance — the Soviet
challenge — will not diminish and will 1
Department of State Bulletin
t
me to be the central foreign policy
?m facing the Atlantic democracies.
We believe that the alliance will
n the most effective, the least
rous, and the least costly way to
the challenge.
We believe that the issues on
i we may differ will continue to be
icantly less important to us than
jntinued mutual commitment to
tic security.
f course, this does not mean that
m simply take the alliance's vitality
"anted. The Reagan Administration
appreciates that the alliance re-
concerted effort. Our frequent,
level consultations with NATO
ers since Inauguration Day — here
ussels, in other capitals, and in
ington — testify to the renewed im-
nce we attach to this process.
America, and supported intervention by
Us allies and proxies. Whether seen as
the pursuit of targets of opportunity or
as part of a grand strategic design.
whether carried out directly or through
proxies, Moscow's occupation of
Afghanistan and Soviet-backed inter
ventions in Southeast Asia, the Horn of
Africa, southern Africa, ami Central
America are realities. As a result. Allan
tic security is challenged not only fron-
tally in Europe but also through the pro-
jection of Soviet force into other regions
of vital interest to us.
Additionally, the Soviets have
demonstrated a cavalier attitude toward
international undertakings to which they
are a party. The Soviet record on com-
pliance with the Helsinki Final Act rein-
forces doubts about the seriousness with
which Moscow takes its international
Europe
hardly surprising that it has not always
been easy t<> agree on such an important
issue. Neither should we be surprii ed
when we encounter disagreement in the
1980s about doctrine, defense spending,
and the nature of Hie threat. Mill this is
hardly a prescription for complacency.
Today's international situation dictates
that we reaffirm our commitment to
effective security. Only then can we take
those diplomatic initiatives which can
bring about the moderation of Soviet
behavior we seek.
The United States is undertaking
sacrifices unprecedented in peacetime to
improve America's overall capabilities,
including our strategic deterrent. At the
same time, alliance unity and resolve on
many fronts are demonstrating how
effectively we can work together,
through strengthening our defenses and
ijjing the Soviet Threat
I is juncture in history it is useful to
l)ack to the situation 10 or 12 years
■ East-West relations were then
I ing the most active phase of what
I rlier American administration
I I a "search for areas of agreement."
| Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin,
I /est German ostpolitik treaties, and
llelsinki Final Act are legacies of
I eriod.
lI that time many hoped that these
p -ments might lead to a web of East-
accords, to the further integration
e Soviet Union into the world
■. Others feared that these agree-
s, whatever their individual merits,
d create moral and physical dis-
ment, outpacing the real increase
purity.
Ve can now see to what an extent
opes placed in detente have failed
realized. The Soviet Union has in
it years carried out an unprece-
fd conventional and strategic mili-
buildup far in excess of its legiti-
■ defense needs. This buildup has
nued through a period when the
t pursued policies of detente, when
J.S. defense budget did not grow in
terms, and when NATO undertook
tally no nuclear force modernization,
here is this more dramatic than in
20w's deployment of SS-20 missiles,
eted against Western Europe, which
destabilized the military balance on
Continent and threatens the
nce's ability to deter the Soviet
m.
The Soviet Union has increasingly
rvened in Asia, in Africa, in Latin
. . . the Soviets have demonstrated a cavalier at-
titude toward international undertakings to which
they are a party . . . [They] continue to violate the
spirit and letter of the [Helsinki] Final Act's human
rights provisions.
obligations. The Soviets continue to
violate the spirit and letter of the Final
Act's human rights provisions.
When we contemplate the record I
have outlined, it is evident that even as
the Soviet Union professes benign in-
tent, its actions undermine its credi-
bility. Soviet behavior is a serious and
growing threat to our own security and
to the basic principles on which a
humane and rational international
system must be based.
We hear voices today asserting that
this record is irrelevant, that peace can
be advanced through unilateral acts of
good will, and that a balance of strength
is no longer essential. To believe this is
profoundly dangerous, for it misreads
the motives for and implications of
Soviet actions. We ignore at our peril
the need to strengthen our defenses and
the requirement that we counter public-
pressures which threaten our ability to
do what is necessary.
Meeting the Continuing Challenge
of Deterrence
Since its creation, the Atlantic alliance
has constantly had to address the ques-
tion of how to deter Soviet attack. It is
pressing for serious negotiations on the
issues which divide East and West, to
strengthen the peace. It is clear that
NATO's December 1979 dual decision on
theater nuclear forces (TNF), by enhanc-
ing deterrence, has brought the Soviet
Union to the negotiating table. Serious
and effective talks will be possible so
long as we continue to carry through on
both tracks of the 1979 decision. In the
Madrid CSCE [Conference on Security
and Cooperation in Europe] review
meeting, which will reconvene in 3 days,
Western firmness has brought progress
on both human rights and security
issues. Our approach is designed to lay
the groundwork for agreement by
Christmas on a balanced and substantive
concluding document which would pro-
vide a mandate for the first stage of a
European disarmament conference and
for progress in the field of human rights.
We seek, and are committed to at-
tain, a redefined East-West relationship
under which each side recognizes the
legitimate interests of the other. We
want greater Soviet respect for the inde-
pendence of others. And we want the
Soviets to abide by their reciprocal
obligations. If we are to accomplish
!mber1981
53
Europe
these aims we must combine perse-
verance, firmness, and strength. As part
of this effort, we need to reverse years
of neglect and respond to the Soviet
military buildup by strengthening our
own conventional and strategic posture.
We must also leave no doubt, through
word or deed, of our commitment to the
indivisibility of our security. As the dual
decision on theater nuclear forces and
our continuing stationing of large
numbers of American troops in Europe
clearly demonstrate, any attempt to
"decouple" Western Europe from the
United States is doomed to failure.
Ours is a policy of reasonable
strength; it is not a policy of confronta-
tion. Through it we seek a stable peace,
not the "naked, poor and mangled
peace" of which Shakespeare wrote.
Secretary Haig has made it abundantly
clear that we offer the Soviet Union a
broad relationship of mutual benefit.
• We see the extensive talks in New
York last month between Secretary
Haig and Foreign Minister Gromyko as
the beginning of a process which could
lead to this new relationship.
• We seek to resolve outstanding
regional conflicts and reduce tensions
which are costly to all of us.
• We seek balanced and verifiable
arms control agreements, which we hope
the TNF talks, set to start
November 30, and the strategic arms
talks, which should begin during the
first half of 1982, will produce.
• We offer the benefits of greater
East-West trade in nonstrategic goods.
We are committed to making this
more stable relationship a reality. But to
realize these goals, the Soviet Union
must play its part. We no longer wish to
live with a kind of double standard in
which Soviet pronouncements of peace-
ful intent are contradicted by its actions
in the real world.
To sum up this portion of my
remarks, I wish to emphasize two
things:
First, our commitment to the de-
fense of Europe is firm and unshakable.
Those tempted to doubt this should
reflect on the significance of the pres-
ence of our troops in Europe. It is an
earnest of our commitment which has
endured over a quarter of a century.
They should also reflect on the sig-
nificance of the indivisibility of alliance
security. U.S. strategic forces are the
ultimate guarantor of European securi-
ty, and our nuclear strategy — a key
component of our overall deterrent
strategy of flexible response — is to con-
vince any aggressor that the use of
nuclear weapons in Europe could not
reasonably be limited to Europe. Indeed,
we and our allies adopted the December
12, 1979, TNF modernization decision in
order to strengthen the link between
U.S. strategic forces and NATO's con-
ventional forces and in order to disabuse
the Soviet Union of any hopes that it
might regionalize a nuclear conflict in
Europe. To claim that the United States
would seek to limit a nuclear war to
Europe is outright deception. Thus,
there are a continuity and solidity to our
commitment which provide a firm basis
for trust and confidence in us as part-
ners and reliable allies in any circum-
stances.
Second, we are not rigid and con-
frontational toward the Soviet Union.
We follow a policy of realism, deter-
mined to be strong enough, together
with our allies, to protect our common
interests, but determined also to spare
no effort to carry on a dialogue with the
Soviet Union and to seek a reduction in
arms to the lowest level compatible with
the principles of stability and balance.
Dealing with the World Beyond
The treaty establishing the Atlantic
alliance defines the geographical area in
which its security guarantees are effec-
tive. But we as allies have recognized
from the start — and recent tragic events
in Egypt have demonstrated once
again — that developments beyond the
treaty area are relevant to our well-
being. In fact, it has been a cliche that
the Western countries have shifted their
concentration from Europe and toward
Third World and global issues. This was
always only a partial truth. But to the
extent that it was true in part it was not
because Europe and its problems had
become less important. It was because
Europe, for most of the past three
decades, was reasonably well-stabilized
by the deterrence provided by the Atlan-
tic alliance.
Moreover, the focus on the world
beyond does not represent a total
change in perceptions. We tend to forget
the attention we have given over the
years to regions such as East Asia and
the Middle East and to the range of
issues created by the process of
decolonization. The last Arab-Israeli war
and the ensuing petroleum embargo, the
economic distress suffered by most
Western countries in the 1970s, the Ira-
nian revolution, the Iran-Iraq war and
'
M
attendant threat to the Persian Gul:
and the escalation of Soviet intervei
tionism in the developing world — all
these underscore the relevance to oi
security of events far from the trea
area. These facts are well understo'
the alliance. But some of the policy
issues they pose have strained the
framework of alliance cooperation.
In order for us to deal more eff<
tively with such cases, we must develo
a common interpretation of the nature
of events in the developing world and
their implications, as we must also
devise appropriate ways in which wel
act to protect our interests and our I
values.
It is precisely at the level of perc®
tion that we should broaden the allianc
consensus on problems beyond the tre;
ty area. We must, without exaggeratir
the extent and success of Soviet effort
to penetrate the Third World, seek cor
mon understandings of the implication
for all of us of North-South issues andi
events in the developing world. Certaii
ly the Soviet occupation of Afghanistai
aside from reinforcing doubts about 1
Moscow's ultimate intentions generally
places the Soviet Union perilously close
to the West's oil lifeline in the Persian
Gulf. Soviet support for violent change
in Africa is an intrinsically disturbing
phenomenon. The threat against Polar*
has been of great concern and a subjec
of effective consultation among us. Arw
Soviet activities, direct and proxy, in I
Latin America clearly are aimed at pro
jecting Soviet influence into a region '
historically beyond Soviet interests, j
Of course, more common perceptioi
of the nature and implications of such
Soviet activity does not guarantee
agreement on concerted action. It is all
the more important, then, that the Wes
insure that it can draw on a full range
responses, from individual national in-
itiatives by several or more nations to
coordinated actions. Such responses ma,,
or may not involve military aspects. Thfl
important thing is to recognize that
Moscow can be deterred only if it is com
vinced of our resolve and ability to
respond.
At the same time we should improvt
our capacity to concert our efforts in ad-
dressing the social, economic, and pofl
cal conditions in the developing world
which create the instability on which
Soviet interventionism feeds. This does
not mean expanding the treaty area. Bui
it does mean articulating our concerns
more effectively, taking the broader
54
Department of State Bulletin
Europe
;y situation into account as we
p our defense and foreign policies,
splaying a readiness to share the
1 and risks involved in this effort.
sum, there is no dearth of
iges facing the alliance: the inter-
i challenges of an expansionist
Union and a rapidly changing
In a very real sense they embody
oice between cooperation and con-
hich is the theme of this confer-
Cooperation can only be under-
in terms of responsibility and
Jity of obligation. The alliance is
ne qua non for assuring that
behave in a manner consistent
hose principles. We must, thus, be
red to oppose unacceptable inter-
al behavior and provide incentives
ideration and responsibility.
1 e will always face conflict, but we
able to manage and isolate
:t to the degree that the alliance is
ius and creative in meeting, and
i mating, the challenges of the
— whether they emanate directly
:he Soviet Union or come in less
:ut ways in a variety of far-off
ny human endeavor must, in the
lalysis, be judged by the challenges
pts — by those it overcomes or by
§ which prove too much for it. By
I andard, the Atlantic alliance is not
I dstorically unique, it is singularly
hsful, having afforded Europe its
i it period of peace and prosperity in
' )th century. The challenges which
I )nt us today are no less difficult
! ;hose which the alliance has met
! its inception; in many respects
are even more sobering. But if we
i hem with the creativity, the deter-
ion, and, if necessary, the sacrifice
I ,ve demonstrated in the past, we
Ttain to prevail.
he Reagan Administration reflects
;newed self-confidence and clarity
rpose of the American people. We
n our friends in the Atlantic enter-
to join us in reaffirming these
d purposes. We call on you to join
renewing our dedication to work
gh the alliance for that restraint
esponsibility on which a new era of
ne international stability and prog-
lepends. ■
NATO Nuclear Planning Group
Meets in Scotland
Secretary of Defense Caspar W.
Weinberger represented the United States
at the NATO Nuclear Planning Group
meeting held in Gleneagles, Scotland,
October 20-21, 1981. The following final
communique was issued on October 21.
1. The NATO Nuclear Planning Group (NPG)
held its thirtieth ministerial meeting at
Gleneagles in Scotland on 20th and 21st
October. 1981. Ministers discussed a wide
range of security matters involving nuclear
weapons and arms control, including the
status of nuclear forces of NATO and the
Warsaw Pact, NATO's theatre nuclear force
posture and progress in the implementation
of the December 1979 two-track decision on
long-range theatre nuclear force moderniza-
tion and arms control.
2. Ministers affirmed that the strategy of
deterrence is the surest way of preserving
peace. This strategy is working today as it
has worked for the last thirty-six years.
Ministers recalled that this strategy is based
on maintaining adequate forces to convince
any potential adversary that the risks in-
volved in initiating aggression against NATO
would be out of all proportion to any con-
ceivable gains. To be effective a deterrent
must be credible; thus, NATO must be seen
to have both the capability to respond effec-
tively and the will to use that capability. In
view of the existing Soviet threat and the
need to avoid the danger of Soviet miscal-
culation, a credible range of forces — con-
ventional theatre nuclear and strategic — is
required for deterrence. Theatre nuclear
forces in NATO Europe provide the crucial
link between the conventional defence of
NATO Europe and the United States'
strategic nuclear forces, the ultimate
guarantee of Western security.
3. Ministers welcomed a briefing by the
United States Secretary of Defense on the
recent United States decisions to modernize,
to strengthen, and to improve the surviva-
bility of its strategic nuclear forces. They ex-
pressed their support for the determination
of the United States to ensure the deterrent
capability of its strategic forces, whose im-
portance to the overall defence of the
Alliance is crucial since the full spectrum of
the military power of the United States is
committed to it. Ministers supported the com-
mitment of the United States to arms control
efforts to achieve substantial, balanced and
verifiable reductions in strategic weapons. In
that connection, they also noted that these
United States efforts are intended to main-
tain an adequate and stable balance of forces
at the lowest possible level and do not repre-
sent an attempt to achieve strategic
superiority.
4. Ministers examined the continuing
development of Soviet nuclear power across
the spectrum of weapon systems — from
strategic missiles to nuclear artillery. They
expressed particular concern about the rapid
rate with which Soviet nuclear forces are be-
ing deployed. In particular, the deployment of
the modern SS-20 missile has upset the
overall military situation in Europe and has
created a potential source of instability and
political pressure. Ministers noted that the
Soviets have currently deployed more than
250 SS-20 missiles, carrying more than 750
warheads, along with about 350 SS-4 and
SS-5 missiles, for a total of more than 1,100
missile warheads altogether. They have also
begun to introduce into their operational
forces new generations and short and
medium-range nuclear missiles such as the
SS-21 and SS-22, and large numbers of im-
proved nuclear-capable aircraft. In stark con-
trast to the overall qualitative and quan-
titative increase of the Soviet theatre nuclear
forces, NATO has not increased the numbers
of its warheads; indeed, the United States
unilaterally withdrew 1,000 warheads from
Europe as an integral part of the 1979 deci-
sion.
5. Ministers agreed that recent claims by
the Soviet Union that there is currently pari-
ty in long-range theatre nuclear forces had no
basis in fact. Such figures and ratios as have
been quoted by the Soviet Union to back up
these claims have been achieved by a process
of selective inclusion and exclusion.
Regardless of the criteria chosen, any objec-
tive comparison between systems of similar
operational capabilities reveals a wide and
growing disparity of nuclear systems in the
European theatre in favour of the Soviet
Union.
6. Ministers noted that the trends in
Soviet armaments are discussed in a com-
prehensive public report on "Soviet Military
Power" published recently by the United
States. They welcomed this report, prepared
in response to Ministers' requests at the April
1981 NPG meeting for more information to
be made publicly available. This is a useful
contribution towards informing the public
about the realities of Soviet nuclear and con-
ventional capabilities. Ministers therefore
also welcomed the fact that a report will be
prepared within the Alliance as soon as possi-
ble, which would compare, for the informa-
tion of the public, NATO and Warsaw Pact
forces.
7. Ministers noted with concern that the
imbalance in long-range theatre nuclear
forces has not only continued but has worsen-
ed. Against this background they emphasized
that NATO will continue to move ahead with
the December 1979 two- track decision on
long-range theatre nuclear force modern-
ization and arms control and took stock of
progress on the implementation of both
aspects.
8. With regard to the modernization
aspects, Ministers noted the significant prog-
ress both in the development of Pershing II
mber1981
55
Europe
#
and ground-launched Cruise missiles and in
preparations for basing them in Europe.
They stressed that these deployments were
intended to retain a credible NATO capability
in this essential area of its deterrent strategy
against the background of the large-scale
deployments of new mobile, longer range and
more accurate Soviet theatre nuclear forces.
Ministers reiterated that NATO's planned
deployments (which will not begin until the
end of 1983 and which are not intended to
match the Soviet Union weapon-for-weapon)
will not increase the Alliance's reliance upon
nuclear weapons nor change NATO's strat-
egy. Ministers continued by stating that
NATO does not seek military superiority, but
that, for deterrence to be maintained, NATO
must have credible and effective nuclear
capabilities. NATO's deployment of modern-
ized long-range theatre nuclear forces is
meant to ensure that the Soviet Union cannot
assume that it could regionalize a conflict in
Europe to exclude its territory or impair the
strategic unity of the Alliance. Ministers con-
cluded by re-emphasizing that the fundamen-
tal role of NATO's nuclear weapons is and
will remain deterrence.
9. Ministers re-affirmed the importance
of continuing high level group work examin-
ing the precise nature, scope and basis of the
adjustments which would be required by long-
range theatre nuclear force deployments as
well as possible implications of these
deployments for the balance of roles and
systems in NATO's nuclear armoury as a
whole.
10. With regard to arms control,
Ministers welcomed the recent announcement
by the United States Secretary of State and
Soviet Foreign Minister on the opening of
theatre nuclear force arms control negotia-
tions in Geneva on November 30th. They
noted that the firmness and determination
maintained by Allied governments in im-
plementing both tracks of NATO's 12th
December 1979 decision have been key fac-
tors in convincing the Soviet Union to
negotiate and will remain essential in
reaching concrete results. They noted the
substantial progress made by the United
States in preparation of these negotiations
and fully endorsed the close consultations
that are taking place in NATO, including
NATO's Special Consultative Group. In this
connection, Ministers discussed two reports
produced by NPG High Level Group, that
had been requested by NATO Foreign and
Defence Ministers at their spring 1981
meetings, which present an updated assess-
ment of the threat facing NATO and discuss
the functional requirements for NATO's
theatre nuclear forces. Ministers agreed that
these papers meet the requirements set by
NATO Ministers at their May meetings and
expressed their view that the United States
can rely on these papers as an important and
essential contribution to the basis for the
forthcoming negotiations on theatre nuclear
force arms control with the Soviet Union.
11. Ministers fully supported the United
States commitment to achieve equitable and
verifiable agreements, within the SALT
framework on theatre nuclear forces at the
lowest attainable levels. On the basis of
reciprocity, the zero level remains a possible
option under ideal circumstances. They called
on the Soviet Union to live up to the pledge
"to spare no effect to reach an appropriate
agreement." Ministers welcomed the United
States dedication to negotiate and achieve
concrete results that enhance security and
secure the peace.H
U.S. Strategic
Policy
PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT.
OCT. 21, 19811
In the past few days, the Soviet Union
has issued several propaganda state-
ments that seek to drive a wedge be-
tween the United States and some of
our closest friends in Europe. I do not
intend to let these gross distortions of
our policies go unchallenged.
American policy toward deterring
conflict in Europe has not changed for
over 20 years. Our strategy remains, as
it has been, one of flexible response:
maintaining an assured military capa-
bility to deter the use of force — conven-
tional or nuclear — by the Warsaw Pact
at the lowest possible level.
As all Presidents have acknowl-
edged, any use of nuclear weapons
would have the most profound conse-
quences. In a nuclear war, all mankind
would lose. Indeed, the awful and in-
calculable risks associated with any use
of nuclear weapons themselves serve to
deter their use.
The suggestion is that the United
States could even consider fighting a
nuclear war at Europe's expense is an
outright deception. The essence of U.S.
nuclear strategy is that no aggressor
should believe that the use of nuclear
weapons in Europe could reasonably be
limited to Europe. Indeed, it is the joint
European-American commitment to
share the burden of our common defense
which assures the peace. Thus, we
regard any military threat to Europe as
a threat to the United States itself.
Three hundred seventy-five thousand
U.S. servicemen provide the living
guarantees of this unshakable U.S. com-
mitment to the peace and security of
Europe.
U.S. Food for
Poland
le
D
DEPARTMENT STATEMENT,
OCT. 27, 1981 '
The U.S. Department of Agriculture
sign a contract on October 28 to sell'
Poland $29 million of urgently needec
food aid in the form of butter, dry mi
and cheese from CCC [Commodity
Credit Corporation] stocks of the
Department of Agriculture. The corns
modities are destined for use in a pro
gram of preschool feeding in Poland!
under the auspices of CARE, Inc. Pa;
merit will be in Polish currency.
In addition, on October 22, a cars
of private food aid from the United 1
States arrived in the Polish port of '
Gydnia consisting of private donations
2,565 tons of dry milk, of which 500
tons are destined for the Polish Catho
Relief Service, 664 tons of frozen
turkeys to be distributed by the Cathc
Church, and 113 tons of baby food. I
These latest sales and deliveries ai
to the previous total of $741 million in
credit guarantees and assistance for '
Polish food purchases which the Unite
States has provided during the past I
fiscal year.
These actions demonstrate our cm
tinuing humanitarian concern for thel
well-being of the people of Poland and
our confidence that they will succeed!
resolving their pressing difficulties
peacefully and without foreign inter-
ference.
'Made available to news correspondents]
by Department spokesman Dean Fischer.!1
'Text from Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents of Oct. 26, 1981.
56
Department of State Bulletin
IEIGN AID
ie of the Private Sector
Developing Countries
Allowing are the statement by M.
iMcPherson, Administrator of the
tufor International Development
\ and an excerpt from a statement
->ert D. Hormats, Assistant
ary for Economic and Business
s, before the Subcommittee on
Productivity, and Economic
h of the Joint Economic Committee
\ober 19, 1981.1
tly appreciate this opportunity to
3S the subject of these hearings:
.nd the Private Sector: Can they
together?" This Administration
js that AID and the private sector
id must work together in order to
ate the kind of long-term develop-
in the less developed countries
5) that results in strong and sus-
economic growth and human
2SS.
resident Reagan outlined U.S.
and investment initiatives before
orld Affairs Council of
lelphia last week [October 15].
1 initiatives are designed to gen-
I development and growth in the
i World through the force of what
| -esident earlier called "the magic of
arketplace." These initiatives are
B icant because the less developed
Iries now, more than ever, under-
I the benefits inherent in a strong
i iable market economy and the need
I iand employment opportunities
Igh a vigorous competitive private
f.
I reation of the Bureau for Private
l-prise in the Agency for Inter-
J lal Development, headed by an
Itant Administrator, Elise du Pont,
lactural evidence of the new policy
lion we have begun to implement.
3 emphasis will be placed on transfer
ids, of taxpayer's dollars. Greater
asis will be placed on the transfer
)se things that generate re-
es— the technology, skills know-
and capital of the U.S. private sec-
JD's mandate under the Foreign
.tance Act encourages private sec-
etivity. Our new emphasis seeks a
lership of government and the
,te sector in the total development
jSS_not just involvement at the
^mentation stage. One important
mber1981
element in AID's policy is to encourage
recipient countries to pursue sound
economic policies. These self-help
measures might include, for example,
pursuing realistic exchange rates, in-
creasing aggregate private investment,
developing intermediary financial bene-
fits, encouraging fiscally productive
taxes, expanding technical training, and
the like. I will look to the Bureau for
Private Enterprise to formulate and
coordinate private sector policy within
AID.
It is our goal to establish a relation-
ship between the U.S. private sector and
private sectors in the developing coun-
tries. That is the best approach, in our
view, for technology transfer, employ-
ment generation, and the generation of
Economic development
in most Third World
countries . . . hinges on
the vigorous interaction
between local and
foreign private sectors.
resources. Economic development in
most Third World countries, in fact,
hinges on the vigorous interaction be-
tween local and foreign private sectors.
Before proceeding further, I would
like to stress that while today's presen-
tation focuses totally on AID's involve-
ment with the private sector, AID most
certainly has a continued commitment to
furthering development by supporting
such other key sectors as health, educa-
tion, and agriculture.
Bureau for Private Enterprise
It is important that I take a few minutes
to describe the structure and responsi-
bilities of this new bureau. In order to
achieve the objective of facilitating
private sector involvement in the
developing world, we believed that it
was necessary to create a special struc-
ture which would not only visibly sym-
bolize our commitment to private enter-
prise but which would also, and more
importantly, insure that AID developed
and implemented new progams and
policies.
The bureau consists of two divisions:
One houses the two organizations which
have played a key role in AID's past in-
volvement with the U.S. private sector.
namely, the Office of Business Liaison
and the Housing Investment Guarantees
office. Through tins division we have
the benefit of AID's past involvement
with the private sector. The other divi-
sion consists of two new units, the
Office of Investment and Office of 1'oliey
and Project Review and Mission Sup-
port.
These offices will be staffed by
outstanding professionals. We are now
in the process of bringing into AID a
small team of people who are skilled in
such fields as investment and capital
market formation. In many ways, they
and the programs and policies which
they will implement represent a pro-
totype for an AID of the future— an AID
which will rely increasingly on lever-
aging relatively small amounts of public
sector funds to attract greater amounts
of private sector resources to accomplish
goals which in the past have fallen to
too great an extent on the shoulders of
the taxpayer. Moreover, this bureau will
also use more creatively AID project
funds to help support projects developed
by both the indigenous and U.S. private
sectors. The bureau will work closely
with private sector liaisons designated in
each of the bureaus.
Finally, the Bureau for Private
Enterprise will have the lead responsi-
bility for coordinating and relating to
the activities of two other agencies
which fall within my purview, namely,
the Trade and Development Program
which reports to me in my capacity as
Acting Director of the International
Development Cooperation Agency
(IDCA), and the Overseas Private In-
vestment Corporation (OPIC) of which I
am the Chairman of the Board. The
Bureau for Private Enterprise will also
be responsible for coordinating with the
aid activities of the International
Finance Corporation (IFC).
Trade and Development Program
The Trade and Development Program
(TDP) is unique and, therefore, requires
further elaboration. This program plays
a special role in fostering the develop-
ment of countries while also promoting
trade opportunities for the United
States. The fiscal year (FY) 1982 budget
of the program under the continuing
57
Foreign Aid
resolution is $4 million. Although this is
relatively small, particularly in com-
parison with similar programs carried
out by our major competitors— such as
Japan, France, and Germany— the pro-
gram has a tremendous multiplier effect
for U.S. exports.
Essentially, the program seeks to tie
U.S. firms into large-scale projects
which will be financed by developing
countries. Since many of the projects
TDP is interested in run into hundreds
of millions of dollars, the export poten-
tial for the United States is very high.
The Trade and Development Program is
thus an ideal way in which to foster a
mutually beneficial relationship between
the United States and the developing
world. The following are some of the
main approaches which the Reagan Ad-
ministration plans to take to facilitate
U.S. trade through the TDP.
First, TDP funds will be made
available at the most critical stage in the
planning process of a development proj-
ect—namely, at the point where U.S.
firms are in the final stages of the bid-
ding process for feasibility studies for
large-scale projects. For example, we
plan to replicate a major success TDP
achieved early this year in the Philip-
pines. It was brought to our attention
that several countries had offered to
conduct, free of charge, a feasibility
study for a major steel mill which the
Government of the Philippines planned
to construct. TDP learned that several
U.S. firms were competing for this
study and concluded that, given the
offer of other nations to conduct the
study free, a U.S. firm would most prob-
ably not win the bid for the feasibility
study. We, in turn, offered a grant of
$300,000 to the Government of the
Philippines to cost-share on the study if
a U.S. firm would be awarded the feasi-
bility study contract. The Philippine
Government agreed, and U.S. Steel was
awarded not only the TDP-financed
$300,000 contract but also an additional
$4.8 million contract from the Govern-
ment of the Philippines.
Second, we will concentrate increas-
ingly on the coal and alternate energy
sectors. Developing nations desperately
need to move away from oil-based
energy sources to other sources of
energy. Both the U.S. Government and
the private sector have devoted huge
sums of money to develop new energy
technologies with the result that the
United States is highly competitive in
these areas. TDP is very active in
marrying the needs of the developing
58
nations with available U.S. technology
and the U.S. firms which can supply it.
Moreover, by helping a nation to convert
its power base from oil to energy
sources such as coal— as TDP is now
doing in Jamaica— we also help open
export markets for U.S. coal.
Third, we will attempt to use TDP
to facilitate access to natural resources
of interest to the U.S. Section 661 of the
Foreign Assistance Act, which author-
izes funds for TDP and specifically
encourages the use of TDP funds in this
area. In light of our nation's reliance on
developing nations for minerals and
metals of strategic importance to the
United States, we are reviewing with
the U.S. Geological Survey, the Bureau
of Mines, and other concerned agencies
how a portion of TDP's budget might be
used to help nations develop the
resources we badly need.
Private Sector Approach
I would now like to address our strategy
for furthering trade and investment to
be carried out by the new Bureau for
Private Enterprise. Recognizing that
limited AID funds require a targeted
approach, the Bureau for Private Enter-
prise, working with AID's regional
bureaus and missions abroad, has
selected several countries to receive
initial attention— Indonesia, Sri Lanka,
Thailand, and Pakistan in Asia; Ivory
Coast, Kenya, and Zimbabwe in Africa;
Jamaica and Costa Rica in this hemi-
sphere; and Egypt in the Middle East.
Criteria for selection included
whether the targeted country had a
private sector that was recognized and
supported by the host government,
whether it was strategically and com-
mercially important to the United
States, and whether the United States
already had a presence there in the form
of an AID mission.
For each country we expect to tar-
get a portion of 1982 or 1983 funds for
private-sector-related activities; this
target will fall within the existing AID
overall country budget. As to the
specific amounts, we are now in the
process of consulting with the House
and Senate Appropriations Subcommit-
tees on Foreign Operations, the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, and the
House Foreign Affairs Committee. This
is not merely ratification but an ex-
change of views and no numbers can be
given until consultation is completed. As
to the internal AID mechanism for
approving the projects, the project con-
Jl
cept will be jointly agreed upon by (
AID country mission and the Burea.
Private Enterprise.
On Wednesday, the first of seve
reconnaissance missions, headed by
AID official but including business
representatives and financial and in1
ment experts, will leave for Indones
explore investment and other develo
ment opportunities. The team will ir,
elude George Ferris, Jr., Chairman i
the Board, Ferris & Company,
Washington, D.C.; Dr. Joel Godhard
prominent Washington consultant or
business strategies; Mr. Ron Katz, a
Indonesian-speaking lawyer and Rhc
scholar with a San Francisco law fir
and Mr. R. Jordan, a well-known ag)
business specialist. Their findings wi
determine exactly what AID may be
able to do to stimulate private sectoi
activity in that important nation.
Missions are also scheduled to gc
Kenya, Sri Lanka, and Thailand befc
the end of the year. AID will also be
represented on OPIC missions sched
for Jamaica and Zimbabwe between
and February 1982.
The purpose of the private sectoi
reconnaissance missions will be
threefold:
• To determine, one, whether th
country has an active and innovative
private sector which wishes to expan
diversify investments in job-creating
enterprises;
• Two, whether the government
created the climate and infrastructur
terms of policies, procedures, and fin
cial markets to support expanded pri
vate sector investments; and
• Three, what are the key oppor-
tunities, ideas, or proposals for priva;
sector investments that are develop-
mentally oriented and where AID in
some way could facilitate the investm
being made. In this latter case, we se
very important role for U.S. privates
tor involvement, either as a joint part
ner or as a source of technology,
marketing, and managerial skills or
other mutually advantageous arrange-
ments.
These missions will be assisted by
hoc advisers primarily from the privat
sector, in thinking through both the
opportunities and the problems of
assisting the targeted countries in
private sector development. AID will
then suggest to the government and to
the AID mission how we, or the U.S.
private sector, might be of assistance,
either through advisory services in the •
policy area, capital market developmenl
or in training to facilitate private sectc
Department of State Bullets
Foreign Aid
)pment in that country. AID will
uggest what we perceive as good
>pmentally oriented private sector
tunities.
he bureau will be working closelj
3PIC which has considerable expe-
i in identifying investment oppor-
es. However, unlike OPIC, we will
je in actually devoting U.S. finan-
?sources now managed by AID to
'urther U.S. and indigenous private
• involvement in the development
ss.
IDs subsequent role in developing
opportunities further may be no
than bringing the parties together
ancing some preliminary marketing
^-feasibility studies that would
y the investment opportunity. I
to stress that AID will take a more
' role in assessing the various con-
its affecting the success of a par-
r project and will suggest to the
tial investors how they and we
; put the various pieces together to
it a good investment. In so doing,
ill also examine host country policy
ing the investment and where
sary make appropriate recommen-
is to the host country so as to
ate the investment.
le could envision AID in some
making a financial contribution to
ular developmental!}' oriented proj-
either through financial inter-
iries that we would support or
directly. If training or small in-
•ucture investments were partic-
important in generating a sig-
nt amount of new private sector in-
lent — e.g., processing and
eting agricultural produce— AID
t become involved in financing
traditional AID programs to meet
need. We envision some projects,
fully developed, being managed
irily by the private investors but
AID oversight. I believe there are
cases in the developing world
e the U.S. investor, in particular,
i feel more comfortable in terms of
sing his risks and making an in-
nent decision if the U.S. Govern-
had an involvement in the project
me way. Depending on the circum-
:es, Alb's role might be as a
tator. In others, we might be a
ancer with a private bank, the In-
itional Finance Corporation, the
id Bank, or other multilateral or
sral donor agencies.
Vn illustrative project we might
age and finance is as follows: A
loping country desires to export
packaged or processed vegetables,
rather than fresh vegetables, to a
neighboring high-income country. Pro-
ductivity per hectare is relatively low by
international standards; use of water per
irrigated hectare is high. However, agri-
culture pricing policy provides the right
market signals to the farmer, and labor
costs in the country, compared to alter-
native suppliers of similar products, are
low. What the country lacks is packag-
ing, processing, and export marketing
know-how. The entrepreneur in the
developing country has money and
managerial talent but lacks knowledge
of cost accounting, training of labor in
the vegetable processing field, and
marketing. This is an opportunity for
AID to help put the project together
combining new production, marketing,
and training technology which the
United States can offer with indigenous
resources of land, labor, and entre-
preneurial talent.
An American partner in this project
may offer the technology for higher
yield production of vegetables for the
export market— seed, irrigation, plant
protection— which would be offered to
private farmers to produce on contract
to the processing plant. A guaranteed
quantity and price before planting would
reduce the farmer's risk and be an incen-
tive for him to use the new technology
offered. The American partner may also
make an equity investment in the proc-
essing plant, provide cost accounting
and training advice and perhaps under-
take the marketing of the processed
product either as a joint partner or on
contract. AID may be involved directly
or through an intermediate institution in
putting the project together, doing
studies, providing credit for the farmers,
financing pilot demonstration plots on
new technology or more efficient use of
water, or take a financial position in the
processing plant for the first few years
to get the project going and arrange for
training.
Let me turn now to the work we are
doing with the International Finance
Corporation. The Bureau for Private
Enterprise is developing a close working
relationship with the IFC— the World
Bank arm that promotes private enter-
prise projects in developing nations—
where we find a common purpose. The
bureau will work with the IFC on capital
market development and job-creating in-
vestment in the targeted countries. In
the action program enunciated by Presi-
dent Reagan last week was this
reference:
We seek to increase cofinancing and
other private financing with the multilateral
development hanks. We want i" enhance 'lie
international activities which foster private
sector debt ami equity financing of invrsi
ments in the developing countries. Its pro
gram is increasing in both size ami diversity,
and the hulk of International Finance Cor-
poration (IFC) projects are privately financed
in I hi' developing countries from domestic
and external sources.
The bureau will also manage a pro-
gram to seek out and respond to par-
ticularly attractive developmentally
oriented private sector opportunities
outside the framework of the specific
country allocations. Agribusiness, train-
ing, and cofinancing with development
banks or venture capital organizations
and the IFC will be a particular focus.
The bureau will also have the
responsibility for managing the Interna-
tional Executive Service Corps' centrally
funded project. As I'm sure you are
aware, this private and voluntary
organization, comprised of retired ex-
ecutives, plays an important role in
augmenting AID's manpower. We are
honored that they are a part of this
team effort. We are also reviewing other
centrally funded projects which we may
move to the new bureau as appropriate.
In developing its program, the
Bureau for Private Enterprise will
benefit from the advice of a private sec-
tor advisory council, drawn from all
segments of the private sector, which is
now being formed.
New Approaches
In addition to the work to be undertaken
by the new Bureau for Private Enter-
prise and the ongoing AID projects, we
also plan to undertake the following
steps:
• Expand AID's Trade and Develop-
ment Program efforts to conduct feasi-
bility studies and other planning services
for development projects. Missions will
also expand their funding of studies to
identify and encourage private sector
development and U.S. exports;
• Establish significant cofinancing
programs for development projects with
private commercial banks and venture
capital firms, both U.S. and LDC based.
I would like to stress that in referring to
cofinancing, we are not talking about
mixed credits for export promotion in
the context of the activities of the
Export-Import Bank; the matter of
mixed credits is now under review by
the Administration. Rather, in referring
to cofinancing, we are talking in terms
of joint ventures to stimulate private in-
vestment in productive enterprises. The
;mber1981
59
Foreign Aid
World Bank and most bilateral aid agen-
cies have also found that cofinancing,
whether in the form of parallel or joint
financing, is an important means of
drawing private debt capital into
development projects. By "blending" con-
cessional funds with private credits, two
principal benefits are realized: (1) scarce
appropriated funds are "stretched" or
"leveraged" and (2) private funds are
channeled toward developmentally sound
projects or transactions. On an ad hoc
basis, AID in the past has cofinanced
projects with other bilateral and multi-
lateral development agencies. We intend
now to develop a program to encourage
cofinancing with private capital;
• Expand support of intermediate
credit institutions, such as local private
development banks, to provide capital to
developing country private sector enter-
prises. For example, we are working
with the private sector to establish a
privately owned development bank in
the eastern Caribbean;
• Increase support for managerial
and technical training oriented to the
private sector;
• Work in close cooperation with
appropriate institutions in providing
advisory services to developing countries
in the following areas: capital market
development, investment policy, and in-
dustrial and agribusiness policy;
• Stimulate private investment
through development of investment
opportunities in conjunction with OPIC
guarantees and Export-Import Bank
credits. We would envision a limited
AID role in debt financing, either
through the host country or direct lend-
ing to U.S. investors against bonds or
debentures;
• Help alleviate bottlenecks in the
marketing of LDC products. For ex-
ample, two projects are in formative
stages to facilitate interisland marketing
in the Caribbean. One involves support
to a privately owned regional shipping
company which would service the small
eastern Caribbean islands. The other is a
regional agricultural marketing facility
which would trade in fresh produce in
the region; and
• Increase investment promotion
activities. In this regard, international
conventions are planned to link small
and medium businesses from the United
States with Caribbean businesses for the
purpose of launching new joint ventures
and transferring technology. A Carib-
bean project entails project identification
activities, linking likely investing part-
ners, and providing followup support to
60
facilitate investment decisions. Also in
the Caribbean, we are funding a project
development program which will finance
resident industrial development advisers.
One of the primary functions of these
advisers is to identify and appraise
business ventures in the small eastern
Caribbean islands. The advisers will help
identify potential U.S. investors and
facilitate business transactions.
Newly Approved AID Projects
Early this year, I undertook a com-
prehensive inventory of all AID private
sector activities. The following is a
highlight of those planned or ongoing
activities which I believe, merit continued
support and, in many cases, replication.
In Latin America and the Carib-
bean, we have developed and funded a
number of projects this year which
strengthen private sector institutions
and support private financial mech-
anisms.
In Jamaica, after the election of a
new government dedicated to the free
market under Prime Minister Seaga, the
United States was the first nation to
offer assistance, providing "bridge"
financing to fill the gap pending larger
scale support from the International
Monetary Fund.
Our long-term objective in Jamaica
is to strengthen key sectors of the
Jamaican economy in order to stimulate
production, exports, and jobs. We and
the government have been working
closely with the Rockefeller Committee 2
in identifying opportunities for private
investment to create jobs and expand
foreign exchange earnings. Through the
offices of the Rockefeller Committee,
and financed by AID, four American
private sector advisers screened 408
investment proposals received by the
Jamaicans. For those that looked prom-
ising, the consultants made contacts, in-
itiated a dialogue, and helped bring
interested parties together. We expect
new and significant American and
Jamaican investments will result from
this pioneer effort.
The AID mission also recently
responded to concerns raised by the
tourism subcommittee of the Rockefeller
Committee about the ability of hotels in
Jamaica to respond adequately to an ex-
pected good winter tourist season. The
International Executive Service Corps
and private consultants financed by AID
reviewed the situation and made recom-
«'•
mendations which may result in the |
hotels better preparing themselves fri
this tourist season.
In Costa Rica, we have made a(
million loan to the privately owned I
Agro- Industrial and Export Bank of
Costa Rica (BANEX) to promote non
traditional exports from that country
Credit, banking, and marketing servii
are provided to help Costa Rican pro-
ducers sell their products abroad. Ths
AID loan is structured to leverage an
equivalent amount of private commer
bank lending to BANEX.
In Central America, a recent $6
million loan to the Latin American
Agribusiness Development Corporatk
(LAAD) will allow that organization t
finance some 45 agribusiness projects
expected to create 10,000 jobs in Cen
America. This program also encourag
a cofinancing arrangement whereby
LAAD will match the AID loan with !
million in private bank borrowings. W
the AID and private bank loans and
LAAD's own resources, more than $2
million will be available for agribusine
projects in Central America. I should
note that we are now considering
replicating the LAAD approach in
Africa.
In the Near East, a major develo
ment, which I personally approved, is
the establishment of a new $25 millioi
trade financing facility to enable U.S.
companies who are low bidders to cor
pete more favorably on international
tenders where better terms of financi
are necessary.
In closing, let me stress our deep
appreciation for the interest you and
your subcommittee have shown in our
program. Today's hearing occurs on tl
eve of the Cancun conference where
President Reagan will again stress thf
vital role of private enterprise in the :
development process. I will be joining
our delegation to the summit, and I ca
assure you that we will very much kee
in mind the thoughts and advice you \»
have offered today on the interaction t
aid and trade.
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HORMA'
Noninvestment Assistance
A number of the businessmen whom wt
have contacted have spoken about the
advantages of increased private sector
exchange programs, providing expertis<
Department of State Bulled
Foreign Aid
jh instruction here and abroad.
:ould take several forms:
anagers and technicians in key
mic sectors could receive on-the-job
ction in the United States. For ex-
, in the important agricultural sec-
leading agricultural university in a
West African country already
farm managers to a cooperating
ican midwestern university which
is the "students" individually to
on farms for specified training
is of several months. The trainee
is home mindful not only of the
cal instruction received but of the
ican products to which he was ex-
the tractor, the air conditioner,
itritive supplements added to feed
Similar programs could be estab-
for other interested countries and
ler key development sectors,
nother approach suggested by a
ier of businessmen is assistance by
private sector experts in critical
•s of overseas projects. For ex-
, an experienced manager or
eer serving as a consultant could
a significant contribution during
artup phase of a manufacturing
i his type of ad hoc, "hands-on"
ach is also used successfully by the
lational Executive Service Corps.
seems to be potential for greater
te sector contributions along these
both on a remunerative and a vol-
y basis.
here are other approaches to the
fer of skills and know-how; many
lready in use. Overseas banches can
act onsite workshops and training
■ams at their plants and repair
irs, open to nonemployees as well as
jyees. They might support local
tific and educational institutions,
'isiting American executives can
as guest speakers at foreign
•rsities and management institutes
ill as at business forums. People
id wish to learn about American
ess techniques. The American bus-
man is still regarded, perhaps in-
;ingly, as having the know-how to
ze an economy. The power of ex-
e can have significant impact. The
se side of this approach is for the
te sector to sponsor attendance of
loping country personnel at inter-
nal symposia and fairs.
rnment Support for Business
e mentioned in passing some areas
lich the U.S. Government can help
■rivate sector in its involvement in
developing countries. What else can we
do to assist? Let me state again my firm
belief that government should nol
attempt to lead or to dominate but
rather to support and to facilitate where
needed. Excellent organizations, mech-
anisms, and systems already exist, out-
side and inside government, which can
help U.S. business to do more along the
lines I have suggested above. The State
Department can encourage and, at
times, act as a catalyst by linking ideas,
persons, and institutions that can help
make these ideas work. In the Depart-
ment we plan to continue our dialogue
with business leaders and others from
the private sector so that we can under-
stand their needs at firsthand and so
that they can share our thoughts.
The Department of State and our
ambassadors will also be playing a more
active role in support of U.S. business
efforts. Specifically, we will do more to
assist American business to obtain a
larger share of these markets and sup-
port them to insure fair treatment of
their investments and a fuller share of
the licensing, consulting, and other serv-
ice contracts so intrinsic to the develop-
ment process. We are determined that
the State Department, in full partner-
ship with the U.S. Trade Representative
and the Commerce Department, should
form part of a "business facilitation
triad" which will work for a more open
international trading and investment
system in which U.S. companies can
compete on fair and attractive terms for
participation in LDC markets and
development.
Secretary Haig has instructed our
ambassadors to assign very high priority
to supporting American business abroad
and to encouraging LDC governments to
develop a more hospitable environment
for U.S. business and for private enter-
prise in general. He was very clear in
his recent instruction to all ambas-
sadors:
I look to you to involve yourself personal-
ly in leading the U.S. Government commer-
cial effort in your country. [There can be no]
half-hearted, unsustained efforts or lip serv-
ice. It must be a conviction and a major pur-
pose in your ambassadorial stewardship.
In my Bureau for Economic and
Business Affairs, we have strengthened
the Office of Commercial Affairs as the
central point for support for the
business community. This office will aid
in export-promotion efforts, the removal
of export disincentives, and in helping
solve problems for business abroad by
cutting through the bureaucratic tangle
which frequently prevents timely solu-
tions.
The Trade Reorganization Act of
1979 established the new Foreign Com-
mercial Service, administered by the
Commerce Department, to handle ex-
port promotion efforts with our major
trading partners. The State Department
is working in full cooperation with the
new service to insure its success, in
Secretary Haig has
instructed our am-
bassadors to assign very
high priority to support-
ing American business
abroad. . . .
addition to urging ambassadors and
other senior embassy officers to do so.
The State Department is directly in-
volved in the commercial business, par-
ticularly in the developing world. We re-
tain direct responsibility for commercial
work in 75 countries which together pur-
chased over $16 billion in U.S. merchan-
dise and agricultural exports in 1980. It
is important to support U.S. export
efforts in these countries in the most
effective way possible, and we plan to do
so in ways that will benefit both econ-
omic growth in our own- country and in
the developing nations.
Just as important, however, is a
unique contribution that the State
Department at home can make in sup-
port of American business in the de-
veloping nations. Frequently senior
executives of major U.S. multinational
corporations have less of a need for
specific commercial support than for
background and analysis on which to
base their strategic planning and risk
assessment. At the State Department
there exists a broad range of essential
political and economic information and
judgment which can be of considerable
value to American companies making
decisions about foreign operations. The
Department will be fully responsive in
sharing this information and perspective
appropriately with business.
In closing, I would like to note a
mber1981
61
IMMIGRATION
3
number of specific actions which have
already been implemented by the
Reagan Administration to reduce export
disincentives.
• A previous policy regarding arms
sales has been changed; our embassies
can now provide the same courtesies and
commercial services to firms selling
defense equipment as they do for other
businesses.
• The Export-Import Bank restric-
tion on lending to Chile was lifted early
in the year.
• Licenses for export of five civilian
Boeing aircraft to Iraq, held up for more
than a year, were issued in May.
We have set in motion a vigorous
policy of support for the U.S. private
sector at the State Department and our
embassies— a policy which has as its cen-
tral objective a more active and respon-
sive role in encouraging and assisting
American business to play the essential
role that we know it can, and can
benefit from, in the developing world.
'The complete transcript of the hearings
will be published by the committee and will
be available from the Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Printing
Office. Washington, D.C. 20402.
2 On February 24, 1981, the White House
announced the formation of the U.S. Business
Committee on Jamaica, chaired by Mr. David
Rockefeller, which works with a counterpart
Jamaican committee to stimulate and
mobilize new investment, trade, and employ-
ment in Jamaica. ■
Interdiction of Illegal Aliens
A PROCLAMATION,
SEPT. 29, 1981'
The ongoing migration of persons to the
United States in violation of our laws is a
serious national problem detrimental to the
interests of the United States. A particularly
difficult aspect of the problem is the contin-
uing illegal migration by sea of large
numbers of undocumented aliens into the
southeastern United States. These arrivals
have severely strained the law enforcement
resources of the Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion Service and have threatened the welfare
and safety of communities in that region.
As a result of our discussions with the
Governments of affected foreign countries
and with agencies of the Executive Branch of
our Government, I have determined that new
and effective measures to curtail these
unlawful arrivals are necessary. In this
regard, I have determined that international
cooperation to intercept vessels trafficking in
illegal migrants is a necessary and proper
means of insuring the effective enforcement
of our laws.
Now. Therefore, I, Ronald Reagan.
President of the United States of America,
by the authority vested in me by the Con-
stitution and the statutes of the United
States, including Sections 212(f) and 215(a)(1)
of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as
amended (8 U.S.C. 1182(f) and 1185(a)(1)), in
order to protect the sovereignly of the
United States, and in accordance with
cooperative arrangements with certain
foreign governments, and having found that
the entry of undocumented aliens, arriving ai
the borders of the United Stales from the
high seas, is detrimental to the interests of
the United States, do proclaim that:
The entry of undocumented aliens from
62
the high seas is hereby suspended and shall
be prevented by the interdiction of certain
vessels carrying such aliens.
In Witness Whereof, I have hereunto
set my hand this twenty-ninth day of
September, in the year of our Lord nineteen
hundred and eighty-one, and of the
Independence of the United States of
America the two hundred and sixth.
Ronald Reagan
EXECUTIVE ORDER,
SEPT. 29, 1981'
By the authority vested in me as President
by the Constitution and statutes of the
United States of America, including Sections
212(f) and 215(a)(1) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act, as amended (8 U.S.C. 1182(f)
and 1185(a)(1)), in view of the continuing
problem of migrants coming to the United
States, by sea, without necessary entry
documents, and in order to carry out the
suspension and interdiction of such entry
which have concurrently been proclaimed, it
is hereby ordered as follows:
Section 1. The Secretary of State shall
undertake to enter into, on behalf of the
1 'nited States, cooperative arrangements
with appropriate foreign governments for the
purpose of preventing illegal migration to the
I "nited States by sea.
Sec. 2. (a) The Secretary of the Depart-
ment in which the Coast Guard is operating
shall issue appropriate instructions to the
Coast Guard in order to enforce the suspen-
sion of the entry of undocumented aliens and
the interdiction of any defined vessel carry-
ing such aliens.
V
(l>) 'those instructions shall apply to a |ft
of the following defined vessels:
(1) Vessels of the United States, meg
any vessel documented under the laws of
United States, or numbered as provided!
the Federal Boat Safety Act of 1971, as|
amended (46 U.S.C. 1451 r! s,-q.). or own
whole or in part by the United States, a J !
citizen of the United States, or a corpora
incorporated under the laws of the Unit!
States or any State, Territory, District, C
monwealth, or possession thereof, unless!
vessel has been granted nationality by a
foreign nation in accord with Article .", of
Convention on the High Seas of 1958 (U|
TIAS 5200; 13 UST 2312).
(2) Vessels without nationality or \ ess
assimilated to vessels without nationality)
accordance with paragraph (2) of Article f
the Convention on the High Seas of 1958*
(U.S. TIAS 5200; 13 UST 2312).
(3) Vessels of foreign nations with wj
we have arrangements authorizing the 11
States to stop and board such vessels.
(c) Those instructions to the Coast G|
shall include appropriate directives provid
for the Coast Guard:
(1) To stop and board defined vessel*
when there is reason to believe that sucH
vessels are engaged in the irregular tranl
tation of persons or violations of United I
States law or the law of a country with wl
the United States has an arrangement
authorizing such action.
(2) To make inquiries of those on boan
examine documents and take such action!
are necessary to establish the registry, c«
tion anil destination of the vessel and' thM
status of those on board the vessel.
(3) To return the vessel and its
passengers to the country from which it I
came, when there is reason to believe thai
offense is being committed against the
United States immigration laws, or ap-
propriate laws of a foreign country with I
which we have an arrangement to assist;B
vided, however, that no person who is a j
refugee will be returned without his consB
(d) These actions, pursuant to this Sel
tion, are authorized to be undertaken onljj
outside the territorial waters of the Unita
States.
Sec. 3. The Attorney General shall, ill
consultation with the Secretary of State M
the Secretary of the Department in whiehji
Coast Guard is operating, take whatever I
steps are necessary to ensure the fair en-B
forcement of our laws relating to immigraf
(including effective implementation of this!
Executive Order) and the strict observanJl
our international obligations concerning tfl
who genuinely flee persecution in their
homeland.
Ronald ReagA
'Nos. 4865 and 12324 (text from Weei
Compilation of Presidential Documents of|
Oct. 5, 198D.B
Department of State Bulleti'
DDLE EAST
«cretary Haig Interviewed
8 "Meet the Press"
ecretary Huiy wax itihrnciml rin
'.te from Cairo. Egypt, by Bill
Qe, NBC News; Hedrick Smith, The
York Times; Marvin Kalb, NB( '
• and Bernard Kalb. NBi ' News m
er 11, 1981.1
lr guest today on "Meet the
is Secretary of State Alexander
, who will be speaking to us by
lite from Cairo. Secretary Haig
d the American delegation to the
al of President Sadat yesterday,
ill be leaving Cairo shortly to
to this country,
hile in Cairo you talked with
President Mubarak, who is
hlluled to become Egypt's president
Jew days; you talked with Prime
iliter Begin. I wonder if you could
llis whether you feel you can say
inditionally at this point that the
il> David peace process will con-
■?
PL I don't think there's any question
I that, and that was affirmed by
I of the leaders you've cited, and we
t-as Americans, we are, of course,
lartners in this process. And we in-
1 to play just that role.
I Would it be helpful to Mr.
■ irak at this point in establishing
leadership if the Israelis were to
I or suspend for the time being the
I y of creating settlements or e.\-
l ing settlements on the West
U, and if so, do you think there's
; ndication that might happen?
[ 4. I think the process that is most
| rtant at the moment is to continue
the autonomy talks, which corn-
ed this past — a month ago and
h will reconvene again at the work-
<evel on the 21st of this month. We
d hope that during this process
2 wouldn't, be a further enlarging of
West Bank settlements, and we've
e that clear.
however, the important thing now is
>oth parties to strip aside some of
nflexihilities of the past on the
nomy issue. And based on my
issions with both leaders yesterday,
nk they are approaching the talks
:h are underway with precisely that
' in mind.
Q. How actively will the United
es involve itself in those talks?
A. We have been from the outset
full partners. We were represented in
the initial talks last month by our two
ambassadors from Israel and Egypt, and
at the right time we would raise the
level of that participation if it will make
a constructive contribution.
Q. One of the things that's come
across in the reports from Cairo is the
striking contrast between the rather
quiet public reaction after President
Sadat's death and the very emotional
reaction after President Nasser's
death 11 years ago. Is there real sup-
port for Sadat's policies now in Egypt
to carry them on?
A. I don't think there's any question
about that. I do recognize that there are
some who have been uncomfortable with
Sadat's policy. But as the Vice President
told me yesterday, what we've had in
this instance is a deep sense of shock,
and that's been reflected by an unusual
degree of quietude in the populace. And
I wouldn't read too much into that in the
context of your question.
Q. Do you see any risk to this
government through the disaffection
of religious fundamentalists or
through disaffection within the army
officer ranks?
A. I think clearly that President
Sadat saw that some weeks ago when he
launched a crackdown of some broadly
based character. Since that time, we've
had several incidents in the south in the
area of fundamentalist primary activity.
But by and large — and I spoke a few
hours ago to Vice President Mubarak on
the subject — the country has been quiet
and in a state of shock.
Q. Last January there was a
report that Vice President Mubarak
and President Sadat had differences,
and that Mr. Mubarak had urged Mr.
Sadat to move Egypt into a closer
policy with the other Arab countries
and perhaps even a closer relationship
with the Soviet Union. Is there any in-
dication that he wants to move the
country in that direction now?
A. No, quite to the contrary. I have
spoken to no Egyptian official that is
more enlightened to the pitfalls of
alliance or convergence with the Soviet
Union than is Vice President Mubarak.
He has been, as you know, a protege of
President Sadat's and his trained
replacement for the past 2 years, as the
\ ice President and Mrs. Sadat herself
told me, He lias been groomed for the
position which he now finds himself
facing.
(\. You mentioned a moment ago
that you had said that the United
States hoped there would be no fur-
ther Israeli settlements on the West
Bank at this point. Did you j^el any
commitment from the Israeli leaders
that at least during this Egyptian
transition they would hold off on that?
A. No, we have not sought that
kind of commitment in the sense of your
question. We've made our position clear.
And we are now most anxious to get on
with these autonomy talks and bring
about a successful conclusion to them.
Q. Since Sadat's murder last Tues-
day, has there been any new evidence
suggesting a conspiracy?
A. Not that I am aware of, and I've
kept fairly close tabs on it. I am not
aware of any additional evidence here in
Cairo from Egyptian sources, nor am I
aware of any from our American in-
telligence community.
Q. So that it continues to be
believed that this was an isolated ac-
tion by four men?
A. I think we would refer to it as an
assassination as distinct from a coup
d'etat.
Q. A number of people who
watched the funeral services yesterday
could not help but note that there
were no Saudi representatives there.
And I was wondering whether there is
any effort now being made by the
United States to bring Saudi Arabia
and Egypt back together again?
A. We would, of course, favor such
a trend, and, indeed, we favor in general
a growing merger of the moderate Arab
leaders throughout the region. And it
could be that in the period ahead that
trend will get a greater momentum. And
we would welcome it. What we would
not welcome, of course, is the radicaliza-
tion of previously moderate Arab
regimes, and that is also a risk.
Q. It was Saudi Arabia that broke
with Egypt because of President
Sadat's Camp David accord. What
must happen now, do you feel, that
would allow Saudi Arabia to drop its
hostility — formal hostility — toward
3mber1981
63
Middle East
Egypt, and resume a more construc-
tive association?
A. I wouldn't describe their relation-
ship as hostile at this point. I think it's
somewhat estranged. And I think that's
up to the two parties to recognize the
desirability of recreating a normal
dialogue. I do not expect this will be too
difficult in the weeks ahead.
Q. In the weeks ahead? Do you
see something like that underway
now?
A. Now don't hold me to weeks,
moments —
Q. Well, months?
A. Or months. Yes, I —
Q. Do you see the possibility?
A. I see a very strong possibility
because of a convergence of strategic
outlook and mutuality of interests be-
tween the two regimes. There are dif-
ficulties with the Camp David process.
Some of that was attributable to
American style at the time, a lack of
perhaps the kind of consultation that
might have been — might have eased
some of these tensions. But in any
event, we're there, and we would
welcome a closer rapprochement.
Q. Let's take a look at this area
over the past couple of years. The
Shah toppled; President Sadat
assassinated. Question: Is it fatal in
the Middle East to be a friend of the
United States?
A. I suppose one could ask that
question, but one might look at other
parts of the world and find similar in-
cidences and circumstances. I think what
it underlies is the importance of demon-
strating that it is not fatal to be an ally
of the United States, and that means we
Americans are going to have to continue
a leadership role in this area. We're go-
ing to have to contribute to the security
of threatened nations by the provision of
economic and military support. We're
going to have to show our presence here
from time to time.
Q. Yes. But you know that's just
the feeling that here in Egypt, for ex-
ample, there is a sense that the United
States has not done enough; that it
did not do enough when the Shah fell;
that in fact it has not been visible
enough in the Middle East; that there
is not a sense of American determina-
tion and resolve. Now you talked to-
day about the United States working
more actively. Can you give us any ex-
amples of active, visible involvement
post-Sadat in this area?
A. Of course, I can. And as a mat-
ter of fact, that's some of the topics that
we've been discussing during this visit.
They involve —
Q. And some of them we've been
pressing you to get on the record.
A. — a very expensive exercise
which will take place this coming month,
which involves U.S. forces working in
collaboration with Egyptian forces,
forces of some of the gulf states, and
then a highly increased U.S. presence
for those exercises. Now all of this is a
sign of reassurance. And, incidentally,
our diplomacy since President Reagan
has been inaugurated has underlined this
dramatically. And I think most of the
leaders have been encouraged by it.
Q. Do you have anything to say,
since you seem to be hinting at it just
a moment ago, about a report that the
B-52s would be used in an exercise in
Egypt next month in which live bombs
will be dropped?
A. I can't testify to the dropping of
live ordnance. I think —
Q. I'm not talking about —
A. — we are looking at a number of
options that might include reinforcement
of the region by B-52 and other type-
aircraft and the presence of American
forces in this region in a live exercise in
which they would work in conjunction
with the forces of the Government of
Egypt and perhaps other nations, as I
mentioned, Oman. We will be involved in
a very extensive exercise in the period
ahead, in the very near future.
Q. As President, President-soon-
to-be Mubarak indicated to you
specifically that while pursuing the
Camp David peace process that he
would like to develop better relation-
ships with such Arab countries as
Saudi Arabia and Jordan than Presi-
dent Sadat enjoyed?
A. I think it goes without saying
that our Egyptian friends have always
felt that they were part of an Arab fami-
ly of moderate Arab nations, and they
are most comfortable when their rela-
tionships with their Arab brothers are
complete and natural. And we have no
objection to this from the viewpoint of
American policy. And I would anticipate
it will occur in the months ahead, as I
said.
Q. Has President Mubarak
specifically talked to you along th
lines?
A. No, no, he wouldn't presume
do that. I know that this is an Arab
ter. It's not a matter for the United
States to interpose itself into. On th
other hand, I think the historic trent
are inevitable.
iit
Q. Have you talked while in C;
with Prime Minister Begin or with
Mr. Mubarak or others about the
AWACS [airborne warning and cor
trol system] airplane deal, the sale
AWACS planes to Saudi Arabia? A
if so, have your conversations shed
any new light on this controversy?
A. First let me say this. There's
hardly an Arab leader that I've spoki
to during the brief time I've been hei
Egypt — and that includes Egyptian (
ficials, officials from other Arab stati
who attended the funeral — all have e
pressed their grave concern that the
U.S. Congress may not support the
President in this important issue. Ar^
may add, our European friends — I
spoke to the foreign ministers, the ha
of states and governments of our
Western European partners — and th*
too expressed their great sense of ala
that this important issue might not gq
through successfully.
Q. Has Prime Minister Begin
changed his view in the least?
A. No, I think not, and I don't th
he should. After all, he has to expresi
the viewpoint of the Government andi
the people of Israel. He has a right ai
indeed, an obligation to express concel
when any additional sophisticated
military equipment is provided to an
Arab state. But his responsibilities arc
not American responsibility. Ours are
broader. And we must address it front-
purely American point of view.
Q. Is the United States going to
do anything now rapidly to demon-
strate support for the new Egyptian
Government, say by speeding up arm
deliveries or changing the economic
aid package?
A. We have two military — political
and military teams in the area right
now. One's on its way to the Sudan, I
where we are looking for a step-up ofj
deliveries of American equipment to th'
threatened nation. We are also conduct
ing a series of discussions here with th'
Egyptian defense officials. Secretary [o
Defense] Weinberger had discussions
IS LI
lii
;:
,i
64
Department of State Bulleti
Middle East
,
he minister of defense yesterday.
as part of our delegation, having
led to Washington before I did.
.vill involve the coordination of ex-
's that 1 talked about and assess-
3 of whether military equipment
ries can be stepped up in the light
2 pust-Sadat situation.
}. The Egyptian base at Ras
s on the Red Sea has figured
inently in our thinking about a
deployment force for the Middle
Mr. Sadat, as I understand it,
ys said that was a facility we
I use but he left it to what they
d the shake of the hand. Is there
* to be any more formal agree-
about that? Are we going to be
to use that facility with the new
rship?
\. I think all (if these offers for the
if Egyptian facilities — Ras Banas,
facilities which we, incidently, are
today — will continue to lie made
able, and we've been assured of that
■e new government. And what we
alking about is we are not going to
to establish bases as such here, I nit
tties will be made available for the
if American forces when required.
3- Now that you've had a chance
jok at the situation on the ground.
3U see a serious danger of any
lict between Egypt and Libya or
een Libya and the Sudan which
d involve wider conflict, get us in-
ed?
A. I think it doesn't serve any
i\ purpose to prognosticate about
: will involve American interest. I do
i that the situation — especially in
•Sudan, which has been threatened
iternal subversion and a certain
'ee of external growth in tension
Libya — is a matter of concern not
to Egypt but to all of us, just as the
an invasion of Chad was a matter of
fern and should continue to be a
ter of concern to the United States
all of the African states, which are
illy threatened.
Q. Do you see the possibility of
flict between Egypt and Libya?
A. I don't anticipate such an out-
,e but one that observes recent
v'an activity— both in the subversion
A and in the overt area, as we are
tiessing in Chad— has to have his
ve ends tingle a little more than has
n the case in the past.
Q. Is the step-up of deliveries to
Egypt and the possiblity of a step-up
of military deliveries to other — Sudan.
Oman, perhaps — does that surest a
concern on the part of the United
States that hostilities will break out
and this is the kind of supplies that
Egypt requires?
A. I think there are several aspects
to a precise answer to your question. 1
think we have just lost an unusual leader
in the region and worldwide. And then
on such occasions it behooves all of us
with interest in a region to reaffirm that
interest by concrete manifestations of it.
In addition to that, there are signs of in-
creasing Libyan activity and threats to
peaceful nations in the region. And both
of these things converge today to make
these actions appropriate.
Q. You warned once again today,
as you did last week at your news con-
ference about outside intervention in
this post-Sadat situation, as you call
it. You're really talking about Russia,
aren't you?
A. As someone on my staff said the
other day, if the shoe fits wear it. And,
of course, we're talking about Russia.
There are questions always as to what
degree Libya represents a client-state
relationship with the Soviet Union. The
simple facts are: It is Soviet armaments
which are today being moved in unprece-
dented numbers into Libya. This arma-
ment base has been created for some
reason. And those of us who are seeking
peace and stability are concerned that
they far exceed the needs or the man-
ning capability, for that matter, of the
Libyan people.
Q. Do you believe the Soviet
Union is now engaged in a mischief-
making role?
A. One might describe it in a
number of ways, some more benign,
some less benign. The simple facts are
that Soviet interventionism in the Conti-
nent of Africa in recent years since the
Angolan adventure has grown, has not
declined.
Q. While you were talking with
the Egyptian foreign minister a few
hours ago today, an Egyptian friend of
mine made the observation that there
was probably more grief in the United
States than here in Egypt about the
assassination of President Sadat. Do
you have any observations on that?
A. That would be a very difficult
judgment for me to make. I've been here
for some 48 hours now. and I can assure
you thai in my discussions with everj
Egyptian official with whom I've con
1 1 uc t ci 1 such discussions, with the wive
and the families of these officials — as 1
look mi the streets, there is a deep sense
of shock at the tremendous loss to
Egypt of President Sadat's passing.
Q. Vice President Mubarak has
identified himself with the policies of
President Sadat. That means that Vice
President Mubarak inherits the spec-
trum of opposition that existed
against Sadat. What sort of con-
fidence do you have that Mubarak will
survive where Sadat was jrunned
down?
A. It goes without question that
President Sadat's policy — the peace-
making process, rapprochement with
Israel — was a controversial policy in
many Arab states and especially among
the fundamentalist movement. I'm very
pleased to say that the Vice President
has dedicated himself to continuation of
those policies. That means that the areas
of resistance or opposition will continue.
But it doesn't mean that they are so ex-
tensive that they are not well within the
capabilities of the Egyptian Government
to keep them under control.
Q. Earlier today you said that the
United States intends to work actively
with our friends in the region and
foremost among these is the Govern-
ment of Egypt and the people of
Egypt. That's raised questions about
whether you had intended in any way
to downgrade the U.S. relationship
with Israel, and you might use this
opportunity to be able to sort it out.
A. No, not at all. The American
relationship with Israel is a historic and
longstanding one. Our commitment is
clear, unequivocal, and unchallengeable.
And I see no circumstances under which
the firmness and the dedication of that
commitment would be lessened one iota.
Q. To some extent you may have
answered this question, but let me get
at it in a different way. I think the
American people are worried about
Egyptian stability, about the leader-
ship of Vice President Mubarak, and
about continuity of Egyptian policy.
Do you feel more hopeful, more confi-
dent in these areas having been in
Cairo and talked to these world
leaders the last few days than you did
a few days ago?
A. Absolutely, although I must say
ember 1981
65
Middle East
a few days ago I wasn't shaken either.
I've worked with the Sadat cabinet, in-
cluding President Mubarak whom I have
known since 1976. These are very com-
petent professional men. They are dedi-
cated to the principles and ideals of
President Sadat and who are thoroughly
capable of carrying them out effectively.
Q. Won't the relative apathy —
apparent apathy — over the loss of
President Sadat in Egypt give them
some feeling that maybe his policies
were not as popular as most people
thought?
A. No, I don't think necessarily. But
I think all of this underlies, as we said
earlier, a need for the United States to
demonstrate its continuing support for
the Government and the people of
Egypt. We've done so, and we're going
to do so in more concrete terms in the
very near future.
Q. You were talking about the
Soviets a minute ago. Is there any
evidence that the Soviets have made
any moves since the death of Presi-
dent Sadat to try and exploit the
situation?
A. No, I'm not aware of any. Again,
I suspect if one looks at their propa-
ganda and their rhetoric they wouldn't
draw any comfort from that in the re-
cent days and hours.
Q. You've also talked about the
importance of supporting friends.
What would be the impact of losing
the AWACS vote in the Congress, and
what are your chances of winning it?
A. There's still a very tough
struggle ahead. And, as we've said,
there are honest people with honest con-
victions on both sides of this issue. But
the fundamental reality is it's not a ques-
tion of whether we should sell the
AWACS to Saudi Arabia, but who will
sell it. And it's our conviction that it's
important that the United Stales con-
tinue its growing and improving rela-
tionship with Saudi Arabia through this
sale and through other actions.
'Press release 347 of On. 1:
Security Situation in Egypt
and the Sudan
DEPARTMENT STATEMENT,
OCT. 15, 1981 '
We have seen a variety of press reports
concerning increased tension and state
of military alerts in the area of Egypt
and the Sudan. In order to put these
reports in perspective and hopefully to
anticipate your many questions, I would
like to make the following statement.
The concern of the United States
about the security situation in the area,
particularly as concerns the potential for
Libyan troublemaking, is a matter of
public record. In this respect, while in
Cairo, the Secretary of State, accom-
panied by the Secretary of Defense,
spoke publicly and at length to the situa-
tion and our responses to it in coopera-
tion with our friends, particularly Egypt
and the Sudan.
And, as you know, for some time,
and subsequently, we have discussed the
planned joint military exercise known as
Bright Star, an exercise which has been
in the planning stage for some months.
We are in the process of considering
some modifications in light of recent
developments in the area. We should
Id
Ac
note that we have taken a number q
tiatives as a result of President Sad;
assassination — the recent treaty be-
tween South Yemen, Libya, and
Ethiopia, and emerging internal and
external threats from Libya against
Sudan. One decision related to Briglfciil
Star and other confidence-building
measures has already been taken. It
volves the deployment of two AW AC
[airborne warning and control systen j
aircraft to Egypt on an interim basis
We wish to emphasize that all of i
security-related activities we are und
taking with friends has the purpose <
helping to defuse the tensions throul
deterring possible hostilities directed
against them. We are confident that
responses are having this effect. In
essence, they are confidence-building
and deterrent in character and, toget
with expedited shipments of arms to
Sudan and perhaps Egypt, are a n
cation and telescoping of long con-
templated actions designed to enhanc
the security of the area.
'Made available to news corresponded
by Department spokesman Dean Fischer.M
12th Report on Sinai Support Mission
MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS,
OCT. 20, 1981'
I am pleased to transmit herewith the
Twelfth Report of the United States Sinai
Support Mission. It covers the Mission's
activities during the six-month period ending
October 1, 1981. This report is provided in
accordance with Section 4 of Public Law
94-110 of October 13, 1975.
The Sinai Support Mission and its over-
seas arm, the Sinai Field Mission, have since
1976 made unique contributions to the peace
process in that part of the Middle East, first
by establishing and operating the tactical
early warning system that made possible the
second disengagement agreement between
Egypt and Israel, and when that mission was
fully completed in .January 1980. by
undertaking during the interim withdrawal
period the verification of Egyptian and
Israeli adherence to the military limitations
called for in their 1979 Peace Treaty.
This second peacekeeping role will end on
April 25, 1982, the date established under the
Treaty for the completion of Israeli with-
drawal from the Sinai. At that time, the I
Field Mission will relinquish its verificatiot
responsibilities to the new Multinational
Force and Observers being established to
supervise implementation of the Treaty's
security arrangements after Israel's
withdrawal.
Funding for the Sinai Support Mission*
for Fiscal Year 1981 was authorized at $lf|
million. Only $10 million is being requests
for Fiscal Year 1982. a level that will fund
the Mission's operations during its final
months and the projected costs of its phasG
out after April 25, 1982.
The role of the Sinai Support and Field
Missions has been a concrete example of th
United States' commitment to the achieve
meat of a just and lasting peace in the Midf
East. Our participation in the Multinational
Force and Observers will be the next cruel
step in the further promotion of that peace.
am counting on the continuing support oft!
Congress for our role in the peace process.
Ronald ReagJ
'Text from Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents of Oct. 26, 1981.
66
Department of State Bullet!
LTARY AFFAIRS
Strategic Weapons Program
flowing are President Reagan's
icement of the strategic weapons
on October 2, 1981, and a
In-and-answer session with news
tondents following the announce-
sident, it's my solemn duty to
America's national security while
lsly pursuing every path to peace,
i this end, I have repeatedly
i to halt the decline in America's
y strength and restore that
of safety needed for the protec-
the American people and the
nance of peace,
ring the last several years, a
ning in our security posture has
articularly noticeable in our
jic nuclear forces — the very foun-
of our strategy for deterring
1 attacks. A window of vulnera-
3 opening, one that would jeopar-
)t just our hopes for serious pro-
3 arms negotiations, but our hopes
ice and freedom,
ortly after taking office, I
>d the Secretary of Defense
tr W. Weinberger] to review our
*y for deterrence and to evaluate
equacy of the forces now available
! 'rying out that strategy. He and
leagues, in consultation with many
s outside the executive branch,
lone that job well. And after one
most complex, thorough, and
| lly conducted processes in
ry, I am announcing today a plan
I italize our strategic forces and
I ain America's ability to keep the
I well into the next century,
ar plan is a comprehensive one. It
;rengthen and modernize the
•gic triad of land-based missiles,
ised missiles, and bombers. It will
mgstanding delays in some of these
ams and introduce new elements
ithers. And just as important, it
nprove communications and control
ms that are vital to these strategic
3.
'his program will achieve three
tives:
It will act as a deterrent against
Soviet actions directed against the
rican people or our allies;
It will provide us with the capa-
to respond at reasonable cost and
n adequate time to any further
th in Soviet forces;
• It will signal our resolve to main-
tain the strategic balance, and this is the
keystone to any genuine arms reduction
agreement with the Soviets.
Let me point out here that this is a
strategic program that America can
afford. It fits within the revised fiscal
guidelines for the Department of
Defense that I announced last week.
And during the next 5 years, the entire
cost of maintaining and rebuilding our
strategic forces will take less than 15%
of our defense expenditures. This is con-
siderably below the 20% of our defense
budget spent on strategic arms during
the 1960s, when we constructed many of
the forces that exist today. It is fair to
say that this program will enable us to
modernize our strategic forces and, at
the same time, meet our many other
commitments as a nation.
Now, let me outline the five main
features of our program.
First, I have directed the Secretary
of Defense to revitalize our bomber
forces by constructing and deploying
some 100 B-l bombers as soon as pos-
sible, while continuing to deploy cruise
missiles on existing bombers. We will
also develop an advanced bomber with
"stealth" characteristics for the 1990s.
Second, I have ordered the
strengthening and expansion of our sea-
based forces. We will continue the con-
struction of Trident submarines at a
steady rate. We will develop a larger
and more accurate sea-based ballistic
missile. We will also deploy nuclear
cruise missiles in some existing sub-
marines.
Third, I've ordered completion of
the MX missiles. We have decided,
however, not to deploy the MX in the
racetrack shelters proposed by the
previous Administration or in any other
scheme for multiple protective shelters.
We will not deploy 200 missiles in 4,600
holes, nor will we deploy 100 missiles in
1,000 holes.
We have concluded that these basing
schemes would be just as vulnerable as
the existing Minuteman silos. The
operative factor here is this: No matter
how many shelters we might build, the
Soviets can build more missiles, more
quickly, and just as cheaply.
Instead, we will complete the MX
missile which is much more powerful
and accurate than our current Minute-
man missiles, and we will deploy a
limited number of the MX missiles in
existing silos as soon as possible.
At the same time, we will pursue
three promising long-term options for
basing the MX missile and choose
among them by 1984, so that we can
proceed promptly with full deployment.
Fourth, I have directed the
Secretary of Defense to strengthen and
rebuild our communications and control
system, a much neglected factor in our
strategic deterrent. I consider this deci-
sion to improve our communications and
control system as important as any of
the other decisions announced today.
This system must be foolproof in case of
any foreign attack.
Finally, I have directed that we end
our long neglect of strategic defenses.
This will include cooperation with
Canada on improving North American
air surveillance and defense, and as part
of this effort, I've also directed that we
devote greater resources to improving
our civil defenses.
This plan is balanced and carefully
considered — a plan that will meet our
vital security needs and strengthen our
hopes for peace. It's my hope that this
program will prevent our adversaries
from making the mistake that others
have made and deeply regretted in the
past — the mistake of underestimating
the resolve and the will of the American
people to keep their freedom and protect
their homeland and their allies.
Q. On that, would we be ready to
use these new systems as bargaining
chips in arms talks with the Soviets?
A. I think everything having to do
with arms would have to be on the table.
Q. When exactly is this "window
of vulnerability?" We heard yesterday
the suggestion that it exists now.
Earlier this morning, a defense
official indicated that it was not until
1984 or 1987. Are we facing it right
now?
A. I think in some areas we are,
yes. I think the imbalance of forces, for
example, on the Western front, in the
NATO line — we are vastly outdistanced
there. I think that right now, they have
a superiority at sea.
Q. If there is or will be a "window
of vulnerability," why is the MX any
less vulnerable if it is in silos, the
location of which the Soviets pre-
sumably already know, unless we
were going to launch on their attack?
A. I don't know but what maybe
Tiber 1981
67
UNITED NATIONS
Prospects for Arms Control
by Eugene V. Rostow
Statement made in Committee 1
(Political mill Security) of the U.N.
General Assembly in New York on
October 21, 1981. Mr. Rostow is Director
of the Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency.1
It is a privilege for me to address Com-
mittee I [Political and Security] of the
General Assembly in order to present
the views of my government on arms
control and disarmament, both the ma-
jor items on the arms control agenda of
the United Nations, and some related
problems as well. If you will permit me
a personal note, I have long been in-
volved in U.N. affairs. I served in the
Secretariat years ago and look back to
that experience with pride. And a con-
siderable part of my scholarly work has
boon devoted to the study of the United
Nations as a peacekeeping institution.
The people and Government of the
United States have always viewed the
Charter and the institutions of the
United Nations as critically important
elements of the world political system.
The American people know that the
United Nations is part of the skeleton
and the central nervous system of world
politics. And they look to it with hope.
The charter embodies an agreed code of
values which define the necessary terms
of international cooperation — the rules
you haven't gotten into the area that I'm
going to turn over to the Secretary of
Defense.
I could say this: The plan also in-
cludes the hardening of silos so that
they are protected against nuclear
attack. We know that is not permanent.
We know that they can then improve
their accuracy, their power, and their
ability, but it will take them some time
to do that, and they will have to devote
a decided effort to doing that.
Q. This is a way, then, of buying
time?
A. In a way, of narrowing that
"window of vulnerability."
Q. Some people already are saying
that your decisions are based, to a
large extent, on politics— domestic
politics— so let me ask you about two
points: One, that you never considered
the racetrack system because it was
proposed by Jimmy Carter, and you
didn't want to have anything to do
with something that he had proposed;
and, two, that you're not basing the
MX in Utah and Nevada because of
opposition from the Mormon Church
and your good friend. Senator Paul
Laxalt.
A. I can tell you now, no, the entire
study of the basis for basing — I got
tangled up there with two words that
sounded so much alike — the MX missile
was a very thorough study of all those
proposals that had been made. And
actually, I could refer you to the Town's
Commission, their study, and their
report that we would not have an in-
vulnerable missile basing by doing that;
that all they would have to do is in-
crease the number of targeted warheads
68
on that particular area and take out the
whole area. And while it would force
them to build additional missiles, we
would be just as vulnerable as we are in
the present Minutemen.
Q. Laxalt didn't persuade you?
A. No, no.
Q. Your predecessor killed the
B-l manned bomber because he said it
couldn't penetrate Soviet air defenses.
The Soviets can make a lot of progress
in radar between now and 1986. Can
you guarantee that the B-l could
penetrate Soviet air defenses, and is it
the best plane as a cruise missile
launch platform?
A. I think, again, you're getting
in — I think that my few minutes are
up — [laughter] — and I'm going to turn
that question over to Cap. I think I
know the answer to it, but I do believe
that you are getting into the kind of
questions that he is properly —
Q. Could you tell us why you
decided to build the B-l as opposed to
your predecessor's decision not to
build it? Do you think it can penetrate
Soviet air space?
A. We have to have it, because be-
tween the aging B-52 and the bomber
we are developing, the newer bomber,
there is too long a time gap in there and
would leave us a very lengthy,
vulnerable period. And the B-l is
designed not just to fill that gap, but it
will then have a cruise missile carrying
capacity later, in which it will still be
worth the cost of building and worth
having.
A ■
ill
k
'Text from Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents of Oct. 5, 1981.
which should guide and animate ti •
behavior of states and unite the
members of the United Nations, fl
their differences, into a single socil
and polity. The code of the chartei *'
grown out of nearly 200 years of t|
and error in the long struggle of t
enlightenment to conquer or at le^
tame the aggressive instincts of m
the charter rules — and especially i
dealing with the international use
force — should finally disappear as
influence on the behavior of states,
world public order would collapse i
anarchy, and general war would in
evitably ensue.
Committee I is the designated
for discussions of arms control, di^
ment, and international security isi
Its authority derives not only from
mandate but from the distinction o
past achievements. It is, surely, thi
premier forum in which the nation^
consider what they should do to lifitfe
crushing burden of arms and the t)
of war from the backs and minds o
their people.
The United States approaches t
problems of arms control not as isd
abstractions but as components of I
larger problem of international sect
and stability. After all, arms conta
tiatives are meaningless unless thel
viewed as aspects of a comprehensi
strategy to achieve and to maintain
peace.
The traditional discussion of mj
hardy perennials on the U.N. arms
trol agenda often has an air of unrd
to say the least. The reason for thia
of unworldliness at the United Natu
is that it has become a habit amond
not to talk about the central issues |
any examination of the problem of
peace — the declining influence of Ai
2(4) of the U.N. Charter on the behj
of states. The charter says, and I qil
All Members shall refrain in their injl
national relations from the threat or use
force against the territorial integrity or]
political independence of any state, <>r in
other manner inconsistent with the Pura
of the United Nations.
The last two decades have witne.
a rising tide of threats to the peace,
breaches of the peace, and aggres-
sions— actions which involved the us
the threat of force against the territc
integrity or political independence oft
states. Far too often, in the United I
tions and elsewhere, we write and tal
as if peace could be secured through'
adoption of an aseptic formula for I
limiting or abolishing nuclear tests m
Department of State Bulle
United Nations
1 rolling international arms transfers
'daring our undying faith in the
s, :iples of universal disarmament. We
Ie such speeches and draft such
lutions while the manufacture of
3 sets new records every year as the
ing growth industry throughout the
d, while state after state around the
d is under threat or under attack,
e unprovoked invasions occur
out even the pretense of the excuse
slf-defense, and while armed hands
terrorists cross international fron-
to assault the political independ-
of states.
As the fever of aggression spreads,
world community does less and less
indicate the basic principle of article
, the principle of the equality and in-
•ity of all states, the rock on which
charter and the state system rest,
i distinguished American scholar has
mented, the world community now
,ts such events with a "normative
ice" which is "deafening" and
nous. As a result, more and more
ies live in fear and trembling. They
Ii to arms, even to nuclear arms, to
ire their survival. Somehow or other
l find arms, despite our rules.
I Unless we confront these facts and
e ore general and reciprocal respect
si the principles of Article 2(4) of the
ll. Charter, the slide toward anarchy
t engulf us all. Achieving peace is not
: mple matter to be settled on the
\ ap and without tears. Peace requires
1 -e than the drafting of treaties and
nlutions, however worthy. Until we
i e effective steps to see to it that the
I rter, the arms control treaties, and
I legally binding decisions of the
i urity Council are obeyed; until we
verify and assure compliance with
|ir terms, much of what passes for
is control will be a sterile exercise at
t and often, alas, no more than a
rade.
My first point today, therefore, is to
ure you that in this forum and in all
er fora my government will urge that
examine the problems of arms con-
1 and disarmament on our agenda in
• full light, of reality. To that end, we
ill propose and support a series of ini-
tives designed to focus attention
itematically on the principal problems
establishing peace.
viet Expansionism
e underlying cause of the declining
luence of article 2(4) in world affairs,
i the corresponding eclipse of arms
ltrol, is the expansionist policy of the
viet Union and the extraordinary
military buildup on which it is based.
The Soviet Union does not initiate all
the turbulence in the world. A great
deal occurs because of other factors.
What the Soviet Union does is to exploit
and manipulate regional turbulence in
the interest of enlarging its own sphere
of dominance.
I make this comment not to engage
in idle polemics but simply to state a
self-evident fact known to everyone in
this room. It is a fact of critical impor-
tance, which is fundamental to the deci-
sions which my government has had to
take and which other governments are
taking as well— decisions to restore the
balance of power, to deepen the solidari-
ty of our alliances and other friendly
relations of security cooperation, and to
Soviet expansionism is
aimed at destroying the
world balance of forces
on which the survival of
freedom depends.
allow the community of nations to live in
peace. In our relations with the Soviet
Union, we must insist on the only possi-
ble rule of true detente— that of
scrupulous and reciprocal respect for the
provisions of the U.N. Charter regard-
ing the international use of force.
Over the past decade, the world has
endured the shock of the Soviet Union's
accelerating drive for dominance, based
upon an extraordinary allocation of its
resources for military purpose. That
drive is a clear and present danger to
world peace and human freedom.
The goal of the Soviet Union's
military buildup is to attain military
superiority, superiority in both the
destructive power of its nuclear forces
and in the global reach of its conven-
tional forces. As the British and
American Governments pointed out
some years ago, and as all the independ-
ent studies of the subject agree, the
Soviet buildup cannot be explained solely
in terms of defense, however broadly
the concept of defense is interpreted.
The record speaks for itself.
Soviet expansionism is aimed at
destroying the world balance of forces
on which the survival of freedom
depends. This drive is being carried on
by methods openly in violation of the
principles of the U.N. ( 'barter. The in-
stabilities thus created have impelled
many developing nations to seek and ac-
quire weapons with which to protect
their perceived national interests.
Thus far, I have recalled for you
only the visible manifestations of the
Soviet drive for power in the Third
World— its quest for client states and
strategic positions, and its tendency to
take advantage of every opportunity to
enlarge its domain by the use of proxy
forces, military assistance, subversion,
or terrorism.
I should now say a few words about
the issue of nuclear arms and nuclear
arms control which are at the center of
Soviet strategic doctrine. The United
States views the effort to bring the
nuclear weapon under international con-
trol as the most important task of those
who seek to realize the promise of
peace. Without success in this effort, no
other success in the field of arms control
will be possible.
A basic dilemma has haunted
nuclear arms control negotiations from
their beginning. For many years the
United States assumed that the Soviet
Union shared its view that the objective
of arms control negotiations should be to
allow each side the same right to main-
tain deterrence, a retaliatory capacity,
and stability.
There have been occasions where
East and West have had the same ap-
proach to an arms control problem, for
example, on the question of nuclear
weapons proliferation. The Nonprolifera-
tion Treaty of 1968 demonstrated how
real gains in security can result when
the Soviet Union recognizes its funda-
mental national interest in the stability
of the state system. It is no longer possi-
ble to assume a mutuality of interest:
The United States and the Soviet Union
have different policies with regard to
nuclear and conventional weapons.
Therefore, they have different objectives
in negotiating to limit the spiral of
nuclear and conventional arms ac-
cumulation.
SALT [Strategic Arms Limitation
Talks] is a case in point. U.S. nuclear
doctrine is clear. Our goals are deter-
rence and stability. Our nuclear arsenal
exists to make certain that neither the
Soviet Union nor any other country can
use or threaten to use nuclear weapons
for aggressive purposes or threaten the
ultimate interests of the United States
by any other means. Our purpose is to
maintain a credible second-strike nuclear
capability so that the United States, its
ember 1981
69
United Nations
allies, and its other interests are pro-
tected at all times. Facing an assured
American second-strike capability, no
potential nuclear aggressor will feel free
to use military force against the United
States, our NATO allies, the nations of
the Western Hemisphere, Japan, or any
other strategically critical nation. And
we could not be deterred from using
conventional force in defense of our in-
terests if it became necessary to do so.
This is and must remain the goal of our
nuclear arsenal and, therefore, our
minimal goal in nuclear arms control
negotiations.
The Soviet Union has not yet
adopted a parallel position. On the con-
trary, the mission of its nuclear forces is
intimidation and coercion and, if
necessary, victory in nuclear war. I need
not recite the list of the new weapons
deployed by the Soviets in the last 10
years. The Soviet Union has been and is
still adding ICBMs [intercontinental
ballistic missiles], large medium-range
missiles, and nuclear-weapons sub-
marines and bombers to its arsenal in an
obvious effort to create and maintain a
nuclear advantage.
The Soviet strategic buildup is aimed
not at achieving and preserving
strategic stability but at creating and ag-
gravating strategic instability. Soviet
strategic programs are designed to
threaten the survivability of our
strategic forces. This emphasis in Soviet
military doctrine and action is in itself a
repudiation of the doctrine of mutual
assured destruction resting on mutual
vulnerability, which many Americans
thought both sides had adopted in 1972.
The Soviet lead in heavy and accurate
ICBMs, capable of destroying a large
part of our ICBM force in a first strike,
undermines the basis for stability and
reciprocal restraint in a crisis. Such a
situation is a recipe for nuclear black-
mail. We cannot emphasize too often
that the principal danger facing the
world is not nuclear war but political
coercion based on the credible threat of
nuclear war.
In this situation, what is the position
of my government toward arms control
negotiations with the Soviet Union? The
profound changes in the strategic en-
vironment since 1972 have required the
United States to review its arms control
policies, which have failed, and to devise
new policies adapted to the world as it
now is. That process of review is pro-
ceeding rapidly and at a high level.
Apart from these indispensable
preparations and the intellectual effort
they require, the United States has
established no preconditions for arms
control negotiations with the Soviet
Union. We are not waiting for a military
balance to be restored before we parlay
with the Soviet Union. And we are set-
ting no political condition, either, despite
our deepest concern regarding the
Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan
and its expansionist activities in other
parts of the world.
The United States is, of course, tak-
ing steps to restore its deterrent
capability, both nuclear and conven-
tional. These steps are indispensable in
themselves from the point of view of
security. In the world or reality, fair and
balanced arms control agreements would
be inconceivable without a firm
American commitment to maintain a
credible deterrent.
We shall be seeking arms reductions
and arms control agreements which
would insure an equal deterrent capacity
for both sides at lower levels of arma-
ment and which would require both par-
ties to cooperate in assuring compliance.
We have already begun the first
phase of substantive talks on nuclear
arms control issues with the Soviet
Union. In August we proposed informal
talks on problems of verifying com-
pliance with arms control agreements,
on the provision of data, and on certain
other general subjects which would arise
in arms control negotiations. We told
the Soviet Union that we thought
cooperative procedures would be
necessary to supplement national tech-
nical means in a number of areas and in-
vited Soviet ideas about how best to pro-
ceed— through diplomatic channels,
through special meetings of experts, or
through the negotiations themselves. We
have not yet had a response to this pro-
posal.
U.S. -Soviet negotiation on inter-
mediate-range nuclear forces will begin
in a few weeks on November 30. We
welcome the commencement of these
talks. We expect to be ready to propose
that the companion talks on the reduc-
tion of strategic nuclear forces should
begin early in 1982.
Arms Control Verification
I should now like to turn to the specific
subjects under discussion in this commit-
tee and at the Committee on Disarma-
ment. Let me state at the outset that
the U.S. Government is strongly com-
mitted to the work of the Committee on
Disarmament. I intend, despite the
demands of the nuclear arms problem,
ri1
s
Bat'
to take a sustained personal interest i i#
the matters to be discussed here and
Geneva. I expect during the months
ahead that the United States will pn>
pose a number of initiatives in the Cor
mittee on Disarmament, in order to t:
full advantage of the committee's capjjnss
ty for seriously considered and
deliberate action.
One area in which we hope and ea
pect this committee and the Commit te i
on Disarmament to take a strong lead
in addressing the questions of monitor
ing and verifying compliance with arm
control agreements, new and old. New *■
procedures are needed to make verifie
tion processes more thorough and moB
reliable. The cause of peace cannot be
advanced if the nations have little
confidence that arms control agreemer-
are being complied with. In certain
areas — those concerned with nuclear, i
biological, or chemical weapons, for ea
ample — compliance can be quite literal
a matter of life and death. No nation I
can be expected to respect an arms col
trol agreement unless it can be sure th)
other signatories are complying with itj
In this perspective, I should mentio
the use of lethal and incapacitant
chemical agents in Southeast Asia,
Afghanistan, and elsewhere. This is a
matter of deep and continuing concern
to my government. The use of chemica
agents and toxins in Southeast Asia
makes clear the need for concrete inter
national action to restore confidence in
the 1925 Geneva Protocol [Protocol for
the Prohibition of the Use in War of
Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gase
and of Bacteriological Methods of War-
fare], the Biological Weapons Conven-
tion, and associated rules of customary
international law.
The United States supported U.N.
General Assembly Resolution 35/144C
which initiated the ongoing experts in- 1
vestigation of reports on the use of
chemical weapons. We regret that some
nations felt obliged to oppose it. We do
not understand such opposition. The
new evidence concerning the use of to»
ins makes the work of the experts group
all the more important. My government
looks forward to the findings of the ex-J
perts group in light of all the evidence '
before it, including the new evidence. I
This issue is a matter of critical im-l
portance in many dimensions. It requires
the full attention of this committee and)
of the General Assembly, both because J
of the implications for the relevant intel
national prohibitions on the possession
and use of such weapons and because of
Ji
70
Department of State Bulletin
■
United Nations
jader issues raised by their use.
are dying. This is not an East-
ssue, nor is it a North-South
Rather, it is an issue which con-
the security— present and future—
lations alike. Once more such
ns are being used — weapons re-
1 with loathing and revulsion
;hout the world. These weapons
t being used on animals but on
beings in small defenseless coun-
[f the nations are not willing or
) take concrete and effective ac-
o deal with this problem and en-
:ompliance with the 1925 Geneva
:ol and the biological weapons con-
ns, then the prospects for any
control initiative will be seriously
mined.
wish to emphasize two of the prin-
which will guide our thinking on
ms of verification in both bilateral
[Unilateral agreements.
irst, we shall not confine ourselves
jotiating only about those aspects
iroblem which can be resolved by
ing to national technical means. In
.se of the negotiations with the
: Union, we shall begin by offering
intial limitations that are strategi-
Ij significant and then construct the
i measures necessary to insure veri-
ity. These may well include cooper-
I procedures between the United
is and the Soviet Union, such as
i ed data exchanges and provisions
Given the importance of verification
for the viability of arms control across
the board, Soviet acceptance of
cooperative measures to improve the
verifiability of specific limitations may be
the best test of its commitment to
serious arms limitations on both a
bilateral and multilateral basis.
Nuclear Nonproliferation
Let me now turn to the important issue
of nuclear nonproliferation. The position
of the United States is clear. President
Reagan has identified this problem as
one of the most critical challenges faced
by the world community. It is the
premise of the Nonproliferation Treaty
that a halt to the proliferation of nuclear
weapons serves the interests of all coun-
tries, nuclear and non-nuclear alike. It is
manifest that, in a world where many
nations have nuclear weapons, inter-
national politics would be nearly unpre-
dictable and volatile to the point of ex-
plosiveness. President Reagan has
recognized that political instability can
be a cause as well as a consequence of
nuclear proliferation. He has pointed out
that global and regional stabilization are
necessary— but not sufficient— conditions
for success in the effort to carry out the
policies of the Nonproliferation Treaty.
In addition, both supplier and consumer
nations must work together to insure
that peaceful nuclear cooperation, an
People are dying. This is not an East-West
tie, nor is it a North-South issue. Rather, it is an
lie which concerns the security — present and
i ure — of all nations alike.
hance the confidence of each side in
obtained by national technical
is.
Second, we shall seek verification
isions which not only insure that ac-
threats to our security resulting
possible violations can be detected
timely manner but also limit the
hood of ambiguous situations devel-
y. Ambiguity can never be elimi-
d entirely from documents drafted
eople, but we shall do our best to
> it to a minimum. Ambiguous provi-
5 result in compliance questions and
pliance questions lead to compliance
plaints which, even if ultimately
lved, strain the atmosphere for arms
rol negotiations.
essential factor in meeting global energy
needs, is not misused.
In the context of regional ap-
proaches to nonproliferation, I am
pleased to announce that the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee has
favorably reported Protocol I of the
Treaty of Tlatelolco, and the Senate is
expected shortly to give its advice and
consent for ratification. President
Reagan will, I am sure, move promptly
to deposit our instrument of ratification.
This treaty was a farsighted initiative of
Latin American countries that has con-
tributed significantly to hemispheric
security. While the regime envisaged by
the treaty is not yet complete, we hope
all nations in the region will make ever}
effort to insure the full success of this
important achievement.
Committee I has on its agenda items
relating to establishing other nuclear-
free zones. The U.S. Government has
taken a keen interest in supporting the
Egyptian initiative to establish a Middle
Eastern nuclear- weapons- free zone. The
proposal has great promise, which can
be realized only if the states of the
region work together to fulfill it. Many
problems will have to be solved by those
states before the dream of the Middle
East as a nuclear-weapons-free zone can
become a reality. The United States
stands ready to assist the states of the
region, if they wish such assistance, in
studying these thorny issues and in
resolving them. We hope that this
General Assembly will encourage the
project and give it further impetus.
The United States is prepared to
participate constructively in the work of
the Committee on Disarmament with a
view to concluding successfully the
negotiation of a convention prohibiting
radiological weapons. We also believe
that the important work of that body in
the area of chemical weapons should be
continued.
Halting nuclear tests has been an
issue before this committee, the Com-
mittee on Disarmament, and its
predecessors for many years. High
hopes have been attached to the pro-
posal, and no one can question the goal
it is designed eventually to achieve. Of
course, the U.S. Government supports
that long-term goal. But a test ban can-
not, of itself, end the threat posed by
nuclear weapons. We shall cooperate ful-
ly in appropriate procedures to examine
the problems the proposal presents.
However, international conditions have
not been propitious and are not now pro-
pitious for immediate action on this
worthy project.
As we consider the question of a
nuclear test ban, we should keep in mind
that in order for such a ban ultimately
to be effective, it must be verifiable. And
it must be concluded under conditions
which insure that it would enhance
rather than diminish international
security and stability.
The committee is discussing the
possibility of further arms control
measures for outer space, a question
which the Committee on Disarmament
might wish to discuss further. The
United States has supported efforts to
control arms in space in the past
through such major international agree-
ments as the outer space treaty and the
Limited Test Ban Treaty. Moreover,
mber1981
71
WESTERN HEMISPHE
U.S. military use of space has been non-
aggressive in nature and has been con-
ducted with great restraint. Further
steps in space arms control are greatly
complicated by the fact that the Soviet
Union has for many years been testing
an antisatellite weapon — a space system
designed for the sole purpose of attack-
ing other nations' satellites— and main-
tains a continuing operational capacity
to use this weapon.
As Committee I conducts its work, it
is important to keep in mind that pious
rhetoric and vacuous resolutions do not
constitute arms control. Moreover, the
United States is firmly opposed to allow-
ing arms control negotiations, which are
the most serious issue any nation can
address, to be abused for purposes of
political warfare. The serious effort to
deal with matters of concern to this
body or the specialized agencies of the
United Nations must not become the vic-
tim of political disputes which can be
considered on their merits in the appro-
priate U.N. bodies. I hope that members
of this committee will reject propaganda
resolutions which tend so often to
frustrate our deliberations about serious
issues. This would provide a better at-
mosphere next year for the second
special session of the U.N. General
Assembly devoted to disarmament. I
want to emphasize the strong support of
the U.S. Government for the special ses-
sion and pledge our cooperation to in-
sure its success.
Prospects for Progress
Let me conclude by returning to the
theme with which I began— that arms
control is not a magic formula through
which differing views of the interna-
tional scene can be reconciled. Without
fundamental agreement on the basic
premises which underlie the U.N.
Charter, the prospects for substantial
progress in arms control will be dim in-
deed. Limitations on nuclear arms will
not have much chance of success until
the Soviet Union accepts the view that it
too must abide by article 2(4). This cen-
tury—bloody as it has been— has, in
most areas of the world, seen the rise of
a state system in which self-determina-
tion and a tolerance of different political
and social systems have become the
norm. Most dreams of militarism, em-
pire, and expansionism have been aban-
doned. The great question which re-
mains to be answered is whether the
last remaining traditional colonial em-
pire is prepared to join with the rest of
us in seeking the newer and better
world order anticipated by our charter.
72
In the nuclear age there can be no
doubt that peace is indivisible. The
world community cannot and will not
long accept a double standard, as Presi-
dent Reagan has pointed out. We in the
West have been patient, and we are
slow to anger. But no one should take
our patience for blindness or passivity.
Secretary of State Haig summed up the
position of the United States a few
months ago in these terms:
What do we want of the Soviet Union?
We want greater Soviet restraint in the use
of force. We want greater Soviet respect for
the independence of others. And we want the
Soviets to abide by their reciprocal obliga-
tions, such as those undertaken in the
Helsinki accords. These are no more than we
demand of any state, and these are no less
than are required by the U.N. Charter and in-
ternational law. The rules of the charter
governing the international use of force will
lose all of their influence on the behavior of
nations if the Soviet Union continues its ag-
gressive course.
The United States and the Soviet
Union, possessing very large nuclear
forces, are locked into an extraordinary
relationship. In a famous article, it was
once characterized as the relationship
between two scorpions in a bottle. I
prefer another metaphor.
There are marriages of love and
marriages of convenience. There are
also marriages of necessity. The Soviet
policy of expansion, fueled by the ex-
traordinary growth of the Soviet armed
forces and particularly of its nuclear
forces, has produced a situation of grow-
ing tension and instability in the world
political system. The efforts of the
Soviet Union to split the West and to
prevent Western improvement of its
defenses will surely fail. As a conse-
quence, the Soviet Union should join the
United States and its allies and accept
the necessity of cooperation as the only
way out of the dilemma both camps now
confront. Only on that footing can they
hope to achieve conditions of peaceful
coexistence, as Secretary of State Haig
defined the concept in the speech from
which I have just quoted.
As President Reagan sees it, the
bilateral nuclear arms control negotia-
tions which have already begun— and
which will soon enter their more formal
stage in Geneva— should, if successful,
be a long step toward the goal of restor-
ing world public order. Our work here
and in the Committee on Disarmament
is equally important and, if conducted in
a spirit of realism, can also contribute
greatly to that end.
U.S. Arms
Transfer Policy
Toward
Latin America
Following are statements by Am
basmdor Thomas 0. Enders, Assisk
Secretary for Inter- American Affair
and Richard R. Burt, Director of tte
Bureau of Politico-Military AffairM
before the Subcommittees on Interna
tiona.l Security and Scientific Affair
and Inter-American Affairs of ike H
Foreign Affairs Committee on Octoh
22, 198H
ASSISTANT SECRETARY ENDE
On July 8, [1981], President Reagan-
signed a directive on our worldwide
policy on conventional arms transfer
which replaced Presidential Directivi
of May 13, 1977. The central thrusl
the new policy was expressed in a J
sentence: "Prudently pursued, arms
transfers can strengthen us" — by
strengthening our friends and allies.
That is also the thrust of our La
American arms transfer policy. Wei
committed, both by longstanding pol
and by the Rio treaty, to join with oi
Latin American allies in "mutual
assistance and common defense of til
American republics." In the Presides
words, the United States "will accorl
high priority to requests from its ml
alliance partners and to those nation,'
with whom it has friendly and
cooperative security relationships." V
are also committed to pursue that ol
tive prudently, with full regard for a
guidelines and caveats established by
legislation and in President Reagan's
directive itself.
■;
Principal Considerations for Requei
The directive listed seven factors as f
principal, but not the only, considera-
tions that would be addressed with 1
regard to each request for arms. The?
were:
• The degree to which the transfe
responds appropriately to the military
threats confronting the recipient;
• Whether the transfer will enhan
'USUN press release 82.1
Western Hemisphere
iipient's capability to participate in
ive security efforts with the
States;
Whether the transfer will promote
1 interests in countering externally
ted aggression;
Whether the transfer is consistent
f.S. interests in maintaining
,y within regions where friends of
lited States may have differing ob-
s;
Whether the transfer is compati-
th the needs of U.S. forces,
lizing that occasions will arise
other nations may require scarce
on an emergency basis;
Whether the proposed equipment
er can be absorbed by the recip-
ithout overburdening its military
:t system or financial resources;
Whether any detrimental effects
transfer are more than counter-
ed by positive contributions to
iterests and objectives.
ch of these factors, and others,
considered by the Administration
egard to every Latin American re-
for arms. Obviously some of the
may be more or less important in
ttin American context than they
be in other regions, and they may
greater or less applicability to
countries within the region than
o to others. For this reason all re-
are considered on a case-by-case
there are no automatic rules that
applied mechanistically to every
y in every circumstance.
Irs for Evaluating Requests
,g the factors of particular impor-
and concern in evaluating Latin
ican requests are these:
Whether the transfer will
jthen a friendly government in
of particular security concern to
nited States, such as the Caribbean
and the South Atlantic, and
ler the arms in question would help
the threat of aggression or subver-
>y our mutual adversaries in those
Whether the transfer is consistent
our interest in maintaining regional
i and stability, or whether it could
ertently contribute to tensions or
tes among countries of the region;
Whether denial of the transfer
i lead the purchaser to turn to
ees of supply and enter into security
tonships that are detrimental to the
3d States and U.S. interests in
1 America.
• Whether approval or denial of the
transfer would best promote "the inter-
national recognition and protection of
human rights and freedoms," to cite the
language and the preamble to the Rio
treaty; and
• Whether, given the fact thai all
nations of the region are developing
countries, the transfer would absorb
resources that should, instead, be
devoted to development or would impact
adversely on the purchaser's ability to
meet its economic as well as its defense
needs.
Latin America has traditionally not
been a heavily armed part of the world,
nor, with the exception of the increas-
ingly sophisticated arsenal in Cuban
hands, is it heavily armed today.
Military expenditures were only 1.6% of
the region's GNP from 1976 to 1978 and
only 10.2% of central government ex-
penditures, down from 13% and 14% in
the early 1970s. Comparable figures for
the developing world as a whole are
more than 5% of GNP and more than
20% of government expenditure. Latin
America's arms imports from 1976 to
1978 were only 7% of all developing
countries' arms imports. U.S. arms sales
to Latin America constitute only about
2% of our arms sales worldwide, and on-
ly about 3% of our sales to developing
countries.
I do not expect these regional
figures to change significantly, although
as individual countries become targets of
externally supported insurgencies or feel
the need to deter Cuban expansionism,
their arms expenditures will necessarily
increase. Except where such a security
threat is present, we do not encourage
or seek an increase in Latin American
defense spending. However, we do have
a direct U.S. interest in the direction
and orientation of that spending.
U.S. Policy: Past and Present
During 1973-76, the United States sup-
plied almost one-fourth of Latin
America's arms imports, excluding
Cuba. During 1977-80, the United
States supplied only 7%. From the
region's largest supplier, in 1974, we
dropped steadily until, in 1980, we were
fifth, after West Germany, France,
Israel, and Italy. I submit to you that
that was not in the U.S. interest. It is
not in the U.S. interest for the military
services of our closest neighbors and
hemispheric allies to be predominantly
equipped by other countries. It is not in
the U.S. interest to have Latin
America's military advice and training
come increasingly from other countries,
and yel advisers, technicians, and
trainers are most likely to come from
major suppliers of military equipment.
There are circumstances in which we
will decide not to make a particular
arms transfer, and thai is explicit in our
policy. When a proposed transfer docs
not meet our criteria, we will turn it
down, and we cannot very well complain
if the purchaser then turns to another
supplier. But the major Latin American
countries have demonstrated thai they
can operate, support, and finance
modern military equipment and that
regardless of others' views, including
our own, they intend to have modern
equipment. In most cases, they have not
sought ultrasophisticateil weaponry but,
rather, the prudent standard for the
armed forces of medium-sized countries.
In the 1960s, we decided that the
F-5 was an inappropriate aircraft for
Latin American requirements. Whatever
the merits of that decision at the time,
the consequence was simply that most of
Latin America bypassed the F-5 and
went to higher performance French,
British, and Soviet aircraft. We did not
succeed in keeping supersonic aircraft
out of Latin America; we did not even
delay their arrival. We only succeeded in
weakening our own security relation-
ships with an area of vital security in-
terest to us.
Conclusion
In making its arms transfer decisions,
this Administration will try to avoid tell-
ing the Latin Americans what it is in
their interest to do. We believe they can
do a good job of deciding that for
themselves, especially when free of out-
side pressures and intervention. We will,
instead, concentrate on determining
what is in our interest — our interest in
the security of the region, in its
economic development, in political
stability and the reduction of interna-
tional tensions, in the protection of
human rights. That is, of course, a proc-
ess in which we seek and welcome the
active participation of the Congress.
MR. BURT
I welcome the opportunity to join Am-
bassador Enders in appearing before
both subcommittees to discuss with you
the President's conventional arms
transfer policy and its relevance to Latin
America.
mber1981
73
Western Hemisphere
In his statement, Ambassador
Enders reviewed many of the ingre-
dients of the policy. It should be clear
that the Administration cannot have an
arms transfer policy based on global
abstractions. Rather, U.S. arms transfer
policy must be attuned to, and tailored
for, the particular circumstances of in-
dividual countries and regions.
Soviet Influence
The world we face today is considerably
less comfortable from our viewpoint
than that of a decade or so ago. The
strategic balance is far more precarious,
and Soviet conventional military
strength has increased relative to our
own. Vital American interests are
challenged in almost every region of the
world as our adversaries continue to
seek opportunities to expand their in-
fluence and control, usually at our ex-
pense and the expense of friends and
allies.
• Soviet forces continue to occupy
Afghanistan threatening other states in
that region.
• Cuban troops in Ethiopia and
military advisers in South Yemen
threaten U.S. and Western interests in
the Arabian Peninsula and the Indian
Ocean. Its troops in Angola are com-
plicating a Namibia settlement and
peaceful evolution in southern Africa.
• The assassination of Anwar
Sadat, a key friend and supporter of
peace in the Middle East, added an ele-
ment of uncertainty to this traditionally
volatile region.
• Libyan troops occupy Chad and
threaten moderate African states.
• A Vietnamese puppet government
still rules in Kampuchea, and Viet-
namese forces remain at the Thai
border.
• The centerpiece of the Soviet
Union's efforts to extend its influence in
the Third World has been massive arms
transfers to its proxies and allies. These
transfers made the Soviet Union the
largest arms supplier to Third World
countries last year, particularly for ma-
jor weapons systems. The increase in
the flow of Soviet arms to the Third
World has been matched by an
upgrading of the quality of the arms
proffered. Indeed, in some cases, the
Soviets have offered top-of-the-line
equipment to their Third World
customers even before it moves into the
inventories of other Communist coun-
tries.
Cuba
Some of the most disturbing
developments have occurred close to our
shores. The growth of Cuban influence
with the Governments of Nicaragua and
Grenada is a source of major concern to
us. The Government of El Salvador is
fighting for survival against a Cuban-
backed insurgency. Cuba's continued
training and logistical support of guer-
rillas in Central and South America and
its unrelenting military buildup is alter-
ing the politico-military balance in Cen-
tral America and the Caribbean and
threatening the security of our friends in
the region. So far this year, for in-
stance, Cuba has received about 50,000
tons of Soviet arms, the largest inflow
of arms since 1962. They have added ad-
vanced MiG-23 aircraft to their inven-
tory and have recently taken possession
of a Koni-class frigate. Latin America
was once relatively sheltered from the
activities of the Soviets and its proxies.
This is clearly no longer the case.
U.S. Policy
In Latin America, then, as elsewhere in
the world, our conventional arms trans-
fer policy, together with our security
assistance program, must serve as an
essential complement to the enhance-
ment of our defenses and as an indispen-
sable component of our foreign policy.
Given the limits of our resources,
the United States cannot defend all its
interests worldwide by itself. We cannot
be the world's policeman. At the same
time, we can ill afford the luxury of
standing aside, asking others to do alone
what, in fact, we can only do together.
In no way is this Administration trying
to recreate the so-called Guam doctrine
of a decade ago.
Instead, the arms transfer policy we
have devised steers a middle
course — helping others to defend
themselves against regional threats
recognizing that we may have to assist
more directly to deter certain
challenges. In the process, we must put
aside some past views of arms transfers,
and in particular the view that arms
transfers are inherently negative, and
restraint a worthy end in itself — while
other suppliers exercise no such
restraint.
We formulated the policy to serve
U.S. interests in a number of ways. It
will:
• Enhance the state of preparedness
of our allies and friends and thereby
help deter aggression;
y
• Demonstrate to all that the I
States has an enduring and legitim
interest in the security of its friend
partners and that it will not allow t
to be put at a military disadvantagi
• Improve the ability of the Ur
States, in concert with its friends a
allies, to project power swiftly and
tively to meet threats posed by mul
adversaries; and
• Help to foster regional and ir
nal stability and contribute to peace
resolutions of disputes. As Ambass?
Enders indicated, often the price of!
tention to the security requirements
friendly states has been a weakenin
our bilateral relationships and deer
ing ability to influence them in area
portant to us.
Many of the factors which we w
consider in making decisions on poti
arms transfers have already been m
tioned. Let me stress several:
• A sober assessment of U.S. in
terests and the threat imposed to th
• The impact of a transfer on fl
recipient. We want nations to be abl
absorb a system and to use, maintai:
and support it properly. We will alsc
look carefully at the effect purchase:
have on a nation's budget, particular
its development programs;
• The legitimate concerns many
you have regarding requests by natii
with poor human rights records. Um
both law and policy, this Administra
will continue to promote the advance
ment of human rights and will factoi
country's record into our decisionma
process on arms transfers. I would li
to emphasize, however, that arms
transfers are not the enemy of huma
rights. We will not look at human
rights performance in a vacuum; rati
we weigh all relevant factors in detei
mining transfers; and
• The impact of the proposed
transfer on our overall relationship w
the country in question.
Conclusion
Considerations such as these affect al
our arms transfer decisions. There wi
be circumstances — owing to the natui
of the threat, the ability of a country
absorb a system both militarily and
economically, and our political relatioi
ships — in which U.S. national interest
will be best served by the sale of our
most advanced weapons. In other case «
a less costly and complex system will I
more appropriate. In order to be effec
tive, our arms transfer policy must
74
IEATIES
;ess ample political flexiblility, pro-
tis expanding the range of available
ons, such as the intermediate export
ter provide us the complementary
inological flexibility.
I do not want to leave you with the
ression that American sales will be
;strained. What we are trying to do
/oid a framework of artificial ceil-
i, arbitrary prohibitions, discrim-
ory treatment against friends, and
■defeating unilateral actions. We are
cing, instead, to be responsive and
)onsible. U.S. interests in Latin
erica and the world demand an arms
isfer policy that is both.
'The complete transcript of the hearings
be published by the committee and will
vailable from the Superintendent of
uments, U.S. Government Printing Of-
Washington, D.C. 20402. ■
iirrent Actions
1LTILATEKAL
liculture
Irrational agreement for the creation at
'( s of an International Office for
pontics, with annex. Done at Paris
I 25 1924. Entered into force Jan. 17,
E; for the U.S. July 29. 1975. TIAS 8141.
jession deposited: Vanuatu, June 29, 1981.
titration
flivention on the recognition and enforce-
hit of foreign arbitral awards. Done at
|v York June 10, 1958. Entered into force
He 7. 1959; for the U.S. Dec. 29, 1970.
Ls 6997.
|-ession deposited: Indonesia, Oct. 7, 1981.
I ronauts
Vvement on the rescue of astronauts, the
lurn of astronauts, and the return of ob-
is launched into outer space. Done at
Ishington. London, and Moscow Apr. 22,
Ii8. Entered into force Dec. 3, 1968. TIAS
■9.
Itification deposited: Chile, Oct. 8, 1981.
Iffee
jernational coffee agreement 1976, with an-
tes. Done at London Dec. 3, 1975. Entered
o force provisionally Oct. 1, 1976;
finitively, Aug. 1, 1977. TIAS 8683.
:tended to: Cook Islands, Aug. 20, 1981.
itification of provisional applica' ion
posited: Greece, Sept. 15, 1981.
mimodities
rreement establishing the Common Fund
r Commodities, with schedules. Done at
sneva June 27, 1980.'
matures: Benin, Comoros, Gabon,
;pt. 10, 1981; Guinea-Bissau. Sept. 11,
1981; India, Sept. 18, 1981; Peru, Sept. 2.r..
1981; Sierra Leone, Sept. 24, 1981; Ethiopia,
Sept. 30, 1981; Cape Verde, Oct. 9, 1981,
Ratifications deposited: Australia,
Oct. 9, 1981; Iraq. Sept. 10, 1981,
Consular
Vienna convention on consular relations.
Done at Vienna Apr. 24, 1963. Entered into
force Mar. 19. 1907; for U.S. Dec. 24, 1969.
TIAS 6820.
Ratification deposited: Poland, Oct. 13, 1981.
Containers
International convention for sale containers
(CSC), with annex. Done at Geneva Dec. 2,
1972. Entered into force Sept. 6, 1977; for
the U.S. Jan. 3, 1979. TIAS 9037.
Accessions deposited: Israel, Aug. 21, 1981;
Belgium, Sept, 16, 1981.
Genocide
Convention on the prevention and punish-
ment of the crime of genocide. Done at Paris
Dec. 9, 1948. Entered into force Jan. 12,
1951.2
Accession deposited: Luxembourg, Oct. 7,
1981.
Hydrographic
Convention on the International
Hydrographic Organization, with annexes.
Done at Monaco May 13. 1967. Entered into
force Sept. 22, 1970. TIAS 6933.
Accession deposited: Uruguay, Sept. 22,
1981.
Human Rights
International covenant on civil and political
rights. Adopted at New York Dec. 16, 1966.
Entered into force Mar. 23, 1976.2
Accession deposited: Democratic People's
Republic of Korea, Sept. 14, 1981.
International covenant on economic, social,
and cultural rights. Adopted at New York
Dec. 16, 1966. Entered into force Jan. 3,
1976.2
Accession deposited: Democratic People's
Republic of Korea, Sept. 14, 1981.
Maritime Matters
Amendments to the convention of Mar. 6,
1948, as amended, on the Intergovernmental
Maritime Consultative Organization (TIAS
4044, 6285, 6490, 8606). Adopted at London
Nov. 14, 1975. Enters into force May 22,
1982, except for Article 51 which enters into
force July 28, 1982.
Acceptance deposited: Malaysia, Sept. 28,
1981.
Oil Pollution
International convention on civil liability tor
oil pollution damage. Done at Brussels
Nov. 29, 1969. Entered into force June 19,
1975 2
Accessions deposited: Nigeria, May 7, 1981;
Singapore, Sept. 16, 1981.
Patents
Patent cooperation treaty, with regulations.
Done at Washington June 19. 1970. Entered
into Force Jan. 24, 1978; except for chapter II
which entered into Force Mar. 29, I978.3
HAS 8733.
Ratification deposited: Belgium, Sept. 14,
1981.
Pollution
Convention on long range transboundarj air
pollution. Done at Geneva Nov. 13, 1979.'
Ratification deposited: Sweden. Feb. 12,
1981.
Postal
General regulations of the Universal Postal
Union, with final protocol and annex, and the
universal postal convention with final pro-
tocol and detailed regulations. Done at Rio de
Janeiro Oct. 26, 1979. Entered into force
July 1. 1981; except For Article 124 of the
General Regulations which became effective
Jan. 1, 1981.
Ratifications deposited: Kuwait, Aug. I 1,
1981; Bangladesh. Sept. 1, 1981; Egypt,
Sept. 7, 1981; Luxembourg, Sept. 18, 1981.
Approvals de] ted: Singapore, Sept, 2,
1981; Madagascar. Sept. 9. 1981; Bulgaria,
Sept. 18, 1981.
Accession deposited: Equatorial Guinea,
Sept. 21, 1981.
Money orders and postal travellers' checks
agreement, with detailed regulations with
final protocol. Done at Rio de Janeiro
Oct. 26. 1979. Entered into force July 1,
1981. TIAS 9973.
Ratification deposited: Kuwait, Aug. 14,
1981; Egypt, Sept. 7, 1981; Luxembourg,
Sept. 18, 1981.
Approvals deposited: Madagascar, Sept. 9.
1981; Bulgaria, Sept. 18, 1981. .
Constitution of the Universal Postal Union
with final protocol. Done at Vienna July 10,
1964. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1966. TIAS
5881.
Ratification deposited: Costa Rica,
Sept. 10, 1981.
Additional protocol to the constitution of the
Universal Postal Union with final protocol,
signed at Vienna July 10, 1964. Done at
Tokyo Nov. 14, 1969. Entered into force
July 1, 1971, except For Article V of the addi-
tional protocol which entered into force Jan.
1, 1971. TIAS 7150.
Ratification deposited: Costa Rica,
Sept. 10, 1981.
Second additional protocol to the constitution
of the Universal Postal Union of July 10.
1964, general regulations with final protocol
and annex, and the universal postal conven-
tion with final protocol and detailed regula-
tions. Done at Lausanne July 5, 1974.
Entered into force Jan. 1, 1976. TIAS 8231.
Ratification deposited: Costa Rica,
Sept. 10, 1981.
Accession deposited: Equatorial Guinea,
Sept. 21, 1981.
scember 1981
75
Treaties
Property-Industrial-Classification
Nice agreement concerning the international
classification of goods and services for the
purpose of the registration of marks of
June 15, 1957, as revised. Done at Geneva
May 13, 1977. Entered into force Feb. li,
1979.2
Accession deposited: Suriname, Sept. 16,
1981.
Rubber
International natural rubber agreement,
1979. Done at Geneva Oct. 6, 1979. Entered
into force provisionally Oct. 23, 1980.
Accession deposited: Turkey, Sept. 17, 1981.
Ratification deposited: F.R.G., Sept. 30,
1981.
Safety at Sea
International convention for the safety of life
at sea, 1974, with annex. Done at London
Nov. 1, 1974. Entered into force May 25,
1980. TIAS 9700.
Ratification deposited: Egypt. Sept. 4, 1981.
Protocol of 1978 relating to the international
convention for the safety of life at sea, 1974
(TIAS 9700). Done at London Feb. 17. 1978.
Entered into force May 1, 1981. TIAS 10009.
Accessions deposited: Libya, July 2, 1981;
Greece, July 17, 1981.
Space
Treaty on principles governing the activities
of states in the exploration and use of outer
space, including the moon and other celestial
bodies. Done at Washington, London, and
Moscow Jan. 27, 1967. Entered into force
Oct. 10, 1967. TIAS 6347.
Ratification deposited: Chile, Oct. 8, 1981.
Convention on registration of objects
launched into outer space. Done at New York
Jan. 14, 1975. Entered into force Sept. 15,
1976. TIAS 8480.
Accession deposited: Chile, Sept. 17, 1981.
Terrorism
International convention against the taking of
hostages. Done at New York Dec. 17, 1979.1
Ratification deposited: Egypt, Oct. 2, 1981.
Trade
Geneva (1979) protocol to the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva
June 30, 1979. Entered into force Jan. 1,
1980. TIAS 9629.
Ratification deposited: Canada, Sept. 1, 1981.
Protocol supplementary to the Geneva (1979)
protocol to the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade. Done at Geneva Nov. 22, 1979.
Entered into force Jan. 1, 1980.
Acceptances deposited: Canada, Sept. 1,
1981; Ivory Coast, Sept. 16, 1981.
Ratification deposited: Israel, Sept. 14, 1981,
Protocol for the accession of Colombia to the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.
Done at Geneva Nov. 28, 1979. Entered into
force Oct. 3, 1981.
76
Ratification deposited: Colombia, Sept. 3,
1981.
Agreement on trade in civil aircraft. Done at
Geneva Apr. 12, 1979. Entered into force
Jan. 1, 1980. TIAS 9620.
Keserval ion » ithdraw n: ( 'anada, An:1.. 18,
1981.
Agreement on government procurement.
Done at Geneva Apr. 12, 1979. Entered into
force Jan. 1, 1981.
Ratification deposited: Austria, Aug. 24,
1981.
Agreement on interpretation and application
of Articles VI, XVI, and XXIII of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(subsidies and countervailing duties). Done at
Geneva Apr. 12, 1979. Entered into force
Jan. 1, 1980. TIAS 9619.
Acceptances: Australia, Sept. 28, 1981;4 New
Zealand, Sept. 15, 1981/'
U.N. convention on contracts for the interna-
tional sale of goods. Done at Vienna Apr. 11,
1980.1
Signatures: Austria, Chile, Ghana, Hungary,
Singapore, Yugoslavia, Apr. 11, 1980; Den-
mark. Finland, F.R.G., Norway, Sweden,
May 26, 1981; Netherlands, May 29, 1981;
Lesotho, June 18, 1981; G.D.R., Aug. 13,
1981; France, Aug. 27, 1981; U.S., Aug. 31,
1981; Czechoslovakia, Sept. 1, 1981; Poland,
Venezuela, Sept. 28, 1981; China, Italy,
Sept. 30, 1981.
Ratification deposited: Lesotho, June 18,
1981.
United Nations
Charter of the U.N. and Statute of th<> Inter-
national Court of Justice. Signed at San
Francisco June 26, 1945. Entered into force
Oct. 24, 1945. TS 993.
Admitted to membership: Belize, Sept. 25,
1981.
UNESCO
Protocol to the agreement on the importation
of educational, scientific, and cultural
materials of Nov. 22, 1950. Adopted at
Nairobi Nov. 26, 1976.
Accession deposited: Egypt, Sept. 18, 1981.
Enters into force: Jan. 2, 1982.
U.N. Industrial Development Organization
Constitution of the U.N. Industrial Develop-
ment Organization, with annexes. Adopted at
Vienna Apr. 8, 1979. '
Signatures: Togo, Dec. 20, 1979; Mauritius,
Sept. 16, 1981; Malta, Oct. 2, 1981.
Approval deposited: Democratic People's
Republic of Korea, Sept. 14, 1981.
Ratifications deposited: Afghanistan, Sept. 9,
1981; Togo, Sept. 18, 1981; Spain, Sept. 21,
1981; Sri Lanka, Sept. 25, 1981; Sudan, Sept.
30, 1981; Suriname, Oct. 8, 1981.
Wheat
1981 protocol for the sixth extension of the
wheat trade convention, 1971. Done at
Washington, Mar. 24, 1981. Entered intc «
force July 1, 1981.
Ratification deposited: Tunisia, Oct. 20,
I kvlaral ion of pro\ isional application
deposited: Nigeria, Sept. 29, 1981.
ilatt
Women
Convention on the elimination of all form il
discrimination against women. Done at N
York Dec. 18, 1979. Entered into force S
3, 1981.2
Ratification deposited: Byelorussian Sovie 51a
Socialist Republic, Feb. 1, 1981s; Ethiopii
Sept. 10, 1981; Egypt, Sept. 18, 1981;
Uruguay, Oct. 9, 1981.
WHO
Amendments to Articles 24 and 25 of the
Constitution of the World Health Organiz
tion. Adopted at Geneva May 17, 1976 by
Twenty-ninth World Health Assembly.1
Acceptance deposited: Philippines, Oct. 7,,
1981
Amendment to Article 74 of the Constitut
of the World Health Organization, as ame
ed. Adopted at Geneva May 18, 1978 by t
31st World Health Assembly.1
Acceptance deposited: Australia, Sept. 29,
1981.
BILATERAL
Bangladesh
Amendment to project agreement of July
1978 (TIAS 9397) for fertilizer distributor
improvement I. Signed at Dacca Aug. 20,
1981. Entered into force Aug. 20, 1981.
Brazil
Agreement on cooperation in the field of c
trol of illicit traffic of drugs. Effected by e
change of notes at Brasilia Sept. 29, 1981.
Entered into force Sept. 29, 1981.
Canada
Agreement amending the air transport agr
ment of Jan. 17, 1966, as amended (TIAS
5972, 7824). Effected by exchange of notes
Ottawa Aug. 10 and 28, 1981. Entered into
force Aug. 28, 1981.
Postal convention, with detailed regulations
Signed at Ottawa and Washington Sept. id
and 14, 1981. Enters into force on a date
mutually agreed upon.
Ratified by the President: Oct. 16, 1981.
Colombia
Treaty concerning the status of Quita Suei..
Roncador, and Serrana, with exchanges of I
notes. Signed at Bogota Sept. 8, 1972.
Ratifications exchanged: Sept. 17, 1981.
Entered into force; Sept. 17, 1981.
Arrangement respecting the status of Ser- I
rana and Quita Sueno Banks and Roncador]
Cay. Effected by exchange of notes. Signed]
Department of State Bulletir
ngton, Apr. 10, 1928. Entered into
r. 10, 1928.
ed: Sept. 17, 1981.
ldum of understanding setting forth
rade concessions and contributions to
lateral trade negotiations, and
?tters of Jan. 28 and June 30, 1980.
t Bogota Apr. 23, 1979. Entered into
3, 1981.
rant agreement for basic education.
ex. Signed at Cairo Aug, 19, 1981.
into force Aug. 19, 1981.
lent to grant agreement of Aug. 3 1 ,
AS 9538) for industrial production
Signed at Cairo Aug. 27, 1981.
into force Aug. 27, 1981.
lent to project grant agreement of
1979 (TIAS 9632) for Shoubrah El
Thermal Power Plant. Signed at
ig. 29, 1981. Entered into force Aug.
^rant agreement for irrigation
jnent systems. Signed at Cairo Sept.
Entered into force Sept. 22, 1981.
lent to project grant agreement of
1978 (TIAS 9556) for Cairo
e. Signed at Cairo Sept. 27, 1981.
into force Sept. 27, 1981.
grant agreement for industrial pro-
■ improvement. Signed at Cairo Sept.
Entered into force Sept. 27, 1981.
grant agreement for the control of
.1 diseases. Signed at Cairo Sept. 27,
ntered into force Sept. 27. 1981.
ador
•ent amending the agreement for sales
ultural commodities of Jan. 22, 1981.
1 by exchange of notes at San
r Aug. 31 and Sept. 2, 1981. Entered
e Sept. 2, 1981.
lent relating to establishment of a
tive program of interdiction and selec-
urn of certain Haitian migrants and
involved in illegal transport of per-
ming from Haiti. Effected by e\-
of notes at Port-au-Prince Sept. 23,
ntered into force Sept. 23, 1981.
itional Atomic Energy Agency
lent relating to provision by the U.S.
" Regulatory Commission to the Inter-
I Atomic Energy Agency of experts in
ious fields of the peaceful applications
lie energy. Signed at Vienna and
da May 29 and Sept. 16, 1981.
d into force Sept. 16, 1981.
nent relating to the reciprocal granting
iprizations to permit licensed amateur
■perators of either country to operate
tations in the other country. Effected
bj exchange of notes at Rome July 28 and
Aug. 28. 1981. Entered into force Aug 28
L981.
Japan
men! to accelerate tariff reductions.
Effected by exchange of letters at
Washington, Sept. :j(i, 1981. Entered into
force Sept, 30, 1981.
Liberia
Agreement amending the agreement for sales
of agricultural commodities of Jan. s. 1981,
Effected by exchange of notes at Monrovia
Aug. 2.". and 28. 1981. Entered into force
Aug. 28, 1981.
Luxembourg
Agreement concerning general security of
military information. Signed at Luxembourg
Sept. 17, 1981. Entered' into force Sept. 17
1981.
Morocco
Agreement amending the agreement for sales
of agricultural commodities of July 3, 1981.
Effected by exchange of letters at Rabat
Aug. 18 and 19, 1981. Entered into force
Aug. 19, 1981.
Nicaragua
Agreement relating to the free movement of
military aircraft of each country into and
through the airspace of the other. Effected
by exchange of notes at Managua Nov. 26,
and Dec. 12, 1951. Entered into force Dec.
12, 1951. TIAS 2460.
Notification of termination by Nicaragua:
June 17, 1981; effective Dec. 16, 1981.
Pakistan
Implementing agreement regarding the con-
solidation and rescheduling of certain debts
owned to the Agency for International
Development, with annexes. Signed at
Islamabad Aug. 18, 1981. Enters into force
upon notification by each government that
certain legal requirements have been met.
Agreement regarding the consolidation and
rescheduling of payments due under PL 480
Title I agricultural commodity agreements,
with annexes. Signed at Islamabad Sept. 27,
1981. Entered into force Sept. 27, 1981.
Peru
Agreement for the recovery and return i if
stolen archaeological, historical, and cultural
properties. Signed at Lima Sept. 15, 1981.
Entered into force Sept. 15, 1981.
Philippines
Agreement relating to the continuation of
medical and scientific research projects con-
ducted in the Philippines by the U.S. Naval
Medical Research Unit-Two (NAMRU-2). Ef-
fected by exchange of notes at Manila
May 12 and 21, 1976. Entered into force
May 21, 1976. TIAS 8425.
Terminated: June 5, 1981.
Agreement permanently locating the U.S.
Naval Medical Research Unit-Two
Treaties
(NAMRl 2) in the Philippines, Effecb
i ■ inj i nolo al Manila Feb 16, 1979
ami June .">, 1981. Entered into lore June 5
1981.
Agreement concerning the granl of defen •
articles and sen ices under the military
assistance program. Effected bj exchange of
holes al Manila Aug. 19 and 30, 1981.
Entered into force Aug. 30, 1981.
Poland
Agreement regarding the consolidation and
rescheduling of certain debts owed to,
guaranteed by, or assured by the U.S.
Government and il agencies. Willi aim. ,
and agreed minute. Signed al Warsaw
Aug. 27. 1981. Entered into force Oct. 20,
1981.
Agreement for sales of agricultural com
modifies, with agreed minute. Signed al War-
saw Aug. 28, 1981. Entered into force
Aug. 28, 1981.
Portugal
Agreement concerning the grant of defense
articles and services under the military
assistance program. Effected l>\ exchange of
Holes at Lisbon Aug. 24 and 28, 1981.
Entered into force Aug. 28. 1981.
Singapore
Agreements amending the agreement of
Sept. 21 and 22. 1978. as amended (TIAS
9214, 9610, 9719), relating to trade m cotton,
wool, and manmade fiber textiles and textile
products. Effected by exchanges of letters at
Washington, Aug. 7 and I.",. 1981. Entered
into force Aug. 13, 1981.
Agreement amending the agreement of Sept.
21 and 22, 1978, as amended (TIAS 9LM4.
9610, 9719), relating to trade in cotton, wool,
and manmade filler textiles and textile prod-
ucts. Effected by exchange of letters at
Singapore Aug. 19, 1981. Entered into force
Aug. 19, 1981.
Agreement relating to trade m cotton, wool,
ami manmade fiber textiles and textile prod-
ucts, with annexes. Effected by exchange of
notes at Singapore Aug. 21. 1981. Entered
into force Aug. 21, 1981; effective .Ian. 1,
1982
Agreement amending the agreement of
Aug. 21. 1981 relating to trade m cotton,
wo,, I, and manmade fiber textiles and textile
products. Effected li\ exchanges of letters at
Singapore Aug. 24 and 27, 1981. Entered in-
to force Aug. 27, 1981.
Spain
Agreement extending the treaty of friendship
and cooperation of Jan. 24. 1976 (TIAS
8360). Effected by exchange of notes at
Madrid Sept. 4, 1981. Enters into force upon
the date on which both parties communicate
in writing that their respective applicable
constitutional requirements have been
satisfied, but will apply provisionally from
Sept. 4, 1981, and during the time in which
the above mentioned requirements are being
met.
nber1981
77
CHRONOLOGY
Tunisia
Agreement for sales of agricultural com-
modities, relating to the agreement of June
7, 1976 (TIAS 8506), with minutes of negotia-
tion. Signed at Tunis Aug. 27, 1981. Entered
into force Aug. 27, 1981.
United Kingdom
Memorandum of understanding concerning
the shared use of U.K. and U.S. controlled
facilities in the U.K., with annexes. Signed at
Mildenhall and London Aug. 19 and Sept. 8,
1981. Entered into force Sept. 8, 1981.
'Not in force.
2Not in force for the United States.
3Chapter II not in force for the United
States.
■•With a statement.
5With a reservation. ■
October 1981
October 2
President Reagan announces a five-point pro-
gram to revitalize U.S. strategic forces which
would include:
• improvement in communications and
control systems;
• modernization of strategic bombers;
• deployment of new submarine-launched
missiles;
• step-by-step plan to improve the
strength and accuracy of new land-based
missiles, and to lessen their vulnerability; and
• improvements in strategic defenses.
Iran holds its third post-revolution
presidential election to vote for a successor to
President Rajai who was assassinated
Aug. 3d.
President Reagan meets with Egyptian
Vice President Mohamed Hosni Mubarak to
discuss sending U.S. arms to Sudan.
October 3
Prime Minister Prem Tinsulanonda of
Thailai ' makes private visit to the U.S.
Oct. 3- and to Washington. D.C.,
Oct. 5-!
October 5
Five-day International Conference on Hazard-
ous Waste opens at the Department of State.
Islamic cleric Hojjatoseslam Saved Ali
Khamenei becomes Iran's third President, the
nation's first clergyman head of
President Reagan signs' into law legisla-
tion making Raoul Wallenberg an honorary
U.S. citizen.
October 6
Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat is
assassinated in Egypt while watching a
military parade commemorating the 1973 war
against Israel.
White House announces the members of
the official U.S. delegation to the funeral
services for President Sadat to be held in
Cairo October 9. In addition to the three
former Presidents — Richard M. Nixon,
Gerald R. Ford, and Jimmy Carter and Mrs.
Carter — the delegation includes Secretary of
State Alexander M. Haig. Jr., head of delega-
tion; Secretary of Defense Caspar W.
Weinberger; U.S. Representative to the U.N.
Jeane J. Kirkpatrick; Chief of Staff, U.S. Ar-
my Gen. Edward C. Meyer; Assistant to the
President Joseph W. Canzeri; U.S. Senators
Strom Thurmond, Charles H. Percy, and
Claiborne Pell; Congressmen Jim Wright,
Clement J. Zablocki, and William S. Broom-
field; Chief of Protocol Lenore Annenberg;
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, former Secretary of
State, Nixon and Ford Administrations; Amb.
Sol M. Linowitz, Personal Representative of
the President for the Middle East Peace
Negotiations, Carter Administration; ami
Sam Brown, friend of President Sadat.
October 7
By a vote of 330 to 0, Egyptian Parliament
nominates Vice President Hosni Mubarak to
succeed Sadat as President of Egypt.
By a vote of 28 to 8, House Foreign Af-
fairs Committee votes against President
Reagan's plan to sell $8,500 million in
defense equipment, including five AWACS
[airborne warning and control system] air-
craft, to Saudi Arabia.
U.S. Senate passes bill authorizing U.S.
participation in the Multinational Force and
Observers in the Sinai.
October 9
State Department releases four-page special
report accusing the Soviet Union of using
"disinformation, forgery, and blackmail to
discredit and weaken the United States and
other nations."
Office of U.S. Trade Representative an-
nounces that the U.S. Government has con-
cluded its review of the Sixth International
Tin Agreement (1TA) and will not join the
new agreement scheduled to enter into force
July 1, 1982.
October 11
Vice President Bush makes official visit to
the Dominican Republic — Santo Domingo
Oct. 11-14; Colombia — Bogota and Brasilia
Oct. 14-16; and Brazil — Rio de Janeiro
Oct. 16-17.
October 12
King Juan Carlos and Queen Sophia of Spain
make official visit to Washington, D.C.
Oct. 12-16.
October 14
Nobel Peace Prize is awarded to the Office of
the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees.
By a vote of 301 to 111, U.S. House of
Representatives vote not to approve Presi-
dent Reagan's proposed sale of AWACS air-
craft to Saudi Arabia.
U.S. sends two radar surveillance planes
to Egypt for "an indeterminate period" to
show U.S. commitment to Egyptian and
Sudanese security.
October 15
President Reagan makes trip to Phila
Pa. to address the World Affairs Coui
U.S. policy on world development pro
By a vote of !) to '8, Senate Foreif,
tions Committee votes to recommend
proval of President Reagan's plan to s
AWACS aircraft to Saudi Arabia.
Iran's Prime Minister Ayatollah M
med Riza Mahdavi-Kani resigns.
to
October 16
Israeli soldier-statesman Moshe Dayar
Tel Aviv.
President Reagan proclaims Oct. ]
World Food Day.
II
ll(ii
October 17
White House announces official U.S.
tion attending funeral services for Mo; mbi
Dayan Oct. 18. The delegation will inc
Attorney General and Mrs. William Fr
Smith; Senator and Mrs. Roger W. Jej
Senator Edward Zorinsky; Representa
and Mrs. Richard Cheney; Represental
Mickey Edwards; and Mr. and Mrs. Ja «
Stem, the White House.
ail
October 18
Greece holds parliamentary elections. 1 IS
Minister George Rallis of the New-
Democracy Party concedes defeat to A
Papandreaou, leader of the Panhellenic-
Socialist Movement, ending 35 years ot|
servative rule.
Central Committee of Poland's Cor
munist Party elects Premier Wohciech
Jaruzelski the new party leader. He sui
Stanislaw Kania who resigned.
President Reagan departs for York:
and Williamsburg, Va. to attend the
Bicentennial Observance of the Battle (
Yorktown Oct. 15-19. Also attending t
ceremonies are French President Frant
Mitterrand and Mrs. Mitterrand and Rt
Honorable Lord Hailsham, Lord Chanc«
of the United Kingdom.
October 20
President Reagan transmits 12th Rep
the U.S. Sinai Support Mission to the
gress. The report covers mission activ
during the 6-month period ending Oct
1981.
Defense ministers of NATO meet
Gleneagles, Scotland Oct. 20-21 and i
communique emphasizing that the "fu
trum of the military power of the l'ni
States" is committed to the overall de
the alliance countries.
in
-si
tei
I'.'i
October 21
President Reagan departs Washington tC
tend the International Meeting on Coopll
tion and Development to be held Oct. 2 M
in Cancun, Mexico.
October 22
Government leaders from 8 industrialize!
14 developing nations and U.N. Secretal
General Kurt Waldheim attend the I uteri
tional Meeting on Cooperation and Devel
ment held in Cancun, Mexico Oct. 22-231
78
Department of State Bull*
PRESS RELEASES
l President Lopez Portillo and Cana
ime Minister Pierre Trudeau are
men of the meeting.
ptian, Israeli, and U.S. negotiators
und of talks (in Palestinian automony
Lviv.
r26
tional Liberators Conference of the
ilocaust Memorial Council is held al
ment ..I' State Oct. 26-28.
egation of five-nation Western contact
m Namibia — Canada, Britain, France,
and U.S. — opens a nine-stop Africa
discuss proposals I'm- dealing with re-
=r issues in the Namibian independence
itions. The delegation will travel to
the front line states — Angola,
ma. Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia.
nbabwe — South Africa, and Namibia.
ml Secretary for African Affairs
r Crocker leads U.S. delegation,
ypt and Israel agree I" hold another
of ministerial talks on Palestinian
my. Nov. 4, in Cairn,
e following newly appointed Am-
rs presented their credentials to
.■lit Reagan: Ernest Corea of Sri
[nacio Semedo, Jr. of Guinea-Bissau,
Salim Al-Mokarrab of the United
mirates, Esteban Arpad Takacs of
tina, Mohammad Abdallah al-Iryani of
i Arab Republic, Dr. Janos Petran of
ry, and Abdul Hadi Majali of Jordan.
er27
1 Conference on Security and Coopera-
Europe followup meeting resumes
t 3-month recess. U.S. delegation is
d by Amb. Max M. Kampelman.
nnisli President Urho Kekkonen resigns
,e (if illness.
■partment of Stale releases a set of
.les which the Western five offer as a
For electing a Constituent Assembly and
lg a Constitution for Namibia.
.er28
innounces it will sell Poland $31 million
.1 aid from U.S. Department of
ulture CCC [Commodity Credil Cor-
[on] stocks. The commodities are for use
reschool feeding program in Poland
the auspices of CARE, Inc.
y a vote of 52 to 4S, U.S. Senate ap-
is the sale of AW ACS aircraft to Saudi
ber29
>se Vice Premier and Foreign Minister
ig Hua makes official visit to
lington, D.C. Oct. 29-30 for talks with
dent Reagan, Secretary Haig. and other
•r U.S. Government officials.
Meeting in Geneva, members of 0PE(
mization of Petroleum Exporting Coun
issue a communique setting ■< common
price of $34 a barrel for crude oil and
free ing i he price al i hal lev el uni il i he end
of 1982.
Tent h ( lonference of 1 1. S. -Japan
I looperative Program mi the Development
and 1 i ih/.ai ion of Natural Resources held at
Department of Stale Oct. 29-30, 1981.
October 31
Iran's Mil- Ibisseiu Mousavi is formally ap
pointed Prime Minister of Iran. ■
Department of State
Press releases may be obtained from the
Office of Press Relations, Department of
State, Washington, D.C. 20520.
No. Date
327 10/1
*328 10/2
329 t0/5
*330 10/5
*331 10/5
*332 10/5
•333 10/5
»334 10/5
*335 Ui/5
♦336 10/5
*337 10/5
338 10/6
339 10/7
•340 10/9
Subject
Haig: statement before the
Senate Foreign Relations
Committee.
International Hazardous
Waste Conference, Oct.
5-9.
Haig: statement before the
Senate Foreign Relations
Committee.
John Gunther Dean sworn in
as Ambassador to Thailand
(biographic data).
Dominick L. DiCarlo sworn
in as Assistant Secretary
for International Narcotics
Matters (biographic data).
International Telegraphic
and Telephone Consultative
Committee (CCITT), In-
tegrated Services Digital
Network (ISDN) working
party, Oct. 21.
CCITT, study group D,
Oct. 22.
Shipping Coordinating
Committee (SCC), Subcom-
mittee on Safety of Life at
Sea (SOLAS), working
group on containers and
cargoes, Oct. 28.
SCC, SOLAS, Oct. 29.
SCC, SOLAS, Nov. 24.
Advisory Committee on
International Investment,
Technology, and Develop-
ment, working group on
treatment of investment
and special investment
problems, Oct. 29.
Haig: statement on assassi-
nation of Egyptian Presi-
dent Sadat.
Haig: news conference.
Program for the State visit
of Their Majesties King
Juan Carlos I and Queen
Sophia of Spain, Oct.
12-16.
:;il
in 13
mil:
10/13
343
10/13
344
10/13
345
10 1
346
10/M
347
10/13
348
10/10
"349 10/15
•350 10/19
*351 10/19
"352
*353
363
304
10/21
10/21
'354 10/23
*355 10/27
*356 10/27
*357 10/27
358
10/27
359
10/29
360
10/29
361
10/29
*362 10/29
10/30
10/30
I bug: remarks on "( lood
Morning, America."
i II II T, study group A,
Oct, 27,
\d\ i i .n, i iommittee on the
Law of the Sea, Nov 2 3
Advisory Committee on
Historical Diplomatic
Documentation, Nov. 13.
Haig, Kama! Hassen Ali:
remarks m Cairo, Oct. 1 1.
1 1. in'. Mubarak: remarks in
Cain.. Oct 11.
Haig; inl(i'\ lew un "Meet the
Press," Oct. 11.
M. Virginia Schafer sworn in
as Ambassador to Papua
New Guinea (biographic
dala).
Economic Progress in Less
Developed Coun-
tries— background paper.
Hugh Montgomery named
Director of Intelligence and
Research (biographic data).
Ad\ isory Committee on
International Investment,
Technology, and Develop-
ment, working group on
transborder data flows,
Nov. 4.
U.S., Pakistan amend textile
agreement, Sept. 4 and 10.
U.S., Korea amend textile
agreement, Aug. 13 and
Sept. 9.
Haig: interview with Diane
Sawyer, CBS, Cancun, Oct.
22.
Thomas R. Pickering sworn
in as Ambassador to
Nigeria (biographic data).
National Committee of the
U.S. Organization for the
International Radio Con-
sultative Committee
(CCIR), Nov. 19.
SCC, SOLAS, working group
on radio-communications,
Nov. 18.
Overseas School Advisory
Council, Dec. 15.
Haig: interview with Marvin
Kalb, NBC, Oct. 28.
Haig: interview with Robert
Pierpoint, CBS, Oct. 28.
Program for the State visit
of His Majesty King Hus-
sein I of Jordan, Nov. 1-12.
Haig: remarks before the
International Liberators
Conference of the U.S.
Holocaust Memorial Coun-
cil, Oct. 26.
Haig: interview for
Newsweek, Oct. 29.
Haig: remarks before the
National Foreign Con-
ference for Editors and
Broadcasters, Oct. 29.
•Not printed in the Bulletin.
79
PUBLICATIONS
U.S.U.N.
Press releases may be obtained from the
Public Affairs Office, U.S. Mission to the
United Nations, 799 United Nations Plaza,
New York, N.Y. 10017.
No.
Subject
*31
[Not
issued.]
*32
5/14
Strasser: U.S. Virgin Islands,
i leci 'Ionization subcommit-
tee.
*33
5/18
Lichenstein: TTPI, Trustee-
ship Council.
*34
5/18
High: TTPI, Trusteeship
Council.
*35
5/29
Lichenstein: TTPI, Trustee-
ship Council.
*36
6/4
Lowman: Kampuchea relief
donations, donor's meeting,
May 28.
*37
6/9
McPherson: development
efforts, UNDP Governing
Council.
*38
6/10
Lichenstein: reply to Soviet
statement, Trusteeship
Council.
39
6/19
Kirkpatrick: Israeli strike on
Iraqi nuclear reactor,
Security Council.
*40
6/17
Glazer: U.N. volunteer
program, UNDP Governing
Council.
41
6/19
Kirkpatrick: explanation of
vote on Iraq complaint,
Security Council.
♦42
6/19
Gleysteen, UNIFIL, Security
Council.
♦43
[Not
ssued.]
*44A
6/25
Sorzano: assistance to
Indochina, UNDP Govern-
ing Council.
"44B
7/2
Kirkpatrick: economic
development, ECOSOC,
Geneva.
♦45
7/8
Lichenstein: admission of
Vanuatu to U.N. member-
ship, Security Council.
46
7/13
Haig: International Confer-
ence on Kampuchea,
General Assembly.
*Not printed in the Bulletin.
Department of State
Free, single copies of the following Depart-
ment of State publications are available from
the Public Information Service, Bureau of
Public Affairs, Department of State,
Washington, D.C., 20520.
President Reagan
■ Cooperative Strategy for Global Growth,
World Affairs Council, Philadelphia,
Oct. 15, 1981 (Current Policy #328).
Challenges of World Development, annual
meeting of the World Bank, IMF, IDA, and
IFC, Washington, D.C., Sept. 29, 1981
(Current Policy #322).
Secretary Haig
Interview on "Meet the Press," via satellite
from Cairo, Oct. 11, 1981 (Current Policy
#326).
News Conference, October 7, 1981 (Current
Policy #325).
Dangerous Illusions and Real Choices on
AWACS, Senate Foreign Relations Com-
mittee, Oct. 5, 1981 (Current Policy #324).
Saudi Security, Middle East Peace, and U.S.
Interests, Senate Foreign Relations Com-
mittee, Oct. 1, 1981 (Current Policy #323).
A New Era of Growth, U.N. General
Assembly, Sept. 21, 1981 (Current Policy
#314).
Interview on "Issues and Answers," Sept. 20,
1981 (Current Policy #313).
U.S. Strategy in the Middle East, Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, Sept. 17,
1981 (Current Policy #312).
The Democratic Revolution and Its Future,
Berlin Press Assoc, West Berlin, Sept. 13,
1981 (Current Policy #311).
News Conference, Sept. 10, 1981 (Current
Policy #310).
News Conference, Aug. 28, 1981 (Current
Policy #307).
Interview on "Issues and Answers," Aug. 23,
1981 (Current Policy #306).
Africa
U.S. Interests in Africa, Assistant Secretary
Crocker, Council on Foreign Relations,
New York, Oct. 5, 1981 (Current Policy
#330).
Regional Strategy for Southern Africa,
Assistant Secretary Crocker, American
Legion, Honolulu, Aug. 29, 1981 (Current
Policy #308).
Background Notes on Ethiopia (Aug. 1981),
Mauritania (Aug. 1981), Tanzania (Sept.
1981), Upper Volta (Aug. 1981).
East Asia and the Pacific
Recent Developments in Indochina, Assistant
Secretary Holdridge, Subcommittee on
East Asia and Pacific Affairs of House
Foreign Affairs Committee, Oct. 22, 1981
(Current Policy #334).
Background Notes on Philippines (Aug.
1981).
Economics
Role of the Private Sector in Developing
Countries, AID Administrator McPherson
and Assistant Secretary Hormats, Subcom-
mittee on Trade, Productivity, and
Economic Growth of Joint Economic Com-
mittee, Oct. 19, 1981 (Current Policy #329).
East-West Trade Relations, Under Secretary
Rashish, Subcommittee on International
Economic Policy of Senate Foreign Rela-
tions Committee, Sept. 16, 1981 (Current
Policy #321).
North American Economic Relations, Under
Secretary Rashish, Center for Inter- J
American Relations, New York, Sept.^
1981 (Current Policy #317).
New Challenges in International Invest™
Assistant Secretary Hormats, Econonf
Policy Council, U.N. Association,
Washington, D.C., Sept. 18, 1981 (Cu:
Policy #316).
mi
I'm
Energy ■)tfr>1
New and Renewable Sources of EnergyB*
Ambassador Anderson, U.N. Conferenol
New and Renewable Sources of Energy I
Nairobi, Aug. 13, 1981 (Current Policy I
#315).
R
4
A
1:1
Europe
Atlantic Prospects, 1981-90, Under
Secretary Stoessel, Atlantic Institute,
Brussels, Oct. 24, 1981 (Current Polic;
#333).
Preserving Western Independence and
Security, Assistant Secretary Eaglebi
North Atlantic Assembly, Munich, Oct,
1981 (Current Policy #327).
Forgery, Disinformation, Political Operatii
Soviet "Active Measures," Oct. 1981
(Special Report #88).
NATO and Nuclear Deterrence, Bureau ill
Politico-Military Affairs Director Burt,||L
Arms Control Association Conference, II
Brussels, Sept. 23, 1981 (Current PolicM
#319).
U.S. -Canada Relations, Assistant Secretal
Eagleburger, Center for Inter-Americall
Relations, New York, Oct. 1, 1981 (Cuffl
Policy #318).
Background Notes on U.S.S.R. (Sept. 19ffl
Vatican City (Sept. 1981).
Middle East
Pursuing Peace and Security in the Middle
East, Assistant Secretary Veliotes, Sub-
committee on Europe and the Middle Ei
of House Foreign Affairs Committee, Otti
21, 1981 (Current Policy #332).
Saudi Arabia and U.S. Security Policy,
Deputy Assistant Secretary Twinam (on
behalf of Under Secretary Buckley), Nal
tional Conference of Editorial Writers, fa
vidence, R.I., Sept. 25, 1981 (Current I
Policy #320).
Background Notes on Oman (Aug. 1981).||
Air Defense Equipment for Saudi Arabia!
(GIST, Sept. 1981).
South Asia
Afghanistan (GIST, Oct. 1981).
United Nations
New World Information Order (GIST,
Oct. 1981).
Western Hemisphere
El Salvador: The Search for Peace,
Sept. 1981 (background study).
Brazil and the United States Today,
Assistant Secretary Enders, American
Chamber of Commerce, Sao Paulo, Aug.
19, 1981 (Current Policy #309).
Background Notes on Bolivia
(Aug. 1981), Colombia (Oct. 1981),
Dominican Republic (Oct, 1981). ■
80
Department of State Bulled'
IX
amber 1981
.,81, No. 2057
A Principles. Bicentennial Observ-
■tho Battle of Yorktow n i Reagan) . L6
Bitrol
1-ation Supports Ratification of Pro
BfTreaty of Tlatelolco (Rostow) 33
Intml and Strategic Nuclear Forces
M 22
. for Arms Coin ml (Rostow) 68
Addresses Editors and Broad
Conference 29
gram for Peace and Arms Control
i) in
an and the United States: A Durable
iship (Holdridge) 38
. Role of the Private Sector in
iping Countries (Hormats,
■son) 57
A Profile 35
ula Relations (Eagleburger) . . . :', I
ities. U.S. Food for Poland (Depart-
atement) . . . .56
ration Supports Ratification of Pr<
if Treaty ol Tlatelolco (Rostow) . . .33
ntrol and Strategic Nuclear Forces
22
lents in Indochina (Holdridge) ... .41
le Private Sector in Developing Coun-
[ormats, McPherson) 57
est European Natural Gas Pipeline
its) 49
ort of Sinai Support Mission (message
Congress) 66
ms Transfer Policy Toward Latin
a (Kurt, Enders) "'.
ide and Foreign Policy (Hormats,
l) ... 11
cretary Addresses Editors and Broad-
Conference
ng Countries
icun Summit (Reagan, cochairmen's)
try) 1
dve Strategy for Global Growth
n) 14
he Private Sector in Developing Coun-
lormats, McPherson) 57
dcs
the United States Foreign Relations:
mics-Part 3 A
tive Strategy for Global Growth
in) .' 14
id the United States: A Durable Rela-
ip (Holdridge) 38
lada Relations (Eagleburger) 34
Situation in Egypt and the Sudan
(•talent statement) 66
ieport on Sinai Support Mission
ige to the Congress) 66
vador. Secretary Interviewed for
veek ' 24
(Vest European Natural Gas Pipeline
iiats) 49
nada Relations (Eagleburger) 34
Environment. U.S. -Canada Relation!
(Eaglel inrger) :; |
Europe
Arms Coni ml and Strategic Nuclear Forces
(Haig) 22
Atlantic Prospects, 1981 90 (Stoessel) ....52
NATO Nuclear Planning Group Meets in
Scotland (final communique) 55
Secretary Addresses Editors and Broadcasters
Conference 29
Secretary Interviewed (orNewsweek 24
Soviet-West European Natural Gas Pipeline
(Hormats) 19
U.S. Program for Peace and Arms Control
(Reagan) 10
I LS. Strategic Policy (Reagan) 56
Fisheries. U.S. -Canada Relations
(Eagleburger) 34
Food. U.S. Komi for Poland (Department
statement) 56
Foreign Aid
Cooperative Strategy for Global Growth
(Reagan) 14
Role of the Private Sector in Developing Coun-
tries (Hormats, McPherson) 57
U.S. Food for Poland (Department state-
ment) 56
France. Bicentennial Observance of the Battle
of Yorktown (Reagan) 16
Immigration. Interdiction of Illegal Aliens
(proclamation, Executive order) 62
Industrialized Democracies. The Cancun
Summit (Reagan, cochairmen's summary) . 1
Iran. Secretary Addresses Editors and Broad
casters Conference 29
Israel. 12th Report on Sinai Support Mission
(message to the Congress) 66
Japan. Japan and the United States: A
Durable Relationship (Holdridge) 38
Kampuchea. Developments in Indochina
(Holdridge) 41
Laos. Developments in Indochina (Hold-
ridge) 41
Latin America and the Caribbean
Administration Supports Ratification of Pro-
tocol 1 of Treaty oi Tlatelolco (Rostow) . . .33
U.S. Arms Transfer Policy Toward Latin
American (Burt, Enders) 72
Libva. Secretary Interviewed for News-
week ... ' 24
Middle East
Secretary Interviewed f or Newsweek 24
Secretary Haig Interviewed on "Meet the
Press" 63
Security Situation in Egypt and the Sudan
(Department statement) 66
Military Affairs
Arms Control and Strategic Nuclear Forces
(Haig) 22
U.S. Strategic Weapons Program (Reagan) 67
Namibia. Secretary Addresses Editors and
Broadcasters Conference 29
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Atlantic Prospects, 1981-90 (Stoessel) 52
NATO Nuclear Planning Group Meets in
Scotland (final communique) 55
U.S. Program for Peace and Arms Control
(Reagan) 10
Nuclear Policy
Prospects for Arms Control (Rostow) 68
U.S. Program for Peace and Arms Control
(Reagan) 10
U.S. Strategic Policy (Reagan) 5b
Poland
Secretary Addresses Editors and Broadcasters
( 'i inference 29
U.S. Food for Poland (Department Late
menu 56
Presidential Documents
Bicentennial Observam f the Battle of
Yorktown Id
The Cancun Summit (cochairmen's sum-
mary) 1
i Cooperative Strategy for ( llobal < Irowth I I
Interdiction of Illegal Aliens (proclamation,
Executive order) 62
12th Report on Sinai Support Mission
(message to the Congress I 66
U.S. Strategic Policy 56
U.S. Strategic Weapons Program 67
Visit of Thai Prime Minister 43
Publications. Department of State 80
Saudi Arabia
Secretary Addresses Editors and Broadcasters
i Conference 29
Secretary Interviewed for Newsweek 24
Security Assistance
Security Situation in Egypt and the Sudan
(Department statement) (i(i
U.S. Arms Transfer Policy Toward Latin
America (Burt, Enders) 72
Sudan. Security Situation in Egypt and the
Sudan (Department statement) 66
Thailand. Visit of Thai Prime Minister
(Reagan) 43
Trade
Japan and 1 he 1 nited States: A Durable Rela-
tionship (Holdridge) 38
U.S. Trade and Foreign Policy (Hormats,
Rashish) '. 44
Treaties
Administration Supports Ratification of Pro-
tocol 1 of Treaty oi Tlatelolco (Rostow) . .33
Current Actions 75
U.S.S.R.
Arms Control and Strategic Nuclear Forces
(Haig) 22
Atlantic Pmspects, 1981-90 (Stoessel) . . . .52
Prospects for Arms Control (Rostow) 68
Secretary Interviewed for Newsweek 24
Soviet-West European Natural Gas Pipeline
(Hormats) 49
U.S. Program for Peace and Arms Control
(Reagan) 10
I -.S. Strategic Policy (Reagan) 56
United Nations. Prospects for Arms Control
(Rostow) 68
Vietnam. Developments in Indochina
(Holdridge) 41
Name Index
Burt, Richard R 72
Eagleburger, Lawrence S .'i4
Enders, Thomas 0 72
Haig, Secretary 22, 24, 29,63
Holdridge. John II 38,41
Hormats, Robert I) 44, 19, 57
McPherson, M. Peter 57
Rashish, Myer 44
Reagan. President . 1. 10, 1 1. 16, 43, 56, 66, 67
Rostow, Eugene V 33, 68
Stoessel, Walter J, Jr 52
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W of State jw jw j +
bulletin
e Official Monthly Record of United States Foreign Policy /Vol. 81 / Nos. 2046-2057
SEP 2 T I982
~\^nr\o 1T"^>D\/
Index 1981
Refugees
Middle East
Poland
El Salvador
Department of State
Biceniennial
Economic Summit
CSCE
Cancun Summit
Afghanistan
Department of State
bulletin
Volume 81 / Nos. 2046 - 2057 / Index 1981
B
The Department of State Bulletin,
published by the Office of Public
Communication in the Bureau of Public
Affairs, is the official record of U.S.
foreign policy. Its purpose is to provide
the public, the Congress, and
government agencies with information
on developments in U.S. foreign
relations and the work of the
Department of State and the Foreign
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releases issued by the White House,
the Department, and the U.S. Mission
to the United Nations; and treaties and
other agreements to which the United
States is or may become a party.
ALEXANDER M HAIG, JR.
Secretary of State
DEAN FISCHER
Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs
PAUL E. AUERSWALD
Director,
Office of Public Communication
NORMAN HOWARD
Acting Chief, Editorial Division
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Vol. 81, Nos.
brams, Elliot, July 54, Oct. 66
cheson, Dean G., Jan. S31, S32, S49
vdams, Charles, Jan. S6, S14
Idams, Henry (quoted), Jan. S14
.dams, John, Jan. S4, Sll, Dec. 21 (quoted)
.dams, John Quincy, Jan. S6 (quoted), S7
S8, S9, S44
.dee, Alvey A., Jan. S16, S17
Jghanistan:
Military situation: Haig, July 15; Van
Hollen, Oct. 64
Soviet occupation and need for withdrawal:
Apr. 28, June 2, July 45, Aug. 15;
ANZUS, Aug. 45; Carter, Feb. 59;
Eagleburger, Aug. 74; Haig, Feb. C,
Apr. 15, May 3, 11, 12, Aug. 22, 37,
Oct. 6, Nov. 45; Holdridge, Dec. 38,
McHenry, Jan. 30; NAC, Apr. 8;
Reagan, Apr. 8; Van Hollen, Mar. 18,
Oct. 63
General Assembly resolutions, Jan. 32,
June 54
International conference, EC proposal:
Bush, Aug. 26; Haig, Feb. J, July
12, Aug. 39, Sept. 12; Kampelman,
Sept. 38
Treaties, agreements, etc., May 74, Nov.
91, Dec. 76
U.S. military aid, question of (Haig), July
20
Africa (see also under Refugees and names of
individual countries): Haig, PR 371, 11/5
Refugees. See under Refugees
Southern Africa: Crocker, Aug. 58, Oct.
25; Haig, May 6, 16, July 19; Moose,
Jan. 8.
Maputo economic conference, proposed
(Moose), Jan 10
Soviet and Cuban presence (see also
Angola): Burt, Dec. 74; Crocker, Aug.
57, Oct. 24; Enders, Nov 88; Haig, Ju-
ly 15, 19, Sept. 15, Dec. 65; Muskie,
Jan. 2
U.S. economic and security assistance:
Crocker, Oct. 25; Haig, Apr. B, July
14, PR 68, 3/18; McPherson, May 47;
Muskie, Jan. 2; Walker, May 18
U.S. policy and relations: Buckley, Sept.
62; Crocker, Aug. 57, Oct. 24; Haig,
Oct. 4; Muskie, Jan. 1
U.S. trade and investment, conferences,
announcement of speaker (Brock), PR
127, 5/1
Western Sahara conflict: June 55; Crocker,
Oct. 28; Department, Aug. 58; Draper,
June 46; Saunders, Feb. 55
African, Caribbean, and Pacific Group of
States, Sept. E
African Development Fund, agreement
(1972), accession, Angola, Mar. 33
Agriculture (see also Food production and
shortages and Wheat):
Agricultural commodities, sales of, bilateral
agreements: Bangladesh, Sept. 76;
Dominican Republic, June 61; Egypt,
Mar. 35, July 59, Sept. 76; El
Agriculture (Cont'd)
Salvador, Apr. 48, Sept. 76, Dec. 77;
Ghana, June 61, July 59; Guinea, Aug.
89; Haiti, Aug. 89; Honduras, Aug. 89;
Indonesia, Mar. 35; Jamaica, May 76,
Nov. 92; Kenya, Korea, Aug. 90;
Liberia, Mar. 35, Nov. 92, Dec. 77;
Madagascar, Nov. 92; Malawi, Mar. 35,
Oct. 83; Mauritius, Aug. 90; Morocco,
Sept. 76, Dec. 77; Mozambique, May
76; Pakistan, Sept. 76; Peru, Apr. 48,
May 76; Poland, Dec. 77; Portugal, Ju-
ly 59; Senegal, June 61; Sierra Leone,
July 59, Nov. 92; Somalia, Apr. 49; Sri
Lanka, Aug. 90; Sudan, Apr. 49, May
76, Nov. 92; Tanzania, July 59;
Tunisia, Dec. 77; Zaire, Feb. 71, Aug.
90; Zambia, Oct. 83
Agriculture, livestock, and forestry, cooper-
ation in, bilateral agreement with
Argentina, Sept. 75.
Cooperation, bilateral agreement with
Venezuela, May 76.
Fertilizer distribution, bilateral agreement
with Bangladesh, Dec. 76
Fertilizer promotion, bilateral agreement
with India, Mar. 35
Food production, U.S. development assist-
ance (McPherson), May 46
Inter-American Institute for Cooperation
on Agriculture, convention (1979):
Argentina, July 57; Bolivia, June 60;
Brazil, Mar. 33; Costa Rica, Mar. 33;
Ecuador, May 73; Grenada, Mar. 33;
Nicaragua, May 73; Trinidad and
Tobago, Mar. 33; Venezuela, Oct. 81
International Fund for Agricultural Devel-
opment, Dec. 7
Current actions: Equatorial Guinea, Oct.
81; St. Lucia, Jan. 36; Solomon
Islands, June 60; Zimbabwe, Apr. 46
International Office for Epizootics,
international agreement (1924): United
Arab Emirates, Mar. 33, Vanuatu,
Dec. 75
Irrigation management systems, project
grant agreement with Egypt, Dec. 77
Mediterranean fruitfly:
Cooperation in combating, bilateral agree-
ments: Mexico, Jan. 40, Apr. 48;
Peru, Aug. 90, Sept. 76.
Japanese import restrictions on Califor-
nia agricultural products, Oct. 50
Research and development, scientific and
technical cooperation, bilateral agree-
ment wth Chile, Nov. 92
Science and technology, cooperation in,
bilateral agreement with Zimbabwe,
Jan. 40
Soil survey, bilateral agreement with
Nigeria, Apr. 48, Nov. 92
Trade development and cooperation, bilat-
eral agreement with Hungary, Sept. 75
U.S. agricultural exports, Sept. J
Albania (Eagleburger), Aug. 78
Aldrich, George H., Feb. 56
Algeria:
Treaties, agreements, etc., Mar. 34, May
74, July 58, Aug. 89, Nov. 91
U.S. relations: Draper, June 46; Saunders,
Feb. 54; Stoessel, Apr. 30
Algerian Declarations. See Iran: American
hostages: Release of hostages, agreement
Ali, Kamal Hassan, PR 345, 10/14
Allen, Richard V. (quoted), Nov. 51
American ideals: Haig, Feb. C; Muskie,
Feb. 26; Reagan, Dec. 21
Anders, Robert G., Feb. 21
Anderson, Eugenie M., Jan. S38
Angola: Crocker, Oct. 25, 26, 27; Haig,
May 6, 11, June 10, Oct. 19
Treaties, agreements, etc., Mar. 33,
May 74, Sept. 74, Oct. 81, Nov. 91
Anguilla, Peace Corps program, bilateral
agreement, Oct. 82
Annenberg, Leonore, swearing in as Chief of
Protocol, PR 178, 6/2
Antarctic Treaty (1959): Italy, May 73; Papua
New Guinea, Peru, June 60
Antarctic fauna and flora, conservation of,
recommendation (1964), approval,
Federal Republic of Germany, Apr. 46
Principles and objectives, recommenda-
tions for furtherance (1961, 1966,
1968, 1970, 1978), approval, Federal
Republic of Germany, Apr. 46
Principles and objectives, recommendations
for furtherance (1972): Chile (for Rec.
VII-4 and VII-9), Sept. 74; Federal
Republic of Germany, Apr. 46
Principles and objectives, recommendations
for furtherance (1977): Poland, Apr.
46; Soviet Union, U.K., Oct. 81
Principles and objectives, recommendations
for furtherance (1979): Argentina, Oct.
81; Belgium, Aug. 88; Chile, Sept. 74;
Japan, New Zealand, Aug. 88; Poland,
U.S., Sept. 74
Antarctica, Antarctic marine living resources,
convention (1980): Australia, July 57;
Chile, Sept. 74; Japan, Aug. 88; South
Africa, Oct. 81; Soviet Union, Aug. 88;
U.K., Nov. 90
ANZUS (Australia, New Zealand, U.S.), 30th
meeting: Haig, Aug. 50; joint communi-
que, Aug. 45
Arab-Israeli conflict: Apr. 28, July 45, Aug.
14; ANZUS, Aug. 46; Constable, June 44;
Haig, Feb. C, K, June 19, 25, Aug. 7,
Sept. 17, Oct. 6, PR 62, 3/11; Holdridge,
Dec. 39; Reagan, Aug. 23; Sadat, Sept.
53; Thatcher, Aug. 13
Autonomy talks, prospects (see also Pales-
tinian Liberation Organization, U.S.
policy, infra): Haig, June 17, Sept. 26,
32, 55, 56, 57, Oct. 14, 20, Nov. 50, 60,
69, 74, 75, 77, 78, Dec. 27, 31, PR 406,
12/1
Palestinian participation, question of
(Haig), Sept. 56, 57, 58
U.S. participation (Haig), Dec. 63
Camp David process: Nov. 55; Ali, PR 345,
10/14; Haig, Aug. 18, Sept. 28, Nov.
66, 67, 68, 69, 70, Dec. 26, 31, PR 359,
Index 1981
Arab-Israeli (Cont'd)
10/29, PR 360, 10/29, PR 380, 11/16,
PR 404, 11/27, PR 408, 12/1; Muskie,
PR 12A, 1/15
European initiative: Bush, Aug. 25; Depart-
ment, Apr. 32; Haig, Apr. 17, Aug. 4,
18, PR 109, 4/24
Golan Heights, Israeli annexation (Haig),
PR 423, 12/15
Habib peace mission. See under Lebanon
Jerusalem, religious significance (Haig),
Feb. I
Moderate Arab role (Haig), Dec. 26, 31, 63
Palestinian issue: Draper, May 48; Haig,
Sept. 56; Sadat, Sept. 53
Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO),
U.S. policy (Haig), Feb. I, June 21,
Sept. 14, 28, 54, 56, Oct. 23, Nov. 68,
Dec. 26, 32
Saudi eight-point peace program, proposed
(Haig), Nov. 50, Dec. 27, 33
Sinai, Israeli scheduled withdrawal (Haig),
Nov. 70, Dec. 27
Sinai multinational peace force (Haig),
Dec. 27, 31
Establishment: Department, Aug. 80;
Haig, Sept. 44, 55 Protocol, Annex,
and Appendix, Sept. 44
Negotiations: Begin, June 17; Haig,
May 13, 14, 15, July 13, Aug. 18;
Sadat, June 15
Participants, question of: Bush, Aug. 26;
Haig, Aug. 47, 48, 49, PR 404,
11/27, PR 405, 11/30
U.S. participation: Nov. 90; Haig, Sept.
44; Veliotes, Sept. 50
Sinai Support Mission, reports (Reagan),
June 45, Dec. 66
U.N. role, June 55
Visit of Secretary Haig {see also names of
individual countries): Haig, Apr. 20,
May 13, 14, June 14, 21, PR 64, 3/12
Aranda, Thomas, Jr., swearing in as
Ambassador to Uruguay, PR 436, 12/30
Arbitration, arbitral awards, foreign, recogni-
tion and enforcement, convention (1958):
Cayman Islands and Belize, Cyprus, Mar.
33; Indonesia, Dec. 75
Argentina: Haig, May 6; Johnston, Oct. 50;
Reagan, Apr. 11
Treaties, agreements, etc., Jan. 39, Feb.
70, Mar. 34, May 73, 74, July 57, 58,
Aug. 88, 89, Sept. 75, Oct. 81, Nov. 91
U.S. Ambassador (Schlaudeman), swearing
in, PR 384, 11/17
Armacost, Michael, May 26
Armaments (see also Defense and National
security):
Enhanced radiation weapons (neutron
bomb):
Deployment, question of: Haig, Sept. 14,
Oct. 23, Nov. 47, 49; Rostow, Oct.
34
Soviet campaign against, Nov. 54
U.S. sales policy: Buckley, July 51, Sept.
62; Burt, May 66, Dec. 73; Enders,
Dec. 72; Haig, Sept. 18; White House,
Sept. 61
Arms control and disarmament (see also
Chemical weapons, alleged use of,
Europe: Strategic arms limitation talks
and under Soviet Union): June 2, 56; AN-
ZUS, Aug. 46; Haig, Feb. E, Aug. 31,
Arms control and disarmament (Cont'd)
Sept. 18, Oct. 6; NATO, Feb. 51, July 41,
43; Reagan, Aug. 24; Rostow, Oct. 30,
Dec. 68
ACDA, functions (Rostow), Aug. 59, Oct.
34
Antisatellite arms control, proposals (Ros-
tow), Aug. 64, Oct. 33
Chemical weapons, prohibition, proposed
convention (Rostow), Dec. 71
Radiological weapons, prohibition, proposed
convention (Rostow), Dec. 71
Verification: Haig, Aug. 32; Rostow, Aug.
63, Oct. 32, Dec. 70
Asia (see also Refugees and names of indi-
vidual countries): Haig, Feb. C
Chemical weapons, reports of use (see also
Chemical weapons): Stoessel, Nov. 79
East Asia, economic and security as-
sistance, proposed: Armacost, May 26;
Haig, Apr. B, PR 68, 3/18; McPherson,
May 47
Southwest: Buckley, Sept. 62, Nov. 85;
Haig, May 13, Sept. 17; NAC, Feb. 51
Soviet interests, influence: Haig, June 16,
July 15, Aug. 40, 45, 47; Twinam,
May 50
U.S. strategic concerns: Oct. 55; Buckley,
Sept 62; Burt, May 66; Constable,
June 43; Eagleburger, Aug. 74;
Haig, June 16, 19, 21, 25, July 15,
Sept. 29, 54, 57, Dec. 28, 30, PR
311, 9/17; Kirkpatrick, Aug. 84;
Reagan, Apr. 8
U.S. role and interests: Buckley, Sept. 62;
Haig, Aug 42; Holdridge, Oct. 35;
Stoessel, June 33
Visit of Secretary Haig: Bush, Aug. 29;
Haig, Aug. 50; Holdridge, Oct. 35;
Reagan, Aug. 23
Visit of Vice President Bush, Aug. 27, 28
Asian Development Fund (Johnston), July 29
Association of South East Asian Nations
(ASEAN): June 2; ANZUS, Aug. 46;
Eagleburger, Aug. 75; Haig, Aug. 45,
Oct. 4; Holdridge, Oct 35; Reagan, Dec.
43; Stoessel, June 34
Atlas, June N
Defense arrangements (Haig), Aug. 43
Japan, relations (Holdridge), Dec. 38
Ministerial meeting, Manila, Sept. 10-12,
1980, text of joint statement, Jan. 12
Ministerial meeting, Manila, June 17-20,
1981 (Haig), Aug. 39, 41, 50
U.S. security assistance (Armacost),
May 26, 29
Atcherson, Lucile, Jan. S25, S38
Australia:
Treaties, agreements, etc., Jan. 37, 39,
Feb. 70, Mar. 34, May 73, 74, 75, July
57, 58, Aug. 88, 89, Sept. 75, Oct. 82,
Nov. 90, 91, Dec. 75, 76
U.S. Ambassador (Nesen), swearing in, PR
172, 5/29
U.S. military flights through RAAF Base
Darwin, operation of, bilateral agree-
ment, May 75
U.S. visit of Prime Minister Fraser, pro-
gram, PR 206, 6/26
Austria:
Treaties, agreements, etc., Jan. 38, 39,
May 74, July 58, Aug. 89, Sept. 74, 75,
Oct. 82, Nov. 91, Dec. 76
I
re
E
nil
ri
I
:.
i
:»
lid
k
lal
1
lal
Austria (Cont'd)
U.S. Ambassador (Cummings), swearing ir
PR 205, 6/25
U.S. relations (Eagleburger), Aug. 68
Automotive traffic:
Customs facilities for touring, convention
(1954), succession, Solomon Islands,
Nov. 90
Road traffic, convention (1949), accession,
Papua New Guinea, Apr. 46
Avery, Dennis T., Nov. 34
Aviation:
Air navigation service in Greenland and th
Faroe Islands and in Iceland, joint
financing agreement, amendment
(1980) of annex I, May 73
Air services agreement with U.K., Feb. 71
Air transport, bilateral agreements:
Canada, Dec. 76; Czechoslovakia, Feb.
71; Finland, Jan. 39; Hungary, Apr.
48; New Zealand, Feb. 71; Yugoslavia,
July 59
Air transport services, bilateral agree-
ments: Belgium (termination), Feb. 71;
Japan, Jan. 40; Poland, PR 413, 12/4
Airbus sales, effect of government policy
(Kopp), June 39
Aircraft "augmentor wing system," bi-
lateral agreement with Canada, Nov.
91
Airworthiness certifications acceptance
agreement with Singapore, Nov. 92
Civil air transport agreement with
Romania, Apr. 49
Civil aircraft, trade in, agreement (1979):
Kopp, June 40
Current actions: Austria, Jan. 38;
Belgium, Greece, Sept. 75; Japan,
Jan. 38; Netherlands, Sept. 75;
Romania, Jan. 38
Civil aviation, cooperation in research and
development, agreement with France,
Jan. 39
Federal Aviation Administration services,
agreement with Uruguay, Oct. 84
International civil aviation, convention
(1944): Grenada, Nov. 90; Kiribati,
June 60; Zimbabwe, Apr. 46
Protocols (1954, 1961, 1971): El Salvador,
Sao Tome and Principe, July 57
Protocol (1962) re number of parties to
request an extraordinary meeting:
El Salvador, Guatemala, Sao Tome
and Principe, July 57
Protocol (1968) re authentic trilingual
text: Grenada, Nov. 90; Kiribati,
June 60
Protocol (1974) re amendment to article
50(a): Cape Verde, Panama, Sao
Tome and Principe, Senegal, July 57
Protocol (1977) to add Russian as an
authentic language: Greece,
Guatemala, Lebanon, Switerzland,
Yemen, July 57
Protocol (1980) on lease, charter, and
interchange, Jan. 36
International recognition of rights in the
aircraft, convention (1948): Guinea,
Togo, July 57
North Atlantic air services discussions,
Apr. 25
Offenses and certain other acts committed
Department of State Bulletin
viation (Cont'd)
on board aircraft, convention (1963):
El Salvador, Suriname, Syria (with
reservation), Mar. 33; United Arab
Emirates, Aug. 88
Stolen vehicles and aircraft, recovery and
return of, agreement with Mexico
Mar. 32
Suppression of unlawful acts against safety
of civil aviation, convention (1971):
China (with reservation and
statement), Mar. 33; Korea, Demo-
cratic People's Republic of, Jan. 36;
Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Nov. 90
Suppression of unlawful seizure of aircraft,
convention (1970): China (with reserva-
tion and statement), Mar. 33; Qatar,
United Arab Emirates, Nov. 90
B
labcock, Orville, Jan. S16
iaeon, Robert, Jan. S47
laehler, David M., Jan. SI
tahamas, treaties, agreements, etc., May 74,
June 60, Aug. 88, 89
iahrain:
Treaties, agreements, etc., May 74, Nov.
91
I U.S. Ambassador (Sutherland), swearing
in, PR 420, 12/9
aker, Howard (Haig), Nov. 69
Salance of payments: Buckley, Nov. 82;
Hinton, June 37; McPherson, Nov. 85;
Rashish, Oct. 43
Jaltic States (Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia),
U.S. relations (Eagleburger), Aug. 78
Bangladesh:
Economic and military assistance, FY 1982
request (Coon), May 68
Treaties, agreements, etc., Jan. 38, 39,
May 74, July 57, Aug. 88, Sept. 76,
Nov. 91, Dec. 75, 76
U.S. Ambassador (Coon), swearing in, PR
242, 7/20
Barbados:
Treaties, agreements, etc., Jan. 39, May
74, 75, June 60, Sept. 75
U.S. developmental assistance, request
(Bushnell), May 72
Barclay, Thomas, Jan. S4
Bassett, Ebenezer Don Carlos, Jan. S17, S38
Bayard, Thomas Francis, Jan. S46
Beecher, Bill, May 9
Begin, Menachem, June 16, Nov. 72, 73
Statement after meeting with Secretary
Haig, PR 99, 4/16
Belgium (Eagleburger), Aug. 70
Treaties, agreements, etc., Jan. 38, Feb.
71, Mar. 33, May 73, 74, 75, June 60,
July 58, Aug. 88, Sept. 75, Nov. 91,
Dec. 75
U.S. Ambassador (Price), swearing in, PR
435, 12/30
Visit of Secretary Haig (Haig), July 39
Belize: Bushnell, Apr. 40; Department, Sept.
73
Treaties, agreements, etc., Mar. 33, Nov.
91, Dec. 76
Bell, Griffin B., Jan. 18
Bell, Steve, Nov. 77
Benin, treaties, agreements, etc., May 74
Nov. 91, Dec. 75
Berlin: Apr. 28, July 45; Bell, Jan. 19; Eagle-
burger, Aug. 68; NAC, Feb. 50, July 44
East Berlin Volkskammer elections (Allied
Public Statement), Aug. 77
Quadripartite Agreement, 10th anniver-
sary: Department, Oct. 52; Haig, Nov.
46
Visit of Secretary Haig (Haig), PR 308,
9/15, PR 309, 9/15, PR 310, 9/15
Berlin Wall, 20th anniversary: Sept 41; Haig,
Nov. 46
Bermuda, extension to of international con-
vention for the prevention of pollution of
sea by oil, Jan. 37.
Berryman, Clifford K., Jan. S28
Bhutan, treaties, agreements, etc., May 74,
Aug. 88, Oct. 81, Nov. 90, 91
Bicentennial Observance of Battle of
Yorktown (Reagan), Dec. 18
Bierce, Ambrose (quoted), Jan. S13
Big-power responsibility: Buckley, July 51;
Haig, Aug. 19, Dec. 25; Stoessel, June 33
Bill of Rights Day, proclamation (Carter),
Feb. 54
Biological and toxin weapons, convention
(1972): Netherlands, Aug. 88; Papua New
Guinea, Mar. 33; Uruguay, June 60; Viet-
nam, Jan. 36
Black, Jeremiah Sullivan, Jan. S45
Blaine, James G., Jan. S18, S46, Nov. 9
Bolivia:
Drug control program (Linneman), May 57
Treaties, agreements, etc., Mar. 34, May
74, June 60, July 58, Aug. 89
U.S. Ambassador (Corr), swearing in, PR
421, 12/14
U.S. developmental assistance FY 1982 re-
quests (Bushnell), May 72
Borg, Parker W., swearing in as Ambassa-
dor to Mali, PR 265, 8/6
Bosworth, Stephen W., Oct. 79
Botswana:
Treaties, agreements, etc., Mar. 34, May
73, 74, Nov. 91
U.S. economic and military aid, proposed
(Walker), May 19
Bradley, Omar, death of (Haig), PR 107, 4/9
Bray, Charles W., Ill, swearing in as Ambas-
sador to Senegal, PR 218, 6/30
Brazil:
Drug control programs (Linneman), May 57
Profile, Nov. 88
Textile agreement with U.S., amendment,
PR 415, 12/7
Treaties, agreements, etc., Jan. 38, 39,
Mar. 33, 34, May 73, 74, 75, June 60,
61, July 58, Aug. 89, Sept. 74, Nov.
91, Dec. 76
U.S. Ambassador (Langhorne), swearing in,
PR 385, 11/17
U.S. relations (Enders), Nov. 87
Bremer, L. Paul, III, nomination as Ex-
ecutive Secretary of State, PR 29, 2/2
Briggs, Everett E., July 4
British Virgin Islands, convention on the
avoidance of double taxation, Apr. 48
Brock, William E., Sept. 69
Speaker, U.S. trade and investment in
Africa conference, announcement, 5/1
Brokaw, Tom, Sept. 27
Brown, Kenneth Lee, swearing in as Am-
bassador to Congo, PR 433, 12/18
Brown, Robert Lyle, Inspector General of
State Department:
Nomination as, PR 30, 2/3
Swearing in, PR 220, 7/8
Byran, William Jennings, Jan. S47
Brzezinski, Zbigniew (Muskie), Feb. 32
Buchanan, James, Jan. S45
Buckley, James L., May 62, June 51, July 51,
Sept. 62, Oct. 52, 68, Nov. 82
Under Secretary for Security Assistance,
Science and Technology, swearing in,
PR 179, 6/2
Visit to Pakistan, Aug. 83
Bulgaria (Eagleburger), Aug. 77
Treaties, agreements, etc., Jan. 37, Feb.
71, Mar. 34, Apr. 48, May 74, Aug. 88,
Oct. 82, Nov. 91, Dec. 75
U.S. trade relations (Rashish), Nov. 22
Bullitt, William C, Jan. S28
Burma:
U.S. Ambassador (Bryne), swearing in, PR
386, 11/17
U.S. security assistance, proposed (Arma-
cost), May 28
Universal Postal Union general regulations,
signature, May 74
Burns, Arthur F., swearing in as Ambassador
to Federal Republic of Germany, PR 207,
6/26
Burroughs, John A., swearing in as Am-
bassador to Malawi, PR 158, 5/26
Burt, Richard R., May 65, Nov. 56, Dec. 73
Nomination as Director of Politico-Military
Affairs, PR 31, 2/3
Burundi, treaties, agreements, etc., Feb. 70,
May 74, Nov. 91
Bush, George
Meetings with:
Dutch Prime Minister van Agt and
Foreign Minister van Der Klaauw,
June 41
First Deputy Prime Minister Jagielski of
Poland, May 41
Turkish Foreign Minister Turkmen
(White House), June 42
Visit to Asia, Aug. 27, 29; Holdridge, Oct.
35
Visit to Paris and London, Aug. 25
Bushnell, John A., Apr. 40, 44, May 69
Butler, George H., Jan. S18
Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic,
treaties, agreements, etc., Feb. 70, May
74, Nov. 91, Dec. 76
Byrne, Patricia M., swearing in as Ambas-
sador to Burma, PR 386, 11/17
Byrnes, James F., Jan. S30, S48
Calhoun, John Caldwell, Jan. S45
Calingaert, Michael, Apr. 23, May 31
Cameroon:
Treaties, agreements, etc., May 74, Aug.
88, Sept. 74, Nov. 91
U.S. security assistance, proposed
(Walker), May 20
Canada:
Energy policy: Eagleburger, Dec. 37; Haig,
PR 65, 3/13, PR 311, 9/17; Hinton,
Feb. 49; Rashish, Nov. 25
Fisheries treaty with U.S., proposed:
Eagleburger, Dec. 36; MacGuigan, PR
ndex1981
Canada (Cont'd)
65, 3/13; Reagan, June 32; Ridgway,
May 21; Trudeau, Apr. 6
Gulf of Maine maritime boundary settle-
ment treaty, ratification: July 59, Aug.
89; Eagleburger, Dec. 34; Feldman,
May 22; Reagan, June 32; Ridgway,
May 21
Entry into force, PR 394, 11/19
Hyde Park landfill settlement agreement,
proposed, Oct. 34
Ice-breaking operations on Great Lakes
and St. Lawrence Seaway system,
bilateral agreement, Mar. 34
North American air surveillance and
defense cooperation (Reagan), Apr. 3,
Dec. 67
Pacific salmon negotiations with U.S.,
Oct. 35
Profile, Dec. 35
Raccoon dogs, prohibition of importation,
bilateral agreement with U.S., Nov. 91
Transboundary air and water pollution
problems: Eagleburger, Dec. 36;
Reagan, Apr. 7; Trudeau, Apr. 6
Canadian air quality legislation, question
of effect on U.S., Feb. 33
Dioxin in the Great Lakes, U.S. -Canada
technical meeting, joint statement,
Feb. 32
Garrison Diversion Unit, consultations,
June 32
Treaties, agreements, etc., Jan. 36, 37, 38,
39, Mar. 33, 34, May 73, 74, 75, July
59, Aug. 88, 89, Sept. 74, 75, 76, Oct.
83, Nov. 91, Dec. 76
U.S. relations: Eagleburger, Aug. 72,
Dec. 34; Haig, June 9, Dec. 25, PR 65,
3/13; MacGuigan, PR 65, 3/13; Reagan,
Apr. 1, 3, 7, 12; Schreyer, Apr. 1;
Trudeau, Apr. 1
U.S. trade: Johnston, Feb. 46; Rashish,
Nov. 24; Reagan, Apr. 7; Trudeau,
Apr. 6
U.S. visit of Prime Minister Trudeau,
program, PR 222, 7/9
Cape Verde:
Treaties, agreements, etc., Feb. 70, May
74, July 57, Oct. 81, Nov. 91, Dec. 75
U.S. Ambassador (de Vos), swearing in,
PR 392, 11/17
Carr, Wilbur J., Jan. S21
Cartagena Commission, bilateral trade agree-
ment with, Oct. 83
Carter, Jimmy, Jan. S36, S37
Achievements (Muskie), Jan. 1
Addresses, remarks, statements, and
correspondence:
Afghanistan, Soviet invasion, Feb. 59
American hostages in Iran, agreement
on release, Feb. 1, 7, 13
Bill of Rights Day and Human Rights
Day and Week, 1980, proclamation,
Feb. 54
Farewell address, Feb. 22
Foreign Service Act of 1980, signature,
Jan. 11
Israel-U.S. oil agreement, signature,
Jan. 24
OAS, 10th General Assembly, Jan. 33
Poland, Jan. 20
Carter, Jimmy (Cont'd)
Addresses, remarks, etc. (Cont'd)
Trade with Soviet Union, question of
change of Jackson-Vanik amend-
ment, Feb. 46
Meeting with Chancellor Schmidt of
Federal Republic of Germany, Feb. 53
Messages to Congress:
Convention on Elimination of Discrimina-
tion Against Women, ratification
urged, Feb. 53
Cyprus, progress reports, Feb. 52, July
40
Release of American hostages and
arrangements re Iranian property in
U.S., Feb. 13
U.S. participation in the U.N., 1979,
Feb. 62
Trips abroad, list, Sept. 8
Cass, Lewis, Jan. S45
Cayman Islands, treaties, agreements, etc.,
Jan. 37, Mar. 33
Central African Republic:
Treaties, agreements, etc., May 74,
July 57, Sept. 75, Nov. 91
U.S. Ambassador (Woodruff), swearing in,
PR 165, 5/29
Chad:
Libyan occupation: Crocker, Oct. 28;
Department, Feb. 31, Aug. 56; Haig,
Feb. J, Nov. 45, Dec. 65
OAU peacekeeping force in, proposed
(Haig), Dec. 28, PR 372, 10/28
Treaties, agreements, etc., May 74,
Nov. 90, 91
Chapin, Frederic L., swearing in as Am-
bassador to Guatemala, PR 266, 8/6
Chemical weapons, alleged use of: Haig,
Nov. 46,48, 51, PR 380, 11/16;
Holdridge, Dec. 42; Rostow, Dec. 70;
Stoessel, Nov. 79
Chile (Johnston), Oct. 50
EximBank financing restrictions lifted:
Bushnell, Apr. 45; Department,
Apr. 45
Treaties, agreements, etc., Jan. 38, 39,
May 74, June 61, Aug. 88, Sept. 74,
75, Nov. 91, 92, Dec. 75, 76
China, People's Republic of: June 2; ANZUS,
Aug. 46
Grain agreement with U.S. (White House),
Jan. 13
Sino-Soviet relations (Haig), Sept. 1 1
Taiwan: Haig, July 14, Aug, 35, 52, Oct.
21; Holdridge, Oct. 40; Reagan, Aug.
25; Stoessel, June 34
U.S. arms sales, question of (Haig), Aug.
36, 53, PR 354, 10/23, PR 406, 12/1
Textile agreement with U.S., PR 323, 9/23,
PR 410, 12/4
Trade (Rashish), Oct. 42, Nov. 21, 22, Dec.
45
Treaties, agreements, etc., Jan. 36, 37, 38,
39, Feb. 71, Mar. 33, 34, Apr. 48, May
73, 74, Sept. 76, Oct. 82, Nov. 90, 91,
Dec. 76
U.S. Ambassador (Hummel), swearing in,
PR 274, 8/12
U.S. arms sales, policy: Bush, Aug. 29;
Haig, Aug. 36, 37, 38, 41, 42, 49, 51,
52, Dec. 32; Holdridge, Oct. 38;
Reagan, Aug. 24
U.S. relations: Eagleburger, Aug. 75; Haig,
July 14, Aug. 34, 37, PR 380, 11/16;
China, People's Republic of (Cont'd)
U.S. relations (Cont'd)
Holdridge, Dec. 38; Rithauddeen, Aug
44; Stoessel, June 34; White House,
Jan. 14
Chronology (1979-1980), Feb. 33
Soviet-U.S. relations, question of effect
(Haig), June 26, Aug. 51, 52
Visit of President Reagan, proposed:
Haig, Aug. 35; Reagan, Nov. 17
Visit of Secretary Haig: Bush, Aug. 29;
Haig, Aug. 4, 34, 50
Discussion topics (Haig), Aug. 35
Christopher, Warren (Muskie), Feb. 19
Chronology of world events by month (see
also under Iran), Jan. 40, Feb. 72, Mar.
35, Apr. 49, May 77, June 62, July 60,
Aug. 90, Sept. 76, Oct. 84, Nov. 92, Dec.
78
Churchill, Sir Winston (quoted), June 7, Aug.
31, 39, Sept. 13, Oct. 6
Civiletti, Benjamin, Feb. 18
Claims:
President's Commission on Hostage
Compensation, final report and recom-
mendations, PR 319, 9/21
U.S. -Iranian: Department, June 44; Muskie,
Feb. 30; Reagan, Apr. 32; Stoessel,
Apr. 32
Background information, PR 294, 9/5
Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal members, ap-
pointment, PR 186, 6/9
U.S.-Israel (USS Liberty): Apr. 48; Depart-
ment, Feb. 55
Clark, Joan M., nomination as Director Gen-
eral of the Foreign Service, PR 32, 2/3
Clark, William P., Sept. 36
Deputy Secretary of State, swearing in, PR
144, 5/12
Clay, Henry, Jan. S44
Clayton, John M., Jan. S10, S45
Cleveland, Grover, Jan. S22
Cocoa and international cocoa agreement
(Avery), Nov. 35, 40, 41
Coffee, international agreement (1976):
Avery, Nov. 34, 43
Current actions: Cook Islands, Greece, Dec.
75; Philippines, Jan. 36; Singapore,
Nov. 90; Sri Lanka, Thailand, Sept. 74;
Zimbabwe, Apr. 46
Colby, Bainbridge, Jan. S48
Colombia:
Drug control programs (Linneman), May 57
Status of Quita Sueno, Roncador, and Ser-
rana, bilateral agreements, Oct. 83,
Dec. 76
Textile agreement with U.S., amendment,
Aug. 89, PR 169, 5/29
Treaties, agreements, etc., Feb. 70, Mar.
34, May 74, Sept. 74, Oct. 83, Nov. 90,
91, Dec. 77
U.S. security assistance FY 1982 request
(Bushnell), May 72
Commodities and commodity trade (see also
names of commodities):
Basic mineral deposits, chart, July G
Common Fund:
Agreement establishing (1980): Australia,
Aug. 88, Dec. 75; Austria, Sept. 74;
Bangladesh, July 57, Aug. 88; Benin,
Dec. 75; Brazil, June 60; Cameroon,
Sept. 74; Canada, Mar. 33; Cape
Verde, Dec. 75; China, Nov. 90;
Department of State Bulletin
(frvmodities and commodity trade (Cont'd)
Common Fund (Cont'd)
I Agreement establishing (Cont'd)
Comoros, Dec. 75; Costa Rica, Oct.
81; Denmark, July 57; Ecuador, Jan.
36; Ethiopia, Gabon, Dec. 75;
Federal Republic of Germany, May
73; Greece, Oct. 81; Guinea-Bissau,
Dec. 75; Haiti, Mar. 33, Oct. 81; In-
dia, Dec. 75; Indonesia, May 73;
Iraq, Dec. 75; Ireland, May 73; Italy,
July 57; Japan, Mar. 33, Aug. 88;
Lesotho, Nov. 90; Luxembourg, July
57; Malawi, May 73, July 57; Mali,
Aug. 88; Mexico, July 57; Morocco,
Apr. 46; Nepal, Nicaragua, Nov. 90;
Nigeria, Oct. 81; Norway, Sept. 74;
Peru, Dec. 75; Philippines, May 73;
Portugal, Apr. 46; Sierra Leone,
Dec. 75; Spain, Aug. 88; Sri Lanka,
Mar. 33, Nov. 90; Sudan, July 57;
Sweden, Sept. 74; Switzerland, July
57; Tanzania, Turkey, Nov. 90; U.S.,
Jan. 36; Upper Volta, Nov. 90;
Venezuela (with reservation), Mar.
33; Yemen, Nov. 90; Zaire, May 73,
July 57; Zambia, Apr. 46
Cancun summit, Dec. 8
Headquarters site, proposed, Jan. 12
Foreign exchange costs financing agree-
ment with Egypt, Sept. 76
International agreements, history and
evaluation (Avery), Nov. 34
Latin America (Johnston), Feb. 45
Nonfuel minerals, U.S. imports, Sept. K
Primary commodities, list, Sept. D
I, U.S. strategic minerals dependency (Cal-
ingaert), Apr. 23
1 )mmonwealth (Atlas), June O
jmoros, treaties, agreements, etc., May 74,
July 58, Dec. 75
mgo:
Treaties, agreements, etc., May 74, Nov.
91
I U.S. Ambassador (Brown), swearing in, PR
433, 12/18
ongress, U.S.:
Executive-Congressional relations (Haig),
Feb. E, Dec. 29
Hostage agreements, transmittal (Depart-
ment), May 52
Legislation:
Foreign Service Act of 1980: Jan. S37;
Carter, Jan. 11
National Materials and Minerals Policy,
Research and Development Act of
1980 (Calingaert), Apr. 23
Refugee Act of 1980 (Muskie), Jan. 6
Taiwan Relations Act, implementation
(Haig), Oct. 21
Legislation, proposed:
Clark Amendment, repeal (Haig), May 6,
June 9
Communications and information policy
cabinet committee (Buckley), Oct. 71
Defense acquisition fund for international
development and security coopera-
tion (Haig), Sept. 18
Energy Policy and Conservation Act,
extension of section 252 (Morse),
May 33
Congress, U.S. (Cont'd)
Legislation, proposed (Cont'd)
Export trading company bill (Hormats),
July 26
Foreign aid FY 1982: Armacost, May 26;
Buckley, May 62, Nov. 84; Burt,
May 65; Bushnell, May 69; Coon,
May 68; Draper, May 48; Ewing,
May 38; Haig, May 24, Sept. 18, PR
124, 4/28; McPherson, May 43, Nov.
85, 86; Twinam, May 49; Walker,
May 18
Foreign Assistance Act, Symington
amendment: Buckley, Nov. 84;
McPherson, Nov. 85, 86
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, modifi-
cation urged: Hormats, July 26;
Johnston, July 29
Foreign investment in U.S. mining com-
panies, moratorium on certain types
(McCarthy), July 31
Immigration policy changes (Enders), Oct.
78
Montreal Convention for the Suppression
of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety
of Civil Aviation, implementing
legislation (Kennedy), Sept. 67
Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials,
convention on, implementation (Ken-
nedy), Sept. 67
Sinai multinational force and observers,
U.S. participation (Veliotes), Sept.
50
Strategic petroleum reserve funding
(Hormats), July 32
Trade Act of 1974, question of change of
section 402 (Carter), Feb. 46
Senate advice and consent:
Elimination of Discrimination Against
Women, Convention on, ratification
urged (Carter), Feb. 53
Human rights treaties, ratification urged:
Carter, Feb. 54; Derian, Jan. 22
Maritime boundary treaty with Canada,
ratification urged: Feldman, May 22;
Ridgway, May 21
Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty, rat-
ification urged (Rostow), Oct. 33
Physical protection of nuclear material
convention, ratification urged (Ken-
nedy), Sept. 67
Threshold Test Ban Treaty, ratification
urged (Rostow), Oct. 33
Tlatelolco Treaty, Protocol I, ratification
urged: Reagan, Sept. 60; Rostow,
Dec. 33
U.N. convention to outlaw the taking of
hostages, ratification urged (Ken-
nedy), Sept. 67
Conservation (see also Fish and fisheries):
Antarctic marine living resources, conven-
tion (1980): Australia, July 57; Chile,
Sept. 74; Japan, Aug. 88; South
Africa, Oct. 81; Soviet Union, Aug. 88;
U.K., Nov. 90
Endangered species of wild fauna and
flora, international trade in, convention
(1973): Argentina, May 73; Australia
(reservation withdrawn), Nov. 90;
Cameroon, Sept. 74; China, May 73;
Colombia, Nov. 90; Liberia, Mozam-
Conservation (Cont'd)
Endangered species, etc. (Cont'd)
bique, June 60; Rwanda, May 73;
South Africa (reservation withdrawn),
June 60; Suriname, May 73; U.S., Jan.
36; Zambia, May 73; Zimbabwe (with
reservation), Sept. 74
Amendment (1979): Botswana, May 73;
Denmark, June 60; Federal Republic
of Germany, Liechtenstein,
Mauritius, May 73; Pakistan,
Suriname, Nov. 90; Switzerland,
June 60; Togo, U.S., May 73; Zim-
babwe, Nov. 90
North Pacific Fur Seals, Interim Conven-
tion on, 1980 protocol amending:
Canada, Mar. 34; Sept. 75; Japan, July
58; U.S., Aug. 89, Sept. 75
Constable, Elinor, Sept. 34
Constable, Peter D., June 43
Consular relations:
China-U.S. additional consulates (Haig),
Aug. 36
Consular conventions: China, Apr. 48,
Sept. 76; German Democratic
Republic, Mar. 35
Optional protocol, accession, Malawi,
May 73
Vienna convention (1963): Bhutan, Oct.
81; Poland, Dec. 75
Continental shelf, convention (1958), succes-
sion, Solomon Islands, Nov. 90
Cook Islands, treaties, agreements, etc., Feb.
70, July 59, Dec. 75
Coolidge, Calvin, Jan. S27, Sept. 3
Coon, Jane A., May 68, June 53
Ambassador to Bangladesh, swearing in,
PR 242, 7/20
Copyright, universal copyright convention
(1971): German Democratic Republic,
Mar. 33; Portugal, Sept. 74
Corr, Edwin Gharst, swearing in as Ambas-
sador to Bolivia, PR 421, 12/14
Costa Rica: Bushnell, Apr. 40; Enders, Sept.
72; McPherson, Dec. 60
Treaties, agreements, etc., Mar. 33, May
74, June 60, Oct. 81, Nov. 91, Dec. 75
Cotton (Avery), Nov. 37
International Cotton Institute, articles of
agreement (1966), accession, Argen-
tina, July 57
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
(COMECON): Atlas, June I, July E, O
Crocker, Chester A., Aug. 55, 57, Oct. 24, 28
Biographical details, Aug. 55
Swearing in as Assistant Secretary of
State for African Affairs, PR 188, 6/10
Cronkite, Walter, Apr. 8
Recipient of Charles Evans Hughes Gold
Medal (Haig), PR 45, 2/11
Crowley, Steven J., S12, S40
Cuba (Haig), Oct. 13, Nov. 20
Cancun summit, exclusion (Haig), Sept. 34
Caribbean Basin plan, question of inclusion
(Haig), Sept. 68
Regional activities (see also El Salvador):
Buckley, Sept. 62; Burt, Dec. 74;
Bushnell, Apr. 40, 41; Department,
Mar. 1; Haig, Feb. J, Apr. 14, 17, 22,
May 1, June 10, 20, 27, July 19, Sept.
15, 18, Dec. 28, 31, PR 406, 12/1, PR
408, 12/1, PR 417, 12/8; Reagan, Apr.
8; Stoessel, Apr. 38
ndex1981
Cuba (Cont'd)
Treaties, agreements, etc., May 74, 75,
July 58, Aug. 89, Oct. 82, Nov. 91
U.S. trade controls (Rashish), Nov. 23
Cultural relations:
Cultural, educational, scientific, and tech-
nical cooperation and exchanges for
1981 and 1982, bilateral agreements:
Bulgaria, Feb. 71; Romania, July 59
Cultural property, illicit import, export,
and transfer of ownership of, conven-
tion (1970): Pakistan, Oct. 81; Peru,
May 73; Sri Lanka, Turkey, Sept. 74
Cultural property, protection of in event
of armed conflict, convention (1954),
accession, Tunisia, Aug. 88
Educational, scientific, and cultural mate-
rials, importation, agreement (1950),
ratification, Syria, Jan. 36
"Egypt Today— Memphis" exhibit, bilateral
agreement with Egypt, May 76
International Centre for the Study of the
Preservation and Restoration of
Cultural Property, Statutes (1956) as
amended: Chile, Aug. 88; U.K.
(withdrawal), June 60
Japan, June 2
Korean-American Cultural Exchange Com-
mittee, bilateral agreement, July 59
Provisional Commission on Educational and
Cultural Exchange, establishment,
bilateral agreement with Morocco, Jan.
40, Oct. 83
Recovery and return of stolen ar-
chaeological, historical, and cultural
properties, bilateral agreement with
Peru, Dec. 77
U.S. Ambassador at Large for Cultural Af-
Af fairs (Terra), swearing in PR 234,
7/15
World cultural and natural heritage, pro-
tection, convention (1972): Cuba, Oct.
82; Ivory Coast, May 75; Mauritania,
Aug. 89; Portugal, Democratic Yemen,
Mar. 34
Cummings, Theodore E., swearing in as Am-
bassador to Austria, PR 205, 6/25
Cushing, Caleb, Jan. S13
Customs:
Containers, convention (1956), succession,
Solomon Islands, Nov. 90
Customs Cooperation Council, convention
establishing (1950): Brazil, May 76;
Niger, Oct. 81; Philippines, Feb. 70;
Swaziland, Sept. 74; Zimbabwe, June
60
Customs facilities for touring, convention
(1954), succession, Solomon Islands,
Nov. 90
Safe containers (CSC), international
convention (1972): Belgium, Dec. 75;
China, Jan. 36; Guinea, Apr. 46; Israel,
Dec. 75; Luxembourg, Mar. 33
TIR carnets, international transport of
goods under, customs convention
(1975): Canada, Jan. 36; Cyprus, Nov.
90; Czechoslovakia, May 73; Poland,
Mar. 33; U.S., Oct. 81, Nov. 90;
Uruguay, Mar. 33
Cutler, Lloyd (Muskie), Feb. 19
Cyprus: June 56; Eagleburger, Aug. 71;
Haig, Oct. 6
Missing persons committee, statement of
agreement, text, July 43
Progress reports: Carter, Feb. 52, July 40:
Reagan, July 43, Oct. 51
Treaties, agreements, etc., Mar. 33,
Apr. 46, May 74, 75, Nov. 90, 91
U.S. Ambassador (Ewing), swearing in, PR
388, 11/17
U.S. security assistance, proposed (Ewing),
May 38
Czechoslovakia (Eagleburger), Aug. 77
Textile agreement with U.S., Nov. 91
Treaties, agreements, etc., Jan. 38,
Feb. 70, 71, Mar. 33, 34, May 73, 74,
Sept. 75, Nov. 91, Dec. 76
U.S. Ambassador (Matlock), swearing in,
PR 387, 11/17
U.S. trade relations (Rashish), Nov. 22
D
Davies, Rodger P., Jan. S40
Dawes, Charles G., Jan. S27
Day, William Rufus, Jan. S47
Dean, John Gunther, swearing in as Am-
bassador to Thailand, PR 330, 10/5
Debts, consolidation and rescheduling, bi-
lateral agreements: Liberia, Aug. 90;
Pakistan, Aug. 90, Dec. 77; Poland,
Dec. 77; Sudan, June 62; Turkey, Feb.
71, May 76, June 62; Zaire, June 62, July
59
Defense and national security: Buckley,
July 53; Haig, Sept. 10, 24, Oct. 17, 18,
22, Nov. 49; Muskie, Jan. 5; Reagan, Dec.
21; Rostow, Oct. 32; Stoessel, June 33;
Weinberger, July 46
Acquisition fund, proposed (Haig), Sept. 18
FY 1983 (Haig), Sept. 58, Oct. 21
Budget: Enders, Nov. 87; Haig, Sept. 17,
Oct. 20, Nov. 20, 49, 75, Dec. 26;
Reagan, Nov. 16, Dec. 67; Rostow,
Oct. 34
Chemical weapons (Haig), July 15
Civil defense (Haig), July 15
Emergency resource mobilization plans,
question of (Haig), Oct. 21
NORAD agreement with Canada: Reagan,
Apr. 3, Dec. 67; Trudeau, Apr. 6
Strategic weapons program: Haig, Dec. 22,
23, 24; Reagan, Dec. 67
Democracy and democratic principles: Haig,
Nov. 44; Reagan, Dec. 10, 14
Denmark (Eagleburger), Aug. 70
Treaties, agreements, etc., Jan. 37, 38, 39,
Mar. 33, 34, Apr. 47, May 73, 74, 75,
June 60, July 57, 58, Aug. 89, Sept.
74, 75, Nov. 91, Dec. 76
Derian, Patricia M., Jan. 21
de Tocqueville, Alexis (quoted), July 48,
Dec. 10
Developing countries (see also Food pro-
duction and shortages and names of in-
dividual countries): Dec. A-N;
Eagleburger, Aug. 66; Haig, Feb. D,
June 7, July 13, 14, 19, Sept. 10;
Hormats, July 24; McPherson, May 43;
Mitterrand, Aug. 12; Muskie, Feb. 24;
Trudeau, Aug. 10
Developing countries (Cont'd)
Commodity exports: Nov. 42; Avery,
Nov. 39
Development needs and strategy for
growth: Dec. G, H; Cancun summit,
Dec. 6; Haig, Oct. 1, Dec. 61 (quoted);
Hormats, Dec. 60; McCall, Feb. 61;
Ottawa summit, Aug. 9; Reagan, Dec.
1,9, 14, 16
Economy:
Background paper, PR 349, 10/15
Maps, charts, July B
Energy problems: Aug. 9, Dec. 8;
ANZUS, Aug. 46; Haig, Oct. 6, PR
0
,1/
it:
'.'■■
lb)
ye
68, 3/18, PR 311, 9/17; Hinton,' Jumf
35; McPherson, Dec. 58; Muskie,
Feb. 24; Rashish, Oct. 47; Reagan
Dec. 17
Group of 77, June K
Growth rate, charts, Dec. F
International investment: Dec. E;
Hormats, Nov. 29; McPherson, Dec. 57
Literacy, Dec. J
Soviet influences: Abrams, Oct. 66; Burt,
Dec. 74; Haig, July 8
U.S. and other Western aid: Dec. A, C, D,
L, M, N; Haig, Apr. 20, July 37;
Hormats, Dec. 60; NAC, July 40, 41;
Rashish, Oct. 44, 47; Reagan, Dec. 4,
15; Regan, Aug. 20
U.S. relations: Haig, June 11, 13, Aug. 2,
Sept. 17, 33; Reagan, Dec. 14;
Stoessel, Dec. 54
Development assistance (Reagan), Dec. 15
Appropriations request FY 1982: Haig,
Apr. A, C, PR 68, 3/18; McPherson,
May 43
Bureau for Private Enterprise
(McPherson), Dec. 57
Charts, tables, Dec. A-N
Costa Rica: Bushnell, Apr. 40; McPherson,
Dec. 60
Drug control (Falco), Jan. 29
1950, 1957, 1958, Dec. L-N
OECD, OPEC, and Communist countries
compared, May 45, Dec. C
South Asia (Coon), May 68
de Vos, Peter Jon, swearing in as Ambassa-
dor to Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde, PR
392, 11/17
DiCarlo, Dominick L., swearing in as Assist-
ant Secretary for International Narcotics
Matters, PR 331, 10/5
Digest of United States Practice in Inter-
national Law, 1978, released, July 62
Diplomatic premises:
Branch offices of commercial sections of
embassies of U.S. and German
Democratic Republic, establishment,
bilateral agreement with German
Democratic Republic, May 76
Embassy security (Kennedy), Sept. 65
Diplomatic relations, Vienna convention
(1961): Democratic People's Republic of
Korea, Jan. 36; Saudi Arabia, Apr. 46;
Sudan, June 60
Disaster relief, natural disasters, bilateral
agreement with Mexico, June 61
Djibouti:
Treaties, agreements, etc., May 74
U.S. Ambassador (North), swearing in, PR
389, 11/17
U.S. economic and military aid, proposed
(Walker), May 19
(HI
0
Department of State Bulletin
minica, treaties, agreements, etc., May 75,
June 61, Sept. 75, Nov. 90
iminican Republic:
Treaties, agreements, etc., June 61, July
58, Oct. 83
U.S. security assistance FY 1982 request
(Bushnell), May 72
mble taxation, avoidance of, bilateral con-
ventions, bilateral agreements with:
Argentina, Aug. 89; Australia, May 75;
Bangladesh, Jan. 39; British Virgin
Islands, Apr. 48; France (termination),
Jan. 39; Federal Republic of Germany,
Feb. 71; Jamaica, Sept. 76
)uglass, Frederick, Jan. S17, S38
•aper, Morris, May 48, 50, June 46
•ugs, narcotic:
Cooperation in control of illicit traffic in,
bilateral agreement with Brazil,
Dec. 76
Crop destruction (Falco), Jan. 29
International narcotics control, FY 1982
budget (Linneman), May 55
Manufacture and distribution, limitation,
convention (1931), Jan. 37
Protocol re international control of drugs
outside the scope 1931 convention
(1948), Jan. 37
Methaqualone, international traffic in
(Falco), Jan. 30
Mexico, illegal drug traffic, efforts to
control: Jan. 40, Feb. 71, Mar. 35,
Apr. 48, July 59, Nov. 92; Briggs, July
7; Linneman, May 55, 57
Protocol (1946) amending the agreements,
conventions, and protocols on narcotic
drugs (1912, 1925, 1931, 1936), Jan. 37
Protocol (1953) limiting and regulating the
cultivation of the poppy plant, the pro-
duction of, international and wholesale
trade in, and use of opium (1953), Jan.
37
Psychotropic substances, convention (1971):
Cameroon, Aug. 88; Colombia, Nigeria,
Sept. 74; Papua New Guinea, Jan. 37;
Rwanda, Oct. 82; Turkey, Aug. 88
Single convention (1961): Ireland, Mar. 33;
Papua New Guinea, Jan. 37; Rwanda,
Oct. 82
Protocol (1972): Jan. 37; Ireland, Mar. 33;
Nigeria, Sri Lanka, Sept. 74
U.N. Fund for Drug Abuse Control
(Linneman), May 58
)ubs, Adolph, Jan. S40
Xilles, John Foster, Jan. S32, S33, S35,
S49; Haig, Sept. 26
Xincan, Evan M., Jan. SI, Mar. 23, Apr. 34
)unsmore, Barrie, May 9, June 30, Oct. 15,
Nov. 17
E
Sagleburger, Lawrence S., Aug., 65, 73,
Dec. 34
Assistant Secretary of State for European
Affairs, swearing in, PR 175, 6/1
Biographical details, Aug. 65
Earth resources and geological sciences,
bilateral agreements: Canada, Mexico,
Venezuela, July 59
East-West relations: Haig, Apr. 14, 19, 28,
May 9, Aug. 4; NAC, Feb. 50, July 39;
NATO, July 42; Stoessel, Dec. 52;
Thatcher, Aug. 13; White House state-
ment, Feb. 53
Economic relations: Eagleburger, Aug. 76;
Haig, Aug. 2, 3, 6; Sept. 13, 20, 24
Ottawa summit: Aug. 9; Rashish, Oct. 42,
Nov. 20, Dec. 45
Economic Community of West African States
(Haig), Oct. 4
Economy, domestic: Haig, Feb. E, June 11,
July 9, 13, 19, Aug. 1, Sept. 10, 17, 19,
34, PR 68, 3/18, PR 324, 9/29; Hormats,
July 26, Dec. 48; Muskie, Jan. 5; Stoessel,
June 33; Weinberger, July 47
Reagan program: Clark, Sept. 36; Enders,
Nov. 87-88; Haig, Apr. 21, June 5,
Aug. 5, Sept 26, 33; Rashish, Oct. 44,
46, Nov. 25; Reagan, Feb. A, Apr. 4,
Dec. 1, 14; Regan, Aug. 17
Economy, world: Eagleburger, Aug. 67;
Hinton, June 35; Hormats, Dec. 48;
Reagan, Aug. 11
Atlas of elements, institutions, natural
resources, and population, July A,
Sept. A
Cancun summit meeting: Oct. 22-23; Haig,
May 12, Aug. 2, Sept. 11, 33, Oct. 6,
Nov. 48, Dec. 29, 31, PR 65, 3/13, PR
368, 11/2, PR 371, 11/5, PR 372,
10/28; Rashish, Oct. 45, 47, Nov. 24,
Dec. 45; Reagan, Dec. 1, 9, 10, 13, 15
Cochairmen's summary, Dec. 5
Global negotiations, proposed: Haig, PR
371, 11/5, PR 372, 10/28; Reagan,
Dec. 14
Multilateral development banks: Dec. D;
Haig, Oct. 4, PR 380, 11/16; Johnston,
Oct. 49; Reagan, Dec. 4, 14, 59
(quoted)
Appropriations request FY 1982 (Haig),
Apr. C, PR 68, 3/18
Ottawa summit meeting: Bush, Aug. 25;
Haig, Aug. 1, Sept. 19, 23, 30, 32, 34,
Oct. 6; Rashish, Oct. 45; Reagan, Apr.
7, Aug. 11, Dec. 4; Regan, Aug. 18, 21
Concluding statement, Aug. 10; Decla-
ration, Aug. 8; summary of political
issues, Aug. 14; terrorism, statement
on, Aug. 16
U.S. foreign policy objectives: Haig,
Aug. 6, 7, PR 124, 4/28; Hormats, July
24; Rashish, Oct. 40, 46; Reagan,
Dec. 15
U.S. interest rates: Haig, Aug. 5, 6, 7,
Sept. 26, 32, Nov. 48; Regan, Aug. 18,
20; Schmidt, Aug. 12
Ecuador:
Drug control programs (Linneman), May 57
Treaties, agreements, etc., Jan. 36,
May 73, 74, 75, Sept. 74, Nov. 91
U.S. assistance, FY 1982 request
(Bushnell), May 72
Education:
Cultural, educational, scientific, and tech-
nological cooperation and exchanges
for 1981 and 1982, bilateral
agreements: Bulgaria, Feb. 71,
Romania, July 59
Education (Cont'd)
Educational, scientific, and cultural mater-
ials, importation, agreement (195(1 1,
ratification, Syria, Jan. 36
Egypt, bilateral agreements with, Feb. 71,
Dec. 77
Less developed countries, needs
(McPherson), May 47
Literacy, developing countries, Dec. J
Provisional Commission on Educational
and Cultural Exchange, establishment,
bilateral agreement with Morocco, Jan.
40, Oct. 83
Recognition of studies, diplomas, and
degrees concerning higher education in
Europe, convention (1979), ratification,
Yugoslavia, Oct. 81
Egypt (see also Arab-Israeli conflict and
Sadat, Anwar al-):
Human rights (Haig), Nov. 78
Joint U.S. military exercise Bright Star:
Department, Dec. 66; Haig, Dec. 64,
65
Nuclear energy cooperation agreement
with U.S., joint statement and sup-
plementary information: May 54, Aug.
89; Department, Sept. 59; Marshall,
Nov. 79
Post-Sadat policies: Haig, Dec. 27, 63, 64,
66; Haig-Mubarak, PR 346, 10/14
President Sadat, assassination: Haig,
Nov. 66, 67, 69, 71, Dec. 63, 65;
Reagan, Nov. 67
U.S. delegation to funeral, selection
(Haig), Nov. 68, 69, 70
Textile agreement with U.S., amendment,
Nov. 91
Treaties, agreements, etc., Jan. 37,
Feb. 70, 71, Mar. 34, 35, Apr. 48, May
74, 76, June 61, July 59, Aug. 88, 89,
Sept. 76, Nov. 91, 92, Dec. 75, 76, 77
U.S. access to military facilities, question
of (Haig), Sept. 28, 57
U.S. economic and security assistance:
Buckley, May 64, June 51; Constable,
June 45; Draper, May 49; Haig, Apr.
B, Sept. 58, Dec. 64, PR 68, 3/18, PR
124, 4/28
U.S. relations, Nov. 55
U.S. visit of President Sadat: Reagan,
Sadat, Sept. 51
Program, PR 260, 8/3
U.S. visit of Vice President Mubarak
(Haig), Nov. 67
Visit of Secretary Haig: Haig, Sadat,
June 14
Eisenhower, Dwight D., Jan. S32, S33,
S34, Sept. 4
Elfin, Melvin, Dec. 24
Ellis, Byran L., Jan. S40
El Salvador: Bush, June 41; Carter, Jan. 33;
Haig, May 13, June 27, PR 371, 11/5
Americans killed in: Department, Feb. 68,
69; Haig, June 8; Muskie, Feb. 31;
Stoessel, Apr. 39
Background, Mar. 8, Oct. 72
Boundary settlement with Honduras:
Carter, Jan. 33; Muskie, Jan. 35
Index 1981
El Salvador (Cont'd)
Foreign intervention and arms supplies:
Apr. 29, Oct. 72, 73, 74, Nov. 55;
Buckley, Sept. 62; Bushnell, Apr. 40,
41; Department, Mar. 1, Apr. 43, May
71; Eagleburger, Aug. 74; Enders,
Sept. 70; Haig, Apr. 14, 18, May 1, 5,
10, 11, 12, 15, June 23, 27, July 10,
19, 20, Aug. 42, Oct. 18, PR 64, 3/12,
PR 418, 12/4; Stoessel, Apr. 38
OAS role, question of (Haig), June 24
Political situation: Oct. 73; Buckley,
June 52; Bushnell, Apr. 41; Depart-
ment, Mar. 7, Apr. 43; Haig, Apr. 17,
May 5, June 24, PR 65, 3/13; Muskie,
Feb. 31; Stoessel, Apr. 38
Political solution, need for: Oct. 76;
Enders, Sept. 71
Terrorism in: Oct. 72; Department,
June 59; Haig, Sept. 24, Oct. 19
Treaties, agreements, etc., Jan. 39,
Mar. 33, Apr. 47, 48, May 75, July 57,
Sept. 75, 76, Oct. 82, Nov. 91, Dec. 77
U.S. Ambassador (Hinton), swearing in, PR
170, 5/29
U.S. economic and military aid: Oct. 76;
Buckley, June 51; Bushnell, Apr. 41,
Department, Feb. 69, Mar. 7, Apr. 43,
May 72; Enders, Sept. 70; Foreign
Relations Outline, July 56; Haig, Feb.
K, Apr. 15, 18, 21, B, May 9, July 19,
Sept. 17, Oct. 18, Dec. 28, PR 65,
3/13, PR 68, 3/18, PR 380, 11/16;
MacGuigan, PR 65, 3/13; Reagan, Apr.
8, 11, 12; Stoessel, Apr. 38
Enders, Thomas O., Sept. 69, 70, Oct. 76
(quoted), 78, Nov. 87, Dec. 72
Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-
American Affairs, swearing in, PR
210, 6/29
Biography, Sept. 71
Energy resources and problems (see also
Nuclear energy): July 45; ASEAN, Jan.
13; Cancun summit, Dec. 8; Haig, Aug. 2;
Hinton, Feb. 47; Muskie, Jan. 34; Ottawa
summit, Aug. 9
Alternative sources, need for: Haig, Aug.
4, 6, 7; Hinton, June 37; McPherson,
May 46
Biomass conversion technical information
service, implementing agreement
(1978): Italy, Japan, New Zealand,
Switzerland, May 73
Canada, national policy: Haig, PR 65, 3/13,
PR 311, 9/17; Hinton, Feb. 49;
Rashish, Nov. 25
Coal:
Coal/oil mixtures program, implementing
agreement (1981): Canada, Japan,
Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, U.S.,
Sept. 74
Control of nitrogen oxides emissions,
implementing agreement (1980):
Canada, Denmark, Sweden, U.S.,
Sept. 74
Economic assessment service, implement-
ing agreement (1975): Australia,
Japan. May 73
Energy resources and problems (Cont'd)
Coal (Cont'd)
International trade (Ferriter), July 34
Liquefaction (SRC-II process), bilateral
agreements: Federal Republic of
Germany, Japan, Jan. 40
U.S. exports (Ferriter), July 34
U.S. mining, question of foreign invest-
ment (McCarthy), July 31
Conservation in the pulp and paper in-
dustry, implementing agreement
(1981): Belgium, Canada, Japan,
Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden,
U.K., U.S., May 73
Conservation through energy storage,
implementing agreement (1978):
Belgium, May 73
Cooperation, bilateral agreement with
Finland, Feb. 71
Energy technology systems analysis
program, implementing agreement
(1980): Australia, Belgium, European
Communities Commission, Denmark,
Federal Republic of Germany, Italy,
Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, U.S.,
May 73
Forestry energy program, implementing
agreement (1978): Switzerland, U.K.,
May 73
Fossil fuel deposits, map, July F
Hot dry rock technology program, im-
plementing agreement (1979), Japan,
May 73
Hydrogen production from water, research
and development program, implement-
ing agreement (1977), U.K., May 73
International Energy Agency:
Eagleburger, Aug. 67; Hinton, Feb.
47; Hormats, July 25; Morse, May 35;
Rashish, Oct. 41
Member countries, July 33
U.S. Energy Policy and Conservation
Act, extension of section 252 urged
(Morse), May 33
International energy program, agreement
(1974): Portugal, Oct. 81; Turkey,
Sept. 74
Kheima Thermal Power Plant, project
grant agreement with Egypt, Dec. 77
Mexican oil and natural gas export
policies (Briggs), July 6
Oil:
Enhanced recovery of oil, implementing
agreement (1979), U.K., May 73
Iran-Iraq war, effect on supplies: Haig,
Feb. D; Hinton, Feb. 48; Hormats,
July 32; Morse, May 35
Market pressures: Clark, Sept. 37;
Hinton, June 37; Hormats, July 32;
Morse, May 34; Muskie, Jan. 4
OPEC prices (Haig), Dec. 31
Persian Gulf, freedom of navigation:
Oct. 54; Buckley, Sept. 62; Burt,
May 66; Hinton, Feb. 49
U.S. imports, Sept. L
Research and development, bilateral agree-
ment with Venezuela, May 76
Small solar power systems project,
supplement (1979) to implementing
agreement, Italy, May 73
Energy resources and problems (Cont'd)
Soviet- West European natural gas pipeline
project: Haig, Aug. 6, 7; Hormats,
Dec. 49; Rashish, Nov. 21
U.S.:
National policy: Clark, Sept. 37; Haig,
PR 311, 9/17; Hinton, Feb. 47;
Hormats, July 25; Rashish, Oct. 41;
Reagan, Apr. 12
Strategic petroleum reserve (SPR):
Hormats, July 25, 32; Rashish, Oct.
41
World trade, chart, Sept. M
English as world language, Oct. 11
Environmental problems and control (see also
Oil pollution): Carter, Feb. 23
Cooperation, bilateral agreement with
Netherlands, Mar. 35
Deforestation (McPherson), May 46
Environmental modification, prohibition of
military or other hostile use, conven-
tion (1977): Canada, Aug. 88; Papua
New Guinea, Jan. 36; Solomon Islands,
Sept. 74
Hyde Park landfill settlement, proposed,
U.S.-Canada, Oct. 34
International hazardous waste conference,
announcement, PR 328, 10/2
Intervention on the high seas in case of
pollution by substances other than oil,
protocol (1973): Bahamas, June 60;
Liberia, May 74; Netherlands, Jan. 37;
Poland, Oct. 82; Yugoslavia, Apr. 47
Marine environment, cooperation re pol-
lution by discharges of hydrocarbons
and other hazardous substances,
bilateral agreement with Mexico, June
61
Prevention of marine pollution by dumping
of wastes and other matter, convention
(1972):
Accession, Suriname, Jan. 37
Amendments (1978): Japan, Sweden,
U.S., Jan. 37
Prevention of pollution from ships, inter-
national convention (1973), protocol
(1978): Denmark, Apr. 47; Liberia,
Jan. 37; Tunisia, Jan. 37; Yugoslavia,
Apr. 47
Seabed mining (Aldrich), Feb. 56
Transboundary air and water pollution
problems, U.S.-Canada: Eagleburger,
Dec. 36; Reagan, Apr. 7; Trudeau,
Apr. 6
Canadian air quality legislation, question
of effect on U.S., Feb. 33
Dioxin in the Great Lakes, U.S.-Canada
technical meeting, joint statement,
Feb. 32
Garrison Diversion Unit, consultations,
June 32
Transboundary air pollution, convention
(1979): Bulgaria, Aug. 88; Sweden,
Dec. 75
U.S. -Panama Joint Commission on the
Environment, announcement, PR 138,
5/7
Department of State Bulletin
Equatorial Guinea:
Treaties, agreements, etc., May 73, Oct.
81, Dec. 75
U.S. Ambassador (Hardy), swearing in, PR
397, 11/23
)spada, Joseph M., Jan. S39
Ithiopia (Haig), Oct. 13
Treaties, agreements, etc., Apr. 47, May
74, 75, Nov. 91, Dec. 75, 76
urope (see also East-West relations and
names of individual countries):
Confidence-building measures, French pro-
posal for disarmament conference,
Aug. 15, Sept. 39
Dept. Oct. 51; Eagleburger, Aug. 66;
Genscher, PR 64, 3/12; Haig, Mar. 30,
May 9, July 17, Aug. 17, Sept. 13
Eastern (see also Soviet Union):
Eagleburger, Aug. 73; Haig, Feb. C;
Rashish, Nov. 21
CSCE Madrid Review Conference: Apr.
28, July 45, Aug. 14, Sept. 39; Bell,
Jan. 18; Eagleburger, Aug. 66;
Genscher, PR 64, 3/12; Haig, May 9,
June 10, Aug. 33; Kampelman, Sept.
37; NAC, Feb. 51, July 40; Stoessel,
Sept. 43, Dec. 53
Terrorism, proposal on (RM14):
Kampelman, Apr. 29
Soviet military exercises in Baltic area
(Department), Oct. 51
Kampelman, Sept. 37; NAC, July 40;
Reagan, Dec. 12; Stoessel, Dec. 53
Mutual and balanced force reduction
(NAC), Feb. 51, July 41
Nuclear-weapons-free zone, question of
(Haig), PR 408, 12/1
U.S. nuclear strategic policy: Haig, Dec.
22, PR 408, 12/1; Reagan, Dec. 10, 56
Western:
Pacifist and antinuclear movement (Haig),
July 11, Aug. 25, Sept. 27, Nov. 48,
Dec. 29, 30, PR 408, 12/1
Political events (Haig), PR 406, 12/1
Soviet natural gas pipeline: Hormats,
Dec. 49; Rashish, Nov. 21
U.S. relations: Eagleburger, Aug. 65;
Haig, May 6, 13, Oct. 18, 23, Nov.
19; Reagan, Nov. 16
U.S. security assistance, FY 1982 (Haig),
Apr. B
European Atomic Energy Community, signa-
ture to energy agreement (1980), May 73
European Communities (Atlas), June G
Commission of, treaties, agreements, etc.,
May 73, Oct. 83
Economic Community: Sept. E;
Eagleburger, Aug. 67; Rashish, Dec.
46
Treaties, agreements, etc., Jan. 38, 39,
July 58, Sept. 75
U.S.-EC high level consultations, an-
nouncement, PR 379, 11/16
Evarts, William M., Jan. S46, Nov. 4, 8
Everett, Edward, Jan. S45
Ewing, Raymond C, May 38
Ambassador to Cyprus, swearing in, PR
388, 11/17
Executive orders:
Interdiction of illegal aliens (12S2J,), Dec. 62
Nuclear cooperation with EURATOM
(12295), Apr. 33
Suspension of litigation against Iran
(122%), Apr. 32
Transfers of Iranian assets and related
matters (Carter), Feb. 7
Exports:
Developing countries, Dec. I
U.S.:
Charts, Sept. F, H, J
Controls on: Haig, Sept. 21; Rashish,
Nov. 23
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and other
export disincentives, effect:
Hormats, July 26; Johnston, July 29
Promotion of (Haig), Sept. 19
Service exports: Hormats, July 25, Dec.
48; Rashish, Dec. 47
Extradition, bilateral agreements: Sweden,
July 59, signature, PR 162, 5/27; Turkey,
Feb. 71, Mar. 35
Fairbanks, Richard M., Ill, swearing in as
Assistant Secretary for Congressional
Relations, PR 217, 7/1
Falco, Mathea, Jan. 29
Feldman, Mark B., May 22
Ferriter, John P., July 34
Field, Pattie H., Jan. S38
Fiji, treaties, agreements, etc., Aug. 89,
Nov. 91
Fillmore, Millard, Jan. S9
Finland (Eagleburger), Aug. 69, 70
Treaties, agreements, etc., Jan. 37, 38, 39,
Feb. 70, 71, Mar. 34, Apr. 47, May 74,
July 58, Aug. 88, 89, Oct. 82, 83, Nov.
91, Dec. 76
Fischer, Dean, swearing in as Spokesman of
the Department of State, PR 83, 3/28
Fish, Hamilton, Jan. S16, S18, S46
Fish and fisheries:
Atlantic tunas, conservation of, internation-
al convention (1966), Angola, Cape
Verde, Oct. 81
Fisheries off coasts of U.S.:
Allocations for 1981, PR 7, 1/8, PR 188,
6/10
Bilateral agreements: Canada, Jan. 39,
Aug. 89; Mexico (termination), Mar.
31, 35; Norway, Apr. 48, June 61,
Aug. 90, PR 21, 1/27; Portugal, May
76
Fishing and conservation of living re-
sources of the high seas, convention
(1958), succession, Solomon Islands,
Nov. 90
North Pacific, high seas fisheries, bilateral
agreement with Japan, Aug. 90
Pacific coast albacore tuna vessels and port
privileges (Eagleburger), Dec. 36
Bilateral treaty with Canada, July 59,
Sept. 76, Oct. 83, Nov. 91
Pacific salmon issues, U.S.-Canada negotia-
tions, Oct. 35
Fish and fisheries (Cont'd)
Whaling, international convention (1946)
with schedule of whaling regulations:
Canada (withdrawal), Sept. 75; China,
Mar. 34; Costa Rica, Nov. 91;
Dominica, Sept. 75; Egypt, Nov. 91;
India, May 75; Jamaica, Sept. 75;
Papua New Guinea, May 75; Philip-
pines, Oct. 82; Saint Lucia, Saint Vin-
cent and the Grenadines, Uruguay,
Sept. 75
Amendments (1980), May 75
Flint, John F., Jan. S40
Food production and shortages: Aug. 9;
Cancun summit, Dec. 6; Muskie, Jan. 3;
Reagan, Dec. 17
U.S. food aid: Dec. H; Haig, Oct. 6
World food production, map, July H
Ford, Gerald R, trips abroad, Sept. 8
Ford, John W., Jan. S34
Foreign aid, U.S.: Haig, Feb. K, Apr. 20, 21,
July 19, Oct. 4; Muskie, Jan. 5, Feb. 25;
Hormats, July 27
FY 1982 appropriations request: Armacost,
May 26; Buckley, May 62, June 51;
Bushnell, May 69; Burt, May 65; Coon,
May 68; Draper, May 48; Ewing, May
38; Haig, May 24, Sept. 18, PR 124,
4/28; McPherson, May 43; Rashish,
Oct. 45; Smyser, May 59; Twinam,
May 49; Walker, May 18
Human rights considerations (Johnston),
Oct. 49
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, modification
urged: Hormats, July 26; Johnston, July
29
Foreign policy, U.S.: Crocker, Oct. 24; Haig,
Aug. 5, Sept. 26, Dec. 29; Reagan, Aug.
23,29
Foreign policy conferences:
Editors and broadcasters: Haig, July 18,
Dec. 29; announcement, PR 152,
5/21, PR 325, 9/29
Leaders in teacher education program,
PR 375, 11/9
Young political leaders, PR 183, 6/4
Presidential responsibilities (Haig), Feb. E,
Nov. 68, 78
Principles, objectives, and purpose: Clark,
Sept. 36; Eagleburger, Aug. 65, 68;
Haig, Feb. C, May 6, 7, June 5, 11, 13,
July 13, 18, Aug. 31, Sept. 10, Dec. 22,
24, 29, PR 103, 4/22, PR 124, 4/28, PR
406, 12/1, PR 408, 12/1; Muskie, Feb.
24; Stoessel, June 33
Consultative discussions with allies: Haig,
May 13, June 6, 11, 13, 31, July 13,
18, Aug. 33, Sept. 17, 31; Rostow,
Aug. 64; Street, Aug. 49
Public opinion (Haig), June 26, 27, Aug. 19
Secretary of State, role (Haig), Feb. E, H,
June 9
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-
195J,, Volume XVI, The Geneva Con-
ference, released, Sept. 78
Foreign Service: Haig, PR 103, 4/22; Muskie,
Feb. 25
FY 1982 request (Haig), May 24, PR 132,
5/1
Index 1981
Foreign Service Act of 1980, Jan. S37
Signature (Carter), Jan. 11
Forsyth, John, Jan. S44
Foster, John Watson, Jan. S46
France:
Internal affairs: Bush, Aug. 25, 26, 27, 28,
51, 54; Department, Aug. 71; Haig,
July 16
Treaties, agreements, etc., Jan. 37, 38, 39,
Feb. 70, May 74, 76, July 58, Aug. 89,
Sept. 76, Nov. 91, Dec. 76
U.S. Ambassador (Galbraith), swearing in,
PR 390, 11/17
U.S. relations: Bush, Aug. 28;
Eagleburger, Aug. 70; Haig, Apr. 16,
PR 311, 9/17
Visit of Secretary Haig, June 22
Visit of Vice President Bush, Aug. 25
Franklin, Benjamin, Jan. SI, S4, S5, Sll,
S50
Freedom of press: Abrams, Oct. 66; Haig,
Nov. 78, PR 398, 11/24, PR 404, 11/27
Frelinghuysen, Frederick, Jan. S46
Fulbright, J. William, Jan. S36
Gabon:
Treaties, agreements, etc., May 74, Nov.
91, Dec. 75
U.S. Ambassador (McNamara), swearing
in, PR 425, 12/15
U.S. military assistance, proposed
(Walker), May 20
Galbraith, Evan Griffith, swearing in as Am-
bassador to France, PR 390, 11/17
Gambia:
Radio communications between amateur
stations on behalf of third parties,
bilateral agreement, June 61
U.S. Ambassador (Piper), swearing in, PR
391, 11/17
Gas and bacteriological warfare, Geneva con-
vention (1925): Rostow, Dec. 70
Current actions: Papua New Guinea (with
reservation), Sudan, Vietnam (with
reservation and declaration), Apr. 46
Gast, Philip, Oct. 58
Gavin, John, swearing in as Ambassador to
Mexico, PR 151, 5/19
General Assembly, U.N.:
Resolution, text, Afghanistan, Jan. 32
35th session, June 54
36th session (Haig), Oct. 1
U.S. delegation, Oct. 5
Geneva conventions (1949) on treatment of
armed forces, civilian persons, and
prisoners of war: Saint Vincent and the
Grenadines, Tuvalu, July 58
Protocol I re protection of victims of inter-
national armed conflicts: Bangladesh,
Finland (with reservation), Jan. 37;
Laos, Apr. 47
Protocol 11 re protection of victims of non-
international armed conflict:
Bangladesh, Finland (with reservation),
Jan. 38; Laos, Apr. 47
Genocide convention (1948): Luxembourg,
Dec. 75; Vietnam, Aug. 88
Genscher, Hans-Dietrich, remarks following
meeting with Secretary Haig, PR 64, 3/12
German Democratic Republic:
East Berlin Volkskammer elections (Allied
Public Statement), Aug. 77
Treaties, agreements, etc., Mar. 33, 35,
May 74, 76, June 61, Aug. 89, Nov. 91,
Dec. 76
U.S. relations: Eagleburger, Aug. 77;
Rashish, Nov. 22
Germany, Federal Republic of:
Treaties, agreements, etc., Jan. 37, 38, 39,
40, Feb. 70, 71, Mar. 33, 34, Apr. 46,
48, May 73, 74, 75, July 58, Aug. 88,
89, Oct. 82, Nov. 91, Dec. 76
U.S. relations: Eagleburger, Aug. 68;
Genscher, PR 64, 3/12; Haig, Nov. 48,
PR 64, 3/12
U.S. visit of Chancellor Schmidt: Haig,
July 9; joint statement, July 44; White
House statement, Feb. 53
Program, PR 150, 5/19
Visit of Secretary Haig (Haig), June 21,
Nov. 44
Berlin, PR 308, 309, 310, 9/15
Geyer, Georgie Anne, May 4
Ghana, treaties, agreements, etc., June 61,
July 59, Nov. 91, Dec. 76
Gibraltar (Haig), May 8
Gibson, Hugh, Jan. S25
Glenn, John (Haig), Nov. 17
Goldberg, Sherwood D., nomination as
Executive Assistant to the Secretary of
State, PR 34, 2/3
Gonzales, William E., Jan. S39
Gorlin, Jacques J., appointment as Executive
Assistant to the Under Secretary of State
for Economic Affairs, PR 235, 7/15
Graham, John, Jan. S7
Grant, James C, Apr. 34
Grant, Ulysses S., Jan. S15, Sept. 1
Greece: Eagleburger, Aug. 71; Haig, July 39,
Nov. 45
Treaties, agreements, etc., Mar. 33, May
74, July 57, 58, Sept. 75, Oct. 81, 82,
Nov. 90, 91, Dec. 75, 76
U.S. Ambassador (Stearns), swearing in,
PR 252, 7/27
U.S. security assistance, proposed: Ewing,
May 38; Haig, Apr. B, PR 68, 3/18
Grenada, treaties, agreements, etc., Mar. 33,
May 74, Nov. 90
Gresham, Walter A., Jan. S18, S47
Grew, Joseph C, Jan. S22
Griffis, Stanton, Jan. S35
Guatemala: Bosworth, Oct. 79; Bushnell,
Apr. 40; Enders, Sept. 72; Haig, Sept. 15
Treaties, agreements, etc., Feb. 70, Mar.
33, July 57, 58, Aug. 89, Nov. 91
U.S. Ambassador (Chapin), swearing in, PR
266, 8/6
U.S. security assistance (Bosworth), Oct.
80
Guerreiro, Ramiro Elisio Saraiva (quoted),
Nov. 87
Guinea, treaties, agreements, etc., Apr. 46,
47, May 73, 74, July 57, Aug. 89, Nov. 91
Guinea-Bissau:
Treaties, agreements, etc., May 74, Dec. 75
U.S. Ambassador (de Vos), swearing in, PR
392, 11/17
Gutman, Roy, May 9
Guyana, treaties, agreements, etc., Mar. 34,
Apr. 48, Oct. 82, Nov. 91
Gwertzman, Bernie, May 9
H
Habib, Philip C, Oct. 62
Personal Representative to the President,
named as, PR 177, 6/1
Haig, Alexander Meigs, Jr., Jan. S49
Addresses, correspondence, remarks, and
statements:
Afghanistan:
Military situation, July 15
Refugees, Aug. 43
Soviet occupation, Feb. C, J, Apr. 15,
May 3, 11, 12, July 12, 15, 20, Aug.
37, 39, Sept. 12, Oct. 6, Nov. 45
Africa, July 15, Sept. 15, Oct. 4, Dec. 65,
PR 371, 11/5
Southern Africa, May 6, 16, July 19
U.S. economic and security assistance,
Apr. B, July 14, PR 68, 3/18
American ideals, Feb. C
American Patriots Medal, recipient, PR
406, 12/1
Angola, May 6, 11, June 10, Oct. 19
ANZUS, Aug. 50
Arab-Israeli conflict (for details, see Arab-
Israeli conflict), Feb. C, I, K, Apr.
17, June 19, 21, 25, July 21, Aug. 4,
7, 20, Sept. 14, 17, 28, 32, 54, Oct.
6, 23, Nov. 68, PR 62, 3/11, PR 109,
4/24
Autonomy talks, June 17, Aug. 18,
Sept. 26, 28, 32, 55, 56, 57, 58, Oct.
14, 20, Nov. 50, 60, 69, 74, 75, 77,
78, Dec. 27, 63, PR 62, 3/11, PR
311, 9/17, PR 406, 12/1
Saudi peace program, proposed,
Nov. 50, Dec. 27, PR 360, 10/29
Sinai peacekeeping force, May 13, 14,
15, July 13, Aug. 18, 44, 47, 48, 49,
Sept. 44, 55, 56, Oct. 20, Dec. 27,
PR 404, 11/27, PR 405, 11/30, PR
406, 12/1
Argentina, May 6
Arms control and disarmament, Feb. E,
Aug. 31, Sept. 12, 18, Oct. 6
Arms sales policy, Sept. 18
ASEAN, Aug. 39, 41, 42, 45, 50, Oct. 4
Asia, Feb. C
East Asia, Apr. B, PR 68, 3/18
Southwest Asia, May 13, July 15,
Aug. 40, 42, 45, 47, Sept. 17
U.S. strategic concerns, June 16,
19, 21, 25, July 15, Sept. 29, 54, 57,
Oct. 13, 16, Nov. 60, 69, 75, 78, PR
311, 9/17
Awards ceremony, airline hijackings task
force participants, PR 164, 5/28
Awards ceremony for former hostages,
PR 93, 4/13
Berlin, Nov. 46, PR 308, 309, 310, 9/15
Bradley, Omar, death of, PR 107, 4/9
Canada, June 9, PR 65, 3/13, PR 311,
9/17
10
Department of State Bulletin
lig, Alexander (Cont'd)
{Addresses, remarks, etc (Cont'd)
I Chad, Libyan incursion, Feb. J, Nov 45
Dec. 65, PR 372, 10/28
J Chemical weapons, alleged use of Nov
46,48, 51, PR 380, 11/16
; China, June 26, Aug. 4, 34, 37, Sept 11
PR 380, 11/16
Taiwan, July 14, Aug. 35, 52, Oct. 21,
PR 354, 10/23, PR 406, 12/1
U.S. arms sales policy, Aug. 36 37
38, 41, 42, 49, 51, 52
Clark amendment, May 6, June 9
Cronkite, Walter, award to, PR 45, 2/11
CSCE Madrid conference, May 9, June
10, Aug. 33
Cuba, Sept. 34, Oct. 13, Nov. 20
Regional activities, Feb. J, Apr.
14, 17, 22, May 1, 5, 11, 15, June
10, 20, 23, 27, July 19, Sept. 15, 18,
Dec. 28, PR 406, 12/1
Cyprus, Oct. 6
Defense, July 15, Sept. 10, 24, Oct. 17,
18, 22
Budget, Sept. 17, 18, 58, Oct. 20,
Nov. 20, 49, 75
Strategic weapons program,
Dec. 22
Developing countries, Feb. D, June 7, 11,
13, July 8, 13, 14, 19, Aug. 2, Sept.
10, 11, 17, 20, 33, Oct. 1, 6, PR 68,
3/18, PR 311, 9/17
U.S. aid and other aid, Apr. 20,
July 37
Development assistance, appropriations
request, Apr. A, C, PR 68, 3/18
East-West relations, Apr. 14, 19, 28,
May 9, July 18, Aug. 2, 3, 4, 6, Sept.
13, 20, 24
Economy, domestic, Feb. E, Apr. 21,
June 5, 11, July 9, 13, 19, Aug. 1, 5,
7, Sept. 10, 17, 19, 26, 34, PR 68,
3/18, PR 324, 9/29
Economy, world:
Cancun summit, May 12, Aug. 2,
Sept. 11, 33, Oct. 6, Nov. 48, Dec.
29, PR 65, 3/13, PR 354, 10/23, PR
365, 11/1, PR 368, 11/2, PR 371,
11/5, PR 372, 10/28
Multilateral development banks, Apr.
C, Oct. 4, PR 68, 3/18, PR 380,
11/16
Ottawa summit, Aug. 1, Sept. 19, 23,
27, 30, 32, 34, Oct. 6
U.S. interest rates, Aug. 5, 6, 7, Sept.
26, 32, Nov. 48
Egypt, Sept. 54
Sadat, death of, Nov. 66, 67, 69, 71,
Dec. 63, 65
U.S. economic and military aid, pro-
posed, Apr. B, Sept. 58, PR 68,
3/18, PR 124, 4/28
U.S. joint Bright Star military exer-
cises, Dec. 64
U.S. use of military facilities, question
of, Sept. 28, 57, Dec. 64, 65
Haig, Alexander (Cont'd)
Addresses, remarks, etc. (Cont'd)
El Salvador (for details, see El Salvador),
Apr. 17, May 13, July 19, Sept. 24,
PR 64, 3/12
Americans killed and subsequent in-
vestigations, June 8
Foreign intervention and arms supplies,
Apr. 14, 18, May 1, 5, 10, 11, 12,
15, June 23, 27, July 10, 19, Aug.
42, Oct. 18, PR 64, 3/12, PR 418,
12/4
U.S. aid, Feb. K, Apr. 15, 18, 21, B,
July 19, Sept. 17, Oct. 18, PR 65,
3/13, PR 68, 3/18
Energy, Aug. 2, 4, 6, 7, PR 311, 9/17
Enhanced radiation weapons, Sept. 14,
Oct. 23, Nov. 47, 49
Europe:
Confidence-building measures, May 9,
July 17, Aug. 17, 33, Sept. 13
Disarmament proposals, question of,
May 9, July 11, 16, Nov. 48
Eastern, Feb. C
CSCE Madrid review conference,
May 9, June 10
Western, Apr. B, May 6, Nov. 19, PR
406, 12/1
Food aid, Oct. 6
Foreign assistance, Feb. K, Apr. 20, 21,
July 19, Oct. 4
FY 1982 request, Apr. A, May 24,
PR 124, 4/28, PR 132, 5/1
Foreign policy, Feb. C, E, H, Mar. 6, 7,
May 13, June 5, 9, 11, 13, 23, 26, 31,
July 13, 18, Aug. 5, 19, 31, 33, Sept.
10, 16, 26, 31, Oct. 13, 18, 23, Nov.
68, 78, Dec. 25, 29, PR 103, 4/22,
PR 406, 12/1
Foreign Service, May 24, PR 103, 4/22,
PR 132, 5/1
France, Apr. 16, July 16, Aug. 7, 51, 54,
PR 311, 9/17
Germany, Federal Republic of:
U.S. relations, Nov. 48, PR 313, 9/17
U.S. visit of Chancellor Schmidt, July
9, PR 64, 3/12
Glenn, John, Nov. 17
Greece, Apr. B, July 39, Nov. 45, PR 68,
3/18
"Haigspeak," Aug. 45
Holocaust, International Liberators Con-
ference of the U.S. Memorial Coun-
cil, remarks, PR 362, 10/29
Human rights, Feb. E, J, June 10, 25,
Sept. 32, Oct. 5, Nov. 47, 78, PR
398, 11/24, PR 404, 11/27
Indian Ocean-Persian Gulf, Apr. 19,
Aug. 49
Interdependence of modern world, Feb.
D, Aug. 1, Oct. 3, Nov. 47, PR 68,
3/18
International Monetary Fund, Oct. 4
Investment of private capital abroad,
Sept. 33, Oct. 6
Iran, Feb. G, I, K, June 25, Oct. 13
Awards ceremony for hostages, re-
marks, PR 93, 4/13
Haig, Alexander (Cont'd)
Addresses, remarks, etc. (Cont'd)
Iran-Iraq war, Feb. C, D, July 17, Oct. 6
Israel, Aug. 53, 79, Sept. 23, 29, 30,
Nov. 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, PR 405,
11/30
Security, U.S. commitment, June 16,
Sept. 14, 31, Oct. 15, Nov. 61, Dec.
27,65
U.S. AWACS sale to Saudi Arabia,
position on, June 18, 30, Oct. 15,
17, Nov. 18, 74, 76
U.S. F-16s, suspension, Aug. 3, 7, 53,
79, 81, Sept. 22, 23, 26, 27, 29, 32,
59
Lifting, Oct. 23, 61
U.S. security assistance, proposed, Apr.
B, PR 68, 3/18, PR 124, 4/28
Visit to, question and answer session,
statements, and toast, June 16, PR
99, 4/16, PR 100, 4/16, PR 101,
4/16
Jamaica, July 18, Aug. 6, Sept. 33
Remarks to U.S. Business Committee
on, PR 219, 7/6
Japan:
Auto exports to U.S., May 30, June 6
U.S. relations, July 11
U.S. visit of Foreign Minister Ito,
May 29
U.S. visit of Prime Minister Suzuki, dis-
cussion topics, PR 141, 5/8
Jordan, visit to, June 18; remarks to U.S.
Embassy staff, PR 103, 4/22
Kampuchea, Aug. 17, 37, 39, 40, 43, 44,
49, 86, Sept. 12, 27, Oct. 6, Nov. 45
Kirkpatrick, Jeane, Aug. 50, 54
Kissinger, Henry, Nov. 20
Korea, Apr. B, May 6, Sept. 17, Oct. 6
U.S. visit of President Chun, Feb. J
Korea, North, Oct. 20, 22
Latin America, Apr. 15, May 12
Caribbean Basin plan, proposed, July
11, Aug. 5, 6, 7, Sept. 11, 18, 20,
34, 68, Oct. 4, 13, PR 219, 7/6, PR
371, 11/5
Cuban and Soviet activities (see also El
Salvador, supra), Apr. 17, 22,
May 1-2, June 10, 20, 27, July 19,
Oct. 21, PR 380, 11/16
U.S. security assistance, proposed,
Apr. B, PR 68, 3/18
Lebanon, May 54, June 17, 18, 22, 30,
July 10, 12, Aug. 18, 81, 82, Sept.
14, 22, 28, 30, 33, 55, 56, 58, 59,
Oct. 6, 16, Nov. 18, 74, 78, Dec. 28,
PR 101, 4/16, PR 136, 5/5
Habib mission, July 10, 15, 17,
Aug. 6, 18, 19, Sept. 23, 32, 58,
Oct. 14, 16, Nov. 60, Dec. 26, PR
311, 9/17
Lefever, Ernest W., July 10, 23
Libya, July 17, 22, Oct. 13, 14, 16, 62,
Nov. 18, 68, 70, Dec. 28, 65
Attack on U.S. planes, Oct. 15, 19,
22,61
ndex1981
11
Haig, Alexander (Cont'd)
Addresses, remarks, etc. (Cont'd)
Middle East, Apr. 19, June 6, 21, 25,
Aug. 4, Dec. 64
Gulf Cooperation Council, Nov. 60,
62
Soviet threat to, June 16, 19, Sept.
29, 54, Oct. 13, 16, Dec. 28, PR
311, 9/17
Multilateral development banks, Apr. C,
Oct. 4, PR 68, 3/18
Namibia, Apr. 19, May 6, 16, June 6,
July 14, 19, 22, Sept. 32, Oct. 6, 19,
PR 380, 11/16
National Security Council, role in foreign
affairs, Feb. H
Neutron bomb, Sept. 14, Oct. 23,
Nov. 47, 49
New Zealand, Aug. 44, 48, 50
Nicaragua, June 10, 20, July 10, 19, 20,
Sept. 15, Dec. 28, PR 417, 12/8, PR
418, 12/4
U.S. aid, Apr. 21, June 21
Nigeria, May 16
NATO, Feb. K, Apr. 17, 19, June 11, July
10, 21, Aug, 4, 21, 33, Sept. 17, 27,
29, Nov. 45, 47
NAC ministerial meeting, Rome
(May 4-5), July 37
Spain, question of integration,
May 8, June 20, 21
TNF, June 6, 31, July 11, 37, 39,
Aug. 6, Sept. 25, 27, Oct. 13, Nov.
46, 50, Dec. 23, 24, PR 64, 3/12,
PR 398, 11/24, PR 404, 11/27
Nuclear nonproliferation, Aug. 4, 33
OPEC, Oct. 4
Pakistan, Aug. 37, 53
U.S. aid, proposed, May 16,
Oct. 14
Philippines, Aug. 38
Poland, May 4, 14, June 8, 22, 24,
July 12, Aug. 5, 22, Sept. 11, 24,
Nov. 45, PR 372, 10/28, PR 406
12/1, PR 423, 12/15
Soviet intervention, question of,
Feb. H, Apr. 14, May 3, 4, 10, 14,
June 6, 15, 21, 28, 30, July 37,
Aug. 5, Sept. 28, 31, Oct. 19, 22,
Nov. 19, 48
U.S. economic aid, Feb. H, June
28, July 17
Political objectives, question of, June 8
Portugal, Apr. B, Nov. 45
President Reagan, May 4, June 7, 27, 30,
Aug. 19, Sept. 26, Oct. 18
Attempted assassination, PR 100
4/16, PR 103, 4/22
Refugees, Aug. 43, Oct. 21
U.S. aid, May 26, Aug. 37, 40, 44
Saudi Arabia, June 18, Nov. 70 Dec 64
U.S. sale of AWACS and other
equipment, June 8, 18, 22, 30, July
15, Aug. 4, 51, 54, Sept. 26, 29,
Oct. 13, 14, 15, 17, 18, Nov. 17, 60
62, Dec. 26, 64, 66, PR 317, 9/18
Secretary of State:
Confirmation hearings, publication
of opening statement at, Mar. 37
Effectiveness, June 27, 29, 31
Nomination, confirmation, and
swearing in, Feb. C, F
Haig, Alexander (Cont'd)
Addresses, remarks, etc. (Cont'd)
Security assistance, FY 1982 appro-
priations request, Apr. A, Sept. 18,
PR 68, 3/18, PR 124, 4/28
Sino-Soviet relations, Sept. 11
South Africa, July 14, 19, 22, Sept. 32
Soviet Union {for details, see Soviet
Union), Feb. D, Apr. A, 13, 15, May
1, July 8, 12, 21, Aug. 6, 22, 31, 33,
35, 39, 41, 86, Sept. 10, 14, 21, 25,
Oct. 13, Nov. 45, Dec. 66
Arms talks with U.S. (see also
SALT), Feb. H, Apr. 16, 18, May 3,
12, 16, June 9, 25, 31, July 9, 11,
16, 22, 37, Aug. 3, 5, 32, 52, Sept.
12, 27, 30, Oct. 17, Nov. 19, 48, 50,
Dec. 24, PR 380, 11/16
Intelligence services in U.S., June 31
Meetings with Mr. Gromyko, discussion
topics, July 37, Oct. 16, 21, Nov.
46,47,49, 50, Dec. 25, PR 311,
9/17, PR 324, 9/29, PR 380, 11/16
U.S. grain embargo, lifting, Feb. J,
May 4, June 7, 24, July 14, 20,
Sept. 24, Dec. 25
U.S. relations, Feb. I, Apr. 18, May 7,
10, 14, 16, June 6, 11, 13, 22, 23,
July 18, Aug. 17, 40, 51, Sept. 11,
16, Oct. 17, 23, Dec. 72 (quoted)
Spain, Apr. B, May 7, June 19, July 39,
Nov. 45
State Department:
Appropriations request, FY 1982, Apr.
C, PR 132, 5/1
Assistant Secretaries, question of
delays in confirmation, June 29,
July 20
Employees, remarks to, PR 17, 1/22
SALT, May 10, 16, 17, July 10, Aug. 31,
33, 42, Sept. 13, 27, Oct. 6, 13, 17,
PR 398, 11/24, PR 404, 11/27
SALT II, Feb. I, Dec. 24
Reassessment, June 9, 23, 24, July
10, 16, 22
Sudan, Dec. 64, 65
Terrorism, Feb. I, J, May 8, 16, June 25,
July 17, 22, Aug. 17, Nov. 66, 68,
70, PR 164, 5/28
Trade, Aug. 2, 40, 48, 50, Sept. 19,
Oct. 3
U.K.:
Northern Ireland, Apr. 19, July 20
U.S. relations, Apr. 17
U.N., Sept. 14, Oct. 5, PR 365, 11/1,
PR 368, 11/2
36th session of General Assembly,
Oct. 1
UNDP and UNICEF, appropriations re-
quest, Apr. C, PR 68, 3/18
Weinberger, Secretary, June 9, July 38,
Oct. 17, 20
West Pointers, Aug. 3
WHO code of marketing breast milk sub-
stitutes, U.S. vote, July 17
World problems, Feb. C
Yugoslavia, U.S. relations, PR 306, 9/15
News conferences and press briefings,
transcripts, Feb. G, Apr. 17, 21, May
9, June 19, July 9, 37, Aug. 1, 6, 17,
35, 41, 46, 81, Sept. 54, 68, Oct. 18,
Nov. 49, 66, 74, PR 62, 3/11, PR 64
Haig, Alexander (Cont'd)
News conferences, etc. (Cont'd)
3/12, PR 65, 3/13, PR 371, 11/5, PR
372, 10/28, PR 417, 12/8, PR 418, 12/4
Question and answer sessions, Apr. 21,
June 7, July 13, 19, Sept. 14, 25, 31,
34, Nov. 47, 68, Dec. 29, PR 101, 4/16,
PR 311, 9/17, PR 380, 11/16, PR 404,
11/27, PR 406, 12/1
Television and radio interviews,
transcripts, Apr. 13, May 1, 4, 7, June
23, 26, 30, Aug. 51, Sept. 22, 27, 29,
58, Oct. 15, 22, 61, Nov. 17, 77, Dec.
24, 63, PR 317, 9/18, PR 324, 9/29, PR
354, 10/23, PR 359, 10/29, PR 398,
11/24, PR 405, 11/30
Visits to:
Asia: Bush, Aug. 29; Haig, Aug. 34, 50;
Holdridge, Oct. 35; Reagan, Aug. 23
Berlin, Nov. 44, PR 308, 309, 310, 9/15
Europe: June 19, Nov. 44; statement
after meeting with British Foreign
Secretary Lord Carrington, PR 109,
4/24
Italy, June 19
Discussion topics, question of,
PR 136, 5/5
Middle East, Apr. 20, May 13, 14,
June 14, 21, PR 64, 3/12
Question and answer session (Haig,
Navron), PR 101, 4/16
Statement after meeting with Prime
Minister Begin, PR 99, 4/16
Toasts (Haig, Shamir), PR 100, 4/16
Philippines, Aug. 38
Manila American cemetery and
memorial, remarks, PR 200, 6/23
Haiti:
Privileges and immunities for Defense
Department personnel temporarily in
Haiti for survey and relief operations,
bilateral agreement, May 76
Textile agreement with U.S., amendment,
May 76, PR 118, 4/22
Treaties, agreements, etc., Mar. 38,
May 74, 76, Aug. 89, Oct. 81, 82, Nov.
91
U.S. Ambassador (Preeg), swearing in, PR
215, 7/1
U.S. economic and security assistance,
proposed (Enders), Oct. 78
Hand, Learned, June 13 (quoted)
Hanna, Margaret, Jan. S37
Hanson, Abraham, Jan. S40
Harding, Warren G., Jan. S27, Sept. 2
Hardy, Alan M., swearing in as Ambassador
to Equatorial Guinea, PR 397, 11/23
Harriman, Florence J., Jan. S38
Harris, Townsend, Jan. S12
Hartman, Arthur A., swearing in as Am-
bassador to the Soviet Union, PR 401,
11/25
Hartman, David, Oct. 22, Nov. 77
Hay, John, Jan. S21, S47
Health and medical research (McPherson),
May 47
Cairo sewerage, amendment of project
grant agreement with Egypt, Dec. 77
Cooperation, bilateral agreements: Egypt,
Apr. 48; Kuwait, Aug. 90; Nigeria,
Nov. 92; Philippines, Dec. 77
le
H.
i
12
Department of State Bulletin
Health and medical research (Cont'd)
Death rate, developing countries, Dec. K
Diarrheal diseases, project grant agree-
ment with Egypt, Dec. 77
International program on chemical safety,
U.S. -EPA collaboration, memorandum
of understanding with World Health
Organization, June 62
World Health Organization:
Constitution (1946): Dominica, Nov. 90;
Saint Lucia, Jan. 39
Amendment to Article 74: Australia,
Dec. 76; Egypt, France, Libya,
Aug. 89; San Marino, U.S., Feb. 70
Amendments to Articles 24 and 25:
Denmark, Sept. 75; Fiji, Aug. 89;
Mauritius, Nov. 91; Philippines,
Dec. 76
Infant Formula Code: Abrams, July 54;
Constable, Sept. 34; Haig, July 17;
McPherson, July 54
Regional office, question of transfer:
Schwebel, Feb. 64; ICJ advisory
opinion, Feb. 68
U.S. -EPA collaboration in international
program on chemical safety,
memorandum of understanding,
June 62
lelms, Jesse A. (Haig), June 29
lenderson, Loy W., Jan. S34
lerman, George, Aug. 51
lerter, Christian Archibald, Jan. S49
ligh seas convention (1958), succession,
Solomon Islands, Nov. 90
Sinton, Dean R., Feb. 47, June 35
Ambassador to El Salvador, swearing in,
PR 170, 5/29
lolbrooke, Richard C, Jan. 14
loldridge, John H„ Oct. 35, 38, Dec. 38, 41
Assistant Secretary of State for East
Asian and Pacific Affairs, swearing in,
PR 163, 5/28
Biographical details, Oct. 36
londuras:
Boundary settlement with El Salvador:
Carter, Jan. 33; Muskie, Jan. 35
Democratic progress: Bushnell, Apr. 40;
Enders, Sept. 72
Treaties, agreements, etc., Apr. 46,
May 74, Aug. 89, Nov. 91
U.S. Ambassador (Negroponte), swearing
in, PR 370, 11/5
-long Kong:
Patent cooperation treaty (1970), appli-
cation to, June 60
Textile agreement with U.S., amendment,
June 61, PR 26, 1/30, PR 70, 3/20
ioover, Herbert, Jan. S35, Sept. 3
iopkins, Harry, Jan. S29
formats, Robert D., July 24, 32, Nov. 28,
Dec. 47, 49, 60
Assistant Secretary for Economic and
Business Affairs, swearing in, PR 190,
6/12
Souse, Edward M., Jan. S25
Bouse, Karen Elliot, Feb. 26, Aug. 51
Eughes, Charles Evans, Jan. S27, S48
ull, Cordell, Jan. S27, S29, S48
Human rights: Jan. S37, Sept. 39; Carter,
Feb. 23; Derian, Jan. 21; Haig, Feb. E,
June 25, Oct. 5, Nov. 47; Muskie, Jan. 5,
35; Reagan, Dec. 13
Africa (Muskie), Jan. 2
American convention on human rights
(1969), accession, Mexico, June 60
Chemical weapons, use of. See Chemical
weapons
Chile (Bushnell), Apr. 44
Czechoslovakia (Kampelman), Sept. 40
Eastern Europe. See Europe: CSCE
Madrid Review Conference
El Salvador (Reagan), Apr. 12
Freedom of press: Abrams, Oct. 66; Haig,
Nov. 78; PR 398, 11/24, PR 404, 11/27
Fundamental to U.S. foreign policy:
Buckley, Sept. 63; Derian, Jan. 21;
Haig, Feb. J, June 25; Reagan, Apr.
10; Stoessel, Sept. 42
Guatemala (Bosworth), Oct. 80
Human Rights Day and Week, proc-
lamation (Carter), Feb. 54
International covenant on civil and
political rights (1966):
Current actions: Central African Re-
public, July 57; Kampuchea, Jan. 37;
Korea, Democratic People's
Republic, Dec. 75; Mexico, June 60
Optional protocol (1966), Trinidad and
Tobago, Jan. 37
U.S. ratification urged: Carter, Feb. 54;
Derian, Jan. 22
International covenant on economic, social,
and cultural rights (1966):
Current actions: Central African
Republic, July 57; Honduras, Apr.
46; Kampuchea, Jan. 36; Korea,
Democratic People's Republic, Dec.
75; Mexico, June 60
U.S. ratification urged: Carter, Feb. 54;
Derian, Jan. 22
Kampuchea (Stoessel), Sept. 43
Latin America: Carter, Jan. 33; Haig,
Sept. 32; Johnston, Feb. 45; Reagan,
Apr. 11
Libyan nationals (Crocker), Oct. 29
Soviet Union: Bell, Jan. 19; Haig, June 10,
Kampelman, Sept. 38
U.N. Declaration on Religious Intolerance
(Stoessel), Sept. 43
U.N. role: June 56; Derian, Jan. 21
Hummel, Arthur W., Jr., swearing in as
Ambassador to China, PR 274, 8/12
Hungary: Eagleburger, Aug. 76, 77; Rashish,
Nov. 21
Treaties, agreements, etc., Jan. 38, 39,
Feb. 70, Apr. 48, May 74, 75, Aug. 88,
Sept. 76, Oct. 83, Nov. 91, Dec. 76
I
Iceland (Eagleburger), Aug. 70
Treaties, agreements, etc., May 74,
Sept. 75, Oct. 83, Nov. 91
Immigration:
Haitian migrants and vessels, interdiction
and selective return, bilateral agree-
ment with Haiti, Dec. 77
Immigration (Cont'd)
U.S. policy: Enders, Oct. 78; Haig,
Oct. 21; Reagan, Sept. 43
Interdiction of illegal aliens, Executive
order, proclamation (Reagan), Dec.
62
World, chart, July M
Imports, U.S. (see also Exports and Trade):
Bivalve mollusks, sanitary quality of
exports to U.S., bilateral agreement
with New Zealand, Apr. 48
Charts, Sept. G, I, K, L
Income tax reimbursement, bilateral agree-
ments: Honduras, Aug. 90, International
Hydrographic Bureau, Jan. 40
India:
Textile agreement with U.S., amendment,
Apr. 48, July 59, Sept. 76, PR 37, 2/6,
PR 129, 4/30, PR 231, 7/14
Treaties, agreements, etc., Jan. 38, 39,
Mar. 35, May 74, 75, Aug. 89, Oct. 83,
Nov. 91, Dec. 75
U.S. economic and security assistance,
proposed (Coon), May 68
Indian Ocean-Persian Gulf: Oct. 54; ANZUS,
Aug. 45; Buckley, Nov. 85; Eagleburger,
Aug. 74; Haig, Aug. 49, Oct. 13; Twinam,
Nov. 63
U.S. position, military presence, etc.: Bush,
Aug. 25; Burt, May 66; Constable,
June 43; Weinberger, July 48
Indonesia:
Treaties, agreements, etc., Jan. 39, 40,
Mar. 35, May 73, 74, 75, Nov. 91, 92,
Dec. 75
U.S. economic and military assistance,
proposed: Armacost, May 28; Haig,
Apr. B; Holdridge, Oct. 36
Industrial production and productivity
improvement, grant agreements with
Egypt, Dec. 77
Industrial property:
International classification of goods and
services to which trademarks apply,
agreement (1957), Poland (withdrawal).
Nov. 90
Locarno agreement establishing an inter-
national classification for industrial
designs (1976), U.S. (denunciation),
Oct. 82
Nice agreement (1977): Denmark, June 60;
Norway, July 58; Suriname, Dec. 76
Protection of, bilateral agreement with
World Intellectual Property Organiza-
tion, Jan. 40
Information, security of, bilateral agree-
ments: Denmark, May 75; Luxembourg,
Dec. 77
Inter-American Development Bank (John-
ston), July 29
Agreement establishing (1959), ratification,
Suriname, Mar. 33
Interdependence of modern world: Haig,
Feb. D; Weinberger, July 46
Economic: Dec. 6; Clark, Sept. 36;
Eagleburger, Aug. 67; Haig, Aug. 1,
Oct. 3, Nov. 47; Hinton, June 35;
Hormats, July 24
ndex1981
13
International Atomic Energy Agency,
treaties, agreements, etc., Feb. 71, Mar.
35, Apr. 46, Sept. 74, Dec. 77
International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (World Bank): Hormats,
Nov. 30, 32; McPherson, Nov. 85;
Reagan, Nov. 14
Articles of agreement (1944): Bhutan,
Vanuatu, Nov. 90
U.S. contribution, proposed (Johnston),
July 28
International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC), U.S. contributions, Aug. 78
International Court of Justice:
Declarations recognizing as compulsory the
jurisdiction of the ICJ under Article
36, paragraph 2, declaration, Malta,
May 73
WHO Regional Office transfer proposed
(Schwebel), Feb. 64
Advisory Opinion (Dec. 20, 11980), Feb.
68
International Finance Corporation: Hormats,
Nov. 30; Reagan, Dec. 15
International Hydrographic Bureau, income
tax reimbursement agreement with U.S.,
Jan. 40
International Hydrographic Organization,
convention (1967): Belgium, June 60;
Uruguay, Dec. 75
International Labor Organization (see under
Labor)
International Monetary Fund: Bushnell,
Apr. 40; Haig, Oct. 4; Hinton, June 38;
Hormats, July 24, Nov. 32; McPherson,
Nov. 85; Rashish, Oct. 43; Reagan, Nov.
14
Articles of agreement (1944); Bhutan,
Nov. 90; Vanuatu, Nov. 90
International organizations, atlas of U.S.
foreign relations, June A
Investment guarantees, bilateral agreement
with China, Feb. 71
Investment of foreign capital in U.S.:
Sept. P; Hormats, Nov. 28, 33; Rashish,
Oct. 44
Coal and other minerals (McCarthy),
July 30
Investment of private capital abroad: Sept. O;
Clark, Sept. 36; Haig, Sept. 33, Oct. 6;
Hormats, Nov. 28; McCarthy, July 30;
McPherson, May 44; Rashish, Oct. 44,
Dec. 47; Reagan, Dec. 15
Africa (Crocker), Aug. 58
AID Bureau of Private Enterprise
(McPherson), Dec. 57
Canada: Eagleburger, Dec. 34, 37;
Hormats, Nov. 31
Investment incentive agreement with
Lebanon, May 76, July 59
Major developing economies receiving
direct investment, map, Dec. E
Performance requirements and investment
incentives (Hormats), Nov. 31
U.S. policy: Hormats, July 27; Rashish,
Nov. 26
Iran: Haig, Oct. 13; Reagan, Nov. 17
American hostages:
Awards ceremony for former hostages:
Haig, Laingen, PR 93, 4/13
List, Feb. 21
Release, timing of (Muskie), Feb. 28, 30
Release agreement: Carter, Feb. 1, 13;
Haig, Feb. G; Miller, Feb. 16;
Muskie, Feb. 1, 16
Algerian declarations, Feb. 1, 3,
Apr. 48
Statements of adherence
(Carter), Feb. 7
Undertakings of U.S. and Iran
re, Feb. 4
Algerian role: Carter, Feb. 1;
Muskie, Jan. 26, Feb. 29
Implementation: Department, Mar.
17; Stoessel, Apr. 30
Negotiation, terms, etc. (Muskie),
Feb. 18, 26, 30, PR 8, 1/9, PR 12A,
1/15
Transmittal to Congress (Depart-
ment), May 51
Rescue attempt (Reagan), Feb. 19
Seizure and detention, summary,
Jan. S37
Treatment (Muskie), Feb. 29
Welcoming ceremony (Reagan), Feb. 19,
20
Americans held following release of 52
hostages (Reagan), Mar. 12
As terrorist government: Haig, Feb. I;
NAC, Feb. 52
Assets in U.S., transfer of: Algerian
declaration, Feb. 2; Carter, Feb. 7, 13;
Civiletti, Feb. 18; Muskie, Feb. 16;
Stoessel, Apr. 31
Escrow agreement, Feb. 6
Technical arrangement, Feb. 14
Chronology of events, Jan. 28, Feb. 5, 9
Cooperation agreement (1959), termination,
May 76
Selection of Netherlands central bank by
the U.S. and Iran to manage security
account funds established by Algerian
Declaration, agreement with related
technical agreements, Nov. 92
Travel to (Department), Mar. 17
Treaties, agreements, etc., Jan. 39,
May 74, 76, Nov. 91
U.S. claims: Department, June 44; Muskie,
Feb. 30; Stoessel, Apr. 31
Background information, PR 294, 9/5
Claims Tribunal, appointment of
additional members, PR 186, 6/9
U.S. suspension of litigation (Reagan),
Apr. 32
U.S. relations: Haig, Feb. G, I, June 25, 31;
Reagan, Mar. 12
Retaliation after release of hostages,
question of: Haig, Feb. G, K;
Reagan, Mar. 13
Iran-Iraq conflict: June 55, Constable,
June 43; Haig, Feb. C, D; July 17, Oct. 6;
Hinton, Feb. 48; Holbrooke, Jan. 15;
Hormats, July 32; Morse, May 35;
Muskie, Feb. 19, 31; NAC, Feb. 51;
Twinam, Nov. 64
Iraq:
Nuclear power facility, Israeli attack. See
under Israel
Nuclear weapon capability, question of
(Bush), Aug. 27
Treaties, agreements, etc., May 74, 75,
July 58, Oct. 82, Nov. 91, Dec. 75
Ireland:
Treaties, agreements, etc., Jan. 38,
Mar. 33, May 73, 74, July 58, Aug. 88,
Nov. 91
U.S. relations (Eagleburger), Aug. 69, 70
Israel:
Attack on Iraqi nuclear facilities: Haig,
Nov. 78; Kirkpatrick, Aug. 84, 85;
Rostow, Aug. 62
Security Council resolution, Aug. 85
Violation of mutual defense assistance
agreement with U.S., question of:
Department, Aug. 79; Haig, Aug.
53, 79; Reagan, Aug. 23, 80
(quoted), 84 (quoted); Stoessel, Aug.
79
Cash transfer assistance, bilateral agree-
ment, Sept. 76
Internal affairs (Haig), Sept. 29
Oil agreement with U.S., signature:
Carter, Jan. 24; Department Fact
Sheet, Jan. 27; Modai, Jan. 24; text,
Jan. 25, 26
Security, U.S. commitment: Oct. 55;
Buckley, Oct. 52; Haig, June 16, Sept.
14, 31, Oct. 15, Nov. 61, Dec. 27, 65;
Kirkpatrick, Aug. 84, 85; Shamir, PR
62, 3/11; Twinam, Nov. 64, 65
Strategic cooperation, memorandum of
understanding with U.S. (Haig), Nov.
75, 76, 77, 78, PR 405, 11/30
Treaties, agreements, etc., Feb. 70,
Mar. 35, May 74, June 61, Sept. 76,
Nov. 91, Dec. 75, 76
U.S. arms sales to Saudi Arabia, position
on: Begin, June 18; Buckley, Oct. 52;
Haig, June 18, 30, Oct. 15, 17, Nov.
18, 74, 76, Dec. 64; Shamir, PR 62,
3/11
U.S. claims, settlement (U.S.S. Liberty):
Apr. 48; Department, Feb. 55
U.S. economic assistance:
Appropriations request FY 1982
(Buckley), June 51
Economic and political stability of Israel,
additional grant funds, first amend-
ment to agreement with U.S., June
61
U.S. F-16s, suspension: Haig, Aug. 3, 7,
53, 80, 81, Sept. 22, 23, 26, 27, 29, 32,
59; Stoessel, Aug. 79
Lifting of (Haig), Oct. 23, 61
U.S. grant, bilateral agreement, Mar. 35
U.S. relations (Haig), Sept. 30, 31,
Nov. 74, 78
Begin influence on U.S. policy, question
of (Haig), Sept. 23
U.S. security assistance FY 1982: Buckley,
May 64; Constable, June 45; Haig,
Apr. B; PR 124, 4/28
14
Department of State Bulletin
trael (Cont'd)
U.S. visit of Prime Minister Begin: Begin,
Nov. 72, 73; Reagan, Nov. 71, 73 Pro-
gram, PR 293, 9/4
Visit of Secretary Haig:
Question and answer session: Haig,
June 16, PR 101, 4/16; Shamir,
June 15
Statements after meeting (Begin, Haig),
PR 99, 4/16
Toasts (Haig, Shamir), PR 100, 4/16
taly (Eagleburger), Aug. 71
Treaties, agreements, etc., Feb. 70, Mar.
33, May 73, June 60, July 57, 58, Aug.
90, Nov. 91, 92, Dec. 76, 77
U.S. Ambassador (Rabb), swearing in, PR
204, 6/24
Visit of Secretary Haig (Haig), June 19
Remarks following meeting with Prime
Minister Forlani and Foreign
Minister Colombo, PR 136, 5/5
to, Masayoshi, May 29
vory Coast, treaties, agreements, etc., Apr.
47, May 74, 75, July 58, Nov. 91, Dec. 76
lackson, Andrew, Jan. S10 (quoted)
'lackson, Henry M., Jan. S35
lagielski, Miechzyslaw, May 41
'amaica:
Economic pilot program (Haig), Aug. 6,
Sept. 33
U.S. Business Committee on Jamaica:
Haig (remarks to), PR 219, 7/16;
McPherson, Dec. 60
Profile, Mar. 30
Seaga regime, U.S. support (Haig),
July 18
Treaties, agreements, etc., Jan. 38, May
74, 76, Sept. 75, 76, Nov. 91, 92
U.S. economic and security assistance,
proposed (Bushnell), May 71
U.S. visit of Prime Minister Seaga:
Reagan, Mar. 29; Seaga, Mar. 29
Program, PR 20, 1/27
Japan (ANZUS), Aug. 46
Automobile exports to U.S.: June 3; Haig,
May 30, June 6; Hinton, June 38;
Holbrooke, Jan. 15; Ito, May 30;
Reagan, Apr. 12
California agricultural products, import re-
strictions on, Oct. 50
Defense spending: Eagleburger, Aug. 74;
Holbrooke, Jan. 16
Economic policies (Hormats), July 26
Internal politics (Haig), July 11
Profile, June 2
Trading practices: Hormats, Dec. 47;
Rashish, Nov. 23; Reagan, Aug. 22
Treaties, agreements, etc., Jan. 37, 38, 39,
40 Feb. 70, Mar. 33, 35, Apr. 48, May
73, 74, 76, July 58, Aug. 88, 89, 90,
Sept. 74, 75, 76, Oct. 83, Nov. 91, Dec.
77
U.S.-Japan Cooperative Program on the
Development and Utilization of
Natural Resources (UJNR), 10th con-
ference, PR 366, 11/2
Japan (Cont'd)
U.S. relations: Holbrooke, Jan. 14, Dec. 38;
Stoessel, June 34
U.S. visit of Foreign Minister Ito: Haig,
Ito, May 29
U.S. visit of Prime Minister Suzuki: Haig,
PR 141, 5/8; Reagan, Suzuki, June 1,
4; text of joint communique, June 2,
Program, PR 131, 5/1
World relations and role (Holdridge), Dec.
38
Javits, Jacob K., appointment as Special Ad-
viser to the Secretary, PR 182, 6/3
Jay, John, Jan. S3, S4, S43
Jefferson, Thomas, Jan. S4, S5, S8, S43, S50
Johnson, Lyndon B., Jan. S34, S35, Sept. 6
Johnston, Ernest B., Jr., Feb. 44, July 28,
29, Oct. 49
Jordan:
Treaties, agreements, etc., Mar. 34, May
74, Sept. 75, Nov. 91
U.S. economic and security assistance FY
1982: Constable, June 45; Draper, May
48
U.S. visit of King Hussein, program, PR
361, 10/29
Visit of Secretary Haig (Haig), June 18
Remarks to U.S. Embassy staff, PR 103,
4/22
Judicial matters:
Criminal matters, mutual assistance treaty
with U.S., Netherlands, Aug. 90
Foreign public documents, abolition of re-
quirement of legalization, convention
with annex (1961), U.S., Feb. 70, Nov.
90
International Systems and Controls Cor-
poration and ITT matters, mutual
assistance in the administration of
justice, bilateral agreement with
Algeria, Mar. 34
Lockheed Aircraft Corporation and
McDonnell Douglas Corporation mat-
ters, mutual assistance in the ad-
ministration of justice, bilateral agree-
ment with Turkey, Nov. 92
Penal judgments, enforcement of, bilateral
agreement with Turkey, Feb. 71, Mar.
35
Service abroad of judicial and extraju-
dicial documents in civil or commercial
matters, convention (1965), accession,
Seychelles, Mar. 33
Taking of evidence, bilateral agreement
with Federal Republic of Germany,
Jan. 40
Taking of evidence abroad in civil and com-
mercial matters, convention (1970):
Barbados, June 60; extension to
Cayman Islands, Jan. 37; Netherlands,
July 57
K
Kalb, Bernard, Dec. 63
Kalb, Marvin, Feb. 26, May 4, 9, June 26,
Dec. 63
Kampelman, Max M., Apr. 29, Sept. 37
Kampuchea (see also Refugees): ANZUS,
Aug. 46; Rashish, Nov. 23; Romulo, Aug.
43; Talboys, Aug. 48, 49
Ad Hoc Committee of the international
conference, establishment, Aug. 87
Human rights violations in (see also Chem-
ical weapons): Stoessel, Sept. 43
Treaties, agreements, etc., Jan. 37, 39
U.N. international conferences: June 2, 54,
Aug. 15; Haig, Aug. 17, 37, 40, 43, 44,
49, 86, Sept. 12, 27, Oct. 6; Holdridge,
Dec. 41; Reagan, Dec. 43;
Rithauddeen, Aug. 44; Talboys, Aug.
47
Declaration, Resolution, Aug. 87
Vietnamese occupation and Soviet support:
Eagleburger, Aug. 75; Haig, Aug. 37,
39, 40, 86, Nov. 45; Holdridge, Oct.
36, Dec. 41; Stoessel, June 35; Street,
Aug. 48
Kasson, John A., Nov. 1,3, 10
Katz, Abraham, swearing in as U.S. Perma-
nent Representative to OECD, PR 296,
9/8
Keim, DeB. Randolph, Jan. S16
Kellogg, Frank B., Jan. S27, S48
Kennan, George F., Jan. S31
Kennedy, John F., Aug. 34 (quoted), Sept. 5
Kennedy, Richard T., Sept. 65
Under Secretary of State for Management,
swearing in, PR 167, 5/29
Kenya:
Treaties, agreements, etc., Apr. 48, May
74, July 58, Aug. 90, Sept. 75, Nov. 91
U.S. economic and security assistance, pro-
posed (Walker), May 18, 19
Kiribati:
International civil aviation convention,
accession, June 60
U.S. security assistance, proposed
(Armacost), May 29
Kirkpatrick, Jeane J., June 58, Aug. 84, 85;
Haig, Aug. 50, 54
Biographical details, Oct. 3
U.S. Permanent Representative to the
United Nations, swearing in, PR 166,
5/29
Kissinger, Henry A., Jan. S35, S36, S39,
S49, S51, June 22 (quoted): Haig, Nov. 20
Knight, Frances G., Jan. Sll
Knox, Philander C, Jan. S21, S47
Kopp, Harry, June 39
Koppel, Ted, Sept. 29
Korea, Democratic People's Republic of:
Missile firing at U.S. reconnaissance air-
craft: Department, Oct. 39; Haig, Oct.
20, 22
Treaties, agreements, etc., Jan. 36, May
74, Oct. 82, Nov. 91, Dec. 75, 76
U.S. trade controls (Rashish), Nov. 23
Korea, Republic of: ANZUS, Aug. 46; Haig,
Oct. 6; Holdridge, Dec. 38; Rashish, Oct.
48
Textile agreement with U.S., amendment,
PR 117, 4/22, PR 120, 4/22, PR 353,
10/21, PR 414, 12/7
Treaties, agreements, etc., Jan. 38, Feb.
70, Mar. 34, Apr. 47, May 74, July 58,
59, Aug. 89, 90, Sept. 74, 75, Nov. 91
U.S. Ambassador (Walker), swearing in,
PR 250, 7/24
Index 1981
15
Korea, Republic of (Cont'd)
U.S. ground force levels (Haig), Sept. 17
U.S. relations: Haig, May 6; Rashish, Oct.
46; Stoessel, June 34
U.S. security assistance, proposed:
Armacost, May 27; Haig, Apr. B
U.S. visit of President Chun: Mar. 14;
Haig, Feb. J
Program, PR 27, 1/30
Kristol, Irving (quoted), July 51, 53
Kusumaatmadja, Mochtar, Aug. 43, 44
Kuwait, treaties, agreements, etc., Mar. 34,
May 74, 76, July 58, Aug. 90, Nov. 91,
Dec. 75
Labor:
Adjustment assistance (Hinton), June 38
International Labor Organization:
Consititution (1946), amendments:
Botswana, Cape Verde, Comoros,
Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea,
Grenada, Lesotho, Saint Lucia, Viet-
nam, Zimbabwe, May 73
Convention No. 53 and 55, ratification,
Djibouti, May 74
Convention No. 58 re minimum age of
children to employ at sea, ratifica-
tion, Seychelles, May 74
Convention No. 74 re certification of able
seamen, ratification, Guinea-Bissau,
May 74
International migration, chart, July N
Mexican in-bond industry program, effect
(Briggs), July 6
Lacy, William, swearing in as Ambassador to
Liberia, PR 251, 7/27
Lafayette, Marquis de (quoted), Dec. 18
Laingen, L. Bruce, Jan. S41, Feb. 20
Acceptance of award to returned hostages
PR 93, 4/13
Laise, Carol C, Jan. S38
Languages, world, Oct. 9, 10, 11
Lansing, Robert, Jan. S25, S48
Laos (see also Refugees): Holdridge, Dec. 42
Treaties, agreements, etc., Apr 47 Nov
91
Latin America (see also Organization of
American States and names of individual
countries):
Caribbean and Central America: Bushnell
Apr. 40; Enders, Nov. 88; Johnston, '
Feb. 45; McPherson, Dec. 60; Reagan
Mar. 13
Caribbean Basin Development Plan: Sept.
68; Brock, Sept. 69; Enders, Sept 69-
Haig, July 11, Aug. 5, 6, 7, Sept. 11
18, 20, 34, 68, Oct. 4, 13, PR 219 7/6
PR 371, 11/15; Hormats, Nov. 31;'
Rashish, Nov. 27, Dec. 46; Reagan
Aug. 23, Dec. 15, 16
Caribbean Trade, Investment, and Develop-
ment, Miami Conference, program PR
376, 11/9
Cuban-Soviet influence (see also Cuba,
El Salvador and Nicaragua): Haig Oct
21, PR 380, 11/16
Latin America (Cont'd)
Tlatelolco treaty (nuclear free zone), Pro-
tocol I: Carter, Jan. 33; Reagan, Sept.
60; Rostow, Dec. 33, 71
U.S. arms transfer policy: Burt, Dec. 73;
Enders, Dec. 72
U.S. economic and security assistance, FY
1982: Bushnell, May 69; Haig, Apr B
PR 68, 3/18; McPherson, May 48
U.S. policy, interests, and role: Buckley,
Sept. 62; Haig, Apr. 15, May 12;
Johnston, Feb. 44
Latin American Economic Associations,
June E
Law of the Sea Treaty, negotiations: Aldrich
Feb. 56; ANZUS, Aug. 46; Calingaert,
Apr. 25; Malone, July 50
Review of U.S. policy (Malone), July 48
League of Arab States, June L
League of Nations, June B, Oct. 7
Lebanon:
Ceasefire: Habib, Oct. 62; Haig, Aug. 81
82, Sept. 30, 58, Oct. 6, Nov. 74;
Sadat, Sept. 53; Security Council
resolution 490, text, Oct. 71
Habib mission: Bush, Aug. 27; Haig,
July 10, 15, 17, Aug. 6, 18, 19, Sept.
23, 32, 58, Oct. 14, 16, Nov. 60, Dec
26, PR 311, 9/17; White House, Aug
82
Report to the President (Habib), Oct. 62
Israeli bombing of Beirut (Haig), Sept. 22,
28, 30, 59, Nov. 78
Libyan militarism in: Crocker, Oct. 28;
Haig, Nov. 18
Saudi peace role (Haig), Dec. 26, 28, 31
Situation in: Aug. 14; Haig, June 30, Aug.
18, Sept. 55, Nov. 18, PR 101, 4/16
PR 136, 5/5; Reagan, Aug. 24;
Thatcher, Aug. 13
Syrian missiles, presence of (Haig), July 21
Treaties, agreements, etc., May 74, 76,
July 57, 59, Nov. 91
U.N. peacekeeping force, question of
(Haig), June 22, Sept. 14, 56, Oct. 16
U.S. economic and security assistance FY
1982: Constable, June 45; Draper Mav
48 J
U.S. position (Haig), May 54, June 17, 18
July 12
Lee, Arthur, Jan. Sll
Lefever, Ernest W. (Haig), July 10, 23
Lehrer, Jim, Feb. 29
Lesotho, treaties, agreements, etc., Jan. 38
May 74, July 58, Sept. 75, Nov. 90, 91,
Dec. 76
Less developed countries. See Developing
countries
Lester, C. Edwards (quoted), Jan. S12
Liberators of Nazi Concentration Camps,
First International Conference announce-
ment, PR 321, 9/22
Liberia:
Treaties, agreements, etc., Jan. 37, Feb.
70, Mar. 33, 35, Apr. 47, May 74, June
60, Aug. 90, Nov. 91, 92, Dec. 77
Liberia (Cont'd)
U.S. Ambassador (Lacy), swearing in PR
251, 7/27
U.S. economic and security assistance, pre
posed: Buckley, June 51: Department,
May 20; Walker, May 18, 19, 21
Libya:
Air attack on U.S. planes: Department
Oct. 58, 60; Haig, Oct. 15, 19, 22, 61;
Weinberger, Oct. 57
German supply of rockets, question of
(Begin), June 17
People's Bureau closure, U.S. request,
and U.S. travel advisory (Department)
July 45
Qadhafi militarism: Buckley, Sept. 62;
Crocker, Oct. 24, 28, Department,
Aug. 56; Haig, July 17, 22, Oct. 13, 14
16, Nov. 18, 68, 70; Dec. 28, 65;
Reagan, Apr. 8
Treaties, agreements, etc., Apr. 47, May
74, Aug. 89, Oct. 82, Nov. 91, Dec. 76
U.S. relations: Haig, Oct. 62, PR 380,
11/16; Weinberger, Oct. 60
Liechtenstein, treaties, agreements, etc.,
May 73, 74, Aug. 88, Sept. 74, Nov. 91
Lijek, Cora A. and Mark J., Feb. 21
Lincoln, Abraham (quoted), July 9, Nov. 46
Linneman, Joseph H., May 55
Lippmann, Walter (quoted), Dec. 10
Livingston, Edward, Jan. S2, S9, S13, S44
Livingston, Robert R., Jan. S2, S7, S43
Load lines, international convention (1966),
accession, Guinea, Apr. 46
Amendments (1971): Australia, Feb 70;
Belgium, June 60; China, Seychelles,
Jan. 37
Amendments (1975): Australia, Feb. 70;
China, Jan. 37; Federal Republic of
Germany, Hungary, Aug. 88; New
Zealand, May 74; Romania, Aug. 88;
Seychelles, Jan. 37; Soviet Union, Apr.
47
Amendments (1979): Bahamas, Aug. 88;
China, Denmark, France, Jan. 37;
Federal Republic of Germany,
Madagascar, Aug. 88; Morocco, Sey-
chelles, U.K., Jan. 37
Lopez, James M., (Reagan), Feb. 19
Lopez, Portillo y Pacheco, Jose, July 1, 2
Louis, John J., Jr., swearing in as Ambassa-
dor to United Kingdom, PR 171, 5/29
Lovell, James (quoted), Jan. S2
Lowden, Frank O., Jan. S22
Lowell, James Russell, Jan. S18
Luxembourg (Eagleburger), Aug. 70
Treaties, agreements, etc., Jan. 38, Mar.
33, May 74, July 57, 58, Oct. 82, Nov.
91, Dec. 75, 77
M
Macau, visa system covering textile exports
to U.S., agreement, PR 289, 8/28
MacGuigan, Mark, PR 65, 3/13
MacKierman, Douglass, Jan. S40
Maclean, John, May 9
II,!
II.
W
I,
I-
II
Hal
16
Department of State Bulletin
•
K
lacNeil, Robert, Feb. 29
' Madagascar:
Treaties, agreements, etc., May 74, Aug.
88, Nov. 91, 92, Dec. 75
U.S. Ambassador (Rondon), swearing in,
PR 424, 12/16
ladison, James, Jan. S3, S43
lalawi:
Treaties, agreements, etc., Mar. 35, May
73, 74, July 57, Oct. 83, Nov. 91
U.S. Ambassador (Burroughs), swearing in,
PR 158, 5/26
[alaysia:
Textile agreements with U.S., amend-
ments, Apr. 48, June 61, PR 4, 1/8, PR
35, 2/6, PR 119, 4/22, PR 270, 8/11
Treaties, agreements, etc., Apr. 46, May
74, June 60, July 57, Sept. 74, Nov.
91, Dec. 75
U.S. Ambassador (Palmer), swearing in,
PR 191, 6/12
U.S. economic and military assistance;
Armacost, May 28; Holdridge, Oct. 36
laldives, treaties, agreements, etc., Jan. 36,
Apr. 47, May 73, June 60, July 58
Hali:
Treaties, agreements, etc., May 74, Aug.
88, Oct. 82, Nov. 91
U.S. Ambassador (Borg), swearing in, PR
265, 8/6
lalone, James L., July 48
Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans
and International Environmental and
Scientific Affairs, swearing in, PR 174,
6/1
ilalta:
Neutrality of (Haig), Nov. 51
Treaties, agreements, etc., May 73, Sept.
75, Nov. 91, Dec. 76
vlarcy, William L., Jan. S6, S10, S45
Vlarine pollution. See Environmental prob-
lems and control and Oil pollution
Maritime boundary treaties:
Current actions: New Zealand, Apr. 48;
Venezuela, Feb. 71, Mar. 35
Gulf of Maine boundary dispute settlement
treaty, U.S. -Canada:
Entry into force, PR 394, 11/19
Ratification: July 59, Aug. 89;
Eagleburger, Dec. 34; Feldman, May
22, Reagan, June 32; Ridgway, May
21
Maritime matters:
Assistance and salvage at sea, unification
of certain rules, convention (1910), cur-
rent actions, Papua New Guinea, Mar.
33
Carriage of goods by sea, convention
(1978), accession, Morocco, Aug. 89
Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative
Organization convention (1948): Costa
Rica, June 60; El Salvador, Apr. 47;
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines,
Aug. 88
Amendments (1974), acceptance, El
Salvador, July 57
Amendments (1975): El Salvador, Apr.
47; Greece, Nov. 90; Malaysia, Dec.
75; Mexico, Feb. 70; Oman, Aug. 88;
Pakistan, Apr. 47; Saint Vincent and
the Grenadines, July 57; Spain, June
60; Switzerland, Aug. 88; Thailand,
May 74; Uruguay, Feb. 70
Maritime matters (Cont'd)
Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative
Organization convention (Cont'd)
Amendments (1977): Argentina, Aug. 88;
Egypt, Jan. 37; El Salvador, Apr.
47; Greece, Oct. 81; Oman, Aug. 88;
Netherlands, Sept. 74; Pakistan,
Apr. 47; Panama, Mar. 33; Saint
Vincent and the Grenadines, July 57;
Spain, June 60; Switzerland, Aug. 88
Amendments (1979): Australia, Jan 37;
Belgium, Mar. 33; Bulgaria, Jan. 37;
Chile, May 74; China, Oct. 81;
Greece, Oct. 81; Liberia, Mar. 33;
Malaysia, June 60; Netherlands,
Sept. 74; New Zealand, Feb. 70;
Norway, Oct. 81; Poland, Feb. 70;
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines,
July 57; Spain, June 60; Soviet
Union, Apr. 47; Sri Lanka, May 74;
Sweden, Feb. 70; Switzerland, Aug.
88; U.S., Oct. 81, Nov. 90
International maritime traffic, facilitation
of, convention (1965): Guinea, May 74;
Senegal, Jan. 37
Amendment of article VII (1973), accept-
ance, Hungary, May 74
International waterborne transportation,
facilitation of, Inter-American conven-
tion (1963), accession, Guatemala, Mar.
33
Jurisdiction over vessels utilizing Louisiana
Offshore Oil Port, bilateral agreement
with Panama, Jan. 40
Marine transportation technology, bilateral
agreement with Canada, Sept. 76
Maritime search and rescue, international
convention (1979), with annex, signa-
ture, China, Jan. 37
Maritime transport, bilateral agreement
with Bulgaria, Apr. 48
Ocean carriage of government controlled
cargoes, equal access, extension of
bilateral agreement with Brazil, Jan.
39
Standards of training, certification, and
watchkeeping for seafarers, convention
(1978): Denmark (with reservation and
statement), Apr. 47; Egypt, Jan. 37;
Liberia, Apr. 47; Spain, Jan. 37;
Sweden, U.K. (with reservation), Apr.
47
Tonnage measurements of ships, conven-
tion (1969): France (with reservation),
Feb. 70; Guinea, Hong Kong (exten-
sion to), Apr. 47
Marshall, George C, Jan. S29, S31, S48
Marshall, Harry R., Jr., Nov. 79
Marshall, John, Jan. S43
Matlock, Jack F., Jr., swearing in as Ambas-
sador to Czechoslovakia, PR 387, 11/17
Mauritania (Draper), June 47
Treaties, agreements, etc., May 74, 75,
Aug. 89, Sept. 75, Nov. 91
Mauritius:
Textile agreement with U.S., PR 395,
11/19
Treaties, agreements, etc., Jan. 38, May
73, 74, July 58, Aug. 89, 90, Sept. 74,
Nov. 91, Dec. 76
U.S. economic aid, proposed (Walker),
May 19
McCall, Richard L., Feb. 60
McCarthy, John T., July 30
McCarthy, Joseph, Jan. S34
McFarlane, Robert Carl, swearing in as
Counselor of the Department of State,
PR 268, 8/11
McHenry, Donald F., Jan. 30
McKinley, William, Jan. S20
McLane, Louis, Jan. S10, S18, S44
McNamara, Francis T., swearing in as Am-
bassador to Gabon and Sao Tome and
Principe, PR 425, 12/15
McPherson, M. Peter, May 43, 45, Nov. 85,
Dec. 57
Mein, John Gordon, Jan. S39, S40
Meloy, Francis E., Jr., Jan. S40
Meteorology, World Meterology Organiza-
tion, convention (1947): St. Lucia, May
74; Zimbabwe, Mar. 33
Metrinko, Michael, Jan. S41
Mexico:
Drugs, efforts to control: Briggs, July 7;
Linneman, May 55, 57
Bilateral agreements, Jan. 40, Feb. 71,
Mar. 35, Apr. 48, July 59, Nov. 92
Fishing agreements with U.S., termination,
Mar. 31, 35
Minute 264 of the International Boundary
and Water Commission, Mar. 35
Profile, July 5
Textile agreement with U.S., amendment,
Feb. 71; text, PR 5, 1/8
Treaties, agreements, etc., Jan. 40, Feb.
70, Apr. 48, May 74, 75, June 60, 61,
July 57, 59, Aug. 90, Nov. 91
Undocumented aliens: Briggs, July 6;
Rashish, Nov. 27; Reagan, Sept. 44
U.S. Ambassador (Gavin), swearing in, PR
151, 5/19
U.S. -Mexico convention on recovery and
return of stolen vehicles and aircraft,
May 32, Apr. 48
U.S. relations: Briggs, July 4; Haig,
Dec. 25, PR 399, 11/24: Lopez Portillo,
July 1; Reagan, July 3
U.S. trade: Sept. N; Briggs, July 4;
Hormats, Nov. 31; Rashish, Nov. 24
U.S. visit of President Lopez Portillo,
July 1
Program, PR 184, 6/5
Middendorf, J. William, swearing in as Per-
manent Representative to OAS, PR 216,
7/1
Middle East (see also Asia: Southwest, Indian
Ocean-Persian Gulf and names of in-
dividual countries): Haig, Apr. 19, June 6,
Aug. 4, Dec. 64
Airbus sales (Kopp), June 39
Gulf Cooperation Council (Haig), Nov. 60,
62
Nuclear weapons free zone, proposed
(Rostow), Oct. 33, Dec. 71
Refugee and migration assistance FY 1982
and FY 1983 (Smyser), May 59
Visit of Secretary Haig: Constable, June
44; Haig, Apr. 20, May 13, 14, June
14, 21, PR 64, 3/12, PR 99, 4/16, PR
100, 4/16, PR 101, 4/16
Military assistance. See security assistance
Military personnel:
Exchange of personnel between U.S. Army
Western Command and Singapore,
memorandum of understanding with
Singapore, May 76
Index 1981
17
Military personnel (Cont'd)
Privileges and immunities of U.S. military
and related personnel in Egypt,
bilateral agreements, Feb. 71, Nov. 91
Miller, David Charles, Jr., swearing in as
Ambassador to Tanzania, PR 396, 11/23
Miller, William, Feb. 16
Mitterrand, Francois, Aug. 11
Modia, Yitzhak, Jan. 24
Monaco, treaties, agreements, etc., May 74,
Nov. 91
Mongolia, treaties, agreements, etc., Feb.
70, May 74, Oct. 82, Nov. 91
Monroe, Bill, Feb. 26, May 4, Dec. 63
Monroe, James, Jan. S5, S7, S44
Montgomery, Hugh, appointment as Director
of the Bureau of Intelligence and
Research, PR 350, 10/19
Montserrat, Peace Corps program, bilateral
agreement, May 76
Moore, George Curtis, Jan. S40
Moose, Richard M., Jan. 8
Morgenthau, Henry, Jr., Jan. S29
Morocco:
Treaties, agreements, etc., Jan. 37, 40,
Apr. 46, 48, May 74, 75, July 58, Aug.
89, 90, Sept. 75, 76, Oct. 83, Nov. 91,
Dec. 77
U.S. arms sales: Draper, June 46;
Saunders, Feb. 56
Morris, Gouverneur, Jan. S5
Morse, Edward L., May 33, 34
Motley, Langhorne A., swearing in as Am-
bassador to Brazil, PR 385, 11/17
Mozambique, treaties, agreements, etc.,
May 74, 76, June 60, Nov. 91
Mubarak, Hosni: PR 346, 10/14; Haig,
Dec. 27, 63
Multinational corporations:
Codes of conduct, U.S. position (Hormats),
Nov. 32
Illicit payments agreement, need for
(Johnston), July 29
Muskie, Edmund S., Jan. S36, S49
Addresses, remarks, and statements:
Africa, Jan. 1
American hostages in Iran:
Negotiations for release, Jan. 26, Feb.
18, 26, 28, 29, 30, PR 8, 1/9, PR
12A, 1/15
Release, agreement on, Feb. 1,16
Arab-Israeli conflict, PR 12A, 1/15
Foreign policy, Feb. 24
Future plans, PR 12A, 1/15
Government and role of Democratic
Party, PR 10, 1/14, PR 11, 1/15
Latin America, Jan. 34
Michael P. Hammer, remarks at funeral
service for, PR 9, 1/9
Poland, Feb. 28, 31, PR 12A, 1/15
Refugees, Jan. 3, 5
Question and answer session, PR 12A,
1/15
Television interview, Feb. 26, 29
N
Namibia: Apr. 29; Crocker, Aug. 55, Oct. 26;
Eagleburger, Aug. 75; Genscher, PR 64,
3/12; Haig, Apr. 19, May 6, 16, June 6,
July 19, Oct. 6, 19, Dec. 32; McCall, Feb.
61; Moose, Jan. 8, 10; Muskie, Jan. 2
Namibia (Cont'd)
Constitutional guarantees, need for: Bush,
Aug. 26; Haig, July 14, 22
Contact Group Communique, Oct. 70
Five-government statements, June 55,
Nov. 86
OAU resolution, U.S. response (Depart-
ment), Aug. 56
National Security Council, role: Haig, Feb.
H; Muskie, Feb. 32
Naturalization conventions, termination: Den-
mark, Jan. 39; Sweden, Jan. 40
Nauru, U.S. Ambassador (Nesen), swearing
in, PR 172, 5/29
Near and Middle East. See Asia: Southwest;
Indian Ocean-Persian Gulf; and Middle
East
Negroponte, John D., swearing in as Ambas-
sador to Honduras, PR 370, 11/5
Nepal:
Treaties, agreements, etc., May 74, Nov.
90,91
U.S. economic aid, appropriations request
(Coon), May 69
Nesen, Robert Dean, swearing in as Ambas-
sador to Australia and Nauru, PR 172,
5/29
Netherlands (Eagleburger), Aug. 70
Selection of Netherlands central bank by
the U.S. and Iran for security account
established by Algerian Declaration,
agreement with Netherlands, Nov. 92
Treaties, agreements, etc., Jan. 37, 38,
Feb. 70, Mar. 33, 35, Apr. 46, 47, May
73, 74, 75, 76, July 57, 58, Aug. 88,
90, Sept. 74, 75, Nov. 91, 92, Dec. 76
U.S. visit of Prime Minister van Agt: Bush,
June 41; program, PR 84, 3/30
U.S. visit of Queen Beatrix, proposed:
Bush, June 41; van Agt, June 42
Netherlands Antilles, signature of Universal
Postal Union general regulations, May 74
Neumann, Robert Gerhard, swearing in as
Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, PR 248,
7/23
Newsom, David D., Jan. S34 (quoted), Jan.
S37
New Zealand:
Internal affairs (Haig), Aug. 50
Treaties, agreements, etc., Jan. 39, Feb.
70, 71, Mar. 34, Apr. 48, May 73, 74,
Aug. 88, Nov. 91, 92, Dec. 76
Visit of Secretary Haig (Haig), Aug. 44
Nicaragua: Carter, Jan. 33; Enders, Sept. 72;
Haig, July 10, Dec. 28, PR 418, 12/4
Cuban and Soviet influence: Buckley, Sept.
62; Bushnell, Apr. 40; Department,
Mar. 4; Haig, June 10, 20, July 19, 20,
Sept. 15, PR 417, 12/8
Treaties, agreements, etc., Jan. 40, May
73, 74, Nov. 90, 91, Dec. 77
U.S. economic aid (Haig), Apr. 21, June 21
Reconstruction program loan, bilateral
agreement, Jan. 40
Suspensions: Bushnell, Apr. 40; Depart-
ment, May 71; Haig, June 21
Niger, treaties, agreements, etc., May 74,
June 61, Sept. 74, Oct. 81, Nov. 91
Nigeria (Haig), May 16
Treaties, agreements, etc., Jan. 39, 40,
Feb. 70, Apr. 48, May 74, Sept. 74, 75,
Oct. 81, 82, Nov. 91, 92, Dec. 75, 76
U.S. Ambassador (Pickering), swearing in,
PR 355, 10/27
Nitze, Paul, (Haig), Nov. 20
Niue, accession to South Pacific Commission
agreement, Feb. 70
Nixon, Richard M.: Jan. S35, S51, Haig, July
16
Trips abroad, list, Sept. 6
Noel, Cleo A., Jr., Jan. S40
Nokes, Greg, May 9
Nonaligned countries: July 45; NAC, July 40;
Rithauddeen, Aug. 44
Atlas, June J
North, Jerrold Martin, swearing in as Ambas-
sador to Djibouti, PR 389, 11/17
North Atlantic Council:
Defense Ministers ministerial session,
Brussels (May 12-13), final communi-
que, July 42
Ministerial meeting, Brussels (Dec. 11-12,
1980) and declaration, Feb. 51; final
communique, Feb. 50; minutes ex-
tracts, Feb. 52
Ministerial meeting, Rome (May 4-5):
Haig, July 37
Agenda, question of (Haig), PR 136, 5/5
Declaration on Terrorism, text, July 41
Final communique, July 39
Minutes extract (May 5), July 41
North Atlantic Treaty Organization: Buckley,
Sept. 62; Bush, June 41; Eagleburger,
Aug. 65; Haig, Feb. K, Apr. 17, June tl,
July 10, Aug. 21, 33, Sept. 17, 27, 29,
Nov. 45, 51; Reagan, Apr. 26, 27, Dec.
10; Stoessel, Dec. 52; Weinberger, July
46
Atlas, May 40, June H
British position (Bush), Aug. 25, 28
Civil emergency planning (NAC), July 41
Cooperation on defense and economy in
accordance with articles II and III of
the North Atlantic Treaty, bilateral
agreement with Turkey, Feb. 71
Cost-effectiveness (Haig), Apr. 19, July 21,
Aug. 4, Nov. 47
EURO-NATO Joint Jet Pilot Training
(ENJJPT) Program, memorandum of
understanding (1980): Belgium,
Canada, Denmark, Federal Republic of
Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands,
Norway, Portugal, Turkey, U.K., U.S.,
Mar. 33
Nuclear Planning Group, 30th ministerial
meeting, Gleneagles, (Oct. 20-21,
1981), final communique, Dec. 55
Officials of NATO civilian bodies located in
U.S., status of, application of part IV
of 1951 agreement, June 61
Out-of-area deployment of forces, pro-
posed: Haig, Apr. 19; NATO, July 42
Poland, position on: Haig, Nov. 19; NAC,
July 39; White House, May 42
Prepositioned war readiness materials,
storage by U.S. forces, bilateral agree-
ment with Netherlands, May 76, Nov.
92
Prestockage and reinforcement, bilateral
agreement with Norway, Mar. 35
Spain, question of membership (Haig),
May 8, June 20, 21, PR 404, 11/27
Status of NATO, national representatives,
and international staff to NATO
civilian bodies in U.S., application of
part IV, agreement (1981), June 61
18
Department of State Bulletin
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Cont'd)
Theater nuclear forces modernization:
Apr. 28, Nov. 54, Burt, Nov. 56;
IEagleburger, Aug. 67; Genscher, PR
64, 3/12; Haig, June 6, 31, July 11, 37,
39, Aug. 6, Nov. 46, 50, Dec. 23, 24,
30, PR 64, 3/12, PR 398, 11/24; PR
404, 11/27, PR 408, 12/1; NAC, Feb.
51, July 41; NATO, Dec. 55; Reagan,
Dec. 11; Stoessel, Dec. 53, 54;
Weinberger, July 46
Belgium, Netherlands, question of
cooperation in deployment (Haig),
Sept. 25, 27
Rights, privileges, and immunities of
delegation, bilateral agreement with
Switzerland, Feb. 71
Trade relations with Soviet Union and
Eastern Europe (Rashish), Nov. 23
Norway (Eagleburger), Aug. 70
Fisheries agreement with U.S., signature,
PR 21, 1/27
Treaties, agreements, etc., Jan. 38, 39,
Feb. 70, Mar. 33, 34, 35, Apr. 47, 48,
May 73, 74, 75, June 60, 61, July 58,
Aug. 89, 90, Sept. 74, Oct. 82, 83,
Nov. 91, Dec. 76
Notices of meetings:
Advisory Committee on Historical Diplo-
matic Documentation, PR 344, 10/13
Advisory Committee on International Intel-
lectual Property, International In-
dustrial Property Panel, PR 73, 3/26
Advisory Committee on International In-
vestment, Technology, and Develop-
ment, PR 23, 1/28, PR 161, 5/27, PR
373, 11/5
Working group on accounting standards,
PR 429, 12/22
Working group on international data
flows, PR 95, 4/14, PR 160, 5/27, PR
255, 7/28
Working group on preparations for the
U.N. Conference on New and Re-
newable Sources of Energy, PR 81,
3/26, PR 195, 6/16, PR 304, 9/14
Working group on restrictive business
practices, PR 303, 9/14
Working group on transborder data
flows, PR 213, 6/30, PR 351, 10/19,
PR 428, 12/22
Working group on treatment of invest-
ment and special investment prob-
lems, PR 337, 10/5
Working group on UN/OECD investment
undertakings, PR 61, 3/6
Advisory Committee on Law of the Sea,
PR 42, 2/10, PR 147, 5/14, PR 214,
6/30, PR 343, 10/13
Advisory Committee on Oceans and Inter-
national Environmental and Scientific
Affairs, PR 134, 5/5, PR 438, 12/30
Antarctic section, PR 153, 5/22
Advisory Committee to the United States
National Section of the International
Commission for Conservation of Atlan-
tic Tunas, PR 316, 9/17, PR 439, 12/30
Advisory Committee to the United States
Section, International North Pacific
Fisheries Commission, PR 297, 9/9
Fine Arts Committee, PR 49, 2/19
Notices of meetings (Cont'd)
Overseas Schools Advisory Council, PR
149, 5/18, PR 358, 10/27
President's Commission of Hostage Com-
pensation, PR 212, 6/30, PR 225, 7/13,
PR 257, 7/29
Secretary of State's Advisory Committee
on Private International Law, PR 75,
3/26
International Business Transactions
Study Group, PR 143, 5/11
Shipping Coordinating Committee:
Committee on Ocean Dumping, PR 315,
9/17
National Committee for the Prevention
of Marine Pollution, PR 336, 10/5
Subcommittee on SOLAS, PR 125, 4/28,
PR 335, 10/5
Working group on bulk cargoes, PR
181, 6/3, PR 334, 10/5
Working group on bulk chemicals, PR
254, 7/28
Working group on carriage of danger-
ous goods, PR 16, 1/21, PR 135,
5/5, PR 157, 5/26, PR 302, 9/14
Working group on containers and car-
goes, PR 289, 8/17
Working group on fire protection, PR
48, 2/19
Working group on international multi-
model transport and containers, PR
156, 5/26
Working group on lifesaving appli-
ances, PR 78, 3/26, PR 133, 5/5
Working group on radiocommunication,
PR 43, 2/10, PR 44, 2/10, PR 60,
3/6, PR 76, 3/26, PR 116, 4/22, PR
185, 6/8, PR 288, 9/3, PR 357,
10/27, PR 374, 11/5, PR 427, 12/22
Working group on safety of fishing
vessels, PR 281, 8/17, PR 381,
11/16
Working group on ship design and
equipment, PR 275, 8/12
Working group on standards of train-
ing and watchkeeping, PR 282, 8/17
Working group on subdivision and
stability, panel on bulk cargoes, PR
52, 2/24, PR 77, 3/26, PR 94, 4/14,
PR 281, 8/17
Working group on subdivision, stabil-
ity, and load lines, PR 52, 2/24, PR
94, 4/14, PR 281, 8/17, PR 381,
11/16
Subcommittee on SOLAS and the Ton-
nage Subcommittee, PR 285, 8/24
U.S. National Committee for the Inter-
national Radio Consultative Commit-
tee (CCIR), PR 356, 10/27
Study group 1, PR 39, 2/10, PR 90,
4/8, PR 382, 11/16
Study group 2, PR 59, 3/6, PR 80, 3/26
Study group 4, PR 91, 4/8
Study group 5, PR 15, 1/21, PR 22,
1/28, PR 430, 12/22
Study group 6, PR 38, 2/10, PR 431,
12/22
Study group 7, PR 47, 2/19, PR 239,
7/16
Study group CMTT, PR 46, 2/19, PR
272, 8/12
Notices of meetings (Cont'd)
U.S. National Committee of the Inter-
national Telegraph and Telephone
Consultative Committee (CITT), PR
41, 2/10
Integrated services digital network
(ISDN) working party, PR 146,
5/14, PR 332, 10/5
Study group A, PR 40, 2/10, PR 115,
4/22, PR 194, 6/16, PR 236, 7/16,
PR 237, 8/12, PR 342, 10/13, PR
367, 11/12, PR 402, 11/27, PR 403,
11/27, PR 437, 12/30
Study group B, PR 224, 7/13, PR 305,
9/14, PR 367, 11/2, PR 402, 11/27,
PR 437, 12/30
Study group C, PR 79, 3/26
Study group D, PR 19, 1/26, PR 74,
3/26, PR 238, 7/16, PR 333, 10/5
Modern working party, PR 126,
4/28, PR 237, 7/16
Novak, Michael (quoted), Apr. 45
Nuclear energy (Reagan), Aug. 20
Cooperation:
Bilateral agreements: Australia, Colom-
bia, Mar. 34; Federal Republic of
Germany, Aug. 89; Indonesia, Jan.
40; Italy, Mexico, Morocco, U.K.,
Aug. 90; Venezuela, July 59
Egypt: May 54, Aug. 89; Department,
Sept. 59; Marshall, Nov. 79
EURATOM (Reagan), Apr. 33
IAEA safeguards (Reagan), Sept. 60
Agreement (1968), between IAEA,
Turkey, and U.S., protocol (1981),
signatures, Sept. 74
Application in U.S., Feb. 71, Mar. 35,
Apr. 46
Nuclear safety, technical exchange and
cooperative arrangements with
Sweden, June 62
Physical protection of nuclear material,
convention (1979): Brazil, Sept. 74;
Bulgaria (with reservation), Oct. 82;
Canada, Jan. 37; German Democratic
Republic, May 74; Finland, Oct. 82;
Morocco, Poland, Jan. 37; Romania
(with reservation and declaration),
Apr. 47; South Africa, Sept. 74;
Sweden, Jan. 39; U.S., Oct. 82, Nov.
90
Radiation damage in fusions materials,
research and development program,
implementing agreement: Canada,
EAEC, Japan, Switzerland, U.S., May
73
Radioactive waste management, technical
exchange and cooperation, bilateral
agreements: Belgium, May 75; Federal
Republic of Csrmany, Apr. 48
Reprocessing, June 2-3
Special nuclear material of U.S. origin,
bilateral agreement with Japan, May
76, Sept. 76
Transfer of a research reactor and en-
riched uranium to Malaysia, agreement
(1980), amendment (1981): Oct. 81;
IAEA, Malaysia, U.S., Sept. 74
U.S. export policy (Reagan), Sept. 60
Index 1981
19
Nuclear energy (Cont'd)
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission:
Provision of experts, bilateral agreement
with IAEA, Dec. 77
U.S. loss of fluid test program (LOFT),
agreement (1981), July 57
Nuclear nonproliferation: ANZUS, Aug. 46;
Buckley, Nov. 84; Coon, June 54; Haig,
Aug. 4, 33; Kirkpatrick, Aug. 85; Muskie,
Jan 4; Reagan, Aug. 24, Sept. 60;
Rostow, Aug. 59, 64, Oct. 33, Dec. 71
Treaty (1968), Egypt, May 74
Nuclear test ban, comprehensive, proposed
(Rostow), Dec. 71
Nuclear test ban treaty (1963), succession,
Papua New Guinea, Apr. 47
Nuclear war, dangers of: Carter, Feb. 22;
Reagan, Aug. 24, Nov. 16, Dec. 56
Credible threat of nuclear war (Rostow),
Dec. 70
Nuclear weapons, Arab nations capability,
proposal of Iraqi President Hussein
(Haig), Aug. 53
0
Oceans, seabed disarmament treaty (1971):
Central African Republic, Sept. 75; Viet-
nam, Jan. 38
Oil pollution:
Civil liability for oil pollution damage, in-
ternational convention (1969): Finland,
Jan. 37; Kuwait, Maldives, July 58;
Nigeria, Singapore, Dec. 75
International fund for compensation for oil
pollution damage, international conven-
tion (1971): Finland, Jan. 37; Kuwait,
July 57; Maldives, June 60
Intervention on the high seas in cases of oil
pollution casualties, international con-
vention (1969): Ireland, Kuwait, July
57
Marine environment, cooperation re pollu-
tion by discharges of hydrocarbons and
other hazardous substances, bilateral
agreement with Mexico, June 61
Prevention of pollution of the sea by oil,
international convention (1954): Ber-
muda, extension to, Jan. 37; Guinea,
Apr. 47
Olney, Richard, Jan. S20, S47
Oman:
Treaties, agreements, etc., Apr. 47, May
74, Aug. 88, Sept. 75, Nov. 91
U.S. security assistance, FY 1982, pro-
posed: Constable, June 45; Haig, Apr.
B; Twinam, May 50
Organization for Economic Development:
Hormats, Nov. 29; Rashish, Dec. 46
Atlas, June F, July E, 0
Development assistance, Dec. C
Ministerial meeting, Paris (June 16-17):
Clark, Sept. 36; Eagleburger, Aug. 67
U.S. Permanent Representative (Katz),
swearing in, PR 296, 9/8
Organization of African Unity:
Ad hoc mediation committee on the west-
ern Sahara (Wisemen Committee):
Saunders, Feb. 55
Atlas, June M
Nairobi summit resolutions (Department),
Aug. 56
Organization of American States: (Haig), PR
365, 11/1, PR 368, 11/2, PR 417, 12/8
Atlas, June D
10th General Assembly: Carter, Jan. 33;
Muskie, Jan. 34
U.S. Permanent Representative
(Middendorf), swearing in, PR 216, 7/1
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Coun-
tries: Haig, Oct. 4; Hinton, Feb. 48;
McPherson, Nov. 85
Atlas, June P
Development assistance, Dec. C
Ortiz, Frank V., swearing in as Ambassador
to Peru, PR 434, 12/30
Overseas Private Investment Corporation:
Jan. 13; Hormats, Nov. 30
Owen, Ruth Bryan, Jan. S29, S38
Pacheco, Romualdo, Jan. S39
Pacific area: ANZUS, Aug. 46; Eagleburger,
Aug. 74; Haig, Aug. 45, 48, Sept. 17
Paine, Thomas (quoted), Dec. 21
Pakistan: Apr. 28; Haig, Aug. 37
Nuclear weapon capability, question of
(Haig), Aug. 53
Profile, Nov. 83
Textile agreement with U.S., amendment,
PR 230, 7/14, PR 352, 10/21, PR 416,
12/7
Treaties, agreements, etc., Jan. 38, Apr.
47, May 74, 76, Aug. 89, 90, Sept. 75,
76, Oct. 81, 83, Nov. 90, 91, Dec. 77
U.S. economic and military assistance:
Aug. 83; Buckley, Nov. 82; Coon, May
68, June 53; Haig, May 16, Oct. 14;
McPherson, Nov. 85; Reagan, Aug. 24
Palfrey, William, Jan. S4, S40
Palmer, Ronald D., swearing in as Ambassa-
dor to Malaysia, PR 191, 6/12
Panama:
Gamboa Penitentiary, transfer, bilateral
agreement with U.S., Mar. 35
Treaties, agreements, etc., Jan. 40,
Mar. 33, May 74, July 57, Aug. 89,
Nov. 91
U.S. -Panama Joint Commission on the En-
vironment, announcement, PR 138, 5/7
Papua New Guinea:
Treaties, agreements, etc., Jan. 36, 37,
Feb. 70, Mar. 33, 34, Apr. 46, 47, May
74, 75, June 60, July 59, Nov. 91
U.S. Ambassador (Schaffer), swearing in
PR 348, 10/16
U.S. security assistance, proposed
(Armacost), May 29
Paraguay (Johnston), Oct. 50
Treaties, agreements, etc., May 74
Nov. 91
Parker, Peter, Jan. S24
Patents:
Microorganisms, deposit for purpose of
patent procedures, international
recognition, Budapest treaty (1977):
Federal Republic of Germany, Jan. 37;
Liechtenstein, Aug. 88; Philippines,
Oct. 82; Soviet Union, May 74; Spain,
Mar. 33; Switzerland, Aug. 88' U K
Jan. 37
Entry into force, July 57
Patents (Cont'd)
Patent cooperation treaty (1970): Belgium,
Dec. 75; U.K. (applicability to Hong
Kong), June 60
Plants, international convention for pro-
tection of new varieties (1961), as
revised: Ireland, Aug. 88; New
Zealand, Feb. 70; South Africa, Oct.
82; Switzerland, Sept. 74; U.S., Feb.
70
Patterson, John S., Jan. S40
Peace Corps program:
Current actions: Anguilla, Oct. 82; Cook
Islands, July 59; Dominica, May 75;
Montserrat, St. Kitts/Nevis, St. Lucia,
May 76; St. Vincent and the
Grenadines, Oct. 84; Turks and Caicos
Islands, Mar. 35
FY 1982 requests (McPherson), May 44
Peaslee, Amos J., Jan. S24
Persian Gulf. See Indian Ocean-Persian Gulf
Peru:
Drug control programs (Linnemann), May
57
Treaties, agreements, etc., Apr. 48, May
73, 74, 76, June 60, July 58, Aug. 89,
90, Sept. 75, 76, Oct. 82, Nov. 91, Dec.
75, 77
U.S. Ambassador (Ortiz), swearing in PR
434, 12/30
U.S. development and security assistance,
FY 1982 request (Bushnell), May 72
Peterson, Neal H., Apr. 34
Philippines:
Exchange of individual personnel, memo-
randum of understanding, June 61
Human rights (Bush), Aug. 28
Manila American cemetery and memorial,
remarks (Haig), PR 200, 6/23
Treaties, agreements, etc., Jan. 36, Feb.
70, May 73, 74, June 61, July 57, Aug.
89, Sept. 75, Oct. 82, Nov. 91, Dec. 76,
77
U.S. economic and military assistance:
Armacost, May 27; Haig, Apr. B;
Holdridge, Oct. 36
U.S. relations (Haig), Aug. 40
Visit of Secretary Haig (Haig), Aug. 38
Visit of Vice President Bush: Aug. 28, 29;
Holdridge, Oct. 35
Pickering, Thomas R., swearing in as Ambas-
sador to Nigeria, PR 355, 10/27
Pickering, Timothy, Jan. S43
Pierpont, Robert, Aug. 51
Piper, Larry G., swearing in as Ambassador
to Gambia, PR 391, 11/17
Poland: Bush, June 41; Haig, June 8, Sept.
11
Elections (Haig), Sept. 24
NATO position: Haig, Nov. 19; NAC, July
39; White House, May 42
Profile, May 42
Situation in: Apr. 28; Department, Nov. 52;
Haig, May 4, 5, 9, 14, June 22, 24, Ju-
ly 12, Aug. 22, Oct. 19, 22, Nov. 45,
PR 372, 10/28, PR 406, 12/1, PR 408,
12/1, PR 423, 12/15; Trudeau, Apr. 2;
White House, May 41
Soviet intervention, question of: June 2,
July 45; ANZUS, Aug. 45; Carter, Jan. "
20; Eagleburger, Aug. 73, 75; Haig,
Feb. H, Apr. 14, May 3, 4, 10, 14,
June 6, 15, 21, 28, 30, July 37, Aug. 5,
Sept. 28, 31, Oct. 19, 22, Nov. 19, 48,
20
Department of State Bulletin
"oland (Cont'd)
Soviet intervention, etc. (Cont'd)
Dec. 33, PR 408, 12/1; Muskie, Feb
28, 31, PR 12A, 1/15; NAC, Feb. 50;
Rashish, Nov. 23; Reagan, Aug. 24;
White House, Jan. 21
Textile agreement with U.S., PR 92, 4/10
Treaties, agreements, etc., Jan. 37, Feb.
70, Mar. 33, Apr. 46, May 74, 75, June
61, Sept. 74, 75, Oct. 82, 84, Nov 90
91, Dec. 75, 76, 77, PR 413, 12/4
U.S. economic assistance: Bush, May 42;
Department, Dec. 56; Eagleburger, '
Aug. 76; Haig, Feb. H, June 28, July
17, Aug. 22
U.S. trade policy (Rashish), Nov. 21
U.S. visit of First Deputy Prime Minister
Jagielski: Bush, May 41; Jagielski, May
42
Dope John Paul II (Haig), July 8
Dopulation growth and problems: Hinton,
June 36, 38; McPherson, May 46; Muskie
Jan. 3
World distribution, map, July J
3ortugal: Eagleburger, Aug. 70; Haig, Nov.
45
Treaties, agreements, etc., Mar. 33, 34,
Apr. 46, May 74, 76, July 58, 59, Sept.
74, Oct. 81, 84, Nov. 91, Dec. 77
U.S. security assistance, proposed: Ewing,
May 38; Haig, Apr. B, PR 68, 3/18
3ostal matters:
Express mail/Postadex service, convention
(1975), termination, France, Aug. 89
International express mail, bilateral agree-
ments: Argentina, Sept. 75; China,
Jan. 39; France, Aug. 89; Kuwait, May
76; Mexico, Apr. 48; South Africa, Oct.
84; Switzerland, June 62
Money orders and postal travellers checks,
agreement (1974): Guyana, Oct. 82;
Qatar, Mar. 34
Money orders and postal travellers checks,
agreement (1979): Algeria, Argentina,
Austria, Barbados, Belgium, Benin,
May 74; Bulgaria, May 74, Dec. 75;
Burundi, Cameroon, Central African
Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Con-
go, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Czecho-
slovakia, Denmark, Ecuador, May 74;
Egypt, May 74, Dec. 75; Finland,
France, Gabon, Federal Republic of
Germany, Greece, Guinea, Haiti,
Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Ivory
Coast, Japan, Jordan, May 74;
Republic of Korea, May 74, Sept. 74;
Kuwait, May 74, Dec. 75; Lebanon,
May 74; Liechtenstein, May 74, Sept.
74; Libya, May 74; Luxembourg,
Madagascar, May 74, Dec. 75; Mali,
Mauritania, Mexico, Monaco, Morocco,
Mozambique, Netherlands, Netherlands
Antilles, Nicaragua, May 74; Niger,
May 74, Sept. 74; Norway, May 74;
Qatar, Sept. 74; Romania, Rwanda,
San Marino, Senegal, Spain, Sri
Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Sweden, May
74; Switzerland, May 74, July 58;
Syria, Thailand, Togo, May 74;
Tunisia, May 74, Sept. 74; Turkey,
Postal matters (Cont'd)
Money orders, etc. (Cont'd)
May 74; U.S., May 74, July 58; Upper
Volta, Uruguay, Vatican City,
Democratic Republic of Yemen, Yemen
Arab Republic, Yugoslavia, Zaire, May
74
Parcel post, bilateral agreement with China,
Jan. 39
Postal convention with detailed regulations,
bilateral agreement with Canada, Dec. 76
Postal Union of the Americas and Spain,
constitution (1971), Bolivia, July 58
Additional protocol (1976): Bolivia, July 58;
Ecuador, Sept. 74
Parcel post agreement, final protocol and
detailed regulations (1976), Bolivia,
July 58
Universal Postal Union, constitution and
final protocol (1964); St. Vincent and
the Grenadines, July 58; Saudi Arabia,
May 74; South Africa, Oct. 82; Tuvalu,
July 58
Protocol (1969): Costa Rica, Dec. 75;
Czechoslovakia, Mar. 33; Ivory
Coast, July 58; Qatar, Mar. 33;
Saudi Arabia, May 74; St. Vincent
and the Grenadines, July 58; South
Africa, Oct. 82; Tuvalu, July 58
Protocol (1974): Costa Rica, Equatorial
Guinea, Dec. 75; Guyana, Mar. 33;
Ivory Coast, Portugal, July 58;
Qatar, Mar. 33; Saudi Arabia, May
74; St. Vincent and the Grenadines,
July 58; South Africa, Oct. 82;
Tuvalu, July 58
General regulations, with final protocol
and annex (1979): Afghanistan,
Algeria, Angola, Argentina,
Australia, Austria, Bahamas,
Bahrain, Bangladesh, May 74, Dec.
75; Barbados, Belgium, Benin, May
74; Bhutan, May 74, Aug. 88;
Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, May 74;
Bulgaria, May 74, Dec. 75; Burma,
Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet
Socialist Republic, Cameroon, May
74; Canada, May 74, Sept. 74; Cen-
tral African Republic, Chad, Chile,
China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica,
Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Den-
mark, Ecuador, May 74; Egypt, May
74, Dec. 75; Equatorial Guinea, Dec.
75; Ethiopia, Finland, France,
Gabon, German Democratic Repub-
lic, Germany, Federal Republic of,
Greece, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau,
Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland,
India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland,
Israel, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan,
Jordan, Kenya, May 74; Democratic
Republic of Korea, May 74; Republic
of Korea, May 74, Sept. 74; Kuwait,
May 74, Dec. 75; Lebanon, Lesotho,
Liberia, Libya, May 74; Liechten-
stein, May 74, Sept. 74; Luxem-
bourg, Madagascar, May 74, Dec. 75;
Malaysia, Malawi, May 74; Maldives,
July 58; Mali, Mauritania, May 74;
Mauritius, May 74, Sept. 74; Mexico,
Postal Union, etc. (Cont'd)
General regulations, etc. (Cont'd)
Monaco, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozam-
bique, Nepal, Netherlands,
Netherlands Antilles, New Zealand,
Nicaragua, May 74; Niger, May 74,
Sept. 74; Nigeria, Norway, Oman,
Pakistan, Panama, Papua New
Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines,
Poland, Portugal, May 74; Qatar,
May 74, Sept. 74; Romania, Rwanda,
May 74; St. Vincent and the
Grenadines, July 58; San Marino,
Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone,
May 74; Singapore, May 74, Dec. 75;
Soviet Union, Spain, Sri Lanka,
Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland,
Sweden, May 74; Switzerland, May
74, July 58; Syria, Tanzania,
Thailand, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and
Tobago, May 74; Tunisia, May 74,
Sept. 74; Turkey, Ukrainian Soviet
Socialist Republic, United Arab
Emirates, U.K. (including overseas
territories), May 74; U.S., May 74,
July 58; Upper Volta, Uruguay,
Venezuela, Democratic Republic of
Yemen, Yemen Arab Republic,
Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, May 74
Preeg, Ernest Henry, swearing in as Am-
bassador to Haiti, PR 215, 7/1
Presidents, trips abroad, Sept. 1
Price, Charles H., Jr., swearing in as Ambas-
sador to Belgium, PR 435, 12/30
Proclamations by the President:
African Refugee Relief Day (4833), June 59
Bill of Rights Day (4804), Feb. 54
Human Rights Day and Week, 1980 (4804),
Feb. 54
Interdiction of illegal aliens (4865), Dec. 62
United Nations Day, 1981, Oct. 2
Public Law 480, Food for Peace: Buckley,
Nov. 82; McPherson, May 44
Publications:
Government Printing Office sales, lists,
Jan. 42, Mar. 38, May 78, June 64,
Aug. 93, Oct. 86
Serial publications, statutes of the inter-
national center for registration of,
(1974), accession, Denmark, Mar. 34
State Department; Mar. 37, Apr. 50, June
63, July 62, Aug. 92, Sept. 78, Oct. 86,
Dec. 80
Digest of United States Practice in Inter-
national Law, 1978 released, July 62
Foreign Relations of the United States,
1952-1954, Volume XVI, The Geneva
Conference, released, Sept. 78
Press releases, lists, Jan. 41, Feb. 72,
Mar. 36, At. 49, May 77, June 63,
July 60, Aug. 92, Sept. 77, Oct. 85,
Nov. 94, Dec. 79
Status of the World's Nations, 1980, re-
leased, Mar. 38
U.S.U.N., lists, Jan. 41, Mar. 36, July 61,
Dec. 80
Index 1981
21
Q
Qatar, treaties, agreements, etc., Mar. 33,
34, Apr. 47, May 74, Sept. 74, Nov. 90,
91
Quainton, Anthony C. E., acceptance of
awards to airline hijacking task force par-
ticipants, PR 164, 5/28
R
Rabb, Maxwell M., swearing in as Ambassa-
dor to Italy, PR 204, 6/24
Racial discrimination:
Apartheid: June 55; Crocker, Oct. 26;
Moose, Jan. 8
International convention (1965) on elimina-
tion of: Colombia, Nov. 90; Uganda,
Mar. 34
Rajaratnam, Sinnathamby (quoted), Aug. 64
Randolph, Edmund, Jan. S43
Randolph, John, Jan. S13
Rashish, Myer, Oct. 40, 46, Nov. 20, 24,
Dec. 44
Biographical details, Oct. 40
Undersecretary for Economic Affairs,
swearing in, PR 209, 6/29
Reagan, Ronald:
Addresses, remarks, and statements:
Afghanistan, Apr. 8
American hostages, welcoming ceremony,
Feb. 19, 20
Annual meeting of Board of Governors of
World Banks, Nov. 14
Arab-Israeli conflict, Aug. 23
Canada, Apr. 1, 3, 7, 12, June 32
Caribbean, Central America, U.S. policy,
Mar. 13, Aug. 23, Dec. 15
China, Aug. 24, Nov. 17
Defense, Nov. 16, Dec. 21
Strategic weapons program, Dec. 56, 67
Developing countries, Nov. 15, Dec 1 9
14
Economy, domestic, Feb. A, Apr. 4,
Dec. 1
Economy, world, Nov. 14, Dec. 14
Cancun summit, Dec. 1, 9, 10, 13
Ottawa summit, Apr. 7, Aug. 11
Attendance, Aug. 1
Egypt, death of President Sadat, Nov. 67
El Salvador:
Human rights, Apr. 12
U.S. aid, Apr. 8, 11
Europe:
U.S. nuclear strategic policy, Dec. 10
56
Western, U.S. relations, Nov. 16
Foreign policy, Aug. 23, 29, 59 (quoted)
Immigration policy, Sept. 43
Inaugural address, Feb. A
Iran, Mar. 12, Nov. 17
U.S. claims, suspension of litigation
Apr. 32
Israeli attack on Iraqi nuclear plant, Aug.
23, 80 (quoted), 84 (quoted)
Latin America:
Caribbean Basin, Mar. 13, Aug. 23,
Nov. 15, Dec. 16
Tlatelolco Treaty, Protocol I, Sept. 60
Reagan, Ronald (Cont'd)
Addresses, remarks, etc. (Cont'd)
Lebanon, Aug. 24
Habib mission, Aug. 23, Nov. 72
Libyan militarism, Apr. 8
Mexico, July 3, Sept. 44
National Press Club, Dec. 10
NATO, Apr. 26, 27, Dec. 10
Nuclear nonproliferation, Aug. 24,
Sept. 60
Nuclear war, danger of, Aug. 24, Nov.
16, Dec. 56
Pakistan, U.S. military aid, Aug. 24
Persian Gulf region, stability, question of,
Mar. 13
Poland, Soviet intervention, possibility of,
Aug. 24
Saudi Arabia, U.S. sale of AWACs and
other equipment, proposed, Oct. 52,
Nov. 16
South Africa, Apr. 1 1
Soviet Union, Aug. 23
Arms reduction talks, proposed, Apr.
10, Nov. 16, Dec. 10
Economic problems, Dec. 15
Grain embargo, lifting of, Mar. 13,
Apr. 10, 13, June 41
Military activities, Mar. 12, Apr. 9
Summit, question of, Apr. 27
SALT II, Mar. 12
Terrorism, Feb. 19, B, Mar. 12
Trade, Dec. 15
U.K., Northern Ireland, May 39
World Affairs Council, Dec. 14
World peace, Aug. 24
Yorktown, battle of, bicentennial observa-
tion of, Dec. 18
Attempted assassination of: Haig, PR 100,
4/16, PR 103, 4/22; van Agt, June 41
Correspondence, Soviet President
Brezhnev, experts, Dec. 10
Meetings with Heads of State and officials
of, remarks and joint communiques:
Egypt, Sept. 51; Germany, Federal
Republic of, July 44; Israel, Nov. 71;
Jamaica, Mar. 29; Japan, May 29, June
1; Korea, Mar. 14; Mexico, July 1;
Thailand, Dec. 42; U.K., Apr. 26
Messages to Congress:
Cyprus, progress reports, July 43, Oct. 51
Iran, U.S. suspension of litigation
against, Apr. 33
Maritime boundary treaty and fishery
agreement with Canada, June 32
Nuclear cooperation with EURATOM,
Apr. 33
Sinai Support Mission, reports, June 45,
Dec. 66
U.S. military equipment sales to Saudi
Arabia, Oct. 52
Zimbabwe, June 31, Oct. 29
News conferences, transcripts, Mar. 12,
Apr. 11, Aug. 23, Nov. 16
Personal Representative to the President
(Habib), named as, PR 177, 6/1
Television interview, Apr. 8
Visit to Canada, Apr. 1
Refugees: June 56, Aug. 15; Muskie, Jan. 3, 5
Afghan: Oct. 64; Coon, May 68; Haig, Aug.
43; McHenry, Jan. 31; Smyser, June
49, 50; Van Hollen, Mar. 21
Africa (Muskie), Jan. 7
African Relief Day, proclamation
(Reagan), June 59
FY 1982 assistance requests (Smyser),
May 59, 60
International conference (Kirkpatrick),
June 58
Cuban: Apr. 49; Enders, Oct. 78; Haig,
Feb. K
El Salvador (Haig), Oct. 21
Haitian, U.S. immigration policies: Dec. 77;
Enders, Oct. 78
Indochinese, U.S. and other relief efforts:
Mar. 15, July 23, Oct. 62; ANZUS,
Aug. 46; Haig, Aug. 37, 40, 44;
Holdridge, Oct. 37; Smyser, June 49
International Committee of the Red Cross,
U.S. contributions: Aug. 78; Stoessel,
Sept. 42
Status of, protocol (1967): Angola, Sept.
74; Chad, Nov. 91; Egypt, Aug. 88;
Jamaica, Jan. 38; Lesotho, July 58;
Philippines, Oct. 82; Sierra Leone,
Aug. 88
U.S. aid, FY 1982 request: Haig, May 26;
McPherson, May 44; Smyser, May 59,
60
U.S. immigration policy: Haig, Oct. 21;
Reagan, Sept. 43
U.S. special advisory panel report on Viet-
namese boat people, Oct. 62
Vietnamese orderly departure program:
Department, Feb. 43; Holdridge, Dec.
42
Regan, Donald T., Aug. 17
Press conference, PR 372, 10/28
Ridgway, Rozanne L., May 21
Rithauddeen, Tengku Ahmad, Aug. 41, 44
Rivera y Damas, Arturo (quoted), Apr. 42
Rivero, Horacio Jr., Jan. S39
Rives, George L. (quoted), Jan. 20
Robbins, Barbara A., Jan. S40
Robinson, William E., Jan. S15
Rochambeau, Comte de (quoted), Dec 20
Rockhill, William W., Jan. S16
Rogers, John Jacob, Jan. S25
Rogers, William P., Jan. S39, S49
Romania (Eagleburger), Aug. 76, 77
Textile agreement with U.S., amendment,
Feb. 71, Oct. 83, PR 269, 8/11
Treaties, agreements, etc., Jan. 38, 39,
Feb. 70, Mar. 34, Apr. 47, 49, May 74,
July 59, Aug. 88, Oct. 84, Nov. 91
U.S. trade policy (Rashish), Nov. 21
Romulo, Carlos P., Aug. 41, 43
Rondon, Fernando E., swearing in as Ambas-
sador to Madagascar, PR 424, 12/16
Roosevelt, Franklin D.: Jan. S6, S24, S28,
S29, S38, Sept. 1, 3, Dec. 37 (quoted);
Reagan, Apr. 10
Roosevelt, Theodore, Jan. S20, S21, S22,
Sept. 1
Root, Elihu, Jan. S21, S22, S47
Rostow, Eugene V., Aug. 59, Oct. 30, Dec.
33,68
22
Department of State Bulletin
loth, Richard, Oct. 61
lowan, Carl T., Jan. S39, Feb. 26
fcowney, Edward (Haig), Nov. 20
(lubber, international agreement (1979):
Avery, Nov. 36
Current actions: Belgium, Brazil, Canada,
China, Czechoslovakia, Denmark,
European Economic Community,
Finland, France, Jan. 38; Germany,
Federal Republic of, Jan. 38, Dec. 76;
Iraq, Oct. 82; Ireland, Jan. 38; Mexico,
May 75; Nigeria, Sept. 75; Nether-
lands, Jan. 38; Norway, Jan. 38, Apr.
47; Papua New Guinea, Feb. 70; Peru,
Sept. 75; Soviet Union, Jan. 38; Sri
Lanka, Feb. 70; Sweden, Jan. 38; Thai-
land, Feb. 70; Turkey, Dec. 76; U.K.,
Jan. 38; U.S., Jan. 38, Aug. 88
tusk, Dean: Jan. S34, S49; Haig, Sept. 26
Iwanda:
Treaties, agreements, etc., May 73, 74, 75,
Oct. 82, Nov. 91
U.S. security assistance, proposed
(Walker), May 20
iadat, Anwar al- (see also Egypt), June 14,
15, Sept. 51, 53, 54, Nov. 61 (quoted), 66
(quoted)
Assassination: Haig, Nov. 66, 67, 69, 71;
Reagan, Nov. 67
Funeral, U.S. delegation, selection (Haig),
Nov. 68, 69, 70
Tribute to (Haig), Sept. 29
iafety at sea:
International regulations for preventing
collisions at sea, convention (1972):
Cyprus, Apr. 46; Guinea, May 73;
Malaysia, Apr. 46; Maldives, May 73
Safety of life at sea, international conven-
tion (1974): Colombia, Czechoslovakia,
Feb. 70; Egypt, Dec. 76; Indonesia,
May 75; Finland, Guinea, Korea,
Republic of, Apr. 47; Libya, Oct. 82;
Maldives, Apr. 47; Nigeria, Oct. 82;
Papua New Guinea, Qatar, Apr. 47;
Singapore, June 60
Protocol (1978): Colombia, Feb. 70; Den-
mark, May 75; Finland, Aug. 88;
Greece, Dec. 76; Liberia, Feb. 70;
Libya, Dec. 76; Norway, June 60;
Soviet Union, Aug. 88; U.S., July 58;
Yugoslavia, Feb. 70
Satellite-aided maritime distress alert sys-
tem, bilateral agreement with U.K.,
Nov. 92
Search and rescue memorandum of under-
standing with Papua New Guinea, July
59
St. Kitts/Nevis, Peace Corps program, bi-
lateral agreement, May 76
St. Lucia, treaties, agreements, etc., Jan. 36,
39, May 74, 76, June 61, Sept. 75
St. Vincent and the Grenadines, treaties,
agreements, etc., June 61, July 57, 58,
Aug. 88, Sept. 75, Oct. 82, 84
Sakharov, Andrei (Bell), Jan. 20
Sanchez, Ramon Leon, Jan. S39
San Marino, treaties, agreements, etc., Feb.
70, May 74, Nov. 91
Sao Tome and Principe:
International civil aviation convention,
amendments, ratification, July 57
U.S. Ambassador (McNamara), swearing
in, PR 425, 12/15
Satellites:
International Maritime Satellite Organiza-
tion (INMARSAT), convention and
operating agreement (1976): Liberia,
Oman, Apr. 47; Philippines, June 61
International Telecommunication Satellite
Organization (INTELSAT), agreement
(1971) and operating agreement,
Somalia, May 75
Landsat system, establishment and opera-
tion, bilateral agreement with In-
donesia, Nov. 92
Loran-C power chain, bilateral agreement
with Canada, Mar. 34
Observation and tracking, cooperative pro-
grams, bilateral agreement with
Ecuador, May 75
OMEGA navigation system monitoring sta-
tion, agreement with Egypt, May 76
Program carrying signals, distribution of,
convention (1974), ratification, Italy,
June 60
Remote sensing, bilateral agreement with
Canada, July 59
Saudi Arabia:
Treaties, agreements, etc., Apr. 46, May
74, July 58, Aug. 89, Nov. 91, 92
U.S. Ambassador (Neumann), swearing in,
PR 248, 7/23
U.S. relations (Haig), Nov. 71
U.S. sale of AWACs and other equipment,
proposed: Begin, June 16, 18; Buckley,
Oct. 52; Department, Apr. 31, June 47;
Haig, June 8, 18, 22, 30, July 15, Aug.
4 51, 54, Sept. 26, 29, Oct. 13, 14, 15,
17, 18, Nov. 17, 18, 50, 60, 61, 66, 68,
69 74 76, 77, 78, Dec. 26, 30, 32, 64,
66! PR 317, 9/18, PR 324, 9/29, PR
359, 10/29, PR 360, 10/29; Reagan,
Oct. 52, Nov. 16; Shamir, PR 62, 3/11;
Twinam, Nov. 63
Background paper, Oct. 53
Terms and conditions, Nov. 62; Haig,
Nov. 60, 62
Visit of Secretary Haig (Haig), June 18
Yemeni threat (Haig), Nov. 70
Saunders, Harold H., Feb. 54
Schafer, M. Virginia, swearing in as Ambas-
sador to Papua New Guinea, PR 348,
10/16
Schatz, H. Lee, Feb. 21
Schlaudeman, Harry W., swearing in as Am-
bassador to Argentina, PR 384, 11/17
Schmidt, Helmut, Aug. 12
U.S. visit, joint statement, July 44
Schreyer, Edward R., Apr. 1
Schuyler, Eugene, Jan. S16, Nov. 1, 2
Schwebel, Stephen M., Feb. 64
Election as judge of ICJ, Feb. 67
Schweid, Barry, May 4
Science and technology (NAC), July 42
China, dual-use technology transfers, ques-
tion of: Haig, Aug. 36, 38, 41, 51;
Holdridge, Oct. 38
Cooperation, bilateral agreements: Egypt,
Apr. 48; Finland, Jan. 39; Italy, Nov.
92; Nigeria, Jan. 40; Pakistan, May 76;
Senegal, Zimbabwe, Jan. 40
Science and technology (Cont'd)
Cultural, educational, scientific and tech-
nological cooperation and exchanges
for 1981 and 1982: Bulgaria, Feb. 71;
Romania, July 59
Educational, scientific, and cultural mater-
ials, importation, agreement (1950),
ratification, Syria, Jan. 36
Icebreaking technology, bilateral agree-
ment with Finland, Oct. 83
Mapping, charting, and geodesy, coopera-
tion in, bilateral agreements: Argen-
tina, Sept. 75; Egypt, Sept. 76
Military technology transfers (Weinberger),
July 47
Nigerian technical educators, training of,
bilateral agreement with Nigeria, Nov.
92
Tax administration and training, technical
cooperation in, bilateral agreement
with Saudi Arabia, Nov. 92
Technical exchanges, bilateral agreements:
Austria, Aug. 89; Japan, Apr. 48
Scruggs, William Lindsay, Jan. S16
Seaga, Edward, Mar. 29, 31
Security assistance [see also names of in-
dividual countries):
Appropriations request FY 1982: Buckley,
May 62; Burt, May 65; Draper, May
48; Haig, Apr. A, PR 68, 3/18, PR 124,
4/28; Twinam, May 49; Walker, May
19
Defense articles under IMET program, pro-
vision of training, bilateral
agreements: Dominica, June 61;
Guyana, Apr. 48; Niger, St. Lucia, St.
Vincent and the Grenadines, June 61;
Singapore, Sept. 76; Somalia, Oct. 84
Military assistance, bilateral agreement
with: Philippines, Portugal, Dec. 77;
Spain, Nov. 92; Turkey, Aug. 90
Switzerland, bilateral agreement amending
the memo of understanding concerning
the purchase of F-5E and F-5F air-
craft, Feb. 71
Security Council, U.N., resolutions, texts:
Israeli raid on Iraqi nuclear facilities,
condemnation, Aug. 85
Lebanon-Israel border dispute, Oct. 71
Seko, Toshihiko (Reagan), June 1
Senegal:
Treaties, agreements, etc., Jan. 37, 40,
May 74, 76, June 61, July 57, Nov. 91
U.S. Ambassador (Bray), swearing in, PR
218, 6/30
U.S. security assistance, proposed
(Walker), May 21
Serbia, U.S. recognition of independence,
Nov. 1
Seward, William H., Jan. S14, S26, S46
Seychelles:
Treaties, agreements, etc., Jan. 37,
Mar. 33, May 74, Sept. 76
U.S. economic aid, proposed (Walker),
May 19
Shamir, Yitzhak: June 16; press briefing,
PR 62, 3/11; toasts (Haig, Shamir), PR
100, 4/16
Sherman, John, Jan. S47
Sherr, Lynn, Oct. 22
Shipley, Ruth, Jan. S38
Sickles, Daniel E., Jan. S17
j ino-i
23
Siddhi, Sawetsila, Aug. 43
Sierra Leone, treaties, agreements, etc.,
May 74, July 59, Aug. 88, Nov. 92, Dec.
75
Singapore:
Textile agreements with U.S., amend-
ments, Mar. 35, Dec. 77, PR 3, 1/7, PR
290, 8/28, PR 291, 8/28
Text, PR 6, 1/8
Treaties, agreements, etc., Jan. 38,
May 74, 76, June 60, Sept. 75, 76,
Nov. 90, 91, 92, Dec. 75, 76
U.S. security assistance, proposed
(Armacost), May 29
U.S. visit of Prime Minister Lee Kuan
Yew (Holdridge), Oct. 36
Slany, William Z., Mar. 23
Slavery, abolition, supplementary convention
(1956), succession, Solomon Islands, Nov.
91
Smith, Hedrick, Dec. 63
Smith, Robert, Jan. S44
Smyser, William R., May 59, 60, June 49
U.N. Deputy High Commissioner for
Refugees, appointment as, PR 226,
7/10
Social security program with Canada:
May 75, July 59; Reagan, Apr. 3;
Trudeau, Apr. 6
Solomon Islands, treaties, agreements, etc.,
June 60, Sept. 74, Nov. 90, 91
Somalia:
Treaties, agreements, etc., Apr. 49,
May 75, Oct. 84, Nov. 91
U.S. economic and military aid, proposed
(Walker), May 18, 19
Soule, Pierre, Jan. S10
South Africa: Crocker, Oct. 25; Haig,
July 21; Moose, Jan. 8; Muskie, Jan. 2
Namibia, role in independence of: Crocker,
Aug. 55, Oct. 27; Department, Aug.
56; Haig, July 19, 22, Sept. 32, Dec. 32
Treaties, agreements, etc., Jan. 39,
June 60, July 58, Aug. 89, Sept. 74,
Oct. 81, 82, 84
U.S. relations: Crocker, Oct. 26; Haig,
July 14; Reagan, Apr. 11
South Pacific Commission, agreement es-
tablishing (1947): Cook Islands, Niue,
Feb. 70
Soviet Union (Reagan), Aug. 23
Baltic military exercises (Department),
Oct. 51
Brezhnev, letter to, excerpts (Reagan),
Dec. 10
Summary (Department), Nov. 51
Economic problems (Reagan), Dec. 15
Forgery, disinformation, and political oper-
ations: Nov. 52; Burt, Nov. 56; Haig,
Dec. 66; Rostow, Oct. 34
Human rights violations: Sept. 39; Bell,
Jan. 19; Haig, June 10; Kampelman,
Sept. 38; Stoessel, Dec. 53
Intelligence services in U.S. (Haig),
June 31
Jewish emigration: Bell, Jan. 19;
Kampelman, Sept. 38
Soviet Union (Cont'd)
Military programs and deployment (see also
Poland): July 45, Aug. 14; Buckley, Ju-
ly 51, Sept. 62; Burt, Nov. 56; Depart-
ment, Nov. 52; Eagleburger, Aug. 73;
Enders, Nov. 89; Haig, Feb. D, Apr.
14, 15, 16, A, May 1, 3, 11, 16, June 6,
11, 13, 22, 24, 26, July 8, 12, 15, 18,
20, 21, 37, Aug. 22, 31, 33, 35, 39, 41,
51, Sept. 10, 11, 12, 14, 16, 21, 25, 30,
Oct. 13, Nov. 45, 46, 48, Dec. 65, PR
408, 12/1; Holdridge, Oct. 35;
Kampelman, Sept. 38; Muskie, Jan. 5,
Feb. 28; NATO, Feb. 50, July 39, 42,
Dec. 55; Reagan, Mar. 12, Apr. 9, Dec.
11; Rostow, Oct. 30, 31, Dec. 68;
Stoessel, June 33, Dec. 53, 54;
Twinam, Nov. 64; Weinberger, July 46
Siberian-West Europe gas pipeline project:
Haig, Aug. 6, 7; Hormats, Dec. 49;
Rashish, Nov. 21
Sino-Soviet relations (Haig), Sept. 11
Strategic nuclear parity with U.S.: Depart-
ment, Nov. 52; Haig, Nov. 49, Dec. 22;
Reagan, Dec. 11
Summit meeting, question of: Apr. 28;
Haig, Apr. 13, May 3, 10, 14, June 23,
24, Sept. 25, Oct. 17, PR 64, 3/12, PR
408, 12/1; Reagan, Apr. 9, 27
Total withdrawal of armed forces from
Europe, question of (Haig), July 16
Treaties, agreements, etc., Jan. 38,
Feb. 70, Apr. 47, May 74, 75, July 58,
Aug. 88, 89, Oct. 81, 84, Nov. 91
U.S. Ambassador (Hartman), swearing in,
PR 401, 11/25
U.S. arms control negotiations, question of
(see also Strategic arms limitation
talks): Aug. 14, Burt, Nov. 59; Bush,
Aug. 26; Genscher, PR 64, 3/12; Haig,
Feb. H, Apr. 16, May 3, 12, 13, 16, 17,
June 9, 25, 31, July 11, 37, Aug. 5, 42,
Sept. 12, 27, Nov. 19; Reagan, Apr.
10, Nov. 16; Rostow, Oct. 31, Dec. 69
TNF: Apr. 28, July 44; Burt, Nov.
59; Department, Oct. 5, Nov. 52;
Eagleburger, Aug. 67, 74; Haig,
Apr. 18, May 3, 17, June 31, July 9,
12, 16, 22, 37, Aug. 3, 33, 52, Sept.
13, 30, Oct. 17, Nov. 20, 48, 50, Dec.
24, 25, 30, PR 380, 11/16, PR 404,
11/27, PR 405, 11/30, PR 408, 12/1;
NAC, Feb. 51, July 41; NATO, Dec.
56; Reagan, Dec. 10; Stoessel, Dec.
53, 54
U.S. nuclear strategic weapons proposal
(Reagan), Dec. 11, 56
U.S. grain embargo, lifting of: Haig,
Feb. J, May 4, June 7, 24, July 14, 20,
Sept. 24, Dec. 25; Reagan, Mar. 13,
Apr. 10, 13, June 41
U.S. relations: Apr. 28; Department,
Nov. 51 (summary of Reagan letter);
Eagleburger, Aug. 66, 73; Haig, Feb.
I, Apr. 15, May 7, 10, 14; June 6, 13,
28, July 21, Aug. 17, 42, 51, Sept. 11,
16, 24, 25, Oct. 16, 23, Nov. 51, Dec.
25, 30; McCall, Feb. 61; Muskie, Jan.
5; Rostow, Dec. 72
China-U.S. relations, question of effect
(Haig), June 26; Aug. 51, 52
U.S. trade: Carter, Feb. 46; Haig, Aug. 6,
17, 19; Rashish, Nov. 21, 22
Space:
Arms control measures, proposed (Rostow),
Dec. 71
Exploration and use of outer space, treaty
(1967): Chile, Dec. 76; Guatemala, Feb.
70; Papua New Guinea, Apr. 47; Viet-
nam, Jan. 38
Liability for damage caused by space ob-
jects, international convention (1972):
Netherlands, Apr. 47; Papua New
Guinea, Mar. 34
Moon treaty (1979): Netherlands, May 75;
Peru, Sept. 75; Philippines, Uruguay,
Aug. 89
Registration of objects launched into outer
space, convention (1975): Chile, Dec.
76; Netherlands, May 75
Rescue and return of astronauts, agree-
ment (1968): Chile, Dec. 75;
Netherlands, Apr. 46; Papua New
Guinea, Mar. 33
Space flight operations, bilateral agree-
ment (amendment) with Australia,
Sept. 75
Space launch assistance, bilateral agree-
ment with Japan, Mar. 35
Space shuttle communications facilities,
bilateral agreement with Botswana,
Mar. 34
Space shuttle contingency landing sites,
bilateral agreement with Japan, Mar.
35
Space vehicle tracking and communication
facility, bilateral agreement with
Senegal, May 76
Tracking and telemetry facility on Mahe,
bilateral agreement with Seychelles,
Sept. 76
Upper air (rawinsonde) observation station
at Belize International Airport,
bilateral agreement with Belize, Nov.
91
Spadolini, Giovanni, Aug. 14
Spain: Eagleburger, Aug. 70; Haig, July 39,
Nov. 45
Coup attempt: Apr. 28; Department,
Apr. 29; Haig, May 7, June 21
Treaties, agreements, etc., Jan. 37, 38,
Mar. 33, Apr. 48, May 73, 74, June 60,
July 58, Aug. 88, Sept. 74, 75, Nov.
91, 92, Dec. 76, 77
U.S. security assistance, proposed: Ewing,
May 38; Haig, Apr. B, PR 68, 3/18
U.S. visit of King Juan Carlos, program,
PR 340, 10/9
Visit of Secretary Haig: May 7; Haig,
June 19
Sparks, Ken, June 23
Sri Lanka:
Textile agreement with U.S., July 59,
Sept. 76, PR 130, 4/30, PR 253, 7/27
Treaties, agreements, etc., Feb. 70,
Mar. 33, May 74, Aug. 90, Sept. 74,
Nov. 90, 91, Dec. 76
U.S. economic and military aid, FY 1982
requests (Coon), May 69
Stafford, Joseph D., Feb. 21
Stafford, Kathleen F., Feb. 21
Stanton, Benjamin W., Jan. S9
24
Department of State Bulletin
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Addendum Sheet
Department of State
Bulletin Index 1981
In the Bulletin Index for 1981, the entries
for the beginning of the letter "T" were in-
advertently omitted. They are as follows:
Taft, William Howard, Jan. S22, Sept. 1, 2
Talboys, Brian: Aug. 45 (quoted), 46; Haig,
Aug. 44
Tanzania:
Treaties, agreements, etc., May 74, July 59,
Nov. 90, 91
U.S. Ambassador (Miller), swearing in, PR
396, 11/23
Telecommunications:
Communications Center support for the
Royal New Zealand Air Force Orion
Modernization Unit, bilateral agreement
with New Zealand, Nov. 92
Communications facilities in northern Fed-
eral Republic of Germany, bilateral
agreement with U.K., Sept. 76
Frequency modulation broadcasting in the
88 to 108 MHz band, bilateral agree-
ment with Mexico, Aug. 90
Geneva radio regulations (1959), partial re-
vision (1978) re aeronautical mobile (R)
service: Denmark, Jan. 38; Finland,
Apr. 47; Korea, Feb. 70; Singapore,
Apr. 47
Geneva radio regulations with appendices
and final protocol (1979): Afghanistan,
Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Australia,
Austria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belgium,
Benin, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria,
Burundi, Byelorussian S.S.R.,
Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Cen-
tral African Republic, Chad, Chile,
China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica,
Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Den-
mark, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador,
Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon,
German Democratic Republic, Federal
Republic of Germany, Ghana, Greece,
Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Hon-
duras, Hungary, Iceland, India, In-
donesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Ita-
ly, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan,
Kenya, Democratic People's Republic of
Korea, Republic of Korea, Kuwait,
Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya,
Liechtenstein, Luxembourg,
Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali,
Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico,
Monaco, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozam-
bique, Nepal, Netherlands, New
Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria,
Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama,
Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru,
Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar,
Romania, Rwanda, San Marino, Saudi
Arabia, Senegal, Singapore, Somalia,
Soviet Union, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan,
Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria,
Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and
Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda,
Ukrainian S.S.R., United Arab
Emirates, United Kingdom, Upper
Volta, Uruguay, Vatican City State,
Telecommunications (Cont'd)
Geneva radio regs. (Cont'd)
Venezuela, People's Democratic
Republic of Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire,
Zambia, Nov. 91
Government procurement, bilateral agree-
ment with Japan, Mar. 35
International telecommunications conven-
tion (1973), Zimbabwe, May 75
Licensed amateur radio operators, recip-
rocal granting of authorization to
operate in either country, bilateral
agreements: Italy, Dec. 77; Yugoslavia,
Jan. 40
OMEGA station Le Reunion, bilateral
agreement with France, Sept. 76
Radio Ceylon, facilities, bilateral agreement
with Sri Lanka, Apr. 49, Aug. 90
Radio communications between amateur
stations on behalf of third parties,
bilateral agreement with The Gambia,
June 61
Swaziland, establishment of a Bureau of
Foreign Broadcast Information Service
in, bilateral agreement, Nov. 92
World Administrative Radio Conference,
Final Acts (1977), Finland, Apr. 47
Terra, Daniel J., swearing in as Ambas-
sador-at-Large for Cultural Affairs, PR
234, 7/15
Territorial sea, limits under international law,
Department, Oct. 59
Territorial sea and contiguous zone, con-
vention on (1958), succession, Solomon
Islands, Nov. 91
Terrorism: Jan. S39, June 57, Oct. 72, Nov.
44; Haig, Feb. I, J, May 8, 16, June 25,
July 17, Aug. 17, Nov. 66, 68, 70; Ken-
nedy, Sept. 25; Reagan, Feb. 19, B, Mar.
12; Stoessel, Sept. 43
Attacks on U.S. official personnel abroad,
history (Duncan), Apr. 34
Awards ceremony for airline hijackings
task force participants (Haig), PR 164,
5/28
CSCE Madrid conference, proposal
(Kampelman), Apr. 29
Hostage incidents, 1785-1981, Mar. 23
NATO declaration, text, July 41
Ottawa statement, text, Aug. 16
Prevention and punishment of crimes
against internationally protected per-
sons, including diplomatic agents, con-
vention (1973): Burundi, Feb. 70; Togo,
Mar. 34; Turkey, Aug. 89
Soviet support (Haig), Feb. J, May 8, 16,
July 22
U.N. convention to outlaw the taking of
hostages (1979): Bahamas, Aug. 89;
Barbados, May 75; Bhutan, Nov. 91;
Egypt, Feb. 70, Dec. 76; El Salvador,
Apr. 47; Finland, Jan. 38; Federal
Republic of Germany, Feb. 70; Hon-
duras, Aug. 89; Iceland, Sept. 75;
Israel, Japan, Feb. 70; Lesotho,
Mauritius, Jan. 38; Netherlands, Feb.
70; New Zealand, Mar. 34; Norway,
Feb. 70, Nov. 91; Sweden, Mar. 34;
Trinidad and Tobago, June 61; Uganda,
Jan. 38; U.S., Oct. 82, Nov. 91;
Yugoslavia, Mar. 34
Textiles:
MAY26BB3
DEPOSITORY
AdminisTraTrvfflg?effleTf!,TvIaIaysiaT'
PR 4, 1/8, PR 270, 8/11
Cotton, wool, and manmade fiber textiles,
bilateral agreements: Brazil, PR 415,
12/7; China PR 323, 9/23; Colombia,
Aug. 89, PR 169, 5/29; Haiti, May 76,
PR 118, 4/22; Hong Kong, PR 26, 1/30,
PR 70, 3/20, June 61; India, PR 37, 2/6,
Apr. 48, July 59, Sept. 76, PR 129,
4/30, PR 231, 7/14; Korea, PR 117,
4/22, PR 120, 4/22, PR 353, 10/21, PR
414, 12/7; Malaysia, Apr. 48, June 61,
PR 4, 1/8, PR 35, 2/6, PR 119, 4/22, PR
270, 8/11; Mauritius, PR 395, 11/19;
Mexico, Feb. 71, PR 5, 1/8; Pakistan,
PR 230, 7/14, PR 352, 10/21, PR 416,
12/7; Poland, June 61, PR 92, 4/10;
Romania, Oct. 83, PR 269, 8/11;
Singapore, Mar. 35, Dec. 77, PR 6, 1/8,
PR 290, 8/28, PR 291, 8/28; Sri Lanka,
July 59, Sept. 76, PR 130, 4/30, PR
253, 7/27; Thailand, May 76, Aug. 90,
Nov. 92, PR 36, 2/6, PR 168, 5/29, PR
301, 9/14, PR 411, 412, 12/4;
Yugoslavia, PR 24, 1/28
International trade arrangement (1973),
Czechoslovakia, Nov. 91
Protocol extending: Czechoslovakia,
Egypt, Nov. 91
Men and boys wool and manmade fiber
suits, bilateral agreement with
Yugoslavia, Feb. 71
Visa system, bilateral agreements: China,
PR 410, 12/4; Macau, PR 289, 8/28;
Singapore, PR 3, 1/7
Wool and manmade fiber textiles, bilateral
agreement with Romania, Feb. 71
Thailand: ANZUS, Aug. 46; Buckley, Sept.
62
Textile agreement with U.S., amendment,
May 76, Aug. 90, Nov. 92, PR 36, 2/6,
PR 168, 5/29, PR 301, 9/14, PR 411,
412, 12/4
Treaties, agreements, etc., Feb. 70, Apr.
4, May 74, 76, Aug. 90, Sept. 74, Nov.
91, 92
U.S. Ambassador (Dean), swearing in,
PR 330, 10/5
U.S. economic and security assistance:
Armacost, May 27; Haig, Apr. B;
Holdridge, Oct. 36
U.S. relations: Haig, Aug. 40; Siddhi,
Aug. 43
U.S. -Thai Antipiracy Program, Mar. 16
U.S. visit of Prime Minister Prem
Tinsulanonda, Dec. 43
Thatcher, Margaret, Apr. 26, Aug. 13
Thoreau, Henry David (quoted), Apr. 2
Thorn, Gaston, Aug. 15
Tin:
Fifth international tin agreement, agree-
ment extending (1981), entry into force,-
Sept. 75
Sixth international tin agreement: Avery,
Nov. 38, 43; Calingaert, May 31;
Rithauddeen, Aug. 41
Todman, Terence A. (Haig), May 7
Etanwood, Victor F. W., Jan. S40
Btapp, Walter, Jan. S12
state Department:
Assistant secretaries, question of delays in
confirmation (Haig), June 29, July 20
Assistant Secretary of State for African
Affairs (Crocker), swearing in, PR 188,
6/10
Assistant Secretary of State for Con-
gressional Relations (Fairbanks),
swearing in, PR 217, 7/1
Assistant Secretary of State for East
Asian and Pacific Affairs (Holdridge),
swearing in, PR 163, 5/28
Assistant Secretary of State for Economic
and Business Affairs (Hormats), swear-
ing in, PR 190, 6/12
Assistant Secretary of State for European
Affairs (Eagleburger), swearing in, PR
175, 6/1
Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-
American Affairs (Enders), swearing
in, PR 210, 6/29
Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-
national Narcotics Matters (DiCarlo),
swearing in, PR 331, 10/5
Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans
and International Environmental and
Scientific Affairs (Malone), swearing
in, PR 174, 6/1
Bicentennial Theater, opening, PR 128,
4/30
Budget (Muskie), Feb. 25
Appropriations request, FY 1982 (Haig),
Apr. C, PR 132, 5/1
Bureau of International Organization
Affairs, reorganization (Abrams), Oct.
66
Chief of Protocol (Annenberg), swearing in,
PR 178, 6/2
Counselor (McFarlane), swearing in, PR
268,8/11
jjeputy Secretary of State (Clark),
swearing in, PR 144, 5/12
Director General of the Foreign Service
(Clark), nomination, PR 32, 2/3
Director of Bureau of Intelligence and
Research (Montgomery), appointment,
PR 350, 10/19
Director of Policy Planning (Wolfowitz),
nomination, PR 33, 2/3
Director of Politico-Military Affairs (Burt),
nomination, PR 31, 2/3
Domestic duties, Jan. S3
Executive Assistant to the Secretary of
State (Goldberg), nomination, PR 34,
2/3
Executive Assistant to the Under Sec-
retary of State for Economic Affairs
(Gorlin), appointment, PR 235, 7/15
Executive Secretary (Bremer), nomination,
PR 29, 2/2
ner hostages, awards ceremony: Haig,
Laingen, PR 93, 4/13
ory, 1781-1981 (Special), Jan. S1-S51
pector General (Brown):
Nomination, PR 30, 2/3
Swearing in, PR 220, 7/8
International communications and infor-
mation policy issues, activities and in-
tentions (Buckley), Oct. 69
nrtov 1QR1
State Department (Cont'd)
Library, dedication ceremony, PR 88, 4/9
Secretary of State (Haig), nomination,
confirmation, and swearing in, Feb. C,
F
Confirmation hearings, opening state-
ment, publication, Mar. 37
Special Adviser to the Secretary (Javits),
announcement, PR 182, 6/3
Spokesman (Fischer), swearing in, PR 83,
3/28
Trade and economic roles (Rashish),
Dec. 44
Under Secretary for Economic Affairs
(Rashish), swearing in, PR 209, 6/29
Under Secretary for Management
(Kennedy), swearing in, PR 167, 5/29
Under Secretary for Political Affairs
(Stoessel), swearing in, PR 63, 3/11
Under Secretary for Security Assistance,
Science and Technology (Buckley),
swearing in, PR 179, 6/2
Stearns, Monteagle, swearing in as Am-
bassador to Greece, PR 252, 7/27
Stettinius, Edward R., Jr., Jan. S29, S48
Stevenson, Adlai (quoted), Dec. 35
Stimson, Henry Lewis, Jan. S48
Stoessel, Walter J., Jr., Apr. 30, 38, June 33,
Sept. 42, Nov. 79, Dec. 52
Under Secretary for Political Affairs,
swearing in, PR 63, 3/11
Strategic arms limitation talks: Apr. 28;
Haig, May 16, 17, Aug. 31, 33, 42, Sept.
13, 27, Oct. 6, 13, 17; Rostow, Dec. 69
Antiballistic Missile Treaty, review of:
Haig, May 10, Dec. 23; Rostow, Aug.
64, Oct. 33
SALT II: Haig, May 16, June 24, July 22,
Nov. 49, Dec. 24; NAC, Feb. 51;
Reagan, Mar. 12
Reassessment: Haig, Feb. I, June 9, 23,
July 16; Rostow, Aug. 61, 63
Strategic arms reduction talks (START):
Haig, PR 398, 11/24, PR 404, 11/27;
Reagan, Dec. 12; Rostow, Oct. 31, 33
Street, A. A., Aug. 47
Sudan:
Treaties, agreements, etc., Apr. 46, 49,
May 74, 76, June 60, 62, July 57, Nov.
91, 92, Dec. 76
U.S. economic and military aid, proposed:
Department, Dec. 66; Haig, Dec. 64;
Walker, May 18, 19
Sugar, international agreement (1977):
Avery, Nov. 35
Current actions: Colombia, Nov. 91; Ivory
Coast, Apr. 47; Portugal (withdrawal),
Mar. 34; Zimbabwe, Jan. 38
Summers, Maddin, Jan. S40
Suriname, treaties, agreements, etc., Jan. 37,
Mar. 33, May 73, 74, Nov. 90, Dec. 76
Sutherland, Peter A., swearing in as Am-
bassador to Bahrain, PR 420, 12/9
Suzuki, Zenko, June 1, 4, Aug. 14
Swaziland, treaties, agreements, etc.,
May 74, Sept. 74, Nov. 91, 92
Sweden (Eagleburger), Aug. 69, 70
Treaties, agreements, etc., Jan. 37, 38,
39, 40, Feb. 70, Mar. 34, Apr. 47, May
73, 74, June 62, July 59, Aug. 89,
Sept. 74, Oct. 84, Nov. 91, Dec. 75, 76
Switzerland:
Treaties, agreements, etc., Jan. 38, 39,
Feb. 71, Apr. 47, May 73, 74, June 60,
62, July 57, 58, Aug. 88, Sept. 74, 75,
Oct. 84, Nov. 91
U.S. Ambassador (Whittlesey), swearing in,
PR 326, 9/30
U.S. relations (Eagleburger), Aug. 68
Syria, treaties, agreements, etc., Jan. 36,
Mar. 33, May 74, Nov. 91
Togo, treaties, agreements, etc., Mar. 34,
May 73, 74, July 57, Nov. 91, Dec. 76
Tonga, treaties, agreements, etc., Jan. 36,
May 74
Tonnage measurement of ships, international
convention (1969): France (with reserva-
tion), Feb. 70; Guinea, Hong Kong (exten-
sin to), Apr. 47
Touring and tourism:
Customs facilities for touring, convention
(1954), succession, Solomon Islands,
Nov. 90
World Tourism Organization (WTO),
Statutes (1972), El Salvador
(withdrawal), May 75
Trade:
Bovine meat arrangement (1979): Austria,
Romania, Jan. 38; Tunisia, Apr. 47;
Uruguay, Yugoslavia, Jan. 38
Cancun summit: Dec. 7, 8; Haig, Aug. 2,
Sept. 19, Oct. 6; Hinton, June 38;
Hormats, July 24; Johnston, Feb. 44;
Muskie, Jan. 5
Civil aircraft, trade in, agreement (1979):
Kopp, June 40
Current actions: Austria, Jan. 38;
Belgium, Greece, Sept. 75; Japan,
Jan. 38; Netherlands, Sept. 75;
Romania, Jan. 38
Conference on international trade,
announcement, PR 322, 9/23
Contracts for the international sale of
goods, U.N. convention (1980):
Austria, Chile, China, Czechoslovakia,
Denmark, Finland, France, German
Democratic Republic, Germany,
Federal Republic, Ghana, Hungary,
Italy, Lesotho, Netherlands, Norway,
Poland, Singapore, Sweden, U.S.,
Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Dec. 76
Dairy arrangement, international (1979):
Austria, Jan. 38; Romania, Feb. 70;
Uruguay, Jan. 38
General agreement on tariffs and trade
(Hormats), Nov. 31, 32, Dec. 48
Article VI, implementation (1979):
Austria, Brazil, Canada,
Czechoslovakia, EEC, Finland,
Hungary, India, Japan, Norway, Jan.
38; Pakistan, Poland, Sept. 75;
Romania, Jan. 38; Spain, Jan. 38,
Sept. 75; Sweden, Switzerland, U.K.,
U.S., Yugoslavia, Jan. 38
Article VI, XVI, XXIII, interpretation
and application (1979): Australia,
Dec. 76; Austria, Brazil, Canada,
Jan. 38; Chile, Jan. 38, Sept. 75;
EEC, Finland, India, Japan,
25
Trade (Cont'd)
General agreement on tariffs and trade
(Cont'd)
Article VI, XVI, XXIII
(Cont'd)
Republic of Korea, Jan. 38; New
Zealand (with reservation), Dec. 75;
Norway, Pakistan, Sweden,
Switzerland, U.K., U.S., Uruguay,
Yugoslavia, Jan. 38
Article VII, implementation (1979):
Argentina, Mar. 34; Austria, Jan.
38, Sept. 75; Japan, Jan. 38; Korea,
Sept. 75; Norway, Jan. 38, Mar. 34;
Romania, Jan. 38; Spain, Jan. 38,
Sept. 75; Sweden, Jan. 38, Mar. 34;
Switzerland, U.K., Jan. 38; U.S.,
Jan. 38, Mar. 34; Yugoslavia, Mar.
34
Protocol (1979): Argentina, Mar. 34;
Austria, Jan. 38, Sept. 75; Canada,
Sept. 75; EEC, Jan. 38; Finland,
Jan. 38, Mar. 34; Hungary, India,
Japan, Jan. 38; Korea, Sept. 75;
Norway, Jan. 38, Mar. 34; Romania,
Jan. 38; Spain, Jan. 38, Sept. 75;
Sweden, Jan. 38, Mar. 34;
Switzerland, Jan. 38, Sept. 75;
U.K., Jan. 38; U.S., Jan. 38, Mar.
34; Yugoslavia, Mar. 34
Article XII, bilateral agreement relating
to, Finland, Oct. 83
Geneva protocol (1979): Belgium,
Sept. 75; Canada, Dec. 76; Federal
Republic of Germany, Mar. 34;
Poland, Spain, Yugoslavia, Sept. 75
Protocol supplementary to (1979):
Canada, Israel, Ivory Coast, Dec.
76
Ministerial meeting, 1982: Rashish,
Dec. 45; Reagan, Dec. 16
Multilateral trade negotiations, U.S. bi-
lateral agreements and arrange-
ments. See under Trade: U.S.
Protocol for the accession of Colombia
(1979), ratification, Colombia, Dec.
76
Record of conclusions reached, bilateral
agreement with Australia, Oct. 82
U.S. schedule XX, bilateral agreement
re certain chemicals in, staging of a
chemical concession in, and modifica-
tion of schedule, pursuant to article
XXVIII, European Communities,
Oct. 83
Government procurement, agreement
(1979): Austria, Dec. 76; Canada,
EEC, Sept. 75; Finland, Japan, Nor-
way, Feb. 70; Singapore, Sweden,
Switzerland, Sept. 75; U.S., Mar. 34
Import licensing procedures, agreement
(1979): Argentina, Australia, Austria,
Canada, Jan. 39; Chile, Jan. 39, Sept.
75; Czechoslovakia, Sept. 75; EEC,
Finland, Hungary, India, Japan, New
Zealand, Norway, Jan. 39; Pakistan,
Philippines, Sept. 75; Romania, South
Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, U.K.,
U.S., Yugoslavia, Jan. 39
Ottawa summit: Aug. 9; Reagan, Dec. 15;
Trudeau, Aug. 10
Trade (Cont'd)
Technical barriers to trade, agreement
(1980): Austria, Jan. 38; Belgium,
Chile, Greece, Sept. 75; Hungary, Jan.
38; Netherlands, Sept. 75; Pakistan,
Philippines, Sept. 75; Romania, Mar.
34; Singapore, Jan. 38; Spain, Jan. 38,
Sept. 75; Tunisia, Sept. 75; Yugoslavia,
Jan. 38, Sept. 75
Trade in civil aircraft, agreement (1979),
reservation withdrawn, Canada, Dec.
76
U.S. (Reagan), Dec. 15
Africa, U.S. trade and investment con-
ference, announcement of speaker
(Brock), PR 127, 5/1
Airbuses (Kopp), June 39
ASEAN: Haig, Aug. 40; Holdridge,
Oct. 36
Balance of trade, chart, Sept. B
Bilateral agreements and arrangements
made in context of GATT
multilateral trade negotiations: Jan.
12; Australia, Austria, Oct. 82;
Canada, Cartagena Commission, Oct.
83; Colombia, Dec. 77; Dominican
Republic, European Communities,
Finland, Hungary, Iceland, India,
Japan, Oct. 83; New Zealand, Nov.
92; Norway, Pakistan, Oct. 83;
Poland, Portugal, Romania, Sweden,
Switzerland, Oct. 84
Brazil, salted cattle hides and manu-
factured leather products, Mar. 34,
May 75
China (Rashish), Oct. 42, Nov. 21, 22
Developing countries: Haig, Sept. 20;
Hormats, July 26; Johnston, Feb. 44;
McPherson, Dec. 57; Rashish, Oct.
42, Dec. 45; Reagan, Dec. 4
Grain trade, bilateral agreements:
China: Jan. 39; White House, Jan. 13
Soviet Union, Oct. 84
Japan: Holdridge, Dec. 40; Rashish,
Dec. 46
Mexico: Sept. N; Briggs, July 4; Hormats,
Nov. 31; Rashish, Nov. 24
New Zealand meat exports, controls:
Haig, Aug. 48, 50; Talboys, Aug. 50
Tariff reductions, accelerations, bilateral
agreement with Japan, Dec. 77
Trade and Development Program
(McPherson), Dec. 57
U.S. policy: Clark, Sept. 36; Haig,
Sept. 19, Oct. 4; Hormats, July 25,
Dec. 47; Rashish, Oct. 40, 42, 47,
Nov. 21, Dec. 44
Western Hemisphere, Sept. N
U.S. role in world trade and investment:
Atlas, Sept. A; Clark, Sept. 36
World merchandise exports, Sept. C
Transportation:
Cooperation, bilateral agreement with Fin-
land, Oct. 83
International carriage of perishable food-
stuffs (1970): German Democratic
Republic, June 61; Morocco, May 75,
July 58
Road traffic, convention (1949), accession,
Papua New Guinea, Apr. 46
Trask, David F., Jan. SI, S41, Mar. 23
Treaties, agreements, etc.:
Current actions, Jan. 36, Feb. 70, Mar. 33,
Apr. 46, May 73, June 60, July 57,
Aug. 88, Sept. 74, Oct. 81, Nov. 90,
Dec. 75
Vienna convention on law of treaties
(1969): Chile, June 61; Japan, Sept. 75
Treptow, Martin (quoted), Feb. C
Trinidad and Tobago, treaties, agreements,
etc., Jan. 37, Mar. 33, May 74, June 61,
July 58, Aug. 89, Nov. 91
Trist, Nicholas, Jan. S13
Trudeau, Pierre Elliott, Apr. 1, 6, Aug. 10
U.S. visit, program, PR 222, 7/9
Truman, Harry S., Jan. S31, S32, Sept. 4
Tunisia: Crocker, Oct. 28; Draper, June 47
Treaties, agreements, etc., Jan. 37,
Apr. 47, May 74, June 61, July 58,
Aug. 88, Sept. 74, 75, Nov. 91, Dec.
76, 78
Turkey:
Ataturk Centennial Year (White House),
June 42
Economic problems: Apr. 28; Ewing,
May 39
Nonproliferation reaffirmation (Haig),
Aug. 53
Treaties, agreements, etc., Feb. 71,
Mar. 33, 35, May 74, 76, June 62, Aug.
88, 89, 90, Sept. 74, Nov. 90, 91, 92,
Dec. 76
U.S. economic and security assistance,
proposed: Ewing, May 39; Haig, Apr.
B, PR 68, 3/18; Reagan, Apr. 13
U.S. military assistance, bilatera' agree-
ment, Aug. 90
U.S. relations: Eagleburger, Aug. 72; Haig,
Oct. 14
U.S. visit of Foreign Minister Turkman
(White House), June 42
Turks and Caicos Islands, Peace Corps
program, bilateral agreement, Mar. 35
Turner, James Milton, Jan. S38
Tuvalu, treaties, agreements, etc., July 58
Twinam, Joseph W., May 49, Nov. 63
u
Uganda, treaties, agreements, etc., Jan. 38,
Mar. 34, Nov. 91
Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, treaties,
agreements, etc., May 74, 75, July 58,
Nov. 91
United Arab Emirates, treaties, agreements,
etc., Mar. 33, May 74, Aug. 88, Nov. 91
United Kingdom:
Employment of dependents of official
government employees, arrangements
with U.S., June 62
Gold exchange agreement with U.S.,
Apr. 49
Northern Ireland: Bush, Aug. 26; Haig,
Apr. 17, July 20; Reagan, May 29
Royal Air Force detachment, Hickam Air
Force Base, bilateral agreement re
support, Aug. 90
Shared use of U.K.- and U.S. -controlled
facilities in the U.K., bilateral agree-
ment, Dec. 78
26
Department of State Bulletin
United Kingdom (Cont'd)
Treaties, agreements, etc., Jan. 37, 38, 39
Feb. 71, Mar. 33, Apr. 47, May 73, 74,
June 60, 62, July 57, 58, Aug. 89, 90
Sept. 76, Oct. 81, 82, Nov. 90, 91, 92
Dec. 78
U.S. Ambassador (Louis), swearing in PR
171, 5/29
U.S. relations: Eagleburger, Aug. 69; Haig,
Apr. 17; Reagan, Apr. 26, 27;
Thatcher, Apr. 27
U.S. visit of Prime Minister Thatcher:
Reagan, Apr. 26, 27; Thatcher, Apr.
27
Program, PR 50, 2/20
Visit of Secretary Haig: Haig, June 21;
statement after meeting with British
Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington,
PR 109, 4/24
Visit of Vice President Bush, Aug. 25
United Nations (Haig), PR 365, 11/1, PR
368, 11/2
Headquarters, bilateral agreement with
U.S. re, Apr. 49, May 74, July 58
Languages, official, Oct. 9
Membership, June B, Oct. 7, 8
Belize, Dec. 76
Vanuatu, Nov. 91
Privileges and immunities, convention
(1946), accession, Federal Republic of
Germany, Jan. 39
Role as forum: Haig, Sept. 14, Oct. 5;
Rostow, Aug. 63, Dec. 68
Secretary General, selection of (Haig),
Dec. 32
Specialized agencies, list, Oct. 12
U.S. participation: Oct. 3; Carter, Feb. 62;
McCall, Feb. 60
U.S. Permanent Representative
(Kirkpatrick), swearing in, PR 166,
5/29
United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF),
appropriations request, FY 1982 (Haig),
Apr. C, PR 68, 3/18
United Nations Day, 1981, proclamation
(Reagan), Oct. 2
United Nations Development Program
(UNDP), U.S. appropriations request
(Haig), Apr. C, PR 68, 3/18
United Nations Educational, Scientific, and
Cultural Organization:
Constitution (1945): Maldives, St. Lucia,
Tonga, Zimbabwe, Jan. 36
Educational and cultural materials, impor-
tation of, agreement and protocol
(1950), succession, Solomon Islands,
Nov. 91
Protocol (1976): Egypt, Dec. 76; U.S.,
Nov. 91
International Program for the Develop-
ment of Communications (Abrams),
Oct. 67
Intergovernmental Council of, U.S. dele-
gation, PR 189, 6/11
New world information order, U.S.
opposition: Abrams, Oct. 66; Buckley,
Oct. 68
United Nations High Commission for Refu-
gees: Muskie, Jan. 6; Smyser, June 49
Cuban refugees, assistance, bilateral
agreement, Apr. 49
Deputy Commissioner (Smyser), appoint-
ment, PR 226, 7/10
United Nations Industrial Development
Organization, Constitution (1979):
Afghanistan, Dec. 76; Argentina. Austria,
July 58; Bangladesh, Jan. 39, Bolivia,
Mar. 34; Brazil, July 58, Bulgaria, Mar.
34; Byelorussian Soviet Socialist
Republic, Feb. 70; Cameroon, Nov. 91;
Comoros, July 58; Cuba, Cyprus, May 75;
Czechoslovakia, Mar. 34; Denmark, Aug.
89; Dominican Republic, July 58; Egypt,
Mar. 34; Ethiopia, Apr. 47, May 75;
Finland, German Democratic Republic,
Aug. 89; Guatemala, July 58; Haiti,
Hungary, May 75; Indonesia, Iran, Jan.
39; Iraq, May 75; Jordan, Sept. 75;
Democratic People's Republic of Korea,
Oct. 82, Dec. 76; Korea, Kuwait, Mar. 34;
Lesotho, Sept. 75; Libya, Apr. 46; Malta,
Mauritania, May 75, Sept. 75; Mauritius,
Dec. 76; Mongolia, Nigeria, Feb. 70; Nor-
way, Apr. 47; Oman, Sept. 75; Poland,
May 75; Romania, Mar. 34; Soviet Union,
Feb. 70; Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan,
Suriname, Dec. 76; Swaziland, Thailand,
Apr. 47; Togo, Dec. 76; Tunisia, Apr. 47;
Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, July
58; Uruguay, Mar. 34; Vietnam, Aug. 89;
Zambia, July 58
Upper Volta:
Treaties, agreements, etc., May 74,
Nov. 90, 91
U.S. Ambassador (Walker), swearing in,
PR 283, 8/19
Upshur, Abel Parker, Jan. S45
Urban growth, charts, July K, L
Uruguay (Johnston), Oct. 50
Treaties, agreements, etc., Jan. 38,
Feb. 70, Mar. 33, 34, May 74, June 60,
July 59, Aug. 89, Sept. 75, Oct. 84,
Nov. 91, Dec. 75, 76
U.S. Ambassador (Aranda), swearing in,
PR 436, 12/30
van Agt, Andreas A. M., June 41
Van Buren, Martin, Jan. S44
Vance, Cyrus R., Jan. S36, S39, S41, S49
Vandenberg, Arthur H., Jan. S31
Van Dyne, Frederick, Jan. S37
Van Hollen, Eliza, Mar. 18, Oct. 63
Vann, John Paul, Jan. S40
Vanocur, Sander, Oct. 15, Nov. 17
Vanuatu (Armacost), May 29
Treaties, agreements, etc., Nov. 90, 91,
Dec. 75
Vatican City State, treaties, agreements,
etc., May 74, July 58, Aug. 89, Nov. 91
Veliotes, Nicholas A., Sept. 50
Venezuela:
Treaties, agreements, etc., Feb. 71,
Mar. 33, 35, May 74, 76, July 58, 59,
Oct. 81, Nov. 91, Dec. 76
U.S. visit of President Herrera Campins,
program, PR 378, 11/16
Victoria, Queen of England (quoted), Jan. S6
Vietnam:
Hegemony (Stoessel), June 35
Intervention {see also Kampuchea): Haig,
Aug. 40, 45; Holdridge, Oct. 35
MIA's (Holdridge), Oct. 37, Dec. 42
Vietnam (Cont'd)
Orderly departure program; I li
Feb. 43; Holdridge, Dec. 12
Soviet influence and support: Haig,
Aug :',7. Id. .12, 17, So; Holdridge,
Dec. 42
Treaties, agreements, etc., Jan. 36, 38,
Apr. 46, May 47, Aug. 88, 89
U.S. relations, question of: Haig, Aug. 40,
86; Holdridge, Oct. 37, Dec. 42
I f.S. trade controls (Rashish), Nov. 23
Viosca, James, Jan. S39
Viosca, James, Jr., Jan. S39
Visas:
Reciprocal issuance to crew members of
aircraft and vessels, bilateral agree-
ment with China, Apr. 48
Selective nonimmigrant visa waiver, pro-
posed (Haig), May 26
Voltaire (quoted), Nov. 47
w
Walcott, John, Dec. 24
Walker, Julius, swearing in as Ambassador to
Upper Volta, PR 283, 8/19
Walker, Lannon, May 18
Walker, Richard L., swearing in as Am-
bassador to Korea, PR 250, 7/24
Wallace, Henry A., Jan. S29
Wallace, John, May 9
Waring, Robert O., Jan. S40
Warren, Joseph (quoted), Feb. B
Warsaw Pact (NAC), July 40
Atlas, June H
Washburne, Elihu B., Jan. S15, S16, S46
Washington, George, Jan. S8
Webster, Daniel, Jan. S12 (quoted), S44, S45
Weinberger, Caspar W.: July 46, Oct. 57,
Dec. 55; Haig, June 9, July 38, Oct. 17,
20
Welles, Sumner, Jan. S29
Western Sahara. See under Africa
Wharton, Clifford R., Jan. S38
Wheat:
Food aid convention (1971), protocol
modifying and extending (1979):
Argentina, Netherlands, U.S., Feb. 70
Food aid convention (1980): Finland,
Mar. 34; Federal Republic of Germany,
May 75; Japan, Feb. 70; Spain, Apr.
48; U.K., Aug. 89; U.S., Jan. 39, Feb.
70
Protocol for the first extension (1981):
Argentina, Australia, July 58, Aug.
89; Austria, Belgium, July 58;
Canada, Aug. 89; Denmark, July 58,
Aug. 89; EEC, Finland, July 58;
France, July 58, Aug. 58; Federal
Republic of Germany, July 58, Oct.
82; Greece, Ireland, Italy, July 58;
Japan, July 58, Aug. 89 (with reser-
vation); Luxembourg, July 58, Oct.
82; Netherlands, July 58; Norway,
May 75, Aug. 89; Spain, July 58;
Sweden, June 61, Aug. 89;
Switzerland (with reservation), July
58; U.K., July 58; U.S., July 58,
Aug. 89 (with reservation)
Index 1981
27
Wheat (Cont'd)
Wheat aid convention (1971):
Protocol modifying and extending (1978),
Morocco, Apr. 47
Protocol modifying and extending (1979):
Argentina, Feb. 70; Brazil, Mar. 34;
Morocco, Apr. 48; Netherlands, Feb.
70; U.S., Jan. 39, Feb. 70
Protocol for the sixth extension (1981):
Algeria, Argentina, Australia, July
58, Aug. 89; Austria, July 58; Bar-
bados, Sept. 75; Belgium, July 58;
Bolivia, Aug. 89; Brazil, June 61,
Aug. 89; Canada, Aug. 89; Cuba,
Denmark, July 58, Aug. 89; EEC,
July 58; Egypt, June 61, Aug. 89,
Nov. 91; El Salvador, Sept. 75, Oct.
82; Finland, July 58; France, July
58, Aug. 89; Federal Republic of
Germany, July 58, Oct. 82; Greece,
July 58; Guatemala, July 58, Aug.
89; India, Aug. 89; Iraq, July 58,
Nov. 91; Ireland, Italy, July 58;
Japan, July 58, Aug. 89; Kenya, July
58, Sept. 75; Korea, July 58, Aug.
89; Luxembourg, July 58; Malta,
Sept. 75; Mauritius, July 58, Aug.
89; Morocco, Sept. 75; Netherlands,
July 58; Nigeria, Dec. 76; Norway,
May 75, Aug. 89; Pakistan, Panama,
Aug. 89; Peru, July 58, Aug. 89,
Oct. 82; Portugal, July 58; Saudi
Arabia, South Africa, Soviet Union,
July 58, Aug. 89; Spain, July 58;
Sweden, June 61, Aug. 89; Switzer-
land, July 58; Trinidad and Tobago,
July 58, Aug. 89; Tunisia, June 61,
July 58, Dec. 76; U.K., U.N., July
58; U.S., July 58, Aug. 89 (with
reservation); Vatican, July 58, Aug.
89; Venezuela, July 58
Wheaton, Henry, Jan. S13
White, Henry, Jan. S16
Whittlesey, Faith Ryan, swearing in as Am-
bassador to Switzerland, PR 326, 9/30
Willis, Francis E., Jan. S38
Wilson, Francis M. Huntington, Jan. S21
Wilson, Woodrow, Jan. S23, S25, S27, Sept.
1,2
Wolfowitz, Paul D., nomination as Director of
Policy Planning, PR 33, 2/3
Women:
Discrimination, elimination of, convention
(1979):
Current actions: Barbados, Jan. 39;
Bhutan, Nov. 91; Brazil, June 61;
Byelorussian Soviet Socialist
Republic (with reservation), Dec. 76;
Cape Verde, Feb. 70; China, Jan. 39;
Egypt, Dec. 76; El Salvador, Jan.
39, Nov. 91; Ethiopia, Dec. 76;
Guatemala, Aug. 89; Haiti, Oct. 82;
Hungary, Feb. 70; Jordan, Mar. 34;
Kampuchea, Jan. 39; Laos, Nov. 91;
Mexico, June 61; Mongolia, Oct. 82;
Norway, Aug. 89; Peru, Philippines,
Oct. 82; Rwanda, May 75; St. Vin-
cent and the Grenadines, Oct. 82;
Soviet Union, May 75; Ukrainian
Soviet Socialist Republic, May 75;
U.K., Oct. 82; Uruguay, July 59,
Dec. 76
U.S. ratification urged (Carter), Feb. 53
Political rights, convention (1953): Egypt,
Nov. 91; Mexico, June 61; Nigeria,
Jan. 39; Solomon Islands, Nov. 91
Political rights, Inter-American convention
(1948), accession, Mexico, June 61
35th General Assembly, June 56
Woodruff, Arthur H., swearing in as Ambas-
sador to Central African Republic, PR
165, 5/29
World Intellectual Property Organization,
cooperation in promotion of industrial
property protection, bilateral agreement,
Jan. 40
World peace: Reagan, Aug. 24, Dec. 10;
Rostow, Oct. 31
World problems: Department, Nov. 52; Haig,
Feb. C
Global 2000 Report (McCall), Feb. 62
Wriston, Henry M., Jan. S35, S37
Wriston, Walter, presentation of awards to
airline hijackings task force participants,
PR 164, 5/28
Yemen (Aden): Haig, Oct. 13
Treaties, agreements, etc., Mar. 34, May
74, July 57, Nov. 91
Yemen Arab Republic:
Treaties, agreements, etc., May 74, Nov.
90
U.S. economic and security assistance, FY
1982: May 50; Constable, June 46
Yugoslavia:
Textile agreement with U.S., Feb. 71, PR
24, 1/28 (extension of agreement)
Treaties, agreements, etc., Jan. 38, 39, 40,
Feb. 70, Mar. 34, Apr. 47, May 74, Ju-
ly 57, 59, Sept. 75, Oct. 81, Nov. 91,
Dec. 76
U.S. relations: Eagleburger, Aug. 73, 77;
Haig, PR 306, 9/15
U.S. trade policy (Rashish), Nov. 21
Visit of Secretary Haig, Nov. 44
Zaire:
Treaties, agreements, etc., Feb. 71, May
73, 74, June 62, July 57, 59, Aug. 90,
Nov. 91
U.S. military assistance, proposed
(Walker), May 20
Zambia:
Treaties, agreements, etc., Apr. 46, May
73, 74, July 58, Oct. 84, Nov. 91
U.S. economic aid, proposed (Walker),
May 19
Zhao Wenjin, retirement, PR 295, 9/8
Zimbabwe: June 55; Moose, Jan. 8, 10;
Muskie, Jan. 1, 2; Reagan, June 31, Oct.
29
Treaties, agreements, etc., Jan. 36, 38, 40,
Mar. 33, Apr. 46, May 74, 75, June 60,
Sept. 74, Nov. 90
U.S. economic aid, proposed; Haig, July 19;
Walker, May 18
28
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